Quotes of the Day:

“Knowledge makes man unfit to be a slave.” 

- Frederick Douglas

"Think not of the books you've bought as a "to be read" pile. INstead, think of your bookcase as a wine cellar. You collect books to read at the right time, the right place, and the right mood."

- Luc van Donkersgoed

Characteristics of the American Way of War (10 of 13)

10. Profoundly Regular. Few, if any, armies have been equally competent in the conduct of regular and irregular warfare. The U.S. Army is no exception to that rule. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have registered occasional successes in irregular warfare, while individual Americans have proved themselves adept at the conduct of guerrilla warfare. As institutions, however, the U.S. armed forces have not been friendly either to irregular warfare or to their own would-be practitioners and advocates of what was regarded as the sideshow of unconventional warfare or counterinsurgency. American soldiers have been overwhelmingly regular in their view of, approach to, and skill in, warfare. They have always prepared near exclusively for "real war," which is to say combat against a tolerably symmetrical, regular enemy. Irregular warfare--or low-intensity conflict (LIC) as denominated by the inclusive and therefore vague 1960s term-of-art--has been regarded as a lesser but included class of challenge. In other words, a good regular army has been assumed to be capable of turning its strengths to meet irregular enemies, whereas the reverse would not be true. It has not generally been appreciated that LIC is not simply a scaled-down version of "real war," but requires an entirely different mindset, doctrine, and training.

The United States has a storehouse of first-hand historical experience which should educate its soldiers in the need to recognize that regular and irregular warfare are significantly different. That educational process still has a distance to travel, but it will travel nowhere without steady endorsement from senior leadership, which appears to be forthcoming at present. Anyone in need of persuasion as to the extent of the regularity of the mindset dominant in America's military institutions need look no further than to the distinctly checkered history of the country's Special Operations Forces (SOF), as we observed earlier.

America's SOF have endured a Cinderella existence. They have prospered somewhat with episodic civilian political sponsorship, but not until very recent times have they been regarded and treated as an important element in the combined arms team. In the 1960s, for example, notwithstanding the enthusiasm of some "new frontiersmen" for the green berets in COIN, SOF efforts were accommodated all too well within the conventional grand designs of MACV. Also, in Vietnam and since, there is some tension between SOF as the expert practitioners of unconventional warfare, and SOF in the local liaison and training roles so vital for COIN. Even a very regular military mind can be attracted to SOF if their assigned tasks are aggressive offensive actions undertaken on a very small scale. In other words, some special operations can appear simply to be scaled-down versions of the traditional American style in war.

The SOF are America's irregular regulars. How they are permitted to operate, and how well or poorly their duties fit into a comprehensive grand design for COIN, for example, tell us how far America's regular military establishment has moved towards incorporating an irregular instrument in its toolkit.83 The jury is still out on whether today, really for the first time, the armed forces will succeed in making doctrinal and operational sense of their invaluable special warriors. On one hand, historical experience inclines one to be skeptical, but on the other, never before has the country elevated irregular enemies to the status of the dominant threat of an era.

- Colin Gray, 2006

1. If North Korea Launches a Full-Range ICBM Test Will Joe Biden Shoot It Down?

2. N. Korea fires one apparent ICBM ahead of S. Korea-Japan summit

3. North Korean ICBM could hit central US in 33 minutes due to gaps in America's missile defence 'kill chain', China claims

4. Department Press Briefing – March 14, 2023 - United States Department of State (Korea Comments)

5. Yoon announces 'complete normalization' of military intel-sharing pact with Japan

6. Japan lifts chipmaking export controls on South Korea     

7. ＜Inside N. Korea＞Food sales banned in markets, leading to anxiety and concern while deepening the poverty suffered by the poor

8. Samsung to build world’s largest semiconductor cluster in Korea

9. President Yoon Suk Yeol warns North after missile launched

10. South Korea and Japan hail spring thaw amid missiles and weight of history

11. National interest not a zero-sum game with Japan: Yoon

12. Nuclear weapons gaffe in South Korea is a warning to leaders everywhere

13. Peninsula Plus: Enhancing U.S.–South Korea Alliance Cooperation on China, Multilateralism, and Military and Security Technologies

14. After South Korea’s Icebreaker, Its President Is Welcomed to Tokyo

15. North Korean Women’s Gloomy ‘Glory’ on International Women’s Day

16. The Kishida-Yoon Summit Meeting: A New Start for Japan-Korea Relations

17. Siblings Who Went Viral After Crashing Dad's on-Air BBC Interview 6 Years Ago Look All Grown Up

18. Amid North Korea’s economic woes, repairing shoes is big business

1. If North Korea Launches a Full-Range ICBM Test Will Joe Biden Shoot It Down?

Concur with Dr. Bechtol. It is not so easy to shoot down any missile. Given today's suspected ICBM (Hwasong-15) launch would we have had the right assets in position to shoot down a "lofted" missile test?

If North Korea Launches a Full-Range ICBM Test Will Joe Biden Shoot It Down?

19fortyfive.com · by Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. · March 15, 2023

In recent days it has been reported in the Chosun Ilbo (one of South Korea’s most widely read daily newspapers) that if North Korea launches an ICBM into the “Pacific region,” the United States will “immediately” intercept it. This report was quickly responded to by Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, who warned of a “swift and overwhelming” military response to any action taken by the United States. It is unclear if the reporting in the Chosun Ilbo was a misquote or even a mistranslation. Such a comment has never been made in the past by a senior American official.

The reporting in the Chosun Ilbo was based on an unconfirmed comment allegedly made by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander to the Korean Consul-General in Honolulu and is based on unnamed military sources. The U.S. Department of Defense has not commented on this reporting.

Of course, the recent rhetoric leads one to ask, why would the North Koreans launch an ICBM into the “Pacific region?” The North Koreans have launched several ICBM platforms on an extremely high trajectory (almost straight up) since 2017. If these angles were to be laid out to the actual trajectory of a missile launched at the United States, the Hwasong-14 likely has the range to hit the west coast of the U.S., while the Hwasong-15 has the range to hit all of the continental U.S. Though the Hwasong-17 has reportedly been tested recently, its reliability remains in question.

So why break from this testing modus operandi that has been in effect since at least 2017? Because the debate within the United States and its allies in East Asia continues about whether or not a North Korean ICBM “can really hit” the United States simply based on the extreme trajectory the missiles have been tested on, and perhaps as importantly, “can it really” re-enter the earth’s atmosphere successfully with a live nuclear payload.

There is only one way to definitively prove this. To launch an ICBM carrying a nuclear payload into an empty spot somewhere in the Pacific Ocean. To date, the North Korean leadership has not felt the need to definitively prove this capability to the world. The ongoing debate, however, may have compelled Kim Jong-un to feel he now must show the world that he can launch a nuclear weapon at the United States if the need arises. In addition, if North Korea were to conduct such a test, it would be a “double-whammy,” detonating yet another nuclear weapon while also testing an ICBM at its “full-range” capability.

If the North Koreans were to conduct such a test and fire an ICBM with a nuclear payload into some empty spot in the Pacific Ocean, what would the risk be to American sovereign territory? Well, the answer is, no risk unless the ICBM was to be on a trajectory that would take it over Guam. Thus, though there have been no comments on the statement allegedly made by the Indo-Pacific Commander, if he did in fact make the remarks he may have been referring to a circumstance where the North Korean missile was actually overflying Guam in the Marianas Islands.

While North Korea’s missile launches can be considered provocative they have not been a threat to any nations in the Asia-Pacifric thus far. One wonders if the United States would even want to shoot at a missile that did not pose a threat, and that calls the reported remarks (if they were made) into question.

If the United States did in fact make the decision to shoot down an ICBM that was overflying U.S. sovereign territory, until very recent times, this was something that was seen as an unlikely reaction – because ballistic missile defense capabilities may not have been able to successfully achieve the mission.

There is a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) unit stationed on Guam and the system is well known for being able to bring down MRBM or IRBM systems – but has not been definitively or successfully tested on intercepting ICBM systems and thus would likely be ineffective against these systems if one or more of them was overflying America’s territory in the Marianas Islands.

Fortunately for the United States, on its Aegis-equipped ships, it has the SM-3 Block II-A system. This system successfully brought down (intercepted) an ICBM target on November 16, 2020, and thus could be deployed to wherever it needed to go if the United States made the decision to intercept a North Korean ICBM.

While it appears unlikely the United States would shoot down a North Korean ICBM headed toward an empty spot in the ocean – unless it looked to be on a trajectory that took it over American territory (and even then it is unclear what Washington’s reaction would be because there have been no official statements addressing this recently) – it is clear that the Americans (certainly in theory) have the capability to shoot down the ICBM if called into action while the North Koreans (certainly in theory) have the capability to put a nuclear warhead on a missile and launch it into an empty area in the Pacific Ocean.

Since the North Koreans have never fired an ICBM with a nuclear payload into the ocean, and the Americans have never intercepted a North Korean ballistic missile, we are looking at unprecedented events if either one of these things were to occur.

What are the events that are likely to occur if North Korea does in fact launch an ICBM with a nuclear payload? We can expect sanctions with real teeth will occur. There will also likely be other initiatives put in place to put pressure on and contain North Korea’s WMD programs.

If the United States were to decide to intercept a North Korean missile (and if the attempt was to be successful), tensions would of course increase, but Pyongyang would be forced to think twice before launching further “full-range” tests. If the attempts to bring down the North Korean missile were to prove unsuccessful, a call for further funding and development of BMD is likely to go out.

This would be legitimate because the threat from North Korea continues to grow in numbers and modernity.

Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. (Ph.D. Union Institute), is an award-winning professor of political science at Angelo State University and a retired Marine. The author of five books on North Korea, he is also the current President of the International Council on Korean Studies. He specializes in North Korean military and counter-proliferation issues. Bechtol is a 19FortyFive contributing editor.

19fortyfive.com · by Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. · March 15, 2023

2. N. Korea fires one apparent ICBM ahead of S. Korea-Japan summit

I wonder if this was also in response to Bruce Bennett's challenge to shoot down a north Korean missile.

One of the things I think we should assess is whether the Hwasong 15 is the most reliable ICBM. It seems the regime launches this missile when it wants to be sure that it will be a success so that it can send the intended message.

(3rd LD) N. Korea fires one apparent ICBM ahead of S. Korea-Japan summit | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · March 16, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with details; MODIFIES headline)

By Song Sang-ho and Chae Yun-hwan

SEOUL, March 16 (Yonhap) -- North Korea fired a long-range ballistic missile toward the East Sea on Thursday, Seoul's military said, hours before summit talks between the leaders of South Korea and Japan on pending bilateral issues and regional security.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the launch from the Sunan area in Pyongyang at 7:10 a.m., and the missile, fired at a lofted angle, flew some 1,000 kilometers before splashing into the sea. A month earlier, the North test-fired a Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Observers have raised the possibility of Pyongyang launching a solid-fuel ICBM, which is faster to fire and harder to spot in advance of take-off.

"The intelligence authorities of South Korea and the United States are conducting a comprehensive analysis in consideration of recent movements related to the North's missile development program," the JCS said in a text message sent to reporters.

Soon after the launch, JCS Chairman Gen. Kim Seung-kyum held virtual talks with Gen. Paul LaCamera, the commander of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, and reaffirmed the allies will further solidify their combined defense posture against "any North Korean threats and provocations," according to the JCS.

"We strongly condemn the North's series of ballistic missile launches as an act of significant provocation that harms peace and stability not only on the Korean Peninsula, but also in the international community, and a clear violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions," the JCS said, urging the North to immediately stop such launches.

Later in the day, President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida plan to hold a summit in Tokyo, in which the North's nuclear and missile threats are expected to be high on the agenda.

The North's growing nuclear and missile threats have created fresh momentum for Seoul and Tokyo to move beyond their historical feuds and work together to confront the security challenge.

The latest launch came amid the ongoing South Korea-U.S. Freedom Shield (FS) exercise. The North has decried the exercise as "preparations for a war of aggression" and threatened to take "overwhelming" action against military activities by the allies.

The North's tough rhetoric has stoked concerns that it could ratchet up tensions with more powerful provocations, such as a solid-propellant ICBM test, the launch of an ICBM at a standard angle and even a nuclear test.

The North fired two short-range ballistic missiles Tuesday and what it claimed to be two "strategic cruise missiles" from a submarine two days earlier. The launches were seen as a response to the FS exercise.

Youtube

https://youtu.be/O3AlkSUZIWo

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on March 15, 2023, shows the North firing two ground-to-ground ballistic missiles from Jangyon, South Hwanghae Province, the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · March 16, 2023

3. North Korean ICBM could hit central US in 33 minutes due to gaps in America's missile defence 'kill chain', China claims

China seems to be trying to add to north Korean propaganda and support the regime's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies.

North Korean ICBM could hit central US in 33 minutes due to gaps in America's missile defence 'kill chain', China claims

• North Korea would be able to hit the United States, the Beijing study said
• The study said the missiles would be 'sufficient to hit the entire US homeland' 

By CHRISTIAN OLIVER

PUBLISHED: 13:11 EDT, 15 March 2023 | UPDATED: 13:14 EDT, 15 March 2023

Daily Mail · by Christian Oliver · March 15, 2023

North Korea could launch an intercontinental ballistic missile at the United States that would hit the country in just 33 minutes, China has claimed.

Scientists in Beijing have simulated the ICBM launch and believe Pyongyang would be able to hit the country should the U.S.'s nuclear defence fail to intercept the missile.

The team of scientists from the Beijing Institute of Electronic System Engineering said North Korea's nuclear-capable Hwasong-15 missile with a range of over 8,000 miles (around 13,000 kilometres) would be 'sufficient to hit the entire US homeland'.

The simulation also suggested that there were gaps in the U.S. nuclear defence armoury.

The scientists said their tests showed the existing US missile defence network had gaps in its 'kill chain' and would struggle to identify and defend against an attack.

A ballistic missile is pictured being launched from an undisclosed location in North Korea, February 20

A missile is displayed during a military parade to mark the 75th founding anniversary of North Korea's army, February 8

The new research and simulation published by China's top institute for aerospace defence was led by scientist Tang Yuyan and released in the Modern Defence Technology Journal for February.

The simulation started with a launch from Sunchon, a North Korean city south of capital Pyongan, and targeted Columbia in Missouri. The specific location was selected for its centrality in the middle of America.

