Quotes of the Day:
"I will either find a way, or make one."
- Hannibal
“Members of Congress love to impose sanctions on countries whose actions they object to, even though usually the only effect is to make the members feel righteous and look tough to their constituents. In fact, all too frequently, the imposition of sanctions is simply a political gesture, intended mainly to show that the United States is doing something in response to another country’s bad behavior without much expectation of success. For example, economic sanctions were imposed on China in 1989 after the brutal suppression of demonstrators at Tiananmen Square in Beijing and on Russia in 2014 after the seizure of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine because no one was prepared to support a military response. The sanctions had little impact on China, and while the post-Crimea sanctions hurt the Russian economy, President Putin would not consider taking the actions required to get them lifted (although they may have constrained him from other acts of aggression).”
— Exercise of Power: American Failures, Successes, and a New Path Forward in the Post-Cold War World by Robert Michael Gates
https://a.co/aq7PJrg
"Intelligence is not to make no mistakes, but quickly to see how to make them good."
- Bertolt Brecht
1. Pentagon declines comment on N. Korean nuclear test site
2. N. Korea appears to have started demolishing S. Korean-built hotel at Mount Kumgang: report
3. Sherman condemns NK missile launch, reaffirms commitment to denuclearization
4. Treasury Targets Russian Individuals and Entities Supporting DPRK Weapons of Mass Destruction and Ballistic Missile Programs
5. South Korea's new president must embrace the people of North Korea
6. Evolution, not revolution, will define Yoon’s foreign policy
7. Misogyny and Real Estate Tax Produced Conservative Victory in South Korea
8. Building a Flywheel: The Biden Administration's Opportunity to Forge a New Path with North Korea
9. New conservative president-elect vows tighter U.S. alliance amid North Korea threats, China bullying
10. Testimony of Justice Michael Kirby (north Korean Human Rights)
11. What South Korea’s Election Means for Its Technology Alliance With the United States
12. N. Korean authorities find huge cache of illegal drugs in China-North Korea border region
13. Many N. Korean forest rangers are abusing their authority to obtain bribes
14. What's Life Like in North Korea? A Defector Explains
15. Yoon’s victory in South Korean election signals hawkish shift in North Korea policy
1. Pentagon declines comment on N. Korean nuclear test site
We may need to consider release of intelligence at the right time to recognize, understand, expose, and attack Kim's strategy.
Pentagon declines comment on N. Korean nuclear test site | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, March 11 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. Department of Defense on Friday declined to comment on suspected work by North Korea to restore a nuclear test site it voluntarily shut down nearly four years ago.
Instead, it reaffirmed the U.S.' commitment to the defense of its allies, including South Korea.
"Regarding the Punggye-Ri site, we won't speak to matters of intelligence or commercial imagery analysis," a department spokesperson told Yonhap News Agency.
"However, we have been very clear on the threat posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear and missile programs, and our commitment to the defense of the ROK, Japan, and the U.S. homeland, and our commitment to uphold regional peace and stability," the spokesperson added, asking not to be identified.
The Punggye-Ri site is North Korea's main nuclear test site where six nuclear tests were conducted between 2006 and 2017.
Pyongyang had purportedly demolished the site in May 2018 in a show of its willingness to denuclearize amid U.S.-North Korea dialogue.
Informed sources in Seoul earlier said the North appeared to be working to restore underground tunnels at the Punggye-Ri site.
North Korea has maintained a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing since late 2017, but said in January that it may consider restarting "all temporarily-suspended activities."
The U.S. on Thursday said the North's two recent missile launches, staged Feb. 27 and last Saturday, had involved a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. N. Korea appears to have started demolishing S. Korean-built hotel at Mount Kumgang: report
Not surprising. I bet Kim will try to extort funds from the South to both pay for the demolition and to build a new one.
N. Korea appears to have started demolishing S. Korean-built hotel at Mount Kumgang: report | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 12 (Yonhap) -- North Korea appears to have begun to dismantle some of the South Korean-built facilities at the Mount Kumgang resort, a report has said.
Citing satellite images taken from March 5-9 by Planet Labs, the Voice of America said Friday (U.S. time) that the roof of the Haegumgang Hotel had become darker in the photos.
The images also showed that heavy machinery was located in front of the floating hotel.
The previous day, the South Korean government said it had detected similar moves at the resort complex but did not elaborate on which facilities were subject to the suspected dismantling.
The resort area, located on the southeastern coast of North Korea, houses a reunion center and other buildings for tourists from South Korea.
Pyongyang had announced that it would remove the facilities at Mount Kumgang, a rare symbol of inter-Korean collaboration, since its leader Kim Jong-un called for tearing down all "unpleasant-looking" facilities in 2019.
Last year, North Korea reiterated its will to renovate the Mount Kumgang area, and build a modern and all-inclusive international tourist area.
But the plan has been put on hold due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Launched in 1998, the tour program to Mount Kumgang was a major inter-Korean cooperative project.
Hyundai Asan, an affiliate of Hyundai Group, had been the operator of the tour program to the mountain until tours came to a halt in 2008, when a South Korean tourist was fatally shot by a North Korean soldier.
In photos released by Seoul's Ministry of Unification in 2019, the abandoned facilities, including Haegumgang Hotel, were dilapidated and covered in rust more than 10 years after the termination of operation.
Hyundai Asan remained cautious over the news report.
"I can't say anything about the VOA report on the Haegumgang Hotel," a company official said. "We will keep close tabs on the issue and cooperate with the Ministry of Unification."
brk@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. Sherman condemns NK missile launch, reaffirms commitment to denuclearization
Excerpts:
"She underscored the ironclad U.S. commitment to the defense of our allies, the ROK and Japan," it added.
...
The U.S. said on Thursday that North Korea's two latest missile launches, staged Feb. 27 and March 5 (Seoul time), had involved a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system, adding the recalcitrant state may soon conduct a full-fledged ICBM test.
"The Deputy Secretary reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and continued efforts to seek diplomacy with the DPRK," the press release said.
Sherman condemns NK missile launch, reaffirms commitment to denuclearization | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, March 11 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman strongly condemned North Korea's recent missile tests Friday, while reaffirming U.S. commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, according to the state department.
Sherman also reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea and Japan in a call with her counterparts from the countries -- South Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun and Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Takeo Mori.
"Deputy Secretary Sherman strongly condemned the DPRK's recent ballistic missile launches, which brazenly violated multiple UN Security Council resolutions and were a serious escalation by the DPRK," the state department said in a press release, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"She underscored the ironclad U.S. commitment to the defense of our allies, the ROK and Japan," it added.
ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name.
The U.S. said on Thursday that North Korea's two latest missile launches, staged Feb. 27 and March 5 (Seoul time), had involved a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system, adding the recalcitrant state may soon conduct a full-fledged ICBM test.
"The Deputy Secretary reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and continued efforts to seek diplomacy with the DPRK," the press release said.
North Korea remains unresponsive to U.S. overtures for dialogue. Pyongyang has avoided denuclearization negotiations since late 2019.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. Treasury Targets Russian Individuals and Entities Supporting DPRK Weapons of Mass Destruction and Ballistic Missile Programs
Enforcement, enforcement, enforcement.
Treasury Targets Russian Individuals and Entities Supporting DPRK Weapons of Mass Destruction and Ballistic Missile Programs
WASHINGTON — The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today sanctioned two individuals and three entities for supporting the DPRK’s ongoing development of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). The DPRK has conducted 11 ballistic missile launches since the beginning of the year, most recently on March 4, 2022 (EST). Today’s action targets a group of foreign individuals and companies that aid a DPRK defense industry-related procurement agent in Russia; much of this activity also violates UN prohibitions with respect to the DPRK.
“The DPRK continues to launch ballistic missiles in blatant violation of international law, posing a grave threat to global security,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “Today’s actions respond to this threat by targeting a network of Russia-based individuals and entities complicit in helping the DPRK procure components for its unlawful ballistic missile systems. The United States will continue to implement and enforce existing sanctions to press the DPRK to return to a diplomatic path and abandon its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.”
PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES IN RUSSIA
On January 24, 2018, OFAC designated 10 representatives of the U.S.- and United Nations-designated Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (Ryonbong), including its representative Pak Kwang Hun based in Vladivostok, Russia. Ryonbong specializes in acquisition for DPRK defense industries and support for Pyongyang’s military-related sales. Its procurements also likely support the DPRK’s chemical weapons program.
Since his designation, Pak Kwang Hun has continued to operate in Russia as a DPRK procurement official in Vladivostok. During that time, the Russian company Apollon OOO (Apollon) and its director, Aleksandr Andreyevich Gayevoy (Gayevoy), aided Pak Kwang Hun in his procurement efforts. Specifically, Pak Kwang Hun acted under an alias and posed as an Apollon employee likely in order to deceive its suppliers of the true end-user of items he procured through the company. OFAC designated Apollon pursuant to E.O. 13687 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Pak Kwang Hun.
Gayevoy, in his role as the director and major shareholder of Apollon, not only authorized Pak Kwang Hun to act on behalf of the company, but also played an active part in the DPRK’s procurement efforts. OFAC designated Gayevoy pursuant to E.O. 13687 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Apollon.
