Quotes of the Day:
“If we really are fighting for freedom and in defense of democracy together, then we have a right to demand help in this difficult turning point. Tanks, aircraft, artillery systems. Freedom should be armed no worse than tyranny,”
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy
"Wise men put their trust in ideas and not in circumstances."
- Ralph Waldo Emerson
"He uses statistics as a drunken man uses lamp-posts... for support rather than illumination."
- Andrew Lang (1844-1912).
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 30 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. UKRAINE INVASION UPDATE 20 Mar 30, 2022
3. Ukraine War Update - March 30, 2022 | SOF News
4. U.S. says Putin being misled, as Ukraine refugee tally hits 4 million
5. Volodymyr Zelensky and The Dangers of Worship Culture
6. The Pentagon is now calling Russia an ‘acute threat’
7. Former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has a Signal for President Putin
8. One Of Russia’s Newest Air Defense Systems Has Been Captured In Ukraine
9. Cold War II and Biden’s new ‘new world order’
10. No one believes Biden has a red line in Ukraine after Obama’s Syria debacle
11. How to prevent China from coming to Russia's rescue | Opinion
12. FDD | Administration’s Iran Nuclear Deal Claims Do Not Stand Up to Reality
13. How drones are helping fuel propaganda in Ukraine
14. Zelenskyy recalls Ukraine’s ambassadors to Morocco and Georgia
15. Vladimir Putin’s New Alter Ego Is Igor Strelkov
16. Putin Has Admitted He Can't Conquer Ukraine
17. U.K. intelligence chief says Putin's Plan B is "more barbarity against civilians" in Ukraine
18. The upcoming defense strategy dubs Russia an 'acute threat.' What does that mean?
19. Ukrainian president says defense is at a 'turning point'
20. "Guide to Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great-Power Competition": What it actually says
21. After Russia Invaded Ukraine, a U.S. Nonprofit Shifted Its Mission
22. Ukrainian Hackers Take Aim at Russian Artillery, Navigation Signals
23. What is the Wagner Group?
24. Tulsi Gabbard And Tucker Carlson Featured In Stunning Exchange On Russian TV
25. A New Framework for Understanding and Countering China's Gray Zone Tactics
26. Civilian group with US military links raising money to supply Ukrainian fighters
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 30 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 30 (PUTIN'S WAR)
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko
March 30, 5:30 pm ET
Russia is withdrawing some elements of its forces around Kyiv into Belarus for likely redeployment to other axes of advance and did not conduct any offensive operations around the city in the past 24 hours, but Russian forces will likely continue to hold their forwardmost positions and shell Ukrainian forces and residential areas. Ukrainian forces repelled several Russian attacks in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in the past 24 hours and Russian forces likely continued to take territory in Mariupol. Russian forces held their positions and did not conduct offensive operations throughout the rest of the country. Russian forces will likely capture Mariupol in the coming days but likely suffered high casualties taking the city, and Russian force generation efforts and the redeployment of damaged units from the Kyiv axis are increasingly unlikely to enable Russian forces to make rapid gains in the Donbas region.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces around Kyiv held their forward positions and continued to defend against limited Ukrainian counterattacks. Russian forces are unlikely to give up their secured territory around the city and are continuing to dig in.
- ISW can confirm Russia is withdrawing some units around Kyiv for likely redeployment to other axes of advance, but cannot confirm any changes in Russian force posture around Chernihiv as of this time.
- Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in northeastern Ukraine in the past 24 hours.
- Elements of the 20th Combined Arms Army and 1st Guards Tank Army are redeploying to support Russian operations on Izyum, but are unlikely to take the city in the near future.
- Ukrainian forces repelled continuing Russian assaults in Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts. Russian forces continued to take territory in Mariupol but are likely suffering high casualties.
Russia is reportedly increasingly deploying support personnel and auxiliary units to replace combat losses in Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russia is deploying servicemen from military support units, including educational institutions, to replace combat losses.[1] Russian officer casualties and the decision to strip Russian training units of personnel will further impede the Russian military’s ability to train new conscripts and replacements. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that three battalion tactical groups (BTGs) including up to 2,000 Russian and South Ossetian personnel from Russia’s 4th and 7th Military Bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, respectively, deployed to unspecified locations in Ukraine.[2] Social media users observed South Ossetian forces in the Donbas region on March 29, but ISW cannot independently confirm if the entirety of these reinforcements were deployed to Donbas.[3]
The Ukrainian General Staff additionally stated that Russia faces continuing morale and supply issues, including contract servicemen (volunteer troops, not conscripts) in the 26th Tank Regiment requesting to terminate their contracts and relocate to garrison service, and elements of the 150th Motor Rifle Division receiving inoperable equipment from military storage.[4] The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate additionally claimed that Russian military procurement is “on the verge of failure” due to western sanctions and that Russia cannot produce modern weapons and equipment without foreign electronics.[5] ISW cannot independently confirm these Ukrainian intelligence reports, but they are largely consistent with previously confirmed reports of low Russian morale and equipment failures.
We do not report in detail on the deliberate Russian targeting of civilian infrastructure and attacks on unarmed civilians, which are war crimes, because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
- Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
- Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts;
- Supporting effort 2—Mariupol; and
- Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances northward and westward.
Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis were aimed at encircling the city from the northwest, west, and east. It is unclear if forces on this axis have been given a new mission and, if so, what it might be.
Elements of Russian forces around Kyiv, both in the northwest and around Brovary, continued to pull back into Belarus on March 30, though Russian forces continued to defend their front lines in the area and shell civilian targets.[6] Ukrainian Interior Ministry Advisor Denisenko reported on March 30 that Russia has not decreased its military activity near Kyiv and those ongoing Russian withdrawals appear to be unit rotations, rather than a cessation of hostilities.[7] Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council concurred that Russian forces withdrawn from Kyiv will likely be redeployed to other axes.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported at noon local time on March 30 that it confirmed a column of Russian forces traveled north through Ivankiv toward the Chernobyl area, though ISW cannot confirm the unit identification or size of this reported withdrawal.[9] The Kyiv Oblast administration reported that Russian forces are concentrating on shelling Ukrainian fuel storage to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and create a humanitarian crisis.[10] Russian forces around Kyiv will continue to shell the city, and forces withdrawn into Belarus will likely be deployed to other lines of advance in the coming week.
Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro
Russian and Ukrainian forces do not appear to have conducted significant operations northwest of Kyiv in the last 24 hours.[11] Kyiv authorities reported on March 30 that Ukrainian forces fully control Makariv and parts of Borodyanka.[12] Fighting has been ongoing in Irpin and Hostomel over the past 24 hours, but Ukrainian forces did not secure additional territory.[13]
Subordinate supporting effort—Chernihiv and Sumy axis
Russian forces did not conduct any major operations along the Chernihiv and Sumy axis in the past 24 hours, but Ukrainian military and civilian sources denied Russian claims to have withdrawn forces from the area.[14] Chernihiv Oblast Administration Head Vyacheslav Chaus stated on March 30 that the city has seen no evidence of Russian withdrawals around the city and reported Russian aircraft continue to strike targets in the city on the night of March 29.[15] The Chernihiv City Council Secretary separately stated on March 30 that Russian shelling increased following the Russian claim on March 29 that Russian forces would reduce operations against Chernihiv.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported at noon local time on March 30 that Russian forces conducted reconnaissance and continued to shell Ukrainian positions in the city.[17] ISW has not confirmed any Russian unit rotations near Chernihiv, unlike observed Russian redeployments from northwestern Kyiv.
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:
Russian forces do not appear to have conducted significant operations in or immediately around Kharkiv in the last 24 hours and continued to shell the city.[18]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported at noon local time on March 30 that Russia is redeploying elements of the 20th Combined Arms Army and 1st Guards Tank Army from unspecified locations—likely from the Sumy region—to reinforce Russian units around Izyum.[19] Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in Izyum or Kam'yanka, a town south of Izyum, in the past 24 hours.[20]
Supporting Effort #1a—Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts:
Ukrainian forces continued to repel Russian assaults throughout Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in the last 24 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 6:00 am local time on March 30 that Ukrainian forces repelled four Russian attacks in the area in the past 24 hours and destroyed seven tanks, seven armored vehicles, and two other vehicles.[21] Local Ukrainian officials in Donetsk Oblast reported Russian shelling and airstrikes continued along the entire line of contact.[22] Donetsk People’s Republic Head Denis Pushilin said on March 30 that Russian and proxy forces main task is to “reach the constitutional borders” claimed by the DNR and LNR—the entirety of their respective oblasts.[23]
Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol:
Russian forces continued to make steady but costly progress in Mariupol on March 30. ISW cannot confirm any specific territorial changes in the last 24 hours. Social media users depicted ongoing Russian use of thermobaric munitions in Mariupol and widespread damage to the city.[24] Russia’s 150th Motor Rifle Division is likely suffering high casualties in ongoing fighting.[25] Mariupol will likely fall within days.
Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and advances northward and westwards:
Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations around Kherson and continued to reconstitute their forces in the southern direction in the last 24 hours.[26]
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces will likely capture Mariupol or force the city to capitulate within the coming days;
- Russian reinforcements may enable a renewed Russian offensive through Slovyansk to link up with Russian forces in Luhansk Oblast;
- Russian withdrawals from near Kyiv and Chernihiv will become significant if Russian troops begin to pull back from front-line positions around either city.
[5] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/cherez-vvedeni-sanktsii-v-rosii-zryvaietsia-vykonannia-oboronnoho-zamovlennia.html.
[8] https://reform dot news/305905-rossija-perebrosit-chast-podrazdelenij-iz-chernigovskoj-i-kievskoj-oblastej-na-drugie-napravlenija-snbo-ukrainy.
[10] https://t dot me/kyivoda/2818.
[12] https://t dot me/kyivoda/2818; https://t dot me/kyivoda/2818.
[13] https://t dot me/kyivoda/2818; https://t dot me/kyivoda/2818.
[15] https://t dot me/chernigivskaODA/721.
2. UKRAINE INVASION UPDATE 20 Mar 30, 2022
UKRAINE INVASION UPDATE 20
Mar 30, 2022 - Press ISW
Ukraine Conflict Updates
Institute for the Study of War, Russia Team
with the Critical Threats Project, AEI
March 30
The Ukraine Invasion Update is a semi-weekly synthetic product covering key political and rhetorical events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. This update covers events from March 25-29. All of the ISW Russia’s team’s coverage of the war in Ukraine – including daily military assessments and maps, past Conflict Updates, and several supplemental assessments – are available on our Ukraine Crisis Coverage landing page.
Key Takeaways March 25-29
- The Kremlin is falsely presenting its partial withdrawal of Russian forces from Kyiv and Chernihiv as a major Russian concession in service of peace talks with Ukraine. In reality, Russian forces are withdrawing to recuperate after suffering severe losses in their failed operations to seize those cities.
- Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to withstand Russian pressure to enter the war in Ukraine on Russia’s behalf.
- The Kremlin is intensifying its internal censorship and crackdown on entities in Russia that do not cover the war in the Kremlin’s preferred terms.
- The Kremlin denied reports of increased conscription on March 26 but is likely beginning a broader mobilization that will coincide with Russia’s annual spring conscription on April 1. These new conscription drives are unlikely to generate effective Russian combat power for many months, at the earliest.
- The Kremlin maintained its defamatory narratives about claimed US involvement in Ukrainian biolaboratories and Russian nuclear capabilities to discredit and intimidate the West.
- The Kremlin continued to downplay the effects of Western sanctions on the Russian economy and threatened the West with counter-sanctions leveraging Russian energy exports.
Key Events March 25-29
Negotiations:
Russian and Ukrainian negotiators met in Istanbul, Turkey, on March 29 as part of ongoing peace talks. The Kremlin is falsely framing the withdrawal of its forces that failed to capture Kyiv as a Russian concession. Kremlin rhetoric following the meeting was more open to further discussion and Ukrainian demands than throughout the first month of the invasion, but the Kremlin likely retains its maximalist objectives in Ukraine, and peace talks are unlikely to progress in the near future.
- The Kremlin's claimed withdrawal of forces around Kyiv, which it seeks to portray as a “huge step” towards peace, is a cover for an ongoing redeployment of Russian forces after their failure to take Kyiv. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel-General Alexander Fomin claimed on March 29 that Russia will “drastically reduce military activity in the Kyiv and Chernihiv directions” and provide details on Russia’s claimed withdrawal later this week.[1] Chief Russian negotiator Vladimir Medinsky falsely framed this claimed withdrawal as a “huge step” toward peace that requires “counter-movement” from Ukraine.[2] The Kremlin is attempting to falsely portray the failure of its campaign to encircle Kyiv, which ISW assessed had failed as of March 19, as an olive branch requiring a Ukrainian concession.[3] Russian forces continue to fight to hold their front-line trace near the city, and Russian forces have been withdrawing into Belarus for rest and refit for several days – prior to the Russian announcement on March 29.[4] Russia’s redeployment of forces to other fronts and continued shelling around Kyiv are not concessions and should not be treated as such by Ukraine and its partners.
- Kyiv remained firm that Ukraine must receive separate security guarantees if it abandons its NATO aspirations. Ukrainian officials called for the establishment of a security guarantee system for Ukraine (involving Russia, China, the United States, Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and France) if Ukraine drops its NATO aspirations.[5] None of those countries have publicly committed to such a system and are unlikely to do so; Kyiv will therefore likely refuse Russian demands to commit to not joining NATO.
- Ukraine's delegation offered possible limited concessions on territorial control but stated all Russian forces must withdraw prior to any territorial negotiations. Ukraine’s delegation presented an agreement stating Ukraine would not join NATO, would adopt a neutral status, and would not host foreign forces if Russia provided security guarantees and withdrew all its forces from Ukraine. Ukraine also offered a fifteen-year negotiation period on the future of the Russian-occupied Crimean Peninsula.[6] Zelensky emphasized in a March 27 interview with Russian media that Russia should return its forces to the positions they held before the February 24 invasion prior to any dialogue on control over the Donbas.[7] Zelensky left open the possibility of conceding parts of eastern Ukraine, emphasizing that “Ukrainian land is important, yes, but ultimately, it's just a territory,” but also said that Ukraine would not compromise Ukrainian territory without “iron-clad” security guarantees.[8] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mykhailo Podolyak said on March 29 that Ukraine will sign an international agreement on security guarantees only after holding a national referendum on the issue.
- The Kremlin said Ukraine’s proposal was “clearly formulated” after previously falsely claiming Kyiv refused to provide a firm position and stated the Kremlin will consider Kyiv’s proposal before responding. Medinsky stated on March 29 that Russia proposed to “expedite” plans to schedule a meeting between Zelensky and Putin to occur prior to the conclusion of negations.[9] Medinsky stated Russia’s delegation will pass Ukraine’s “clearly formulated position” to President Putin, after which Moscow will give a response, but did not specify a timeline for further meetings.
Russian Domestic Opposition and Censorship:
Kremlin crackdowns on coverage of the war are increasingly prompting self-censorship among Russia’s few remaining independent outlets. The Russian Investigative Committee announced it is investigating more than 10 criminal cases of “fakes about the Russian army” as of March 25.[10] Russian authorities continue to arrest individuals Russian President Vladimir Putin deemed “scum and traitors” for sharing what the Kremlin claims is false information about the war.[11] Russian state censorship is increasingly prompting self-censorship by Russian media outlets. Russian media censor Roskomnadzor demanded on March 27 that Russian media refuse to publish interviews with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[12] Leading independent Russian news outlet Novaya Gazeta announced on March 28 that it is suspending operations until after the war following warnings from Roskomnadzor.[13]
Ukrainian reporting successfully forced the Kremlin to respond to rumors about the absence of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu from Kremlin broadcasts and reports. Shoigu reappeared in a Kremlin-published video on March 26 following a two-week absence.[14] Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Adviser Anton Gerashcenko claimed on March 26 that Shoigu’s condition has deteriorated following a heart attack at an unspecified date and that the March 26 video was previously recorded on March 11, though ISW cannot independently verify this claim.[15] Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov has also not appeared in public for several weeks.
Kremlin Narratives:
The Kremlin denied reports of increased conscription on March 26 but is likely beginning a broader mobilization.[16] Russia’s Defense Ministry denied claims on March 26 that it is calling Russian reservists to military enlistment offices and instead claimed that Ukrainian intelligence is issuing fake calls imitating Russian officials.[17] Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on March 28 that Russia will begin conscription through the BARS-2021 (Combat Army Reserve of the Country) program on April 1, 2022, alongside the normal semi-annual conscription cycle on April 1 to “conceal mass mobilization measures.”[18] Such a recruitment drive would be unlikely to provide Russian forces around Ukraine with sufficient combat power to restart major offensive operations in the near term. Russia’s pool of available well-trained replacements remains low, and new conscripts will require months to reach even a minimum standard of readiness.
The Kremlin continues to advance information operations seeking to discredit the US government’s cooperation with Ukraine, claiming it is conducting an “investigation” into what it claims are US-funded biolaboratories in Ukraine that could be used to conduct chemical attacks. Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated on March 25 that Russia will continue to investigate what it claims are US-funded biolaboratories in Ukraine.[19] The Russian State Duma’s Deputy Chair of CIS Affairs Viktor Vodolatsky announced on March 26 that Russia planned to present the results of its investigation into alleged US-funded biolaboratories in Ukraine to the United Nations.[20] Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev stated on March 29 that the United States must explain its financing of alleged Ukrainian biolaboratories.[21] Patrushev also falsely accused the United States of developing bioweapons that can selectively target specific populations on March 29.[22]
Peskov claimed that US reports of Russia's use of banned munitions are attempts to divert attention from US-funded biolaboratories in Ukraine.[23] The Donetsk People’s Republic denied claims on March 26 that Russian forces used white phosphorous munitions in Ukraine.[24] Izvestiya correspondent Lenoid Kitrar claimed on March 26 to have visited the Chernobyl laboratory for the study of radioactive waste and alleged that Ukrainian workers confiscated important documents before abandoning the facility.[25]
Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev outlined the conditions under which Russia would use nuclear weapons on March 26 in an effort to intimidate the west.[26] Medvedev’s stated conditions were: the use of nuclear weapons against Russia or its allies; an attack on Russian critical infrastructure that paralyzes their nuclear response forces; or an act of aggression against Russia or its allies that threatens the existence of the state. The Kremlin is leaving the extent of what it considers an existential threat to Russia or its allies (notably including Belarus) intentionally ambiguous. Medvedev separately noted that the 2010 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, later extended by Russian President Vladimir Putin, is subject to a unique clause wherein “international treaties are only valid as long as the circumstances that gave rise to them exist,” and that those circumstances have disappeared, implying that Russia is no longer obligated to follow the treaty.[27]
Russian Reactions to Sanctions:
The Kremlin continues to claim it can weather the effect of Western sanctions and promised to implement counter-sanctions that will further isolate Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated on March 28 that Russia will create a package of countermeasures in response to unfriendly US actions. Lavrov also stated that Russia will restrict entry into Russia from “unfriendly states.”[28] Russian Industry and Trade Minister Denis Maturov claimed on March 27 that Russia will rebuild all of its supply chains within 3-6 months, which is highly unlikely.[29] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law providing income tax breaks from 2021 to 2023 on March 26 to mitigate the impacts of sanctions.[30] Russia also banned foreigners from withdrawing funds from the Russian financial system on March 25.[31] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev stated on March 25 that the West’s “stupid sanctions” are strengthening domestic support for the Kremlin.[32] Lavrov stated on March 25 that most states will not join the West’s sanction “games” and accused the West of launching a “hybrid, total war” with sanctions.[33] The Kremlin remains focused on downplaying the effect of sanctions for a domestic audience but is unlikely to mitigate the damage to its economy.
