Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:

"I will either find a way, or make one." 
- Hannibal

“Members of Congress love to impose sanctions on countries whose actions they object to, even though usually the only effect is to make the members feel righteous and look tough to their constituents. In fact, all too frequently, the imposition of sanctions is simply a political gesture, intended mainly to show that the United States is doing something in response to another country’s bad behavior without much expectation of success. For example, economic sanctions were imposed on China in 1989 after the brutal suppression of demonstrators at Tiananmen Square in Beijing and on Russia in 2014 after the seizure of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine because no one was prepared to support a military response. The sanctions had little impact on China, and while the post-Crimea sanctions hurt the Russian economy, President Putin would not consider taking the actions required to get them lifted (although they may have constrained him from other acts of aggression).”
— Exercise of Power: American Failures, Successes, and a New Path Forward in the Post-Cold War World by Robert Michael Gates
https://a.co/aq7PJrg

"Intelligence is not to make no mistakes, but quickly to see how to make them good." 
- Bertolt Brecht



1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 11
2. Ukraine Conflict Update - March 12, 2022 | SOF News
3. Putin's War in Ukraine Is Going So Bad He Is Firing Generals: Report
4. Is a Russian disinformation campaign a prelude to a Russian bioweapons attack?
5. Analysis: Russia and QAnon have the same false conspiracy theory about Ukraine
6. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has created NATO's watershed moment
7. Fiery Biden insists the U.S. will not fight ‘World War III’ in Ukraine
8. Why Hasn't Putin Unleashed Major Cyber and Electronic Warfare in Ukraine?
9. How to Deal With the Unappeasable Putin
10. Opinion | Biden Is Seeing a Polling Bump Amid War in Ukraine. History Suggests It Won’t Last.
11. Top American generals on three key lessons learned from Ukraine
12. Risk Hindered Decision Making: How the DoD’s Faulty Understanding of Risk Jeopardizes its Strategy
13. The Growing Fear of a Wider War Between Russia and the West
14. Russian Military Efforts Stymied by Blunders, Stiff Ukrainian Resistance, Defense Official
15. US strategists double down on war with China
16. Perspective | Russia’s new control tactic is the one Hannah Arendt warned us about 50 years ago
17. Main actions of Russia in the course of “hybrid warfare” against Ukraine
18. “The alarmists were right all along”: A Moscow journalist on Putin and the new Russian reality
19. FDD | While Others Debate No-Fly Zones, Take These Steps Now to Help Ukraine
20. How Russians Can Bring an End to Putin’s Chekist State
21. Zelensky warns of "new stage of terror" in latest video
22. Putin Is in Trouble: Russia Is the Most Sanctioned Country on Earth
23. Putin Can't Get Lucky Enough to Win
24. War in Ukraine: How Russia is recruiting mercenaries
25.  Preparing for Defeat (Russia in Ukraine) Preparing for Defeat (Russia in Ukraine)
26. U.S. military investigation finds extensive failures before deadly terror attack in Kenya
27. Putin’s Endgame: A Conversation With Fiona Hill



1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 11
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 11
Mar 11, 2022 - Press ISW
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko
March 11, 5:30pm EST
Russian ground forces attempting to encircle and take Kyiv began another pause to resupply and refit combat units on March 11 after failed attacks March 8-10. Russian forces also appear to be largely stalemated around Kharkiv. Russian advances from Crimea toward Mykolayiv and Zaporizhya and in the east around Donetsk and Luhansk made no progress in the last 24 hours, and Russian forces in the south face growing morale and supply issues. The Ukrainian General Staff asserted Russia has so far failed to take its territorial objectives for the war and will likely increasingly turn to strikes on civilian targets and psychological operations to undermine civilian support for the Ukrainian government.[1] Uncoordinated and sporadic Russian offensive operations against major Ukrainian cities support the Ukrainian General Staff’s assessment that Russian forces face growing morale and supply issues and have lost the initiative. The Ukrainian General Staff stated on March 11 that Ukrainian forces are “actively defending and conducting successful counterattacks in all directions,” but did not state where reported counterattacks are occurring.[2]
The Kremlin likely seeks to increase its combat power by drawing Belarus into the war and leveraging Syrian proxies, in addition to ongoing efforts to directly replace Russian combat losses through individual conscripts that are unlikely to be well-enough trained or motivated to generate effective new combat power. Putin is reportedly conducting an internal purge of general offers and intelligence personnel and recalibrating Russia’s war effort to sustain combat operations far longer than the Kremlin initially planned. Russia likely requires a new wave of combat-effective reservists or recruits in a short period of time to achieve its objectives in Ukraine but is unlikely to be able to generate such a wave. Russian aircraft likely conducted an attempted false-flag attack on Belarusian territory on March 11. The Kremlin is likely pressuring Belarus to enter the war in Ukraine to support Russian forces, though Belarusian President Lukashenko is likely attempting to delay or prevent his entry into the war to avoid costly Western sanctions and Belarusian combat losses. The Kremlin additionally announced plans on March 11 to deploy foreign fighters, including up to 16,000 Syrian fighters, to Ukraine. The Kremlin is highly unlikely to abandon its continuing main effort to encircle and capture Kyiv and will continue to feed replacements and reinforcements into this operation.
Key Takeaways
  • Russian operations around Kyiv remained largely stalled over the past 24 hours and Russian forces conducted another pause to resupply and refit frontline units.
  • Russian forces did not secure any new territory in northeastern Ukraine and may be redeploying forces attacking eastern Kyiv to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks in Sumy Oblast.
  • Russian forces remain pinned down attempting to reduce Mariupol by siege and bombardment.
  • Ukrainian forces halted Russian advances north and west from Crimea as Russian forces face growing supply and morale issues.
  • Russian aircraft likely conducted an attempted false-flag attack on Belarusian territory on March 11 in an effort to draw Belarus into the war.
  • The Kremlin announced plans to deploy foreign fighters, including up to 16,000 Syrian fighters, to Ukraine.
  • Putin reportedly fired several generals and arrested FSB intelligence officers in an internal purge.
  • Ukrainian forces killed the commander of Russia’s 29th Combined Arms Army. High casualties among Russian general officers indicate the poor quality of Russian command and control, requiring Russian generals to deploy forward and risk Ukrainian fire to command their forces.
  • Ukrainian air force and air defense operations continue to hinder Russian ground forces maneuver by likely limiting Russian close air support and exposing Russian mechanized forces to Ukrainian air and artillery attacks.

The Kremlin advanced three separate force generation efforts on March 11.
  1. The Kremlin conducted a likely false-flag attack on Belarus and continued to pressure Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to bring Belarusian forces into the war;
  2. The Kremlin announced plans to deploy Syrian fighters to Ukraine;
  3. The Kremlin increased deployments of Russian reservists and individual replacements to replace rising casualties, including among general officers.
1. Russian aircraft likely conducted an attempted false-flag attack on Belarusian territory on March 11. The Kremlin is likely pressuring Belarus to enter the war in Ukraine to support Russian forces. Belarusian President Lukashenko is likely attempting to delay or prevent his entry into the war to avoid costly Western sanctions and Belarusian combat losses. Ukrainian authorities reported at 2:30 pm local time on March 11 that two Russian aircraft had entered Ukrainian airspace before returning to Belarus and launching an airstrike against the Belarusian town of Kopani.[3] Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov additionally stated on March 11 that Ukraine is “fully confident” that Russian aviation is preparing to strike several Belarusian settlements, including Kopani, from Ukrainian airspace to force Belarusian leadership to join Russia’s war in Ukraine.[4] Russian forces have not conducted any additional false-flag attacks as of this publication. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense denied that the strikes occurred.[5] Ukraine's State Centre for Strategic Communications separately stated that “according to preliminary data, Belarusian troops may be drawn into an invasion on March 11 at 21:00 local time [2pm EST]."[6] There is no evidence in the open-source indicating that Belarusian forces have joined Russian combat operations as of this publication.
Belarusian President Lukashenko additionally met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on March 11 to discuss Russia’s war in Ukraine.[7] Lukashenko claimed Ukraine would have attacked Belarus if Russia had not launched its preemptive “military operation” and expressed support for the Russian operation.[8] Lukashenko separately claimed that “foreign mercenaries” are moving toward Belarus and intend to draw Belarus into the war so that Belarusian troops “expose the western sector.”[9] Lukashenko has previously claimed Belarus will not participate in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine so that Belarusian troops can defend Belarus from what they allege to be a planned NATO attack through Poland and Lithuania.[10] Lukashenko’s continued claims that Belarusian forces are needed to defend western Belarus and that any attacks on Belarus are Western attempts to bring Belarus into the war are likely intended to push back on Russian pressure on him to order Belarusian forces to enter the war.
2. The Kremlin announced plans to deploy foreign fighters, including up to 16,000 Syrian fighters, to Ukraine. Putin stated Russia will help international “volunteers” who want to defend Donbas travel to Ukraine, framing this effort as a counterbalance to Kremlin claims of “Western mercenaries” fighting for Ukraine.[11] Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu claimed Russia has already received 16,000 applications from the Middle East, primarily from troops that ”helped in the fight against ISIS.”[12] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov later clarified the ”volunteers” are primarily Syrians and that the Kremlin is not separately recruiting Russian volunteers at this time.[13] Russia will likely deploy Syrian Arab Army (SAA) units and other Russian-led proxy forces to Ukraine, as it has previously done in Libya.[14]
3. Russia continues to rush individual replacements to frontline combat units amid rising casualties, including among hard-to-replace general officers. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 11 that Russian units continue to suffer heavy losses and are struggling to deliver supplies to units in combat.[15] Ukrainian forces’ capture of a Russian supply column with ammunition on March 11 supports this assessment.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff stated Russia is transferring reserves across Russia to its combat units and began sourcing conscripts from prisons in Rostov Oblast in exchange for amnesty.[17] ISW previously assessed that Russian efforts to mobilize more manpower can bring more personnel into Russian combat units, but that those new personnel are unlikely to be well-enough trained or motivated to generate effective new combat power.[18] The Ukrainian Armed Forces additionally claimed that they killed Russian Major General Andrei Kolesnikov, commander of the Eastern Military District’s 29th Combined Arms Army, on March 11.[19] This follows the death of Russian Colonel Andrei Zakharov, commander of the 6th Tank Regiment of the 90th Tank Division, on March 10.[20] High casualties among Russian general officers indicate the poor quality of Russian command and control, requiring Russian generals to deploy forward and risk Ukrainian fire to command their forces.
Putin reportedly fired several generals and arrested Federal Security Service (FSB) intelligence officers in an internal purge. Ukrainian Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Oleksiy Danilov stated on March 9 that the Kremlin has replaced eight generals due to their failures in Ukraine, though ISW cannot independently verify this information.[21] Putin additionally detained several personnel from the FSB’s 5th Service, which is responsible for informing Putin about the political situation in Ukraine. The Federal Protective Service and 9th Directorate of the FSB (its internal security department) reportedly raided the 5th Service and over 20 other locations on March 11. Several media outlets reported that 5th Service Head Sergey Beseda and his deputy Anatoly Bolyukh are under house arrest on March 11.[22] Independent Russian media outlet Meduza claimed the 5th Service might have provided Putin with false information about the political situation in Ukraine ahead of his invasion out of fear of contradicting Putin‘s desired prognosis that a war in Ukraine would be a smooth undertaking.[23] Putin is likely carrying out an internal purge of general officers and intelligence personnel. He may be doing so either to save face after failing to consider their assessments in his own pre-invasion decision-making or in retaliation for faulty intelligence he may believe they provided him.
Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
  • Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
  • Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
  • Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk Oblast;
  • Supporting effort 2—Mariupol; and
  • Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward.
Russian forces reportedly began efforts to establish an occupation regime in several areas of Ukraine on March 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 11 that Russia is attempting to introduce an “administrative-police” regime in occupied areas by conducting pro-Russian messaging to hostile civilian populations and establishing police structures likely made up of Rosgvardia units in several occupied territories.[24]
Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis are aimed at encircling the city from the northwest, west, and east.
Russian forces did not make any substantial gains in the past 24 hours and Ukrainian forces likely conducted several local counterattacks northwest of Kyiv. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the pace of the Russian invasion has slowed and that Ukrainian forces continue to inflict heavy losses.[25] Russian forces once again paused offensive operations to regroup and resupply on March 11. The apparent need of Russian forces to conduct another operational pause after failed attacks on March 8-9 supports the Ukrainian General Staff assessments that Russian forces have far less effective combat power around the capital than their numbers would suggest.
Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro
Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations west of Kyiv on March 11 after several failed attacks late on March 10. Russian forces paused to regroup and resupply.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported at midnight local time on March 10 that Russian forces attempted to break through Ukrainian defenses in Andriivka, Zhovtneve, Kopyliv, Motyzhyn, Buzova, Horenychi, and Bucha (a ring of suburbs north and northwest on Kyiv) and later stated at 6:00 am local time on March 11 that Russian forces failed to secure any territory.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally stated that Russian forces previously “suffered significant losses” and retreated from “previously captured settlements of Kyiv region,” but did not specify what positions Russian forces retreated from.[28] Ukrainian forces likely conducted local counterattacks west of Kyiv following failed Russian advances on March 10, but ISW cannot independently confirm the location of any Ukrainian counterattacks.[29]
Subordinate supporting effort — Chernihiv axis
Russian attacks on Chernihiv failed to secure additional territory on March 10-11. Russian forces launched several failed attacks on Chernihiv late on March 10.[30] Ukrainian forces claimed they recaptured five settlements in Chernihiv Oblast on March 11, but ISW cannot independently confirm the location of these possible counterattacks.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue to inflict heavy casualties and take Russian prisoners around Chernihiv, claiming captured Russian equipment has “significantly strengthened” Ukrainian forces in the city.[32]
The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces did not conduct any attacks toward eastern Kyiv on March 11 and limited their operations to “raids and reconnaissance.”[33] Ukrainian forces claimed to capture or destroy at least eight Russian T-72 tanks and a Tor air defense system near Mokrets, approximately 60 kilometers northwest of Kyiv.[34]
Subordinate supporting effort — Sumy axis
The military situation on the Sumy axis has not materially changed in the past 24 hours. Ukrainian forces claimed to destroy approximately a dozen Russian artillery and combat vehicles at an unspecified location in Sumy Oblast on March 10.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces “kept Sumy surrounded” but did not conduct any new attacks on March 11.[36]
The US Department of Defense separately reported on March 10 that Russian forces have advanced within 40 kilometers of eastern Kyiv, but that “a portion of these forces may be repositioning themselves back toward Sumy.”[37] ISW cannot independently verify these reported Russian redeployments. Russia may be withdrawing forces from attacks toward eastern Kyiv to shore up the defenses of its long ground line of communication in northeastern Ukraine against Ukrainian counterattacks, as ISW previously forecasted.[38]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:
Russian forces did not conduct any direct assaults on Kharkiv City on March 11, instead pausing to reconstitute their forces.[39] Russian forces continued to shell the city and made limited territorial gains on its southeastern outskirts, seizing Malaya Rohan late on March 10.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian units attacking Kharkiv are increasingly using Russian reservists.[41]
Supporting Effort #1a—Luhansk Oblast:
Russian forces continued to unsuccessfully attack Severdonetsk (in Luhansk Oblast) on March 11.[42] The military situation in Luhansk Oblast has not materially changed in the past 24 hours.
Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol:
Russian forces made several unsuccessful assaults on Mariupol on March 10-11 and continued to shell the city.[43] Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov stated on March 11 that Russian forces continue to hold Mariupol “hostage” and are “committing a real act of genocide.” Reznikov stated Ukraine is attempting to negotiate the opening of humanitarian corridors out of the city, but that Russian forces continued to shell the city during official negotiations.[44] Russian forces are unlikely to seize Mariupol through a direct assault without a greater concentration of forces (which they remain unlikely to have the ability to assemble). Russia will likely continue to shell the city to force it to capitulate.
Russian and proxy forces made limited territorial gains north of Mariupol on March 11. Donetsk Peoples Republic (DNR) forces claimed to capture Olginka, Velika-Anadol, and Zeleny Hai on March 11.[45] The Russian Ministry of Defense separately claimed that DNR forces seized Volnovakha on March 11 after several days of fighting.[46]
Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and west:
Russian attacks toward both Mykolayiv and Zaporizhya stalled on March 11.[47] The Ukrainian commander in Mykolayiv reportedly stated Russian forces are abandoning many vehicles near the city and are demoralized due to low temperatures and supply difficulties: “They have no will to fight. They don't even have food. It's -10 with snow here, they don't want to be here.”[48]
Immediate items to watch
  • The Kremlin likely seeks to pressure Belarus to join the war in Ukraine and will deploy Syrian fighters to Ukraine in the near future;
  • Russian forces are undertaking another operational pause to prepare for renewed efforts to encircle Kyiv from east and west and/or to seize the city center itself following their failures of March 8-9;
  • Russian troops may drive on Zaporizhya City itself within the next 48-72 hours, likely attempting to block it from the east and set conditions for subsequent operations after Russian forces take Mariupol, which they are currently besieging;
  • Russian forces may attempt amphibious landings anywhere along the Black Sea Coast from Odesa to the mouth of the Southern Bug River in the next 24-48 hours.
[5] https://www dot belta dot by/society/view/minoborony-informatsija-o-raketnom-udare-po-belorusskoj-derevne-fejk-489662-2022/.
[7] https://tass dot ru/politika/14040169.
[8] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/14040463; https://meduza dot io/news/2022/03/11/v-moskve-nachalis-peregovory-putina-i-lukashenko-pered-vstrechey-lukashenko-rasskazal-o-karte-raskryvayuschey-plany-napadeniya-ukrainy-na-belarus.
[9] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/14040463.
[11] https://tass dot ru/politika/14037259.
[12] https://interfax.com dot ua/news/general/811346.html.
[13] https://tass dot ru/politika/14039069
[19] https://24tv dot ua/zsu-likviduvali-general-mayora-komanduvacha-29-armiyi-rosiyi_n1901591.
[21] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2022/03/9/7329868/.
[22] https://twitter.com/igorsushko/status/1502345408365748225; https://twitter.com/igorsushko/status/1502345407350730755; https://meduza dot io/feature/2022/03/11/putin-nachal-repressii-protiv-5-y-sluzhby-fsb-imenno-ona-nakanune-voyny-obespechivala-prezidenta-rossii-dannymi-o-politicheskoy-situatsii-v-ukraine; https://www dot dialog.ua/war/247891_1647006815.
[23] https://meduza dot io/feature/2022/03/11/putin-nachal-repressii-protiv-5-y-sluzhby-fsb-imenno-ona-nakanune-voyny-obespechivala-prezidenta-rossii-dannymi-o-politicheskoy-situatsii-v-ukraine.
[31] https://interfax.com dot ua/news/general/811342.html.
[45] https://twitter.com/BellYusri/status/1502179591515152386; https://english.pravda dot ru/news/world/150650-russia_mariupol/; https://www.rtv dot rs/sr_ci/svet/kremlj-sastanak-putina-i-zelenskog-moguc-uz-pripremu_1321993.html

2. Ukraine Conflict Update - March 12, 2022 | SOF News


Ukraine Conflict Update - March 12, 2022 | SOF News
sof.news · by SOF News · March 12, 2022

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO.
Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).
Russian Campaign Update. The Russians have expanded their aerial attacks against more cities across Ukraine. The large city of Dnipro in central Ukraine and Lutsk and Ivano-Frankivsk in western Ukraine were attacked by aircraft and missiles. The Russians have not made any significant advances in the past 48 hours; although they have stepped up their attacks over the March 11th period. A senior defense official held a ‘background briefing’ at the Pentagon on Friday, March 11, 2022 providing some details on the tactical situation on the ground in Ukraine.
And Belarus? There are a significant number of forces gathered around the Brest region. There is always the possibility that Belarus forces could move from that area (located in southwest Belarus) south into western Ukraine to cut off the supply routes of weapons being sent by Western nations. Something to keep an eye on.
Fight for the Skies. Two airfields in western Ukraine, Lutsk and Ivano-Frankivsk, were hit by long-range missiles. There have not been many attacks against targets in the west. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense reported earlier today that Russia launched two airstrikes inside Belarus. It is believed that this will be used as an incident to prompt Belarus to enter the conflict. Ukraine is looking for more air defense weapons from the West.
Maritime Activities. No news on this front.
Kyiv. The capital city of Ukraine is considered the primary objective of the Russians. The Capture of Kyiv would allow Russia to put in place its puppet government. Russian forces are slowly moving forward in their positions. It is believed that the Russians will attack the capital city of Kyiv in the next several days. It is anticipated that the city will be encircled in the next two weeks and that the battle for the Ukrainian capital could take one month. Heavy fighting is occurring in the areas outside of Kyiv – including Bucha, Irpin, and Hostomel.
Kharkiv. The second largest city of Ukraine is Kharkiv located in the northeast of the country. It continues to be under heavy shelling but Ukrainian forces are holding the city.
Mariupol. Located on the Sea of Azov, the coastal city of Mariupol is under siege by the Russians. This city is situated along the coastal road network that would provide Russia with a land bridge between Russia and the Crimea. The city is considered to be completely cut off by the Russians – and has been for probably a week. Food, fuel, and water are extremely short and the humanitarian condition is dire. Mass graves are now being used in the city. The Russians failed to occupy this city in 2014; so they will likely want to ensure that they get control of this strategic city this time around.
Mykolayiv. Located on the west bank of the Dnieper River close to the coast of the Black Sea, Mykolayiv is a strategic objective for the Russians that is on the road to Odessa located further west along the coast of the Black Sea. The Russians are continuing their efforts to encroach further into the city limits. Several buildings were on fire as a result of shelling in the past 24 hours.
Dnipro. This city along the Dnieper River has been receiving early morning aerial attacks the last few nights. It will likely be a Russian target in the weeks to come.
Refugees. Are the European countries getting to the stressing point on receiving Ukrainian refugees? They have taken in 2.5 million over the past two weeks. How many more can they take in before things become problematic? Warsaw and Krakow are full and the train stations are maxed out. Check out this map to see where the refugees are going. There are about 1.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ukraine.
Negotiations – Nothing Achieved. Russia seems intent on a military solution for Ukraine – despite the death of Russian soldiers on the battlefield, stiff resistance by Ukraine, the heavy costs to Russia’s economy, and the plummeting stature of Russia in the opinion of the world. The high-level talks in Turkey held on Thursday confirm that the Russians have firm goals in sight and feel that they can achieve all of their strategic objectives. “Talks Stall as Russian Army Besieges Ukrainian Cities”, National Interest, March 12, 2022.
Maps of Conflict. This map by David Batashvili provides a graphic display of the front line positions and axes of advance of the Russians in Ukraine. The Institute for the Study of War has posted its Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment for March 11th. It includes a good graphic of the disposition of forces in Ukraine. Euromaidan Press (UA) has posted its March 12, 2022 SITMAP. The UK Ministry of Defence has posted an updated (Mar 12th) situation map.

