Quotes of the Day:

“Books are the carriers of civilization. Without books, history is silent, literature dumb, science crippled, thought and speculation at a standstill.” 

- Barbara Tuchman

“We have become the impatient species, too busy to let nature replenish itself and too puffed up with our own sense of importance to acknowledge our utter dependence on its generosity." 

- David Suzuki

“You meet Saints everywhere. They could be anywhere. They are people behaving decently in an indecent society.” 

- Kurt Vonnegut.

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 14, 2023

2. Iran Update, October 14, 2023

3. A War Like No Other: Israel Will Fight Hamas in 6 Dimensions

4. Opinion | Why Israel Is Acting This Way

5. PolitiFact - Why do Americans have to pay for a State Department evacuation from Israel? It’s the law

6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 15, 2023

7. Wall Street Journal reporters split over Iran story

8. Iran Update, October 15, 2023

9. China's Military Decision-making in Times of Crisis and Conflict

10. Special Operations News - October 16, 2023 | SOF News

11. Opinion | The U.S. Can Still Avoid War With China Over Taiwan

12. ‘Everything you see is live’ as CENTCOM shifts to digital tools

13.  How Israel Can Win: Defeating Hamas Will Require a Strategy That Goes Beyond Revenge By Audrey Kurth Cronin

14. A Short Story Anthology For The Joint Special Operations Community

15. Biden administration seeks emergency aid package for both Israel and Ukraine.

16. Russia releases four Ukrainian children after mediation by Qatar

17.  A Major Pivot in Hamas Strategy

18.War Books, Harding Project Special Edition: On Writing

19. What Friends Owe Friends

20. “IF” (Israel and Hamas)

21. Experts weigh in on lessons Taiwan should learn from Israel-Hamas war

22. Hamas Distributed A Handy Guide To Destroying Israeli Tanks

23. Army deploys more troops to secure Basilan for upcoming elections

24. How America Can Beat China in a War

25. This Country Has the Most American Military Bases

26. A Coalition Against Atrocity in the Middle East Can Also Undermine China

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 14, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2023

Key Takeaways:

• US and Ukrainian officials reported on October 12 and 13 that they anticipated the Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka and expressed confidence in Ukrainian defenses.
• The Russian information space remains divided on the prospects of Russian successes near Avdiivka and on current Ukrainian capabilities.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine on October 14 and advanced west of Donetsk City.
• The Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) will maintain some vessels at its main Sevastopol naval base amid Ukrainian strikes on Russian vessels, as the Russian Navy’s main dry dock on the Black Sea is in Sevastopol.
• Armenia ratified the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute on October 14, obliging Armenia to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he enters Armenia due to the ICC’s outstanding arrest warrant, directly after Putin’s efforts on October 13 to claim that the Russia-Armenia relationship is not deteriorating.
• Ukrainian forces will reportedly begin training on F-16 fighter jets in the US next week.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
• Relatives of Russian mobilized men and recruited prisoners continue to complain that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Russian military command are mistreating troops on the frontlines – especially on the Kupyansk-Svatove line.
• Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to establish patronage programs between Russian federal subjects and occupied areas in order to integrate occupied territories into Russia.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 14, 2023

Oct 14, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 14, 2023

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Mason Clark

October 14, 2023, 4:25pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on October 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US and Ukrainian officials reported on October 12 and 13 that they anticipated the Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka and expressed confidence in Ukrainian defenses. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby reported on October 13 that the new Russian offensive operations near Lyman and Avdiivka “did not come as a surprise.”[1] Kirby stated that the US is confident that Ukrainian forces will repel these Russian attacks.[2] Kirby also reported that Russian forces appear to be using human wave tactics, wherein the Russian military uses masses of poorly trained and equipped Russian soldiers to attempt to advance - the same practice Russian forces used during their failed winter offensive in winter 2023.[3] ISW has additionally observed Russian forces using higher than usual numbers of armored vehicles in ongoing operations.[4] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov similarly reported on October 12 that Ukrainian forces knew about and prepared for the Russian attack near Avdiivka and that Russian forces did not form sufficient reserves to attack along the entire frontline, but only in certain sectors.[5] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian mines are slowing Russian advances near Avdiivka, indicating Ukrainian prior preparations for the attack.[6]

The Russian information space remains divided on the prospects of Russian successes near Avdiivka and on current Ukrainian capabilities. Geolocated footage published on October 13 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced north of the waste heap north of Avdiivka.[7] Additional geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Russian forces also advanced south of Avdiivka.[8] Some Russian sources claimed on October 13 and 14 that Ukrainian defensive fortifications pose a significant challenge to Russian advances around Avdiivka.[9] Some Russian sources indicated that Russian problems with medical support are also impeding Russian advances in the Avdiivka area. One Russian source claimed on October 12 that there is a shortage of surgeons in occupied Horlivka and Donetsk City near Avdiivka and called on Russian doctors to travel to the front to help treat wounded Russian soldiers.[10] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun similarly stated on October 14 that the majority of Russian casualties in the Avdiivka direction are due to low-quality medical treatment and local hospitals reaching capacity.[11]

Other Russian milbloggers continued to praise Russian offensive efforts on October 13 and 14 and reiterated the Kremlin’s desired narrative that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is over.[12] One Russian milblogger warned that Russian officials and sources have likely dismissed the Ukrainian counteroffensive too quickly and noted that it is too early to determine if the Russian attacks near Avdiivka will develop into an organized offensive operation.[13]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine on October 14 and advanced west of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Marinka (just west of Donetsk City).[14] Ukrainian and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to attack Russian positions on Bakhmut’s southern flank.[15] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced west of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) towards Rivne (24km southwest of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[16]

The Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) will maintain some vessels at its main Sevastopol naval base amid Ukrainian strikes on Russian vessels, as the Russian Navy’s main drydock on the Black Sea is in Sevastopol. Ukrainian Naval Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on October 14 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Professor Nikolai Muru tugboat and the Pavel Derzhavin patrol ship on October 13 and stated that the BSF has redeployed vessels from Sevastopol to Kerch, Feodosia, and Novorossiysk (in mainland Russia).[17] Pletenchuk noted that Russian forces continue to use the Sevastopol base because there are not enough piers to accommodate vessels at other ports, however.[18] The BSF‘s headquarters and main facilities including a dry dock are located in Sevastopol, and the Russian navy therefore must send some vessels for repairs within range of Ukrainian strikes.[19] The UK Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on October 14 that the BSF has likely increased its defensive and reactive posture after multiple Ukrainian strikes on BSF assets in August and September 2023.[20]

Armenia ratified the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute on October 14, obliging Armenia to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he enters Armenia due to the ICC’s outstanding arrest warrant, directly after Putin’s efforts on October 13 to claim that the Russia-Armenia relationship is not deteriorating.[21] Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed the corresponding degree as well as a statement recognizing the ICC’s jurisdiction on October 14 following the Armenian parliament‘s vote to ratify the statute on October 3.[22] Ratifying the Rome Statute notably legally obliges Armenia to arrest Putin on behalf of the ICC, which issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest on March 17, 2023, for illegally deporting Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia.[23] Armenia’s ratification of the Rome Statute comes one day after Putin boasted about the strength of Russia-Armenia relations during the meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Member States.[24]

Ukrainian forces will reportedly begin training on F-16 fighter jets in the US next week. Politico reported on October 13 that anonymous US officials stated that a “small number” of Ukrainian pilots will begin F-16 fighter jet training next week at Morris Air National Guard Base in Arizona after having completed English language training at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas.[25] One US official reportedly stated that the training may be accelerated due to Ukrainian forces’ urgent need for F-16 fighter jets.

Key Takeaways:

• US and Ukrainian officials reported on October 12 and 13 that they anticipated the Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka and expressed confidence in Ukrainian defenses.
• The Russian information space remains divided on the prospects of Russian successes near Avdiivka and on current Ukrainian capabilities.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine on October 14 and advanced west of Donetsk City.
• The Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) will maintain some vessels at its main Sevastopol naval base amid Ukrainian strikes on Russian vessels, as the Russian Navy’s main dry dock on the Black Sea is in Sevastopol.
• Armenia ratified the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute on October 14, obliging Armenia to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he enters Armenia due to the ICC’s outstanding arrest warrant, directly after Putin’s efforts on October 13 to claim that the Russia-Armenia relationship is not deteriorating.
• Ukrainian forces will reportedly begin training on F-16 fighter jets in the US next week.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
• Relatives of Russian mobilized men and recruited prisoners continue to complain that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Russian military command are mistreating troops on the frontlines – especially on the Kupyansk-Svatove line.
• Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to establish patronage programs between Russian federal subjects and occupied areas in order to integrate occupied territories into Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on October 14 that Russian forces have intensified their offensive operations in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction in recent days but that Ukrainian forces were prepared and are defending.[26] Syrskyi stated that Russian forces had previously suffered losses and spent two months resting and reconstituting before first resuming offensive operations near Makiivka, Luhansk Oblast (20km southwest of Svatove) then later attacking in the Kupyansk direction. Syrskyi stated that Russian forces ultimately aim to encircle Kupyansk and cross the Oskil River.

Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 14 and marginally advanced southwest of Svatove. Geolocated footage published on October 13 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced along a road east of Makiivka, Luhansk Oblast.[27] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced over one kilometer into Ukrainian-held territory and captured 10 Ukrainian positions on the Lyman Pershyi-Orlyanka line (12km northeast to 20km east of Kupyansk) in the past few days.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (19km southeast of Kupyansk), and Kyslivka (21km southeast of Kupyansk) in Kharkiv Oblast and near Makiivka and Torske (14km west of Kreminna) in Luhansk Oblast.[29] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 237th Tank Regiment (both of 3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Western Military District [WMD]) are trying to break through Ukrainian positions on the Nevske-Novovodyane (18km northwest to 16km southwest of Svatove) and Ploshchanka-Makiivka (16km northwest to 20km southwest of Kreminna) lines.[30] Mashovets also reported that the Russian 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 331st Airborne Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are operating in the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna).

Ukrainian sources indicated that the Russian military command is committing elements of all three WMD armies to offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Lyman line. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army, 6th CAA, and 20th CAA are conducting offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Lyman line.[31] The presence of all three army-level formations subordinate to the WMD on this frontline indicates that Russian forces are conducting these offensive operations under a relatively cohesive and doctrinally sound command structure. The Russian military command is also continuing to replace some Central Military District (CMD) elements with elements of the newly formed 25th CAA. Mashovets assessed that the 25th CAA will likely replace elements of the 2nd CAA (CMD).[32] ISW previously assessed that the 25th CAA will likely replace elements of the 41st CAA (CMD) but that the 25th CAA is likely combat ineffective due to its rushed deployment.[33] Mashovets assessed that Russia will likely use elements of the 35th and 55th Motorized Rifle brigades (both of the 41st CAA) and possibly elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD), 90th Tank Division, and 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th CAA) to attack near Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna), Terny (17km west of Kreminna), and Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna).[34]

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and did not advance on October 14. Russian military officials claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Ivanivka, Synkivka, Tymkivka (18km east of Kupyansk), and Yampolivka; north of Serebryanka 12km southwest of Kreminna); and in the Serebryanske forest area.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued assaults near Bakhmut on October 14 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued assaults south of Bakhmut.[36] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces gained a foothold along the rail line near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[37] Another Russian milblogger claimed on October 13 that the intensity of fighting has slightly decreased along the Klishchiivka-Andriivka-Kurdyumivka (7-13km southwest of Bakhmut) line.[38]

Russian forces continued assaults near Bakhmut on October 14 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Russian forces advanced east of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut).[39] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have taken up positions east of an unspecified highway, potentially the T0513 highway, near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[40] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces are regularly conducting assaults at night in the Bakhmut direction.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive actions near Avdiivka on October 14 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on October 13 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced north of a waste heap two kilometers northwest of Avdiivka.[42] Several Russian milbloggers, including a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, claimed that Russian forces abandoned previously occupied positions on the waste heap for an unspecified reason on October 13.[43] Additional geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Russian forces also advanced south of Avdiivka.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Berdychi (9km northwest of Avdiivka), Kamianka (5km northeast of Avdiivka), Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka), and in the Vodyane (6km west of Avdiivka) direction and attempted to advance along the route to Keramik (10km north of Avdiivka).[45] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims as of this report. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 14 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Tonenke (5km northwest of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, Sieverne, Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Netaylove (14km southwest of Avdiivka).[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also attacked near Kamianka, Stepove (8km northwest of Avdiivka), in the direction of Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka).[47] One Russian milblogger compared the challenge that Ukrainian minefields pose to Russian forces near Avdiivka as comparable to the challenge Russian minefields posed for Ukrainian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[48] A Russian milblogger posted footage on October 13 claiming to show elements of the Russian 114th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) operating near Avdiivka.[49]

Geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Marinka (just west of Donetsk City).[50]

Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Marinka on October 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Marinka.[51] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces attacked near Novomykhailivka (12km southwest of Donetsk City) on October 13.[52] A Russian milblogger posted footage on October 14 claiming to show elements of the Russian 5th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR Army Corps) operating in the Marinka direction.[53]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not advance on October 14. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked west of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and east of Urozhaine (9km south of Velka Novosilka).[54] The Russian milblogger also claimed that positional battles are ongoing along the Hrusheva Gully north of Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[55]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and reportedly advanced on October 14. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) marginally advanced east of Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[56] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Staromayorske.[57] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assault operations near Staromayorske.[58]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly made limited advances on October 14. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced west of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) towards Rivne (24km southwest of Orikhiv).[59] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv), Robotyne, and Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv).[60] Russian sources claimed that fighting is ongoing on the western outskirts of Verbove.[61]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to recapture lost positions near Robotyne.[62] Russian sources claimed on October 13 and 14 that Russian forces counterattacked near Verbove.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 14 that Russian forces counterattacked and pushed Ukrainian forces back along the Kopani-Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Verbove line (20km southwest to 18km southeast of Orikhiv) but that fighting continues in the area.[64]

A Ukrainian military official reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes against Kherson Oblast and Snake Island. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated on October 14 that Russian forces launched 30 guided aerial bombs mostly at Kherson Oblast and in the direction of Snake Island in the past day and targeted residential and agricultural areas.[65] Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are only conducting air strikes at night.

A Russian milblogger claimed on October 14 that Ukrainian forces attempted to land on islands in the Dnipro River. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces prevented four Ukrainian boats from landing on islands in the Dnipro River near Kozachi Laheri (23km east of Kherson City).[66] Russian sources claimed on October 14 that Ukrainian forces increased their maritime activity in the Dnipro River.[67]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to conduct a drone strike on the eastern coast of the Black Sea in Russia. Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Russian air defenses shot down two Ukrainian drones near Sochi on the coast of Krasnodar Krai.[68]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Relatives of Russian mobilized men and recruited prisoners continue to complain that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Russian military command are mistreating troops on the frontlines – especially on the Kupyansk-Svatove line. Relatives of Russian servicemen from the Republic of Tatarstan issued a complaint claiming that the Russian military command is committing Russian mobilized personnel from the 2nd Battalion of the 1234th Regiment to assault operations, likely in the Svatove direction.[69] The relatives claimed that the battalion has been fighting in the Svatove direction for their second year and is suffering significant losses. The relatives demanded that elements of the battalion resume defensive tasks instead of engaging in offensive operations. Wives of mobilized servicemen of the 12th Guards Tank Regiment (4th Guards Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) claimed that the Russian military command placed 42 mobilized personnel into a basement on October 7 after their unit suffered 300 casualties during a failed assault in the Kupyansk direction.[70] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty‘s northwestern Russia service Sever Realii reported that relatives of Russian prisoners who had joined Russian ”Storm Z” detachments complained that the Russian MoD is not returning the bodies of deceased ”Storm-Z” personnel and are refusing to provide any documents that would grant these personnel veteran status.[71]

A Russian milblogger amplified an alleged letter from an unidentified Russian serviceman who had claimed that the Russian military command had not resolved long-standing problems on the Kherson frontline.[72] The milblogger notably redacted the name of the serviceman’s unit and precise location in the letter, likely in an effort to self-censor and protect the servicemen or unit from punishment. The serviceman stated that his unit replaced motorized rifle elements from the Russian “24th” unit (the precise unit is likely intentionally unclear) and noted that commanders know about persistent issues in this direction. The serviceman noted that Russian forces struggle to provide each other coverage from Ukrainian FPV drones and struggle with a lack of normal communication with the Russian headquarters to direct artillery fire against Ukrainian targets. The serviceman added that his unit’s logistics routes are near the logistics routes of neighboring Russian units, which reveals Russian positions to Ukrainian forces. The servicemen noted that Russian forces in the Kherson direction are suffering significant losses due to these issues.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to establish patronage programs between Russian federal subjects and occupied areas of Ukraine in order to integrate occupied territories into Russia. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on October 13 that the Republic of Tatarstan government is helping to repair heating infrastructure and communication systems in occupied Lysychansk and Rubizhne, Luhansk Oblast before winter.[73] Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov visited occupied Lysychansk on October 13 to inspect the ongoing repairs.[74] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on October 12 that the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug government is helping to rebuild a school, hospital, residential buildings, and other infrastructure in occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast.[75]

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to forcibly depopulate occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast of Ukrainians and replace them with Russians. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on October 14 that Russian occupation authorities are renovating a quarter of central Mariupol for Russian citizens to occupy starting in spring 2024.[76] Andryushchenko stated that Russian forces evicted or killed some of these residents and that other residents evacuated from Mariupol.[77] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian authorities brought over 25,000 construction workers from Russia and Central Asian countries to occupied Mariupol.[78]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives:

NOTE: ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has and will continue to exploit the Israel-Hamas war to advance several Russian information operations about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, ISW has notably not observed any evidence – and does not assess – that the Kremlin supported, directed, or is involved in the Israel-Hamas war.

Nothing significant to report.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

A Ukrainian intelligence official reported that Belarus continues to resist Russian efforts to draw Belarusian forces into the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov reported on October 12 that the Kremlin continues to attempt to involve Belarusian forces in a “full-fledged ground operation against Ukraine.”[79] Yusov stated that Belarusian authorities are aware of Russian efforts to involve Belarusian forces in the war and understand that Belarusian involvement is not in Belarus’ national interest.[80] ISW has observed no indications that Belarusian forces are preparing to enter the Russian war in Ukraine.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Iran Update, October 14, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-14-2023

Key Takeaways:

1. Hamas continued its ground and rocket attacks into Israel, primarily southern Israel. Palestinian militants are continuing limited attempts to infiltrate southern Israel via land and sea.
2. Clashes in the West Bank between Israeli forces and Palestinian militias decreased after peaking on October 13. Hamas remains committed to expanding the war to the West Bank, however.
3. Lebanese Hezbollah claimed attacks on the IDF for the second consecutive day as part of its ongoing harassment of Israeli forces. LH messaging indicates that the group will conduct additional attacks against Israeli forces in the coming days.
4. Iran and elements of its Axis of Resistance are messaging that the Hamas-Israel war could expand geographically into a multi-front conflict. CTP-ISW is closely monitoring the situation to forecast whether such a scenario is becoming more or less likely.
5. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abdollahian traveled to Qatar, likely to meet with Hamas leadership and discuss Iranian financial assets with Qatari officials.

IRAN UPDATE, OCTOBER 14, 2023

Oct 14, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, October 14, 2023

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 3:00 pm EDT

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments and in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Key Takeaways:

1. Hamas continued its ground and rocket attacks into Israel, primarily southern Israel. Palestinian militants are continuing limited attempts to infiltrate southern Israel via land and sea.
2. Clashes in the West Bank between Israeli forces and Palestinian militias decreased after peaking on October 13. Hamas remains committed to expanding the war to the West Bank, however.
3. Lebanese Hezbollah claimed attacks on the IDF for the second consecutive day as part of its ongoing harassment of Israeli forces. LH messaging indicates that the group will conduct additional attacks against Israeli forces in the coming days.
4. Iran and elements of its Axis of Resistance are messaging that the Hamas-Israel war could expand geographically into a multi-front conflict. CTP-ISW is closely monitoring the situation to forecast whether such a scenario is becoming more or less likely.
5. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abdollahian traveled to Qatar, likely to meet with Hamas leadership and discuss Iranian financial assets with Qatari officials.

Gaza Strip

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Hamas continued its ground and rocket attacks into Israel, primarily southern Israel, on October 14. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—claimed responsibility for conducting rocket attacks on 12 locations, including Tel Aviv.[1] Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed responsibility for launching rockets on seven locations in southern Israel.[2] Hamas has reduced its rate of rocket fire into Israeli territory since October 12 to conserve its stockpile and prepare for a prolonged war.[3]

Palestinian militants are continuing limited attempts to infiltrate southern Israel via land and sea. Militants engaged in small arms clashes with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) at least four times in Israeli territory surrounding the Gaza Strip on October 14. These militants used an anti-tank missile in one of these instances.[4] The IDF Navy separately interdicted speedboats trying to enter Israeli territory.[5] Hamas previously used speedboats to launch its assault into Israeli territory on October 7.[6]

Recorded reports of rocket fire; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) are messaging that Hamas is prepared to defend the Gaza Strip effectively against the IDF. Hamas published messages on October 14 boasting about its anti-armor capabilities and defensive preparations.[7] LH-affiliated al Mayadeen similarly published remarks from an unspecified Palestinian militant stating that Palestinian militias have a comprehensive defense plan for the Gaza Strip.[8] The militant also stated that the militias have enough manpower and weapons to fight the IDF for months in the Gaza Strip. Below are some of the factors that Hamas could exploit in fighting the IDF in the Gaza Strip.

• Hamas maintains around 480 kilometers of tunnels under the strip.[9] The Washington Institute for Near East Policy wrote that “Hamas has had 15 years to prepare a dense ‘defense in depth’ that integrates subterranean, ground-level, and aboveground fortifications.”[10] Hamas could use these tunnels to quickly maneuver around the battlespace and facilitate the movement of fighters and weapons.
• Hamas has manufactured and used Iranian-designed explosively formed penetrators (EFP) in the Gaza Strip since 2007.[11] Hamas could use EFPs to constrain the movement of the IDF in the urban environment and threaten Israeli troops. Iran exported EFPs to its proxy and partner militias in Iraq as late as 2004, which these militias then used extensively in their attacks on US servicemembers in Iraq.[12]
• Hamas took around 150-200 individuals hostage during its initial attack into Israeli territory on October 7.[13] The al Qassem Brigades spokesperson has threatened to execute hostages in response to Israeli attacks, although CTP-ISW has not yet recorded any such executions.[14] CTP-ISW previously reported on how Hamas uses civilians as human shields, intentionally putting them in danger to protect Hamas’ military infrastructure and weapons.[15]

West Bank

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Clashes in the West Bank between Israeli forces and Palestinian militias decreased on October 14 after peaking the previous day. CTP-ISW recorded 13 small arms clashes across the West Bank on October 14—significantly less than the 32 clashes recorded on October 13. Israeli forces are conducting arrest campaigns in the West Bank, which may be contributing to the reduced violence.

Hamas remains committed to expanding the war to the West Bank, however. Hamas has repeatedly called for Palestinians to mobilize and escalate against Israeli forces in the West Bank in recent days.[16] Hamas released a statement on October 14 calling for the establishment of “popular protection committees” in all cities and towns of the West Bank to target Israeli settlers.[17] Hamas stated that it is the duty of all Palestinians to actively participate in the war against Israel.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

LH claimed attacks on the IDF for the second consecutive day on October 14 as part of its ongoing harassment of Israeli forces. LH claimed to have conducted missile and rocket attacks against five IDF positions in the Shebaa Farms.[18] The IDF furthermore conducted a drone strike on the border targeting a group of militants preparing to fire an anti-tank missile toward Israel.[19] Former IDF Military Intelligence Directorate Chief Tamir Tayman stated that LH is conducting attacks against Israel to reduce IDF pressure on Hamas.[20]

LH messaging indicates that the group will conduct additional attacks against Israeli forces in the coming days. LH released separate statements on October 14 emphasizing that Israeli attacks against Lebanese security will not go unanswered and that LH has given permission to its members to fight Israel.[21]

Israeli, Lebanese, and UN officials have warned in recent days that the Hamas-Israel war could expand to Lebanon. Hayman stated that LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah is putting Lebanon at serious risk by continuing to conduct attacks against Israeli forces.[22] Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati has similarly warned that LH may enter the war against Israel.[23] Finally, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres stated that IDF airstrikes along the Israel-Lebanon border risk spreading fighting into Lebanon.[24]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Iran and elements of its Axis of Resistance are messaging that the Hamas-Israel war could expand geographically into a multi-front conflict. CTP-ISW is closely monitoring the situation to forecast whether such a scenario is becoming more or less likely.

• Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian warned that the Axis of Resistance has its “hands on the trigger” and will respond to Israel “at an appropriate time” if the United Nations does not stop IDF attacks into the Gaza Strip.[25] Abdollahian made these comments during a press conference in Beirut on October 14. Abdollahian similarly called on the United Nations to stop IDF attacks before it is “too late” during a meeting with UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Tor Wennesland in Beirut on October 14.[26]
• Iranian-backed Iraqi militants have broadcast their presence in Lebanon in recent days. Fighters from Asaib Ahl al Haq announced on October 8 that they are joining the war against Israel.[27] Abu Azrael—an Iranian-backed Iraqi fighter with a prominent social media presence—later claimed on October 12 that he is near the Israel-Lebanon border and waiting for “any opportunity” to enter Israel.[28] A Syrian journalist on October 13 claimed that elements of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces have entered Lebanon via Syria.[29]
• The IRGC and LH deployed forces to the southwestern Syrian border on October 13, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[30] The IRGC transferred elements of its engineering units from Albu Kamal to the Golan Heights. LH similarly redeployed militants from Mayadin to Damascus as part of an effort to transfer LH members throughout Syria to the southwestern border.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian traveled to Qatar on October 14, likely to meet with Hamas leadership and discuss Iranian financial assets with Qatari officials.

• Senior Hamas officials, including its Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, are based in Qatar.[31] Abdollahian is concluded a diplomatic tour to Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria before traveling to Qatar. CTP-ISW assessed that the tour was part of an Iranian effort to coordinate politically with senior leaders in the Axis of Resistance.[32]
• Western media reported on October 12 that the United States and Qatar have agreed to prevent Iran from accessing $6 billion of financial assets in Qatari banks.[33] South Korea transferred the assets to Qatari banks for Iran to access as part of the prisoner swap agreement that the United States and Iran reached in August 2023.

3. A War Like No Other: Israel Will Fight Hamas in 6 Dimensions

Excerpts:

The sad reality is that Hamas planned and conducted the attack with a ferocity and barbarism that they knew would trigger a significantly intense and violent Israeli reply — one that would stop any peace or normalization process in its tracks, and one that, by their own design and intent, will result in an inordinate number of civilian casualties. Israel now must act simultaneously holding one element of its conundrum in each hand.

...

For all this, Israel will need the support of the U.S. and other allies — and all should provide it. But, U.S. military and political leaders have an additional burden. Other nations or terrorist organizations could seek an opportunity in what they may believe is a distracted and degraded American capacity. In addition to providing support to Israel and Ukraine, therefore, the U.S. intelligence community must intensify its watch over the rest of the world, America’s military must review its readiness posture, and the U.S. industrial base must increase its output. Vigilance deters.

A War Like No Other: Israel Will Fight Hamas in 6 Dimensions

Published 10/15/23 06:00 AM ET

Lt. Gen. (Ret.) James M. Dubik

themessenger.com · October 15, 2023

The horrific terror unleashed by Hamas on Oct. 7 is tragically consistent with its 1988 Covenant and revised Charter of 2017. Both documents commit to the complete destruction of Israel, the need for unrestrained and unceasing holy war, and disdain for any negotiated or political settlement. “Any compromise,” summarizes Bruce Hoffman, the Shelby Cullom and Kathryn W. Davis Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security at the Council on Foreign Relations, “over this land [Palestine], including the moribund two-state solution, much less coexistence among faiths and peoples, is forbidden.” Therein lies Israel’s conundrum.

Israel cannot destroy or kill its way to a peaceful future. Only a negotiated political arrangement among regional partners will bring durable peace and stability. The Abraham Accords of 2020 was a concerted effort to effect peace in the Middle East based upon mutual understanding and coexistence. These Accords would have gained significant momentum had the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia reached a deal to normalize Saudi-Israeli relations. Because most Sunni Arab states typically take cues from Saudi Arabia on foreign policy matters, especially in relation to Israel, Saudi Arabia’s joining the Accords would have unlocked opportunities for other Arab states to join as well. Hamas could not stand by and let that happen.

So, after being trained, funded, and supplied by its sponsor, Iran, Hamas scheduled and conducted their attack to prevent just such an arrangement from emerging. Its aggression is as illegal as Vladimir Putin’s in Ukraine. And its horrific terrorism constitutes a war crime every bit as much as Putin’s Ukraine operations. Certainly, the long-term conditions set by years of turmoil among the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the region’s terrorist organizations — Hamas, Hezbollah, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and others — have left blame and blood on all those involved. But equally certain, and absolutely clear, is that history does not justify Hamas’s brutal and shocking attacks that slaughtered innocent civilians. Make no mistake about it: Hamas is the cause for the war they forced upon Israel.

The sad reality is that Hamas planned and conducted the attack with a ferocity and barbarism that they knew would trigger a significantly intense and violent Israeli reply — one that would stop any peace or normalization process in its tracks, and one that, by their own design and intent, will result in an inordinate number of civilian casualties. Israel now must act simultaneously holding one element of its conundrum in each hand.

The first element of the conundrum: Israel must defeat Hamas on a very complex, urban battlefield — one that, all should remember, was chosen by Hamas. Defeating an enemy, in military terminology, is to break that enemy’s will or its capacity for organized resistance. It also means precluding an enemy from recovering or reconstituting. Defeat does not mean total annihilation of the enemy. With Hamas, defeat has a temporal component. The Israeli military is unlikely to break Hamas’s will permanently. It can, however, break its capacity for significant organized resistance and prevent it from recovering or reconstituting for some period of time. At what cost and for how long is an open question.

Another complication is whether the Israeli military can accomplish its missions on the urban battlefield Hamas has already shaped: full of non-combatants, hostages, and normally-protected targets — mosques, schools, hospitals, homes, for example — some of which Hamas has turned into legitimate targets of war by using them for military purposes. Fighting in this kind of environment has already begun. Even for a disciplined force like the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) following the Laws of War, it will be very difficult.

Fighting in the 21st century is complicated. The fight will take place on a multi-dimensioned, complex battlefield and possibly on three fronts. Those dimensions include: (a) air — planes, drones, missiles, rockets, artillery and mortars; (b) ground — direct fire weapons, like tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, machine guns and individual arms; and (c) below the ground — in tunnels that include weapons and ammunition caches, medical and logistical facilities, command and control nodes, and likely both hostage holding areas and tunnel entry points. Likely also in the cyber dimension with attacks on dual use (civil and military) networks and communications nodes. In the information dimension, this war will be recorded, tweeted and posted like few others. It will include its share of Hamas-generated lies, distortions, misinformation, and half-truths. And it will be fought amid an emotion-filled population by an emotion-filled IDF.

Israeli army Merkava battle tanks deploy along the border with the Gaza Strip in southern Israel on Oct. 13, 2023, as battles between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement continued. Thousands of Israelis and Palestinians have died since Oct. 7, when Hamas militants entered Israel in a surprise attack, leading Israel to declare war on Hamas in Gaza.ARIS MESSINIS/AFP via Getty Images

And if this weren’t enough, the second element of Israel’s conundrum: The war must be waged in the capitals as well as fought on the battlefields. Simultaneous with its tactical and operational activities, Israel’s military leaders must isolate the theater of war, to the extent possible, preventing outside actors like Iran from intervening through direct action or by providing logistical support through third parties. And Israeli diplomats and political leaders must act at the strategic and grand strategic levels as well. They must promulgate a factual-based narrative justifying their tactical actions, engage their partners and neighbors to convince them to stick with the Abraham Accords and the long-term peace process, and prevent the war from spreading or escalating. Israel’s military forces can contribute to success at these levels by fighting with enough ferocity to accomplish their military objectives but do so in a way that does not detract from the strategic and grand strategic objectives the Israeli government must pursue. This is a tough balance.

This war will not be a short one. In Phase 0, Hamas spent many months of planning, stockpiling, hiding and rehearsing. Phase I began with Hamas’s unprovoked, illegal and barbaric invasion. Phase II, now in progress, consists of Israel’s initial reactions, which will set the conditions for Phase III, an air-ground incursion into Gaza while simultaneously wading through a population, searching for hostages, and blocking any action from Hamas allies in the North and East.

Assuming Israel succeeds, its military will probably have to occupy Gaza, Phase IV, for some time. This occupation will include security operations like completing the destruction of Hamas’s infrastructure, tracking down residual Hamas leaders and fighters, and stabilizing the population. Phase IV will also include humanitarian and reconstruction tasks — with American help and most likely that of the signatories of the Abraham Accords and Saudi Arabia. Each of these remaining phases of the war is time-consuming, complex and dangerous.

For all this, Israel will need the support of the U.S. and other allies — and all should provide it. But, U.S. military and political leaders have an additional burden. Other nations or terrorist organizations could seek an opportunity in what they may believe is a distracted and degraded American capacity. In addition to providing support to Israel and Ukraine, therefore, the U.S. intelligence community must intensify its watch over the rest of the world, America’s military must review its readiness posture, and the U.S. industrial base must increase its output. Vigilance deters.

James M. Dubik, Ph.D., a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general, is a senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War. His military command and operational roles were in Bosnia, Haiti and Iraq and he has trained forces in many countries.

themessenger.com · October 15, 2023

4. Opinion | Why Israel Is Acting This Way

Excerpts:

Israel has suffered a staggering blow and is now forced into a morally impossible war to outcrazy Hamas and deter Iran and Hezbollah at the same time. I weep for the terrible deaths that now await so many good Israelis and Palestinians. And I also worry deeply about the Israeli war plan. It is one thing to deter Hezbollah and deter Hamas. It is quite another to replace Hamas and leave behind something more stable and decent. But what to do?

Finally, though, just as I stand today with Israel’s new unity government in its fight against Hamas to save Israel’s body, I will stand after this war with Israel’s democracy defenders against those who tried to abduct Israel’s soul.

Opinion | Why Israel Is Acting This Way

The New York Times · by Thomas L. Friedman · October 14, 2023

With the Middle East on the cusp of a full-blown ground war, I was thinking on Friday morning about how Israel’s last two major wars have two very important things in common: They were both started by nonstate actors backed by Iran — Hezbollah from Lebanon in 2006 and Hamas from Gaza now — after Israel had withdrawn from their territories.

And they both began with bold border-crossing assaults — Hezbollah killing three and kidnapping two Israeli soldiers in 2006 and Hamas brutally killing more than 1,300 and abducting some 150 Israeli civilians, including older people, babies and toddlers, in addition to soldiers.

That similarity is not a coincidence. Both assaults were designed to challenge emerging trends in the Arab world of accepting Israel’s existence in the region.

And most critically, the result of these surprise, deadly attacks across relatively stable borders was that they drove Israel crazy.

In 2006, Israel essentially responded to Hezbollah: “You think you can just do crazy stuff like kidnap our people and we will treat this as a little border dispute. We may look Western, but the modern Jewish state has survived as ‘a villa in the jungle’” — which is how the former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak described it — “because if push comes to shove, we are willing to play by the local rules. Have no illusions about that. You will not outcrazy us out of this neighborhood.”

So the Israeli Air Force relentlessly pounded the homes and offices of Hezbollah’s leadership in the southern suburbs of Beirut throughout the 34 days of the war, as well as key bridges into and out of the city and Beirut International Airport. Hezbollah’s leaders and their families and neighbors paid a very personal price.

The Israeli response was so ferocious that Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, said in a now famous interview on Aug. 27, 2006, with Lebanon’s New TV station, shortly after the war ended: “We did not think, even 1 percent, that the capture [of two Israeli soldiers] would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask me, if I had known on July 11 … that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not.”

Indeed, since 2006, the Israel-Lebanon border has been relatively stable and quiet, with few casualties on both sides. And while Israel did take a hit in terms of its global image because of the carnage it inflicted in Beirut, it was not nearly as isolated in the world or the Middle East over the short term or long run as Hezbollah had hoped.

Hamas must have missed that lesson when it decided to disrupt the status quo around Gaza with an all-out attack on Israel last weekend. This is in spite of the fact that over the past few years, Israel and Hamas developed a form of coexistence around Gaza that allowed thousands of Gazans to enter Israel daily for work, filled Hamas coffers with cash aid from Qatar and gave Gazans the ability to do business with Israel, with Gazan goods being exported through Israeli seaports and airports.

Hamas’s stated reasons for this war are that Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has been provoking the Palestinians by the morning strolls that Israel’s minister for national security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, was taking around Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and by the steps that he was taking to make imprisonment of Palestinians harsher. While these moves by Israel were widely seen as provocations, they are hardly issues that justify Hamas putting all its chips on the table the way it did last Saturday.

The bigger reason it acted now, which Hamas won’t admit, is that it saw how Israel was being more accepted by the Arab world and soon possibly by the birthplace of Islam, Saudi Arabia. Iran was being cornered by President Biden’s Middle East diplomacy, and Palestinians feared being left behind.

So Hamas essentially said, “OK, Jews, we will go where we have never gone before. We will launch an all-out attack from Gaza that won’t stop with soldiers but will murder your grandparents and slaughter your babies. We know it’s crazy, but we are willing to risk it to force you to outcrazy us, with the hope that the fires will burn up all Arab-Israeli normalization in the process.”

Yes, if you think Israel is now crazy, it is because Hamas punched it in the face, humiliated it and then poked out one eye. So now Israel believes it must restore its deterrence by proving that it can outcrazy Hamas’s latest craziness.

Israel will apply Hama Rules — a term I coined years ago to describe the strategy deployed in 1982 by Syria’s president, Hafez al-Assad, when Hamas’s political forefathers, the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria, tried to topple Assad’s secular regime by starting a rebellion in the city of Hama.

Assad pounded the Brotherhood’s neighborhoods in Hama relentlessly for days, letting no one out, and brought in bulldozers and leveled it as flat as a parking lot, killing some 20,000 of his own people in the process. I walked on that rubble weeks later. An Arab leader I know told me privately how, afterward, Assad laconically shrugged when he was asked about it: “People live. People die.”

Welcome to the Middle East. This is not like a border dispute between Norway and Sweden or a heated debate in Harvard Yard. Lord, how I wish that it were, but it’s not.

This Israel-Hamas war is part of an evolving escalation of craziness that has been underway in this neighborhood but getting more and more dangerous every year as weapons get bigger, cheaper and more lethal.

Like Biden, I stand 100 percent with Israel against Hamas, because Israel is an ally that shares many values with America, while Hamas and Iran are opposed to what America stands for. That math is quite simple for me.

But what makes this war different for me from any war before is Israel’s internal politics. In the past nine months, a group of Israeli far-right and ultra-Orthodox politicians led by Netanyahu tried to kidnap Israeli democracy in plain sight. The religious-nationalist-settler right, led by the prime minister, tried to take over Israel’s judiciary and other key institutions by eliminating the power of Israel’s Supreme Court to exercise judicial review. That attempt opened multiple fractures across Israeli society. Israel was recklessly being taken by its leadership to the brink of a civil war for an ideological flight of fancy. These fractures were seen by Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah and may have stirred their boldness.

If you want to get just a little feel for those fractures — and the volcanic anger at Netanyahu for the way he divided the country before this war — watch the video that went viral in Israel two days ago when Idit Silman, a minister in Netanyahu’s ruling Likud party, was tossed out of the Assaf Harofeh Hospital in Tzrifin when she went to visit some wounded.

“You’ve ruined this country. Get out of here,” an Israeli doctor yelled at her. “How are you not ashamed to wage another war?” another person told her. “Now it’s our turn,” the doctor can be heard screaming in a video published on X, formerly known as Twitter, and reported by The Forward. “We are in charge. We will govern here — right, left, a nation united — without you. You’ve ruined everything!”

Israel has suffered a staggering blow and is now forced into a morally impossible war to outcrazy Hamas and deter Iran and Hezbollah at the same time. I weep for the terrible deaths that now await so many good Israelis and Palestinians. And I also worry deeply about the Israeli war plan. It is one thing to deter Hezbollah and deter Hamas. It is quite another to replace Hamas and leave behind something more stable and decent. But what to do?

Finally, though, just as I stand today with Israel’s new unity government in its fight against Hamas to save Israel’s body, I will stand after this war with Israel’s democracy defenders against those who tried to abduct Israel’s soul.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram.

Thomas L. Friedman is the foreign affairs Opinion columnist. He joined the paper in 1981, and has won three Pulitzer Prizes. He is the author of seven books, including “From Beirut to Jerusalem,” which won the National Book Award.

2044

The New York Times · by Thomas L. Friedman · October 14, 2023

5. PolitiFact - Why do Americans have to pay for a State Department evacuation from Israel? It’s the law

Good background. We should all know this but it comes up with every NEO.

PolitiFact - Why do Americans have to pay for a State Department evacuation from Israel? It’s the law

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Brian Krassenstein

stated on October 12, 2023 in a post on X:

It has been U.S. policy “for at least 79 years" to require Americans who intend to be evacuated from overseas to sign a promissory note.

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• Brian Krassenstein

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, left, and Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu make statements to the media inside The Kirya, which houses the Israeli Ministry of Defense, after their meeting in Tel Aviv, Thursday Oct. 12, 2023. (AP)

By Amy Sherman October 13, 2023

Why do Americans have to pay for a State Department evacuation from Israel? It’s the law

If Your Time is short

• Many airlines have canceled flights from Israel, making it difficult for Americans who want to evacuate from the country. The State Department said Oct. 12 that it will charter flights out of Israel to Europe for U.S. citizens.
• U.S. citizens who want the federal government’s assistance have been asked to sign a promissory note saying they will reimburse the government for evacuation costs.
• A law signed 67 years ago requires that the federal government seek reimbursement to evacuate U.S. citizens from overseas during war, civil unrest or natural disasters. The law has roots in an earlier World War II policy.

As thousands of Americans try to flee Israel amid a war, the State Department has offered U.S. citizens the opportunity to get a chartered flight — if they pay.

Many commercial airlines canceled flights to and from Israel after it was attacked by Hamas, leaving tens of thousands of Americans in the country with few options to evacuate. Hundreds of Americans also are stuck in Gaza.

The State Department said Oct. 12 that it would charter flights out of Israel to Europe, and the U.S. Embassy in Israel said citizens will be "asked to sign an agreement to repay the U.S. government prior to departure."

Critics of the Biden administration were angered that Americans will need to pay their own way.

But Brian Krassenstein, a left-wing commentator, said Biden’s agencies are following a policy set decades ago. He responded to a critical X post with this message:

"FACT Check: Conservatives are attacking Biden saying he's requiring Americans Trapped in Israel, who want to leave, sign a promissory note to repay costs? FACTS: This has been US policy for at least 79 years!"

Krassenstein said the promissory note policy, known as a form DS-5528, goes "back to at least 1944."

We researched the policy’s origins and found it predates Biden’s administration by decades. The policy was used in World War II and became law 67 years ago.

At some points in history, American evacuees did not end up paying the transportation costs, but it’s unclear whether the requirement will be lifted for people leaving Israel now.

U.S. law has required reimbursement since 1956

We found a telegram Secretary of State Cordell Hull sent in August 1944 to the American Legion in Stockholm, Sweden, about Americans who had been evacuated.

The telegram refers to 92 people and says adults "should be required to sign a promissory note" for the cost of transportation to Stockholm from Helsinki, Finland. It says children should be charged a half-fare.

(Screenshot of telegram from Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)

We could not determine when this policy started or why it became a law in 1956. The law requires U.S. citizens to reimburse the federal government for evacuation when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest or natural disaster.

The State Department website says people evacuated on U.S. government-coordinated transport must sign an Evacuee Manifest and Promissory Note (form DS-5528) before they leave.

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stated on October 8, 2023 in a TikTok video

Video shows pro-Palestine march in Chicago on Oct. 8.

By Jeff Cercone • October 10, 2023

The form says the travelers know they will be billed for the cost. Payment is due within 30 days, but citizens can pay in installments, given State Department approval.

The State Department’s website explains, "U.S. law requires that departure assistance to private U.S. citizens or third country nationals be provided ‘on a reimbursable basis to the maximum extent practicable.’"

The law has been cited, and sometimes waived, during many past overseas crises

Searching news reports, we found multiple past examples of the law being cited. Sometimes, the repayment requirement was waived.

• In 1989, the U.S. Embassy evacuated 282 Americans from El Salvador on chartered flights "after as many as nine U.S. officials and their families spent a harrowing night pinned in their homes by cross fire and rebel raids," the Miami Herald reported. "The evacuation was the first in 10 years of civil war." The embassy paid for flights of its staff and dependents, and asked other Americans to sign a $500 promissory note.
• In 1990, a two-paragraph brief in the Los Angeles Times said the U.S. government would pay the costs of evacuating American citizens from Iraq and Kuwait. An unnamed government official told the Times that some officials may have asked evacuees to sign promissory notes covering airfares, but that was contrary to the George H.W. Bush administration’s policy.
• In July 2006, when the State Department was evacuating U.S. citizens out of Lebanon, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., and Sen. John Sununu, R-N.H., called on the State Department to not charge U.S. citizens. The department dropped plans to seek reimbursement.
• In February 2011 amid a revolt in Libya, the American embassy in Libya used a ferry to evacuate Americans to Malta. Reports by CNN and The Associated Press said the evacuees would be required to reimburse the government.
• In 2021, the State Department initially said it would charge U.S. citizens $2,000 to evacuate from Afghanistan, but it backtracked.

During the COVID-19 pandemic’s early months, some lawmakers introduced legislation seeking to amend the law. Some bills called for waiving the reimbursement requirement if it was related to COVID-19. The bills did not reach a vote.

PolitiFact asked the White House whether the Biden administration is considering lifting the requirement for reimbursement but received no immediate response. National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby announced plans Oct. 12 to have chartered flights but did not share any details.

CBS reported that flights would begin Oct. 13 from Tel Aviv to Athens, Greece, or Frankfurt, Germany, and ships would leave Haifa, Israel, and travel to Cyprus.

Our ruling

Krassenstein said it "has been US policy for at least 79 years" to require Americans who intend to be evacuated from overseas to sign a promissory note.

In August 1944, a telegram from the U.S. secretary of state said American adults who had been evacuated in Europe during World War II "should be required to sign a promissory note" for the cost of transportation. This policy became law in 1956.

The 1956 law has been cited for decades when Republican and Democratic administrations have evacuated Americans during war or conflicts.

We rate this statement True.

PolitiFact researcher Caryn Baird contributed to this report.

