Quotes of the Day:
"It is infinitely better to have a few good men than many indifferent ones."
- George Washington
"The will to win, the desire to succeed, the urge to reach your full potential... these are the keys that will unlock the door to personal excellence."
-Confucius
"Change your life today. Don't gamble on the future, act now, without delay."
- Simone de Beauvoir
1. North Korea boasts recovery as WHO worries over missing data
2. China draws North Korea closer than ever as Biden visits region
3. North Korea May Be Trapped Between Famine and Plague
4. US assesses North Korea preparing for possible long range missile test within days as Biden prepares to travel to Asia
5. Army activates new air cavalry squadron with latest Apache helicopters in South Korea
6. ROK Yellow Sea Defense
7. What to Know About Biden's First Trip to Asia as President
8. N. Korea reemphasizes orders to use live ammunition against border intruders
9. Hamhung university students mobilized to work on farms despite pandemic
10. S. Korea, U.S. have 'plan B' ready in case of N.K. provocation during Biden's visit
11. Yoon, PPP lawmakers travel to Gwangju en masse to commemorate 1980 democracy uprising
12. Evidence keeps mounting of a new nuke test by North Korea
13. Yoon Suk-yeol gets on board Joe Biden's IPEF
14. N. Korea silent on S. Korea's offer for COVID-19 talks for 3rd day: official
15. North Korea's Kim faces 'huge dilemma' on aid as virus surges
16. From Storage to Transport, Hurdles to Getting COVID Vaccine to N.Koreans
17. N.K. leader criticizes problem in early response to COVID-19 crisis in key politburo meeting: state media
18. North Korean COVID-19/Fever Data Tracker
1. North Korea boasts recovery as WHO worries over missing data
I know people will tire of me saying this every day but we need to observe closely for the indicators of instability and we need to update our contingency plans for dealing with north Korean instability and regime collapse. I am not making any predictions that north Korea will collapse or when it may collapse. The only prediction I will make that if the regime does collapse it will be catastrophic and we must be prepared.
North Korea boasts recovery as WHO worries over missing data
AP · by KIM TONG-HYUNG · May 17, 2022
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea on Wednesday added hundreds of thousands of infections to its growing pandemic caseload but also said that a million people have already recovered from suspected COVID-19 just a week after disclosing an outbreak, a public health crisis it appears to be trying to manage in isolation as global experts express deep concern about dire consequences.
The country’s anti-virus headquarters announced 232,880 new cases of fever and another six deaths in state media Wednesday. Those figures raise its totals to 62 deaths and more than 1.7 million fever cases since late April. It said more than a million people recovered but at least 691,170 remain in quarantine.
Outside experts believe most of the fevers are from COVID-19 but North Korea lacks tests to confirm so many. The outbreak is almost certainly larger than the fever tally, since some virus carriers may not develop fevers or other symptoms.
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It’s also unclear how more than a million people recovered so quickly when limited medicine, medical equipment and health facilities exist to treat the country’s impoverished, unvaccinated population of 26 million.
Some experts say the North could be simply releasing people from quarantine after their fevers subside.
Globally, COVID-19 has killed about 6.3 million people with the true toll believed to be much higher. Countries with outbreaks of a similar size to North Korea’s official fever tally have confirmed thousands of deaths each.
World Health Organization Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said Tuesday that North Korea has not responded to its request for more data about its outbreak.
Before acknowledging COVID-19 infections for the first time last week, North Korea had held to a widely doubted claim of keeping out the virus. It also shunned millions of vaccine shots offered by the U.N.-backed COVAX distribution program, likely because of international monitoring requirements attached to them.
North Korea and Eritrea are the only sovereign U.N.-member countries not to have rolled out vaccines, but Tedros said neither country has responded to WHO’s offers of vaccines, medicines, tests and technical support.
“WHO is deeply concerned at the risk of further spread in (North Korea),” Tedros said, also noting the country has worrying numbers of people with underlying conditions that make them more likely to get severe COVID-19.
WHO emergencies chief Dr. Michael Ryan said unchecked transmission of the virus could lead to new variants but that WHO was powerless to act unless countries accepted its help.
The North has so far ignored rival South Korea’s offer to provide vaccines, medicine and health personnel, but experts say the North may be more willing to accept help from its main ally China. South Korea’s government said it couldn’t confirm media reports that North Korea flew multiple planes to bring back emergency supplies from China on Tuesday.
North Korean officials during a ruling party Politburo meeting Tuesday continued to express confidence that the country could overcome the crisis on its own, with the Politburo members discussing ways for “continuously maintaining the good chance in the overall epidemic prevention front,” the official Korean Central News Agency said Wednesday.
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There’s suspicion that North Korea is underreporting deaths to soften the blow for Kim, who already was navigating the toughest moment of his decade in power. The pandemic has further damaged an economy already broken by mismanagement and U.S.-led sanctions over Kim’s nuclear weapons and missiles development.
At the Politburo meeting, Kim criticized officials over their early pandemic response, which he said underscored “immaturity in the state capacity for coping with the crisis” and he blamed the country’s vulnerability on their “non-positive attitude, slackness and non-activity,” KCNA said.
He urged officials to strengthen virus controls at workplaces and redouble efforts to improve the supply of daily necessities and stabilize living conditions, the report said.
North Korea has also deployed nearly 3,000 military medical officers to help deliver medicine to pharmacies and deployed public health officials, teachers and students studying health care to identify people with fevers so they could be quarantined. The country has been relying on finding people with symptoms and isolating them at shelters since it lacks vaccines, high-tech medicine and equipment, and intensive care units that lowered hospitalizations and deaths in other nations.
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While raising alarm over the outbreak, Kim has also stressed that his economic goals should be met. State media reports show large groups of workers are continuing to gather at farms, mining facilities, power stations and construction sites, being driven to ensure their works are “propelled as scheduled.”
North Korea’s COVID-19 outbreak came amid a provocative run in weapons demonstrations, including its first test of an intercontinental ballistic missile in nearly five years, in a brinkmanship aimed at forcing the United States to accept the idea of the North as a nuclear power and negotiate economic and security concessions from a position of strength.
U.S. and South Korean officials also believe North Korea could conduct its seventh nuclear test explosion this month.
The North Korean nuclear threat is expected to top agenda when U.S. President Joe Biden meets South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol during a visit to Seoul this week. Kim Tae-hyo, Yoon’s deputy national security adviser, told reporters Wednesday that North Korea probably won’t conduct a nuclear test this week but that its preparations for another ICBM test appeared imminent.
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Kim Jong Un during Tuesday’s Politburo meeting affirmed he would “arouse the whole party like (an) active volcano once again under the state emergency situation” to prove its leadership before history and time and “defend the wellbeing of the country and the people without fail and demonstrate to the whole world the strength and the spirit of heroic Korea once again,” KCNA said. The report did not make a direct reference to a major weapons test.
Recent commercial satellite images of the nuclear testing ground in Punggye-ri indicate refurbishment work and preparations at a yet unused tunnel on the southern part of the site, which is presumably nearing completion to host a nuclear test, according to an analysis released Tuesday by Beyond Parallel, a website run by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.
AP · by KIM TONG-HYUNG · May 17, 2022
2. China draws North Korea closer than ever as Biden visits region
Maybe closer than lips and teeth will be somewhat accurate again.
Excerpts:
In particular, China’s strategic overture to North Korea since the collapse of U.S.-North Korea diplomatic talks in 2019 has drawn the two countries closer. With tensions rising over the U.S.-China competition and a new South Korean conservative government that vows to take a harder line on North Korea and China, Beijing has more incentive to keep Pyongyang close, experts say.
The United States wants to strengthen relationships with South Korea and Japan to tackle urgent regional issues, including North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, China’s supply chain dominance and the possibility of a conflict in Taiwan. But it won’t be an easy task, especially with souring Japan-South Korea relations and South Korea’s economic dependence on China.
“The overall security and economic situation, the landscape, doesn’t look very bright,” said Ahn Ho-young, former South Korean ambassador to the United States. “Because of all these challenges, this visit that President Biden is planning, is even more important.”
China draws North Korea closer than ever as Biden visits region
SEOUL — In December 2017, the U.N. Security Council agreed that the next time North Korea tested a ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States, it would slam down new fuel sanctions to pressure its leader, Kim Jong Un.
In March, when North Korea finally tested just such a missile capable of reaching Washington, the Security Council did not carry out its threat, largely because of objections from two countries: China and Russia.
As President Biden makes his first presidential trip to South Korea and Japan in the next week, he faces shifting dynamics in Northeast Asia that pose steep challenges to U.S. efforts to shore up alliances to counter China’s rise. A key challenge is North Korea’s thawing relationships with China and Russia, aimed at reducing U.S. influence in the region.
In particular, China’s strategic overture to North Korea since the collapse of U.S.-North Korea diplomatic talks in 2019 has drawn the two countries closer. With tensions rising over the U.S.-China competition and a new South Korean conservative government that vows to take a harder line on North Korea and China, Beijing has more incentive to keep Pyongyang close, experts say.
The United States wants to strengthen relationships with South Korea and Japan to tackle urgent regional issues, including North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, China’s supply chain dominance and the possibility of a conflict in Taiwan. But it won’t be an easy task, especially with souring Japan-South Korea relations and South Korea’s economic dependence on China.
“The overall security and economic situation, the landscape, doesn’t look very bright,” said Ahn Ho-young, former South Korean ambassador to the United States. “Because of all these challenges, this visit that President Biden is planning, is even more important.”
North Korea has long had a rocky relationship with China. But in recent years, Beijing has boosted its diplomacy with Pyongyang and grown to account for more than 90 percent of its external trade activity. While that trade sharply dropped during North Korea’s covid lockdown, Beijing remains its main lifeline.
The two countries have become more cooperative in recent years out of political convenience in the face of the U.S.-China competition, said Andrei Lankov, professor of Korean Studies at Kookmin University and a leading scholar on North Korean issues.
