Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Politics, it seems to me, for years, or all too long, has been concerned with right or left instead of right or wrong."
- Richard Armour

"Mankind will never see an end of trouble until lovers of wisdom come to hold political power, or the holders of power become lovers of wisdom."
- Plato

"There are always too many Democratic congressmen, too many Republican congressmen, and never enough U.S. congressmen."
- Anonymous





1. FDD | Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: April - KOREA
2. Treasury Targets Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Weapons of Mass Destruction Organization and Subsidiaries
3. S. Korean, U.S. nuclear envoys to meet in Washington next week
4. Japan expands sanctions against N. Korea over ICBM launch
5. N. Korea prints stamps of Kim's meeting with Trump, not Moon
6. Reps. Young Kim, Ami Bera Lead North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act
7. North Korea Looks to Capitalize on Washington’s Attention Deficit
8. N. Korea continues to develop nuclear capability while evading UN sanctions: report
9. China's role complicates North Korean denuclearization process
10. 'Dramatic change in Korea-Japan ties unlikely under Yoon'
11. Petition against Yoon’s office relocation plan gains over 500,000 supports
12. Explained | The change of guard in South Korea
13. North Korean threat actors target news outlets and fintechs with a Google Chrome vulnerability
14. N.Korea may be preparing new nuclear tests to improve arsenal, U.S. and allies say
15. Sohae Satellite Launch Station: Activity Gradually Picks Up
16. Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: Probable Spoil at the South Portal
17. North Korea’s “Checkerboard” Threat: Obstacles & Opportunities for the US-ROK Alliance



1. FDD | Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: April - KOREA


Korea
By David Maxwell

Previous Trend: Negative
After a contentious campaign, conservative candidate Yoon Suk-yeol was elected president of South Korea and will be inaugurated on May 10. Yoon’s campaign pledges indicate he will likely better align Seoul’s security policies with those of the United States. Yoon announced a controversial move of government offices from the Blue House to the Ministry of Defense. Incumbent President Moon Jae-in reluctantly agreed to “cooperate” on the $40 million move.
North Korea conducted missile tests on February 27th and March 5th16th, and 24th (local time). The first two were suspected tests of components of an ICBM system; however, the third missile malfunctioned during flight and spread debris in the vicinity of Pyongyang. North Korea said the fourth launch tested the new Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile. However, allied intelligence suspects the missile was actually the Hwasong-15, which was previously tested in 2017.
North Korea has been observed conducting activity at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site that could indicate preparation for a nuclear test.
This combination of missile tests and possible nuclear preparations is likely part of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un’s political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy, aimed at extracting concessions, namely sanctions relief. However, on March 24, Washington issued new sanctions that target North Korea’s missile program, and the administration seeks to “strengthen and update” existing sanctions at the United Nations. However, China and Russia likely will not support updated UN sanctions.
On March 28, Kim said he intends to continue to develop “powerful means for attack.” With a new president elected in South Korea, it is time to rethink ROK-U.S. alliance strategy.
2. Treasury Targets Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Weapons of Mass Destruction Organization and Subsidiaries

I will ask my friends from north Korea who are experts on north Korean companies about the designations and the potential effects on the regime.

Treasury Targets Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Weapons of Mass Destruction Organization and Subsidiaries
WASHINGTON — The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today sanctioned five entities for providing support to the DPRK’s development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). The DPRK has conducted a series of escalatory ballistic missile launches in the past several months, including most recently the DPRK’s February 26, March 4, and March 24 intercontinental ballistic missile launches (ICBM), which demonstrate the DPRK’s clear determination to continue developing its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs. These ballistic missile tests are brazen violations of multiple UNSCRs, needlessly raise tensions, and risk destabilizing the security situation in the region. Today’s action targets a DPRK WMD research and development organization that is directly linked to the development of the DPRK’s ICBMs, along with four of its revenue generating subsidiaries.
“The DPRK’s provocative ballistic missile tests represent a clear threat to regional and global security and are a blatant violation of UN Security Council resolutions,” said Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen. “The United States and our allies, including Japan today, are committed to using sanctions authorities to limit the DPRK’s continued development and proliferation of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile s.”
DPRK BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT
On August 30, 2010, the U.S. Department of State designated the Munitions Industry Department (MID) pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 (“Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters”) for its involvement with or provision of support for the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction programs, including the development of ballistic missiles . The United Nations Security Council subsequently sanctioned MID on March 2, 2016. Today’s action further restricts the ability of MID to procure both financial and material support from DPRK workers overseas and the use of front companies, shell companies, joint ventures and other opaque ownership structures that circumvent UNSCRs and U.S. sanctions.
As part of today’s action, OFAC designated the DPRK Ministry of Rocket Industry (MoRI) pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the MID. MoRI has worked with overseas representatives from other DPRK organizations in order to support MoRI procurement goals.
Additionally, OFAC is designating four MoRI trading companies Hapjanggang Trading Corporation, Korea Rounsan Trading Corporation, Sungnisan Trading Corporation, and Unchon Trading Corporation pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, MoRI. These trading companies have pursued various activities likely aimed at generating revenue for MoRI. Such activities include: establishing joint ventures in North Korea, pursuing large scale projects with Chinese firms, exporting North Korean labor, including IT workers, establishing a restaurant in a foreign location, coordinating with DPRK embassy personnel on international trade efforts, and importing large equipment manufactured by a European company to North Korea.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the individuals and entities that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.
In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individuals or entities designated today may themselves be exposed to designation. Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for any of the individuals or entities designated today could be subject to U.S. correspondent or payable-through account sanctions.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from its ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list.
###