General Information
MiG-29 Fiasco. The U.S. decision to deny 28 Polish fighter jets to Ukraine is putting the spokespersons for the White House, Department of State, and Department of Defense into a difficult position. They are attempting to explain why Poland sending MiG-29s to Ukraine is ‘a good idea’ but that the U.S. receiving the jet fighters from Poland at Ramstein Air Base and then sending them to Ukraine is ‘a bad idea’. President Biden personally vetoed the delivery of the jets. Vice President Harris was in Poland to ‘patch things up’. She sidestepped questions about the MiG-29s with reporters. “The Ukraine MiG-29 Fiasco Gets Worse”, The Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2022. (subscription).
Ukrainian Women in the Fight. About 15% of the Ukrainian armed forces are women. Since the invasion by Russia many more women are joining in the volunteer resistance groups as well. “Ukrainian women are showing the world what they’re made of in the fight against Russia”, Task & Purpose, March 9, 2022.
Google’s Air Raid Function. On March 10, Google announced its “Air Raid Alerts” system for Android. The firm is building a client into the OS for the government’s air raid alert system. The feature is available via Google Play Services. (ARS Technica, Mar 10, 2022).
U.S. Volunteers for Ukraine. Jeff Schogol writes about Americans who have a desire to assist Ukraine in the fight against Russia. “In search of a just war: Why American veterans are answering a call to serve in Ukraine”, Task & Purpose, March 9, 2022.
U.S. Vets on Urban Combat. Several U.S. combat veterans are interviewed on what Ukraine needs to do to defeat the Russians. “Urban combat veterans share lessons for Ukraine fight”, Military Times, March 11, 2022.
Cyber and Info Ops
False Flag Activities? There are reports that Russia may attempt two separate false flag events in the near future. The first is an alleged bombing of villages in Belarus by Ukrainian aircraft. The second is an alleged terrorist act at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant. The United Nations announced on Friday that it had no evidence Ukraine had a biological weapons program. Washington and its allies accused Russia of spreading the unproven claim as a possible prelude to launching its own biological or chemical attacks.
Media Platform Actions. The Tow Center, posted on the Columbia Journalism Review, is tracking actions taken by social media and news platforms against Russia. “A Platform and Publishers Timeline of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”.
Russia’s Disinformation Campaign. Days after Russia invaded Ukraine, multiple social media platforms made moves to limit the activities of Russia’s info ops organizations. YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter announced measures to limit Russia’s disinformation activities. Platforms have become more adept at handling this disinformation flow since the interference by Russia in the 2016 U.S. elections. “Russia is having less success at spreading social media disinformation (for now)“, NiemanLab, March 9, 2022.
Russia’s Media – Going Off Message? There may be some cracks in the internal Russian propaganda machine. Russians are starting to question the invasion of Ukraine on the air. “Even Russia’s Kremlin-backed media is going off message and beginning to question Putin’s war on Ukraine”, Fortune.com, March 11, 2022.
World Response
Volunteer Evac Groups. A number of volunteer veteran organizations formed up in the chaotic days of the Kabul airlift in mid-August 2021 to assist Afghans attempting to get on the Kabul airport and catch an evacuation flight out of Afghanistan. Many of the volunteers from these Afghan Evac groups are now helping Ukrainians flee to the western border into neighboring countries. Read more in a article by Beth Bailey – “Afghanistan evacuation organizations use lessons learned to assist Ukraine refugees”, Washington Examiner, March 10, 2022.
Trade Relations With Russia. The European Union and the United States will be ending normal trade relations with Russia. Tariffs on Russian goods will be raised. It appears that Russia will soon be denied the ability to borrow money from institutions like the IMF and World Bank.
U.S. Weapons Assistance – Speeding up the Process? The process that the U.S. uses to pass on weapons to allies in times of crisis is laboriously slow and bureaucratic. However, it appears the Pentagon is taking steps to speed up the delivery of weapons to Ukraine with the reactivation of a special team that has accomplished this task in the past. “Pentagon revives team to speed arms to Ukraine and allies, sources say”, Reuters.com, March 11, 2022.
NATO Membership? The aim of Putin to enhance Russia’s strategic position versus the North Atlantic Treaty Organization seems to be backfiring. The invasion of Ukraine was to weaken the NATO alliance and improve Russia’s security position. It isn’t working out that way. Finland and Sweden, long neutral countries, are looking hard at the benefits of NATO membership. “Complex – but Promising – Prospects as Finland and Sweden Mull NATO Membership”, RAND Corporation, March 3, 2022.
Commentary
Merchant Ships and Neutrality. The French recently seized a Russian merchant ship at sea, using the the sanction measures recently instituted as a legal mechanism. This detention raises some questions. During armed conflict, can neutral states seize belligerent merchant vessels on the high seas and retain their neutral status? Cmdr. Michael Petta, U.S. Coast Guard, is a professor of international law at the U.S. Naval War College. He provides his thoughts on this maritime legal issue. “The Seizure of a Russian Merchant Vessel Raises Questions about Neutrality”, Lawfare Blog, March 8, 2022.
A Slow Advance – No Surprise. Russia doesn’t wage war elegantly. It is slow and ponderous. The last few weeks in Ukraine have come as no surprise to some who study the Russian way of war. A former Marine Corps officer provides an analysis of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine through the U.S. military’s three Warfighting Factors (time, space, and force); and the six Warfighting Functions (command and control, intelligence, fire support, movement and maneuver, sustainment, and force protection). “A Marine special ops commander explains why Russia’s stalled advance in Ukraine is no surprise”, Task & Purpose, March 10, 2022.
Urban Combat – Not a Russian Thing. The combined-arms doctrine followed by the Russian army has generally advised against making cities primary objectives. It has the stance that if the enemy’s main force in the field is destroyed, then his cities will surrender. Putin’s plan for a quick defeat of Ukraine’s military in the field and the decapitation of the Ukraine government did not work out. Now his army must deal with the difficult task of combat in built-up cities. “Russia Doesn’t Train Troops for Urban Warfare. It’s About to Learn the Consequences in Ukraine”, Military.com, March 8, 2022.
Sanctioning Russia. Jane Vaynman and Tristan A. Volpe had done some heavy thinking when they wrote this article about the sanctions applied by Western governments and how they will influence the ‘off ramp’ that Putin may take . . . if he does. “Making Coercion Work Against Russia?”, War on the Rocks, March 11, 2022.
No Off Ramp? When the Russian invasion took place two weeks ago most national security observers predicted a quick victory by the Russians, a temporary cessation of the conflict, and a period of negotiations. However, the stiff resistance by the Ukrainians has resulted in an outpouring of support for Ukraine, significant punitive action (sanctions, financial measures, etc.), and rapid resupply of needed defensive weapons to Ukraine. So now it appears that Ukraine and Russia are in long, hard slog with no end in sight. “No off-ramps: U.S. and European officials don’t see a clear endgame in Ukraine”, The Washington Post, March 10, 2022.
Understanding Putin’s Decision to Invade. Western governments are trying to determine why the Russian president decided to invade Ukraine. Perhaps, despite the months long posturing about Ukraine, he didn’t really plan to invade? Chris Harrington notes that after the Russians moved ‘peacekeeping forces’ into the two separatist regions of Ukraine, there was a partial mobilization of reservists in Ukraine. Drawing on parallels to the mobilizations of World War I, he suggests that Putin reacted to the mobilizations and went on the offense before his Russian army was ready. “Why Putin Pulled the Trigger”, Georgetown Security Studies Review, March 8, 2022.

SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, defense, or the current conflict in Ukraine then we are interested.
Maps and Other Resources
Maps of Ukraine
Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.
Janes Equipment Profile – Ukraine Conflict. An 81-page PDF provides information on the military equipment of the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces. Covers naval, air, electronic warfare, C4ISR, communications, night vision, radar, and armored fighting vehicles, Ukraine Conflict Equipment Profile, February 28, 2022.
Russian EW Capabilities. “Rah, Rah, Rash Putin?”, Armada International, March 2, 2022.
Arms Transfers to Ukraine. Forum on the Arms Trade.
UNHCR Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation
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Photo: Photo: Ukraine soldier Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
sof.news · by SOF News · March 12, 2022



3. Putin's War in Ukraine Is Going So Bad He Is Firing Generals: Report

Conclusion:

It means that Putin is beginning to run out of options and may soon be faced with the choice of retreating or continuing to suffer heavy losses as his forces continue and fail to take control of the nation’s capital city. An estimated 4,000 Russian troops have already died in the Ukraine conflict, which is around the same number of American troops who died in Afghanistan over 20 years.

Putin's War in Ukraine Is Going So Bad He Is Firing Generals: Report
19fortyfive.com · by ByJack Buckby · March 12, 2022
Putin Fires Generals After Ukraine Invasion Falters – Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly fired as many as eight of his generals over a multitude of military losses in Ukraine, as Ukraine hangs on to control of Kyiv and Ukrainian troops and civilians continue pushing back against invading forces.
The news comes from Ukrainian Defense Secretary Oleksiy Danilov, who made the claim on Ukrainian television on Wednesday. Danilov said that Russia had removed eight generals from their posts “because they did not complete the task” and that new generals have been appointed.
“We clearly understand what is happening in the Russian federation. What’s more, I can tell they’re desperate,” he said.
Danilov also claimed that Russian propagandists are changing their rhetoric about Ukraine, as U.S. intelligence units “said in the forecasts that the victory will be ours.”
While Danilov expressed confidence in Ukraine’s ability to hold off the Russian invaders, he admitted that the fight will not be easy and could take time.
“Will it be difficult? Yes, it will be difficult. Do not underestimate the enemy,” he said. “We loop it in all directions, but it crawls and crawls like locusts. I know for sure that we will survive.”
Putin Running Out of Options
Jeffrey Edmonds, a Russian military expert at the Virginia-based think tank, told Insider that he is “highly skeptical” of Russian forces being able to secure Kyiv.
“They can level it, which is what their preferred technique is,” he said. “It remains to be seen if they try to actually control the city street by street or if they just level it in the hopes that the Ukrainians give up.”
Despite Putin’s military being significantly larger than Ukraine’s, a constant supply of Western military equipment, missiles, and rockets has made it difficult for Russian forces to take control of Kyiv, one of Europe’s largest cities.
President Putin watches the Zapad 2021 joint strategic exercises of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.
Roughly a million Ukrainians remain in the city, with many taking to the streets and fighting alongside the nation’s armed forces.
It means that Putin is beginning to run out of options and may soon be faced with the choice of retreating or continuing to suffer heavy losses as his forces continue and fail to take control of the nation’s capital city. An estimated 4,000 Russian troops have already died in the Ukraine conflict, which is around the same number of American troops who died in Afghanistan over 20 years.
Jack Buckby is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and report on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society.
19fortyfive.com · by ByJack Buckby · March 12, 2022

4. Is a Russian disinformation campaign a prelude to a Russian bioweapons attack?

Excerpts:

“Is there going to be a large-scale chemical weapons attack launched by Russian forces on Ukrainian civilians or soldiers? There is no military reason to do that,” he said. “I think what we’re looking at is the possibility that there’s a limited use of some sort of chemical agent in a way that is designed to make it look as though Ukrainian forces [are attacking].”

Russia has also been accused of enabling the widespread use of chemical weapons by the government of Syria. In the wake of the Ghouta attack, which killed more than 1,400 people, Russia and the U.S. reached a deal under which Moscow agreed to ensure that its Syrian ally would refrain from using these weapons and work to destroy its stockpile under international oversight. But the Syrian regime continued to use chemical weapons, including the Sarin attack on the town of Khan Shaykhun in 2017 and an attack using chlorine on Douma in 2018. The U.S. accused Russia of hindering international investigations of these incidents.

The Syrian examples also show why, beyond the immediate danger these weapons themselves pose, they could dramatically transform the Ukraine conflict. The U.S. government has tended to treat instances of chemical weapons use with particular gravity, even compared to other wartime atrocities. Barack Obama’s administration nearly launched a military intervention in Syria after Assad crossed his infamous “red line” with the Ghouta attack, and Donald Trump’s administration did launch retaliatory missile strikes after Khan Shaykhun and Douma. Thus far, the Biden administration has stood firm on its vow to avoid escalatory steps like putting U.S. troops into Ukraine or imposing a no-fly zone over the country. Chemical weapons attacks have a way of changing those calculations.

Meanwhile, two weeks into the war, the Russian false narrative about bioweapons has injected two fresh concerns: The immediate worry is the false-flag scenario that U.S. and European diplomats laid out Friday. The other — a longer-term concern — is the involvement of China. At their Beijing summit last month, Putin and Xi Jinping said there were “no limits” to their friendship. A misinformation alliance aimed at the West would be a particularly disturbing example.

Is a Russian disinformation campaign a prelude to a Russian bioweapons attack?
Russia, China and Tucker Carlson are among those spreading a false — and dangerous — story about biological weapons.
Anya van Wagtendonk, Misinformation Reporter, 
Jonathan Lambert, Public Health Reporter, 
and Joshua Keating, Global Security Reporter
March 11, 2022
For weeks, Russia has been spreading misinformation about the existence of U.S.-controlled biological weapons facilities in Ukraine. On Friday, the Russians took that false information to the U.N. Security Council.
Russia’s U.N. Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia said his country had proof that Ukraine has at least 30 biological laboratories carrying out “very dangerous biological experiments,” and that the work “is being done and funded and supervised by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the United States.”
It’s a narrative the Russians have been spinning since the first days of the war: that biological labs in Ukraine are in fact run by the U.S. military for the purpose of producing biological and chemical weapons.
The Pentagon has “built two biological war labs [in Ukraine] and they have been developing pathogens there, in Kiev and Odessa,” foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said this week. “And now they are concerned that they may lose control over these labs.”
“Utter nonsense,” said Britain’s U.N. Ambassador Barbara Woodward at the Security Council Friday. “Russia is sinking to new depths.”
The U.S. accused Russia of “lying and spreading disinformation” as part of a potential false-flag operation for the use of chemical or biological agents in Ukraine.
“The intent behind these lies seems clear, and is deeply troubling,” said U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield. “We believe Russia could use chemical or biological agents for assassinations, as part of a staged or false-flag incident, or to support tactical military operations.”
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As with much disinformation, there’s a kernel of truth to the Russian story: The United States does fund biological facilities in Ukraine, but they are for disease research and prevention. As Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, told Grid, the notion that they are used for weapons purposes is “complete hogwash. Utter hogwash.”
Russia, China and Tucker Carlson
While the U.S., its NATO allies, U.N. officials, scientists and watchdog groups have joined in debunking the claims, Russia has found a pair of allies for this conspiracy theory: right-wing media in the U.S. and the government of China.
China has been at least somewhat measured in its support for Putin’s war — but in the misinformation war, it has gone all in.
This week China’s foreign ministry demanded that the U.S. “give a full account of its biological military activities at home and abroad and subject itself to multilateral verification.”
Chinese state media outlets published stories parroting the Russian charges. Many of those stories trended on the Chinese social media platform Weibo.
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According to Doublethink Lab, a Mandarin-language media watchdog, those stories drew heavily from an article by a Russian think tank aligned with the Russian ministry of foreign affairs.
“To the extent that the biological weapons narrative provides a justification for Putin’s invasion, and also an opportunity to tarnish the United States and dent its global soft power, this is a game that China’s been happy to play,” Jessica Brandt, a fellow in the Center for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Brookings Institution, told Grid.
It’s a level of linked messaging between the two countries that’s unlike anything observers have seen, Brandt added.
“Russia and China have very different long-term goals and interests. But in the near term, they both want to tarnish the appeal of the United States; they both want to sort of undermine the salience and the moral authority of liberal institutions like NATO.”
China has a recent history of spreading anti-U.S. disinformation — most notably when the government said in March 2020 that the U.S. military might have brought the covid-19 virus to Wuhan, and claimed that research at Fort Detrick, Maryland, might have been at the root of the pandemic.
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As for American media, the Ukraine weapons lab conspiracy theory has found a home in recent weeks among far-right American political figures and groups. Glenn Greenwald, a journalist critical of American military power and security agencies, said the theory could be true. And on Wednesday, Fox News’ Tucker Carlson ran with the Russian line, saying that Victoria Nuland, the U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs, had confirmed the existence of U.S.-backed bioweapons labs in Ukraine.
“Nuland just confirmed that the Russian disinformation they’ve been telling us for days is a lie and a conspiracy theory and crazy and immoral to believe is, in fact, totally and completely true,” Carlson said on his show, which was broadcast on Russian state TV the next day.
In fact, what Nuland said was that the U.S. is concerned that Russian troops would gain control of biological research facilities. Nothing about weapons.
Labs in Ukraine: the facts
This much is true: Since 2005, several Ukrainian labs have participated in the U.S. Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP), an initiative run by the Department of Defense. The program aims to “counter the threat of outbreaks (deliberate, accidental or natural) of the world’s most dangerous infectious diseases” around the world by partnering with local labs. In total, the U.S. has invested about $200 million in 46 labs, health facilities and diagnostic sites across Ukraine. But the U.S. does not run the facilities, and they are not “weapons labs.”
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union operated bioweapons labs, and the BTRP has been a decades-long effort to demilitarize Soviet facilities, but none of those were in Ukraine, said Andrew Weber, a senior fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks. “The laboratories in Ukraine were not directly part of the biological weapons program of the Soviet Union.”
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“The labs are not secret,” Filippa Lentzos, a senior lecturer in science and international security at King’s College London, said in an email to the Associated Press. “They are not being used in relation to bioweapons. This is all disinformation.”
The Ukrainian labs are no different than the sorts of labs found in many countries. “They are normal public health labs, sort of like CDC labs, where they do research on diseases endemic to the region,” said Gigi Gronvall, an immunologist at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security and former member of the Defense Department’s Threat Reduction Advisory Committee. For example, many of the labs monitor and try to prevent diseases like African swine fever, a virus that wreaks havoc on pig farms, or Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever, a viral tick-borne illness first discovered in Crimea that can spark deadly outbreaks. During the covid-19 pandemic, labs that were part of the BTRP helped study SARS-CoV-2 and track its transmission.
It’s in the U.S.’s interest to fund such research, Gronvall said. “Infectious diseases don’t respect borders,” she added. “Programs where you engage with scientists around the world and learn about new public health threats as they come up help us, they help our security.”
There are fears that fighting might inadvertently release some of the pathogens stored in these laboratories for study, which include pathogens on the U.S. Select Agent list, such as anthrax. The World Health Organization reportedly advised Ukraine to destroy any high-threat pathogens housed in refrigerators or freezers that could be disrupted during an attack and potentially released into the public. “I think that’s a prudent measure,” Weber said. Most of these Ukrainian labs are biosecurity level 2 (BSL-2), which means they study human pathogens, but not exceptionally dangerous or exotic ones. BSL-2 labs handle pathogens that present a moderate danger to human health. (The highest lab biosecurity rating level is 4; labs at that level around the world study highly dangerous pathogens for which there are no treatments.)
Still, the Ukrainian labs would be “well advised to destroy [samples] before they come under Russian control,” he said.
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The history — and the danger
While the U.S. and other countries fume over the false narrative, security officials are worried about that false-flag possibility: namely, that Russia will carry out a chemical or biological attack and then rely on its well-seeded disinformation to blame the U.S. for it.
Russia’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities are not what they once were, though it likely has the capability to launch some sort of attack.
The Russian Federation inherited the Soviet Union’s chemical weapons program and as recently as 20 years ago, it had the world’s largest declared stockpile of these weapons — 40,000 metric tons of them including nerve agents like sarin and VX, blister agents including mustard gas, and the World War I-era choking agent phosgene.
Russia also inherited a significant biological weapons program from the Soviets, including weaponized anthrax, smallpox and other disease. According to a 2021 U.S. State Department assessment, Russia has not “satisfactorily documented the complete extent of its programs and whether the items of these program … were completely destroyed.” The U.S. assessment is that Russia “maintains an offensive biological weapons program,” though the extent of the program is unclear.
Russia began the process of destroying its chemical stockpile in 1997, when the global Chemical Weapons Convention came into effect. (Under the same process, the U.S. has destroyed more than 90 percent of its own large chemical weapons arsenal and is due to complete the process next year.) In 2017, after several delays, the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) certified that Russia’s stockpile had been completely destroyed, calling it a “major milestone.”
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The celebration may have been premature. On March 4, 2018, Sergei Skripal, a Russian former spy, and his daughter, were poisoned in Salisbury, England, with what the OPCW later concluded to be Novichok, a Soviet-developed nerve agent. In addition to the Skripals, three other people were hospitalized by the Novichok, and one British woman died. The British government said it was “highly likely” the Russian government had ordered the attack, which the Kremlin denied. Novichok was also found to have been used in the 2020 poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny.
These individual poisonings are very different from what are typically thought of as chemical weapons attacks — horrific massacres such as Saddam Hussein’s mustard gas attack on the Kurdish city of Halabja in 1988 or Bashar al-Assad’s sarin attack on Ghouta, Syria, in 2013—but they do indicate Russia retains at least small traces of its former capability. It’s enough to raise serious concerns given what the U.S. alleges Russia is planning, the Arms Control Association’s Daryl Kimball told Grid.
“Is there going to be a large-scale chemical weapons attack launched by Russian forces on Ukrainian civilians or soldiers? There is no military reason to do that,” he said. “I think what we’re looking at is the possibility that there’s a limited use of some sort of chemical agent in a way that is designed to make it look as though Ukrainian forces [are attacking].”
Russia has also been accused of enabling the widespread use of chemical weapons by the government of Syria. In the wake of the Ghouta attack, which killed more than 1,400 people, Russia and the U.S. reached a deal under which Moscow agreed to ensure that its Syrian ally would refrain from using these weapons and work to destroy its stockpile under international oversight. But the Syrian regime continued to use chemical weapons, including the Sarin attack on the town of Khan Shaykhun in 2017 and an attack using chlorine on Douma in 2018. The U.S. accused Russia of hindering international investigations of these incidents.
The Syrian examples also show why, beyond the immediate danger these weapons themselves pose, they could dramatically transform the Ukraine conflict. The U.S. government has tended to treat instances of chemical weapons use with particular gravity, even compared to other wartime atrocities. Barack Obama’s administration nearly launched a military intervention in Syria after Assad crossed his infamous “red line” with the Ghouta attack, and Donald Trump’s administration did launch retaliatory missile strikes after Khan Shaykhun and Douma. Thus far, the Biden administration has stood firm on its vow to avoid escalatory steps like putting U.S. troops into Ukraine or imposing a no-fly zone over the country. Chemical weapons attacks have a way of changing those calculations.
Meanwhile, two weeks into the war, the Russian false narrative about bioweapons has injected two fresh concerns: The immediate worry is the false-flag scenario that U.S. and European diplomats laid out Friday. The other — a longer-term concern — is the involvement of China. At their Beijing summit last month, Putin and Xi Jinping said there were “no limits” to their friendship. A misinformation alliance aimed at the West would be a particularly disturbing example.

5. Analysis: Russia and QAnon have the same false conspiracy theory about Ukraine

QAnon: useful idiots or complicit in Russian propaganda?


Analysis: Russia and QAnon have the same false conspiracy theory about Ukraine | CNN Business
CNN · by Donie O'Sullivan · March 10, 2022
New York CNN Business —
A new conspiracy theory has become popular among some of the online communities that formed around QAnon – one simultaneously being promoted by the Kremlin as a justification for its invasion of Ukraine. The false claim: the United States is developing bioweapons in Ukraine and Vladimir Putin has stepped in to save the day and destroy the weapons.
QAnon’s core prophecy has always been that there is a “plan” and that former President Donald Trump will rid the world of an evil cabal, culminating in the unmasking, imprisonment or even execution of cabal members. But that prophecy dates back to when Trump was actually president – now that he’s not, believers have been convincing themselves there is evidence that the plan is still very much in place, maybe even more so than ever before. In the Kremlin’s disinformation, some have seen that hope.
There are US-funded biolabs in Ukraine, that much is true. But they are not building bioweapons. Actually, it’s the opposite: Part of the reason for their creation was to secure old Soviet weapons left behind in the former Soviet republics. The State Department has described the claims as nonsense – and the US and Ukrainian governments have repeatedly, and for years now, tried to bat down conspiracy theories about the labs and spoken about the work that is actually being done in them
Russia’s falsehoods about labs like this have not been limited to Ukraine. Similar claims were made about a lab in Tbilisi, Georgia; those were proven false. Dr. Filippa Lentzos, co-director of the Centre for Science & Security Studies at King’s College London, visited the lab along with other experts and debunked the Russian claims. She told CNN the Russians are spreading the same lies about labs in Ukraine.