Belarus:
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to withstand Russian pressure to enter the war in Ukraine on Russia’s behalf. Lukashenko reiterated on March 25 that he does not have “plans to fight in Ukraine” and that Belarusian citizens “do not accept war at a genetic level.”[34] However, Belarus continues to logistically support Russia’s military operation. The Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs announced on March 26 that any Belarusian citizens who fight against Russia in Ukraine or who sabotage Belarusian infrastructure will face terrorism charges. The ministry additionally blamed Belarusian opposition leaders for coordinating a “criminal” foreign battalion - a reference to a pro-Ukrainian Belarusian volunteer unit that is operating in Ukraine.[35]
Russian Occupation:
The Kremlin is intensifying efforts to establish a formal military regime in occupied areas of Ukraine and is kidnapping Ukrainian citizens in a likely attempt to reduce Ukrainian resistance and use civilians as hostages in future negotiations. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry stated on March 29 that Russian forces have kidnapped nearly 30 Ukrainian officials, activists, and journalists and forcibly deported over 40,000 Ukrainian citizens to Belarus and Russia.[36] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied this report and improbably claimed Russia has no data on Russian arrests of Ukrainian officials.[37] Russian forces are additionally increasing steps to establish an occupation regime in Ukraine. The Kremlin's United Russia party opened an office on the outskirts of Mariupol on March 25 to disseminate party newspapers, propaganda, and cellphone SIM cards.[38] Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister for Crimea Georgy Muradov announced the formation of civil-military administrations in occupied southern Ukraine on March 26 and claimed Russian TV channels are broadcasting in Kherson and south of Zaporizhzhia.[39]
Drivers of Russian Threat Perceptions:
Kremlin officials claimed US President Joe Biden’s March 26 statement in Poland that Russian President Vladimir Putin “cannot remain in power” demonstrates the US has no interest in diplomacy. The White House later clarified that “the president’s point was that Putin cannot be allowed to exercise power over his neighbors or the region” and was not calling for regime change in Russia.[40] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on March 26 that Biden’s comments about Putin “narrow the window of opportunity” for bilateral relations.[41] Russian media additionally mischaracterized Biden’s statements to claim the US will deploy US forces to Ukraine.[42]
The Kremlin is attempting to leverage its energy exports to Europe to prop up the ruble as Western restrictions on Russian energy exports erode this Russian economic lifeline. The United States and the European Commission (EC) announced a new task force on March 25 to supply Europe with 15 billion cubic meters of US liquified gas to wean European nations off of their reliance on Russian fuel.[43] EU Foreign Affairs and Security Policy High Representative Josep Borell stated on March 28 that the EU plans to abandon the Russian gas market within two years.[44] Russian President Vladimir Putin demanded that European importers pay for Russian energy in rubles on March 23, a direct attempt to restore the value of the ruble and mitigate the effect of international sanctions.[45] G7 energy ministers rejected Putin’s demands to pay for Russian gas with rubles on March 28, citing breaches in existing gas import contracts.[46] Separately, Ukraine is likely attempting to limit the willingness of states to import Russian energy. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called on Qatari energy producers to increase their exports to Europe to undercut Russia’s efforts to put pressure on European markets through an energy crisis on March 26.[47]
NATO and EU countries continue to provide lethal and non-lethal military aid to Ukraine and bordering NATO countries and increased defense measures to counter Russian aggression.
- Sweden announced on March 25 that it will increase its defense spending by $300 million to provide support to Ukraine.[48]
- Estonian president Alar Karis called for a permanent NATO presence on the eastern border on March 28.[49]
- The US Department of Defense deployed six Navy electronic warfare aircraft and 240 troops to Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank on March 28.[50]
- US President Joe Biden’s new 2023 budget proposal includes $6.9 billion for the European Deterrence Initiative and for NATO to counter Russian aggression.[51]
- Abkhazia's military reportedly moved to high-readiness status in response to NATO exercises in Georgia on March 27.[52]
Foreign Involvement:
N/A
[7] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/zelenskij-shodo-mozhlivogo-kompromisu-z-rf-povernitsya-na-poziciyi-do-24-lyutogo-i-sprobuyemo-rozvyazuvati-pitannya-donbasu
[8] https://nv dot ua/ukraine/politics/peregovory-s-rossiey-zelenskiy-rasskazal-chto-takoe-pobeda-50229038.html; https://www.kyivpost dot com/ukraine-politics/zelensky-surrender-of-land-fake-security-guarantees-deal-breakers-for-ukraine.html
[10] https://ru dot krymr.com/a/news-sledkom-rf-dela-o-feikah-pro-armiyu/31770269.html
[15] https://nv dot ua/world/countries/sostoyanie-shoygu-uhudshilos-posle-perenesennogo-infarkta-anton-gerashchenko-50228571.html
[16] https://iz dot ru/1310415/2022-03-25/rossiia-napravit-es-materialy-ob-istiazanii-grazhdan-kievskimi-vlastiami
[20] https://iz dot ru/1310878/2022-03-26/rezultaty-rassledovaniia-po-biolaboratoriiam-na-ukraine-predstaviat-v-oon
[22] https://iz dot ru/1312273/2022-03-29/patrushev-zaiavil-o-razrabotke-v-ssha-metodov-izbiratelnogo-zarazheniia-liudei
https://iz dot ru/1310875/2022-03-26/v-dnr-oprovergli-svedeniia-o-primenenii-fosfornykh-bomb-rossiiskimi-voennymi[24]
[25] https://iz dot ru/1310853/2022-03-26/korrespondent-izvestii-pobyval-v-laboratorii-v-chernobyle
[27] https://riafan dot ru/22364303-medvedev_gradus_napryazhennosti_v_otnosheniyah_s_zapadom_previsil_vremena_holodnoi_voini
[30] https://iz dot ru/1310926/2022-03-26/putin-podpisal-zakon-o-novykh-antikrizisnykh-nalogovykh-merakh
[31] https://www dot pravda.ru/news/economics/1693201-zamorozka_rezervov/; https://www dot pravda.ru/news/economics/1693201-zamorozka_rezervov/; https://iz dot ru/1310497/2022-03-25/tcb-rf-vvel-ogranicheniia-na-dvizhenie-sredstv-v-nedruzhestvennye-strany
https://iz dot ru/1312214/2022-03-29/peskov-nazval-lozhiu-soobshcheniia-zapadnykh-smi-o-nasilnom-vyvoze-mariupoltcev-v-rf
[39] https://iz dot ru/1310883/2022-03-26/na-iuge-ukrainy-nachali-formirovat-voenno-grazhdanskie-administratcii
[42] https://iz dot ru/1310857/2022-03-26/baiden-dopustil-chto-voennye-ssha-pobyvaiut-na-ukraine
3. Ukraine War Update - March 30, 2022 | SOF News
Ukraine War Update - March 30, 2022 | SOF News
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO. Additional topics include refugees, internally displaced personnel, humanitarian efforts, cyber, and information operations.
Photo: A U.S. Navy EA-18G Growler. The U.S. has sent six Growlers to Europe, see story below. U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman John Linzmeier, May 3, 2017.
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Russian Campaign Update
While the Russian offensive seems stalled, it still has significant combat power in Ukraine and it may have the capability to sustain that combat power if the logistics flow is fixed. It is refining its ‘goals’, to something more attainable; the capture of parts of eastern Ukraine along the Russian border. A senior Russian defense official said that his military planned to cut back military activity near the Ukrainian capital (Kyiv) in an effort to increase trust around the peace talks. This is likely just a move to reposition units to the eastern regions of Ukraine. The units pulled back will reorganize and resupply themselves before being committed to forward areas. There will likely be more Russian activity in the east and south of Ukraine over the future weeks.
The Russian military will continue to use mass artillery and missile strikes to compensate for its lack of forward progress on the ground. According to the commander of European Command (EUCOM), Russia has fired ‘multiple’ hypersonic missiles into Ukraine against military targets. (Defense One, Mar 29, 2022).
Fight for the Skies. The air war has not followed the usual flow that have been observed in past conflicts. Most wars start off with both sides fighting for the skies and one side finally establishing air superiority. Then the side with the advantage in the air moves on to support the ground effort with close air support. This hasn’t happened in the Ukraine War. There are too many air defense systems in the area of operations employed by both sides of the conflict.
Drones. However, drones are making an impact – especially those used by the Ukrainians. It is still cold out in Ukraine and the Russians are living in field conditions. The tank crews keep their massive steel hulks warm by running the engines. That provides a heat signature at night for the armed drones of the Ukrainian military. In addition to the armed drones wreaking havoc on Russian tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and fuel trucks are the surveillance drones (ISR) scouting out the terrain for Russian units, vehicles, and convoys. These ISR drones feed information into the situation overlays of the Ukrainian operations centers for planning purposes and to artillery units for targeting data.
Small SOF Drone Unit with Big Impact. A specialized force of 30 soldiers on quad bikes helped stop the 40-mile Russian convoy in its tracks. Night ambushes were carried out by a team of Ukrainian special forces and drone operators roaming up and down the Russian convoy. The unit was equipped with night vision goggles, sniper rifles, remotely detonated mines, and drones equipped with thermal imaging cameras and small 1.5kg bombs. “The drone operators who halted Russian convoy headed for Kyiv”, The Guardian, March 28, 2022.
Maritime Activities. An amphibious landing force on several ships is still positioned in the Black Sea off the coast of Odessa to land a substantial element of Russian naval infantry. The Russian blockade of Ukrainian shipping continues. There are a lot of merchant ships stranded in Ukrainian ports. The United Nations is pressing for their safe passage out of danger so that the world’s food supply is not threatened.
World’s Grain Supply. Some 30% of the world’s grain comes from Russia and Ukraine. Most of the grain departing Ukraine goes by ship via the Black Sea and on into the Mediterranean Sea. However, Russia is currently blocking 94 ships with food from leaving Ukrainian ports.
Ground Fight. The Ukrainians are on the offensive in many areas of the country. The suburban town of Irpin (northwest of Kyiv) has been taken back from the Russians. Kharkiv is still being resupplied and the city of Sumy is receiving supplies. Even Kherson in the south seems to be contested due to a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Russia has been deploying banned anti-personnel mines in the Kharkiv region according to a new report by Human Rights Watch published on March 29, 2022.
Tactical Situation
Kyiv. In the initial days of the invasion the capital city of Ukraine was considered the primary objective of the Russians. However, the attack was stalled by the Ukrainians. It appears that some Russian units are being withdrawn from the Kyiv region back to Belarus for a subsequent repositioning to other conflict zones in Ukraine, most likely the eastern sector. Over 2 million of its 4 million residents have fled the city.
Mariupol. The fall of this city to the Russians may happen within days. The Russians continue to advance street by street, block by block. This city had a pre-invasion population of about 430,000. There are reports that thousands of residents have been forcibly evacuated from the city by the Russians and are now headed to distant Russian cities.
Mykolayiv. This city is suffering from constant missile attacks by the Russians. It is contested and there is a lot of fighting around the perimeter of the city. Reports on social media on Tuesday (Mar 29) stated that a large column of Russian troops were headed to Mykolayiv from Kherson. Located on the west bank of the Dnieper River close to the coast of the Black Sea, Mykolayiv is a strategic objective for the Russians that is on the road to Odessa located further west along the coast of the Black Sea.
General Information
Negotiations. Talks between Ukrainian and Russian officials held on Tuesday (Mar 29) covered a wide range of topics. These included Crimea, the Donbas region (eastern Ukraine), and security guarantees for Ukraine. Ukraine is looking for international security guarantees to ensure another Russian attack does not occur in the future. Most observers believe that the parties are getting a little closer to an agreement. One result of the negotiations over the past few days resulted in a prisoner exchange. One group returned were the Border Guards on Snake Island who were told to surrender by a Russian warship. They responded with “Russian warship, “Go **** ********”.
“Ukrainians are not naïve, we see risks in peace talks. Of course, we see all the risks. Of course, we don’t have a reason to trust the words of representatives of a country that wages war against us.”
President Zelensky
Refugees, IDPs, and Humanitarian Crisis. As of March 30, over 3,900,000 refugees have left Ukraine according to data provided by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR). Almost seven million have been internally displaced. This means about 25% of Ukraine’s population has left their homes. About 2.3 million Ukrainians left for Poland. More than 12 million are in constant danger due to being close to conflict zones or cities under siege. A significant proportion of the population is in need of clean water, food, medicine, and shelter. Almost one million are lacking access to electricity. Read a report on the humanitarian crisis provided by ACAPS, March 29, 2022, PDF, 9 pages.
U.S. Intelligence. The United States intelligence community miscalculated on how long the Afghan army and Afghan government would hold out against the Taliban last summer – many feeling that the government would hold out until the spring of 2022. The same intel gurus also erred on their predictions about how quickly the Russians would take Kyiv – some saying that the conflict would last just a few days. Up to this past Friday, most national security observers were predicting a long fight that would grind away at the Ukrainians as the Russians pumped more tanks, artillery, and troops into Ukraine. Now, the ‘experts’ don’t seem that sure. Hopefully, the intel guys are making up for their faulty intel forecasts by passing info to the Ukrainian military that is helpful to the targeting of Russian formations in Ukraine.
U.S. Cyber Attack on Russia? The Russian Foreign Ministry has accused the United States of “. . . waging a large-scale cyberattack against Russia.” A US spokesperson for the U.S. National Security Council says that it hasn’t happened. Hmmm. (Russian Foreign Ministry, Mar 29, 2022).
World Response
Navy Growlers to Europe. The United States is sending six EA-18 Growlers to be based at Spangdahlem in Germany. They will be flying missions in support of “eastern flank deterrence and defense”. The typical mission for the EA-18 is electronic warfare and radar jamming to suppress enemy air defense. According to a DoD spokesman, the Growlers will be based in Europe to reinforce deterrence capabilities of NATO’s Eastern Flank, and will not engage Russian assets. The aircraft are from VAQ-134 based at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Washington. About 240 personnel from the unit will deploy, including air crew, aircraft maintainers, and pilots. “6 Navy ‘Growler’ Aircraft Headed to Germany to Support Deterrence Mission”, DoD News, March 28, 2022.
Commentary
Red Line Needed. The Russians can’t achieve success on the battlefield with its armor and infantry. But they can level Ukrainian cities and force them to submit with their artillery and missiles. Perhaps a ‘no atrocities’ red line is needed; meaning the indiscriminate bombardment of civilians in Ukrainian cities will not be tolerated by the West. Air strikes using air-launched stand-off weapons against Russian artillery and missile launch positions in Ukraine would result in crossing the red line. Kevin R. James goes into detail on this topic in “The West must draw a red line for Russian in Ukraine”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 30, 2022.
More Weapons Needed. The Russians may have been ‘stalled’ in their offensive to take Kyiv and other major cities in eastern Ukraine; but they are still on the offensive. They will concentrate their forces in the east and south of Ukraine and continue with their missile, propaganda, and cyber attacks. The Russians will also be bringing in more troops from the far east, Georgia, and mobilized reserve forces. The Ukrainians can prevail but need more weapons at a faster pace. Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at FPRI’s Eurasia Program and a book author. He provides his thoughts in “What Ukraine Needs Now”, Real Clear Defense, March 29, 2022.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, defense, or the current conflict in Ukraine then we are interested.
Maps and Other Resources
UNCN. The Ukraine NGO Coordination Network is an organization that ties together U.S.-based 501c3 organizations and non-profit humanitarian organizations that are working to evacuate and support those in need affected by the Ukraine crisis. https://uncn.one
Maps of Ukraine
Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.
UNHCR Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation
Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.
Janes Equipment Profile – Ukraine Conflict. An 81-page PDF provides information on the military equipment of the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces. Covers naval, air, electronic warfare, C4ISR, communications, night vision, radar, and armored fighting vehicles, Ukraine Conflict Equipment Profile, February 28, 2022.
Arms Transfers to Ukraine. Forum on the Arms Trade.
4. U.S. says Putin being misled, as Ukraine refugee tally hits 4 million
There is no speaking truth to power about Putin's War. I would like to hear the deliberations by the Joint Planning Group that put together this debacle for Putin.
It started off like this, "Can you believe old Vlad wants us to do this sh*t?" "Is he off his meds again?" "Doesn't he know the Ukrainians will fight to the death and hand us our as**s?" "Who is in charge of ensuring we have enough body bags?"
It must have been a helluva design process before they even started the planning process.
Excerpt:
“We have information that Putin felt misled by the Russian military, which has resulted in persistent tension between Putin and his military leadership,” White House spokeswoman Kate Bedingfield told reporters. “We believe that Putin is being misinformed by his advisers about how badly the Russian military is performing and how the Russian economy is being crippled by sanctions because his senior advisers are too afraid to tell him the truth.”
U.S. says Putin being misled, as Ukraine refugee tally hits 4 million
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s advisers are shielding him from how badly the invasion of Ukraine is going, top U.S. officials said Wednesday, as the conflict raged on despite peace talks and the number of Ukrainians who have fled their country topped 4 million.
Putin’s advisers may be afraid to deliver bad news to a leader who has been willing to take increasingly extreme measures against people who dissent within the Russian system, U.S. intelligence officials said. One worrisome consequence, Pentagon officials said, was that negotiations underway between Russia and Ukraine to end the nearly five-week-old invasion could be undermined by misinformed expectations and directives from the Russian side.
“We have information that Putin felt misled by the Russian military, which has resulted in persistent tension between Putin and his military leadership,” White House spokeswoman Kate Bedingfield told reporters. “We believe that Putin is being misinformed by his advisers about how badly the Russian military is performing and how the Russian economy is being crippled by sanctions because his senior advisers are too afraid to tell him the truth.”
Both the Ukrainian and Russian negotiators had generally positive things to say Wednesday about the most recent round of talks, which concluded a day earlier in Istanbul. But adding to the general sense that there are splits on the Russian side or, at a minimum, a lack of understanding about Putin’s desires, some top Russian officials gave contradictory statements.
Ukrainian officials said Russian bombing and shelling continued on Wednesday, although forces did appear to be withdrawing from around Kyiv and the northern city of Chernihiv, something the Russian side had signaled a day earlier. A spokesman for the Russian defense ministry said that its military was refocusing its operations on eastern Ukraine, away from the Ukrainian capital.
Top U.S. officials said that Putin’s alleged information problems are one of the weaknesses of the Russian system.
“One of the Achilles’ heels of autocracies is that we don’t have people in those systems who speak truth to power or have the ability to speak truth to power. And I think that is something that we’re seeing in Russia,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters during a visit to Algiers.
At the Pentagon on Wednesday, spokesman John Kirby called it “discomforting” that Putin “may not fully understand the degree to which his forces are failing” thus far in Ukraine.
“One outcome of that could be a less-than-faithful effort at negotiating some sort of settlement here,” Kirby said. “If he’s not fully informed of how poorly he’s doing, then how are his negotiators going to come up with an agreement that is enduring?”
The exodus of Ukrainians — nearly 10 percent of the country’s prewar population fleeing in five weeks — underscored the regional crisis that Europe is now facing. The U.N. refugee agency estimates that an additional 6.5 million Ukrainians have been displaced inside Ukraine, meaning about a quarter of the nation of 44 million people has been uprooted. An estimated 2 million of those who have fled the country are children.
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi arrived in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv, near the Polish border, and said he would look for ways “to increase our support to people affected and displaced by this senseless war.”
The flood of Ukrainians into other countries has started to overwhelm their ability to absorb them, officials warned. More than half of the refugees have fled to Poland, while others have gone to other neighboring countries such as Romania and Moldova. About 350,000 people have gone to Russia, according to the latest U.N. refugee figures. The International Organization for Migration has said nearly 200,000 non-Ukrainians who were living in the country have also had to escape.
Ultimately, the refugees are likely to be spread across Europe, and some countries are bracing for the impact. Estonia, a country of 1.3 million people, may take in up to 100,000 Ukrainians by the end of April, for example, a step that would balloon the country’s population by nearly 8 percent. Proportionally, that would be as if the United States were to take in 25 million refugees in the same time frame.
The European Union has enacted unprecedented measures to allow Ukrainians “temporary protection” anywhere in the 27-country bloc for up to three years.
The apparent breakdown in communication inside the Kremlin adds to the challenges of Ukrainian and other European and American policymakers who are seeking to end the conflict. Leaders of both the Ukrainian and Russian negotiation teams offered a mixed picture of the talks on Wednesday, saying they had made progress during talks in Istanbul on Tuesday but that there were still disagreements on key issues.
From the Ukrainian perspective, the Russian team “definitely moved the negotiations forward,” Ihor Zhovkva, deputy chief of staff to President Volodymyr Zelensky, told BBC Radio on Wednesday.
“This was the first time that, instead of giving its own ultimatums and red lines, the Russian side listened to Ukrainian positions,” Zhovkva said. He also said Ukraine is still seeking security guarantees in a legally binding treaty to end the war and stop future aggression.
“They took into consideration our proposals,” he said. “Hopefully, when they come back with their proposals, we will be moving forward to the conclusion of this international treaty.”
But Zhovkva insisted that Ukraine would not trade an “inch” of its eastern territory or ever consider it Russian land.
The head of the Russian delegation offered a similar, relatively positive assessment. “Yesterday, for the first time, the Ukrainian side provided … its readiness to fulfill a number of important conditions for building normal and, I hope, good neighborly relations with Russia in the future,” Vladimir Medinsky said in a televised statement.
Medinsky outlined some of Ukraine’s commitments, some of which Russia said it had demanded “for years,” including Ukraine’s promise not to join NATO, renunciation of nuclear weapons, a refusal to host foreign military bases and military contingents, and to conduct military exercises only with the consent of guarantor states, including Russia.
These set of principles, Medinsky said, gave way to a “possible future agreement.”
But Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov poured cold water on hopes of a speedy resolution, saying that an agreement is not close. “So far, we cannot say anything very promising, any breakthroughs. There’s still a long, long way to go,” he told reporters.
Consultations continued on Wednesday, with a lower-level team of Ukrainian officials flying to Tel Aviv to talk to Israeli policymakers. Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has offered to be a mediator in the conflict.
