Quotes of the Day:
"Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."
- Winston Churchill
"Not necessity, not desire - no, the love of power is the demon of men. Let them have everything - health, food, a place to live, entertainment - they are and remain unhappy and low-spirited: for the demon waits and waits and will be satisfied."
- Friedrich Nietzsche
“RW=G+P,” or “Revolutionary equals Guerrilla Warfare plus Political Action.”
- Bernard Fall
1. RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 5 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. UKRAINE INVASION UPDATE 25
3. U.S. provided intelligence that helped Ukraine sink Russian warship
4. Army Creating Second Paratrooper Division as Service Forges New Identity for Arctic Troops
5. Andy Levin’s ‘Two-State Bill’ Won’t Support Middle East Peace
6. Defenders inside Ukrainian steel mill refuse to surrender
7. How millions of Russians are tearing holes in the Digital Iron Curtain
8. Ukraine Brutally Trolls Putin With App Tracking Russian Deaths
9. Why the Philippine election could be a win for China
10. Can the Intelligence Community Tell What’s Brewing in Afghanistan?
11. A View From the Trenches on the Debate Wracking the Marine Corps
12. Russia Just Lost Its Most Advanced Operational Tank In Ukraine
13. An Airfield Too Far: Failures at Market Garden and Antonov Airfield
14. Pentagon in damage control mode over report that US intel was used to kill Russian generals
15. NCOs: America Has Them, China Wants Them, Russia is Struggling Without Them
16. China Likely to Use ‘Nuclear Coercion’ in Bid to Take Taiwan by 2027, STRATCOM Chief Says
17. How to Save the Postwar Order
18. The Trouble With “the Free World”
19. Why the battle for Mariupol is important for Vladimir Putin.
20. U.S. offers assurances to Sweden, Finland over NATO application
21. NSA cyber boss seeks to discourage vigilante hacking against Russia
22. For first time, France talks openly about sending weapons to Ukraine
.
1. RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 5 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 5
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 5
Kateryna Stepanenko, Mason Clark, and George Barros
May 5, 7:00 pm ET
The Ukrainian counteroffensive out of Kharkiv city may disrupt Russian forces northeast of Kharkiv and will likely force Russian forces to decide whether to reinforce positions near Kharkiv or risk losing most or all of their positions within artillery range of the city. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zalyzhnyi stated on May 5 that Ukrainian forces are transitioning to counteroffensive operations around Kharkiv and Izyum, the first direct Ukrainian military statement of a shift to offensive operations. Ukrainian forces did not make any confirmed advances in the last 24 hours but repelled Russian attempts to regain lost positions. Russian forces made few advances in continued attacks in eastern Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces may be able to build their ongoing counterattacks and successful repulse of Russian attacks along the Izyum axis into a wider counteroffensive to retake Russian-occupied territory in Kharkiv Oblast.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces continued ineffectual offensive operations in southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts without securing any significant territorial gains in the past 24 hours.
- Ukrainian officials and military officers confirmed that Russian forces have breached the Azovstal facility itself and confirmed that Ukrainian forces are losing ground. Russian forces will likely capture the facility in the coming days.
- Ukrainian offensive operations around Kharkiv likely intend to push Russian forces out of artillery range of Kharkiv city, force Russian units to redeploy from the Izyum axis, and potentially threaten Russian lines of communication.
- Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations toward Zaporizhia City but did not conduct any attacks in Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts in the last 24 hours. Ukrainian forces claimed to recapture additional territory west of Kherson, but ISW cannot independently confirm any advances.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated the structure of its discussion of the primary efforts Russian forces are currently engaging in. The main Russian effort is concentrated in eastern Ukraine and includes one subordinate main effort and four supporting efforts. The subordinate main effort is the encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron formed between the Izyum-Slovyansk highway and the Kreminna-Rubizhne-Popasna frontline in Luhansk. The four supporting efforts are: completing the seizure of Mariupol, retaining pressure on Kharkiv City, holding occupied territory on the Southern Axis, and threatening northeastern Ukraine from Russian and Belarusian territory.
ISW has updated its assessment of the five primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:
- Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and four supporting efforts);
- Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
- Supporting effort 1—Mariupol;
- Supporting effort 2—Kharkiv City;
- Supporting effort 3—Southern axis;
- Supporting effort 4—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued ineffectual offensive operations in southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk Oblasts without securing any significant territorial gains in the past 24 hours. The Pentagon assessed that Russian forces have not been able to make further advances due to their inability to conduct offensive operations far from their ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along highways, as ISW previously assessed, and muddy terrain.[1] Russian GLOCs supporting the Izyum axis likely run from the Russian border to Kupyansk and Vovchansk, and local Kharkiv civilian authorities reported additional Russian reinforcements moving through these settlements towards the front line as of May 5.[2] Russian forces are reportedly suffering losses in stalled attacks along the Izyum axis, with the Ukrainian General Staff reporting that elements of the 4th Tank Division and the 106th Airborne Division withdrew to Russia after sustaining heavy losses in the past several days.[3]
Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks in Lyman, Severodonetsk, and Popasna, and maintained shelling along the line of contact in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.[4] Russian forces also used thermobaric munitions against Ukrainian positions in Lyman and are unsuccessfully attempting to leverage massed artillery fire to break through Ukrainian defenses.[5] Russian forces targeted grain facilities in Rubizhne and Soledar, a settlement located approximately 30 kilometers from Popasna, likely to deprive Ukrainian forces and civilians of supplies.[6] The Donetsk People’s Republic claimed to have seized Troitske (a village approximately 25 kilometers from occupied Horlivka) on May 5, but social media imagery confirmed that Ukrainian artillery inflicted heavy damage on Russian munitions depots, tanks, and armored personnel carriers in the area.[7]
Supporting Effort #1—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
Russian forces continued assaults on the Azovstal Steel Plant with supporting airstrikes and naval artillery on May 5.[8] Ukrainian officials and military officers confirmed that Russian forces have breached the Azovstal facility itself and that Ukrainian forces are losing ground.[9] Azov Regiment Deputy Commander Svyatoslav Palamar released a video on Telegram reporting the current Russian assault began on May 3 and confirmed that Russian forces are inside the facility.[10] Palamar said the remaining defenders and civilians were unable to evacuate on May 5, despite reports from the Ukrainian government that Russian and Ukrainian forces agreed to a ceasefire in Mariupol between May 5 and May 7.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that 344 Mariupol residents, including over 150 evacuees from Azovstal, evacuated on May 4.[12] Russian forces will likely completely capture the Azovstal facility in the coming days, but Ukrainian forces have successfully tied down and degraded large numbers of Russian forces in Mariupol for several months.
Supporting Effort #2—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Continue to pressure Kharkiv City to fix Ukrainian defenders there and prevent their movement to reinforce defenders on other axes.)
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zalyzhnyi stated on May 5 that Ukrainian forces are transitioning to counteroffensive operations around Kharkiv and Izyum, the first direct Ukrainian military statement of a shift to offensive operations.[13] Ukrainian forces likely intend to push Russian forces out of artillery range of Kharkiv city, force Russian units to redeploy from the Izyum axis, and potentially threaten Russian lines of communication. Ukrainian forces did not make any confirmed advances in the last 24 hours but repelled Russian attempts to regain lost positions. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful assault on Stary Saltiv (approximately 40 kilometers east of Kharkiv City) on May 5, after Ukrainian forces liberated the settlement on May 2.[14] Russian forces also reconnoitered Ukrainian positions and continued to shell Ukrainian positions in the northeastern outskirts of Kharkiv City.[15] Pro-Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces blew up a bridge near the occupied settlement of Cherkaski Tishki, approximately 25 kilometers northeast of Kharkiv City, which could indicate an ongoing Ukrainian counterattack in the area targeting the bridge to interdict Russian movements.[16]
Supporting Effort #3—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces continued offensive operations toward Zaporizhia City but did not conduct any attacks in Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts on May 5.[17] Ukraine’s Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian forces attacked Hulyaipole, near the Donetsk Oblast border, throughout the day.[18] The Administration additionally stated up to 13 battalion tactical groups are concentrated on this line of advance toward Zaporizhia City or the Donetsk Oblast administrative borders from the west, though these battalion tactical groups (BTGs) are almost certainly understrength.[19] Zaporizhia authorities noted that Russian forces operating in the region are more cautious than during the initial stage of the war and are increasing their use of reconnaissance assets.[20]
Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in Kherson or Mykolaiv oblasts.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces liberated unspecified villages along the border between Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts on May 5, but ISW cannot independently these claims.[22] Ukraine’s Operational Command South reported that Ukrainian forces successfully pushed Russian forces around 20 kilometers away from Mykolaiv City, possibly indicating that these liberated villages are in northwestern Kherson Oblast, though we have previously assessed that Ukrainian forces have taken most territory within this 20km arc and have not updated our maps with this Ukrainian claim.[23] Russian authorities in occupied Crimea claimed on May 5 that Russian forces restored railway connections between Crimea and Kherson Oblast for cargo and passenger trains, likely to improve logistics on the southern front.[24]
Transnistrian media reported unspecified indiscriminate shooting near the Kuchurhan-Pervomaisc border checkpoint with Ukraine on May 5, two days after Ukraine blocked the crossing.[25] Transnistrian media claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting military exercises in Pavlivka, a village on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border. Transnistrian Foreign Minister Vitaliy Ignatiev also claimed that Transnistrian forces neutralized another Ukrainian drone on May 5.[26] ISW cannot independently verify any of these Transnistrian claims. Ukraine’s Operational Command South reported that the Transnistrian border is stable and that Ukrainian forces are taking counter-sabotage measures.[27] Russian forces and their Transnistrian proxy will likely continue to stage provocations to threaten Ukrainian forces with the possibility of a military operation out of Transnistria to fix Ukrainian forces in Odesa in place.
Supporting Effort #4—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that some unidentified Belarusian units increased their combat readiness amid ongoing snap exercises on May 5.[28] Belarusian social media users spotted Belarusian forces deploying military equipment in the direction of Pinsk, a settlement near western Ukraine and on the way to Brest.[29] Belarusian forces remain highly unlikely to enter the war in Ukraine and likely aim to pin Ukrainian forces in place by threatening further action.
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces will likely continue to merge offensive efforts southward of Izyum with westward advances from Donetsk in order to encircle Ukrainian troops in southern Kharkiv Oblast and Western Donetsk.
- Russia may change the status of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, possibly by merging them into a single “Donbas Republic” and/or by annexing them directly to Russia.
- Russian forces have apparently decided to seize the Azovstal plant through ground assault and will likely continue operations accordingly.
- Ukrainian counteroffensives around Kharkiv City may unhinge Russian positions northeast of the city, possibly forcing the Russians to choose between reinforcing those positions or abandoning them if the Ukrainians continue to press their counterattack.
- Russian forces may be preparing to conduct renewed offensive operations to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days.
[2] https://t dot me/synegubov/3098
[9] ttps://hromadske dot ua/posts/rosiyani-prorvalis-na-teritoriyu-azovstali-u-mariupoli-tretij-den-trivaye-aktivnij-shturm-azov
[11] https://www dot rbc.ua/ukr/news/novaya-evakuatsiya-azovstali-ukraina-rf-dogovorilis-1651693316.html
[12] https://t dot me/V_Zelenskiy_official/1500
[20] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/na-zaporizhzhi-rosijski-okupanti-zminyuyut-taktiku-stali-oberezhnishimi-ova
2. UKRAINE INVASION UPDATE 25
UKRAINE INVASION UPDATE 25
Institute for the Study of War, Russia Team
with AEI’s Critical Threats Project
May 5, 2022
The Ukraine Invasion Update is a weekly synthetic product covering key political and rhetorical events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. This update covers events from April 22 to May 4. All of the ISW Russia’s team’s coverage of the war in Ukraine—including daily military assessments and maps, past Conflict Updates, and several supplemental assessments—are available on our Ukraine Crisis Coverage landing page.
Key Takeaways April 22-May 4
- The Kremlin is establishing economic, governmental, and informational control over occupied Ukrainian territory, indicating that Russia may be preparing to create a series of Russian proxy “people’s republics” and/or to directly annex some occupied Ukrainian territory.
- The Kremlin continues to falsely claim that Ukraine is stalling negotiations that the Kremlin is also not seriously pursuing.
- Ukraine may suspend negotiations entirely in the coming weeks in response to Russian-sponsored “independence referendums” in occupied Ukrainian territory.
- Russian forces are likely considering the use of chemical weapons to achieve battlefield advantages in the battle for Donbas.
- Russian false-flag attacks in Transnistria and missile attacks in Odesa likely do not indicate an imminent Russian escalation in Transnistria or Moldova. The Kremlin likely intends to pin Ukrainian forces in the south to prevent them from reinforcing eastern Ukraine.
- The Kremlin is likely attempting to consolidate control over and surveillance of Russian government officials.
- The Kremlin continues to project economic confidence to its domestic audience despite a Russian Central Bank report that Russia’s economy will constrict by 8-10% in 2022
- The Kremlin made an example out of Poland and Bulgaria by cutting off natural gas shipments in an attempt to coerce Germany, Italy, and other EU consumers of Russian natural gas to pay for their Russian gas imports in rubles, thereby propping up Russia’s sanctions-battered economy.
- NATO and EU countries continued supplying Ukraine with military assistance, including high-end capabilities to counter Russian aggression, as Sweden and Finland consider NATO membership.
- The Kremlin’s antisemitism may drive Israel away from its current neutral position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Key Events April 22-May 4
Russian Occupation:
The Kremlin is establishing economic, governmental, and informational control over occupied Ukrainian territory, indicating that Russia may be preparing to create a series of Russian proxy “people’s republics” and/or to directly annex some occupied Ukrainian territory. Russian forces are transitioning occupied territories to use the Russian ruble. Occupying military forces do not typically replace local currencies, but Russia’s proxies in occupied Ukrainian territory, the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR), have used rubles in some capacity since 2015. Russian forces are also likely planning to falsify “independence referendums” to create new proxy republics or to annex occupied territories into the DNR, LNR, or Russia itself. To that end, Russian forces are supplanting local governance and beginning to establish greater control over Ukrainian communications and culture in occupied areas.
- Switching to Russian Currency: Russian occupying forces in Kherson implemented a four-month transition period to switch the city’s currency to Russian rubles rather than Ukrainian hryvnias as of May 1.[1] Russian sources reported that stores in Russian-occupied Melitopol and Volnovakha are beginning to transition to the Russian ruble as of May 1.[2] The Ukrainian GUR separately reported on April 24 that Russian forces are introducing ruble payments in occupied parts of Kharkiv Oblast and are encouraging residents to buy products and medicines from Russia.[3] Permanent Crimean Representative to Russia Georgy Muradov had previously claimed on April 6 that Crimea and Russian-occupied southern Ukrainian territories had “restored a single economic complex” and replaced the hryvnia with the ruble.[4]
- Falsifying Referendums: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on April 22 that Russian forces are collecting the personal data of Ukrainians in southern oblasts to help falsify planned referendums.[5] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on April 26 that Russian forces collected the personal information of residents of Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts to falsify the results of future Russian-rigged referendums.[6] Ukraine’s General Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 30 that the Kremlin is planning an independence referendum to create a new proxy republic in Kherson and, eventually, in Zaporizhia and Odesa oblasts.[7] The US Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Michael Carpenter, said on May 2 that US intelligence has “highly credible” reports that Russia will try to annex Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by mid-May and may attempt to create a similar proxy republic in Russian-occupied Kherson.[8]
- Replacing Local Governance: The Ukrainian mayor of Kherson City reported that Russian occupation forces replaced the mayor and the regional governor on April 26 with Russian proxies.[9] Russian forces have repeatedly replaced Ukrainian officials with Russian proxies after occupying Ukrainian territory.[10] Separately, the head of the Russian proxy Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), Denis Pushilin, said on April 28 that the DNR is working to distribute DNR passports to residents of the “newly liberated” territories.[11] The DNR claims to control Mariupol and other Russian-occupied cities in Donetsk Oblast and will likely adopt greater administrative control of newly captured areas.
- Controlling Communications: Russian forces in Kherson and parts of Zaporizhia likely imposed an internet blackout around May 2 and reportedly cut fiber optic cables in the area, likely to limit freedom of information.[12] Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 24 that Russian occupiers are installing Russian-operated MegaFon equipment in Kharkiv Oblast, likely to tighten control over telephone and internet networks in areas that Russian forces currently occupy or intend to occupy after planned offensive operations.[13] The Kremlin also likely intends to sever cultural ties between Russian-occupied territories and the Ukrainian state in the long term; the only school that has remained open in Mariupol was likely forced to stop teaching the Ukrainian language and will only teach Russian as of April 28.[14]
Kremlin Narratives
The Kremlin may be setting conditions for the partition of Ukraine if Russian forces can capture and hold larger parts of eastern and southern Ukraine. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Head Sergey Naryshkin began promoting a new narrative on April 28: that NATO is planning to use “peacekeepers” to invade Western Ukraine and eventually annex part of the country into Poland.[15] Naryshkin was often at the forefront of pre-invasion Kremlin propaganda narratives but has been largely sidelined since the invasion began, possibly due to Russian intelligence failures. Naryshkin’s re-emergence at the forefront of a new Kremlin information campaign indicates that the Kremlin may be shifting its rhetorical efforts to justify annexing captured Ukrainian territory by claiming that NATO intends to annex parts of Ukraine as well.
Former Ukrainian MP and longtime Russian propagandist Alexei Zhuravko claimed on May 4 that Ukraine’s Southern provinces have “always” historically gravitated toward Russia and will not return to Ukraine.[16] He claimed that Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa will also leave Ukraine, setting conditions for a possible Russian annexation of those regions, either directly into Russia or as proxy states. Russian State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin claimed on May 3 that Kherson and other regions do not want to be part of Ukraine, which he framed as fractious.[17] Volodin claimed that many western Ukrainians had accepted Hungarian and Polish citizenship. Former Ukrainian MP Ilya Kiva, who defected to Russia at the start of the invasion, claimed on May 3 that a new, pro-Western Ukraine would form with its capital in Lviv and would then hold a referendum to accede to Poland.[18] Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 4 that Ukraine must “recognize the territorial realities” in eastern Ukraine and should respect “the legitimate and conscious choice of peoples and the right of nations to self-determination.”[19] Russian media also amplified a May 4 claim by Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary (NSDC) Oleksiy Danilov that Hungary believed it could annex part of Ukraine during the conflict.[20] State media linked Danilov’s claims to Naryshkin’s claims of a Western plot to partition the country. The Hungarian Embassy in Ukraine condemned and denied Danilov’s claims.[21]
Russian forces are likely considering the use of chemical weapons to achieve battlefield advantages in the battle for Donbas. The Kremlin increased its condition-setting for the use of chemical weapons in a false-flag attack in eastern Ukraine between April 22 and May 4. ISW assessed on March 9 that the Kremlin had set rhetorical conditions to conduct a chemical or biochemical false-flag attack within Ukraine for which it would blame the Ukrainian military or NATO.[22]
- First Russian Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Dmitry Polyansky claimed on April 26 that the White Helmets, a Syrian humanitarian aid group that has been the subject of a sustained Kremlin disinformation campaign, are already present in Ukraine and are preparing false-flag chemical provocations for which they will blame Russian forces.[23] The Kremlin and the Russian-backed regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad have repeatedly used chemical weapons against civilians in Syria and blamed opposition and aid groups, particularly the White Helmets, for either conducting or fabricating the attacks and may be preparing to make similar claims in Ukraine.
- Polyansky additionally claimed on April 26 that Ukraine may covertly use chemical weapons to gain a tactical advantage in certain areas and claimed that Ukraine had planned to do so at the Azovstal steelworks in Mariupol before Russian leadership called off their direct assault.[24] He claimed that Ukraine may overtly use weapons of mass destruction on a larger scale to turn the tide of the war.
- Russian Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Forces Chief Igor Kirillov falsely claimed on April 23 that Ukrainian forces used a drone to conduct a chemical weapon attack on Russian forces on April 21, and additionally blamed the United States for encouraging the attack.[25] Kirilov claimed the United States is preparing additional provocations to accuse Russia of using chemical, biological, or tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine.[26]
The Kremlin continues to falsely blame Ukrainian forces for planning or conducting “provocations” in areas where Russian forces intend to commit or have already committed atrocities. The Kremlin likely seeks to introduce doubt into future attributions of war crimes and to diminish global support for Ukraine by blaming Ukrainian forces for crimes already committed by Russian forces. The Kremlin likely also intends to negatively portray Ukrainian forces to the Russian population to maintain domestic support for the invasion.