Pak Kwang Hun also worked through the Russian company Zeel – M Co., Ltd (Zeel – M) with the help of its director, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Chasovnikov (Chasovnikov), in his procurement efforts. In addition to supporting Pak Kwang Hun, Chasovnikov coordinated the purchase and transportation of a variety of items for other DPRK government organizations. At times, Zeel – M paid Russian port service fees for DPRK vessels, and Chasovnikov himself was involved in the coordination of a ship-to-ship transfer involving a DPRK vessel.
OFAC designated Chasovnikov pursuant to E.O. 13687 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Government of North Korea. Additionally, OFAC designated both Zeel – M and another Russian company, RK Briz, OOO, pursuant to E.O. 13687 for being owned or controlled by Chasovnikov.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the individuals and entities that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.
In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individuals or entities designated today may themselves be exposed to designation. Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for any of the individuals or entities designated today could be subject to U.S. correspondent or payable-through account sanctions.
###
5. South Korea's new president must embrace the people of North Korea
Professor Lee reminds of the importance of human rights and the Korean people living in the north.
We need an alliance human rights upfront approach.
South Korea's new president must embrace the people of North Korea
The Hill · by Sung-Yoon Lee, opinion contributor · March 11, 2022
If democracy, as Winston Churchill once mused, is indeed the “worst form of government except all those already tried,” then South Koreans can take comfort in having elected the least undesirable candidate among all contenders for the presidency.
On Wednesday, Yoon Suk-yeol, a former top prosecutor and political novice, prevailed over the smooth-talking Lee Jae-Myung, a former mayor and governor. In garnering 48.56 percent of the total votes to Lee’s 47.83 percent — 247,077 more votes, with a 0.73 percentage points differential — Yoon has set a Korean record for the slimmest margin of victory in a presidential election.
Compared with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s unbroken streak of 100 percent votes and approval ratings, or even the more earthly 2020 win by President Biden with 51.3 percent of the votes, Yoon’s numbers appear modest. But they are higher than both Donald’s Trump’s mark (45.9 percent) and Hillary Clinton’s (48.0 percent) in the 2016 race. More importantly, Yoon’s tally is markedly higher than the outgoing President Moon Jae-In’s in 2017, when he won with a mere 41.09 percent. And Yoon has won nearly 3 million more ballots than Moon did five years ago (16.4 million v. 13.4 million). The difference gives Yoon the mandate and imperative, once he assumes office on May 10, to redirect his democratic nation from the undemocratic course chosen by his soon-to-be predecessor.
In fact, it is Moon’s distinctly undistinguished legacy and the public’s thirst for change, rather than any discernible political acumen on Yoon’s part, that has carried the former prosecutor general to victory.
Senior South Korean prosecutors long have been stereotyped, with some basis, as “stiff-necked.” Yoon lends himself to the stereotype. He comes across not only as imperious and inflexible but also prone to gaffes and insensitive remarks. On the other hand, he has doggedly abided by principles. As a prosecutor, he investigated his nation’s spy chief for election-meddling. In 2017, he sought the maximum sentence of 30 years for the impeached President Park Geun Hye. Park was sentenced at first to 30 years for bribery and corruption, before her sentence was reduced to 20 years. In connection to Park’s case, Yoon also indicted the head of Samsung Electronics. Later, Yoon had another former president, Lee Myung-Bak, arrested for corruption.
Impressed by Yoon’s utility in Moon’s campaign of “eradicating deeply-rooted evils” — also known as political revenge against opponents — in July 2019, Moon appointed Yoon as prosecutor general. The president called on Yoon to be “strict” even with the powers-that-be. The next month, much to Moon’s surprise, Yoon quite literally carried out his exhortation. He took the same hard-nosed stance even against Cho Kuk, Moon’s confidant and Justice Minister. Much to Moon’s chagrin, Yoon indicted Cho (and his wife) for alleged abuse of power, falsification of records, graft, embezzlement and corruption. Last year, Cho’s wife was sentenced to four years in prison; Cho’s case is still pending.
It is the public’s appreciation for Yoon’s principles — that he does not yield to political pressure — that has made Yoon, a relatively unknown and visibly unsmooth political neophyte, into the president-elect. This perception matters and will be an asset throughout Yoon’s presidency, for South Korea faces numerous domestic and foreign challenges.
First, Yoon must reverse South Korea’s democratic backsliding under Moon, who has waged an impressive war on the universal freedoms of speech and information. Moon has sued private citizens for mocking him. A young man was found by a court criminally liable for placing posters lampooning Moon on an open college campus. Moon sued another man for distributing near the national assembly leaflets insulting him in 2019, but later dropped the lawsuit. Moon has used South Korea’s notorious libel/slander laws, which are so overly broad as to intimidate and censor private and media statements with a criminal penalty, to imprison a man who once called him a “communist.”
Moon also took cues from North Korean leadership to ram through the National Assembly a law that criminalizes sending into North Korea any item with an exchange value, including cash and other means of property gains. This “gag law,” as a senior British parliamentarian called it, was dictated by Kim Jong Un’s sister, Yo Jong, in a written statement issued on June 4, 2020. Minutes later, Seoul’s Unification Ministry, which governs Seoul’s relationship with Pyongyang, promised to work on it. Within the month, Moon’s point man on the task, chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, proposed a bill.
Moon, a former human rights lawyer, also waged war on human rights. Since 2017, his administration has cut funding to nongovernmental organizations that research human rights abuses, which, according to a 2014 United Nations Commission of Inquiry, are crimes against humanity in a category of one. The Moon administration has conducted pretextual audits of those groups, which human rights organizations around the world have denounced.
Yoon must do much more than just rectify these injustices. He needs to address what I called on the newly-elected South Korean leader 10 years ago to tackle — “the greatest moral challenge to the Korean nation: alleviating the tremendous suffering of fellow Koreans in North Korea.”
The long-suffering people of North Korea need a strong South Korean leader who can articulate the nature of their oppressors, as well as the scale and severity of the cruel repression the Kim regime has meted out for more than seven decades. They need a leader who can raise awareness of the extreme human rights violations in the North and instill empathy in the South Korean public and the world at large. The entire Korean nation needs a leader who can define a path to greater freedom and information for the North Korean people and, eventually, their liberation through a peaceful reunification with the South.
To this end, Yoon can start by doing the very opposite of Moon’s policies: vastly increase funding for radio broadcasts and other information transmission efforts across the border; embrace North Korean escapees by expanding resettlement programs and financial support; and take the lead at the United Nations and in other international forums to call the Kim regime out on its manifold crimes. In sum, normalize both domestic and international conversations on the North Korean human rights issue with sustained financial support and public diplomacy.
Such efforts will raise tension with the North’s criminal regime. The Kim regime will bristle. It will call Yoon vile names. And it will use the Yoon administration’s defense of human rights to justify its crimes and military provocations. But the absence of justice in inter-Korean relations is a greater problem than the presence of tension. There can be no justice without freedom, and no true peace without justice.
If Yoon can muster up the moral courage to call on Kim to tear down his inhumane gulags — which, to date, no South Korean leader has — and, with the same kind of loyalty to principles he has shown throughout his career, support during his single five-year term the invaluable work of human rights activists who seek to help, save and liberate the enslaved people of North Korea, then his will be a legacy no less renowned than that of any brave and inspiring wartime leader.
Sung-Yoon Lee is Kim Koo-Korea Foundation Professor of Korean Studies and assistant professor at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and faculty associate at the U.S.-Japan Program, the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Follow him on Twitter @SungYoonLee1.
The Hill · by Sung-Yoon Lee, opinion contributor · March 11, 2022
6. Evolution, not revolution, will define Yoon’s foreign policy
Excerpts:
As for Yoon’s approach toward the Indo-Pacific, we can expect Yoon to seek to boost security cooperation with the US — above all — Australia, Japan, Southeast Asia, and Europe to contain China’s behaviour in the region. The New Southern Policy is Moon’s approach towards the Indo-Pacific, prioritising relations with Southeast Asia and India. The question is how much will Yoon be willing to build on one of Moon’s successes to boost ties with the region. Moon has been accused of focusing on economics and not enough on security when it comes to the Indo-Pacific. In reality, however, the ROK Navy has joined joint exercises with other navies, increased arms sales and defence cooperation with countries in the region, and supported cybersecurity capacity-building in the region. These are activities that a Yoon government will continue.
Yet, Yoon may be more open about the need for South Korea to step up its security commitments to the region. After all, he is known for being vocal and has already suggested that Seoul needs to “step up” in its foreign and security policy. His government may also play up South Korean activities in the region, in contrast with the Moon government that has been quiet about them. And Yoon may clearly state that South Korea’s activities in the Indo-Pacific target Chinese behaviour, for he has not shied away from openly criticising Beijing during the election. Moon has refused to openly state this, even if that is the aim.
Ultimately, South Korea has an obvious interest in the Indo-Pacific: to support open sea lanes and the principle of freedom of navigation, especially in the South China Sea. It is the main route for South Korean exports to flow to Europe, and for oil and gas from the Middle East to reach South Korea. Yoon will do all he can to protect this interest, as Moon has been doing since taking office. All in all, South Korean foreign policy is driven by long-term interests including inter-Korean reconciliation, cooperation with the US and like-minded partners, and deterring potential threats — today, China. Moon understands this. Yoon does as well. The president-elect will leave his footprint in South Korea’s foreign policy. But we should not expect a complete break from the past. This is not the South Korean way.