And President Biden spoke by phone to Zelensky, getting an update on negotiations and offering an additional $500 million in aid on top of $16.3 billion already promised for the country, according to a White House readout of the call.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, their first face-to-face meeting since Russia invaded Ukraine last month. Lavrov told reporters that the Ukraine-Russia negotiations had made “significant progress” in Istanbul, a sharply different tone from Peskov and a possible sign of poor coordination among Russian officials.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin reiterated at a news conference that there were “no limits” to Sino-Russian cooperation, according to China’s official broadcaster CCTV.
Russia’s promised drawdown around the key cities of Kyiv and Chernihiv did not halt hostilities near the cities on Wednesday. The governor of the Chernihiv region, Viacheslav Chaus, said that Russian forces “spent the whole night striking” the city.
But by Wednesday evening, the Ukrainian military said that it was indeed seeing a “partial withdrawal” of Russian forces around both cities. The British Defense Ministry said that the withdrawal may be connected to Russian units “suffering heavy losses” and returning to Belarus and Russia to “reorganize and resupply.”
Russia meanwhile continued a high-stakes dance around energy supplies for Europe, for which it had been demanding payments in rubles starting on Thursday. Europe currently pays for its natural gas in euros, and the switch in currencies would apparently enable Russia to sidestep sanctions that have frozen much of the country’s hard currency reserves.
European leaders have refused to make the switch, entertaining the possibility that Russia will cut off energy shipments altogether. In a measure of European concerns, German policymakers on Wednesday activated the “early warning” phase of an emergency plan to ensure natural gas supplies in the event of a disruption, asking people to “reduce their consumption as much as possible.”
In a sign that Russia isn’t yet prepared to flip off the switch, Peskov said the Kremlin would postpone the March 31 deadline to switch to ruble payments as it continued discussions with European leaders. A Russian cutoff of natural gas and oil would be profoundly painful to Europe, potentially leading to energy rationing and some factories being asked to go offline temporarily. But it would also cut off one of the last and biggest remaining flows of cash to the Kremlin.
The disruption to global energy supplies can also be felt in the United States, amid rising prices at the gasoline pump and increased costs for the components and metals needed for battery technology. Acknowledging that challenge, the White House plans to invoke the Defense Production Act to secure materials necessary for clean energy with the aim to break dependence on foreign sources of oil and natural gas.
According to an official familiar with the plan, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because it hasn’t been formally announced, Biden as soon as this week may sign a presidential determination to encourage domestic production of critical minerals for both stationary large-capacity batteries and those used in electric vehicles.
Francis and Suliman reported from London. John Hudson in Algiers; Robyn Dixon and Mary Ilyushina in Riga, Latvia; David L. Stern in Mukachevo, Ukraine; Shira Rubin in Tel Aviv; Isaac Stanley-Becker in Berlin; Rachel Pannett in Sydney; Eugene Scott, Paulina Villegas, Amy B Wang, Steven Mufson, Alex Horton and Maxine Joselow in Washington; and Jennifer Hassan in London contributed to this report.
5. Volodymyr Zelensky and The Dangers of Worship Culture
Although I disagree with the author I of course published it in the Small Wars Journal.
Here are some of my comments to the author.
An interesting article that should stir up some discussion. It is a cautionary essay. However, I am not sure I see Zelensky as god and I do not think things have gone to his head or that he suffers from hubris culture. I think he is giving the world a master class in strategic communications and is effectively a one man influence operation from the almost daily engagement with legislatures around the world to engagement with the native daughter and her husband who are generating funds for the fight. I do not worship him but I think he is doing a lot of things that are worthy of study and learning from in the information environment. But your piece is thought provoking and very worthy of discussion.
Volodymyr Zelensky and The Dangers of Worship Culture | Small Wars Journal
Volodymyr Zelensky and The Dangers of Worship Culture
By John Mac Ghlionn
Lede: Cancel culture is bad. This is not a controversial statement to make. It’s the antithesis of everything a free and open society stands for. As the author Steve Maroboli so accurately noted, cancel culture flourishes “because we accept (and gluttonously consume) social violence. We no longer seek truth or both sides of a story. Whichever side is loudest, wins… regardless of its relationship to the truth.” In this climate, to paraphrase a well-known motto, " the survival rate for everyone drops to zero.” Absolutely nothing good comes from cancel culture. The same, though, is true for worship culture. In this particular environment, mere mortals are deified, venerated, and idolized. When it comes to the dangers of worship culture, China provides a valuable lesson.
Although Mao Zedong, arguably the vilest man to have ever walked the planet, died in 1976, he's still worshiped like a god. This is especially true in Shaoshan, the city in which the dictator was born. Journalist Brian Kelly previously discussed the ways in which “Buddhist and Taoist temples often have a statue of the Great Helmsman, covered with yellow cloth (the color of the emperor and the Buddha).” Here, “incense, fruit, paper money (false) are offered as if to a god or the spirit of an ancestor.”
Before the Chinese Communist Party imposed the strictest of COVID lockdowns imaginable, it was common practice for people – thousands of them from all across the country- to congregate, form a vigil, and remember their former president. For the uninitiated, Mao was responsible for the Great Leap Forward, a brutal campaign that attempted to rapidly transform the country from an agrarian economy into an industrial one. A disaster of epic proportions, it led to the deadliest famine in the history of mankind, with at least 45 million people dying in the space of just 4 years (1958-1962). Mao Zedong was a monster, yet, in the eyes of so many Chinese, he was (and still is) a hero. A man worthy of adulation and extreme devotion.
Which brings us onto Volodymyr Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, a man who is most definitely worthy of adulation. Now, before proceeding, I must state the following clearly: this is not a comparison between Mao and Zelensky; this is to highlight the dangers of worshipping any man (or woman) like a god. Nothing good comes from the deification of human beings. Right now, Zelensky, a comedian-turned-politician, is one of the most, if not the most, discussed people on the planet. Rightly praised for his bravery, Zelensky has become an international sex-symbol, with The New York Post referring to him as a “thirst trap,” a “smoking hot macho head honcho.” Many readers, I'm sure, will find this amusing. It's just a bit of fun. Right? Wrong. By focusing so much on one man, we risk losing sight of the bigger picture. In Ukraine, as I type this, women and children are being killed. Towns and cities are being blown to smithereens. There are fears that Putin will use chemical weapons on the people of Ukraine. Some are rightly concerned that Russia’s president is ready to quite literally go nuclear. By focusing so much on Zelensky, and painting him as some sort of god, we risk ignoring the fact that World War III may be just around the corner. It is possible to praise Ukraine’s president without worshipping him. We are fast becoming the silliest of societies, with journalists being paid to write glowing articles about Zelensky’s green t-shirt. Sometimes, as Freud never quite said, a t-shirt is just a t-shirt. Contrary to popular belief, Zelensky did not transform the meaning of a piece of cotton. However, by writing such pieces, journalists appear to have transformed the meaning of journalism.
As I have written previously, hubris syndrome is very real. It doesn’t just affect brutal dictators. It also affects decent people, and it appears to be affecting Mr. Zelensky. How else do you explain his request – no, demand – for a place at this year’s Oscars? Zelensky, who recently organized a video call with Mila Kunis and Ashton Kutcher, is clearly enjoying the limelight. Perhaps a little too much, I argue. There is a time and place for Zoom calls with celebrities. Right now, however, there are more important issues to address, like preventing more innocent people from being slaughtered by Russian forces. Perhaps, just perhaps, Mr. Zelensky should get his priorities in order. The media has played a major role in turning Zelensky into something that he is not: a god among men. Yes, he is brave. And yes, he is most definitely a respectable politician. But Zelensky appears to have gotten carried away by the fanfare, as well as the gushing articles praising his fashion IQ and virile potency. We must remember that this is not a game, and Mr. Zelensky is not an actor in some Hollywood blockbuster. He is the president of a country currently being destroyed. This is real life; it's very much a matter of life and death. The longer the war persists, the further Ukraine slips into the abyss.
About the Author(s)
John Mac Ghlionn
John Mac Ghlionn is a researcher and essayist. His work has been published by the New York Post, The Sydney Morning Herald, Newsweek, National Review, and The Spectator US, among others. He covers psychology and social relations, and has a keen interest in social dysfunction and media manipulation. Follow him on Twitter, @ghlionn.
6. The Pentagon is now calling Russia an ‘acute threat’
Excerpts:
By adopting the term “acute threat,” the Pentagon may have found a way to keep its focus on China while taking into account Russia’s attack on Ukraine, Schroden told Task & Purpose.
“They clearly wanted to downgrade Russia to a No. 2 spot when they started writing the NDS,” Schroden said. “This to me feels like a bit of backtracking, in terms of: Russia is still clearly less important than China in the framing here, but it’s elevated from where they might have wanted to go. Russia’s invasion forces them to think about Russia more fulsomely than I think they wanted to with this NDS. They really wanted the NDS to be heavily focused on China.”
He noted that the word “acute” itself could be used to describe an issue that has arisen suddenly, and that accurately describes how Russia has become a much more strategically dangerous threat since the invasion of Ukraine.
“The situation is unpredictable,” Schroden said. “I don’t think it’s clear to anybody where this goes from here. If there’s one thing you don’t want between countries with large stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons, it’s large degrees of unpredictability.”
The Pentagon is now calling Russia an ‘acute threat’
'Russia poses acute threats, as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.'
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In Pentagon jargon, Russia has gone from a “great power competitor” to an “acute threat,” but it’s not yet clear what that means for U.S. service members and their families.
On Monday, Congress received a classified version of the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which keeps China as the Defense Department’s top priority, while Russia runs a close second, according to a fact sheet provided by the Pentagon.
“Russia poses acute threats, as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine,” the fact sheet says. “We will collaborate with our NATO Allies and partners to reinforce robust deterrence in the face of Russian aggression.”
Get used to hearing Russia being called an “acute threat” by defense officials. The Pentagon has already adopted the new terminology. “As we’ve all seen, Russia remains an acute threat, but China and its ambitions remain our No. 1 challenge,” Defense Department comptroller Michael McCord told reporters on Monday during a news conference.
Yet, defense officials have been to say so far whether the new catchphrase for Russia means that it has become a greater or lesser priority for the Pentagon, or what the difference is between an “acute threat” and a “near-peer competitor,” as military officials had described Russia in the past.
Pentagon's new strategy will describe Russia as an "acute threat" but one that cannot post a long-term systemic challenge to the United States, the number three Pentagon official says.
— Idrees Ali (@idreesali114) March 25, 2022
“We describe Russia as an acute threat, not only for its unprovoked and premeditated war in Ukraine, but also its destabilizing actions elsewhere in the world, including Syria,” Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said in a statement to Task & Purpose. “Russia has a track record of territorial aggression and extensive gray zone campaigns against democracies in particular. It is a country without major economic power, and with few allies, particularly in light of its violations of international norms in Ukraine. We view Russia’s threat — which includes nuclear threats to the U.S. and to our allies — as temporal and unpredictable.”
During Tuesday’s Pentagon news briefing, Kirby said it would have been “irresponsible” for the Defense Department to not recognize the unique security threats posed by Russia and explain how the budget request for next fiscal year would help the U.S. military deal with those challenges.
Experts differ on the implications of the Pentagon labeling Russia an acute threat. Nora Bensahel, a noted defense policy expert and political scientist, said she believes the new terminology signals a major shift in U.S. national security policy that recognizes how the threat posed by Russia to the United States and its allies has “risen very significantly” following Russia’s attack on Ukraine.
By describing Russia as an acute threat, the National Defense Strategy conveys “an immediacy and an urgency that hasn’t been there before” about how dangerous Russia is to U.S. interests, Bensahel told Task & Purpose.
Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a concert marking the eighth anniversary of Russia’s annexation of Crimea at the Luzhniki stadium in Moscow on March 18, 2022. (Photo by Sergei GUNEYEV / POOL / AFP) (Photo by SERGEI GUNEYEV/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)
“The most recent National Defense Strategy, which was released in 2018, talks broadly about major power competition,” Bensahel said. “More recently, the Pentagon in the past couple of years has talked about China as the ‘pacing threat’ out of those two. But, in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it’s very clear that Russia poses a grave threat to its neighbors, some of whom are U.S./NATO allies. So, the United States has to be prepared for the possibility of increasing threats coming from Russia and has to focus particularly on deterring them, especially for our NATO allies.”
But by using the word “acute” to describe the threat posed by Russia, the Pentagon could be implying that it does not consider Russia to be a permanent menace, said Michael Kofman, a Russian military analyst. Russia has gone through cycles of ascendancy and decline, but it has remained a persistent threat, Kofman told Task & Purpose. That’s why both Russia and China should be viewed as “distinct but interrelated challenges.”
“Obviously, China should have first priority,” Kofman said. “But it would be a mistake to put Russia along with other challenges like North Korea and Iran.”
FILE PHOTO: In this image taken from a video released by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service, the Russian army’s self-propelled howitzers fire during military drills near Orenburg in the Urals, Russia, Thursday, Dec. 16, 2021. (Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP)
Still, President Joe Biden’s administration initially wanted the 2022 National Defense Strategy to deemphasize the security challenges posed by Russia until Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his forces to attack Ukraine, said Jonathan Schroden of CNA, a federally funded research and development center.
By adopting the term “acute threat,” the Pentagon may have found a way to keep its focus on China while taking into account Russia’s attack on Ukraine, Schroden told Task & Purpose.
“They clearly wanted to downgrade Russia to a No. 2 spot when they started writing the NDS,” Schroden said. “This to me feels like a bit of backtracking, in terms of: Russia is still clearly less important than China in the framing here, but it’s elevated from where they might have wanted to go. Russia’s invasion forces them to think about Russia more fulsomely than I think they wanted to with this NDS. They really wanted the NDS to be heavily focused on China.”
He noted that the word “acute” itself could be used to describe an issue that has arisen suddenly, and that accurately describes how Russia has become a much more strategically dangerous threat since the invasion of Ukraine.
“The situation is unpredictable,” Schroden said. “I don’t think it’s clear to anybody where this goes from here. If there’s one thing you don’t want between countries with large stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons, it’s large degrees of unpredictability.”
What’s new on Task & Purpose
7. Former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has a Signal for President Putin
The key points about Putin: risk taker taking bigger risks, possibly changed due to COVID isolation, wants to reestablish the Russian empire and the "Slavic core."
Excerpts:
He also said Putin has, “always been [a] cold, calculating risk-taker, but a measured risk-taker.” Recalling 2008, Gates said, “In Georgia, he took a bite, but he stopped; in Crimea [2014], he took a bite, a big bite, and then he stopped.”
As with others, Gates believes Putin has changed in recent years.
“Those of us that have met with him, worked with him, think that the two-years in isolation because of Covid has had an impact on him. Almost everyone who has dealt with him has commented on it. [French] President Macron…others have described him as erratic.”
Gates said, “I think to understand Putin, you have to understand he is not trying to rebuild the Soviet Union; he’s trying to re-establish the Russian Empire, and particularly the Slavic core of the Russian Empire – Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.”
Former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has a Signal for President Putin
Fine Print
Pulitzer Prize Winning Journalist Walter Pincus is a contributing senior national security columnist for The Cipher Brief. He spent forty years at The Washington Post, writing on topics that ranged from nuclear weapons to politics. He is the author of Blown to Hell: America's Deadly Betrayal of the Marshall Islanders. [...] Read more
OPINION — “Even if the war stops, when you look at the number of civilians and Ukrainian soldiers and others who have died; and when you look at the destruction of Ukraine, Russia cannot get back into the family of nations as long as [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is there, and as long as Russians have the same kind of approach to the West that they have demonstrated through their attacks on our politics and on Ukraine…They have to be treated as a pariah nation as long as Putin is there.”
That former-Secretary of Defense and former-CIA Director Robert Gates, speaking during an OSS Society-sponsored conversation last Wednesday with Michael Vickers, himself a former Pentagon official and long-time CIA officer.
In a more discreet way, Gates was saying what President Biden ad-libbed three days later, at the end of his speech in Poland when he said, “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power.”
During last Wednesday’s conversation, Gates covered a wide-ranging number of issues — psychoanalyzing Putin, measuring China and Russia’s armies, discussing the potential impact of Russia using a chemical or tactical nuclear weapon, Biden’s actions vis-a-vis Ukraine – along with, as above, what to do about Putin in a post-Ukraine war era. For the latter, Gates said if Putin attends October’s G20 meeting in Indonesia, “the U.S. and its allies ought not to go.”
I don’t agree with all Gates said but given his background and experience, I do think he should be heard, although he has not always been right. For example, although Gates made his name at CIA initially as an analyst on the Soviet Union, his views in 1987, about Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform plans, turned out to be wrong. In a memo at that time, Gates wrote, “A major purpose of [Gorbachev’s] economic modernization – as in Russia in the days of Peter the Great – remains the further increase in Soviet military power and political influence.”
Gates, however, has always been tough on Putin.
Asked initially last Wednesday about Putin, Gates recalled, “I came back from my first meeting with Putin and told then-President [George H.W.] Bush, I had looked into Putin’s eyes, and I’d seen a stone-cold killer.”
He also said Putin has, “always been [a] cold, calculating risk-taker, but a measured risk-taker.” Recalling 2008, Gates said, “In Georgia, he took a bite, but he stopped; in Crimea [2014], he took a bite, a big bite, and then he stopped.”
As with others, Gates believes Putin has changed in recent years.
“Those of us that have met with him, worked with him, think that the two-years in isolation because of Covid has had an impact on him. Almost everyone who has dealt with him has commented on it. [French] President Macron…others have described him as erratic.”
Gates said, “I think to understand Putin, you have to understand he is not trying to rebuild the Soviet Union; he’s trying to re-establish the Russian Empire, and particularly the Slavic core of the Russian Empire – Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.”
Gates said he was “stunned” by a recent speech in which Putin “basically trashed Lenin, for essentially writing a constitution in which the USSR gave the [Soviet} Republics the right to secede. And then he goes after Stalin for trying to fix the problem but being unsuccessful. So, here I am Vladimir Putin, I’ve got to fix what Lenin broke and Stalin couldn’t fix.”
Gates said he has read that Putin has, “gotten into orthodox mysticism; that he spends time every day with an orthodox priest that’s kind of into this mysticism, so I don’t know how much all that has impacted his approach to all of this.”
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Other factors, Gates noted, were that “both [Chinese President] Xi and Putin share a narrative that the West is in decline, the West is politically paralyzed, the [NATO and European Union] countries are divided internally and deeply. The Americans are withdrawing from the rest of the world. They are not going to want to be a player. They are not going to be willing to take any risks. Watching what happened in Afghanistan, the [Biden] administration is weak and not going to be able to respond. And if so, it’s going to be a wrist slap and so on.”
Gates called that “a total under-estimation and misunderstanding of democracy and I think that both Xi and Putin have to have been quite surprised by the speed by which the West came together, but not just the West – Japan, Australia, South Korea and others.”
But it was Biden and his team that did it by rallying allies to step up financial aid, provide defensive weapons to Ukraine, and establish tough sanctions against Russia.
In discussing the war, Gates talked about the modernization of both Russian and Chinese militaries in the last 20 years. They both previously had depended on huge land armies, he said, but more recently reduced sizes of their ground forces and invested heavily in air forces, navies, and in new weapons based on new technology.
Yet in Ukraine, Gates said, we are seeing Russian, “conscripts not knowing why they are there, not being very well trained, and huge problems with command and control and incredibly lousy tactics…Whether a lot of money spent on the ground forces went into corrupt hands or was misspent or whatever,” Gates said, “Putin has got to be stunningly disappointed in the performance of his military.”
After a month of warfare, Gates said if Putin’s army is going to sustain this campaign, “they need to be reset. They need new units. They need new troops. They need more equipment, replacement equipment. They need better logistics, more things to support a ground campaign.”
Something to recognize, Gates said, is that, “The Russian army is basically designed to fight on Russian soil, ironically because…it is the most railroad-based army in the world. And they have fewer trucks per unit the U.S. Army by a long shot…So their logistics when they get beyond 50, 60 or 70 miles, they begin to run into real problems because they don’t have enough trucks to make up for the fact that they are farther and farther away from their railroad supply depots.”
Having traveled in Russia, I can tell you Russian supply trains cannot travel on Ukraine train tracks because their train wheels are set for wider gauge tracks.
Gates pointed out that he believes the impressive performance by the Ukrainians is related to their army’s eight years of fighting against separatists and Russian-supported fighters in the Dombas area in eastern Ukraine.
It’s got to be noted, although Gates did not mention it, that Ukraine, over five years, supplied 5,000 troops to the U.S.-led effort known as Operation Iraqi Freedom. In fact, from 2003 to 2005, the Ukrainians were the third-largest contributor to the coalition, with about 1,700 soldiers.
Ukraine was also a participant in the NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and deployed small numbers of troops and medical teams as part of NATO’s ISAF mission in that country.
In addition, since 2004, there has been a Ukraine Joint Working Group (JWG) within the NATO – Ukraine Commission which is responsible for identifying and coordinating the implementation of the practical measures of cooperation in the field of armaments. Among the JWG cooperative activities have been command and control and “Smart Defense” projects.
“You could see in Putin’s eyes,” Gates said, “Ukraine was becoming at least a de facto member of NATO if not de jure.”