Running the tests, the team said a theoretical launch would cause the U.S. to receive an alert 20 seconds later.

Within 11 minutes, the U.S.'s nuclear defence would fall into action as intercepting missiles would blast out of Fort Greely in Alaska's Southeast Fairbanks Census Area.]

A second phase of missiles would then launch Vandenberg Space Force Base in California should the first defence fail.

Tang's team said the U.S. defence was impressive but they said the simulation identified some gaps in the 'kill chain' that a nation such as North Korea could exploit.

The study claimed that the reason for the research was to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. nuclear defence capabilities.

The most recent simulation follows another Chinese study released earlier this year which marked potential targets for China's hypersonic weapons.

The first wave of a hypothetical attack would aim at some of the largest ground-based radars in the U.S., the study said.

It would target Beale Air Force Base in California’s Yuba county and the Cape Cod peninsula.

Those bases were identified as they would be vulnerable to hypersonic weapons that are able to move unpredictably and strike at five-times the speed of sound, the study said.

The test-firing of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) "Hwasong-15", at Pyongyang International Airport in February 2023

The nation's dictator Kim Jong Un has also been incredibly public with the testing, combining it with appearances of his rarely seen daughter

The study also follows continued launching and testing of several ballistic missiles by North Korea.

For some months, North Korea has conducted tests firing short-range ballistic missiles into the sea.

The nation's dictator Kim Jong Un has also been incredibly public with the testing, combining it with appearances of his rarely seen daughter.

Analysts have dubbed the combined appearance of the girl and the missile testing as an effort to remind the world he has no intentions to voluntarily surrender his nuclear weapons, which he apparently sees as the strongest guarantee of his survival and the extension of his family's dynastic rule.

Western countries have strongly condemned the testing. South Korea called the repeated missile launches a grave provocation threatening the region's peace and security, and a U.S. State Department spokesperson criticised the launches as violation of multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

Daily Mail · by Christian Oliver · March 15, 2023

4. Department Press Briefing – March 14, 2023 - United States Department of State (Korea Comments)

Two good questions from Jiha Ham from VOA. This is what good journalists do.

The first question requires additional explanation and commentary. First, we should not use exercises as a bargaining chip with north Korea, especially if we are committed to the defense of South Korea. We should always keep in mind that north Korean forces are postured for offensive operations and can attack on short notice - perhaps with as little as 48 hours warning or even less. Because of that the ROK/US Combined Forces Command, which is chartered by both the ROK and US through the Military Committee to deter war and defend the ROK.  

Second, we must know by now that concessions with north Korea do not work. We have cancelled, postponed, and scaled back exercises between 2018 and 2022 and there was no reciprocity from north Korea. Despite north Korean rhetoric about wanting security guarantees and calling for the US to end exercises so as not to be a threat, the truth is Kim is not really concerned with exercises and in fact privately must welcome them as they support his strategies and most importantly provide the rationale and justification for the sacrifices and suffering of the Korean people as Kim prioritizes nuclear and missile development over the welfare of hee people. We know that Kim is more afraid of the Korean people in the north (especially when armed with information) than he is of the ROK/US military exercises. But he needs the threat perception provided by the exercises.  And there is also a long term reason for ending the exercises. If the military cannot train, readiness declines, and US forces cannot be allowed to remain on the peninsula if they cannot train. We must never forget that one of Kim's major lines of effort is tot split the ROK US alliance and get US troops off the peninsula so the regime cna coerce the SOuth and ultimate use force to unify the peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the regime.

The second question on ship-to-ship transfers is also important. If VOA can track 30 transfers we need to ask the question of why we did not attempt to interdict the transfers? This is one of the sanctions evasion activities that help support the regime. If we want to pressure the regime we need to interdict ship-to-ship trasnfers.

Excerpts:

Let’s go to the line of Jiha Ham.

QUESTION: Hi, Ned. Can you hear me?

MR PRICE: I can, yeah. Go ahead.

QUESTION: Okay. I have two questions today, both on North Korea. Yesterday, you said that the U.S. would much rather be engaging in dialogue and diplomacy with North Korea instead of being in a position to reaffirm the security commitment that you have with ROK and Japan. The question yesterday for this answer was about the joint military exercises between the U.S. and the ROK. So I’m wondering if there is a possibility that you would tone down the exercises when and if North Korea decides to engage in diplomacy or even stop launching missiles.

My second question – do you mind if you – go for the first one first?

MR PRICE: Sure, sure. Go ahead with your second question.

QUESTION: Sure. My second question: The UN Panel of Experts on North Korea in their last year’s report said that North Korea uses its territorial waters as ship-to-ship transfer areas, so – transferring illicit items such as coal or oil. And VOA so far this year has found more than 30 ship-to-ship transfer cases on the west coast of North Korea via satellite imagery. So what is your comment on this, the fact that North Korea continues evading sanctions? I mean, how can you, I mean, stop them? Thanks.

MR PRICE: Yeah. Thanks, Jiha, for both of those. On your first question, it unfortunately is a purely hypothetical question. It’s an academic question, because we have been clear and consistent in conveying publicly and through all channels available to us that we are prepared and willing to engage in constructive diplomacy with the DPRK towards what is the goal we share with our allies and partners of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. And I say it’s hypothetical and academic because at every turn the DPRK has failed to engage meaningfully on these offers. But were that to be the case, were the DPRK to take us up on this, we would look to see if we could devise practical steps that could help to advance what is that longer-term objective of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

I’m not in a position today to say whether any of the exercises you refer to would be implicated as part of those practical steps. We’re always going to have an ironclad commitment to the security of our treaty allies, including the ROK and Japan in this case. We’re always going to remain committed to the extended deterrence that we afford to our treaty allies. But the practical, specific steps that we may be in a position to take with the DPRK, were it to engage – that would be the subject of dialogue and diplomacy, the very dialogue and diplomacy in which the DPRK has refused to engage.

When it comes to ship-to-ship transfers, as you know, Jiha, we routinely designate additional actors in the DPRK or entities in or working on behalf of the DPRK for its efforts that are in violation of UN Security Council resolutions or other forms of international law. In addition to finding new targets, much of our work is focused on sanctions enforcement, and so when we have an opportunity to identify activity that seeks to circumvent the sanctions that are on the books, whether they’re U.S. sanctions, where – whether they are UN sanctions, we look to go after those evasion networks. And there’s a good example of the United States just within recent days going after a large evasion network that is responsible for providing billions of dollars’ worth of support to the DPRK regime. Whether that’s in the form of ship-to-ship transfers, whether that’s in the form of overland transfers, regardless of the form, we are going to look for the activity and look to devise ways that we can counter it.

Department Press Briefing – March 14, 2023 - United States Department of State

state.gov · by Ned Price, Department Spokesperson

2:02 p.m. EDT

MR PRICE: Good afternoon, everyone, and thanks very much for joining us today. Before I start taking your questions, we are joined at the top by a special guest. We have with us Ramin Toloui. Ramin, as many of you know, is our Assistant Secretary of State in our Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. Ramin will have some opening remarks on the implementation of the State Department’s components of the CHIPS and Science Act, and then we will take a few questions for Ramin before he departs. So I would ask that as you listen to Ramin, please only indicate that you have a question if your question is for Ramin. We will then bid him adieu, and I will be happy to take your questions on unrelated subjects.

So with that, I will turn it over to Assistant Secretary Toloui.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY TOLOUI: Ned, thanks a lot. It’s great to be with you today and with everyone who is on the call.

So last year, President Biden signed a historic piece of bipartisan legislation – the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022. Through tax credits and more than $50 billion in direct investments, the CHIPS Act is aimed at securing American technological leadership through a renaissance in high-tech manufacturing and research and development.

Why is this important? Because semiconductors and telecommunications networks are critical sectors for both economic competitiveness and for the well-being of Americans. We learned during the COVID pandemic how disruptions in semiconductor supply chains had the potential to affect key sectors that impact our citizens, in everything from cars to medical devices.

And that reliance on semiconductors will only grow over time, as more and more sectors of the economy harness the power of digital technology to increase productivity and improve the quality of goods and services.

So global economic security and stability hinges on our ability to create robust and reliable semiconductor supply chains, prevent misuse or exploitation of semiconductor technology, and develop and deploy secure and trustworthy information and communications technology – or ICT – networks and services.

Recognizing that global cooperation is essential to realizing the goals of the CHIPS Act, Congress also appropriated in the act $500 million over five years to the Department of State for the International Technology Security and Innovation Fund, or ITSI Fund.

And I am delighted to announce that today the State Department is releasing the outline of its strategy for implementing the ITSI Fund. And this strategy has two parts: the first one relates to semiconductors, and the second one relates to information technology and communication networks and services.

On semiconductors, State will use the ITSI Fund to work collaboratively with our partners and allies on four priority areas of work that will strengthen the resilience, diversity, and security of global semiconductor supply chains.

The first area of focus is securing and diversifying the sources of critical mineral inputs that are needed in microchip fabrication. This is the so-called upstream component of the semiconductor supply chain. So the fabrication of semiconductors requires reliable access to critical minerals such as cobalt, aluminum, arsenic, copper, and rare earth elements, and we want to bring new, more diverse, and resilient mining, refining, processing, and recycling capacity online to support global chip production, including in the United States.

The second area of focus is diversifying and ensuring the resilience of the later downstream activities of the semiconductor supply chain – namely the assembly, testing, and packaging of microchips that’s needed to take those pieces of silicon and put them in the products that we use. As the United States ramps up its own fabrication, we want to make sure that there is a diversity and robustness of these downstream elements of the supply chain, particularly in the Indo-Pacific and in the Americas.

The third area of focus is strengthening the policy coordination with our allies and partners. And the goal here is to help ensure complementarity in our respective approaches to industry incentives, as well as improve collaboration during disruptions in supply.

And the fourth and final area of focus on the semiconductor side is protecting national security. Some uses of advanced semiconductors can pose national security risks, and the goal is to strengthen mechanisms to mitigate those risks through collaboration with international partners on export controls and licensing policies.

Now, moving over to the secure information and communications technologies side, the ITSI Fund will support programs across three workstreams, aimed at helping our partners harness the benefits of a vibrant digital economy underpinned by secure and trustworthy ICT infrastructure and services. First is capacity building to help governments create enabling environments for investments in interoperable and secure ICT ecosystems; second is the financing and investment de-risking to support the deployment of secure ICT networks, including Open Radio Access Networks or Open RAN; and third is working with partners to help them prepare for, and defend against, malicious cyber activities.

Now, no single country can onshore or conduct all the essential activities in the modern semiconductor supply chain. Collaboration with our allies and partners is critical to realizing the ambitious goals of the CHIPS Act, and the United States looks forward to accelerating our work in this regard under the ITSI Fund.

So thanks very much to all of you, thanks to Ned for this opportunity to share the details, and I’d be happy to take any questions.

MR PRICE: Excellent. Thank you very much. Just a reminder, we will first take questions for Assistant Secretary Toloui only. So, Operator, if you wouldn’t mind repeating instructions to ask a question of the assistant secretary.

OPERATOR: Sure. And once again, if you wish to ask a question, press 1 then 0; and you may remove yourself by repeating 1, 0 command.

MR PRICE: Give it a moment. We will go to the line of Joel Gehrke.

QUESTION: Hello, can you hear me?

MR PRICE: We have you. Go ahead.

QUESTION: Cool, thanks for doing this. Yeah, I just wondered, as you think about the CHIPS Act and sort of this broad priority, what do you think of the objections that we’ve heard even from the Taiwanese industry that this is not on anything like the scale needed to really offset or mitigate the effects of a conflict or any kind of disruption around Taiwan? And frankly, the – Taiwanese officials and industry leaders are pretty candid about saying that they don’t want to see too much of their semiconductor capacity removed to the United States or other places, because they regard that as increasing the geopolitical value of Taiwan and thus making it more important to the U.S.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY TOLOUI: So I think the CHIPS Act is – has several goals. The overriding goal is to restore and maintain America’s technological leadership and generate a renaissance in American high-tech manufacturing and continued leadership in research and development. Embedded in that objective is this goal of creating globally more resilient, diversified, and secure semiconductor supply chains. And so the main body of the CHIPS Act, which is the production incentives and the support for R&D, is being implemented and executed by the Department of Commerce. But when Congress passed the CHIPS Act, they recognized that international collaboration was essential to helping realize that goal.

And so what I was describing today were really actions that are intended to advance that goal of not only the increased domestic production and increased R&D leadership but also that international connectivity that’s critical to allowing that to happen and realizing that objective. So that’s – that’s really what we’re aiming at with the CHIPS Act, and that’s what we’re aiming at in particular with the ITSI Fund is that international partnerships you mentioned.

MR PRICE: Excellent. We’ll give it just a moment in case there are other questions for the assistant secretary.

OPERATOR: And as a reminder, if you have a question, press 1 then 0.

MR PRICE: Excellent. Thank you, Mr. Assistant Secretary. Much appreciated. We will now go on to – appreciate it – with the rest of the briefing. Let me start with one additional item at the top.

Today, the department is releasing our latest Global Engagement Center bulletin on the Kremlin’s biological weapons disinformation.

The bulletin demonstrates that the Kremlin has for many years now peddled false claims about biological weapons to create mistrust in the peaceful global efforts and public health institutions that counter biological threats.

It illustrates how Russia falsely built a disinformation campaign about, quote, “biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine” in one of many failed attempts to justify its unjustifiable war in Ukraine.

The report also breaks down the methods Russia uses to disseminate disinformation, including its parliamentary commission, Kremlin-funded media outlets, Russian-intelligence linked websites, and use of Kremlin-selected so-called “experts.” These entities work together to inject the information environment with a sustained drip of disinformation narratives to create the illusion of multiple voices echoing one another.

We will continue to call out the Kremlin for spreading disinformation, including about biological weapons. Russia has a history of accusing others of doing what it is itself doing, and its recent biological weapons claim related to Ukraine are no different. The United States assesses that Russia continues to maintain an offensive biological weapons program in violation of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.

So with that, we will turn to your broader questions. We’ll start with the line of Matt Lee. Matt, go ahead. Let’s see, do we have Matt Lee?

QUESTION: Can you hear me?

MR PRICE: Yes, go ahead.

QUESTION: Yeah, all right. I said thanks and I presume this is the end of your extended farewell tour, right?