There is a disinformation machine at work here.
It goes a bit like this. The Russian government makes suggestive statements, leaving breadcrumbs that are dutifully repeated by official Russian state media – and then, increasingly importantly, by dozens of faceless websites (some of which the US has alleged are tied to Russian intelligence). Social media accounts push the idea further, build on it, make it more fantastical – and those more fantastical claims eventually end up getting picked up by official Russian media and the cycle begins again.
Russia has been pushing various bits of disinformation about the US and biological weapons since the Cold War – infamously publicizing, for instance, the false idea that the US manufactured the HIV/AIDS virus.
Matt Field, an editor with the Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences, told CNN disinformation about US-supported bio-labs seems to peak when Russia finds itself under increased international scrutiny – the allegations about the Tbilisi lab, for instance, bubbled up in 2018 amid the international scandal after Russia was found to have poisoned Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, England.
The methods used to spread this kind of disinformation are not new, either. Former KGB agents have said the KGB would plant stories in obscure or small publications in foreign countries and then those stories would be cited as sources in official Russian media.
That process can happen a lot more easily today. Instead of having to go to the trouble of convincing an editor at a newspaper to publish disinformation, Russia can push it out on seemingly independent websites that present themselves as news outlets but are no more than Kremlin cut-outs. The US government has identified websites working in tandem with Russia’s FSB security service.
Russia still plants stories in real outlets too – for example, in 2017 the leftwing US magazine Counterpunch detailed how it had been duped into running articles under the byline “Alice Donovan,” which the US government later confirmed was a fake identity run by GRU Russian military intelligence.
Russia does not necessarily need to push its disinformation to QAnon adherents, because the two have enough shared interests. Today, many Americans find themselves in online groups and following accounts that mobilized around QAnon – there, Russian disinformation is sometimes embraced with enthusiasm.
On an American QAnon online radio show broadcast Monday, one host read verbatim from Russian state media reports about biolabs.
Over on the show’s online discussion forum a person who had intentionally misspelled the word “Patriot” so it would include the letter “Q” wrote, “I had a hunch that these bastards were getting ready to release another bio weapon and we needed SOMEONE to put a stop to it. Putin stepped up. IMO this was part of his deal with DJT.”
“A central element of conspiracy theory belief systems is the constant refining of narratives and reactions to wider events to support the grand narrative,” Ciarán O’Connor, a researcher with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a think tank that analyses disinformation, told CNN.
Journalists and government officials have been trying to debunk the falsehoods and spread the truth. Big Tech companies have been trying to stop the conspiracy theory’s spread on their platforms, too. But those measures have thus far been no match for the power of belief and the sustained campaign to promote this theory.
On Tuesday, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman helped the Russian effort, making his own suggestion that the US was up to something nefarious at labs in Ukraine. The same official in 2020 promoted the idea that the US military brought Covid-19 to China.
CNN · by Donie O'Sullivan · March 10, 2022


6. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has created NATO's watershed moment

Excerpts:
Curtis Scaparrotti was Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces from 2016-2019. He believes such a containment strategy would necessarily entail the return of significant US command-and-control and armor capabilities to Europe.
“Putin has surprised us at every turn with his territorial aggressions, and while I don’t think it’s likely that he would move on a NATO nation, the potential is there if he decides to escalate once again. The best way to stop that is to strengthen NATO’s defensive deterrence on its eastern flank,” Scaparrotti said in an interview. That would require NATO scuttling its 1997 agreement with Russia not to permanently station military forces on its eastern flank — an agreement that is hard to honor in light of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.
“In the past we relied on good warning time to mobilize US-based forces, but with the massing of Russian forces in Belarus and Ukraine it’s now clear we would have less time,” said Scaparrotti.
At the heart of that defense in the east, both Scaparrotti and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Dempsey would like to see a US armored division and a US corps headquarters for command-and-control once again based in Europe, backed by multi-domain capabilities and forces to provide air and missile defenses, artillery and rocket forces, logistics, engineering, and other enablers, with the armored division stationed on the alliance’s eastern flank.
“Our European allies will also have to step up and take more responsibility for their own defense, but I believe they have awoken to the threat,” said Scaparrotti. “The irony is that Vladimir Putin’s stated goal was to halt NATO enlargement and move NATO forces out of Eastern Europe, and his reckless actions have achieved exactly the opposite effect. He has prompted NATO to strengthen its force posture in Eastern Europe, and convinced countries like Sweden and Finland to reconsider their neutrality and possibly join NATO. Even Switzerland has made the remarkable decision to abandon its traditional neutrality.
“Who would have thought the world would see all of that?”
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has created NATO's watershed moment - Breaking Defense
A former chairman of the joint chiefs and two former supreme allied commanders of NATO, among others, lay out how it has come to the point Russia felt it could invade Ukraine.
on March 11, 2022 at 3:01 PM
breakingdefense.com · by James Kitfield · March 11, 2022
Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO, speaks during a joint press conference at the Tapa Army Base on March 1, 2022 in Tallinn, Estonia. (Photo by Leon Neal/Getty Images)
WASHINGTON: This week Secretary of State Antony Blinken wrapped up his tour of NATO eastern flank countries Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, hoping to reassure nervous allies. Russia’s naked war of aggression against nearby Ukraine and its constant threats and bullying of its neighbors explain why all eyes in the trans-Atlantic alliance are now fixed not only on Ukraine, but also on NATO’s vulnerable Baltic members, where Blinken was met with a warning on his arrival in Estonia.
“Frankly, deterrence is no longer enough and we need forward defense here in place because otherwise it will be too late, Mr. Secretary,” Estonian President Gitanas Nauseda told Blinken bluntly. “Putin will not stop in Ukraine if he will not be stopped.”
In fact Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is just the latest and boldest move by President Vladimir Putin to forcibly impose a privileged sphere of influence on his democratic neighbors. As far back as 2007 he launched one of the largest state-sponsored cyberattacks ever against Estonia, paralyzing the country’s internet for the crime of daring to move a statue of a Soviet soldier from the center of the capital.
In 2008 Russian forces invaded Georgia and occupied two “breakaway” republics because that country expressed an intent to join NATO. When Ukraine tilted West in 2014, Russia forcibly annexed Crimea and launched the separatist conflict in Donbas. More recently Moscow has helped quell democratic uprisings and prop up dictators in Belarus in 2020, and Kazakhstan earlier this year.
As Russian military forces continue trying to bomb Ukraine into submission, it is certainly not lost on US military leaders that Putin’s recently stated demands that NATO halt its expansion and remove military forces and infrastructure from its eastern flank countries suggest where his ire and ambition may be focused next. In the harsh light of the new cold war that is descending over Europe, it’s also increasingly clear that NATO leaders for years wrote checks and IOU’s with the alliance’s expansion eastward that its steadily dwindling defense capabilities couldn’t cover. And Vladimir Putin noticed.
“If Putin was willing to launch a full-scale invasion of another country on the doorstep of NATO, we have to be candid with ourselves that he perceived some signal from the United States and NATO that made him think he could get away with it, and we need to understand those signals that are eroding the alliance’s deterrence,” Martin Dempsey, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Breaking Defense.
Those signals likely include a steady reduction of US forces in Europe and declining military readiness and capability among European allies; a 20-year US preoccupation with counterterrorism and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan; a publicly announced US “pivot” to Asia to cope with the challenge of a rising China; an overreliance on the threat of economic sanctions as an adequate deterrence; years of former President Donald Trump browbeating NATO over inadequate burden sharing and threats to abandon the alliance; and the Biden administration’s chaotic military retreat from Afghanistan last year.
“Intuitively I think it’s unlikely that Putin would have ordered the invasion of Ukraine if he hadn’t perceived that the NATO alliance was more vulnerable than in the past, and that that vulnerability was growing over time. So lesson number one to me is that we need a reinforced US military presence in Europe, and the right kind of political statements about the value of the alliance to strengthen its deterrent value,” said Dempsey. Putin has also made clear that he considers himself a historic figure in the mold of Peter the Great, noted Dempsey, and he’s intent on reestablishing Russia’s sphere of influence, including in the Baltics.
President of Russia and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Vladimir Putin watches a Victory Day military parade on Red Square on June 24, 2020 in Moscow, Russia. (Photo by Ramil Sitdikov – Host Photo Agency via Getty Images )
“In Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014 and today in Ukraine, he has showed us the lengths he is willing to go to achieve a new Russian empire,” Dempsey said. “So as Maya Angelou once said, ‘When someone shows you who they are, believe them the first time.’ Putin has repeatedly showed us who he is, and shame on us if we fail to believe him.”
A Vulnerable Alliance
At the height of the Cold War the United Sates maintained roughly 400,000 troops in Europe, spread out primarily in Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy. By 2021 that number had plummeted to below 60,000. The Pentagon withdrew the two corps headquarters it once based in Europe, and in 2013 the US Army brought home its last armored units with M-1 Abrams battle tanks Bradley Fighting Vehicles from the continent. Even as it expanded eastward, the alliance also kept an agreement made in 1997 not to permanently station forces in member states bordering Russia.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and capture of Crimea in 2014 served as an initial wake-up call for the alliance. In response NATO formed four multinational battlegroups of roughly a battalion size (800-1,000 troops) led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States, and deployed them forward on a rotational basis to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. At NATO’s Wales Summit in 2014, the allies also agreed to devote 2 percent of gross domestic product to defense by 2024, a target that only three allied countries met at the time.
Yet in the years hence it became increasingly obvious that the threat from Russia was growing at a much faster pace than the alliance was evolving militarily, despite the addition of Montenegro in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2019. Moscow has been engaged in a decade-long military modernization of both conventional and strategic nuclear forces, for instance, and Russian forces gained valuable combat experience in Ukraine and Syria.
Meanwhile, European pillars of the NATO alliance like Germany and Great Britain saw a steady decline in military capability during that time. A 2018 report on the German Bundeswehr by the Parliamentary Armed Forces Commissioner detailed that decline, including transport planes and fighter aircraft that couldn’t fly, submarines that couldn’t sail, and tanks that couldn’t maneuver because of poor maintenance and repair and a lack of spare parts. A severe manpower shortage had also created a gaping 21,000 vacancies in the German officer corps.
The situation for the once globe-spanning British military was not much better. Due to defense budget cuts, London announced in 2021 that it was reducing the size of the British Army to 72,500 troops and just seven combat brigades, the smallest the British army has been in centuries. The number of British tanks under the plan will fall from 227 to 148, the Royal Air Force will lose 24 Typhoon jets, and the Royal Navy will drop from just 19 frigates and destroyers to 17. When the new HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier launched on its maiden voyage last year, it required a squadron of US Marine Corps F-35 fighters to fill out its air wing.
UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson sits in the cockpit of an Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II during a visit to HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier on May 21, 2021 in Portsmouth, England. (Photo by Leon Neal – WPA Pool/Getty Images)
In 2021, 10 of NATO’s 30 member states reached or exceeded the 2% of GDP target for defense spending, with the average for European members and Canada at 1.7% of GDP, and the United States spending 3.5% of GDP on defense to meet its global commitments [PDF].
Beyond increasing defense budgets, US military experts believe what’s most needed is a change of mindset in the alliance that recaptures some of the muscle memory from the Cold War, when military forces were maintained in a heightened state of readiness and prepared to fight on strict timelines based on the Soviet Red Army’s order of battle.
“We need to recalculate the entire readiness posture of our military forces, because collectively NATO forces are not ready,” said Ben Hodges, former commander of US Army Europe and currently the Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis. “Germany has three divisions, but they are not ready to fight. The British Army today is way too small. NATO exercises are far too scripted in advance, and they put too much emphasis on ‘Distinguished Visitor Day’ rather than adopting the necessary rigor where you train to failure, and then learn from the experience. The European Union also still has a ton of work to do in terms of prioritizing the movement of military forces on rail lines and roadways so you can efficiently move them across Europe. All of that is hard and expensive, but if you don’t practice those skills and demonstrate those capabilities our adversary is not going to be very impressed.”
Joseph Ralston, who served as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces from 2000-2003, remembers participating in annual “Reforger” exercises during the Cold War as a fighter squadron commander based in the United States.
“Every squadron commander and every maintenance shop focused on that deployment to Germany all year long, and we would have to plan on where to sleep, eat and requisition spare parts when we landed in Europe. We also developed good relationships and trust with the local host nation forces,” Ralston said in an interview. “We now need to reclaim that kind of readiness and warfighting mindset in NATO, because we’re in this confrontation with Russia for the long haul.”
A Watershed Moment
Certainly the spectacle of a Russian tyrant invading and attempting to subjugate a major European democracy for the first time since World War II has shocked the world, and transformed the counsels of the trans-Atlantic alliance. Since the crisis began NATO for the first time has activated its Rapid Response Force and is preparing to deploy it to the alliance’s eastern front. The 1st armored brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division in Georgia has for the first time deployed to Germany and collected prepositioned tanks and armored fighting vehicles stored there for an expected move to the east. A brigade combat team from the 82nd Airborne Division has deployed to Poland. In all, the United States has deployed 14,500 troops to Europe during the crisis, with thousands more on heightened alert.
U.S. Army Gen. Mark Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman Ramon Colon-Lopez, speak with Paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division during a visit to Nowa Deba, Poland, March 4, 2022. (U.S. Army Photo by Master Sgt. Alexander Burnett)
In other historic firsts, the European Union and traditionally pacifist Germany are both funding and sending lethal weaponry to Ukraine, along with many other NATO allies. Berlin has halted the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline with Russia and pledged an immediate down payment of roughly $113 billion of defense spending, while promising to exceed NATO’s 2% of GDP target next year. Poland has announced the planned purchase of roughly a division’s worth (250) of Abrams M-1 tanks. Switzerland has broken with its tradition of neutrality to join punishing European Union sanctions on Russia. Reliably neutral Finland and Sweden are now openly debating seeking membership in the NATO military alliance.
Yet against the roughly 190,000 Russian troops assembled for the dismemberment of Ukraine, the allied troops arrayed on NATO’s eastern flank are still insufficient deterrence. The threat is real that Putin will respond to the faltering of his Ukraine offensive and crippling Western sanctions by lashing out in frustration. In an act of desperation, he could move on a weak NATO member state to show alliance weakness and then threaten to employ tactical nuclear weapons against any response, a move actually anticipated in Russia’s “escalate to deescalate” nuclear doctrine. Putin “is unlikely to be deterred,” Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines testified before the House Intelligence Committee on Tuesday. “And instead may escalate – essentially doubling down.”
“I still worry that we are not building up military forces quick enough on NATO’s new eastern front, because we need significantly more military capability deployed in key strategic areas along a front that runs from the Baltics to the Black Sea,” said Ivo Daalder, former US ambassador to NATO and currently president of the Chicago Counsel on Global Affairs, speaking recently at an event hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations. “Because this is a very serious long-term confrontation that we’re going to have with Russia, and we need to start thinking in terms of a return to a containment strategy, and all that entails.”
Curtis Scaparrotti was Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces from 2016-2019. He believes such a containment strategy would necessarily entail the return of significant US command-and-control and armor capabilities to Europe.
“Putin has surprised us at every turn with his territorial aggressions, and while I don’t think it’s likely that he would move on a NATO nation, the potential is there if he decides to escalate once again. The best way to stop that is to strengthen NATO’s defensive deterrence on its eastern flank,” Scaparrotti said in an interview. That would require NATO scuttling its 1997 agreement with Russia not to permanently station military forces on its eastern flank — an agreement that is hard to honor in light of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.
“In the past we relied on good warning time to mobilize US-based forces, but with the massing of Russian forces in Belarus and Ukraine it’s now clear we would have less time,” said Scaparrotti.
At the heart of that defense in the east, both Scaparrotti and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Dempsey would like to see a US armored division and a US corps headquarters for command-and-control once again based in Europe, backed by multi-domain capabilities and forces to provide air and missile defenses, artillery and rocket forces, logistics, engineering, and other enablers, with the armored division stationed on the alliance’s eastern flank.
“Our European allies will also have to step up and take more responsibility for their own defense, but I believe they have awoken to the threat,” said Scaparrotti. “The irony is that Vladimir Putin’s stated goal was to halt NATO enlargement and move NATO forces out of Eastern Europe, and his reckless actions have achieved exactly the opposite effect. He has prompted NATO to strengthen its force posture in Eastern Europe, and convinced countries like Sweden and Finland to reconsider their neutrality and possibly join NATO. Even Switzerland has made the remarkable decision to abandon its traditional neutrality.
“Who would have thought the world would see all of that?”

7. Fiery Biden insists the U.S. will not fight ‘World War III’ in Ukraine
I fear the President is undermining our diplomacy by self deterring and expressing fear of World War III. He should never take the use of US military force off the table. I fear Putin assesses this as weakness and allows him freedom of action. These statements could actually cause more suffering and bloodshed in Ukraine that could spill over especially if Russian troops are able to get to the west edge of Ukraine.

Fiery Biden insists the U.S. will not fight ‘World War III’ in Ukraine
washingtontimes.com · by Mica Soellner

PHILADELPHIA — President Biden forcefully insisted Friday that he will not send U.S. troops into Ukraine to fight Russia, saying such an action would amount to World War III.
“The idea that we are going to send offensive equipment and have planes and tanks and trains going in with American pilots and American crews — don’t kid yourself, no matter what you all say — that’s called World War III,” he told a gathering of Democrats in Philadelphia. “Let’s get it straight here, guys.”
Mr. Biden and other NATO leaders have declared repeatedly that they will not send military forces into Ukraine to fight the Russian army, despite their support for Kyiv in the war. Mr. Biden has deployed thousands of troops to eastern European countries near Ukraine before and during the invasion to reassure NATO allies and assist with the refugee crisis.

The U.S. and NATO have provided Ukraine — which is not a member of the Western military alliance — with arms, including anti-tank weapons such as Javelin missiles.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned Western nations about joining the two-week-old war in Ukraine, hinting darkly that the Kremlin might resort to nuclear war against countries that try to intervene.
“I want to be clear though, we are going to make sure that Ukraine has the weapons to defend themselves against an invading Russian force,” Mr. Biden said at the House the Democratic Caucus Issues Conference in Philadelphia. “And we will send money and food aid to save Ukrainian lives. We’re going to welcome Ukrainian refugees with open arms if, in fact, they come all the way here.”
But he emphasized that no U.S. troops will be sent into Ukraine.
“We will not fight the Third World War in Ukraine,” he said.
The Biden administration and NATO have already taken some steps to avoid direct conflict with Russia over Ukraine.
For example, Mr. Biden has ruled out establishing a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine, fearing that it would be required to shoot down Russian jets that enter the zone. It also objected to a Polish plan to provide Ukraine with fighter jets, saying the move could also lead to a direct confrontation with Russia.
• Jeff Mordock can be reached at jmordock@washingtontimes.com.
• Mica Soellner can be reached at msoellner@washingtontimes.com.
Copyright © 2022 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.
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8. Why Hasn't Putin Unleashed Major Cyber and Electronic Warfare in Ukraine?


Why Hasn't Putin Unleashed Major Cyber and Electronic Warfare in Ukraine?

Why Hasn't Putin Unleashed Major Cyber and Electronic Warfare in Ukraine?
1: The Relative Absence of Russian Cyber Operations in Ukraine
"There have been many surprises in Russia’s conduct of its campaign. The poor performance of the Russian armed forces, the impact of inadequate training to support anticipated Russian air operations, the absence of Russia electronic warfare operations, Russia’s poor expeditionary logistics, etc.
"Among the most 'surprising surprises' is the relative absence of Russian cyber operations, and especially major cyber-attacks. Some of the success is almost certainly attribute to the NSA’s ‘defend forward' concept of contesting and disrupting adversary cyber operations. This capability was established in a series of policy changes culminating in a shift in the U.S. cyber strategy in 2018. These activities have built on indigenous cyber capabilities in Ukraine, and more recently aggressive private Ukrainian cyber hacking operations as well."
2: Russia Faces Deconfliction Issues
"They’re having a lot of coordination problems. Part of what you’re seeing is that the Russians’ coordination of the invasion has been flawed, which is part of why they get bogged down.
"The Russians now have to worry about deconfliction. They can’t just start jamming and exploiting signals as aggressively as they were because now they've got to use the spectrum a lot more to manage their own operation. I think they’re saying 'we’re going to prioritize, maintain our comms open,' which means 'we’re going to probably reduce the amount of jamming that we tried to employ' because they don’t have good electromagnetic management."
3: Russia's Electronic Warfare Strategy Moving Forward
"The lack of electronic warfare use by Russia seems related to their concept of operations. Russia’s capabilities are not well-aligned to the tactics they are now facing against the Ukrainian military, which is fighting more like an irregular militia, dispersing its forces and reducing their electronic signatures by mixing in with civilian communications. As a result, Russian electronic warfare forces are having difficulty detecting Ukrainian troops and risk jamming other Russian units if they conduct electronic attacks.
“Russian forces will adapt, however, as they have throughout their operations in the Donbas and in Syria. Russia will likely ramp up its jamming as the invasion progresses and Ukrainian forces necessarily collapse into urban centers or bases. Russia may also be able to afford some jamming of their own communications because troop formations are closer together and logistics begin to catch up with them, making operations easier to coordinate.
"To detect Ukrainian forces via their emissions, we will likely see more use of drones by Russian forces, which can enable rapid attacks against Ukrainian units using rocket artillery. During the past decade’s gray-zone operations, this tactic was devastating against Ukrainian troop formations in eastern Ukraine.”
4: How the US Military Can Help Ukraine [Bryan Clark]
Electronic Warfare:
"The U.S. military should get involved in the conflict in ways that are reversible, deniable or peripheral. Electronic warfare was one of the U.S. military’s asymmetric advantages in the Cold War and could slow or confuse Russian forces using reversible effects and without causing direct casualties.

"U.S. Army MQ-1 Gray Eagle UAVs and Air Force or Marine Corps MQ-9 Reapers could fly from Romania or Poland into Ukrainian airspace to disrupt Russian communications using jammers, such as the Marine Corps Intrepid Tiger electronic attack pods. These systems could also be employed against Russian naval forces on the Black Sea to degrade their ability to coordinate amphibious operations along the Ukrainian coast west of Crimea."
Cyber Operations:
"Like electronic warfare, cyber operations such as denial-of-service attacks can create temporary disruptions. Like high-power microwave, cyber can also create permanent damage. The United States and Russia have refrained from cyberattacks on civilian targets, but they could be employed more aggressively against Russian military forces.

"Russian logistics are already not keeping up with its maneuver units, slowing the Russian advance. The United States should further degrade Russian troops’ support by disrupting the computer networks used to manage supply inventories and movements from depots. These networks are unlikely to be as well-protected as Russian operational networks, and hitting them would not be as escalatory as attacking Russian command and control directly.

"U.S. Cyber Command is finding success in its confrontations with bad actors on the internet using the persistent-engagement approach. The United States should apply it more broadly to discourage adversaries such as Russia and China."
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9. How to Deal With the Unappeasable Putin

Excerpts:

The best way to think about Mr. Putin is as a gifted tactician committed to a strategic impossibility: for Russia to regain the superpower status once held by the Soviet Union. Such leaders are unappeasable because their goals can never be reached. The rise of China, Russia’s continuing demographic decline, and its continuing inability to create a modern and dynamic economy will not end because Russian flags fly over the ruins of Kyiv.
There are two mistakes we can make about figures like Mr. Putin. One is to underestimate their talent for troublemaking if they don’t get what they want. The other is to believe that by giving in to their demands we can quiet them down. The West has made both mistakes with Mr. Putin in the past. We must try to do better now.
How to Deal With the Unappeasable Putin
The Russian leader, like Mussolini, lacks the military and economy of a great power—and has an impossible political goal.
WSJ · by Walter Russell Mead

March 10, 2022 12:44 pm ET

Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulates officers and veterans of Russia's Special Operations Forces in Moscow, Feb. 27, 2021.
Photo: Alexei Druzhinin/Zuma Press

Russia is internationally isolated, its forces are stuck in the mud in Ukraine, and it faces the toughest array of economic sanctions ever imposed on a great power. Yet Russian armies continue to advance, China appears to back Vladimir Putin’s play, Ukrainian negotiators are considering concession to some Russian demands, and Europe remains vulnerable to Russian energy blackmail.