3. S. Korean, U.S. nuclear envoys to meet in Washington next week


S. Korean, U.S. nuclear envoys to meet in Washington next week | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · April 1, 2022
SEOUL, April 1 (Yonhap) -- The chief nuclear envoys of South Korea and the United States will have a meeting in Washington D.C. next week to discuss regional security, Seoul's foreign ministry said Friday, amid concerns about the possibility of North Korea carrying out additional provocative acts.
Noh Kyu-duk, special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, plans to depart for the U.S. capital on Saturday for consultations with his American counterpart Sung Kim on Monday, according to the ministry.
Last week, the North test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile and speculation is rampant that it may be pushing for a nuclear test.

ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · April 1, 2022


4. Japan expands sanctions against N. Korea over ICBM launch
Excerpts:
Six North Koreans, three Russians and four Russian entities will be subject to an "asset freeze" for their involvement in Pyongyang's nuclear and missile development under the measure approved by the Cabinet, according to Tokyo officials.
The move came in response to Pyongyang's first-known ICBM launch in more than four years.
Japan expands sanctions against N. Korea over ICBM launch | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · April 1, 2022
TOKYO, April 1 (Yonhap) -- The Japanese government on Friday announced additional sanctions on North Korea over its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch last week.
Six North Koreans, three Russians and four Russian entities will be subject to an "asset freeze" for their involvement in Pyongyang's nuclear and missile development under the measure approved by the Cabinet, according to Tokyo officials.
The move came in response to Pyongyang's first-known ICBM launch in more than four years.
Tokyo has implemented its own sanctions against Pyongyang since 2006, with 129 organizations and 120 individuals blacklisted.

ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · April 1, 2022


5. N. Korea prints stamps of Kim's meeting with Trump, not Moon

The reason there are no stamps about President Moon is because of his visit to Pyongyang in September of 2018.

Kim miscalculated when he allowed President Moon to speak to the Korean people in Pyongyang. He gave a speech that was well received by the Korean people in the north (though it was panned by conservatives in the South). He was viewed as a good man, articulate, caring, logical, and someone with whom Kim should be able to make a deal. Unfortateunly for Kim this undermined decades of propaganda painting South Korean presidents as dumb, weak, and puppets of the US. This is why since September 2018, Kim has refused to engage with the South despite all the overtures from the Moon administration. He has had to allow the Propaganda and Agitation Department to recreate the myths of South Korean presidents.

This is likely why there is no stamp with President Moon's picture.


N. Korea prints stamps of Kim's meeting with Trump, not Moon | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · April 1, 2022
By Yi Won-ju
SEOUL, April 1 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Friday released a new collection of commemorative stamps for the 10th anniversary of leader Kim Jong-un's rise to power with photos of his meetings with world leaders.
The 49 sets of stamps, published by the North's Korea Stamp Corp., include those featuring Kim's Singapore summit in 2018 with then U.S. President Donald Trump and another meeting at the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom the following year, as well his talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
But no stamps on Kim's summit talks with South Korean President Moon Jae-in or a trilateral gathering with Trump at Panmunjom were featured in the collection.
The North introduced the test-firing of its missiles in the stamp collection, including the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) launched in 2017.
Images of the newest Hwasong-17 ICBM the North claims to have launched last week were not included in the collection.
Inter-Korean relations have chilled and the Korea peace process has stalled since the no-deal end of the 2019 Hanoi summit between Kim and Trump.


julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · April 1, 2022

6. Reps. Young Kim, Ami Bera Lead North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act

Excellent. Human rights upfront. This needs to be a key part of the north Korean strategy.

Excerpt:
"The reauthorization of the North Korean Human Rights Act is critical to the security of the United States and our staunch allies, friends and partners in Northeast Asia. Robust implementation of the Act is essential to bringing freedom, human rights, prosperity, reconciliation, and eventually unification to all Koreans. We need a U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean human rights issues. The United States must provide much better protection to North Korean refugees, and we need to see more of them resettling in the United States. Information campaigns are critical to empowering the people of North Korea. After all, they are the only ones who can bring positive change to the Korean peninsula and the region,” said Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.