MR PRICE: Matt, you’re welcome to give me another tribute if you would like, and go on at length, please. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: I’d love to. I was just going to wait – are you going to show up outside the Saks Fifth Avenue at some point doing another briefing? Seriously, I have two things, both on Russia, and they’ll both be really brief.

One – the first one – is your colleague John Kirby at the NSC said a little bit earlier that you guys, i.e., the State Department, were going to be in touch with the Russians over this drone incident over the Black Sea. Has that happened? What – if it has, where did – who spoke to who? Was the Secretary involved at all? I realize – I think he’s just landed or about to land in Ethiopia.

And then secondly, on the GEC report, why today? Was there any specific reason for releasing this report today? Thanks.

MR PRICE: Thanks very much, Matt. I’ll take your questions in the order you offered them.

First, this wasn’t exactly your first question, but let me start by saying that we have engaged at high levels with our allies and partners in the first instance to brief them on this incident and to let them know what we know, just about as soon as we were learning of the details.

To your more proximate question, we are engaging directly with the Russians – again, at senior levels – to convey our strong objections to this unsafe, unprofessional intercept which caused the downing of the unmanned U.S. aircraft. As to the particulars, we are summoning the Russian ambassador to the department, where we will convey this message. In Moscow meanwhile, Ambassador Tracy has conveyed a strong message to the Russian ministry of foreign affairs.

On your second question regarding the GEC report, as you know, Matt, disinformation routinely springs from the Kremlin and its information organs. We are releasing this bulletin now to set the record straight, including because we expect the Russians to release another so-called report full of lies and disinformation in the coming days. The bulletin we have just described describes the types of disinformation on biological weapons deployed by the Kremlin in a failed attempt to justify its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Russians have pushed this false narrative for decades in an effort to create mistrust in the peaceful global efforts and public health institutions that counter these very biological threats. So as we are preparing for the Russians to repeat these lies, we wanted to be sure to repeat the truth.

We will go the line of Jennifer Hansler, please.

QUESTION: Hi. Can you hear me?

MR PRICE: Yes, go ahead.

QUESTION: Okay. Thanks, Ned. Following up on Matt’s questions, can you say – you said you are summoning the ambassador, so he has not been summoned yet. Who will he meet with here at the State Department?

And then are you asking for any assistance from allies in retrieving the drone? My understanding is the – it has not been retrieved by the U.S.; it’s not in the U.S.’s possession at this point. Thank you.

MR PRICE: Thanks, Jenny. We are in the process of summoning the ambassador. I would expect that that high-level engagement will take place with the ambassador later this afternoon, where the ambassador will hear directly from senior officials about our strong objections to what was clearly an unsafe and an unprofessional intercept on the part of a Russian aircraft. As for efforts to recover the craft, that’s a question I will leave to my colleagues at the Department of Defense.

Let’s go to the line of Alex Raufoglu.

QUESTION: Ned, can you hear me?

MR PRICE: Yes, go ahead.

QUESTION: Yes. Thank you so much, Ned. On the drone incident, can you say it was a clear Russian aggravation against the United States and allied nations of Ukraine?

And also, moving away from the situation over the Black Sea for a moment, two developments happened around Wagner today. Russian parliament voted to censor Wagner critics and Lithuanian parliament labeled Wagner Group a terrorist organization and urged the other countries to do the same. Judging from the department’s tweet from yesterday on Wagner, when do you think is the best time to add the mercenary group to the FTO list? Thanks so much.

MR PRICE: Thanks, Alex. On your first question, we’re not in a position to speak to what the Russians intended to do. We’re not in a position to speak to what their motivations may have been. We are in a position to speak to what happened, and what happened was an unsafe and unprofessional maneuver on the part of a Russian aircraft, a maneuver that was also tinged with a lack of competence that caused the U.S. military to need to bring this unmanned craft down. That is the result, again, of these Russian actions. We can characterize them, but we can’t characterize the motivations. In a sense, however, the motivations matter much less than what actually transpired, and that’s what we’re speaking to today.

When it comes to the Wagner Group, Alex, as you know, we have used a range of authorities to pursue the Wagner Group. We have used designations. We have used sanctions. We have designated the Wagner Group a transnational criminal organization. And we have encouraged countries around the world to treat the Wagner Group with the same severity and the same level of priority that we do. Our work with countries around the world on Wagner to counter its malign influence and its malicious efforts wherever we can is ongoing. Countries around the world have their own authorities. Each of those authorities is going to be unique to the country in question. It’s up to the country in question to determine whether a particular authority is relevant to the Wagner Group. And in this case, one of our partners was able to establish a fact pattern that according to their own legislation – which is different from ours – allowed them to take this step.

When it comes to other tools that we may use, Alex, our task is always to look at the facts, as the Wagner Group is perpetrating its malicious activities in Ukraine, in Africa, in other parts of the world, and apply them to the laws as they are written in this country. That is what has allowed us to use a range of sanctions authorities, of designations, and to designate the Wagner Group as a transnational criminal organization.

Let’s go to the line of Jiha Ham.

QUESTION: Hi, Ned. Can you hear me?

MR PRICE: I can, yeah. Go ahead.

QUESTION: Okay. I have two questions today, both on North Korea. Yesterday, you said that the U.S. would much rather be engaging in dialogue and diplomacy with North Korea instead of being in a position to reaffirm the security commitment that you have with ROK and Japan. The question yesterday for this answer was about the joint military exercises between the U.S. and the ROK. So I’m wondering if there is a possibility that you would tone down the exercises when and if North Korea decides to engage in diplomacy or even stop launching missiles.

My second question – do you mind if you – go for the first one first?

MR PRICE: Sure, sure. Go ahead with your second question.

QUESTION: Sure. My second question: The UN Panel of Experts on North Korea in their last year’s report said that North Korea uses its territorial waters as ship-to-ship transfer areas, so – transferring illicit items such as coal or oil. And VOA so far this year has found more than 30 ship-to-ship transfer cases on the west coast of North Korea via satellite imagery. So what is your comment on this, the fact that North Korea continues evading sanctions? I mean, how can you, I mean, stop them? Thanks.

MR PRICE: Yeah. Thanks, Jiha, for both of those. On your first question, it unfortunately is a purely hypothetical question. It’s an academic question, because we have been clear and consistent in conveying publicly and through all channels available to us that we are prepared and willing to engage in constructive diplomacy with the DPRK towards what is the goal we share with our allies and partners of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. And I say it’s hypothetical and academic because at every turn the DPRK has failed to engage meaningfully on these offers. But were that to be the case, were the DPRK to take us up on this, we would look to see if we could devise practical steps that could help to advance what is that longer-term objective of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

I’m not in a position today to say whether any of the exercises you refer to would be implicated as part of those practical steps. We’re always going to have an ironclad commitment to the security of our treaty allies, including the ROK and Japan in this case. We’re always going to remain committed to the extended deterrence that we afford to our treaty allies. But the practical, specific steps that we may be in a position to take with the DPRK, were it to engage – that would be the subject of dialogue and diplomacy, the very dialogue and diplomacy in which the DPRK has refused to engage.

When it comes to ship-to-ship transfers, as you know, Jiha, we routinely designate additional actors in the DPRK or entities in or working on behalf of the DPRK for its efforts that are in violation of UN Security Council resolutions or other forms of international law. In addition to finding new targets, much of our work is focused on sanctions enforcement, and so when we have an opportunity to identify activity that seeks to circumvent the sanctions that are on the books, whether they’re U.S. sanctions, where – whether they are UN sanctions, we look to go after those evasion networks. And there’s a good example of the United States just within recent days going after a large evasion network that is responsible for providing billions of dollars’ worth of support to the DPRK regime. Whether that’s in the form of ship-to-ship transfers, whether that’s in the form of overland transfers, regardless of the form, we are going to look for the activity and look to devise ways that we can counter it.

Let’s go to the line of Humeyra Pamuk.

QUESTION: I was just wondering what kind of a response Ambassador Tracy received when she raised this with the Russian foreign ministry. How would you describe that?

And also, this is not the first time that U.S. has been flying drones over that airspace. This has been the case for over a year. Do you have any assessment on why this incident has taken place now? Thanks.

MR PRICE: Thanks, Humeyra. You’ve – you saw from the statement from European Command earlier today a reaffirmation of the fact that we fly, we sail, we operate everywhere international law allows. And when it comes to this region, U.S. Air Forces in Europe – Air Forces Africa routinely fly aircraft through Europe over sovereign territory and throughout international airspace in coordination with applicable host-nation and international laws. Of course, this unmanned craft was downed – forced to go down, I should say, in international airspace in what was a brazen violation of international law. And so we are conveying in strong terms our objections to this.

I can only speak to what we are doing and what we are conveying. I am going to leave the Russians – leave it to the Russians to characterize their response. But Ambassador Tracy did convey a strong message on behalf of the department earlier today to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Let’s go to the line of Pearl Matibe.

QUESTION: Thank you, Ned, and I just want to take this opportunity to thank you for all the hundreds – literally – of briefings and your being available and flexible for answering some of my questions.

MR PRICE: Thanks, Pearl.

QUESTION: I look forward – and good luck on your next step.

So, Ned, I have a couple of questions for you. As of right now, we are almost exactly two weeks away from President Biden’s second democracy summit, and taking a look at the promotion of it on the State Department website, there’s very thin information about what exactly the Biden administration and State Department are doing in terms of the democracy summit. Could you speak to the second democracy summit, and also let me know if any elements of it are going to be weaved into Secretary Blinken’s trip while he is in Africa? And also, do you have any idea whether since Vice President Kamala Harris is planned to be in Zambia, and where Zambia is also going to be a co-host, might that element be threaded in?

And then, to what extent might press freedom and journalists being a pillar in democracy be part of your public diplomacy planning? Please just let us know what is going on with the second democracy summit. We’re not hearing anything from the State Department about the second democracy summit.

Thanks, Ned. I may have a follow-up question.

MR PRICE: Thanks, Pearl, and I very much appreciate the question. I can assure you, you will be hearing additional concrete details as the second democracy summit approaches in the coming days, but let me say a couple things. First, as you alluded to, we will co-host the second summit for democracy with the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Costa Rica, and Zambia later this month. It will take place on March 29th and 30th. Similar to the first summit, world leaders will gather in a virtual plenary format. What will be new this year will be in-person and hybrid events held in host countries, including here in the United States.

This – we believe this co-host format really reinforces the notion that democratic renewal is a truly global and truly shared effort, and we look forward to partners coming together at the second summit to report on progress in implementing the over 750 commitments made at the first summit to support a meaningful declaration of our collective priorities that address the challenges of our time, and to recommit to strengthening that democratic resilience globally.

Pearl, this summit is taking place on March 29th and 30th, but democracy and the underlying principles are on the agenda every single day in everything that we do. So as the Secretary is traveling this week in Ethiopia and Niger, he will have an opportunity to stress and to speak to some of the very principles that will be on full display during the democracy summit later this month. Human rights are always on the agenda. Universal rights, more broadly, are always on the agenda. And one of those universal rights is the freedom of expression, is freedom to access information; press freedom is part and parcel of all of that. And we demonstrate that and recommit ourselves to that in a number of ways. When the Secretary is in Ethiopia and Niger, you will see him take questions from journalists in both places, including from Ethiopian journalists and Nigerien journalists when he is in Niamey. We bring a press corps with us everywhere we go. That itself is a very tangible and real demonstration of the commitment we have to press freedom and to holding ourselves accountable, making sure that the Secretary is always surrounded by those who can ask the tough questions of him.

So you are very much going to see these themes as the Secretary is in Africa this week, just as you see these themes as the Secretary has traveled to dozens of countries around the world and as we look to the summit that will take place in Washington later this month.

Let’s go to Tetsuo Shintomi.

QUESTION: Can you hear me?

MR PRICE: Yes, please go ahead.

QUESTION: Before the question, I would like to thank you for your professional work. You are the spokesperson answering my questions sincerely all the time. Thank you.

MR PRICE: Thank you. I appreciate that.

QUESTION: South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol is going to visit Japan on this Thursday and meet with Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. Are you welcoming two leaders’ meeting in terms of U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation? And also, is U.S. planning any diplomatic engagement with ROK and Japan during President Yoon’s two-day visit? Thank you.

MR PRICE: What was – sorry, what was the second part of your question? Are we planning any engagement?

QUESTION: Sure. Is United States planning any diplomatic engagement with ROK and Japan during two-day visit of President Yoon?

MR PRICE: Thank you. Thank you very much for the question. Yes, we very much welcome the upcoming meeting between the leaders – between the leaders of the ROK and the leaders of – and the prime minister of Japan. This is part and parcel of the announcement that we heartily welcomed earlier this month, when those two countries issued the historic announcement that bilateral discussions between them to resolve sensitive historical issues had concluded. At the time, we encouraged the ROK and Japan to build on this step to continue to advance those bilateral relations, and the meeting between the president of South Korea and the prime minister of Japan will be a tangible manifestation of the efforts on the part of these two staunch allies of the United States to advance their own bilateral relationship.

We applaud those efforts because we always appreciate seeing our allies working collectively and constructively with one another, but also because in this case the three of us have what is to us and we think to both the ROK and Japan an especially important trilateral relationship. We, of course, engage bilaterally across a number of issues with both countries, but it’s a trilateral relationship that in so – in some ways allows us to be all that more effective when it comes to the core challenges that we face in the Indo-Pacific and in some ways even beyond. Whether it is the challenge posed by the DPRK, whether it is other elements of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, whether it’s the shared challenges that all countries around the world face, like a warming climate or COVID, our cooperation in all of these areas has been important to us and important to the ROK and Japan as well.

Beyond those shared interests, though, the trilateral relationship is so vitally important because the United States, the ROK, Japan, we have shared values. And at the core – at the center, I should say – of those shared values is an enduring belief and a vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region. That’s the vision that we have long worked bilaterally with the ROK on, bilaterally with Japan on, and it’s a vision that we would like to deepen our cooperation on a trilateral basis with the ROK and Japan going forward.

We’ll go to Samira Gharaei.

QUESTION: Thank you, Ned. Can you hear me?

MR PRICE: Yes. Please, go ahead.

QUESTION: Perfect. Ned, I sincerely want to thank you for all you’ve done as spokesperson. For one, you gave me so much confidence to ask questions when I was just starting my job at the State Department. Thank you, and you will be dearly missed.

MR PRICE: Thank you.