- Kremlin officials and media outlets reiterated their claims on April 26 that Ukrainian forces might stage nuclear incidents at Ukrainian nuclear power plants and that alleged US biolabs are developing new biological weapons on Ukrainian territory.[27] Russian Investigative Committee Chairman Alexander Bastrykin falsely claimed on May 3 that the United States has provided $225 million to fund Ukrainian bioweapons programs since 2005.[28]
- Russian National Defense Management Center Head Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev claimed on April 22 that Ukrainian forces staged a video “provocation” in the village of Voskresenskoye near Mykolaiv to accuse Russian forces of looting in the area.[29]
The Kremlin continued to reframe its invasion of Ukraine as a NATO-led proxy war of Western aggression against Russia, likely to build domestic support for Russia’s invasion and to coerce Western states into reducing their support to Ukraine by threatening international escalation. Kremlin Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on April 22 that the United States is not interested in peace in Ukraine and that the West is doing everything it can to escalate the war.[30] Russian President Vladimir Putin accused the United States and its allies of trying to “split Russian society” on April 25.[31] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued on April 26 that NATO is conducting a proxy war against Russia in Ukrainian territory and warned that the risk of World War III is “considerable.”[32] The Kremlin is increasingly framing its war in Ukraine as one with NATO to justify Russian battlefield failures and likely to intimidate Ukraine’s international partners by threatening escalation.
The Kremlin is also falsely framing itself as a mediator and a de-escalatory party in the war of Russia’s own making. Russian Foreign Deputy Minister Yevgeny Ivanov said on April 25 that Russia’s current task is to prevent major military conflict in the world and framed the war in Ukraine as an opportunity for Russia to rebalance the global balance of power.[33] Russian Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Antonov claimed on April 25 that Russia seeks to stabilize its relationship with the United States.[34] Lavrov said on April 29 that the West has “encouraged the aggressive anti-Russian course pursued by the Kyiv authorities” and pushed Ukraine to use force to resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine.[35] Lavrov added that Russia does not believe that it is at war with NATO, but that NATO and the European Union believe they are at war with Russia (contradicting statements by other key Kremlin figures).[36] Lavrov claimed that Russia does not threaten any state with nuclear weapons but that a war between Russia and NATO would increase the risk of a nuclear escalation, framing NATO and the EU as aggressors.[37] Russia’s chief delegate to military security and arms control negotiations in Vienna, Konstantin Gavrilov, claimed on May 4 that the West could conduct nuclear or biological “provocations” in Ukraine because the divide between Russia and the West is “existential” and “a clash between good and evil.”[38]
The Kremlin directly threatened NATO with retaliation for Ukrainian counterattacks into Russia to deter continued Western support to Ukraine. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on April 28 that “the West openly calls on Kyiv to attack Russia using … weapons received from NATO countries” and that Western encouragement has led Ukraine to conduct attacks against Russia itself.[39] Zakharova warned that “further provoking Ukraine to strike at Russian targets will certainly lead to a harsh response from Russia.” Russian state television programs mapped out the time it would allegedly take Russian missiles to reach London, Berlin, and Paris on April 29 in a likely attempt to deter additional European military aid to Ukraine.[40] The Kremlin continues to falsely claim that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory—during an unprovoked war of Russian aggression against Ukraine—are somehow escalatory or a war crime, rather than a legal Ukrainian response under the laws of war.
Russian false-flag attacks in Transnistria and missile attacks in Odesa likely do not indicate an imminent Russian escalation in Transnistria or Moldova. The Kremlin likely intended to pin Ukrainian forces in the south to prevent them from reinforcing eastern Ukraine.[41] Likely Russian forces began false-flag attacks in the Russian-occupied Transnistria region of Moldova on April 25, as ISW has chronicled in its daily military campaign updates.[42] Russian state media also set rhetorical conditions for Russian intervention or escalation in Transnistria, which borders southern Ukraine. The Kremlin likely intended this psychological campaign to keep Ukrainian forces deployed to southern Ukraine in case of a Russian attack through Transnistria, which would almost certainly fail.
Negotiations:
The Kremlin will blame Ukraine and the West for stalling peace negotiations, but likely has no intention of halting combat operations unless Russian forces can take additional territory in Ukraine’s east and south. Three people briefed on conversations with Russian President Vladimir Putin told the Financial Times on April 24 that Putin “has lost interest in diplomatic efforts to end his war with Ukraine and instead appears set on seizing as much territory as possible.”[43] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on April 26 that the war will eventually end with a treaty, but that “the parameters of this treaty will be determined by the stage of hostilities at which this treaty will become a reality,” implying that the Kremlin intends to make territorial gains in order to impose harsher terms on Ukraine in an eventual peace settlement.[44] Lavrov additionally claimed Ukraine is uninterested in negotiations and is being pushed by the West to continue its war with Russia.[45] Lavrov told Chinese media on April 29 that NATO countries are doing “everything they can” to prevent a political solution to the conflict.[46] Lavrov warned that NATO “should come to their senses and stop supplying weapons and ammunition to Kyiv” if NATO countries want to end the war. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on May 4 that negotiations had made no progress and that Ukrainian “inconsistency” in the negotiations process had caused Moscow to doubt whether a deal can be reached.[47]
Ukraine may suspend negotiations entirely in the coming weeks in response to Russian-sponsored “independence referendums” in occupied Ukrainian territory. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on April 23 that Ukraine would pull out of negotiations if Russian forces “destroy” the civilian population of Mariupol or hold “pseudo-referendums” in occupied territories.[48] Russian forces are likely scheduling a rigged independence referendum in the Russian-occupied Ukrainian city of Kherson to take place in early May.[49] The implementation of the planned Kherson referendum or widescale Russian atrocities against civilians in Mariupol would likely prompt the Ukrainian government to formally suspend negotiations. However, this will likely have little tangible effect, as negotiations are already largely stalled and Kyiv is highly unlikely to accept an outcome less than a Ukrainian military victory.
Russian Domestic Opposition and Censorship
The Kremlin is likely attempting to consolidate its control and surveillance of Russian government officials. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on April 25 establishing the use of a new information system, Poseidon, to collect and analyze activities to “prevent corruption” and “other offenses” in government and government-adjacent agencies. [50] The Kremlin will likely use Poseidon to increase its control over the outer rungs of the Russian government.
The Kremlin continued its crackdown on Russian journalists and domestic freedom of information to ensure continued domestic acceptance of its invasion of Ukraine.
- A Russian court arrested Kremlin critic and opposition journalist Vladimir Kara-Murza in Moscow on April 22 for spreading “false information” about the Russian Armed Forces.[51]
- A Moscow court fined the Wikimedia Foundation, which owns Russian Wikipedia, 5 million rubles on April 26 for refusing to remove information about Russian war crimes and civilian targeting in Ukraine, as well as information on how to produce gunpowder, from Wikipedia.[52]
- A Saint Petersburg court sentenced Russian journalist Maria Ponomarenko to pre-trial detention on April 27 after she shared a social media post about the Russian bombing of a theater in Mariupol that contained Ukrainian civilians. Russian authorities charged Ponomarenko with spreading “fake news about the Russian military.[53]
- US intelligence agencies reported on April 28 that Russian intelligence orchestrated the April 7 attack on Dmitri Muratov, the editor of the independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta. Russian intelligence is likely conducting an intimidation campaign against Russian journalists to deter coverage of the war in Ukraine.[54]
Russian Reactions to Sanctions:
The Kremlin continues to project economic confidence to its domestic audience despite a Russian Central Bank report that Russia’s economy will constrict by 8-10% in 2022.[55] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed on April 29 that Russia has “withstood the pressure” of anti-Russian sanctions and that the financial situation in Russia “is already stabilizing.”[56] The Russian Central Bank predicted 18-23% inflation in 2022 but reported that it expects economic recovery in 2023 as the Russian economy restructures. The Kremlin released additional sanctions measures on May 3 that retaliate against “unfriendly” states and foreign officials, likely to portray Russian sanctions to a domestic audience as effective against the West.[57] The Kremlin also likely seeks to negotiate additional economic ties with Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states, both to produce military components for Russia and to launder Russian exports through CSTO markets to avoid international sanctions.[58]
The United States and its allies are attempting to force Russia to use up its foreign currency reserves as part of Western sanctions to weaken Russia’s ability to economically sustain its invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin made a last-minute bond payment in dollars on April 29 to avoid default after failing to force foreign creditors to accept payments in rubles.[59] The European Commission said on April 22 that some companies may be able to pay Gazprom in euros and then convert the payments into rubles to avoid a complete cutoff of Russian natural gas imports to Europe.[60]
The Kremlin made an example out of Poland and Bulgaria by cutting off natural gas shipments in an attempt to coerce Germany, Italy, and other EU consumers of Russian natural gas to pay for their Russian gas imports in rubles, thereby propping up Russia’s sanctions-battered economy.[61] Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom announced that it would cut off natural gas shipments to Poland and Bulgaria on April 27 after both countries refused to pay for the gas in rubles. Other EU member states supplied gas to the countries to make up for the shortage. However, a complete Russian natural gas shutoff to the EU (which receives approximately 40% of its natural gas from Russia) would severely damage the European economy without further measures to substitute Russian gas supplies with other sources.
Europe is meanwhile attempting to wean itself off of its reliance on Russian energy; European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on May 4 that EU member states are considering a phased ban on Russian oil.[62] Particularly oil-reliant states like Hungary and Slovakia are likely seeking exceptions or prolonged timelines for the phased ban.[63] Greece began construction on its second natural gas terminal on May 3.[64] Such terminals empower Europe to receive natural gas imports from abroad and will help limit long-term reliance on Russian natural gas.
Belarus:
N/A
Drivers of Russian Threat Perceptions:
NATO and EU countries continued supplying Ukraine with military assistance, including high-end capabilities to counter Russian aggression, as Sweden and Finland consider NATO membership. The Kremlin continued to frame this aid as an escalation against Russia; Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 28 that Western military supplies to Ukraine threaten the security of the entire European continent.[65] The Kremlin continues to reiterate that Western military aid shipments are legitimate military targets in a likely attempt to deter additional military aid shipments, but Russian forces have not demonstrated the capability to consistently interdict Western aid shipments.[66] The Kremlin also attempted to tap into US partisan divides that thus far have not affected US support to Ukraine, likely to manufacture a US political dispute over additional US military and economic aid to Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev claimed on April 28 that US President Joe Biden’s $33 billion aid package to Ukraine will be “sewed” among corrupt Ukrainian oligarchs and the US Democratic Party, including Biden’s son Hunter Biden.[67]
- Sweden and Finland will likely submit simultaneous applications for NATO membership the week of May 15-22, according to Swedish and Finnish media reports on April 25.[68] Finland Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto stated on April 29 that Sweden and Finland could increase their military cooperation in the Baltic Sea if security deteriorates generally or is triggered by the two countries’ application to join NATO.[69] Neither state is likely to make a final decision before a planned May 13 Swedish parliamentary report. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova warned on May 4 that Finnish and Swedish admittance to NATO would “turn into a space of confrontation” between NATO and Russia.[70]
- The Biden Administration requested $33 billion from Congress in supplemental funding aimed at supporting Ukraine on April 28. The funding includes $20.4 billion in military and security aid, $8.5 billion in economic aid, and $3 billion in humanitarian aid.[71]
- US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated on April 28 that the Pentagon is trying to find ways to send additional artillery and air defense weapons to Ukraine since the Pentagon has predicted that long-range weapons capabilities will be decisive in winning the war.[72]
- The United States gathered military and defense leaders from 40 countries in a meeting in Germany on April 26 to discuss accelerating the supply of weapons and aid to Ukraine.[73] US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated that a US-led international group like this one will meet monthly to focus on aiding Ukraine and coined it the Ukraine Contact Group. The group will include defense ministers and military chiefs, meeting either virtually or in person.
- The US State Department approved the sale of $165 million in legacy Warsaw Pact ammunition and other non-standard ammunition to Ukraine on April 25.[74]
- Australian officials stated on April 27 that Australia has committed to providing $19 million in military assistance to Ukraine.[75] The assistance includes ammunition, six 155mm howitzers, 20 Bushmaster mobility vehicles, and additional military supplies.
- German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht stated on April 26 that Germany will send 50 self-propelled antiaircraft guns to Ukraine.[76]
- Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki stated on April 26 that Poland will send an unknown number of tanks to Ukraine after British Prime Minister Boris Johnson promised to backfill Poland’s supplies.[77] Polish media reported on April 30 that Poland has sent over 200 T-72 tanks to Ukraine in the past few weeks.[78]
- Canadian Defense Minister Anita Anand stated on April 26 that Canada would send an undetermined number of M777 155-mm howitzers to Ukraine.[79]
- The South Korean Foreign Ministry announced on April 29 that South Korea will provide an additional $50 million in non-combat support to Ukraine.[80]
- British Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced a $375 million security aid package to Ukraine during an address to Ukraine’s Parliament on May 3. The package includes heavy drones, electronic warfare equipment, night vision devices, and 13 upgraded 4x4 armored vehicles.[81]
Foreign Involvement:
The Kremlin’s antisemitism may drive Israel away from its current neutral position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov bizarrely claimed on May 2 that Hitler, like Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, was Jewish, and that “the most ardent antisemites are usually Jews.”[82] Hitler was not Jewish. Israel’s foreign ministry summoned the Russian ambassador on May 2 to condemn Lavrov’s comments.[83] The Russian Foreign Ministry accused Israel on May 3 of supporting the “neo-Nazi” regime in Kyiv.[84] Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 4 that Israeli mercenaries are fighting alongside the far-right Azov Battalion in Ukraine and that Israel has long ignored Ukrainian neo-Nazism.[85] The diplomatic spat may put political pressure on Israel to more directly oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Israel has so far attempted to frame itself as a mediator in the conflict. At least one pro-Kremlin media outlet amplified experts who refuted the often-debunked claim that Hitler had Jewish ancestry but justified Lavrov’s claims as well-intentioned, likely in an attempt to mend the Russo-Israeli rift.[86]
[6] https://www.unian dot net/war/novosti-hersonskoy-oblasti-russkie-sobirayut-dannye-grazhdan-dlya-provedeniya-referenduma-novosti-vtorzheniya-rossii-na-ukrainu-11801946.html
[7] https://rus dot lb.ua/society/2022/04/30/515254_soprotivlenie_hersone.html
[16] https://iz dot ru/1329770/2022-05-04/na-ukraine-vystupili-protiv-nakhozhdeniia-iuzhnykh-regionov-v-sostave-strany
[18] https://iz dot ru/1329756/2022-05-04/eks-deputat-rady-ilia-kiva-nachalsia-pervyi-etap-anneksii-polshei-zapadnoi-ukrainy
[51] https://iz dot ru/1324964/2022-04-22/sud-arestoval-publitcista-kara-murzu-po-delu-o-diskreditatcii-vs-rf; https://iz dot ru/1324965/2022-04-22/publitcista-kara-murzu-vkliuchili-v-spisok-fizlitc-inoagentov
[57] https://tass dot ru/politika/14538443; https://meduza dot io/news/2022/05/03/putin-podpisal-ukaz-ob-otvetnyh-sanktsiyah-on-trebuet-ignorirovat-deystvuyuschie-kontrakty-i-zapreschaet-eksport-kto-popadet-pod-sanktsii-poka-neyasno; http://kremlin dot ru/catalog/keywords/128/events/68347
[58] https://nv dot ua/world/geopolitics/sankcii-protiv-rf-rossiya-planiruet-proizvodit-v-stranah-odkb-sostavlyayushchie-k-voennoy-tehnike-50238326.html
3. U.S. provided intelligence that helped Ukraine sink Russian warship
Do we really need to release all this kind of intelligence information. I think everyone knows our capabilities and that we are helping the Ukrainians. Why do we need to reveal this?
U.S. provided intelligence that helped Ukraine sink Russian warship
Today at 6:24 p.m. EDT
The United States provided Ukraine with intelligence that helped Kyiv attack and sink the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, the Moskva, in one of the most dramatic battlefield successes of the 71-day old war, according to people familiar with the matter.
The missile strike by Ukrainian forces in April, an extraordinary embarrassment for the Kremlin that deprived Russia of a key vessel in its military campaign, may not have been possible without the U.S. assistance, these people said, underscoring how deeply Washington has become enmeshed in Ukraine’s fight against Russia. It is unclear how many Russian sailors died in the attack, but U.S. officials believe there were significant casualties.
Despite providing intelligence on the Moskva, the United States had “no prior awareness” of Ukraine’s decision to strike the warship, a U.S. official said. The official noted that the U.S. government shares maritime awareness with Ukraine to help the nation defend against threats. Russian vessels in the Black Sea have been launching missiles at Ukraine — and could be used to support an amphibious assault on the country, the official said.
Military analysts and experts have praised the Ukrainian military’s strength and ingenuity as it repels a larger Russian force that many believed was more sophisticated and technically superior. But the U.S. intelligence has also given the Ukrainian forces a significant advantage, allowing them to locate Russian forces, equipment, and command and control centers.
Absent the intelligence from the United States, Ukraine would have struggled to target the warship with the confidence necessary to expend two valuable Neptune missiles, which were in short supply, according to the people familiar with the strike, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence. NBC News first reported that the United States had provided intelligence on the Moskva.
Since before the war began, the Biden administration has treated the issue of intelligence-sharing with Ukraine as extremely sensitive. Officials have insisted they only provide assistance that helps Ukraine defend itself, worried that Russia could view the provision of information used in attacks as a justification for retaliating directly against the United States and its allies.
“Ukraine combines information that we and others provide with intelligence they’re gathering themselves … and then they make their own decisions,” Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said Thursday in response to a New York Times report that U.S. intelligence had helped Ukraine target Russian generals in the field.
“We do provide them useful intelligence, timely intelligence,” Kirby added, but he did not detail what that is or how it has been exploited.
To avoid sparking a wider war between two nuclear-armed superpowers, President Biden has ruled out sending U.S. troops to Ukraine, enforcing a no-fly zone over the country or providing certain categories of weapons, such as fighter planes, that could allow Ukraine to strike inside Russia.
“The [United States] provides battlefield intelligence to help the Ukrainians defend their country,” National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson said in a statement Tuesday. “We do not provide intelligence with the intent to kill Russian generals.”
That is a legal distinction that may make little practical difference to Russian leaders. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Thursday that the Russian military is “well aware that the United States, Great Britain and NATO as a whole are constantly transmitting intelligence and other parameters to the Ukrainian armed forces.”
“This is well known, and of course, coupled with the flow of weapons that these countries and the alliance are sending to Ukraine — these are all actions that, let’s say, are not enabling a speedy completion of the operation,” said Peskov, who added that the West nevertheless wasn’t capable of preventing Russia from achieving its stated goals.
Asked if Russia would take specific measures in reaction to any intelligence-sharing that led to the deaths of Russian generals, Peskov said, “Of course, Russian forces are doing everything necessary in this situation,” according to state news agency RIA Novosti.
The intelligence-sharing with Ukraine differs from past conflicts in which the United States has worked directly with allies to execute strikes. During the U.S.-led surge in Iraq in 2008, for instance, the U.S. military partnered with Iraqi forces to locate and attack insurgents and militants using cellular phone data tracked by the National Security Agency. And in counterterrorism operations in Africa, the intelligence community has provided security services with the ability to track militants’ cellphones, for the purpose of trying to capture or kill them.
From the U.S. perspective, if Ukraine receives intelligence and then decides to take action in the country’s defense, the United States did not provide “targeting” information that directed the Ukrainians whom or what to strike.
Kirby seemed to draw that distinction last month when asked during a news conference whether a U.S. Navy patrol plane in the Black Sea region “was tracking the Moskva before it was attacked by Ukraine and provided them targeting information.”
Kirby said that the type of aircraft in question, P-8 Poseidons from a U.S. base in Italy, were used as part of NATO’s “air policing missions” over the area. “There was no provision of targeting information by any United States Navy P-8 flying in these air policing missions,” he said. He did not elaborate.
As the war has raged on, the United States has increased the volume and speed of the intelligence it is providing, according to U.S. and Ukrainian officials. In the early days of the conflict, some Ukrainian officials complained that information about Russian troop positions was slow to arrive and not precise enough to help the Ukrainians launch attacks.
Today the intelligence is flowing in “real time” and has proved to be a key enabler of the Ukrainian campaign, one senior Ukrainian official said. The United States has provided Ukraine a large amount of satellite imagery and reports about the Russian military, some of which are based on intercepted communications, according to U.S. and European officials.