Evolution, not revolution, will define Yoon’s foreign policy — 9DASHLINE
WRITTEN BY RAMON PACHECO PARDO
11 March 2022
South Korean voters have spoken. Following a bitter campaign, Yoon Suk-yeol of the opposition’s People Power Party has defeated Lee Jae-myung of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DP) by less than 0.8 per cent points. This is the smallest gap in the history of South Korean elections, showing the division among voters along different lines primarily based on generational differences, but also, to an extent, based on regional differences and along gender in the under 20s group.
In fact, Yoon will have to find a way to govern together with a National Assembly controlled by the DP for at least two more years. In this context, how may South Korean foreign policy change once Yoon takes office in two months? In short, expect evolution rather than revolution in Seoul’s relations with North Korea and China and its stance towards the Indo-Pacific.
Yoon and the conservatives tackle North Korea
Starting with inter-Korean relations, Yoon has promised to take a tough stance against North Korea unless Pyongyang changes its behaviour. In theory, this marks a clear break with the Moon Jae-in government. In practice, however, relations between Seoul and Pyongyang essentially broke down after the failure of the Hanoi summit between former US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. In the meantime, Seoul has ramped up its military capabilities to deter Pyongyang and, more recently, joined in multilateral condemnations of North Korean missile and satellite tests. Yoon is likely to follow these policies, while also emphasising the need to continue to impose sanctions on Pyongyang and becoming more critical of North Korea’s human rights abuses.
We can expect Yoon to seek to boost security cooperation with the US — above all — Australia, Japan, Southeast Asia, and Europe to contain China’s behaviour in the region.
Yet, Yoon has indicated that he would be willing to meet Kim if Pyongyang takes steps towards denuclearisation. While this marks a point of departure with Moon’s willingness to engage in talks without preconditions, ultimately one thing is clear: sustainable engagement between the two Koreas depends on Pyongyang rather than Seoul. Thus, the ball is in North Korea’s court. After all, every South Korean president has seen him or herself as the leader who could bring inter-Korean reconciliation. Yoon will be no different. It is South Korea’s long-term goal. More than a goal, it is a dream. The president-elect will not waste the opportunity to pursue it if possible at all.
The rise of anti-China attitudes
Yoon, however, has shown a willingness to openly criticise Beijing that Moon has lacked. For example, he has called the COVID-19 virus the “Wuhan virus”, in line with other politicians worldwide who blame China for the pandemic. Plus, the president-elect has toyed with the idea of South Korea formally joining the Quad. The Moon government has quietly, but surely, joined Quad+ meetings and worked together with Quad members in areas such as vaccine distribution or redesigning tech supply chains. But Moon has refused to formally become part of the Quad, which he seems to believe is unnecessarily antagonistic towards China. Yoon could decide that this is in South Korea’s interests, and send a clear political message by joining this security dialogue. Having said that, it is very unlikely that Yoon will seek to completely overhaul relations with Beijing. China is Seoul’s largest trading partner, a potential partner to deal with North Korea’s nuclear program, and — let’s not forget — (South) Korea’s neighbour for centuries. Simply put, it does not make sense for Yoon to break all ties with Beijing. South Korean policymakers understand this.
Seoul’s role in the Indo-Pacific
As for Yoon’s approach toward the Indo-Pacific, we can expect Yoon to seek to boost security cooperation with the US — above all — Australia, Japan, Southeast Asia, and Europe to contain China’s behaviour in the region. The New Southern Policy is Moon’s approach towards the Indo-Pacific, prioritising relations with Southeast Asia and India. The question is how much will Yoon be willing to build on one of Moon’s successes to boost ties with the region. Moon has been accused of focusing on economics and not enough on security when it comes to the Indo-Pacific. In reality, however, the ROK Navy has joined joint exercises with other navies, increased arms sales and defence cooperation with countries in the region, and supported cybersecurity capacity-building in the region. These are activities that a Yoon government will continue.
Yet, Yoon may be more open about the need for South Korea to step up its security commitments to the region. After all, he is known for being vocal and has already suggested that Seoul needs to “step up” in its foreign and security policy. His government may also play up South Korean activities in the region, in contrast with the Moon government that has been quiet about them. And Yoon may clearly state that South Korea’s activities in the Indo-Pacific target Chinese behaviour, for he has not shied away from openly criticising Beijing during the election. Moon has refused to openly state this, even if that is the aim.
Ultimately, South Korea has an obvious interest in the Indo-Pacific: to support open sea lanes and the principle of freedom of navigation, especially in the South China Sea. It is the main route for South Korean exports to flow to Europe, and for oil and gas from the Middle East to reach South Korea. Yoon will do all he can to protect this interest, as Moon has been doing since taking office. All in all, South Korean foreign policy is driven by long-term interests including inter-Korean reconciliation, cooperation with the US and like-minded partners, and deterring potential threats — today, China. Moon understands this. Yoon does as well. The president-elect will leave his footprint in South Korea’s foreign policy. But we should not expect a complete break from the past. This is not the South Korean way.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Ramon Pacheco Pardo is Professor of International Relations at King’s College London and KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Brussels School of Governance. He is the author of Shrimp to Whale: South Korea from the Forgotten War to K-Pop (Hurst, 2022). Image credit: Wikimedia.
7. Misogyny and Real Estate Tax Produced Conservative Victory in South Korea
The author is one of the most prolific supporters of President Moon, his peace agenda, and his political views. And if Lee had won the election he would have been one of the most vocal mouthpieces in support of him. Now he will work for the (not so loyal) opposition.
Misogyny and Real Estate Tax Produced Conservative Victory in South Korea
Five years after Park Geun-hye’s expulsion, a narrow win for the Korean right.
By S. Nathan Park, a Washington-based attorney and nonresident fellow of the Sejong Institute.
South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol of the main opposition People Power Party celebrates with supporters at the party's headquarters in Seoul on March 10. Chung Sung-Jun via Getty Images
On March 10, 2017, the Constitutional Court of Korea issued a historic decision: that impeached President Park Geun-hye should be expelled from office. South Korea convulsed as acting Chief Justice Lee Jung-mi read the unanimous decision from the bench. The pro-Park riots that followed the decision killed three people, and the Korean military was moments away from executing a coup before deciding against it. The millions of people who protested Park in the candlelight demonstrations quickly mobilized in the following snap election in May 2017, making the liberal Moon Jae-in the next president of South Korea.
This January, Lee made news again—this time as an attorney, following the end of her term as a Constitutional Court justice. Lee filed a constitutional challenge against the comprehensive real estate tax (CRET), the progressive taxation levied on homeowners with multiple houses, individuals with a high-value house, or corporations owning homes, in addition to the ordinary property tax. The actual amount of CRET, applicable to 2 percent of all houses in South Korea, is modest: For single homeowners whose house value is more than $1.3 million, the average CRET bill with standard deductions is about $400 a year. Yet Lee argued in her suit that the CRET was an infringement on the constitutional right to property and equality.
It was a sign of things to come. On March 9, five years after Lee and her fellow justices removed Park from office, Yoon Suk-yeol—the candidate of the People Power Party (PPP), a successor to Park’s Liberty Korea Party—was elected to be the next president of South Korea, ending the Democratic Party’s hold on the Blue House to just a single term. Yoon defeated the liberal candidate Lee Jae-myung in the narrowest election in South Korean history, one that was primarily driven by grievance over the rising real estate tax.
On March 10, 2017, the Constitutional Court of Korea issued a historic decision: that impeached President Park Geun-hye should be expelled from office. South Korea convulsed as acting Chief Justice Lee Jung-mi read the unanimous decision from the bench. The pro-Park riots that followed the decision killed three people, and the Korean military was moments away from executing a coup before deciding against it. The millions of people who protested Park in the candlelight demonstrations quickly mobilized in the following snap election in May 2017, making the liberal Moon Jae-in the next president of South Korea.
This January, Lee made news again—this time as an attorney, following the end of her term as a Constitutional Court justice. Lee filed a constitutional challenge against the comprehensive real estate tax (CRET), the progressive taxation levied on homeowners with multiple houses, individuals with a high-value house, or corporations owning homes, in addition to the ordinary property tax. The actual amount of CRET, applicable to 2 percent of all houses in South Korea, is modest: For single homeowners whose house value is more than $1.3 million, the average CRET bill with standard deductions is about $400 a year. Yet Lee argued in her suit that the CRET was an infringement on the constitutional right to property and equality.
It was a sign of things to come. On March 9, five years after Lee and her fellow justices removed Park from office, Yoon Suk-yeol—the candidate of the People Power Party (PPP), a successor to Park’s Liberty Korea Party—was elected to be the next president of South Korea, ending the Democratic Party’s hold on the Blue House to just a single term. Yoon defeated the liberal candidate Lee Jae-myung in the narrowest election in South Korean history, one that was primarily driven by grievance over the rising real estate tax.
Yoon’s rise is baffling. He was a career prosecutor who led the criminal investigation of Park, which initially made him a star among South Korea’s liberals. But after he was appointed as prosecutor general in 2019, Yoon rebelled against Moon’s reforms that attempted to reduce the authority of the powerful public prosecutors’ office. As if to demonstrate the office’s might, Yoon directed the full strength of the office to his boss, Justice Minister Cho Kuk and his family. The investigation, which pushed Cho to resign from his post, made Yoon a conservative darling.