So: Is Mr. Putin a political genius we underestimate at our peril, or is he an overrated buffoon who, intoxicated by a long run of good luck, has fatally misjudged his prospects in Ukraine?
History offers another way to think about figures like Mr. Putin. Benito Mussolini had an astonishing career, creating a political movement that ruled Italy for 20 years. His methods often were morally repugnant, but the Fascist movement he created found sympathizers and imitators from Germany to Japan. There was a time when Fascist Italy looked to be leading Europe out of the “decadence” of parliamentary democracy toward a postliberal era.
But Mussolini had an Achilles’ heel. His political project of re-creating the Roman Empire couldn’t be realized. He could build the most powerful political movement in modern Italian history, he could conquer Ethiopia, he could help Franco win the Spanish Civil War, but none of it brought his goal within reach.
Like Mussolini, Mr. Putin has a long record of success. The war in Chechnya was ugly, but he began his time in office by ending what many thought was the inevitable dissolution of the Russian Federation and reasserting Moscow’s control over its restive regions. Coming to power when oligarchs dominated Russian politics, Mr. Putin skillfully played them against one another until he emerged as the unrivaled master of the Russian scene.
He reasserted Russian power in international relations. Post-Soviet Russia was a helpless and weak state, unable to halt the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or to influence American and European power in the Balkans and Central Asia. A combination of adroit diplomacy and the ruthless use of force gave Mr. Putin a de facto veto on NATO expansion after his 2008 invasion of Georgia. In 2014 he snatched Crimea and invaded the Donbas, drawing only halfhearted sanctions from a divided West.
Defying the sanctions, and profiting from the Obama administration’s strategic confusion, Mr. Putin seized the opportunity of the Syrian civil war to support longtime Russian ally Bashar al-Assad, making a mockery of John Kerry’s pompous demand that Mr. Assad had to go. Russia’s new role in Syria gave it an entrée into Middle East politics, which it used to build a close relationship with Israel and the Arab oil producers. Employing mercenary organizations like the Wagner Group, Mr. Putin was able to extend Russian power into Libya and sub-Saharan Africa, forcing the French out of Mali. By selling sophisticated antiaircraft weapons to Turkey, he drove a wedge into NATO even as he cultivated close relations with countries like Hungary and Italy in ways that undercut European Union cohesion.
Like Mussolini, Mr. Putin was fortunate to face an ungifted generation of Western leaders. Nobody will be expanding Mount Rushmore with sculptures memorializing any of America’s post-Cold War presidents, and the generation of European leaders that included figures like Gerhard Schröder and François Hollande will not long be remembered. Playing a weak hand aggressively, Mr. Putin managed to divide and confuse this motley crew long enough to threaten the Western order in Europe and reassert Russia’s place among the great powers.
But as Mussolini discovered, diplomatic and even military victories cannot make an impossible dream come true. Mussolini was unable to build an Italian economy that could support his ambitions or a military capable of rivaling the great powers like Germany and Britain. This is where the limits of Mr. Putin’s achievements also seem to lie. After 20 years in power, he has failed to equip Russia with either the economy or the military that a great power needs. And because his power rests on such narrow and unsatisfactory foundations, his foreign policy remains one of brinkmanship and adventurism that is always vulnerable should his adversaries call his bluff—or if he miscalculates and bites off more than he can chew.
The best way to think about Mr. Putin is as a gifted tactician committed to a strategic impossibility: for Russia to regain the superpower status once held by the Soviet Union. Such leaders are unappeasable because their goals can never be reached. The rise of China, Russia’s continuing demographic decline, and its continuing inability to create a modern and dynamic economy will not end because Russian flags fly over the ruins of Kyiv.
There are two mistakes we can make about figures like Mr. Putin. One is to underestimate their talent for troublemaking if they don’t get what they want. The other is to believe that by giving in to their demands we can quiet them down. The West has made both mistakes with Mr. Putin in the past. We must try to do better now.
Appeared in the March 11, 2022, print edition.
WSJ · by Walter Russell Mead

10. Opinion | Biden Is Seeing a Polling Bump Amid War in Ukraine. History Suggests It Won’t Last.

A cautionary note from our "misremembering" of history

Opinion | Biden Is Seeing a Polling Bump Amid War in Ukraine. History Suggests It Won’t Last.
Magazine
Opinion | Biden Is Seeing a Polling Bump Amid War in Ukraine. History Suggests It Won’t Last.
Once the public starts bearing the costs of the conflict, opinion is likely to shift.

President Biden speaks about the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the White House, Feb. 24, 2022. | Alex Brandon/AP Photo
Opinion by Jeff Greenfield
03/12/2022 07:00 AM EST
Jeff Greenfield is a five-time Emmy-winning network television analyst and author.
You can understand why the White House would welcome a new Reuters poll finding more than three in five Americans say they’d “willingly” pay more at the gas pump to support Ukraine in its war with Russia.
Of course, Americans also say they plan to exercise more, eat more vegetables and watch more documentaries on television.
Joe Biden is enjoying a rare, modest bump in his approval rating, perhaps off his State of the Union address and his steady handling of the Ukraine crisis. He’s even speculating that Democrats could yet keep the House come November. But as U.S. sanctions against Russia become more painful for the American public, Biden should ask himself a couple of difficult questions: When are Americans actually willing to sacrifice in an international conflict or crisis? And who gets punished politically when the cost of engagement hits home?


It was Sen. Arthur Vandenberg, an isolationist-turned-internationalist who, in supporting the Truman administration’s push for what became NATO, said: “Politics stops at the water’s edge.” It is a memorable, highly inaccurate turn of phrase.
Foreign crises, even wars, rarely produce anything like national unity. During the Civil War, deadly riots broke out in New York City over the prospect of a draft. In 1864, Lincoln’s election opponent was George McClellan, whom Lincoln had replaced as commanding general of the Union forces. From Korea to Vietnam to Iraq, Americans have fought wars amid clamorous discontent at home. Even in World War II, “the last good war,” discontent over everything from military strategy to home front policies divided us politically. In the 1942 midterms, Democrats lost eight Senate seats and 45 House seats, losing the national popular House vote by a million-vote margin, largely, according to the New York Times, because of “voters’ dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war, both at home and abroad.”
That same Times story noted that this result did not suggest a lack of enthusiasm for the war effort itself. And that points to a second fact about when Americans are more willing to bear the cost of conflict: when we are attacked.
In the years between the outbreak of World War II in Europe (1939) and the U.S. entry into that war (Dec. 8, 1941), the nation was closely and intensely divided. FDR’s push to aid Great Britain with arms faced fierce opposition. (In fact, it was his 1940 GOP opponent, Wendell Willkie, who provided critical backing for the Lend-Lease proposal even as it alienated him from the isolationist base of his party). On Aug. 12, 1941, the vote to extend the peacetime draft passed the House by just one vote.
But when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, there was only one vote in the House to oppose the declaration of war. With more than 16 million Americans serving in the Armed Forces, and the entire industrial might of the United States mobilized, complaints were often met with the rejoinder, “Don’t You Know There’s a War On?”
But not always. On Jan. 18, 1943, a ban on sliced bread was imposed by Secretary of Agriculture Claude R. Wickard, who held the position of Food Administrator. According to the New York Times, officials explained that “the ready-sliced loaf must have a heavier wrapping than an unsliced one if it is not to dry out.” The outcry among homemakers was loud enough for Wickard to discover that there was enough wrapping paper to rescind the ban — giving permanent life to the compliment, “the greatest thing since sliced bread.”
After the attacks of Sept. 11, the nearly 3,000 dead at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon ensured that there was little if any opposition to the inconveniences imposed on travel, or the ousting of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The tens of billions spent on the establishment of a massive intelligence infrastructure occurred with barely an objection. It was not until the Bush administration headed into Iraq that widespread dissent was heard — a dissent that grew louder when the war turned into a military quagmire and a geopolitical disaster. (This points to another lesson, true in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan as well: When the prospect of victory in a conflict recedes, or disappears, discontent grows.)
In the absence of a direct attack, the patience of Americans fades. The shocks at the gas pumps in 1973 and 1979 were inflicted by OPEC, but Richard Nixon and later Jimmy Carter bore the political cost. Today, Republicans may stand and cheer during the State of the Union address when Biden assails Russia, but they are already blaming the president’s environmental and energy policies as the cost of gasoline rises, and that blame is likely to have political resonance.
All of which suggests that Biden and the Democrats may be wise not to put much stock in those encouraging poll numbers. History suggests they will have a half-life that will fade well before November.




11. Top American generals on three key lessons learned from Ukraine


Three important lessons. We do number one better than any country and any military (and most of our victories are because of this) but we need to heed number two and three and never forget their importance, especially number three.

I would add a fourth: Beware of believing the computer models. 

1. Logistics Are Not Optional
2. Humble “Legacy” Technology Can Still Play a Role Against a Sophisticated Adversary
3. The Human Element (Still) Matters



Top American generals on three key lessons learned from Ukraine - Breaking Defense
"The computer models would have said Russia wins in 72 to 96 hours," said Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger. They "cannot explain why Ukraine is still hanging on. Why is that?"

breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · March 11, 2022
A member of a Territorial Defence unit guards a barricade on the outskirts of eastern Kyiv on March 06, 2022 in Kyiv, Ukraine. (Chris McGrath/Getty Images)
WASHINGTON: It’s been two weeks since Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, and a conflict that some expected to be over in days appears to be stretching into a bloody and protracted war.
While President Joe Biden has repeatedly stated that the US military will not get involved, senior US defense officials and military leaders have been closely watching the conflict to better comprehend the risk to NATO allies — and to understand how the nature of warfare may be changing. And thanks to a series of public hearings and events, some of those assessments have entered the public sphere.
Here, then, are the lessons learned from the first two weeks of conflict in Ukraine, as identified by three key American officers.
Logistics Are Not Optional
It took months for Russian President Vladimir Putin to amass more than 175,000 Russian troops on the Ukrainian border. But since those forces mobilized on Feb. 23, the Russian military has been embarrassed by one logistical failure after another.
Videos posted on social media showed lines of tanks and military vehicles stalled on Ukrainian roads, with no spare parts available to fix broken vehicles and no fuel to get them running again. Other viral videos showed hungry Russian soldiers who had apparently run out of rations accepting food from Ukrainians.
Meanwhile, Ukrainian citizens have posted photos and videos of themselves with captured Russian equipment — everything from abandoned vehicles to air defense systems.
Tractor pull of an abandoned Russian air defense system now confirmed as legit by Ukraine’s military, which jokes about the harvest carrying on in February. https://t.co/DVYF2LAxew
— Michael Weiss  (@michaeldweiss) February 28, 2022
“We often like to talk about amateurs study tactics and professionals study logistics, and we see that play out right before our eyes,” Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville said Tuesday.
“If you’re going to put an army on the move, if you’re going to conduct combat operations, if you don’t have logistics, if you don’t have gas, if you don’t have parts, if you don’t have all the ammunition, then those weapon systems become paperweights. They just sit on the side of the road and you can’t fight [with] them.”
Russia’s problem isn’t a technological one, said Air Combat Command head Gen. Mark Kelly during the McAleese and Associates conference on Wednesday.
Russian surface to air missile systems “are operating pretty well when operated by Ukrainians,” he quipped.
Rather, Kelly suggested that the Russian military is used to training on its own turf, where it can use its layers of air defense systems and other weapons to wear down an attacking force. It may not be practiced in operating in an environment where its own forces are disaggregated and it does not already have control over both ground terrain and the skies, which means Ukrainian defenders are operating from a playbook Moscow hasn’t seen before.
“I think — and think is a key word — is that they’re struggling with fighting Russian systems and they [the Ukrainians] are not adhering to Russian doctrine,” Kelly said. “But we also see the challenge of: What happens if your joint force is organized, trained, and equipped to operate with air superiority and not remotely designed to operate without air superiority? What happens when you don’t have it?”
Humble “Legacy” Technology Can Still Play a Role Against a Sophisticated Adversary
As the US military looks toward a future fight against a technologically advanced foe like Russia or China, the services have made the case for why it’s important to invest in cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons, and the next-generation of combat aircraft, ships and vehicles.
However, the fight between Ukraine and Russia shows that older, less advanced tech can still make an impact against high-end threats.
McConville pointed to Ukraine’s success in using relatively inexpensive, Turkish-made TB2 Bayraktar drones to take out Russian tanks and other military vehicles without putting human pilots at risk.
“People envision that integrated air and missile defense is like a wall, that you can’t get through it. There’s ways you can get around it, There’s ways you can get through it,” McConville said. “You can suppress with kinetic [fires]. You can suppress with non-kinetic means. … You provide commanders with a lot of options and you also provide adversaries with a lot of dilemmas.”
The expanse of the Indo-Pacific region and layered Chinese defensive systems have put a premium on systems that can hold an adversary hostage from a distance. However, there is no substitute for positioning some forces close to an enemy, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger said during the McAleese conference on Wednesday.
By utilizing its intelligence and surveillance assets in Eastern Europe, the United States was able to build a picture of Russia’s movements and strategically release information about Russia’s plans, Berger said.
“I would offer to you this validates the need for a stand-in force to be forward all the time, collecting [information] against the adversary,” Berger said during the McAleese conference on Wednesday. “If we back up and cede that space, things are going to happen in there [and] we will be surprised. So, winning the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance fight early on [is] critical, absolutely critical.”
The Human Element (Still) Matters
Russia has a 900,000-person military that dwarfs Ukraine’s and a defense budget to match, but Ukraine’s citizens have mounted a resistance campaign that has imposed a heavy cost on Russian forces, stalling their march toward Kyiv.
If one were to run a virtual wargame knowing how Russian forces were postured and understanding their capabilities, the computer model would have said Russia would be victorious in a matter of 72 to 96 hours, Berger said.
But those models don’t — and can’t — account for the Ukrainian people’s will to fight on behalf of their homeland, he said.
Whether it’s stories of the legendary (and likely fictitious) Ghost of Kyiv shooting down Russian fighter jets above the skies of Ukraine or the real footage of Ukrainian citizens making Molotov cocktails and distributing weaponry, Ukraine is winning the information war against Russia by showcasing the resolve of its people and contrasting it with the Russian military’s blunders.
“The discipline, the leadership, the fighting spirit, whatever you want to call it, models don’t account for that. They can account for a weapon system, they can do [calculations]. They cannot explain why Ukraine is still hanging on. Why is that?” Berger said.
“We have to understand there’s a human component to fighting — a brutality. All the technology in the world allows them [Russia] to win, but it doesn’t replace the human.”
Andrew Eversden, Jaspreet Gill, and Justin Katz contributed to this report.



12. Risk Hindered Decision Making: How the DoD’s Faulty Understanding of Risk Jeopardizes its Strategy

Conclusion:
In 2016, just as the U.S. military was pivoting towards strategic competition, the DoD released its first manual on risk. This attempt at codifying risk analysis is as wrong as it is comfortably conventional. In measuring risk to force and risk to mission, this risk assessment methodology subverts the very strategies it is presumed to support. It nascently considers the risks to one’s immediate forces relative to a mission only considered in isolation with scant regard for the future operating environment. This understanding of risk is hindering decision making and will, over time, contribute to strategic failure. That is, unless the U.S. military changes now.
Adopting the risk methodology I prescribe here is foundational to such a change. However, it requires the military institutions to comprehend systems theory as a basis to enable mission command, and to adopt holistic precision and a proper temporal horizon in perceiving and mitigating risk. Only with precise measurement of critical information, nested within a system, can one begin to access patterns. And, only by defining a temporal horizon that is sufficient for strategic competition, can the significance of those patterns be exposed for what they really are. Then and only then, when this understanding of the adversary is comprehensive, can military commanders and stakeholders across the instruments of power, from the strategic down to the disaggregated and perhaps isolated tactical elements, make appropriate and informed risk decisions now and into the future. With this clarity, mission command becomes a weapon, a desired way to fight rather than another self-imposed doctrinal obstacle.
Risk Hindered Decision Making: How the DoD’s Faulty Understanding of Risk Jeopardizes its Strategy
thestrategybridge.org · March 11, 2022
The current risk analysis manual from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff could be reduced, without much consequence, to a CliffsNotes version: “Accept no unnecessary risk.”[1] Out of 49 pages, this axiom is the only guidance worth taking forward. The rest of the manual consists of legacy terms or fallacies—like “risk to mission” and “risk to force—that not only serve no purpose in strategic competition but, if carried forward, will undermine the national security of the U.S.[2]
This article contests the U.S. military’s current risk framework and provides an initial vector for how to consider risk in strategic competition. In doing so I also dismantle the U.S. military’s nascent risk actions: accept, avoid, reduce, and transfer.[3] Using systems theory as a foundation, I illustrate how risk cannot be created or destroyed but can be accepted in its current state or transferred to another state. Finally, I recommend two revisions to the way the U.S. military measures risk to better derive clarity for commanders: increasing the precision of measurements and expanding the temporal scope to better assess cumulative risks.
This new comprehension of risk is the first step to achieving what the Chairman’s manual could not: a common framework for risk analysis that is applicable from the strategic to the tactical levels of war and across the spectrum of conflict, from competition to all-out war. In achieving this scope, the framework this article proposes is applicable to all instruments of power, which would enable the U.S. to more effectively communicate and coordinate strategic actions across all stakeholders.
How Risk is Different in Strategic Competition
As the United States military embarks into strategic competition and orients its strategy to counter revisionist powers like China and Russia, it also faces a challenge within its ranks: no individual below the rank of colonel has experienced anything other than the war on terror, and yet these are the leaders of the next endeavor. For these commanders, strategic competition presents two operational extremes. The first is the daily contest where even routine actions could have significance for strategic messaging and relative advantage. Risk here is to the strategy of the U.S. and, relative to the military instrument of power, is the cumulative sum of the joint force’s daily actions and inactions. When considering the risk to strategy, the risks associated with inaction are generally the greater threat to military strategy compared to the risks associated with action, for as Schelling notes violence “is most successful when it is threatened and not used.”[4]
Never has the entering argument into the equation been a multipolar, thermo-nuclear world with opportunistic adversaries.
While cumulative actions could inevitably jeopardize a strategy—e.g., MacArthur ordering his commanders to advance towards the Yalu spurring the Chinese intervention in Korea in 1950[5]—the counter is cumulative inaction. Inaction is the only guarantee known to render a strategy ineffective due to the lack of perceived threat of violence. However, when considering the risks associated with action and inaction, when operating below the threshold of armed conflict, the military commander must also carefully consider the strategies of other instruments of power. Military inaction could be a means of buying down the risk to desired outcomes from other non-military instruments of national power that might be more necessary in the pursuit of the national interest in a given moment.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma (Wikimedia)
The other extreme strategic competition presents is war. While histories are replete with lessons learned for the military strategist, strategic competition is unique in two ways. Never has the entering argument into the equation been a multipolar, thermo-nuclear world with opportunistic adversaries. Here, the actions that enable deterrence can no longer be targeted at a singular adversary, but must simultaneously be targeted at a specific adversary and all current and possible future adversaries all at once. This calculus has long surpassed Tuckers’ prisoner’s dilemma of the Cold War.[6]
As if that were not enough, the U.S. military’s center of gravity for the past 30-years has been its command and control capability which required the dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum. Given the diminishing costs for its adversaries to disrupt the electro-magnetic spectrum, the U.S. has no choice but to adopt mission command, which requires “subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission.”[7] As a prerequisite for mission command to succeed, commanders at all levels must be able to directly correlate their individual actions to the effective implementation of a unified strategy. Further, they must all perceive risk in a similar manner for their independent decision making to be synergistic.
Risk in military operations, as determined by time, the priority of instruments of national power, and the imperatives of national strategy, ought to be defined much differently than current doctrine suggests. But, the U.S. military can fix this now. The U.S. military, recognizing how its understanding of risk is holding back its own commanders, should reconcile its efforts across the instruments of power.
The Fallacies of “Risk to Mission” and “Risk to Force”
Risk to Mission
If commanders inherently apply the axiom “accept no unnecessary risk,” the reader begins to see the fault lines inherent to the term “risk to mission.” If a commander is briefed on a plan and they employ all the resources available within their authority, the risks associated with that mission have been reduced to the lowest possible level for the specified period of time. Other courses of action presented to the commander might appear to have different levels of risk, but they do not.
Commanders ought to concern themselves with more than risk to their mission. They must be cognizant of risk to the U.S. national interests by recognizing risk to partners and stakeholders involved in pursuing national strategies.
Inherent risk to the strategic enterprise is a fundamental constant that merely manifests differently as a function of varying the time horizon or by coordinating with other commanders to pool their resources into a singular effort. Every risk that remains across the range of plans considered and among the instruments of national power should be a necessary risk. Therefore, risk to this, or to any given mission is a static and irrelevant metric; it is an expected cost.[8] Commanders ought to concern themselves with more than risk to their mission. They must be cognizant of risk to the U.S. national interests by recognizing risk to partners and stakeholders involved in pursuing national strategies.
Competition below the threshold of armed conflict in the present time makes it all the more important that the U.S. military understands and supports the strategies and the risks faced by other instruments of power. Cost-benefit analyses are meaningless in isolation. In any given mission, military commanders must consider the critical costs and benefits to the plans of other stakeholders in national strategy. In many instances, the U.S. military has the capacity to accept risks that other stakeholders cannot, and if left unchecked, those unaccounted for risks could jeopardize the larger enterprise. Therefore, a broader conception of risks to strategies across stakeholders must be of the utmost concern.
Risk to Force
Commanders in the U.S. military are legally responsible for the readiness, discipline, and wellbeing of their personnel.[9] Under the assumption that commanders accept no unnecessary risk, given a set mission and bounded by a specified period of time, risk to force should be reduced down to the lowest level possible. Vary the time horizon by which one bounds risk—e.g., changing the mission type from a seizure to a raid, or adding in supporting commanders’ resources—and the risk to one’s forces can be reduced below what the commander could accomplish organically. By this logic, risk to force is a mere datum, a set value moderated by probability, to be used in a cost-benefit analysis to consider action versus action.
One must consider if the opposite is true: is there a time where the risk could be too high not to pursue an activity? Without considering this counterpoint, if ever a risk is defined as unacceptable, then that key terrain in the adversary’s mind has been lost; they know where you will not go.
In executing their legal responsibility to protect their personnel, most commanders, especially those only considering risk to their mission and risk to their force rather than the risk to stakeholders and the risk to the national capability to wage war, as strategic competition necessitates, will err conservatively and myopically in only considering risk to their force. The U.S. military’s risk analysis manual would support them using this nascent aperture: it defines unacceptable risk as one that is “too high to pursue a desired activity without additional risk mitigation efforts.”[10] One must consider if the opposite is true: is there a time where the risk could be too high not to pursue an activity? Without considering this counterpoint, if ever a risk is defined as unacceptable, then that key terrain in the adversary’s mind has been lost; they know where you will not go. The Pandora’s Box that is deterrence is no longer an abyss.
While the commander never abrogates their legal responsibility to ensure the wellbeing of their personnel, commanders must account for their relative priority as merely a component of the military instrument of power. They must concern themselves over the risk to national capability to wage war. It is a unique and perhaps rare instance that theirs is a single point of failure within the military instrument of power. Jimmy Doolittle exemplified the fallacy of risk to force in his raid on Tokyo, where he launched his squadron expecting a nearly 100% casualty rate. Despite the substantial and highly probable costs his squadron would pay on his mission, Doolittle piloted the first aircraft into the air. After all, his squadron consisted of only 16 of the 9,816 B-25s the U.S. built in World War II.[11] The complete loss of a statistically insignificant warfighting capability on a mission that would change the adversary’s strategic calculus was not a risk; it was an essential task at an acceptable cost. Thus, the mature, complementary commander in strategic competition is biased to accepts risks,[12] or rather, stewards and competes in support of their nation’s strategies, using their people and resources for which they are legally responsible, each and every day, to gain a cumulative advantage.

