Quotes of the Day:
"Under democracy one party always devotes its chief energies to trying to prove that the other party is unfit to rule — and both commonly succeed, and are right."
- H.L. Mencken
"Before a war military science seems a real science, like astronomy; but after a war it seems more like astrology."
- Rebecca West
"The warning message we sent the Russians was a calculated ambiguity that would be clearly understood. "
- Alexander Haig
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 26 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. Russia’s grain blockade may require US intervention
3. U.S. Aims to Constrain China by Shaping Environment Around It, Blinken Says
4. Has Ukraine Broken the Russian Military?
5. Commercial and military drones in Ukraine: The evolutionary use and implications on security and safety
6. War Will Never Be This Bulky Again
7. Japan, US fly fighters after China drill, N. Korean missiles
8. MARSOC Has New Cdr - Major General Matthew Trollinger | SOF News
9. “China's Columbus” Was an Imperialist Too: Contesting the Myth of Zheng He
10. SWJ Book Review – Bullets Not Ballots: Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare
11. Japan to 'drastically strengthen' military capability
12. U.S. Treasury Targets Hamas Financial Network
13. Tajik terrorist serves as Taliban commander in northern Afghanistan
14. Biden’s Maiden Presidential Trip To Asia: Reassuring Important Indo-Pacific Allies – Analysis
15. Why Are Spare Parts on the Unfunded List? Senator Asks Navy's Top Officer
16. World Leaders Tout Self-Reliance Amid Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
17. Finland, Sweden Would Contribute Militarily to NATO on ‘Day One,’ General Says
18. 400. Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1)
19. The U.S. has accused China of carrying out a genocide in Xinjiang. Why has the U.N. been so quiet?
20. Inside the Afghan Resistance
21. Are the Marines Inventing the Edsel or the Mustang?
22. Willingness to take risks': Former Special Forces Delta commander inducted into regiment
23. Jerusalem livid about US leak that Israel killed senior Iranian operative
24. Open Source Intelligence May Be Changing Old-School War
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 26 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 26
Karolina Hird, Mason Clark, and George Barros
May 26, 6:30pm ET
Russian forces have made steady, incremental gains in heavy fighting in eastern Ukraine in the past several days, though Ukrainian defenses remain effective overall. Deputy Ukrainian Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that the fighting is currently at its "maximum intensity” compared to previous Russian assaults and will likely continue to escalate.[1] Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Oleksandr Motuzyanyk characterized Russian gains as “temporary success” and stated that Ukrainian forces are using a maneuver defense to put pressure on Russian advances in key areas.[2] Russian forces have now taken control of over 95% of Luhansk Oblast and will likely continue efforts to complete the capture of Severodonetsk in the coming days.[3] Russian forces have made several gains in the past week, but their offensive operations remain slow. Russian forces are heavily degraded and will struggle to replace further losses.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance southeast of Izyum near the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border.
- Russian forces continued steady advances around Severodonetsk and likely seek to completely encircle the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area in the coming days.
- Russian forces continued to make persistent advances south and west of Popasna toward Bakhmut, but the Russian pace of advance will likely slow as they approach the town itself.
- Russian forces in occupied areas of the Southern Axis are reportedly preparing a “third line of defense” to consolidate long-term control over the region and in preparation to repel likely future Ukrainian counteroffensives.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time. We have stopped coverage of Mariupol as a separate effort since the city’s fall. We have added a new section on activities in Russian-occupied areas:
- Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
- Subordinate main effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv City
- Supporting effort 2—Southern axis
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued to attempt advances southeast of Izyum toward Slovyansk on May 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attempted to attack Bohorodychne, about 30 km southeast of Izyum.[4] Russian forces additionally conducted artillery, rocket, mortar, and tank attacks against Chepil, Dovehenke, Kurulka, and Studenok, all settlements to the southeast of Izyum in the direction of Slovyansk.[5] Such offensive actions indicate that Russian troops hope to continue their advance toward the borders of Donetsk Oblast and merge with operations around Lyman, which Russian forces fully captured on May 26.[6]
Russian forces continued efforts to encircle Severodonetsk on May 26. Russian forces reportedly attempted to take control of Ustynivka, about 15 km southeast of Severodonetsk.[7] Russian sources additionally reported that Russian troops are approaching Severodonetsk from Vojevodivka and Schedryshcheve (northeast of Severodonetsk) and that the northeast portion of the city is under Russian control.[8] A Russian military reporter claimed that as many as 10,000 people may be trapped in the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk cauldron.[9] Ukrainian troops have reportedly fortified their positions in the Zolote-Orikhiv area, where Russian troops have encircled them.[10]
Russian forces continued persistent advances in Donetsk Oblast south and west of Popasna on May 26. Troops from the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) claimed to have taken full control of Svitlodarsk and Midna Ruda, settlements off the M03 highway and within 30 km southeast of Bakhmut.[11] Russian troops are reportedly fighting around Komyshuvakha, Nirkove, Berestove, Belohorivka, Pokrovske, Klynove, Lypove, and Nahirne and using these areas to advance toward Bakhmut.[12] Russian forces conducted unsuccessful operations around Donetsk City in the vicinity of Avdiivka and continued to shell north and northwest of Avdiivka.[13]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces focused on maintaining their positions around Kharkiv City on May 26. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops north of Kharkiv City reconnoitered and fired on Ukrainian positions to prevent any further Ukrainian advances in this area.[14] Russian forces shelled the center of Kharkiv City and surrounding settlements.[15]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces focused on improving their tactical positions and strengthening defensive lines on the southern axis on May 26.[16] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian forces are creating a “third line of defense” in occupied Kherson Oblast, indicating they are preparing for protracted conflict in this area and digging in to repel likely anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensives.[17] This assessment is consistent with statements made by the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) that Russian forces are strengthening their defenses in occupied areas in order to hold those territories over the long term.[18]
Russian forces are reportedly attempting to advance to the Mykolaiv-Kherson administrative border and conducted unsuccessful assault operations around Tavriyske and Mykolaivka on May 26.[19] Russian forces heavily shelled areas of Zaporizhia Oblast and strengthened their grouping of forces around Vasylivka and Polohy to renew offensives in the directions of Kamyanske, Orikhiv, and Huliapole.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Russian grouping in Zaporizhia, specifically around Melitopol, has been reinforced by a battalion using outdated T-62 tanks, confirming earlier Ukrainian reports that Russian forces are cobbling together battalions with obsolete T-62 tanks to compensate for equipment losses.[21]
Activity in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Russian occupation authorities continued actions to strengthen their administrative control of occupied areas on May 26. Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations deployed three broadcast trucks to Mariupol to transmit state-controlled programming to residents of the city.[22] Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko claimed that occupation elements are taking control of schools in Mariupol and have extended the school year through September in order to ensure children spend the summer learning according to strictly Russian curricula.[23] Russian-backed occupation authorities in Kherson stated that Russian mobile phone operators will be available in occupied areas and that pensions will be paid in rubles starting in June.[24] Residents of Kherson and Zaporizhia will additionally be able to obtain Russian passports at newly established passport points in accordance with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s May 25 decree simplifying the process to obtain Russian passports in these occupied areas.[25]
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces are likely reinforcing their grouping north of Kharkiv City to prevent further advances of the Ukrainian counteroffensive toward the Russian border. Russan forces may commit elements of the 1st Tank Army to Northern Kharkiv in the near future.
- Russian forces are prioritizing cutting off two major highways to Severodonetsk but may start to storm the city before they successfully cut GLOCs.
- Occupation forces in Mariupol will continue to strengthen administrative control of the city but are likely unsure of what the ultimate annexation policy will be.
- Russian forces are likely preparing for Ukrainian counteroffensives and settling in for protracted operations in Southern Ukraine.
2. Russia’s grain blockade may require US intervention
A naval conflict could be one of the most overlooked actions of Putin's War. Should we, can we, will we break the Russian blockade? (In my opinion we have to - it should be a UN action but the Russians and Chinese will veto any UNSCR addressing this).
Russia’s grain blockade may require US intervention
U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Christopher Cavoli, right, commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe, in Hungary in 2019 during joint U.S.-Hungary training exercises. (Spec. Nyatan Bol/Army)
WASHINGTON - The American general slated to become NATO’s next supreme allied commander warned Thursday that Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian grain exports could enable terrorist networks in other parts of the world and may require U.S. military intervention to ensure global markets don’t become destabilized.
Gen. Christopher Cavoli, commander of all U.S. Army forces in Europe and Africa, told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that groups including the Islamic State, al-Shabab and Boko Haram stand to benefit from food shortages resulting from the war. Those groups “feed on weak governance and food insecurity and corruption and poverty,” he said, noting they already have been “doing fairly well” in Africa in recent years. “A food shortage now would just exacerbate the situation down there.” Cavoli appeared on Capitol Hill as part of the confirmation process to lead U.S. and NATO forces in Europe.
Russia’s navy effectively controls all traffic in the northern third of the Black Sea, according to U.S. intelligence assessments, and Western officials have accused Moscow of using food as a form of blackmail. The Kremlin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said earlier Thursday that commercial ships carrying Ukrainian grain would not be allowed to leave from any Black Sea ports until Western governments lift their sanctions on Russia.
Ukraine is the world’s largest exporter of sunflower oil, the fourth-largest exporter of corn and the fifth-largest exporter of wheat. British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss accused Moscow of attempting to “hold the world to ransom” and “essentially weaponizing hunger.” In calling on Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the blockade, she rejected the idea of lifting sanctions and said “any appeasement” would only make the Russian leader “stronger in the longer term.”
Cavoli hinted that, at some point, the U.S. military could get involved in an effort to guarantee that exports from Ukraine can resume. But he declined to say whether he would recommend such an approach, apart from preparing the options requested by civilian leaders, if he’s confirmed.
For now, he said, “it’s going to be a combination of modes of transportation that we’re going to have to use” to get around Russian efforts to stymie grain shipments from leaving Ukraine.
Romania has already made the Black Sea port of Constanta - which is not under blockade - available to exports of Ukrainian grain, though Cavoli noted that accounts only for about 90,000 tons a day. About 22 million tons remain backed up in Ukraine, he said.
German rail line Deutsche Bahn also has begun an operation Cavoli referred to as the “Berlin train lift” - intentionally reminiscent of the Berlin Airlift of 1948 and 1949, when Allied forces flew food and other vital supplies into Berlin to circumvent a Soviet blockade of the roads and rail lines. That option would route Ukrainian grain supplies through Poland, which established a border crossing regime to facilitate such passage, and on to ports on Germany’s northern coast for shipping.
“Some efforts are taking place,” Cavoli told senators, adding: “Much more needs to be done.”
Pentagon spokesman John Kirby, speaking to reporters later Thursday, said “there are no plans to use the United States military, or military sources or assets, to assist in the movement of grain outside of Ukraine.” The Biden administration, he added, is “in discussion with our international partners and allies about how best to address this.”
Cavoli also acknowledged that the influx of Western arms flows into Ukraine poses the risk of weapons smuggling by or to illicit groups who could in turn use them to undermine U.S. interests elsewhere.
“Establishing accountability over where all of that equipment is a vital task for us,” Cavoli said, adding that doing so is “challenging right now” as the United States has no military presence in Ukraine.
“As the conflict winds down or concludes that will be one of the things that I have to get at,” he added, telling senators, “I share your concern on it.”
Cavoli, a Russian-speaker with extensive experience and expertise in the region, would take over at U.S. European Command as Putin, having failed to topple the government in Kyiv, has scaled down his ambitions in Ukraine.
Putin’s forces have made only slow, grinding progress in their renewed campaign to seize territory in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, Western intelligence assessments show. The Pentagon on Thursday said that Russian commanders are attempting to entrap Ukrainian forces defending key towns in Donbas even as the Kremlin’s combat losses continue to mount in the face of significant resistance.
The northeastern part of Severodonetsk, a strategic city in the region, appears to have been seized by Russian forces, said a senior U.S. defense official, speaking on the condition of anonymity under ground rules established by the Pentagon. Collectively, this official said, the strategy amounts to “an encirclement effort” meant to cut off Ukrainian forces from reinforcement and resupply of Western weapons.
The war, entering its fourth month, has been a costly endeavor for the Russians, the senior U.S. official said. They’ve lost about a thousand tanks, 350 artillery pieces, three dozen fighter-bomber aircraft and more than 50 helicopters, according to Pentagon estimates. More than 80% of Russia’s go-to fighting units - battalion tactical groups - have been committed to the war effort, the official said, stressing, however, that Russian forces “still have a significant amount of their capability” left to fight.
Ukrainian military officials have claimed their forces have expunged nearly 30,000 Russian troops from the battlefield. The Pentagon has declined to provide an estimate of either side’s casualty figures.
The Washington Post’s Shane Harris, Jennifer Hassan, Mary Ilyushina contributed to this report.
3. U.S. Aims to Constrain China by Shaping Environment Around It, Blinken Says
Shaping the environment. Sounds good in theory and briefs well (and I have used the phrase many times so I am guilty). But how do you really operationalize it? (e.g., a campaign plan),
U.S. Aims to Constrain China by Shaping Environment Around It, Blinken Says
Published May 26, 2022
Updated May 27, 2022, 12:05 a.m. ET
The U.S. secretary of state gave a glimpse of President Biden’s classified strategy on China, in which officials have concluded they cannot change Beijing’s aggressive behavior.
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Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said the United States would not try to isolate China.Credit...Michael A. McCoy for The New York Times
May 26, 2022, 11:54 a.m. ET
WASHINGTON — Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said Thursday that despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China remains the greatest challenger to the United States and its allies, and that the Biden administration aims to “shape the strategic environment” around the Asian superpower to limit its increasingly aggressive actions.
“China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do it,” Mr. Blinken said in a speech laying out the administration’s strategy on China. “Beijing’s vision would move us away from the universal values that have sustained so much of the world’s progress over the past 75 years.”
The speech was a much shorter, public version of the administration’s classified strategy on China, which was largely completed last fall. U.S. officials have concluded that decades of direct economic and diplomatic engagement to compel the Chinese Communist Party to abide by the American-led order have largely failed, and Mr. Blinken asserted that the goal now should be to form coalitions with other nations to limit the party’s influence and try to curb its aggressions in that way.
“We can’t rely on Beijing to change its trajectory,” he said. “So we will shape the strategic environment around Beijing to advance our vision for an open and inclusive international system.”
China’s statements before and during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have further clarified for American and European officials the difficulties of engaging with Beijing. On Feb. 4, two weeks before the invasion, President Vladimir V. Putin met with President Xi Jinping in Beijing as their two governments issued a 5,000-word statement announcing a “no limits” partnership that aims to oppose the international diplomatic and economic systems overseen by the United States and its allies. Since the war began, the Chinese government has given strong diplomatic support to Russia by reiterating Mr. Putin’s criticisms of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and spreading disinformation and conspiracy theories that undermine the United States and Ukraine.
Read More on Biden’s Trip to Asia
In his speech, given at George Washington University on the theme “Invest, Align and Compete,” Mr. Blinken noted the human rights abuses, repression of ethnic minorities and suppression of free speech and assembly in the regions of Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong. In recent years, those issues have galvanized greater animus toward China among Democratic and Republican politicians and policymakers. “We’ll continue to raise these issues and call for change,” he said.
Mr. Blinken reiterated the longstanding U.S. policy on Taiwan, despite remarks by President Biden in Tokyo on Monday that the United States had a “commitment” to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan if China attacks the self-governing democratic island. The U.S. government for decades has maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan — leaving unsaid whether it would directly defend the island from China. Mr. Blinken said it was China’s recent actions toward Taiwan — trying to sever the island’s diplomatic and international ties, for instance, and sending fighter jets over the area — that were “deeply destabilizing.”
But Mr. Blinken stressed that despite the rising concerns, the United States was not seeking a new Cold War and would not try to isolate China, the world’s second-largest economy. He reiterated a point that Mr. Biden and his national security aides have made since Mr. Biden’s presidential campaign of 2020 — that there are areas of cooperation with China, including climate change, health security and the global economy.
Mr. Blinken credited China’s growth to the talent and hard work of the Chinese people, as well as the stability and opportunity of the rules on global trade and diplomacy created and shaped by the United States in what Washington calls the international order. “Arguably no country on earth has benefited more from that than China,” he said. “But rather than using its power to reinforce and revitalize the laws, agreements, principles and institutions that enabled its success, so other countries can benefit from them too, Beijing is undermining it.”
Following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, which the United States supported, leaders in Beijing carried out far-reaching changes to the nation’s planned economy to open up further to outside trade and investment, helping to transform China from one of the world’s poorest countries into its biggest factory hub, and lifting hundreds of millions of people into the global middle class. But China stopped far short of becoming the free-market democracy that many in the West had hoped, and over the last decade, under Mr. Xi, the Communist Party and Chinese state have exerted an even heavier hand over the private market and individual freedoms.
Both Democrats and Republicans now see Chinese trade practices, including the government’s creation of heavily subsidized national champions and its acceptance of intellectual property theft, as one of the biggest factors undercutting American industry.
The Biden administration introduced one of its key elements in efforts to shape the economic environment around China — the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework — during Mr. Biden’s visit to Tokyo this week. The United States and 12 Asian nations will try to negotiate new agreements to create more resilient supply chains, set new rules for how electronic data is shared and stored, reduce greenhouse gases emitted by industry and eliminate bureaucratic hurdles that hold back trade, among other proposals.
But skeptics have said the ability of Washington to shape trade in the Asia-Pacific region may be limited because the framework is not a traditional trade agreement that offers countries reductions in tariffs and more access to the lucrative U.S. market.
The Obama administration had proposed such a deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Mr. Biden had supported it. But some Democrats and Republicans in Congress who worried about its potential for sending more jobs offshore opposed it. President Donald J. Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement, though other Asian nations moved forward with it, and China has since applied to join it.