QUESTION: So let’s go to my question – sure. It’s about Roger Carstens’ trip to Doha. We heard about it yesterday, the start – he started yesterday. Are you proceeding with a deal with Iranians? Can you give us more details about the purpose of this trip? Is it done?

MR PRICE: Thanks very much, Samira. I appreciate the kind words.

Roger Carstens has traveled to Doha. He is there primarily to attend the Soufan Forum. It’s a gathering that brings together a number of stakeholders from around the world, and that’s primarily what he’s engaged in in Doha.

Of course, when it comes to Americans who are wrongfully detained around the world, whether that’s in Iran or anywhere else, we are working relentlessly in every possible way to see their prompt release. Samira, you know well that we have conveyed from the earliest part of this administration to the Iranian regime the priority we attach to seeing the release of the three Americans who continue to be wrongfully detained in Iran. It’s not productive for us to speak to the particulars of what precisely we are doing or contemplating as part of that, but our commitment to do everything we can to see their release is firm and it is steadfast, and we are working on it all the time.

QUESTION: Thank you, Ned. I need to – can I ask another one, please?

MR PRICE: Quickly, sure.

QUESTION: Yeah. I just wanted to ask about a wrap-up about your Iran policy, because during the last two years, we did not see any dual nationality or American citizen getting released, JCPOA talks have gone nowhere and reached a dead end, and Iranians have started one of their biggest movements against the Islamic Republic and they are still upholding it. How do you judge the U.S. Iran policy after you are finishing your job as a spokesperson?

MR PRICE: Thanks, Samira. Look, of course Iran poses a number of challenges, and we’ve always been clear-eyed that those challenges are difficult, they are – they are complex; they cross into many different realms. But I think when you take a look at each one of those realms, you have seen us work with allies and partners in ways that meaningfully protect our interests and promote our interests.

When it comes to Iran’s nuclear program, of course this is one of those core challenges. But I think when you look at where we are now as opposed to where we had been or where the previous administration had been, we are now united with our European allies. When this administration came into office, for far too long it had been the case that it had been the United States that was in some ways diplomatically isolated and we were sitting on opposite sides of the table from what should have been our closest allies. We quickly fixed that, and we now come to this challenge alongside the E3, in this case, our close European allies – the French, the Germans, and the Brits as well – working in lockstep.

Now, you know, Samira, that the Iranian regime has not been true to its word when it said early on in this administration that it sought a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA. It has consistently proven itself unable or unwilling to do so, and the JCPOA is no longer on the agenda. But what very much is on the agenda is working with our European allies, other allies and partners in the Middle East, and other parts in the world to do what we can to counter this program, to impose additional pressure on Iran in response to its intransigence and its continued advancements when it comes to its nuclear program.

You look at other areas, Samira, and the challenges that Iran has posed – from the funding of terrorist groups and proxies to its other malign capabilities – we have enacted sanctions; we have enacted designations as well. We’ve worked with our partners in the region to help bolster their defensive and deterrent capabilities to, in the first instance, protect themselves from the type of cross-border attacks that Iran has in many ways supported and even fueled, but also to helping them deter such attacks in the first place. Baquer Namazi, of course, is – has been reunited with his family. We are working steadfast, as I said a moment ago, to do everything we can to bring home the three Americans who remain wrongfully detained in Iran.

Let’s go to – let’s see – we’ll go to Michel Ghandour.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) and I wish you all the best. I have two questions. First, any comments on the Syrian president’s visit to Russia today?

MR PRICE: Michel, I don’t have any particular comments on that. Of course, these are two countries that have long been aligned. These are two countries that have long cooperated together, much to the detriment of the Syrian people, of the people in the region. So it’s of course no surprise to see high-level engagement between these two countries.

All right. Okay, we will conclude there. Many thanks to all of you who were able to join today. If you weren’t able to ask a question, you know where to find us, and we’ll be happy to take your questions offline. Thank you all very much. Talk to you soon.

(The briefing was concluded at 2:42 p.m.)

# # #

state.gov · by Ned Price, Department Spokesperson

5. Yoon announces 'complete normalization' of military intel-sharing pact with Japan

Potentially moving toward integrated missile defense. Every north Korean provocation makes trilateral relations and coordination stronger. 

(6th LD) Yoon announces 'complete normalization' of military intel-sharing pact with Japan | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · March 16, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with Yoon's announcement on GSOMIA; CHANGES headline)

By Lee Haye-ah

TOKYO, March 16 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol said Thursday he agreed to "completely normalize" a military intelligence-sharing pact between South Korea and Japan during his summit with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Tokyo on Thursday.

Yoon made the remark during a joint press conference, referring to the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) that Seoul's previous administration threatened to suspend amid a bilateral dispute over wartime forced labor.

"I declared the complete normalization of GSOMIA at our summit a short while ago," Yoon said at the press conference held at the prime minister's residence. "I believe the two countries should be able to share information on North Korea's nuclear missile launches and trajectories, and respond to them."

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (R) salutes the national flag during an honor guard inspection prior to summit talks with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at the latter's residence in Tokyo on March 16, 2023. Yoon began a two-day trip to Japan to put strained relations back on track. (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · March 16, 2023

6. Japan lifts chipmaking export controls on South Korea

Another positive step forward in the ROK-Japan relationship.

Japan lifts chipmaking export controls on South Korea

Seoul drops WTO dispute process as Yoon and Kishida seek common ground in Tokyo

https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Japan-South-Korea-rift/Japan-lifts-chipmaking-export-controls-on-South-Korea

KIM JAEWON, Nikkei staff writer

March 16, 2023 16:15 JSTUpdated on March 16, 2023 17:22 JST

TOKYO -- Japan lifted export controls it had imposed on South Korea in regard to three materials needed to produce semiconductors and displays, responding to Seoul's gesture to improve soured ties.

Ahead of the summit between Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and visiting President Yoon Suk Yeol in Tokyo, both governments announced on Thursday that Japan eliminated regulations on hydrogen fluoride, fluorinated polyamide and photoresist.

The lifting of the curbs follows a meeting between the directors general of each country's trade ministry.

Japan assessed South Korea to have appropriate export control regimes, reversing what it had said when it imposed the curbs.

South Korea, for its part, announced the withdrawal of litigation it had filed with the World Trade Organization over the matter.

The litigation was put on hold on March 6, prompting the neighbors to resume bilateral trade dialogue for the first time in three years.

Japan stopped short of putting South Korea back on its list of "white countries" to which Japanese companies can freely export items that are not easily diverted to military use.

The countries will continue to hold discussions about bilateral trade issues.

The export curbs were imposed in July 2019 on hydrogen fluoride and photoresist, key items in chip production, and on fluorinated polyamide, a key material used in organic light-emitting displays.

7. ＜Inside N. Korea＞Food sales banned in markets, leading to anxiety and concern while deepening the poverty suffered by the poor

Is Kim Jong Un doing everything he can to deliberately make the Korean people suffer?

I know this is a provocative statement but we need to be as concerned with internal instability in north Korea as we are with an ICBM test. This instability may be more likely to lead to conflict than Kim Jong Un's strategy to dominate the Korean peninsula. We are more likely to have conflict due to regime collapse than we are to have a war based on a calculated decision by Kim Jong Un. Are we prepared for the full range of likely contingencies (of course up to and including war which our current exercise is ensuring the readiness for).

＜Inside N. Korea＞Food sales banned in markets, leading to anxiety and concern while deepening the poverty suffered by the poor

asiapress.org

(FILE PHOTO) North Koreans selling rice at a market. There are a diverse range of grains on display at the stalls, but now it is impossible to see such a scene. Taken by ASIAPRESS in Chongjin in September 2013.

◆ A ban on rice and corn in some markets in the country

Public markets in North Korea’s northern cities banned the sale of rice and corn in January. This news has been confirmed by several ASIAPRESS reporting partners in North Hamgyung Province, Yanggang Province, and North Pyongan Province. The measure has made it so the only remaining place for people to purchase food is state-run food shops, but these shops have very limited stocks of food, which is causing discontent among consumers. (KANG Ji-won / ISHIMARU Jiro)

ASIAPRESS has confirmed that four cities in the northern region of the country has slapped bans on the sale of rice and corn. ASIAPRESS was unable to confirm similar bans in Pyongyang and other cities, but it does appear the ban is nationwide.

A reporting partner in Yanggang Province told ASIAPRESS that “last year market sellers were told by market management offices that there would be a complete ban on food sales starting in 2023, and this ban was implemented at the start of this year. The ban affects just rice and corn, but allows the sale of potatoes, beans and other non-grain foods.”

An ASIAPRESS reporting partner in North Hamgyung Province confirmed the Yanggang Province reporting partner’s report.

(FILE PHOTO) A picture of a state-run food store taken in November 2012. No bags of rice can be seen, and the store appears closed. Taken by ASIAPRESS in Hyesan in November 2012.

◆ Why the regime has banned food sales in markets

North Korean authorities began to intensify their controls over the sale of food in markets around the time the COVID-19 pandemic began in January 2020. The Kim Jong-un regime stopped almost all trade with China as part of efforts to prevent the spread of the virus across the border and placed strict bans on the movement of people and goods within the country.

As a result of these measures, the country began experiencing an acute shortage of basic commodities, leading to severe fluctuations in food prices. The authorities intervened in food transactions at markets, putting in place price ceilings for food items. In addition to enforcing these price ceilings, the authorities strengthened their monitoring of people hoarding food. All of these measures were an attempt by the authorities to stabilize food prices by force.

Meanwhile, the Kim Jong-un regime attempted an expansion of its state-run food shop network. Starting in 2019, the government had already started selling rice and corn at irregular intervals through these shops at prices slightly lower than what could be found in markets. Following the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the regime expanded the state-run food shops nationwide.

A comprehensive look at the reports from reporting partners in North Korea suggests that, starting in 2021, the regime shifted from selling food items when stocks were available to selling five kilograms per person in each household once per month.

The market prices of white rice and corn in December 2022 were KPW 6,000 and KPW 3,000, respectively; however, state-run food shops sold these commodities at just KPW 4,400 and KPW 2,400 (prices are for one kilogram. KRW 1,000 equals around KPW 6,400). The shops also allow consumers to buy food using Chinese yuan and US dollars.

Laborers have been able to buy several kilograms of food at the state-run shops while also receiving rations from the state, although workers who miss work several times or don’t show up altogether are not allowed these benefits. Some people believe that the government is restarting the food distribution system of the past, but the food distributions are not uniform or stable: there are times when workers are not even able to receive one gram of food over several months, and the amount of food workers receive depends on where they work.

The Kim Jong-un regime has thus intensified efforts to suppress market activity while increasing importance of state-run food shops. The regime appears intent in implementing a state-led monopoly over the country’s food supply.

◆ The first time in 20 years that selling food has been banned in markets

Following the fall harvest last year, the regime heavily intensified its restrictions on the distribution of food in markets. In particular, the government has strongly cracked down on market sellers purchasing food produced in rural farming areas. Trading companies are not allowed to sell food they have in stock to market sellers, either.

Market management offices demanded that market sellers submit documents confirming the sources of the grains they sell, and also placed limits on how much they can sell. The markets did not ban sellers from putting rice and corn products on display; however, many market sellers gave up selling those items when they found they could no longer make money.

Then, starting in early January, the regime moved to completely ban the sale of certain foods in markets. This is the first time that has happened since the government legalized blacked markets (jangmadang) in 2003.

(FILE PHOTO) A man transporting food he bought at a farm to the city on a bike. There are many poor urban dwellers who are involved in such difficult and poorly paid work. Currently, transporting food from farms to the cities is strictly banned. Taken by KIM Dong-chul in South Pyongan Province in October 2010. (ASIAPRESS)

◆ The negative affects of the ban on selling food in markets

Below is an interview with two ASIAPRESS reporting partners in Yanggang Province.

―― If sellers aren’t allowed to sell food in the markets, how do people buy food? Rations provided through workplaces and food sold through state-run food shops will not be nearly enough…

Rice sellers continue to sell their goods at their homes. In the fall of last year, the crackdowns got so intense that officials even went into people’s homes (to check to anyone selling rice). There has been a rise in discontent among consumers because there’s no place to buy food, so the authorities are now turning a blind eye to people selling from their homes. They do not allow sellers to put out their food items for display.

―― Why are the authorities allowing people to sell goods from their homes?

The state has now banned even the sale of food in markets despite not being able to provide the people with proper supplies of food, so how are households with just elderly people or those working in jobs requiring only light labor and their family members supposed to get food? The issue blew up all at once. There are even people who are starving because they can’t buy food, so the authorities have eased their crackdowns on people selling food from their homes. (An ASIAPRESS reporting partner in North Hamgyung Province also provided the same information.)

―― What kind of impact is this having on poverty-stricken people?

(At the markets) it was possible to buy things from sellers you know on credit even if you didn’t have money, which allowed many people to find ways to survive. The state-run food shops don’t allow buying things on credit, nor do they haggle. There were a lot of people who made a living by buying rice and corn on credit from markets to make food they could sell (such as rice cakes), but now they can’t do that anymore.

―― We’ve heard reports of people dying of starvation…

People don’t have cash incomes. Nor can they buy food on credit. So there’s even people who head to farm areas to beg for food. There’s quite a few people around me who are surviving on just one or two meals a day. They are physically weakening to the point that (some) are dying. But the authorities never say that they died of starvation, just that they died of disease.

◆ What is the government saying about the ban?

―― How is the government explaining the ban on food sales in markets?

It is explaining that the ban is aimed at preventing people from conducting transactions with illegally obtained, state-owned food and selling this food in markets at marked up rates. The ban is also aimed at preventing wealthy people from reselling food they bought at markets for high prices. The authorities are also saying that the ban is aimed at stopping people from selling food in the markets to cover the costs of purchasing materials for enterprises and farms.

――What is the Kim Jong-un regime’s intention to implement the ban?

Right now, people are leading tough lives because the business environment is so poor. Many people are reliant on the food sold at state-run food stores, along with rations provided by their workplaces. There’s been a rise in the number of people who want to join a workplace that hands out rations. The government knows this and that’s why it is restricting sales of food at markets. There has also been rumors of a large amount of food coming in from China in late March, which has raised the hopes of many people.

The Kim Jong-un regime is trying to implement a state-run monopoly over food distribution at the expense of the markets. It is unclear whether these efforts will be successful, but it is clear the regime is in the midst of an effort to exert more control over its people by taking hold of their food supply.