Reps. Young Kim, Ami Bera Lead North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act
youngkim.house.gov · March 31, 2022
Washington, DC – Today, U.S. Rep. Young Kim (CA-39), Vice Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation, and Subcommittee Chair Ami Bera (CA-07), introduced the North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2022.
This bipartisan bill would reauthorize, update and improve the North Korean Human Rights Act, which became law in 2004 to promote human rights and freedom in North Korea.
Reps. Michelle Steel (CA-48) and Chris Smith (NJ-04) joined Reps. Kim and Bera as original cosponsors of this bill.
“Kim Jong-un continues to oppress the North Korean people through torture, imprisonment, forced labor and starvation in his quest to expand North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and gain military power. These gross human rights abuses cannot be tolerated,” said Kim. “As an immigrant from South Korea with family members who fled North Korea, supporting the North Korean people is personal to me. I’m proud to lead the charge to ensure the U.S. promotes human rights for the people of North Korea and continues to be a beacon for hope, freedom and democracy.”
“North Korea continues to commit egregious human rights violations against its people, including arbitrary detention, forced disappearance, torture, and the restriction of freedom of religion and belief,” said Representative Ami Bera, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation. “I am proud to introduce bipartisan legislation to reauthorize the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 to hold North Korea accountable for its human rights atrocities. As we face rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the United States Congress will continue to support fundamental human rights in North Korea, while seeking reasonable steps forward toward peace on the peninsula.”
"The reauthorization of the North Korean Human Rights Act is critical to the security of the United States and our staunch allies, friends and partners in Northeast Asia. Robust implementation of the Act is essential to bringing freedom, human rights, prosperity, reconciliation, and eventually unification to all Koreans. We need a U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean human rights issues. The United States must provide much better protection to North Korean refugees, and we need to see more of them resettling in the United States. Information campaigns are critical to empowering the people of North Korea. After all, they are the only ones who can bring positive change to the Korean peninsula and the region,” said Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.
Included in the North Korean Human Rights Act are initiatives Rep. Kim has worked on such as:
Ensuring the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid goes to the people of North Korea and does not support military operations; and,
Working with the United Nation’s Refugee Agency to protect and resettle refugees from North Korea.
Read the bill HERE.
youngkim.house.gov · March 31, 2022

7. North Korea Looks to Capitalize on Washington’s Attention Deficit

A good run down of sanctions actions to include sanctions enforcement that must be executed. It is necessary but insufficient. This is why in our FDD monograph we laid out 5 lines of effort that includes sanctions.

 
 
 
 
 