“The major game changer is the confrontation with the United States. … It means that the strategic value of North Korea from the Chinese point of view has increased dramatically,” Lankov said. “For North Korea, the Sino-U.S. rivalry is a kind of gift sent by the heavens. It gives them essentially unconditional Chinese support — something in the past they couldn’t even dream about.”
“China, Russia and North Korea will continue to cooperate to safeguard regional peace and stability no matter what pressures and impacts may come from the U.S.,” China’s state-run Global Times wrote in 2021.
Most recently, when the United States last week pushed for new U.N. sanctions on North Korea over its missile and nuclear programs, China and Russia vetoed the move.
China’s ambassador to the U.N., Zhang Jun, blamed the United States for being “enamored superstitiously of the magic power of sanctions” and urged Washington to take a more active role in resuming talks with Pyongyang. Russia’s deputy U.N. ambassador, Anna Evstigneeva, said, “it is absolutely unrealistic” to expect North Korea to disarm under the threat of sanctions.
“Russia would like to see Americans to be distracted by some kind of development elsewhere. So they don’t mind, for the time being, North Korea’s nuclear adventurism — even though in the long run, Russia is not very happy about a nuclear North Korea, like China,” Lankov said.
But China and Russia probably will not support additional sanctions on Kim even if he conducts a nuclear test, given China’s “dual track” approach to engaging North Korea despite its nuclear ambitions, and Russia’s opposition to international sanctions in the wake of the war in Ukraine.
The muddled response from the international community as a result of China and Russia has emboldened North Korea to develop an array of nuclear-capable weapons with impunity, including weapons targeting South Korea, said Ahn, the former South Korean ambassador. Ahn noted that North Korea’s leader Kim last month threatened nuclear retaliation if provoked.
“We have to deal with objective developments: North Korean missile technology is progressing all the time, and then North Korea is in fact coming up with declared intention of using those, tactical nuclear weapons,” Ahn said. “I think this would be the time we should be substantiating what we mean by strong deterrence.”
The new South Korean president, Yoon Suk-yeol, has promised to work with the United States to cooperate on regional efforts to counter China, such as the Quad and Biden’s new economic proposal named the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.
But doing so risks crippling economic retaliation from Beijing and pushing North Korea closer to China, and further destabilizing inter-Korean relations, said Chung Jae-hung, a China scholar and research fellow at the Sejong Institute in South Korea.
In 2017, for example, when the United States deployed the ground-based missile defense system Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to South Korea, Beijing economically struck back on Seoul. China is now watching to see whether the Yoon government’s rhetoric turns to action, Chung said.
“It’s hard to be optimistic,” Chung said. “If North Korea conducts a nuclear test, and Russia and China decline to pursue additional U.N. sanctions, then what does South Korea do?”
3. North Korea May Be Trapped Between Famine and Plague
Outside help is separately needed, yes, but will Kim accept it and allow it to work properly if he does accept it?
This is another indication that the ROK, US, and the international community care more about the welfare of the Korean people in the north than does Kim Jong-un.
Excerpt:
The first principle guiding Washington and Seoul in approaching Pyongyang as it navigates this period of crisis should be to ensure that the suffering of innocent North Korean citizens at the hands of the pandemic can be minimized. An effort to this end that succeeds could restore lines of communication, promote confidence, and set in the place the conditions that could allow for a return to talks—even without any explicit linkage between the nuclear and missile issues and the pandemic.
North Korea May Be Trapped Between Famine and Plague
As COVID-19 sweeps through the country, outside help is desperately needed.
By Ankit Panda, the Stanton senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.
Kim Jong Un wears a face mask on television
Kim Jong Un is seen in a face mask on television for the first time during a news broadcast in Seoul on May 12. Anthony Wallace/AFP via Getty Images
Back in January 2020, North Korea looked on with concern as a then-novel coronavirus epidemic emerged in China. Preventing the spread of this virus beyond China’s borders was a matter of “national survival,” Rodong Sinmun, the ruling Workers’ Party’s official newspaper, said.
For 28 months afterwards, North Korea implausibly reported zero cases of COVID-19—even as the virus tore through the rest of the world. Like the Chinese Communist Party next door, the Workers’ Party of Korea opted to pursue a zero-COVID strategy premised on sealing off the country’s borders. Unlike China, enforcement consisted of, among other measures, shoot-on-sight orders.
The zero-case claim came to a screeching halt last week as the country reported the first case of the omicron variant of COVID-19—and the BA.2 subvariant—within its borders. Not a single North Korean citizen is known to have been vaccinated against COVID-19, and with no confirmed previous COVID-19 cases, it’s unlikely that any natural immunity to earlier coronavirus variants exists either.
Back in January 2020, North Korea looked on with concern as a then-novel coronavirus epidemic emerged in China. Preventing the spread of this virus beyond China’s borders was a matter of “national survival,” Rodong Sinmun, the ruling Workers’ Party’s official newspaper, said.
For 28 months afterwards, North Korea implausibly reported zero cases of COVID-19—even as the virus tore through the rest of the world. Like the Chinese Communist Party next door, the Workers’ Party of Korea opted to pursue a zero-COVID strategy premised on sealing off the country’s borders. Unlike China, enforcement consisted of, among other measures, shoot-on-sight orders.
The zero-case claim came to a screeching halt last week as the country reported the first case of the omicron variant of COVID-19—and the BA.2 subvariant—within its borders. Not a single North Korean citizen is known to have been vaccinated against COVID-19, and with no confirmed previous COVID-19 cases, it’s unlikely that any natural immunity to earlier coronavirus variants exists either.
In a matter of days, state media acknowledged that more than 1 million cases of “fever”—a euphemism for suspected COVID-19, given the lack of diagnostic testing capacity—had spread across the country. Officially, 50 deaths have been attributed to the “fever” taking over the country. Pyongyang, the national capital that saw a major military parade in the final days of April, is the epicenter of the outbreak. For what is thought to be the first time, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was shown to be wearing a mask in state media.
For Kim, who celebrated the completion of a decade in power just months ago, the arrival of omicron and its subvariants in North Korea represents a severe threat. Yet COVID-19 is far from the only challenge for the country right now. North Korea may once again be on the brink of famine. On New Year’s Day this year, Kim delivered remarks that emphasized not nuclear weapons and missiles, but agricultural output. North Korea is no stranger to food shortages, but the combination of widespread food insecurity and a deadly respiratory virus is a new and frightening challenge.
While the situation remains fluid, this set of parallel challenges appears to pose a fundamental dilemma for the regime in how to manage the spread of the virus.
Days before state media reported on the confirmed arrival of omicron in the country, Pyongyang went into a lockdown that strongly suggested a COVID-19 outbreak may have been underway. Following the acknowledgement of COVID-19’s presence in North Korea, the Workers’ Party Politburo met to discuss “the epidemic prevention crisis state.”
According to North Korean state media, Kim “called on all the cities and counties of the whole country to thoroughly lock down their areas and organize work and production after closing each working unit, production unit and living unit from each other so as to flawlessly and perfectly block the spread vacuum of the malicious virus.” This amounts to a call for a national-level lockdown. North Korea’s top-down system should be able to do that fast. But all signs are that the country hasn’t gone into total lockdown just yet—even if Pyongyang and other cities have.
Journalists in South Korea peering across the inter-Korean border with telescopes continue to see signs of normal agricultural activity in farms to the south, suggesting there may be a rural-urban divide in how lockdowns are being implemented. The explanation for this seems to be the inescapable reality of what a serious lockdown would mean: an assured and catastrophic famine. May, it just so happens, is the start of North Korea’s rice planting season, which runs through October. This five-month window may, in reality, be a two-month window, as May and June are generally the most favorable for maximizing rice production. Producing rice, as the national staple food, is essential for preventing colossal food shortages.
North Korea has already seen its food stocks run low amid unfavorable harvests during its 28 months of self-imposed isolation. Going all-in on a national lockdown may save lives from the “fever” that’s taken hold across the country, but it could come at the cost of lives lost later to starvation and malnutrition.
It’s unclear what steps the country’s leadership might take if the worst comes to pass and omicron/BA.2 prove impossible to contain. In an unusual public call to draw on China’s experiences, normally shunned by a regime that avoids acknowledging foreign influences, Rodong Sinmun reported that Kim told North Korean authorities to study the “policies, successes, and experiences” of China, among other countries, and to “actively follow” their approach. This could indicate a predisposition to favor a national-level lockdown to contain the pandemic, even if it does significantly increase the odds of mass starvation.
There’s no quick and easy fix for North Korea’s domestic dilemmas. Ever-insular since its national lockdown in early 2020, Pyongyang remains deeply uninterested in seeking outside help. Pyongyang repeatedly rejected COVAX-allocated vaccines for its people—to the point that the international consortium announced in late April that vaccines allocated for North Korea would be diverted elsewhere.
Throughout its 28 months of pre-omicron lockdown, North Korea also steered clear of diplomacy with either the United States or South Korea. This tendency predates the pandemic and has more to do with Kim’s general strategic recalibration in the aftermath of the February 2019 Hanoi summit with then-U.S. President Donald Trump. During the pandemic, Pyongyang’s isolation likely was intensified by a sense that accepting external assistance would present new vectors for the virus to introduce itself into North Korea.
With North Korea now fully in the throes of a COVID-19 breakout, the possibility of Kim accepting external assistance may be more likely. Despite North Korea’s slogans emphasizing “self-reliance,” the country has repeatedly accepted offers of foreign aid, including from South Korea and the United States, during previous periods of economic difficulty. Indeed, part of the reason North Korean officials may not have accepted COVAX-allocated AstraZeneca viral vector vaccines was because of a preference for U.S.-made mRNA vaccines
South Korea’s newly inaugurated president, Yoon Suk-yeol, has said that he would be willing to offer North Korea coronavirus-specific assistance as necessary. The Biden administration has also urged North Korea to open its borders to facilitate a vaccination campaign. While North Korea may have once seen reason to push back on these offers amid perceptions of ulterior motives, that may change as the crisis worsens.