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

Map of North Korea ( ASIAPRESS)

asiapress.org

8. Samsung to build world’s largest semiconductor cluster in Korea

Samsung to build world’s largest semiconductor cluster in Korea

donga.com

Posted March. 16, 2023 07:52,

Updated March. 16, 2023 07:52

Samsung to build world’s largest semiconductor cluster in Korea. March. 16, 2023 07:52. kalssam35@donga.com,will@donga.com.

The government will foster the world’s largest system semiconductor cluster by attracting private sector investment of 300 trillion won by 2042. The government also plans to build 15 high-tech industrial complexes across the nation in semiconductors, futuristic cars, nuclear energy, and space industries. By easing various regulations, including development-restricted areas (such as green belt), to match the level of competitor nations, the government plans to attract corporate investment of 55 trillion won by 2026 in six businesses, including semiconductors, displays, and secondary cells.

President Yoon Suk Yeol led the 14th Contingency Economic Council Meeting on Wednesday and announced that the government would work with more than 150 materials/parts/equipment businesses and Fabless companies in Pangyo to build the world’s largest semiconductor mega cluster. The government plans to attract five chip fabrication plants and 150 materials/parts/equipment businesses, and fabless companies (semiconductor design) in the semiconductor cluster. It will connect with existing semiconductor production centers in Giheung, Hwaseong, Pyeongtaek, and Icheon to operate as a mega-cluster. Companies that join the cluster will be waived of acquisition tax and property tax and enjoy eased business approval and increased floor area (1.4 times of other industrial complexes).

Samsung Electronics announced on the same day that it would invest 300 trillion won over the next 20 years to build a system semiconductor cluster in Yong-in. Once the Yong-in cluster is finished, Samsung Electronics will have a semiconductor production delta belt connecting Giheung, Hwaseong, and Yongin. Indirect production impact is expected to be around 4 trillion won and expected to hire around 1.6 million.

The government will also foster 15 high-tech industrial complexes for futuristic cars, nuclear energy, and robotics. The total area will cover 40.76 million square meters, the largest of its kind in the nation. Upon designation, national industrial cluster areas will be subject to the highest degree of deregulation and receive government support to build infrastructure.

한국어

donga.com

9. President Yoon Suk Yeol warns North after missile launched

President Yoon: Please let "slip the information dogs of war" you have previously discussed in response to north Korean provocations. Now is the time for a comprehensive information warfare campaign.

• Pressure on the three main target audiences: The regime elite (party and military leaders) the 2d Tier military leadership, and the population.
• Opportunity for Kim to change (unlikely); the elite pressure Kim to change due to their suffering and desire for survival; the people (disaffected elite, 2d tier leadership, and collective action from the population) force change from within.

Design an overt influence campaign targeting the Korean people based on Information, Knowledge, Truth, and Understanding

•Information – massive quantities of information from entertainment to news

•Knowledge – practical information on how to effect change, best practices for agriculture and market activity, educational lessons without Juche influence

•Truth – the truth about the regime and the situation in north Korea and the outside world

•Understanding – help the Korean people in the north to understand the inalienable and universal rights that belong to all human beings

7 Basic Considerations for Information and Influence Activities in the north

1.Focus on creating divisions within the elite

2.Influence the 2d tier leadership – to not attack in crisis

3.Adopt simple concepts that are meaningful to the Korea people living in the north and support the idea of unification

4.Focus on human rights violations by the Kim Family Regime

5.Focus on educating people on the unification process (in the north and South)

–e.g., Korean Dramas

–Land ownership

–Political action at local level

–Bright future for those who engage in unification process

–Military leaders who secure WMD and prevent conflict will have a place in a unified Korea

6.Emphasize local leadership in the north during the unification process

7.Identify and support key communicators in the north

Strategic Influence through Information Advantage

•Information and influence activities campaign to target regime elite, second tier leaders, and the population.

–Arguably the most important effort

–When is the best time to plant a tree? (20 years ago)

–So much potential

•Full spectrum of media

•7.5 million smart phones and growing

•Korean Dramas – Crash Landing On You

•Use of escapees (defectors) – Korean Defector Information Institute

•Themes and messages for short and long term effects

•north Korea is a laboratory for PSYOP innovation

•How to help our ally with effective influence operations

Thursday

March 16, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

President Yoon Suk Yeol warns North after missile launched

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/03/16/national/northKorea/Korea-North-Korea-Pyongyang/20230316150111663.html

Footage broadcast by Pyongyang's Korean Central Television (KCTV) shows one of the two ballistic missiles that were launched from Jangyon, South Hwanghae Province on Tuesday. [YONHAP]

President Yoon Suk Yeol warned Thursday that North Korea “will certainly pay” for its “reckless provocations” at a morning National Security Council (NSC) meeting that took place just after a long-range ballistic missile launch from the North was detected.

South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the launch of a suspected long-range ballistic missile at a high angle from the Sunan area of Pyongyang at 7:10 a.m.

The missile flew approximately 1,000 kilometers (621 miles), reaching a maximum altitude of 6,000 kilometers during its 70-minute flight before falling into the sea approximately 250 kilometers east of the northern Japanese island of Oshima, according to South Korean and Japanese defense officials.

The NSC issued a statement after the meeting condemning the latest missile launch as “a clear violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions and a grave provocation that escalates tensions on the Korean Peninsula and threatens regional peace.”

Yoon attended the NSC meeting right before he headed to Tokyo for a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. They are expected to discuss security cooperation against the growing nuclear and missile threat from the North and other bilateral issues.

According to the presidential office, Yoon emphasized the need for strengthened security cooperation with the United States and Japan in his remarks at the meeting.

Yoon also ordered South Korea’s military to “thoroughly carry out the ongoing Freedom Shield joint exercise to maintain a firm South Korea-U.S. joint defense posture that can deter any threat from North Korea,” his office said in a statement.

The exercise began earlier this week and is scheduled to run until March 23.

In a February statement, Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, said “We keep our eye on the restless military moves by the U.S. forces and the South Korean puppet military and are always on standby to take appropriate, quick and overwhelming action at any time according to our judgment,” suggesting the North could use the ongoing joint exercise as a pretext to conduct more missile launches or other kinds of weapons testing.

The North fired what it called two medium-range ballistic missiles Tuesday, after it claimed to have launched two “strategic cruise missiles” from a submarine two days earlier. 

While the North has previously launched missiles over Japan — most recently in October last year — the regime typically fires them on lofted trajectories so they avoid neighboring countries, and the majority of missiles fired by the regime in the past year have landed in the East Sea.

But in a statement earlier this month, Kim Yo-jong said “The Pacific Ocean does not belong to the dominion of the United States or Japan,” suggesting the North sees missile launches into international waters farther away as fair game.

In response to the North Korean missile launch on Thursday morning, JCS Chairman Gen. Kim Seung-kyum held talks with Gen. Paul LaCamera, the commander of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, and vowed the allies will further bolster their joint defense posture against “any North Korean threats and provocations,” according to the JCS.

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]

10. South Korea and Japan hail spring thaw amid missiles and weight of history

South Korea and Japan hail spring thaw amid missiles and weight of history

Reuters · by Sakura Murakami

TOKYO/SEOUL, March 16 (Reuters) - The leaders of Japan and South Korea promised to turn the page on years of animosity at a meeting on Thursday, putting aside their difficult, shared history and saying they needed to work more closely to counter regional security challenges.

The comments from South Korea's Yoon Suk Yeol and Japan's Fumio Kishida at a summit in Tokyo highlight how the two U.S. allies have been pushed closer together by North Korea's frequent missile launches, as well as growing concern about China's more muscular role on the international stage.

Yoon's visit to Japan on Thursday was the first for a South Korean president in 12 years. The urgency of the regional security situation - and the threat posed by North Korea - were underscored in the hours before his arrival, when the North fired a long-range ballistic missile that landed in the sea between the Korean peninsula and Japan.

The two countries also agreed to drop an almost four-year trade dispute on high-tech materials used for chips, an issue that has dogged their relationship even as the political importance of semiconductors, and securing their supply, has increased.

"This week Tokyo saw its cherry blossom trees blooming a little earlier than usual. I'm very happy to have this opportunity to start a new chapter of a forward-looking future of Japan and South Korea relations on this day when we can feel the arrival of spring," Kishida said as the two faced each other across a table.

The two said they would restart the previously halted "shuttle diplomacy" of regular leader visits between the countries.

"Today's meeting with Prime Minister Kishida has a special meaning of letting the people of our two countries know that South Korea-Japan relations, which have gone through difficult times due to various pending issues, are at a new starting point," Yoon said.

He said North Korea's launch of a long-range ballistic missile that morning had shown the "grave threat" to international peace and stability.

EXPORT CURBS

Japan will remove curbs on its exports to South Korea of critical materials for smartphone displays and chips while Seoul will drop a World Trade Organization (WTO) complaint against Tokyo, officials from both sides said.

Tokyo imposed the curbs in 2019 as tensions over a decades-old row with Seoul deepened.

Yoon has said that he expects to "invigorate" security cooperation. The two leaders are preparing to confirm the restart of a bilateral security dialogue which has been suspended since 2018, Japanese broadcaster NHK reported.

The attempt for closer ties brought a rebuke from China, whose foreign ministry said it opposed the attempt by certain countries to form exclusive circles.

SCEPTICISM AT HOME

Behind the scenes, Japanese officials have been cautious about improving relations.

Yoon also faces scepticism at home. In a poll by Gallup Korea published Friday, 64% of respondents said there was no need to rush to improve ties with Japan if there was no change in its attitude, and 85% said they thought the current Japanese government was not apologetic about Japan's colonial history.

Nevertheless, economic ties are strong. The two were each other's fourth-largest export markets in 2021, according to the IMF. Japanese exports to South Korea totalled $52 billion, while South Korean exports totalled $30 billion, the data showed.

In a fresh reminder of the long-running tensions, two South Korean victims of wartime forced labour filed a lawsuit, seeking compensation from Japanese company Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (7011.T), their representatives said on Thursday.

Relations between the two, long-strained over the wartime labour issue as well as over disputed islands, and Korean girls and women forced to work in Japanese wartime brothels, made headway last week when Seoul announced a plan for its companies to compensate former forced labourers. The victims who filed the lawsuit reject that plan.

Japan's biggest business lobby, Keidanren, said it and its South Korean counterpart, the Federation of Korean Industries, agreed to launch foundations aimed at "future-oriented" bilateral relations.

Park Hong-keun, floor leader of South Korea's main opposition Democratic Party, said Yoon's visit should not stop at "his trip down memory lane" and asked Yoon to earn a true apology and resolution from Japan on forced labour issues during his trip.

Japan said the "strategic challenge posed by China is the biggest Japan has ever faced" in a defence strategy paper released in December. Tokyo worries that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has set a precedent that will encourage China to attack self-ruled Taiwan.

China's coast guard entered waters around disputed East China Sea islets on Wednesday to counter what it called the incursion of Japanese vessels into Chinese territorial waters.

Reporting by Sakura Murakami and Kaori Kaneko in Tokyo, Josh Smith, Ju-min Park and Soo-hyang Choi in Seoul; Additional reporting by Laurie Chen in Beijing; Writing by David Dolan; Editing by Gerry Doyle and Sharon Singleton

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Sakura Murakami

11. National interest not a zero-sum game with Japan: Yoon

​The only zero sum game is with north Korea for both South Korea and Japan.

Thursday

March 16, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

National interest not a zero-sum game with Japan: Yoon

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/03/16/national/politics/Korea-Japan-Yoon-Suk-Yeol/20230316202516743.html

Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, left, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida shake hands at a press conference held after their bilateral summit in Tokyo Thursday. It was the first time a Korean president made a visit to Japan for a bilateral summit in 12 years. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

President Yoon Suk Yeol stressed that it's in both Korea and Japan's national interests to normalize relations to better respond to security issues following his summit with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on Thursday. 

"Korea's national interest is not a zero-sum relationship with Japan's national interest," said Yoon, adding that the normalization of bilateral relations will be helpful to the security of both countries in a joint press conference with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Tokyo. 

The two sides agreed to the normalization of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (Gsomia), a bilateral military intelligence-sharing pact established in 2016 and renewed annually until it was almost terminated by Seoul in 2019 in response to Tokyo's trade curbs.

Yoon said the move comes as a part of efforts to better share information on North Korea's nuclear and missile threats and respond to them. 

Yoon added that if bilateral relations are normalized and advanced by resolving the issue of compensating victims of Japan's wartime forced labor, "it will be of great help in responding to the security crisis." 

Yoon's first visit to Tokyo after taking office comes after Seoul announced last week its decision to pay compensation to victims of Japan's wartime forced labor through a Korea-backed public foundation, without set contributions from Japanese companies. 

Yoon in turn said that Seoul will not exercise its right to indemnity on the forced labor issue, noting that if that happens, "all problems will return to square one."

Kishida in turn said that Japan "positively" views Korea's proposed solution to the forced labor issue.

Japan also lifted export restrictions imposed on Korea since 2019.

Korea simultaneously withdrew its complaint filed against Japan with the World Trade Organization (WTO) over restrictions on the export of key materials to Korea that are essential for semiconductor and display productions. 

"Korea and Japan are the closest neighbors and partners that share the universal values of freedom, human rights and the rule of law, and need to pursue common interests in security, economy and global agendas," said Yoon.

"Today, Japan lifted export restrictions on three materials, and Korea withdrew its WTO complaint," said Yoon. 

Yoon said the two sides also agreed to continue "close consultation" to swiftly return one another to each nation's trade "whitelists."

Kishida in turn said in the press conference that he will "inherit the historical awareness of previous cabinets," including the joint declaration of 1998 adopted by Korean President Kim Dae-jung and Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, 

In this landmark declaration, Obuchi acknowledged the "tremendous damage and suffering to the people of the Republic of Korea through its colonial rule" and expressed "deep remorse and heartfelt apology." Kishida didn't repeat the exact words of the statement. 

Kishida said Yoon's visit served as a "major first step toward restoring our bilateral ties to normal." 

The two sides also reaffirmed the importance of resuming security consultations to better respond to North Korea threats and bolstering bilateral cooperation on economic security. 

On Thursday morning, Yoon kicked off a two-day visit to Tokyo, accompanied by first lady Kim Keon-hee, marking the first visit by a Korean president to Tokyo for a bilateral summit in 12 years. 