Our Sources

Brian Krassenstein, Tweet, Oct. 12, 2012

U.S. Secretary of State, Telegram, Aug. 19, 1944

State Department, Information for U.S. Citizens about a U.S. Government-Assisted Evacuation, Accessed Oct. 12, 2023

State Department, Crisis intake form, Accessed Oct. 12, 2023

U.S. Embassy in Israel, Security Alert #7: U.S. Embassy Jerusalem, Oct. 13, 2023

22 U.S. Code § 2671 - Emergency expenditures

Congressional Research Service, Helping U.S. Citizens Abroad During the COVID-19 Pandemic and Other International Crises: Role of the Department of State, May 13, 2020

ABC News, State Department announces plan to fly Americans out of Israel, Oct. 12, 2023

Ed O’Keefe of CBS News, Tweet, Oct. 12, 2023

Washington Post, For American family trapped in Gaza as bombs fall, there’s no way out, Oct. 12, 2023

Miami Herald, Americans in Salvador evacuated, Dec. 1, 1989

Los Angeles Times, U.S. to pick up tab for Gulf evacuees, Dec. 13, 1990

CNN, Middle East Crisis Continue, July 18, 2006

State Department, The July 2006 Evacuation of American Citizens from Lebanon, June 7, 2007

Copley News service, Lahood urges Israel to show restraint against Lebanon, July 18, 2006

AP, Americans frustrated, angry over US evacuation efforts in Lebanon, July 19, 2006

CNN, Foreigners scramble to get out of Egypt as protests turn violent, Feb. 2, 2011

CNN, Countries scramble to get citizens out of Libya, Feb. 13, 2011

Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Statement to PolitiFact, Oct. 12, 2023

Interview, Brian Krassenstein, Oct. 12-13, 2023

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6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 15, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin may be trying to temper expectations of significant Russian advances around Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast.
• The Russian information space writ large is also metering its initial optimism about the prospects of Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations aimed at encircling Avdiivka on October 15 but have yet to make further gains amid a likely decreasing tempo of Russian operations in the area.
• Russian forces will likely continue offensive operations at this decreased tempo in the near term, however, and will remain a threat to Ukrainian forces in the area despite being unlikely to achieve a decisive breakthrough or encircle Avdiivka at this time.
• A prominent Russian milblogger and frontline unit commander complained that Russian military leadership is uninterested in battalion level problems, supplementing other Russian milblogger complaints about general problems in the Russian military.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 15 and slightly advanced south of Bakhmut.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 15 and advanced in some areas.
• A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have “significant” reserves comprised of new divisions currently located in rear areas, though these formations are highly unlikely to be fully staffed at this time.
• The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is sending a reportedly Kremlin-affiliated priest to Crimea, likely as part of continued Russian efforts to persecute religious communities in occupied Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 15, 2023

Oct 15, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 15, 2023

Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and Mason Clark

October 15, 2023, 5:30pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on October 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin may be trying to temper expectations of significant Russian advances around Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast. Putin claimed in an interview on Russian state television on October 15 that Russian forces are conducting an “active defense” in the Avdiivka, Kupyansk, and Zaporizhia directions.[1] Putin’s characterization of Russian offensive operations near Avdiivka as an “active defense,” instead of “active combat operations” as Russian UN Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya claimed on October 13, or discussing Russian operations as an “offensive” as some milbloggers have, may be an attempt to temper expectations of significant Russian advances.[2] Russian operations including intensive artillery and airstrikes are likely intended to degrade Ukrainian forces around Avdiivka.[3] Russian forces are unlikely to make significant breakthroughs or cut off Ukrainian forces in the settlement in the near term, and potential advances at scale would likely require a significant and protracted commitment of personnel and materiel.[4]

The Russian information space writ large is also metering its initial optimism about the prospects of Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka. Russian milbloggers initially reported maximalist and unverifiable claims of Russian advances over 10km, likely exaggerated the degree of Russian successes near Avdiivka during initial offensive operations, and expressed optimism for rapid Russian advances.[5] Some Russian milbloggers have since acknowledged difficulties in the Russian advance near Avdiivka and noted that Russian forces decreased their pace of offensive operations around the settlement.[6] Russian milbloggers have also begun to claim that intense and attritional fighting is ongoing around Avdiivka.[7] Many Russian milbloggers also continue to self-censor by limiting reports of Russian tactical actions and problems specific to individual sectors of the frontline.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified actors, possibly the Russian military leadership and some subset of milbloggers, agreed to stop reporting on the Avdiivka operations, but reiterated complaints about general problems in the Russian military not specific to any sector of the front.[9]

Russian forces continued offensive operations aimed at encircling Avdiivka on October 15 but have yet to make further gains amid a likely decreasing tempo of Russian operations in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled more than 15 Russian assaults near Avdiivka, as well as northwest and southwest of the settlement.[10] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of previous claims of Russian advances in the area or geolocated footage of any other Russian gains. Russian sources claimed notably fewer Russian advances in the area on October 15 compared to previous days and described these new alleged advances as marginal.[11] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces still maintain a presence at the Avdiivka Coke Plant following conflicting Russian claims about Russian control of the plant.[12]

Both Ukrainian military observers and Russian sources stated that Russian forces did not achieve their desired immediate breakthrough, and Russian forces faced initial high losses and a likely slower than anticipated rate of advance.[13] Avdiivka City Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash stated on October 12 that Russian forces conducted assaults with air support in 10 to 12 directions around the settlement, whereas the Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 15 that fighting occurred near only six settlements.[14] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated on October 14 that the pace of Russian offensive operations near Avdiivka declined and that Russian forces have lost more than 300 pieces of military equipment and 3000 personnel since intensifying offensive operations in the area on October 9.[15]

Russian forces will likely continue offensive operations at this decreased tempo in the near term, however, and will remain a threat to Ukrainian forces in the area despite being unlikely to achieve a decisive breakthrough or encircle Avdiivka at this time. Any decrease in the tempo of Russian offensive operations may be the result of a temporary adjustment to the tactical situation, and Russian forces may intensify their attempts to encircle Avdiivka in the coming days. A Ukrainian military observer noted that Russian forces have penetrated Ukrainian flanks around Avdiivka and pose a significant threat to Ukrainian positions despite being unlikely to encircle Avdiivka in the near term.[16] Ukrainian military observers indicated that Russian forces had concentrated a significant grouping of forces consisting of elements of 15 motorized rifle regiments and 11 rifle regiments to the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front and have already executed regiment-size offensive operations in the area (meaning three or more battalions conducting cohesive assaults, a scale beyond that of most Russian or Ukrainian attacks at this stage in the war).[17] This reported Russian grouping will likely be able to sustain offensive operations aimed at encircling Avdiivka if Russian commanders are willing to sustain relatively high losses, despite being insufficient for an immediate breakthrough.

A prominent Russian milblogger and frontline unit commander complained that the Russian military leadership is uninterested in battalion level problems, supplementing other Russian milblogger complaints about general problems in the Russian military.[18] Russian “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky, who has previously complained about problems affecting Russian forces’ ability to conduct effective combat operations, claimed on October 15 that Russian infantry on the front in Ukraine face problems with insufficient counterbattery capabilities, commander competency, medical support, rotations, and supplies.[19] Khodakovsky claimed that a lack of communication between Russian battalions and headquarters is common, so much so that (in an undated and unspecific anecdote) when Ukrainian forces struck a Russian headquarters building, a Russian battalion did not realize that the headquarters had been disabled and continued conducting operations independently. Another Russian milblogger, who said on October 14 that he concurred with the “agreement” to stop any commentary about Russian operations in Avdiivka, complained a few hours later that Russian forces, in general, are experiencing ammunition shortages and continued issues combating Ukrainian drones.[20] These complaints indicate that a wider disdain for the Russian military command persists despite likely top-down attempts to censor discussion about certain areas of the front.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 15 and slightly advanced south of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage published on October 15 shows that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced towards the railway line north of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and Russian sources reported continued Ukrainian ground attacks south of Bakhmut on the Klishchiivka-Kurdyumivka-Andriivka line (7-13km southwest of Bakhmut).[21] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces took advantage of recent Russian counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast to gradually advance near Kopani (5km northwest of Robotyne), east of Nesteryanka (10km northwest of Robotyne), and near Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[22] Ukrainian officials have not yet commented on any recent Ukrainian advances along the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Verbove line (20km southwest to 18km southeast of Orikhiv), however. Russian sources reported continued Ukrainian attacks on the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Verbove line on October 15.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin may be trying to temper expectations of significant Russian advances around Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast.
• The Russian information space writ large is also metering its initial optimism about the prospects of Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations aimed at encircling Avdiivka on October 15 but have yet to make further gains amid a likely decreasing tempo of Russian operations in the area.
• Russian forces will likely continue offensive operations at this decreased tempo in the near term, however, and will remain a threat to Ukrainian forces in the area despite being unlikely to achieve a decisive breakthrough or encircle Avdiivka at this time.
• A prominent Russian milblogger and frontline unit commander complained that Russian military leadership is uninterested in battalion level problems, supplementing other Russian milblogger complaints about general problems in the Russian military.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 15 and slightly advanced south of Bakhmut.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 15 and advanced in some areas.
• A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have “significant” reserves comprised of new divisions currently located in rear areas, though these formations are highly unlikely to be fully staffed at this time.
• The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is sending a reportedly Kremlin-affiliated priest to Crimea, likely as part of continued Russian efforts to persecute religious communities in occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk on October 15 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in an unspecified area near Orlyanka (22km southeast of Kupyansk) and pushed Ukrainian forces out of several unspecified positions near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Lyman Pershyi (12km northeast of Kupyansk), and Stepova Novosilka (17km southeast of Kupyansk).[24] ISW has not observed evidence to support these claims, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Synkivka and Ivanivka (19km southeast of Kupyansk).[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Synkivka is contested, despite some Russian claims that Russian forces captured the settlement.[26] Another prominent milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to enter Synkivka, but ISW has observed no indication that Russian forces have entered the settlement.[27]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 15 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka in the Kupyansk direction.[28]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on October 15 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the newly formed 25th Combined Arms Army advanced up to “several” kilometers in an unspecified area along the Svatove-Kreminna line, though ISW has not observed evidence to support this claim.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Makiivka (20km southwest of Svatove), the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna), and Torske (14km west of Kreminna).[30] Footage published on October 15 purportedly shows elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating in the Bilohorivka direction (10km south of Kreminna).[31]

The Russian MoD claimed on October 15 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove), Makiivka, Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna), the Serebryanske forest area, and Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna) on the Svatove-Kreminne line.[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations around Bakhmut on October 15 and made marginal gains. Geolocated footage published on October 15 shows elements of the 4th Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Brigade (2nd Army Corps, Southern Military District) striking Ukrainian positions at the railway line north of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), indicating marginal Ukrainian gains in the area.[33] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Ukrainian forces made unspecified advances towards the railway line near Klishchiivka and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) on October 14.[34] The Russian MoD claimed on October 15 that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Klishchiivka, Dubovo-Vasylivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut), and Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut) but did not specify an outcome.[36] The milblogger claimed that fighting also occurred near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[37] A Russian milblogger posted footage on October 15 purporting to show elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) operating in the Bakhmut area.[38]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled four Russian assaults south of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka on October 15.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Avdiivka on October 15 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled more than 15 Russian assaults near Avdiivka; north of Avdiivka near Stepove and Keramik (up to 13km northwest of Avdiivka); and southwest of Avdiivka near Tonenke, Sieverne, and Pervomaiske (up to 11km southwest of Avdiivka).[40] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 14 and 15 that Russian forces advanced near Novokalynove (13km north of Avdiivka) and that Ukrainian forces retreated from unspecified strongholds in the Avdiivka area.[41] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are focusing on securing positions near Avdiivka that are least vulnerable to Ukrainian artillery fire to set conditions for further offensive operations.[42] Russian sources widely claimed that Russian forces are now able to interdict all Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) into Avdiivka, although a prominent Russian milblogger stated that these claims are premature.[43] Russian milbloggers previously claimed in July and August 2023 that elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Pyatnashka” International Brigade established fire control over Ukrainian GLOCs in the Avdiivka area.[44] ISW has not observed any indications that these persistent Russian claims about Russian fire control over Ukrainian GLOCs in the Avdiivka area are true, however.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces successfully counterattacked near Avdiivka and made marginal gains on October 15. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recaptured unspecified positions near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdivika) and Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka).[45] Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks near Pervomaiske and on the northeastern outskirts of Avdiivka near the Avdiivka Coke Plant.[46] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conduct counterattacks in the Avdiivka area with small assault groups of up to 15 personnel.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Donetsk City on October 15 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled over 15 Russian assaults near Marinka (just west of Donetsk City).[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Novomykhailivka (10km south of Marinka) and recaptured positions near Solodke (17km south of Marinka) that Russian forces lost during the summer of 2023.[49] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.

A Ukrainian military observer stated that Russian forces may be preparing for attacks near Vuhledar to push Ukrainian forces out of firing distance of a rail line that Russia seeks to restore to support logistics in southern Ukraine.[50] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets also stated that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, Eastern Military District) tried to push Ukrainian forces back from Novomykhailivka (10km south of Marinka and 19km northeast of Vuhledar) by attacking from Solodke (6km south of Novomykhailivka) and Slavne (5km southeast of Novomykhailivka) but only captured a few footholds near Solodke.[51]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 15 but did not advance. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) on October 14 and 15.[52]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 15 and recently advanced. Geolocated footage published on October 14 shows elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) capturing a Ukrainian position northwest of Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack north of Pryyutne.[54]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 15 and reportedly recently advanced. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[55] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks along the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Verbove line (10km south to 18km southeast of Orikhiv).[56] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on October 14 that Ukrainian forces slightly advanced west of Kopani (5km northwest of Robotyne) but retreated to positions northwest of Kopani after Russian forces shelled the advancing Ukrainian forces.[57]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces are taking advantage of recent Russian counterattacks to advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces likely advanced towards Verbove after Russian counterattacks in the area in recent days.[58] Mashovets also stated that Ukrainian forces began gradually advancing near Kopani and east of Nesteryanka (10km northwest of Robotyne) from the north after elements of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) counterattacked from these areas. Mashovets also stated that elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) withdrew from northern to central Novoprokopivka (16km south of Orikhiv) following counterattacks and that northern Novoprokopivka is now a contested “gray zone.”

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 14 and recently marginally advanced. Geolocated footage published on October 14 and 15 shows elements of the 247th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) capturing Ukrainian positions west of Verbove on the northern tree line of the Robotyne-Verbove road.[59] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from several positions along the Robotyne-Verbove line on October 14.[60] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked along the Kopani-Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Verbove line and surrounded several Ukrainian positions near Verbove on October 14 and continued counterattacks on October 15.[61]

Russian sources continued to discuss Ukrainian activity on the Dnipro River delta islands in Kherson Oblast. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from unspecified islands in the Dnipro River delta.[62] Russian milbloggers continued to express concern about a potential future Ukrainian operation into the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[63]

A Ukrainian official indicated that Russian forces may be altering their force posture in the Black Sea as a result of Ukrainian strikes against Black Sea Fleet assets. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian naval vessels are no longer trying to block Ukrainian ports but that Russian tactical aviation is constantly active in the Black Sea and is disrupting sea transport routes near Snake Island.[64] Humenyuk stated that the Russian naval group currently in the Black Sea consists of 12 vessels and that Russian vessels withdrawn to Novorossiysk are still able to strike Ukraine with long range missiles and drones.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have “significant” reserves comprised of new divisions currently located in rear areas, though these formations are highly unlikely to be fully staffed at this time.[65] The milblogger claimed that these new divisions are partly composed of expendable personnel but that the senior officers have “extensive” combat and leadership experience. The milblogger also claimed that more than half of the new formations are equipped with the “latest technology.” ISW previously assessed that the Russian MoD’s recently announced nine training regiments can possibly also serve as in extremis operational or strategic reserves, and it is possible these regiments are part of the “significant” reserves the Russian milblogger was referencing.[66] The reported existence of Russian reserves in the rear does not indicate that these reserves are operating at scale or combat ready, however. ISW previously assessed that the newly-formed 25th Combined Arms Army was hurriedly deployed ahead of its intended deployment date and is therefore likely understaffed, poorly trained, or both.[67] It is conceivable that the Russian MoD has already stood up the administrative and command backbones of several on-paper divisions as part of Defense Minister Shoigu’s announced force restructuring goals in January 2023, but these formations are highly unlikely to be fully staffed or combat ready.

A Russian insider source claimed on October 15 that Rosgvardia has been negotiating with the Wagner Group since Wagner’s June 24 rebellion to increase Rosgvardia’s power inside Russia.[68] The insider source claimed that negotiations between Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov and the now-deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin began immediately after the rebellion but fell through as Zolotov was not prepared to fund Wagner. The insider source claimed that negotiations resumed with Prigozhin’s son, Pavel, after Prigozhin’s death. The insider source also claimed on October 13 that Rosgvardia was interested in using Wagner personnel in the war in Ukraine in order to avoid having to commit Rosgvardia personnel to combat.[69] The insider source claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is allowing Zolotov to pursue these objectives in order to create a system of “checks and balances” between political elites after Prigozhin’s death left Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s influence unchecked. ISW is unable to verify any of these insider sources’ claims, although they are consistent with continued Russian information space speculation about the future of the Wagner Group following Prigozhin’s death.

A Russian Governor indicated that Russian regional governments continue to struggle to support the material needs of the war in Ukraine. The Governor of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Yugra, Natalya Komarova, responded to a local resident’s complaint about the lack of equipment for soldiers in Ukraine on October 14, saying that “we as a whole did not prepare for this war, we do not need it.”[70] Komarova stated that there are “certainly...some inconsistencies and unresolved issues.” A member of the Obereg Center for Public Control, Yuri Ryabtsev, sent a statement to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs accusing Komarov of “discrediting” the Russian military and demanding criminal charges be brought against her.[71]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is sending a reportedly closely Kremlin-affiliated priest to Crimea, likely as part of continued Russian efforts to persecute religious communities in occupied Ukraine. Russian opposition media outlet Meduza reported on October 15 that the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church appointed Pskov Metropolitan Tikhon (Georgii Shevkunov) as the head of the Crimean Metropolitanate.[72] Meduza reported in 2015 that Shevkunov is allegedly Putin’s personal confessor and reportedly has ties with Russian government officials.[73] Shevkunov compared his relocation to Crimea to historical exiles of religious figures to Kolyma in the Russian Far East.[74] ISW previously reported that Russian authorities are reportedly installing ROC representatives in independent Orthodox of the Church of Ukraine (OCU) communities in occupied Ukraine in order to collect information on non-ROC parishioners and clergy members and provide information to Russian special services.[75] ISW has long assessed that Russian authorities have conducted systemic religious persecution against OCU dioceses and religious minorities in occupied Ukraine since the start of the war.[76]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives:

Russian President Vladimir Putin restated boilerplate rhetoric threatening military escalation with the West, likely in an attempt to deter Western support for Ukraine. Putin claimed during an interview on Russian state television on October 15 that a “hot” conflict between the West and Russia would be a “completely different war” and not limited to the framework of the “special military operation.”[77]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

7. Wall Street Journal reporters split over Iran story

Wall Street Journal reporters split over Iran story | Semafor

semafor.com · by Max Tani

The Wall Street Journal overrode some objections inside its own Washington bureau to publish an explosive, disputed Oct. 8 report that Iran “helped plan” last week’s attack by Hamas.

The article cited senior members of Hamas and Iran-backed military group Hezbollah, as well as an adviser to Syria and a European official, who told the paper that Iranian security officials helped plan and ultimately greenlit the attack on Israel.

The stakes of the story couldn’t be higher. A proven, direct Iranian role in the Hamas attack could trigger a broader regional war.

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Three people with knowledge of the situation told Semafor that before the story was published, veteran staffers on the national security team at the paper raised concerns about the story, which was written by three of the paper’s correspondents based in the Middle East. Reporters from the Washington, D.C. bureau said that they could not directly confirm the explosive string of allegations shared by their colleagues abroad, and sought more time before publication.

Curiously, while reporters from the D.C. bureau contacted the White House for comment on the story, according to a person familiar with that element of the reporting, no Washington bylines appeared on the piece.

A Wall Street Journal spokesperson rejected the notion that there was any internal friction over the publication of last week’s story. “We stand by our reporting,” a spokesperson for the paper said.

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U.S., Israeli, and Iranian officials, as well as Hamas leaders, all rejected the Journal’s claims. And the Journal is currently the only major news organization to report that last week’s attack had a direct link to Iran, though The New York Times published a story on Friday partially confirming the details of the Journal’s report. The Times reported that officials from Iran helped plan the attack, but the U.S. and its allies have downplayed (though not debunked) the suggestion that the Iranian government was deeply involved.

Crucially, U.S. officials told the Times and other outlets that intelligence suggests key Iranian leaders were surprised by the Hamas attack. Other outlets like CNN and the Washington Post have not confirmed any link, though Israeli and U.S. government officials have not ruled out that possibility.

semafor.com · by Max Tani

8. Iran Update, October 15, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-15-2023

Key Takeaways:

1. Palestinian militias continued drone and indirect fire attacks into Israel, primarily southern Israel. CTP-ISW did not record any reports of infiltrations or small arms clashes in southern Israel.
2. The rate of small arms clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants has continued to fall after peaking on October 13.
3. LH expanded its campaign against Israeli forces along the Israel-Lebanon border in terms of pace, location, and actors involved. The IDF spokesperson stated that Iran has instructed LH to escalate against Israel and thereby impose pressure on the IDF while it prepares for ground operations into the Gaza Strip.
4. The IDF conducted an airstrike on the Aleppo International Airport, marking the second time that the IDF has struck this location since the war began on October 7.
5. Iran and elements of its Axis of Resistance are messaging that the Hamas-Israel war could expand geographically into a multi-front conflict. CTP-ISW is closely monitoring the situation to forecast whether such a scenario is becoming more or less likely.
6. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abdollahian met with senior Hamas and Qatari officials during an official visit to Doha.

IRAN UPDATE, OCTOBER 15, 2023

Oct 15, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, October 15, 2023

Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, and Nicholas Carl

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Key Takeaways:

1. Palestinian militias continued drone and indirect fire attacks into Israel, primarily southern Israel. CTP-ISW did not record any reports of infiltrations or small arms clashes in southern Israel.
2. The rate of small arms clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants has continued to fall after peaking on October 13.
3. LH expanded its campaign against Israeli forces along the Israel-Lebanon border in terms of pace, location, and actors involved. The IDF spokesperson stated that Iran has instructed LH to escalate against Israel and thereby impose pressure on the IDF while it prepares for ground operations into the Gaza Strip.
4. The IDF conducted an airstrike on the Aleppo International Airport, marking the second time that the IDF has struck this location since the war began on October 7.
5. Iran and elements of its Axis of Resistance are messaging that the Hamas-Israel war could expand geographically into a multi-front conflict. CTP-ISW is closely monitoring the situation to forecast whether such a scenario is becoming more or less likely.
6. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abdollahian met with senior Hamas and Qatari officials during an official visit to Doha.

Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias continued drone and indirect fire attacks into Israel, primarily southern Israel, on October 15. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—claimed responsibility for two one-way drone attacks and 12 mortar and rocket attacks.[1] Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed responsibility for another 12 mortar and rocket attacks.[2] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine militia claimed that it conducted two mortar attacks.[3] CTP-ISW recorded reports of five unclaimed mortar and rocket strikes as well.[4] This rate of fire is consistent with CTP-ISW’s previous reporting that Hamas has reduced the frequency of its attacks to conserve its munitions stockpile and prepare for a prolonged war.[5]

CTP-ISW did not record any reports of infiltrations or small arms clashes in southern Israel on October 15.

West Bank

The rate of small arms clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants has continued to fall after peaking on October 13. CTP-ISW recorded eight clashes on October 15 and 13 clashes on October 14—significantly less than the 32 clashes recorded on October 13. Israeli forces are conducting arrest campaigns in the West Bank, which may be contributing to the declining violence.[6] Hamas remains committed to expanding the war to the West Bank, however.[7]

Fatah—the dominant Palestinian political party in the West Bank—organized a march in Ramallah on October 15 to denounce IDF attacks into the Gaza Strip.[8] CTP-ISW has recorded five instances of clashes and four instances of marches in Ramallah since October 7.[9]

South Lebanon and Golan Heights

LH expanded its campaign against Israeli forces along the Israel-Lebanon border in terms of pace, location, and actors involved on October 15. The IDF spokesperson stated that Iran has instructed LH to escalate against Israel and thereby impose pressure on the IDF while it prepares for ground operations into the Gaza Strip.[10]

• LH engaged in small arms clashes with Israeli forces in five border towns and military posts.[11] LH also fired anti-tank missiles at Israeli targets in at least five instances.[12] LH claimed responsibility for these attacks for the third consecutive day. This activity marks a slight uptick in the rate of attacks compared to previous days and an expansion of attacks westward along the Israel-Lebanon border. Most LH attacks on Israeli targets have occurred around Shebaa Farms since the war began on October 7.[13]
• Hamas’s al Qassem Brigades claimed to launch 20 rockets into northern Israel on October 15.[14] LH probably approved the attack in advanced given the extent to which LH controls southern Lebanon and coordinated with other Iranian-backed groups there. The al Qassem Brigades furthermore released a statement on October 15 claiming that its militants infiltrated northern Israel and clashed with Israeli forces.[15]

The IDF conducted an airstrike on the Aleppo International Airport on October 14, marking the second time that the IDF has struck this location since the war began on October 7.[16] The IDF similarly conducted an airstrike on the Damascus International Airport on October 12.[17] A senior official at the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry indicated that the strikes are part of an Israeli effort to prevent Iran from moving weapons into Syria and/or opening a front against Israel from there.[18] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has long used commercial airliners affiliated with the Iranian regime for military transports to Syria throughout the civil war there.

Unidentified militants conducted a rocket attack from Syria into the Golan Heights following the IDF airstrike on Aleppo, possibly as symbolic retaliation.[19] Israeli forces intercepted the rockets and fired artillery back into Syria.[20]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Iran and elements of its Axis of Resistance are messaging that the Hamas-Israel war could expand geographically into a multi-front conflict. CTP-ISW is closely monitoring the situation to forecast whether such a scenario is becoming more or less likely.

• Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian warned that Iran will intervene in some unspecified way if Israel continues its attacks into the Gaza Strip and especially If the IDF conducts ground operations there, according to Axios.[21] Abdollahian issued this warning during a meeting with UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Tor Wennesland in Beirut on October 14. CTP-ISW reported on this meeting at the time, noting that Abdollahian called on the United Nations to stop IDF attacks into the Gaza Strip before it is “too late.”[22]
• Iranian-backed Iraqi militants have deployed to the Israel-Lebanon border in recent days. Fighters from Asaib Ahl al Haq announced on October 8 that they are joining the war against Israel.[23] Prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militants have broadcast on social media their presence near the border since then.[24] These militants include Abu Alaa al Walaei—the leader of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Seyyed ol Shohada.[25]
• Iranian-backed militants have deployed to the southwestern Syrian border in recent days. These militants include military engineers and missile experts.[26] These militants also include members of the Afghan Fatemiyoun Division and Pakistani Zeynabiyoun Division, according to Israeli media.[27] IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani is currently in Syria coordinating some of these deployments, according to an Iranian journalist.[28] The journalist claimed that Ghaani was in Iraq meeting with Iranian-backed militias three days prior to traveling to Syria.

Abdollahian met with senior Hamas and Qatari officials during an official visit to Doha on October 14-15.

• Abdollahian met with senior Hamas officials, including its Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in Doha.[29] Abdollahian during the meeting implicitly threatened Israel if the IDF continues to attack targets in the Gaza Strip. Abdollahian is visiting Qatar after concluding a diplomatic tour of Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. CTP-ISW assessed that the tour was part of an Iranian effort to coordinate politically with senior leaders of Axis of Resistance vis-à-vis the Hamas-Israel war.[30]
• Abdollahian met separately with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani and Prime Minister Mohammad bin Abdul Rahman al Thani in Doha.[31] Iranian readouts of the meetings focused primarily on the Hamas-Israel war. Abdollahian may have discussed Iranian financial assets currently held in Qatar. Western media reported on October 12 that the United States and Qatar have agreed to prevent Iran from accessing $6 billion of its financial assets in Qatari banks.[32] South Korea transferred the assets to Qatari banks for Iran to access as part of the prisoner swap deal that the United States and Iran reached in August 2023.

9. China's Military Decision-making in Times of Crisis and Conflict

An important, timely report.

Download the entire 190 page report at this link: https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/chinas-military-decision-making_sep2023.pdf

China's Military Decision-making in Times of Crisis and Conflict

Edited by Roy D. Kamphausen

September 26, 2023 The National Bureau of Asian Research

China’s Military Decision-making in Times of Crisis and Conflict features papers from the 2022 People’s Liberation Army Conference convened by the National Bureau of Asian Research, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s China Strategic Focus Group, and the Department of Foreign Languages at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. As competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China intensifies and unplanned encounters between their militaries become more frequent, what impact has Xi Jinping had on China’s crisis decision-making and behavior? In what domains and against which actors may China be inclined to escalate or de-escalate a crisis? Leading experts address these questions and more in this volume and find that fundamentally different understandings and approaches to crisis management and response could make it more difficult to swiftly resolve crises.

Contents

Foreword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Karl Eikenberry

Introduction: The Differences and Risks in U.S.-China Military Crisis Management and Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Roy D. Kamphausen and Jeremy Rausch

Chapter 1 – How China Approaches Military Crises and the Implications for Crisis Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

David Santoro

Chapter 2 – Managing a Crisis with China: Crisis Behavior and De-escalation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Balazs Szanto

Chapter 3 – PRC Crisis Response Behaviors at the End of Xi Jinping’s Second Term. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Drew T. Holliday

Chapter 4 – How China Leverages Artificial Intelligence for Military Decision-making. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Zi Yang

Chapter 5 – China’s Decision to Escalate the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Standoff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Shuxian Luo

Chapter 6 – China’s Decision-making and the Border Dispute with India. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Jagannath Panda

Chapter 7 – China’s Cyber Crisis Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Adam Segal

Chapter 8 – The Implications of the PLA’s Nuclear Expansion and Modernization for China’s Crisis Behavior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Phillip C. Saunders and David C. Logan

About the Contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .175

10. Special Operations News - October 16, 2023 | SOF News

Special Operations News - October 16, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · October 16, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: Naval Special Warfare Combatant Craft (image from DVIDS video, 3 Oct 2023).

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Ken Tovo. A former commander of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) is assuming the position of Strategic Advisor (Instagram) with Oak Grove Technologies. Tovo had a 35-year Army career with much of it spent in Special Forces.

Army SOF Cuts Coming. Defense Department officials and the Army undersecretary briefed congressional staff members on Thursday, October 12th, on the 3,000 cuts in personnel that will take place in the USASOC force structure. “Pentagon briefs Hill on Army special ops cuts, vacant slots targeted”, Army Times, October 12, 2023.

U.S. SOF Hostage Rescue in Gaza Strip? A Navy SEAL who is now a GOP lawmaker says that a U.S. special operations hostage rescue in Israel would take considerable effort. (Fox News, October 15, 2023)

‘Space Ranger’. An MIT graduate who works on satellites has completed U.S. Army Ranger School. His primary job in the Air Force is to develop satellite communications tools. He has attended other ‘infantry’ type schools to include the Sapper Leader’s Course and Air Assault School. (The Messenger, October 15, 2023).

SOF and Multidomain Operations. Lt. Gen. Jonathan P. Braga, commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, spoke during the Association of U.S. Army’s Warriors Corner event – “Special Operations, Space, and Cyber Operations: A Modern-Day Triad” – in Washington D.C. on Oct. 11. Braga said he foresees the Triad being leveraged for irregular warfare options, flexible deterrents and flexible response options for the joint warfighter. He said the Triad has to work together, experiment together and learn together. “TRIAD leaders update AUSA at Warriors Center”, DVIDS, October 13, 2023.

Green Beret (the hat) History. Sarah Sicard has penned an article that provides details on how the green beret became the official headgear for Special Forces soldiers. “How the green beret became the symbol of US Army Special Forces”, Military Times, October 10, 2023.

A Dad Remembers His Fallen Son. On October 4, 2017, four U.S. soldiers of the 3rd Special Forces Group died in an ambush in Niger. While this event captured the attention of the nation for several months, for most Americans, it is a faint and distinct memory. But not for the families of those lost soldiers. “A father reflects on the death of his son during the 2017 Niger ambush”, by Henry Black, Military Times, October 6, 2023.

‘Hell Week’. Joshua Skovlund provides some historical perspective on SEAL training and the early days of frogmen. “Why Navy SEALs wear a trident and other facts about life as a frogman”, Task and Purpose, October 12, 2023.

SOF History

3rd SFG(A). On October 16, 1991, 2nd Battalion, 3rd SFGA was activated with HQs company, 2 SF companies, and a forward support company.

Martha Raye. On October 19, 1994, the Honorary Special Forces LTC “Maggie” Raye died.

Afghanistan. On October 19, 2001, two SF detachments infiltrate into northern Afghanistan to link up with the Northern Alliance. They were the first two U.S. Army SF teams inserted into Afghanistan to work with Northern Alliance Forces. On the same day, Operation Rhino took place in southern Afghanistan. The 3rd Ranger Battalion conducted an airborne operation to seize Objective Rhino. This was part of a highly publicized U.S. effort to show that the United States could put boots on the ground anywhere in the world whenever it wanted.

PSYOP. On October 16, 2006, the Psychological Operations branch was established.

Conflict in Israel and Gaza

Hostages. Israel and the international community are confronted with the vexing problem of recovering their citizens held hostage by Hamas in Gaza Strip. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) says that more than 120 hostages are being held by Hamas. There are a total of 32 countries with ‘missing’ citizens. The United States has more than ten Americans held in dispersed locations by the terrorist group. Over 30 countries have had at least one of their citizens killed by Hamas in Israel. At least 27 Americans have been killed in the Israel-Gaza War. According to reporter James LaPorta the U.S. has special operations forces in the region should a hostage rescue attempt be necessary. In addition, he says U.S. hostage rescue experts may now be in Israel (The Messenger News, Oct 11, 2023).

Civilians in Combat Zones. Israel has moved thousands of its citizens from the border areas of Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon. The IDF has warned civilian Palestinians that northern Gaza will soon see extensive combat operations and urges them to evacuate (IDF Twitter) to southern Gaza along two designated ‘safe routes’. Some news reports stay that Hamas has set up roadblocks to prevent Palestinians from moving south. Despite the roadblocks hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have fled northern Gaza to the south.

U.S. State Department. DoS has authorized the departure of non-emergency U.S. government personnel and eligible family members from Israel. It has updated (Oct 14, 2023) its travel advisory for Israel. U.S. citizens who wish to depart with U.S. government assistance must express their interest via the DoS crisis intake form. The U.S. Embassy in Israel has announced that a ship will leave Haifa, Israel on October 16, 2023, for Cyprus to evacuate U.S. citizens. There are about 200,000 U.S. citizens in Israel, most of them dual citizens.

Evacuations. Most foreign nationals are leaving Israel on commercial flights. Some nations, including the U.S., have chartered aircraft to evacuate their citizens from Israel. Poland was one of the first to conduct evacuation flights for its citizens, completing the task with over 27 lifts.

Crossing into Egypt from Gaza. Negotiations with Egypt for the use of the Rafah Border Crossing as an evacuation corridor from Gaza Strip is ongoing. It was reported that a few citizens of the U.S. and Canada got across a few days ago; but it has now been closed by Egypt. There is the possibility that the crossing will be open on Monday, October 16, 2023, at 9 am (local time) according to the U.S. State Department, but only for a limited amount of time and probably only for foreign nationals.

Coming Ground War. Tunnels, anti-tank missiles, drones, and suicide bombers are just some of the perils that await Israeli forces in the tight confines of heavily populated Gaza. “The Perilous Tactical Realities Israel Will Face Fighting in Gaza”, by Howard Altman, The WarZone, October 13, 2023. Read also “Reflections on Israel’s Urban Operations”, Irregular Warfare Center, October 12, 2023.

CRS Reports. The Congressional Research Service has published two reports about the Hamas – Israel conflict. https://www.national-security.info/country/israel/hamas-attack-2023.html

Odds and Ends. The Iraqi Parliament has called for the activation of the Arab Defense Treaty (Yale.edu) in response to the ongoing Israeli actions in Gaza. The U.S. has been building up its naval forces in the region; a US armada is now based in the waters off Israel and more ships are on the way (The Washington Post, subscription). Sec Def Austin issued a statement on the composition of U.S. naval forces in the region (defense.gov). The U.S. is providing a variety of assistance to Israel (Military.com, Oct 15, 2023). Despite the dropping of over 6,000 bombs on Hamas targets in Gaza by the Israeli Air Force the terrorist group still has the capacity (as on Mon, 16 Oct) to send a large number of rockets and missiles into Israel’s cities.

Ukraine Conflict

Russian Offensive. The Russians have begun offensive operations in the Avdiivka (Google Maps) region close to Russian-occupied Donetsk. Thus far it has gained minimal ground. The Russians have stepped up attacks on military and civilian targets with drones over the past few days. F-16 fighter training will begin in the coming days for Ukrainian pilots and crews in the United States.

IO Front. Ukrainian information operations activities are credited with the defection of over 17,000 Russian soldiers according to US Army Special Operations Command’s Lt. Gen. Jon Braga (Breaking Defense). A recent RAND corporation study examines the respective characteristics and persuasiveness of the Russian and Ukrainian information operations campaigns. See “The Nightingale Versus the Bear”, RAND, October 2023, PDF, 59 pages. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2032-1.html

Help Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel with spine injuries receive the healthcare options, education, and care they need.

National Security

Bolduc on our Generals. In modern military operations, the role of Generals and Admirals is critical in shaping the direction and outcomes of defense strategies. However, there has been an increasing concern over the failure of these top-ranking officers to fulfill their duties effectively. Retired Brig. General Don Bolduc, a career Special Forces officer, examines the reasons behind this perceived failure and the implications for our military today. “Evaluating the Leadership Failure of Generals and Admirals in Today’s Military”, SOFREP, October 9, 2023.

IW and the Gaza Conflict. The future is entirely unwritten, but the history that will be made in the Middle East in the coming weeks and months will prove valuable to the study of multi-echelon irregular warfare. “The Irregular Warfare Implications of the Israel-Hamas Conflict”, by Doug Livermore, Irregular Warfare Initiative, October 12, 2023.

Are China and North Korea Allies? Beijing is keeping a careful eye on its neighboring nation – it has concerns that the growing threats from Pyongyang will destabilize Northeast Asia. “North Korea and China Aren’t the Allies You Think They Are”, The RAND Blog, September 27, 2023.

Russian Military Ground Forces. The Institute for the Study of War has published Russian Regular Ground Forces Order of Battle: Russian Military 101. The PDF (60 pages) was published on October 12, 2023. It has two sections: an introductory essay on the regular Russian ground forces and a fully sourced order of battle (OB). https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-regular-ground-forces-order-battle-russian-military-101

Sahel CT Effort. If the US is forced to end operations at the air base it modernized at Agadez, Niger and to withdraw US troops from Niger, they may be able to relocate to another country. But it’s hard to see how the US can continue to pursue its counterterrorism strategy in the Sahel without a base in the immediate area. “West Africa: Collapse of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy in the Sahel”, All Africa, October 15, 2023.

Another Earthquake. A third earthquake, measuring 6.3 magnitude, struck an area close to Herat on Sunday, October 14, 2023. Over 100 have been injured with some deaths reported as well. The last two earthquakes flattened thousands of homes, killed over 3,000 people, injured more than 7,000, and displaced thousands. The United States is providing over $12 million in aid for Afghan earthquake relief. The Hindu Kush Mountain range lies near the junction of the Eurasian and Indian tectonic plates. “Afghanistan hit by third earthquake in a week”, BBC News, October 15, 2023.

SOF News Book Shop

View our selection of books about special operations forces at the SOF News Book Shop.

Book – The Fourth Age: The Future of Special Operations. This anthology of fictional stories helps us visualize a future era of special operations. Through their creative talents and subject matter knowledge, the authors realistically portray what is within the realm of possible. They draw upon lessons of the past while imagining the future. Joint Special Operations Press (JSOU), October 2, 2023, PDF, 192 pages. https://www.jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/239

Podcast – SEALs in Iraq. The commander of a SEAL team in Iraq, Rick Witt, talks about the deployment. The Spear Podcast, October 11, 2023, 50 minutes. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/podcast-the-spear-seals-in-iraq/

Video – NSW Overview. Naval Special Warfare Command, located on Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, leads the Navy’s maritime special operations force and is the Navy component to U.S. Special Operations Command. NSW is the nation’s elite maritime special operations force, uniquely positioned to extend the Fleet’s reach and gain and maintain access for the Joint Force in competition and conflict. DVIDS, October 3, 2023, 6 minutes. https://www.dvidshub.net/video/900276/nsw-overview-video

Video – AFSOC Mission Overview. A look at the history, heritage, and missions of Air Force Special Operations Command. DVIDS, October 12, 2023, 5 minutes. https://www.dvidshub.net/video/900214/afsoc-mission-overview

Upcoming Events

October 16-20, 2023

SOAR XLVII

Special Operations Association

November 29-30, 2023

SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium

Defense Strategies Institute

December 8, 2023

Winter Cruise

Combat Diver Association

December 8-10, 2023

2023 Civil Affairs Conference

Civil Affairs Association

sof.news · by SOF News · October 16, 2023

11. Opinion | The U.S. Can Still Avoid War With China Over Taiwan

But why would the Taiwan people want to peacefully unify given how Xi and the CCP govern the PRC?

Would the PRC allow Taiwan's continued self determination of government? What if the people continue to choose not to unify? Will the ambiguity of a one China two systems protect Taiwan?

Excerpts:

There also are longer-term repercussions to consider: If the combination of deterrence and reassurance fails and China attacks Taiwan, it will set a precedent in which Chinese leaders kill and destroy to achieve their goals. But if a pathway remains for China to eventually convince Taiwan’s people — through inducements or pressure — that it is in their interest to peacefully unify, then that may be a China that we can live with.

In the best-case scenario, the United States and China would reach a high-level agreement, a new communiqué, in which Washington reiterates its longstanding political neutrality and China commits to dialing back its military threats. This would avert war while giving China political space to work toward peaceful unification. That might mean using its clout to isolate Taiwan and eventually convince the island’s people that it should strike a deal with Beijing. But it isn’t Washington’s place to prevent the unification of the two sides — only to ensure that doesn’t happen through military force or coercion.

A war between the United States and China over Taiwan could be the most brutal since World War II. As politically difficult as it may be, U.S. leaders have a duty to try to prevent conflict, and that means speaking more softly but carrying a big stick.

Opinion | The U.S. Can Still Avoid War With China Over Taiwan

The New York Times · by Oriana Skylar Mastro · October 16, 2023

Guest Essay

Oct. 16, 2023, 1:00 a.m. ET

Credit...The New York Times

By

Ms. Mastro is an expert on Chinese politics and military policy.

For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.

That equilibrium has been upset. China is building up and flexing its military power; hostile rhetoric emanates from both Beijing and Washington. War seems likelier each day.

It’s not too late to restore the kind of balance that helped to keep the peace for decades, but it will require taking steps to ease China’s concerns. This will be difficult because of Chinese intransigence and the overheated atmosphere prevailing in Washington. But it is worth the political risk if it prevents war.

Deterrence came in the form of the implied use of U.S. military force to thwart a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Reassurance was provided by the understanding that the United States would not intrude on decisions regarding Taiwan’s eventual political status.

The United States and its regional allies must continue to create a robust military deterrence. But U.S. leaders and politicians also need to keep in mind the power of reassurance, try to understand China’s deep sensitivities about Taiwan and should recommit — clearly and unequivocally — to the idea that only China and Taiwan can work out their political differences, a stance that remains official U.S. policy.

During the Cold War, Beijing and Washington signed a series of communiqués related to Taiwan. One of them said the United States “reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” This and other wording was deliberately ambiguous, but it was accepted by all sides as a commitment to avoid rocking the boat. China still views this arrangement as binding.

To be clear, it was China that began rocking the boat first.

Since 2016, when Tsai Ing-wen of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party was elected president of Taiwan (succeeding a more China-friendly administration), Xi Jinping has repeatedly brandished China’s military power with large-scale military exercises and other pressure tactics apparently meant to discourage independence sentiment on Taiwan.

U.S. political figures have rightly responded with rhetorical support for democratic Taiwan, by supplying it with weapons and by strengthening the U.S. military presence in the region. But the American reaction is also pouring fuel on the fire.

I have worked on U.S. defense strategy in various military roles for more than a decade. I recently traveled to Beijing, where I met with Chinese government and military officials, leading academics and experts from Communist Party-affiliated think tanks. During these talks it was clear that Beijing is far less concerned with U.S. efforts to enhance its military posture in the region — the deterrence side of the equation — than with the political rhetoric, which is seen in China as proof that the United States is moving away from past ambiguity and toward supporting Taiwan’s de facto independence.

They have plenty of evidence to point to.

In December 2016, Donald Trump became the first U.S. president or president-elect since the normalization of China-U.S. relations in 1979 to speak directly with a Taiwanese leader, when Ms. Tsai called to congratulate him on his election victory. President Biden has, on four occasions, contradicted the U.S. policy of ambiguity by saying we would support Taiwan militarily if China attacked. The number of U.S. Congress members visiting Taiwan — which China views as overt support for the island’s independence — reached a decade high last year, including an August 2022 trip by Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the House at the time and the highest-ranking U.S. official travel to Taiwan since the 1990s. That has continued this year: In June a nine-member congressional delegation, the largest in years, arrived in Taipei.

Provocative legislation has not helped. Last year the Taiwan Policy Act, which articulated support for Taiwan’s role in international organizations, was introduced in the Senate, and in July of this year the House passed a similar act. House Republicans introduced a motion in January to recognize Taiwan as an independent country.

Actions like these put great pressure on Mr. Xi, who won’t tolerate going down in history as the Chinese leader to have lost Taiwan. That would be seen in Beijing as an existential threat, potentially fueling separatist sentiment in restive regions like Tibet and Xinjiang.

For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi. But if he concludes that the United States has broken, once and for all, from its previous position on Taiwan and is bent on thwarting unification, he may feel that he must act militarily. The United States might be able to build the necessary military power in the region to deter a Chinese war of choice. But the level of dominance needed to stop Mr. Xi from launching a war he sees as necessary might be impossible to achieve.

Reassuring China would require Mr. Biden to reiterate that the United States does not support Taiwanese independence or oppose the island’s peaceful unification with China and that, ultimately, Taiwan’s fate is up to Taipei and Beijing. It would mean moving away from attempts to create international space for Taiwan and chastising Beijing when it pulls away Taipei’s diplomatic partners. The White House would also need to use what leverage it has to discourage members of Congress from visiting Taiwan and threaten to veto provocative legislation.

There would doubtless be blowback in Washington and Taipei, and Mr. Xi may already have made up his mind to seize Taiwan, regardless of the U.S. stance. But a politically neutral position on Taiwan is what the United States has followed for decades. Presidents Bill Clinton, Barack Obama and George H.W. and George W. Bush advocated peaceful dialogue between Taipei and Beijing to resolve their differences.

There also are longer-term repercussions to consider: If the combination of deterrence and reassurance fails and China attacks Taiwan, it will set a precedent in which Chinese leaders kill and destroy to achieve their goals. But if a pathway remains for China to eventually convince Taiwan’s people — through inducements or pressure — that it is in their interest to peacefully unify, then that may be a China that we can live with.

In the best-case scenario, the United States and China would reach a high-level agreement, a new communiqué, in which Washington reiterates its longstanding political neutrality and China commits to dialing back its military threats. This would avert war while giving China political space to work toward peaceful unification. That might mean using its clout to isolate Taiwan and eventually convince the island’s people that it should strike a deal with Beijing. But it isn’t Washington’s place to prevent the unification of the two sides — only to ensure that doesn’t happen through military force or coercion.

A war between the United States and China over Taiwan could be the most brutal since World War II. As politically difficult as it may be, U.S. leaders have a duty to try to prevent conflict, and that means speaking more softly but carrying a big stick.

Oriana Skylar Mastro (@osmastro) is a fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. She is the author of the forthcoming “Upstart: How China Became a Great Power.”

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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The New York Times · by Oriana Skylar Mastro · October 16, 2023

12. ‘Everything you see is live’ as CENTCOM shifts to digital tools

‘Everything you see is live’ as CENTCOM shifts to digital tools

A U.S. Central Command exercise shows that operations can—and soon must—be centered on live data feeds.

By SCHUYLER MOORE and BRIG. GEN. JOHN COGBILL

OCTOBER 15, 2023 08:57 AM ET

defenseone.com · by Schuyler Moore

Stock image from Getty Milan_Jovic

The central challenge in the most recent Digital Falcon Oasis exercise was this: could digital tools enable U.S. Central Command to find, prioritize, approve, and neutralize a thousand or more threats in 24 hours?

Those who attended the post-exercise briefing may have guessed the answer when they were not emailed a massive PowerPoint deck in advance, nor greeted with a thick binder when they arrived. Indeed, the briefing embodied Central Command’s ongoing transition to digital capabilities. The event opened with a quick introduction, then immediately shifted to a digital map displaying live layers of blue and red forces in theater, annotations from team members collaborating in a shared space, and tabs for the various software tools that had been built and tested throughout the exercise.

One by one, teams across the Command and partner organizations demonstrated how the tools work—and how they plan to put them to daily use. Within three clicks, any analyst could find a remotely piloted vehicle flying over the Arabian Gulf and open up its live video feed. Within another three clicks, any logistician could view a real-time snapshot of fuel, rations, medical supplies, and more, at any base in theater. A few more clicks would join the workbench where targeteers were collaborating live on target approvals and prioritization, or another workbench where planners were building dynamic plans based on a live picture of supplies and forces in theater.

One briefing team briefly switched to PowerPoint—but only to show how their process had been run previously, and the audience cringed along with them as they described the manual, labor-intensive, error-prone system of the past.

“Everything you see is live.” Across the countless demonstrations, briefers could confirm that the data presented was either live-streamed, or at a minimum updated within the last 24 hours. For newer tools that had yet to set up those data connections, teams eagerly described their pathway and expected timeline to set up those connections, and noted where leaders in the room might be able to help facilitate.