The United States also took steps to provide intelligence about Russian positions in the south and east of the country that had not been provided before the invasion. Washington previously did not hand over that information because it could have helped Ukraine launch offensive attacks on Russian and separatist positions on Ukrainian territory that had been occupied since 2014, officials said.
Before the invasion, on Feb. 24, the Biden administration declassified and released publicly intelligence, including satellite images, that pointed to a massive buildup in Russian forces along Ukraine’s border in what appeared to be preparations for an attack.
The United States is not alone in helping Ukraine.
Baltic intelligence services have had an especially large role in helping Ukraine with information about the Russian military in the eastern part of the country, a European intelligence official said. The flow of assistance has been of growing importance in recent weeks as the bulk of Russia’s military effort shifts to the region.
The Baltic assistance has been focused mostly on intercepts of phone calls and other battlefield communications within the Russian military, although it also includes intelligence analysis based on the those countries’ deep experience with Russia’s military organization, strategy and planning, the official said. Russian officers and soldiers have been using unencrypted cellphones and walkie-talkies to communicate with each other, which allows outsiders to both listen in on the conversations and use the signal location to pinpoint the soldiers for strikes.
The Baltic intelligence contribution complements assistance the United States has been offering Ukraine, which has been more focused on southern Ukraine and the Black Sea region, the European official said.
Ukraine invested in the domestic development of anti-ship missiles after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and fueled a separatist war in the country’s eastern Donbas region.
The Ukrainians have an extremely limited supply, however. Testing of the Neptune went on for years, but the Luch Design Bureau, which manufactures the weapon in Ukraine, was only due to supply the first deployable Neptune systems to Ukrainian forces this year.
The target the Ukrainians decided to use the missiles against was loaded with symbolism.
Launched in 1979, the Moskva was one of few guided missile cruisers in the Russian navy’s fleet. Originally named the Slava, the vessel hosted Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev during his Malta summit with President George H.W. Bush in December 1989.
Russia initially attempted to conceal the Ukrainian strike on the Moskva. The Russian military said a fire had broken out aboard the ship, forcing the crew to evacuate. Later, Russian authorities said the ship sank during a storm while being towed back to port.
The Moskva played a role in the initial days of the war against Ukraine.
“I am a Russian warship,” the Moskva’s loudspeaker said to a group of Ukrainian border guards stationed on Snake Island in the Black Sea, demanding that the Ukrainians lay down their arms and surrender. The Ukrainians responded, “Russian warship, go f--- yourself,” a phrase that subsequently became a mantra of Ukrainian resistance to the Russian invasion.
Initially, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said the Ukrainian border guards had been fired upon and killed, but Ukraine’s parliament announced in March that they had been taken alive and later freed in a prisoner exchange.
John Hudson and Karoun Demirjian contributed to this report.
4. Army Creating Second Paratrooper Division as Service Forges New Identity for Arctic Troops
Why create a new (old) airborne division and not make them paratroopers?
Excerpts:
Those brigades would be redesignated the 1st and 2nd Brigade Combat Teams of the 11th Airborne Division. It is unclear whether the move would mean the mechanized troops would convert to paratroopers in the future.
"The Army is reviewing options to convert the [Stryker] brigade combat team at Fort Wainwright from a Stryker to an infantry unit," Lt. Col. Randee Farrell, an Army spokesperson, told Military.com. "We are in the midst of consultation with our joint partners to ensure that any potential change enhances the ability of joint force commanders to achieve their mission."
Army Creating Second Paratrooper Division as Service Forges New Identity for Arctic Troops
Soldiers stationed in Alaska will soon ditch the 25th Infantry Division's "Tropic Lightning" patch and be redesignated the 11th Airborne Division, in what could be an important step in the Army's recent focus on Arctic warfare.
Army Secretary Christine Wormuth told lawmakers that the move will give units in the state a clear identity. Soldiers there currently fall under the command of U.S. Army Alaska and wear the 25th Infantry Division patch. But that division is mostly associated with units in Hawaii that train for combat in the jungle, the opposite of Alaska's mission and something leaders and junior soldiers told Military.com has been a point of confusion.
U.S. Army Alaska will be redesignated as the 11th Airborne Division this summer and issued a new patch.
"It would be a new common sense of identity for the soldiers there," Wormuth told lawmakers on the Senate Armed Services Committee during a hearing Thursday.
Some rank-and-file troops and leaders in Alaska told Military.com they don't have the proper equipment needed to be the service's premier Arctic force. Some of that is due to its primary vehicle, the Stryker, being ineffective.
"We're looking at the Arctic very differently. This would give the units the confidence all of this would come together," McConville told lawmakers at Thursday's Senate hearing.
But units there are starved of other critical resources, with some soldiers telling Military.com they can't even get ripped uniforms replaced. More importantly, bases in the region have struggled to tackle a growing suicide crisis. That lack of resources has been partly blamed by some on Alaskan units not having a clear identity and thus often being forgotten about by Pentagon planners, something this change is meant to address.
The move would give the active-duty Army its third named airborne combat unit and its second paratrooper division.
The two existing airborne combat units are the 82nd Airborne Division based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, which falls under XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Europe. The 101st Airborne in Fort Campbell, Kentucky, is airborne in name only; it's actually an air assault division. The Texas National Guard has the 1st Battalion, 143rd Infantry Regiment, the only conventional airborne element of the component.
Two Alaska brigade combat teams would be most impacted by the redesignation -- the 1st and 4th Brigade Combat Teams of the 25th infantry Division. The 4th is the region's paratrooper element, while the 1st is a mechanized Stryker brigade.
Those brigades would be redesignated the 1st and 2nd Brigade Combat Teams of the 11th Airborne Division. It is unclear whether the move would mean the mechanized troops would convert to paratroopers in the future.
"The Army is reviewing options to convert the [Stryker] brigade combat team at Fort Wainwright from a Stryker to an infantry unit," Lt. Col. Randee Farrell, an Army spokesperson, told Military.com. "We are in the midst of consultation with our joint partners to ensure that any potential change enhances the ability of joint force commanders to achieve their mission."
The changes are yet another move the force is making since the wind-down of the post-9/11 wars, with a shift to focus on conventional fighting and outpacing China and Russia.
Airborne capabilities haven't been truly tested on a modern battlefield but are built to insert ground troops into enemy territory and to quickly seize critical terrain or infrastructure such as airfields.
Airborne units gained famed during the invasion of Nazi-occupied France with dangerous jumps that secured key terrain for the success of the allied invasion of Normandy. That legendary battle spurred paratroopers to be the Army's elite force. While still a conventional unit, airborne troops are traditionally called upon first to deploy and are often on high-paced training schedules.
Yet those tactics were seldom part of modern wars, with the last major use of airborne capabilities being the U.S. invasion of Panama, commonly referred to as Operation Just Cause in 1989. However, there were limited uses of special operations jumps in Afghanistan and Iraq. The last -- smaller -- conventional airborne assault was in Iraq in 2003 when the 173rd Airborne Brigade seized Bashur Airfield with virtually no resistance.
The 11th Airborne Division's legacy stems from its activation in 1943 during World War II. It fought in the Pacific Theater, where two of its soldiers, Pvts. Elmer Fryar and Manuel Perez Jr., earned the Medal of Honor. The formation was later used to occupy post-war Japan.
The 11th Airborne was transformed into a training formation at Fort Campbell in 1949. In the 1960s, the division was reorganized into three air assault brigades and designated the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) when the Army was in the early stages of developing tactics using helicopters on the battlefield. The unit was disbanded in 1965, transferring its equipment and personnel to the 1st Cavalry Division.
5. Andy Levin’s ‘Two-State Bill’ Won’t Support Middle East Peace
Excerpts:
The way to end this occupation is the same way previous occupations ended, by reaching some sort of diplomatic agreement that either ends the conflict completely or at least effects some sort of agreed-upon truce.
Levin’s bill, were it enacted, would never achieve its ostensible goal. It could achieve only two things. Between Israel and the Palestinians, it would actually entrench the conflict further by incentivizing precisely those actions that have made reaching a final peace accord difficult over the past two decades. In the United States, it would merely provide a basis for further moral disengagement from Israel within mainstream liberal politics and for additional demonization of Israel just outside of it.
Andy Levin’s ‘Two-State Bill’ Won’t Support Middle East Peace
Levin’s bill, were it enacted, would never achieve its ostensible goal.
Late last autumn and to great fanfare, Representative Andy Levin (D-MI-9) proposed the Two-State Solution Act, which would make it U.S. policy to achieve a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and would, according to Levin, lay out the steps necessary to achieve it.
As a piece of legislation, the bill went nowhere. Only a dozen or so Democrats expressed support for it. This stands in marked contrast to a resolution introduced in the last Congress by Representative Alan Lowenthal (D-CA-47). That resolution, which expressed support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, had 192 co-sponsors, all Democrats.
But the goal was never to pass a bill, but rather to move the Overton window of the mainstream liberal foreign policy consensus on Israel. For this reason alone, Levin’s bill and the organizational effort behind it merit scrutiny.
On his webpage, the congressman writes, “We can no longer claim credibly to support a two-state solution without taking steps to bring one about.” The question that isn’t asked is whether this bill contains any such steps. The deeper question lurking in the background, which the bill does attempt to answer but which it answers wrongly, is why such a solution hasn’t been affected yet.
Though both congressional initiatives have “two-state” featured prominently in the title, Levin’s bill is radically different from the earlier Lowenthal resolution. The former codifies the emergent orthodoxy among foreign-policy liberals over the past two decades into legislative language. This orthodoxy has less to do with any constructive ideas about conflict resolution and more to do with a morality tale about Israel that might be useful for domestic politics but is often quite disconnected from reality. For establishment liberals in Democratic Party circles, this new orthodoxy both distinguishes them from the Republicans and functions as a rear-guard action against the loud anti-Israel minority on their left flank.
The Levin bill’s small number of sponsors might make it seem like a fringe effort, but that is far from the case. The bill is not an appeal to the so-called “Squad,” but rather a bid to refashion the consensus arrayed against the Squad when it comes to liberal Democratic policy toward Israel.
And because there is no realistic chance of anything like this bill passing now and binding a Democratic administration, its language is actually much more free and unguarded in expressing the new mainstream liberal orthodoxy on Israel, pushed by leading figures in the foreign-policy establishment and by the tough-love-for-Israel lobby group J Street. The bill’s text and subtext are a guide for where liberal Democrats might go in a future Democratic administration—or how the Democratic leadership might challenge either a future Republican administration or an ascendant anti-Israel minority from the fringes of their own party.
What Went Wrong
The text embodies two pillars of thought of liberal Israel agonistes: a wholly inaccurate story of what went wrong in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and a determination to selectively prejudge some of the “final status” issues that might otherwise have to be negotiated by the parties.
The spirit of the bill is best expressed in its “Findings” section. Of eleven findings, the first three are anodyne statements about the importance of two states, and the remaining eight are direct criticisms of Israel. None criticize the Palestinians in any way. If the bill’s author believes the Palestinians might have contributed in any way to the current impasse, he didn’t see fit to share it.
Instead, the bill promotes a simplistic view of why there is no peace. The what-went-wrong story can be summarized in one word: settlements.
The common claim is that the growth of settlements in the West Bank has made a two-state solution impossible. The problem with this claim isn’t that settlements aren’t deeply problematic; they certainly are.
The problem is that at no point in any of the three rounds of final-status talks (2000–2001, 2007–2008, 2013–2014) did any settlement block a deal. We are frequently told that settlements make dividing the land into two states impossible, but maps were on the table doing just that in all three rounds of talks, and all three times the Palestinian side rejected them. In the first two rounds, the Israeli side very explicitly accepted sweeping settlement evacuations as part of a proposed deal. Lest anyone think this impossible, it is worth remembering that Israel has already evacuated settlements in Sinai and in Gaza.
The heuristic employed to reach this determination is simple. It consists of two steps. First, identifying the single most counterproductive, unpopular, unhelpful action Israel has taken in its conflict with the Palestinians: settlement construction. Second, since the attribution of any agency whatsoever to Palestinians is forbidden, the worst thing Israel does is almost definitionally the reason for the absence of peace.
The Levin bill fits perfectly into this discourse. It wants a cure—several cures, in fact—to a misdiagnosed illness. Three times in the last twenty-five years Israelis and Palestinians have sat down to iron out terms of a two-state solution, and three times the Palestinians have rejected any deal that would involve a full reconciliation of Israel. But Levin’s bill offers no “medicine” for that affliction, just a legal finding against the existence of settlements (something which runs counter to the Oslo Accords, which recognize Israeli rule over the settlements in the interim phase and leave their final status to be negotiated by the two sides), bolstered by a strict labeling regime against products made there.
There is nothing in the bill to address Palestinian rejection of previous peace plans. In fact, there is no mention of this at all. It does not come up as part of the background; it is not the findings. Quite unlike the attention given to settlements, the bill’s text contains absolutely nothing that would indicate its backers think previous Palestinian rejections of peace have any explanatory value at all. The bill offers no suggestions for how to overcome Palestinian rejectionism, because this rejectionism is nowhere acknowledged as having happened.
The same goes for Palestinian terrorism against Israeli civilians, which had a catastrophic effect on the peace process when it first exploded during the Oslo years (especially 1994–1997). Its effect was even starker following the collapse of the peace process (especially 2000–2004). That these two waves of suicidal terror might actually explain, if only partially, why a two-state solution didn’t come to fruition twenty years ago is not addressed in Levin’s bill. Nor is the fact that such terror was only ended by offensive Israeli military action of exactly the kind that this bill’s proposed export controls would render impossible.
The Oslo process in the 1990s gave the Palestinians their first-ever measure of self-government—their first trappings of sovereignty, which they recklessly forsook in the late 1940s, when so many other national liberation movements did begin to govern territories vacated by old imperial powers. For the first time ever, the Palestinians had passports, postage stamps, armed police forces, diplomatic missions, trade agreements, an international airport, and free and fair elections for their own government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
This self-government was poised to become a fully sovereign state within less than a decade. But at just that moment, the Palestinian leadership under Yasser Arafat rejected a peace accord with Israel and launched a violent campaign of suicidal terror. It is both astonishing and deeply revealing that even twenty years later, with that decision’s disastrous consequences apparent to all who wish to see them, there are still so few voices within Palestinian society or in the broader community of pro-Palestinian activists and intellectuals who will acknowledge this mistake or seek to correct it.
And there is nothing in the Levin bill that acknowledges it or seeks to correct it.
Incentivizing Further Conflict
The second pillar complements the first. Even if one accepts the determination that Israeli misdeeds caused the peace process to fail, one still must account for why each time it is the Palestinian side that rejects proposed terms for ending the conflict. To this end, parameters are set forth that always offer much better terms for the Palestinians than those they turned down in previous peace talks, without ever giving any adequate explanation for why that should be the case.
The Oslo Accords spell out several final-status issues that need to be ironed out by the two sides. These include statehood, borders, refugees, security, settlements, and Jerusalem. The accords call on both sides not to take any action that might prejudge these issues, and commit the accords’ sponsors to take no such action, either.
Drawing on what has become the standard think tank and NGO playbook, Levin’s bill selectively prejudges some final-status issues and is either silent on the rest or leaves them up to future negotiations. But there is nothing accidental about the choice of issues or the positions taken. The issues prejudged are always those where the consensus runs against Israel, and never the ones where international opinion is more understanding of the Israeli position (such as security and refugees).
On statehood, there is nothing left to discuss. Israel’s concession on this issue in 2000 is now a starting point for negotiations, and there is no expectation that the Palestinian side should give anything for it (for example, a full recognition of Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state that might constitute a termination of claims). On borders, Levin’s bill again leaves little room for negotiation, insisting that every inch of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem are “occupied Palestinian territories,” an ahistorical determination that successive U.S. administrations have always avoided. On settlements, the bill insists that U.S. policy should view them all as violations of international law, even though the Oslo Accords leave settlements as an issue to be negotiated and explicitly stipulate continued Israeli control over them in the interim. The bill’s designation of all of Jerusalem beyond the 1949 armistice line as “Palestinian”—including, for example, the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and disputed holy sites—is perhaps its most thoughtless overreach. It is particularly curious in light of the pieties heard only just recently about the dangers of American statements on Jerusalem when the previous administration moved the U.S. Embassy there.
On other final-status issues, the bill is curiously silent. Not a word about security arrangements once two states are achieved. Nothing about mutual recognition or termination of claims. And absolutely nothing on the refugee issue. If it is U.S. policy that any Israeli civilian presence beyond the 1949 armistice line is illegitimate, it seems reasonable for it to be U.S. policy that any resettlement of descendants of Palestinian refugees within the armistice lines is equally illegitimate.
And in fact, it is self-evident that improving the terms for the Palestinians since they rejected Israel’s Camp David peace offers can’t possibly bring either side closer to resolution. In any confrontation, a mediated compromise is viable only if it is better for both sides than what either side could realistically hope to attain in open conflict.
And yet, since 2000, the consensus among the think tank crowd, as well as among self-appointed experts, has been to meet each Palestinian rejection with terms that are better for the Palestinians and worse for Israel. There is no historical precedent for mediation that offered a sweeter deal to the side that rejected a previous offer or status quo, initiated a violent confrontation, and was defeated. It’s easy to see why. No winning side in a conflict would agree to such a resolution, because that side would be better off just continuing to fight. And no losing side would agree, either, because it, too, would be better off rejecting and fighting as it receives better and better terms.
It is astonishing to realize that the accepted view of learned opinion on Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy since the failure of the Oslo process runs so counter to any tried and tested conception of peacemaking. An agreement between any two belligerent parties—warring nations, labor and management, a divorcing couple—is possible only when the proposed agreement is better for both parties than the result of open confrontation could be for either.
The current approach to peacemaking can only incentivize further conflict. If the losing side can get better terms by rejection and violence, it will keep rejecting and pursuing violence. If the winning side gets worse terms by making peace than by maintaining the status quo, it will seek to maintain the status quo. None of this is new or particularly insightful. It is how the expert class approaches every conflict in the world—except for the one involving the Jewish state.
This is an elementary principle of conflict mediation, yet it is always abandoned in Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking, with entirely predictable results.
Metaphysics of Occupation
In the absence of any coherent concept of conflict resolution, we are instead treated to a metaphysics of occupation. The occupation looms large over the entire bill and the entire output of expert analysis that underlies it. It is always cause and never effect. An FAQ accompanying Levin’s bill links to only one news article, a New York Times piece that labels the occupation as the “heart of the conflict.”
This, too, flies in the face not just of accumulated knowledge about conflict resolution in general, but also the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The occupation, in this rendering, exists on its own and explains everything in its wake. But this is nonsense. Occupations don’t cause war; they are the result of war. When two sides clash in an armed conflict, it is not unusual that at the end of the conflict, one or both sides (usually the winner, but sometimes both) is occupying territory previously held by the other. Ordinarily, this is where negotiations begin for a diplomatic settlement (an armistice, a truce, or even a full peace treaty). And once a new line is agreed upon (sometimes even the same as the line before the war, especially if that line was an internationally recognized border, which was not the case in 1967), both sides redeploy to opposite sides of it.
But to acknowledge this truth would mean acknowledging the twin truths of how the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza began and why it has lasted so long. The occupation began with the defeat of a coalition of three Arab armies in their attempt to wipe Israel off the map. The occupation’s persistence lies in the refusal, initially of the defeated Arab states and later of the self-governing Palestinians, to accept any peace deal that would require full reconciliation with the existence of a Jewish state in the Middle East.
The way to end this occupation is the same way previous occupations ended, by reaching some sort of diplomatic agreement that either ends the conflict completely or at least effects some sort of agreed-upon truce.
Levin’s bill, were it enacted, would never achieve its ostensible goal. It could achieve only two things. Between Israel and the Palestinians, it would actually entrench the conflict further by incentivizing precisely those actions that have made reaching a final peace accord difficult over the past two decades. In the United States, it would merely provide a basis for further moral disengagement from Israel within mainstream liberal politics and for additional demonization of Israel just outside of it.
Shany Mor is an adjunct fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Follow him on Twitter at @ShMMor.
Image: Reuters.
6. Defenders inside Ukrainian steel mill refuse to surrender
“The soldier who fights to death never dies, but the soldier who fights for existence never truly exists.”
-Admiral Yi Sun-shin
Defenders inside Ukrainian steel mill refuse to surrender
AP · by JON GAMBRELL and CARA ANNA · May 6, 2022
LVIV, Ukraine (AP) — Ukrainian fighters battling Russian forces in the tunnels beneath Mariupol’s immense steel plant refused to surrender in the face of relentless attacks, with the wife of one commander saying they had vowed to “stand till the end.”