Yoon and Kishida held bilateral talks for 85 minutes ahead of their press conference.

The trip was an occasion to make headway on the two countries' trade dispute which began in July 2019, after Japan unilaterally imposed export restrictions to Korea on three key chemicals — fluorinated polyimide, photoresist and hydrogen fluoride — that are essential for semiconductor and display productions.

Seoul saw Tokyo's export restrictions as retaliation against Korea's Supreme Court rulings in 2018 ordering two Japanese companies — Nippon Steel and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries — to individually compensate Korean victims of forced labor during World War II. 

Tokyo maintains that a 1965 bilateral accord that normalized relations with Seoul settled all compensation matters related to Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule over Korea, and the Japanese companies refused to comply. 

In August 2019, Japan removed Korea from its so-called "whitelist" of preferred trading partners, which it had been on since 2004. In a tit-for-tat move, Korea removed Japan from its own whitelist and filed a WTO dispute complaint against Japanese export measures. 

Seoul nearly terminated Gsomia in response to Japan's export curbs in 2019, but the Moon Jae-in administration conditionally suspended the decision to terminate Gsomia later that year, technically leaving open the possibility that the pact could be scrapped at any time. That technicality has now been removed. 

The Korean and Japanese industry ministries held consultations from Tuesday to Thursday on the export restrictions ahead of the scheduled summit between the two countries.

Yoon said that it is "of special significance to inform the people of both countries that Korea-Japan relations, which have suffered from various pending issues, are starting anew."

He also stressed the importance of security cooperation between the two countries in light of Pyonyang's nuclear and missile threats. 

Just hours ahead of the South Korea-Japan summit, North Korea launched what appears to have been an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) toward the East Sea. 

"North Korea's increasingly sophisticated nuclear and missile threat poses a great threat not only to East Asia but also to peace and stability in the international community," Yoon told Kishida. "South Korea and Japan should closely cooperate with solidarity to wisely deal with such illegal threats and the challenges in the international community."

He noted that discussions that day would help "transform the stagnant relationship between Korea and Japan into a relationship of cooperation and mutually beneficial development."

Yoon said he looks forward to "working together to open a new era in Korea-Japan relations while communicating closely."

Kishida likewise said he looks forward to "open a new chapter for Korea-Japan relations" and reviving shuttle diplomacy between the two countries. 

He said the two sides shared views that Seoul and Tokyo should work together to strengthen communication for bilateral cooperation in various fields such as politics, economy and culture. 

Regarding North Korea, Kishida called for trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the United States and Japan. 

The two leaders had dinner later Thursday. 

Also on Thursday, the business lobbies of the two countries – the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) and the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) – announced that they will each create a "future partnership" fund to support youths and cooperation projects. This is a part of the two countries' broader efforts to resolve Japan's wartime forced labor issue and strengthen economic ties.

Nippon Steel and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries are members of Keidanren, but it is unclear if these companies will make contributions to the fund. 

Some victims and civic groups have strongly protested the third-party compensation method proposed by the Korean government, saying that the plan does not include an apology, nor direct contributions, from the liable Japanese companies.

The last Japanese prime minister to visit Seoul for a bilateral summit was Yoshihiko Noda in October 2011, and President Lee Myung-bak made a return bilateral visit to Tokyo in December 2011. 

President Moon Jae-in visited Japan four years ago to attend the G20 summit in Osaka in June 2019. However, he did not hold a bilateral summit with then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Yoon and Kishida previously met during multilateral forums, holding bilateral talks in September 2022 in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly and during Asean meetings last November in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 

Earlier in the afternoon, the presidential couple met with Koreans living in Tokyo. 

During the luncheon meeting, Yoon said, "I don't think a responsible politician should use the Korea-Japan issue for domestic politics."

He stressed that the reason for improving Korea-Japan relations, including resolving the forced labor issue, was a "difficult but natural decision."

He said two countries should normalize relations because of these overseas compatriots, noting, "If the relationship between Korea and Japan is uncomfortable or worsens, it will be difficult for our compatriots."

"As the head of the government, I apologize to our compatriots," Yoon said. "I will lead Korea-Japan relations with a bold heart in the future."

BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]​

12. Nuclear weapons gaffe in South Korea is a warning to leaders everywhere

Was it a gaffe for South Korea to talk about developing nuclear weapons?  

What if it leads to better confidence in extended deterrence? And better processes and procedures?

Also, I think one aspect of the discussion should be to recognize that South Korea is committed to its defense and is willing to explore every option to ensure its defense. This does contribute to deterrence as the demonstration of will is an important element.

I personally do not think it is wise for South Korea to develop nuclear weapons because I do not think they will have the desired deterrent effect given the nature of the Kim family regime, but I respect their concerns and most importantly their willingness to look at all options to defend themselves.

Nuclear weapons gaffe in South Korea is a warning to leaders everywhere​

Janani Mohan

Janani Mohan is an international policy analyst with experience across nuclear, technology, and development policy for the US federal government,... Read More​

thebulletin.org · by Dawn Stover · March 15, 2023

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol visiting the Navy Special Warfare Flotilla in March 2023. Official photo by Kang Min Seok/Presidential Security Service

What would happen if South Korea developed nuclear weapons? A year ago, this question might have seemed as far-fetched as wondering what would happen if Russia invaded Ukraine. However, as the clock ticks closer to doomsday and global tensions run high, hypotheticals that we once laughed at have become possibilities to prepare for.

Comments like one recently made by South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol have exposed the precariousness of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. On January 11, President Yoon stated that if the United States were to fail to deploy nuclear weapons to South Korea when needed, the country would “acquire our own nuke.” According to observers, Yoon delivered these comments offhand during a rambling speech and then backpedaled a few days later. To be clear, South Korea is not actively pursuing homegrown nuclear weapons. However, the incident demonstrated an increased tolerance for casually suggesting nuclear proliferation.

Once viewed as an agreement that could only be broken with the harshest of consequences, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been waning for decades, with North Korea withdrawing in 2003 and Iran threatening to withdraw in 2020. South Korea’s latest discussions on nuclear policy add a new layer—for the first time, a stable, democratic, non-nuclear weapon state and ally of the United States publicly considered, if only for a brief moment, developing nuclear weapons.

Although Yoon’s comments reflect the need for stronger assurances from the United States, such rhetoric can do serious damage to the NPT. If South Korea, a country that has strongly supported the treaty, considers leaving it, the NPT and the faith that other countries place in the treaty could weaken too. Incautious posturing by world leaders could signal the beginning of the end of nuclear nonproliferation.

South Korea’s shifting nuclear posture. Yoon’s latest comments reflect broader discussions on nuclear policy in South Korea in recent years, but they also represent a notable shift from previous statements. As North Korea’s escalatory behavior reaches new levels, so too has South Koreans’ willingness to develop nuclear weapons. South Korean public support for a domestic nuclear weapons program was at 71 percent in 2022, the highest in over a decade.

Although South Korean policy makers have explored greater militarization, they have avoided the nuclear option thus far. A joint US-South Korea statement in May 2022 reaffirmed the United States’ “extended deterrence commitment” to South Korea, “including nuclear . . . defense capabilities,” but also discussed the “common goal of the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.” The statement called for expanding combined military exercises, increasing military training programs in South Korea, and other conventional responses to the North Korean threat.

Meanwhile, most nuclear rhetoric leading up to Yoon’s statements has consisted of debates over whether the United States should station tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea again. Such weapons were deployed between 1958 and 1991 in South Korea, and South Korean conservatives like Yoon have suggested that the United States either redeploy these weapons or train South Koreans to launch nuclear weapons if needed. The United States ruled out redeploying tactical nuclear weapons in 2021. Interestingly, in November 2022, South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup concurred that South Korea was “currently not thinking to deploy tactical nukes on the Korean peninsula.”

RELATED:

Poll: Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans don’t support using nuclear weapons against North Korea

Given this previous nuclear posturing, the recent comments by Yoon are a significant change from South Korea’s previously stated policy. Since the 1970s, South Korea has actively supported the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, ending its program to domestically acquire nuclear weapons. Yoon’s statement hints at a potential reversal of this stance. There are three potential rationales for his comments: that South Korea would actually consider acquiring nuclear weapons and leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; that South Korea wanted to send a warning to North Korea; or that it is using nuclear rhetoric to pressure the United States. All of these explanations are troubling, for these reasons:

Withdrawing from the treaty. This rationale is the most unlikely, but also the most worrisome. If South Korea were to withdraw from the treaty, it could have a domino effect on other countries. For South Korea to actually develop nuclear weapons, it would have to leave the treaty first, to avoid breaking its international obligations. This process has only been used by one country, North Korea, and it requires a three-month notice to the United Nations Security Council.

Although the consequences for leaving the treaty were severe for North Korea, South Korea might expect solidarity from countries that don’t want to develop nuclear weapons but oppose the inequality of the treaty. If South Korea’s departure were to set off a cascade of withdrawals, it’s unlikely that economic consequences would be levied broadly across several countries—and South Korea therefore would not suffer harsh consequences. In addition, there have been no international nuclear-related sanctions against countries with nuclear weapons that never signed the treaty (India, Pakistan, and Israel). Because South Korea remains a US ally, its leaders might believe that it would more seamlessly transition to a similar status outside of the NPT.

However, as is more probable, international pressure on countries considering withdrawal will ensure that South Korea does not attempt to leave the treaty. Although the consequences might be minimal, the international regime is inclined to disincentivize this behavior. Fear of sanctions and other consequences perhaps caused Yoon to dial back his remarks.

Posturing to warn North Korea. Yoon’s comments may have aimed to warn North Korea of the potential consequences of continued escalation. A couple weeks before Yoon’s statement, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said he plans to “exponentially” increase North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. To prevent North Korea from expanding its nuclear weapons program, Yoon might have attempted to warn Kim Jong-un of potential consequences.

However, Yoon could not reasonably expect North Korea to slow proliferation in response to his comments, given Kim Jong-un’s history of responding to increased militarization in South Korea with more escalation, not less. If Yoon’s comments were intended as well-measured posturing, North Korea couldn’t have been his target.

Nuclear rhetoric to pressure the United States. Yoon’s broader statement discussed a hypothetical situation in which the United States fails to deploy nuclear weapons to South Korea when needed. US allies in East and Southeast Asia are concerned that, as the US eye increasingly turns to the war in Ukraine, Asia is falling into a blind spot of complacency. These concerns include worries about the strength of the nuclear umbrella that guarantees the United States will defend its non-nuclear allies and about the US security guarantee against China and North Korea.

RELATED:

The US has a new nuclear proliferation problem: South Korea

Yoon’s statements might reflect frustration that the United States is not paying sufficient attention to the growing escalation on the Korean Peninsula. In 2022 alone, North Korea launched more than 90 missiles, the most in any year, including several that flew as far as the Sea of Japan. Given these rising tensions, Yoon might have been prodding the United States to reaffirm its nuclear guarantee.

Yoon suggesting the need for a stronger security umbrella from the United States might have prompted behind-the-scenes conversations between the two countries. In all likelihood, Washington and Seoul discussed this guarantee privately after Yoon’s comments, to ensure that South Korean leaders trust the US nuclear umbrella and are not seriously considering nuclear weapons. Yoon’s later remarks walking back his comments on developing nuclear weapons could reflect this.

The NPT is weakening. Even if Yoon’s concerns have been resolved, his willingness to use nuclear rhetoric as a negotiation tactic points to an ongoing global issue. South Korea is not the first country to use nuclear rhetoric, and it won’t be the last. However, when the potential development and use of nuclear weapons is discussed, the nuclear taboo slowly weakens.

Are low-yield, battlefield tactical nuclear weapons really as problematic as traditional nuclear weapons? Are high-yield conventional weapons really that different from low-yield nuclear weapons? These questions are worrisome because lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons could lead to untold deaths, long-term environmental damage, and other severely negative consequences.

Regrettably, the nuclear taboo is not the only thing that might be weakening—so might the treaty itself. If countries that have traditionally been strong backers of the NPT start talking about leaving the NPT or developing nuclear weapons, this rhetoric showcases a growing lack of belief in the treaty. And, unfortunately, international law in many ways is only as strong as belief in the benefits and consequences of those agreements. Countries should regularly express their belief that international law is important, the NPT is invaluable, and leaving the NPT should never be considered.

At the height of the NPT’s power, many people, including South Koreans, would have viewed Yoon’s comments as highly escalatory. In today’s world, though, his comments are forgotten amid other, even more escalatory, nuclear rhetoric. If such comments become more commonplace, the NPT will continue to erode, raising global security issues and reducing protections against escalation.

World leaders must be more careful to avoid nuclear rhetoric. Otherwise, comments like Yoon’s could lead to the end of the nonproliferation era and the start of something much more concerning.

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thebulletin.org · by Dawn Stover · March 15, 2023

13.Peninsula Plus: Enhancing U.S.–South Korea Alliance Cooperation on China, Multilateralism, and Military and Security Technologies

In recent weeks, the Korean watcher community is overwhelming the NSC, DOS, and DOD with new policy and strategy proposals. I hope the action officers and principles have time to read them all!

Download the 26 page paper at this link: https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/PeninsulaPlus_Final.pdf?mtime=20230315092611&focal=none

Peninsula Plus: Enhancing U.S.–South Korea Alliance Cooperation on China, Multilateralism, and Military and Security Technologies

By Jacob Stokes and Joshua Fitt

cnas.org

March 15, 2023

Executive Summary

The United States–Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) alliance has entered a critical phase. In 2023, the two countries will commemorate the 70th anniversary of signing their bilateral mutual defense treaty. This year also marks the first full year under national leaders President Joe Biden and President Yoon Suk Yeol. After several challenging years in the two countries’ relationship, ties are improving. Better alliance relations have, unfortunately, coincided with a deterioration in the regional and global security environment, specifically due to threats from North Korea, China, and Russia. This report examines the U.S.-ROK alliance as it adapts to the new regional context by exploring how the United States and South Korea can sustain and deepen their relationship in three vital policy areas: coordination on China, alignment in minilateral and multilateral settings, and defense technology collaboration.