Live data has been, and will continue to be, at the heart of CENTCOM’s efforts. It serves as the anchor to operational reality, the bridge between conceptual and functional use: without it, these software tools would have minimal impact on real-world operations. A simulated air picture can’t help an air commander identify and counter real enemy fighters that have entered the airspace. A supply report with placeholder numbers can’t inform a ground commander’s decision on how to resupply bases in theater, and the list goes on.

With each new exercise, CENTCOM can pressure-test the flow of data between real teams and live assets: from partnered live-fly events in Jordan, to HIMARS live-fire events in Kuwait, to maritime assets out in the Arabian Gulf sending reports back to shore. Teams across the Command have spent months fighting technical and policy barriers to access the critical data they need do their jobs, and they continue to fight those battles for every new data integration. That effort has resulted in over 150 live data feeds that are now at the fingertips of anyone at the Command, as well as dozens of additional data sources updated regularly.

CENTCOM’s efforts do not exist in a vacuum. Each exercise has supported a broader digital exercise series run by the Chief Digital and AI Office, where Combatant Commands and Service entities from across the Department have the opportunity to coordinate with one another, practice the use of digital tools and transfer of live data, and work towards shared operational goals.

As the post-exercise briefings drew to a close, the conversation turned to next steps. Audience members asked about the next exercise and what capabilities might be displayed 90 days from now, but briefers had a different timeline in mind: “I’m using these tools to do my job every day now. I can’t wait for the next exercise, we’re starting the next round of updates on Monday.”

The series has proven that any shift to digital warfighting must be driven by live data. Without live data, operators will be slow to adopt the tools, and quick to abandon them in a crisis where timely data is critical. The technical and operational communities must henceforth treat live feeds and inputs as the backbone of digital warfighting, and build tools to meet that standard. CENTCOM has already started down this path, and is seeing the day-to-day impact of digital warfighting based on live data.

Schuyler Moore serves as Chief Technology Officer and Brig. Gen. John Cogbill as Deputy Director of Operations of U.S. Central Command.

13.  How Israel Can Win: Defeating Hamas Will Require a Strategy That Goes Beyond Revenge By Audrey Kurth Cronin

Excerpts:

HOW TO WIN BY NOT LOSING

Overwhelming military oppression in Gaza would backfire, stirring support for resistance and aligning Israel’s adversaries against it. A more nuanced political strategy would divide them. Israeli leaders must make clear that their enemies are the 30,000 Hamas fighters in Gaza, especially the Qassam Brigades, and not the two million other residents of Gaza. To legitimize its barbarity, Hamas has claimed that every Israeli is a combatant, just as al Qaeda and ISIS did in their campaigns in the West and in the Middle East. Israel must avoid doing the same thing and make clear that it is specifically targeting Hamas.

A successful Israeli military response would use discriminate force, making it clear through both statements and actions that Israel’s enemy is Hamas, not the Palestinian people. The Israeli government should help fleeing Gazans find somewhere to go, by either creating safe zones, helping the Egyptians to do so, or permitting regional or international actors to create a humanitarian corridor, and then allowing aid organizations to supply food and water to trapped civilians. Even in the north, they must avoid targeting Gazan hospitals from which the injured cannot be moved. Hamas will use those people as human shields—and when they do, such barbarity toward their own people will sap the group’s ability to mobilize wider support. The Israel Defense Forces will be fighting street to street; Hamas will not hold them off for long regardless.

No one is asking for a new Israeli-Palestinian peace process now, but Israeli leaders must stop actively encouraging West Bank settlements to expand, a process that has gradually snuffed out any hope of a two-state solution. Israel must give the Palestinian Authority a reason to stand aside during this fight; otherwise, Israel will be flanked by fighting in both Palestinian territories. Israel must lean on its international partners to urge Iran not to encourage attacks by Hezbollah. The United States has already warned Tehran and the terrorist group not to attack Israel and has sent a carrier strike force to the region to deter them and any other parties from joining the conflict. Steps such as U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s tour of six Arab countries and discussions with Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas can help, but only if Israel does not further inflame its enemies with indiscriminate killing in Gaza.

Finally, the Israelis must come together politically, not just militarily. Before the attacks, Netanyahu’s efforts to weaken Israel’s judiciary had divided the public and produced pushback among some military reservists and even some senior members of the security establishment, arguably making the country more vulnerable to attack. Without a clear endgame, a renewed occupation of Gaza could further split the country. Netanyahu has created an emergency unity government with one of his rivals, the former army general Benny Gantz. But Netanyahu has refused to fully sideline the far-right members of his coalition, suggesting that he is still unwilling to move past the divisive politics that paralyzed Israel and possibly invited this Hamas assault. Only a truly unified political leadership will fortify Israel’s democracy for the difficult military operations ahead, giving it the domestic mandate necessary to build a winning strategy and end Hamas for good.

How Israel Can Win

Defeating Hamas Will Require a Strategy That Goes Beyond Revenge

By Audrey Kurth Cronin

October 15, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Audrey Kurth Cronin · October 15, 2023

Even in the wretched history of terrorism, the assault that Hamas carried out in Israel on October 7 stands out. Hamas fighters viciously murdered more than 1,300 Israeli citizens, including elderly people, toddlers, and babies. It was an act of intimate barbarism that revealed a total lack of moral restraint and evoked memories of the Holocaust.

Comparisons to another surprise attack on Israel—the Arab assault that launched the 1973 Yom Kippur War—are misleading in one important respect: the 2,656 Israelis who died then were exclusively soldiers. One must go back to the 1948 War of Independence to find comparable Israeli civilian casualties. The attack also involved hostage-taking on a massive scale, with roughly 150 people (mainly Israelis, but also Americans and other foreign nationals) captured and taken to Gaza; one Hamas leader vowed that the group would distribute video recordings of hostage executions if Israel launched a counterattack.

There is no defending or explaining such sadism. Repeated injustice and repression cannot excuse atrocity. Israelis’ outrage and desire for vengeance is understandable. Israel’s goal, according to Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, is to wipe Hamas “off the face of the earth.” Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesperson Emmanuel Nahshon called for “the complete and unequivocal defeat of the enemy, at any cost.”

But, as the saying goes, “Hope is not a strategy”—and neither is anger. Destroying an enemy’s fighting force is a core principle of military strategy, but killing with little discrimination or restraint places revenge ahead of logic. Instead of merely reacting, Israel must make hard strategic and political choices not because it is weak but because it is strong. As the United States learned after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, how a government responds to a major terrorist attack can set a country’s trajectory for decades. And although this attack was particularly gruesome, it was not unprecedented. In 2008, the Pakistan-based jihadi group Lashkar-e-Taiba launched an assault on Mumbai that likewise came from land and sea, involved armed strikes against soft targets, and killed many civilians (though not as many as the Hamas attack). Even as Israeli officials lament, they can learn from what other governments have done in the aftermath of massive terrorist assaults.

Terrorism is incredibly challenging for democracies because it is an accelerator for war. Elected leaders must regain the upper hand and replace fear with resolve. Dispassionate strategic thinking in the aftermath of terrorist attacks is difficult, but it is the only way to end a group—which Israel says it wants to do. The history of modern counterterrorism holds a clear lesson: only through the strict targeting of a terrorist organization can a state permanently crush it and avoid a wider conflict. For that reason, in addition to using its traditional playbook of airstrikes, targeting leaders, and deploying troops, Israel must protect innocent civilians, including Israeli hostages. This is not merely a matter of morality and law; it is a strategic imperative. If it conducts this campaign in a way that targets all Gazans, Israel risks a calamitous failure.

DOES HAMAS HAVE A STRATEGY?

Hamas’s foundational aim is the eradication of Israel. But Hamas does not have the means to directly bring about Israel’s demise. To believe otherwise would be delusional; Israel is militarily strong and has the backing of the United States. So what did Hamas think this bloodshed would achieve?

All terrorist groups adopt at least one (and sometimes two) of the following strategies: compellence, polarization, provocation, and mobilization. A superficial reading of the October 7 assault might suggest that Hamas sought to compel Israel to alter its behavior by inflicting pain—as Hezbollah did in 1983 with its attacks on American and French personnel and civilians in Beirut, which led Washington and Paris to withdraw their forces from Lebanon. But compellence does not fit the context of today’s Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Israel withdrew its forces from Gaza in 2005, and no Israeli policy change could advance Hamas’s long-term goal. What is more, if all Hamas wanted to do was kill Israelis, its fighters would not have filmed their operations or taken hostages, actions that reflect the fact that the attack on Israel was aimed at audiences beyond the Israelis and was thus advancing a strategy other than compellence.

Terrorist groups often attempt to polarize the polities they target, carrying out attacks that will pit one part of society against another and hoping that the state will rot from within. Examples of this include the Armed Islamic Group’s atrocities in the late 1990s against entire Algerian villages full of civilians who rejected their extremist principles, and suicide attacks that al Qaeda in Iraq launched in Shiite strongholds and against moderate Sunnis from 2004 to 2006. But Israeli society was already deeply divided politically before the Hamas attack—which, if anything, has at least partially unified Israel. Hamas did not need to polarize Israeli society; in recent years, the Israelis have accomplished that feat themselves.

Hamas is likely hoping for an Israeli overreaction.

What Hamas was trying to do, instead, was to provoke and mobilize. Terrorists often try to provoke states into counterproductive overreactions. The nineteenth-century Russian group Narodnaya Volya used provocation effectively to undermine the tsarist regime, by killing Tsar Alexander II, which inspired a brutal state response. Killing the tsar also killed Narodnaya Volya, but the regime was unable to reform, and 30 years later the Russian Revolution overthrew it. Many other groups followed Narodnaya Volya’s example, notably the Black Hand, the Serbian nationalist group that lit the fuse of World War I by assassinating the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914.

In the present case, Hamas is likely hoping that an Israeli overreaction might reverse the diplomatic momentum toward “normalization” in the Middle East, which has seen a number of Gulf Arab states start to align with Israel even in the absence of any Israeli concessions to the Palestinians. An Israeli overreaction might also increase the chances that Hezbollah and its patrons in Iran will join the fray.

Mobilization strategies, meanwhile, seek to grab attention, draw recruits, and gather allies for a terrorist group’s cause. ISIS did that in 2014, carrying out some basic functions of government in the parts of Iraq and Syria it conquered to create the appearance of order, and also carrying out gruesome videotaped beheadings of hostages to create an image of uncompromising, fearsome severity. Seeming to take a page from the ISIS playbook, Hamas has threatened to kill a hostage each time Israel targets “people who are safe in their homes without prior warning,” in the words of Abu Obeida, a spokesperson for the Hamas military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades. Obeida also suggested that the group would broadcast the executions, probably on social media. Hamas leaders may be calculating that such ultraviolent spectacles would bring further attention to their cause and mobilize support—not only among Palestinians but also among sympathizers and anti-Semitic extremists throughout the region and around the world. In the long run, preying on humanity’s basest instincts through spectacles of dominance and vengeance will cause a global backlash and destroy Hamas. But, like ISIS before it, the group may believe that such tactics will buttress it in the short term.

THE RETURN OF THE REPRESSED

Facing an opponent that relies on provocation and mobilization, Israel has a limited number of strategic options. The one it seems to have chosen is repression, a time-honored but rarely successful approach to counterterrorism.

An overwhelming military response can successfully repress a terrorist group. In 2009, the Sri Lanka army crushed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, an ethnic separatist group of some 10,000 to 15,000 members, in the process killing up to 40,000 civilians, according to the United Nations. That paroxysm of ethnic cleansing and extrajudicial killings devolved into a gruesome civil war, trapping Tamil civilians in the violence. Many remain internally displaced, with thousands of victims unaccounted for. In the 1990s, the Peruvian government defeated the Shining Path, a Maoist revolutionary terrorist group, by using indiscriminate military force. But Peruvian democracy suffered: President Alberto Fujimori dissolved Congress and the judiciary, setting in motion a process that routinized extreme policies and eventually led to his own downfall. (Sendero Luminoso, meanwhile, survived as a political party.)

Repression has also been Russia’s preferred counterterrorism strategy. In 1999, when authorities blamed a series of bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk on Chechen terrorists, President Vladimir Putin vowed to “flush the Chechens down the toilet” and used the crisis to consolidate his power. He launched a vicious campaign that leveled the Chechen city of Grozny, killed at least 25,000 civilians, and displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians. Chechen terrorism was significantly diminished but not eradicated altogether: in 2002, Chechen terrorists took 912 hostages in a Moscow theater (175 people ultimately died), and two years later murdered 344 people, mostly children, at an elementary school in North Ossetia.

Repression is a natural response to terrorism, and countries in every part of the world have resorted to repressive means before eventually learning more effective strategies. As a form of counterterrorism, repression is especially difficult for democracies to sustain, and it usually does not result in the destruction of its target. Repression also exacts an enormous cost in money, casualties, and individual rights, and works best in places where the members of terrorist groups can be separated from the broader population. Using overwhelming force tends to disperse the threat to neighboring region. So when Israeli government officials speak of destroying Hamas “at any cost,” one wonders whether they are considering not only the certain costs to Hamas, Gazan civilians, the hostages, Palestinians in the West Bank, and Israeli Arabs but also the potential long-term costs to regional stability, Israeli democracy, and Jewish Israelis.

Israel is hurtling toward a lose-lose outcome.

Repression succeeds under certain conditions, but the situation in Gaza does not meet them. It will be impossible to kill Hamas leaders and fighters without causing huge numbers of civilian deaths, displacing hundreds of thousands, and immiserating the entire population of Gaza. These outcomes are already evident. Some 1,900 Gazans have already died in Israeli retaliatory airstrikes. Meanwhile, Israel has imposed a siege, cutting off supplies of electricity, food, and water to Gaza with apparent disregard for the effects on the vast majority of Gazans, who have nothing to do with Hamas. (“We are fighting human animals and we act accordingly,” Gallant remarked by way of justification—employing precisely the kind of dehumanizing rhetoric that Hamas’s strategy of provocation aims to generate.)

On October 13, Israel ordered 1.1 million Gazans to evacuate to the south of the territory or face the brutal consequences of an Israeli military campaign they might not survive, thus creating more conducive conditions for repression but also risking a full-scale humanitarian disaster. The only way to leave Gaza now is through the Rafah transit point on the Egypt-Gaza border. But Israel has repeatedly hit that crossing with airstrikes in recent days, making it difficult for anyone to cross safely or to bring in humanitarian aid or medical supplies, which are already exhausted.

If thousands more civilians die as a result of Israel’s response, Hamas (or whatever group takes its place) will publicize those deaths to build support and set off another cycle of violence that occupying Israeli troops will struggle to contain. Israeli commentators have called this a zero-sum situation: any loss for Hamas is a gain for Israel, they believe. But as the war unfolds, Israel is hurtling toward a lose-lose outcome.

HOW TO WIN BY NOT LOSING

Overwhelming military oppression in Gaza would backfire, stirring support for resistance and aligning Israel’s adversaries against it. A more nuanced political strategy would divide them. Israeli leaders must make clear that their enemies are the 30,000 Hamas fighters in Gaza, especially the Qassam Brigades, and not the two million other residents of Gaza. To legitimize its barbarity, Hamas has claimed that every Israeli is a combatant, just as al Qaeda and ISIS did in their campaigns in the West and in the Middle East. Israel must avoid doing the same thing and make clear that it is specifically targeting Hamas.

A successful Israeli military response would use discriminate force, making it clear through both statements and actions that Israel’s enemy is Hamas, not the Palestinian people. The Israeli government should help fleeing Gazans find somewhere to go, by either creating safe zones, helping the Egyptians to do so, or permitting regional or international actors to create a humanitarian corridor, and then allowing aid organizations to supply food and water to trapped civilians. Even in the north, they must avoid targeting Gazan hospitals from which the injured cannot be moved. Hamas will use those people as human shields—and when they do, such barbarity toward their own people will sap the group’s ability to mobilize wider support. The Israel Defense Forces will be fighting street to street; Hamas will not hold them off for long regardless.

No one is asking for a new Israeli-Palestinian peace process now, but Israeli leaders must stop actively encouraging West Bank settlements to expand, a process that has gradually snuffed out any hope of a two-state solution. Israel must give the Palestinian Authority a reason to stand aside during this fight; otherwise, Israel will be flanked by fighting in both Palestinian territories. Israel must lean on its international partners to urge Iran not to encourage attacks by Hezbollah. The United States has already warned Tehran and the terrorist group not to attack Israel and has sent a carrier strike force to the region to deter them and any other parties from joining the conflict. Steps such as U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s tour of six Arab countries and discussions with Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas can help, but only if Israel does not further inflame its enemies with indiscriminate killing in Gaza.

Finally, the Israelis must come together politically, not just militarily. Before the attacks, Netanyahu’s efforts to weaken Israel’s judiciary had divided the public and produced pushback among some military reservists and even some senior members of the security establishment, arguably making the country more vulnerable to attack. Without a clear endgame, a renewed occupation of Gaza could further split the country. Netanyahu has created an emergency unity government with one of his rivals, the former army general Benny Gantz. But Netanyahu has refused to fully sideline the far-right members of his coalition, suggesting that he is still unwilling to move past the divisive politics that paralyzed Israel and possibly invited this Hamas assault. Only a truly unified political leadership will fortify Israel’s democracy for the difficult military operations ahead, giving it the domestic mandate necessary to build a winning strategy and end Hamas for good.

• AUDREY KURTH CRONIN is Director of the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology and the author of How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns.

Foreign Affairs · by Audrey Kurth Cronin · October 15, 2023

14. A Short Story Anthology For The Joint Special Operations Community

The 192 page anthology can be downloaded here:  https://jsouapplicationstorage.blob.core.windows.net/press/464/U_Useful%20Fiction_FINAL.pdf

I worked on a project a few years ago with USSOCOM using fiction writers to try to understand how to imagine the future. I recall having a beer with Max Brooks (World War Z) who described his book research. He went to the CDC and NIH to understand the procedures for handling pandemics. His books outline these in some detail. But he said he could never write a book about panedicms and the procedures to handle them because it would be too dry. But add in Zombies and people are entertained. And through being entertained seeds of ideas can be planted and when faced with similar circumstances (pandemics not zombies) people might have some idea of how to act from their subconscious. That is one of the important contributions fiction can make.

I have not read all the stories yet but I look forward to doing so soon. I read CSM Shane Shorter's Q&A comments (“I learn and I lead through stories.” - and he mentions Steinbeck's The Moon is Down which should inspire much of our PSYOP work). 

But what really stirred my interest was this from the froward written in "2047" (100 years after the National Security Act of 1947):

Ten years ago, we celebrated SOCOM at 50, by inaugurating our formal reestablishment of The Office of Strategic Services. I offer the most important transformational evolutions we’ve made coming through the Fourth Age, is the combined “going distributed” approach to Force Design and Structure (part of our Go-Invisible Initiatives), along with this re-establishment of an OSS-like capacity and multi-composition capability. Similar to what historian Thomas F. Foy stated as the originating intent for the first OSS, our intent in this reestablishment was, “a novel attempt in American history to organize research, intelligence, geoeconomics, political and social anthropology and psychology, propaganda, subversion, and commando operations as a unified and essential feature of modern warfare competitive statecraft; civil-military intervention.”1 The original OSS left a legacy of daring and innovation that has influenced American military and intelligence thinking since World War II. In its first decade of renewed existence and operations, OSS-NEXT has begun to extend that legacy of daring and innovation. Obviously, there’s more to update you all on in closed-door session; we are eager to get behind closed doors and, with great pride, update you on the achievements of your latest investment.

A Short Story Anthology 

For The Joint Special Operations Community

Edited by August Cole and PW Singer

The Fourth Age: The Future of Special Operations

https://www.jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/239

Edited by:

August Cole, PW SInger

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Edited Volumes

Published on 10/2/2023

Out of Print

This anthology of fictional stories helps us visualize a future era of special operations. Through their creative talents and subject matter knowledge, the authors realistically portray what is within the realm of possible. They draw upon lessons of the past while imagining the future.

Topics

Fiction

15. Biden administration seeks emergency aid package for both Israel and Ukraine.

Biden administration seeks emergency aid package for both Israel and Ukraine.

The New York Times · by Karoun Demirjian · October 16, 2023

LIVE See more updates: Israel-Hamas War

Oct. 15, 2023, 9:36 p.m. ET

Aid to Ukraine lapsed last month amid Republican resistance, while aid for Israel in its war with Hamas has drawn bipartisan support in recent days.

Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, this week in Washington. Mr. Sullivan said on Sunday that President Biden will ask Congress to support a package of aid to both Israel and Ukraine.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

By

• Oct. 15, 2023, 8:57 p.m. ET

The Biden administration is pushing for Congress to take up an emergency assistance package that would pair support for Ukraine and Israel, according to a senior White House official and multiple lawmakers.

“The president has made clear that he is going to go to Congress with a package of funding for Ukraine as well as continued support for Israel,” Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, said Sunday on CBS’s “Face the Nation.”

Last month, Congress let lapse the emergency funds it had been sending to Ukraine for its war with Russia, amid dwindling Republican support for such assistance. In contrast, Hamas’s deadly raid last weekend prompted a sweeping bipartisan outcry for similar assistance to Israel. The decision to tie aid for Ukraine to aid for Israel reflects the urgency of both conflicts — and a calculation that Republicans who would otherwise be loath to send more money to Ukraine may feel bound to approve such a package to support Israel.

Speaking in Tel Aviv on Sunday, Senator Chuck Schumer, the majority leader, promised to put an aid package to a floor vote in the next few weeks.

“We’re not waiting for the House,” he told reporters after meeting with top Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his war cabinet. “We believe if we put together a strong package and pass it with an overwhelming, strong bipartisan majority, it will put pressure on the House, one way or another, to act.”

Mr. Schumer said he had discussed the package with Israeli leaders, including replacement ammunition for Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system, 155-millimeter shells, precision-guided bombs and JDAMs, kits that convert unguided bombs into precision munitions. Mr. Schumer has separately called for including humanitarian aid to Palestinians in a package of aid to Israel.

Palestinians in line to buy bread on Sunday. A humanitarian crisis has erupted in southern Gaza, where thousands of displaced people have fled.Credit...Samar Abu Elouf for The New York Times

Legislative activity in the House has been at a standstill for almost two weeks since Representative Kevin McCarthy was ousted as speaker. Most Republicans in that chamber have resisted the idea of pairing assistance for Ukraine and Israel, fearing that help for Israel might be held up by growing Republican resistance to Ukraine aid.

But Representative Mike Turner of Ohio, the chairman of the intelligence committee, noted that the package also included priority items that his fellow Republicans would be hard-pressed to vote against, such as funds to build a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border and support for Taiwan.

“They’re putting those together so that we don’t piecemeal this,” Mr. Turner said Sunday on “Face the Nation.”

Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina, who has called for a comprehensive aid package in the Senate, all but dared his House counterparts to vote against it in an appearance on NBC’s “Meet the Press” on Sunday.

“If you strip out Ukrainian aid, Russia will keep going, there will eventually be a war between NATO and Russia, and it will be a green light to China to invade Taiwan,” Mr. Graham warned.

The New York Times · by Karoun Demirjian · October 16, 2023

16. Russia releases four Ukrainian children after mediation by Qatar

Only four? How many Ukrainian children is Russia holding?

Russia releases four Ukrainian children after mediation by Qatar

The Washington Post · by Siobhán O'Grady · October 16, 2023

KYIV — Russia has agreed to free four Ukrainian children — ranging in age from 2 to 17 — and allow them to return them to their families in Ukraine after Qatar intervened as a mediator, according to a government official briefed on the matter. Two of the children are now back with relatives and two others are expected to be reunited with their families in the coming days, the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomatic negotiations, said.

Qatar’s role in the negotiations, which lasted several months, came at the request of the Ukrainian government.

The Ukrainian children passed through Qatar’s Embassy in Moscow and took different routes home. Some traveled or were scheduled to travel from Russia to Ukraine via Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Others went through Belarus.

The travel arrangements involved several types of transport, including diplomatic convoy, train and a privately chartered plane through Qatar, the official said.

“We welcome today’s positive news, about the reunification of children with their families in the Ukraine through Qatari mediation efforts,” Lolwah Al-Khater, Qatar’s minister of state for international cooperation said in a statement. In recent weeks, Qatari officials have been in “continuous dialogue with our Ukrainian and Russian counterparts,” she said.