Lt. Col. Jimmy Doolittle (second from right) with several of his aircrew on the deck of the Hornet (Wikimedia)
A Faulty Framework for Risk Decisions
The Joint Chiefs’ manual provides that risk can be accepted, avoided, reduced, or transferred.[13] While this aligns with business management theory, it is nonetheless problematic and indicative of America’s strategic myopia, which lacks a common vernacular between stakeholders to discuss risks and leads to coherent national strategies that are bogged down by short-term inter-governmental maneuvering at the cost of strategic intra-government maneuvering. Strategic competition is an infinite game that operates under constraints and forces that are distinct from those affecting business strategy. Contrary to a world where decision makers often focus on maximizing profits over the omnipresent yet arbitrary time horizon that is the quarter, strategic competition’s goal is to perpetuate the game at all costs.[14]
The sudden appearance of a new strategic risk does not mean that our adversaries have created more risk. Rather, they have successfully unlocked and transferred some of their risks to the U.S.
Through this lens, the U.S., as well as its adversaries, are all part of a global system of actors who are indefinitely competing to protect their own interests. All actions, and inactions, have repercussions that transfer risk throughout the system. “Mitigating” or “avoiding” risks are merely forms of transferring the risk, either to our partners to include other instruments of power, our adversaries, or our future selves. A small risk avoided today is added to a small risk in the future to create a larger cumulative risk. When mitigating risk by, for example, buying a new weapon system to counter an emerging adversary capability, the risk is actually transferred; a hard to quantify military risk becomes a projected economic cost which, in turn, imposes a risk into the economic system.
The sudden appearance of a new strategic risk does not mean that our adversaries have created more risk. Rather, they have successfully unlocked and transferred some of their risks to the U.S. Therefore, in the cumulative world that is strategic competition, where commanders could be isolated and executing on mission type orders, it is critical for all commanders, from the combatant commander to the lowest level officer in charge, to have a common perception of how their actions or inactions will displace risk and, most importantly, consider how and when that risk will be transferred back to the U.S. Only through adopting a common perception of risk in a system, like those proposed in this article, will American military commanders gain a decision advantage across the extremes of conflict that strategic competition presents.
Measuring What Matters
I have summarized why the foundations of the U.S. military’s risk management framework are fatally flawed. There are two lodestars that the next revision of the Joint Chiefs’ manual on risk analysis must incorporate: precision and scope. These elements support more precisely and comprehensively structuring the concept of risk for any commander and across stakeholders. Despite best practices outlined in modern research—such as Tetlock and Gardner’s Superforecasting, or Gutman and Goldmeier’s Becoming a Data Head—the Joint Chiefs’ manual still uses an antiquated scale of “highly unlikely” (~0-20%) “unlikely” (~21-50%) “likely” (~51-80%) and “very likely” (~81-100%) to articulate risks.[15] And yes, the ~ is used in the source document.

This scale encourages human performance mediocrity by fostering a culture of incomplete problem analysis. The measures are too blunt to wield, giving those on the receiving end of the data no perceptible means to continue problem solving by arguing with the data presented to them. This scale obscures relevant indicators of a problem and, even if identified, does not leverage these critical factors to inform decision making. A minute change in a critical factor should carry more weight than an ~20-30% change in a less-relevant indicator, contrary to what the current manual would suggest. This can have critical repercussions when an adversary is maneuvering for positional advantage or is attempting to deliver strategic messaging to the U.S. With such wide bands to articulate risk, the U.S. military could perceive an adversary’s strategic messaging as normal indications or, as an adversary maneuvers for relative advantage, the U.S. could hide their activity for them with the ~20–30% bands currently used to assess risk.
But for risk to be measured accurately, more is needed than just an illuminating snapshot. The temporal and cumulative nature of risk is equally important. This is especially true in strategic competition, where our adversaries will desire to compete below the U.S. threshold of armed conflict. This is why adding a time horizon is especially important for the U.S. military.
Commanders at all levels, who typically serve between two and three years, even if they perceive a long-term cumulative risk, have no incentive to make decisions based on cumulative risks beyond their tenure.
The purpose of the U.S. military adopting this new risk dimension is twofold. First, one must look out further than one’s strategy to understand its consequences. This is because, as international affairs expert George Friedman would advocate, the solution to today’s problem is likely the genesis of one’s future problem.[16] Second, this time horizon is important to conduct a cumulative and weighted assessment of risk. However, just as there is a drawback to saying some risks are “unacceptable,” there are drawbacks to bounding and defining a time horizon. One’s adversaries could simply temporally outmaneuver the artificial horizon. But the problem today is greater and necessitates some temporal boundary.
Commanders at all levels, who typically serve between two and three years, even if they perceive a long-term cumulative risk, have no incentive to make decisions based on cumulative risks beyond their tenure. Without a temporal horizon, the U.S. military lacks a forcing function to demand commanders consider and take actions today based on cumulative risks. Unless the U.S. military changes the way it perceives risk, it is at risk of ceding strategic initiative to its most dangerous adversaries because its temporal frames are too limited.
So how far out should the U.S. instruments of power look? Certainly, a 100-year plan is infeasible as the fidelity of one’s assessments diminishes the further into the future one forecasts–another reason it is necessary to start with the precise measures mentioned above. The value of temporally bounding risk assessment by standardizing a distant yet perceptible future comes in analyzing the right information over time and using that to make informed predictions about how risk will be transferred in the future. At the strategic level, more important than the probability of individual events occurring is the probability that variables will be in play. Put another way, I do not care exactly who my opponent is a decade or more into the future, but I desire to know that, as a rational actor, any future opponent is likely bound by certain geo-political constraints which I can predict today. If, however, a temporal horizon is set too distant where the fidelity of relevant variables becomes opaque, regardless of the precision of the current measures of relevant information, then this risk assessment methodology loses all value.
Conclusions
In 2016, just as the U.S. military was pivoting towards strategic competition, the DoD released its first manual on risk. This attempt at codifying risk analysis is as wrong as it is comfortably conventional. In measuring risk to force and risk to mission, this risk assessment methodology subverts the very strategies it is presumed to support. It nascently considers the risks to one’s immediate forces relative to a mission only considered in isolation with scant regard for the future operating environment. This understanding of risk is hindering decision making and will, over time, contribute to strategic failure. That is, unless the U.S. military changes now.
Adopting the risk methodology I prescribe here is foundational to such a change. However, it requires the military institutions to comprehend systems theory as a basis to enable mission command, and to adopt holistic precision and a proper temporal horizon in perceiving and mitigating risk. Only with precise measurement of critical information, nested within a system, can one begin to access patterns. And, only by defining a temporal horizon that is sufficient for strategic competition, can the significance of those patterns be exposed for what they really are. Then and only then, when this understanding of the adversary is comprehensive, can military commanders and stakeholders across the instruments of power, from the strategic down to the disaggregated and perhaps isolated tactical elements, make appropriate and informed risk decisions now and into the future. With this clarity, mission command becomes a weapon, a desired way to fight rather than another self-imposed doctrinal obstacle.
Neils Abderhalden is an officer in the United States Air Force and a student at Air Command and Staff College. He has numerous deployments in support of overseas contingency operations. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: Major General Chris Donahue, commander of the U.S. Army 82nd Airborne Division, XVIII Airborne Corps, boards a C-17 cargo plane at the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan. August 30, 2021 (Master Sgt. Alexander Burnett).
Notes:
[1] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3105.01A, “Joint Risk Analysis Methodology,” (October 2021), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Manuals/CJCSM%203105.01A.pdf?ver=y3cH4s5UNyqJAXwxAYCL5Q%3d%3d.
[2] Ibid., C-4.
[3] Ibid., B-1.
[4] Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 10.
[5] Thomas Ricks, The Generals: American Military Command from WWII to Today (New York, NY: Penguin Random House, 2012), 129-132.
[6] S. M. Amadae, Prisoners of Reason: Game Theory and Neoliberal Political Economy (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 25, untitled http://www.amadae.com/Amadae__Prisoners_of_Reason__Prisoners_Dilemma.pdf.
[7] Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Innovative Examples: Exercising Mission Command through Memoranda of Understanding,” (March 2015): 2, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/CORe/1503_White_Paper_MOU.pdf.
[8] A more suitable term for “risk to mission” as the DoD uses it would be “probability of accomplishing mission objectives.” This is a separate matter that pertains to the cost-benefit analysis of action vs inaction of a specific mission and is an important matter when considering how risk is transferring throughout time and space.
[9] Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 1: Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States, Change 1,”(July 2017): II-12, IV-18, IV-21, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf.
[10] CJCSM 3105.01A, “Joint Risk Analysis Methodology,” B-7.
[11] “North American B-25B Mitchell,” National Museum of the United States Air Force, accessed 10 Feb 2022, https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/196310/north-american-b-25b-mitchell/.
[12] Office of the Chairman, “Innovative Examples,” 2.
[13] CJCSM 3105.01A, “Joint Risk Analysis Methodology,” B-1.
[14] Simon Sinek, The Infinite Game (London, England: Penguin, 2019).
[15] CJCSM 3105.01A, “Joint Risk Analysis Methodology,” B-5.
[16] George Friedman, The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century (Harpswell, ME: Anchor, 2009).
thestrategybridge.org · March 11, 2022

13. The Growing Fear of a Wider War Between Russia and the West

Another example of our self deterrence. I think the corollary to our new concept of integrated deterrence is self deterrence. We need to recognize our penchant for self deterrence and consider how that influences and possibly damages or undermines integrated deterrence.


The Growing Fear of a Wider War Between Russia and the West
U.S. officials warn that tensions over Ukraine could trigger a once unthinkable conflict pitting Russia against NATO.

By 
March 10, 2022
The New Yorker · by Robin Wright · March 10, 2022
On his visit to Poland last weekend, Secretary of State Antony Blinken walked fifteen feet into Ukraine, as snow began to fall, to [meet briefly[(https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-on-cbs-face-the-nation-with-margaret-brennan) with its foreign minister. It was symbolic of the Biden Administration’s deliberately calibrated policy—going up to the border, but not beyond—to avoid any move that the Russian leader, Vladimir Putin, could perceive as provocative. “For everything we’re doing for Ukraine, the President also has a responsibility to not get us into a direct conflict, a direct war, with Russia, a nuclear power, and risk a war that expands even beyond Ukraine to Europe,” Blinken told “Meet the Press” the next day, from Moldova. Yet, just two weeks into the war, the U.S. increasingly fears being drawn into a war with Russia. The undercurrent to frantic diplomacy and waves of U.S. military deployments—thousands more troops dispatched to Europe, Patriot-missile batteries to Poland, and B-52 bombers flying over Central Europe—is the palpable fear that the unthinkable is now thinkable.
On Tuesday, a new U.S. intelligence assessment concluded that Russia will pursue its interests in “competitive and sometimes confrontational and provocative ways, including pressing to dominate Ukraine and other countries in its ‘near-abroad.’ ” In testimony on the Hill, William Burns, the C.I.A. director and a former Ambassador to Russia, was pressed about Vladimir Putin’s intent. “He’s not going to stop at Ukraine, correct?” asked Representative Jackie Speier, of California. Burns replied, “That’s what makes it more important than ever to demonstrate that he’s not going to succeed in Ukraine.” The stakes, Burns acknowledged, are bigger. “This is one of those pivotal points where we and all of our allies and partners need to act.”
Since Russia’s invasion, the besieged Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, has repeatedly warned the West about the danger that Putin would target other European nations. “Everyone thinks that we are far away from America or Canada. No, we are in this zone of freedom,” Zelensky said in a television interview, on Monday. “And, when the limits of rights and freedoms are being violated and stepped on, then you have to protect us. Because we will come first. You will come second. Because, the more this beast will eat, he wants more, more, and more.”
The U.S., however, pushed back this week on key military requests from Ukraine, for fear of Russia’s reaction. Putin’s reckless offensive has forced the U.S. to adopt awkward policy positions. On March 5th, Zelensky made an impassioned appeal to members of the House and Senate for more military aid, notably help in obtaining Soviet-era warplanes that Ukrainian pilots are trained to fly and that could balance Russia’s air superiority. On Wednesday, the Pentagon rejected an offer from Poland to turn over twenty-eight MIG-29 fighter jets to U.S. custody—flying them to a base in Germany—for transfer to Ukraine. U.S. intelligence officials assessed that an American role in a transfer “may be mistaken as escalatory and could result in significant Russian reaction that might increase the prospects of a military escalation with NATO,” the Pentagon spokesman, John Kirby, told reporters. U.S. involvement was deemed to be “high risk.” The majority of Ukraine’s warplanes are still intact, a senior Defense Department official added, while acknowledging that Russia’s surface-to-air missiles now have an “umbrella” that covers virtually all of Ukraine.
The Administration cited the same fears about Zelensky’s request for help from NATO in establishing a no-fly zone over part of Ukraine to protect civilians. “We also have to see to it that this war does not expand,” Blinken said on Wednesday, at a joint press conference with his British counterpart. “Our goal is to end the war, not to expand it, including potentially expand it to NATO territory.” Otherwise, he warned, “it’s going to turn even deadlier, involve more people, and I think potentially even make things harder to resolve in Ukraine itself.”
On Thursday, Avril Haines, the director of National Intelligence, acknowledged that the U.S. is now in a uniquely challenging position. “We are obviously providing enormous amounts of support to the Ukrainians, as we should and need to do,” she told the Senate Intelligence Committee. “But at the same time trying not to escalate the conflict into a full-on NATO or U.S. war with Russia. And that’s a challenging space to manage.”
Yet, at each of his four stops in NATO countries near Russia, Blinken heard dire predictions about the broader Russian threat beyond Ukraine—and the need for the U.S. to do more. In Riga, on Monday, the Latvian Foreign Minister, Edgars Rinkēvičs, lamented to Blinken, “We have no illusions about Putin’s Russia anymore.” In Vilnius, the Lithuanian President, Gitanas Nauseda, turned to Blinken and said, “Deterrence is no longer enough. We need more defense here, because otherwise it will be too late here, Mr. Secretary. Putin will not stop in Ukraine; he will not stop.” And in Tallinn, on Tuesday, the Estonian Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas, said that NATO countries “need to adapt to the new reality” of a “very aggressive Russia” and permanently strengthen their defenses in the air, on land, and at sea. Pressed on what specifically countries on Russia’s borders needed, she replied, “Everything.”
Eastern European countries—notably those once allied with, or part of, the former Soviet Union’s empire—have long warned of the potential for Russian aggression. “We, the Poles, are already tired of reminding everyone: ‘We told ya so,’ ” Marek Magierowski, Poland’s Ambassador to the U.S., told me in an interview this week. He cited the forewarning by the late Polish President Lech Kaczynski during the Russian invasion of Georgia, in 2008. “Today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow—the Baltic states and later, perhaps, time will come for my country, Poland,” Kaczynski said.
Magierowski added, “We have never had any doubts whatsoever about Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperial ambitions.” Putin has been waiting for this “window of opportunity” for years, he said. “He convinced himself that the West is weak, divided, wallowing in a decadent mood. He thought the free world wouldn’t care about Ukraine’s fate, as it didn’t care about Czechoslovakia’s in 1938,” when Europe tolerated Nazi Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland. Putin, he told me, is similarly “emboldened” because the West was “tragically lenient” and “outrageously complacent” after Russia murdered the defector Alexander Litvinenko, in 2006, invaded and annexed Crimea, in 2014, helped destroy the Syrian city of Aleppo, in 2016, reportedly used chemical weapons to poison the former spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter, in 2018, and poisoned the opposition leader Alexey Navalny, in 2020. Over the past three decades, Eastern Europeans have often encountered skepticism of their view of Putin as the U.S. and Western Europeans, notably the former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, advocated dealing pragmatically with Russia.
During his European trip, Blinken repeatedly promised that NATO, this time, would prevent further Russian expansion. “We will defend every inch of NATO territory with the full force of our collective power,” he vowed, in Estonia. But U.S. experts worry, too, about an unintended incident triggering a wider war, like the spark that ignited the First World War, a conflict that dragged on for four years and killed tens of millions. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine “could easily escalate into a larger conflict stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and further west into Europe,” Thomas E. Graham, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, warned in a new report issued on Tuesday. It might not matter what the U.S. does, he said. Crippling sanctions “could provoke Putin to lash out with greater violence,” Graham wrote. But, if NATO appeared restrained, Moscow could be “tempted to press militarily even further into Europe” to enlarge its sphere of influence. The rippling impact of broader Russian aggression would stress “the geopolitical, economic, and institutional foundations” of the international order created after the Second World War, Graham wrote.
Given the Russian leader’s history, Angela Stent, a former national intelligence officer and the author of “Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest,” is worried about a miscalculation. “The concern we have to have immediately is that the war in Ukraine doesn’t inadvertently spread to Poland or Romania by some unforeseen clash, which would then have to involve NATO in a war with Russia,” she told me. Stent also worries about Putin’s intentions short of war. “You can use nonmilitary means to disrupt societies. And he’s already been doing that for the past couple of decades.” As the Russian leader grows increasingly cornered, she added, he will seek to exploit popular sentiment in countries like Serbia, where a pro-Russia march to support the war was held last week. The new U.S. intelligence assessment warns that Russia will employ “an array of tools” to undermine the interests of the U.S. and its NATO allies. “We expect Moscow to insert itself into crises” whenever it sees an opportunity, it concludes.
On Wednesday, the Biden Administration issued a forceful denial after Russia’s bizarre claim that the U.S. and Ukraine were developing chemical and biological weapons. The State Department spokesperson, Ned Price, said that Moscow has a long track record of accusing the U.S. of the very crimes that Russia is perpetrating. These tactics are “an obvious ploy” by Russia to try to justify “further premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified attacks,” he said.
Russia, as the aggressor, still has the upper hand. But, for the U.S. and its allies, the one positive sign is that the performance of the Ukrainian military has exceeded expectations. Russian forces have fallen far short of Putin’s goal of a swift seizure of Kyiv and the ouster of Zelensky’s government. The first two weeks have, instead, been grinding for Moscow. U.S. intelligence estimates that between two thousand and four thousand troops fighting for Russia—not all of them Russian—have died in the first two weeks. The bravery of Ukrainians, so far, has prevented the worst-case scenario.
The New Yorker · by Robin Wright · March 10, 2022


14. Russian Military Efforts Stymied by Blunders, Stiff Ukrainian Resistance, Defense Official

Excerpts:

The Russians are flying on average 200 sorties per day — not all into Ukrainian airspace since cruise missiles can be launched from those aircraft to hit targets in Ukraine from a great distance. "There's a general cautiousness on their part," the official said.

The Ukrainians have about 56 fighter jets available and are flying about five-to-10 sorties per day. The official noted that they don't really need to do more than that since the Russians have surface-to-air missiles that could knock those planes out of the sky. In addition, the Ukrainians have made great use of their drones, which can deliver munitions as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, the official said.

The United States and 14 allies continue to send defensive weapons systems into Ukraine, including small arms, anti-armor and air defense, the official said.

The official cautioned against U.S. veterans traveling to Ukraine to assist in the fighting. The best way Americans can help would be to contribute to organizations like the Red Cross, which is doing humanitarian work there, the official said.

Russian Military Efforts Stymied by Blunders, Stiff Ukrainian Resistance, Defense Official
defense.gov · by David Vergun
Ukrainian resistance continues to be "stiff and determined," a senior defense official said today at a Pentagon press briefing.
"Frankly, [the Ukrainians are] being very strategic about how they're defending and where they are putting their resources where they're most needed. They are doing it quickly. They are being adaptive and nimble," the official said, noting they are using hit-and-run tactics to great advantage.

Aircraft Refueling
Air Force Staff Sgt. Lorina Hochstetler, assigned to the 480th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, prepares to refuel an F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft at 86th Air Base, Romania, March 7, 2022.
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Photo By: Air Force Senior Airman Ali Stewart
VIRIN: 220307-F-FW957-1085A
The Defense Department has surmised that the Russian intelligence apparatus didn't fully factor in the degree to which Russian troops were going to be resisted, the official said.
Also, the DOD believes that the Russians haven't properly planned and executed their logistics and sustainment efforts, the official noted.
Not since World War II have Russian forces executed such a large-scale ground operation using combined arms of air, land and sea, so it’s understandable, in a way, that their planning and execution has faltered. Combined arms integration is difficult to execute in any scenario by any country, the official said.
Having said that, the official believed that the Russians are "going to work through those challenges, and we're beginning to see them do that."
Situational Report Update
Advanced elements of Russian forces are about 15 kilometers from the center of Kyiv, which would put them near the suburbs of Ukraine's capital, the official said.

Chopper Landing
An Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter lands to refuel in Zamosc, Poland, March 5, 2022.
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Russian forces are also on the outskirts of Kharkiv, but there's still a lot of fighting there and it's being well defended. The city of Mariupol is under increasing pressure, but is also being well defended, the official said.
Also, the city of Mykolayiv is being effectively defended despite heavy fighting there, the official added.
Since the start of the war, the Russians have launched more than 800 missiles of all varieties and sizes into Ukraine, the official said.
Regarding the Russian convoy in the north of Ukraine, it has not made any significant progress. Some of their vehicles have moved off the road and into the tree line, presumably for force protection against Ukrainian attacks.

Vehicle Guidance
Soldiers assigned to Alpha Company “Orphans,” 2nd Battalion, 34th Armored Regiment, guide the bed of a M1078 light medium tactical vehicle that’s being removed at the maintenance bay in Drawsko Pomorskie, Poland, March 8, 2022.
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The Russians are flying on average 200 sorties per day — not all into Ukrainian airspace since cruise missiles can be launched from those aircraft to hit targets in Ukraine from a great distance. "There's a general cautiousness on their part," the official said.
The Ukrainians have about 56 fighter jets available and are flying about five-to-10 sorties per day. The official noted that they don't really need to do more than that since the Russians have surface-to-air missiles that could knock those planes out of the sky. In addition, the Ukrainians have made great use of their drones, which can deliver munitions as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, the official said.
The United States and 14 allies continue to send defensive weapons systems into Ukraine, including small arms, anti-armor and air defense, the official said.
The official cautioned against U.S. veterans traveling to Ukraine to assist in the fighting. The best way Americans can help would be to contribute to organizations like the Red Cross, which is doing humanitarian work there, the official said.
defense.gov · by David Vergun



15. US strategists double down on war with China

Quite a critique in the subtitle and here:
Colby’s reluctance to answer the decisive question – whether Chinese missiles can sink US carriers – puts him in the company of the naval strategists of 1940 who watched torpedo bombers sink their battleships from Taranto to Singapore to Pearl Harbor.
Military logic, though, has little to do with these outbursts. Cropsey, Colby and other old friends simply cannot wrap their minds around the miserable fact that American power is fading, the consequence of thirty years of grotesque blunders following the end of the Cold War. They cannot bear the idea that America might have to share power with a rising China, and in their heart of hearts, they prefer a war, even a losing one, to this sort of humiliation.

US strategists double down on war with China
Strategic thinkers can’t wrap their minds around the fact that American power is fading after 30 years of blunders
asiatimes.com · by David P. Goldman · March 11, 2022
NEW YORK – Prominent American strategists whom I have known for years and who previously displayed signs of rationality have gone mad at the prospect of American strategic decline.
China is the obvious winner in the present international crisis. It has the luxury of choosing between two outcomes that increase its power: to act as a friend of all the parties in the Ukraine dispute and mediate the conflict, or to gain the battered Russian Federation as an ally. It probably can do both.
The United States put Ukraine on track for a violent confrontation with Russia by undermining the Russian-backed Minsk II agreement, which would have kept Ukraine out of NATO and allowed home rule for the Russophone provinces Donetsk and Luhansk within a sovereign Ukraine.

Russia charged that Washington intended to move nuclear missiles to the Russia-Ukraine border 300 miles from Moscow, and invaded Ukraine to preempt this. Whether the Biden administration insisted on Ukraine’s option to join NATO out of design or incompetence, US policy is now in ruins.
That leaves Washington debating how to deal with a China that fields 400 city-buster nuclear weapons and the ICBMs that would be needed to deliver them, as well as about 1,300 medium-to-long-range surface-to-ship missiles that probably can sink US aircraft carriers – not to mention a host of other strategic weapons.
It also leaves Washington a couple of steps away from a nuclear confrontation with Russia, which last October tested a submarine-launched hypervelocity glide vehicle, a super-fast cruise missile that could hit Washington in 60 seconds from a submarine a hundred miles offshore.
And it also leaves the United States with the prospect of the union of Russia’s formidable technical talent, including a cadre of engineers as large as America’s, with China’s burgeoning high-tech industry.
The simplest solution, in the view of former Defense Department official Seth Cropsey, is military confrontation with China. “One would expect the Russian invasion to formalize the return to traditional great-power politics, what theorists of international relations call ‘multipolarity,’ a system in which multiple political and military centers of gravity exist,” Cropsey wrote in the Wall Street Journal on March 9.