As a result, Gates said, Putin “was determined to pull Ukraine back into the Russian orbit, back into the Slavic core and I don’t think there was anything we could have done that would have stopped him from taking drastic measures.”
Gates also dealt with Putin’s repeated threats to use chemical or tactical nuclear weapons by saying, “You have to take that seriously as a possibility and that would be a serious escalation.”
He then offered a view that I know from experience, represents the thinking of many retired and active senior civilian and military officials who have been, or are now, involved with dealing with the prospect of tactical nuclear weapon use.
“I don’t think either of those [chemical or tactical nuclear weapons] has much military value,” Gates said. “They both would be terror weapons in an effort to break the will of the Ukrainian people. My guess is it would have the opposite effect. But you have to take that [prospect of use] seriously if only because the Russians are talking about it.”
Gates also said that the Biden administration had done “the right thing” after Putin’s so-called alerting of his nuclear forces, “by not raising our nuclear alert level.” He also called postponing a U.S. ICBM test at the time, “the right move.”
Gates added, “Basically you don’t allow yourself to be deterred by this [Putin] brandishing of this sword. But you let the other side know that…if you use a nuclear weapon, you have to know the consequences. You’re not going to get away with that and we will respond appropriately.”
When it came to information warfare with Russia, Gates said, “I think we ought to be bolder to break the Russian [Internet] firewalls. We ought to be able to do more in terms of getting the truth to the Russian people.”
He recalled during the Cold War, that the CIA was able to covertly distribute millions of books, magazines, documents, audio cassettes and video tapes in the Soviet Union.
Gates then described a CIA covert action when Pope John Paul II visited Poland in 1979, and the Soviet and Polish Communist government officials kept secret his motorcade route in order to limit the crowd size. In response, Gates said with a CIA-developed capability, the Agency “took control of the Polish State television network for about ten minutes and broadcast his itinerary and the time and everything and millions of people turned out.”
“If we can do that kind of stuff 40 years ago,” Gates said, “we ought to be able to do more in getting the truth to the Russian people about what’s going on in Ukraine, their Slavic brothers.”
Looking to the future, Gates said, “The United States, because we put this whole coalition together in the first place…we need to devise a very robust humanitarian rescue program and make it public.”
He described it as “a plan for the restoration of Ukraine, rebuilding of its cities and so on, significant resources…dealing with this humanitarian crisis that is going on during this war and will follow this war. I think it would boost the morale of the Ukrainians, particularly those men who are in the country fighting, but whose wives and families have left the country. I think it would be a big morale boost for them to know not only that their families are being well cared for, but that the world is going to come in behind and help rebuild Ukraine when this is all over.”
He added, “It would also not be a bad signal to send to Vladimir Putin.”
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Fine Print
Pulitzer Prize Winning Journalist Walter Pincus is a contributing senior national security columnist for The Cipher Brief. He spent forty years at The Washington Post, writing on topics that ranged from nuclear weapons to politics. He is the author of Blown to Hell: America's Deadly Betrayal of the Marshall Islanders. Pincus won an Emmy in 1981 and was the recipient of the Arthur Ross Award from the American Academy for Diplomacy in 2010.
8. One Of Russia’s Newest Air Defense Systems Has Been Captured In Ukraine
Hopefully an intelligence coup. I wonder if the Russians have sold this system to the Chinese or sold the critical technology to them.
I heard a discussion about this and some interesting questions were raised. How was this captured. Why didn't the Russians destroy these to prevent capture intact? Did the Russians just give it up, leave it and walk (or run) away? If any of the above can the PSYOP professionals use this in their themes and messages to illustrate the indiscipline of the Russian soldiers?
Excerpt:
Ukrainian forces appear to come across at least three examples of this particular component of in the course of what has now been nearly five weeks of fighting. What looks to have been a second 9S932-1 was found in relatively good condition in the Kharkiv region sometime around March 12. A third one was captured near the capital Kyiv on or about March 3 and was apparently so pristine that it was then pressed into Ukrainian service in an unclear capacity.
One Of Russia’s Newest Air Defense Systems Has Been Captured In Ukraine
Ukrainian and foreign intelligence agencies could glean much from captured Russian Barnaul-T air defense radar and command post vehicles.
via Twitter/Rosoboronexport
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Ukrainian forces continue to capture, or at least stumble across, examples of some of Russia's most sophisticated ground combat hardware as the conflict in the country rages on. Just this past weekend, pictures emerged online showing a Russian radar-equipped air defense command post vehicle, part of a larger system known as Barnaul-T, that Ukrainian troops found during a counteroffensive in the northeastern Kharkiv region. The fact that this vehicle is intended to serve as a sensor, command and control, and communications node all rolled into one could make it a particularly invaluable source of intelligence for Ukrainian and foreign governments, as well as be a significant operational loss for Russian forces.
A Ukrainian unit reportedly found this vehicle relatively intact, also known by the nomenclature 9S932-1 and the acronym MRU-B, among other Russian vehicles and artillery pieces, in the town of Husarivka. The 9S932-1 is most readily identifiable by its 1L122 surveillance and target acquisition radar, which is mounted on the top rear portion of the hull and is folded down during transit. There was also a TZM-T dedicated reloading vehicle for the TOS-1A thermobaric artillery rocket launch system, another uncommon find.
Ukrainian forces appear to come across at least three examples of this particular component of in the course of what has now been nearly five weeks of fighting. What looks to have been a second 9S932-1 was found in relatively good condition in the Kharkiv region sometime around March 12. A third one was captured near the capital Kyiv on or about March 3 and was apparently so pristine that it was then pressed into Ukrainian service in an unclear capacity.
Elements of the Barnaul-T system have been in use in fighting in Ukraine since at least 2015. Examples of the 9S932-1 specifically have been seen operating in the country since the Russian military launched its all-out invasion of the country in February.
A video, seen below, emerged just this week that reportedly shows Russian forces using a 9K35 Strela-10 mobile short-range surface-to-air missile system, supported by a 9S932-1 command post vehicle, to shoot down a relatively small Ukrainian octocopter-type unmanned aerial system.
The 9S932-1, which uses a modified MT-LBu multi-purpose tracked vehicle, serves as a battery command post within the complete system. It is directly linked to units equipped with various SHORAD systems, such as tracked Tor-M-series (SA-15) and 9K35 Strela (SA-13) surface-to-air missile systems, 9K33 Osa (SA-8) wheeled surface-to-air missile systems, 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19) tracked air defense systems, and 9K333 Verba (SA-25) shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, also known as a man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS).
The Russian-language graphic below depicts a typical Barnaul-T system that includes six 9S932-1s, seen in a row near the bottom linked to different SHORAD systems, among other components.
Public Domain
Additional equipment is necessary in certain cases to link the 9S932-1s to different SHORAD systems. As just one example, the 9K333 Verba uses an add-on system known as the 9S935 to connect it to the broader Barnaul-T network via a standalone 9S933 fire control module at the platoon level.
The video below provides an overview of the complete Verba system, including the 9S933 and 9S935.
Just today, a video emerged that reportedly shows a 9S935 system still neatly packed in its transit case after its capture by Ukrainian forces.
Thanks to their integrated 1L122 radars, 9S932-1s can provide direct target cueing for the SHORAD systems they are tied to via datalinks. They can also pass along targeting information from other ground-based radars via other mobile command posts within the Barnaul-T system, such as the intermediate 9S931 MP tracked and 9S931-1 MP-K wheeled types, at higher echelons. They can feed their own data back into the overall network, as well.
It's worth noting that there are now multiple versions of the Barnaul-T system that use other mixtures of command post vehicles, including variants based on the BTR-MDM, an air-droppable multi-purpose tracked vehicle, specifically for airborne units.
From an immediate operational perspective, Ukrainian forces capturing or otherwise eliminating 9S932-1s, or any other component of the Barnaul-T system, can only limit the ability of their Russian opponents to provide effective air defense coverage for their units. Neutralizing Russian ground-based air defense capabilities has been one important component of the Ukrainian armed forces' successful efforts to ensure that the skies above the country remain contested, even after more than four weeks of fighting.
More importantly, captured 9S932-1s and other elements of the Barnaul-T are certainly an invaluable source of intelligence on Russian air defense systems, radars, data links, and more. Just being able to test the capabilities of the 1L122 radar would provide useful insights into the ability of Russia's short-range air defense networks to spot and engage a variety of threats, including small drones. Acquiring detailed data on this radar's specific signature could help when it comes to developing capabilities to detect and counter them, as well.
Beyond the radar, these vehicles carry various communications and data-sharing systems, and what could be gleaned about how data is encoded and transferred from the software that runs them could be just as valuable, if not more so, than what one might be able to learn from physical components themselves. A vehicle like this could also contain coded identification friend or foe (IFF) data that Russian forces use to help avoid accidentally targeting friendly aircraft. All of this information could be exploited for both electronic and cyber warfare purposes.
At the same time, the physical construction of portions of these mobile command posts, right down to things like the wiring, could be a source of useful industrial intelligence. Any documents or other ancillary items found inside them could provide additional insights into Russian capabilities and operating procedures.
With all this in mind, the Ukrainian government's international partners, such as the United States, are likely to be interested in at least examing these mobile air defense command posts, if not taking complete examples out of the country for deeper analysis, as part of so-called foreign materiel exploitation (FME) programs. Of course, American and other foreign intelligence agencies may have already gained access to 9S932-1s captured in Ukraine, or through other, unrelated means.
Regardless, the current war in Ukraine is already leaving the country with a treasure trove of examples of some of Russia's most advanced equipment, not just the 9S932-1s. Earlier this month, Ukrainian forces captured part of a Krasukha-4, one of Russia's most modern and capable electronic warfare systems, as you can read more about here. Elements of Ukraine's armed forces have captured multiple vehicles associated with the Borisoglebsk-2, another mobile electronic warfare system, and at least one Zoopark-1M, a mobile counter-battery radar used to detect incoming artillery fire and determine its source for counterattacks.
Since it gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine has already been a notable source of higher-end systems, from fighter jets to ground-based air defense radars, for the U.S. government's FME enterprise. Some of those systems may well now be headed back to Ukraine, as the U.S. military digs into its FME stocks to find systems to help bolster Ukraine's own air defense capabilities, as you can find out more about here.
Altogether, for every system like the 9S932-1 that Ukrainian forces capture, they are not only hampering Russian forces' ability to operate in the country, they are also potentially exposing new details and providing new insights about some of their most advanced capabilities.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com
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9. Cold War II and Biden’s new ‘new world order’
Cold War II and Biden’s new ‘new world order’
Unless we mobilize, expect no good outcome
OPINION:
These are confusing times, and President Biden is not helping to bring clarity. Last week, for example, he told the Business Roundtable that “there’s going to be a new world order.” What could he possibly have meant?
The old “new world order” was established by the U.S. following World War II. With the hopefully named United Nations at its core, the goal was to prevent or at least limit armed conflicts, promote human rights and establish a body of international laws and norms.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 1991 Persian Gulf War, then-President George H.W. Bush announced the advent of a new “new world order,” one that would feature “new ways of working with other nations … peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and just treatment of all peoples.”
It was a lovely idea but, like the older new world order, it failed to coalesce. Or, as the scholar Joseph S. Nye Jr. wrote in 1992, “reality intruded.”
Today, dictators with dreams of conquest — including a Russian neo-imperialist, a Chinese communist and a jihadist — are attempting to establish yet another new “new world order,” one they would dominate.
“We have entered a new era,” Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leader Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami said last week, inadvertently echoing Mr. Biden. “The sun has set on the evil powers.”
Matt Pottinger has been bringing clarity to these issues. A White House deputy national security adviser from 2019 to 2021, he now chairs FDD’s China Program. In recent interviews, including with The Wall Street Journal, the Vandenberg Coalition, and AEI’s “What the Hell Is Going On?” podcast, he’s framed the current international situation this way: “A Cold War has been declared against us.”
That term is “contentious,” he acknowledges, and there are “differences between Cold War I and Cold War II.” But as “Niall Ferguson, the historian, has pointed out, there were big differences between World War I and World War II as well, but the similarities really overshadow the differences.”
This is not merely an academic observation. It is — or should be — a call to action. Wars, hot or cold, are not won willy-nilly. If our opponents are mobilizing and fighting, and we are not, a good outcome is unlikely.
Mr. Pottinger sees Russia’s war on Ukraine as analogous to the Korean War, the first armed conflict of the first Cold War: “Stalin had given a green light for Kim Il-sung to invade South Korea. He noticed that the West had clearly drawn South Korea outside of our defensive perimeter” — just as NATO kept Ukraine outside its defensive perimeter.
Though Russian forces in Ukraine have performed poorly and Ukrainian defenders have performed spectacularly, Russia’s defeat — on the battlefields or in diplomatic palavers — is by no means assured.
Historians of the future are likely to cite Feb. 4 as a significant milestone in Cold War II. It was on that date, just 20 days before the Russian invasion, that Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin released a 5,000-word statement declaring that, subsequently, their relationship would have “no limits.”
Mr. Xi has been providing Mr. Putin immoral support and, according to Mr. Pottinger, is “at least on the verge of providing material, military, and financial support.”
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, for his part, is reportedly loaning Mr. Putin fighters from Hezbollah, Tehran’s military/political proxy which, over recent years, has turned Lebanon into a failing state and, in tandem with Russia, helped prop up the Assad dictatorship in Syria at the cost of more than half a million lives.
Last week, Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen used drones and missiles to attack oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. Afterward, Iranian authorities celebrated. Despite this and many other provocations, Mr. Biden appears determined to cut a deal with the clerical regime, enriching it and putting it on a path to developing a nuclear weapons arsenal. His claim that the deal will stop — as opposed to, at most, slightly delay — the regime’s progress is unserious.
Iranian diplomats have refused to sit at the same table with Americans, so Mr. Biden — mindbogglingly — entrusted a Russian diplomat to act as an intermediary. The new deal will reportedly allow Moscow to sell Tehran both weapons and nuclear facilities (for peaceful purposes only!) despite U.S. sanctions imposed in response to Mr. Putin’s war on Ukraine.
Mr. Biden told the Business Roundtable that his goal is to “unite” and “lead” the “free world” within the “new world order.” That would represent a great achievement, to the detriment of the Cold Warriors from the fear societies. But to get from here to there would require a long list of policies that Mr. Biden does not have in place. I’ll briefly mention just three.
First, he’d do whatever is necessary to restore the U.S. military and its allies to at least Cold War I levels of spending, capabilities and readiness.
Second, he’d spend less money at the U.N., where key entities such as its Human Right Council have been subverted by human rights abusers. Nor should the International Monetary Fund be committing American money to regimes that regard America as their enemy.
Third, he should make America a great energy power again. Climate change is a challenge, not an emergency that overrides all other threats.
Speaking to reporters in Brussels last week, Mr. Biden said: “I don’t think you’ll find any European leader who thinks I’m not up to the job.” Perhaps, but there are despots in Europe, Asia and the Middle East who hold a different view. Let me be clear: I hope he proves them wrong.
10. No one believes Biden has a red line in Ukraine after Obama’s Syria debacle
Excerpts:
As Biden lobbies our Arab allies for increased oil production, US and Iranian negotiators in Vienna are on the verge of yet another nuclear deal — with the Russians as the primary mediator, no less. The result will once again be the release of billions of dollars to bankroll Tehran and its proxies. Assad will once again be a beneficiary.
Biden himself recently warned of “consequences” if Moscow uses chemical weapons in Ukraine. For our allies in the Middle East, these threats ring as hollow today as they did in 2013.
Actions have consequences. So does inaction. Ten years later, our Middle East allies can attest to this. Ten years from now, our European allies may do the same.
No one believes Biden has a red line in Ukraine after Obama’s Syria debacle
By Jonathan Schanzer and Enia Krivine
March 29, 2022 7:49pm Updated
This White House lacks any credibility to issue such a threat — as our Middle East allies well know.
The last time a US president attempted to dissuade a despot from deploying chemical weapons in a bloody conflict was 2013, when Sullivan’s former boss, President Barack Obama, warned Syrian President Bashar al-Assad that attacking the Syrian people with chemical weapons amounted to a “red line” that if crossed would result in “enormous consequences.”
Assad didn’t heed Obama’s warning. He ultimately carried out dozens of chemical attacks against his own people. Obama (and his vice president, Joe Biden) hoped to gain overwhelming international support to intervene. But Europe was divided, so Obama looked to Congress, then decided against pushing for congressional authorization. In the end, the president stood down, destroying whatever credibility America had in the Middle East.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad crossed Obama’s “red line” and used chemical weapons in Syria.
Sputnik/Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin via REUTERS
A map of the current state of the Ukraine war as of March 29, 2022.
One can only imagine how this display of indecision appeared to Russian strongman Vladimir Putin, who sought to lessen American influence in the region.
Once it became clear Obama would not intervene, Putin made his move. He sent aircraft to Syria, targeting the Sunni rebels who threatened Assad’s rule. From there, Putin deployed ground personnel, who fought alongside Syrian forces as well as fighters from the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians lost their lives as a result. Many more were displaced.
The 2013 red-line episode not only enabled Assad to remain in power to perpetrate crimes against humanity. It also allowed Putin to cycle as many as 63,000 military personnel in and out of Syria over the years. They gained valuable battlefield experience, which they are now leveraging in Ukraine.
But the negative consequences didn’t end there. Once Putin moved into Syria, he deployed his formidable S-400 anti-aircraft systems to patrol the Syrian skies. This tied the hands of Israel, which has increasingly needed to conduct airstrikes in Syria, thanks to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s massive weapons-smuggling operation.
Russian President Vladimir Putin supported al-Assad in the civil war.
REUTERS/Aziz Taher
Iran has exploited the fog of war in Syria, using the battlefield to quietly move precision-guided munitions to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Never before has a nonstate actor acquired PGMs. There could be significant consequences if Hezbollah acquires enough of them. They would enable the terrorist group to strike strategic targets throughout Israel with deadly accuracy, and they could even evade Israel’s Iron Dome system. With enough PGMs, Hezbollah can one day wage a destructive war in Israel.
Expectedly, the Israelis have grown alarmed. Over the last several years, they have carried out thousands of attacks against Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria. For the Israelis, this is a matter of urgent national security. But to do so, they must deconflict with the Russian military. Indeed, as a result of the 2013 red-line episode, Israel needs Russia if it wishes to operate across its northeastern border.
In a bizarre twist, many of the same officials who failed to enforce Obama’s red line now serve the Biden administration. With zero self-awareness, they are excoriating Israel for not sufficiently aiding Ukraine. Somehow lost on them is that Israel cannot openly challenge Russia if it wishes to access Syrian airspace.
In another strange twist, the White House wants the oil-producing Arab states to make up for lost production resulting from sanctions on Russia. These states once yearned for the Obama administration to oust Assad. Instead, they watched in horror as Putin came to Assad’s rescue. Then they watched in disbelief as Washington inked a nuclear deal with Iran, yielding Tehran some $150 billion in sanctions relief. Significant chunks of that money helped buttress Assad’s regime.
Biden said that there would be “consequences” for Russia if Vladimir Putin uses chemical weapons in Ukraine.
Mikhail Klimentyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP
As Biden lobbies our Arab allies for increased oil production, US and Iranian negotiators in Vienna are on the verge of yet another nuclear deal — with the Russians as the primary mediator, no less. The result will once again be the release of billions of dollars to bankroll Tehran and its proxies. Assad will once again be a beneficiary.
Biden himself recently warned of “consequences” if Moscow uses chemical weapons in Ukraine. For our allies in the Middle East, these threats ring as hollow today as they did in 2013.
Actions have consequences. So does inaction. Ten years later, our Middle East allies can attest to this. Ten years from now, our European allies may do the same.
Jonathan Schanzer is senior vice president for research at Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Enia Krivine is senior director of FDD’s Israel Program and National Security Network.
Twitter: @JSchanzer @EKrivine.
11. How to prevent China from coming to Russia's rescue | Opinion
Excerpts:
Nevertheless, to avoid a scenario in which China and Russia consider bolstering CIPS as a sanctions workaround, Congress should mandate that any actors caught using CIPS to circumvent Russia's SWIFT ban be made immediately subject to secondary sanctions.
As Washington and Brussels have long known, partnerships come with price tags. With Russia's military bearing down on civilian population centers, it is high time that China learn that lesson for itself.
How to prevent China from coming to Russia's rescue | Opinion
CRAIG SINGLETON , SENIOR CHINA FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
ON 3/30/22 AT 7:00 AM EDT
Newsweek · by Craig Singleton · March 30, 2022
With war raging in Europe, the already fraught U.S.-China relationship has reached a critical juncture. So far, the White House has refrained from issuing any ultimatums to Beijing even as it tacitly backs Russian President Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine. According to numerous credible reports, China is even considering providing Russia with military assistance to sustain its battlefield operations.