Since he entered politics in June 2021 and throughout his campaign during the PPP primary and the presidential election, Yoon’s political career has resembled a series of absurd dares. Can you win elections with a candidate who was recruited from the opposing administration and is trying politics for the first time with the presidential election in nine months? Can you win elections with a candidate whose nickname is “A Gaffe a Day” and who freezes on live television for two minutes when he’s not given a script? Especially in the wake of Park, who was impeached for her corrupt association with a shaman’s daughter, can you win elections with a candidate who has been persistently associated with numerous shamans, including an anal acupuncturist? Can you win elections with a candidate whose mother-in-law was a serial white-collar criminal, convicted multiple times of document forgery and illegal reception of government subsidies that also implicated his wife?
Well, it turns out you can.
Yoon managed to get through the PPP primary leaning heavily on machine politics to defeat Hong Jun-pyo, the veteran conservative who had more popular support. But by January, all of Yoon’s liabilities appeared to catch up to him. The political machine he borrowed was exploding in his face, as various conservative factions feuded bitterly against one another. The PPP’s president, Lee Jun-seok—a 36-year-old pundit who became a political star by becoming the leader of misogynist young men—quit Yoon’s campaign twice before returning to the fold. By the first week of January, Yoon was behind in the polls to his main rival, Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party, by 7 to 9 percentage points.
Yoon got out of this hole thanks to misogyny and the media. After slimming down his campaign staff by prioritizing the voice of young men, Yoon posted a simple message on his Facebook page: “Abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family.” (For good measure, Yoon flashed this message again on the day before the election, which was also International Women’s Day.) The misogynist young men, who were souring on Yoon’s campaign as their champion Lee Jun-seok was running hot and cold with Yoon, responded instantly. (The staffer who crafted that message was later arrested for taking a hidden-camera photo of a woman in public.) Yoon rocketed upward in the polls in a matter of weeks, posting a 9-percentage-point lead by mid-February.
It helped that Yoon’s rival was an imperfect candidate. Lee Jae-myung was hampered by the Daejang-dong real estate scandal, a public-private development partnership in which the private developer bribed numerous public officials to win the bid for development. As Lee at the time was the mayor of Seongnam, where Daejang-dong district is located, there was persistent suspicion that Lee took bribes, too. The Daejang-dong scandal became the go-to weapon for Yoon: In an analysis that examined the frequency of words appearing on his social media site, the words “Lee Jae-myung” and “Daejang-dong” appeared more frequently on Yoon’s social media than his own name.
In a fairer media environment, this attack would not have worked because each additional fact that was revealed about the scandal exonerated Lee while implicating Yoon. Although the public prosecutors’ office heavily investigated Lee, nothing connected him to any bribes. In a recorded phone conversation, the lead Daejang-dong developer was heard calling Lee a “communist” and a “piece of work” for making his company put more of the development profit into the city’s public spaces, while Yoon “made the case go away” during the investigation of an illegal loan that provided the seed money for the development. In the final televised debate, Lee challenged Yoon directly: Let us agree to appoint a special prosecutor immediately, and if the special prosecutor finds criminality with the election winner, the winner will step down. Stunned by the demand, Yoon first stammered and then shouted at Lee that the Democratic Party was covering up the investigation while refusing to agree with a special prosecution investigation.
These stories were duly reported in the media. But in South Korea’s media landscape, heavily tilted toward conservatives (the country’s top five newspapers all lean right), their impact was muted. Small faults of Lee and his family—such as Lee’s wife’s secretary using a government credit card to order meals—received nonstop coverage, while large faults of Yoon and his family—such as Yoon’s wife being involved in a stock pump-and-dump scheme that earned her more than $700,000 in illegitimate profit—were reported and then forgotten.
Drawing on the parallels of a political novice winning a narrow election thanks to an appeal to bigotry, some have dubbed Yoon a Korean version of Donald Trump. That comparison is only half-true because it undersells Trump. For all his faults, Trump had his own brand of charisma that fostered a cult of personality—similar to the impeached Park, who had the allure of being the daughter of the dictator Park Chung-hee, who oversaw South Korea’s economic development. In contrast, no throng of fans follows Yoon. The Trump comparison, however, is correct in this sense. Both Trump and Yoon won using the same tactic of promising a tax cut for the wealthy and stoking bigotry in the masses, both with the aid of friendly media to create an alternate reality. Despite being a worse individual politician than Trump, Yoon was able to use this tactic well enough to win, if barely. In the end, Lee lost only two cohorts that previously voted liberal in 2017: young men and the Seoul neighborhoods with increased home values. But in an election with a margin of 0.73 percentage points, or just over 247,000 votes, that mixture of households and South Korea’s increasingly misogynistic young men proved the difference.
Moon will leave the Blue House as South Korea’s most popular president by a wide margin. With less than two months left in his term, Moon’s approval rating is above 40 percent, when all other South Korean presidents polled under 30 percent in the lame-duck period. His administration staved off a nuclear war with North Korea, saved thousands of lives by delivering a top-notch response against the COVID-19 pandemic, and oversaw the country’s international profile elevating higher than ever before. That was not enough to defeat aggressive sexism and a $400 increase in real estate taxes for owners of million-dollar homes, pushed by a deeply flawed candidate. Five years after the end of the disastrous Park administration, South Korea’s conservative party is back in power.
S. Nathan Park is a Washington-based attorney and nonresident fellow of the Sejong Institute.
8. Building a Flywheel: The Biden Administration's Opportunity to Forge a New Path with North Korea
The flywheel is an interesting analogy. But what will get it going?
FEBRUARY 28, 2022
Building a Flywheel
The Biden Administration's Opportunity to Forge a New Path with North Korea
By Dr. John Park
February 28, 2022
The Biden Administration's Opportunity to Forge a New Path with North Korea
Executive Summary
As the United States seeks to maintain a level of stability in its increasingly competitive relationship with China, North Korea has the potential to complicate their intensifying rivalry. Dealing with North Korea is a complex endeavor that requires deft handling by both nations because the stakes are high and instability can spread rapidly.
For decades, China has been seeking to bolster the stability of the Kim family regime and increase China’s economic engagement with North Korea, to the point where North Korea Inc.—the Kim regime’s network of elite state trading companies—has embedded itself in major commercial hubs throughout China. By prioritizing the stability of the North Korean regime over denuclearization in its policy actions, China created a loophole in which the North Korean regime could enjoy economic benefits without having to do denuclearization work. Beijing thus impeded the development of a connection to a larger process in which major denuclearization activity would be paired with major economic and diplomatic concessions.
In contrast to China’s sustained engagement with North Korea, U.S. policy toward North Korea over the last decade has focused substantially on sanctions implementation. There was a brief period of summit diplomacy during the Trump administration, but those efforts failed to bring about progress toward denuclearization.
The North Korean nuclear issue has mutated into a much more complex challenge that no longer fits into past policy molds that rely heavily on sanctions implementation. President Joe Biden’s administration will need to recognize that North Korea under Kim Jong Un has become highly resilient to U.S. policy tools such as sanctions, largely due to far-reaching advancements in the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) as well as the migration and embedding of North Korea Inc. deep inside the Chinese national economy.
During the past few years, five key developments have changed the environment and called into question the efficacy of relying on sanctions alone to change North Korean behavior:
- North Korea has advanced its nuclear and missile capabilities. North Korea has advanced its nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities and now poses a direct threat to the continental United States. In recent years, North Korea has also dramatically advanced other aspects of its nuclear and missile capabilities at shorter ranges. Sanctions are neither bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table nor impeding its ability to further build its nuclear arsenal.
- North Korea is surviving a self-inflicted economic crisis. North Korea effectively survived a severe protracted lockdown of its economy, raising serious doubts about depending on U.S. and U.N. Security Council sanctions as a tool of influence. Since January 2020, North Korea has implemented a stringent COVID-19 prevention policy that, in practice, has the impact of a full-scale economic quarantine. (Although the North Koreans reportedly made an exception for two train shipments in January 2022, the overall border closure remains in place.) North Korea’s trade with China plunged by 75 percent in 2020 versus the previous year, yet Kim made no effort to seek sanctions relief nor demonstrated any willingness to make concessions on his country’s nuclear or missile programs in order to access international assistance.
- The season of summitry has failed, and North Korea is increasingly dependent on China. The failure of the short-lived U.S.–North Korea summitry during 2018–19 resulted in North Korea shutting down communications with both Washington and Seoul. China emerged as North Korea’s sole outlet for support.
- U.S.-China relations have worsened. U.S.-China relations have deteriorated sharply over the last two years, making the possibility for cooperation on North Korea between the two countries more remote.
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China has rapidly pursued a digital currency. China continues to speedily build its own digital currency, which has major consequences for the United States’ sanctions playbook. Although China’s digital currency is at an early stage, its efforts to circumvent the U.S. dollar denominated system and build an alternative to the U.S. financial system will likely accelerate.1
In light of these developments, the traditional U.S. approach of applying more sanctions to bring North Korea to the bargaining table and pressuring China to rein in North Korea has largely run its course. The COVID-19 threat brought about the most intense actualization of a maximum pressure campaign that the United States could ever hope for, yet North Korea carries on.
The Biden administration has an opportunity to develop a more calibrated, practical approach that explores diplomacy with North Korea. This report draws on the idea of a flywheel—a heavy wheel that requires considerable effort to start rotating—and recommends creating a “flywheel effect,” or a structured series of decision points and wins to build momentum toward risk reduction and denuclearization, where “small wins for small wins” grow into “larger wins for larger wins.”