The fight in the last Ukrainian stronghold of the strategic port city reduced to ruins by the Russian onslaught appeared increasingly desperate amid growing speculation that President Vladimir Putin wants to present the Russian people with a battlefield triumph — or announce an escalation of the war — in time for Victory Day on Monday.
“They won’t surrender,” Kateryna Prokopenko said Thursday after speaking by phone to her husband, a leader of the steel plant defenders. “They only hope for a miracle.”
She said her husband, Azov Regiment commander Denys Prokopenko, told her he would love her forever. “I am going mad from this. It seemed like words of goodbye,” she said.
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The Ukrainian military’s General Staff said Friday that “the blockade of units of the defense forces in the Azovstal area continues” and that the Russians, with aviation support, had resumed assault operations to take control of the sprawling plant.
Monday’s Victory Day is the biggest patriotic holiday on the Russian calendar, marking the Soviet Union’s triumph over Nazi Germany. But as long as Ukrainians resist the takeover of the plant, “Russian losses will continue to build and frustrate their operational plans in southern Donbas,” the British Defense Ministry said in an assessment.
Some 2,000 Ukrainian fighters, by Russia’s most recent estimate, were holed up in a maze of tunnels and bunkers beneath Azovstal steelworks. A few hundred civilians were also believed trapped there.
“There are many wounded (fighters), but they are not surrendering,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in his nightly video address. “They are holding their positions.”
“Just imagine this hell! And there are children there,” he said. “More than two months of constant shelling, bombing, constant death.”
The Russians managed to get inside the plant Wednesday with the help of an electrician who knew the layout, said Anton Gerashchenko, an adviser to Ukraine’s Internal Affairs Ministry.
“He showed them the underground tunnels which are leading to the factory,” Gerashchenko said in a video.
Zelenskyy said the attack was preventing evacuation of the remaining civilians, even as U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said another attempt was underway. “We must continue to do all we can to get people out of these hellscapes,” Guterres said.
The Kremlin denied its troops were storming the plant and has demanded the Ukrainians surrender. They have refused. Russia has also accused the fighters of preventing the civilians from leaving.
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The fall of Mariupol would deprive Ukraine of a vital port, allow Russia to establish a land corridor to the Crimean Peninsula, which it seized from Ukraine in 2014, and free up troops to fight elsewhere in the Donbas, the eastern industrial region that the Kremlin says is now its chief objective.
Capt. Sviatoslav Palamar, deputy commander of the Azov Regiment, pleaded on Ukrainian TV for the evacuation of civilians and wounded fighters from the steelworks, saying soldiers were “dying in agony due to the lack of proper treatment.”
More than 100 civilians were rescued from the steelworks over the weekend. But many previous attempts to open safe corridors from Mariupol have fallen through, with Ukraine blaming shelling and firing by the Russians.
Meanwhile, 10 weeks into the devastating war, Ukraine’s military claimed it recaptured some areas in the south and repelled other attacks in the east, further frustrating Putin’s ambitions after his abortive attempt to seize Kyiv. Ukrainian and Russian forces are fighting village by village.
The General Staff in Kyiv said Russian forces were conducting surveillance flights, and in the hard-hit areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, Ukrainian forces repulsed 11 attacks and destroyed tanks and armored vehicles. Russia gave no immediate acknowledgement of those losses.
Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said Russian forces are making only “plodding” progress in the Donbas.
There are growing suggestions that Ukraine might try to widen its push to seize more territory from Russia outside of Kharkiv, its second-largest city.
Ukrainian chief of defense, Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi, said Thursday that a counteroffensive could begin to push Russian forces away from Kharkiv and Izyum, which has been a key node in Russia’s control of the eastern cauldron. Ukraine in recent days has driven Russian troops some 40 kilometers (25 miles) east of Kharkiv, which has been repeatedly struck by Russian shelling.
Additional Ukrainian advances may spare the city from artillery strikes, as well as force Moscow to divert troops from other areas of the front line.
The U.S. has provided “a range of intelligence” that includes locations of warships, said the official, who was not authorized to speak publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity. The official said the decision to target the missile cruiser Moskva was purely a Ukrainian decision.
Fearful of new attacks surrounding Victory Day, the mayor of the western Ukrainian city of Ivano-Frankivsk urged residents to leave for the countryside over the long weekend and warned them not to gather in public places.
And the southeastern city of Zaporizhzhia, a key transit point for evacuees from Mariupol, announced a curfew from Sunday evening through Tuesday morning.
Mariupol, which had a prewar population of over 400,000, has come to symbolize the misery inflicted by the war. The siege of the city has trapped perhaps 100,000 civilians with little food, water, medicine or heat.
As the battle raged there, Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov said Russian bombardment Thursday hit dozens of Ukrainian military targets, including troop concentrations in the east, an artillery battery near the eastern settlement of Zarozhne and rocket launchers near the southern city of Mykolaiv.
The war has devastated Ukraine’s medical infrastructure, Zelenskyy said in a video link to a charity event in the U.K. Nearly 400 health care facilities have been damaged or destroyed, he said.
“There is simply a catastrophic situation regarding access to medical services and medicines,” in areas occupied by Russian forces, he said. “Even the simplest drugs are lacking.”
With the challenge of mine-clearing and rebuilding after the war in mind, Zelenskyy announced the launch of a global fundraising platform called United24.
At the same time, Poland hosted an international donor conference that raised $6.5 billion in humanitarian aid. The gathering was attended by prime ministers and ambassadors from many European countries, as well as representatives of other nations and some businesses.
In addition, a Ukrainian cabinet body began to develop proposals for a comprehensive postwar reconstruction plan, while Zelenskyy also urged Western allies to put forward a program similar to the post-World War II Marshall Plan plan to help Ukraine rebuild.
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Anna reported from Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine. Associated Press journalists Yesica Fisch in Zaporizhzhia, Inna Varenytsia and David Keyton in Kyiv, Yuras Karmanau in Lviv, Mstyslav Chernov in Kharkiv, Lolita C. Baldor in Washington and AP staff around the world contributed to this report.
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AP · by JON GAMBRELL and CARA ANNA · May 6, 2022
7. How millions of Russians are tearing holes in the Digital Iron Curtain
Can the Chinese achieve similar effects through the digital bamboo curtain?
Excerpts:
Natalia, an 83-year-old Muscovite and former computer operator, asked her adult daughter to help her download a VPN on her laptop shortly after the war started. She feared that the government would ban YouTube, preventing her from seeing her favorite program — an online talk show on technology news. The Kremlin has yet to block YouTube, though Russian Internet experts say the probability remains high.
As the war progressed, however, Natalia found herself also looking at banned news sites, including Radio Free Europe, to stay informed, even as friends around her bought “totally” into the government line that Ukrainians were Nazis and Russia was facing an existential threat from the West.
“People now just believe lie after lie. I feel so isolated,” she said.
She said, for example, that she’s been able to read foreign news stories suggesting there were significant Russian casualties in the sinking last month of the Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. But the Russian press has reported only one official death, with 27 soldiers declared “missing.”
How millions of Russians are tearing holes in the Digital Iron Curtain
A tremendous surge in VPN downloads represents a challenge to Putin and his version of the Ukraine war
Today at 3:00 a.m. EDT
RIGA, Latvia — When Russian authorities blocked hundreds of Internet sites in March, Konstantin decided to act. The 52-year-old company manager in Moscow tore a hole in the Digital Iron Curtain, which had been erected to control the narrative of the Ukraine war, with a tool that lets him surf blocked sites and eyeball taboo news.
Konstantin turned to a virtual private network, an encrypted digital tunnel more commonly known as a VPN. Since the war began in February, VPNs have been downloaded in Russia by the hundreds of thousands a day — a massive surge in demand that represents a direct challenge to President Vladimir Putin’s attempt to seal Russians off from the wider world. By protecting the locations and identities of users, VPNs are now granting millions of Russians access to blocked material.
Downloading one in his Moscow apartment, Konstantin said, brought back memories of the 1980s in the Soviet Union — when he used a shortwave radio to hear forbidden news of dissident arrests on U.S.-funded Radio Liberty.
“We didn’t know what was going on around us, and that’s true again now,” said Konstantin, who, like other Russian VPN users, spoke on the condition that his last name be withheld for fear of government retribution. “Many people in Russia simply watch TV and eat whatever the government is feeding them. I wanted to find out what was really happening.”
Daily downloads in Russia of the 10 most popular VPNs jumped from below 15,000 just before the war to as many as 475,000 in March. As of this week, downloads were continuing at a rate of nearly 300,000 a day, according to data compiled for the Washington Post by the analytics firm Apptopia, which relies on information from apps, publicly available data and an algorithm to come up with estimates.
Russian clients typically download multiple VPNs, but the data suggests millions of new users per month. In early April, Russian telecom operator Yota reported that the number of VPN users was 53.5 times as high as in January, according to the Tass state news service.
The Internet Protection Society, a digital rights group associated with jailed Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, launched its own VPN service on March 20 — and reached its limit of 300,000 users within 10 days, according to executive director Mikhail Klimarev. Based on internal surveys, Klimarev estimates that the number of VPN users in Russia has risen to roughly 30 percent of the country’s 100 million Internet users.
To combat Putin, “Ukraine needs Javelin [missiles] and Russians need Internet,” Klimarev said.
By accessing banned Ukrainian and Western news sites, Konstantin said, he has come to deeply sympathize with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, a former comedian the Russian press has sought to falsely portray as a “drug addict.” He was recently compared to Adolf Hitler by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
“I loved him as an actor, but now I know Zelensky is also brave because I’ve seen him talk on Ukrainian news sites with my VPN,” Konstantin said.
Not only does widespread VPN use help millions reach material laying out the true extent of Russian military losses and countering the official portrayal of the war as a fight against fascists, say Russian Internet experts, but it also limits government surveillance of activists.
Russian officials have sought to curtail VPN use. An anti-VPN law in 2017 resulted in the banning of more than a dozen providers for refusing to comply with Russian censorship rules.
In the days before the war, and in the weeks since then, Russian authorities have also ratcheted up pressure on Google, asking the search engine to remove thousands of URLs associated with VPNs, according to the Lumen database, an archive of legal complaints related to Internet content. Google, which did not respond to a request for comment, still includes banned sites in search results.
The Russian government is reluctant to ban VPNs completely. Policing such a ban would pose a technological challenge. In addition, many Russians use VPNs to access nonpolitical entertainment and communication tools — popular distractions from daily hardships.
Last month, when asked by Belarusian TV if he had downloaded a VPN, even Putin spokesman Dmitry Peskov conceded: “Yes, I have. Why not?”
Since the war began on Feb. 24, more than 1,000 Internet sites have been restricted by Russian authorities, including Facebook, Instagram, BBC News, Voice of America and Radio Liberty, according to a survey by the technology site Top10VPN. The last independent Russian media outlets were forced to shut down, and those in exile that are offering critical content — like the popular Meduza — have also been banned.
“People want to see banned content, but I think they’re also genuinely scared,” said Tonia Samsonova, a London-based Russian media entrepreneur. “No matter your attitude toward the government or the war, every Russian knows that if the government knows too much about you, it’s potentially dangerous. So a VPN is so useful even if they aren’t critical of Putin.”
Katerina Abramova, spokeswoman for Meduza, said online traffic at the site declined only briefly after it was banned by Russian authorities in March. That’s because, suddenly, traffic began surging from unlikely countries like the Netherlands — suggesting that Russians were utilizing VPNs that made them appear to be abroad.
“VPNs won’t start a broad revolution in Russia,” Abramova said. “But it’s a way people who are against this war can stay connected to the world.”
Natalia, an 83-year-old Muscovite and former computer operator, asked her adult daughter to help her download a VPN on her laptop shortly after the war started. She feared that the government would ban YouTube, preventing her from seeing her favorite program — an online talk show on technology news. The Kremlin has yet to block YouTube, though Russian Internet experts say the probability remains high.
As the war progressed, however, Natalia found herself also looking at banned news sites, including Radio Free Europe, to stay informed, even as friends around her bought “totally” into the government line that Ukrainians were Nazis and Russia was facing an existential threat from the West.
“People now just believe lie after lie. I feel so isolated,” she said.
She said, for example, that she’s been able to read foreign news stories suggesting there were significant Russian casualties in the sinking last month of the Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. But the Russian press has reported only one official death, with 27 soldiers declared “missing.”
“Parents are just getting one answer from the Ministry of Defense — that your son is ‘missing,’ ” she said. “Missing? Don’t you really mean dead? But they’re not saying that. They’re not telling the truth.”
Although downloading a VPN is technically easy, usually requiring only a few clicks, purchasing a paid VPN has become complicated in Russia, as Western sanctions have rendered Russian credit and debit cards nearly useless outside the country. That has forced many to resort to free VPNs, which can have spotty service and can sell information about users.
Vytautas Kaziukonis, chief executive of Surfshark — a Lithuania-based VPN that saw a 20-fold increase in Russian users in March — said some of those customers are now paying in cryptocurrencies or through people they know in third countries.
In a country used to hardships, Russians are good at creative workarounds. Elena, a 50-year-old Moscow tour operator, said she has managed to tap into her old Facebook account by repeatedly signing up for free trials with a series of different VPN providers to avoid payment.
“We do what we have to do,” Elena said.
8. Ukraine Brutally Trolls Putin With App Tracking Russian Deaths
Will this kind of ingenuity and whole of society contribution bring victory to Ukraine? As Bonaprte said, the moral is to the physical as three is to one.
Ukraine Brutally Trolls Putin With App Tracking Russian Deaths
Ukraine’s military has named the app “Russian ship, go fuck yourself,” in the latest effort to cut through the Kremlin’s lies about Russian casualties in the war.
Published May. 05, 2022 1:08PM ET
Dogukan Keskinkilic/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images
The app, which the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine created in concert with Alty, a Ukrainian tech company, can be downloaded by looking up Русский корабль иди нах@й, or Ркин, in the app store. The app also includes information about Russian equipment, the military said.
Leonid Goriev, the CEO of Alty, said the company created the app to help bring Ukraine a victory sooner.
“We were inspired by the daily work of the specialists of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, who diligently formulated information on the damage of enemy personnel and the Russian Federation technology in their infographics,” Gorev said in a statement shared by the Ukrainian military. “Therefore, on a volunteer basis, we created a handy app with a set of beautiful widgets to track the occupant's losses and bring our victory closer.”
A spokesperson for Alty confirmed to The Daily Beast the company made the app.
The cheeky app includes instructions for users on how to make the app’s information and latest stats appear on the iPhone’s “Today View” (the side screen with multiple widgets users can access by swiping all the way to the right on the Home Screen) so users don’t even have to click into the app to get the latest information on just how poorly Russia’s military is doing.
The casualties for Russia have been staggering. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization estimated in March that up to 40,000 Russians were killed, captured, missing, or suffering from wounds during just the first months of the war. Overall, approximately 24,700 Russian troops have died since the beginning of the war, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine said Thursday.
Although Russian forces have been committing atrocities throughout Ukraine, the Russian military hasn’t been performing very well from an operational standpoint. They’ve been having trouble coordinating plans from the top-down. Russian forces weren’t able to capture Kyiv at the outset of the invasion as planned, and instead were stuck outside the capital without proper sustainment supplies. Eventually, they had to just up and leave because they couldn’t get the job done.
“They have no reason to stop the war at this point.”
Russian military leadership has even been lying to Russian President Vladimir Putin along the way, misleading him on just how poorly the armed forces are performing, a senior White House official said in March.
And along the way, Putin’s apparent interest in helping provide life-sustaining tools on the battlefield to keep the war going as much as he can has been dismal. A photo comparing Russian first aid kits and Ukrainian first aid kits that Russian fighters shared on social media last week shows the Russians are not nearly as prepared to provide life-saving care in crisis situations as Ukrainians are, which is certainly not helping the military keep up the numbers necessary to fight the war.
The app comes at a potentially pivotal moment in the war where tracking casualties might provide up-to-the minute information on which way the wind is blowing. Although Russia has had to regroup and move off the goal of taking Kyiv, Russia has instead set its sights on fighting in Eastern Ukraine in the Donbas. And in the coming days, as Victory Day nears in Russia, the day Russia celebrates the victory in World War II against the Nazis, senior Biden administration officials are warning that Putin might be working to escalate the war, as The Daily Beast reported. Ukrainian officials have suggested that Putin will seek to declare war formally and mobilize even more troops to take on the fight in Ukraine by Victory Day, May 9.
And more mobilization means, inevitably, more Russian troops sent home in body bags.
For now, there is no clear way out of the war, Russian military analysts tell The Daily Beast.
“There is nothing to suggest to us that either country is going to make major concessions for peace or that either military is likely to quit the fight in the near future,” Michael Kofman, research program director in the Russia Studies Program at CNA, told The Daily Beast. “If the Russian leadership declares a state of war and begins mobilizing the population, that mobilization… is a very strong indicator that this war is likely to go on much longer and be more costly.”
Regardless of whether May 9 leads to massive escalation, all signs point to this war dragging on with no end in sight, according to Rob Lee, a Russian military analyst at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
“The bad thing for the occupier is that Ukraine gets a vote on this and… they have no reason to stop the war at this point,” Lee said. “There are more than a few Ukrainian people who want to take back all the Donbas.”
9. Why the Philippine election could be a win for China
Excerpts:
But Arugay, too, points to the issue of balance, adding that even if Marcos pursues a deeper relationship with Beijing, that may not necessarily come at the expense of a relationship with the US.
“Just like any other Philippine President, if he wins, (Marcos) will also try and approach the US, because whatever happens, the new President will have a chance for a reboot,” he said.
Why the Philippine election could be a win for China | CNN
CNN · by Simone McCarthy · May 5, 2022
Hong Kong CNN —
Speaking in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People during his first state visit to China in 2016, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte heralded a bold new era in his country’s foreign policy: “America has lost now,” he said. “I’ve realigned myself in your ideological flow.”
While Duterte later clarified that he was not planning to sever ties with the United States – a treaty ally and longstanding diplomatic partner – he continued to threaten to downgrade the relationship while pivoting to China, despite a simmering territorial dispute with Beijing.
Now, with the election to decide Duterte’s successor days away, analysts say there is an opportunity for a reset of the Philippines’ relationships with both major powers – and its outcome could shift the balance of power in Asia.
How that shapes up may come down to the aims of current presidential frontrunner Ferdinand Marcos Jr. – the son and namesake of the Philippines’ late deposed dictator – who is widely seen as more friendly to China than his nearest rival Leni Robredo, the sitting vice president.
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping before their meeting at the Great Hall of People in Beijing on April 25, 2019.
KENZABURO FUKUHARA/AFP/Getty Images
Who Filipinos pick when they cast their votes on Monday, will have ramifications far beyond the country’s borders.
For the US, close ties with the Philippines, including American troop rotations there under a two-decade-old agreement, are critical to its strategy in the region, where Washington seeks to counter Beijing’s growing footprint.
The Philippines has been on the front line of those Chinese ambitions in the South China Sea, with Manila in recent years accusing Beijing of trying to intimidate its coast guard vessels and assembling a “maritime militia” to crowd out its fishing boats. Beijing claims large swaths of the resource-rich waters as its own, even after Manila challenged that in an international court of arbitration and won.
But Duterte did little to assert that 2016 court decision, analysts say, and how much the next Philippine President uses the ruling to push back on an expansive China will send signals not only to the leaders of other Southeast Asia nations who dispute China’s territorial claims – but also to Beijing.
“The Philippines is of very significant strategic importance to both (the US and China). China is right now consumed by domestic matters but it also continues to expand its activities in the South China Sea,” said Joshua Kurlantzick, a senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.
“And the US is definitely going to invest significant effort bonding with whoever leads the Philippines, simply for strategic reasons – the Philippines is of critical strategic importance, and there are also such close longstanding ties,” he said.
Balancing act
Manila has long sought to balance its ties with these powers – or play them off one another – and any President coming to power will need to navigate relationships with both, especially in the wake of Duterte’s pro-China bent.
Marcos, whose running mate is Duterte’s daughter, Sara, has for years called for Manila to deal with Beijing bilaterally over territorial claims.
Critics see his stance as deferential to China, and in recent months Marcos has met the Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian.
Beijing has praised its relationship with Duterte ever since his first visit to China – described by Chinese leader Xi Jinping last month as “an ice-breaking trip marking a milestone in the history of China-Philippines relations”, with Xi also saying China “stands ready” to “constantly elevate” relations.