Washington and Seoul should be prepared to unconditionally extend assistance to North Korea if and when Pyongyang demonstrates a willingness to accept it. There will be an opportunity later this month, when Yoon meets his American counterpart Joe Biden, to unilaterally message a willingness to assist North Korea without conditions. Even as the world anticipates a seventh North Korean nuclear test and continued missile testing, Washington and Seoul should take steps to engage Pyongyang on pandemic-related assistance. Quite simply, if North Korea tests its seventh nuclear device at 9 a.m. on a given day and requests pandemic-related assistance at 9:30 a.m., there should be no hesitation in responding positively—even as the nuclear testing should be condemned.
The first principle guiding Washington and Seoul in approaching Pyongyang as it navigates this period of crisis should be to ensure that the suffering of innocent North Korean citizens at the hands of the pandemic can be minimized. An effort to this end that succeeds could restore lines of communication, promote confidence, and set in the place the conditions that could allow for a return to talks—even without any explicit linkage between the nuclear and missile issues and the pandemic.
Ankit Panda is the Stanton senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. He is the author of Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea. Twitter: @nktpnd
4. US assesses North Korea preparing for possible long range missile test within days as Biden prepares to travel to Asia
Yes everyone will be focused on missile tests (or worse, a possible nuclear test). But I remain more concerned with internal instability though they are inextricably linked and we must consider the totality of the threats and problems in north Korea.
US assesses North Korea preparing for possible long range missile test within days as Biden prepares to travel to Asia
CNN · by Barbara Starr, CNN Pentagon Correspondent
(CNN)North Korea appears to be preparing for a possible intercontinental ballistic missile test within the next 48 to 96 hours, just as President Joe Biden is scheduled to travel to Asia, according to a US official familiar with the latest intelligence assessment.
"The things we have noticed in the past for a launch are the things we are noticing now," the official said. The launch site under satellite observation is located near Pyongyang. The official would not detail specifics of the current imagery, but typically, intelligence analysts look for signs of scaffolding or other launcher equipment, fueling, vehicles and personnel.
Biden sets off for South Korea on Thursday and will hold meetings with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol before traveling to Japan on Sunday where he is set to meet with the leaders of Japan, Australia and India.
North Korea has conducted a number of ballistic missile tests this year, and US military and intelligence agencies assess Pyongyang may also be preparing for its first underground nuclear test in nearly five years.
The US now believes that a North Korean missile launch on May 4 was a failed ICBM that exploded shortly after launch.
The US also had assessed that two ballistic missile tests on February 26 and March 4 involved a new ICBM that is under development by North Korea. According to the Pentagon the missile was originally shown for the first time at the Korean Workers Party parade on October 10, 2020. The tests earlier this year were intended as an evaluation and did not try to demonstrate the range of the ICBM. A test of the missile's range could come come later.
After making those findings public in March, the Pentagon increased surveillance activity in the Yellow Sea as well as "enhanced readiness" of US missile defenses in the region.
That assessment concluded that Kim Jong Un's government was making preparations at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and could be ready to conduct a test by the end of the month. Signs of personnel and vehicle activity at the site had been seen through satellite imagery, but the officials do not know if the regime has placed nuclear material in one of the underground tunnels at the test site, which the US has been closely watching.
If North Korea conducts a test, it would be the country's seventh underground nuclear test and first since 2017.
Speaking at a briefing Wednesday on Biden's upcoming visit, South Korean deputy security adviser Kim Tae-hyo said a new intercontinental ballistic missile test by North Korea seems "imminent" but the possibility of a nuclear test seems "low."
"In the event of a North Korean provocation during the SK-US summit period, depending on the nature of the provocation, a plan B has been prepared so that the two leaders can immediately begin the command and control system of the combined defense posture, even if the existing schedule is changed," Kim said.
Biden and Yoon will discuss the most effective measures for deterring North Korean nuclear missiles along with other global issues, including issues in the Indo-Pacific and economic security, according to Kim.
A summit between Biden and Yoon will take place shortly after their photo op at the presidential palace at 1:30 p.m. local time on Saturday, according to Kim. The two leaders will later hold a joint news conference before attending a dinner at the National Museum of Korea, Kim said.
Biden's trip to the region this week is only the latest instance where a US president has traveled to Asia amid the threat of a nuclear test: Pyongyang was preparing for a test in 2014 when then-President Barack Obama traveled to South Korea, and the country conducted a test soon after Obama and other leaders departed Asia in 2016.
CNN's Jeremy Herb and Yoonjung Seo contributed to this report.
CNN · by Barbara Starr, CNN Pentagon Correspondent
5. Army activates new air cavalry squadron with latest Apache helicopters in South Korea
Excerpts:
The squadron’s commander, Lt. Col. Ian Benson, said he was honored to lead the new unit.
“I think the activation reflects the continued U.S. commitment to our [South Korea]-U.S. alliance, as well as the continued commitment to all of our partners and allies across the Pacific,” he said.
Benson echoed Martin’s remarks, saying he believed experience and continuity was important in military operations on the Korean Peninsula.
“I think that understanding the environment and terrain – and building those partnerships not only with U.S. ground forces but with our Korean counterparts – is incredibly important,” Benson said. “It’s the intangible that allows us to do our job much, much better.”
Army activates new air cavalry squadron with latest Apache helicopters in South Korea
The 5th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade is activated at Camp Humphreys, South Korea, Tuesday, May 17, 2022. (Frank Spatt/U.S. Army)
CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — The Army on Tuesday activated a new air cavalry squadron tasked with providing permanent reconnaissance support to U.S. forces in South Korea.
The 5th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade was activated in a ceremony on Camp Humphreys, the largest U.S. military base overseas.
The new squadron consists of roughly 500 soldiers and 24 AH-64E Apaches, the latest version of the Army’s attack helicopter. The 5-17th air cavalry squadron also includes RQ-7B Shadows, unmanned aircraft systems that provide reconnaissance and surveillance assistance to aviation brigades.
The squadron will permanently replace the aviation units previously deployed to South Korea for nine-month tours.
“Here we are on the most fitting of dates — the fifth month and the seventeenth day — to finally restore the division’s permanently assigned air cavalry squadron to its formation,” brigade commander Col. Aaron Martin said during the ceremony.
Martin, who commands roughly 3,300 soldiers in the 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade, said activating the squadron took around three years. The unique environment in South Korea and the brigade’s mission requires “more longevity” and experience than a standard nine-month tour, he told Stars and Stripes at the ceremony.
“Their expertise and experience over that time will make this air cavalry squadron more ready and more proficient to do their battle tasks,” Martin said.
The squadron’s commander, Lt. Col. Ian Benson, said he was honored to lead the new unit.
“I think the activation reflects the continued U.S. commitment to our [South Korea]-U.S. alliance, as well as the continued commitment to all of our partners and allies across the Pacific,” he said.
Benson echoed Martin’s remarks, saying he believed experience and continuity was important in military operations on the Korean Peninsula.
“I think that understanding the environment and terrain – and building those partnerships not only with U.S. ground forces but with our Korean counterparts – is incredibly important,” Benson said. “It’s the intangible that allows us to do our job much, much better.”
The 5-17th traces its lineage to 1916, when U.S. troops patrolled the southern border during World War I.
As part of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the squadron deployed to Vietnam as a ground reconnaissance unit in 1965. It took part in several battles, including the Battle of Dak To and the Tet Offensive.
6. ROK Yellow Sea Defense
As a side note I think the Koreans refer to the West Sea as the name for the waters to the west of the Korean peninsula just as they refer to the East Sea for the waters to the east of the Korean peninsula.
Excerpts:
In 2010, when North Korean shore batteries shelled Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea responded by striking North Korean shore batteries utilizing its self-propelled Howitzers, causing enough damage to save face while leaving space for de-escalation without territorial concession. For this purpose, the NWIDC is equipped with batteries of K-9 SPG (contemporaries to the Army’s M109A7 Paladin) that enable it to strike shore batteries. Originally a weapon developed to accompany mechanized forces in Cold War–style mechanized combat, the K-9 SPG inadvertently became a perfect fit for a role in limited territorial conflict. Like the K-9 SPG, there may be overlooked platforms already in the U.S. joint force’s arsenal that are extremely effective in limited combat operations. The United States must look for and field this equipment, and develop tactics and responses that sufficiently retaliates, but leaves room to negotiate and deescalate.
Future conflict in the South China Sea will likely be complex, gray, and multifaceted. The Navy–Marine Corps team will undoubtedly face great challenges responding to increased aggression in the Indo-Pacific and run into hurdles as it matures concepts behind littoral combat operations. Fortunately, they are not the first maritime force to face conflict in a complex littoral battlespace. It is imperative the United States learn from the experiences of its allies that have operated for decades in a similar battlespace. The result must be an effective operational littoral combat force able to win a high-intensity conflict.
ROK Yellow Sea Defense
By Lieutenant (junior grade) Jeong Soo “Gary” Kim, U.S. Navy
May 2022 Proceedings Vol. 148/5/1,431
The Marine Corp’s Force Design 2030 introduces the marine littoral regiment (MLR), a unit that will play a central role in deterring aggression in the western Pacific. In its current iteration, it is centered on the littoral combat team (LCT), littoral logistics battalion (LLB), and littoral antiair battalion (LAAB). Once this unit is stood up, virtual and realistic training exercises and war games inevitably will expose its strengths and weaknesses and inform the final structure of the unit. While the Navy and Marine Corps experiment to create the most effective MLR, they can learn from U.S. allies who have conducted a similar mission for decades, and analyze their units, tactics, and practices. A notable example is the Republic of Korea (ROK) defense of the Yellow Sea, a sea line of communication (SLOC) critical for trade into the Seoul metropolitan area and fishery operations.