Photo: Hudson Institute
“This prediction is alluring and wrong,” Cropsey added, because of China’s lust for conquest: “China remains the crucial actor. The Communist Party under Mr Xi … drew a unique lesson from the Soviet collapse. The Soviets failed not because they didn’t integrate capitalist insights into their economy but because they never went far enough in their external expansion.”
I should add that Cropsey, a dedicated amateur cellist, is a personal friend; I have dined at his home in Washington and think him personable and literate. But the above statement suggests that he is subject to a maniacal delusion. China’s strategic thinking says exactly the opposite, that expansion caused the downfall of the Soviet Empire.
On this topic, I recommend a recent essay by Professor Wen Yang of Fudan University, a prominent columnist for the leading Chinese news site “The Observer.” Wen writes: “World hegemony exercised in the name of liberalism must be opposed by the people of the world, and world hegemony exercised in the name of communism also must be opposed by the people of the world.”
From the ashes of Ukraine, Cropsey avers, will arise a strategy for world domination that I would characterize as straight out of Fu Manchu:
China will use Russia’s increasing isolation to transform Moscow into a petrochemical satellite, taking advantage of Western sanctions to secure Russian energy flows indefinitely.
In turn, China hopes that Russia, humbled or emboldened by its Ukraine adventure – and with or without Mr. Putin at the helm– will occupy Western attention as Beijing gobbles up the choicest Pacific possessions and extends its economic and diplomatic tendrils into the Middle East, Africa and Eastern Europe. Far from accepting independent Russian action, China is counting on Russian failure to accelerate the satisfaction of its boundless appetite.
Another old friend, former Pentagon official Elbridge Colby, has taken the opportunity of the Ukraine war to promote his “Strategy of Denial,” which amounts to mining the Taiwan Strait and otherwise reinforcing Taiwan to forestall the mainland attack on Taiwan that Colby, like Cropsey, believes to be imminent.

I have known the affable Mr Colby – grandson of the late CIA chief William Colby – since he was a law student at Yale. I reviewed his book here, concluding:
There is a close analogy here to the outbreak of war in 1914. An American attempt to deny China access to Taiwan would have the same effect as the Russian mobilization that triggered the conflict, in Christopher Clark’s authoritative account.
If one side mobilizes, the other must also try to avoid a catastrophic disadvantage – and this is how great powers “sleepwalk” (Clark) into wars they do not want and cannot win.
I have asked Colby numerous times in public forms how likely he thinks it is that China’s DF-21 or DF-26 missiles could target and destroy an American carrier under full steam. Answer came there none.
If the US takes military measures that make it possible to ditch the One China policy and establish Taiwan as a sovereign state, China may well act preemptively and seize the island by force. If US planes try to stop this, China may sink the carrier that launched them. That could start a nuclear war, as Admiral James Staviridis describes in his 2021 thriller 2034.
Elbridge Colby. Photo: Facebook
Colby’s reluctance to answer the decisive question – whether Chinese missiles can sink US carriers – puts him in the company of the naval strategists of 1940 who watched torpedo bombers sink their battleships from Taranto to Singapore to Pearl Harbor.
Military logic, though, has little to do with these outbursts. Cropsey, Colby and other old friends simply cannot wrap their minds around the miserable fact that American power is fading, the consequence of thirty years of grotesque blunders following the end of the Cold War. They cannot bear the idea that America might have to share power with a rising China, and in their heart of hearts, they prefer a war, even a losing one, to this sort of humiliation.

Other American strategists now argue that the United States should seek China’s help in dealing with the Ukraine crisis. Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations – the center of the American Establishment – told MSNBC’s Joe Scarborough on March 11:
China is thinking, “Why the hell should we do the United States any sort of a favor? We’re not going to get rewarded for it.” We still have the tariffs in place that the Trump Administration put there, even though they’re not working. So why don’t we lift those? Why won’t we offer to have a new communique with China, a new broad agreement – they just had one with Russia – where we talk about among other things, something that’s important to them, the One China Policy.
We can be committed in some ways to Taiwan but in a way that reassures China Why can’t we open up new cooperation on Afghanistan? North Korea’s getting into the business of testing missiles and, for all I know, nuclear weapons. We need an agenda. But right now, you have this bipartisan unity of bashing China, and this is not the time for it. Putin is the more immediate strategic adversary and threat to our interests. China is a longer-term challenge.
We have to sequence this. We have to prioritize. We have to figure out a way of getting China more distant from Mr. Putin. Imagine what it would be if Xi picked up the phone and called Putin and said, ‘This isn’t working for me. I don’t want to get caught up in these secondary sanctions that the Americans are putting on. That isn’t helping me get what I want, my third term. Cool it, Vlad.’ Imagine if we could engineer that kind of phone call?
Follow David P Goldman on Twitter at @davidpgoldman
asiatimes.com · by David P. Goldman · March 11, 2022


16. Perspective | Russia’s new control tactic is the one Hannah Arendt warned us about 50 years ago

We are all complicit in undermining the fourth estate but Putin (and China) is very good at it. Of course it is not hard for them when Americans have adopted "fake news" as an article of faith. And too often the fake news accusations are a sign of a failure to think critically and instead look at all news only through their partisan perspective. Simply stated for too many people if the news does not comport with their partisan world view it is labeled fake. And of course politicians exploit this and the desire to have an "enemy." Too many people are willing to call the media the enemy rather than think for themselves.  

But I digress. Philosophy is always relevant. 

Quite literally, the term "philosophy" means, "love of wisdom." In a broad sense, philosophy is an activity people undertake when they seek to understand fundamental truths about themselves, the world in which they live, and their relationships to the world and to each other. As an academic discipline philosophy is much the same. Those who study philosophy are perpetually engaged in asking, answering, and arguing for their answers to life’s most basic questions. To make such a pursuit more systematic academic philosophy is traditionally divided into major areas of study.
https://philosophy.fsu.edu/undergraduate-study/why-philosophy/What-is-Philosophy

 I think this is one of the most important articles to read and ponder. It explains much and if we should read this with a critical eye we should be able to see clearly what is happening in the world and how we are complicit with our hard core partisan views (extreme left and extreme right).

Perspective | Russia’s new control tactic is the one Hannah Arendt warned us about 50 years ago
Fake fact-checks, designed to sow confusion, are Putin’s latest trick for undermining faith in media — and the truth
The Washington Post · by Margaret SullivanColumnist Yesterday at 6:00 a.m. EST · March 11, 2022
You don’t need belief. All you need is confusion.
That’s how authoritarian leaders manage to control the populace, the great German political philosopher Hannah Arendt once explained.
“If everybody always lies to you, the consequence is not that you believe the lies, but rather that nobody believes anything any longer,” she said in an interview nearly five decades ago.
When that happens, people lose the capacity not only to act but even to think and judge. “And with such a people,” she concluded grimly, “you can then do what you please.”
Arendt knew of what she spoke. She was a survivor of the Holocaust who devoted herself to the study of totalitarian regimes. It was Arendt who coined the phrase “the banality of evil” to describe the chilling mentality that guided the SS officer Adolph Eichmann, convinced that in helping to craft Adolf Hitler’s Final Solution, he was simply a man “doing his job.”
Flash forward to a new war in Europe and a new diabolical way to confuse the populace of Vladimir Putin’s Russia: a raft of Russian-language videos that bill themselves as fact-checks of falsehoods by Ukrainian propagandists — but are actually fakes themselves.
This is next-level disinformation, a mind-bending 21st-century version of what Arendt warned us about.
One video pushed by pro-Russian sources on social media made a big show of dunking on footage of a huge explosion in an urban area — claiming that while Ukrainian propagandists had tried to present it as a recent missile strike in Kharkiv, it was actually an unrelated explosion from 2017, according to an analysis by the investigative news outlet ProPublica.
The unspoken message? Don’t believe all these reports you’re seeing of Russian missile strikes in Ukraine! The catch? This supposed fact-check was a pure straw man: ProPublica’s analysis found virtually no evidence that the above-mentioned explosion footage was being trafficked on social media at all, let alone by Ukrainian propagandists presenting it as something it’s not.
This is some twisted stuff: actual lies spread by what looks like the debunking of lies.
The phony fact-check videos — there are about a dozen of them — have garnered more than a million views on the messaging app Telegram and are finding a ready audience on Twitter, too. No one knows their precise source or sources, but pro-Russian officials are doing what they can to spread them. A screenshot from one of the fake debunking videos was broadcast on Russian state TV, ProPublica reported; another was circulated by an official Russian government Twitter account.
The researchers who examined the videos see an obvious purpose, one that will resonate with those who know their 20th-century European history.
“The reason that it’s so effective is because you don’t actually have to convince someone that it’s true. It’s sufficient to make people uncertain as to what they should trust,” Patrick Warren of Clemson University’s Media Forensics Hub, which led the research in the story, told ProPublica.
And when the legitimate press has been run out of the country, there’s no way to know or check.
As Russian forces bomb civilian targets in Ukraine — including, horrifically, a maternity hospital in an attack that killed three this week and injured 17 others — the truth is too ugly. So the strategy is to deny, accuse and obfuscate.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova dismissed reports of the hospital bombing as “information terrorism,” according to Reuters, while Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov scoffed at the “pathetic shouting about so-called atrocities by the Russian armed forces.”
It’s all part of Putin’s much broader campaign to control the message in Russia. That includes shutting down the independent press, blocking Facebook and making journalistic truth-telling — described as “false news” if it doesn’t hew to the party line — a crime punishable by a prison term. Even the words “war” and “invasion” are off limits.
On Thursday, the Russian embassy in the United Kingdom tweeted out photographs it claimed were evidence that a popular beauty blogger was masquerading as a woman injured in the Mariupol hospital bombing. (“Wondering how the Russian government will deal with being accused of war crimes?” the Russian-born American journalist Julia Ioffe noted darkly on Twitter. “By accusing the injured pregnant women of being actors in makeup.”)
Part of the reason this tactic works is that there are so many faked-up videos and photographs circulating on the Internet these days that skepticism really is necessary. Indeed, it’s unwise to share such images unless they are from a reliable source that is doing serious verification and vetting.
There could be no doubt, though, of the memorable photograph that appeared on many newspaper front pages Thursday — including The Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, USA Today and others around the world — showing an injured pregnant woman being carried on a stretcher amid the rubble of the bombed-out hospital grounds.
In the digital age, keeping reality under lock and key isn’t as feasible as in Hannah Arendt’s day. What is possible, though, is sowing endless doubt.
Truth will out,” wrote Shakespeare in an era much further removed than Arendt’s from our own dystopian moment.
Maybe so, but Putin and his henchmen will do their best to make people unable to recognize it. And, “with such a people,” as Arendt put it, “you can then do what you please.”
READ MORE by Margaret Sullivan:
The Washington Post · by Margaret SullivanColumnist Yesterday at 6:00 a.m. EST · March 11, 2022


17. Main actions of Russia in the course of “hybrid warfare” against Ukraine

Received from a friend working on the Ukraine problem.


Main actions of Russia in the course of “hybrid warfare” against Ukraine
(as at 8 a.m. March 11, 2022)
 
During the day it was observed:
Terrorist methods by the enemy against civilians
- crime actions against peaceful inhabitants: blocking of evacuation routes, using people as “human shield”, killings, looting
MARIUPOL city – air strikes on residential districts and evacuation routes.
MALA ROGAN village (Kharkiv Oblast) – blocking of humanitarian aid cargos.
BOHDANIVKA village (Kyiv Oblast) – forced detaining of the locals and using them as “human shield” during regrouping and digging of Russian troops. The occupants steal cars and dress in civilian clothes.
MELITOPOL (Zaporizhia Oblast) – capturing of deputy of the regional council.
BUCHA city (Kyiv Oblast) – establishing prison in the basement of residential building житлового where Russian militaries hold and torture local people.
STAROBILSK city (Luhansk Oblast) – searching and capturing of pro-Ukrainian activists. They are detained in seized police office.
In occupied cities of southern Ukraine Russian servicemen search and capture
Crimean Tatars.
 
- targeted destroying of civilian infrastructure by artillery/missile/air strikes
MARKHALIVKA village (Kyiv Oblast) – residential buildings destroyed, 5 people killed.
AKHTYRKA city (Sumy Oblast) – air strike on residential buildings.
KHARKIV – shelling of trade and entertainment center.
MARIUPOL city – air strikes on residential buildings and on the State Technical University, main building of local State Emergency Service of Ukraine is destroyed, at least
1 killed.
RUBIZHNE village (Kharkiv Oblast) – air strike on village council.
VELYKA DYMERKA (Lyiv Oblast) – air strike on “Coca-Cola” factory.
SEVERODONETSK city (Luhansk Oblast) – air strikes on residential buildings and shops.
DNIPRO – missile strike nearby kindergarten, residential building and shoe factory,
at least 1 killed.
LUTSK – missile strike, two heating stations are damaged.
IVANO-FRANKIVSK – missile strike on airport.
 
- engaging the targets that can cause technological catastrophes
Russian servicemen have mined a coast line of Kakhovka Reservoir that is located nearby Zaporizhia NPP.
SVITLODARSK city (Donetsk Oblast) – the occupants have damaged a high pressure gas pipeline.
 
Peculiarities of Russian special services actions
-       enemy activity in social networks and messenger group chats
Russian special services use special bots in Telegram messenger (e.g. “@VoZmezdiebot”) in order to get information about movements/activity of Ukrainian troops, adjust missile/artillery strikes.
 
- the use of prohibited weaponry by Russian troops
Russians have recognized the use of “TOS-1A” Heavy Flamethrower System with prohibited thermobaric weapon in Chernihiv Oblast during the news story at “Zvezda” TV-channel.
 
- state of awareness of Russian agents about communication system in Ukraine
According to available information, Russian agents gathered information about satellite telecommunication systems in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Lviv Oblasts and functioning of radio FM-stations in Kharkiv which broadcast on the following frequencies (MHz): 102.0; 102.4; 103.0.
 
- deception operations
MELITOPOL (Zaporzhia Oblast) – active Russian propaganda on the radio. Main narratives: “almost deoccupied territories”; “Russia will provide humanitarian aid”; “now you can freely visit Crimea”; “Russian will help with sowing campaign”; “all debts on loans and utility bills will be canceled ”.
 
- enhanced control over Ukrainian citizens by enemy special services
Belarus – Ukrainian diaspora members are being actively detained. Belarusian KGB officers demand them to provide any information about contacts with representatives of Ukrainian Embassy in Belarus.
 
- enemy activity in the occupied territories
In Kherson Oblast the occupants gather personal and service information about the locals. It is being done in order to strengthen a counter-reconnaissance regime and possible preparation of so-called “people’s referendum”.
 
- destroying/reprogramming of cell towers
Enemy forces destroy cell towers in Kyiv, Zhytomyr and Chernihiv Oblasts.
Kherson, Chernihiv Oblasts – we observe reprogramming of “lifecell” carriers towers that become to be displayed as “life” (old carrier name until 2016). It is likely that enemy creates fictitious carrier, controls and monitors Ukrainian callers.
 
- enemy attacks on Internet-infrastructure of Ukraine
Russia tries to turn off Ukrainian Internet-infrastructure on regional level in Kyiv Oblast and others.
 
Enemy measures on concealing its actions
- invasion of Russian SRGs in Ukrainian cities
SRG members stopped civilian vehicles, stolen them and changed clothes in order to enter SUMY city. They also tried to infiltrate among peaceful inhabitants and used evacuation busses for this reason.
 
- concealment of enemy movements and activities in the occupied territories
CHAPLYNKA village (Kherson Oblast) – massive cremation and further burring of dead Russian servicemen (approximately 50 bodies).
 
Other enemy actions
- involvement of certain segments of Russian population in war
Rostov Oblast (Russia) – in “IK-10” and “IK-11” penal colonies volunteers are being recruited to take part in war against Ukraine in exchange for a full amnesty and
a conviction.
Security Service of Ukraine officers have detained a worker of private security company from Rostov-on-Don who had to deliver 2 trucks of ammunitions for further bombardments
of Kharkiv residential districts for a reward of $2,000.


18. “The alarmists were right all along”: A Moscow journalist on Putin and the new Russian reality


There are a lot of people who are now authorized to say: "See, I told you so."

Excerpts:
I guess we’ll find out, won’t we? We’ve been interviewing parents of Russian soldiers, and not professional volunteer soldiers, but conscripts, people who were drafted into the army. These are 20-year-olds who, after a few months of boot camp, were shipped off to the front line and told this was all a training exercise. Many of these soldiers have been captured by the Ukrainians, and their parents are absolutely crushed because they were told their kids were at training drills. So there’s a lot of confusion.
But I’m not sure reality will come crashing through, or that it’ll happen soon enough. Sanctions move slow. Even though this military campaign has been such an obvious failure, unless someone in Putin’s close circle convinces him to pull back, which is unlikely, this is going to drag on and more people will die.
Who knows what that will mean? Will it spark a nationwide revolt? I don’t know. Here’s what I know: The Russian government has been preparing for this moment for a long time, and they’ve built up a police state to crush any signs of resistance with extreme violence.

“The alarmists were right all along”: A Moscow journalist on Putin and the new Russian reality
An independent journalist describes what life is like inside Russia’s parallel universe.
By Sean Illing@seanillingsean.illing@vox.com  Mar 11, 2022, 6:30am EST
Vox · by Sean Illing · March 11, 2022
Russian President Vladimir Putin takes part in a meeting of the Russian Emergencies Ministry Board via a video link from Moscow’s Kremlin. on February 16.
Alexei Nikolsky/TASS vis Getty Images
Almost everyone outside Russia views Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine the same way: as an obscene and unnecessary atrocity.
But that’s because the outside world can see clearly what’s happening on the ground in Ukraine. For the average Russian, the picture looks very different. They know there’s something happening in Ukraine, but it’s not a “war” — it’s a “special military operation.” And if you watch the news, which is controlled by the state, you’re not seeing images of bombed apartment buildings or dead civilians on the streets, because that’s what a war looks like and there’s definitely not a war in Ukraine.
Indeed, Putin signed a law last week mandating up to 15 years in prison for spreading “false information” about the conflict, which includes using words like “war” or “invasion.” And while the state has largely controlled media in Russia, it has now shut down the last remaining independent channel and is even blocking Facebook in the hope of controlling the internet as well.
So what’s it like to live in this totalizing parallel universe? What are Russians seeing? What are they hearing? Most importantly, what do they believe?
To get some answers, I reached out to Alexey Kovalyov, a former editor for the Moscow Times and now an editor at Meduza, an independent news site formerly headquartered in Russia but now based in Latvia (the site has been blocked by the Russian government). Kovalyov was living in Moscow and escaped to Latvia last week as Putin’s regime imposed even heavier restrictions on press freedom.
We talked about what messages are getting through in Russia, how the media environment has evolved in the past couple of weeks, and if he believes reality might finally crash through the fog of state-sanctioned disinformation.
A lightly edited transcript of our conversation follows.
Sean Illing
Can you give me a sense of what it’s like on the ground right now in Russia?
Alexey Kovalyov
I’ve been gone for a week now, but there was already a massive bank run when I was still there. Now I hear the currency controls are creating all kinds of chaos and it’s getting harder to buy things, and that’s probably going to open up black markets for all sorts of essential goods. So the reality of what’s happening is already bleeding into everyday life for Russians.
Sean Illing
People can see the consequences of what’s happening, but who do they blame? Why do they think this is happening?
Alexey Kovalyov
People are just now seeing the immediate consequences of something they don’t fully understand yet. There’s an instinct in Russia, when you see a long line anywhere snaking around the corner, you just know you need to be in it, even if you don’t know why. You just know something bad is happening, you need to be in that line. That’s sort of what’s happening now.
But it’s really hard to say what people believe. I mean, I’ve seen polling from a week ago showing that 68 percent of Russians support the war, but that’s a state polling agency. And the polling doesn’t even use the word “war” because that would be unthinkable and the state has banned that language. So who knows what people really believe?
I can tell you what happens when you try to explain to people what’s happening in Ukraine, and remember that lots of people here have relatives in Ukraine. When you try to tell them, “This is your aunt’s apartment building in Kyiv. You see? It’s in ashes. It’s being bombed,” they don’t believe it, even if you show them the pictures. They say — and I know this from personal experience — “No, this couldn’t be happening, because they told us that we’re not harming civilians, that this isn’t a war. And if that is happening, it must be because these Ukrainian nationalists are bombing their own people so as to provoke the Russian army into fighting back and killing civilians.” That’s what we’re talking about here.
“These people are getting the shit beat out of them by the police. They’re the bravest people in Russia right now because they know what they’re facing.”
Sean Illing
We don’t really have a reliable indicator of public opinion in Russia, right? As you said, the polling is suspect and it’s now a police state, so how do we distinguish between what people say they believe and what they actually believe?
Alexey Kovalyov
We have no idea. What these polls reflect is how many people actually tune in to state media, which tells them what to think and what to say.
Even the poll I mentioned, like I said, it doesn’t ask people about a “war,” it asks them if they support a “special military operation” in Ukraine. And then it asks what you think the goals of this special military operation [are] and gives you choices like “The denazification of Ukraine” or “The protection of Russian-speaking peoples in Ukraine.” None of them reflect what’s happening in Ukraine. They’re just letting people choose between the various talking points being pounded by the state.
Sean Illing
What’s it like to be a journalist right now in Russia? And just to be clear, I’m not asking about the hacks and the nihilists shilling for the state. I’m asking about the journalists and the writers who object to this totalitarian nightmare, but they also face enormous risks if they break ranks.
Are they finding ways to tell the truth without telling the truth? Or are they all just getting the hell out of there while they still can?
Alexey Kovalyov
I frankly don’t know many journalists who are still there. I know a few people who still remain in Russia and they made a conscious decision to stay, and I admire their bravery. I wish I was in a position to make that decision, but I didn’t. My family begged me to get out. My own mother cried with joy when I called from across the border to tell her that I was safe.
But it’s not like all this happened overnight. We at Meduza were declared foreign agents last year by the government, and that was the government painting a huge target on our backs, calling us traitors and enemies of the people. So this has been a long time coming. We’ve been preparing for this moment for several years. It’s not unexpected. What is unexpected is how quickly it happened.
Sean Illing
It does seem like there’s been a shift in the regime’s approach to media and propaganda. For a long while, Russia has “flooded the zone” and bombarded the population with so many contradictory accounts of reality that they weren’t sure what to believe, or they were too cynical to believe anything. But now it’s full Orwellian control of reality, and that’s a much heavier lift because it’s not about undermining consensus, which is easy; it’s about enforcing one.
Alexey Kovalyov
Yeah, absolutely. There has definitely been a shift. And I have to be honest, there were a handful of people here who have been warning about this for a long time, who were telling people like me that this was going to be a fascist dictatorship one day, and we’ve been dismissing these people. We were like, “Come on, Putin is a cynic, he’s evil in so many ways, but at least he’s a rational guy. All he wants to do is get himself insanely rich. He’s not going to do anything really drastic.”
But we were all fucking wrong. The alarmists were right all along, and almost every one of them is either dead or in jail or exiled.
Sean Illing
People outside Russia are seeing the videos of people protesting on the streets in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and I think a lot of us want to believe that Putin can’t contain this, that there will be a revolt. But I worry that that’s mostly wishful thinking. Are you convinced that this will put a real dent in Putin’s regime?
Alexey Kovalyov
No, not really. What you’re seeing from these protesters on the streets is possibly the bravest thing I’ve seen, and it’s mostly women who are facing real violence and serious prison time. These people are getting the shit beat out of them by the police. They’re the bravest people in Russia right now because they know what they’re facing.
But we’re talking about a few thousand people in a country of over 140 million people. It’s not nearly enough to even put a dent in Putin’s regime. What it’s really going to take is the silent majority, or Putin’s passive electorate, who for all these years have just been doing what they’re told, they’re going to have to make a stand. But I have no idea what it would take for these people to wake up. I really have no idea.
All I know is that we’re in uncharted waters. All these major foreign media outlets, like the New York Times and the BBC, are fleeing Moscow. That’s never happened. The New York Times has had a bureau in Moscow throughout the entire 20th century, including three revolutions and two world wars and the entire Cold War. But now Moscow isn’t safe for the New York Times. I really don’t have the words to describe how unpredictable this situation is.
“The alarmists were right all along, and almost every one of them is either dead or in jail or exiled”
Sean Illing
Again, I don’t want to dreamcast here, but is it possible that Putin isn’t as popular as he appears? Is it possible that there’s an undercurrent of discontent waiting to be tapped?
Alexey Kovalyov
Maybe. It’s so hard to know. You can’t trust any of the polling data, especially the polling run by state-owned organizations. The state controls the entire media apparatus in Russia, and that’s incredibly hard to puncture. We just don’t know what people are thinking or what they truly believe or what’s possible. No one knows.
Sean Illing
As the pain of this war becomes more real, as the soldiers start returning home in coffins, as the economy continues to crater, maybe reality will come crashing through the fog of propaganda.
Alexey Kovalyov
I guess we’ll find out, won’t we? We’ve been interviewing parents of Russian soldiers, and not professional volunteer soldiers, but conscripts, people who were drafted into the army. These are 20-year-olds who, after a few months of boot camp, were shipped off to the front line and told this was all a training exercise. Many of these soldiers have been captured by the Ukrainians, and their parents are absolutely crushed because they were told their kids were at training drills. So there’s a lot of confusion.
But I’m not sure reality will come crashing through, or that it’ll happen soon enough. Sanctions move slow. Even though this military campaign has been such an obvious failure, unless someone in Putin’s close circle convinces him to pull back, which is unlikely, this is going to drag on and more people will die.
Who knows what that will mean? Will it spark a nationwide revolt? I don’t know. Here’s what I know: The Russian government has been preparing for this moment for a long time, and they’ve built up a police state to crush any signs of resistance with extreme violence.