The goodwill appears to extend to Marcos, who has been building a rapport with Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian in recent months. Huang said during an event in October that it was a “great honor” to meet Marcos and that as those in support of Sino-Philippines ties, “together, we are opening a brighter future.”
When it comes to the US, one issue is a human rights suit in the US seeking compensation for the victims of the late, elder Marcos’ brutal regime.
Analysts suggest could this complicate any future presidential visit to the United States, were Marcos to win. While Marcos has recently characterized the relationship with the United States as “special,” a perceived snub from the White House could push Marcos closer to Beijing.
But how far he could lean toward China may be constrained by a public that wants to see a pragmatic, but firmer line on China than they did under Duterte, according to Richard Heydarian, a professor of political science at Polytechnic University of the Philippines. Marcos would also need to manage a military establishment that’s critical of China, he added.
“And for (Robredo), she also cannot go for a confrontational policy towards China, because the reality is that the majority of Filipinos and the Philippine military, even, recognize the Philippines’ limitations in terms of standing up to China … (and) a lot of Filipinos also expressed their willingness to support economically productive relations with China,” he said, adding Robredo too is open to economic engagement, insofar as it doesn’t conflict with Philippine sovereignty.
Duterte’s own final years in office underline the sensitive balance, as the President dialed back his own rhetoric against the United States, not only backing out of a vow to end the agreement governing the presence of American forces in the country, but hosting a large joint military exercise with US troops and pushing back on Chinese maritime presence – amid a rising sense that China has not delivered on promises to the Philippines.
“The reality is that China was not reciprocating President Duterte’s charm offensive … China’s pledges of investment, which were largely illusory, made Duterte make a lot of geopolitical concessions,” Heydarian said, adding that in the meantime China continued to press its own claims.
Uncertain future
Whether, or to what extent, Marcos would try to extend Duterte’s pivot to China is elected is not yet clear, experts say, pointing to the absence of a detailed foreign policy – or information on who would lead his foreign affairs.
But there are signs that Marcos, unlike Robredo, may hew more closely to Duterte when it comes to handling issues in the South China Sea.
Philippines Vice President Leni Robredo addresses a crowd on May 1, 2022 in Manila.
Jes Aznar/Getty Images
Robredo has made clear throughout her campaign that she would engage China multilaterally, relying on strength in numbers alongside friendly nations “to help a small country like the Philippines do what it takes to use the 2016 (South China Sea) arbitration award … (toward its) national interest,” said Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby, an associate professor of international studies at De La Salle University in Manila, the Philippines.
For Robredo to allow certain deals with China, like joint oil exploration in the South China Sea, the “buck stops” with whether China acknowledges the court ruling on the Philippines’ claims, she added.
Marcos, too, in a debate earlier this year, appeared tough on China – saying he would send warships to the South China Sea to protect Philippines’ territorial claims. But a dearth of details has raised questions as to whether this was an idle claim. Instead, analysts point to his long-standing calls for bilateral resolution.
“Marcos has insisted that he will deal with China in a more bilateral manner, which somehow is what Beijing wants … and puts the Philippines, again, in a position of weakness,” said Aries Arugay, a visiting fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.
But Arugay, too, points to the issue of balance, adding that even if Marcos pursues a deeper relationship with Beijing, that may not necessarily come at the expense of a relationship with the US.
“Just like any other Philippine President, if he wins, (Marcos) will also try and approach the US, because whatever happens, the new President will have a chance for a reboot,” he said.
CNN · by Simone McCarthy · May 5, 2022
10. Can the Intelligence Community Tell What’s Brewing in Afghanistan?
A HOOVER INSTITUTION ESSAY FROM THE CARAVAN NOTEBOOK
Can the Intelligence Community Tell What’s Brewing in Afghanistan?
REUEL MARC GERECHT
Whenever the United States gets traumatized by the unexpected abroad, discussions inevitably start about the inadequacy of American intelligence collection and analysis. There is truth behind this reex response: US intelligence organizations, particularly the two largest and most consequential, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA), the latter of which is responsible for the bulk of America’s intercept of foreign communications and other digital treasure troves, often don’t perform as envisioned. Criticisms of the NSA usually revolve around timeliness—seeing and analyzing the intercepts soon enough—and the unavoidable mathematical problems that give encryption an advantage over decryption. And Langley has a way of condently repackaging establishment biases, in both analysis and operations, which makes it comfortable speaking “truth” to power except when conventional wisdom fails. Weapons of mass destruction—seeing them when they’re not there, not seeing them when they are—revolutionary movements, and religious terrorism have been challenging subjects for Langley to get ahead of. And the Directorate of Operations, the outt that makes the CIA special among America’s intelligence services, has long-standing problems with agent recruitment—a chronic inability to put the right operatives on difcult targets long enough to develop creative approaches and a promotions system that rewards case ofcers who recruit by volume not quality—that may well have given us, among other things, nearly useless agents against the Taliban and Al-Qa’ida.
11. A View From the Trenches on the Debate Wracking the Marine Corps
Conclusion:
Bottom line: When a small-unit leader involved in the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s infantry battalion experimentation efforts is asked “What now, Lieutenant?” you get an entirely different response today than I did while fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Force Design 2030 provides the squad leader, platoon commander, and company commander with an increase in lethality and survivability from their own intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting assets along with loitering munitions employed with a level of precision and accuracy that minimizes the threat of collateral damage and civilian casualties. Now, when asked “What now, Lieutenant?” you get a sheepish grin, and a “Watch this, Gunner.”
A View From the Trenches on the Debate Wracking the Marine Corps - War on the Rocks
This debate has provided many perspectives that are all important for the Marine Corps and the United States, but surprisingly the debate has overshadowed what Force Design 2030 is already doing at the tactical level — especially among the infantry units who are at the service’s tactical edge.
I have been a Marine infantryman for almost 30 years. For the last three years, I’ve served as one of my service’s representatives on the Pentagon’s Close Combat Lethality Task Force, which focuses on small-unit, tactical operations. As most War on the Rocks readers will likely recall, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis created this task force in 2018 to improve the “combat preparedness, lethality, survivability, and resiliency of our nation’s ground close-combat formations.” Mattis explained:
These formations have historically accounted for almost 90 percent of our casualties and yet our personnel policies, advances in training methods, and equipment have not kept pace with changes in available technology, human factors science, and talent-management best practices.
Gen. David Berger’s Force Design 2030 is doing more than any other military service’s plan to realize Mattis’ intent on close-combat lethality. For example, the initiative directs educating and training in this area, as well as properly manning small units with more mature leaders. It raises the rank to job requirements for fireteam leaders, squad leaders, and platoon sergeants, increasing the time, exposure, and experience needed for these specific small-unit leaders. It also directs an investment in better weapons and equipment for squad-, platoon-, and company-sized formations in order to enable them with organic intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities; tactical network and communications systems; and organic precision fires that change the long-standing equation of attacker-to-defender, this math equation for planning operations used to require three attackers for every defender, but not anymore. These changes have led to marines being able to conduct attacks much differently than in the past. I seek to explain these changes and tell a broader audience why I’m so encouraged by the commandant’s initiatives. But in order to understand these changes, we need to explain first what it was like for Marine infantrymen only a decade ago.
“What Now, Lieutenant?”
There are three words that every Marine infantry officer knows all too well: “What now, Lieutenant?” I asked a platoon commander this in 2013 as withering enemy fire was massing on our position, and casualties mounted.
On this cold morning in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, the feared most dangerous course of enemy action identified during the planning process was now being pressed on the marines. As the platoon commander assessed the battlespace with intensity, I asked again: “What now, Lieutenant?” Without looking at me, and keeping his focus downrange, his response was quick: “We need to close with the enemy, Gunner.” His answer was right, so I asked another question: “What do we need to do that?” His response was quick again: “We need to bring in fires and gain fire superiority so we can close.” Again, it was the right answer, but he quickly realized that he didn’t have air support and was already denied artillery due to the civilians on the battlefield. He only had medium machine guns with him since the use of mortars was also restricted by the rules of engagement to avoid civilian casualties.
This is the American way of war. We do not kill civilians intentionally. So I asked again: “What now, Lieutenant? You don’t have fire support, and only organic machine guns against a numerically superior enemy who has massed fires. So, what now?” He broke his gaze from downrange and stared at me in shock and said that we had to break contact — to retreat. In both our hearts we knew it was the right answer, but marines have been trained to close with and destroy the enemy. That’s what we do. We don’t retreat, but that day we did.
The timeliness and responsiveness of fires, and their release authority, have always plagued light infantry units. These problems have only been exacerbated by technology and the ability of the higher headquarters, focused on the strategic and operational levels of combat, to have direct involvement in tactical decisions and actions.
The year before, in 2012, after a tough 15-day combat operation filled with daylong gunfights and casualties, I approached an exhausted company commander at Camp Leatherneck after being extracted off the battlefield by helicopter. His head was in both hands as he sat slumped over on the side of the flight line. He looked up at me as I approached, and I asked if he was okay. His voice, filled with frustration and guilt, announced, “Gunner, I know I am supposed to close with the enemy when we make contact and are heavily engaged, but I am not being given what it takes to do it, and I am not willing to waste my marines’ lives.” He was heartbroken and frustrated. He felt like he was betraying his lawful oath as a Marine officer by not attacking, even though he didn’t have fire support. Marines close with and destroy the enemy. That’s what we do, and when we don’t, then something’s wrong.
Every infantry leader of my generation is familiar with another tragic example of how this has unfolded: the Battle of Wanat in Afghanistan. On one day in the summer of 2008, nine American soldiers were killed and 27 wounded because the Taliban were able to exploit these gaps in the kill-chain, leaving the American unit exposed and deprived of timely artillery and air support. Light infantry units have been overly dependent on non-organic fire support that has only fallen victim to kill-chain micromanagement. These problems, which pre-date the 9/11 wars, are not going to be wished away. The solution has always been clear: Provide small units with their own lethal weapons systems instead of keeping them assigned to a higher headquarters. Tragically, as Mattis stated in his Close Combat Lethality Task Force guidance, the solution to these problems has long existed. However, senior leaders responsible for combat development as well as resourcing, to include those in the Marine Corps, have not prioritized these units’ modernization. Instead, the Pentagon continued to choose to relearn the same lessons in blood.
Platoon Attack
Fast-forward to a training exercise in March 2022 at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. The marines from Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines, one of the service’s experimental infantry battalions, emerged from their assembly area and began their attack on a heavily defended objective. First platoon was up against an entrenched enemy platoon supported by armored vehicles, machine guns, and organic indirect fire weapons consisting of light mortars and grenade launchers. As a general rule of thumb, attacking an entrenched enemy in the defense has been thought to require a force ratio of at least three to one. By echelons, this rule of thumb suggests a platoon is needed to dislodge a squad, a company to dislodge a platoon, and so on.
As the marines moved towards their line of departure, you could hear the radio communication between element leaders and their fire support taking place. Long-range rocket artillery was being employed by the battalion in support of the attack, which had already started in order to suppress an enemy reserve element beyond the line of sight of those conducting the attack. Marines operating within the battalion’s fire support coordination cell coordinated the employment of these fires, leveraging intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities provided by the unit’s remotely piloted aircraft. They also leveraged the lethal effects from Hero-120 drone strikes. Over the past decade, these revolutionary armed and remotely piloted aircraft, sometimes referred to as loitering munitions, have repeatedly proven their devastating effectiveness in combat against armored and mechanized vehicles. General Berger’s decision to take advantage of the democratization of airpower, providing these weapon systems to the Marine infantry, proved to have similar effects for Alpha Company. Instead of marines only being able to “suppress” the enemy reserve element during their attack, they were now able to “destroy” it, at ranges far exceeding the engagement criteria set in planning.
Simultaneous with the enemy reserve element’s destruction, Alpha’s first platoon commander and his squad leaders, all seasoned Infantry Unit Leader Course-certified staff sergeants, made final assault preparations at their line of departure. They were aided by receiving up to the second, real-time information on the enemy disposition at their objective. This information, provided by a young lance corporal remotely piloted aircraft operator, was also passed to the company’s Switchblade 300 operators. The platoon commander told these marines to destroy in priority order: enemy light armored vehicles, crew-served weapons, command and control locations, and then groups of three or more combatants on the objective.
“Enemy mortar position destroyed, three enemy vehicles destroyed, now attacking targets in trench line,” came the voice of the lance corporal guiding the loitering munitions onto the enemy.
While the lance corporal and the Switchblade operators employed their combined arms capabilities to destroy key parts of the enemy’s defense, the company’s electronic warfare marines — another new addition to the formation catalyzed by Mattis’ intent to increase the company’s organic ability to locate and interfere with enemy communications — waited for first platoon’s assault element to cross the line of departure. On order, these marines had two tasks. First, they were to jam the enemy’s tactical network. Second, they were to flood the objective area with “spectrum noise” designed to confuse the enemy such that the platoon’s radio emissions could not be effectively targeted. Concurrently, the company’s cyber marines protected the unit’s tactical network from enemy attack.
Once the priority targets were destroyed in order on the objective, the platoon commander ordered the electronic warfare and cyber marines to execute their tasks. He then ordered the staff sergeant leading the platoon’s support-by-fire element to occupy its position. Expeditionary modular autonomous vehicles armed with machine guns raced to their firing locations while the Switchblade team destroyed additional enemy positions. Suppressive machine-gun fires then effectively engaged the enemy across the objective. These fires, employed by marines from positions of cover as they leveraged advanced, video-streaming optics on their machine guns, enabled the platoon’s Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle element to go into action. This element, equipped with anti-armor and bunker-busting capabilities fielded only a year ago, leveraged the weapon’s extended range capabilities and advanced fire control systems as it moved from “cold” into “hot” positions to destroy reinforced enemy targets in the objective area.
Conditions were now set for first platoon’s marines to cross their line of departure into the assault. As the marines maneuvered, they employed by hand and from their M320 grenade launchers squad-organic drones equipped with camera payloads and high explosives. The platoon’s supporting effort assistant squad leader controlled this additional “swarm” of drones from a covered position, providing further precision strikes on enemy crew-served weapons teams and individual defenders in the trench.
During the platoon’s movement from its attack into assault position, the enemy attempted to thwart the attack by unmasking and employing light-armored technical vehicles that had not been previously identified. As the vehicles unmasked, the company’s Switchblade operators had their armed aircraft in loitering positions above the objective. These marines subsequently made quick work of these vehicles, destroying with top-down attack strikes, within seconds. All the while, the platoon’s squads continued maneuvering unimpeded into their assault positions without taking any casualties.
Now, the real fight began. Gaining a foothold on a defended objective remains one of the toughest tasks for any combat element. Squad one was given this task, and once the squad leader had massed enough combat power, he gave his orders. But before he could establish his internal support-by-fire and assign the marines that were going to deliver the high-explosive breach using hand grenades, a swarm of Drone 40 loitering munitions massed and smashed into the entry point designated by the squad leader. The assistant squad leader back at the attack position had planned these fires before the attack, and the squad leader was caught off guard by how quick, accurate, and effective this happened. The squad leader gave first fire team the command to enter the trench, and the foothold was established. When it became time to clear the trench, the squad’s “quadcopter” gave visual feedback to the assistant squad leader, leading the fire team clearing the trench. One by one, each bunker was first cleared by the assistant squad leader using the quadcopter and Drone 40 loitering munitions before a marine went inside to confirm all enemy combatants were destroyed. Very little rifle fire was used by the assault squad.
Once the objective was secured, the platoon consolidated in the immediate area. Based on the training scenario, however, the enemy had an additional tank capability still in the reserve, which intended to wage a counterattack on the platoon. Similar to what happened toward the start of the scenario, though, marines in the battalion fire support coordination center, leveraging remotely piloted aircraft for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as long-range rocket artillery fires, and Hero-120 systems, destroyed the tank formation. In the end, the objective was secured in less than 20 minutes, and there were no casualties taken by the main effort squad.
The platoon’s second and third squads then moved quickly to join the assault squad on the objective. Armed with new infantry assault rifles, suppressors, variable-powered scopes, additional recoilless rifles, and M320 grenade launchers, these marines were fully prepared and eager to employ combined arms to destroy any additional counterattacking enemy force. Additionally, the relative speed of the platoon’s attack, enhanced by wearing lighter body armor, integrated enhanced hearing protection to block out rifle fire and rocket fire preserving the marines’ hearing for verbal commands, and enhanced individual night-vision goggles, provided the marines with game-changing advantages when compared to the infantry attacks discussed earlier from Afghanistan. The lethality and efficiency of Alpha Company’s attack left the squads on the objective with little to do as the remaining enemy hastily retreated, simulated by autonomous robotic targets that make live-fire training as realistic as possible. After this enemy retreat, the expeditionary modular autonomous vehicles displaced from the support-by-fire position and moved to the limit of advance, joining the platoon consolidating in the defense, carrying their packs and extra ammo.
The speed and lethality that was delivered by 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines with their hyper-enabled small units is all part of the experimentation being conducted by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory in support of Force Design 2030. Even though some of the technologies described have yet to be fielded (for example, Switchblade systems served as surrogates for the proven Hero-120 systems until they are fielded), the conceptual employment of these “system of systems” is undergoing rigorous real-world employment and development with the General Berger’s Force Design 2030 Fleet Marine Force. While many of these capabilities are new to the Marine Corps, they are combat-tested systems that have been in use by special operations forces and the militaries of allied nations such as Israel for many years.
“Watch This, Gunner”
1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, which is also involved in the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s infantry battalion experimentation effort, deployed to 29 Palms, California in 2021. While in the desert, the marines conducted platoon attacks on Range 410. Marine rifle platoons have executed attacks on this range for the past 40 years. In 2021, however, a young captain involved in the experimentation presented a problem to the training control group that runs the range that now, miles away from Range 410, even from Camp Wilson, with organic intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting drones and precision loitering munitions, the marines can destroy every target on the range from beyond line of sight, so the dilemma fell on the control group, what now? How do we evaluate platoon attacks with platoons that have these types of capabilities?
Bottom line: When a small-unit leader involved in the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s infantry battalion experimentation efforts is asked “What now, Lieutenant?” you get an entirely different response today than I did while fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Force Design 2030 provides the squad leader, platoon commander, and company commander with an increase in lethality and survivability from their own intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting assets along with loitering munitions employed with a level of precision and accuracy that minimizes the threat of collateral damage and civilian casualties. Now, when asked “What now, Lieutenant?” you get a sheepish grin, and a “Watch this, Gunner.”
Chief Warrant Officer (Marine Gunner) Stephen W. LaRose is a member of the Close Combat Lethality Task Force. He is also a veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as various other operations around the globe. He is the recipient of two Bronze Stars and was awarded the 2013 Hulbert Trophy for outstanding leadership by a Marine gunner. The opinions and views expressed here are not those of the Close Combat Lethality Task Force, the Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Photo by Lance Cpl. Ryan Ramsammy. 2nd Marine Division.
12. Russia Just Lost Its Most Advanced Operational Tank In Ukraine
Russia Just Lost Its Most Advanced Operational Tank In Ukraine
The first confirmed loss of Russia’s most advanced operational tank is another blow to the Russian Army’s eroded image.
BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK, OLIVER PARKEN, TYLER ROGOWAY
MAY 4, 2022 9:24 PM
thedrive.com · by Joseph Trevithick, Oliver Parken, Tyler Rogoway · May 4, 2022
The war in Ukraine has had its fair share of embarrassments for the Kremlin. From the sinking of the Slava class cruiser Moskva in April to the infamous 40-mile-long Russian military convoy holdup near Kyiv seen earlier in the conflict, Moscow has had little to cheer about in terms of projecting competent military strength. The latest hit comes via visual evidence that a Russian T-90M P
roryv-3 (Breakthrough-3) — a modern and rare main battle tank — has been destroyed on the battlefield by Ukrainian forces.
Shared on Twitter by The Kyiv Independent’s defense reporter Illia Ponomarenko, the image, dated May 4, shows what appears to be the remnants of a T-90M tank, still smoldering after a direct hit somewhere within Ukraine’s northeastern Kharkiv Oblast. Andriy Tsaplienko is seen reporting in the foreground.