The ROK military’s defense of the northern limit line (NLL) shares similarities to the battlespace that the integrated Navy–Marine Corps team will face in the western Pacific. The ROK Marine Corps and the Navy defend a chain of five islands and a maritime border that is within five miles of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) coastline and within its weapon engagement zone. Furthermore, this battlespace is even more complicated by its proximity to South Korea’s primary air hub (Incheon International Airport) and active fisheries shared by both Koreas and China’s fishing fleets. While it is impossible to draw exact comparison between the western Pacific, South China Sea theater of operations, and the NLL, the Navy–Marine Corps team should analyze and consider the operational philosophy of a force that has successfully defended an economically vital maritime node against a continental foe.
Lessons for the U.S. Navy
Superiority in limited combat operations and asymmetric threats. Conflicts in the Yellow Sea occur in a dense commercial space vital to both Koreas. Both sides realize that committing major surface combatants or guided missiles in response to a commercial dispute may escalate beyond this battlespace and risk an all-out conflict along the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Therefore, unspoken protocols for kinetic military conflict have been well established, with both sides exchanging fire via naval guns while emergency deconfliction channels limit further escalation. Battles last mere minutes at close range as strict rules of engagement including warning shots, and proximity to civilian vessels prevents belligerents from using the full stand-off range of their arsenal. At the end of the engagement, vessels limp back to their bases and both sides account for their casualties while political entities negotiate the consequences. This style of gray-zone conflict has endured in the Yellow Sea since the 1953 Armistice, while the ROK and DPRK have tailored their forces to gain superiority in this limited style of conflict.
The 2,500-ton Incheon-class frigate is equipped with a 12-mm main gun. Credit: Republic of Korea Navy
This style of conflict has influenced naval vessel design on both sides. For example, new patrol craft and frigates assigned to the ROK Navy (ROKN) Second Fleet carry significantly heavier gun armaments than similar-sized ships in other parts of the world. This trend can be seen starting from the ROKN’s 2,500-ton frigate carrying 127-mm guns to 500-ton patrol craft (PKG) carrying 76-mm, dual 40-mm guns, and even smaller 200-ton patrol craft armed with 76-mm guns. North Korea attempts to reciprocate with its limited resources, devising creative designs such as mounting a T-54/55 turret on board a patrol craft. Therefore, while the rest of the world’s patrol/corvette fleet gravitates more toward missiles and stealth, both Koreas have built fleets of stable gun platforms, preparing for short, deadly gun duels.
The 1,000-ton Pohang-class corvettes are equipped with multiple 76-mm and 40-mm guns. These gunships are contemporaries of missile-focused vessels such as the Oliver Hazard Perry and Ticonderoga classes. Credit: Republic of Korea Navy
There is a chance that the western Pacific and South China Sea maritime battlespaces will take on a similar characteristic. Heavy commercial use may discourage conflict with full naval arsenals. Furthermore, neighboring countries rely on the South China Sea for significant portion of their economic activity, and these countries likely will not conduct open high-intensity warfare and suffer the dire economic consequences to deny China’s territorial claims. Armed engagements may result as an escalation between maritime law enforcement forces and may use limited armaments that will prevent larger escalation. Furthermore, when armed conflict does occur, established de-escalation channels may force a ceasefire within hours or even minutes.
A small North Korean patrol craft equipped with a tank turret, enabling them to fire large caliber shells against South Korean warships. Credit: blog.sina.com
While maintaining high-end tactical superiority to deter Chinese aggression in the South China Sea is crucial, it also isvery likely that naval combat will merge into the gray-zone conflict encompassing maritime law enforcement, posturing and deterrence. Just as the ROKN Second Fleet and its DPRK counterpart have designed their surface combatants to adapt to the style of naval combat unique to the Yellow Sea battlespace, the U.S. maritime force will have to make armament and design decisions informed of the complexities of gray-zone maritime conflict in the South China Sea. Hypothetically, if an unspoken rule limits naval combat in the South China Sea to ramming, then the U.S Navy must build ships ideally suited for ramming combat operations.
Developing a tactical chain of command optimized for the South China Sea. The U.S. Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) supplies combatant commanders with a steady supply of highly trained operational units. However, it is not difficult to see this system being strained as dynamic world events outside the Indo-Pacific, such as potential conflict with Iran, Russian aggression, and COVID-19 severely stress the Navy’s ability to project maritime power. The South China Sea and western Pacific may be a uniquely dynamic theater in which evolving commercial, diplomatic, law enforcement, and military situations require flexibility and surge capability not conducive to the Navy’s current OFRP plan. To support a more dynamic operational tempo, the ROKN Second Fleet’s organization may suit the operations in a commercially dense and dynamic maritime environment such as the South China Sea.
The ROKN Second Fleet encompasses not only its ships and battle staff, but also its supporting functions. The fleet commander (a rear admiral) takes overall command of not only the combatants, but the logistics, early warning, and base functions. The structure is extremely similar to the Air Force’s “Objective Wing” structure, where all flying (or sailing) and support units all report to a single wing (or fleet) commander. This approach is inherently different from the relationship between the U.S. Navy’s operational and installation units, as operational units play a “tenant” role to a base commanding officer that plays the “landlord” role. This systems works well in the current deployment operational framework, as ships, squadrons, and embarked command element operate far away from their homeports. The ROKN Second Fleet accepts that because of its battlespace, all elements, including logistics and base functions, are a part of the fleet’s battlespace, and its command framework is designed to more effectively “fight” the fleet.
Based in Pyeongtaek (the same city that hosts the U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys), The ROKN Second Fleet headquarters is about 60 to 100 nm away from the NLL, the primary maritime border and battle space in which it must operate. With the range of modern precision guided munitions and proximity to the DMZ, Second Fleet headquarters is very much inside the battlespace, different to the relationship between the U.S. Pacific Fleet (based in Hawaii) and the battlespace to which its subordinate operational units deploy (the western Pacific, South China Sea). Surface combatants assigned to the ROKN Second Fleet typically respond to one- to two-daylong “intercepts” of probing North Korean vessels on short notice rather than monthslong deployments typical of U.S. naval assets. In a way, naval assets in a smaller theater of operation like the Yellow Sea function similarly to fighter aircraft flying out of an Air Force base rather than a typical U.S. Navy vessel. If permanently forward deploying naval assets near the South China Sea is an option the Navy is considering, integrating operational and sustainment functions into one chain of command like the Air Force or the ROK Navy may yield benefits.
Sailing distances between headquarters of the ROK Second Fleet, and its potential operational areas. Credit: LTJG Jeong Soo Kim
Integrating Navy and Marine Corps Units in the Battlespace
While decades of defending an island chain against a continental enemy has allowed the ROKN and ROK Marine Corps (ROKMC) to accumulate significant knowledge and experience. While each component is effective in deterring and defeating their North Korean counterparts, this organization suffers significant flaws that may inhibit its ability to effectively defend this battlespace in time of conflict. The most notable of which is the lack of integration and combat interoperability between the ROKN Second Fleet and Marine Corps Headquarters/Northwest Islands Defense Command (NWIDC). Each unit has different combat focus, and there is no combatant commander that can effectively “fight” a joint force in the time of conflict.
First, the ROKN Second Fleet and NWIDC occupy the same battlespace but have inherently non-supporting mission sets. The ROKN Second Fleet mainly focuses on defending the NLL from North Korean aggression with primarily naval gunnery and antiship missiles. NWIDC focuses on repelling raids and amphibious landings on islands, using a traditionally structured infantry brigade in a coastal-defense role. In addition, artillery battalions (armed with K-9 SPG) also are tasked with providing retaliatory counterbattery fire against North Korean positions inland.
Organization of ROKMC’s Sixth Brigade and Yeonpyeong Unit. Both report to the Northwest Island Defense Commander, who dual hats as the Commandant of the ROKMC. Credit: LTJG Jeong Soo Kim
The threats to the island chain remain high and the garrisons well manned. However NWIDC’s order of battle reveals a disconnect between development in the Korean People Army’s (KPA) asymmetric warfare capabilities and what ROKMC perceives as its threats. NWIDC centers around two brigade sized unit. Five infantry battalions, two artillery battalions, and one logistics battalion form the core of these two brigades along with various supporting companies to round out the fighting force. In case of war, the brigades are to repel invaders primarily with infantry weapons. However, with the ROKN Second Fleet growing more qualitatively superior to their North Korean counterparts, the ROKN continues to enforce its NLL, and likely will intercept any sizable attempts of an amphibious landing. With this operational reality, along with the North Korean Army’s increasing tendency to use asymmetric tactics such as drone attacks, infiltrations, and sudden artillery bombardment, it is difficult to picture five infantry battalions being effectively used in the Yellow Sea.
Most critically, NWIDC and ROKN 2FLT does not report to a singular battlespace commander, and their chain of command only converges at the ROK Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations. While ROKN and ROKMC units communicate and cooperate at a tactical level, the chain of command that does not integrate the two units does hamper their ability to more effectively fight incursions in the battlespace. The ROKN and ROKMC should redesign both its Second Fleet and NWIDC to complement each other and assign a singular mission.
Command relationship between NWIDC and ROK2FLT. Note that they only share an operational commander at the ROK CNO. Credit: LTJG Jeong Soo Kim
ROKMC Reforms
Recent weapons testing and force deployment to the ROKN Second Fleet and NWIDC indicate a strategic shift. Units are now being geared to strike North Korean vessels and deny their use of maritime transport lanes between the islands. To perform this task, a Humvee-like tactical vehicle is paired with a long-range antitank missile (SPIKE-NLOS), allowing significant tactical mobility on island, while having the range and firepower to destroy landing and patrol craft at a distance. While using a smaller missile, this pair of a multipurpose tactical vehicle and guided missile is similar to the deployment of the NMESIS platform by the U.S Marine Corps.