4. Has Ukraine Broken the Russian Military?
Excerpts:
As of press time, the independent site Oryx has used photographs to document 4,150 destroyed or damaged Russian pieces of equipment, including 734 tanks and 148 aircraft (fighter jets, helicopters, and drones).
But human casualty figures are harder to fix. This week, British Ministry of Defence officials estimated that Russia has lost as many troops in the past three months as it did during its nine-year war in Afghanistan. If public sentiment about that war is any indication, the MoD tweeted, the losses could elevate “public dissatisfaction with the war and willingness to voice it.”
Pentagon officials have declined to estimate Russian personnel losses but said Thursday that the equipment losses are significant.
Has Ukraine Broken the Russian Military?
With thousands of troops dead, Russia seems desperate for new soldiers—allowing enlistees as old as 50, U.S. defense official says.
There’s no way to verify that 29,600 Russian troops have died in the invasion, as Ukraine’s defense ministry claimed on Thursday, but what is known is that Russia is calling for more volunteers and raising the upper age limit of enlistees.
The Russian military has also lost thousands of weapons, and in the last few weeks has scaled back from a three-pronged attack on Ukraine to a narrower effort to take the whole of the Donbas—and retain the parts it captured in 2014. The losses could make it difficult to wage war anywhere else in the short term, defense experts and officials said.
“Russia has taken heavy losses in this campaign, which will reduce its ability to engage in conflict over the next few years,” said Ryan Brobst, a research analyst for Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.
As of press time, the independent site Oryx has used photographs to document 4,150 destroyed or damaged Russian pieces of equipment, including 734 tanks and 148 aircraft (fighter jets, helicopters, and drones).
But human casualty figures are harder to fix. This week, British Ministry of Defence officials estimated that Russia has lost as many troops in the past three months as it did during its nine-year war in Afghanistan. If public sentiment about that war is any indication, the MoD tweeted, the losses could elevate “public dissatisfaction with the war and willingness to voice it.”
Pentagon officials have declined to estimate Russian personnel losses but said Thursday that the equipment losses are significant.
“We believe they've lost or rendered inoperable almost 1,000 of their tanks in this fight,” a senior defense official told reporters at the Pentagon. “They've lost well over 350 artillery pieces. They have lost almost three dozen fighter or fighter-bomber fixed-wing aircraft, and more than 50 helicopters.”
At full strength, Russia’s active-duty force, including conscripts, has about 280,000 troops, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which publishes an annual assessment of military end strengths and weapon worldwide. IISS reported in its February 2022 Military Balance report—the final one ante bellum—that Russia had more than 2,900 tanks in active use, including 2,000-plus T-72 variants, and another 10,200 T-72s and T-80s in storage.
“They still have the significant amount of the majority of their capability left to them,” the senior defense official said Thursday.
FDD’s Brobst said that while Russia will be challenged in the short term, it will pull weapons from storage, and would likely cut non-defense budgets to fund its re-arming.
Personnel-wise, Russia has gone all-in on Ukraine, and it’s taken a toll.
The senior defense official said Russia has committed more than 80 percent of “their entire battalion tactical groups” to invading Ukraine, 110 of which are currently in the Donbas region.
“They've invested an awful lot of their hardware and their personnel in this fight,” the official said.
A Russian battalion tactical group can be as large as 600 to 800 personnel. The units fighting in Ukraine are likely smaller than that, because Russia has classified the attack on Ukraine as a “special military operation” and not a war, so their reserve forces have not been activated, Probst said.
Russia recently put out a call for volunteers from the Army Reserve to come fight in Ukraine, the official said, and it’s recently increased the age of enlistment to 50 years old to replenish troops it has lost.
“It used to be that you couldn't be any older than 40 to join the Russian army. Now you can be 50 years old, and they've been public about that,” the official said.
5. Commercial and military drones in Ukraine: The evolutionary use and implications on security and safety
Conclusion:
The Ukraine war has given us an open window into the possibilities of drones in combat. But more importantly, it has shown security professionals the reality of this evolving technology and what is on the horizon from a threat perspective. This technology needs to be studied, understood, and proactively planned for. Commercial drone technology has made considerable advances in the last decade and has “crept” upon the security and safety landscape. Let’s keep the conversation going!
Commercial and military drones in Ukraine: The evolutionary use and implications on security and safety
There has been a tremendous amount of reporting on drones and the Ukraine war but a real lack of reporting from the ground perspective. Recently, coverage on capability and effects from the ground point of view has emerged, and the information is insightful and valuable. Elements of Ukrainian Special Forces have been causing havoc on Russian Motorized Rifle formations. The Russian advantage in terms of the “principle of mass” is clearly there, but unconventional warfare is proving to be the creative factor generating ground parity for the Ukrainian effort.
Textbook small unit operations and “hit and move” techniques have shown to be highly successful, especially with the right anti-tank and armor weapons. But what about drones? How are these platforms changing the landscape in what has become a target-rich environment? And how does this shape our future security environment in areas outside of conflict zones?
The desire and tactical need for a portable drone platform with extended range, battery life, and customized payload are clear from the ground perspective. The primary issue is supply, type of platform and quantity. The use of commercial drones is routine on both sides of the conflict. We are inundated daily with news reporting on the application and use of these platforms, proving the importance of the technology on the battlefield. Technology is not a replacement for other battlefield realities but a tool that is seeing evolutionary use to support ground and air parity. In reality, all units are equipped with a platform, even down to individual tank crews and squads. This tells the story of the importance of easily deployable drone systems and the creativity associated with getting them into the fight.
Overall, the effectiveness of these tools has been based on the circumstances and the environment. One specific item of note is the ease of geo-locating commercial drone operators. This is a crucial lesson learned and makes the operator vulnerable as a target in a fast-paced conflict with modern detection capability.
So how does this relate to security and safety in the homeland?
Technologies continue to evolve in the form of lightweight, man-portable, quickly deployable systems. Equipment that can go in a soldier’s rucksack or a person’s backpack has the potential to provide high-end capability options with customized payloads is now a reality. Look at recent reports from Teledyne FLIR on emerging capability on what is possible. Additionally, drone platforms available for commercial purchase come “out of the box,” ready for myriad payload options. Still, they are highly trackable by drone detection systems that can geo-locate the operator. Since this is the only legal response option based on current FAA regulations and legislation, this type of system could be valuable to a business or venue interested in lowering the drone threat. Note: this is not the case for designated critical infrastructure and events with high-level visibility.
The experimentation with drone warfare in Ukraine has opened our eyes to what is possible with easily accessible platforms. Technology tested in conflict can — and will — eventually make its way to the homeland both for positive and negative purposes, and we must be mindful and prepared. USG and security professionals from all agencies and businesses are woefully behind on what can be done from a legal perspective and what should be done from a planning perspective. Two over-the-horizon ideas that are still in development are unmanned traffic management (UTM) in Europe, commonly known as U-Space. U-Space is a system to monitor the future “drone superhighway,” similar to how the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) monitors commercial air traffic.
The second is the urban air mobility (UAM) program — think unmanned taxis and delivery platforms. UAM is the next wave of moving people and goods in unmanned autonomous platforms. While these programs are still in development, a simple solution can significantly impact drone security: innovative urban planning. Urban planners need to consider the rapidly changing pace of society as it pertains to this technology. Security consultants should play a vital role on design teams from the early stages. If we don’t plan for drones in future design, the cost will rise immensely to retrofit vital security features.
As the war in Ukraine continues, so does the experimentation with commercial drones in a high-intensity conflict. The Modern War Institute recently published a piece on seven lessons learned regarding drones and the Ukraine war. This article is an insightful piece about the air parity between combatants. A convergence of commercial and military drones is reshaping air space conditions.
The merging of military-designed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) drone technology is simply mind-boggling. It’s making a significant impact as Ukrainians leverage every available tool to defend their homeland and fight off the Russian superpower. As the Western world continues to slowly move military supplies into Ukraine, so do private companies willing to help the war effort. The drone war is only beginning to heat up as Ukrainian creativity and innovation have proven effective and deadly.
We’ve recently seen advanced technology like the Switchblade and Phoenix Ghost platforms join the fight, giving the Ukrainians quick-strike capability. But we’ve also seen many COTS products utilized for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and targeting, typically seen in higher-end platforms but are now easily used by employing recreational platforms with video payloads.
So why is this important? This merger of military-grade and COTS is a new approach when it comes to full employment of drones and robotics in conflict, specifically in Ukraine. As the war continues, it gives governments and private businesses a place to test their products under wartime conditions. This ultimate laboratory environment puts the systems through high-stress environments and helps to prove the technology.
So, how can we apply these lessons to security in the private sector?
- Understand that drone and robotic technologies are now solidly part of the fabric of modern society. They are not going away.
-
What is tested and used in conflict zones will eventually make its way to the homeland. Security professionals need to understand the capability and the threat. Conduct a Drone Vulnerability and Risk Assessment (DVRA).
- Face Reality. Security professionals from all market sectors need to understand the risks. Security program development should include assessment and mitigation options as it pertains to commercial drones.
- Understand your operating environment. If you host the public at your venue or event, take prudent measures to step up security. Conduct a DVRA, survey your airspace for pattern of life cycles, conduct Drone Emergency Response Planning (DERP), solidify policies and procedures into standard operating procedures, and train, rehearse responses, and exercise potential incidents.
- Don’t sit idle waiting for a drone event to happen. Take steps to mitigate the risk associated with this technology. Waiting for a catastrophe is a poor course of action choice.
The Ukraine war has given us an open window into the possibilities of drones in combat. But more importantly, it has shown security professionals the reality of this evolving technology and what is on the horizon from a threat perspective. This technology needs to be studied, understood, and proactively planned for. Commercial drone technology has made considerable advances in the last decade and has “crept” upon the security and safety landscape. Let’s keep the conversation going!
6. War Will Never Be This Bulky Again
Never say never.
Conclusion:
The future shape of militaries is open to debate. What is clear, though, is that investing in large World War II–era materiel such as the heavy tank, enormous aircraft carrier, and super-expensive fixed-wing aircraft has never been riskier. As far less expensive but still lethal systems continue to improve, the investment that will be required to protect larger, more expensive weapons systems will be financially crippling, even for the American military. Instead, political and military leaders will need to start conceiving of an entirely different battlefield, full of lighter, smaller, more mobile, and in many cases autonomous or remotely operated weapons. In essence, they will need to prepare for the first wars of the 21st century.
War Will Never Be This Bulky Again
Russia’s botched invasion has illustrated the diminishing power of heavy and expensive military power.
Nearly 80 years on from the end of World War II, it is striking how much of that conflict remains with us. This is of course true in terms of historic legacy—politicians who compare themselves to Churchill, for example, or fears of German power within Europe.
But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine makes clear that we still live in World War II’s shadow in other ways too. The Russian military, for example, shares many similarities with the great armies of that period. The country’s ground forces are built around large numbers of heavy armored vehicles, most famously tanks, and concentrations of heavy artillery. Much like the German Wehrmacht’s plans for attacking the Soviet Union in 1941, the Russians expected to blast holes in Ukrainian lines with their big guns, and then move tanks and armored personnel carriers through the gaps to make rapid advances, with Russian fighters and bombers in support. Even the Russian navy, with its large surface vessels not too dissimilar in shape and size from those you could have seen in the Pacific or North Atlantic in the early 20th century, was discussed as a force capable of launching an amphibious assault on the Ukrainian coast, much as the Allies did on D-Day in June 1944.
We know now that none of this worked out quite as Moscow had planned. In part, this is because of the basic inadequacies of the Russian military, which have revealed themselves to be manifold. Yet to focus on these factors would be to ignore a deeper shift under way, one that holds out the prospect of reshaping both the structure and expectation of militaries around the world.
Russia’s botched invasion and Ukraine’s remarkable fortitude in fighting back have illustrated the diminishing power of the heavy and expensive unit of military power, its role challenged by nimbler, easier-to-use—and, crucially, cheaper—systems. Tanks, fighter jets, and warships are being pushed into obsolescence, giving way to new tools of conflict. In the process, we are seeing the very nature of combat change. In fact, we may be witnessing in Ukraine the final war of 20th-century militaries.
This transition is most evident with the tank, the king of the land battlefield since World War II. At the time of its invasion in February, Russia held not just a significant numerical advantage over Ukraine in terms of the number of tanks in its arsenal, but a qualitative edge as well—Russian tanks were judged to be some of the best in the world. What we have seen, however, is a tank massacre: Tallies of Russian tank losses range from 700 to 1,200, an enormous loss out of a total arsenal of perhaps 1,500 that took part in the initial invasion.
The tank’s vulnerabilities—it is ill-suited to many types of terrain, inflexible in its movements, and the opposite of stealthy—have been known for years, but until this war they had not been exposed so clearly. During World War II, the Germans developed an excellent and cheap handheld anti-tank weapon, nicknamed the Panzerfaust, which struck fear into the hearts of many American, British, and Soviet tankers. However, the Panzerfaust had an effective range of only 30 meters when it was first deployed, and technological advancements extended that to only 100 meters by the end of the war. If a soldier using a Panzerfaust missed (or even hit, it must be said), it was likely to be the last thing he ever did. In Ukraine, by contrast, many Russian tanks have been picked off at distances of two miles or more, by small groups of well-concealed Ukrainian soldiers using handheld anti-tank weapons.
This swing in favor of smaller and cheaper defensive weapons has been matched in the air. The Russian air force, which was expected to dominate, has been significantly disrupted by Ukraine’s use of a range of cheaper systems, again including a number of handhelds, among them Stinger missiles that have been in service for almost half a century. Such systems render Russian pilots incapable of carrying out patrols, restricting them to quick point-to-point missions. By neutering Russian airpower, including helicopters, in places such as the Donbas, Ukrainian forces have retained desperately needed mobility. So even when the Russians do make advances, the Ukrainians can adjust. Along with their low-cost anti-air equipment, the Ukrainians have also made good use of cheaper unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, to scout Russian positions and launch attacks where possible.
On the seas, the story has been similar. Maybe the most shocking moment of the war so far was the sinking of the Russian Black Sea flagship Moskva, apparently by a homemade Ukrainian anti-ship missile. If Western reports are to be believed—Kyiv has steadfastly refused to comment on its role in the vessel’s sinking—the Ukrainians used two relatively cheap systems to destroy the Moskva: They employed a drone to distract the Moskva’s defensive systems, then hit the ship with two missiles—leading to a catastrophic internal fire and the eventual sinking.
This wide-ranging success of cheaper, simpler systems against the ostensibly more advanced (but more expensive) equipment that is a feature of the world’s great militaries is something that has been prophesized for decades, since the advent of the Panzerfaust. If it is now a reality, that has significant implications for how armed forces the world over plan and strategize. As the counterinsurgency expert T. X. Hammes has argued, the improvement of defensive firepower has made forward movement very difficult, changing the balance of modern warfare very much against the attacker.
What the Ukraine conflict has revealed is that this shift might be even more dramatic than most have imagined, a change that for the past few decades has been obscured by the overwhelming battle-winning (if not war-winning) capabilities of the American armed forces. The U.S. has held such a marked technological, logistical, and training advantage that its large offensive forces were typically able to thwart the efforts of forces using smaller and cheaper equipment.
Going forward, however, the Russian experience is probably more instructive for all states—even the U.S. (American struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan point to even its enormous advantage eroding.) The effectiveness of defensive firepower will only improve. Anti-tank weapons will achieve longer ranges, and their detection ability and accuracy will get better. Drones will be able to stay in the air for longer and avoid detection better, while increasing their lethality and improving their own computational performance. The ability of both to destroy heavy land vehicles while remaining unseen will improve. The massacre of Russian vehicles we have seen in Ukraine will become the norm, not the exception. Navies that want to risk having their ships near the shores of a well-armed enemy will need to contend with huge salvos of anti-ship missiles and even anti-ship drones, far more than their anti-missile capabilities can now handle. This has consequences around the world: If the Chinese were rash enough to attempt an amphibious assault on Taiwan, or the U.S. were rash enough to send large carrier battle groups to the Chinese coast in a battle over the South China Sea, the result would be the Moskva many times over.
The future shape of militaries is open to debate. What is clear, though, is that investing in large World War II–era materiel such as the heavy tank, enormous aircraft carrier, and super-expensive fixed-wing aircraft has never been riskier. As far less expensive but still lethal systems continue to improve, the investment that will be required to protect larger, more expensive weapons systems will be financially crippling, even for the American military. Instead, political and military leaders will need to start conceiving of an entirely different battlefield, full of lighter, smaller, more mobile, and in many cases autonomous or remotely operated weapons. In essence, they will need to prepare for the first wars of the 21st century.
7. Japan, US fly fighters after China drill, N. Korean missiles
Northeast Asia is a dangerous neighborhood. The Korean peninsula and Taiwan and territorial conflict up to the Kuril islands create complex security conditions. Perhaps there should be a combatant command (Northeast Asia Command or Far East Command) to provide a holistics approach to address these threats. The Asia Pacific and Indo Pacific may be too large for one combatant command.
Japan, US fly fighters after China drill, N. Korean missiles
TOKYO (AP) — Japanese and U.S. forces have conducted a joint fighter jet flight over the Sea of Japan, Japan’s military said Thursday, in an apparent response to a Russia-China joint bomber flight while U.S. President Joe Biden was in Tokyo.
The Japan-U.S. joint flight on Wednesday involved eight warplanes based in Japan, including four U.S. F-16 fighters and four Japanese F-15s, the Joint Staff of the Japan Self-Defense Forces said.
The joint flight was meant to confirm the combined capabilities of the two militaries and further strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance, it said in a statement.