Implementing policies that create this effect can help lead North Korea toward a denuclearization path and break the country’s dependence on China.2 Figure 1 outlines how policy actions could bring the United States and North Korea closer to a common vision of stability and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, while also creating the space for other actors, such as South Korea and Japan, to contribute momentum to transforming the security, political, and economic landscape in the region.
This strategy has two key risks. First, North Korea could benefit from the easing of sanctions and halt additional denuclearization activities. Second, China could expand its engagement policy with North Korea, thereby decreasing the appeal of lifting sanctions under the "flywheel effect." The United States, however, can mitigate these risks by reinforcing the message to North Korea that only both sides’ sustained actions will enable them to reach the larger wins.
Figure 1: U.S. Actions to Create “The Flywheel Effect” with North Korea
Download the Full Report
Endnotes
Authors
Adjunct Senior Fellow, Indo-Pacific Security Program, Director, Korea Project, Harvard Kennedy School
Dr. John Park is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security focusing on the political economy of the Korean Peninsula, nuclear proliferation, economic ...
9. New conservative president-elect vows tighter U.S. alliance amid North Korea threats, China bullying
Excerpts:
Mr. Yoon was never hostile toward Beijing on the campaign trail, but clearly emphasized a desire to emphasize relations with the United States, which has roughly 30,000 military personnel stationed in South Korea and provides a nuclear shield to deter an attack from the North.
For his own part, Mr. Yoon has not been overtly hostile toward Beijing, which will celebrate 30 years of diplomatic relations with Seoul later this year.
During a November meeting with China’s ambassador to South Korea, Mr. Yoon said he would “work for a further upgrade of South Korea-China relations” if elected. “I hope that the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations will serve as an opportunity to understand each other better and really grow closer,” he said, according to a report at the time by South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency.
Mr. Yoon’s razor-thin victory was viewed by some as a referendum on South Korea’s liberal government, whose popularity has waned in recent years over failures to deal with stark economic inequalities, a troubled job market and soaring house prices that have left many younger South Koreans facing an uncertain future.
New conservative president-elect vows tighter U.S. alliance amid North Korea threats, China bullying
The narrow election victory by conservative South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk Yeol this week sets the stage for what analysts say could be a major reorientation of the country’s foreign policy, including dramatically increased coordination with Washington to counter North Korean nuclear and missile threats and a tougher line against China’s pressure tactics targeting smaller countries across Asia.
While it remains to be seen how Washington and Seoul will navigate the sharp policy turns promised by Wednesday’s result, there were signs Thursday the White House is eager to be done with outgoing South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s persistent outreach policies toward both Pyongyang and Beijing.
Mr. Biden phoned Mr. Yoon Thursday to invite him to Washington and “looks forward to working together to deepen cooperation on key global challenges,” according to a White House statement, which came hours before the administration announced a new U.S. push to disrupt North Korea’s ballistic missile program.
Mr. Yoon, meanwhile, used his first post-election press conference to confirm that he intends to beef up South Korea’s military in response to growing nuclear and ballistic missile provocations from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, who has resumed an aggressive missile-testing schedule reflecting his frustration with the absence of direct talks with the U.S. in more than two years.
“I’ll establish a strong military capacity to deter any provocation completely,” said Mr. Yoon, a 61-year-old career prosecutor who has never held elective office before. “I’ll firmly deal with illicit, unreasonable behavior by North Korea in a principled manner, though I’ll always leave the door for South-North talks open.”
Mr. Yoon, whose single five-year term will begin in May, said on the campaign trail that he would make an enhanced alliance with the United States the center of his foreign policy. He also signaled a desire to repair strategic ties between South Korea and Japan — America’s other major security ally on China’s periphery — and accused the leftist Mr. Moon of tilting Seoul away from Washington in hopes of better ties with Pyongyang and Beijing.
North Korea has yet to offer a public reaction to Mr. Yoon’s victory in the South, but spent recent weeks test-launching a wave of increasingly sophisticated, nuclear-capable ballistic missiles in what experts call an attempt to modernize its weapons arsenal and pressure the Biden administration into offering sanctions relief amid stalled diplomacy.
China reacted with caution on Thursday, with an editorial in one of the main newspapers of the ruling Chinese Communist Party saying Beijing congratulates Mr. Yoon and “respects the independent foreign policy of South Korea,” but also threatening that “Seoul has no room to gamble in the so-called game between Beijing and Washington.”
The editorial published by the Global Times newspaper expressed particular concern over what it described as indications that Mr. Yoon favors an expanded deployment to South Korea of sophisticated U.S. missile defense technology that Beijing claims are less about countering North Korean threats than about trying to contain China.
At issue specifically is the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. Thursday’s Global Times editorial claimed the president-elect’s “senior advisor” has said Mr. Yoon “supported an additional THAAD deployment” to South Korea. “We hope that this is a misinterpretation of Yoon’s opinion,” the editorial said.
The U.S. military began deploying THAAD to South Korea prior to the 2017 arrival in Seoul of Mr. Moon, who has engaged during the years since in efforts to block further deployments of the system after China imposed economic sanctions on South Korea for accepting a first installment of the system.
Mr. Moon’s efforts to block further deployments are widely seen to have been driven by a desire to assuage the anger from China — South Korea’s top trade partner. At the same time, Chinese officials claim America’s goal in deploying THAAD was to use the system’s advanced “x-band radar” to potentially neutralize China’s own ballistic missile capabilities.
U.S. officials have sharply denied such claims, although the THAAD issue is now among a range of possible developments that could enhance U.S.-South Korea strategic alignment once Mr. Yoon takes office.
Most notably, the president-elect has indicated a desire for South Korea to be included in the “Quad” security dialogue between the United States and the other most powerful democracies in Asia: Australia, Japan and India, a dialogue China has also fiercely complained about.
The Quad, which has been around for more than a decade, gained fresh momentum during the Trump administration, which used the grouping to counter what U.S. officials say is China’s increasingly aggressive economic and military moves in the Indo-Pacific. The Biden administration has picked up on the Trump initiative in promoting the potential of the Quad.
Regional experts predict the Biden administration will likely seize on Mr. Yoon’s interest in the Quad and any efforts to repair South Korea-Japan relations. Tokyo and Seoul are both key U.S. allies and closely linked economically and culturally, but their relations sank to post-war lows during Mr. Moon’s presidency over still-unresolved issues related to Japan’s 1910-1945 colonization of the Korean Peninsula.
“The Biden administration will welcome Yoon’s foreign policy emphasis and will look forward to strengthening South Korean contributions in the multilateral context of the Indo-Pacific and in the trilateral context of U.S.-Japan-South Korea relations,” said Scott Snyder, who heads the Council on Foreign Relations’ program on U.S.-Korea policy.
“Yoon’s election poses a challenge for China, in particular in terms of how Beijing positions itself in the face of stronger South Korean alignment with the United States and what tools it might use in response,” Mr. Snyder said in an interview with the U.S. government-backed Voice of America.
Japan’s government welcomed Mr. Yoon’s victory Thursday, with Prime Minister Fumio Kishida telling reporters that “Japan-South Korea relations are in a very severe condition, and we cannot leave them as they are.”
“Healthy ties between Japan and South Korea are indispensable for the peace, stability and prosperity of the world,” he said, adding that “cooperation among Japan, the United States and South Korea is also important.”
Mr. Yoon, representing South Korea’s main opposition People Power Party, won Wednesday’s election with 48.6 percent of the vote, edging out Lee Jae-myung of President Moon’s ruling center-left Democratic Party by a margin of only 0.8 percentage points.
It was South Korea’s 20th presidential election and the closest in the history of the country, with Mr. Yoon and Mr. Lee attacking each other personally in one of the most bitter political campaigns in recent memory, aggravating the country’s already severe domestic divisions.
Mr. Lee and his allies attacked Mr. Yoon over his lack of experience in foreign policy, claiming his hardline stance on North Korea will unnecessarily provoke Pyongyang, and that picking a side between Washington and Beijing will pose greater security threats to Seoul.
Mr. Yoon was never hostile toward Beijing on the campaign trail, but clearly emphasized a desire to emphasize relations with the United States, which has roughly 30,000 military personnel stationed in South Korea and provides a nuclear shield to deter an attack from the North.
For his own part, Mr. Yoon has not been overtly hostile toward Beijing, which will celebrate 30 years of diplomatic relations with Seoul later this year.
During a November meeting with China’s ambassador to South Korea, Mr. Yoon said he would “work for a further upgrade of South Korea-China relations” if elected. “I hope that the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations will serve as an opportunity to understand each other better and really grow closer,” he said, according to a report at the time by South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency.
Mr. Yoon’s razor-thin victory was viewed by some as a referendum on South Korea’s liberal government, whose popularity has waned in recent years over failures to deal with stark economic inequalities, a troubled job market and soaring house prices that have left many younger South Koreans facing an uncertain future.
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10. Testimony of Justice Michael Kirby (north Korean Human Rights)
Testimony of Justice Michael Kirby
Submitted to the March 4, 2022 Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers, held in Washington, D.C.
Dear Friends of HRNK,
On Friday, March 4th, HRNK and the International Bar Association (IBA) held an Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers at the DACOR Bacon House in Washington, D.C.