While Beijing has denied those reports, it has made clear its opposition to the Western sanctions that aim to cut off Russia's financial lifelines. China has a long track record of deriding unilateral sanctions, often ignoring them altogether. That strategy is now being put to the test as Beijing seeks to advance its revisionist ambitions without jeopardizing China's access to the Western capital and technology it needs to power its development.
Nevertheless, if the goal of Western sanctions is to pull Putin back from the brink, the Russian president must know for certain China will not be coming to his rescue, even if Chinese leader Xi Jinping is inclined to do so.
The only way for Washington and Brussels to accomplish that objective is to impose harsh, compulsory penalties on any Chinese entities that skirt sanctions, in effect tying Beijing's hands.
Last month, China claimed Russia was not its "ally." But make no mistake—the two countries are as economically interdependent as ever. In 2021, trade between China and Russia reached new heights, jumping 35.9 percent to a record $146.9 billion. Since 2019, the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has loaned more than $500 million for various Russian projects. Last January, Moscow requested $12 billion from the AIIB to finance five new ventures.
The bond between the two countries grew stronger following a recent summit between Xi and Putin. Just weeks before the invasion of Ukraine, the two leaders finalized several new energy-related initiatives, including plans to construct a Russian pipeline to satisfy China's surging energy demands. Soon thereafter, Beijing lifted restrictions on Russian wheat imports, a move aimed at addressing rampant food insecurity across China.
These and other developments aside, China's economic partnership with Russia is not "without limits," as Xi and Putin purport.
Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) and Chinese President Xi Jinping arrive to pose for a photograph during their meeting in Beijing, on February 4, 2022. Alexei Druzhinin / Sputnik / AFP/Getty Images
Russia's invasion comes at a sensitive moment for Beijing. Xi is already grappling with a severe domestic economic slowdown and record-high COVID-19 caseloads in more than a dozen Chinese provinces. His domestic position has deteriorated so rapidly that Beijing recently warned that amid China's "economic downturn, some deep-seated problems may surface."
That's why, when push comes to shove, Beijing will protect its own interests—its financial links to the West—at the expense of its partnership with Moscow.
Exploiting this divergence will require Western policymakers to ramp up their scrutiny of China's financial support of Russia. They must make clear that any Chinese entities that do not comply with sanctions will find themselves subject to sanctions or export controls—no questions asked. That should include China's central bank, which currently holds 13 percent of Russia's foreign exchange reserves—funds that Russia desperately needs.
Similar to previous maximum-pressure campaigns, Washington should also automatically terminate the correspondent banking relationships between American financial institutions and Chinese entities which flout sanctions. The deterrent effect of severing these relationships, which enable cross-border payments, would be immediate, as Chinese entities would be hesitant to facilitate transactions that could result in their expulsion from the dollarized economy.
Enhanced regulatory pressure must also be brought to bear on China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments in Europe and Central Asia, nearly half of which pass through Russia. While many BRI programs are yuan-denominated, others are transacted in dollars or euros, and are therefore vulnerable to Western sanctions. The same logic applies to scrutinizing AIIB's ventures in Russia, a large percentage of which are financed in dollars or euros by China's state-owned banks and government ministries.
Lastly, U.S. and European regulators should dissect transactional data associated with China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), which Beijing established in 2015 as a yuan-denominated alternative to SWIFT. Unfortunately for Russia, CIPS' scale remains limited, with the platform only processing about 13,000 transactions a day compared with SWIFT's 40 million. What's more, nearly 80 percent of CIPS' transactions are connected to SWIFT's global network, making them subject to U.S. and European sanctions enforcement.
Nevertheless, to avoid a scenario in which China and Russia consider bolstering CIPS as a sanctions workaround, Congress should mandate that any actors caught using CIPS to circumvent Russia's SWIFT ban be made immediately subject to secondary sanctions.
As Washington and Brussels have long known, partnerships come with price tags. With Russia's military bearing down on civilian population centers, it is high time that China learn that lesson for itself.
Craig Singleton is a senior China fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a non-partisan think tank focused on foreign policy and national security issues.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
Newsweek · by Craig Singleton · March 30, 2022
12. FDD | Administration’s Iran Nuclear Deal Claims Do Not Stand Up to Reality
Excerpts:
Despite all the above provisions that clear the way for Iran to expand its nuclear program, administration officials have claimed that the JCPOA would render Tehran “permanently and verifiably prevented from obtaining a nuclear weapon.” In fact, even if the Islamic Republic complied with every provision of the deal being negotiated in Vienna, it would emerge in less than a decade with an industrial-sized nuclear enrichment program and minimal breakout time.
In exchange for these temporary and deficient restrictions on its nuclear program, Iran will receive extensive sanctions relief under a revised JCPOA, including immediate access to tens of billions of dollars of foreign assets now beyond its reach. The administration owes the American people — and Washington’s regional partners — factual answers about how this accord meets their interests.
FDD | Administration’s Iran Nuclear Deal Claims Do Not Stand Up to Reality
fdd.org · by Andrea Stricker Research Fellow · March 30, 2022
National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said during a press briefing last week that President Joe Biden seeks to put Iran’s atomic program “back in the box after President Trump let it out of the box when he left the deal in 2018.” However, the reported provisions of the deal that Biden’s team is negotiating in Vienna would hardly box in Tehran’s rapidly advancing nuclear program.
First of all, the U.S. withdrawal from the previous nuclear deal in 2018 did not let Iran’s nuclear program out of the box. Under the original deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action (JCPOA), Iran never had to submit to intrusive inspections of sensitive military sites and sought to conceal a nuclear archive that Israel’s Mossad later exfiltrated.
Next, Sullivan is wrong to attribute the rapid advance of Iran’s nuclear program to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. Until Biden’s election in November 2020, Tehran undertook only incremental violations in response to the U.S. withdrawal. Iran’s major advances, such as enriching uranium to 60 percent purity and manufacturing uranium metal, occurred after Biden was elected in November 2020 on a platform of reviving the JCPOA and lifting sanctions on Iran.
In defense of the new deal being negotiated in Vienna, administration officials have pointed out that it would restore a 300 kilogram cap on the amount of enriched uranium Iran can stockpile, as well as limit the enrichment of uranium to no more than 3.67 percent purity. While true, this misses the more important point that under the prospective deal, Tehran’s so-called breakout time — the amount of time required to produce one atomic bomb’s worth of fissile material — would never exceed seven months and would then drop almost to zero over the duration of the updated JCPOA.
While the Obama administration said the original JCPOA increased Iran’s breakout time to 12 months, an independent assessment put the number closer to seven. The reported provisions of the revised JCPOA would place even fewer restraints on Iran’s breakout time than the original deal. Israel reportedly estimates that Tehran’s breakout time under a new deal would initially reach just four to six months. This limits the response time available to the United States and its allies in the event Tehran attempts to cross the nuclear threshold.
The new deal’s insufficient breakout time reflects the reported decision by U.S. negotiators to permit the clerical regime to keep in storage more than 2,000 advanced centrifuges that can quickly enrich uranium to weapons-grade purity. This loophole is significant: If the regime diverted just 650 of its fastest centrifuges to a clandestine enrichment plant, it could break out to nuclear weapons on short order.
Moreover, Iran’s inventory of advanced centrifuges will only continue to grow. As part of a side accord to the original JCPOA that is expected to remain as part of the new deal, Iran is allowed to manufacture up to 400 additional advanced centrifuges per year starting in 2024, more than doubling its existing capacity by 2029. At that point, all limits on production of advanced centrifuges would terminate. Thus, Iran’s breakout time would be down to a matter of weeks by January 2031, when the deal ends.
Despite all the above provisions that clear the way for Iran to expand its nuclear program, administration officials have claimed that the JCPOA would render Tehran “permanently and verifiably prevented from obtaining a nuclear weapon.” In fact, even if the Islamic Republic complied with every provision of the deal being negotiated in Vienna, it would emerge in less than a decade with an industrial-sized nuclear enrichment program and minimal breakout time.
In exchange for these temporary and deficient restrictions on its nuclear program, Iran will receive extensive sanctions relief under a revised JCPOA, including immediate access to tens of billions of dollars of foreign assets now beyond its reach. The administration owes the American people — and Washington’s regional partners — factual answers about how this accord meets their interests.
Andrea Stricker is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where she also contributes to FDD’s Iran Program and Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP). For more analysis from Andrea, the Iran Program, and CMPP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Andrea on Twitter @StrickerNonpro. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_Iran and @FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Andrea Stricker Research Fellow · March 30, 2022
13. How drones are helping fuel propaganda in Ukraine
There is going to be a lot of innovation coming out of Putin's War. We need to be studying all aspects of this war, including especially the informant influence aspects from the tactical to the strategic.
Links to this 3 part story at the end.
How drones are helping fuel propaganda in Ukraine
Long used for scouting battlegrounds, unmanned flying machines and their footage can also shape public perception.
BY KELSEY D. ATHERTON, POPULAR SCIENCE | PUBLISHED MAR 28, 2022 8:33 AM
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This story was originally featured on Popular Science in partnership with The Center for Public Integrity. This is the fourth in a 10-part series on nuclear risk, military technology, and the future of warfare in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
On March 4, eight days into its invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Ministry of Defense tweeted a video purporting to show a Russian-made Orion drone conducting an air strike against enemies inside the Donetsk region.
Then there’s drone use by the other side: A Turkish-built drone that has become a sort of mechanical folk hero. In October 2021, Ukraine’s military used Bayraktar drones to attack separatists in the Donetsk region. Since Russia’s invasion, Ukranians have turned Bayraktar drones into a symbol of the war, complete with a song released online March 1.
“[The] Russians are carefully releasing videos of Forpost-R and Orion combat drones as well to try and compete with a Bayraktar narrative,” said Samuel Bendett, an analyst at the Center for Naval Analysis and adjunct senior fellow at the Center for New American Security, referring to Ukraine’s Bayraktar drone use.
Drones, the expansive category of uncrewed flying machines guided remotely, are one of the defining weapons of 21st-century warfare. The origin of drones can be traced back at least as far as experiments with aerial torpedoes in World War I. What sets modern drones apart is their ability to capture footage in real-time of movement on the ground and to then use that video to direct attacks and, increasingly, to use the video as propaganda.
“This is an information war. It’s an information environment. What you see posted on Twitter and TikTok is not the whole battlefield picture. It’s just a small part of it,” Bendett said. Popular perception of the war is shaped by the videos people outside of combat can watch. This means that drones are a useful tool for controlling the perception of performance in war. “And because Russians have ceded the information environment to the Ukrainians, the Ukrainians can run with it,” Bendett added.
Modern drones are used by militaries for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or, in general, scouting. When equipped with regular and infrared cameras, these drones allow remote operators to look for people and vehicles in daylight and at night. Militaries can use drones to find the coordinates of military targets, like a tank or a group of soldiers. If the drone is armed, a military can also use it to attack the targets it finds.
As sensitive military information, drone footage is classified by default, making any public release a deliberate choice. Both the U.S. and Israel, which have used military drones for decades, have selectively released video captured by drones. In 2008, the Israel Defense Forces released footage of a drone strike on what it claimed were terror operatives moving missiles in Gaza—one way to contest evidence that the drone strike targeted civilians.
Drone footage can shape public perception of military power and precision. Describing the use of drone footage by both Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020’s Nagorno-Karabakh war, analysts Michael Kofman and Leonid Nersisyan wrote: “A social media feed composed largely of drone video footage could lead one to believe in the dominance of such systems, even in a conflict where many casualties are still inflicted by armor, artillery and multiple launch rocket systems.”
As Putin’s war in Ukraine continues, it is increasingly likely that Russia’s Ministry of Defense will continue to release drone footage in an attempt to tell similar stories of competence and precision. And while drone footage will continue to be useful to tell the story of the war, the primary use of drones will be fulfilling their original missions, as flying scouts, sometimes armed, that can find targets for other, deadlier weapons.
The Russian military has had years of experience using drones, both in Syria and in support of separatists fighting Ukraine over the Donetsk region. Drones in Syria faced few modern anti-air defenses, so they could operate with little risk of being shot down. Drone tactics developed for open skies are hard to adapt to the more constrained airspace of a large war against a modern military.
As a result, much of the documented evidence of Russian drones in combat comes through images shared on social media of shot down, crashed, or destroyed machines. The images of destroyed drones suggest a broad range of machines used by Russia, even if Russia has been slow to share video from its drone strikes.
These shot-down drones include Forpost-R, an armed scout based on an Israeli design, which can be used for attacks like Ukraine’s Bayraktar. Other Russian drones observed shot down in the war include Orlan-10s, a small scout used as an artillery spotter. Without spotters directing fire, it is harder to use artillery accurately, especially against moving targets.
Beyond the spotter drones, observers have reported wreckage of Kub loitering munitions, which are missiles in the airframe of a drone. These weapons, in a similar fashion to the U.S.-made Switchblade drones delivered to Ukraine, potentially let small units of soldiers attack targets miles away from where they are launched.
Both Russia and Ukraine have already supplemented their use of military drones with hobbyist and commercial drone models. As the supply of drones built for war dwindles with continued fighting, over the course of the war, experts expect an increased military reliance on commercial models, provided those drones are still available for purchase.
“Let’s say Russians exaggerated everything …. In modern combat, they would still need to come up with that capability right away or yesterday, because that’s how wars are fought,” Bendett said. Drones have “become organic to warfare.”
And even if the Russians didn’t have the same drone capability “that they bragged about,” he said, “they will need to acquire drones somewhere and put them out there.”
Part one in the series, here. Part two, here. Part three, here.
14. Zelenskyy recalls Ukraine’s ambassadors to Morocco and Georgia
Zelenskyy recalls Ukraine’s ambassadors to Morocco and Georgia
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has recalled Ukraine’s ambassadors to Morocco and Georgia, suggesting the diplomats had not done enough to convince those countries to punish Russia for its invasion last month.
“With all due respect, if there won’t be weapons, won’t be sanctions, won’t be restrictions for Russian business, then please look for other work,” Zelenskyy said during a nighttime video address to the nation on Wednesday.
“I am waiting for concrete results in the coming days from the work of our representatives in Latin America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Africa,” he added.
Zelenskyy, who has been addressing parliaments around the world via video link urging countries to send more money and arms, called diplomacy “one of the key fronts” in the battle to win the war against Russia. He also said he was expecting results from Ukraine’s military attaches in embassies abroad.
His comments came as a delegation of politicians from Ukraine’s parliament visited Washington to push the United States for increased assistance, saying their country needs more military equipment, more financial help and tougher sanctions against Russia.
The administration of US President Joe Biden has led the Western response to the February 24 invasion, levelling unprecedented sanctions against Russia and funnelling weapons and aid to Ukraine.
Now in its fifth week, the war has so far killed thousands of people and wounded even more, with some four million forced to flee abroad.
15. Vladimir Putin’s New Alter Ego Is Igor Strelkov
Excerpts:
If there’s any kind of logic to Putin’s recent actions, after all, it’s the warped logic of Strelkov, the empire-or-death logic. Theirs is now a kinship of war criminals: Strelkov is wanted by the Dutch authorities for his alleged role in the 2014 downing of a Malaysian passenger airliner over eastern Ukraine, and Putin will never be safe from prosecution for the near-complete destruction of Ukrainian cities such as Mariupol and Volnovakha. If Putin loses the war, Strelkov’s relative safety in Moscow will end, too. For the former “defense minister,” defeat is no abstract notion — it’s an existential threat. That applies to Putin, too.
As I read Strelkov’s impassioned commentary from the sidelines, I wish I’d paid more attention to his ramblings earlier. I wish I’d noticed the clear connection between his ideas and Putin’s increasing history obsession, between Strelkov’s insistence that the very name “Ukraine” be stamped out and replaced with Malorossia — Little Russia — and Putin’s contempt for Ukrainians as a people. If I’d noticed how close the two men’s beliefs had grown, I wouldn’t have misjudged Putin's determination to wreck two countries — the neighboring one and his own, my own — in the name of an apocryphal reading of history. I fear there’s no going back for the dictator now: He has to go where Strelkov has been waiting for him all these years. And even if there are seeming victories along the way, this road leads toward the bitterest defeat.
Vladimir Putin’s New Alter Ego Is Igor Strelkov
Russia’s president has come around to the twisted views of the man who started the conflict in Eastern Ukraine in 2014.
March 30, 2022, 3:00 AM EDT
Amid the carnage of war in Ukraine, one man appears to feel grimly vindicated, if not quite happy about how things have turned out — the man who played an outsize role in starting the conflict in 2014, Igor Girkin, also known as Strelkov.
Few people are hated as much in Ukraine as Strelkov (I’ll use his nom-de-guerre throughout, since he prefers it to his real name). In April 2014, after Ukraine’s provisional government said it would send troops to put down pro-Russian revolts in eastern Ukraine, Strelkov crossed the border from Russia with about 50 men and wreaked enough havoc to pull the Russian military into a conflict that Vladimir Putin initially was reluctant to enter. He almost got Putin to do in 2014 what he is doing now, but Strelkov received no thanks from the Kremlin, was marginalized and became — so it seemed — little more than a bitter fringe figure.
The conventional wisdom saw Putin as a wily, modern strongman more interested in self-preservation and the enrichment of his clique than in any kind of ideology. By contrast, Strelkov was a romantic believer in a version of the Russian Empire that has never really existed outside of nostalgic pseudo-historical literature. Putin pursued a bureaucratic, then a political, career and consolidated power while Strelkov reconstructed historical battles as a hobby and fought as a volunteer in Transnistria and the former Yugoslavia. And yet in 2022, Putin is so besotted with history that he can talk of little else; to a large extent, he’s come around to Strelkov’s worldview, ditching his cynicism and pragmatism for a kind of murderous idealism.
“I have written more than once that the president is ‘sitting on two chairs that are gradually moving apart under his butt’,” Strelkov wrote recently on his Telegram channel.
The chairs were a patriotic state ideology, represented by all kinds of military and civilian officials, and a ‘liberal-oligarchic’ economic model. Your humble servant has also cautioned that, while one could be comfortable sitting like that before the Crimea events, it was no longer sustainable, and the president would have to choose a chair — or fall down in between. And now — incredibly late, but still — the choice has been made.
Indeed, Putin appears to be past caring about the open economy he maintained for the first 21 years of his rule. He certainly cares little about the fortunes of the wealthiest Russians, or about the effect of unprecedented Western sanctions on everyone in Russia, from his closest friends to millions of ordinary workers. He’s no longer listening to “systemic liberals” around him, the architects of Russia’s relative oil-fueled prosperity that underpinned Putin’s popular support. The recent headlong emigration of a key “syslib,” Anatoly Chubais, a man to whom Putin in large part owes his rise, is a sign that this group no longer has a place in Putin’s system of power.
This metamorphosis makes Strelkov’s utterances a rare window on what Putin might do next as he continues his spiritual and intellectual journey toward the loony edge Strelkov has always inhabited — a journey that ends when the two become indistinguishable.
When Strelkov’s tiny group of fighters, funded apparently by the wealthy nationalist Konstantin Malofeev, took control of the Ukrainian town of Slavyansk in 2014, it became a magnet for local separatists, like-minded Russian volunteers and out-of-uniform soldiers acting as mercenaries. Strelkov quickly rose to “defense minister” of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, commanding a substantial ragtag force. As the regular Ukrainian army caught its stride and pushed back against Strelkov’s fighters, the Russian resorted to the tactic that serves the Ukrainians well in the current conflict: He led the rebel army into the city of Donetsk, where street-by-street urban combat would have been too costly for the Ukrainians. Then Putin reluctantly sent Russian troops to support the separatists — their defeat would have undermined the popular euphoria that gave him his best-ever poll numbers after the Crimea annexation.
Strelkov, however, was too uncompromisingly odious a figure for Putin to support or even tolerate. He was ousted as “minister” in Aug. 2014, as Putin’s aide Vladislav Surkov became “curator” of the separatist “people’s republics,” with a brief to make them as self-reliant as possible, and thus less costly for Russia. Putin appeared to be interested in minimizing all kinds of costs, including foreign policy ones; he wanted a deal with the West, and he got one in the form of the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015, brokered by the leaders of Germany and France.
“The biggest tragedy for the residents of Donbas is that the founding referenda of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s republics weren’t immediately recognized by Russia like Crimea’s referendum,” Strelkov told an interviewer at the time, complaining that the Kremlin didn’t share his enthusiasm for further military action. “They never thought their uprising would lead to an outcome as disgraceful as the Minsk agreements.”
Eight years later, Putin gave up on Minsk and recognized the “people’s republics,” as if Strelkov’s pleas have only just reached his ears.
The time lapse in following Strelkov’s advice appears to be hurting Vladimir the invader. The former “defense minister,” for example, never would have advised the Russian dictator to go into Ukraine as blithely as he’s done: He knew from his remaining sources in the separatist statelets that Ukrainians were much better prepared to resist now than they were eight years ago. Thus his often sarcastic criticism of Russia’s invasion planning. Responding to the Russian General Staff’s recent assertion that Russia never planned to storm big Ukrainian cities, Strelkov wrote:
Agreed: They just planned to occupy them — Kharkov, Chernihiv, Kyiv, the whole list. The occupation didn’t quite work out, but they really didn’t plan to storm — and so didn’t pull together the necessary forces.