The flight occurred hours after North Korea fired three missiles, including an intercontinental ballistic missile, toward the sea between the Korean Peninsula and Japan, amid concerns about another nuclear test by the North. The missiles fell in waters outside of Japan’s exclusive economic zone.
Chinese and Russian strategic bombers conducted joint flights near Japan on Tuesday, Japan’s Defense Ministry said. Biden was meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and their counterparts from India and Australia for the Quad, an Indo-Pacific security and economic coalition meant as a counterweight to China’s growing influence in the region.
Chinese H-6 bombers joined Russian TU-95s over the Sea of Japan and flew to areas over the East China Sea, but did not violate Japanese airspace, Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi said. Separately, a Russian IL-20 reconnaissance plane was spotted flying off the northern Japanese coast.
The Chinese-Russian joint flight represented an “increased level of provocation” and a threat to the Quad, Kishi said.
China said the flights were over the the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea and the western Pacific. Defense Ministry spokesperson Wu Qian said it was a “routine joint strategic air patrol” that has been carried out four times since 2019.
“This operation is not aimed at a third party and has nothing to do with the current international and regional situation,” he said in a video statement posted Wednesday on the Defense Ministry website.
8. MARSOC Has New Cdr - Major General Matthew Trollinger | SOF News
MARSOC Has New Cdr - Major General Matthew Trollinger | SOF News
Story by Sgt. Jesula Jeanlouis.
Marine Forces Special Operations Command hosted a change of command ceremony at Camp Lejeune, N.C., May 23, 2022. Major General James F. Glynn relinquished his duties as the commander of Marine Forces Special Operations Command to Major General Matthew G. Trollinger.
The senior officer in attendance was General David H. Berger, 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps. Also in attendance was U.S. Army General Richard D. Clarke, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, previous commanders of MARSOC, and various dignitaries from the local government.
Presiding over the ceremony, General Berger said, “There is a time when the right person comes in at exactly the right time and has the courage to look at what you [have to] do right now, but also where they have to be in the future, that has been General Glynn and Denise.”
Glynn took the helm as MARSOC’s eighth commander on June 26, 2020, returning to MARSOC after previously serving as the commanding officer of the Marine Raider Training Center from 2011-2013.
“As I turn over the colors today,” continued Glynn, “somebody asked what’s it like? Somewhere between excitement and pride is what I could describe, as you hold the flag and let go. Pride in knowing that that formation, in two-years’ time will not look like this. I couldn’t be more excited to hand this over and know that this place is going to be different. And by being different, it’s going to be better.”
Trollinger assumes command after serving his previous tour as the deputy director, Politico-Military Affairs (Middle East), J-5, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.
“To the Marines and Sailors of the command, I’m just so grateful,” said Trollinger. “[I have] a lot of pride and humility to stand in front of this formation with you. As has been stated, we’re in a number of areas right now doing a number of different things in pursuit of our national security interests. And as General Glynn mentioned, the command is doing great things moving us into the future and Nancy and I are tremendously proud to be back here and leading this organization.”
As the MARSOC Commander, Trollinger will be responsible for manning, training, and equipping Marine Raiders for deployments in support of special operations missions across the globe. MARSOC maintains a continuous deployed presence in the areas of operations for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command.
“I believe that MARSOC has and will continue to play a critical role in your vision for the Marine Corps into the future and I do believe that when any of our components, whether be the [Air Force] or Navy, Army or Marine Corps, are closest to their services, it makes us collectively better, and it makes SOCOM a better headquarters going forward.” said Clarke.
MARSOC is the Marine Corps service component of U.S. Special Operations Command and was activated Feb. 24, 2006. Since then, MARSOC has deployed continuously in support of special operations forces worldwide. MARSOC’s current missions include counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and preparation of the environment.
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This story by Sgt. Jesula Jeanlouis of MARSOC was first published on May 26, 2022 by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service. DVIDS publishes content in the public domain.
Photo: Sgt. Maj. Anthony J. Loftus, Marine Forces Special Operations Command Sgt. Maj., passes the organizational colors to Maj. Gen. James F. Glynn, outgoing MARSOC Commander, during a change of command ceremony, at Camp Lejeune, N.C., May 23, 2022. The change of command ceremony represents the transition of command and responsibility of MARSOC from Maj. Gen. James F. Glynn to Maj. Gen. Matthew G. Trollinger. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Gunnery Sgt. Tia Nagle)
9. “China's Columbus” Was an Imperialist Too: Contesting the Myth of Zheng He
Dealing with a Chinese narrative. Can this be effective? What kind of effects can we achieve?
“China's Columbus” Was an Imperialist Too: Contesting the Myth of Zheng He
By Peggy-Jean M. Allin and Steven R. Corman
Editor’s note: This essay was produced with the support of a grant from the Office of Naval Research (ONR N00014-21-1-2121). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding organization.
Zheng He is a popular Chinese Admiral who is remembered for commanding naval voyages in the early 15th century through what is today the South China Sea. Positive stories pushed by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) propaganda apparatus have portrayed Zheng He as a Muslim, a benign friend, a peaceful and morally sophisticated diplomat, and a symbol of China’s gentle, benevolent and “peaceful rise.” Chinese officials emphasize that, unlike Christopher Columbus or other Western voyagers, Zheng He “did not occupy a single piece of land.”
This is disinformation that represents a PRC strategic narrative: Zheng He was no Columbus, but a man of power representing the greatness of the Empire’s scientific, technological, cultural, and moral advancements. He travelled the world as a benevolent gift giver (not taker), who spread Islam, religious tolerance, peace, and openness around the world. Zheng He supposedly shunned imperialism, colonialism, and exploitation despite holding power that could make these things possible.
By pushing this narrative, the Chinese state has attempted (and succeeded to a degree) to construct collective memory through mythical and inaccurate historical rebranding. The goal of this public diplomacy campaign is to increase regional support for China’s pursuit of geostrategic interests—namely, aggression in the South China Sea and the “Maritime Silk Road” component of its Belt and Road Initiative.
China has invested significant effort in building the Zheng He myth. In 2005, the CCP organized the 600th anniversary of Zheng He’s first voyage. This laid the ground for China’s “National Maritime Day” in July. During this holiday Chinese citizens rally for national maritime justice and support the state’s goal of reclaiming what “rightfully” belongs to China. The opening ceremonies of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games dedicated several minutes to Zheng He’s heroism,further signaling the importance of this narrative to the Chinese government.
Zheng He mythology has also worked to “mollify littoral nations” and advance China’s cultural and Islamic diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Officials, academics, and elites in neighboring countries have “lavished praise” on Zheng He. Indonesians and Malaysians have also participated in Zheng He festivals, events, theater productions, and have founded Zheng He temples, museums, shrines, think tanks, NGOs and associations.
As these examples demonstrate, and as other scholars have argued, the Chinese government’s use of historically inaccurate and exaggerated accounts about Zheng He does not only foster diplomatic traction in Southeast Asia. The narrative also acts as a “backbone” that shapes key security issues. As such the narrative presents a challenge to the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy.
A Questionable Myth
One way narratives gain validity and persuasive force is to “to prune away the dead branches of the past,” leaving inconvenient details out of the picture. One good option for counter-narrative, then, is to put those branches back. This can be accomplished by restoring omitted facts and countering inaccuracies in the CCP version of Zheng He narrative, features which otherwise render it romantic and “fanciful.”
A model of a Ming Dynasty ship on display in a Zheng He exhibit at the Field Museum in Chicago. Photo by author.
Scholars such as Geoff Wade and Charles Horner have sought to do such restoration by debunking the Zheng He myth. They conclude that he was a “proto-colonialist” whose fleets captured the strategic military ports of Malacca, fought in a Javanese civil war and installed a new leader there who was allied with the Ming Emperor, and colonized Ceylon—all while traveling with tens of thousands of personnel and magazines holding ample stores of gunpowder.
Wade’s research has been attacked by pro-China scholars who defend Zheng He as fighting for “self-defense” and against “pirates”. These attacks suggest that Wade has found an effective counter-narrative that the Chinese are keen to resist: “[H]ere, then, [is] a reversal of roles and a transposition of villains: China, once on the receiving end of imperialism, can now be written about, almost offhandedly, as a Great Power like any other power— like any other imperialist power.” In other words, contrary to the CCP narrative, Zheng He was China’s version of Christopher Columbus.
Implications for Strategy
We propose a counter-narrative as a policy-oriented solution to help restore leadership in the region and counteract Chinese propaganda. The Biden-Harris administration’s current Indo-Pacific narrative envisions a region free, open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient. While these are noble goals, they seem superficial because they are not explicitly grounded in a historical or cultural narrative that is meaningful in the region. Simply wishing for good things is not enough when a competing adversary is constructing a strong (but false) cultural narrative about an ancient hero who embodies similar goals.
The Achilles' heel of this CCP narrative is that it relies on a credulous audience that does not question idealistic, romantic, and fanciful claims. Exploiting this weakness is a key to undermining and countering CCP propaganda and disinformation. The U.S. could strengthen its hand by campaigning to “fact-check” and pick holes in the Zheng He myth. The goal would be to build a consensus that China can, and indeed should, be compared to all other large countries that historically undertook “imperialist” behavior.
Though we lack the space to develop the argument here (but will pursue elsewhere), we believe Zheng He qualifies as a master narrative which is in turn an element of a larger rhetorical vision China has been promoting as a foundation of its public diplomacy and international relations. Therefore, undermining the Zheng He myth could not only assist Biden’s current Indo-Pacific messaging, but also help to unravel the larger strategic vision being promoted by China.
About the Author(s)
Steven R. Corman is a Professor and Director of the Center for Strategic Communication in the Hugh Downs School of Human Communication at Arizona State University. He has studied terrorism and state-based disinformation and propaganda for the past 20 years.
Peggy-Jean M. Allin is a Research Analyst at the Center for Narrative, Disinformation and Strategic Influence at the Global Security Initiative at Arizona State University. She holds an M.A. in International Relations.
10. SWJ Book Review – Bullets Not Ballots: Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare
Dr. Jill Hazelton provides quite a critique of COIN.
SWJ Book Review – Bullets Not Ballots: Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare
Steven Metz
In a paradigm-busting study Jacqueline Hazelton, then at the U.S. Naval War College, takes on the normal explanation for success in counterinsurgency, subjects it to penetrating analysis using the latest available evidence, and comes up with a very different picture than has been the norm in the counterinsurgency literature over the past fifty years. The author, now at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center and Executive Editor of the journal International Security, is well versed in the subject matter with a decade of focused research dedicated to it.
Dr. Hazelton approaches insurgency as a form or variant of war: “Counterinsurgency is a competition for power among armed groups. Successful counterinsurgency is one armed group coming to dominate the rest.”(p. 2)[1] From this perspective “The process ends with the insurgents’ and supporters’ will to fight broken. The government need not kill all the insurgents. It only needs to show them they cannot win.”(p. 18) This definition of success shapes her analysis—the measuring stick is not a “better peace” in B.H. Liddell Hart’s famous phrasing or long-term political stability, but victory in the military sense.
Hazelton contends, much of the analytical literature on counterinsurgency misidentified the source of success when it did occur. Reflecting “modernization” theory popular in the 1960s and 1970s, most counterinsurgency theorists used a “good governance” approach. While it was necessary that a nation threatened by an insurgency increase the effectiveness of its security forces through professionalization, better equipment, training and intelligence, and expanded capacity, strategic success came from political and economic reforms which addressed the root causes of insurgency, winning over the members of the public who supported or considered supporting the insurgents to the side of the government. Military success was necessary but not sufficient. The orthodox literature on counterinsurgency, then, relied on the logic of rational choice, assuming that the people of a country supported the side that offered them the best deal. In effect this line of thinking took Mao's theory of insurgency which relied on providing fairer and better governance than the state and transformed it into a theory of counterinsurgency.
Dr. Hazelton contends that the evidence does not validate “good governance” approach. It has dominated the counterinsurgency literature less because it worked than because of who developed the theory and why they did. The bulk of the literature came from Western democracies involved in counterinsurgency support, particularly the United States, Great Britain, and France. In these nations political leaders had to sell their citizens on involvement in protracted, nasty conflicts. They did so by demonizing insurgents, particularly those linked to communism, and by insisting that they were improving the lot of the people in the nations where counterinsurgency took place. Because the history of counterinsurgency was mostly written by outsiders, it reflected their perspective and preferences—selecting data that supported their thesis—rather than what governments fighting insurgents actually did.
Bullets Not Ballots aims to move beyond this, looking both at newly available data and examining the existing historical record in its entirety rather than cherry picking information that supports a desired political point. Hazleton focuses on the cases generally considered successes: the Malayan “emergency,” the Greek civil war, the Philippine conflict with the Huks, the Dhofar conflict in Oman, El Salvador, and Turkey’s conflict with the PKK.[2] She then suggests that compellence theory rather than “good governance” best explains the outcome.[3] The key to success in the cases examined was mustering resources and using them to break the will of the insurgents, not trying to lure away civilian support for the insurgents. Success thus had two crucial elements: the accommodation of countervailing elites so that they did not support the insurgents and, if possible, directly supported the government; and the use of brute force to control civilians, cut the flow of resources to the insurgency, and degrade insurgent forces and resources. Governments successful at counterinsurgency, Hazelton wrote, “bargained with rival elites rather than sharing wealth and power with the masses, to get the cooperation, information, and military capabilities they needed to conduct the campaign” (p. 148).
Dr. Hazelton thus sees counterinsurgency as a form of violent state building rather a political competition for popular allegiance.(p. 15) The historical record, she argues, suggests that “popular support and reforms are unnecessary to reducing an insurgency to an annoyance.”(p. 145) To the extent they occurred, they were often superficial and undertaken after the insurgency had been broken militarily, more to sustain the flow of outside support that to affect the outcome of the conflict. Ultimately “Counterinsurgency success is about power, co-optation, building a coalition, and crushing opposition, not good governance.”(p. 149)
There has been a debate between the “mailed fist” and “velvet glove” approach to counterinsurgency for decades. What Hazelton has done is provide the most analytically rigorous case for the mailed fist. While admitting that her study is intended as scholarly analysis rather than a guide to policy, she is aware of the implications of her conclusion. Outside nations and their publics would balk at counterinsurgency support if they understand what success actually takes. But perhaps this would be a good thing, forcing nations contemplating counterinsurgency support to do so without misconception. Dr. Hazelton makes a powerful case that while involvement in counterinsurgency may be promoting the lesser evil advancing good governance and economic equity is unlikely and unnecessary for success. It is unrealistic to expect a government fighting an insurgency to radically transform a political and economic system that benefits those in power.
For some reason Americans in particular repeatedly overlook this but it is a vital point that every counterinsurgency expert and everyone advising political leaders on potential involvement in counterinsurgency support must understand. Anyone who might someday be in this situation should read Dr. Hazelton’s book so that they understand counterinsurgency for the nasty, brutish thing it actually is.
Endnotes
[1] In a very broad sense the analytical literature conceptualizes insurgency and counterinsurgency as either a variant of war, a variant of politics that incorporates violence, or a form of strategy.
[2] When the US Army Command and General Staff College rebuilt its counterinsurgency curriculum after Vietnam, Malaya and Oman were used as case studies of success and the French campaign in Algeria as a failure.
[3] It is important to note that “compellence theory” has at least two meaning in the national security literature. In some cases, it means the threat of but not actual use of force to create desired political effects (e.g., Melanie W. Sisson, James A. Siebens and Barry M. Blechman, Eds. Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy: The Use of Force Short of War. London: Routledge, 2020. Hazelton is using it in the sense of applying armed force to compel desired behavior.
About the Author(s)
Dr. Steven Metz is Professor of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College and a nonresident fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Prior to his current position Dr. Metz was with the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute serving as Director of Research, chairman of the Regional Strategy Department, research director for the Joint Strategic Landpower Task Force, director of the Future of American Strategy Project, and project director for the Army Iraq Stabilization Strategic Assessment. He has also been on the faculty of the Air War College, the US Army Command and General Staff College, and several universities. He has testified in both houses of Congress and spoken on military and security issues around the world. He served on the advisory panel for the Secretary of Defense Strategic Portfolio Review for Close Combat Capabilities, the RAND Insurgency Board, the Senior Advisory Panel on Special Forces—Conventional Forces Interdependence, and as a nonresident fellow at the Modern War Institute. Dr. Metz is the author of Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy and many publications on strategic futures, insurgency, military strategy, and defense policy. He is currently writing a book on the future of insurgency.
11. Japan to 'drastically strengthen' military capability
China, Russia, and north Korea are driving changes in the Japanese military. Is that what they anticipated? They surely do not desire that.
Japan to 'drastically strengthen' military capability
TOKYO, May 27 (Reuters) - Japan aims to "drastically strengthen" its military capabilities, according to an economic policy draft seen by Reuters, as officials worry that Russia's invasion of Ukraine could prompt instability in East Asia.
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, meeting U.S. President Joe Biden on Monday, pledged to "substantially increase" Japan's defence budget.
The draft, a long-term economic outline that is updated annually, does not gives details about spending, but says for the first time: "There have been attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in East Asia, making regional security increasingly severe."
It also does not specify security threats in the region, but Japan's military planners have expressed repeated concern about China, with which Japan has a long-running territorial dispute, and North Korea.
Kishida's news conference with Biden was dominated by the president saying the United States would be willing to use force to defend Taiwan from Chinese aggression. read more
"We will drastically strengthen defence capabilities that will be the ultimate collateral to secure national security," the draft document says.
Former prime minister Shinzo Abe called on Thursday for defence spending of nearly 7 trillion yen ($60 billion) for next fiscal year, up from 5.4 trillion yen under this year's initial budget, in light of China's growing military spending and missile threats from North Korea, Nippon Television Network reported.