The NWIDC is also preparing to retaliate at North Korean shore military assets in times of limited territorial conflict. The Korean 국지전(局地戰 (Gook-Ji-Jeon) is a warfare concept in which a military uses limited lethal force to shape the narrative over a geopolitical dispute. A tactic the North Korean government previously used is a short, intense artillery barrage into the five islands. Such action effectively puts the South Korean government in a dilemma over whether to escalate and risk massive economic damage or look for a route of de-escalation and in some cases offer material and territorial concessions.
In 2010, when North Korean shore batteries shelled Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea responded by striking North Korean shore batteries utilizing its self-propelled Howitzers, causing enough damage to save face while leaving space for de-escalation without territorial concession. For this purpose, the NWIDC is equipped with batteries of K-9 SPG (contemporaries to the Army’s M109A7 Paladin) that enable it to strike shore batteries. Originally a weapon developed to accompany mechanized forces in Cold War–style mechanized combat, the K-9 SPG inadvertently became a perfect fit for a role in limited territorial conflict. Like the K-9 SPG, there may be overlooked platforms already in the U.S. joint force’s arsenal that are extremely effective in limited combat operations. The United States must look for and field this equipment, and develop tactics and responses that sufficiently retaliates, but leaves room to negotiate and deescalate.
Future conflict in the South China Sea will likely be complex, gray, and multifaceted. The Navy–Marine Corps team will undoubtedly face great challenges responding to increased aggression in the Indo-Pacific and run into hurdles as it matures concepts behind littoral combat operations. Fortunately, they are not the first maritime force to face conflict in a complex littoral battlespace. It is imperative the United States learn from the experiences of its allies that have operated for decades in a similar battlespace. The result must be an effective operational littoral combat force able to win a high-intensity conflict.
7. What to Know About Biden's First Trip to Asia as President
It is tiring to keep hearing about the sabotage of alliances. First, the Biden administration has made a concerted effort to prioritize our alliances for more than the last year. We have moved on. Second, despite erratic political leadership, professional diplomats, military personnel, and intelligence community members have worked hard over the years to sustain the foundation of our alliances while still supporting the direction from political leaders even if they did not agree with them (e.g., $5 billion demand for cost sharing) (no political leader ever directed the US national security to deliberately undermine or end alliances so the professionals were not working contrary to the political leadership, they were just doing the right thing for for the long term of US national security).
Excerpts:
“Biden is hoping to reassure allies about U.S. commitment that Trump sabotaged with his erratic diplomacy,” says Jeffery Kingston, director of Asian Studies at Tokyo’s Temple University Japan.
Security on the Korean peninsula will dominate Biden’s summit with new South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol in Seoul on May 21, though Ukraine and supply chain issues are also on the agenda. The following day, Biden joins a meeting of the Quad security pact in Tokyo alongside the leaders of Japan, India and Australia.
What to Know About Biden's First Trip to Asia as President
TIME · by Charlie Campbell
On May 20, Joe Biden embarks on his first trip to Asia as U.S. President against a tumultuous backdrop. Among other issues, his administration has been dealing with China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and tensions with Beijing over Taiwan. Then there’s the ramping up of missile tests by North Korea even as it locks down major cities in response to its first COVID-19 outbreak—or at least the first one that Pyongyang has admitted to.
Biden’s top foreign policy priority is containing China, U.S. diplomatic sources tell TIME, and he doesn’t want American help for Ukraine to give the impression that his focus has drifted westwards. The tour is intended to demonstrate U.S. engagement in Asia while sending a message to China and North Korea that regional alliances with South Korea and Japan remain rock solid.
Biden’s predecessor Donald Trump made a visit to Beijing the centerpiece of on his first Asian trip, but the current president is making a point of concentrating on allies.
“Biden is hoping to reassure allies about U.S. commitment that Trump sabotaged with his erratic diplomacy,” says Jeffery Kingston, director of Asian Studies at Tokyo’s Temple University Japan.
Security on the Korean peninsula will dominate Biden’s summit with new South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol in Seoul on May 21, though Ukraine and supply chain issues are also on the agenda. The following day, Biden joins a meeting of the Quad security pact in Tokyo alongside the leaders of Japan, India and Australia.
In this handout image provided by the U.S. Army, then president-elect of South Korea, Yoon Suk-yeol (2nd L) stands with Gen. Paul J. LaCamera (R) of United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea Commander, during his visit at Camp Humphreys on April 7, 2022 in Pyeongtaek, South Korea.
Staff Sgt. Kris Bonet—U.S. Army via Getty Images
Biden’s visit to South Korea
During his election campaign, Yoon called for more U.S. THAAD missile systems to be deployed to South Korea and even raised the possibility of pre-emptive military strikes on Pyongyang’s weapons sites. While in Seoul, Biden is likely to urge Yoon to maintain this tough stance, given that Kim Jong Un has held 16 weapons tests so far this year, including a potentially game-changing submarine missile launch. There is also growing suspicion that another nuclear test looms.
But despite Kim’s bluster, North Korea is in trouble. The reclusive nation is suffering an “explosive” COVID-19 outbreak, with at least 1.2 million believed infected and more than 50 dead, according to official figures. The regime has so far refused offers of vaccines and lacks basic medical supplies. In response, major cities, including the capital Pyongyang, have been shuttered. In rural areas, work units are being kept apart. State media has advocated homespun remedies, including salt water gargles and the consumption of yogurt.
Some have suggested that the crisis may offer a window for medical diplomacy. In his first budget speech to South Korea’s National Assembly on Monday, Yoon said: “If the North Korean authorities accept, we will not spare any necessary support, such as medicine, including COVID-19 vaccines, medical equipment and health care personnel.”
However, Pyongyang’s track record from the mid-1990s, when it aggressively pursued a nuclear program despite widespread famine that reportedly killed millions, doesn’t offer much hope of a slowdown in militarization.
“The government does not care about its own people,” says Sean King, a former U.S. diplomat and now senior vice-president of political risk firm Park Strategies.
Members of the Korean University Student Progressive Association burn a Japanese war flag across from the Japanese Embassy on June 1, 2020 in Seoul, South Korea.
Chris Jung/Nur Photo via Getty Images
U.S. allies in Asia
It is meanwhile unclear whether Biden can push Seoul to cooperate more forcefully on countering China. Favorable views of the U.S. jumped sharply in South Korea in 2021, following Trump’s departure from the White House, and Yoon portrayed himself as staunchly pro-American during April’s election campaign.
However, he scraped through on the narrowest of margins and, given his weak mandate, may be reluctant to alienate top trading partner China, especially when improving the economy remains a key issue. “It’s not clear that Yoon will be as hard-line as the U.S. wants,” says Kingston.
Biden may try to increase pressure on China by getting Seoul to patch up differences with Tokyo and close ranks against Beijing. Relations between the two U.S. allies have been poor in recent years, owing to territorial disputes and unresolved abuses dating from Japan’s wartime occupation of the Korean peninsula. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has made it clear that the ball is in Seoul’s court, and Yoon says he wants to improve ties but, given opposition control of South Korea’s National Assembly, making any concessions to Tokyo will be an uphill task for the South Korean leader.
Biden will also be looking for a show of unity at the Quad meeting. However, India’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine spotlights the contradictory nature of this odd alliance. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi won’t want to be pushed too hard to take sides against Moscow, which Delhi regards as a long-time ally and defense partner. Nor will Biden be insistent, for fear of losing India’s support in America’s rivalry with China.
“It makes things a little awkward and kind of calls into question the utility of the Quad,” says King. “Here you have this grouping where you pursue shared values … [of] democracy and human rights. And then on the defining issue of the day, its most populous member doesn’t want to take a stand.”
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and leaders of other countries attend the signing ceremony of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement via video link, Nov. 15, 2020.
Xinhua/Zhang Ling via Getty Images
The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
Every U.S. president comes to Asia with something to sell and bulging out of Biden’s briefcase is his Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). First unveiled in October 2021, the IPEF is an initiative that seeks fair trade, improved supply chains, greater sustainability, and measures to reduce corruption.
Doubtless Washington will hope that the framework can mitigate the influence China wields through its Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership—a pact of 16 countries that together make up about a third of the world’s GDP. There are also hopes that the IPEF can make up for the lost opportunities of the Obama-era Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which Trump scrapped on his first day in office.
“The IPEF holds promise, but it will need to be well engineered and managed if it is to advance U.S. economic and strategic interests, become a credible alternative to other regional initiatives, and be seen by allies and partners as a durable U.S. commitment to the region,” wrote Matthew P. Goodman and William Alan Reinsch in a report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
It will be asked why the U.S. doesn’t simply join the Japanese-led Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership—which evolved from the TPP after America’s withdrawal—instead of pitching an entirely new agreement that might be seen as adversarial to Beijing. Many Asian nations balk at being continually asked to chose between the U.S. and China.
“I guess it’s good that we’re pushing something, but I’d rather just see us get back in TPP,” says King.
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TIME · by Charlie Campbell
8. N. Korea reemphasizes orders to use live ammunition against border intruders
The COVID paradox in north Korea. Kim is deathly afraid of COVID. But COVID provides the opportunity to further oppress and defend against what he is most fearful of: the Korean people in the north. And while the order seems to be to prevent "intruders" (could be smugglers), live ammunition works equally well on people trying to cross the border in both directions.
N. Korea reemphasizes orders to use live ammunition against border intruders - Daily NK
The new order comes amid flagging discipline within the border patrol due to the protracted COVID-19 pandemic
A border patrol checkpoint in Pungso County, Yanggang Province, can be seen in this photo taken in February 2019 (Daily NK)
North Korean authorities recently instructed soldiers along the China-North Korea border to further tighten controls along the international boundary, emphasizing once again orders to shoot at anything approaching the border with live ammunition.
North Korean authorities handed down the order on May 12, the day the country switched over to a “maximum emergency epidemic prevention system,” according to a Daily NK source in Yanggang Province on Tuesday.