Vox · by Sean Illing · March 11, 2022


19. FDD | While Others Debate No-Fly Zones, Take These Steps Now to Help Ukraine



FDD | While Others Debate No-Fly Zones, Take These Steps Now to Help Ukraine
fdd.org · by Bradley Bowman CMPP Senior Director · March 11, 2022

March 11, 2022 | Policy Brief
While Others Debate No-Fly Zones, Take These Steps Now to Help Ukraine
Ukrainian forces are fighting hard to defend against the Russian invasion, but are slowly losing ground and cities in the face of a brutal Russian onslaught. As the debates in Washington over no-fly zones and Polish MiG-29s continue, there are a number of actions that Washington and its allies can take to immediately help Ukrainian forces.
Ukrainian forces have exceeded the expectations of many regarding their will and capability to fight, dashing Russian hopes for a quick victory. The bravery of Ukrainians and the provision of weapons from the United States and others have proven a powerful combination. However, Russian forces are slowly advancing, taking territory, inflicting losses on Ukrainian forces, and employing increasingly brutal siege tactics.
In addition to continuing to rush man-portable anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and other weapons to Ukraine, the West should take five specific steps immediately:
  • Share Targeting Intelligence — The U.S. government is still not sharing all the intelligence it can with the Ukrainian military to target invading Russian forces. Washington has the means to do so but the Biden administration is slow-walking the policy decision. Each day this intelligence is withheld from Kyiv helps Russian forces and hurts Ukrainians defending their homes. We are already sending lethal weapons to Ukraine. We should also give Kyiv the information it needs to best employ those weapons against invading Russian forces.
  • Diversify Supply Lines — NATO and like-minded partners have conducted an impressive, if belated, effort to supply Ukraine with lethal and non-lethal aid. However, a large proportion of those supplies are being flown into a single airbase in Poland and then moving over land into Ukraine. Those supply lines into Ukraine from Poland are increasingly vulnerable to Russian attacks. The Kremlin has recently conducted strikes in Western Ukraine, and we should expect strikes on weapons convoys coming from Poland next. NATO members should open additional supply lines, including from Romania and Slovakia. Washington and NATO allies should transfer to Ukraine additional capabilities to defend those weapons convoys once they cross into Ukraine.
  • Provide Secure Tactical Communications — Ukrainian forces continue to conduct much of their command and control and operational communications via unsecure channels. This allows Russia to listen in and endangers Ukrainian forces. Admittedly, this problem also afflicts some Russian forces. For that reason, giving Kyiv at least a modest means to conduct encrypted communications could provide Ukraine an important advantage. Secure communications are the backbone of coordinated and effective military action, including in the intense urban warfare that may become more prevalent in the coming days.
  • Prepare for Chemical Attacks — Russia has been setting the stage to potentially conduct a chemical attack in Ukraine. Moscow has a long and deplorable record of employing chemical weapons abroad. Washington should sprint to help Kyiv prepare for a chemical attack. This should include planning assistance and the provision to Ukrainian forces of the protective equipment they would need to survive and operate after a chemical attack.
  • Help Ukraine Counter Russian Jamming — There has been a recent uptick in jamming attacks from the Russians against Ukrainian forces, with some of these attacks possibly coming from Belarus. These attacks are likely intended to interfere with the ability of the Ukrainian military to fly unmanned aerial systems, including the TB-2 drones that have been so effective. The United States can help Ukraine counter jamming efforts and should do so without delay.
While pundits in Washington debate no-fly zones, taking these five steps can help Ukraine better defend itself and raise the costs for Putin’s aggression.
Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Ryan Brobst is a research analyst. For more analysis from the authors and CMPP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Bradley on Twitter @Brad_L_Bowman. Follow FDD on Twitter at @FDD and @FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Bradley Bowman CMPP Senior Director · March 11, 2022

20. How Russians Can Bring an End to Putin’s Chekist State

From one of our nation's experts on Russia.

Excerpts:

There is, of course, risk in encouraging regime change. Even if Putin holds onto power, it is possible that a weakened Russia would be driven into an ever closer alliance with China. Or Putin could seize upon support for his opponents as a casus belli, although should it come to that, he will surely have many other excuses to expand the war. 
There is also the possibility, albeit hard to imagine given what we are seeing in Ukraine, that someone worse could emerge if Putin were toppled. Finally, there is the possibility, even probability given past Kremlin success in suppressing its opponents, that even with increasing casualties and growing economic hardship, not enough Russians will have the courage to take to the streets to demand change. But there is also the prospect that the Russian people, many of whom (surely including members of the army and security services) have little memory of the 20th century, and none of the Soviet Union, are ready to look to the future by putting an end to the rule of their country by homo Sovieticus.
Even if the Russian people do not seize this occasion to force Putin out of power, or if no one close to him should, as some have suggested, pull out a Makarov and put it to good use, the Russian leader knows his time to fulfill his goals is limited. Just as an actuarial imperative must have influenced his decision to launch his war, he must also be all too aware of the actuarial certainty that the end of his reign is in sight, whatever the outcome in Ukraine. It is, of course possible that another aged KGB veteran, such as FSB Director Aleksandr Bortnikov, or former FSB Director and current Secretary of the Russian National Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, might follow a deposed Putin in the Kremlin, though that person’s rein is likely to be short, given that they are both 71 years old. The question is whether, whenever and by whatever means, Putin’s rule ends, the Russian people have the will to seize that opportunity to put an end to the Chekist State.
“I think”, Dostoevsky wrote in The Brothers Karamozov, “the devil does not exist, but man has created him, he has created him in his own image and likeness”. To call Putin crazy is intellectually lazy and absolves him to some degree, of responsibility for his actions. Nor should we caricature him as the devil. It should suffice that we rightly identify Putin and the Chekist State he embodies as evil and act accordingly.

How Russians Can Bring an End to Putin’s Chekist State
MARCH 11TH, 2022 BY MARK KELTON | 0 COMMENTS

Mark Kelton retired from CIA as a senior executive with 34 years of experience in intelligence operations including serving as CIA’s Deputy Director for Counterintelligence. He is currently a partner at the FiveEyes Group and is Board Chair of Spookstock, a charity that benefits the CIA Memorial Foundation, the Special Operations Warrior Foundation and the Defense Intelligence Memorial Foundation.
EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — “Nothing”, Fyodor Dostoevsky observed in Crime and Punishment, “is easier than to denounce the evildoer; nothing is more difficult than to understand him.” Since Vladimir Putin launched his assault on Ukraine, I have watched the debate over why the Russian leader is doing what he is doing with some puzzlement, and not a little incredulity. There has been much speculation about his health and state of mind. Dr. Ken Dekleva addressed the challenges inherent in assessing both issues recently in The Cipher Brief. Is Putin crazy? 
I can only attest that his statements and actions regarding Ukraine, however alien and abhorrent to us, are fully in keeping with what we knew of the man when he came to power while I oversaw CIA operations in Russia. 
On his becoming Acting President of the Russian Federation on 31 December 1999, my office produced a field assessment of the new leader and what could be expected from him. Entitled ‘The Rise of the Chekist State’, we judged therein that Putin’s principal aim would be the restoration of Moscow’s power and influence both in the “near abroad” of former Soviet space and on the world stage. We further assessed that he would surround himself with trusted fellow veterans of the Soviet and Russian intelligence and security apparatus and would rely upon those services as instruments of first resort in his exercise of power.
In our assessment, we wrote of Putin’s oft-stated nostalgia for the Soviet Union, of the shame he felt over the country’s collapse and of his bitter resentment at what he saw as the use of the cudgel of democracy to humiliate and impoverish Russia in the 1990’s. We also highlighted Putin’s deep self-identification with the intelligence organization he served. 
Recent events have made clear that the burning anger he felt back then has not abated. In his heart and head, Putin was – and remains – a man of the KGB (Russia’s Committee for State Security). He should be understood as such. 
While those who have dealt with him on the world stage over the last two decades, have studied at Oxford, Princeton, Harvard, and other renowned institutions, Putin got an education of quite a different sort. At the KGB’s Yuri Andropov Red Banner Institute, he was initiated into life as a Soviet intelligence officer. That introduction was not limited to learning the tools of the espionage trade. He was also imbued with the ethos of an institution that – as the ‘Sword and Shield’ of the Soviet Communist Party – saw itself as elite and as the proud inheritor of the brutal vestige of its forbearers. 
The crimes the KGB and its antecedent organizations committed against millions of innocents were presented as acts necessary to the defense of the Party and the revolution. The culture of the KGB and the Soviet legal system dictated that those victims – to the degree they were spoken of at all – were described as class enemies or enemies of the state. Apart from a brief period in the early 1990’s of limited public access to the archives of the Soviet services, there was no public airing and cleansing of those institutions akin to that which occurred in post-Cold War Eastern Europe. The KGB’s successor services moved with willful blindness to embrace a falsified version of their predecessors’ histories as their own. That stark reality was brought home to me on one particularly memorable occasion.
Several weeks before Putin came to power, I attended a unique party at Moscow’s Hotel National. As it was the residence of Lenin for a short time after the Bolsheviks seized power, the hotel was the appropriate venue for what was sort of a ‘Secret Policeman’s Ball’ attended by representatives of the Russian intelligence and security apparatus and their American counterparts. 
During the event, a senior Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer approached me to convey his theory that Feliks Dzerzhinsky – the founder of the first Soviet intelligence; the notorious All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (Cheka) – had much in common with Jesus Christ. Both appalled and curious, I asked him to explain. 
The FSB officer responded that just as Jesus handed down the Ten Commandments, “Iron Feliks” decreed that a good Chekist has a ‘cool head, clean hands and a warm heart’. Not wanting to engage in a pointless debate on his theological knowledge, or lack thereof, I said that I did not think it right to compare the Lord with a man who boasted that his service represented “organized terror”. The agitated FSB man responded by pointing in the direction of the nearby Lubyanka. 
The ‘architectural symmetry’ of the square in front of the building that housed the headquarters of the FSB and its KGB predecessor had, he said, been ruined by the 1991 removal of Dzerzhinsky’s Statue. He went on to say that it should be put back in place. Neither my response that I thought it would be better to put a memorial honoring Soviet dissident Andrey Sakarov on the site, nor my termination of the conversation with a remark to the effect that the Lubyanka was dripping in blood and needed to be torn down if Russia was going to come to terms with its past, did anything to calm him down. We parted with mutually insincere best wishes for the coming year.
Since coming to power, Putin has done everything possible to prevent such a reckoning with history. For example, he labeled the PERM-36 museum to the victims of the Gulag system and Memorial – the organization that documented both Stalinist crimes and human rights abuses in Chechnya – as ‘foreign agents’ before ultimately shutting them down altogether. His rule has seen poisonings, assassinations and imprisonments of defectors, political opponents and reporters on a scale and with an audacity that earlier generations of Chekists would have appreciated. At the same time, Putin wholeheartedly embraced the legacy of the KGB and its predecessors, dedicating a memorial plaque to former KGB Chief and Soviet Premier Andropov – the man who oversaw the crushing of the 1956 Hungarian uprising. In an echo of the language Putin uses to describe Ukrainians and their leaders in the present conflict, during Putin’s time as FSB Director, that service’s Museum featured an exhibit honoring the elimination by the officers of Soviet State Security of Ukrainian ‘traitors, Nazis and bandits’ during and after the Second World War. Asserting that “there are no ‘former’ Chekists”, Putin has made regular appearances at annual ceremonies commemorating the December 20, 1917 founding of the Cheka. He has spoken passionately of his pride at being one of the Soviet and Russian intelligence and security officers honored on a day that now bears the Orwellian moniker of ‘Security Service Workers’ Day’ but is still colloquially known as “Chekists’ Day”. That atmosphere of veneration for organizations that were responsible for countless deaths exemplifies the environment that shaped Putin and informs his approach to decision-making.
While our assessment did predict that Putin would be ruthless in the pursuit of his goals and the maintenance of his position, it did not envision his reign lasting 22 years. Nor did it speak to the ideological shift Putin himself would undergo as he moved – and moved his country – away from a discredited Communist ideology towards what is an irredentist worldview wherein Russia can lay claim to suzerainty over all lands that are traditionally considered Russian, that are populated by Russian speakers or in which Russian and Russian Orthodox culture predominate.
Cipher Brief Subscriber+Members can access Cipher Brief Expert and former CIA Chief of the Central Eurasia Division, Rob Dannenberg’s assessment, With his only option being escalation, this is How Putin’s War Must End  
It is obvious in hindsight, that Putin’s belief in such an expansionist vision of Russian power was always there. He acted on it in 2008 in Georgia, and again in 2014, in Crimea and Donbas, albeit with the application of force on a comparatively limited but progressively escalatory scale. Until the decision to attack Ukraine, however, Putin acted with relative caution, relying heavily on his security services and special operations forces to conduct a hybrid model of warfare that was predicated on gradual and at least nominally-deniable, escalation of force. He could always pull back should he encounter resistance, on the use of relatively small military expeditionary operations (e.g. in Syria), and on private military companies such as the Wagner Group to exert and expand Russian influence. Why, then, did Putin decide to undertake the greatly increased risk of invading Ukraine? Was that decision, from his perspective, rational? And what should we do about it?
Addressing Putin’s Aggression
Simply put, Putin decided to attack Ukraine because he thought he could and must do so. The latter assertion is most easily addressed. Putin believed he had to invade Ukraine to counter the growing extension of Western influence, affluence and military ties into a country he and many of his countrymen still consider Russian borderlands and with which they have close familial, linguistic and cultural ties. After his previous efforts to insure the bacillus of Western democratic values did not jump the border into his country, (his puppet was driven from office by the Maidan protests and repeated rebuffs of his demands for a halt to – and roll-back of – NATO expansion into former Soviet space) Putin became increasingly convinced that he must act decisively to preserve his own hold on power and that he could, consequently, justify that action as self-defense.
That Putin chose this moment to attack is the result of an accumulation of factors that culminated in what must to him, have seemed a unique window of opportunity. In no particular order, those reasons likely included a perceived weakness of American leadership as exemplified by the US debacle in Afghanistan, the concurrent US decision to begin to shift its national security posture away from the War on Terror back towards countering peer competitors, and the presence in the US Administration of many of the same officials who were in office in 2014, when he initially carved off chunks of Ukraine without discernible reaction from Washington; domestic turmoil in the US due to the impact of COVID, heightened racial tensions and the political damage wrought by years of unproven claims that a US President was a Russian stooge; (assertions that Putin’s own intelligence services’ worked to stoke and exploit through their active measures operations) his increasingly close anti-American entente with Xi Jinping’s China; the failure of the US and NATO to respond decisively to Russian military exercises on Ukraine’s borders in 2021; his (ultimately erroneous) belief that the calamitous US decision to forego its own energy independence coupled with European – particularly German – dependence on Russian gas would allow him to wield energy as a lever to split NATO; an apparent (and ironic given Putin’s background) Russian intelligence failure as to the prospects for success of an assault on Ukraine; and a misplaced confidence in the ability of the Russian military to effect a coup de main by quickly toppling the government in Kyiv and easily defeating any Ukrainian resistance.  
Putin and many around him are the Cheka’s bastard remnants. They are conducting this conflict in a manner fully in keeping with the bloody-mindedness of their murderous forerunners. Yet, as we now see with stark clarity, the Ukrainian people are giving Putin much more than he bargained for. 
The Russian leader knows he is in a war he cannot afford to lose. Consequently, as was the case with Soviet armies in Finland and after the grim first years of the so-called Great Patriotic War, as well as with the Russian army in the first and second wars in Chechnya, Moscow’s response to initial failure in Ukraine has been to apply more firepower more indiscriminately in an attempt to hammer out something the Kremlin can call a victory. 
While Putin still professes certainty that military operations are going ‘according to plan’ and that his objective remains a demilitarized and neutral Ukraine, it is surely evident to him that he is in a race to bring his war to a successful conclusion before seemingly growing Ukrainian resolve, an ongoing influx of western weaponry onto the battlefield, and the impact of sanctions and international isolation on his own people and economy, make the cost in lives and treasure inherent in seizing and occupying all of Ukraine prohibitive. Retreat and consequent defeat being impossible if he is to keep his job, at some point soon in the not-too distant future, Putin will be confronted with a stark choice between further escalation or modification of his war aims. 
The latter might involve a ceasefire – likely pushed by China – once Russian forces have seized Ukraine’s Black Sea coast, completed their capture of Kyiv and Ukraine’s major eastern cities and reached a defensible line of contact; perhaps along the Dniepr river. Putin would then foreswear his assertions that he would not grab additional Ukrainian territory, leaving a rump, weak western Ukrainian state to either accept the new status quo or mount an insurgency to recapture its lost lands.
To paraphrase Lenin, what is to be done by the US and its allies? The way forward is fraught with peril. But it also presents us with potential opportunity. 
Moscow’s threats to expand the war outside Ukraine’s borders either in response to what it sees as belligerent acts by another power (e.g. efforts to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine) or because of events that spin out of control (e.g. a Russian attempt to interdict possible arms shipments into the country) should not be discounted. Nor should its warnings about the use of nuclear weapons in response to Western actions or to intractable Ukrainian defiance, particularly if Putin feels his back is to the wall. We must avoid actions that could precipitate a general war between Russia and the West. At the same time, there is an imperative that the US fulfill its obligations to defend its NATO allies while doing all it prudently can to assist Ukraine in confronting this Russian threat to its liberty and independence. Failure to do so will embolden Moscow and other aggressors in Beijing and Tehran and will further erode Washington’s position as the leader of the free world. To do so means the clandestine (i.e. without sanctioned leaks for political reasons) provision to Kyiv of weapons, other military equipment, intelligence and training assistance to allow them to bleed the aggressor white, will help Ukraine hold out long enough to allow sanctions to begin to undermine Russia’s capacity to wage war.
Register for your own Expert-Level Briefing on Ukraine and How Private Sector Intelligence is Defining a New World with Mandiant CEO Kevin Mandia
Wednesday, March 23 from 1:30p – 2:30p ET
At the same time, we must seize upon this opportunity to mount a concerted overt and covert campaign designed to undermine the popular acquiescence – if not support – that Putin requires to continue this conflict and remain in office. That campaign should seek to expose the Russian people to the aggression and atrocities being committed in their name and to link those actions to the history of similar actions by Putin’s fellow Chekists past and present. 
This is important because the latter are the very same people charged with suppressing any public manifestation of opposition to Putin’s war, and ensuring his continued grip on power. As was the case in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War, the surest sign that a repressive regime is losing its grip on power is when the ‘organs of state repression’ (as they were known in Stalin’s day) refuse to use force against their own people. Putin will, as always, seek to identify himself with the state by portraying western assistance to Ukraine – and appeals to the Russian people to oppose his rule – as attacks on the Motherland.
There is, of course, risk in encouraging regime change. Even if Putin holds onto power, it is possible that a weakened Russia would be driven into an ever closer alliance with China. Or Putin could seize upon support for his opponents as a casus belli, although should it come to that, he will surely have many other excuses to expand the war. 
There is also the possibility, albeit hard to imagine given what we are seeing in Ukraine, that someone worse could emerge if Putin were toppled. Finally, there is the possibility, even probability given past Kremlin success in suppressing its opponents, that even with increasing casualties and growing economic hardship, not enough Russians will have the courage to take to the streets to demand change. But there is also the prospect that the Russian people, many of whom (surely including members of the army and security services) have little memory of the 20th century, and none of the Soviet Union, are ready to look to the future by putting an end to the rule of their country by homo Sovieticus.
Even if the Russian people do not seize this occasion to force Putin out of power, or if no one close to him should, as some have suggested, pull out a Makarov and put it to good use, the Russian leader knows his time to fulfill his goals is limited. Just as an actuarial imperative must have influenced his decision to launch his war, he must also be all too aware of the actuarial certainty that the end of his reign is in sight, whatever the outcome in Ukraine. It is, of course possible that another aged KGB veteran, such as FSB Director Aleksandr Bortnikov, or former FSB Director and current Secretary of the Russian National Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, might follow a deposed Putin in the Kremlin, though that person’s rein is likely to be short, given that they are both 71 years old. The question is whether, whenever and by whatever means, Putin’s rule ends, the Russian people have the will to seize that opportunity to put an end to the Chekist State.
“I think”, Dostoevsky wrote in The Brothers Karamozov, “the devil does not exist, but man has created him, he has created him in his own image and likeness”. To call Putin crazy is intellectually lazy and absolves him to some degree, of responsibility for his actions. Nor should we caricature him as the devil. It should suffice that we rightly identify Putin and the Chekist State he embodies as evil and act accordingly.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief


21. Zelensky warns of "new stage of terror" in latest video



Updated 11 hours ago - World
Zelensky warns of "new stage of terror" in latest video

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned of "a new stage of terror" in a video posted to Telegram on Friday night, referencing the abduction of the mayor of Melitopol by Russian forces.
Driving the news: The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the kidnapping of Mayor Ivan Fedorov a war crime, according to a statement posted to Facebook on Friday.
  • "It is a democratic world here therefore the capture of the mayor of Melitopol is a crime not only against a particular person. Not only against a particular community. And not only against Ukraine. This is a crime against democracy," Zelensky said in his own video message.
  • "Obviously, this is a sign of the weakness of the invaders," the Ukrainian president added. "They did not find collaborators who would hand over the city and the power to the invaders. Therefore, they have switched to a new stage of terror when they are trying to physically eliminate representatives of the legitimate local Ukrainian authorities."
Go deeper:
22. Putin Is in Trouble: Russia Is the Most Sanctioned Country on Earth

Excerpts:

What Is Left for the U.S. to Sanction?

Brian O’Toole and Daniel Fried of the Atlantic Council think tank argued recently that the West needs to continue “developing escalatory options for sanctions to keep pace with Putin’s increasing violence,” adding that there is “still room for more targeting before these sanctions reach a level comparable to those against Iran or North Korea.”

However, with the Biden administration having already suspended normal trading relations with Russia, cut off all oil and energy imports, and sanctioned major Russian banks and economic institutions, it’s hard to imagine what truly meaningful sanctions could be left.