"It's natural (for the government) to secure defence spending equivalent of 2% of GDP," Abe, who still wields considerable clout as head of the biggest faction in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, was quoted as saying.
Kishida has not said how much he wants to boost military spending for the fiscal year starting in April 2023.
Higher defence spending will strain Japan's already dire public finances.
"There's no end to spending pressure," said Takuya Hoshino, senior economist at Dai-ichi Life Research Institute.
The lower house of parliament on Friday approved an extra budget worth 2.7 trillion yen, funded by bond sales, to cushion the blow to households and firms from rising fuel and raw material costs. The upper house is expected to enact the budget into law next week.
With Kishida facing a national election in July, another supplementary budget "is almost a done deal", Hoshino said. "The question is how to secure funding, other than having to rely on ultra-low borrowing costs provided by the Bank of Japan."
($1 = 126.9800 yen)
Reporting by Takaya Yamaguchi; Writing by Tetsushi Kajimoto; Editing by William Mallard
12. U.S. Treasury Targets Hamas Financial Network
Excerpts:
Lastly, Treasury’s designated six companies either allegedly controlled by Hamas or used to illicitly transfer funds. Companies that were noted such as Sidar Company and Itqan Real Estate JSC were used to fund Hamas’ so-called military arm, al-Qassam Brigades, which is based in Gaza and also active in the West Bank and the Palestinian camps of Lebanon.
While the designation is a positive development in targeting the jihadist organization’s funds, it also reveals Hamas’ increasingly sophisticated efforts to evade sanctions by using individuals and companies to support its illicit financial network across the globe.
U.S. Treasury Targets Hamas Financial Network | FDD's Long War Journal
Tressury-designated Hisham Qafisheh and Trend GYO
On May 24, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) announced it designated a Hamas financial official, and other financial facilitators, including companies used to move money for the Gaza-based militant organization. The move is the latest in a series of actions by the U.S. government to target Hamas’ illicit financial network around the globe.
The individuals and entities sanctioned by Treasury were Ahmed Sharif Abdallah Odeh, Usama Ali, Hisham Yunis Qafisheh, ‘Abdallah Yusuf Faisal Sabri, Trend GYO, Anda Company, Agrogate Holding, Al-Rowad Real Estate Development, Sidar Company and Itqan Real Estate JSC.
All were found by Treasury to be involved in concealing and laundering funds for Hamas.
Treasury noted that Hisham Yunis Qafisheh played an “important role” in the transfer of Hamas funds. He also managed several companies operated by Hamas, including Agrogate Holding, Al-Rowad Real Estate Holding and Turkey-based Trend GYO.
From documents obtained by FDD’s Long War Journal, Qafisheh was also a board member of another Turkish real estate company called IYS. That information was not included in Treasury’s report and IYS was not mentioned as having any connection to Hamas in Tuesday’s announcement.
Also not mentioned in Treasury’s report is Qafisheh’s change of name.
From the documents obtained by FDD’s Long War Journal, Qafisheh changed his name to Hasmet Aslan, though it is unclear on what date that occurred and the reason behind it.
Other Treasury-designated individuals include Ahraf Sharif Abdallah Odeh, who is described as a “Jordanian national” who “oversaw the Investment Office on behalf of Hamas’ Shura Council” and “regularly met with Hamas officials.” Odeh also “coordinated financial transfers” on behalf of Hamas, according to Treasury’s report.
Like Odeh, Usama Ali was involved in investments on behalf of Hamas. Treasury charged that Ali was a “Hamas operative” and “maintained direct contact with senior Hamas leaders, including Political Bureau Chief Ismail Haniyeh, Political Bureau Deputy Chief Salih al-Aruri, financial official Zahar Jabarin, and others.”
Treasury also implicated ‘Abdallah Yusuf Faisal Sabri as an “important figure” in Hamas and noted his efforts in expanding the organization’s “reach in the region.” Treasury’s report also said that Sabri managed “Hamas’s operational expenses” including “transfers from Iran and Saudi Arabia, which he sent to Hamas members, units, and industries.”
Lastly, Treasury’s designated six companies either allegedly controlled by Hamas or used to illicitly transfer funds. Companies that were noted such as Sidar Company and Itqan Real Estate JSC were used to fund Hamas’ so-called military arm, al-Qassam Brigades, which is based in Gaza and also active in the West Bank and the Palestinian camps of Lebanon.
While the designation is a positive development in targeting the jihadist organization’s funds, it also reveals Hamas’ increasingly sophisticated efforts to evade sanctions by using individuals and companies to support its illicit financial network across the globe.
Joe Truzman is a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.
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13. Tajik terrorist serves as Taliban commander in northern Afghanistan
Tajik terrorist serves as Taliban commander in northern Afghanistan | FDD's Long War Journal
As the Taliban continues to maintain that it doesn’t allow foreign fighters in Afghanistan, a Tajik national and commander for the Al Qaeda-linked Jamaat Ansarullah remains in control of several districts in a northern Afghan province.
During the Taliban’s swift offensive across Afghanistan last spring and summer, the Taliban placed five districts in the northern province of Badakhshan under the control of Mahdi Arsalon, a Tajik national and a commander in the Al Qaeda-linked Jamaat Ansarullah (JA). Arsalon was given control of the districts by Qari Fasihuddin, an ethnic Tajik Taliban commander who served as the shadow governor of Badakhshan at the time. Fasihuddin has since been appointed to serve as the Taliban’s chief of army staff.
The clear cooperation between the Taliban and Jamaat Ansarullah directly contradicts repeated Taliban claims that their regime does not provide safe haven to foreign fighters. In an interview with CNN this past week, the Taliban’s Minister of the Interior, and leader of the Haqqani Network, Siraj Haqqani doubled down on the assertion, declaring that the Taliban does not support foreign fighters and does not allow Afghanistan to serve as a breeding ground or launching pad for terrorism.
On his Facebook account, Arsalon recently posted videos of Jamaat Ansarullah fighters, or “Tajik Taliban” forces, operating along the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border in Badakhshan’s districts of Kuf Ab, Khwahan, Maimay, Nusay, and Shekay.
Jamaat Ansarullah fighters, or the “Tajik Taliban", operating along the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border in the province of Badakhshan. Video was published by Jamaat Ansarullah commander Mahdi Arsalon. pic.twitter.com/SbvN45i4G8
— Bill Roggio (@billroggio) May 25, 2022
Arsalon, also known as Muhamma Sharifov, was born in the Rasht Valley in eastern Tajikistan. He joined Jamaat Ansarullah in 2014. Described as “dangerous and ruthless,” Arsalon followed the jihadist footsteps of his father and elder brother, both of whom were killed by Tajik security forces. He acted as a recruiter for the organization before climbing the ranks to a leadership role that allowed him to assume command in Badakhshan.
Jamaat Ansarullah: Operating in Afghanistan for two decades
Jamaat Ansarullah is an al Qaeda-linked terrorist organization that emerged in Tajikistan in 2006 as a Tajik-focused offshoot of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The group first rose to prominence with a sucide bombing in Khujand, the capital of Tajikistan’s Sughd region, in Sept. 2010.
That bombing, targeting the local police headquarters, killed 3 people and injured an additional 25. Local officials stated the bomber trained in al Qaeda’s camps in Pakistan’s tribal areas. In 2012, the group was banned from Tajikistan as an extremist organization that threatened the state.
The terrorist organization, which aims to replace the government in Dushanbe with an Islamic regime, has operated in northern Afghanistan since its inception, receiving support from the IMU and the Taliban. Even after its leader, Mullah Amriddin Tabarov, was killed by Afghan forces in 2015, JA maintained its presence in Afghanistan, including training facilities.
However, in Afghanistan, doubts emerged about JA’s manpower and capabilities, as reports indicated it had less than 100 fighters. Despite its size, the Tajik terrorist group continued recruiting in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, and even Russia, with dozens of members arrested in Russia and Tajikistan.
On the ground, it previously highlighted conducting joint operations with other foreign jihadist groups, particularly the ethnic Uyghur Turkistan Islamic Party and the ethnic Uzbek Islamic Jihad Union, itself also a splinter from the IMU, in northern Afghanistan.
In its propaganda from Afghanistan, it routinely featured prominent al Qaeda commanders, in addition to using clips from other al Qaeda groups, such as Shabaab in Somalia, the former Al Nusrah Front in Syria (now Hay’at Tahrir al Sham), and the Turkistan Islamic Party.
In July 2021, as the Taliban gobbled up territory against the hapless ANDSF, it entrusted the protection of five districts in Badakhshan to JA under Mahdi Arsalon, a Tajik national. In 2021, Tajik authorities estimated that Arsalon commanded approximately 200 Tajik fighters in this section of Badakhshan, contradicting the Taliban’s claims that its ranks did not include foreign fighters, especially Tajiks.
In September 2021, Tajik security reports indicated that Arsalon was planning JA operations to infiltrate Tajikistan. After Kabul fell, Arsalon allegedly consulted Taliban leaders in the Afghan capital for operational guidance.
The only way Taliban can propagate its lie about the supposed lack of foreign fighters in Afghanistan is by integrating these forces within its hierarchy, as they are clearly attempting with Arsalan and his contingent from JA.
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14. Biden’s Maiden Presidential Trip To Asia: Reassuring Important Indo-Pacific Allies – Analysis
Excerpts:
As America looks to create more jobs back home, the economic resurgence is seen as consistent with US’ objectives in the Indo-Pacific—amongst them, to wean Japan and South Korea away from a growing trade dependence on China. In the recent past, both Japan and South Korea have seen growing trade dependence on China.
The launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework was perhaps the most important development of Biden’s maiden Asia visit as President in this regard. The US’ Indo-Pacific Economic Framework brings both Japan and the ROK formally into an expanded geoeconomic vision which, in the short term, seeks to emphasise that the US’ focus on the Eurasian front is not at the cost of its focus on the Indo-Pacific region and, in the long term, create economic and strategic alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Biden’s Asia trip to two of the US’ most important allies in the Pacific remains united by their opposition to Russia’s military operation in Ukraine. This may have been a step to distinctively pre-empt the rather nuanced position on the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war due to India’s subtle position on the issue. However, on other issues, the Quad remains resolutely unanimous.
Biden’s Maiden Presidential Trip To Asia: Reassuring Important Indo-Pacific Allies – Analysis
By Vivek Mishra
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On his first trip to Asia as President, Joe Biden made a five-days tour to two important Asian allies, South Korea and Japan. The importance of the visit lies in the US’ renewed focus on Asia which seemed somewhat fraying in the backdrop of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, drawing much of Washington’s resource and strategic focus to the Eurasian heartland. The sudden turn of events beset by the Russia–Ukraine war and the strategic necessities engendered by it has compelled the Biden administration to asymmetrically focus on a heated Eurasian front, even as the Indo-Pacific region has demanded US’ continued attention.
Be it China’s assertive actions, the apprehension of a looming China threat over Taiwan, or North Korea’s unabated efforts to build its missile programme as well as its nuclear arsenal, there has hardly been a dearth of issues drawing the US’ attention to the Indo-Pacific even amidst an active war in Europe. As such, Biden’s trip, coming rather late in his term, sought to achieve two important objectives: Mark his administration’s commitment to the important alliances in the Pacific—a departure from his predecessor’s style and intent—and to reassure two important allies in the Indo-Pacific amidst concerns that the US’ focus and resources could be drawn away from this region.
While a united front against Russia along with its European allies has helped the US consolidate its transatlantic alliance, it may have played a hand in withering assurances from the Biden administration that America’s allies in the Pacific theatre were expecting out of a different dispensation in Washington than the brinkmanship of the erstwhile Donald Trump presidency. Against this backdrop, Biden’s trip to two important allies in Asia–Japan and South Korea—marks the refocusing of the US in the Indo-Pacific. In line with his administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy which was brought out earlier this year, Biden has sought to assure its Indo-Pacific allies that his promise of America’s continued focus in every part of this region is not just empty words and that a renewed focus on the threats posed by Russia in Europe will not take away from the Indo-Pacific strategy.
Broadly, Biden’s Asia trip was undergirded by three strong focuses: Improving economic security at home and abroad through stronger partnerships with its allies in the Indo-Pacific; stability of the Korean Peninsula in the face of continued North Korean threats; emphasising US’ extended deterrence in the Pacific theatre and countering China’s growing dominance in the Indo-Pacific.
The US-ROK relationship forms an important strategic arc in the Indo-Pacific. Symbolically, President Biden’s visit marked the earliest visit ever by a US President during any South Korean President’s tenure. In many ways, Biden’s visit looked to carve a sharper role for the ROK in US’ Indo-Pacific strategy. In South Korea, Biden looked to reassure a new government in Seoul under President Yoon Suk-yeol of the conservative People Power Party (PPP), of Washington’s continued support amidst a wearing out of trust in Seoul that the US under Biden was doing enough to bring North Korea to the negotiating table. In the US too, there was some settling apprehensionthat the South Korean government under President Yoon may be timider in its approach to North Korea and China. Besides, in an early scramble, China has already reached out to the new government of South Korea by sending one of its top officials into the recent swearing-in ceremony of President Yoon. Biden’s visit to Seoul sits well with President Yoon’s claim that the US–South Korea ties had weakened under his predecessor as the latter had drawn close to China. As Yoon had taken a hard-line position against China in his presidential campaign, Biden’s visit may have served as a necessary early scramble by the US to build on Yoon’s domestic political stand vis-à-vis China.
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Biden’s trip to South Korea carried high economic stakes. By linking the intention to carve a distinct place for the ROK in the Indo-Pacific with the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, the Biden administration has made it clear that there is a broad basing of the US–-ROK alliance underway that not just relies on the security compulsions but on “creating a strategic economic and technology partnership that really will reflect the importance of innovation and technology.” Discussions on supporting innovations, partnership on critical and emerging technologies, strengthening cooperation on defence industry issues, economic and energy security, global health, and climate change formed an important part of the bilateral discussions between the two sides. Specifically, the US and South Korea have targeted cooperation in the semiconductor industry as well as items like EV batteries and microchips. During this visit, President Biden and the Executive Chairman of Hyundai Motor Group discussed Hyundai’s decision to invest in a new electric vehicle and battery manufacturing facility in Savannah, Georgia. On May 19, the first day of his visit to South Korea, President Biden along with President Yoon also visited the Samsung Pyeongtaek facility. The agreements are slated to secure a US$11-billion investment towards manufacturing as well as 8,000 jobs in the US.
North Korea’s continued build-up of its nuclear arsenal remains a strong concern for the US, and Biden’s visit was meant to reflect his administration’s continued commitment towards the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.
Japan
While in Japan, Biden had two important issues at hand. An image makeover for the US due to a growing conviction among the Japanese that the US may not be considering their interests and reassuring Tokyo as an important ally in the Indo-Pacific against China. The graph below shows that Japanese assurances fell sharply under Trump.
Source: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/11/12/views-of-the-u-s-and-president-trump/
The leg of Biden’s visit focusing on Japan placed equal emphasis on bilateral as well as multilateral issues. Bilaterally, the US assured Japan of security guarantees, maintaining Japan’s position as the lynchpin of Indo-Pacific security. Multilaterally, Biden chose Tokyo to launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework as well as counted on Japan’s cooperation through the G7 to present a united front against the Russian war on Ukraine. The hosting of the Quad summit provided space for the additional front against China in the Indo-Pacific, even as US’ strategic focus remains tethered to the Eurasian front.
Biden’s visit showcased that Japan remains a steadfast ally in the Pacific for advancing a free and open vision in the region, with common assertions on the importance of the Quad, ASEAN centrality, AUKUS, and other multilateral partnerships and forums. The discussions between Japan and the US covered a wide range of issues spanning China’s activities in the maritime domain, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and boosting extended deterrence by reaffirming the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the two countries and mechanisms within it such as the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) and the Extended Deterrence Dialogue.
As America looks to create more jobs back home, the economic resurgence is seen as consistent with US’ objectives in the Indo-Pacific—amongst them, to wean Japan and South Korea away from a growing trade dependence on China. In the recent past, both Japan and South Korea have seen growing trade dependence on China.
Source: https://www.sc.com/en/feature/china-japan-and-south-korea-time-to-reinforce-not-break-complementarity/
The launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework was perhaps the most important development of Biden’s maiden Asia visit as President in this regard. The US’ Indo-Pacific Economic Framework brings both Japan and the ROK formally into an expanded geoeconomic vision which, in the short term, seeks to emphasise that the US’ focus on the Eurasian front is not at the cost of its focus on the Indo-Pacific region and, in the long term, create economic and strategic alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Biden’s Asia trip to two of the US’ most important allies in the Pacific remains united by their opposition to Russia’s military operation in Ukraine. This may have been a step to distinctively pre-empt the rather nuanced position on the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war due to India’s subtle position on the issue. However, on other issues, the Quad remains resolutely unanimous.
15. Why Are Spare Parts on the Unfunded List? Senator Asks Navy's Top Officer
Typical budget strategy? Put items that must be funded on the unfunded requirement list to get congress to fund them.
Why Are Spare Parts on the Unfunded List? Senator Asks Navy's Top Officer
Sailors are cannibalizing parts to keep equipment operational.
If readiness is so important to the U.S. Navy, why are some spare parts on the service’s unfunded priorities list?
Sen. Jon Tester, D-Mont., pressed the Navy’s top officer on that point Tuesday. The chair of the Senate’s defense appropriations subcommittee brought up last August’s deadly crash of an MH-60S helicopter, which was caused by the failure of a damaged damper hose, which the senator said costs about $100,000.