North Korea Looks to Capitalize on Washington’s Attention Deficit
A serious problem does not go away if you ignore it.
thedispatch.com · by Anthony Ruggiero
People watch a TV at the Seoul Railway Station showing a file image of a North Korean missile launch on March 24, 2022. (Photo by Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images.)
A serious problem does not go away if you ignore it. It instead grows uncontrollably. Case in point: President Joe Biden has largely ignored North Korea’s advancing nuclear, missile, and military programs. And last week, as Biden prepared for important meetings with NATO over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile for the first-time in half a decade. Japanese Prime Minister ​​Fumio Kishida called the launch an act of “unforgivable recklessness.”
Kim’s message was clear: Ignoring Pyongyang has costs. An ICBM test by North Korea should serve as an inflection point in U.S. policy. It’s now on the Biden administration to prove that such actions come with consequences and assiduously rebuild the coalition for pressure to blunt Kim’s weapons programs and extortion efforts.
North Korea’s latest ICBM launch follows a failed March 16 ICBM test. It is the clearest sign of the collapse of Kim’s self-imposed moratorium on long-range ballistic missile testing. Earlier this year, on February 26 and March 4, Kim conducted at least two launches using what U.S. officials called ICBM-related technology as part of a new missile system. An unnamed senior administration official called those launches a “serious escalation.” Kim is likely to have combined elements from these launches in his latest ICBM test.
Foreign military sources claim the missile, fired in a lofted trajectory, reached a peak altitude of 6,200 kilometers while flying for 71 minutes. Missiles fired on a lofted trajectory travel shorter horizontal distances. But the latest missile launch implies that Kim could fire the weapon at the continental U.S. on a normal ballistic trajectory. In late January, Kim also fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile known as Hwasong-12 otherwise capable of reaching Guam. North Korea has launched over a dozen missiles this year.
Although there is some debate as to the exact weapon that was tested, North Korea is working on a larger ICBM that can carry multiple warheads, potentially with the goal of being able to target multiple sites in the United States with one missile. Other military capabilities the North is developing include hypersonic missiles, as well as long-range land-attack cruise missiles. Cruise missile launches are not banned by U.N. Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) on North Korea, which instead narrowly focus on ballistic missiles.
In the face of all these developments and the most recent ICBM test, the Biden administration continues to claim that “the door has not closed for diplomacy.” While the administration deserves the lion’s share of the blame for the state of U.S. policy, pressure against Pyongyang began to atrophy in 2018 when then-President Donald Trump embraced high-level diplomatic engagement as the cornerstone of his North Korea policy. Biden has built on his predecessor’s approach and highlighted in public and private its willingness to negotiate with North Korea. Kim has rejected these overtures and continued development of his prohibited programs.
The only realistic option for Washington is a punitive one. Critics will suggest that pressure does not work on Kim and that North Korea will never relinquish its nuclear weapons program. The Obama administration increased pressure on Pyongyang in 2016 and the Trump administration escalated that policy through 2018. There is no question that Kim was worried that the mounting financial, political, and military pressure at that time would threaten his hold on power. Mounting pressure was likely why Kim agreed to the leader-level summits.
And while denuclearization of North Korea remains the ultimate goal of U.S.-North Korea policy, sanctions can achieve important policy goals in the interim. These include reducing the funding available for Kim’s nuclear and missile programs and making material inputs for those programs harder and costlier to procure and produce.
A robust pressure policy on Pyongyang should begin with rebuilding a diplomatic coalition. The Biden administration announced last Friday that it will introduce a new sanctions resolution to “update and strengthen the sanctions regime.” At present, the U.N. Security Council is a lost cause because Russia and China will veto the U.S. resolution and prevent any additional UNSC action.
In the absence of a new resolution, the U.S. mission to the United Nations issued another strong statement on Friday, as it has done several times this year following Pyongyang’s missile launches. Unfortunately, even those non-controversial statements highlight the fractured nature of a once strong diplomatic consensus against the Kim regime. The administration has been unable to persuade more than eight Council members to support these statements.
Pivoting to financial pressure, Washington should quickly focus its sanctions efforts on three key areas: cutting access to the international financial system, impeding overseas sanctions busting and procurement networks, and cracking down on the illicit energy trade. Rather than meting out this punishment gradually, the Biden administration should do this all at once and with the same if not greater zeal that it is showing on the Russia sanctions front to make sure Kim gets the message.
First, the Treasury Department should in public and private warn financial institutions that they will lose access to the U.S. financial system if they support North Korean trade or sanctioned programs. Critics may counter that Biden should not isolate China and other countries that may be needed to support sanctions against Russia. Yet opposite is true, strong action on North Korea will reinforce the notion that Biden is serious about sanctions enforcement across the board.
Similarly, if the U.S. Treasury or the Justice Departments have identified Chinese, Russian, or other financial institutions aiding North Korea, now is the time to take action against these actors to both expose and penalize their activities.
The next target should be North Korea’s overseas diplomatic, financial, and commercial representatives. The Biden team should insist that countries implement, at a minimum, U.N. sanctions requiring the expulsion of representatives of designated entities or persons engaged in sanctions busting or illicit procurement. Every North Korean diplomat and representative may have the ability to engage in some form of sanctions evasion. If U.S. allies continue to harbor these representatives, Biden should consider sanctions against them or even a potential reduction in U.S. aid.
The final target should be Pyongyang’s longstanding track-record of violating Security Council sanctions by exporting coal and importing refined petroleum. The U.S. 7th Fleet participates in the Enforcement Coordination Cell, a multinational coalition (U.S., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Japan, France, and Germany) that monitors violations of U,N, maritime sanctions. The U.S. should warn China that it must stop these transfers and if they do not the administration will switch from monitoring sanctions violations to interdicting these vessels.
Congress has a role to play too. North Korea sanctions passed both chambers with overwhelming majorities in 20162017, and 2019. House and Senate foreign affairs and banking committees should hold oversight hearings to investigate the reduction in sanctions pressure since 2018 and enforcement of mandatory sanctions.
An ICBM test is a direct threat to the U.S. homeland and should be treated as such. Biden cannot ignore North Korea’s evolving missile and nuclear capabilities in the hopes of them fading away. Fortunately, there is a blueprint of how to pressure Pyongyang already on file. The question is, will Washington reach for it before it is too late?
Anthony Ruggiero and Behnam Ben Taleblu are senior fellows at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Anthony previously served in the U.S. government for more than 19 years, most recently as senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense on the U.S. National Security Council. Follow Anthony on Twitter @NatSecAnthony. Behnam covers Iranian political and security issues at FDD as well as functional issues like nonproliferation and arms control.
thedispatch.com · by Anthony Ruggiero
8. N. Korea continues to develop nuclear capability while evading UN sanctions: report

Excerpts:
To help finance its missile tests, the North may have stolen as much as US$400 million worth of cryptocurrency in 2021, the panel of experts noted, citing a recent report from a cybersecurity firm.
"The cryptocurrency funds that are acquired by the cyberactors of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea go through a careful money-laundering process in order to be cashed out," it said.
The North's trade of goods, on the other hand, fell to record low levels in 2021, partly due to its continued border closure.
Still, the North continued to engage in illicit transfer of goods, including energy imports, according to the report.
"Sophisticated evasion of maritime sanctions continued, facilitated by deliberately obfuscated financial and ownership networks," it said.