News of what appears to be the first T-90M tank destroyed in Ukraine should lift the spirits of the Ukrainian forces, given its status as the most technologically advanced and capable tank within Russia’s frontline military arsenal. The initial batch of production T-90M tanks were only issued to the 2nd Guards M. I. Kalinin Taman Motor Rifle Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army in the spring of 2020, with recent estimates suggesting that only 100 or so models are currently in service in total. The much-hyped, but still not proven, T-14 Armata main battle tanks, aren't yet ready for frontline combat and are in very short supply. This is mainly due to the financial realities of producing a brand new tank and the development it takes to make it actually work as promised. So, the Uralvagonzavod-designed T-90M serves as an important update to the T-90 line of tanks, first introduced in the early 1990s as a direct outgrowth of the T-72. The T-90M follows the T-90MS Proryv-2 (Breakthrough 2), an upgrade of the export-centered T-90S variant, which was revealed in 2011.
The tank’s destruction reflects Moscow’s readiness to commit such high-end materiel in battle. This comes amid Russia’s wider concentration of its forces in the east of Ukraine, in a bid to further exert control over the eastern Donbas region. Early evidence that Russia may have committed some of its limited supply of T-90M tanks to the conflict began to surface in April. Video evidence released by the National Guard of Russia (Rosgvardia) on April 25, which has since circulated on social media, revealed a crudely concealed T-90M tank in Kharkiv Oblast.
While losing any of its prized T-90M tanks is obviously a blow, the Russian Army has had to deal with other issues related to its tank arsenal during the conflict. In particular, older Soviet-era tanks, including the T-72 and T-80 models, which have been used widely in the invasion, have suffered from a much-publicized ‘jack-in-the-box’ effect due to how rounds for the tank's main gun are stored internally in the hull. This often results in the turret violently separating from the rest of the vehicle hull if an attack causes that ammunition to cook off.
Boasting an improved 2A46M-4 125mm smoothbore main gun in a modernized turret, the T-90M is encased with advanced armor-protection and countermeasures capabilities. Relikt built-in explosive reactive armor (ERA) is designed to protect against shaped charges and minimizes the impact of armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) rounds.
Additionally, the tank features slat armor in places and can also be equipped with net armor, both of which are designed to improve its defenses against rocket-propelled grenades. Its countermeasures include smoke grenade launchers, which can further help to conceal it, including from infantry with anti-tank weaponry. Major sensor and fire control enhancements make up the heart of the T-90M upgrade, as well as an advanced remote weapon station. The tank's environmental and propulsion systems, as well as its ammo handling system, are all upgraded, as well. These upgrades don't seem to have helped the T-90M in question, which stands as the first confirmed loss of the type.
Regardless of why T-90M tanks do not appear to have been used in the conflict until more recently, photos of Russia's most advanced operational tank, destroyed on Ukrainian soil, won't sit well with the Russian Army, the image of which as a feared combat force has degraded to a degree few would have imagined over the last two and a half months.
Contact the editor: Tyler@thedrive.com
thedrive.com · by Joseph Trevithick, Oliver Parken, Tyler Rogoway · May 4, 2022
13. An Airfield Too Far: Failures at Market Garden and Antonov Airfield
History may not repeat but it seems to rhyme.
Excerpts:
In the analysis of Operation Market Garden and the assault on Antonov Airport, the similarities are quite telling and present a list of considerations for planners of vertical envelopment operations in the future. A lightly armed group of paratroopers can use speed and violence of action to force an enemy into capitulation, but they must have surprise on their side. FM 3-99, Airborne and Air Assault Operations states, “Tactical surprise and detailed planning should enable units to seize their assault objectives and to establish the airhead before the enemy has time to react in force.” The ability to understand the terrain, objectives, and supporting fires is critical in the time between first landings and reinforcements, when the assault is at the most vulnerable stage.
Before intelligence planning and equipment loadouts are to be considered, the mission has to be a sustainable one. Airborne forces are not designed to hold out for extended periods of time. The Market Garden operation was supposed to take forty-eight to ninety-six hours and the Antonov Airport assault ended up taking approximately the same amount of time. The physical distance between relieving forces and the air assault bridge needs to be considered. By understanding the potential obstacles and resistance to operations, the vertical envelopment plan can come to more realistic aims, increasing the chance of success. The air assault, be it by parachute or helicopter, puts the trooper in a very precarious position. It is incumbent on the paratrooper’s leadership to ensure the ways, means, and ends of an operation align and ensure no airport or bridge is too far.
An Airfield Too Far: Failures at Market Garden and Antonov Airfield - Modern War Institute
Standing in the door of the lead aircraft, the paratroop commander adjusted his helmet and equipment one last time. The jump light glowed red. The land below was enemy-held terrain, with objectives ripe for seizure by his crack forces. Their mission, as befitting paratroops, had strategic and operational objectives at its heart. Sixty miles behind enemy lines at a thousand feet, the war’s rapid conclusion could be within his grasp. The light turned green and out he stepped. The slipstream pulled him down and away, toward his fate on the ground.
The paratroop commander could have been an American, British, or Polish officer over the Netherlands in 1944 or a Russian officer over Ukraine more recently. Being dropped behind enemy lines in pursuit of strategic and operational objectives, fighting outnumbered and surrounded by enemy forces, and trying to hold on until the ground forces arrive remain constants for an airborne force. The geographic similarities between mass parachute operations in the Netherlands during Operation Market Garden and the early morning airborne assault on Antonov Airport near Kyiv are striking. Both objectives were approximately sixty miles from the nearest friendly lines. Commanders sought to significantly shorten the war by seizing critical operational and strategic objectives. Commanders in both cases underestimated the enemy forces waiting below. By analyzing the airborne drops and subsequent ground combat in 1944 and 2022, through the prism of American airborne doctrine, the vertical envelopment practitioner and planner can learn valuable lessons paid for in the blood of these airborne soldiers.
Russian Airborne Forces
The Vozdushno-desantnye voyska Rossii (VDV) is an elite Russian airborne organization, designed to be, as one Russian analyst stated, “light imperial infantry,” responsible for quick reaction within Russia’s near abroad. Except for the vaunted and mysterious Spetsnaz, the 45,000-strong VDV is seen as the most elite element of the Russian military, with its own annual and nationally recognized Paratroopers Day and having a separate branch status on par with the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, responsible for ground-based nuclear missiles, within the Russian Armed Forces. The VDV was the first military organization to practice parachute operations as a mass military maneuver, starting with initial twelve-parachutist sticks in 1930 and progressing to brigade-sized elements by 1933.
Increasing the VDV’s capabilities was a key priority of the 2008 New Look reforms to the Russian army. This increase in capabilities focused on the ability to project power via expeditionary operations, improving readiness and effectiveness by increased proportion of contract personnel, and increases in modernized equipment. The VDV is also unique in military circles as being one of very few, if not the only, large-scale airborne formations with organic armored vehicles capable of inserting with their paratroopers into operations. The VDV is often the first unit of the Russian military to openly conduct operations within the Russian sphere of influence, most famously as the core of the “Little Green Men” who took part in the annexation of Crimea. The VDV attempted to replicate this success in the early days of the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 and were met with the dire realities of modern air assault/airborne operations.
Sixty Miles to End the War: Market Garden, 1944
By the fall of 1944, the European Theater of Operations was one of burgeoning hope and optimism. The overall aim of the combined Market Garden operation (Market being the airborne element and Garden being the ground element) was to create an entrenched foothold into the Ruhr valley to enable destruction of the German industrial base, thereby diminishing Germany’s ability to make war and creating the conditions for a quick surrender by Christmas 1944. Supporting the airborne plan were the well-supplied and battle-tested Allied airborne divisions (the British 1st Airborne Division and the American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions) and the Polish 1st Independent Airborne Brigade, a total of approximately forty-two thousand paratroopers. Garden’s units, aligned under the XXX Corps, consisted of ten motorized and armored brigades, numbering approximately fifty thousand men. Opposing them were nearly one hundred thousand German soldiers, including two Waffen-SS Panzer divisions being rearmed and refitted.
While initial airborne operations successfully captured key terrain and roadways, the inability of XXX Corps to conduct a quick linkup with the Allied airborne forces, combined with stiffer-than-expected German resistance, caused the overall plan to collapse. Market Garden has gone down in the annals of history as a bitter Allied loss, resulting in approximately sixteen thousand Allied casualties and delaying Allied plans to capture the Ruhr valley by at least seven months, resulting in several more tens of thousands of deaths.
Sixty Miles to End the War: Antonov Airport, 2022
The initial VDV assault into Antonov Airport consisted of approximately a company-sized element of three hundred light infantry soldiers with light antitank and modern assault rifles, supported by Ka-52 and Mi-8 helicopters for fire support and transport, respectively. The perceived aim of the assault was to create an air bridge for subsequent units of the VDV, notably those of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division from Pskov, Russia, to launch a rapid and sustained decapitation strike of the Ukrainian government to quickly end the war in Russia’s favor. Arrayed against them was the National Guard of Ukraine’s 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade, a combined arms force trained to NATO standards, which includes a tank battalion, an artillery battery, and an intelligence section with organic signals intelligence and unmanned aerial vehicles, in support of its two infantry battalions. The lack of air support, poor intelligence, and an inability to counter a combined arms attack ultimately spelled the doom of the operation and subsequently created the conditions wherein the Antonov Airport was rendered inoperable by the Ukrainians, meaning the VDV failed in its overall objective.
Airborne Planning
At the tactical level, both the Allies and Russians suffered from a failure to use intelligence appropriately. Both believed they were going against the decaying husks of beaten enemies. Despite an abundance of signals intelligence from the Ultra intercept program, Allied intelligence officers were unable to convince commanders of the dangers to the airborne forces posed by German troop strength. The Allies believed the Germans’ fighting spirit had been crushed in the summer offensives of 1944 out of the Normandy beachhead and all that remained was to crush the Ruhr industrial area and end Germany’s physical ability to make war. The Allied commanders believed the bulk of the German Army had moved into Germany and the area along the Market Garden route would be defended by the old, infirm, and Hitler Youth.
Landing and Air Movement Plan
In 1944, the Allies controlled all the water crossings along the sixty-four-mile route for the Garden portion of Market Garden and were able to prevent any successful German counterattacks. The use of a daytime drop meant the Allied paratroopers were able to effectively and quickly mass at their specified drop zones and move to their D-Day objectives. The relative lack of concentrated enemy forces in the American 101st and 82nd sectors of operation were meant to be overcome on D+1 (the second day of the operation) by XXX Corps relieving their positions. The British and Polish airborne forces at the northern end of the sixty-mile penetration of Allied forces were ordered to hold out for ninety-six hours before they would be relieved by XXX Corps.
Despite their vaunted and historical use of parachutes to insert troops, commanders of the 11th Guards Air Assault Brigade used twenty to thirty-four Mi-8 assault transports escorted by Ka-52 attack helicopters for a morning landing. The Russians wanted to insert their desantniki (paratroopers) to create an air bridge for follow-on forces to be flown into the airport and quickly move twenty miles into the city center of Kyiv. Similarly, the aerial insertion of the Allies’ 1st Allied Airborne Army took place in the daytime, roughly around 1230–1400 for initial drops, and captured key terrain and bridges for follow-on forces of XXX Corps to flow through and break into the Ruhr.
Both operations were initially successful. By midmorning, Russian forces had secured the airfield and eighteen Il-76MD troop transports headed toward Kyiv after taking off from Pskov, Russia, base of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division. A CNN news crew even conversed with one of the VDV commanders on the airfield only thirty-six minutes after the first helicopters were spotted over the Dnieper River near the airfield. By noon, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed the airport was in Russian hands.
Defensive Actions on the Drop Zone
While surprise assaults are key for airborne and air assault forces, and daring will often initially carry the day, the professional airborne practitioner must also be prepared for the enemy’s reaction. The Allies were initially very successful in the Market portion of Market Garden, but the Garden portion only achieved half their anticipated distance on the first day. Meanwhile the Germans also quickly realized what was happening and what the Allies thought were defenders who were too old, young, or sick to effectively fight were actually two SS Panzer divisions. These battle-hardened German units immediately and viciously counterattacked, separating the lightly armed and hard-to-reinforce Allied paratroopers. The Germans isolated Allied units, destroying them using combined arms and armor to overwhelm the airborne light infantry.
At Antonov Airport, the Russians used the speed and surprise of their initial assault into Ukraine to give the VDV a psychological advantage and present the Ukrainians with a fait accompli. Russian planners, however, failed to account for the strong resistance encountered both en route to the airport and after its initial securing. Conducting a daylight attack enabled Russia to overcome a lack of night-vision equipment and increase coordination but also left Russian forces vulnerable to man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), resulting in the loss of two Ka-52 and three Mi-8 helicopters. Furthermore, the Ukrainians quickly determined the Russian plan and immediately counterattacked with the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade of the Ukrainian National Guard with Su-24M attack aircraft for close air support. Despite Russian use of both rotary- and fixed-wing air support to counter the armored vehicles of the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade, the Ukrainian counterattack was a success. Russian paratroopers were driven off the airfield and into the surrounding woods by 2200.
Finalizing the Operation and Securing the Drop Zone
When the Allies were unable to meet their key strategic objective of crossing the Rhine, they were left with an exposed salient sixty miles deep. The exposed salient left the Allies open to counterattacks that needed to be defended against and repelled. The requirement to defend the salient further slowed Allied momentum as troops were now tied to an ancillary area of the European theater. The aftermath of Market Garden and the many noted deficiencies in intelligence and leadership led to a further nine months of occupation of the Netherlands and an estimated sixteen thousand additional Dutch deaths.
After the Ukrainian’s successful counterattack, the Russians reattacked Antonov Airport the following day with a combined air and ground attack that succeeded in finally driving off the Ukrainian defenders. The Ukrainians were successful in preventing the airport’s use as an air bridge into Kyiv by destroying the runway and other facilities to prevent the landing of further Russian transports. The Ukrainians maintained pressure on the Russians in the surrounding area of Hostomel and repeatedly attacked Russian armored columns, blunting any chance of a quick strike emerging from the airfield into Kyiv. At the operational and strategic levels, the VDV’s inability to support a quick strike meant its forces were tied down for weeks until finally being withdrawn in early April.
In the analysis of Operation Market Garden and the assault on Antonov Airport, the similarities are quite telling and present a list of considerations for planners of vertical envelopment operations in the future. A lightly armed group of paratroopers can use speed and violence of action to force an enemy into capitulation, but they must have surprise on their side. FM 3-99, Airborne and Air Assault Operations states, “Tactical surprise and detailed planning should enable units to seize their assault objectives and to establish the airhead before the enemy has time to react in force.” The ability to understand the terrain, objectives, and supporting fires is critical in the time between first landings and reinforcements, when the assault is at the most vulnerable stage.
Before intelligence planning and equipment loadouts are to be considered, the mission has to be a sustainable one. Airborne forces are not designed to hold out for extended periods of time. The Market Garden operation was supposed to take forty-eight to ninety-six hours and the Antonov Airport assault ended up taking approximately the same amount of time. The physical distance between relieving forces and the air assault bridge needs to be considered. By understanding the potential obstacles and resistance to operations, the vertical envelopment plan can come to more realistic aims, increasing the chance of success. The air assault, be it by parachute or helicopter, puts the trooper in a very precarious position. It is incumbent on the paratrooper’s leadership to ensure the ways, means, and ends of an operation align and ensure no airport or bridge is too far.
Gunnery Sgt. Jeremy Kofsky is a Marine with small unit operational experience on five continents. He is currently a parachute operations staff noncommissioned officer in charge at II Marine Expeditionary Force aboard Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: mil.ru
14. Pentagon in damage control mode over report that US intel was used to kill Russian generals
Who leaked this information? Or more precisely who is making these claims? Is this a result of Russian active measures to paint the US as a co-belligerent. I hope the NY Times thoroughly vetted its sources.
Excerpts:
But while Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has openly said that he wants to see Russia “weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine,” the kind of intelligence sharing reported by the New York Times would be unprecedented.
The news that the U.S. is providing intelligence to Ukrainian forces, which has then reportedly been used to target Russia’s military command structure in Ukraine, is just the latest in a long list of challenges facing the invading forces.
Pentagon in damage control mode over report that US intel was used to kill Russian generals
“We do not provide intelligence on the location of senior military leaders on the battlefield or participate in the targeting decisions of the Ukrainian military."
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According to the article published on Wednesday, “the United States has focused on providing the location and other details about the Russian military’s mobile headquarters, which relocate frequently.”
It’s part of a “classified effort by the Biden administration to provide real-time battlefield intelligence to Ukraine,” and “includes anticipated Russian troop movements gleaned from recent American assessments of Moscow’s secret battle plan for the fighting in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine,” reported the New York Times.
However, when asked about the report on Thursday, Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said, “the United States provides battlefield intelligence to help Ukrainians defend their country,” adding that, “We do not provide intelligence on the location of senior military leaders on the battlefield or participate in the targeting decisions of the Ukrainian military.”
Kirby continued, saying “the Ukrainians have, quite frankly, a lot more information than we do. This is their country, their territory, and they have capable intelligence collection abilities of their own. Ukraine combines information that we and other partners provide, with the intelligence that they themselves are gathering on the battlefield – and then they make their own decisions and they take their own actions.”
Likewise, Adrienne Curry, a spokeswoman for the National Security Council, said in a statement to Task & Purpose that, “The United States provides battlefield intelligence to help the Ukrainians defend their country. We do not provide intelligence with the intent to kill Russian generals.”
Unnamed officials quoted in the article did not specify how many generals had been killed as a result of shared intelligence. According to the New York Times, Ukrainian officials claim to have killed approximately 12 general officers on the front lines of the invasion.
From almost the beginning of the invasion, Russian generals have been dying on the battlefield, often on or very near the front lines.
The high number of fatalities among senior Russian officers may be due, in part, to Russian military doctrine.
As Michael Kofman, director of the Russia Studies program at CNA told Task & Purpose in March, “Russian military leaders are often sent to lead from the front,” adding that “Even senior officers are known to take on a lot of risk.” This is largely attributed to Russia’s lack of junior leadership, which pushes decisions higher and higher up the chain of command, as Task & Purpose previously reported.
Earlier this week, there were reports that Russia’s highest ranking general and chief of the general staff, Valery Gerasimov, had been wounded while visiting the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. U.S. officials would not confirm his location, but did confirm he was in Donbas. According to the Times, the United States did not provide intelligence to aid in a strike on Gerasimov.
It’s no secret that the United States as well as other countries are sending military aid to Ukraine. That includes more than $350 million in anti-tank weapons and anti-aircraft missiles authorized on Feb. 25. There are also the 90 M777 howitzers being transferred to Ukraine, along with 70,000 artillery rounds and training provided by Florida National Guard and Canadian Army troops.
In the air there have been the Switchblade and the Phoenix Ghost drones, both of which specialize in taking out armored vehicles.
But while Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has openly said that he wants to see Russia “weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine,” the kind of intelligence sharing reported by the New York Times would be unprecedented.
The news that the U.S. is providing intelligence to Ukrainian forces, which has then reportedly been used to target Russia’s military command structure in Ukraine, is just the latest in a long list of challenges facing the invading forces.
Max Hauptman has been covering breaking news at Task & Purpose since December 2021. He previously worked at The Washington Post as a Military Veterans in Journalism Fellow, as well as covering local news in New England. Contact the author here.
15. NCOs: America Has Them, China Wants Them, Russia is Struggling Without Them
As we are seeing, the NCO is the superpower and the secret sauce of the US and democratic countries with professional militaries.
NCOs: America Has Them, China Wants Them, Russia is Struggling Without Them
Non-commissioned officers, long the “backbone” of the U.S. military, are proving even more crucial on modern battlefields.
One reason the Russian military has struggled to win territory in Ukraine is its lack of a strong corps of non-commissioned officers, or NCOs, which are more crucial than ever to success on the modern battlefield, U.S. military officials and experts say.
In the American military, NCOs—enlisted servicemembers at or above the rank of Army and Marine corporal, Air Force staff sergeant, and Navy petty officer—are trusted experts who execute officers’ battlefield directions and take care of the troops. But while China is working to develop a corps of enlisted leaders, Russia seems stuck in an older model.
"The Russians are practicing a top-down, very, very top-heavy directive in nature–sort of, settled orders coming from the top, which is not necessarily the best thing to do in a dynamic battlefield," Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Tuesday to the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee.
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said that Russia’s failure to “integrate aerial fires with their ground maneuver” was due to the lack of lower-level leadership.
Rep. Mikie Sherrill, D-N.J., who served as a Sea King helicopter pilot in the Navy for 10 years, said Russia's performance in the war reaffirms her own experience: the military doesn't function without an empowered NCO class.