North Korea established a one to two kilometer buffer zone along the border in August 2020, when COVID-19 was spreading worldwide. At the time, the country’s Ministry of Social Security issued an order calling on border patrol troops to “unconditionally” shoot people and even animals that approached the zone.
North Korean authorities have now re-emphasized heightened wariness and a tough response from the border patrol, taking into account the seriousness of the situation following the outbreak.
In fact, the new order comes amid flagging discipline within the border patrol due to the protracted COVID-19 pandemic.
The source said the order called on the border patrol’s 25th Brigade to “abandon their chronically poor attitude on duty and carry out their border patrol duties with a battle-like and ideological attitude.”
In particular, North Korean authorities provided detailed instructions about what border patrol troops should do when firing live ammunition. If, for example, troops shoot dead an unknown person along the border, they should leave the body where it is and stay at least two meters away. Then they should report the incident immediately to the local emergency anti-epidemic regiment or battalion.
However, the source said some soldiers are reacting poorly to the order. He heard soldiers saying: “We signed up to protect the country and the people, not to kill people trying to feed themselves,” “People wouldn’t risk death to cross the border unless it was that difficult to survive,” and “Even if I spot somebody trying to run away, I’ll play dumb rather than shoot them.”
North Korean authorities have ordered the bolstering of military regulations, strictly forbidding border patrol troops from approaching local villages.
The authorities also ordered for reinforced night duties and stakeouts, while officers must stay on duty with their men until the “maximum emergency epidemic prevention system” is lifted.
However, soldiers are complaining that they cannot seal the border any more than it already is.
Soldiers are suffering from poor food conditions and dislike the order because it would put an end to smuggling, which allows them to obtain food, the source said.
With government rations having ceased a long time ago, military units have taken to farming their own fields to solve food problems. However, with soldiers mobilized for part-time farm work now being recalled to their units to tighten border patrols, military units are finding it tougher to ensure everyone is fed, the source said.
“In the old days, even when [military] units gave you snacks like biscuits or candies to eat while working, you didn’t eat them,” said the source, adding, “But since [the start of] COVID-19, the military can’t even ensure three meals a day, let alone snacks. Who would welcome an order to suffocate oneself?”
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
9. Hamhung university students mobilized to work on farms despite pandemic
As Ankit Panda wrote the regime is caught between the plague and the famine.
Hamhung university students mobilized to work on farms despite pandemic - Daily NK
Hamhung’s universities have asked students unable to help out on the farms for health or personal reasons to pay USD 150 to help pay for teachers' meals
Farmland in Chongsan-ri, between Nampo and Pyongyang. (Flickr, Creative Commons)
Universities in Hamhung were recently ordered by the government to send students to support nearby agricultural areas over a period of 25 days, a source in South Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Monday.
“As a result, students arrived at their designated farms on the afternoon of May 14 and began work on May 15,” the source said.
Given the recent outbreak of COVID-19 in the country, students with a fever were exempted from the order, while the rest of the students have been put to work on the farms as planned, he explained.
As part of the mobilization order, the universities were told to come up with their own solutions to provide food to the students during the country’s “farm assistance period.”
The universities passed along the responsibility for arranging food and covering other living expenses to the students, who are already struggling to get by amid North Korea’s current economic troubles. That has left students frustrated, the source said.
The Hamhung University of Pharmacology, after deciding that participants will need 700g of food per day at the farms, ordered each student to provide 20kg of rice and pay KPW 100,000 to cover side dishes, he continued, noting that this amount of rice and money is a considerable hardship for students whose families are not well off.
A junior at the Hamhung University of Pharmacology surnamed Kim had already been thinking about quitting school because of hard times at home. After being ordered to fork over food and money for the farm work, Kim finally submitted paperwork to leave the university, the source said.
Another student at the university surnamed Lee confessed feeling guilty about asking his family to send more money. Lee’s parents had been subsisting on porridge so they could save enough money to pay his college expenses. Lee said that this abrupt demand for a big sum of money would force him to quit his studies.
In short, the financial burdens being exacted on students by the farm assistance program is driving students who were already struggling to stay afloat at college to simply give up on school.
Meanwhile, Hamhung’s universities have asked students who are unable to help out on the farms for health or personal reasons to pay USD 150 (around KPW 1 million) to help with paying for the meals of teachers during the farm assistance period, the source said.
“When the farm assistance period rolls around every year, universities expect students to cover the meals of teachers,” he said. “This year, as usual, students are being asked to provide food for the teaching staff, which places an even larger burden on them.”
Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
10. S. Korea, U.S. have 'plan B' ready in case of N.K. provocation during Biden's visit
I envision Kim Jong-un sitting in Pyongyang considering POTUS' visit and concluding with this:
"Now we could do it with conventional weapons, but that could take years and cost millions of lives. No, I think we have to go all out. I think that this situation absolutely requires a really futile and stupid gesture be done on somebody's part!"
-Eric Stratton. (ahem, Animal House)
(2nd LD) S. Korea, U.S. have 'plan B' ready in case of N.K. provocation during Biden's visit | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS remarks, details in paras 9-11)
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, May 18 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk-yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden have a "plan B" ready to command the combined forces of the two countries in case North Korea carries out a major provocation during Biden's visit to Seoul this week, a presidential official said Wednesday.
Biden is set to arrive in Seoul on Friday amid concern the North could conduct a nuclear test or launch an intercontinental ballistic missile around his three-day visit.
"At the moment, we assess that the possibility is relatively low of North Korea carrying out a nuclear test by the weekend, but preparations for an intercontinental ballistic missile launch appear to be imminent," Kim Tae-hyo, first deputy chief of the presidential National Security Office, told reporters.
"In the event of a North Korean provocation, big or small, during the three-day summit period, depending on its characteristics, we have prepared a plan B so that the leaders of South Korea and the United States will immediately enter the command and control system of the South Korea-U.S. combined defense posture, even if it calls for changing schedules," he said.
Yoon and Biden will meet at least once each day, with Saturday dedicated to their summit and the other two days dedicated to either an economic security event or a national security event, according to Kim.
The summit will begin shortly after 1:30 p.m. at the new presidential office in Yongsan, central Seoul, first in a small group in Yoon's office on the fifth floor and then in an expanded format in the adjacent reception room.
Before arriving for the talks, Biden will pay tribute to fallen soldiers at Seoul National Cemetery.
"The first thing that will be addressed during the one-on-one summit will be coming up with an action plan for how South Korea and the United States will strengthen the reliable and effective extended deterrence," Kim said.
Asked whether Yoon and Biden could discuss a bilateral currency swap deal during the summit, Kim replied that South Korea's economic fundamentals are solid, but the two leaders could discuss "smooth and swift cooperation" in stabilization of foreign exchange markets.
With regard to the matter of a currency swap deal with the U.S., an official at the presidential office said the two nations have been holding "substantial discussions."
The Yoon government will hold its first National Security Council meeting on Thursday to prepare for the Yoon-Biden summit and discuss North Korea's movements toward possible provocations, another presidential official said.
Yoon and Biden are also expected to agree to add a "technological" pillar to the military and economic alliance between the two countries.
The talks are expected to last for about an hour and a half, after which the two sides will summarize the results on paper and prepare the final draft of the joint summit declaration.
The two sides are currently in the final stages of drawing up the declaration, Kim said.
By 4 p.m., Yoon and Biden are expected to hold a joint press conference in the basement of the presidential office building and each give opening remarks before taking reporters' questions.
After a break, Yoon will host an official dinner at the National Museum of Korea at 7 p.m. with around 50 guests in attendance from the South Korean side and some 30 people from the U.S. side.
Kim said Biden is not scheduled to visit the Demilitarized Zone on the inter-Korean border during his stay but will attend a different event related to national security.
Biden has twice visited the DMZ, first as chairperson of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August 2001 and then as U.S. vice president in December 2013.
Meanwhile, Kim said the U.S. recently offered to send COVID-19 aid to North Korea to help the country contain a massive outbreak but received no response.
He also said Yoon plans to virtually attend a summit in Tokyo next Tuesday, where Biden will formally launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).
Biden is due to depart for Japan early Sunday afternoon at the end of his three-day visit to Seoul.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
11. Yoon, PPP lawmakers travel to Gwangju en masse to commemorate 1980 democracy uprising
The first major test of Yoon's presidency.
Excerpt:
The PPP's decision to have its lawmakers visit the annual ceremony en masse was seen as an outreach to the rival region of Honam aimed at improving its image and wooing centrist voters ahead of the June 1 local elections.
(LEAD) Yoon, PPP lawmakers travel to Gwangju en masse to commemorate 1980 democracy uprising | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES lead; ADDS more info in paras 3-7; CHANGES photo)
SEOUL, May 18 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk-yeol and some 100 lawmakers from the ruling People Power Party (PPP) traveled to the southwestern city of Gwangju on Wednesday and paid their respects to the victims of the 1980 pro-democracy uprising in an unprecedented outreach to the home turf of the main opposition party.
The civil revolt, in which Gwangju citizens rose up against the then military junta led by late former President Chun Doo-hwan, has long been associated with the liberal opposition Democratic Party (DP), and the conservative party has kept a distance from it amid perceptions its roots have ties to Chun.
During the ceremony, Yoon and PPP lawmakers were seen singing along to the signature song for the pro-democracy uprising in Gwangju, "March for the Beloved," with some holding hands.
The song had been sung by a choir under the two previous conservative Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, before Yoon's predecessor and liberal former president Moon Jae-in ordered it to be officially sung by all participants at the annual commemorative event.
"Some of our party members used to sing the song personally, but today it was meaningful, because we decided to sing along together as a party," PPP Chairman Lee Jun-seok told reporters after the event. "I hope this is an irreversible change that does not go back to the past."
Yoon and the PPP lawmakers took a KTX high-speed train from Seoul to Gwangju to attend the ceremony.
The PPP's decision to have its lawmakers visit the annual ceremony en masse was seen as an outreach to the rival region of Honam aimed at improving its image and wooing centrist voters ahead of the June 1 local elections.