“I think this committee wants to make sure we're providing our warfighters with the necessary funding to ensure that the equipment they're using is adequately maintained. It's pretty basic,” Tester told Adm. Mike Gilday, chief of naval operations; and Gen. David Berger, Marine Corps commandant. “That means getting the necessary spare parts and safety equipment up front, not after something like this happens.”
He noted that the Navy and Marine Corps’ unfunded priorities lists—items that service leaders want but not enough to devote part of this year’s budget to—include some categories of spare parts for warships, F/A-18 fighter jets, MH-60S helicopters, and more.
Tester wondered why spare parts would be on the unfunded priorities lists “when this seems pretty basic, at least to my perspective, as to making sure that we're keeping folks safe and effective in the field.”
The Navy’s top priority has been the Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarine program, Gilday said, followed by readiness and the spare parts associated with it. He said the Navy has “underinvested” in spare parts at sea to save money; he acknowledged that parts shortages were causing problems. He cited a February report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office that said sailors are cannibalizing other ships and resorting to work-arounds to keep equipment runnning. It also noted Navy efforts to track cannibalized parts and use the data to predict and fill future needs.
“So that's why in both our budget, with the secretary's help, and also in my unfunded list, we're trying to get back to where we need to be,” Gilday said. “You can't fool the fleet, you can't fool sailors, they know when they don't have the stuff that they need. And so, in our trips out to the fleet we've heard loud and clear that supply parts have been a problem. The GAO report confirmed that for us, and so we're trying to make things right with respect to spares.”
Those comments, Tester said, indicates to him that the spare parts should not have been placed on the Navy’s unfunded list.
“Sir, it's a valid point,” Gilday acknowledged.
For his part, Berger noted that some of the parts on the unfunded list are for aircraft also on that list, including KC-130J tankers.
Berger also mentioned “the fragility of our supply chain system” that has been revealed over the past year and a half, and that getting parts is taking longer and from fewer sources.
“So buying them ahead, as the CNO said, seems prudent going forward,” the commandant said.
16. World Leaders Tout Self-Reliance Amid Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
You can have free trade as long as you haven freedom but without freedom you cannot have free trade.
And we are arguing over which is the bigger threat: China or Russia.
Excerpts:
“This is a new Cold War…and I think it is closer to a hot war than I’d like,” Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group, said on a panel on Monday. Still, he pointed out some differences; for example, in the first Cold War, the Iron Curtain divided Europe, but today, Russia’s actions have united Europe. Bremmer also said the new Cold War is between Russia and the United States and allies, rather than being a global conflict.
Others, however, argued that the threat of a global conflict is with China, not Russia.
“At the end of the day, it’s not the Ukraine issue that will decide the course of the 21st century,” said Kishore Mahbubani, a former diplomat for Singapore and former president of the United Nations Security Council. The real contest in this century will be between the world’s No. 1 power, the United States, and the world’s No. 1 emerging power, China. The big question there is: will this U.S.-China contest become Cold War 2.0?”
World Leaders Tout Self-Reliance Amid Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
“Freedom is more important than free trade,” the NATO leader said at the conferenc
European leaders are preaching a measure of self-reliance after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine revealed how the global trade architecture can leave countries reliant on bad actors or unstable regions.
Attendees of the World Economic Forum reckoned with a world that looked drastically different since 2020, the last time the conference was held in person. Sessions focused on a warming climate, the fallout of a global pandemic, and the changing workforce, but many world leaders focused their remarks on how nations must change their behavior because of the conflict in Europe that has raged for nearly 100 days.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that, while he is supportive of global trade and boosting the world’s economy, the war in Ukraine has made clear that “economic relationships with authoritarian regimes can create vulnerabilities.” He cited Europe’s reliance on Russia for energy and natural gas, but said the same lessons can also be applied to China, who develops 5G networks for the European Union.
“We must recognize that our economic choices have consequences for our security,” Stoltenberg said in a keynote address on Tuesday. “Freedom is more important than free trade. The protection of values is more important than profit.”
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said his country is taking steps to end its reliance on Russian oil and natural gas, with plans to phase out the use of Russian oil by year’s end and eventually abandon Russian gas by importing it from other countries through floating liquid natural gas terminals.
“Of course we need to reduce some of our strategic dependencies,” Scholz said at a session on the closing day of the conference. “Our dependence on imports from Russia…falls into this category; that’s why we are putting an end to it.”
Germany is also joining Belgium, the Netherlands. and Denmark to build wind turbines in the North Sea by 2050.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen used her speech at Davos to call for the European Union to “end unhealthy dependencies,” and outlined why quickly moving to clean energy is imperative for both the climate crisis and national security.
Countries are making these changes now, but the long-term impact on globalization and the European economy remains to be seen.
“All European countries are making irreversible choices related to energy supply. The impact of that takes time, but in the years to come, this is going to have a profound impact,” said Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo.
There was also much debate at the conference about whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the global response to it is launching a Cold War 2.0.
“This is a new Cold War…and I think it is closer to a hot war than I’d like,” Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group, said on a panel on Monday. Still, he pointed out some differences; for example, in the first Cold War, the Iron Curtain divided Europe, but today, Russia’s actions have united Europe. Bremmer also said the new Cold War is between Russia and the United States and allies, rather than being a global conflict.
Others, however, argued that the threat of a global conflict is with China, not Russia.
“At the end of the day, it’s not the Ukraine issue that will decide the course of the 21st century,” said Kishore Mahbubani, a former diplomat for Singapore and former president of the United Nations Security Council. The real contest in this century will be between the world’s No. 1 power, the United States, and the world’s No. 1 emerging power, China. The big question there is: will this U.S.-China contest become Cold War 2.0?”
17. Finland, Sweden Would Contribute Militarily to NATO on ‘Day One,’ General Says
Finland, Sweden Would Contribute Militarily to NATO on ‘Day One,’ General Says
Alliance applicants would bring expertise in deterring Russia and advanced naval capabilities in the Baltic Sea.
Finland and Sweden’s accession into NATO would immediately enable the alliance to better deter Russia, the Biden administration’s nominee to be NATO’s supreme allied commander told Congress on Thursday.
Whether to accept the two countries’ applications will be a diplomatic and political decision, one that will require the unanimous approval of member government bodies, including the U.S. Senate. But from a military perspective, the integration should be seamless, said Gen. Christopher Cavoli, the commander of U.S. Army Europe and Africa who has been tapped to be NATO’s supreme allied commander and the head of U.S. European Command.
“I look forward to the accession of Finland and Sweden to the alliance,” Cavoli told the Senate Armed Services Committee. “Each of those militaries brings quite a bit of capability and capacity to the alliance from day one.”
Finland’s well-trained and well-equipped military is “absolutely expert” in defending its 830-mile border with Russia, Cavoli said. The Finnish military already uses American-made F/A-18 fighter jets, and announced in February that it would buy 64 F-35 jets, so equipment from both nation’s militaries will be easily interoperable.
Though Sweden has a smaller military, it is investing heavily in defense and will boost military spending by more than $300 million in 2022. Cavoli also highlighted the important capability it will bring to deter Russia at sea.
“Critically, they bring a Navy in the Baltic Sea, which will be of enormous military significance for the alliance,” he said. “The entire [Baltic] Sea with the exception of a few kilometers will be coastline of NATO nations, which will create a very different geometry in the area.”
Cavoli also rejected concerns that establishing a new border with Russia could drain NATO’s resources, because Finnish troops have been independently defending that border for decades. In fact, the general argued, it could impose costs on the Russian military, which may pull troops from elsewhere to boost their presence on a border that they previously kept sparsely guarded.
Finland and Sweden applied for membership in NATO on May 18, and are now in a gray area where their push to join the alliance could draw retaliation from Russia but the nations are not yet covered by NATO’s Article 5 security guarantee. The United States and others have promised to provide more protection while their applications are considered.
“As a practical matter, any would-be aggressor should be on notice that the United States will be there for Finland and Sweden in the event that they are attacked,” National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan told reporters on Friday.
To shorten the time when the two countries are in this middle ground, officials are trying to speed up the application process. President Joe Biden sent the Senate the resolution to consider their membership in NATO on May 19, just one day after they applied. And Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H., and Sen. Thom Tillis, R-N.C., the co-chairs of the NATO Observer Group, released a bipartisan letter on Tuesday asking the administration to do its part of the process as quickly as possible.
“We are fully committed to doing our part to expedite ratification of the Washington Treaty to ensure their quick accession to NATO,” reads the letter, which was signed by more than 80 senators. “We ask that you expedite the process in the executive branch to ensure that the United States moves quickly to bring two capable and committed partners into our alliance as swiftly as possible.”
Five senators—Shaheen; Tillis; John Barasso, R-Wyo.; Mike Rounds, R-S.D.; and Jerry Moran, R-Kan.—met on Tuesday with Finnish Ambassador to the United States Mikko Hautala and Swedish Ambassador to the United States Karin Olofsdotter, according to a release from Shaheen’s office.
Shaheen and Tillis will also lead a bipartisan delegation of lawmakers to next month’s NATO summit in Spain, where officials are expected to discuss the accession of Finland and Sweden as well as set NATO’s strategic plan for the next decade.
18. 400. Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1)
From the Mad Scientist Blog.
400. Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1) | Mad Scientist Laboratory
[Editor’s Note: Army Mad Scientist hits another milestone with today’s 400th post, featuring an insightful guest submission by Kate Kilgore — the first in a series of posts addressing what the on-going conflict in Ukraine can tell us about the Operational Environment (OE) and the changing character of warfare. Today’s post explores three sign posts emerging from this conflict that are broadening our understanding of the OE: the advent of a digital levée en masse, battlefield transparency, and questions concerning the public or private nature of war. What can the U.S. Army learn from these sign posts to successfully compete with and deter our adversaries, and when necessary, fight and win decisively against them in future conflicts? Read on!]
Russian invasion of Ukraine – military offensive starting on 24 February 2022, part of the Russo-Ukrainian War / Source: Image by Viewsridge, via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 sparked intense international discussion about conducting and analyzing conflict. Some signposts to the future include the advent of a digital levée en masse, a highly transparent battlefield, and questions concerning the public or private nature of war. The ongoing conflict has seen individuals from both within the conflict zone and half a world away becoming involved and engaged virtually via the internet. This, in conjunction with advances in geo-sensing and image sharing in the private sector, facilitates actionable intelligence for both military and auxiliary forces and individual citizens. In addition, Ukraine’s efforts in the information domain have led to the first truly public war, where intimate details regarding the battlefield are transparent to the international community. While this creates opportunities for flexible response and an expanded information base, the implications of allowing private citizens access to this battlefield, or even inviting them to join in the conflict via the information domain, creates new nuances for the OE and the changing character of warfare.
Digital Levée en Masse and the Quest for Information Advantage
Digital levée en masse blurs the line between decentralized digital activism and state-sponsored hacking. We are seeing a trend of non-state involvement in the information sphere of conflicts with actors who are oftentimes not formally affiliated with the belligerents.
The term “levée en masse” originated during the French Revolutionary wars at the end of the Eighteenth Century, referring to the conscription process that generated a massive citizen force with a strong national identity to overwhelm opponents in both numbers and resolve. The digital levée en masse, however, is a contemporary phenomenon, largely made up ofnon-state actors who harness and motivate vast numbers of online users to impact the fight for information advantage. Though the present digital levée en masse has rallied in support of Ukraine, it is important to consider how this virtual phenomenon could yield negative outcomes [from the U.S. perspective] in the future. Private actors are not bound by international rules and norms during a conflict, and have already been seen to engage in efforts and operations that a law-abiding country and its military would be prohibited from doing. This also highlights the fact that outdated international laws governing conflict do not address whether the online actions by civilians abridge their protected noncombatant status.
The Ukrainian government sponsored the creation of an “IT Army,” consisting of more than 300,000 individuals from all over the world pushing pro-Ukrainian messaging to Russians via geo-targeted ads and malware. Ukraine also set up a Russian-language Telegram page where citizens in Ukraine could post photos and identifying information of killed or captured Russian soldiers. In an initiative called Ishchi Svoikh (Look For Your Own), the Ukrainian Interior Ministry directed relatives of Russian soldiers to these online platforms where they can search through photos and videos for their family members. The initiative appears aimed in part at undermining morale and support for the war in Russia. This effort has been met with Russian censorship, and has generated international discussion about whether this page violates the Geneva Convention’s stipulation that governments must protect prisoners of war from “insults and public curiosity.” Other initiatives that are not formally sponsored by a state government range from professional programmers in Poland and Norway who have organized efforts to email and text Russian citizens about the conflict, to efforts by the hacking group Anonymous to steal and leak Russian government and corporate information. Regardless, individuals with altruistic goals are exhibiting a willingness to take potentially illegal action and assume significant risks to help Ukraine’s fight against Russia.
The Transparent Battlefield — Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide
As Russia’s war in Ukraine wears on, the role of technology is creating a modern battlefield where there is nowhere to run and nowhere to hide. Not only does technology facilitate militaries gathering information from civilian sources and infrastructures, but it also has facilitated targeting based on advanced imaging.
Ukraine’s quick and competent integration of videos and photos posted to social media or provided by commercial imaging enterprises (e.g., MAXAR’s satellite imagery-rich situation reports) have helped produce a highly transparent battlefield. Both the Ukrainian military and the world have an unprecedented degree of access to the battlefield, presaging future conflictswhere every unit’s or even individual soldier’s actions and movements may be detected and broadcast. Ukraine has used social media and satellites to its advantage by crowdsourcing reports of Russian troop movements. Indeed, Russia has begun jamming cellular networks along its forces’ axes of advance to mask tactical movements, highlighting the effect battlefield transparency has had in Ukraine. The modern battlefield has become so transparent that more than 32 Russian Combined Arms Army, Separate Brigade, and Battalion Tactical Group command posts have been detected, targeted, and destroyed by Ukrainian military strikes. It is important to recognize both the advantages and threats posed by this unprecedented degree of visibility that the U.S. military and its adversaries alike will be subject to in future conflicts.
Ukraine has incorporated photos and videos of Russian military forces’ movements and conduct posted on social media into its intelligence gatheringand targeting operations, supported by information provided by civilian-owned satellites and drones. This allows for greater flexibility and adaptability, but it also creates a potentially overwhelming pool of data to be vetted. Over-reliance on intelligence provided by the public may also increase the potential for mistakes or allow the enemy to flood collections with mis-information. Ukraine may be uniquely willing to assume that risk to maintain its sovereignty in the face of invasion. International investigators are also using social media and facial recognition software to investigate alleged Russian war crimes in Ukraine, and reports with the faces and names of accused Russian soldiers have recently been published. Despite its use against Russian soldiers, this trend may bolster the international expectation that intimate details of all parties in future conflicts will be quickly and publicly available, thus increasing the level of scrutiny of all actors. Ukraine’s recent reports about Russia declaring war on SpaceX Starlink satellites, which provided the Ukrainian military and government with continued communications and internet connectivity throughout the conflict and recently repelled a Russian hacking attempt, further establishes that international law insufficiently addresses the status of civilians and private infrastructure in modern conflict.
Narrative Warfare — Information Operations, Domestic and Abroad
Narratives coming from both Russia and Ukraine are being used in an attempt to influence the information environment both inside and outside of their borders. Does the advantage lie in open communication with the global community to win international support, or is it better to keep the scope of an information campaign limited for greater domestic control?
While gaining information advantage is important in determining success in the wider OE, the emergence of diametrically opposed information spheres raises concerns about what it really means to compete in the information domain. Ukraine’s use of social media to garner international support has helped shape the West’s position, while Russia has relied onsolidifying domestic support by crafting historic and emotional narratives and largely limited its international efforts to existing allies (Iran), non-aligned nations (India, Sri Lanka, and South Africa), and areas with large ethnic Russian populations. The implications of these two diverging “truths” signals that future adversaries may isolate themselves from the rest of the world. A dual information domain means that the U.S. will have to redefine information advantage and determine whether this means simultaneously working to win in the international public domain while attempting to crack an adversary’s private information control.
Ukraine’s credibility among much of the international community is largely due to its willingness to publicize firsthand accounts of Russia’s invasion over all forms of media. Ukraine’s torrent of success stories and unflinching documentation of Russian misconduct have enabled it to establish trust in its narrative and gain widespread sympathy in countries that value freedom of information. Ukraine’s near-constant information operations addressing the Russian invasion motivated many countries to provide extensive aid, and mobilized the digital levée en masse. In contrast, Russia has effectively focused its information campaign domestically, with limited international appeals catered toward established allies,the ethnic Russian diaspora, and some developing nations. China has publicly echoed Russian talking points claiming U.S. and NATO threats to Russian security forced its invasion of Ukraine, but large-scale Russian efforts to compete with Ukraine’s dominance in the global information space have been largely unseen. Russia is not a society built on freedom of information, and remnants of Soviet-era censorship and state violence have established a general reluctance to dissent against state narratives. Coupled with threats of 15 years in prison for promoting narratives counter to the Russian government’s position on Ukraine, Russia’s approach to influence operations has been primarily focused on establishing and sustaining sizeable domestic support for its “special military operation.”
Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Questions for the U.S. Army
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has generated a host of important questions regarding the opportunities and challenges posed by future conflicts that will be transparent, globally connected, and the subject of influence operations.Ukraine has set a precedent where gaining international and public support will likely depend on a military’s willingness to show candor by engaging in an open and transparent battlefield, but is it possible to contain and manage a conflict in an open, online domain where militaries and non-state participants exist in the same space? Ukraine has paved the way for engaging civilian support and actions to influence conflicts through digital participation, but how far can civilian actors go and still be protected as noncombatants per theGeneva Conventions? Answering this may prove challenging for the U.S. Army as it tries to navigate an ambiguous, uncertain battlefield where the lines between combatant and non-combatant are blurred. Can choosing to use the flexibility offered by crowdsourcing intelligence information from civilians and private infrastructure negate their protected status? Nations with little interest in adhering to international law may ignore or leverage their civilians’ digital actions against protected U.S. affiliated individuals and infrastructure. How will the U.S. approach its own citizens who take such actions against an adversary? Can Ukraine’s success in publicizing the minutiae of a conflict to undermine the legitimacy of Russia’s mis-information campaigns be duplicated by the U.S. in future conflicts? Would such an approach mitigate or exacerbate the ability for an adversary to create distrust in the U.S. military by publishing identities and alleging misconduct by Service members on social media? Russia’s attempts to solidify its State-controlled domestic information sphere may lead to future bad actors taking a similar approach in order to isolate its citizens and maintain domestic support. How can the U.S. Army prepare to compete for information advantage in both an international information domain that prizes freedom of information and in a near-peer’s State-controlled and highly censored information space simultaneously? As the OE continues to develop toward a more highly connected, transparent, and public future, the Army has the opportunity to learn from these sign posts and prepare to successfully compete, deter, and when necessary, fight and win decisively in future conflicts.
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About the Author: Kate Kilgore is a TRADOC G-2 Intern and recent graduate of Indiana University, where she studied Law and Public Policy, Comparative International Politics, Soviet History, and Russian and Eastern European Studies. Kate has been greatly influenced by her father’s Army career, and she grew up all over the United States and in Germany, which influenced her passion for Eastern European history. Much of her undergraduate research focused on analyzing the path dependence and modern social implications of Soviet laws and in the former Eastern Bloc, with a focus on Hungary. When she’s not reading about culture and politics of the former Warsaw Pact States, she enjoys baking and antiquing.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).
19. The U.S. has accused China of carrying out a genocide in Xinjiang. Why has the U.N. been so quiet?
Because China has co-opted and coerced members of the UN?
The U.S. has accused China of carrying out a genocide in Xinjiang. Why has the U.N. been so quiet?
The U.N.’s top human rights official has finally traveled to Xinjiang. Rights advocates aren’t sure that’s a good thing.
China Reporter
May 26, 2022
Ever since the first reports emerged — years ago — that China was detaining Uyghurs in camps across Xinjiang, human rights advocates knew they needed to get the attention of one person in particular. The United Nations high commissioner for human rights, one of the few officials who could address the allegations with a mix of neutrality and global authority.
Those human rights groups might have been expected to applaud the news this week that the current U.N. human rights commissioner, Michelle Bachelet, was finally coming to China, including stops in Xinjiang — the first such visit by the top U.N. rights official in nearly two decades. Instead, many see her trip to Xinjiang as China’s latest attempt to thwart a real investigation into rights violations in the region.
“The fear is that it could be used to whitewash the abuses,” said Maya Wang, a senior China researcher at Human Rights Watch. Bachelet’s trip was approved with restrictions; China imposed a “closed loop” for covid safety purposes, meaning that Bachelet has had to stick to a preapproved agenda without the “unfettered access” that the U.N. tried to secure.
“This is a visit to the region that is choreographed,” said David Tobin, a lecturer in East Asian studies at the University of Sheffield who specializes in Xinjiang. “It’s a party-state tour.” Bloomberg reported that the commissioner herself told diplomats on a video call on Monday that the trip wasn’t an “investigation” and that setting high expectations could result in disappointment.
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The trip follows another disappointment for rights advocates. In December, a U.N. spokesperson said Bachelet’s Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) hoped to publish a long-awaited report assessing the violations in Xinjiang in “a matter of weeks.” The report has yet to be released.
The U.S. and an independent tribunal in the United Kingdom have determined that China’s actions in Xinjiang amount to genocide — “genocide and crimes against humanity,” the State Department said in its assessment. According to testimony from the Uyghur diaspora and extensive research by scholars and journalists, the Chinese government has detained more than a million people in “re-education camps” and prisons, sent children of detainees to state-run boarding schools, limited Uyghur births through forced sterilization and other restrictive birth control policies, and assigned Uyghurs to jobs in a forced labor system. The latest evidence was made public this week, in the leak of thousands of Xinjiang police files. The trove of documents includes photos of more than 2,500 people who have been detained and spreadsheets that help corroborate estimates of the number of detainees across Xinjiang.
All this evidence has left Uyghur advocates frustrated and even betrayed by the lack of action from the United Nations.
“People tend to see the U.N. as this very slow-moving, bureaucratic entity,” said Babur Ilchi, program director at the Campaign for Uyghurs, a D.C.-based advocacy organization. “The issue with that is that when human rights are at stake, especially when atrocities are being committed and a genocide is happening against an entire group of people, we need to be moving faster.”
The U.N.’s slow approach to Xinjiang may reflect its bureaucratic nature, but experts say the delay is “unprecedented” and point to another factor: China’s growing efforts to weaken human rights accountability both within its borders and beyond.
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How China has tried to keep Xinjiang out of the U.N. spotlight
Over the past four years, the U.N. has been a forum for debate over the situation in Xinjiang — a debate China has worked hard to stifle.
In 2018, U.N. human rights experts called attention to the abuses for the first time in an official U.N. gathering. Gay McDougall, an American lawyer serving on a U.N. human rights committee within Bachelet’s office, said that Xinjiang had become “something resembling a massive internment camp, shrouded in secrecy, a sort of no-rights zone.” Another expert told the session that more than a million Uyghurs had likely been detained.
These comments garnered global headlines, but Chinese representatives were quick to downplay the issue. “The argument that ‘a million Uyghurs are detained in re-education centers’ is completely untrue,” said Hu Lianhe, then-deputy director-general of China’s United Front Work Department.
James Millward, a history professor at Georgetown University who studies Xinjiang, told Grid that “the very first Chinese reaction to the very first U.N. reaction was to deny, deny, deny.”
When Bachelet, a former president of Chile, came to the U.N. office in 2018, she acknowledged the findings from independent experts of “deeply disturbing allegations of large-scale arbitrary detentions of Uyghurs and other Muslim communities, in so called re-education camps across Xinjiang” and requested access to China.
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U.N. special experts and country member states continued to press the issue. In July 2019, 22 countries wrote a letter to Bachelet’s office calling out the abuses in Xinjiang and demanding U.N. access to the region. China responded by gathering more countries — 50 — to push back against the charges. Those countries submitted a letter celebrating China’s “remarkable achievements” in human rights and defending China’s actions in Xinjiang as legitimate counterterrorism measures.
This pattern has repeated itself. Nearly every call for greater scrutiny of Xinjiang has been met by another example of China successfully rallying its partners, largely in the Global South, to sign onto statements of support. At the U.N. “we see very, very quick action, condemnation, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. We’ve seen moves to try and get to international courts very, very quickly,” said Tobin. “These are things that were not possible in the case of Xinjiang, due to Chinese influence.”
All the while, Bachelet’s office kept pushing for a trip to Xinjiang, and the Chinese government remained unwilling to meet her terms for open access. Eventually, it appears she decided the trip was still worth taking despite the limitations; her office said only: “The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet on Monday begins a six-day official mission to China, at the invitation of the Government,” without describing the conditions of the trip or her goals for the visit. The commissioner’s office did not respond to a request for comment.
The Chinese government may have also played a role in postponing the release of Bachelet’s report. In December, a U.N. spokesperson said the report had “identified patterns of arbitrary detention and ill-treatment in institutions, coercive labor practices and erosion of social and cultural rights in general.” Sources told the South China Morning Post that Chinese officials had pressed the U.N. not to release the report before the Beijing Olympics in February.
“I can’t think of another situation like this involving the very public stalling of an already completed OHCHR report on an extremely dire human rights situation,” said Andréa Worden, a China human rights advocate and practitioner-instructor at Johns Hopkins University. “I think it’s fair to say such a delay is unprecedented.”
Human rights advocates have also expressed concerns that Bachelet’s visit will dilute her office’s report, given that she is likely seeing a highly curated version of Xinjiang. The process is “making people skeptical that the U.N. is going to be able to actually call a spade a spade in this case,” Millward told Grid.
China’s broader campaign to soften the U.N. mandate on human rights
China’s efforts to limit the U.N.’s involvement in Xinjiang are reflective of a larger push to undermine and reshape human rights work at the U.N.
“Under Xi, the Chinese government does not merely seek to neutralize U.N. human rights mechanisms’ scrutiny of China, it also aspires to neutralize the ability of that system to hold any government accountable for serious human rights violations,” Sophie Richardson, the China director of Human Rights Watch, wrote. China has consistently dismissed serious human rights violations in other countries, blocking action from the Human Rights Council to address abuses in Syria, Yemen, Myanmar and other countries.
At the same time, China has set out to redefine the very notion of human rights. China has long opposed the Western vision of individual rights that is the foundation of the U.N. Human Rights Council’s mission. Instead, as Worden wrote in a 2020 essay, it has backed the idea that economic development is a “precondition” for rights. China also “rejects the fundamental principle that human rights are universal”; the official Chinese view is that each country should be able to determine its own notion of human rights.
In recent years, China has tried to implant this definition into new operating procedures for the U.N. itself. China has passed resolutions calling for “mutually beneficial cooperation” as a guiding principle for the Human Rights Council — resolutions that the European Union rejected as “missing the point” of the council’s work. China has also slowly increased its presence in the staffing of the Human Rights Council and the commissioner’s office to expand its influence, according to Worden. This was all made easier by the U.S. exit from the Human Rights Council during the Trump administration, which gave China more room to maneuver.
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“They’ve actually succeeded in many ways in bending the U.N. to China’s will,” said Millward. “So one question to many people is whether the U.N. can stand up to this.”
Why Uyghurs and other advocates are still looking to the U.N.
For all the concerns about Bachelet’s visit, and the U.N.’s general inability or unwillingness to join in condemnation of the Chinese record in Xinjiang, many advocates still see Bachelet’s visit and her report — assuming it is finally released — as their best hope for change. And all are in agreement: The need for change is acute.
Despite recent reporting that the police presence on the streets of Xinjiang’s cities has decreased and that some camps have been closed, experts say that likely belies the larger picture. Boots on the ground have been replaced by an increasingly complex surveillance state, and experts told Grid there seems to be a movement to put more people into prisons rather than re-education camps. Meanwhile, the camps are still there. “There have definitely been cases reported of the guard towers and barbed wire on the top of the walls taken down so they look a little bit less like prisons,” Millward said. “But the important thing to remember is that they still exist. … They are a threat that is available, and in the back of anyone’s mind.”
In the absence of any formal U.N. assessment, governments and independent organizations have taken increasingly aggressive action to target the Chinese government for its abuses in Xinjiang. The U.S. and EU imposed extensive sanctions, and the U.S. is about to implement a sweeping law banning the import of any goods made using Uyghur forced labor. These moves haven’t gone unnoticed. The Chinese government has counter-sanctioned U.S. and EU officials, and Chinese state media has promoted boycotts on foreign companies that have spoken out about Uyghur forced labor.
But individual Western sanctions are ultimately limited in their effect. “Government sanctions have been important, but they also run the risk of being seen as partisan as well, which is an accusation that I think the Chinese government uses in deflecting these criticisms,” said Wang.
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The U.N.’s judgment would be received differently. Tobin, who testified before the Uyghur Tribunal in the U.K., said the Chinese government dismissed the tribunal as an Anglo-Saxon conspiracy against China, whereas “the party state would be more concerned about statements from the U.N., simply because these would be seen as more neutral, more multilateral, and they couldn’t be dismissed in those kind of racialized terms or in terms of political interference.”
Human rights advocates say that a strong report from the U.N. could also catalyze further government-level actions, including sanctions and trade restrictions in more countries across the globe. Overall, China would face greater pressure to change its policies.
“This [U.N.] report is something that Uyghur rights groups consider very important in making sure that the international community sees exactly what’s happening and commits to action,” said Ilchi. “This report would act as a way to remove these doubts that countries are clinging to avoid having to take action.”
How would China receive a strong U.N. report on Xinjiang? Chinese President Xi Jinping made that clear during a Wednesday video meeting with Bachelet. “When it comes to human rights issues, there is no such thing as a flawless utopia,” Xi said. “Countries do not need patronizing lectures; still less should human rights issues be politicized and used as a tool to apply double standards, or as a pretext to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.”
Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.
20. Inside the Afghan Resistance
Is anyone tracking the resistance potential in Afghanistan? Are there any plans to support it?
Inside the Afghan Resistance
The first photographs from the longest-lasting fight against the Taliban
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A requiem for Sabz Ali Andarabi, who gazes at the camera from the center of a group of Andarab warriors readying for a tactical discussion. Next to him, on a visit, Habib Rahman Khan, the formidable commander of the rapid response force, wearing a red keffiyeh. The valley of Parand and distant Panjshir lie in the background.
Depending on one’s pace, the season, and the ongoing state of war, it is a day’s hike from Andarab to the border of legendary Panjshir, the adjacent province in the highlands of Afghanistan. The two mountain districts, part of a five-hundred-mile-long stretch of the Hindu Kush extending from the Himalayas, are citadels that have rained doom on every bully ever to pass through Central Asia in endless dogged pursuit of cruelty and loot.
After the fall of Kabul and the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, it was only a matter of time before another resistance to the draconian, tribal, and racialist policies of the Pashtun-dominated Taliban took hold. In the 1990s, the resistance had come from Ahmad Shah Massoud, the fabled leader of the Northern Alliance, who stood alone against Taliban control of 90 percent of the country; in 2021, it was his mild-mannered son, Ahmad Massoud, a connoisseur of Persian literature, like his father, and an alumnus of three esteemed British institutions, including the Sandhurst military academy. After the inglorious exit of the Americans from Kabul’s airport last August, it became clearer that the Taliban not only had no intention of power-sharing but were, in fact, determined to carry out a scorched-earth policy toward other ethnicities, such as the Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks. And so Ahmad Massoud assumed leadership of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF) and announced to the world that opposition to the Taliban had begun, yet again.
The world, however, seemed to care little. After twenty years of bumbling, the United States and NATO could not get out of Afghanistan fast enough. And it wasn’t long before another war, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, expunged Afghanistan from anyone’s to-do list.
The game plan of the Taliban, and of those who had negotiated with them in Qatar during the Trump presidency, was to rebrand: what rolled into Kabul was a new, improved Taliban. But many Afghans, and analysts familiar with the rebrand, already knew that it wouldn’t be long until the return of murders, reprisals, severe oppression of women, and ethnic cleansing and displacement of entire communities — not to mention an utter economic collapse.
As summer gave way to fall, and as I watched friends make Taliban-sanctioned beelines to Kabul and Kandahar to fatten their professional photo portfolios or buy up antiques at bargain prices from starving Afghans, the resistance — having suffered a severe thrashing from the Taliban that autumn — managed to entrench itself in its mountain strongholds and bide its time.
Yet the rest of the world — the international community and its carnivorous media — refused to acknowledge that a real resistance existed, and the Taliban went to great lengths to promote the absence of any kind of conflict. The onset of harsh winter and the inability or unwillingness of foreign journalists to make it up into the Hindu Kush to witness and document the opposition also lent some credibility to the fiction that Panjshir and its neighbors had been entirely subdued.
They hadn’t. Men like Qumandan (Commander) Kheirkhah of Andarab, who had held a rank the equivalent of general in the Afghan Army under Ashraf Ghani, the previous Afghan president, had seen the writing on the wall not long before Kabul fell and decided to take action. On a spring day in his mountain redoubt, holding a thick copy of the Book of Kings — the Persian national epic that Iranians, Tajiks, and many Afghans hold sacred — Kheirkhah talked about his last days in the army, in July 2021. On the cusp of recovering significant territory from the Taliban in Balkh province, he was suddenly, needlessly recalled to Kabul, ten hours away by car. After waiting there nearly two weeks, he was given new directives that essentially cut him off from the soldiers under his command. “It was a terrible blow for me, but even more so for my officers, who needed their commander with them during those critical days,” he said.
His was not an isolated case. Meanwhile, officers like him, along with just about anyone who had been in uniform, would soon be hunted by the Taliban. Kheirkhah chose to take matters into his own hands. He gathered seasoned soldiers from his native Andarab, and together they built rudimentary fortifications and weapons caches along their ancestral lands. Other commanders in Panjshir and nearby regions took similar action. This collective defiance toward the Taliban eventually came under Ahmad Massoud’s National Resistance Front, with Massoud directing the effort from neighboring Tajikistan.
Few things can demoralize a soldier more than being forgotten. Afghanistan is nearly forgotten. But the Taliban have left the non-Pashtun peoples of the country without another option, and so Ahmad Massoud and his commanders carry on the fight — a fight that is in its ninth month now. And while the Ukrainian resistance receives a king’s ransom in military ware, intelligence, and money from the West, the men of the Hindu Kush weather one of Earth’s most rugged and inhospitable places to fight another day.
The improbable odds for men like Kheirkhah are exacerbated by the vast amount of state-of-the-art weapons that the defeated US Army left behind for the Taliban, an arsenal estimated to be worth $7 billion. When asked how the men of the Hindu Kush manage against such odds, Kheirkhah gazes into the distance and explains that two things are on the side of the resistance: knowledge and memory. They know that the Taliban are out of their depth in these mountains, and they remember the fighting prowess of the men of the Northern Alliance going back to the days of Ahmad Shah Massoud.
This pictorial immersion in the daily life of the resistance is the first of its kind. After weeks of planning with the author, and years of relationships in place through a shared language and culture, documentarian Abolfazl Shakiba and his cameraman, Mostafa Saeidi, managed to spend several days with Qumandan Kheirkhah and his men. They were the first outsiders to be offered access to these Hindu Kush fighters as they prepare, with the turn in the weather, to take the fight of the “second resistance” to the Taliban beyond Panjshir and Andarab.