"I could have told you that certainly, that is the backbone of the U.S. fighting force. And I think we've seen the lack of that in the Russian military and how that impacts their ability to conduct this war and certainly, the inability without the mission command to really have anyone other than the actual general lead with the commander's intent," Sherrill said.
But others note that the Russian military has historically done reasonably well without a NCO corps. Michael Kofman, research program director at CNA’s Russian Studies Program, said that Russia and the Soviet Union have won wars in the past. In Ukraine, he said, the lack of an NCO corps is not the problem, but the top-down decision-making structure.
The Russian military is considered rigid at the tactical level and flexible only at the strategic operational level, Kofman said, leaving ownership and independent thinking to the officers. At these higher officer levels, he said, “That’s where you see the Russian military really sort of affected structurally as a force in terms of its culture and how it operates.”
Russia’s version of NCOs are mostly contracted troops who do not have a leadership role or manage discipline like their counterparts in the U.S. or British militaries, Kofman said.
“They are not in charge of, you know, adapting the unit. They're not in charge of tactics and things like that…The person in charge of everything is the officer. That's why the Russian military is officer top-heavy. The officer corps handles all those issues that NCOs might,” he said.
U.S. military services, by comparison, entrust leadership to NCOs. Mission command is pushed to the lowest possible rank, meaning that officers give objectives—for example, to seize a hill— and NCOs work out how to accomplish it, said Army Sgt. Maj. Jeremy Crisp, a spokesman at III Armored Corps at Fort Hood Texas.
“But for instance, if you're running up that hill and all of a sudden there's a roadblock that the commander didn't say in his initial intent, the soldiers are allowed the flexibility to figure out how to either go around, above, below, or through that roadblock to accomplish the mission, because the commander hasn't micromanaged it to such a point that the NCOs and the junior officers can’t accomplish that mission,” he said.
NCOs are also responsible for the combat readiness, including the general well-being, of their troops. In March, a senior U.S. defense official said that Russian forces had struggled to feed their troops.
“If you're not taking care of your soldiers, they're not going to be happy and they're going to be miserable. And then that's when the unit cohesion falls apart, that's when things like mutual trust falls apart. That's when things like shared understanding goes away,” Crisp said.
A large number of Russian generals have reportedly died in Ukraine, a rare occurrence in recent wars. Kofman said one reason is because Russian officers tend to lead from the front and survey battlefields themselves.
“They are a military where officers take a lot of risks that ours wouldn't,” he said. “Second, there are definitely aspects of Russian military culture where a lot of what happens with the unit heavily depends on the officer and their personality and their performance. And so officers show up to the battlefield to lend their personality to the fight.”
Kofman said Russia’s generals feel like they must do this because the military does not sufficiently delegate authority and lacks ownership in the lower echelon levels. “And that's in part because it doesn't have an NCO corps and it also doesn’t have that kind of culture,” he said.
In the U.S. military, officers and non-commissioned officers are linked together. Each commander has a non-commissioned officer counterpart, from the platoon level up to the chiefs of the service branches. Crisp, who has served in the Army for 21 years, including 15 years as an NCO, said the U.S. Army would “fall apart” without a strong NCO corps.
“Readiness would decrease, the ability to function would decrease, the ability to be lethal would decrease. You can't even fathom it,” he said.
Perhaps heeding that warning, China is working to develop its own NCO corps as part of its effort to make its People’s Liberation Army a world-class military by 2049. Personnel issues have been “one of the real challenges” for the PLA over the past 30 years, according to David Finkelstein, vice president and director of CNA’s China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs division.
In the late 1990s, China established its first program to develop a professional NCO corps, but it has not been working out as well as they had hoped, according to Finkelstein. In 2013, China’s Communist Party decided they needed to “perfect the non-commissioned officer system,” he said. “So they understand that they've got some issues.”
The PLA is a mixed force of conscripts and volunteers, Finkelstein said. A conscript may elect to join the regular army and go to a school to become an NCO.
“But it’s not exactly clear how the system is working for them,” Finkelstein said. “But they're very attuned to the fact that they've got to do better, because as they aspire to fight the type of high-tech, multidomain campaigns that they envision, they know that they have got to push authorities down to the lowest level… And pushing authority down to the lowest possible tactical level is really anathema to the PLA culture, where they have a very vertical and stove-piped command-and-control system.”
As in the Russian military, China’s junior officers have the same responsibilities that the U.S. expects NCOs to handle. But the PLA is paying attention to how other militaries build their officer and NCO corps and are working hard to be better at it, Finkelstein said. “It is really hard to change the culture of any organization, and military cultures change slower than most.”
The PLA is also the “armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party,” Finkelstein said, where people who want to become NCOs or officers are looked at for their political attributes.
The PLA was probably “quite taken aback by the challenges that the Russians have had” in the first phase of the war in Ukraine, he said, because they have traditionally held the Russian military in high esteem and because of Russia’s battle experience over the past 30 years, which the PLA does not have.
Finkelstein is certain that the PLA is studying how Russian forces are faring in Ukraine at the strategic and tactical levels..
“Ukraine is really going to be a battle lab for the PLA, to the degree that they can observe and learn anything about the Russian experience.”
Patrick Tucker contributed to this post.
16. China Likely to Use ‘Nuclear Coercion’ in Bid to Take Taiwan by 2027, STRATCOM Chief Says
An obviously ominous assessment.
China Likely to Use ‘Nuclear Coercion’ in Bid to Take Taiwan by 2027, STRATCOM Chief Says
U.S. Navy Adm. Charles Richard, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, spoke at last year's Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama. U.S. Navy / Capt. Ron Flanders
Adm. Richard urged Congress to restore funding for a ship-based nuclear missile.
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May 5, 2022 10:44 AM ET
Technology Editor
May 5, 2022 10:44 AM ET
China is closely watching the war in Ukraine and “will likely use nuclear coercion to their advantage in the future,” Adm. Charles Richard, the head of U.S. Strategic Command, or STRATCOM, told lawmakers on Wednesday. “Their intent is to achieve the military capability to reunify Taiwan by 2027.”
That timeline aligns with what then-INDOPACOM commander Adm. Philip Davidson told lawmakers in March 2021.
Richard urged lawmakers to restore funding for the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, a variable-yield weapon that the Pentagon was researching but omitted from its 2023 budget request. Military officials have argued that low-yield nukes are crucial to deterring Russia, which has some 2,000 of its own, while others say such weapons are destabilizing.
“China's nuclear trajectory, their strategic breakout, demonstrates that we have a deterrence and assurance gap against the threat of limited nuclear employment to help close this gap,” Richard told lawmakers on the Strategic Forces panel of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Because of that, he said, “pursuing a low-yield non-ballistic capability should be reconsidered.”
17. How to Save the Postwar Order
A thoughtful and provocative essay. I am not sure this analogy (or counter analogy works). This is the opposite of "you have to burn the village to save it." If you want to defend the rules based order you have to defend it less. Rather than being more aggressive you should be less aggressive. Something to ponder.
This dynamic points to an uncomfortable truth. To preserve the postwar international order, Washington will have to moderate and restrict its promotion of the order’s norms and the enforcement of its rules. A rigid and uncompromising approach will produce repeated overreach, provoke needless backlash from hedging states, and ultimately jeopardize the consensus at the order’s core. This may be the most important lesson of recent events in Europe and beyond: the United States needs to embrace a practical and sustainable, rather than inflexible and absolute, approach to the rules-based order.
Such an approach should focus on a few nonnegotiable norms: constraints on physical and cyber-aggression, collaboration on climate change, and cooperation to promote a stable global trade and financial system. It would accept the need to work with democracies and nondemocracies alike. It would actively promote free societies but do so by helping established and emerging democracies rather than forcing change on undemocratic ones. It would accept flawed but effective arms control deals rather than holding out for perfection.
At a moment when much of the world is aligned against Russian aggression, it may seem counterintuitive to suggest that Washington should dial back the intensity of its defense and promotion of the rules-based order. After all, that order has given the United States a tremendous competitive advantage and helped stabilize world politics. But the war in Ukraine has exposed the system’s brittleness. And unless the United States adopts a more pragmatic and flexible approach to maintaining it, the postwar order may collapse into a new era of conflict.
How to Save the Postwar Order
The United States Should Rethink Its Defense of the System
May 6, 2022
For the last decade or so, a debate has raged among scholars and policymakers about the significance of the post–World War II, rules-based international order. Is it a feeble myth, as Graham Allison has suggested in Foreign Affairs? Or, as G. John Ikenberry and others have argued, is it a powerful influence on state behavior?
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the global response to it has put these competing claims into sharp relief, underscoring that the postwar order places real and tangible constraints on most countries. But the war has also made clear how brittle international orders can be and highlighted two potentially fatal vulnerabilities of the current one: excessive ambition on the part of dominant powers and careful hedging on the part of middle ones. These weaknesses may have put the postwar order and the legitimacy of U.S. leadership in more danger than at any time since 1990—and preserving them will require walking a difficult diplomatic tightrope.
MORE THAN A MYTH
Broadly speaking, the international order is nothing more than the prevailing pattern of interactions in world politics. The existence of an order does not presume shared, enforced rules or any degree of stability. But in certain periods, rules-based orders have emerged that benefited many nations. These systems were not grounded in altruism or the ideal of a supranational government. Rather, the most powerful actors of the era, often under the leadership of one preeminent power or a small number of them, agreed to certain explicit or implicit rules and norms to promote their own interests—typically, territorial security and economic prosperity.
The post-1945 U.S.-led international order is by far the most institutionalized rules-based order to date. It is grounded in the UN system but incorporates regional organizations such as NATO and the European Union, as well as global economic institutions, intergovernmental processes, public-private coalitions, and nongovernmental organizations that set thousands of issue-specific rules and standards. The order embodies norms, imperfectly adhered to but widely shared and at least partly enforced, that promote the interests of participating countries, most notably their interest in territorial nonaggression and relatively open economic exchange.
The postwar order may be in more danger than at any time since 1990.
The result is a material set of influences on states. The economic alignment of powerful countries, for example, made it possible for these countries to set standards—in the rule of law, financial and monetary policy, technology interoperability, and many other areas—and then to attract new adherents eager to benefit from the resulting coordination. Countries that sought cutting-edge technology, foreign direct investment, or support from international financial organizations found themselves at least partly constrained by the order’s rules and norms. Exclusion from the economic order has proved economically fatal—ensuring that the vast majority of countries adjust their behavior, at least to a degree, in order to remain tethered to the international system.
The postwar order is often held to be the sum of its institutional parts, but its wider gravitational effect is the real source of its power. The order’s norms and institutions derive from a more essential underlying force—the corresponding interests of a critical mass of the world community and the resulting global influence of that bloc. Dozens of leading economic and military powers have come to view the postwar order as essential to creating the conditions that produce economic and territorial security for themselves. Over time, the states enmeshed in the international order have been joined by potent nonstate actors: nongovernmental organizations, businesses, political parties, and movements now play important roles in advocating for and enforcing the order’s rules. By conditioning full participation in economic, political, and even cultural networks on those rules, the states and nonstate actors at the core of the order create a formidable echo effect on world politics.
In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the full power of this order has been unleashed on Moscow. A core group of leading democracies and nonstate actors have rallied to the system’s defense, using components of the order—from the United Nations to economic institutions and networks to the International Criminal Court—to threaten or impose penalties on those who defy it. These actions demonstrate that the postwar order is much more than just a product of U.S. power: far from blindly agreeing to American demands, these states and nonstate actors have defended the system out of their own volition and in pursuit of their own perceived interests.
A WHIMPER, NOT A BANG
If the global reaction to Russia’s aggression has shown the postwar order to be far more than a myth, it has also made clear how vulnerable that order is. A direct assault by revisionist powers is often portrayed as the greatest threat to any international system. As the crisis in Ukraine has revealed, however, the more violently revisionists attack an order, the more powerfully its defenders will fight back. Frontal attacks on existing structures tend to consolidate the perceived interests and values that bind them together—a lesson China has also learned from its aggressive “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy. In addition, obvious rule flouting hurts revisionists’ ability to enlist support for their actions, even from countries with hesitations or grievances about the existing system.
The postwar order is therefore less vulnerable to sledgehammer blows by revisionist powers than it is to two other vulnerabilities revealed by the current crisis, both of which have the potential to erode the consensus around postwar norms and principles. The first is excessive ambition: the architects of the postwar system risk pushing their objectives too far and generating a violent backlash. This is arguably what happened with NATO in Europe. Under the United States’ watch, the alliance metastasized from a measured and carefully calibrated program to fortify European security into a limitless, duty-bound imperative. Without endorsing the legitimacy of Russia’s claim to dominate the countries of its near abroad, it is possible to acknowledge that Moscow was always bound to object to NATO’s expansion into areas it perceives as core security concerns.
Another product of excessive ambition is the concept of liberal interventionism, which helped to justify a series of interventions, from Iraq to Libya, which have done much damage to U.S. credibility. Elaborate ambitions for the postwar order’s rules and norms also produced absolutist nonproliferation goals that led U.S. administrations to abandon imperfect but useful stopgap accords such as the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea and the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. Pushing for absolute and uncompromising enforcement of any order’s rules is not a sustainable approach.
The postwar order might perish not with the bang of a direct revisionist attack but with a whimper, as middle powers gradually drift away from its core institutions.
The second vulnerability of the postwar order is the growing influence of what can be termed the “hedging middle” in world politics—countries that prefer to avoid taking sides in the U.S.-Chinese and U.S.-Russian rivalries and therefore hesitate to enforce the norms of the order. These countries—including Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey—participate in and support many elements of the international system. They broadly support the order’s norms and typically respect them. Some of these countries are set to become major economic and military players. Yet if more of them come to see a Chinese-Russian axis as a useful counterweight to U.S. and Western dominance and therefore defect from U.S.-led institutions, the postwar order will be in deep trouble.
This dynamic is already apparent in the international response to Russia’s war. While impressive by any historical comparison, the global reaction has been more cautious than many realize. Less than two dozen countries are fully committed to imposing economic sanctions against Moscow, and many in the hedging middle have explicitly rejected such measures. Political leaders, scholars, and pundits in many developing countries have rejected the U.S. and European narrative on Ukraine and questioned the legitimacy of U.S. leadership. These divisions could deepen in the coming weeks if the situation on the ground becomes more ambiguous—for example, if Russia calls for a cease-fire to consolidate its territorial gains and Moscow and Beijing begin rounding up support from hedging countries.
In this way, the postwar order might perish not with the bang of a direct revisionist attack but with a whimper, as middle powers gradually drift away from its core institutions, decline to enforce its norms, and join China and even Russia in various efforts to formulate a more multipolar world system. Such a process would likely play out across dozens of institutions and issue areas, fragmenting and sometimes regionalizing trade, investment, and information flows and much else. And it could be accelerated by the continued rise of angry, resentful, self-glorifying nationalism in many countries.
Such a scenario illustrates how these two vulnerabilities of the international order are intertwined. It is when excessive ambition generates crises—whether over Iran, North Korea, or Ukraine—that the hedgers are backed into the most uncomfortable position. Events demand that they choose a side. In failing to do so, they seem to weaken the norms of the order—even though they had no desire to endorse the rule breakers and even though they broadly support those norms themselves.
BEND, DON’T BREAK
This dynamic points to an uncomfortable truth. To preserve the postwar international order, Washington will have to moderate and restrict its promotion of the order’s norms and the enforcement of its rules. A rigid and uncompromising approach will produce repeated overreach, provoke needless backlash from hedging states, and ultimately jeopardize the consensus at the order’s core. This may be the most important lesson of recent events in Europe and beyond: the United States needs to embrace a practical and sustainable, rather than inflexible and absolute, approach to the rules-based order.
Such an approach should focus on a few nonnegotiable norms: constraints on physical and cyber-aggression, collaboration on climate change, and cooperation to promote a stable global trade and financial system. It would accept the need to work with democracies and nondemocracies alike. It would actively promote free societies but do so by helping established and emerging democracies rather than forcing change on undemocratic ones. It would accept flawed but effective arms control deals rather than holding out for perfection.
At a moment when much of the world is aligned against Russian aggression, it may seem counterintuitive to suggest that Washington should dial back the intensity of its defense and promotion of the rules-based order. After all, that order has given the United States a tremendous competitive advantage and helped stabilize world politics. But the war in Ukraine has exposed the system’s brittleness. And unless the United States adopts a more pragmatic and flexible approach to maintaining it, the postwar order may collapse into a new era of conflict.
18. The Trouble With “the Free World”
Conclusion:
Perhaps the revival of the free world will be fleeting. Efforts to deploy the concept during the so-called war on terror never stuck. But rhetorical categories can create their own inertia. A renewed commitment to a negatively defined free world would produce a familiar set of problems: an insistence on viewing distant wars as decisive tests, an intolerance of nonalignment, an inability to formulate a common purpose in positive terms, and a reliance on the enduring evil of the enemy. It is not too late to devise a flexible and regionally attuned foreign policy that does not require a worldwide mobilization against a single, globally interconnected existential threat. Attempting to lead something called the free world is not a grand strategy. It’s a trap.
The Trouble With “the Free World”
Why It’s a Bad Idea to Revive a Cold War Concept
By Peter Slezkine
May 6, 2022
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has revived the concept of “the free world.” On the day the attack began, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appealed to “free world leaders” for support. In his State of the Union address on March 1, U.S. President Joe Biden emphasized “the resolve of the free world.” “The free world is united in its resolve,” echoed British Prime Minister Boris Johnson three days later.
The return of the free world may have consequences that transcend the realm of rhetoric. From the late 1940s through the mid-1960s, the American commitment to free world leadership resulted in a series of unintended policymaking constraints. Before we once again become captives of the concept, it would be wise to consider how a free world foreign policy functioned the first time around.
A Brief History
On March 12, 1947, U.S. President Harry Truman called on Congress to support an aid package for Greece and Turkey intended to prevent the spread of Soviet influence in southeastern Europe. Truman posited a stark moral divide and declared that Americans must take a side. In a situation where “nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life,” it would be the policy of the United States to “help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.”
The invocation of a pervasive communist menace helped rally support for the administration’s aid bill. At the same time, the apparently universal formulation of what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine suggested enduring and global commitments that the White House did not mean to meet. In the weeks after Truman’s speech, the bill’s backers sought to set clear limits on the scope of American intervention, emphasizing that aid to Greece and Turkey would not automatically lead to equivalent support for other “free peoples” in the future. Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, the Republican chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and a key administration ally, made the point explicit: “I emphatically repeat that we do not here set a universal precedent.”
Nevertheless, Truman’s depiction of a universal contest between “free peoples” and “totalitarian regimes” opened the administration to charges that it was failing to meet the global challenge it had identified. In November 1947, Thomas Dewey, governor of New York and future Republican presidential nominee, emphasized the inconsistency of resisting communism in Europe while tolerating its spread in Asia. “The free world is now in the desperate position of a man who has gangrene in both legs—in Western Europe and in Asia,” he warned. “Our government is telling the world we have a very good cure for gangrene, but we will apply it to one leg only while the gangrene in the other leg destroys the patient.” The establishment of a communist regime in China in 1949 added political weight to this argument.
By early 1950, the Truman administration had begun to settle on a strict two-world vision. The top-secret U.S. strategy document, NSC-68, reflected this outlook, positing a zero-sum contest between “the free world” and “the Soviet world.” It declared “a defeat of free institutions anywhere” to be “a defeat everywhere” and called on the U.S. to conduct “a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world.” The administration’s decision to enter the Korean War later that year put theory into practice, demonstrating the United States’ commitment to defend the entire length of the free world’s frontiers. The doctor would not let the patient perish after all.
The return of the free world may have consequences that transcend the realm of rhetoric.
The passage of the 1951 Mutual Security Act institutionalized a free world foreign policy, combining the country’s ad hoc military and economic aid efforts into a single program. Truman explained that the legislation aimed to counter the three major aspects of the communist menace: “First, the Soviet threat is worldwide. Second, the Soviet threat is total. . . . Third, the Soviet threat is of indefinite duration.” Although the U.S. government would continue to draw distinctions within the free world, support for each part now required justification in terms of the whole. The implied universalism of the Truman doctrine had become official policy.
A Negative Definition
Perhaps the key feature of the free world was its negative definition. Government reports generated hard figures regarding free world trade and resources by listing the communist countries that were excluded. As Senator Richard Russell, a Democrat from Georgia, remarked at a 1951 executive session meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: “I call everything outside of the Iron Curtain a free nation.” Senator J. William Fulbright, a Democrat from Arkansas, concurred: “Free means ‘free from the domination of Moscow.’”