The DP, meanwhile, also had more than 100 of its lawmakers at the event.
kdon@yna.co.kr
(END)
12. Evidence keeps mounting of a new nuke test by North Korea
Wednesday
May 18, 2022
Evidence keeps mounting of a new nuke test by North Korea
Satellite imagery of the Punggye-ri test site in North Hamgyong Province in North Korea shows excavation work in preparation for a possible nuclear test. [BEYOND PARALLEL]
Excavation work at North Korea's Punggye-ri nuclear testing site suggests the regime is gearing up for a seventh nuclear test, according to a U.S.-based think tank.
Beyond Parallel, a North Korea analysis portal operated by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said that Pyongyang is making preparations at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in Kilju County, North Hamgyong Province based on satellite images captured on Tuesday.
Photos of Punggye-ri – the only known nuclear testing facility in North Korea – shows “continued activity outside the new portal” for a tunnel leading into an underground test site. Support equipment around the tunnel's entrance indicates ongoing work inside the tunnel.
Further evidence cited by Beyond Parallel for the possibility of an upcoming test included changes in lumber piles, the renovation of existing buildings, and construction of new buildings in the main administration and support areas in and around the test site, suggesting a continued expansion of the support infrastructure.
The think tank cautioned that while an end to the work at the tunnel, which have been going on for three months, would suggest that preparation for a nuclear test is complete, “timing of this test rests solely within the hands of Kim Jong-un,” North Korea’s leader.
The satellite imagery analysis by the think tank follows an assessment by the U.S. government on May 6 that Pyongyang could be ready to conduct a nuclear test at Punggye-ri as early as the end of this month.
"The United States assesses that the DPRK is preparing its Punggye-ri test site and could be ready to conduct a test there as early as this month, which would be its seventh test," said State Department deputy spokesperson Jalina Porter at a regular press briefing, referring to the North by the acronym for its official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
“This assessment is consistent with DPRK's own recent public statements. We've shared this information with allies and partners and will continue closely coordinating with them as well,” Porter said.
She added that the United States would share more with its allies when U.S. President Joe Biden travels to South Korea and Japan for a visit between May 20 and 24.
The Punggye-ri nuclear test site has remained almost inactive since May 2018, when North Korea demolished all four portals or tunnels in a much-publicized event witnessed by foreign media allowed into the country to do so.
Concerns are growing, however, that recent missile tests are precursors to a nuclear test by the regime, which would be final proof that its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and longer-range missile tests, which started in late 2017, is definitely over.
Since 2006, Pyongyang has carried out six known nuclear tests, with the last test being conducted at the Punggye-ri testing site in North Hamgyong Province in September 2017.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
13. Yoon Suk-yeol gets on board Joe Biden's IPEF
Wednesday
May 18, 2022
Yoon Suk-yeol gets on board Joe Biden's IPEF
Kim Tae-hyo, first deputy chief of the National Security Office, gives a press briefing on President Yoon Suk-yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden's upcoming summit at the presidential office in Yongsan District, central Seoul, Wednesday. [YONHAP]
President Yoon Suk-yeol plans to announce Korea's participation as an inaugural member in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) during President Joe Biden's visit to Seoul this week.
Yoon is also expected to join a virtual summit launching the IPEF during Biden's visit to Japan next Tuesday, said Kim Tae-hyo, first deputy director of the National Security Office (NSO), in a press briefing Wednesday.
The IPEF, a comprehensive economic framework for the region proposed by the United States last October at the East Asia Summit, is expected to be launched on May 24. One of its goals is to help members decouple from the Chinese market by finding alternative supply chains. It will focus on four pillars: fair and resilient trade; supply chain resilience; clean energy, decarbonization and infrastructure; and tax and anticorruption.
This could have diplomatic implications for Korea amid the Sino-U.S. rivalry. The IPEF is meant to counter China's growing influence in the region and be a countermeasure to the Chinese-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the largest free trade agreement to date, which went into effect in Korea in February. Asean's 10 member states, Japan, China, Australia and New Zealand also signed the mega-FTA.
On Tuesday, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo said that Biden will announce the launch of the new regional bloc during his visit to Japan.
In his first parliamentary address Monday, Yoon revealed that he plans to discuss Korea's participation in the IPEF during Biden's visit as a means to "strengthen cooperation on global supply chains."
Biden is set to make a three-day official visit to Seoul from Friday and depart for Tokyo Sunday to attend a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, meeting of the U.S.-led cooperative forum with Japan, India and Australia.
The Yoon-Biden summit Saturday will last 90 minutes and will be held on the fifth floor of the new presidential office in Yongsan District, central Seoul.
Biden will visit the Seoul National Cemetery in Dongjak District, hold a summit with Yoon in the Yongsan office and a joint press conference afterwards, then attend an official banquet, said Kim Tae-hyo, presidential deputy national security adviser, in the press briefing.
The summit is expected to focus on North Korea's nuclear and missile threats and economic security.
Kim stressed that Yoon has the "goal of positioning the Republic of Korea-U.S. comprehensive strategic alliance as a pivotal pillar contributing to East Asia and global peace and prosperity."
He added that the two sides are expected to push for "strategic coordination to overcome the global challenges we face together."
He said a "technological alliance" is expected to be added to this relationship in the summit.
Addressing the possibility of Pyongyang carrying out some provocation during Biden's visit, Kim said that Seoul and Washington have a Plan B ready, without elaborating further.
He said there is a "relatively low possibility" of North Korea carrying out a seventh nuclear test this weekend. But he added that an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch is believed to be "imminent."
Kim said that the United States recently offered to send Covid-19 aid to North Korea after the country acknowledged a virus outbreak, but has so far received no response.
Biden is making his first visit to Asia since his inauguration last year, and Seoul is his first stop.
The summit with the U.S. president comes just 11 days after the launch of the Yoon administration, the quickest meeting for a Korean president with his or her U.S. counterpart.
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
14.N. Korea silent on S. Korea's offer for COVID-19 talks for 3rd day: official
I wonder if this is Kim's attempt at maximum pressure campaign. Is he using both provocations and the suffering of the Korean people to put pressure on the alliance? Is he building up to a "futile gesture" (thank you Eric Stratton) to be conducted during POTUS' visit to the ROK. He is going to generate so much pressure on us so that we will commit to sanctions relief to allow us to provide humanitarian assistance to help the Korean people in the north. Quite a plan and strategy - let's recognize it, understand it, expose it, and attack it.
(LEAD) N. Korea silent on S. Korea's offer for COVID-19 talks for 3rd day: official | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with details on UNICEF's aid in paras 5-9)
By Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, May 18 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has remained unresponsive to South Korea's attempt to propose working-level consultations on its push to extend help to the neighbor in its fight against the COVID-19 outbreak for the third day, a ministry official here said Wednesday.
The Ministry of Unification had sought to deliver a related message to the North on Monday through their liaison office to hold the talks and offer assistance in medical supplies to the neighbor, known for its dilapidated medical system.
The two Koreas held a routine phone call at 9 a.m. Wednesday, but the North did not express its intention on whether it would accept the message, according to the official who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
"Nothing noteworthy was exchanged (during the call)," the official said.
Meanwhile, the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) said vaccine cold chain equipment for the North is "pending delivery," although it received a sanctions exemption from a related U.N. Security Council panel late last year.
"The cold chain equipment is pending delivery to the DPRK," Shima Islam, a UNICEF spokesperson, told Yonhap News Agency in an email without elaborating. "At this time, its purpose remains to support the regular immunization programme in the country." DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
The U.N. North Korea sanctions committee had approved a yearlong exemption on the Chinese-made cold chain equipment on Nov. 30 last year with plans to ship it via the Chinese port of Dalian to the North's western port of Nampo, according to the committee's website.
In March, UNICEF said it was distributing humanitarian supplies, such as micronutrient treatments for pregnant women and new mothers, to health facilities in the North after they were released from months of quarantine at Nampo, following the reopening of its western sea routes in October last year.
As of 6 p.m. Tuesday, North Korea, with a population of 24 million, had reported more than 1.72 million fever cases and 62 fatalities.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
15. North Korea's Kim faces 'huge dilemma' on aid as virus surges
A dilemma of his own making. It does not have to be so if he was a responsible leader and a responsible member of the international community.
North Korea's Kim faces 'huge dilemma' on aid as virus surges
An employee of Pyongyang Dental Hygiene Products Factory disinfects the floor of a dining room after North Korea increased measures to stop the spread of illness in Pyongyang, North Korea, May 16. AP-Yonhap
During more than a decade as North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Un has made ''self-reliance'' his governing lynchpin, shunning international help and striving instead for domestic strategies to fix his battered economy.
But as an illness suspected to be COVID-19 sickens hundreds of thousands of his people, Kim stands at a critical crossroad: Either swallow his pride and receive foreign help to fight the disease, or go it alone, enduring potential huge fatalities that may undermine his leadership.
''Kim Jong-un is in a dilemma, a really huge dilemma,'' said Lim Eul-chul, a professor at Kyungnam University's Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul. ''If he accepts U.S. or Western assistance, that can shake the self-reliance stance that he has steadfastly maintained and public confidence in him could be weakened.''
Doing nothing, however, could be calamitous.
Since acknowledging a COVID-19 outbreak last week, North Korea has said ''an explosively spreading fever'' has killed 56 people and sickened about 1.5 million others. Outside observers suspect most of those cases were caused by the coronavirus.
Whatever North Korea's state-controlled media say about those who are sick, the outbreak is likely several times worse. North Korea lacks sufficient COVID-19 tests, and experts say it is significantly understating deaths to avoid possible public unrest that could hurt Kim politically.
Some observers say the stated death toll is low for a country where most of the 26 million people are unvaccinated and medicine is in short supply.
The North's apparent underreporting of deaths is meant to defend Kim's authority as he faces ''the first and biggest crisis'' of his decades of rule, Nam Sung-wook, a professor at Korea University, said.