What would Strelkov do differently? Firstly, give up the official pretense of a “special military operation” and start using the word “war.” No more talk of “demilitarization and denazification.” Instead, an existential war to the death. This framing, Strelkov’s thinking goes, would allow a mobilization of the much more numerous military force needed to conquer and hold Ukraine. He would withdraw official recognition from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and his government as a whole, declaring them fair game. He would pull out all the stops to achieve total victory, because the only alternative to it is an equally total defeat. Strelkov has suggested that Putin would arrive at the same conclusions by his usual circuitous route — just as he arrived at the inevitability of the February invasion.
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If there’s any kind of logic to Putin’s recent actions, after all, it’s the warped logic of Strelkov, the empire-or-death logic. Theirs is now a kinship of war criminals: Strelkov is wanted by the Dutch authorities for his alleged role in the 2014 downing of a Malaysian passenger airliner over eastern Ukraine, and Putin will never be safe from prosecution for the near-complete destruction of Ukrainian cities such as Mariupol and Volnovakha. If Putin loses the war, Strelkov’s relative safety in Moscow will end, too. For the former “defense minister,” defeat is no abstract notion — it’s an existential threat. That applies to Putin, too.
As I read Strelkov’s impassioned commentary from the sidelines, I wish I’d paid more attention to his ramblings earlier. I wish I’d noticed the clear connection between his ideas and Putin’s increasing history obsession, between Strelkov’s insistence that the very name “Ukraine” be stamped out and replaced with Malorossia — Little Russia — and Putin’s contempt for Ukrainians as a people. If I’d noticed how close the two men’s beliefs had grown, I wouldn’t have misjudged Putin's determination to wreck two countries — the neighboring one and his own, my own — in the name of an apocryphal reading of history. I fear there’s no going back for the dictator now: He has to go where Strelkov has been waiting for him all these years. And even if there are seeming victories along the way, this road leads toward the bitterest defeat.
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
To contact the author of this story:
To contact the editor responsible for this story:
16. Putin Has Admitted He Can't Conquer Ukraine
Excerpts:
Putin is long practiced in land-grabs – in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine itself. The big question of any peace deal is whether Putin can hang onto his conquests and snatchings. Specifically, will Ukraine accept: Putin’s 2014 Anschluss of the Crimea; the secessionism Putin stirred up on Donetsk and Luhansk and the ‘people’s republics’ he created there; and Russia’s military conquests north of Crimea and in the rest of Donbas in this war.
Zelensky may give on the Crimea. Ukraine is unlikely to ever get it back, and if it helps end the war, it might be worth formally accepting its loss. The tougher question is if Russia can conquer Donbas beyond Donetsk and Luhansk, will the Ukrainians accept that in a peace deal? If Ukraine fights as well as it has in the last month, the Russians might not even accomplish that more limited goal and Zelensky can negotiate harder.
War resolution is ultimately a bargain. Unconditional surrender is rare, and Ukraine cannot defeat Russia like that. But it can tilt the negotiations in its direction by winning on the ground, and Putin has, this week admitted Ukraine’s success at doing so.
Putin Has Admitted He Can't Conquer Ukraine
Russia’s General Offensive in Ukraine Has Culminated, and Putin is Desperate – With this week’s announcement that Russia will shift its offensive operations to eastern Ukraine – to ‘liberate Donbas’ – Russian President Vladimir Putin has admitted that he can no longer win the war on the terms he set out at its opening.
Putin’s war has ground to a halt. The Russian army originally attacked along three ‘axes’ – from Belarus in the north toward the Ukrainian capital, from the east to take Donbas, and from the south to capture Ukraine’s Black Sea coast, particularly Odesa. The former and the latter are now beyond Russia’s ability with the forces planned for the war. To bring new units into the theater would reduce commitments elsewhere along Russia’s long frontier, or require the extensive use of conscripts, with the attendant problems of morale, desertion, and family resistance back home. (That latter issue grew into a major problem for the Soviet army’s war in Afghanistan in the 1980s).
So Putin’s options were to either escalate dramatically in an effort to break the stalemate or to scale back his war aims. There were recent hints he might escalate with a weapon of mass destruction, but NATO signaled strongly in the last week that it might directly intervene in the war if Putin did that. The war might have then slid toward a nuclear stand-off and jeopardized Putin’s authority at home. Putin wisely chooses to partially de-escalate.
This is not because Putin has changed his opinion of Ukraine as a ‘fake nation,’ but rather because he is militarily over-extended. De-escalation has been forced on him by events and might change if Russia’s fortunes improve in Donbas. But for the moment this is a major step forward for Ukraine as Putin has effectively given up on regime change and demilitarization.
‘Denazification’ (Regime Change)
The ‘denazification’ of Ukraine – by which Putin presumably meant regime change, specifically the deposition of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky – is now impossible. The Ukrainian government as a reasonably liberal democracy independent of Russia and tilting toward the West will survive.
This was always an absurd argument. Zelensky is Jewish, so accusing him of nazi sympathies was a bizarre rationale. Ukraine is shaky democracy with a major corruption problem, but it is significantly freer than Russia and has moved in the right direction in the last decade. It does have a far-right, as most Western countries do, but Russia has provided no evidence of its outlandish claims that Ukraine engages in ‘genocide’ against Russian-speakers in Ukraine.
Demilitarization
This too is now impossible. Post-war Ukraine will likely not join NATO. That seems to be emerging as a core Ukrainian concession for a peace deal. Ukraine may get a path into the European Union. That will provide a hint of external security. It would be awkward for other EU members to watch as one of their own was invaded. And Finland and Sweden are not in NATO but are in the EU, so this might be a workable compromise.
But Putin’s original goal was to disarm Ukraine by annihilating its military. That is now impractical. Ukraine’s army has fought the Russians to a standstill. Indeed, it has even prosecuted limited offensives. Ukraine is also awash in high-end Western military hardware. It now has one of the best militaries in Europe, an deliciously ironic outcome for Putin.
Zelensky will obviously not give this up. Indeed, the Ukrainian military and population would reject such a move if Zelensky even tried it.
Territorial Acquisition
Putin is long practiced in land-grabs – in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine itself. The big question of any peace deal is whether Putin can hang onto his conquests and snatchings. Specifically, will Ukraine accept: Putin’s 2014 Anschluss of the Crimea; the secessionism Putin stirred up on Donetsk and Luhansk and the ‘people’s republics’ he created there; and Russia’s military conquests north of Crimea and in the rest of Donbas in this war.
Zelensky may give on the Crimea. Ukraine is unlikely to ever get it back, and if it helps end the war, it might be worth formally accepting its loss. The tougher question is if Russia can conquer Donbas beyond Donetsk and Luhansk, will the Ukrainians accept that in a peace deal? If Ukraine fights as well as it has in the last month, the Russians might not even accomplish that more limited goal and Zelensky can negotiate harder.
War resolution is ultimately a bargain. Unconditional surrender is rare, and Ukraine cannot defeat Russia like that. But it can tilt the negotiations in its direction by winning on the ground, and Putin has, this week admitted Ukraine’s success at doing so.
Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; website) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University. Dr. Kelly is a 1945 Contributing Editor as well.
17. U.K. intelligence chief says Putin's Plan B is "more barbarity against civilians" in Ukraine
I fear for the Ukrainian people. But we cannot allow this fear to prevent us from providing all the support to Ukraine that we can. Those who argue that we should not provide the support to prevent Putin from targeting civilians are mistaken about Putin's intent. A decision to stop arming Ukraine will not lead to safety for civilians. The idea that we are the ones creating the moral hazard by providing arms that the civilian resistance might use is misinformed.
U.K. intelligence chief says Putin's Plan B is "more barbarity against civilians" in Ukraine
Axios · by Rebecca Falconer · March 31, 2022
U.S. and British intelligence officials believe Russian President Vladimir Putin has "massively misjudged" the economic and military consequences of his forces invading Ukraine.
State of play: The head of British intelligence agency GCHQ said in a rare address Thursday that Putin was trying to follow through on his plan, but "it is failing." So "his Plan B has been more barbarity against civilians and cities," GCHQ director Jeremy Fleming said in his address in Canberra, Australia.
- "[I]t increasingly looks like Putin has massively misjudged the situation," Fleming said. "It's clear he misjudged the resistance of the Ukrainian people. He underestimated the strength of the coalition his actions would galvanise. He under-played the economic consequences of the sanctions regime. He over-estimated the abilities of his military to secure a rapid victory.
"We've seen Russian soldiers — short of weapons and morale — refusing to carry out orders, sabotaging their own equipment and even accidentally shooting down their own aircraft."
— GCHQ head Jeremy Fleming
Meanwhile, Pentagon press secretary John Kirby said the U.S. concurred with reports that Putin has "not been fully informed" by his advisers about the developments of the war in Ukraine.
Between the lines: White House communications director Kate Bedingfield said at a briefing Wednesday that recently declassified U.S. intelligence showed "Putin felt misled by the Russian military, which has resulted in persistent tension between Putin and his military leadership."
- "We believe that Putin is being misinformed by his advisors about how badly the Russian military is performing and how the Russian economy is being crippled by sanctions because his senior advisors are too afraid to tell him the truth," Bedingfield said.
- "So it is increasingly clear that Putin's war has been a strategic blunder that has left Russia weaker over the long term and increasingly isolated on the world stage."
The bottom line, via Fleming: Even though Western intelligence officials "believe Putin's advisers are afraid to tell him the truth, what's going on and the extent of these misjudgements must be crystal clear to the regime."
Axios · by Rebecca Falconer · March 31, 2022
18. The upcoming defense strategy dubs Russia an 'acute threat.' What does that mean?
"Mushy?" I like mushy. I think there is a lot to work on even in the 2 pages of the fact sheet.
Everyone is a critic and tells us what they do not like or that their pet agenda was not included (my bias: Irregular Warfare was not specifically mentioned). But I think there is a lot to draw from even those two pages and if I were a planner I think I could connect a lot of dots and develop supporting plans from the not overly descriptive summary.
I like to think of the short fact sheet like Grant's order to Sherman.
Excerpts:
Cancian pointed out that the fact sheet also references “changes in global climate and other dangerous transboundary threats, including pandemics” — two areas of emphasis that would not likely be a major focus for the Pentagon if former President Donald Trump had won the 2020 election.
Both Cancian and Pettyjohn said they would be looking for the full, unclassified strategy to lay out clear objectives for how it will accomplish its goals.
“I look at those two pages, and it’s pretty mushy,” Cancian said. “I hope that the full document has more substance to it than these two pages.”
The Pentagon has made “integrated deterrence” the cornerstone of the new strategy, and it has emerged as the latest buzzword used by senior leaders. But because the concept calls for leveraging other US agencies or international partners in order to amass power, one major question moving forward, according to Pettyjohn, is “is everybody else going to get on board with that?”
The upcoming defense strategy dubs Russia an 'acute threat.' What does that mean? - Breaking Defense
“Acute is a sharper, sort of more immediate word,” said Mark Cancian, a senior adviser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “I think that's a response to Ukraine, and the fact that this is not a long term challenge, it is immediate [and] happening today.”
U.S. Paratroopers assigned to 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division conduct sling load training in Zamość, Poland, March 18, 2022.(US Marine Corps/Sgt. James Bourgeois)
WASHINGTON: Defense policy wonks, get ready to add the phrase “acute threat” to your Pentagon bingo card.
That’s the term Defense Department leaders are using to describe Russia in its new defense strategy and budget. It’s an attempt to differentiate the very near-term threat of Russia from the longer-term, whole of government challenge of China, and you’re about to start hearing it everywhere.
“Even as we confront Russia’s malign activities, the defense strategy describes how the department will act urgently to sustain and strengthen deterrence with the [People’s Republic of China] as our most consequential strategic competitor and pacing challenge,” she said. China “has the military, economic and technological potential to challenge the international system and our interests within it.”
The Pentagon delivered the classified version of the National Defense Strategy to Capitol Hill on Monday in tandem with the release of the FY23 budget — an attempt to ensure that the proposed spending plan is viewed by lawmakers as being closely linked to the strategy.
The unclassified version will be released “in the coming months,” Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl tweeted Monday evening. In the meantime, those without a security clearance will have to be content with the two-page fact sheet on the new strategy released by the Pentagon on Monday.
The Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy marked a distinct shift in US defense policy, stipulating that the Pentagon would pivot towards focusing on its greatest strategic competitor: China.
While the Biden administration’s strategy seems to uphold that view, calling Russia an “acute threat” is a new turn of phrase — and one that has been used not only by Hicks during budget briefings, but also by senior leaders such as Pentagon Comptroller Mike McCord, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall and Army budget director Maj. Gen. Mark Bennett.
So what does that mean?
“Acute is a sharper, sort of more immediate word,” said Mark Cancian, a senior adviser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “I think that’s a response to Ukraine, and the fact that this is not a long term challenge, it is immediate, happening today.”
Stacie Pettyjohn, director of the defense programs at the Center for a New American Security, agreed that the change in terminology likely reflects the ongoing war in Ukraine, signaling the “urgent, pressing threat” posed by Russia due to its role in launching the conflict.
“But what I don’t like about it is just that it sort of implies to me that it is going to be acute, but that you’re going to move past it quickly. It’s not something chronic,” she said.
The idea of Russia as the “second-place” threat to China was echoed by Rear Adm. John Gumbleton, the deputy assistant Navy secretary for budget, during a budget briefing on Monday.
“This budget gets after a near-peer competitor, of which Russia is not,” he told reporters. “Now, they have nuclear weapons and that’s concerning, but they are not a near-peer competitor.”
Pettyjohn said Russia’s stockpile of nuclear weapons suggests that it should be not be underestimated in US strategy, even as if it continues to decline both militarily and economically — a trajectory that will likely worsen in the future as it tries to recover from its losses during its war with Ukraine and the crippling sanctions that have shut it out from the global market.
“[The strategy] seems a bit dismissive of Russia. And Russia isn’t the same type of threat [as China], but it also could potentially be a more dangerous threat as a declining power — often it’s states that are facing this irreversible type of decline that lash out,” Pettyjohn said. “There is a real risk, I think, of escalation with what’s happening in Ukraine should the West decide to intervene, or depending on what happens on the ground.”
Experts Looking For Strategic Clarity After A “Pretty Mushy” Fact Sheet
There appears to be a great deal of continuity between the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the upcoming version, at least based on the preliminary information provided in the fact sheet.
China continues to be the pacing threat for the US military, and Hicks said the new strategy retains the same force sizing construct as the 2018 version: How can the US military defeat a major power in a conflict, while also deterring opportunistic aggression by a second entity elsewhere?
“Our classified NDS that we’ve shared with Congress goes into great, great detail in how we come at that issue of force sizing and provides a lot of forward-looking analysis in terms of how we will measure ourselves,” she said Monday.
“It’s very often in this town that folks are focused on a particular number — even dollar values but also numbers of platforms. We absolutely took a hard-nosed analytic look at what are the effects that we can create, and we use that to drive us in this strategy.”
The fact sheet lays out three ways that the department will achieve its goals:
- Integrated deterrence, which entails “developing and combining our strengths to maximum effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of U.S. national power, and our unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships.”
- Campaigning, the term the department is using to describe a new way of operating forces, so as to complicate an adversary’s military preparations and pose logistics challenges
- Building enduring advantages, which involves internal changes such as acquisition reform or investments in professional development
Cancian pointed out that the fact sheet also references “changes in global climate and other dangerous transboundary threats, including pandemics” — two areas of emphasis that would not likely be a major focus for the Pentagon if former President Donald Trump had won the 2020 election.
Both Cancian and Pettyjohn said they would be looking for the full, unclassified strategy to lay out clear objectives for how it will accomplish its goals.
“I look at those two pages, and it’s pretty mushy,” Cancian said. “I hope that the full document has more substance to it than these two pages.”
The Pentagon has made “integrated deterrence” the cornerstone of the new strategy, and it has emerged as the latest buzzword used by senior leaders. But because the concept calls for leveraging other US agencies or international partners in order to amass power, one major question moving forward, according to Pettyjohn, is “is everybody else going to get on board with that?”
Justin Katz and Andrew Eversden contributed to this report.
19. Ukrainian president says defense is at a 'turning point'
The master class in strategic communications continues.
Excerpts:
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made the case directly to U.S. President Joe Biden.
“If we really are fighting for freedom and in defense of democracy together, then we have a right to demand help in this difficult turning point. Tanks, aircraft, artillery systems. Freedom should be armed no worse than tyranny,” Zelenskyy said in his nightly video address to the nation, which he delivered standing in the dark outside the dimly lit presidential offices in Kyiv. He thanked the U.S. for an additional $500 million in aid that was announced Wednesday.
Ukrainian president says defense is at a 'turning point'
AP · by NEBI QENA and YURAS KARMANAU · March 31, 2022
KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Ukraine’s president said his country’s defense against the Russian invasion was at a “turning point” and again pressed the United States for more help, hours after the Kremlin’s forces reneged on a pledge to scale back some of their operations.
Russian bombardment of areas around Kyiv and the northern city of Chernihiv and intensified attacks elsewhere in the country further undermined hopes for progress toward ending the bloody conflict that has devolved into a war of attrition. Civilians trapped in besieged cities have shouldered some of the worst suffering, though both sides said Thursday they would attempt another evacuation from the port city of Mariupol.
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Talks between Ukraine and Russia were set to resume Friday by video, according to the head of the Ukrainian delegation, David Arakhamia.
A delegation of Ukrainian lawmakers visited Washington on Wednesday to push for more U.S. assistance, saying their nation needs more military equipment, more financial help and tougher sanctions against Russia.
“We need to kick Russian soldiers off our land, and for that we need all, all possible weapons,” Ukrainian parliament member Anastasia Radina said at a news conference at the Ukrainian Embassy.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made the case directly to U.S. President Joe Biden.
“If we really are fighting for freedom and in defense of democracy together, then we have a right to demand help in this difficult turning point. Tanks, aircraft, artillery systems. Freedom should be armed no worse than tyranny,” Zelenskyy said in his nightly video address to the nation, which he delivered standing in the dark outside the dimly lit presidential offices in Kyiv. He thanked the U.S. for an additional $500 million in aid that was announced Wednesday.
There seemed little faith that Russia and Ukraine will resolve the conflict soon, particularly after the Russian military’s about-face and its most recent attacks.
Russia said Tuesday that it would de-escalate operations near Kyiv and Chernihiv to “increase mutual trust and create conditions for further negotiations.” Zelenskyy and the West were skeptical. Soon after, Ukrainian officials reported that Russian shelling was hitting homes, stores, libraries and other civilian sites in or near those areas.
Britain’s Defense Ministry also confirmed “significant Russian shelling and missile strikes” around Chernihiv.
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It said Thursday that “Russian forces continue to hold positions to the east and west of Kyiv despite the withdrawal of a limited number of units. Heavy fighting will likely take place in the suburbs of the city in coming days.”
Russian troops also stepped up their attacks on the Donbas region in the east and around the city of Izyum, which lies on a key route to the Donbas, after redeploying units from other areas, the Ukrainian side said.
Olexander Lomako, secretary of the Chernihiv city council, said the Russian announcement turned out to be “a complete lie.”
“At night they didn’t decrease, but vice versa increased the intensity of military action,” Lomako said.
In a speech in the Australian capital Canberra, Jeremy Fleming, who heads the GCHQ electronic spy agency, said President Vladimir Putin had apparently “massively misjudged” the invasion, he said. Although Putin’s advisers appeared to be too afraid to tell the truth, the “extent of these misjudgments must be crystal clear to the regime,” he said.
Five weeks into the invasion that has left thousands dead, the number of Ukrainians fleeing the country topped a staggering 4 million, half of them children, according to the United Nations.
“I do not know if we can still believe the Russians,” Nikolay Nazarov, a refugee from Ukraine, said as he pushed his father’s wheelchair at a border crossing into Poland. “I think more escalation will occur in eastern Ukraine. That is why we cannot go back to Kharkiv.”
Zelenskyy said the continuing negotiations with Russia were only “words without specifics.” He said Ukraine was preparing for concentrated new strikes on the Donbas.
Zelenskyy also said he had recalled Ukraine’s ambassadors to Georgia and Morocco, suggesting they had not done enough to persuade those countries to support Ukraine and punish Russia for the invasion.
“With all due respect, if there won’t be weapons, won’t be sanctions, won’t be restrictions for Russian business, then please look for other work,” he said.
During talks Tuesday in Istanbul, the faint outlines of a possible peace agreement seemed to emerge when the Ukrainian delegation offered a framework under which the country would declare itself neutral — dropping its bid to join NATO, as Moscow has long demanded — in return for security guarantees from a group of other nations.
Top Russian officials responded positively, with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov saying Wednesday that Ukraine’s willingness to accept neutrality and look outside NATO for security represents “significant progress,” according to Russian news agencies.