Perhaps the biggest shift in alliance priorities in recent years has been the growing importance of the China challenge. During Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s decade in power, Beijing has adopted a more muscular foreign policy. Both the United States and South Korea have reshaped their approaches toward China in response. ROK concerns about China have grown as Beijing shields Pyongyang and acts aggressively elsewhere in the region, including toward Taiwan. But South Korea’s approach to China will continue to differ from that of the United States. The allies have divergent preferences regarding the speed, manner, and degree of partial decoupling with China. Moreover, South Korea’s deep trade ties with China will continue to make it vulnerable to Chinese political and economic coercion.

Perhaps the biggest shift in alliance priorities in recent years has been the growing importance of the China challenge.

More broadly across the region, the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategies of the Biden and Yoon administrations both place strong emphasis on multilateralism and more robust engagement with the region. The United States and South Korea have many opportunities to expand their cooperation beyond the Korean Peninsula, including through the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral relationship, engagement with the Quad (the United States, Australia, India, and Japan), deeper involvement with NATO and Europe, and other minilateral and multilateral relationships. Efforts along these lines are integral to the Yoon administration’s vision of transforming South Korea into a “global pivotal state.”

As South Korea prepares for a larger role on the international stage, it must also continue to keep pace with the evolution of North Korean and Chinese military capabilities. Over the past several decades, the South Korean defense industry has transformed from near-complete dependency on foreign hardware to becoming one of the world’s top defense suppliers. The end of U.S.-imposed missile and weapons restrictions on South Korea in 2021 supercharged a series of defense technology modernization initiatives during former President Moon Jae-in’s administration, which have continued under Yoon. Given Seoul’s ambition to build an independent domestic defense industry, the opportunities for innovations driven by American and Korean collaboration on the scientific cutting edge, along with greater defense technology integration, are substantial.

In consideration of the above challenges and opportunities, the report recommends that U.S. and ROK alliance policymakers:

• Identify and build on overlapping priorities in the U.S. and ROK Indo-Pacific Strategies;
• Broaden the alliance to account for threats from China in addition to North Korea;
• Encourage Seoul’s ambitions beyond the Korean Peninsula while also acknowledging the concomitant pressures of a larger global role—especially from Beijing;
• Take a bold approach to boosting U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation;
• Facilitate South Korea’s deeper integration into minilateral coalitions with leading democracies;
• Create a defense technology development and acquisition roadmap for the alliance that strengthens both deterrence and stability;
• Deepen U.S.-ROK cooperation in the cyber and space domains;
• Negotiate a U.S.-ROK reciprocal defense procurement agreement; and
• Jointly reexamine from first principles all options for bolstering allied nuclear deterrence, but be realistic about the negative consequences of drastic changes in capabilities and posture.

14. After South Korea’s Icebreaker, Its President Is Welcomed to Tokyo

If relations significant improvise between the ROK and Japan President Yoon could be remembered as making one of the most important diplomatic initiatives in the region in the 21st Century. However, some of the South Korean political opposition will vilify him for his actions.

After South Korea’s Icebreaker, Its President Is Welcomed to Tokyo

By Motoko Rich and Choe Sang-Hun

Reporting from Tokyo and Seoul

Published March 15, 2023

Updated March 16, 2023, 7:27 a.m. ET

The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · March 15, 2023

The first such visit to Japan by a South Korean president in 12 years is a tangible step toward thawing relations, but both leaders face challenges.

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South Korea’s president, Yoon Suk Yeol, left, with Japan’s prime minister, Fumio Kishida, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, last year.Credit...Vincent Thian/Associated Press

By Motoko Rich and

Reporting from Tokyo and Seoul

March 15, 2023, 5:00 p.m. ET

When South Korea’s president, Yoon Suk Yeol, touches down in Japan on Thursday, it will be the first time in a dozen years that a leader from Seoul has made the short flight for a one-on-one visit with the Japanese prime minister.

It is a sign that the long-fraught relationship between the two Asian neighbors is thawing, a quick follow-up to last week’s ice-breaking announcement that South Korea would drop its demand that Japanese companies compensate Korean victims of forced labor during World War II.

Officials have indicated that Mr. Yoon’s meeting with Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is unlikely to produce significant new pronouncements on possible next steps in the rapprochement, like a lifting of Japanese restrictions on technology exports to South Korea. But the visit is a strong indication that the two countries, which have been at odds over history and territory for years, are now willing to cooperate to face rising threats from North Korea’s advancing nuclear program and China’s growing military ambitions in the region.

The steps toward conciliation are significant not only to Japan and South Korea but also to their alliance with the United States. The Americans need their two strongest allies in the region to get along so they can focus on creating a bulwark against China, which is upending geopolitical calculations not only in Asia but across the globe.

Yet Mr. Yoon’s visit, which is expected to include a dinner on Thursday at the prime minister’s residence and meetings between business leaders on Friday, will also be a test of how well the two leaders can assuage domestic public opinion about issues that have long aroused heated passions in both countries.

“Ninety percent of Japan-South Korea relations are domestic politics,” said Kunihiko Miyake, a former Japanese diplomat who is now a visiting professor at Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto, Japan. “Therefore, nobody knows what’s going to happen.” Mr. Miyake said that he was “still cautiously optimistic, but more optimistic than cautious.”

A joint anti-submarine drill involving South Korea, the United States and Japan in waters off South Korea last year.Credit...South Korea Defense Ministry

For the moment, the political risk is higher for Mr. Yoon. When he announced last week that South Korea would create a government-run fund to pay wartime forced laborers as a workaround for a Korean court order requiring compensation from Japanese companies, victims and activists denounced the agreement.

Opposition lawmakers described it as “one of the worst diplomatic disasters in the history of South Korea-Japan relations.” Public opinion polls released in Seoul this week showed that close to 56 percent of the public regarded Mr. Yoon’s solution to the forced labor dispute as “humiliating diplomacy.”

In Japan, which appeared to give little last week, the response was more favorable — a Kyodo News poll on Monday showed more than 57 percent of the public supporting the South Korean solution.

More on Japan

• ‘Sushi Terrorism’: Most people would agree that drinking out of a restaurant’s communal soy sauce bottle is disgusting. But is it criminal? A viral video of a Japanese young man caught in the act puts the notion to the test.
• A Corruption Scandal: Japan’s prosecutors accused Dentsu, an advertising company that was one of the driving forces behind the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, of conspiring to evade the public bidding process leading up to the Games.
• A Video-Gaming School: Japan’s first e-sports high school thought it would turn out pro gamers. Instead, it attracted an unexpected demographic: absentee students.
• Economic Growth: After more than two years under some of the world’s tightest border controls, tourist spots in Japan are packed. That has been good for business.

There is still risk for Mr. Kishida from the right flank of his Liberal Democratic Party and other conservative critics. An editorial in the Sankei Shimbun, a right-leaning newspaper in Tokyo, castigated Japan’s welcoming response to Mr. Yoon’s plan last week as “extremely regrettable” and “pandering” to South Korea for “distorting and denouncing historical facts.”

The newspaper said that by not openly objecting to the agreement, Mr. Kishida had tacitly accepted the South Korean court’s argument: that Japanese companies owed the Korean laborers reparations despite a 1965 agreement through which Japan had already made payments.

Despite such criticism, analysts expect that Japan will eventually offer something in return, beyond welcoming Mr. Yoon to Tokyo. Japanese officials indicated last week that the trade ministry would begin talks about lifting export controls it imposed in 2019 that limited South Korea’s access to chemicals essential for making semiconductors. Keita Kawamori, a ministry spokesman, said “there is a lot of discussion happening under the surface” about the possibility of rescinding the controls, which were imposed as relations were ebbing.

South Korea has also suggested that it would like Japanese companies to make voluntary contributions to the forced-labor fund. So far, the Japanese business community has not said much, but analysts said it was probably mulling some kind of conciliatory gesture. South Korean officials said that the business communities of both nations were discussing creating a new fund to offer scholarships and finance student exchange programs.

A rally in Seoul last week united people against the South Korean government’s plan to compensate Korean victims of forced labor during World War II.Credit...Lee Jin-Man/Associated Press

“If the South Korean side goes first and doesn’t ask too much of the Japan side, then the Japanese side will try to make an advance,” said Tsuneo Watanabe, senior research fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Tokyo.

The last time a South Korean president came to Japan for an official bilateral visit, in 2011, Lee Myung-bak pressed his hosts to compensate Korean women who were forced to work as sex slaves by the Japanese military during World War II.

When Japan did not reciprocate, the South Korean public turned against Mr. Lee, who went on to antagonize Tokyo by visiting a disputed set of islets in the sea between South Korea and Japan in 2012. Relations between the two countries deteriorated from there.

This time around, both sides may have strong reasons to keep the reconciliation on track, as Russia’s war in Ukraine causes energy shortages and supply chain problems, and China’s rising ambitions threaten to alter the balance of power in Asia.

“There are extraneous events that force collaboration and cooperation,” said Rahm Emanuel, the U.S. ambassador to Japan. Even as relations between Japan and South Korea remained frosty in recent years, trilateral meetings between the Americans, the South Koreans and the Japanese continued.

Last year, Mr. Emanuel said, officials from the three countries met more than 40 times. “That normalizes friendships, relationships and trust that didn’t exist before,” he said, helping to support efforts by Seoul and Tokyo to calm the waters between them.

The former South Korean president, Lee Myung-bak, right, with Japan’s then-prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda, in Kyoto in 2011.

On the South Korean side, Mr. Yoon was unlikely to have been surprised by the public reaction to his olive branch to Tokyo and would not easily be steered off course by criticism, analysts said.

South Korean politics is so polarized that “turning anti-Japanese won’t get him new credit from voters,” said Bong Youngshik, an expert on South Korea-Japan relations at Yonsei University in Seoul.

The loudest criticism in South Korea comes from activists who have long argued that Japan has not done enough to atone for its atrocities during the 35 years it occupied the Korean Peninsula.

But with the urgency for South Korea and Japan to cooperate in combating geopolitical threats, “South Koreans need to let their government get on with the business of governance,” said Katharine H.S. Moon, professor emerita of political science at Wellesley College.

During Mr. Yoon’s visit, Tokyo will lend a hand to the conciliatory message by staging the kind of hospitable and convivial show that Japan specializes in for official diplomatic meetings. Local media has reported that in addition to hosting a formal working dinner at his residence, Mr. Kishida will take Mr. Yoon for a casual post-dinner drink and a snack of “omu rice,” a popular Japanese version of an omelet on fried rice that Mr. Yoon has said he enjoys.

If the visit does mark more than a momentary reprieve in tensions, it will most likely cause concerns in China, said Victor Cha, a professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown University and Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

“China counts on Japan and Korea hating each other,” Mr. Cha said. “That’s part of their strategy to divide and weaken the U.S. position in Asia.”

Hikari Hida contributed reporting from Tokyo.

The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · March 15, 2023

15. North Korean Women’s Gloomy ‘Glory’ on International Women’s Day

What amazes me is that there are some NGOs (fortunately a few)who would rather engage with Kim Jong Un on his terms and not call attention to these human rights abuses. Then there are others such as Human Rights Watch (see excerpt below)and the Committee for Human RIghts in North Korea that consistently call out the crimes against humanity being committed by the Kim family regime.

Excerpt:

NGO reports on dire women’s rights in country

North Korean women are forced to comply with sexual purity and face violence, discrimination, and subordination at the hands of men, according to Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) 2023 special report on North Korean women’s rights. The HRW report also notes how North Koreans often lack the language and education to describe sexual offences and how victims are often socially stigmatized. Many North Korean women who escape the ‘Hermit Kingdom’ are often targets of human traffickers. HRW and 33 other organizations have appealed to the UN Human Rights Council’s 47 member states to give more attention and support to North Korean women during the Council’s annual meeting, which runs February 27 to April 4.

North Korean Women’s Gloomy ‘Glory’ on International Women’s Day

asiapacific.ca · by Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada

The Takeaway

On March 8, North Korea called for a large celebration to mark International Women's Day, a day traditionally used to glorify North Korean women as socialist revolutionaries. In reality, women in the country remain subjugated by a patriarchal North Korean society and subject to the propaganda tools of the Kim Jong Un regime.

In Brief

North Korea is one of several socialist countries that commemorates International Women’s Day and the day’s socialist roots. The country designated March 8 as a national holiday, ‘Wives and Daughters’ Day,’ to appreciate North Korean women for their sacrifices and efforts in the foundation and development of the socialist country since 1948. International observers used the occasion to express concerns about women’s rights violations in North Korea.

By tradition, North Korean women often receive flowers and cosmetics gifts from men, who also volunteer to cook at home and help with housework for the day. North Korea’s national and municipal governments also host various cultural events for women. To mark the day, the North Korean state-run media released articles praising women as the “flowers or heroines of the country,” and various propaganda campaigns emphasized women’s social roles and political obligations as wives, mothers, daughters, and participants in the Kim dynasty.

Implications

The front page of the North's state-run newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, praised women as true patriots and said that “women should always be aware of their responsibilities as housewives, daughters-in-law, and mothers.” It stressed the necessity of women’s active contributions “to the prosperity of our country by bearing more children and raising them well.” Recognizing the kitchen as a “woman's space” and limiting women to the borders of the household, North Korean society places the dual burden of housework and breadwinning on the shoulders of North Korean women — statistics indicate that, on average, they bring in over 70 per cent of household incomes by doing side jobs in the black market alongside their domestic housework. Considering the discrimination and violence against North Korean women reported by the UN and various human rights watchdogs, living as a woman in North Korea seems to entail a series of daily adverse experiences.

On North Korea’s Wives and Daughters’ Day, many North Korean women visit statues of the Kim family as a group. The Rodong Sinmun described the scene, saying three generations of the Kim family “have unfolded a new era of women's importance and respect for women for the first time in history.” Women are taught that the North Korean leadership has emancipated women from the shackles of social expectations and oppression. Using Wives and Daughters’ Day as a propaganda tool, North Korea aims to display its “superiority” — particularly over South Korea, which is relatively less interested in International Women’s Day — within a socialist framework and the progress made in women’s rights each year.

The Rodong Sinmun further praised North Korean women’s dedication and loyalty to their families, society, communities, and “revolutionary comrades.” Loyalty is one of the ideological requirements for North Korean women to become what the state describes as true socialist comrades and steady patriots. This reinforces the need for North Korean women to blindly conform to the current system and is a far cry from the goals of the women's groups that catalyzed global social transformation more than 100 years ago.