The reunifications mark a major development in what has become one of the most contentious and sensitive issues since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

They also shine a diplomatic spotlight on Qatar. The small Gulf country has often served as a key negotiator in global crises and could play an outsize role in negotiations regarding the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, the militant group that controls the Gaza Strip.

In March, judges of the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, and accused them of war crimes, saying the two bear individual responsibility for the “unlawful deportation” and “unlawful transfer” of Ukrainian children to Russia.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov denounced the arrest warrants as “outrageous and unacceptable” but also irrelevant for Russia as a matter of law because Russia is not a party to the International Criminal Court.

At that time the warrants were issued, Ukrainian Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin said Ukraine was investigating some 16,000 cases of forced deportations of children.

Putin approved a decree in May 2022 making it easier for Russian families to adopt Ukrainian children taken from the war zone and Lvova-Belova was among the Russians to do so, adopting a boy from the besieged city of Mariupol.

Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, who also serves as foreign minister, visited Moscow in June, where he met with Putin and other high-ranking officials.

The following month, he visited Ukraine, where he met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and pledged $100 million of humanitarian aid for health, education and demining efforts. During that visit, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal publicly thanked Qatar for its willingness to mediate the return of Ukrainian children from Russia.

The full scope of the transfer of children to Russia is not clear. The official said a Ukrainian list contains the names of thousands of children while a Russian list merely has hundreds — a discrepancy that may make it difficult to find and return all of the children sought by Ukraine.

Forcibly moving children or stripping them of their identity is generally considered to be a war crime, but the ICC warrants are unlikely to result in any court appearances unless Putin or Lvova-Belova travel to a country willing to arrest them.

Putin skipped a summit meeting of leaders of the BRICS countries in South Africa in August because of concerns he might be detained. Last week, he made a rare trip abroad to Kyrgyzstan.

The four Ukrainian children returning home this week are the first to be released as part of Qatar’s negotiations because “all parties agreed they found their parents, documents all matched [and] they could be reunited,” the official said.

If all goes smoothly, the official added, it could pave the way for other returns.

Qatar News Agency photos reviewed by The Washington Post ahead of publication showed a young boy, his face blurred, sitting between his grandmother and Lvova-Belova. Other photos showed him hugging and shaking the hand of a Qatari diplomat.

The 2-year-old, who will return to the Zhytomyr region of Ukraine, was in the hospital — and just 6 months old — when Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022 and “lost contact with his mother,” according to the official.

The two have since been reunited in Russia and are expected to travel to Ukraine this week. Details of how or when the then-infant was transferred to Russian custody are unclear. Russian forces occupied some parts of Zhytomyr region in the first weeks of the war before being forced to retreat.

A 7-year-old boy, who has been staying in a children’s home in Russia, was recently reunited with his grandmother, who traveled to Russia through Estonia, the official said. The pair is now on their way back to Ukraine. The boy’s mother, who was arrested in Russia, remains in custody there. It was not clear when or why she was detained.

The group also includes a 9-year-old boy who was staying with his grandparents in Ukraine’s southern Kherson region when Russia invaded and occupied the area, including the regional capital. The boy is expected to travel back to Ukraine on Wednesday.

The 17-year-old, whose family was unable to come to Russia to retrieve her, is also expected to reunite with her relatives on Wednesday.

Some other Ukrainian children held in Russia have also been released to their parents on a case-by-case basis, usually after a relative traveled to Russia and personally escorted them home, a task that can be difficult, dangerous and financially impossible for many Ukrainian families.

The Washington Post · by Siobhán O'Grady · October 16, 2023

17. A Major Pivot in Hamas Strategy

Excerpts:

The Hamas-led attacks may have helped to achieve a long-term, broader goal of the group as well: mobilizing its allies against Israel. Designed to elicit a response so “disproportionate” from Israel that it would draw international condemnation and overshadow memories of Hamas’ own violence, the operation could — by Hamas’ reasoning — bring others to its side. Haniyeh’s Oct. 7 statement noted that “the battle has to do with the land of Palestine, Jerusalem, and the al-Aqsa Mosque, it is the battle of the entire ‘umma’ [world Muslim community].” Hamas, then, is hoping that its allies in the Muslim world will join this fight as well.

Hamas is firmly aware that it cannot defeat Israel on its own — and aware of Israeli statements heralding a decapitation campaign against the group’s leadership — and thus is seeking to rally others in the hopes of achieving “horizontal escalation.” Such escalation could include a potential war with Hizballah in the north, uprisings in the West Bank, internal struggles fomented by Arab citizens of Israel, and targeting of both Israeli and Jewish targets abroad. In the immediate days after the attack, such trends appear to be surfacing.

Moreover, despite its slightly softer rhetoric in recent years, resistance has remained a core principle for Hamas, which notes in its updated 2017 document, “Resistance and jihad for the liberation of Palestine will remain a legitimate right, a duty, and an honor for all the sons and daughters of our people and our umma.” Hamas remains committed to its original goal — leading the Palestinian people in a violent struggle against Israel by any means necessary.

Through its recent actions, Hamas has made clear to all that lasting Middle East peace cannot happen without addressing the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The group has also made clear that the rift between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority effectively precludes the possibility of peace. “Gaza is the pillar of resistance,” Haniyeh proclaimed in a speech on Oct. 7, showing once again his view that the Gaza leadership is the true champion of the Palestinians.

While the situation in the region remains fluid, Hamas clearly wanted to demonstrate that it — not the Palestinian Authority and not Arab governments normalizing with Israel — is the most important actor on these issues in the region.

A Major Pivot in Hamas Strategy - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Devorah Margolin · October 16, 2023

The Oct. 7 attack launched by Hamas — along with other factions including Palestinian Islamic Jihad — was unprecedented in its nature and scope, as news reports have made clear in the days since. On the Israeli side, the death toll from the initial attack passed 1,300 as of Friday, and thousands more have been injured. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are estimated to have also kidnapped more than 100 Israelis, mostly civilians, and transported them into the coastal territory. In response, Israel has launched airstrikes in Gaza, with casualties reaching 2750.

The Hamas-led attack, in turn a massive intelligence failure for Israel, not only was well-planned (and well-supported), but also constitutes a major deviation in Hamas strategy since the group took control of Gaza in 2007. Built on violence, Hamas declared in its 1988 charter that “there is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad.” However, for the past 16 years, Hamas has worked to present itself to the international community as a legitimate political entity. While it has never stopped espousing violence in pursuit of jihad, it has also garnered popular support through social services and governance in Gaza and has implemented a well-laid strategic communications strategy that has highlighted both its internal governance and foreign policy.

Historically, in its violent attacks, Hamas has generally targeted adults, whom the group sees as legitimate targets. Though it has also indiscriminately targeted civilians through rocket attacks or suicide bombings, the group views these civilian casualties as collateral damage. This time, however, was different. The group’s decision to explicitly target vulnerable groups like children and the elderly last weekend seemingly represents a major pivot in Hamas’ strategy.

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This pivot will have reverberating ramifications. The Hamas attack highlights that any illusions surrounding Hamas’ legitimacy have been shattered. That being said, while the group may initially lose popular support for its cause due to the graphic nature of its actions, this attack could also play into Hamas’ desired outcome, the creation of horizontal escalation against Israel, rallying others to its side.

Who Is Hamas?

Hamas’ 1988 charter declares the group “one of the wings of Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine” while also calling itself “a distinguished Palestinian movement.” Today it remains the only Brotherhood-linked group that has not denounced violence. As a Brotherhood-inspired group, Hamas believes in using existing political institutions to garner power and authority, while simultaneously establishing a social service infrastructure and conducting missionary work to gain popular support. It was this approach that later helped the group take part in, and win, Palestinian elections.

Yet violence has always been a driving part of the group and its goals. As Article 12 of the 1988 Hamas charter notes,

Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, is part of the religious creed. Nothing in nationalism is more significant or deeper than in the case when an enemy should tread Muslim land. Resisting and quelling the enemy become the individual duty of every Muslim, male or female. A woman can go out to fight the enemy without her husband’s permission, and so does the slave: without his master’s permission.

Hamas’ language appears to be a nod toward Abdallah Azzam’s infamous fatwa on the individual duty of jihad. Azzam, a Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood member, later went on to inspire the likes of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, with both groups citing similar language in their justifications for violence.

Since its inception, Hamas’ military wing has kept up militaristic operations over the years, targeting civilians and military alike. This includes a wave of suicide bombings — by male and later female perpetrators — in Israel, during the first and second intifadas, including twin 1996 suicide bombings on buses in Jerusalem that killed 45 and a 2002 Netanya hotel attack that killed 30. The group has also taken adult male hostages into Gaza in the past, including Gilad Shalit, who was released in a prisoner exchange between Hamas and Israel for approximately 1,000 prisoners in Israeli jails after five years in captivity.

Despite this, the group’s political wing has spent decades trying to portray itself as a legitimate political entity that is actively engaged in governance and puts forth a clear foreign policy. This is specifically true since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007, following an election victory and subsequent deadly conflict with Fatah, which controls the West Bank. Since wresting control of Gaza, the group has strived to portray itself as a legitimate political actor and representative of Palestinians in Gaza. The group even operated social media accounts to engage with the general public, including an official Twitter account that in 2015 Tweeted, “Hamas respects human rights; that is part of our ideology and dogma.”

This was further highlighted by the rhetorical shift in its May 2017 “Document of General Principles and Policies,” in which Hamas dropped reference to its Brotherhood roots and presented itself as a more “centrist” alternative to global jihadist organizations like the Islamic State and secular nationalist groups like the Palestine Liberation Organization. While still reminding its supporters “resistance and jihad for the liberation of Palestine will remain a legitimate right, a duty and an honour for all the sons and daughters of our people and our Ummah,” the group also highlighted that it believes in “managing its Palestinian relations on the basis of pluralism, democracy, national partnership, acceptance of the other and the adoption of dialogue” and for the first time acknowledged the possibility of a Palestinian state drawn along the borders that existed in 1967.

Hamas’ Shift

The explicit targeted killing and kidnapping of civilians beginning on Oct. 7 – which U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin called “worse than ISIS,” then, baldly contradicts Hamas’ articulated revised political strategy. This disjuncture may reflect an ongoing struggle between the Gaza-based military leadership, which led the attack, and the political leadership, led by the Qatar-based Ismail Haniyeh, who watched the attack on TV. This disconnect may also reflect a gross misunderstanding of the group and its goals in the West.

While the group has struck civilians over the years, those attacks have mainly targeted adults, whom the group sees as legitimate targets due to Israeli military draft laws. To Hamas, all Israeli adults are military targets. Hamas has also indiscriminately targeted civilians through rocket attacks or suicide bombings, in which they view civilian casualties as collateral damage. But in transitioning to a governance role, the group had sought to portray itself as a changed entity, one less focused on violence. One academic study (written by this author) examining the group’s Twitter account found that between 2015 and 2018, the group mostly Tweeted about its internal governance and foreign policy, with the smallest focus on “resistance.”

The recent operation obliterates any Hamas claims to legitimacy as a political actor. Over 35 years, the group has never undertaken an operation of such scale, and it has not explicitly targeted vulnerable groups like children or the elderly. Moreover, the taking of children and elderly hostages into Gaza is a first for the group, which to this point has only taken male hostages over the age of 18. Images emerging from Gaza highlight the abuse of many current detainees, and recent statements from the al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, highlight the potential for extrajudicial killings of civilians in response to Israeli airstrikes, once again running counter to Hamas’ attempts to gain legitimacy.

The question is, why would Hamas decide to pivot from its status quo? Here, potential answers include a desire to thwart normalization between Arab States and Israel, especially the U.S.-brokered talks involving Saudi Arabia; to exploit U.S. deprioritization of Middle East policy, except that involving Iran, in favor of China and Russia; and to challenge the current right-wing Israeli government and its policies.

Reports indicate that both Iran and its proxy in Lebanon, Hizballah, appear to have backed or at least supported the Hamas-led operation, highlighting the potential for second and third fronts to open in the coming weeks. Tensions along the Lebanon-Israel border already appear to be boiling over. Iran is aware that it is increasingly isolated in the face of the Abraham Accords, where the United States has pursued normalization between Arab States and Israel, and that the United States is simultaneously deprioritizing the region in terms of foreign policy. As such, Iran appears to have taken the opportunity to carry out a destabilization strategy.

While Iran’s role has not yet been confirmed, after the initial attack, an al-Qassam Brigades video from 2014 resurfaced, praising Iran for providing weapons, money, and equipment. Hamas, while acknowledging Iran’s apparent support, has also emphasized that last weekend’s attacks were primarily a homegrown initiative, with Hamas official Mahmoud Mirdawi reiterating that the group planned the attacks on its own: “This is a Palestinian and Hamas decision.”

The Hamas-led attacks may have helped to achieve a long-term, broader goal of the group as well: mobilizing its allies against Israel. Designed to elicit a response so “disproportionate” from Israel that it would draw international condemnation and overshadow memories of Hamas’ own violence, the operation could — by Hamas’ reasoning — bring others to its side. Haniyeh’s Oct. 7 statement noted that “the battle has to do with the land of Palestine, Jerusalem, and the al-Aqsa Mosque, it is the battle of the entire ‘umma’ [world Muslim community].” Hamas, then, is hoping that its allies in the Muslim world will join this fight as well.

Hamas is firmly aware that it cannot defeat Israel on its own — and aware of Israeli statements heralding a decapitation campaign against the group’s leadership — and thus is seeking to rally others in the hopes of achieving “horizontal escalation.” Such escalation could include a potential war with Hizballah in the north, uprisings in the West Bank, internal struggles fomented by Arab citizens of Israel, and targeting of both Israeli and Jewish targets abroad. In the immediate days after the attack, such trends appear to be surfacing.

Moreover, despite its slightly softer rhetoric in recent years, resistance has remained a core principle for Hamas, which notes in its updated 2017 document, “Resistance and jihad for the liberation of Palestine will remain a legitimate right, a duty, and an honor for all the sons and daughters of our people and our umma.” Hamas remains committed to its original goal — leading the Palestinian people in a violent struggle against Israel by any means necessary.

Through its recent actions, Hamas has made clear to all that lasting Middle East peace cannot happen without addressing the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The group has also made clear that the rift between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority effectively precludes the possibility of peace. “Gaza is the pillar of resistance,” Haniyeh proclaimed in a speech on Oct. 7, showing once again his view that the Gaza leadership is the true champion of the Palestinians.

While the situation in the region remains fluid, Hamas clearly wanted to demonstrate that it — not the Palestinian Authority and not Arab governments normalizing with Israel — is the most important actor on these issues in the region.

Become a Member

Devorah Margolin is the Blumenstein-Rosenbloom fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Devorah Margolin · October 16, 2023

18. War Books, Harding Project Special Edition: On Writing

Some excellent resources here.

 I would add these from the late John Collins (AKA The Warlord).

"Warlord's Writing Tips"

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/736-collins1.pdf

“Sharp Pens Sharpen Swords” 

http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/Collins_Prof_Writing.doc

"Strategic and Tactical Paper Pushing"

https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/Collins_0209.pdf

"The Warlord on Careers in National Security: Seven Forks in the Road"

https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/the-warlord-on-careers-in-national-security-seven-forks-in-the-road/

War Books, Harding Project Special Edition: On Writing - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by John Amble · October 13, 2023

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Editor’s note: Welcome to another installment of our weekly War Books series! The premise is simple and straightforward. We invite a participant to recommend five books and tell us what sets each one apart. War Books is a resource for MWI readers who want to learn more about important subjects related to modern war and are looking for books to add to their reading lists.

This week’s installment is inspired by the recently launched Harding Project, which aims to reinvigorate the Army’s professional journals and inspire a culture of writing within the service. MWI editorial director John Amble shares five reading recommendations that will help make you a better writer and enhance the contributions you can make through writing to the Army profession.

A month ago, three of the US Army’s most senior leaders issued a clarion call to the service’s men and women in uniform. General Randy George, the Army’s chief of staff, General Gary Brito, commanding general of Training and Doctrine Command, and Sergeant Major of the Army Michael Weimer described the need to strengthen the Army profession. Key to doing so, they argued, is “building expertise through written discourse.”

Their message is clear: the Army needs leaders at all levels to share their ideas. “We know those ideas are out there,” they wrote. “We see them every time we talk with soldiers, whether at home station, at the combat training centers, or on deployment.” It is a professional service—even a professional obligation—then, to write. Have an idea about the specific capabilities that will be required on the future battlefield? Put pen to paper. Have thoughts about the future of your branch? Share them. Want to engage with doctrinal concepts and explore how they should be implemented by your unit? Start typing.

Of course, writing for publication is a new experience for many, one that can be intimidating. But it doesn’t have to be. Professional writing is a journey. The first steps don’t need to be perfect—they just need to be in the right direction. The following books and other resources will help you make sure that they are.

On Writing Well: The Classic Guide to Writing Nonfiction, by William Zinsser

If I could only include one book on this list, Zinsser’s volume would be it. Its advice is simple and straightforward, and it identifies key principles that will improve your writing, no matter the subject. I’ve had my copy for fifteen years, it’s full of underlined sections and notes in the margins, and it is the book I most frequently take off my shelves—by a mile. If you read it and follow its guidance, your writing will become crisper, smoother, and ultimately more impactful.

Working, by Robert Caro

Caro is best known for his biographies of Robert Moses (1,344 pages) and Lyndon Johnson (four volumes, with a fifth yet to be released). The length of his works is matched by his remarkable economy of words—over thousands of pages, a reader is hard-pressed to find anything superfluous. In his writing there is craftsmanship, honed by practice and a commitment to the work. There are shortcuts available to writers, but the best writing doesn’t take them. This book will inspire you to produce your best.

On Writing: A Memoir of the Craft, by Stephen King

This is another classic in the how-to-write genre. King is, of course, best known as a fiction writer, but there’s no reason you can’t learn lessons on nonfiction writing from a novelist. In fact, you should look for lessons there. Like fiction, nonfiction writing should also tell a story. It should create a narrative thread that carries the analysis or argument through to its conclusion. And it should be engaging and accessible, even if the subject matter is dense or technical. The book is split into five parts, and while I recommend it in its entirety, two in particular stand out. The second part will motivate you write. The third will give you a practical set of tools with which to do so.

“Starting Professional Writing: A Harding Project How-To,” by Zachary Griffiths

I mentioned above the call for professional writing issued by the Army’s senior leaders. That’s why the Harding Project was recently launched. It aims to strengthen the culture of professional writing in the Army and revitalize the service’s journals as spaces for military professionals to engage in dialogue, exchange ideas, and work collaboratively to strengthen the Army and its preparedness for the challenges it will face in the future. This concise article is packed with tips that will help you contribute to the Army profession by writing.

Anything You Like!

It sounds like a platitude, but the more you read the better you’ll write. Some of that improvement will happen unconsciously as you process the way others use words to tell stories and share ideas. But there’s also an important deliberate effort to this. If you enjoy an author’s work, ask yourself why. Is the writing well organized? Does the author do something to grab your attention and hold it? Is there a lyrical quality to the sentence structure that makes it easy and enjoyable to read? Identify those things that you appreciate and emulate them.

John Amble is the editorial director of the Modern War Institute at West Point.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. Jeremiah Meaney, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by John Amble · October 13, 2023

19. What Friends Owe Friends

Excerpts;

Yet if attempting a negotiation in the near term would be futile or worse, U.S. diplomacy must still begin the work of building a context for negotiation. A political track involving Israel and Palestinians remains essential. Without it, further normalization between Israel and its Arab neighbors will prove difficult, since Saudi Arabia is more likely now than previously to condition normalization on Israeli policy toward the Palestinians. More important, Israel cannot remain a secure, prosperous, democratic, and Jewish state unless there is, before too long, a Palestinian state alongside of it. The indefinite continuation of the status quo—what might be called a one-state nonsolution—threatens all of those attributes.

The United States should urge Israel, first in private, then in public if necessary, to orient its policy around building the context for a viable Palestinian partner to emerge over time. By contrast, Israeli policy has in recent years seemed intent on undermining the Palestinian Authority so as to be able to say there is no partner for peace. The aim should be to demonstrate that what Hamas offers is a dead end—but also, just as important, that there is a better alternative for those willing to reject violence and accept Israel. That would mean putting sharp limits on settlement activity in the West Bank; articulating final-status principles that would include a Palestinian state; and specifying stringent but still reasonable conditions that the Palestinians could meet to achieve that aim.

Getting there would require a willingness on Washington's part to take an active hand in the process and to state U.S. views publicly, even if it means distancing the United States from Israeli policy. U.S. officials will need to speak directly and honestly to their Israeli counterparts. Curiously, the Biden administration has been much more forceful in reacting to Israeli judicial reform and matters of internal politics than to Israel’s approach to the Palestinian issue. But it needs to have the type of conversations with Israel that only the United States, Israel’s closest partner, can have. As significant a threat as the proposed judicial reform was (and is) to Israel’s democracy, events of the past week have revealed that an unresolved Palestinian issue poses a far greater one.

What Friends Owe Friends

Why Washington Should Restrain Israeli Military Action in Gaza—and Preserve a Path to Peace

By Richard Haass

October 15, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Richard Haass · October 15, 2023

Israel’s desire to destroy Hamas once and for all is entirely understandable. The terrorist group’s October 7 attacks resulted in the deaths of more than 1,300 Israelis, injuries to thousands more, and the seizure of some 150 hostages; most of those killed, injured, or abducted were civilians. The attacks also raised the question of how Hamas can be deterred from carrying out similar attacks in the future.

But just because an objective is understandable does not mean that pursuing it is the optimal or even advisable path, and Israel’s apparent strategy is flawed in both ends and means. Hamas is as much a network, a movement, and an ideology as much as it is an organization. Its leadership can be killed, but the entity or something like it will survive.

Israel has begun airstrikes on Gaza, and there is a good deal of evidence that it is preparing for a large-scale land invasion. This puts Washington in a difficult position. The Biden administration is correct in supporting Israel’s right to retaliate, but it still must try to shape how that retaliation unfolds. The United States cannot force Israel to forgo a massive ground invasion or to curtail one soon after launching it, but U.S. policymakers can and should try. They should also take steps to reduce the chances the war will widen. And they must look beyond the crisis, pressing their Israeli counterparts to offer Palestinians a viable peaceful path to statehood.

The case for the United States working to shape Israel’s response to the crisis and its aftermath rests not just on the reality that good if tough advice is what friends owe one another. The United States has interests in the Middle East and beyond that would not be well served by an Israeli invasion and occupation of Gaza nor by longer-term Israeli policies that offer no hope to Palestinians who reject violence. Such U.S. aims are sure to make for difficult conversations and politics. But the alternative—a wider war and the indefinite continuation of an unsustainable status quo—would be far more difficult and dangerous.

ENDS AND MEANS

The first argument against a large-scale invasion is that its costs would almost certainly outweigh any benefits. Hamas does not present good military targets, as it has deeply embedded its military infrastructure in civilian areas of Gaza. An attempt to destroy it would require a large-scale assault in a densely populated urban environment, which would prove costly for Israel and lead to civilian casualties that would generate support for Hamas among Palestinians. Israel would also suffer extensive casualties, and additional soldiers could be abducted. If there is a historical analogy, it is closer to the U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq than to what Israel accomplished in its 1967 and 1973 wars.

Employing massive force against Gaza (as opposed to more targeted action against Hamas) would also prompt an international outcry. Further normalization with Arab governments, above all Saudi Arabia, would be stalled; Israel’s existing relationships with its Arab neighbors would be put on hold or possibly even reversed. A large, prolonged military undertaking could also lead to a wider regional war, sparked either by a conscious decision by Hezbollah (urged on by Iran) to launch rockets against Israel or by spontaneous outbreaks of violence in the West Bank aimed at Israelis or at the Arab governments (especially those in Jordan and Egypt) long at peace with Israel.

The Biden administration must try to shape how Israel’s retaliation unfolds.

Even if Israel crushed Hamas, what would follow? There is no alternative authority available to take its place. The Palestinian Authority, which oversees the West Bank, lacks legitimacy, capacity, and standing in Gaza. No Arab government is prepared to step in and take responsibility for Gaza. Hamas or a facsimile would soon emerge, as happened after Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005.