But those statements were followed by attacks.
Oleksandr Pavliuk, head of the Kyiv region military administration, said Russian shells targeted residential areas and civilian infrastructure in the Bucha, Brovary and Vyshhorod regions around the capital.
Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov said the military also targeted fuel depots in two towns in central Ukraine with air-launched long-range cruise missiles. Russian forces hit a Ukrainian special forces headquarters in the southern Mykolaiv region, he said, and two ammunition depots in the Donetsk region, in the Donbas.
In southern Ukraine, a Russian missile destroyed a fuel depot in Dnipro, the country’s fourth-largest city, regional officials said.
The U.S. said Russia had begun to reposition less than 20% of its troops that had been arrayed around Kyiv. Pentagon press secretary John Kirby said troops from there and some other zones began moving mostly to the north, and some went into neighboring Belarus. Kirby said it appeared Russia planned to resupply them and send them back into Ukraine, but it is not clear where.
The Ukrainian military said some Russian airborne units were believed to have withdrawn into Belarus.
Top Russian military officials say their main goal now is the “liberation” of the Donbas, the predominantly Russian-speaking industrial heartland where Moscow-backed separatists have been battling Ukrainian forces since 2014. Some analysts have suggested that the focus on the Donbas and the pledge to de-escalate may merely be an effort to put a positive spin on reality since Moscow’s ground forces have become bogged down and taken heavy losses.
The Russians also are expected to try to blockade Chernihiv.
Russian forces have already been blockading Mariupol, a key port in the south, for weeks. The city has seen some of the worst devastation of the war and many attempts to implement safe evacuation corridors have collapsed. Ukraine accused Russian forces last week of seizing bus drivers and rescue workers headed to Mariupol.
The Russian military said it committed to a localized cease-fire along the route from Mariupol to the Ukrainian-held city of Zaporizhzhia from Thursday morning.
Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk said that Ukraine was sending out 45 buses to collect people. She said the International Committee of the Red Cross was acting as an intermediary.
Similar evacuation efforts have been planned before and collapsed amid recriminations over fighting along the route.
Civilians who have managed to leave the city have typically done so using private cars, but the number of drivable vehicles left in Mariupol has dwindled and fuel stocks are low.
Russia has also operated its own evacuations from territory it has captured in Mariupol. Ukraine alleges Russia is sending its citizens to “filtration camps” in separatist-controlled eastern Ukraine and then forcibly taking people to Russia.
The U.N. is looking into those allegations.
___
Karmanau reported from Lviv, Ukraine. Associated Press journalists around the world contributed to this report.
___
AP · by NEBI QENA and YURAS KARMANAU · March 31, 2022
20. "Guide to Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great-Power Competition": What it actually says
"Guide to Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great-Power Competition": What it actually says - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Artist's concept of the next generation of US land-based intercontinental ballistic missile, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent. Credit: Northrop Grumman
A February 2, 2022, article, “US defense to its workforce: Nuclear war can be won,” in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, dabbles in political science, history, deterrence theory, and grand strategy. The authors, university physicists Alan Kaptanoglu and Stewart Prager, offer their critique of the book, Guide to Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great-Power Competition. Their effort to cherry-pick incomplete quotes and mischaracterize the arguments of more than 20 leading practitioners and experts in the more than 440 pages of the book’s text deserve a rebuttal. I served as editor and a contributing author of “the guide” and speak for myself in offering the discussion below.
Kaptanoglu and Prager open their critique by quoting the November 21, 1985, Joint Soviet-United States Statement on the Summit Meeting in Geneva in which General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan outlined the results of a summit that was intended, by President Reagan, to dramatically limit or eliminate all nuclear weapons. Concerning security, the statement reads:
The sides, having discussed key security issues, and conscious of the special responsibility of the USSR and the US for maintaining peace, have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the US could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.
The guide to Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great Power Competition
As Martin Anderson and Annelise Anderson chronicle in their superb book, Reagan’s Secret War: The Untold Story of His Fight to Save the World from Nuclear Disaster, General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan faced the threat of a nuclear war that, if fought, would see the use of up to 65,000 nuclear weapons. Given their circumstances, neither man could have imagined that the number of deployed Russian and American nuclear weapons would decline by more than 90 percent in the immediate decades following their time in office. But it did!
It is important to understand the context in which these leaders sought arms reductions and in which President Reagan refused to negotiate away the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—perhaps the disarmament community’s single most hated and lampooned program.
It is certainly ironic that two advocates of nuclear disarmament would choose a quote from the very president whose stubborn refusal to give up a space-based missile defense system was likely responsible for the failure of the Soviet Union and the United States to reach an agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons.
False arguments. Unlike the vast majority of contributors to the guide, neither Kaptanoglu nor Prager, according to their biographies, have experience in the nuclear enterprise. While they are certainly intelligent men and accomplished in their own fields, they are novices on the topic of nuclear deterrence. Where Kaptanoglu and Prager act as arm-chair generals, the contributors to the guide were actual generals, admirals, colonels, presidential appointees, and civil servants actively engaged in planning and decision-making during and after the Cold War.
Kaptanoglu and Prager assert the guide contains “misrepresentations, omissions, and questionable policy.” With few exceptions, they inaccurately characterize the arguments made in the guide. I will take their arguments in the order and fashion they were offered.
A nuclear war can be fought and won. Kaptanoglu and Prager begin by accusing my coauthors and me of arguing that a nuclear war can be fought and won. They do this by quoting us as saying, “US strategic nuclear forces might be expected to perform the following functions … endurance throughout the various phases of a protracted (and presumably limited) nuclear war … or establish escalation dominance and nuclear-strategic superiority over any prospective opponent.” This, however, is a disingenuous effort to selectively create a quote that changes the meaning of the actual discussion.
In a section titled, “Arguments Pro and Con,” Steve Cimbala writes:
Whether current or prospective US nuclear forces are adequate depends upon their missions and tasking. US strategic nuclear forces might be expected to perform the following functions on a graduated scale of complexity: (1) guarantee assured retaliation against any aggressor; (2) provide for assured retaliation plus flexible targeting and “withholds” for follow-on attacks and interwar coercive bargaining; (3) provide for assured retaliation, flexible response, and endurance throughout the various phases of a protracted (and presumably limited) nuclear war; or (4) establish escalation dominance and nuclear-strategic superiority over any prospective opponent, including the capability to deny the attacker his objectives by deployment of highly competent missile defenses.
This is certainly not the argument for nuclear warfighting Kaptanoglu and Prager lead you to believe. Cimbala goes on to offer a critique of the view he just explained, providing the balance Kaptanoglu and Prager argue does not exist.
The reality of a possible nuclear conflict today is dramatically different than during the Cold War. Nuclear disarmament advocates’ hindsight bias makes it difficult to see that the United States is operating in a different strategic environment. There is no reliable guarantee that general deterrence will hold because nuclear powers fear thousands of intercontinental ballistic missile warheads reigning down on their cities. Those arsenals no longer exist.
Today, as Nikolai Sokov correctly explains, Russia sees the use of one or a small number of non-strategic nuclear weapons—likely low-yield—as a means to de-escalate a conflict. This leaves the United States no choice but to plan to fight and win a nuclear war, but one that is very different from the war contemplated by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. The nuclear disarmament community’s thinking is stuck in an historical period that is a far cry from our present reality.
It is also important to keep in mind the task of the United States military. According to Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, “The US Armed Forces fulfill unique and crucial roles, defending the US against all adversaries while serving the Nation as a bulwark and the guarantor of its security and independence.” Within the military, it is common to say, we deter adversaries if possible and defeat them if necessary. This is the mission Congress has mandated the military to perform and one the American people expect.
As President Biden said, “We will ensure our armed forces are equipped to deter our adversaries.” He added that if deterrence fails, “The United States will never hesitate to use force when required to defend our vital national interests.”
Contrary to the insinuation of Kaptanoglu and Prager, no member of the United States military desires war, especially nuclear war, but preparing for the worst case is necessary if we seek to prevent it. Deterrence is not effective if an adversary believes the United States lacks the will to fight. In fact, it is will, not capability, that matters most to the credibility of deterrence. Thus, it is specious to insinuate some aggressive and nefarious effort on our part or the Department of Defense.
The reality of nuclear war. We are then chastised for not offering a detailed discussion of nuclear weapon effects. But this is not the point of the book. Lt. Gen. Tom Bussiere, US Strategic Command Deputy Commander, explains the purpose of the book very clearly in the forward when he writes, “To do that, we answer the simple question: why does deterrence matter to each Global Strike Airman?”
What Kaptanoglu and Prager do not understand, never having served in the Air Force nuclear enterprise, is that its men and women receive significant training and education throughout their Air Force careers regarding nuclear weapons effects. From technical training, to professional continuing education (PCE), to professional military education (PME), both enlisted and officer develop an understanding of nuclear weapon effects.
One example is poignant. It was very specifically because missile officers understood the effects of nuclear weapons and the moral dilemma that knowledge generated that the Air Force incorporated ethics training into technical training at Vandenburg Air Force Base. Firing a nuclear weapon is not an easy choice for any airman. The consequences way heavily on every man and woman who performs the nuclear mission.
Across the nuclear force, training, education, and experience are provided to pilots, missileers, maintainers, security forces, and airmen in every relevant career field. During their careers both enlisted and officer can attend courses such as Nuclear 150, 200, 300, and/or 400. They may also attend Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) 150, 200, and/or 300, which have varying discussion on nuclear weapon effects.
Many airmen also earn the Nuclear Weapons Effects, Policy, and Proliferation (NWEPP) graduate certificate from the Air Force Institute of Technology’s (AFIT) Department of Engineering Physics. In this program, students learn to calculate weapons effects using Samuel Glasstone and Phillip Dolan’s The Effects of Nuclear Weapons—the bible of weapons effects. Equally important for the development of airmen is the Defense Nuclear Weapons School’s Theater Nuclear Operations Course (TNOC) and its Nuclear Weapons Orientation Course (NWOC), which are focused on understanding the effects of nuclear weapons and, in the case of TNOC, calculating those effects using the most advanced Defense Threat Reduction Agency software.
Officers may also have the opportunity to complete a nuclear engineering graduate degree from the Air Force Institute of Technology or a related degree from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). They may also attend a program at one of the professional military education schools and delve into weapon effects there.
With airmen receiving so many opportunities to develop an understanding of exactly what it means to use a nuclear weapon, there is no need for the guide to repeat what is already known.
Nuclear weapons keep the peace. Kaptanoglu and Prager follow this argument by suggesting that we overstate the role of nuclear weapons in promoting peace. They write, “Other potential contributors to the long peace—the rise of democracies, global commerce, international organizations, international law, and the hardening of national boundaries—are briefly mentioned in the guide, but only in the service of downplaying their effects.”
While this is a common argument offered by disarmament advocates, Vladimir Putin’s recent threats to use nuclear weapons offer clear support to our view. Nuclear weapons are still the primary reason nuclear armed states do not go to war and why they constrain their allies—avoiding being pulled into a nuclear conflict. Moreover, the clear failure of “economic deterrence” reminds the world that hard power still reigns supreme.
If the United States and Russia manage to avoid a nuclear conflict, it will not be because of global commerce, international organizations, international law, or any variable Steven Pinker attributes to our greater passivity. It will be the fear of nuclear war that drives both nations to deescalate.
Kaptanoglu and Prager also challenge our assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the role nuclear weapons played in the agreement reached by General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and President John Kennedy. They write, “Missing from this discussion is the now-common knowledge that Khrushchev stood down because of a secret agreement with Kennedy to remove similar missiles from Turkey. In other words, diplomacy prevailed.”
Perhaps our critics are unfamiliar with deterrence theory. It is defined by the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms as “[t]he prevention of action by the credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits.” Perhaps Dr. Strangelove explains it even better, “Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy the fear to attack.” Thus, suggesting that nuclear weapons were not the single most important variable in resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis misses the very purpose of nuclear weapons and deterrence—avoiding conflict. The secret agreement between Khrushchev and Kennedy to remove obsolete Jupiter missiles from Turkey is an example of just how important nuclear weapons are, not the opposite.
Nuclear weapon mistakes and accidents never happen. Next, Kaptanoglu and Prager argue, “Indeed, the guide does not mention the many well-documented false-alarms and close calls of nuclear detonation from technical or human error that could have led to catastrophe.” Again, I would encourage both men to remember the purpose of the book. No single work can scratch every itch and answer every question.
I would also suggest they learned the wrong lessons from accidents involving nuclear weapons. This tired and trite argument willfully fails to accept that we have burned nuclear bombs, dropped nuclear bombs accidentally, and blown-up ICBMs—all with 1950s- and 1960s-era technology—and yet we have never had an accidental detonation. In other words, safety systems worked 100 percent of the time. That fact is indisputable.
Given the modern safety systems in our weapons, the chances of an accidental detonation are even lower today. Furthermore, our resilient Earth has experienced 2,056 above- and below-ground nuclear tests and yet it hosts 7 billion inhabitants. I have walked the test sites at both Frenchman and Yucca Flats at the Nevada Test Site, where many American nuclear tests were conducted, and toured Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The assertion that a nuclear detonation will end civilization and turn the world into a nuclear wasteland is simply not true. I have seen it with my own eyes.
Kaptanoglu and Prager suggest that the book “does not acknowledge the dangers posed by the imperfect humans who control the nuclear weapons and infrastructure.” Given the collective experience of the book’s contributors there can be no doubt that we have a deep and abiding understanding of past mistakes, but that does not mean the guide is the best place to discuss them. Airmen, for example, have Facebook pages, Signal groups, and other social media sites where they specifically discuss mistakes and how to avoid them in the future. These and other related venues within the community are far better for dissing our mistakes.
By way of example, I was a member of the Air Force team that investigated cheating on exams at Malmstrom Air Force Base in 2014. That experience gave me a great appreciation for the understanding of human fallibility that our nuclear system designers possess and their uncanny ability to build systems with multiple redundancies and checks. It is for good reason that we have never had an accidental detonation or miscalculation that led to war. Luck has nothing to do with it.
A nuclear triad is necessary. The final critique of Kaptanoglu and Prager challenges our argument that all three legs of the nuclear triad are necessary. Collectively, the contributors to the guide have explained, in detail, the unique attributes of each leg of the nuclear triad and addressed critics claims in dozens of articles over the past decade. It was for good reason that we did not rehash the errors of the disarmament logic … again.
The authors offer too many factually inaccurate assertions to dismantle each argument in a single response. Thus, let me selectively address the most egregious arguments.
First, the United States does not maintain a policy of launch on warning with the intercontinental ballistic missile force. To insist otherwise is a lie. The argument is false and belies an ignorance of strategy, policy, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures.
The ICBM leg is the least expensive, most responsive, and most complicating to adversary targeting. Bombers may crash and submarines can mysteriously sink, but there is no question that an attack on an ICBM silo is an attack on American soil and worthy of reprisal.
Third, Kaptanoglu and Prager offer wildly optimistic claims about the effectiveness of a minimum deterrence strategy that has no basis in analytical rigor. Matt Kroenig’s chapter on nuclear supremacy, which synthesizes the arguments from his book, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, is dismissed without ever addressing his arguments. Such practice is common in their critique and unhelpful.
Conclusion
The type of sloppy critique offered by Kaptanoglu and Prager may feel good to many readers of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, but it does nothing to further understanding of the nuclear deterrence debate. Frankly, the Bulletin largely serves as an echo chamber for advocates of nuclear abolition. Given the growing divide in American society and social media’s willful manipulation of our ever-shrinking world, articles like Kaptanoglu and Prager’s are not helpful because they only serve to reinforce what their audience already believes.
In 2009, Andrew Krepinevich wrote, “The world has yet to successfully ban any weapon deemed to be effective by those with the desire and the means to acquire it.” Nations seek to obtain or maintain nuclear weapons because it is in their national interests. While those interests may vary, all center around the desire for “self-determination” and sovereignty. Nuclear weapons serve as the greatest insurance policy for peace; one that can withstand failed treaties, treacherous friends, and predacious neighbors.
A world without nuclear weapons certainly feels good. However, we know the world before Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was a world of death and destruction characterized by an average of six major-power wars each century. For over 75 years, the world has enjoyed what John Lewis Gaddis calls “the Long Peace”; a world without major-power conflict, which in turn has allowed for unprecedented prosperity.
What we need today is a vigorous and honest debate about the role nuclear weapons and deterrence play in national security. Both sides must actively engage those who do not share the same opinions—instead of retreating to their favorite echo chambers. For those of us who have dedicated our lives to service in the military and nuclear enterprise, we are more than willing to discuss and debate our positions. Let me challenge the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist to host an active debate on its pages between those who advocate nuclear disarmament and those who advocate a modern and robust nuclear arsenal. Even if we still walk away in disagreement, we will at least understand one another.
Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank Curtis McGiffin, Mike Guillot, and Bill Murphy for their thoughtful comments, editing, and additions.
As the Russian invasion of Ukraine shows, nuclear threats are real, present, and dangerous
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21. After Russia Invaded Ukraine, a U.S. Nonprofit Shifted Its Mission
A truly American NGO in more than name only. Spirit of America is doing great work and has the most unique philosophy among all NGOs. It is truly one of a kind. Please support it. (note I am biased as I am on its board of advisers).
After Russia Invaded Ukraine, a U.S. Nonprofit Shifted Its Mission
Spirit of America was focused on helping counter Russian propaganda but now is sending helmets, Kevlar vests, radios and vehicles to Ukraine.
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Jim Hake, founder and CEO of Spirit of America, in front of supplies his organization is sending to Ukraine.Credit...Hilary Swift for The New York Times
By
March 30, 2022
WASHINGTON — Jim Hake began working in Ukraine in 2015, the year after Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula. His nonprofit, Spirit of America, supplied medical kits to the Ukrainian military and assisted U.S. programs to counter Russian propaganda.
But when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, the group put aside those efforts and focused on providing basic, nonlethal military supplies — and figuring out how to get the items into the country quickly.
A variety of groups have given millions of dollars in nonlethal aid to Ukraine since Russia invaded. Several in addition to Spirit of America, like Direct Relief, Mercy Corps and Save the Children, have years of experience in the country. Others, including some of the veterans’ organizations that helped evacuate Afghans after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, are newer and just started working in Ukraine.
But Spirit of America’s deep contacts with the Ukrainian military and American diplomats in the region set it apart.
On Wednesday, a second Boeing cargo jet of supplies from Spirit of America landed in Poland, en route to Ukraine, as the group readjusts to help a society that went onto full wartime footing overnight. Since the invasion, Spirit of America has delivered $7.2 million worth of medical equipment, Kevlar vests, drones and communication gear.
Supplies, including bulletproof vests, that were donated by Spirit of America being loaded onto a plane on Tuesday at Kennedy Airport for Ukraine.Credit...Hilary Swift for The New York Times
The U.S. government does not prohibit nonprofits from delivering aid in conflict zones. But any group providing firearms, munitions or other military equipment is subject to regulations on international traffic in arms and must obtain a license from the State Department before shipping such weaponry.
Because of those regulations, and to avoid accusations they are making a conflict more deadly, most groups leave the provision of lethal aid and weapons to the U.S. government and its allies. Instead, they focus on assistance that is aimed at saving lives, not taking them.
Getting the right aid to the right place is also critically important. Clothes and toys sent after a disaster are sometimes of little use and can do more harm than good if they overwhelm relief efforts. Spirit of America is working directly with Ukrainians to identify the specific needs of frontline troops and civilian volunteers.
Originally an entrepreneur and business executive, Mr. Hake founded the group in 2003 to aid U.S. military deployments. It began by providing supplies that soldiers and Marines could distribute to local populations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but later took on more ambitious projects.
Many nonprofit groups that provide aid in wartime situations adhere to a kind of battlefield neutrality, in hopes that offers some sort of protection for their workers. But Spirit of America declares that it is “not neutral.” When working in conflict zones, the group says it is openly choosing a side and backing American foreign policy goals. In Ukraine, that has meant supporting the Ukrainian government and pushing back against Russian aggression.
In most of the conflict zones where Spirit of America has operated, the U.S. embassy or military has helped guide its donations. But in this war, Mr. Hake has worked with Ukrainian contacts, including the territorial defense forces.
Much of Spirit of America’s aid has flowed through Ruslan Kavatsiuk, who in 2016 helped the group found a radio station in Ukraine called Army FM to counter Russian propaganda. He also assisted the group in setting up mobile communications teams that helped frontline Ukrainian units recognize and combat disinformation. At the time, Russia was blanketing eastern Ukraine, where Russia-backed separatists were battling government forces, with disinformation aimed at getting Ukrainian soldiers to defect.
Soon after Russian forces came over the border, his home in a Kyiv suburb was destroyed, and many of his neighbors were killed in the fighting. In early March, a Russian airstrike hit an older building at the memorial.
Russia-Ukraine War: Key Developments
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Putin’s advisers. U.S. intelligence suggests that President Vladimir V. Putin has been misinformed by his advisers about the Russian military’s struggles in Ukraine. The intelligence shows what appears to be growing tension between Mr. Putin and the Ministry of Defense, U.S. officials said.