The conflation of the free world and the noncommunist world led to persistent difficulties. For one thing, it effectively bound the United States to a policy of global containment, despite widespread concern about potential overstretch. A month into the Korean War, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., a Republican from Massachusetts, asked Secretary of State Dean Acheson whether universal opposition to communist expansion was strategically sustainable: “Aren't we . . . going to have to cede some areas taken by the Soviets if we are not going to find ourselves hopelessly committed all over the world?” Acheson agreed. Yet over the next two decades, the United States would continue to resist the advance of communism everywhere in the indivisible free world.
Another flaw in the free world doctrine was the conceptual impossibility of nonalignment. According to the U.S. government, all countries outside of the Communist bloc belonged to the free world by default. Yet foreign states resisted the demand to take sides, risking a conflict with the United States. The Mutual Security Act, for example, stipulated that any country receiving military assistance from the United States had to pledge a contribution to the “defensive strength of the free world.” In early 1952, the United States suspended military aid to Iran after Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh refused to make a public commitment to the free world. That same year, when the foreign minister of Indonesia agreed to sign such, the domestic outcry against entering the “American orbit” led to the fall of the entire cabinet. In 1953, the U.S. and Indonesia reached an alternative agreement that excluded military aid, and the CIA and British intelligence officers orchestrated a successful coup against Mosaddegh.
The United States’ inability to devise a positive ideology to bind the negatively formed free world was another persistent problem. A 1948 congressional report stressed the need to counter Soviet propaganda with a clear message: “One factor in the weakness of morale in the non-Communist world, and in the strength of morale in the Communist world, is the clarity of their ideas and the vagueness of ours.” Increased investment in information programs under the Eisenhower administration failed to resolve this fundamental issue. As a field officer complained in 1955, “One of the chief weaknesses of a negative definition of free world philosophy . . . is that it offers nothing specific or concrete which can be conveyed to the targets.” Ultimately, the free world was a vast and heterogeneous collection of states united by nothing but noncommunism.
The United States’ inability to devise a positive ideology to bind the free world was a persistent problem.
The United States’ failure to foster a common faith in the noncommunist world put policymakers in the paradoxical position of fearing, rather than welcoming, any apparent reduction of the Soviet threat. A 1951 National Security Council report expressed grave concern over the success of the Kremlin-directed “peace campaign,” which charged the West with arming for war and demanded the criminalization of nuclear weapons. “By such wiles the USSR may yet lull the free world into a false sense of security, with adverse effect upon both its military posture and its political cohesion.” A 1956 NSC report issued the same warning after the start of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s “peaceful coexistence” campaign. “If the USSR succeeds in improving its reputation for peaceful intentions, such efforts will . . . lead to gradual erosion of free world positions.” U.S. leadership of the free world relied on the apparent permanence of an external threat.
A New Iteration
Over the course of the 1960s, the free world fractured along three separate axes. The routinization of the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet split made the communist world appear less menacing and monolithic. The increasing importance of the less developed countries of the free world resulted in the recognition of a separate “third world.” And the growing countercultural movement in the West challenged the meaning of freedom within ostensibly free countries. After the end of the Vietnam War, the phrase “free world” mostly disappeared from government documents. Nevertheless, the legacy of the concept lived on in the United States’ commitment to global leadership and the maintenance of its military alliances.
Now “the free world” is back in circulation. In its current form, it often appears to overlap with the idea of the West. At the same time, the war in Ukraine has revealed a persistent gap between Western unity and Western universalism. Outside of the United States’ (mostly Western) formal allies, attitudes toward anti-Russian sanctions have been largely ambivalent. For defenders of the free world, such fence-sitting is hardly permissible, as pressure campaigns against India, Pakistan, and others have recently demonstrated. The insufficiency of “the West” as a synonym for “the free world” will become even more apparent after the acute phase of the European crisis passes and the United States seeks another pivot to Asia. As a 1951 State Department directive warned (following a previous reorientation from Europe to Asia): “Keep in mind that free nations are found in both the West and the East. The standing caution on East-West terminology is reaffirmed.”
Another possibility is for “the free world” to serve as a label for one side in a struggle (much invoked by the Biden administration) between democracies and autocracies. The problem is that autocracy appears to be an illness incipient in almost every country, including the United States itself. Such a free world would contain its own opposite. Efforts to externalize autocracy by circumscribing a group of good-enough democracies raises its own set of difficulties. Biden’s promise to renew “the shared purpose of the nations of the free world” resulted in a Summit for Democracy that was both muted and muddled. Membership criteria lacked clarity and the club’s future contours remain unpredictable. Moreover, if shared values rather than common defense represent the group’s reason for being, then the basis of U.S. leadership is hardly self-evident.
The simplest way to give form to the free world is to identify its opposite.
The simplest way to give form to the free world is to identify its opposite. A renewed free world will tend, once again, toward a negative definition based on an exclusion of the conveniently contiguous territories of Russia and China (as well as North Korea) with all other countries qualifying for at least potential membership. Liberal internationalists in Washington have long assigned paradigmatic status to these regimes relative to other autocracies. The war in Ukraine has cemented this distinction. Recent proposals to relax pressure on the oil-producing states of Venezuela and Iran in order to tighten the squeeze on Russia follow naturally from a free world foreign policy. After all, a long-term struggle against absolute evil requires the mobilization of all available resources. As Senator Tom Connally, a Democrat from Texas, exclaimed during a discussion of NATO membership in 1949: “I do not know how much democracy Portugal has, but I know she has the Azores.”
Perhaps the revival of the free world will be fleeting. Efforts to deploy the concept during the so-called war on terror never stuck. But rhetorical categories can create their own inertia. A renewed commitment to a negatively defined free world would produce a familiar set of problems: an insistence on viewing distant wars as decisive tests, an intolerance of nonalignment, an inability to formulate a common purpose in positive terms, and a reliance on the enduring evil of the enemy. It is not too late to devise a flexible and regionally attuned foreign policy that does not require a worldwide mobilization against a single, globally interconnected existential threat. Attempting to lead something called the free world is not a grand strategy. It’s a trap.
19. Why the battle for Mariupol is important for Vladimir Putin.
Excerpt:
But perhaps the most striking sign of Mariupol’s importance ahead of May 9 is that one of Mr. Putin’s most powerful aides, deputy chief of staff Sergei Kiriyenko, visited the city this week. He was shown meeting with a man described as a Mariupol World War II veteran, and looked on as the man became the first Mariupol resident to get a passport of the breakaway “Donetsk People’s Republic,” which Mr. Putin recognized as independent in February.
Why the battle for Mariupol is important for Vladimir Putin.
May 5, 2022, 11:31 a.m. ET
Russian state media are now highlighting Russia’s capture of almost all of Mariupol as a long-anticipated victory in Mr. Putin’s pledge to “denazify” Ukraine.Credit...Alexander Ermochenko/Reuters
For Russia, the Ukrainian port city of Mariupol is a potent symbol.
It is a predominantly Russian-speaking city in the eastern Ukrainian region known as the Donbas, the one where President Vladimir V. Putin falsely claimed Ukraine was carrying out a “genocide” before launching his invasion.
The Azovstal steel plant in the middle of the city has also become the last bastion of Ukrainian military’s Azov regiment, whose origins in a far-right military group, the Azov Batallion, have lent a veneer of credibility to Mr. Putin’s false narrative that the country is overrun by “Nazis.” The steel plant is the last holdout of Ukrainian resistance in Mariupol as Moscow’s forces mount a final push to seize control of the city.
In weeks of fierce fighting, much of the city of more than 400,000 was leveled, and Ukrainian officials said more than 20,000 civilians were killed. But despite the horrific toll, Russian state media outlets are now highlighting Russia’s capture of almost all of Mariupol as a long-anticipated victory in Mr. Putin’s campaign to “denazify” Ukraine.
That message is particularly important to the Kremlin this week, as it prepares for May 9 celebrations on Monday, when Russia marks the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. The looming Victory Day holiday — one of the most important dates on the calendar for Russians as they remember the 27 million Soviets killed in World War II — is already being used by the Russian government to channel national pride into support for the war.
Vladimir Solovyov, a hawkish state television host, traveled to Mariupol this week and was captured on video holding court in the city in military fatigues, later telling viewers that local residents “wanted to touch me and hug me.”
Another host, Dmitri Kiselyov, highlighted the fight for Mariupol last Sunday on his marquee weekly news show, which declared: “Denazification is when the neo-Nazis from the Azov Battalion rot alive in cold factory basements.”
But perhaps the most striking sign of Mariupol’s importance ahead of May 9 is that one of Mr. Putin’s most powerful aides, deputy chief of staff Sergei Kiriyenko, visited the city this week. He was shown meeting with a man described as a Mariupol World War II veteran, and looked on as the man became the first Mariupol resident to get a passport of the breakaway “Donetsk People’s Republic,” which Mr. Putin recognized as independent in February.
On Wednesday, Mr. Kiriyenko helped unveil a statue to “Grandma Anya” — a Ukrainian woman filmed greeting Ukrainian soldiers with a Soviet banner last month, apparently thinking they were Russian, according to Russian media.
Anya has become a symbol for proponents of the war in Russia of the idea that some Ukrainians are in fact greeting Russian troops as liberators. Mr. Kiriyenko, in his speech, evoked the May 9 holiday and called her “a living symbol of the continuity of generations. Continuity in the fight against Nazism and fascism.”
In a short video released Thursday, the Ukrainian government identified her as Anna Ivanova and said her home had been hit by a Russian shell; she says in the video that it was “very lousy” that Russia had invaded.
Russia-Ukraine War: Key Developments
Card 1 of 4
Victory Day concerns. There are growing fears among Western officials that Mr. Putin may use the Russian holiday on May 9, which commemorates the Soviet Union’s triumph over Nazi Germany, to turn what he calls a “special military operation” in Ukraine into explicit, all-out war.
Targeting Russian generals. The United States has provided real-time intelligence to Ukraine that has allowed them to target and kill many of the Russian generals who have died in the war, according to senior American officials. Ukrainian officials say they have killed approximately 12 Russian generals.
Russian oil embargo. The European Union unveiled a plan to halt imports of Russian crude oil in the next six months and refined oil products by the end of the year. If approved as expected, it would be the bloc’s biggest and costliest step yet toward ending its own dependence on Russian fossil fuels.
Mr. Kiriyenko is in charge of domestic politics in Mr. Putin’s administration, and the fact that he is becoming closely involved in Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine is being seen as a signal that the Kremlin may be planning to incorporate the territory into Russia. In Mariupol, Mr. Kiriyenko said that it would not be possible to hold Victory Day parades on Monday in Donetsk and Luhansk, the main cities of the Donbas, but he pledged they would take place in the future.
“This time will come, and it will come soon,” Mr. Kiriyenko said.
Russian state media have given short shrift to the devastation in Mariupol, and have falsely claimed that Ukrainian forces firing at their own city are largely to blame. At Wednesday’s statue unveiling, Denis Pushilin, the head of the Donetsk separatist region, acknowledged the destruction but also invoked World War II to promise that the city would be rebuilt, according to a news release issued by his office.
“I am sure that we will also manage it,” Mr. Pushilin said, “especially because Russia is with us.”
20. U.S. offers assurances to Sweden, Finland over NATO application
U.S. offers assurances to Sweden, Finland over NATO application
WASHINGTON, May 5 (Reuters) - The United States is confident it can address any security concerns Sweden and Finland may have about the period of time after they apply for NATO membership and before they are accepted into the alliance, the White House said on Thursday.
Sweden and Finland are concerned they would be vulnerable to Russian threats during an application process, which could take up to a year to be approved by all 30 NATO members.
"We are confident that we could find ways to address any concerns either country may have about the period of time between a NATO membership application and the formal accession to the alliance," White House spokesperson Jen Psaki told a briefing.
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Both Sweden and Finland are expected to make a decision about whether to apply to join NATO this month.
Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde said after a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Wednesday that she had received security assurances, but she did not give any details. read more
Sweden's defense minister said last month that an application could trigger a number of responses from Russia, including cyber attacks and hybrid measures - such as propaganda campaigns - to undermine Sweden's security.
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Reporting by Nandita Bose and Steve Holland; Editing by Richard Pullin
21. NSA cyber boss seeks to discourage vigilante hacking against Russia
Conclusion:
“For those who want to help Ukraine and help its people, there are many ways to do that, including by supporting and helping the many NGOs that are working to provide humanitarian assistance, providing resources themselves to groups that are trying to help Ukraine by being advocates for Ukraine and for peaceful resolution to this crisis that was created by Russia,” he said. “Those are the most effective ways that people who want to help can do so.”
NSA cyber boss seeks to discourage vigilante hacking against Russia
WASHINGTON — Vigilante hacking, the sort seen as Ukraine confronts another Russian invasion, is inadvisable and raises broader questions of ethics and consequences in the digital domain, according to the National Security Agency’s director of cybersecurity.
“I will tell you that the idea of the civil vigilantes joining in a nation-state attack is unwise, right? I really think it is,” the NSA’s Rob Joyce said May 4 at a Vanderbilt University security summit. “As you pointed out, it’s illegal. But it’s also unhelpful, because one of the things we talked about is we’re trying to get Russia to take account for the ransomware attacks and hacks that come out of Russia and emanate.”
Hundreds of thousands of volunteers from across the world have reportedly coalesced around Ukraine’s call for digital talent and cyber specialists, forming a so-called IT army outside typical government oversight.
“There will be tasks for everyone,” Mykhailo Fedorov, minister of digital transformation of Ukraine, tweeted Feb. 26, shortly after the Kremlin’s war machine rolled into the country. “We continue to fight on the cyber front.”
The crowdsourced efforts, the efficacy of which is difficult to gauge, blur the line between traditional cyber maneuvers executed by world powers and fringe advocacy in an increasingly digital ecosystem.
They could also complicate negotiations and deescalation at a time of serious peril.
“This certainly isn’t going to make the State Department discussions with Russia of ‘you need to hold your people accountable’ any easier,” Joyce said Wednesday.
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The campaign launched in April 2021 with 14 participating companies and 141 publicly accessible assets to probe. Interest quickly ballooned; 41 companies and nearly 350 assets were eventually admitted.
Kevin Mandia, CEO of American cybersecurity firm Mandiant, at the same summit said random individuals swaying relationships between countries and dictating foreign policy could be dangerous.
“You can’t have the private sector influencing the doctrine between nations,” he said. “You don’t have us fighting on air, land and sea without being deputized or part of a force and with an agenda and a mission plan.”
The IT army is reminiscent of volunteers who physically traveled to Ukraine and took up arms, despite enormous risks and warnings from officials. But hacking from home — or at least not from the bombarded and besieged locales of Ukraine — offers a sense of safety the frontlines do not.
“In regards to the cyber domain, anybody can participate in it and do whatever the hell they want in it, whether they’re breaking the law or not,” Mandia said. “So, yeah, the genie’s out of the bottle in regards to cyber showing the intent of individuals that want to be in support of certain agendas.”
Asked March 2 about those who wish to join the fight in Eastern Europe, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the Biden administration has made clear to Americans who may be thinking of traveling there not to go.
“For those who want to help Ukraine and help its people, there are many ways to do that, including by supporting and helping the many NGOs that are working to provide humanitarian assistance, providing resources themselves to groups that are trying to help Ukraine by being advocates for Ukraine and for peaceful resolution to this crisis that was created by Russia,” he said. “Those are the most effective ways that people who want to help can do so.”
Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers networks and IT. Colin previously covered the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — namely nuclear weapons development and Cold War cleanup — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina.
22. For first time, France talks openly about sending weapons to Ukraine
For first time, France talks openly about sending weapons to Ukraine - Breaking Defense
France has been tight-lipped about what it is sending to Ukraine, until a few days after President Emmanuel Macron won a second term.
French soldiers stand next to units of CAESAR, a French self-propelled 155 mm/52-calibre gun-howitzer, in the Qayyarah base south of Mosul on October 31, 2016. (AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP via Getty Images)
PARIS: Breaking the self-imposed silence on what weapons it is providing to Ukraine, France confirmed on April 29 it is loaning 12 Caesar truck-mounted guns and gifting several tens of thousands of shells and Milan anti-tank missiles to Ukraine.
French President Emmanuel Macron, who was re-elected for a second five-year term on April 24, told his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky in an hour-long telephone conversation on April 30 that French military support and humanitarian aid would “continue to increase.” In addition, the French experts’ mission contributing to gathering proof of war crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine “will be prolonged” according to a statement released after the two heads of state spoke.
It is perhaps not coincidence that France is being open, for the first time, about its weapon shipments to Ukraine now that Macron is now longer fending off a political challenge from euro-skeptic Marine Le Pen. After the French election Macron said that during his second mandate he would “actively work to re-establishing Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity through close coordination with our European partners and allies.”
French media reports have previously revealed that France has sent satellite imagery and Milan, Mistral and Javelin missiles, the latter acquired in the United States for operations in Afghanistan. But Paris had been tight-lipped about what they were sending, so as not to antagonize Moscow and keep diplomatic channels open.
Macron and Russian President Vladimir Putin had been talking by phone daily until revelations over a month ago of suspected war-crimes in the Ukrainian town of Bucha. Contact between the two men resumed on May 3 when, according to the Elysée Palace (the French president’s office) they had a two-hour, 10 minute phone conversation during which Macron “called on Russia to live up to its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council by putting an end to this devastating aggression” and “renewed his demand for a ceasefire”.
The announcement concerning the Caesar guns was hinted at by Macron two days before his re-election in an interview with Ouest-France, Germany’s Westdeutche Allgemeine Zeitung and Italy’s Corriere della Serra in which he confirmed that France had delivered Milan anti-tank missiles and revealed, almost in an aside, that Caesars would be sent. “We are delivering consequential equipment, from Milans to Caesars via various other types of weapons. I think we need to continue on this path. Always with the red line which is not to enter into co-belligerence.”
In the days since, 40 Ukrainian soldiers have arrived in France to learn how to use the Caesars, which are 155mm howitzers that have a top range of 40 kms (25 miles), roughly twice the range of the Russian guns currently deployed in the war zone. The 12 being loaned to Ukraine come from French Army stocks reducing those to 64 units.
The combat-proven 17.7 tonne (19.82 ton) Caesars are mounted on either 6×6 or 8×8 trucks whose 245 hp engine can propel them to a top road speed of 80 kmh (50 mph) and an off-road speed of more than 50 kmh (31 mph). The 10m (32.8 feet) long, 2.55 m (8.4 feet) wide and 3.7 m (12 feet) high trucks have a cruising range of 600 kms (373 miles) and are air-transportable.
The 155mm/52 caliber ordnance, semi-automatic gun can fire six shells a minute at a target between 3 to 25 miles away “whatever the weather” Hervé Grandjean the Armed Forces Ministry spokesman, confirmed this week.
Retired Colonel Jean-Luc Lefebvre, formerly responsible for the curriculum at the École de Guerre (war college) and a frequent commentator in French media on the war in Ukraine, told Breaking Defense that the Caesar, being a counter-battery weapon, would allow the Ukrainian army to detect where Russian shelling was coming from and riposte.
“This is a sophisticated weapon and politically shows that France, just like the US and the UK, can send high technology material to help the Ukrainians,” Lefebvre said. He added that it was “also likely that France wants to show the Ukrainians that help is not only coming from the Americans.”
Marc Chasaillan, a weapon systems expert, told Breaking Defense that “to be honest France doesn’t have much choice as to what systems it can send, so the Caesars clearly marks a step up.” He said that sending guns and ammunition “is great but what I don’t know, and this is a fundamental question, is whether donor countries are also providing the fire control and targeting systems for these heavy artillery systems.”
Regardless, Chasaillan said, “the great advantage of the Caesar is that the Ukrainians can learn to use and maintain it in a week.” Speed is also a factor: it takes less than 60 seconds to get the Caesar into action, and less than 40 seconds for it to pack up and move to a different location. The weapon has been operational in the French Army since 2010 and has been combat deployed in Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali.
The DGA, the Armed Forces Ministry’s procurement agency, in December 2021 awarded a €600 million ($681 million) four-year initial development and qualification contract to develop a new generation of this weapon, the Caesar NG. However, as work had already started on the new design in 2021 the qualification will take place in 2024. At that point the DGA will have a choice to make: it will either order 109 new systems, or it will only order 33 new systems and upgrade the 76 existing systems (assuming none are destroyed in Ukraine).
The new truck for the French Army will be almost entirely redesigned by Arquus but the armored cabin will be designed and built by Nexter.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