The Hon. Justice Michael Kirby, a former Justice of the High Court of Australia (1996-2009) and the Chair of the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK (2013-14), submitted pre-recorded remarks as his testimony to this Inquiry.
The UN COI's 2014 report concludes that "systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations have been and are being committed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In many instances, the violations found entailed crimes against humanity based on State policies."
The report further notes that the COI "carried out its inquiry with a view to ensuring full accountability, in particular where these violations may amount to crimes against humanity." Last Friday's Inquiry sought to extend and build upon the work of the COI, with a focus on detention facilities in North Korea.
In concluding his testimony to the Inquiry, Justice Michael Kirby states that "I would hope that the testimony I have just given will be another step in the direction of bringing North Korea back into the community of nations...in a way that respects the people of North Korea, who are the ultimate subjects of the Charter of the United Nations."
We wish to take this opportunity to thank Justice Michael Kirby for his invaluable contribution to the Inquiry.
His remarks are enclosed below.
Thank you.
Testimony of The Hon. Justice Michael Kirby,
Chair of the UN COI on North Korean Human Rights
1801 F Street, NW, Suite 305
Washington, DC 20006
202-499-7970
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11. What South Korea’s Election Means for Its Technology Alliance With the United States
One of the important parts of our alliance.
What South Korea’s Election Means for Its Technology Alliance With the United States
Yoon’s election presents opportunities to strengthen the South Korea-U.S. relationship beyond traditional security concerns.
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Following months of bitter contest, South Koreans on Wednesday narrowly elected Yoon Suk-yeol, the candidate from the conservative People Power Party, as the country’s next president. Facing an uncertain economic outlook and increasing political polarization, the stakes of the election were momentous, with some comparing the ferocity of the campaign to the popular Korean horror-survival show “Squid Game.” In particular, Yoon came under fire for his stance against feminism, which resulted in him winning just 34 percent of the vote from women in their 20s.
In terms of foreign policy, Yoon is expected to take a more hawkish approach to China, and to pursue a renewed, strengthened alliance with the United States. Under Yoon’s presidency, for example, the United States is likely to resume bomber flights and carrier strike group deployments to the Korean Peninsula, which have been on pause since 2018. But Yoon’s election also presents opportunities to strengthen the South Korea-U.S. relationship beyond traditional security concerns. One of these is the promotion and protection of critical and emerging technologies.
First, the Yoon administration can build on the work of its predecessor to strengthen South Korea-U.S. promotion of emerging technologies. The May 2021 summit between Presidents Moon Jae-in and Joe Biden established a framework under which the United States and South Korea can coordinate on high-technology issues, but it will be up to Yoon, who takes office in May, to put words into action. In artificial intelligence, for example, the United States and South Korea have both recognized the mutual benefit of exchanging scientific talent but have yet to establish a formal mechanism for doing so. Both countries also agreed to collaborate when screening outbound technology investments, but such screening mechanisms are still under negotiation in the United States and are not expected to crystallize until later this year.
The Yoon administration also has ample room to tackle new technology challenges not covered by the Moon-Biden agreement. For example, South Korea will be an integral partner as the Biden administration promotes its new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for digital trade. The Blue House has embraced metaverse content and “Web3” applications at the same time it has regulated cryptocurrency transactions, and Yoon has pledged to raise the threshold for a crypto capital gains tax, prompting a more permissive investment environment. The United States and South Korea can also coordinate to tackle unanticipated threats and mitigate supply chain risks. In biotechnology, for example, South Korean gene sequencing companies could serve as trusted alternatives to Chinese counterparts like BGI, which have fueled China’s military modernization and contributed to human rights abuses in Xinjiang.
Beyond its scientific prowess, South Korea has cultivated significant soft power, and may offer a counterweight to China’s ballooning influence in international standards-setting bodies like the International Telecommunications Union and Third-Generation Partnership Project. The Korea Research Institute of Standards and Science (KRISS) has already proposed technical standards that could augment the development of quantum information science. As treaty allies and like-minded democracies, the United States and South Korea should continue working closely to craft rules of the road for digital and emerging technologies.
Finally, Yoon’s election bodes well for U.S. and South Korean prospects to resist the shared threat of Chinese economic coercion. Since the 2017 “THAAD incident,” the Moon administration had been hesitant to coordinate with the United States on issues beyond traditional security concerns, for fear of prompting economic reprisal from China, its largest trading partner. Yoon, by contrast, has promised to “reset” the China-South Korea relationship, and in late February even committed to purchasing an additional THAAD battery. Writing in Foreign Affairs last month, Yoon decried what he viewed as “timidity” by the Moon administration and “overly accommodating gestures meant to placate China.” He also opened the door to a trilateral security partnership with the United States and Japan.
Still, questions remain about how far Yoon’s administration may swing toward countering threats from China. For example, although the Moon administration had announced that South Korea would join the global coalition of countries coordinating to impose sanctions and restrict technology exports to Russia and Belarus, it is not clear whether Yoon is willing to extend restrictions to Chinese companies likely to violate these policies, as U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo promised earlier this week.
If carried out, Yoon’s campaign promises concerning the United States and China would represent a bold about-face in South Korean foreign policy. The new direction charted by his administration could create significant room for Seoul and Washington to maneuver on other issues, such as supply chain resilience and export controls, but also has the potential to invite new risks. But no matter what challenges may test the South Korea-U.S. alliance during Yoon’s administration, technology will remain one fruitful area for cooperation between Washington and Seoul, and may serve as a launchpad for tighter economic integration in the Indo-Pacific.
12. N. Korean authorities find huge cache of illegal drugs in China-North Korea border region
I think it is little known but north Korea is a large producer of methamphetamines.
N. Korean authorities find huge cache of illegal drugs in China-North Korea border region - Daily NK
A vehicle stopped during an inspection was found to have been carrying three five-kilogram boxes of methamphetamine
By Kim Chae Hwan - 2022.03.11 2:09pm
A photo of Hyesan (Daily NK)
North Korean authorities are conducting an investigation after discovering a huge cache of illegal narcotics in a vehicle entering the China-North Korea border region from the North Korean interior.
A source in Yanggang Province told Daily NK on Friday that inspection personnel at a checkpoint in Pungso County busted a vehicle carrying a large amount of methamphetamine from Hamgung, South Hamgyong Province, in late February.
According to the source, the car was carrying three five-kilogram boxes of meth. On the street, methamphetamine goes for RMB 200 (USD 31.62) a gram. Based on that alone, the cache would have been worth millions of yuan.
The car in question was a privately operated bus carrying cargo between Hamhung and Hyesan. The bus had passed through several vehicular and quarantine checkpoints before inspectors nabbed it with just four checkpoints left to go.
Private buses have been suffering from plummeting earnings since North Korean authorities began restricting public movement in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, the bus in question might have shouldered the risk of transporting the drugs, despite the authorities regarding such activity as “anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior.”
The case may prompt authorities to strengthen controls on private buses, depending on the results of their investigation into the incident.
The Pungso County branch of the Ministry of State Security has detained the driver and conductor of the bus for questioning.
However, the source said the investigation is running into trouble as both the drugs’ sender and ultimate destination remain unknown.
The source reported that the people directly involved with the drugs have disappeared. He said the sender provided a fake name with an unconfirmed phone number, leaving only the innocent conductor in the proverbial hot seat.
The source added that with North Korea’s legal system launching tougher investigations on drug dealing, dealers are employing increasingly elaborate methods to do business.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
13. Many N. Korean forest rangers are abusing their authority to obtain bribes
Corruption erodes the party and control. Will this lead to a significant level of internal instability?
Excerpts:
North Korea suffers shortages of kindling material, which forces most people to find firewood in the forests. Many people also engage in unsanctioned hillside slash-and-burn agriculture.
Accordingly, North Koreans have naturally come to believe they need forest rangers to provide them with “protection” so that they can farm in the mountains or collect firewood in the forests.
Ironically, this trend has grown even more pronounced under Kim Jong Un, whose government has stressed forest protection and forestation. Many North Koreans now even say that forest rangers “have grown rich without fanfare.”
The source said most residents of agricultural villages must collect wood from hillside forests to cook or heat their homes. He said locals bribe forest rangers with cigarettes, alcohol, or KPW 5,000 in cash to enter the mountains.
Many N. Korean forest rangers are abusing their authority to obtain bribes - Daily NK
People bribe forest rangers with cigarettes, alcohol, or KPW 5,000 in cash to enter the mountains, a source told Daily NK
Propaganda slogan in North Pyongan Province calling for people to protect trees. (Daily NK)
In the wake of an order by North Korean authorities to bolster efforts to prevent forest fires, many forest rangers in the country are abusing the order so they can obtain bribes.
According to a Daily NK source in Yanggang Province on Thursday, the authorities issued the order on Sunday to bolster the role of forest rangers in preventing forest fires.
However, some forest rangers are reportedly using the order as an opportunity to make money.
Forest rangers in North Korea manage forests within their jurisdiction under the auspices of local people’s committees. Some of them are apparently taking advantage of the authority they have.
North Korea suffers shortages of kindling material, which forces most people to find firewood in the forests. Many people also engage in unsanctioned hillside slash-and-burn agriculture.
Accordingly, North Koreans have naturally come to believe they need forest rangers to provide them with “protection” so that they can farm in the mountains or collect firewood in the forests.