None of this is to argue Israel should not act against Hamas. To the contrary, it must. Like any country, Israel has the right of self-defense, which allows it to strike terrorists who have attacked or are preparing to attack wherever they are. In addition, Israel must demonstrate the price to be paid by those who conduct such horrific attacks. How the Hamas attacks are answered, however, is a separate question. A different option would be to eschew a large-scale invasion and occupation of Gaza and instead carry out targeted strikes against Hamas leaders and fighters; Hamas’s military potential would be degraded, and Israeli military and Palestinian civilian casualties alike would be kept to a minimum. Israel should also re-establish military capabilities along its border with Gaza, which would help restore deterrence and make future terrorist attacks less likely.

The Biden administration has banked enormous goodwill with the Israeli government and people as a result of President Joe Biden’s extraordinary October 10 speech; Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Israel last week; and the decision to supply Israel with what it needs militarily. Mario Cuomo, who served as the governor of New York, once remarked that a politician campaigns in poetry but governs in prose. Biden’s speech was poetry, but the time has come for prose, best delivered in private. Both the United States and Israel should want to avoid an outcome that involves Israel being pressured into a cease-fire amid broad condemnation regionally and globally. Arab governments, including Saudi Arabia, could reinforce that message as well as help to facilitate the release of Israeli hostages and signal to Israel that normalization could proceed after the war ends if Israel is seen to have acted responsibly.

CONTAINING THE WAR

A second American goal must be to discourage any widening of the war. The biggest danger is Hezbollah, which possesses on the order of 150,000 rockets that can hit Israel, entering the fray. Again, the best way to achieve this is to persuade Israel to hold off on doing something large that will be broadly perceived as indiscriminate, as such action could create pressure—and an excuse—for Hezbollah to act.

The United States has a limited ability to keep Hezbollah at bay. Nor, as history suggests, does Israel have good options in Lebanon. But Washington could help by informing Iran that it will be held accountable for Hezbollah’s actions. That would require that the United States signal that it is prepared to inflict pain on Iran if Hezbollah attacks Israel, for example, by reducing Iran’s oil exports (now around two million barrels a day). Since much of this ends up in China, U.S. policymakers should consider letting their Chinese counterparts know that Washington is prepared to stop much of this trade by sanctioning those importing Iranian oil or, if necessary, by attacking select Iranian production or refining facilities. Beijing might be prepared to use its leverage with Iran, as the last thing the troubled Chinese economy needs is spiking energy costs. Washington should also put on indefinite hold any further relaxation of sanctions and reiterate the limits of its tolerance when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program.

Reporting thus far suggests that Iran provided strategic rather than tactical support to Hamas—that is, it trained, funded, and armed Hamas over the years, but there is as yet no intelligence indicating it designed or ordered this operation. For decades, U.S. policy has been not to draw a distinction between terrorists and those that support them with sanctuary, arms, or money. If it is determined that Iran was an active party to the Hamas attacks, Washington would have to consider further economic or even military action against it.

THE ONE-STATE NONSOLUTION

If and when the dust settles, there will be a need for sustained U.S. diplomacy, with the aim of resuscitating a two-state solution. American policymakers should point their Israeli counterparts to the lessons of Northern Ireland, where British strategy in the 1990s had two tracks. On one track, British policy was focused on establishing a large security presence and arresting or killing members of the provisional Irish Republican Army and other paramilitary groups; the British objective was to signal that violence would fail, that the IRA could not shoot its way to power.

But it was the second track that accounted for the eventual success of British policy, culminating in the 1998 Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement, which effectively ended the three decades of violence known as the Troubles. This track gave IRA leaders the chance to participate in serious negotiations that promised to bring them some of what they sought if they would eschew violence. British policy made clear that they would achieve more at the negotiating table than on the battlefield.

This analogy is not meant to suggest that a return to serious negotiations to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is possible now or even soon. The conditions necessary to make a situation ripe for diplomacy are glaringly absent. Hamas has disqualified itself as an acceptable participant in any political process, and no other Palestinian entity has the political strength to compromise (which Hamas ironically does, though without any willingness to use it). The Palestinian Authority is too weak and unpopular; even much stronger PA leaders, such as Yasir Arafat, balked at the chance of peace when far more was on the table. And Israel’s leaders have shown no more willingness to seriously negotiate. Prior to the Hamas attacks, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government had embraced policies that undermined the chance of a good-faith negotiation; the new unity government under his leadership exists to wage war, not negotiate peace. A new government with a new mandate would be needed for the latter.

Even if Israel crushed Hamas, what would follow?

Yet if attempting a negotiation in the near term would be futile or worse, U.S. diplomacy must still begin the work of building a context for negotiation. A political track involving Israel and Palestinians remains essential. Without it, further normalization between Israel and its Arab neighbors will prove difficult, since Saudi Arabia is more likely now than previously to condition normalization on Israeli policy toward the Palestinians. More important, Israel cannot remain a secure, prosperous, democratic, and Jewish state unless there is, before too long, a Palestinian state alongside of it. The indefinite continuation of the status quo—what might be called a one-state nonsolution—threatens all of those attributes.

The United States should urge Israel, first in private, then in public if necessary, to orient its policy around building the context for a viable Palestinian partner to emerge over time. By contrast, Israeli policy has in recent years seemed intent on undermining the Palestinian Authority so as to be able to say there is no partner for peace. The aim should be to demonstrate that what Hamas offers is a dead end—but also, just as important, that there is a better alternative for those willing to reject violence and accept Israel. That would mean putting sharp limits on settlement activity in the West Bank; articulating final-status principles that would include a Palestinian state; and specifying stringent but still reasonable conditions that the Palestinians could meet to achieve that aim.

Getting there would require a willingness on Washington's part to take an active hand in the process and to state U.S. views publicly, even if it means distancing the United States from Israeli policy. U.S. officials will need to speak directly and honestly to their Israeli counterparts. Curiously, the Biden administration has been much more forceful in reacting to Israeli judicial reform and matters of internal politics than to Israel’s approach to the Palestinian issue. But it needs to have the type of conversations with Israel that only the United States, Israel’s closest partner, can have. As significant a threat as the proposed judicial reform was (and is) to Israel’s democracy, events of the past week have revealed that an unresolved Palestinian issue poses a far greater one.

• RICHARD HAASS is President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Foreign Affairs · by Richard Haass · October 15, 2023

20. “IF” (Israel and Hamas)

Mon, 10/16/2023 - 9:51am

“IF”

Brigadier General (RET) Russ Howard

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/if

The word “if” is a conjunction and a noun. Its brevity belies its importance as a forecaster of important events. As a result of the Hamas invasion of Israel, several "ifs" must be weighing on the minds of US security professionals, including government officials and military leaders, particularly those in the special operations community. This is what I mean.

If, as some are reporting, Americans are being held hostage in Gaza by Hamas, many in the US electorate will be calling for the United States to rescue them.

If, as the Wall Street Journal is reporting, Iran is behind the Hamas attacks, many in the US electorate will feel it is necessary to punish Iran in some fashion—particularly since the United States recently returned $6 billion of seized Iranian funds to the rogue theocracy.[1]

The rescue capabilities of the United States and Israel are the best in the world. However, a hostage rescue in the Gaza Strip would be no easy task. Gaza is the third most densely populated area in the world. Its two million citizens are hostile to Israel (an understatement) and to the United States. Its urban and metropolitan areas are well fortified, and, by its own admission, Hamas uses schools and hospitals in Gaza as shields for rocket launchers and military formations. It is more than likely that Hamas will now use the hostages as human shields.

The rough terrain is only part of the problem in conducting a rescue. There are four generally accepted principles that are essential to a successful hostage rescue mission: intelligence, deception, surprise, and the operators’ skill. One out of these four—operators’ skill—does not guarantee success. There also will be no surprise, as Hamas will know the hostage rescuers are coming and they want them to come—that is why they took hostages in the first place! Deception also will be difficult. Misleading Hamas about the hostage rescue operations would be nearly impossible because, again, Hamas will know the rescuers are coming. And, unlike the rescuers, Hamas knows exactly where the hostages are. Finally, the intelligence is questionable…very questionable. One of the major questions being asked by all is, How did Israeli intelligence not see this coming? The follow-on question will certainly be, is the location of the hostages known? For all the stated reasons and more, a hostage rescue operation in Gaza will be no easy task.

One can understand the hesitation of the Biden administration to accuse Iran of being an accomplice to the Hamas invasion. Raising the temperature at this early stage could be counter-productive, particularly until more of the facts are known. However, if subsequent reports confirm Iran’s support for Hamas and its possible culpability in the attack, many US citizens will be disappointed if Iran merely receives a diplomatic tongue-lashing. 

Many questions resonate. Where did Hamas get the thousands of rockets now raining down on Israel? Did Iran, as the Wall Street Journal reported, actually help Hamas plan the attack? More importantly, did Iran assist in the attack? Most of the tactics employed by Hamas—using fast boats, taking hostages, and swarming an adversary—are known Iranian tactics. As one senior US military official reported to NBC, “The sophistication and the complexity of the attack seems beyond what Hamas could do on its own.”[2]

Iran’s possible motivation seems clear. First, both the US and Israeli political establishments are in disarray, which is an opportune time for Iran to act aggressively. Second, many speculate that Iran acted now against Israel to stifle ongoing peace negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Rapprochement between the long-time adversaries would shake Iran to its core. 

So, what is the United States to do? The US response to the hostage situation will depend on the details. If American hostages are being held in Gaza it’s one thing; if they are being mistreated it is another altogether. If the American hostages are being subjected to anything like the massacre and mutilation Hamas inflicted on the Israeli citizenry this past weekend, it would—in this author’s view—demand an immediate US response. A US response to any involvement by Iran would also depend on the details. If the Iranians helped plan the attack, that would be one thing. It would be quite another if they directed or commanded the attack.

Two things are certain, at least to this author. One is that those in the US security establishment who are calling for a reduction in US special operations personnel and funding should be rethinking their position. The other is that, if either of the scenarios highlighted in this commentary come to task, it will be US special operators who either provide or aggressively support the nation’s response.

 [1] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-israel-hamas-strike-planning-bbe07b25

[2] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/hamas-attack-bears-hallmarks-iranian-involvement-former-us-officials-s-rcna119400

About the Author(s)

Russ Howard

Brigadier General (RET) Russ Howard is an American veteran Special Forces officer, academic, tutor, writer and counter-terrorism strategist. He is a former Special Forces Group Commander, the co-founder of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and a Distinguished Senior Fellow at Joint Special Operations University. He is also the co-editor of seven counter terrorism related books published by McGraw Hill. 

21. Experts weigh in on lessons Taiwan should learn from Israel-Hamas war

Experts weigh in on lessons Taiwan should learn from Israel-Hamas war - Focus Taiwan

focustaiwan.tw · by Link · October 16, 2023

By Sean Lin, CNA staff reporter

The swift coordinated attack on Israel by Hamas that began on Oct. 7 shocked the world and prompted discussions in Taiwan over how the island country would defend itself if China were to launch a similar attack.

In particular, experts have underlined the importance of intelligence and civil defense and offered insights into what a "saturation attack," similar to the one by Hamas, on Taiwan, would look like.

When rockets rain down

The militant group fired more than 2,000 rockets from Gaza into Israel in about 20 minutes, overwhelming Israel's famous Iron Dome air defense system.

"The threat of a rocket attack [on Taiwan] is real," said Chieh Chung (揭仲), an associate research fellow with the National Policy Foundation in Taipei, citing two reasons.

First, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been deploying rockets with a range of 150-300 kilometers, which can reach Taiwan's west coast, Chieh said.

Additionally, he said that during the large-scale military exercises China staged around Taiwan in August 2022 in retaliation to then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taipei, the PLA fired rockets into a maritime zone near the median line of the Taiwan Strait, to demonstrate its ability to carry out such an attack.

"When the number of incoming rockets reaches a certain level in a certain amount of time, no surface-to-air missile system can intercept them all. Taiwan's MIM-104 Patriot and Tien Kung (Sky Bow) systems are no different," Chieh said.

As such, he said, the assets most in need of protection would need to be prioritized to ensure they would not be paralyzed by a saturation attack involving PLA missiles or rockets, while civilian casualties would be "inevitable."

Taiwan's Air Force deploys the Tien Kung III surface-to-air missile defense system in a drill. CNA Photo August 18, 2022

Lin Ying-yu (林穎佑), an assistant professor at the Tamkang University Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, agreed that it would be impossible to intercept all incoming rockets or missiles in the event of a saturation attack.

He said what should be focused on is how to preserve and relocate troops and other key military assets so the country's armed forces can continue fighting.

Protecting the public

The prospect of Taiwan being hit by a barrage of rockets has also highlighted the issue of air raid shelters in the country.

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Legislator Wang Ting-yu (王定宇) broached the issue of the public not being aware of shelter locations and how to access them with Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng (邱國正) during an interpellation on Oct. 12.

Currently, information regarding the shelters is only accessible through scanning a QR code located in an online file named "All-Out Defense Handbook," and Wang said that not everybody knows how to do so.

To tackle this problem, Chieh recommended that agencies assign air raid shelters to be used by residents in a borough or township depending on their house numbers, with borough or village chiefs responsible for going door-to-door to deliver such information.

"Sometimes, the old way is the best way," he said.

Chieh also recommended conducting annual or biannual evacuation drills that require residents to enter their assigned air-raid shelter -- something that is not covered in Taiwan's Wan An air raid drills -- to help them become familiarized with the route.

People wait in a convenience store in Taipei after the siren for the Wan An air raid drill is sounded. CNA Photo July 25, 2022

Ho Cheng-hui (何澄輝), CEO of the privately-run civil defense education institution Kuma Academy, said although the nation has designated enough locations to act as air raid shelters, it was doubtful how many would be functional if an enemy attack occurred.

Under Taiwan's laws regarding shelters and evacuating during an airstrike, legal residential buildings with a basement are meant to be considered air raid shelters, but this has presented a host of problems, Ho said.

"Say you're walking along the street and the air raid siren is sounded, but the nearest building to you is a luxury condominium. Would the caretaker let you in?" he asked.

"Is the basement of your building easily accessible? Does it have a generator to power ventilators? Is it stocked with food, water, and medical equipment? What if you live on the 13th floor?" he continued.

"None of these issues are addressed in the regulations, which is a big problem," Ho said.

Viability of a Chinese invasion

Regarding the concern that the United States could become militarily involved in the Israel-Hamas war, thus presenting China with the opportunity to invade Taiwan, Lin said he did not see a direct link between the two scenarios.

"The decision to attack, or not attack, depends on PLA's capabilities. It does not matter whether there is a conflict between Israel and Palestine," he said.

In addition, recent reports of the arrests of former PLA Rocket Force Commander Li Yuchao (李玉超) and his sitting and former deputies on charges of corruption, as well as the disappearance of Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu (李尚福), have likely impacted PLA morale, which in turn reduces the likelihood of an attack on Taiwan, Lin said.

Li Shangfu has not been seen in public since Aug. 29. According to media reports, he has been under investigation and is suspected of the corrupt procurement of military equipment while he was head of the Chinese Central Military Commission's Equipment Development Department.

Echoing Lin, Chieh said the PLA currently lacked what it would take to launch a successful invasion of Taiwan, but he has concerns that the U.S.' focus on Israel-Hamas war could potentially compromise stability in the Taiwan Strait.

To take Taiwan, he said, the PLA would need to be able to secure a "quick victory" in its "first battle" against Taiwan's armed forces, adding that it was still building up its capabilities to be able to do so.

Chieh also noted that the U.S. had deployed the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group to the Eastern Mediterranean to assist Israel and to prevent any expansion of the conflict, in particular the possibility of Iranian and Syrian militant groups aligned with Hamas joining the fight.

In a statement on Oct. 8, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said he had directed the Ford carrier strike group to the Eastern Mediterranean. The Pentagon has also taken steps to augment U.S. Air Force F-35, F-15, F-16, and A-10 fighter aircraft squadrons in the region, Austin said.

On Oct. 15, Austin announced that he had ordered the deployment of USS Dwight D. Eisenhower strike group to the Eastern Mediterranean, to deter others from joining the conflict as Israel prepares to expand its ground operations in Gaza.

According to CNN, which cited an unnamed defense official, it is, however, unclear how long the Ford will stay in the region once the Eisenhower carrier strike group arrives.

The USS Dwight D. Eisenhower is pictured in this undated photograph. Photo taken from facebook.com/TheCVN69

Chieh said that while he did not believe that China would change the status quo in the Western Pacific by force and risk a direct confrontation with the U.S., he was worried that Washington pivoting its military deployments away from the Western Pacific region could embolden China's campaign of military intimidation in regions in which it is engaged in territorial disputes with other countries, including Taiwan, because this increases the risk of skirmishes, which could lead to conflicts.

The power of intelligence

After the Hamas attack on Israel, another focus of discussions has been the crucial role of intelligence in preparing for an attack and how Israel seemed to have had an "intelligence failure."

Asked to comment on the issue, Lin and Ho both said the problem with Israel's intelligence system was not its ability to gather information, but with analyzing information and making decisions based on the intelligence it has.

"Mossad (Israel's intelligence and special operations institute) must have received relevant information but misinterpreted it, which in turn caused it to make wrong decisions," Lin said.

In the same vein, Lin said that while Taiwan can quickly obtain intelligence on the PLA, its development, and movements, whether top intelligence officials will be able to form an accurate judgment from it will depend on the country's understanding of the PLA, which underscores the importance of PLA studies.

Over the years, gathering intelligence on Palestine has very much constituted Israel looking through a "one-way mirror," and this may have caused it to become overconfident in its ability to process the data and in turn neglect signs it should have been more wary about, including changes in communications and planning methods, Ho said.

In Taiwan's case, he said, its intelligence agencies are plagued by problems more serious than those of their Israeli counterparts because he has yet to see any of Taiwan's intelligence and government agencies collate intelligence about Chinese politics, military, or the economy, let alone utilize it to form effective responses.

Chieh, meanwhile, said that because invading Taiwan would be a massive operation and require large-scale mobilization of troops, vehicles and ships, the PLA has formulated plans to speed up the process, including teaming up with logistics companies and incorporating artificial intelligence to assist with necessary changes in deployments.

As such, it is important that Taiwan can obtain intelligence on the PLA at the earliest opportunity so it can conduct any necessary mobilizations to respond to an imminent attack, he said.

Civil defense in peacetime

Taipei City rescuers participate in the Min An disaster prevention and rescue drill. CNA Photo May 4, 2023

The early obtaining of intelligence would also aid civil defense efforts -- such as mobilizing reservists, assigning medical personnel, and moving civilians to safety -- allowing them to be made before rather than after an attack like in the Israel-Hamas conflict, Chieh said.

Ho pointed out that the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia shows that as wars become protracted, civil defense plays a prominent role that has evolved from its traditional definition of concentrating all efforts on supporting the military.

Nowadays, civil defense is also responsible for helping society develop resilience and encompasses efforts to ensure the continued stable operation of society after it has come under attack, to bring about speedy economic recovery, to treat people experiencing trauma, and to counter cyberattacks, cognitive warfare, and disinformation campaigns, he said.

To ensure these functions during wartime, preparations should be made during peaceful times, he said.

"So far, Taiwan's civil defense system has neglected increasing social resilience," he said. "We need to rethink and review civil defense and overhaul the entire system. This will be a great challenge for Taiwan."

Enditem/kb

focustaiwan.tw · by Link · October 16, 2023

22. Hamas Distributed A Handy Guide To Destroying Israeli Tanks

​Image at the link: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/10/15/hamas-distributed-a-handy-guide-to-destroying-israeli-tanks/?sh=29c4e5d634e1

Hamas Distributed A Handy Guide To Destroying Israeli Tanks

Forbes · by David Axe · October 15, 2023

Hamas's anti-tank flyer.

Via social media

Hamas terrorists think they know how to knock out the Israeli army’s main tank, the 70-ton Merkava Mark IV.

Aim for the rear hatch and ammunition-stowage, the space between the turret and hull, the tank’s belly or a supposed weak spot in the armor on the side of the hull near the front. Use rockets and roadside improvised explosive devices.

These are the tips Hamas reportedly communicated to its fighters, via a paper flyer, in preparation for the terror group’s infiltration of southern Israel on Oct. 7—an attack that left at least 1,400 Israelis and foreigners dead. The terrorists abducted hundreds more people in settlements near the Israeli wall surrounding Gaza.

The Israelis retrieved at least one of the flyers, apparently from a dead Hamas fighter, and posted photos on social media.

The flyer’s contents should come as no surprise to experienced soldiers. The ammo storage, turret ring and belly are weak spots on virtually all tanks.

What’s more surprising is Hamas’ tips for defeating the Trophy active protective systems that are new features on some of the Israeli army’s roughly 400 front-line Merkava Mark IVs. Trophy is a combination of tiny radars and fast-firing grenade launchers that automatically detects incoming missiles and rockets—and intercepts them.

Hamas assumes that firing a rocket-propelled grenade from 50 yards or closer should thwart the Trophy, presumably by giving it too little time to react. Alternatively, an SPG-9 recoilless gun should defeat a Trophy-equipped tank, simply by virtue of its projectile’s high speed.

There is some evidence of Hamas militants damaging a Merkava with an PG-7T rocket on Oct. 7. It’s not clear how close the RPG team was when it opened fire. It’s possible the terrorists dutifully followed the flyer’s advice; it’s also possible they defeated the tank’s Trophy by firing several rounds in quick succession—and overwhelming the device.

In any event, it wasn’t RPG teams who claimed the most Merkavas on Oct. 7. Hamas’ small drones struck at least two of the heavily-armed, thickly-armored tanks. One aimed its payload at the thin armor protecting the tank’s engine in its forward hull. Another hit a Merkava on the turret bustle, which holds spare 120-millimeter cannon rounds for the four-person crew.

And the militants also captured a Merkava—along with more than a dozen superheavy armored personnel carriers—at an Israeli army base in Nakhal Oz. You don’t need help from a flyer when a tank is crewless and idle.

Forbes · by David Axe · October 15, 2023

23. Army deploys more troops to secure Basilan for upcoming elections

Political violence versus terrorism.

Excerpt:

A red category designates an area of grave concern due to heightened political rivalries, with the potential for violence to erupt at any time.

Army deploys more troops to secure Basilan for upcoming elections

rappler.com · by Herbie G · October 16, 2023

SUMMARY

This is AI generated summarization, which may have errors. For context, always refer to the full article.

AUGMENTATION. About 300 Army soldiers from Sulu arrive in Lamitan City to beef up security in Basilan province on Sunday, October 15.

Richard Falcatan/Rappler

The augmentation force from Sulu province will be fielded throughout Basilan

BASILAN, Philippines – The Army deployed around 300 additional soldiers to beef up security in Basilan province ahead of the barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections.

At least seven towns in Basilan are among places categorized as “red” by the police in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).

A red category designates an area of grave concern due to heightened political rivalries, with the potential for violence to erupt at any time.

In late August, the Philippine National Police (PNP) in the BARMM also identified eight red category areas, including seven towns in Lanao del Sur and two in Maguindanao del Norte.

The troops arrived at the port of Lamitan City from Sulu around noon on Sunday, October 15.

Colonel Frederick Sales, deputy commander of the Army’s 101st Brigade, said the soldiers were from the 111th and 112th Division reconnaissance companies under the 8th Field Artillery Battalion in Sulu.

He said the augmentation force would be deployed to different Army battalions in Basilan to help secure the barangay and SK elections on October 30.

Basilan Governor Jim Salliman-Hataman welcomed the arrival of more soldiers, as they would strengthen efforts to ensure the upcoming elections are peaceful and orderly.

The Army’s 11th Infantry Division has established Task Force Orion, led by Major General Ignatius Patrimonio, to intensify the elections’ gun ban and work towards making the elections peaceful, honest, and orderly in the province.

Throughout the BARMM, the Commission on Elections (Comelec) has identified 85 places in the BARMM, including Basilan, as areas of concern, out of a total of 2,732 barangays, including 63 in the Special Geographic Area (SGA) in Cotabato province.

The SGA refers to the 63 barangays in Soccsksargen region’s Cotabato province that voted to be included in the BARMM during a plebiscite in 2019.

At least 30 towns and 10 barangays in the BARMM’s SGA have been designated by the police as high-risk areas where violence is likely to occur during the upcoming grassroots elections. – Rappler.com

Summarize this article with AI

Related Topics

rappler.com · by Herbie G · October 16, 2023

​24. How America Can Beat China in a War

Oh, the challenges of interior and exterior lines.