The North Korean outbreak may be linked to a massive military parade in Pyongyang in late April that Kim organized to feature new weapons and loyal troops. The parade drew tens of thousands of soldiers and residents from around the country. After the event, Kim spent several days taking dozens of commemorative group photos with parade participants, all of whom were without masks. Most of the photos involved dozens or hundreds of people.
North Korea may be able to publicly hide the real number of deaths, but the country's strengthened restrictions on movement and quarantine rules could hurt its agricultural cultivation. Its economy is already battered by more than two years of pandemic-caused border shutdowns and other curbs.
North Korea is also worried about a shortage of medical supplies and food and daily necessities that have dried up in markets during the border closures, Yang Moo-jin, a professor at Seoul's University of North Korean Studies, said.
''They are experiencing another arduous march,'' Yang said, referring to the state's euphemism for a devastating famine in the 1990s that killed hundreds of thousands of people.
Kim has previously rebuffed millions of doses of vaccines offered by the U.N.-backed COVAX distribution program. After the North admitted to an outbreak, South Korean and China offered to send vaccines, medicine and other medical supplies to North Korea. The United States said it supports international aid efforts, though it has no current plans to share its vaccine supplies with the North.
An employees of Pyongyang Dental Hygiene Products Factory produces toothpaste for citizens after North Korea tate increased measures to stop the spread of illness in Pyongyang, North Korea, May 16. AP-Yonhap Receiving outside help would put the North, which is always intensely proud, despite its poverty, in a difficult position. Kim had repeatedly touted his country as ''impregnable'' to the pandemic during the past two years. On Saturday, however, he said his country faces ''a great upheaval'' and that officials must study how China, his country's only major ally, and other nations have handled the pandemic.
Nam, the professor, said Kim will likely eventually want to receive Chinese aid shipments, but not from South Korea, the United States or COVAX.
''Overcoming the great upheaval with help from what North Korea calls American imperialists and from South Korea won't be tolerated because that goes against the dignity of its supreme leader,'' he said.
And North Korea will only accept Chinese aid if it's made in an informal, unpublicized manner, because it's ''a matter of national pride,'' analyst Seo Yu-Seok at the Seoul-based Institute of North Korean Studies said. He said China will likely agree to this because it views aid shipments as a way to bolster ties with a partner as it confronts the West.
But Cho Han Bum, an analyst at Seoul's Korea Institute for National Unification, said North Korea may look to South Korea for support because it questions the effectiveness of Chinese vaccines. He said South Korean shipments over the Korean land border would also be faster.
Experts are divided over what support North Korea most needs. Some call for sending 60 million to 70 million vaccine doses to inoculate its people multiple times. Others say it's too late to send such a large volume, and that North Korea needs fever reducers, test kits, masks and other daily necessities more.
Because preventing a virus spread across the country's unvaccinated population is already unrealistic, the aim should be providing a limited supply of vaccines to reduce deaths among high-risk groups, including the elderly and people with existing medical conditions, said Jung Jae-hun, a professor of preventive medicine at South Korea's Gachon University.
''Combating COVID-19 requires a comprehensive national ability, including the capacity for testing, treatment and inoculating people with vaccines,'' Jung said. ''The problem can't be solved if the outside world helps with only one or two of those elements.'' (AP)
16. From Storage to Transport, Hurdles to Getting COVID Vaccine to N.Koreans
I do not think north Korea is capable of helping itself and will need outside aid.
From Storage to Transport, Hurdles to Getting COVID Vaccine to N.Koreans
By U.S. News Staff U.S. News & World Report3 min
FILE PHOTO: A man visits a pharmacy, amid growing fears over the spread of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), in Pyongyang, North Korea, in this photo taken on May 16, 2022 and released by Kyodo on May 17, 2022. Kyodo/via REUTERS/File PhotoReuters
By Soo-hyang Choi
SEOUL (Reuters) - As North Korea battles its first known COVID outbreak, a lack of storage, chronic power shortages and inadequately trained medical staff pose acute challenges to inoculating its 25 million people - even with outside help, analysts said.
North Korea has not responded to offers of aid from South Korea and international vaccine-sharing programmes, but prefers U.S.-made Moderna and Pfizer over China's Sinovac or British-Swedish Astrazeneca shots, according to South Korean officials.
Both the U.S. vaccines rely on technology known as mRNA, and require super-cold storage. Sinovac or AstraZeneca vaccines can be transported and stored at normal refrigerator temperatures.
"Moderna and Pfizer vaccines require a low-temperature storage system, which North Korea does not have," said Moon Jin-soo, director of the Institute for Health and Unification Studies at Seoul National University. "It would require a ton of additional materials to use them for inoculation."
South Korean officials have said it is not clear whether the North has access to such storage systems.
In March, the U.N. Security Council gave a sanctions exemption to the UNICEF to ship such "cold-chain" equipment to North Korea to assist with vaccinations.
The items included three walk-in cold rooms for "storage of routine immunization vaccines," though it was not immediately confirmed whether they had been shipped amid strict border restrictions.
According to the North's latest Voluntary National Review report presented to the U.N. last year, only 34.6% of its population had access to electricity, and the country’s roads and railways were, "in general, not in standard condition."
Given those conditions, only few cities could accommodate the cold storage units, experts said.
Whether North Korea can mobilise trained medical personnel on a large scale for a nationwide inoculation campaign also remains an open question.
"You need a system and trained medical experts to distribute the doses and inject the shots. I doubt the North has that," said Jacob Lee, a professor of infectious diseases at South Korea's Hallym University School of Medicine.
North Korea has inoculated children for diseases such as tuberculosis with the help of international organizations. But U.N. aid agencies and most other relief groups have pulled out of the country amid extended border shutdowns.
South Korea's foreign minister, Park Jin, said on Tuesday he would ask Washington for sanctions exemptions to send needed equipment to the North if it asks.
"The most important thing is speed," said Shin Young-jeon, a professor at Hanyang University's College of Medicine in Seoul. "The virus is already spreading fast, and without swift vaccination and immunity building, the death toll could soar to an uncontrollable level."
(Reporting by Soo-hyang Choi. Editing by Gerry Doyle)
Copyright 2022 Thomson Reuters.
17. N.K. leader criticizes problem in early response to COVID-19 crisis in key politburo meeting: state media
Blame in north Korea - ABK: anyone or anything but Kim.
(2nd LD) N.K. leader criticizes problem in early response to COVID-19 crisis in key politburo meeting: state media | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS more info in paras 8-9)
By Yi Wonju
SEOUL, May 18 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un rebuked officials for failing to respond properly to the COVID-19 outbreak in its early stages as he presided over a ruling Workers' Party meeting, state media said Wednesday.
His message came as the country reported more than 232,880 people with fever symptoms nationwide and six additional deaths, raising total fatalities to 62, as of 6 p.m. the previous day.
At the meeting of the presidium of the political bureau held Tuesday, Kim said that "immaturity" in coping with the crisis from the early stages and the slack response of the country's leading officials has fully revealed the "vulnerable points," according to the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
Kim added that such measures against the virus have resulted in further increasing the "complexity and hardships" in the early period of the antivirus campaign when "time is the life."
"The crisis facing us offered a test board to distinguish between merits and demerits of all working system of our state," he said.
Kim then called for "redoubled efforts" to stabilize people's lives and stressed the need to "more scrupulously organize the work for providing the living conditions and the supply of daily necessities."
Members of the presidium, including Jo Yong-won, secretary for organizational affairs of the ruling Workers' Party's Central Committee, and other officials attended the session.
Meanwhile, they claimed that the virus situation is improving. They pointed out that the current trend is showing a "favorable turn" thanks to the "efficiency and scientific accuracy" of the emergency antivirus measures in place, the KCNA said.
Pyongyang stated the number of new fever cases has declined this week after reaching its peak of over 390,000 on Sunday.
Photos released by the KCNA show leader Kim and officials without masks at the meeting. As he announced the country's first outbreak, Kim appeared wearing a mask for the first time in public at a politburo session last week.
The total number of fever cases stood at more than 1.72 million as of 6 p.m. Tuesday, of which more than 1.02 million have fully recovered and at least 691,170 being treated.
Last Thursday, North Korea reported its first COVID-19 case after claiming to be coronavirus-free for over two years. In response, Pyongyang declared the implementation of the "maximum emergency" virus control system.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
18. North Korean COVID-19/Fever Data Tracker
Please go to the link to view the charts and data.
North Korean COVID-19/Fever Data Tracker
After two years of claiming no confirmed COVID-19 cases, North Korea disclosed a nationwide outbreak on May 13 and launched emergency epidemic prevention measures. The epidemic began in late April and is spreading “explosively,” according to state media.
Officially, there have only been a handful of confirmed COVID-19 cases so far, although this low number is likely due to insufficient testing capabilities. Instead, most cases are attributed to an unidentified “fever” and assumed to be COVID-19 related. North Korean state media has been publishing daily data on the outbreak, which is featured below. 38 North will update these numbers daily as new information becomes available.
Current Situation
North Korean state media reported 269,510 new cases of fever diagnosed in the 24 hours to 6pm KST on May 16 to 6pm KST on May 16. An additional 8 deaths were reported taking the nationwide total to 50 since the outbreak began. The country currently has 663,910 active cases and 819,090 people have recovered. Together, that means 1.5 million people, or 5.7 percent of the population, have experienced symptoms.
Provincial Data
Provincial data reported on Korean Central Television indicates the fever outbreak is hitting North Korea’s main cities the hardest. In Pyongyang there were 240,459 people being treated as of May 15, accounting for roughly 7 percent of the city’s population. Cases in Nampho were equally high at 7 percent and in Rason and Kaesong active cases accounted for about 4.5 percent of the populations.
Deaths By Age Group
Of the 50 deaths reported to date, about a third have been among North Koreans aged 61 or older. By age group, infants and children up to 10 years old have been second hardest hit with 8 deaths, according to state data.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