Ironically, this trend has grown even more pronounced under Kim Jong Un, whose government has stressed forest protection and forestation. Many North Koreans now even say that forest rangers “have grown rich without fanfare.”
The source said most residents of agricultural villages must collect wood from hillside forests to cook or heat their homes. He said locals bribe forest rangers with cigarettes, alcohol, or KPW 5,000 in cash to enter the mountains.
This could change as the authorities emphasize efforts to prevent forest fires. Forest rangers who find themselves having to disobey official orders are now demanding bigger bribes because of the added “risks.”
The source said a man surnamed Kim who lives in Samsu County had been making a living selling firewood he collected by bribing forest rangers. However, he can no longer do so with forest rangers tripling their price.
The source further reported that other forest rangers are making money by demanding firewood merchants turn over half their profits.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
14. What's Life Like in North Korea? A Defector Explains
From our good friend and escapee Hyun Seung (Arthur) Lee.
What's Life Like in North Korea? A Defector Explains
Growing up in North Korea, Hyun-Seung Lee says, he had no real understanding of the concept of freedom or human rights. The communist regime monitors citizens so closely, he couldn’t speak freely even in his own home, says Lee, who goes by the nickname Arthur.
“I believe that in my home, there [were] bugs or listening devices, so honestly, when we were in North Korea among our family, we cannot share honest opinion[s],” Lee says.
When he was 29, Lee escaped North Korea with some of his family and eventually made his way to America. Today, he is director of the D.C. office of the Korean Conservative Political Action Conference.
Lee joins “The Daily Signal Podcast” to talk about how his childhood in North Korea informs what he wants Americans to know about life under a totalitarian regime.
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Listen to the podcast below or read a portion of the lightly edited transcript:
Virginia Allen: It is my pleasure to be joined by Mr. Hyun-Seung “Arthur” Lee. He was born and raised in North Korea and he now serves as the director for the D.C. office for the Conservative Political Action Conference for Korea. Mr. Lee, thank you so much for being here.
Hyun-Seung “Arthur” Lee: It’s my pleasure. Thanks for having me.
Allen: So, as I mentioned, you were born in North Korea. You were raised in North Korea. You didn’t come to America until your late 20s. Talk a little bit about what it was like for you growing up in North Korea.
Lee: When I was in North Korea, I saw my life as just an ordinary citizen. And then I didn’t know what was freedom. And then the North Korean regime didn’t teach me what was “human rights.” So there’s no words like “human rights,” “freedom.”
And I grew up in a so-called elite environment. So I went to kind of high state education in North Korea. I was out to study foreign language, and then I had a chance to study abroad in China. So I graduated [from a] Chinese college.
And when I was 17, I voluntarily joined the North Korean military, even though my school was exempted from the military service, but I joined the military. So I served more than three years.
And at that time, I experienced what the ordinary citizen’s life actually is. So I visited their home and then I saw their life with my naked eye. So I realized that, “Oh, this is not the country [that] propaganda [described].”
Allen: So you were in some ways a little bit protected in your early childhood from kind of the realities of North Korea in a way?
Lee: I would say all the environments like the capital cities were far better than rural areas. So I was naturally not knowing the rural area situation, even though my relatives are still living in the local area. And then I visited them.
I think I was ignored when I was little. So while growing up, I found out that … the propaganda and then the North Korean situation, what they’re describing is not true. Because in North Korea, the regime emphasizes that North Korea is the best country in the world and the best leader in the world. And while I’m watching South Korean dramas and American movies … there’s a totally different society.
And then I found out that, “Oh, I mean, [if] we are the best country in the world, then why is our living so poor?” And then everybody’s able to travel freely to visit another country and then why we cannot go outside? And then those questions I had, but I cannot share these questions with other people because North Korea is in total control of the society.
Allen: At what age were you when you sort of started questioning, “Wait a second. I’m not sure if what I’ve been told about North Korea is actually true”?
Lee: It’s I think 19 or 20, because I access information, South Korean dramas or South Korean news, and American movies, and then I had the chance to move to China.
Allen: And that was for school, correct?
Lee: Yes. College. … It’s a very rare chance for a North Korean citizen, but my dad served two times in a presidential appointee job. So I was able to have a chance to study. So as soon as I got to China, I can access internet. So I found lots of information. And then I understand how the world sees North Korea. And then the truth was very brutal. So everybody’s talking about human rights in North Korea, sanctions, and missile nuclear development. And then I agreed with their opinion.
Allen: As a child in North Korea, going to school, what were you taught about America and about the West?
Lee: When you’re born in North Korea, you have to forcefully join kind of any form of organization, like Boy Scouts, like Children’s Union, or like a socialist news league. So from the kindergarten, you’re naturally being taught that America is our enemy.
So America invaded the country in 1950, that’s why our great leader is trying to protect people from the invasion of the United States. And then all the propaganda says American people, soldiers kill lots of Koreans and [they’re] brutally executed. So they made an … anti-American museum in North Korea. So when we go there, all the brutal execution scenes by the American soldiers, 1950 to Korean War. So America is the top enemy in our propaganda.
Allen: OK. So, if you chose to say, “I want to serve in North Korea’s military,” you were obviously very invested as a North Korean in your country. That passion and that drive, did that come from your family? Did that come from what you were told in school about North Korea?
Lee: So, I was about to join the college in North Korea and then my dad and I discussed [it] and then, “Oh, be a man. You have to serve the military.” So yeah, I agreed with that because I think I was loyal to [the] country and loyal to the regime, then I believe that military service was to try.
So I voluntarily joined and then I was able to become a member of the North Korea Workers’ Party at age 20. So it’s a very rare chance because many men in North Korea can be a member of the Workers’ Party at age 30 or 40, but I was up to become a member at my age, 20. So I was so proud of myself to become a young member of the Workers’ Party. But the whole perception was changing while I’m studying in China.
Allen: Yeah. Then after you studied in China, did you go back to North Korea?
Lee: Yeah, of course. I was up to go back and forth, vacation. So I had a North Korean passport, so I was out to travel.
Allen: As you were going back and seeing your family, were you talking to them about, “You know what? I’m starting to realize that some of the things that we’ve all been told are maybe not true”?
Lee: Yeah. My dad was the economy official and then he also was assigned a job to introduce investment in North Korea. So he was in China as well. So all my family was in China. But when I go back to North Korea, I talked to my friends and relatives and they keep asking, “I heard that China is so good.” And then in their eyes, China is so much better than North Korea. So I can say that, “Oh—” but, I mean, I cannot say China’s better than North Korea, because if I said that I could be kind of traded.
Allen: Yeah. You were worried for your own safety.
Lee: Yes. So I just say, “It’s normal.” I only lied to them.
Allen: OK. So you knew, “I can’t say anything against North Korea or my own life would be in danger.”
Lee: And then I believe that in my home, there was a bug or listening devices. So honestly, when we were in Korea among our family, we cannot share honest opinions.
Allen: Even in your own home?
Lee: Yes.
Allen: You can’t really say what you think?
Lee: Yeah.
Allen: OK. So then what happened to get to the point where you and your family decided, “We need to leave North Korea”?
Lee: I think there was a triggering moment … it was the execution of Kim Jong Un’s uncle, Jang Song Thaek. So, he was the very top official. And then Jang was executed by … Kim Jong Un.
And November 2013, his associates were executed brutally in front of many people. And they killed them with the anti-aircraft guns. And then those top officials and military leaders, they witnessed the scene and then they told us it was so brutal that they could not eat a meal for two days. And I was shocked.
And then one of them was actually my friend’s father-in-law. So I felt bad. And then after a week, I heard that my friend also disappeared. I don’t know where he is now.
And then six months later, one of the friends who we actually went to college in China together disappeared because the friend I had drink a week ago [with], and then I was trying to find him to have lunch or dinner with me. Then I couldn’t contact him. I went to his house, the house is gone. So I asked other friends where this guy is, and he told me rather his grandfather was executed two days ago and his entire family went to the prison camp.
So that kind of ongoing instant gave me very deep frustration and anger toward the regime. And then my dad also lost lots of friends because Kim Jong Un killed, purged about 500 officers from November 2013 to October 2014. And among them, there are lots of my father’s friends.
And then also my sister’s roommate in China, she was arrested in front of her and sent back to North Korea. So my sister was so shocked.
And then the day her roommate was arrested in her dorm, she came back home and she was very shaky. Several days later, we decide that, “I think this is not the country we can live in.” And then, “I think this is not the leader we should serve. So we should find freedom. We should leave this country for freedom.” And then my dad also emphasized that, “I think we should do something for our people.”
Allen: Yeah. So were you able to cross the border freely because of your family and your status, or did you-all literally have to escape in the dark of night?
Lee: Technically we were in China as a North Korean official, my dad was official. I had a passport. So we were able to come to China. So when we decided that, all my family was in China. If one of my family is in North Korea, I don’t think we can make a decision easily because it’s so painful to see families leaving behind.
And the day we left, we were very worried because I don’t know what CCP, or Chinese Communist Party, or the North Korean regime can do to us. So, yeah. But eventually we made it happen.
Allen: You went to South Korea for a time, right?
Lee: Correct.
Allen: And then in 2016, you made your way to America?
Lee: Mm-hmm.
Allen: What was that like, coming to America for the first time and experiencing a place that you’d heard a lot about, but never seen?