With his country at war, Mr. Kavatsiuk set up a training center in western Ukraine for what he calls highly motivated but unskilled Ukrainians. Working with military trainers from the United States and Britain, he helped create crash courses on basic military tactics and battlefield medicine. Classes in combat truck driving and slightly more advanced infantry were later added.
Mr. Hake directed his group’s first shipments to Mr. Kavatsiuk. Some equipment has stayed at the training center for new recruits, but Mr. Kavatsiuk has begun driving more of it to army brigades on the front lines.
“I took the first shipment to Kyiv, distributed the supplies, and then we took back the wounded to hospitals in western Ukraine,” he said.
Before the invasion, Spirit of America had been considering new projects to counter rising amounts of Russian disinformation falsely claiming that Ukraine was aligned with Nazism and was plotting a genocide against ethnic Russians. But those plans had to be put on hold, Mr. Hake said, as his team confronted the urgent task of getting vehicles, body armor and tourniquets into Ukraine.
“Right now it’s not so much about the narrative, it’s about helping people stay alive,” Mr. Hake said.
But the earlier initiatives are still going. Army FM continues to broadcast, and the mobile communications teams are still at work with troops.
Improving supply lines into Ukraine, and throughout the country, has been a focus of Spirit of America’s recent efforts. Working with Mr. Kavatsiuk and others, the group is setting up a new logistics hub to direct future supplies, and giving vehicles and body armor to Ukrainian organizations that are trying to move aid into cities.
Spirit of America has scheduled a third cargo flight and hopes to continue raising enough money to send a flight every 10 days.
“This is the moment our organization was built for,” Mr. Hake said.
22. Ukrainian Hackers Take Aim at Russian Artillery, Navigation Signals
I know we are studying everything the Ukrainians are doing to mine the many lessons learned. While we observe how technology and weapons work, the concept developers also should be studying their actions for lessons for our military. But SOF also should be looking at lessons from resistance and resilience as well and increasing the knowledge base for modern resistance operations.
I love the subtitle below. This used to just take a 2LT to cause this to happen. Now it can be done by hackers. (note humor attempt and apologies to 2LTs)
Ukrainian Hackers Take Aim at Russian Artillery, Navigation Signals
Group says it has found several ways to keep lost units lost.
A group of Ukrainian hackers says it has found ways to disrupt Russian military units’ navigation and is working on ways to disrupt artillery fire as well.
The nearly two dozen volunteers of the CyberPan Ukraine group work with the Ukrainian military and get funds from sources in Israel and the United States, group members told Defense One.
In the weeks since Russia invaded Ukraine, one member said, the group has found ways to keep some field units from receiving signals from the GLONASS system, Russia’s version of the U.S. GPS satellite navigation constellation. Lost Russian forces are easier to find and target than ones that know where they are going.
Currently, the group is looking for ways to disrupt artillery fire, at least from systems that employ precision guidance systems. The member said the group has identified several computer servers linked to Russian rockets.
“We found many mistakes inside the system,” he said.
Poor communications tech has hobbled the Russian war effort. Its Era secure cellphones aren’t working, in part because the invading forces destroyed many of the system’s cell towers, Bellingcat investigator Cristo Grovez said on March 7. This has forced many Russian units to use unencrypted phones, whose calls have been picked up by Ukrainian forces, foreign journalists, and others.
Russia does have better communication equipment, like software-defined radios such as the R-187P1 Azart and R-168-5UN-2.
“The impression provided by the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) over the years has been that this equipment was widespread and that the majority of the Russian Armed Forces (RuAF) were operating digital radios and systems designed to facilitate planning and decision-making,” Sam Cranny-Evans and Thomas Withington wrote in a March 9 article for the Royal United Services Institute.” But that clearly isn’t the case, the authors note.
Meanwhile, Russian state media have reported that the government is investigating corruption allegations against some Russian makers of communications equipment.
Some of the communications problems are likely due to poor preparation of the invasion force, said Samuel Bendett, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an adviser at the CNA Corporation.
“Some were not fully aware they were going into an actual war [but] thinking they were part of a military drill,” Bendett said. “Perhaps they did not fully combat-proof their comms equipment as a result, and that is how Ukrainians are able to intercept.”
Bendett also pointed out that the United States and other allies were training and equipping Ukraine, which has had years to prepare for this invasion.
“The Ukrainian military knows what technology the Russian military uses and this preparation gave them the opportunity to learn how to disrupt Russian comms,” he said.
23. What is the Wagner Group?
What is the Wagner Group?
March 31, 2022, 3:33 a.m. ET
Mercenaries from the Wagner Group in Bangui, Central African Republic, in 2019.Credit...Ashley Gilbertson for The New York Times
Unless you have been on the battlefield in Syria, Libya or the Central African Republic, you most likely have never heard of the Wagner Group, a private military force with close links to President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.
Wagner forces have appeared in Ukraine, presumably to fight alongside Russian troops in Mr. Putin’s war. In the past month, the number of Wagner troops in the country has more than tripled to over 1,000. Their presence, in the eastern region known as Donbas that is home to Russia-backed separatist groups, raises concerns, given the group’s history. U.N. investigators and rights groups say Wagner troops have targeted civilians, conducted mass executions and looted private property in conflict zones.
Here’s what to know about Wagner:
How did Wagner get its start?
The entity first emerged in 2014, during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The U.S. government has said that the organization is financed by Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, a Russian businessman and a close associate of Mr. Putin. He has been referred to as “Putin’s chef” because of his catering business, which has staged elaborate state banquets for Mr. Putin.
How did the group get its name?
The group reportedly took its name from the nom de guerre of its leader, Dmitry Utkin, a retired Russian military officer. Mr. Utkin is said to have chosen Wagner to honor the composer, who was a favorite of Hitler’s. Despite the Kremlin’s denial of any ties to Wagner, Mr. Utkin has been photographed next to Mr. Putin.
Where is the group based?
The group is not registered as a legal entity anywhere in the world. Mercenaries are illegal under Russian law. Their shadowy existence allows Russia to downplay its battlefield casualties and distance itself from atrocities committed by Wagner fighters, observers say.
“It operates in a situation of opacity, there’s a real lack of transparency and that’s the whole point,” said Sorcha MacLeod, chair of the United Nations Working Group on the use of mercenaries, which has scrutinized the group. Their structure allows them to have plausible deniability and to create “distance between the Russian state and the group,” she said.
Why are the mercenaries in Ukraine?
With Russia suffering heavy losses, according to U.S. intelligence, Mr. Putin is sending battle-hardened reinforcements with experience into Ukraine, according to experts, including Jeremy Fleming, the director of Britain’s electronic surveillance agency.
Russia-Ukraine War: Key Developments
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Putin’s advisers. U.S. intelligence suggests that President Vladimir V. Putin has been misinformed by his advisers about the Russian military’s struggles in Ukraine. The intelligence shows what appears to be growing tension between Mr. Putin and the Ministry of Defense, U.S. officials said.
“These soldiers are likely to be used as cannon fodder to try to limit Russian military losses,” he has said.
Where do they recruit?
Some of the fighters appeared to have been recruited from Syria and Libya, the Pentagon’s spokesman, John F. Kirby, has said. He said Russia seemed to be turning to them to bolster its troops in the east of Ukraine because the group already had experience fighting in the Donbas region for the past eight years.
Where have Wagner forces been deployed?
In addition to their involvement in Syria, Libya, Central African Republic and Ukraine, Wagner operatives have also fought in Sudan, Mali and Mozambique, exerting Russian influence by proxy, doing the bidding of authoritarian leaders and, at times, seizing oil and gas fields or securing other material interests. Increasingly, they’ve become more formalized and have started acting more like Western military contractors.
“There’s a trend or pattern around what happens when Wagner is involved in an armed conflict,” Dr. MacLeod said. “The conflict is prolonged, involves heavy weaponry, civilians are impacted in substantial way, human rights violations and war crimes increase substantially and there’s no access justice for victims.”
24. Tulsi Gabbard And Tucker Carlson Featured In Stunning Exchange On Russian TV
You can't make this sh*t up. I wonder how this affects Ms Gabbard's military service as a reserve Civil Affairs officer. How do the background investigators for her security clearance adjudicate these actions?
Tulsi Gabbard And Tucker Carlson Featured In Stunning Exchange On Russian TV
He introduced Gabbard, a Democratic primary candidate for the 2020 presidential race, as “our girlfriend Tulsi,” according to a translation by Russian media analyst Julia Davis, a columnist for the Daily Beast.
A clip was then aired of Gabbard’s appearance on Monday’s episode of “Tucker Carlson Tonight” in which she suggested President Joe Biden was secretly plotting to remove Putin from power.
After the clip aired, a panelist reportedly asked, “Is she some sort of Russian agent?”
According to Davis’ translation, Soloviev said she was.
This content is not available due to your privacy preferences.
During Monday’s interview, Gabbard argued that Biden was pushing for regime change in Russia through “economic warfare.”
“They are doing so by waging this modern-day siege against Russia, isolating, containing, destroying their economy, starving the Russian people in the hope that the Russian people or the military will rise up and revolt and overthrow their government and get rid of Putin,” she said during part of the excerpt that aired in Russia.
On Sunday, Biden said that Putin “cannot remain in power” in off-script remarks during a speech in Poland. White House officials quickly clarified that Biden was not advocating for regime change in Russia but that “Putin cannot be allowed to exercise power over his neighbors or the region.”
But according to Gabbard, “it was not a gaffe at all” and Biden is “lying” about his true motives.
The Putin-friendly rhetoric is nothing new for the former congresswoman from Hawaii. Last month, as Putin was beginning his invasion of Russia, Gabbard blamed the U.S., NATO and Ukraine, claiming that the war could “easily have been avoided” if NATO had “simply acknowledged Russia’s legitimate security concerns regarding Ukraine’s becoming a member of NATO.”
In 2019, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggested in an interview that Gabbard, then a long shot in the Democratic presidential field, was being groomed by Russia as an “asset” who would run as a third-party candidate and help usher in a Republican president. Gabbard filed and then later dropped a defamation lawsuit against Clinton over the “asset” comment.
Carlson, meanwhile, has been a favorite of Russian propagandists for weeks. The Fox News host has repeatedly been featured on Russian state-sponsored television for his defenses of Russia and criticisms of the U.S., NATO and Ukraine, and was even reportedly endorsed by the Kremlin in a leaked memo to state media.
Earlier this week, he promoted a bizarre theory to keep Putin in power, suggesting that Islamic extremists would somehow get hold of the country’s nuclear weapons and use them on Americans if he was removed.
This article originally appeared on HuffPost and has been updated.
Related...
25. A New Framework for Understanding and Countering China's Gray Zone Tactics
A just released report from RAND that we will have to study.
A New Framework for Understanding and Countering China's Gray Zone Tactics
by Bonny Lin, Cristina L. Garafola, Bruce McClintock, Jonah Blank, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Karen Schwindt, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Paul Orner, Dennis Borrman, Sarah W. Denton, et al.
By Bonny Lin rand.org7 min
Key Findings
- China views gray zone activities as a natural extension of how countries exercise power. These activities are a way to pressure countries to act according to Beijing's interests—advancing its domestic, economic, foreign policy, and security objectives—without triggering backlash or conflict.
- Over the past decade, China employed nearly 80 different gray zone tactics across all instruments of national power against Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, India, and the Philippines.
- Three indicators could help determine which tactics are most problematic: the extent to which Chinese tactics undermine U.S. objectives, how difficult it is for allies and partners to counter tactics, and how widely China uses the tactics.
To understand how the United States can better compete with and counter PRC gray zone coercion, RAND researchers analyzed open-source material and held a workshop with more than 90 U.S. interagency and U.S. Department of Defense participants to answer four related research questions.
Gray zone tactics—coercive actions that are shy of armed conflict but beyond normal diplomatic, economic, and other activities—are widely recognized as playing an increasingly important role in China's efforts to advance its domestic, economic, foreign policy, and security objectives, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. But there is little consensus to date on which tactics pose the greatest challenges to the United States and its allies and partners in the region.
RAND Project Air Force researchers developed a framework to help U.S. policymakers categorize China's use of gray zone tactics and identify the most-problematic People's Republic of China (PRC) tactics that the United States could prioritize countering. Studies of China's gray zone tactics typically have focused on specific countries, domains (e.g., maritime), or incidents. RAND analyzed trends and patterns in China's gray zone behavior by examining the country's use of different types of gray zone tactics over time against five key U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific: Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, India, and the Philippines.
Definition
We define Chinese gray zone tactics as coercive Chinese government geopolitical, economic, military, and cyber and information operations (cyber/IO) activities beyond regular diplomatic and economic activities and below the use of kinetic military force.
We further differentiate by mechanism, or how China uses its power to pressure the target, dividing
- geopolitical, economic, and cyber/IO tactics into international (indirect external pressure, such as by leveraging regional fora), bilateral (direct external pressure), and grassroots (direct activities on the ground in the target country or region, such as by leveraging local proxies)
- military tactics into military domains, specifically air, maritime, land, and general (multiple PRC military services or general threats).
Question 1. How Does China View Competition in the Gray Zone?
Chinese analysts view gray zone actions as measures that powerful countries have employed both historically and in recent decades that are beyond normal diplomacy and other traditional approaches to statecraft but short of direct use of military force for escalation or a conflict. While Chinese scholars do not typically use the term gray zone to describe Chinese gray zone activities, the Chinese conceptualization of military operations other than war (MOOTW) is helpful for understanding how China may use its military for such activities. Chinese analysts characterize coercive or confrontational external-facing MOOTW as stability maintenance, rights protection, or security and guarding operations. China believes that MOOTW should also leverage nonmilitary actors and means.
Question 2. What Drives and Enables Chinese Use of Gray Zone Tactics?
Chinese activities in the gray zone support PRC leadership's overarching domestic, economic, foreign policy, and security objectives in the Indo-Pacific, which Beijing views as China's priority region. Gray zone activities balance China's pursuit of a more favorable external environment by altering the regional status quo in its favor with a desire to act below the threshold of a militarized response from the United States or China's neighbors. Recent developments have provided an increasingly varied toolkit for pressuring other countries across four key domains: geopolitical, economic, military, and cyber/IO. These developments are
- laws and regulations enabling Beijing to harness nongovernmental personnel and assets
- growing Chinese geopolitical, economic, and military power and influence vis-à-vis other countries
- increasing linkages between China's military development and economic growth
- the integration of military and paramilitary forces.
Question 3. How Does China Employ Gray Zone Tactics?
Overall, China tailors its gray zone activities to the target and has an increasing variety and number of more-coercive tools. Beijing layers the use of multiple gray zone tactics to pressure allies and partners, particularly on issues related to China's core interests. Combining multiple geopolitical, economic, military, and cyber/IO activities means that China no longer has to rely on significant escalation in any single domain and, if needed, can sequence actions to apply pressure in nonmilitary domains before resorting to use of military activity. China also appears to be more cautious and selective in using high-profile gray zone tactics against more-capable countries—for instance, employing a smaller variety of tactics against Japan and India than against Vietnam and the Philippines.
China has increasingly leveraged military tactics, and there is no evidence to suggest that China will use fewer military tactics as its overall military capabilities grow or that improved bilateral relations will discourage China from pressing its territorial claims. Likewise, there is little reason to believe that China will use fewer military gray zone tactics as its geopolitical or economic power increases. China has recently relied heavily on air- and maritime-domain tactics, for example.
China exercises caution in its use of high-profile, bilateral geopolitical and economic tactics and has become more active in wielding its influence in international institutions or via third-party actors. Since at least 2013, China has expanded its involvement on the ground in select regions, recruiting local proxies and engaging in various information efforts. In terms of nonmilitary tactics, China uses geopolitical and bilateral tactics most often.
Question 4. Which PRC Tactics Could the United States Prioritize Countering?
Given the wide range of PRC gray zone tactics and the diverse collection of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States faces the difficult task of determining how to prioritize which PRC activities to counter. The U.S. government, experts, and academics do not currently agree on how to assess which PRC gray zone tactics are most problematic. Policymakers could consider aggregating across three different criteria: (1) the extent to which PRC tactics undermine U.S. objectives and interests in the Indo-Pacific region, (2) how difficult it is for allies and partners to respond to and counter tactics, and (3) how widely China uses specific tactics (against one or multiple allies and partners).
While there are many ways to combine the three indicators, the most balanced approach might be to weight U.S. objectives and interests equally with allied and partner concerns (40 percent each) and the prevalence of PRC tactics less (20 percent). Based on this aggregate method, ten of the 20 most-problematic PRC tactics are military activities that the People's Liberation Army or Chinese paramilitary actors engage in, with many of the tactics involving operations near or in disputed territories. Other military tactics include China engaging in highly publicized and large-scale, cross-service military exercises; establishing military bases or potential dual-use facilities in neighboring countries to threaten a target; and building up or acquiring PRC military capabilities against targets.
Geopolitical, economic, and cyber/IO tactics also ranked among the top 20. While the most-problematic PRC activities were international geopolitical and grassroots economic tactics, other PRC economic activities and grassroots cyber/IO activities in the targeted region were also problematic. Relative to the other tactics, grassroots geopolitical activities and bilateral cyber/IO activities have been less challenging. These findings suggest that the United States should devote significant effort to helping U.S. allies and partners counter PRC international geopolitical and economic tactics (particularly PRC economic activity in the target region or in disputed regions) and address grassroots cyber/IO activities.
Photo by Stringer China/Reuters
Recommendations
- The U.S. government should hold gray zone scenario discussions with key allies and partners to better understand their concerns, responses, and needs.
- The National Security Council or the U.S. Department of State should identify a set of criteria to determine the most-problematic PRC gray zone tactics to counter via whole-of-government efforts.
- The United States could prioritize countering Chinese activities in disputed territories and responding to PRC geopolitical international and economic tactics.
- The U.S. Department of Defense should develop gray zone plans similar to existing operational plans but focused on responding to a range of more-escalatory PRC gray zone scenarios.
- The U.S. Air Force should continue to build out intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific and improve regional cyberdefense capabilities to increase domain awareness, identify and attribute PRC activities, and counter PRC cyber/IO tactics.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Research brief series. RAND research briefs present policy-oriented summaries of individual published, peer-reviewed documents or of a body of published work.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
26. Civilian group with US military links raising money to supply Ukrainian fighters
Civilian group with US military links raising money to supply Ukrainian fighters
Spirit of America, a U.S. nonprofit group, has bought 3,200 sets of body armor and more than 32,000 single-meal rations to support troops in Ukraine. The organization, which works in tandem with the U.S. military, is trying to raise $100 million to ramp up deliveries. (Spirit of America)
A nonprofit group with close ties to the U.S. military is seeking to raise $100 million to get life-saving equipment and supplies to the front lines in Ukraine, where body armor, helmets and food rations are in high demand.
“It is need-driven, and this is what the people on the ground are telling us they need,” said Jim Hake, chief executive officer of Spirit of America, a group that works in tandem with U.S. forces on the ground in Poland.
The organization, which so far has raised $14 million to support Ukrainian fighters, has already sent in two chartered planes loaded with supplies, he said.
So far, 33,000 meals, ready-to-eat and 3,200 sets of body armor and helmets have been flown into Poland for onward movement to Ukraine. Other gear includes satellite phones and communication equipment, first aid kits, binoculars and even earplugs.
For security reasons, Hake declined to detail the logistics of getting the supplies into Ukraine. The goal is to send in similar flights every 10 days on a continuous basis, but to make that happen, more donations will be needed, he said.
“The immediate impact of the assistance is that it is helping to save lives and help (Ukrainian troops) defend their country,” he said. “To have this kind of equipment is essential.”
Hake launched Spirit of America in 2003, inspired by a segment he saw on the National Geographic channel that featured U.S. special operations troops in Afghanistan who had launched their own grassroots fundraising effort to help residents of a village in which they were working.
“I was sure there were men in women in other parts of the world who wanted to do the exact same thing if there was a way for them to offer support,” Hake said.
Unlike many other aid organizations, Spirit of America describes itself as “not neutral” and works in sync with the U.S. military. Hake said it is the only nonprofit authorized by Congress and the Defense Department to work alongside deployed U.S. troops.
To date, the group, which is funded through private donations, has launched about 1,500 projects in 94 countries.
The current campaign in Ukraine isn’t the group’s first involvement there. In 2015, Hake’s team launched a radio station for Ukrainian troops facing a Russian disinformation campaign while they fought Kremlin-backed separatists in Ukraine’s east.
At the time, Ukrainian troops were being bombarded with Russian propaganda, which came in many forms, including direct phone calls and text messages, Hake said.
“They were operating in an information vacuum,” Hake said.
Meanwhile, the effort to better equip Ukrainian fighters is picking up steam, he said.
“When you can do that with the right velocity and scale, it increases the impact,” Hake said. “It creates momentum for the good guys.”
Information about the Ukraine effort can be found at www.spiritofamerica.org.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