N. Korea continues to develop nuclear capability while evading UN sanctions: report | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · April 2, 2022
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, April 1 (Yonhap) -- North Korea continued to advance its nuclear capabilities last year despite its border closure in response to the COVID-19 pandemic that led to "historically low levels" of goods and people entering or leaving the country, a U.N. Security Council panel of experts said in its annual report, released Friday.
The panel, however, said Pyongyang also continued to seek materials and technology for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs from overseas by evading U.N. Security Council resolutions.
"During the reporting period, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to maintain and develop its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in violation of Security Council resolutions," said the report, dated March 1.
"Although no nuclear tests or launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles were reported, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to develop its capability for production of nuclear fissile materials," it added, referring to North Korea by its official name.

The annual report on North Korean sanctions enforcement covers the period between August 4, 2021 and January 28, 2022.
North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) last Thursday (Seoul time), ending its self-imposed moratorium on long-range ballistic missile testing that had been in place since late 2017.
Pyongyang also fired two missiles on Feb. 27 and March 5, which the U.S. said involved testing a new ICBM system.
"Maintenance and development of the nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued, and the country continued to seek material, technology and know-how for these programs overseas, including through cyber means and joint scientific research," said the report.
It added the North's ballistic missile capabilities appeared to be advancing, noting the country staged a "series of launch tests of a wide range of new missile systems" from September 2021 to January 2022.
"It appears that those related to the development of various delivery platforms using either solid or liquid propellant ballistic missiles are being gradually achieved," said the report.
Pyongyang conducted nearly a dozen rounds of missile launches over the cited period, including seven rounds in January that marked the largest number of missile tests it has undertaken in a single month.

To help finance its missile tests, the North may have stolen as much as US$400 million worth of cryptocurrency in 2021, the panel of experts noted, citing a recent report from a cybersecurity firm.
"The cryptocurrency funds that are acquired by the cyberactors of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea go through a careful money-laundering process in order to be cashed out," it said.
The North's trade of goods, on the other hand, fell to record low levels in 2021, partly due to its continued border closure.
Still, the North continued to engage in illicit transfer of goods, including energy imports, according to the report.
"Sophisticated evasion of maritime sanctions continued, facilitated by deliberately obfuscated financial and ownership networks," it said.
The panel added tactics to evade UNSC restrictions on oil shipments to North Korea included the use of "shell" companies and "multi-stage oil transfers" where a group of smaller vessels will deliver oil to a North Korean tanker, making it more difficult to track and identify their origins.
The panel also pointed to worsening humanitarian conditions in North Korea.
"The humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to worsen, with the COVID-19 blockade probably the most important factor in that decline," it said.
The panel recommended the Security Council help minimize the "unintended adverse impacts of sanctions" on the people of North Korea and support international humanitarian aid operations in the reclusive country.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · April 2, 2022

9. China's role complicates North Korean denuclearization process

Simply put, China wants to prevent war and regime collapse and instability while allowing north Korea to create dilemmas for the US and the rok. We cannot expect China to help solve ROK/US alliance security challenges.

China's role complicates North Korean denuclearization process
The Korea Times · April 1, 2022
Chinese President Xi Jinping, left, waves with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on the former's visit to Pyongyang in June 2019. Xinhua via APPyongyang emerges as key challenge for Yoon Suk-yeol administration
By Kim Bo-eun

HONG KONG ― Pyongyang's series of provocations this year signal that addressing the neighbor to the North will be one of the greatest challenges for President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, who has pledged to take a hardline stance toward the reclusive state compared to his predecessor, Moon Jae-in.

Yoon is scheduled to take office in May and has outlined the direction of his administration's foreign policy ― which is to strengthen Seoul's alliance with Washington, while relying less on Beijing. This would be a shift from Moon's policy towards China, given that South Korea depends largely on the Asian neighbor, not only for trade but also in regards to progress in relations with North Korea.

Although China and North Korea have not always been on the best terms, the two have had a special relationship. Beijing is Pyongyang's greatest ally, among the few that exist, with the two countries signing a treaty in 1961. China has played a complex role in the geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula. It took part in efforts for North Korea's nuclear disarmament, as one of the participants of the six party talks, and in 2017 backed the United Nations Security Council sanctions on Pyongyang, which strained ties with the country. However, Beijing's role has shifted in recent years.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un made his first overseas trip, since taking power in 2011, to Beijing to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2018, and four more summits followed, the last being Xi's visit to Pyongyang in 2019. It was the first time in 14 years a Chinese head of state visited North Korea.

China continues to be North Korea's largest trading partner, accounting for 63 percent of total trade in 2020, while the figure is down due to sanctions and Pyongyang closing its border after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Beijing has continued to supply key resources not only through legal trade, but also through illicit means. Beijing, along with Moscow, has recently been backing Pyongyang at the United Nations, leading efforts to ease sanctions imposed for its weapons testing as well as the prevention new ones being realized.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, left, holds hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping at Pyongyang Sunan Airport before Xi's departure for China in June 2019. Korean Central News Agency-Yonhap

China has acted as a buffer, speaking on behalf of Pyongyang. Beijing's ambassador to the United Nations, Zhang Jun, in February said that Washington should "show more flexibility" if it wanted to see a "new breakthrough." He said more "attractive, practical policies and actions accommodating the concerns of North Korea" were necessary.