Lee: Yeah. As you know, I watched American movies a lot. So I had some basic understanding. Obviously, nowadays, there’s some information in North Korea, too. So I don’t think every North Korean believes that America is the bad country or enemy of an Asian. And then many people nowadays know America is the most prosperous country. So I had a basic understanding.
And then when I come to the U.S., then I feel very comfortable because in South Korea, my safety also is threatened by the regime. The North Korean regime actually showed my grandma and uncle and my aunt on North Korean TV show that threatened “Do not stay in South Korea.” And while we are in South Korea, there’s some threat from North Korean agents. So that was one of the reasons we decided to leave South Korea and come to the U.S. as well.
Allen: Do you still have family members in North Korea?
Lee: My relatives. All my relatives, my mother’s side, father’s side.
Allen: Do you worry for their safety?
Lee: Yeah. Unfortunately, several people were punished and then all the relatives who lived in the capital city, they were all relocated to the rural area. So that’s the latest information I have.
Allen: Yeah. Do you think by and large that the people of North Korea, whether in cities or in rural areas, know that they are being oppressed?
Lee: I don’t think many of them know exactly because they only access the propaganda. So in North Korea, there’s one broadcasting channel—I mean the radio—and then there are only two or three TV channels. So if you don’t access outside information, then you only can be brainwashed.
Allen: So now you work for the Conservative Political Action Conference Korea. You value, obviously, freedom and independence and liberty. How are you going about sharing those principles and what would you want young people and Americans in general to know about North Korea, to know about China, to know about oppressive regimes?
Lee: So, three years ago, I think, I found out that in America, lots of young people think socialism is not bad. And when I listened to that, I was speechless, because I lived in a socialist country almost three decades. And then I believe that socialism’s final goal is to become a totalitarian regime and then a dictatorship. And a totalitarian regime is almost absolute control of the people, no more freedom.
So I want to say, when I was in North Korea, no one has ever told me that the regime is oppressing me. And then no one else told me that my freedom is taken away by the regime. So I want to let American young people know that socialism and communism is not the ideal as in a book, and I hope that they realize the actual reality of the socialist countries.
So I think it’s the people. Even though the socialism ideal sounds good, looks good, the people won’t be as nice like that. So North Korea started with communism and then they transformed to socialism and then later they become a totalitarian regime and now this cult dictatorship. …
American people should not think freedom is taken for granted. So if you’re not fighting for your freedom, then I think your freedom will be eliminated by the power elites and authoritarian government. Yeah.
Allen: And how can we follow your work? How can we follow what you’re up to?
Lee: Yeah, my sister and I, actually, operate a YouTube channel named Pyonghattan.
Allen: Mr. Lee, thank you so much for your time today. We really appreciate you sharing your story.
Lee: Thank you so much for having me.
Allen: It’s a pleasure.
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15. Yoon’s victory in South Korean election signals hawkish shift in North Korea policy
Yoon’s victory in South Korean election signals hawkish shift in North Korea policy
The new president will try to bring Seoul and Washington closer together, analysts say.
By Albert Hong, So Young Kim, and Sangmin Lee
2022.03.09
The election of conservative Yoon Suk-yeol as South Korea’s next president Wednesday is likely to bring more hawkish policies toward North Korea and less deference toward China, analysts told RFA.
Yoon, representing the main opposition People Power Party, won with 48.6 percent of the vote, edging out the ruling Democratic Party’s Lee Jae-myung by a margin of only 0.8 percent. The 20th presidential election was the closest in the history of South Korea, a U.S. ally and leading Asian democracy.
The election was largely seen as a referendum on the policies of current term-limited president Moon Jae-in, and turned on domestic issues such as housing costs and job creation.
On North Korea, an issue always lurking in the background of South Korea’s vibrant democracy, Yoon will likely be far more hawkish than his predecessor, analysts say.
The Moon administration was very eager to engage with Pyongyang, with the president in 2018 even meeting personally with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in three inter-Korean summits, and a trilateral summit with Kim and then-U.S. President Donald Trump in 2019.
Moon also pushed for an official end of the Korean War to replace the current armistice agreement that ended hostilities in 1953, and he toned down joint military exercises with the U.S. in hopes of coaxing North Korea to the denuclearization negotiating table.
President-elect Yoon, who has never held political office and takes power in May, will likely step-up the frequency of the joint exercises, the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) said in a report Wednesday.
“Yoon will not press for an end-of-war declaration before denuclearization advances and will respond more decisively to North Korean provocations,” CSIS said.
“He will expand defense and deterrence capabilities in conjunction with the U.S. alliance, including offensive strike capabilities and enhanced missile defense.”
The White House congratulated Yoon in his victory, telling RFA’s Korean Service that the alliance between Washington and Seoul was “ironclad.”
“President Biden looks forward to continue working with the new President-elect to further expand our close cooperation,” a White House spokesperson said.
National Election Commission officials sort out ballots for counting in the presidential election in Seoul, South Korea, Wednesday, March 9, 2022. Photo: AP
In sync with Seoul
“With the ROK election of Yoon Suk-yeol, the focus will be on ensuring that U.S.-ROK allied relations are totally in sync, especially as it relates to North Korea and the goal of complete, verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” Joseph Detrani, the former U.S. Special Envoy for the Six Party Talks with North Korea, told RFA.
Detrani said that the two countries’ militaries would also need a strong relationship, suggesting that the two sides would discuss the possibility of South Korea joining the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), a strategic security dialogue among the Indo-Pcific democracies.
He said Seoul and Washington would likely discuss “the advisability of enhancing the missile defense system in the ROK, given North Korea's eleven missile launches in 2022 and indications that Pyongyang may resume nuclear tests and long-range ballistic missile launches.”
A Yoon presidency would lead to improved coordination between South Korea and the U.S. in their alliance and on North Korea strategy, Bruce Klingner of the Washington-based Heritage Foundation told RFA.
“His advocacy for reciprocal engagement with Pyongyang, in which the regime must take steps toward denuclearization prior to receiving benefits, as well as his resistance to showboat summits are the same positions as those of the Biden administration,” said Klingner.
Yoon will go further than Moon on “improving relations with Japan, as well as South Korea assuming a larger regional security role. However, progress on both issues will be difficult, due to contentious historic issues for the former and Seoul's reluctance to antagonize China for the later,” he said.
Yoon “is likely to take a less deferential policy stance toward Beijing than the previous administration in part due to a recognition of Chinese bullying tactics and a lack of confidence that China can deliver North Korea,” said the CSIS analysis.
With Washington and Seoul working closer together, though, the scope of their coordination will extend beyond immediate defense and North Korea issues, Soo Kim, a policy analyst at the California-based RAND Corporation told RFA.
“This, by extension, could help the allies work together on other broader challenges, including China,” she said.
“In light of ongoing geopolitical challenges and contingencies, this new administration might be welcomed by the Biden Administration,” said Kim.
Speaking before the result in Wednesday’s election was determined, the Brookings Institution’s Patricia Kim told RFA that regardless of who wins, the geopolitical climate will be challenging.
“Pyongyang has shown a complete lack of interest in coming to the negotiating table and has doubled down on its determination to advance its military capabilities citing ‘hostility’ from the outside world. It’s unclear what offers a new South Korean administration could provide to induce North Korea to the negotiating table,” said Patricia Kim.
She also said that Washington and Beijing need to cooperate with each other to advance peace on the Korean peninsula.
“But the chances for such coordination have been low due to escalating U.S.-China tensions, and have become even more remote due to China’s unwillingness to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its doubling down on its strategic alignment with Russia,” she said.
“In short, the new South Korean president faces an uphill battle on managing South Korea’s geopolitical challenges, especially on the key objectives of advancing peace on the Korean Peninsula and maintaining good relations with the major players in Asia,” said Patricia Kim.
A voter wearing a plastic glove as a precaution against the coronavirus, casts a ballot for the presidential election at a local polling station in Seoul, South Korea, Wednesday, March 9, 2022. Photo: AP
Emphasis on rights
Two North Korean human rights advocacy organizations told RFA that they support the change from Moon to Yoon, citing the former’s reluctance to bringing up the rights situation in dialogue.
“This regime change was what all North Korean refugees had hoped for,” Park Jihyun, the co-director of Stepping Stones, a U.K.-based advocacy group, told RFA.
“I don’t know whether the new regime will place North Korean human rights issues at a high priority, unlike the past five years, but I would like to see them develop things differently from the Moon Jae-in administration,” ,” said Park, who escaped from North Korea herself prior to resettling in the U.K.
The past five years have been difficult for people and organizations interested in improving North Korean human rights, Greg Scarlatoiu of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), told RFA.
“It can be seen that the human rights issue was sacrificed to appease the Kim Jong Un regime,” he said. “Now, I think this situation can change in a positive direction.”
South Korea should focus on the people of North Korea rather than trying to make overtures to its government, Kim Doo-hyun, who settled in South Korea in 2009 after escaping North Korea, then moved to the U.S. four years ago to pursue educational goals.
“I hope the new president implements a North Korean policy that focuses on the North Korean people, rather than on Kim Jong Un and his regime,” said Kim Doo-hyun.
“I, as a North Korean defector, expected that President Moon Jae-in, a former human rights lawyer, would have a lot of interest in North Korean human rights, but I was disappointed that he did not.”
Translated by Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