But their fight, unlike Europe’s Ukraine, is lonely, and it is unlikely that they can succeed without help. So far, help seems remote.
Text by Salar Abdoh. Photographs by Abolfazl Shakiba and Mostafa Saeidi.
Salar Abdoh’s latest novel, Out of Mesopotamia, about the ISIS war in Syria and Iraq, was a New York Times Editors’ Choice and named a Best Book of 2020 by Publishers Weekly. He lives and works between Tehran and New York.
Abolfazl Shakiba lives and works in Nishapur, in the Khorasan province of Iran. His short films and documentaries have been shown at festivals in New York, Chicago, and Belgrade, as well as on BBC Persian.
Mostafa Saeidi was born in Bojnurd, in the Khorasan province of Iran. A photographer and filmmaker, he has been involved in the making of more than fifty short films and documentaries for Iranian television.
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21. Are the Marines Inventing the Edsel or the Mustang?
Conclusion:
The Commandant has one year remaining on his four-year appointment. Two successors will make course corrections, overseen by an increasingly inquisitive but broadly supportive Congressional board of directors. The Marines — retired and active duty — have had an honest argument resembling 19th century German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel’s Dialectics, whereby back-and-forth debate by opposing sides leads to sophisticated evolution. This could lead to a synthesis of views of how to adapt to the Marine Corps to the modern battlefield, testing various roles where the Marine Corps has core competitive and comparative advantages. Recent Marine Corps communications have emphasized the potential of organic surveillance-strike technologies for the infantry battalion and de-emphasized the long-range missiles which were the “number one priority” in 2021. The argument is likely to have a familiar result: the most lethal air-ground team on the planet.
Are the Marines Inventing the Edsel or the Mustang? - War on the Rocks
Ford Motor Company’s development of the Edsel 60 years ago still stands as a classic corporate case study of transformative product failure. The Marine Corps, a $50 billion dollar enterprise, has introduced its own futuristic product — an explicitly defensive island-hopping “Stand-In Force” capable of reconnoitering and sinking warships in order to support naval campaigns. To pay for it, the Marine Corps intends to cut its main product line — infantry supported by artillery, armor, and air — by about 25 percent.
More than 70 percent of corporate transformations fail. The Marine Corps is not a corporation, but critical principles of change management still apply. In 1954, Ford devised the futuristic Edsel to enter the mid-range car market. Four years and $250 million later, Ford ended its disastrous experiment. But Ford had not cut production of its popular cars. The Marine Corps is in a far more precarious position. It could have used incremental dollars to test its promising fusion of targeting technologies and distributed maritime operations with a minimum viable product. Instead, the commandant, Gen. David Berger, divested current crisis response and land battle capabilities in order to fund a large-scale, hyper-optimized capability that will take eight years to build. Before the new force was designed or prototyped, Berger wrote, “We will not seek to hedge or balance our investments to account for [other] contingencies.”
The capabilities gap isn’t the only risk the Marine Corps faces. Differentiating among dozens of ships hundreds of miles away, the service will be forced to grapple with an electronic targeting engineering integration that is complex and new to them. There is also fiscal risk within Congress and the Department of Defense. In 2021, the Marine Corps did not convince Congress to fully fund its top budget priority: ground-based anti-ship missiles. In 2022, a more problematic misalignment was revealed. The Navy cut a larger amphibious ship from the Marines’ “must have” list, while dragging its feet on developing the fleet of small amphibious ships required to transport marines among remote atolls. In large corporations, product innovation is budgeted before commitments are made. In contrast, the Marine Corps divested capabilities, such as tanks and cannon artillery, up front for future funding goodwill by a more powerful Navy partner with different priorities, and an always unpredictable Congress.
Last December, Berger signaled dire consequences if the Pentagon or Congress balks:
I think this is the deciding point where, in the building and in Congress, are they willing to back an organization … that is willing to accept risk, willing to move at speed, willing to discard legacy things…Because if they don’t, then you’re in a bad place because you’ve already gotten rid of … the things you don’t think you need for the future.
The decision to divest before proving the concept and securing investment commitments by the Navy and Congress has tested the limits of the commandant’s organizational powers. In the Marine Corps, the office of the commandant is compared to the papacy, complete with a murky election, widespread worship, and the power of decree. In the private sector, it is perilous for executives to disagree with the chief executive officer. For all of these reasons, those on active duty inside the Marine Corps were likely fearful of openly challenging the commandant — who is a genuine change agent — on process or risk analysis.
The Marine Corps’ increasingly leveraged position did attract rare publicized criticism from its alarmed retired community. In an unprecedented act, many of the service’s luminaries objected to the scope of the divestment. This group included 22 four-star generals, including prior commandants. Although every organizational transformation has challenges, the resistance to Berger’s plan is unprecedented in the history of the Marine Corps.
How did this happen? Marine leaders neglected key principles of change management, repeating four organizational mistakes surrounding Ford’s Edsel and Coca Cola’s New Coke: choosing secrecy over stakeholders, testing in a closed loop, leapfrogging instead of iterating, and losing control of the narrative.
Secrecy Over Stakeholders
Undue secrecy during the design phase leaves change agents vulnerable to what corporate innovation expert Roger Martin calls the heroic leadership trap. Once a direction has been set by a small, powerful cadre, it becomes extremely difficult to stress test. “Merely adding employees to a choice-making situation does not help, as the literature on ‘groupthink’ and conformity to group norms makes clear,” Martin writes.
In 1954, Ford established a stand-alone unit called the Special Products Division to develop the Edsel in secret. Regarded as a “semi-brain trust,” the small unit operated in a secure facility that included rotating locks and lookouts. Rather than consulting internal Ford design experts from other models, the secretive team added new features that seemed sure to appeal to the modern buyer. Outside the bubble, there was no sustainable market for the futuristic Edsel.
New Coke was the Edsel of the beverage industry. Immediately after being named CEO of Coca Cola in 1981, Roberto Goizueta formed a secret unit with the code name “Kansas” to design a new formula to respond to Pepsi, which was gaining market share. The team met in off-site “bunkers.” Convinced that a sweeter formula showed promise, participants who joined Project Kansas were required to sign non-disclosure agreements. This ensured secrecy but prevented internal dissent and customer input. When brought to market, New Coke failed spectacularly.
The Marine Corps followed these secretive, self-contained examples. A small group of advocates met in secret to consider a stronger focus on China as outlined in the 2018 National Defense Strategy. The military has a formal classification system and an oath of office. Yet Marines invited into this group were compelled to sign non-disclosure agreements. Communications surrounding these signatures were uneven, sometimes heavy-handed. This was a highly unusual requirement that indicated a fear of resistance and, according to three senior officers with whom I spoke, accelerated the design process at the cost of widespread input.
Force design is my number one priority. I have already initiated, and am personally leading, a future force design effort. Going forward, [Combat Development and Integration] will be the only organization authorized to publish force development guidance on my behalf.
Berger was replaced at Combat Development and Integration by Lt. Gen. Eric Smith, who was subsequently promoted to assistant commandant, the second-most senior officer in the service. It is not unusual for a hot business unit to populate the C-suite. For 20 years, Goldman Sachs was run by executives who had come up through a tiny commodities trading unit. But promoting both the commandant and the assistant commandant from Combat Development and Integration was a first for the Marine Corps, unifying the top and reducing the odds of successful dissent.
The transformation went from secrecy to scale in a few months. Signaling that it would reflect best business practices, Berger used a quote from transformation expert John Kotter of Harvard Business School as a forward to his Force Design 2030: “Transformation is a process, not an event.” Kotter, however, argued that a key part of the change process is early engagement of stakeholders. This occurs before the vision is formed, tested, and communicated. Many innovations fail because key stakeholders are bypassed in the critical formation of what Kotter calls the “guiding coalition.”
It is therefore surprising that the top experts across 50 years of Marine Corps force design and combat employment — the de facto board of advisors — report not being not consulted. The force design advertising includes quotes from several retired Marine four-star generals whose expertise was in military innovation. Instead of being identified as members of the guiding coalition early in the process, they report being unnecessarily alienated, and oppose the plan.
The lack of engagement is especially puzzling because a business unit (the Marine Corps) hoping to change roles inside a larger corporation (the Defense Department) needs influencers on the management committee to join the guiding coalition. In the two years since its debut in March of 2020, Force Design 2030 has been approved by two administrations and three secretaries of the Navy. Approval, however, is not advocacy. The Navy supports the idea of Marines disrupting enemy shipping from islands, but refuses to prioritize a mixed fleet to get them there.
When the force design plan was being formulated by the small group reporting directly to Berger, the Navy should have been identified as the key enterprise stakeholder and co-leader of the guiding coalition. Force Design 2030 could have been published as a joint Navy-Marine Corps plan. Instead, it was broadly perceived on Capitol Hill and in the media as a bold initiative by the Marine Corps and an example for the other services, including the Navy, which has gradually drifted away.
Closed Loop Testing
A closed loop testing system imperils product design. The executive education school at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology teaches executives that “the biggest challenge to innovation is isolation.” Asking questions of skeptics early and often attacks the problem from multiple viewpoints.
When the Edsel was being designed by the Special Products Division, it had access to Ford’s marketing experts. Instead, the brain trust commissioned its own studies that confirmed the Edsel would open a new market.
The Marines’ organizational structure has the potential to be a closed loop. Combat Development and Integration not only designs new forces but also tests them in wargaming. This is the Wall Street equivalent of housing the risk officer inside the unit that conducts futures trading. The difference is that Combat Development and Integration has an elaborate, integrated force development process refined by Commandant Robert Neller in 2015 requiring input from an extensive list of stakeholders. Mass input from a variety of sources including operating forces and combatant commands is converted into a honed product at the cost of time and stakeholder bureaucracy.
Within the Marine Corps, existing processes for force development have too often led to unimaginative results, as we tend to become prisoners of platform-based thinking, seeking incremental improvements in current capabilities and methods.
Berger further closed the loop by focusing on the Chinese maritime pacing threat identified by his civilian leadership. “He handed the force development enterprise a single course of action, which dominated the analysis and wargaming in a way that left little room for a consideration of alternatives,” according to the head of Marine wargaming.
The Marines did not follow Roger Martin’s principles of design testing: First, consider several independent options, because “if only one option is considered, there is no choice to be made.” Then have the “biggest skeptic design the test.” There is no account of dissent or even classic military Red Team feedback from the games.
In his book Blink, Malcolm Gladwell uses New Coke as a counter-argument to reactive decision-making. Coca Cola’s secretive taste tests confirmed that new ingredients, sweeter than the 99-year-old formula, were the ideal response to sugary Pepsi. The problem was that sugary drinks are superior in sips. That’s not how people usually consume soda. In 1997, Marine Commandant Charles Krulak updated the Marines’ philosophical classic Warfighting — a call for “continuous innovation” made a decade earlier by the former commandant, Gen. Al Gray — and issued a companion called Tactics “based on the probabilistic view of combat.” Krulak opposes Force Design 2030, arguing its testing did not probability-weight the opportunity costs of more likely scenarios requiring divested forces.
Leapfrogging Over Iteration
New products are even more likely to fail than organizational transformations. The former Harvard professor Clayton Christensen, a leading proponent of innovative disruption, concluded that the new product failure rate was about 80 percent. Untested distribution channels further reduce the odds.
Ford tried to do both with the Edsel. Designed by the insulated Special Products Division, the Edsel was distributed through an entirely new dealership network. This further shrank the odds of success. The basic lesson is that during innovation, the farther a company moves from its niche — which Bain calls its “core roots” — the lower the odds of success.
This is why the world’s most innovative companies commonly choose iteration over leapfrogging. Iterative companies adapt constantly but incrementally. Leapfrogs attempt to combine the latest technologies to skip ahead of dominant players. For the last decade, Apple and Microsoft have been consistently ranked among the world’s most innovative companies. They are iterative companies, enhancing their leading products while avoiding outsize risk on new ones. When they fail, they fail small.
Since World War II, the Marine Corps has followed this model, innovating via adjacencies to their top product: swiftly deployable, combined air-ground combat units built around the success of its elite infantry. Variations of this model excelled from World War II through the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These task units opened and closed the war in Afghanistan, were the first to topple Saddam’s statue in Baghdad, won the largest battle of the Iraq war, and provided artillery support to a special operations task force in Syria that “was the most effective fire support [we] had,” according to a Marine colonel involved in the operation with whom I spoke.
The 2018 overhaul of infantry typified Marine innovation. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Neller focused investment on the core competitive advantage: “superior infantry.” Within two years, squads were more lethal. Discussing the changes he made to the squad’s size, Neller said, “Everything we want to do has to be reversible.”
Berger is following this this infantry iteration today. He has increased testing of drones and loitering munitions in infantry battalions with an eye on Ukraine. This form of iteration has an embedded benefit: It is a forcing function for prototyping. Prototypes reduce the cost and speed of innovation, testing multiple independent solutions for a demand signal. The few transformative products that do survive have typically been subjected to a series of tough experiments. Bain calls this “failing fast.” Only then is the decision to scale made.
The Marine Corps flipped this sequence with its concept of stand-in forces. After limited wargames with hand-picked participants, the plan was announced, divestments were initiated to make room to scale the expensive product, and then prototyping began.
Berger took a much more aggressive approach. He is simultaneously pushing several lines of effort, each of which is challenging. He is attempting to overhaul the Marine Corps talent management system (including convincing Marines to stay past their initial enlistment commitments), field three major product lines new to the Marines (sensors, anti-ship missiles, and MQ-9 Reaper), persuade the Navy to build an entirely new transportation fleet, and convince several Pacific nations to provide distribution sites on the eve of any conflict with China, forgoing neutrality. In aggregate, this is a leapfrog. “We cannot and will not get this wrong,” Berger wrote about the effort.
The Marines’ fiscal strategy also leapfrogs. In addition to funding stand-in forces by cutting successful product lines, Berger also took on critical funding risk in dropping the Marines’ longstanding 38-ship requirement just three months after Neller had re-endorsed its necessity. This gesture of goodwill, which gave the Navy flexibility to support the stand-in force design with a mix of smaller vessels, has not been reciprocated and is already proving costly for the Marine Corps. The service was forced to appeal to Congress to reinstate its minimum requirement of 31 large amphibious ships. The smaller vessels on which the stand-in force depends have been twice delayed by the Navy, which will not deliver the first vessel for seven years, and only a half-dozen by 2030. The Marines Corps is pouring money into a product that the Navy is not eager to distribute.
An alternative would have been to convince the Navy to co-invest in a prototype stand-in unit. A telling early test would have been a joint exercise with allies such as the Philippines and Indonesia which may be reluctant to grant landing rights for intermediate range missiles. Naval sponsorship would have had dual benefit. First, it would have united the Services in the future budgeting process. This would have been a “quick win” so critical in organizational change. Second, it would have been a superior first step in vetting the concept. If the Navy wasn’t willing to fund a small prototype, that would have been a red flag to scale the concept. Instead, while the Navy is thrilled to have the Marines purchase organic anti-ship systems, the services are already at odds on amphibious transportation. The enormous daylight between the two is a stand-in demand indicator.
Force Design 2030 and Talent Management 2030 are filled with good ideas. The service’s leadership chose incrementalism in the latter. For example, 360-degree evaluations, a favorite of idealist junior officers for decades, will be prototyped on a few marines in a few circumstances before wider adoption is considered. Force Design 2030, a far riskier proposal, cut personnel in high-performing Marine infantry task units by a quarter.
Losing Control of the Narrative
During the key communication phase of change management, Kotter’s first principle is to “Keep your messages simple and jargon-free.” Ford did not follow this advice in previewing the Edsel. For a year, Ford issued cluttered advertisements touting mysterious technologies and social-sexual benefits. The proclamations built to the point that the chief designer confided to a colleague, “When they find out it’s got four wheels and one engine … they’re liable to be disappointed.”
For a century, the Marines have demonstrated excellence in simple communications. Shifts in the role of Marines were distilled to core principles, often a single phrase or sentence. These mantras are recited at boot camp, emphasized in the field and carried throughout life. Examples of complex concepts made simple are:
- First to Fight (1929)
- The mission of the Marine Corps rifle squad is to locate, close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, or repel the enemy assault by fire and close combat (1980s)
- Improvise, Adapt, and Overcome (1980s)
- Every Marine is a Rifleman (1990)
- A 911 Force-in-Readiness (1990s)
- The Strategic Corporal (fighting a) 3 Block War (1999)
- No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy (2004)
Force Design 2030 was well-written and ambitious. But including the series of articles and speeches preceding its publication, the core concepts took on a variety of forms, making it difficult to digest. The force design overhaul attracted criticism in May of 2020 from former Senator and Secretary of the Navy James Webb. The next day, Berger responded with the cogent but multifarious “The Case for Change.” Lacking established fora, the argument escalated in public from there.
“The Case for Change” could have introduced a formalized feedback system to augment the planning teams bound by non-disclosure agreements. A Concept for Stand-In Forces, published 21 months after Force Design 2030, could have reinforced Berger’s case before announcing sweeping divestments. Instead, the Marine Corps was caught in a reactive cycle of its own making, attempting to communicate a sprawling concept that had been neither distilled nor tested.
Lacking a tight script characteristic of the Marine Corps, much of the writing seemed to target national defense PhDs more than grunts. Varying, complex descriptions of the promising but unproven force have been introduced in waves in print and in person for two years. Stand-in forces were ultimately defined as “small but lethal forces, designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of maritime defense-in-depth. The enduring function for SIF is to help the fleet and joint force win the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance (RXR) battle at every point on the competition continuum.” Adding complexity, core concepts have been described multiple ways, and nuanced technical-strategic capabilities have been periodically introduced, from “deterrence by detection” to preventing “fait accompli scenarios” to a force “out there sinking ships … [and] submarines.”