Analysts have stated that China is invested in relations with North Korea, because it is a means to counter U.S. influence in the region, with U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. On the other hand, the Beijing-Pyongyang relationship also provides China with some leverage as a broker if the process of North Korea's denuclearization were to actually occur.

"Beijing, since Kim Jong-un's visit in March 2018, has transformed its North Korea policy into a historic new form: restoring the alliance discourse and the expression of ideological commonality with North Korea, while ending any reference to denuclearization of the Peninsula as an element of China's position and policy toward that country," Shi Yinhong, professor of international relations at Renmin University of China, said via email.

"That 'new normal' will be kept intact in the predictable future."
China's current role has complicated the situation on the Korean Peninsula, analysts said.

"By propping up the Kim regime, China allows North Korea to threaten Seoul and reject offers of engagement," Leif-Eric Easley, professor of international relations at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, said in an email.
President Moon Jae-in, right, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un shake hands at the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom at an inter-Korean summit held April 2018. Korea Times file

As progress with North Korea was one of the Moon administration's greatest goals, the president took a dovish stance, which led to historic summits in 2018, and denuclearization talks with the U.S. But it is unclear how Yoon's expected hardline stance will drive relations with North Korea, and whether negotiations with the U.S. can resume.

This challenge is presented at a time when expectations are growing that the alliance of China, Russia and North Korea will likely be strengthened against the backdrop of the Russia-led Ukraine invasion. Beijing has not condemned the aggression, while Pyongyang has attributed Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a result of the U.S.' refusal to take Moscow's security demands seriously.

South Korean president-elect Yoon Suk-yeol / NewsisShi said that China's stance on Russia's attack on Ukraine has further deteriorated relations with the U.S. and other major allies.

"In this context, Kim Jong-un is accelerating his nuclear missile development program, and South Korea's president-elect, a so-called hardline conservative, will therefore, take a harsher stance towards Kim, based on closer allied cooperation with the U.S. and perhaps also Japan," he added.

"The incoming Yoon administration is aware of the strategic and economic importance of China, but wants the bilateral relationship to be based on mutual respect and framed by the rules-based international order," Easley said, referring to Beijing's rivalry with Washington, which prompted it to strengthen alliances with Russia and North Korea.

"Yoon won't seek to escalate tensions but will strengthen deterrence via the U.S. alliance and demand reciprocity from the Kim regime," he said.

President Moon Jae-in, left, shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to Beijing in December 2017. YonhapWhile Beijing's role has varied over past decades, it is set to continue to have a presence in the geopolitical dynamics of the Korea Peninsula, analysts said.

"In the past, China has acted at times as a mediator for North Korea's denuclearization, and at times it has also taken part in UN Security Council moves to pressure Pyongyang," Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, said via phone.

"China plays a weighty role in achieving peace on the Korean peninsula," he said.


The Korea Times · April 1, 2022


10. 'Dramatic change in Korea-Japan ties unlikely under Yoon'


'Dramatic change in Korea-Japan ties unlikely under Yoon'
The Korea Times · April 1, 2022
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida / Korea Times photo

Incoming president needs to make 'political' decision, convince public
By Kang Seung-woo

Even though President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, who wants to mend frayed ties with Japan, takes office in May, strained bilateral relations will not return to normal overnight due to longstanding historical irritants, according to diplomatic observers.

Currently, ties between Korea and Japan have slumped to their worst level in years due to Tokyo's imposition of export controls on three key materials critical for the semiconductor and display industries here, in an apparent retaliation against a ruling by Korea's Supreme Court ordering Japanese companies to compensate surviving Koreans victims of wartime forced labor.

On Monday, Yoon held a meeting with Japanese Ambassador to Seoul Koichi Aiboshi, where he called for a future-oriented approach to worsening bilateral ties. But it came to light the following day that Japan will remove expressions and descriptions of forced labor and sex slavery in some of its history textbooks for high school students, in what seems to be a move to whitewash its wartime atrocities.

"While Korea and Japan have shown hugely different views on thorny bilateral issues, their current ties are also at the lowest point. Under the circumstances, an immediate and dramatic shift in Korea-Japan ties is not likely even though the two heads of state want to improve them," said Choi Eun-mi, a researcher at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.

"If such bilateral history-related issues occur frequently, domestic sentiment toward Japan could worsen, which will make it more difficult for the new president to mend fences with Japan."

However, Choi said the timing between the meeting and the textbook issue was accidental, given that the Yoon-Aiboshi meeting was rearranged after the Japanese ambassador had tested positive for COVID-19.

Lee Won-deog, a professor of Japanese studies at Kookmin University, said it was not easy to just say that rapprochement between Korea and Japan will escalate with the launch of a new administration, citing barriers to improving relations between the two neighbors, including the wartime forced labor issue and the planned release of radioactive water from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant, which was damaged in a 2011 earthquake.

In addition, the Japanese government is currently seeking to add a controversial site on to UNESCO's World Heritage list next year, despite its connection with the wartime use of Korean laborers.