What's Next

1. Emerging VIPs and the status of women
2. Due to recent rumours of Kim Ju-ae, Kim Jong Un's daughter, being a potential regime successor, as well as the growing diplomatic clout of government heavyweight Kim Yo Jong (Kim Jong Un’s sister), and rising leaders Hyon Song Wol and Choe Son Hui, the term “petticoat government” has come to be used to refer to the noticeable increase of women in positions of power in the North. But some North Koreans, according to observers, are concerned that women politicians’ healthy-looking faces amid the chronic food shortage, and seemingly arbitrary orders (like the one calling for women named ‘Ju-ae’ to change their name), might garner criticism rather than improve the status of women in the starkly patriarchal society.
3. Fashion as a form of resistance
4. North Korea's unique socialist ideas are injected into women's makeup and hairstyles, limiting women’s fashion options. North Korean women's South Korean-style makeup and hairstyles are sometimes seen as subtle resistance against the Kim regime. It signals the possibility of North Korean women coalescing into a group that could march beyond the existing, rigid gender norms.
5. NGO reports on dire women’s rights in country
6. North Korean women are forced to comply with sexual purity and face violence, discrimination, and subordination at the hands of men, according to Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) 2023 special report on North Korean women’s rights. The HRW report also notes how North Koreans often lack the language and education to describe sexual offences and how victims are often socially stigmatized. Many North Korean women who escape the ‘Hermit Kingdom’ are often targets of human traffickers. HRW and 33 other organizations have appealed to the UN Human Rights Council’s 47 member states to give more attention and support to North Korean women during the Council’s annual meeting, which runs February 27 to April 4.

• Produced by CAST’s Northeast Asia team: Dr. Scott Harrison (Senior Program Manager); Momo Sakudo (Analyst); Tae Yeon Eom (Analyst); and Sue Jeong (Analyst).

asiapacific.ca · by Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada

​16. The Kishida-Yoon Summit Meeting: A New Start for Japan-Korea Relations

​

The Kishida-Yoon Summit Meeting: A New Start for Japan-Korea Relations

Critical Questions by Ellen Kim , Nicholas Szechenyi , Victor Cha , and Christopher B. Johnstone

Published March 15, 2023

csis.org

Photo: Prime Minister's Office of Japan

President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea will make his first visit to Japan on March 16–17 for a bilateral summit with Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. Kishida’s invitation to Yoon came shortly after the South Korean government announced its plan earlier this month to resolve a dispute between the two countries over wartime conscripted labor, giving a boost to ongoing efforts by both sides to build a future-oriented relationship and strengthen coordination on regional security challenges.

Q1: Why is the Kishida-Yoon summit meeting important?

A1: The summit meeting indicates an attempted return to normalcy in diplomatic ties between South Korea and Japan. Kishida and Yoon met four times last year, including two U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK)-Japan trilateral summits in June and November. But this is the first time in 12 years that the leaders of the two countries will hold an official summit in one of their countries, rather than on the sidelines of other diplomatic events. The visit, which Kishida may reciprocate with a visit to Seoul later in the year, sends a powerful message to both countries that productive bilateral ties are a priority. After a severe downturn in bilateral ties in 2019 over historical sensitivities and other issues, Yoon and Kishida are seeking to establish a durable foundation for the relationship and to expand avenues for cooperation on a range of issues. The summit is an important opportunity to build personal rapport, which could further momentum for bilateral coordination after months of working-level diplomacy between the two governments on the wartime labor issue. The restoration of the bilateral relationship has strategic implications with respect to managing the North Korea threat and other regional challenges bilaterally and together with the United States.

Q2: How will the two leaders address the wartime labor issue?

A2: The two leaders will seek to advance a package of steps intended to resolve and move beyond the wartime labor issue. Yoon will reiterate his government’s plan to provide compensation to the plaintiffs through a public foundation with funds from Korean companies, while keeping the door open for voluntary contribution from Japanese companies. Kishida will offer gestures intended to welcome Yoon’s initiative, while adhering to Japan’s longstanding position that issues related to compensation were resolved by the 1965 normalization treaty. Kishida may reiterate the apology reflected in a 1998 joint declaration issued by then-prime minister Obuchi Keizo and President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea. Japan’s major business federation, the Keidanren, appears likely to join with its South Korean counterpart in establishing a new fund to support young people. In addition, Tokyo and Seoul are moving quickly to resume dialogue on export controls that Japan imposed on semiconductor-related items in 2019. Finally, Kishida appears likely to invite Yoon to participate in the G7, although he may not announce this decision publicly as part of the visit.

The public reactions in Japan and South Korea are polar opposites. A recent poll in Japan showed 57 percent of the public supports Yoon’s plan to resolve this issue, but a recent Gallup Korea public opinion poll showed that 59 percent of the Korean public oppose it, and 64 percent do not consider Yoon’s proposed compensation plan for the plaintiffs via a public foundation in South Korea adequate. While three plaintiffs chose not to accept compensation from that foundation, this alone does not define the agreement’s success or failure.

Q3: Is there potential for bilateral coordination on the North Korea threat?

A3: Another major impetus for improving Japan-Korea relations is the need to coordinate approaches to the security challenges posed by North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. To strengthen bilateral security cooperation, Kishida and Yoon reportedly will seek to normalize the bilateral General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which provides the scope for classified information-sharing between the two governments, with the Yoon government expected to formally withdraw a notification of intention to withdraw sent to Japan in 2019. Yoon’s predecessor Moon Jae-in attempted to withdraw from the GSOMIA in 2019 after Japan removed South Korea from its preferred trade partner list (the so-called whitelist) and introduced export controls on semiconductor-related items to Seoul, but North Korea’s intensifying provocations (including multiple ballistic missile tests earlier this week) necessitate sustained information-sharing between the two militaries. Solidifying the GSOMIA will also help accelerate trilateral security cooperation with the United States. Since Yoon’s inauguration last year, militaries from the three countries have conducted a series of exercises, including a ballistic missile defense drill last month. Kishida, Yoon, and President Biden agreed to share North Korean missile warning data in real time at a trilateral summit in Phnom Penh last November. And the diplomatic calendar in the coming months—a Yoon-Biden state visit is scheduled in April 26–27, and Kishida could invite Yoon to attend the G7 Summit in Hiroshima from May 19–21—affords opportunities to signal the vitality of the trilateral alliance network.

Q4: What about economic issues and regional cooperation more broadly?

A4: Yoon and Kishida are expected to reaffirm their countries’ shared commitment to the rules-based international order and future cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, especially given that Washington, Japan, and Korea are now more closely aligned in their respective Indo-Pacific visions based on international norms and shared values. Yoon and Kishida may also discuss South Korea’s future contribution to the Quad’s workstreams, such as infrastructure, climate, and emerging technology. The two leaders are likely to reinforce the importance of economic security and supply chain resilience in light of the recent senior level trilateral dialogue on economic security. With respect to bilateral economic issues, the priority will be placed on the resolution of the export control and whitelist issues. Yoon is scheduled to participate in a meeting between the Federation of Korean Industries and the Keidanren during his visit to Japan in an attempt to strengthen the economic partnership between Japan and Korea in areas such as critical technologies and supply chain resilience.

Q5: Can Kishida and Yoon turn the tide?

A5: The summit presents an excellent opportunity to follow up on the historic agreement reached between Seoul and Tokyo this month on forced laborer compensation cases. The war in Europe, China’s assertiveness in Korean and Japanese airspace and territorial waters, and North Korea’s incessant missile testing creates a compelling external environment for the two leaders to find a cooperative path forward. This is an important step toward reaffirming common strategic objectives in Northeast Asia and beyond.

Ellen Kim is a senior fellow and deputy director of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Nicholas Szechenyi is a senior fellow with the Japan Chair and deputy director for Asia at CSIS. Victor Cha is senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at CSIS. Christopher Johnstone is senior adviser and Japan Chair at CSIS.

Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2023 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

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Ellen Kim

Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Korea Chair

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Nicholas Szechenyi

Senior Fellow, Japan Chair and Deputy Director for Asia

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Christopher B. Johnstone

Senior Adviser and Japan Chair

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17. Siblings Who Went Viral After Crashing Dad's on-Air BBC Interview 6 Years Ago Look All Grown Up

Professor Kelly and his family were very prescient in establishing the video crashing standard prior to the Zoom era brought on by COVID. The video endeared the family to most of us though there were some terrible racist tropes from internet trolls.

Photos and the original video at the link: https://people.com/human-interest/kids-from-viral-bbc-interview-look-all-grown-up-six-years-later/

Siblings Who Went Viral After Crashing Dad's on-Air BBC Interview 6 Years Ago Look All Grown Up

"My family and I [are] flattered by your kindness," political analyst Robert E. Kelly wrote alongside a set of photos shared on Twitter

By Ingrid Vasquez  Published on March 15, 2023 12:39 AM

https://people.com/human-interest/kids-from-viral-bbc-interview-look-all-grown-up-six-years-later/

A brother-sister duo who went viral after crashing their dad's live interview six years ago look all grown up!

In 2017, Robert E. Kelly — a professor of political science at Pusan National University — was participating in a live BBC News interview about the impeachment of South Korean president Park Geun-hye when his then 4-year-old daughter Marion and then 9-month-old son James unexpectedly came into his home office.

 Firefighter's 3 Kids Who Died After Fire at Home Were 'Deeply Loved,' Says Grandmother: 'Gone Too Soon'

As the interview continued, Marion could be seen dancing in the room as she played with a toy. As her dad attempted to keep her at bay, James rolled in on a walker causing his wife to burst into the room — while the interview was still being conducted — to grab her children.

The viral moment, which now has 54 million views on YouTube, ended with Kelly apologizing as his kids could still be heard from outside the room.

Making light of the interview's sixth anniversary, Kelly took to Twitter Tuesday to provide an update on his family while jokingly referring to himself as the "BBC dad."

 Teenager and 2 Horses Dead After Car Crashes into 3 People Riding Stolen Horses on Texas Freeway

"Some BBC Dad content since the 6th anniversary of the original video was last Friday," he wrote alongside photos showing him and his wife standing next to their two children.

"Marion had a singing performance this past weekend, so we got some nice family pictures. Thanks again to all of you who follow me bc of the video. My family and I [are] flattered by your kindness," added Kelly.

The snaps show James looking dapper as he matches his dad's formal attire, wearing a long-sleeve white dress shirt underneath a black vest. His sister was also dressed for the occasion in a sparkling pink dress as she held a bouquet of yellow roses.

"People often ask me and my wife what it has been like to suddenly become virally famous. It has mostly been fun, and sometimes weird," shared Kelly in a self-written essay published a year after the 2017 interview.

Never miss a story — sign up for PEOPLE's free daily newsletter to stay up-to-date on the best of what PEOPLE has to offer, from juicy celebrity news to compelling human-interest stories.

"As work becomes more flexible due to smartphones, super-light laptops, the cloud, and so on, it increasingly follows us home," added Kelly while speaking to the reaction from parents.

"I do a lot of my job from my home office, including most of my TV appearances. Many of the comments we received were from parents who had had similar experiences, such as locking themselves in the bathroom so their kids could not interrupt a radio interview."

"These reactions were positive and empathetic," he shared. "We were very moved by them."

18. Amid North Korea’s economic woes, repairing shoes is big business

The cobbler does good business.

Amid North Korea’s economic woes, repairing shoes is big business

Shoe repairmen earn more in a day than government officials earn in a month.

By Hyemin Son for RFA Korean

2023.03.14

rfa.org

North Korea’s economic hardship has been miserable for most people, but it’s been a boon for the lowly shoe repairman, who is earning more in a day than local government officials earn in a month, sources in the country told Radio Free Asia.

Times are so tough that new shoes are an expense that most people cannot afford. So instead, they flock to the local marketplaces to repair their old, worn out ones.

“The person making the most money in the Unsan county marketplace is the shoe repairman. He is easily making at least 10,000 won (U.S.$1.19) every day,” a resident of the county in South Pyongan province said on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

Another source, in the northwestern province of North Hamgyong, said a cobbler can sometimes make as much as 50,000 won, or nearly U.S.$6.00.

That’s far higher than the local party secretary’s official monthly salary of about 4,500 won, or about 54 U.S. cents.

Most North Koreans have not been able to survive on the monthly salary from their government-assigned jobs since the country’s economy collapsed in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Instead, families have gone into business for themselves, and a large portion of those businesses involve buying and selling products imported from China in the local marketplaces.

The closing of the border with China at the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic dealt a devastating blow to North Korea’s already fragile economy, and sapped the livelihoods of people who relied on the constant flow of Chinese imports.

Although freight trade has resumed, the economy is still reeling from the chaos caused by the more than two-year shutdown, and many people are still struggling.

Fewer Chinese imports

Government officials are in a different situation though. Even though their salaries are only nominally higher than the average worker, they are able to use the power and influence associated with their position to support themselves, either by taking bribes from businesses or running businesses themselves.

Since the onset of the pandemic meant fewer Chinese-made clothes and shoes were coming into North Korea, citizens have been repairing what they can over the past three years.

For clothes, a simple needle and thread is enough to mend torn shirts or darn holey socks. But shoes require more expertise and tools, the source said.

“Worn out shoes must be taken to a shoe repair shop for more complicated things like sole soldering,” the source said.

“The shoe repair shop is located at the entrance of the marketplace, and has a constant flow of customers from morning to evening,” he said. “People who want to repair their shoes keep rushing in with worn uppers or sneakers with holes in the soles.”

Factories hurting too

The border shutdown hasn’t only hurt small businesses, state-owned factories saw disruptions in their supply chain of raw materials, meaning they too could not produce as high as demand.

“After more than three years of this COVID-19 lockdown, the Sinuiju Shoe Factory is still experiencing production delays because materials still cannot come in,” the second source from North Hamgyong province said.

“Sneakers and shoes are produced in little batches using recycled materials brought in through a state-run junk shop,” he said.

The few shoes that the factory produces are not affordable to most North Koreans, according to the second source. The cheapest ones sell for over 30,000 won ($3.57) in the market.

“Buying a new pair of shoes has now become a dream for residents who can barely make a living,” the second source said. “Most residents wear old shoes that have been repaired several times at repair shops.”

The new school year is about to begin in North Korea, so students are flocking to the repair shops to fix their shoes before it starts, the second source said.

People are noticing the crowds of customers and are considering a career change.

“Since shoe repairers make good money,” he said, “many residents now want to open new repair shops.”

Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

rfa.org

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com