When Warfighting was published in 1989, it epitomized the crawl-walk-run communications approach of the Marines. The Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz is cited in its first two first pages as a philosophical underpinning for the institutional transformation. From there, the publication builds its case. Berger got the original idea for Force Design 2030 from Capt. (ret.) Wayne Hughes, author of the classic Fleet Tactics. This explains its focus on sea control and naval campaigning. However, no publication takes the reader on the philosophical journey walked by the commandant.
The net result of the narrative is confusion over whether the proposed changes will change the culture of the Marine Corps. This is risky, because even in the Fortune 500, culture eats strategy for breakfast, let alone in a fanatical military service in which every marine is a rifleman whose mission is to “locate, close with, and kill the enemy.” That’s not so clear any more. To date, every marine is first trained as a rifleman, to close with the enemy. Distance and defense expressly underpin stand-in forces. Will future marines be judged by their contribution to sinking Chinese ships a hundred miles away? Potentially, but the has not come to terms with thisomplex strategy has not been distilled and clearly communicated.
From New Coke to Coke Classic, From Edsel to Mustang
New Coke’s failure spurred the company to re-examine the extended soft drink market. It quickly re-issued “Coke Classic,” introduced several other products, and gobbled up market share. Today Coca Cola features the blunder prominently on its website as an example of rash risk taking that resulted in re-engineering. Similarly, the spectacular failure of the Edsel forced a second transformation in Ford: the shift from a product-centric design model to customer-led model. The resulting product line, the Mustang, catapulted the company and is still popular 60 years after its debut. Both were self-inflicted wounds that triggered positive change.
The character of war has shifted drastically in the last decade. Berger should be applauded for an ambitious goal to adapt the Marine Corps among multiple fronts. Many of the ideas about distributed operations, precision fires, and the democratization of surveillance technologies raised in Force Design 2030 will meaningfully improve the Marine Corps. The questions are, which ones, after what assessment process, at what cost, and at what scale?
The Commandant has one year remaining on his four-year appointment. Two successors will make course corrections, overseen by an increasingly inquisitive but broadly supportive Congressional board of directors. The Marines — retired and active duty — have had an honest argument resembling 19th century German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel’s Dialectics, whereby back-and-forth debate by opposing sides leads to sophisticated evolution. This could lead to a synthesis of views of how to adapt to the Marine Corps to the modern battlefield, testing various roles where the Marine Corps has core competitive and comparative advantages. Recent Marine Corps communications have emphasized the potential of organic surveillance-strike technologies for the infantry battalion and de-emphasized the long-range missiles which were the “number one priority” in 2021. The argument is likely to have a familiar result: the most lethal air-ground team on the planet.
Owen West is a former marine infantry officer and retired Goldman, Sachs partner who took two leaves of absence to serve in Iraq. He was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict from 2017-2019.
22. Willingness to take risks': Former Special Forces Delta commander inducted into regiment
Willingness to take risks': Former Special Forces Delta commander inducted into regiment
Rachael Riley, The Fayetteville Observer - Yesterday 5:02 AM
F
ORT BRAGG — A Special Forces leader whose 31-year Army career included the rescue of an American hostage and commanding Delta Forces in combat was honored during a ceremony Tuesday at Fort Bragg.
Retired Maj. Gen. Gary Harrell commissioned into the Army in December 1973, first serving under the 82nd Airborne Division, and retired as deputy commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command in July 2008.
More than 100 colleagues, soldiers, friends and family and supporters joined Harrell, as he was inducted as a Distinguished Member of the Special Forces Regiment during a ceremony hosted by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.
The regiment serves as a link between Special Forces soldiers currently serving and those who have separated or retired and serve as role models for unit morale, cohesion and esprit de corps.
Maj. Gen. Patrick Roberson, commander of the Special Warfare Center and School, said Harrell is an icon of the regiment.
“The visionary leadership, the willingness to take risks, and the ultimate success of the mission in northern Iraq, it’s very representative of this man’s career and his accomplishments,” Roberson said.
Army career
Harrell’s first Army assignment was with the 2nd Battalion, 508th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, with which he’d later deploy to Grenada in the 1980s during Operation Urgent Fury.
© Rachael Riley/The Fayetteville Observer
Retired Maj. Gen. Gary Harrell was inducted as a Distinguished Member of the Special Forces Regiment during a ceremony Tuesday, May 24, 2022, at Fort Bragg.
He completed the Special Forces Qualifications Course in January 1977 and was assigned to the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta at Fort Bragg as a troop commander.
While serving with the detachment, Harrell participated in Operation Just Cause during the U.S. invasion of Panama and was the only officer to enter the Modelo Prison with his soldiers to rescue American hostage Kurt Muse, who was held captive by Gen. Manual Noriega’s forces.
Harrell deployed with the Joint Special Operations Command as an Army special operations action officer during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
While commanding the Squadron C, 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta in April 1992, he led forces in operations against drug lord Pablo Escobar.
His next combat deployment was as a ground force commander in Somalia during the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, which is depicted in the book and movie “Black Hawk Down.”
In that incident, two MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down Oct. 3, 1993, by armed militants, which led to the deaths of 18 American soldiers attempting to recover the downed personnel.
Mark Stephens, executive director of the nonprofit Task Force Dagger that assists wounded or ill Special Forces soldiers and their families, said at Tuesday's ceremony that he first served under Harrell in Somalia.
© Rachael Riley/The Fayetteville Observer
Retired Maj. Gen. Gary Harrell was inducted as a Distinguished Member of the Special Forces Regiment during a ceremony Tuesday, May 24, 2022, at Fort Bragg.
Stephens said Harrell stood out as a commander who could make "hard calls in very unique tough and situations."
Harrell was wounded by enemy mortar fire and evacuated to the U.S. on Oct. 9, 1993.
Harrell became deputy commander of Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta in June 1995 and commander of the detachment from July 1998 to July 2000.
In the early 2000s, Harrell served as director of the Joint Security Directorate, becoming responsible for the U.S. Central Command’s security operations following the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen.
He deployed to Bagram, Afghanistan, as commander of Task Force Bowie in November 2011 and served as assistant division commander for the 10th Mountain Division during Operation Anaconda.
Trusted leader
In July 2002, Harrell assumed command of the Special Operations Command and led more than 20,000 troops responsible for combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Maj. Gen. Roberson said he served on a team with the 10th Special Forces Group during that time.
Based on Harrell’s intents and guidance, Roberson said, his team was the first to be inserted in Iraq before other American forces and fought alongside Iraqi Kurds against Saddam Hussein’s army and terrorist groups.
“There are individuals even within my own group, 10th Group, that told me this mission will never happen — too bold, too dangerous, too risky, nobody would ever approve this,” Roberson said. “Well, Maj. Gen. Harrell not only approved it, he had to convince others that it was a great idea.”
Roberson said there were risks to the mission and force, and diplomatic risks, but Harrell made a “gutsy” call,” that “set the tone” for special operations forces deployed to Iraq.
“There remains to this day a strong relationship between us and the Iraqi Kurds,” he said.
Roberson said that relationship was relied upon “countless times,” and helped American forces recently defeat the Islamic State of Syria.
Stephens described Harrell as a loyal commander with integrity who soldiers could trust.
“He was willing to look at the whole picture and make the hard calls,” he said. “His loyalty to his men is beyond reproach, and I think because of that he receives loyalty, unlike any other leader I’ve ever seen.”
In April 2005, Harrell was assigned as deputy chief of staff for operations and commander of the deployable Joint Task Force, NATO Response Force in Brunssum, Netherlands.
The task force was responsible for NATO forces taking operational control in Afghanistan and Harrell led the task force on its first operational deployment to the Cape Verde Islands off the west coast of Africa.
Harrell’s awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Bronze Star Medal with valor device and two oak leaf clusters, Purple Heart Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, Air Medal and Army Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters among other awards and certifications.
Continued service
After his retirement, Harrell became an executive board member for the Task Force Dagger Foundation, of which Stephens is the director.
Stephens said Harrell’s continued to serve the Special Forces community by helping raise funds to support wounded or ill special operations service members and their families.
Following Tuesday’s ceremony, Harrell said “the people” is what has stood out to him about the special operation forces community and that is just as important today as it was during its inception.
“We protect the world,” Harrell said. “There’s a lot of stuff that needs to be done.”
Staff writer Rachael Riley can be reached at rriley@fayobserver.com or 910-486-3528.
23. Jerusalem livid about US leak that Israel killed senior Iranian operative
Jerusalem livid about US leak that Israel killed senior Iranian operative | World Israel News
“This kind of publicity endangers Israel,” said the country’s defense officials.
By Batya Jerenberg, World Israel News
Israel is reportedly demanding that the Biden administration explain an intelligence leak to The New York Times Wednesday regarding the assassination Sunday of a top Iranian terrorist operative.
Col. Hassan Sayyad Khodaei was reportedly shot five times in his car outside his home in Tehran by men on two motorcycles who then fled the scene and have yet to be caught.
While the mullahs immediately blamed “the hand of global arrogance” – code for Israel and the United States – Jerusalem remained mum, as it has for other sudden deaths of senior Iranian officials such as scientists involved in Iran’s nuclear program.
An unnamed intelligence official told the Times that Israeli officials had informed the administration that they were behind the targeted killing of Khodaei. Arutz 7 identified the official as being involved in a secretive communications channel between the allies dedicated to operations in Iran.
The purpose of the hit, the intelligence official said, was to send a message to the Iranians that it must halt the activities of Unit 840 in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.
While the IRGC said that Khodaei was involved in Syrian operations, some media reports have tagged him as second in command of the unit. The IDF says Unit 840 is in charge of planning and carrying out kidnappings and assassinations of Israelis and other foreigners outside of Iran.
According to an Iran International TV report based on European security sources, the senior Quds Force commander was behind a series of bombings in February 2012 aimed at Israeli diplomats in the capitals of Thailand, Georgia and India. He was also reportedly involved in unsuccessful plots to attack Israelis in several Central Asian countries and Africa.
Speaking diplomatically to the Hebrew press, Israeli defense officials said, “Professional authorities were updated as part of a working relationship regarding the assassination of the senior Iranian official.”
While the Times report had not mentioned the nationality of its source, the officials said point-blank, “The Americans are behind the article” in the paper.
This is “a serious and worrying process and it should not happen,” they continued. “This kind of publicity endangers Israel, it must not happen. Similar messages have been passed on to the Americans.”
The immediate concern is that while Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi has already promised to retaliate for Khodaei’s murder, having American confirmation of the perpetrators – or at least those who sent them to do the job – could only increase Tehran’s desire to repay Israel for its loss.
24. Open Source Intelligence May Be Changing Old-School War
Open Source Intelligence May Be Changing Old-School War
Intelligence collected from public information online could be impacting traditional warfare and altering the calculus between large and small powers.
ALEXA O'BRIEN SECURITYMAY 24, 2022 7:00 AM
Wired · by Condé Nast · May 24, 2022
An open source panopticon—from commercial big data aggregation to information infrastructure across mobile, smart devices, and social media—is reshaping the way intelligence is collected and used in conventional war.
Open source intelligence is information that can be readily and legally accessed by the general public. It was used in war and diplomacy long before the internet—alongside information stolen or otherwise secretly obtained and closely held. But its prevalence today means what was once cost-prohibitive to many is now affordable to myriad actors, whether North Korea, the CIA, journalists, terrorists, or cybercriminals.
One consequence of widely available open source information is that anonymity is eroding, not only for ordinary civilians, but also for members of law enforcement, military, and the intelligence community. Even missing information can alert an adversarial spy service, says a former US intelligence official who spoke on background. When the US State Department unfolded a public diplomacy strategy in 2008 that emphasized the use of social media, a foreign counterpart joked to the former US intelligence official that CIA officers, working under nonofficial cover at US embassies, were easily deduced because they lacked Facebook profiles. The US government has a gargantuan effort underway to address similar issues brought on by an absence or expectation of digital exhaust associated with intelligence officers’ cover identities.
When it comes to modern intelligence collection, closed societies like North Korea, Russia, and Iran have an advantage against open ones. Both secrecy and transparency—or the control of information, whether by individuals or governments—are integral to the freedom and security of those individuals and societies. Closed societies can collect an open one’s information with ease, all the while preventing access to similar information from domestic political opponents or hostile foreign actors.
But too much secrecy on the part of governments and militaries—including those of Russia’s Vladimir Putin—can also prevent them from knowing themselves, which may contribute to strategic blunders. Information technology, by its nature, disintegrates boundaries. It erodes barriers to markets across sectors and societies: from journalism to intelligence, crime to terrorism—and now it seems, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, conventional war.
Intelligence isn’t just information, says Jeff Rogg, a historian of US intelligence whose work focuses on civil-intelligence relations. The objective of intelligence, compared to just information, is obtaining or maintaining an advantage over one’s adversaries—whether that intelligence is secret or open source. This principle is at play when the Biden administration declassifies intelligence in an unprecedented manner in order to counter Russian misinformation or shares secret intelligence with Ukrainian counterparts.
“Given the emphasis placed on open sources in the war in Ukraine, it’s easy to forget how successful intelligence outcomes can also depend on secrecy, and even a bit of deception. Attributing successes in Ukraine to open sources can also offer a cover of sorts for more closely held sources and methods,” says Rogg.
British scholar Matthew Ford, coauthor of an upcoming book on the impact information infrastructure and connected devices have on conventional military conflicts, calls the phenomenon “radical war.”
Ford says that the high level of mobile connectivity among Ukrainians and a notable absence of combat footage from smartphones and headcams, especially in the early phases of the war, suggest an effective information operation may be underway. “No doubt the Ukrainians fear such images will reveal their tactics, techniques, and procedures,” says Ford. So Ukrainians may simply be censoring themselves.
Social media platforms and cell phones are also a force multiplier for traditionally weaker military powers, like Ukraine, especially when it comes to coordinating intelligence collection for targeting activities. “Targeting information is now being exchanged online,” Ford says. “Successful kills have been celebrated on Telegram. Chatbots have been established, helping Ukrainians share target coordinates with their smartphones. Identifying targets doesn’t involve complex military systems; it works from civilian information infrastructures.”
“The problem with crowdsourced intelligence in a war like Ukraine is standardizing the reporting,” Ford says. For example: “You want to be able to identify the vehicle, geo-locate it, then map against any available signals or satellite imagery, or other collection disciplines, fusing it into actionable target information.”
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is not only the 21st century’s first conventional war in Europe, it is the “most digitally connected in history,” according to Ford. “If the Ukrainians can make that intelligence actionable quicker than the Russians, they can use their limited remote fires, artillery, drones, and maybe even missiles or air power effectively. The objective, therefore, is to find, fix, and finish Russian forces more quickly than the Russians can do this themselves.”
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in late February, the US, its allies, and Russia concluded that Ukraine’s forces were asymmetrically disadvantaged against Putin’s endowed and historically brutal counterpart. US officials expected the country to fall in days. Yet despite the US’s monumental success predicting Russia’s intentions and plans and offering warnings, American intelligence agencies incorrectly assessed Ukraine’s prospects—the current subject of an internal review.
Facing the full onslaught of Russia's armed forces, Ukraine’s military resilience may even have come as a bit of a surprise to Ukrainians themselves, Ford suspects. Yet mistaken judgments about the expected balance between strong and weak powers, accompanied by strategic surprise, may be a common occurrence in the information age. Before the acknowledged role of social media in fueling the Arab Spring, or the reported significance of thumb drives in more recent counterintelligence failures—telecommunications, open source infrastructure, and cheap and accessible consumer technology have impacted the parity calculus for state and non-state actors alike.
Indeed, it was the worldwide growth of telecommunications in the 1990s that empowered Al-Qaeda to conduct its successful covert military attacks on US soil on September 11, 2001. But in the run-up to those attacks, the US Department of Defense hadn’t drafted a net assessment on the military or intelligence capabilities of what was later described by the 9/11 Commission as America’s “most dangerous foreign enemy.” The concept was unimaginable then, but it shouldn’t be now.
Similarly, the intelligence community had not authored a national estimate that comprehensively evaluated or articulated the strategic threat posed by Al-Qaeda before its 2001 attack. This category of cognitive bias is called the “paradox of expertise.” Genuine experts may communicate incredible nuance and understanding of a subject but overlook indicators of seismic changes within the domains of their knowledge.
It’s also possible to make analytical errors by overstating or inflating the impact or outcomes of technology and information on civil society—or any domain—including conventional war. The internet, which promised us a techno-utopian commune of open source information, has arguably turned large swaths of civil society into psychedelic hellscapes, much like the Charles Manson murders after the Summer of Love.
Civilian noncombatants’ use of open source platforms and consumer devices in support of hostile military actions raise serious questions about blurred lines between civilian and combatant—lawful or otherwise—leading to the same subjects becoming legitimate targets or tried for espionage under the law of war. Civilians are legally protected under international humanitarian law, as long as they are not party to military conflicts.
According to recent reports, US intelligence support led to the successful targeting of Russian generals and the Moskva, Russia’s flagship in the Black Sea. “One of the intelligence concerns people have voiced is that these leaks unnecessarily raise the risks of escalation,” Rogg says. “But consider the Javelins, Stingers, and military hardware we are publicly providing. The US and its allies are fighting an overt—as compared to covert—proxy war against Russia. That’s one of the key distinctions in this conflict from, for example, US support to the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, which is one of the popular comparisons you read about today: The US is taking a risk by abandoning some of the hallmarks of intelligence and advantages of covert action, like plausible deniability. That being said, there is still plenty that we do not know. Putting aside all the reporting, leaks, and official disclosures, the exact role and impact of US intelligence in Ukraine will be a source of study and debate for years to come.”
Wired · by Condé Nast · May 24, 2022
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