"Despite the thorny issues, if the president wants to get bilateral ties back on track, he should make a political decision, which will inevitably draw backlash from opponents," Lee said.

"In that respect, a new government does not guarantee better relations."

However, the experts advised the incoming president to show his determination to mend soured ties, while also dealing with domestic sentiment toward Japan.
"Although there are several pending bilateral issues, if the president or the government shows a willingness to improve ties with Japan, I believe there is a window of opportunity for rapprochement," Lee said.

Choi said, "The current government took political advantage of the anti-Japan sentiment, so it would be a task for the new administration to mobilize all of its diplomatic abilities to advance relations with Japan, while swaying domestic opinion regarding the need to improve them."



The Korea Times · April 1, 2022


11.  Petition against Yoon’s office relocation plan gains over 500,000 supports

I am pretty sure this will not change the president-elect's decision:

Petition against Yoon’s office relocation plan gains over 500,000 supports
koreaherald.com · by Jo He-rim · April 1, 2022
Published : Apr 1, 2022 - 17:09 Updated : Apr 1, 2022 - 17:09
View of Cheong Wa Dae in Jongno, central Seoul (Yonhap)

A presidential petition against the president-elect’s plan to relocate the presidential office had garnered over 500,000 signatures of support Friday.

The petition on the presidential website operated by the Moon Jae-in government claims that President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol’s election pledge to relocate the presidential office from Cheong Wa Dae in Jongno, Seoul about 6 kilometers south to the Defense Ministry compound in Yongsan poses a threat to national security and is a waste of tax money.

“Yoon is forcefully moving the military facilities and systems that have been optimized as the ultimate keeper for national security to launch a presidential office only for his own satisfaction,” the anonymous petitioner wrote.

“The move not only poses a great threat to national security, but is a waste of a tremendous amount of taxpayer money. So I ask for the National Assembly to stop the unilateral and forceful relocation of the Defense Ministry.”

In just three days since the petition was uploaded on March 17, it had gained the 200,000 requisite signatures for the presidential office to give an official response.

But the response from the presidential office is unlikely to come in support of the petition, as President Moon Jae-in has already said that any decisions regarding the office relocation are up to the next government.

To fulfill his election pledge, President-elect Yoon has been strongly pushing the relocation of the presidential office, seeking to complete the process and start his work in the office that is to be newly launched in the Defense Ministry building from his inauguration on May 10.

But the plan has hit a hurdle, as the incumbent government did not approve of Yoon using reserve funds for the relocation. The Moon administration had similarly raised concerns over a security vacuum if the Defense Ministry and Joint Chiefs of Staff were forced to move hastily in just two months between the election and inauguration.

Yoon’s office has reportedly been reviewing the outline for the budget to report to the presidential office.

By Jo He-rim (herim@heraldcorp.com)



12. Explained | The change of guard in South Korea

Conclusion:

Moon is set to leave office with a decent approval rating. However, South Korea has a history of succeeding administrations having prosecuted previous Presidents, and Yoon had pledged to look into irregularities in the Moon administration if he was elected.