Excerpts:

But there’s an even more basic point to be made. As Corbett declares, all wars are settled on land because land is where people live. The navy—Corbett was writing just before the onset of military aviation—exists to help the army control events on shore. Admiral J. C. Wylie goes further, depicting “the man on the scene with a gun” as the final arbiter of who wins and who loses in warfare. In other words, the soldier—or, more accurately, bodies of soldiers toting more firepower than any rival—is who controls whatever turf or physical object military commanders have determined needs to be controlled.

And control, says Wylie, is the point of military strategy.

Welcome to the sea services, U.S. Army.

How America Can Beat China in a War

If the allies entrench themselves on prime real estate within the anti-access zone, they could defy the PLA to come and take the ground while operating on tactically exterior lines. They could flip the script on China, making use of interior lines. 

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · October 15, 2023

Ground power is central to maritime strategy, in the Western Pacific as elsewhere. General Charles Flynn, commander of U.S. Army Pacific, told the annual gathering of the Association of the United States Army that China boasts three core advantages over the United States and its Asian allies. Ground forces supported from sea, air, and space represent the allies’ offset.

What Advantages China Has in a War

First, said General Flynn, China enjoys “interior lines” relative to the allies. This is a geometric, geospatial way of parsing the strategic and operational relationship between potential foes. Think of it in terms of a circle centered on one antagonist. That’s the interior power. Likely military engagements would take place somewhere along the circumference of the circle, meaning the interior combatant’s forces would have the luxury of traversing short, direct routes to scenes of fighting while maneuvering between separate engagements if need be.

Operating along the circle’s radii makes the interior power faster and nimbler, helping it mass forces at the right point in space at the right time for action. Meanwhile the exterior contender, presumably approaching the battlespace from afar, has to range around the circle’s circumference, taking longer, more circuitous routes to the battleground. Those are the “exterior lines.” The imperative to move around the periphery makes it harder, slower, and more costly for the exterior power to stage superior combat power at the time and place of battle.

Advantage: China. Allied forces would need to close on likely battlefields such as the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea on strategically exterior lines while China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) avails itself of the interior lines.

Second, Flynn observed that the PLA has the advantage of mass to go along with its central geographic position. It has constructed large forces to tame China’s environs. For example, the PLA Navy is now the world’s largest by numbers of hulls, and no slouch with regard to technology and other measures of quality. The PLA Navy is joined by the world’s largest coast guard, and by a maritime militia embedded in the world’s largest fishing fleet. Backing up China’s sea forces are shore-based striking arms such as the PLA Rocket Force, which fields anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles able to deliver precision firepower throughout that hypothetical China-centered circle. Missile-armed PLA Air Force warplanes likewise make their weight felt within the zone.

Mass is seldom sufficient in itself, but it is necessary in battle.

And third, Flynn noted that China has “magazine depth.” That means the PLA has built up a large inventory of munitions for its forces to deploy in combat. The more rounds on hand, and the greater the industrial capacity to keep replacements coming, the more staying power a force exhibits. Compare Chinese magazine depth to the West’s struggles to produce enough ordnance to resupply Ukraine and now, presumably, Israel. Together these factors make China a formidable opponent.

But.

How America and the Allies Win

Flynn rightly pointed out that the allies mainly need to deny the PLA key terrain, chiefly along the first island chain. That means they need to slow down the tempo of operations. If the war is short and sharp, China will prevail for reasons Flynn cited. But if the allies entrench themselves on prime real estate within the anti-access zone, they could defy the PLA to come and take the ground while operating on tactically exterior lines. They could flip the script on China, making use of interior lines.

The greats of military and naval strategy would concur with Flynn. British naval historian Julian S. Corbett, channeling German field marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, notes that strategic offense coupled with tactical defense constitutes the strongest form of war. What he means is this. Strategic offense is more decisive than strategic defense. If you can seize some object you desire that the enemy has left unguarded or lightly guarded, you will have accomplished your offensive goals while hastening yourself toward victory. Then you defend that object to the utmost, leveraging the fact that tactical defense is stronger than tactical offense. It’s simply hard to root out entrenched defenders—witness the Ukrainian army’s fitful progress against Russian defenses-in-depth.

Strategic offense, tactical defense. Possession is nine-tenths of the law in affairs of arms. Grab and hold.

The good news for the allies is that they already hold the key terrain that China covets. They need not wrest it from anyone. They just need to hold it, mounting a stubborn tactical defense from a position of advantage. Sea, air, space, and cyber forces can help hold PLA sea and air forces at a distance from Pacific islands, and so they must. But they are ultimately the “supporting” element of allied combat power—the enabler. Land forces on the islands are the “supported,” decisive element. In the end it is soldiers and marines, not sailors or aviators, who will—or will not—hold the contested ground.

But there’s an even more basic point to be made. As Corbett declares, all wars are settled on land because land is where people live. The navy—Corbett was writing just before the onset of military aviation—exists to help the army control events on shore. Admiral J. C. Wylie goes further, depicting “the man on the scene with a gun” as the final arbiter of who wins and who loses in warfare. In other words, the soldier—or, more accurately, bodies of soldiers toting more firepower than any rival—is who controls whatever turf or physical object military commanders have determined needs to be controlled.

And control, says Wylie, is the point of military strategy.

Welcome to the sea services, U.S. Army.

About the Author and His Military Expertise

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Distinguished Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · October 15, 2023

25. This Country Has the Most American Military Bases

I am sure you can choose the top 2 or 3. But there are some surprises on this list to me.

This Country Has the Most American Military Bases

247wallst.com · by John Harrington · October 14, 2023

Special Report

Sean Gallup / Getty Images News via Getty Images

John Harrington

Published: October 14, 2023 9:34 am

The United States, holding its status as the globe’s foremost military force, maintains a network of over 750 military installations in approximately 80 countries and territories, as reported by the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. In comparison, the U.S. possesses more than three times the number of overseas bases than all other nations combined. The annual cost of upkeeping these foreign bases is estimated to be around $55 billion, a financial burden shouldered by American taxpayers.

To determine the countries with the most active U.S. military bases that are overseas, 24/7 Wall St. reviewed military think-tank the Quincy Institute’s 2021 article Drawdown: Improving U.S. and Global Security Through Military Base Closures Abroad. We ranked the countries according to the number of active bases within each country. We did not include countries with less than four bases. All data is from the Quincy Institute.

Excepting South America, the U.S. has bases on every continent. The overwhelming majority of facilities are in Europe and Asia, a vestige of America’s involvement in World War II and responsibilities stemming from confronting communism during the Cold War. Though the Department of Defense considers its installations as U.S. military facilities, many of them are operated jointly with the host nation or through alliances such as NATO. (Here are all NATO members ranked by military power.)

The United States has added bases in Africa in recent years, including in the nations of Niger and Somalia.

There is a growing debate among government officials over the need for so many U.S. overseas facilities. Besides the cost, there are concerns that the bases are a lightning rod for hostility toward the United States and serve as a recruiting tool for militant groups. The Quincy Institute notes that foreign installations have made it easier for America to become involved in wars of choice. (Also see, the six European bases where the U.S. is storing nuclear bombs.)

Here are the countries with the most U.S. military bases.

Source: Public Domain / Wikimedia Commons

33. Poland

> Number of US military installations: 4

> First US base opened: 2012

> US active-duty personnel in country: 226 – #30 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Lask, Powidz

Source: Public Domain / Wikimedia Commons

32. Syria

> Number of US military installations: 4

> First US base opened: 2016

> US active-duty personnel in country: 900 – #18 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Al-Tanf 1, Dier Ezzour

24/7 Wall St.

The 21 Bases Where US Military Are Trained

Source: Public Domain / Wikimedia Commons

31. Bulgaria

> Number of US military installations: 4

> First US base opened: 2005

> US active-duty personnel in country: 2,500 – #11 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Bezmer Air Base, Aitos Logistics Center

30. Spain

> Number of US military installations: 4

> First US base opened: 1953

> US active-duty personnel in country: 3,353 – #9 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Moron AB, Naval Station Rota

Source: Public Domain / Wikimedia Commons

29. N. Mariana Islands

> Number of US military installations: 5

> First US base opened: 1944

> US active-duty personnel in country: 45 – #51 out of 80

> Notable base(s): NAVBASE Guam Tinian

28. Somalia

> Number of US military installations: 5

> First US base opened: 2013

> US active-duty personnel in country: 71 – #46 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Bosasso, Camp Baledogle, Mogadishu

Source: Courtesy of Marlon Cureg via Wikimedia Commons

27. Oman

> Number of US military installations: 6

> First US base opened: 1981

> US active-duty personnel in country: 25 – #56 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Masirah Island Mpt Site 1, Al Mussanah AB

ALSO READ: Norfolk Naval Base in Virginia Is the Largest in the Country

Source: Public Domain / Wikimedia Commons

26. The Bahamas

> Number of US military installations: 6

> First US base opened: 1966

> US active-duty personnel in country: 56 – #49 out of 80

> Notable base(s): AUTEC Main Base, AUTEC Big Wood Cay

25. Israel

> Number of US military installations: 6

> First US base opened: 1979

> US active-duty personnel in country: 127 – #40 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Haifa, Mashabim Air Base

24. Romania

> Number of US military installations: 6

> First US base opened: 2007

> US active-duty personnel in country: 165 – #36 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Smardan Training base, Cincu Training Base, Campia Turzii

Source: Public Domain / Wikimedia Commons

23. Netherlands

> Number of US military installations: 6

> First US base opened: 1954

> US active-duty personnel in country: 641 – #22 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Eygelshoven Army Depot, Schinnen Emma Mine

Source: Courtesy of Virgin Islands National Guard via Facebook

22. Virgin Islands

> Number of US military installations: 6

> First US base opened: 1973

> US active-duty personnel in country: 787 – #20 out of 80

> Notable base(s): NG Bethlehem Military Compound, NG Sprat Hall

24/7 Wall St.

The Six European Bases Where The US Is Storing Nuclear Bombs

21. Iraq

> Number of US military installations: 6

> First US base opened: 2014

> US active-duty personnel in country: 2,500 – #11 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Al Asad AB, Anbar, Abu Ghraib, Camp Taji

20. Norway

> Number of US military installations: 7

> First US base opened: 2018

> US active-duty personnel in country: 167 – #35 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Rygge

Source: FiledIMAGE / iStock via Getty Images

19. Australia

> Number of US military installations: 7

> First US base opened: 1963

> US active-duty personnel in country: 1,736 – #16 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Alice Springs, Robertson Barracks, Tindal Air Base

18. Niger

> Number of US military installations: 8

> First US base opened: 2012

> US active-duty personnel in country: 21 – #57 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Dirkou, Arlit

Source: 39955793@N07 / Flickr

17. Philippines

> Number of US military installations: 8

> First US base opened: 2002

> US active-duty personnel in country: 155 – #38 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Basa Air Base, Camp Navarro

ALSO READ: The Largest Military Base in Every State

Source: cne-cna-c6f / Flickr

16. Greece

> Number of US military installations: 8

> First US base opened: 1969

> US active-duty personnel in country: 446 – #24 out of 80

> Notable base(s): NSA Souda Bay, NATO Ordnance Area

Source: Public Domain / Wikimedia Commons

15. Kuwait

> Number of US military installations: 10

> First US base opened: 1991

> US active-duty personnel in country: 2,054 – #13 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Camp Arifjan, Camp Patriot, Camp Virginia

Source: Public Domain / Wikimedia Commons

14. Panama

> Number of US military installations: 11

> First US base opened: 2007

> US active-duty personnel in country: 35 – #52 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Panama City Support Complex, North Coast Area Test Sites

Source: Public Domain / Wikimedia Commons

13. Saudi Arabia

> Number of US military installations: 11

> First US base opened: 1951

> US active-duty personnel in country: 693 – #21 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Drone Base, Jeddah, Prince Sultan AB

12. Belgium

> Number of US military installations: 11

> First US base opened: 1962

> US active-duty personnel in country: 1,869 – #14 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Brussels, Zutendaal, Chievres AB

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All 30 NATO Members Ranked By Military Power

Source: Courtesy of U.S. Army Garrison - Kwajalein Atoll via Facebook

11. Marshall Islands

> Number of US military installations: 12

> First US base opened: 1944

> US active-duty personnel in country: 96 – #43 out of 80

> Notable base(s): US Army Kwajalein Atoll, Meck Island

10. Bahrain

> Number of US military installations: 12

> First US base opened: 1948

> US active-duty personnel in country: 4,603 – #8 out of 80

> Notable base(s): NSA Bahrain, Sheik Isa Air Base

9. Turkey

> Number of US military installations: 13

> First US base opened: 1951

> US active-duty personnel in country: 1,758 – #15 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Batman AB, Incirlik AB, Izmir AB

Source: usairforce / Flickr

8. Portugal

> Number of US military installations: 21

> First US base opened: 1944

> US active-duty personnel in country: 256 – #29 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Lajes Air Base, Cinco Picos Globecom Annex

Source: usairforce / Flickr

7. United Kingdom

> Number of US military installations: 25

> First US base opened: 1942

> US active-duty personnel in country: 10,770 – #7 out of 80

> Notable base(s): RAF Alconbury, RAF Molesworth, RAF Mildenhall

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The 21 Bases Where US Military Are Trained

Source: Public Domain / Wikimedia Commons

6. Puerto Rico

> Number of US military installations: 34

> First US base opened: 1902

> US active-duty personnel in country: 13,571 – #5 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Mayaguez AFRC, Fort Buchanan, MTA Camp Santiago Rq

Source: Public Domain / Wikimedia Commons

5. Italy

> Number of US military installations: 44

> First US base opened: 1951

> US active-duty personnel in country: 14,756 – #4 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Camp Darby, Aviano Air Base, NAS Sigonella

Source: sdasmarchives / Flickr

4. Guam

> Number of US military installations: 54

> First US base opened: 1899

> US active-duty personnel in country: 11,295 – #6 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Agana, Andersen AFB, Marine Corps Base Camp Blaz

3. South Korea

> Number of US military installations: 76

> First US base opened: 1946

> US active-duty personnel in country: 28,503 – #3 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Camp Casey, Camp Humphreys, Kunsan AB

2. Germany

> Number of US military installations: 119

> First US base opened: 1945

> US active-duty personnel in country: 46,562 – #2 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Duelmen Tower Barracks, Kaiserslautern, Spangdahlem AB

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Norfolk Naval Base in Virginia Is the Largest in the Country

Source: 39955793@N07 / Flickr

1. Japan

> Number of US military installations: 119

> First US base opened: 1946

> US active-duty personnel in country: 63,690 – #1 out of 80

> Notable base(s): Camp Fuji, Camp Hansen, Kadena AB

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26. A Coalition Against Atrocity in the Middle East Can Also Undermine China

Excerpts:

These goals will take time to accomplish. Israel’s long-term strategy will have to parallel what the U.S. did to al Qaeda and ISIS, a process that in the former case took more than a decade. Israel needs not only to destroy Hamas on the ground in Gaza, but also to track down and neutralize all those who helped plan and finance the attack — no matter where they reside. U.S. and allied assistance will be key to this endeavor, which will surely lead back to Tehran. The coalition’s patience will be tested as Israel’s war causes civilian casualties, but it is critical that Beijing and Moscow see that it holds together.

For the U.S. and its allies, then, Israel’s destruction of Hamas and a reckoning with Iran should be vital strategic objectives. A military, intelligence, and diplomatic campaign alongside Israel aimed at making Iran pay a price for its support of terrorism would serve Washington’s counter-terror interests while also frustrating Moscow and Beijing’s objective to build up Iran.

Washington has worked hard to organize a coalition against Russian aggression. The most immediate next step is to expand this coalition to fight radical Islam. Over the long term, the goal is to undermine China’s efforts to support new allies that Beijing hopes will help it topple Washington’s leadership of a liberal world order.

A Coalition Against Atrocity in the Middle East Can Also Undermine China

19fortyfive.com · by Dan Blumenthal · October 16, 2023

Hamas’ barbaric Oct. 7 attack on Israel provides a rare moment of clarity in international politics. It opens up a fleeting chance for the U.S. not only to help Israel strike a blow against radical Islam, but also to frustrate Washington’s other enemies and rivals.

Hamas’ attack directly benefits Iran and Russia, and it indirectly boosts China. Tehran’s multidimensional support for the terrorist entity serves its designs to inflict unbearable costs on the Jewish state. Its main goal in the region is the genocidal destruction of Israel. But a shorter-term and more achievable goal for Iran is to stymie any further reconciliation between Jerusalem and the Gulf countries, halting the emergence of an alignment that serves U.S. interests.

Tehran’s hope is that Israel’s reaction to the atrocities will cause the Persian Gulf States to question their new allegiance to Jerusalem — or in the case of Saudi Arabia, to ditch the nascent relationship altogether. This goal aligns with Russian and Chinese efforts to subvert global U.S. leadership. Washington should help Israel succeed in its efforts to destroy Hamas and other Iranian proxies. It should also work with Jerusalem to roll back Iranian regional influence. Doing so will strike a blow against Tehran’s Chinese and Russian allies.

For now, if there is any silver lining in the horrific events of the past week, it is that the same coalition that formed to support Ukraine against Russia has rallied to back Israel. Significantly, this time India has joined this coalition.

Russia, Iran and China Benefit

Besides Iran, Russia is the prime beneficiary of Hamas’ depravity. Russia hopes that Iran’s proxies can distract the United States from Russian aggression in Ukraine. Most likely, Iran used the terror organization to open up another front in what it hopes will be a long-term global challenge to Washington.

China benefits as well, though it is quieter about how it reaps the rewards of Hamas’ actions. Beijing is challenging U.S. leadership everywhere and all at once, most dramatically in its support for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

In Beijing’s cynical assessment, Russia’s war focuses the U.S. on the defense of Europe. Given how Washington has starved its own global military power, defending Europe comes at the expense of defending Asia, and China knows it. Now Beijing will enjoy the fact that two U.S. carrier battle groups are stationed far away from China, in the Eastern Mediterranean.

China is also threatening U.S. posture in the Gulf as it builds robust relations with Tehran. In the past two years, Iran’s oil shipments to China returned to pre-sanctions levels, and China’s crude oil imports from Iran might have reached a new high at the end of 2022. China is Iran’s top trading partner, and Iran has formally joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the security bloc led by China and Russia. Meanwhile, China’s military ties with the Islamic Republic are also growing. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi hosted Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe in April 2022, and the two countries agreed to collaborate on military strategy. Iran, China, and Russia conducted a five-day naval drill in the Gulf of Oman earlier this year.

Iran’s leaders can count on China’s diplomatic support as well. When Raisi traveled to Beijing in February, the two countries signed 20 agreements worth billions of dollars. Iran can now rely on China as an economic safety valve, while also avoiding military and diplomatic isolation despite being the world’s number one state sponsor of terror.

With two of its allies supporting Hamas, China’s call for a “two-state solution” to the Israel-Palestinian conflict is unsurprising. China probably further assesses that its moral equivocation has political benefits closer to home. Indonesia and Malaysia, countries courted by both China and the U.S., are far more sympathetic to Beijing’s position than they are to Washington’s. Even as Israel was still uncovering the slaughter of babies and rape of women, Indonesian President Joko Widodo blamed Israel’s “occupation” for Hamas’ depravity. Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur remain implacably hostile to the Jewish state. That stance cannot be explained by sympathy with Muslims, given both countries’ silence on China’s cultural and religious genocide of the Muslim Uighurs.

Washington will have to ignore criticism from these quarters as it helps Israel prosecute its war. It will have to count on these countries to follow their own interests in countering Chinese hegemony.

A Coalition Against Radicalism

In stark contrast, as happened with the response to Russian aggression, Asia’s democracies and other U.S. friends joined the U.S. and Europe in standing firmly at Israel’s side — this time with the addition of India. Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, and Singapore have all declared their support for the Jewish state. Many of these countries’ leaders were moved by both moral and strategic calculations. They are part of a civilized world disgusted by Hamas’ atrocities against Israeli Jews. All would benefit if Israel and the U.S. struck a major blow against Islamists. In particular, India, Singapore, and Australia still face threats from radical Islam.

With the exception of India, the global coalition that thus far has stood in solidarity with the Jewish state parallels the coalition supporting Ukraine against Russia’s brutal aggression. Like Ukraine, Israel will need a coalition’s support to accomplish its strategic objectives, which include the utter destruction of Hamas and the severing of Iran’s radical tentacles.

These goals will take time to accomplish. Israel’s long-term strategy will have to parallel what the U.S. did to al Qaeda and ISIS, a process that in the former case took more than a decade. Israel needs not only to destroy Hamas on the ground in Gaza, but also to track down and neutralize all those who helped plan and finance the attack — no matter where they reside. U.S. and allied assistance will be key to this endeavor, which will surely lead back to Tehran. The coalition’s patience will be tested as Israel’s war causes civilian casualties, but it is critical that Beijing and Moscow see that it holds together.

For the U.S. and its allies, then, Israel’s destruction of Hamas and a reckoning with Iran should be vital strategic objectives. A military, intelligence, and diplomatic campaign alongside Israel aimed at making Iran pay a price for its support of terrorism would serve Washington’s counter-terror interests while also frustrating Moscow and Beijing’s objective to build up Iran.

Washington has worked hard to organize a coalition against Russian aggression. The most immediate next step is to expand this coalition to fight radical Islam. Over the long term, the goal is to undermine China’s efforts to support new allies that Beijing hopes will help it topple Washington’s leadership of a liberal world order.

About the Author

Dan Blumenthal is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he focuses on East Asian security issues and Sino-American relations. Mr. Blumenthal has served in and advised the US government on China issues for more than a decade.

19fortyfive.com · by Dan Blumenthal · October 16, 2023

27. John Kirby Won’t Rule Out Using Ground Forces to Get American Hostages Held by Hamas Home Safe

John Kirby Won’t Rule Out Using Ground Forces to Get American Hostages Held by Hamas Home Safe

'What I won’t do is rule anything in or out when it comes to getting our hostages home,' Kirby said

Published 10/15/23 04:56 PM ET|Updated 17 hr ago

Zachary Rogers

themessenger.com · October 15, 2023

In an appearance on Fox News Sunday, White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said that he wouldn’t “rule anything in or out” when it comes to getting American hostages of the Hamas terrorist group home safe.

The show’s host, Shannon Bream, specifically asked Kirby if U.S. forces would be used to save American citizens who had been taken hostage after Hamas launched a deadly surprise attack on Israel.

"There’s no plans or intentions to put U.S. troops on the ground to fight in this fight between Israel and Hamas," Kirby answered, before adding: “We are actively trying to find out where they are… I hope everybody can understand – we’re gonna be careful about what we say publicly about our efforts to get those hostages home.”

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Kirby added that American authorities “don’t even know” how many hostages there are “exactly” and that there's a possibility that they could be “in different groups” and could have been “moved around.”

(Earlier today a spokesperson for the Israeli Defense Forces confirmed that the Israeli government had contacted families of 155 hostages. It is unclear how many of that number may also be U.S. citizens or have American ties.)

“We’re working this literally by the hour, but we’re not going to get ahead in where we are in policy operations since we don’t have necessarily all the information that we need to try to get them home,” Kirby told Bream.

John Kirby, coordinator for strategic communications at the National Security Council, speaks at the daily White House briefing at the White House on July 17, 2023 in Washington, DC. Kirby spoke on news that Russia has refused to extend a U.N-backed deal that permitted Ukraine to continue to export grain and other food during the ongoing war.Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images

In response, Bream then asked Kirby if the U.S. would consider putting boots on the ground to rescue the hostages.

"Would you absolutely rule out the possibility of any kind of US forces being on the ground?" Bream asked.

"What I won’t do is rule anything in or out when it comes to getting our hostages home," Kirby answered. "We’re working on this literally by the hour. But again, in order for you to develop specific policy options, you gotta have a lot more contextual information than is available to us right now. And we’re working at that."

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Rescuing American hostages of Hamas is something that President Joe Biden places high on his priority list, Kirby told Bream, saying “nothing’s more important to him than the safety and security of Americans held hostage overseas and we’re not gonna stop until we can get them back with their families.”

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During his Fox News Sunday appearance, Kirby also said that the White House is watching the $6 billion Iranian fund, which has come under scrutiny since Hamas’ attack, “like a hawk.”

Kirby called critics’ claims that the fund freed up Iran to more freely financially support Hamas “false.” The funds are currently frozen, Kirby added.

"We are watching it like a hawk, Shannon,” Kirby told Bream. “I'm telling you we are keeping tabs on every single dime of that.”

themessenger.com · October 15, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com