Putin Is in Trouble: Russia Is the Most Sanctioned Country on Earth
19fortyfive.com · by ByJack Buckby · March 12, 2022
In the wake of economic sanctions levied against Russia by the United States and Europe, Russia has officially become the most sanctioned nation in the world.
Russia’s central bank attempted to stave off a major and immediate economic downturn – and pressure from Russian citizens who quickly attempted to withdraw their money from ATMs in the wake of sanctions against Russian banks – by increasing interest rates to 20%. The decision meant that Russians got improved returns on their savings should they keep them in Russian banks, but also means that loans in the country have become significantly more expensive.
The Central Bank of Russia may have reduced the hemorrhage of rubles from Russian banks but has also made it less likely for Russians to borrow, invest, and move money. It means that Russia’s current economic situation will only get worse as it approaches a deep recession.
Economists predict that Russia’s Gross Domestic Product will decline by 7% over the next year.
New Sanctions Announced on Friday
President Joe Biden announced a new round of sanctions against Russia in conjunction with G-7 nations, starting with the revocation of Russia’s “most favored nation” trade status.
It means that Russia will no longer be a member of the World Trade Organization, giving it equal access to the markets of other World Trade Organization members. Biden’s latest sanction effectively ends all normal trading relations with Russia, meaning there will be higher tariffs on imports from Russia, pushing American businesses and consumers to look elsewhere for the same products.
“As Putin continues his merciless assault, the United States and allies and partners continue to work in lockstep to ramp up the economic pressures on Putin and to further isolate Russia on the global stage,” Biden said during a White House briefing.
“Revoking permanent normal trade relations for Russia is gonna make it harder for Russia to do business with the United States.”
What Is Left for the U.S. to Sanction?
Brian O’Toole and Daniel Fried of the Atlantic Council think tank argued recently that the West needs to continue “developing escalatory options for sanctions to keep pace with Putin’s increasing violence,” adding that there is “still room for more targeting before these sanctions reach a level comparable to those against Iran or North Korea.”
However, with the Biden administration having already suspended normal trading relations with Russia, cut off all oil and energy imports, and sanctioned major Russian banks and economic institutions, it’s hard to imagine what truly meaningful sanctions could be left.
Jack Buckby is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and report on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society.
19fortyfive.com · by ByJack Buckby · March 12, 2022

23. Putin Can't Get Lucky Enough to Win

Putin Can't Get Lucky Enough to Win
thetriad.thebulwark.com · by Jonathan V. Last
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1. Proof
Seth Abramson gives us what he calls ten hard truths about the war. It’s a really long essay and there’s not way to excerpt it properly. So I’m going to give you a rough summary of his arguments:
We are already engaged in a world war.
Trump’s election in 2024 would mean the end of NATO and Russian victory.
Russia is in a stronger position than we think.
Biden is ignorant of the true stakes.
Read the whole thing in order to get the real sweep of Abramson’s thinking.
It’s smart but—and I can’t believe I’m saying this—too pessimistic?
You can see how events could break in such a manner as to help Russia’s cause in the near terms. If you want to go dark, here’s a plausible scenario:
Russia escalates in some manner—a nuke, chemical weapons, a strike on Poland—and NATO fractures in its response. Some members take a hard line others aren’t willing to adopt.
NATO resolve weakens. Weapon shipments to Ukraine become more difficult.
Ukrainian cities are eventually occupied.
Putin declares victory and an “end” to the conflict.
Some of the partners in the global sanctions regime go wobbly and move to ratchet back the pain.
That’s probably the very best outcome Putin could hope for, and even this would be terrible for Russia. There would be a Ukrainian insurgency that would chew up the Russian military for months/years. The bulk of sanctions would not lift. The Russian economy would come to resemble a failed state. NATO would harden the defenses of member states and possibly admit new members.
Maybe Putin could survive this. But maybe not. And this is his best-case scenario.
You’ll note that I’m leaving Donald Trump out of this discussion entirely. I don’t disagree with Abramson that Trump’s reelection would be helpful to Putin and potentially disastrous for NATO.
But Putin has to get from here to there. No one knows what the Russian economy is going to look like six months from now, let alone in three years. Even if we do get a Trump restoration—a real possibility—it might be too late for Putin.
2. Peacefield
I never thought we’d need a refresher course on nuclear terminology, but here we are. Tom Nichols has it for you:
States usually categorize nuclear weapons, especially in arms-control agreements, by the distances they travel and their intended uses.
Strategic nuclear weapons are meant to travel long distances—by treaty, we once agreed with the Soviets and the Russians that long meant more than 5,500 kilometers—and to strike targets of “strategic” importance: enemy nuclear forces, leadership, and even cities and infrastructure.
Theater nuclear weapons are meant to be used in a “theater,” such as Europe or Asia, as a means of affecting the outcome of a war in that region. Targets in this category would include assets such as airbases, regional command centers, and, in some cases, even cities. Theater-range weapons were seen by both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as highly destabilizing because they could provide the fateful bridge between a regional nuclear conflict and all-out nuclear war, and were banned by both parties in the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The Trump administration exited that treaty in 2019.
Tactical nuclear weapons are also called “battlefield” nuclear weapons. They are smaller nuclear arms—but remember, this is “small” in the context of “a small nuclear weapon”—meant to affect the course of a particular battle. Such weapons (defined by the now-defunct INF treaty as those that cannot travel more than 500 kilometers) might be aimed at tank formations, for example, to blunt a massive attack.
Nichols notes the irony that Putin has now adopted the strategy NATO came up with in the 1960s: Flexible response.
During the Cold War, NATO was outgunned. It could not win a major conventional war in Europe against the U.S.S.R. Instead, the U.S. and NATO promised high risks of escalation. If you invade us, we told the Soviets, we’ll hold you off as long as we can with any number of conventional options. But we reserve the right to escalate the conflict—and even to use nuclear weapons first, if that’s what it takes to save ourselves and our allies. . . .
It was, and remains, a threat to drag out a war so long and at such a price that the situation becomes unstable and thus far more dangerous to Moscow, whose “allies” during the Cold War hated the U.S.S.R. and whose entire war plan for any conflict in Europe was to conquer quickly and without the risk of either internal political opposition or a nuclear exchange.
Flexible response was, in effect, a warning that no Soviet military leader could promise a quick and nonnuclear victory in Europe.
Note the sick irony here that Putin launched a war of aggression, but is relying on the NATO defensive flexible response doctrine to prevent his own collapse.
Anyway, if you want to remind yourself as to why NATO policy is to give Ukraine maximum assistance while limiting the risk of the conflict spreading, here’s Uncle Tom’s Cold War story time:
Both the Soviets and the Americans over the years were faced with false alarms. In one case in 1983, war was averted when a Soviet air-defense officer refused to believe an attack warning. (It was indeed erroneous.) In another case, in 1979, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski was roused from bed in the middle of the night and told that a massive Soviet strike was incoming; he was about to wake up President Jimmy Carter when NORAD officials realized that they were looking at a training tape instead of a war.
3. About the MiGs
Last week I argued that the cocked-up attempt to give Polish MiG-29s to Ukraine was probably not worth the risks of escalation. Part of this had to do with the cost part of the equation. But a lot had to do with the benefit side: Are MiG-29s really what Ukraine needs?
This piece in the Drive—not a newsletter, but worth your time—argues that what the Ukrainians need most (aside from anti-tank weapons; more on that in a minute) are SAMs:
The presence of medium to higher-tier SAM threats keeps Russia's combat aircraft from operating at medium altitudes or above, in effect pressing them right into the shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile (man-portable air defense systems or MANPADS) engagement envelope, which is roughly defined as anything under 15,000 feet. Thousands of MANPADS of different types have flooded into Ukraine and have been dispersed among troops across the country — and more are on the way. They have been brutally effective so far, but without the threat presented by more capable air defense systems, the opportunities to engage the enemy at lower altitudes will decline.
We’re able to get cheap, shoulder-fired SAMs into Ukraine pretty easily. But in order for these to be effective, we have to keep the Ukrainians supplied with mobile SAM batteries to threaten Russian air assets at higher altitudes:
[T]he major sticking point here is that Ukraine needs systems it can operate, employ successfully, and maintain in the field immediately, not western designs that will take months or even years to train on, field, and create a logistical train in a war zone to support.
So what fits that bill? Essentially, a bunch of old Soviet systems. (This piece gives the rundown and specifics for each.) Where would we get them? From the more recent NATO countries, like Greece, Poland, and Romania. (As well as our future NATO ally, Finland.) It’s the same principal as the MiG-29 deal: NATO countries give Ukraine their back-stock mobile SAM systems and then the U.S. makes them whole with modern tech.
Read the whole piece. It’ll make you smarter.
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thetriad.thebulwark.com · by Jonathan V. Last
24. War in Ukraine: How Russia is recruiting mercenaries

Is this an indication of the poor state of the Russian military or an attempt to reduce the burden on the families of Russian soldiers?

War in Ukraine: How Russia is recruiting mercenaries
BBC · by Menu
By Hanan Razek and Illya Barabanov
BBC News Russian & BBC News Arabic
Published
24 minutes ago
Social media channels and private messaging groups are being used in Russia to recruit a new brigade of mercenaries to fight in Ukraine alongside the army, the BBC has learned.
The BBC has spoken to a serving mercenary and a former fighter with close links to one of Russia's leading mercenary organisations, who have shared details of the recruitment campaign.
A few weeks before the start of the war, the serving mercenary told the BBC many veterans of the secretive Wagner organisation were contacted on a private Telegram group. They were invited to a "picnic in Ukraine", with references to tasting "Salo", a pork fat traditionally eaten in Ukraine.
The message appeals to "those with criminal records, debts, banned from mercenary groups or without an external passport" to apply. The message also included that "those from the Russian-occupied areas of Luhansk and Donetsk republics and Crimea - cordially invited".
Image source, @RSOTM telegram group
Image caption,
Wagner in eastern Ukraine, 2014/15
The Wagner group is one of the most secretive organisations in Russia. Officially, it doesn't exist - serving as a mercenary is against Russian and international law. But up to 10,000 operatives are believed to have taken at least one contract with Wagner over the past seven years.
The serving mercenary who spoke to the BBC said new recruits are being placed in units under the command of officers from the GRU, the Russian military intelligence unit of the ministry of defence.
He stressed that the recruitment policy had changed, and fewer restrictions were applied. "They are recruiting anyone and everyone," he said, unhappy with what he described as the lower professionalism of the new fighters.
He said the new units being recruited are no longer referred to as Wagner, but new names - such as The Hawks - were being used.

Read more about Wagner
In 2021, the BBC gained access to an electronic tablet left behind by a Wagner fighter in Libya

This seems to be part of a recent tendency to steer away from the Wagner group's reputation, as "the brand is tainted", says Candace Rondeaux, professor of Russian, Eurasian and Eastern European studies at Arizona State University.
Wagner has faced repeated accusations of human rights abuses and war crimes in its operations in Syria and Libya.
The mercenary sources who spoke to the BBC, said the recruits are trained at the Wagner base in Mol'kino in southern Russia, next to a Russian army base.

As well as the private messaging group,s there has also been a public campaign in Russia to recruit mercenaries.
On the Russian social media platform VK, a page that describes itself as a specialist in security activities, posted an advert during the first week of the invasion calling for "security guards" from other former Soviet Union countries to apply for "the near abroad". Military experts have said this is a reference to Ukraine.
Previously, a criminal record was a block for those wanting to join the mercenaries. Also restrictions were placed on anyone born outside Russia because of doubts around loyalty.
Image source, VK social media site
Image caption,
Translated advert for mercenaries on the VK social media site
There is a "high demand on fighters" and to make a difference on the ground "they're going to need thousands of mercenaries", says Jason Blazakis, senior research fellow at the Soufan Centre, a US-based security think tank.
On Friday, the Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu said that 16,000 fighters from the Middle East had volunteered to fight with the Russian army. The Russian president Vladimir Putin gave orders allowing fighters from the Middle East to be deployed in the war.
It has been reported that up to 400 fighters from the Wagner group have been in Ukraine.
The Wagner group was first identified in 2014, when it was backing pro-Russian separatists in the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
The serving Wagner fighter who spoke to the BBC, explained that in the first days of the invasion of Ukraine he was sent to the country's second city, Kharkiv, where he said his unit successfully completed a mission without revealing what it was.
"We were then paid $2,100 (£1,600) for a month's work and returned home,to Russia," he told the BBC.
Image source, @RSOTM telegram group
Image caption,
Wagner members in Syria
Blazakis describes using mercenaries as a "sign of desperation" to keep the Russian public's support. Russian President Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine has stirred several protests In Russia. Thousands have been arrested. Blazakis added that using mercenaries allows the Kremlin to "keep the death toll down because mercenaries are used like cannon fodder".
Moscow has always denied any links with mercenary groups.
The BBC asked the Russian ministry of defence whether the base in Mol'kino was being used to recruit additional forces for what the Russian authorities call "a special military operation in Ukraine''. No response was received.

Additional reporting by Nader Ibrahim and Ahmed ElShamy
BBC · by Menu
25.  Preparing for Defeat (Russia in Ukraine) 
Preparing for Defeat
americanpurpose.com · by Francis Fukuyama · March 10, 2022
I’m writing this from Skopje, North Macedonia, where I’ve been for the last week teaching one of our Leadership Academy for Development courses. Following the Ukraine war is no different here in terms of available information, except that I’m in an adjacent time zone, and the fact that there is more support for Putin in the Balkans than in other parts of Europe. A lot of the latter is due to Serbia, and Serbia's hosting of Sputnik.
I’ll stick my neck out and make several prognostications:
  1. Russia is heading for an outright defeat in Ukraine. Russian planning was incompetent, based on a flawed assumption that Ukrainians were favorable to Russia and that their military would collapse immediately following an invasion. Russian soldiers were evidently carrying dress uniforms for their victory parade in Kyiv rather than extra ammo and rations. Putin at this point has committed the bulk of his entire military to this operation—there are no vast reserves of forces he can call up to add to the battle. Russian troops are stuck outside various Ukrainian cities where they face huge supply problems and constant Ukrainian attacks.
  2. The collapse of their position could be sudden and catastrophic, rather than happening slowly through a war of attrition. The army in the field will reach a point where it can neither be supplied nor withdrawn, and morale will vaporize. This is at least true in the north; the Russians are doing better in the south, but those positions would be hard to maintain if the north collapses.
  3. There is no diplomatic solution to the war possible prior to this happening. There is no conceivable compromise that would be acceptable to both Russia and Ukraine given the losses they have taken at this point.
  4. The United Nations Security Council has proven once again to be useless. The only helpful thing was the General Assembly vote, which helps to identify the world’s bad or prevaricating actors.
  5. The Biden administration’s decisions not to declare a no-fly zone or help transfer Polish MiGs were both good ones; they've kept their heads during a very emotional time. It is much better to have the Ukrainians defeat the Russians on their own, depriving Moscow of the excuse that NATO attacked them, as well as avoiding all the obvious escalatory possibilities. The Polish MiGs in particular would not add much to Ukrainian capabilities. Much more important is a continuing supply of Javelins, Stingers, TB2s, medical supplies, comms equipment, and intel sharing. I assume that Ukrainian forces are already being vectored by NATO intelligence operating from outside Ukraine.
  6. The cost that Ukraine is paying is enormous, of course. But the greatest damage is being done by rockets and artillery, which neither MiGs nor a no-fly zone can do much about. The only thing that will stop the slaughter is defeat of the Russian army on the ground.
  7. Putin will not survive the defeat of his army. He gets support because he is perceived to be a strongman; what does he have to offer once he demonstrates incompetence and is stripped of his coercive power?
  8. The invasion has already done huge damage to populists all over the world, who prior to the attack uniformly expressed sympathy for Putin. That includes Matteo Salvini, Jair Bolsonaro, Éric Zemmour, Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán, and of course Donald Trump. The politics of the war has exposed their openly authoritarian leanings.
  9. The war to this point has been a good lesson for China. Like Russia, China has built up seemingly high-tech military forces in the past decade, but they have no combat experience. The miserable performance of the Russian air force would likely be replicated by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, which similarly has no experience managing complex air operations. We may hope that the Chinese leadership will not delude itself as to its own capabilities the way the Russians did when contemplating a future move against Taiwan.
  10. Hopefully Taiwan itself will wake up as to the need to prepare to fight as the Ukrainians have done, and restore conscription. Let’s not be prematurely defeatist.
  11. Turkish drones will become bestsellers.
  12. A Russian defeat will make possible a “new birth of freedom,” and get us out of our funk about the declining state of global democracy. The spirit of 1989 will live on, thanks to a bunch of brave Ukrainians.
americanpurpose.com · by Francis Fukuyama · March 10, 2022


26. U.S. military investigation finds extensive failures before deadly terror attack in Kenya


U.S. military investigation finds extensive failures before deadly terror attack in Kenya
The Washington Post · by Karoun DemirjianYesterday at 4:56 p.m. EST · March 10, 2022
An “inadequate focus on potential threats,” “complacent leadership” and “poor oversight” all were contributing factors in the January 2020 attack by fighters linked to al-Qaeda that left three Americans dead at a base in Kenya, according to U.S. military investigators, but it remains unclear what disciplinary action the “negligent” parties may face.
An investigation by U.S. Africa Command and a subsequent independent review blamed the fatalities at Manda Bay on about 30 to 40 “determined, disciplined and well-sourced” al-Shabab militants who staged the attack, officials said Thursday. Army Gen. Stephen Townsend, who leads U.S. Africa Command, called al-Shabab “the most lethal arm of al-Qaeda.”
According to investigators, the deadly assault consisted of two attacks on the seaside base near Kenya’s border with Somalia. Investigators determined that one, in which 10 mortar rounds were fired at Camp Simba, was intended to distract troops from responding to the main assault on Manda Bay’s airfield.
Investigators described how, in the predawn hours, Army Spec. Henry J. Mayfield Jr. and a colleague were clearing the runway, when they detected thermal images of what appeared to be hyenas, realizing too late that what they spotted were al-Shabab fighters hiding. Mayfield was killed after a rocket-propelled grenade struck his vehicle. Defense contractors Bruce Triplett, 64 and Dustin Harrison, 47, who were piloting an aircraft, were killed after militants attacked their plane, which caught fire.
The attack, which left other Americans injured and several aircraft destroyed, was the deadliest attack on U.S. forces in Africa since the October 2017 ambush in Niger, in which four soldiers were killed. But the incident was largely eclipsed by the U.S. strike that killed Qasem Soleimani, the leader of Iran’s Quds Force, which occurred two days before the assault on Manda Bay.
U.S. Africa Command completed its investigation into the attack in April 2021. But instead of releasing its findings, the Pentagon commissioned an independent review, led by Gen. Paul Funk, commanding general of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Funk said Thursday that he concurred with the findings reached by U.S. Africa Command, and that “no single point of failure directly caused the loss of life and damage to the property at Manda Bay.”
While Funk said he “was able to identify multiple personnel who I deemed negligent in their actions or inactions which contributed to creating a vulnerable airfield,” he did not detail what disciplinary recommendations he had made to the Air Force. Pentagon chief spokesman John Kirby said all disciplinary actions taken were “administrative.”
In the case of previous military disasters that included loss of life, lawmakers have intervened to block promotions when they did not think the Pentagon had done an adequate job in holding military leaders accountable. Members of Congress had previously expressed frustration at the slow pace of disclosures from the Pentagon, despite their repeated attempts at oversight.
For instance, the Army’s investigation of the ambush in Niger initially placed blame on soldiers on the ground, even though military officials acknowledged that commanders had sent them on a mission without adequate backup or aerial surveillance. Under scrutiny from Capitol Hill, the Army eventually withdrew a nomination for Col. Bradley Moses, commander of the 3rd Special Forces Group at the time of the attack, who had been in line for a promotion to general officer.
The case in Manda Bay has some parallels to a 2012 attack by the Taliban on Camp Bastion, an airfield in southern Afghanistan. Militants sneaked onto a base undetected there and destroyed numerous aircraft with rocket-propelled grenades, prompting a battle that left two Marines dead.
The top Marine Corps officer at the time, Gen. James F. Amos, found that subordinate Marine generals in Afghanistan had not taken adequate steps to safeguard the base and asked two of them, Maj. Gen. Charles Gurganus and Maj. Gen. Gregg Sturdevant, to retire.
In the meantime, the incident at Manda Bay has prompted U.S. Africa Command to implement improvements to the physical defenses at its installations, increase the number of security forces and enhance intelligence sharing. It also is requiring leaders to do more site visits and security inspections, and employing more mobile surgical teams around the region.
Dan Lamothe contributed to this report.
The Washington Post · by Karoun DemirjianYesterday at 4:56 p.m. EST · March 10, 2022

27. Putin’s Endgame: A Conversation With Fiona Hill

The headline caught me off guard, When I read this I thought is that all Putin wants to end this? Simply a conversation with Fiona Hill? Shouldn't that be easy to make happen? I seem to remember hearing about her first meeting with Putin a coupled decades ago. My thought was perhaps he has some kind of thing for her.

But this is the title of a podcast.

 
Putin’s Endgame: A Conversation With Fiona Hill
The New York Times · by Ezra Klein · March 11, 2022
The DailySubscribe:
A discussion on the Russian president’s motivations, the West’s response and how the conflict could play out.
transcript
0:00/35:58
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March 11, 2022
Hosted by
Produced by Roge Karma, Annie Galvin and Jeffrey Geld
Engineered by Jeffrey Geld and Chris Wood
Listen and follow The Daily
Ending the war in Ukraine very much depends on how and when President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia allows it to end.
In an interview for his podcast “The Ezra Klein Show,” the opinion columnist Ezra Klein spoke with one of the world’s leading experts on Mr. Putin, Fiona Hill, a foreign policy adviser for three United States presidents.
Today, we run the discussion between Ms. Hill and Ezra Klein about how Mr. Putin is approaching this moment, and the right and wrong ways for the West to engage him.
On today’s episode
Fiona Hill, a senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution.

Last month in Washington, Fiona Hill, an expert on Russia, discussed President Vladimir V. Putin’s persistent interest in pulling Ukraine into Russia’s orbit.
Background reading
Here’s a guide to the roots of the Ukraine war.
About two-thirds of Ukraine’s population of 44 million people lived in cities before Russia’s invasion began. Now, many urban areas are in the cross hairs of war. What cities is Russia targeting?
There are a lot of ways to listen to The Daily. Here’s how.
Transcripts of each episode are available by the next workday. You can find them at the top of the page.
Fact checked by Michelle Harris and Andrea Lopez-Rosado.
The executive producer of “The Ezra Klein Show” is Irene Noguchi.
Special thanks to Shannon Busta and Kristen Lin.
The Daily is made by Lisa Tobin, Rachel Quester, Lynsea Garrison, Clare Toeniskoetter, Paige Cowett, Michael Simon Johnson, Brad Fisher, Larissa Anderson, Chris Wood, Jessica Cheung, Stella Tan, Alexandra Leigh Young, Lisa Chow, Eric Krupke, Marc Georges, Luke Vander Ploeg, M.J. Davis Lin, Austin Mitchell, Dan Powell, Dave Shaw, Sydney Harper, Daniel Guillemette, Robert Jimison, Mike Benoist, Liz O. Baylen, Asthaa Chaturvedi, Kaitlin Roberts, Rachelle Bonja, Diana Nguyen, Marion Lozano, Corey Schreppel, Anita Badejo, Rob Szypko, Elisheba Ittoop, Chelsea Daniel, Mooj Zadie, Patricia Willens and Rowan Niemisto.
Our theme music is by Jim Brunberg and Ben Landsverk of Wonderly. Special thanks to Sam Dolnick, Paula Szuchman, Cliff Levy, Lauren Jackson, Julia Simon, Mahima Chablani, Sofia Milan, Desiree Ibekwe, Erica Futterman, Wendy Dorr, Elizabeth Davis-Moorer, Jeffrey Miranda, Renan Borelli and Maddy Masiello.
The New York Times · by Ezra Klein · March 11, 2022



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Foundation for Defense of Democracies
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V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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