Explained | The change of guard in South Korea
As Yoon Suk-yeol is set to take over as the South Korean President from Moon Jae-In, here is a look at his political and foreign policy agenda, and a snapshot of South Korea’s political history
The story so far: On March 10, Yoon Suk-yeol of the conservative People Power Party (PPP) defeated the Democratic Party (DP) candidate Lee Jae-myung in a close battle to emerge victorious in the South Korean presidential elections.
Yoon will take office on May 10 at the helm of the 300 member-strong National Assembly, which currently has a Democratic Party-majority, post the 2020 general elections. He succeeds Moon Jae-In (DP), who served from 2017 and is precluded from serving again because of a single 5-year presidential term limit.
Yoon gained the popular vote by a margin of less than 1%. While both candidates were viewed as unpopular, voter turnout was high at 77%, just shy of 2017’s record-setting 77.2%. A small chunk of the vote also went to Sim Sang-jung, the Justice Party candidate running on a platform of gender equality.
After his election, Yoon has already made some contentious moves. He proposes to move the presidency from its current location at the Blue House to the Defence Ministry premises in central Seoul, a decision estimated to cost $40 million which has been met with mixed responses from citizens and politicians across the aisle. The Defence Ministry is also reportedly not taken with the move since it means displacement for its staff.
The core priorities in 2022
DP candidate Lee, a former Mayor of Seongnam city and later Governor of Gyeonggi Province, ran on a progressive platform that included reducing housing-related taxes, a land tax, a carbon tax and an initial proposal to introduce a universal basic income.
Yoon rose to prominence as Prosecutor-General under the Moon administration, investigating charges of corruption against Moon’s cabinet officials, including former Justice Minister and Moon aide Cho Kuk. He also played a part in the 2017 impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye and in the investigation into supposed attempts by the National Intelligence Service to influence the 2012 elections.
In a first for presidential candidates, neither had been a legislator for the National Assembly and both were relative newcomers to politics and foreign policy.
The top priorities for voters in the recent elections were high housing costs, tepid economic growth and rising youth unemployment, set against the backdrop of increasing Covid-19 cases due to the Omicron variant
Youth unemployment has been a major issue, hovering at around 7%, with young graduates often describing South Korea as ‘Hell Joseon,’ where getting a job without connections is viewed as unlikely, and remaining in one demands overworking and a poor work-life balance. (Joseon was the name of an earlier dynasty that ruled Korea for five centuries.)
Another tipping point in the election was the rise of anti-feminist sentiment.
One of Yoon’s campaign pledges was to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family ( Yeoseonggajokbu, or Ministry of Women and Family in Korean) once elected. This ministry spends a small chunk of its resources to further gender equality but mainly offers social services for families and children. Yoon has also blamed feminism for the country’s low birth rate. Another sore point has been the requirement that all men enlist in the military for 18 months before turning 30, which does not apply to women.
Yoon’s proposals resonated with young men disenchanted with feminism who allege reverse discrimination. 60% of the Gen Z male vote went to Yoon. By contrast, around 60% of the Gen Z female vote went to Lee.
Yoon and Lee also had distinct foreign policy differences.
Lee indicated that he would mostly follow the policy of strategic ambiguity towards China and the U.S., which formed the cornerstone of Moon’s approach. His approach to North Korea was also one of gradual diplomacy.
Yoon has already outlined a different foreign policy. He plans to make the U.S. a central part of South Korean policy with a comprehensive strategic alliance, while maintaining a “mutual respect”-based policy towards China.
He indicated that he will rebuild ties with Japan, and align himself more closely with the Quad comprising the U.S., Australia, Japan and India. In a perhaps telling move, the Quad leaders were among the first to congratulate Yoon after his election, along with the U.K.
He also outlined an ‘ABCD strategy’ toward Southeast Asia– advance human capital, build health security, connect cultures, and digitise Asian infrastructure– in place of Moon’s New Southern Policy, which centred people, peace, and prosperity.
His approach towards North Korea is poised to be tougher than that of his predecessor, prioritising human rights, expectations of reciprocity and pushing complete denuclearisation. He also signalled willingness to arm the Seoul metropolitan area with Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) batteries.
Brief snapshot of Korean democracy
South Korea is a young democracy and Asia’s fourth-largest economy- one of the Asian tigers. The Economist Intelligence Unit lists South Korea as one of five full democracies in the Asia and Australasia region (as of 2020.) But its progress towards democracy has been a slow and painful one.
The Republic of Korea formally came into being in August 1948, following 35 years of Japanese colonial rule, which ended with the Japanese surrender at the end of World War 2. Deliberations about the future of Korea among the Allied Forces culminated in a split into U.S.-supported South Korea and USSR- recognised North Korea along the 38th parallel. Attempts at reunification have failed, and the two nations are still technically at war.
South Korea moved through successive, increasingly authoritarian regimes from 1948 onwards, including a military coup in 1961. It achieved rapid industrialisation and economic development, termed the ‘Miracle on The Han River’ under the iron fist of President Park Chung-hee, the leader of the coup. Park ruled for 18 years until his assassination by long-time friend Kim Jae-Kyu in 1979.
During this time, simmering civilian opposition to military rule took the shape of several protests. A key event was the Gwangju uprising of 1980, where almost a quarter million protesters rallied against military rule and were violently suppressed.
However, the eventual transformation of South Korea into a more consolidated democracy happened in 1987, following widespread national protests known as the ‘June Struggle’. It led to the introduction of the so-called Sixth Republic that continues till today, signalling an end to authoritarian rule.
Despite this, South Korea’s struggles as a fledgling democracy are far from over. Corruption scandals have plagued every administration since 1987, including that of the current president- Moon Jae-In.
The outgoing President
Moon was elected in 2017 following the ouster of Park Geun-hye, the country’s first female President and daughter of Park Chung-hee.
Park faced criticism after the 2014 Sewol ferry incident in which nearly 300 passengers, mostly students, drowned while the captain and crewmates saved themselves. Subsequently, there were revelations that Park’s aide Choi Soon-Sil had an undue influence over the President and the ‘Candlelight Revolution’ in 2016-2017 brought about Park’s ouster. She was eventually impeached and convicted for corruption and abuse of power.
Moon Jae-In is the the son of North Korean refugees and is a human rights lawyer.
Moon attempted to reign in the influence of chaebols, or business conglomerates like Samsung and Hyundai, on the Korean economy, pushing for significant corporate governance reforms with a Bill in 2020. Proposed reforms included changing the amount of influence shareholders had in picking auditors and allowing for prosecution of chaebols by a number of entities if they violated fair trade rules.
He also helmed the effort to introduce a constitutional amendment that would change presidential term limits to two four year terms. His legacy also includes some labour reforms, national security reforms and an attempt to reign in the power of the public prosecutor’s office by re-vesting some of its powers in other agencies.
His handling of the Covid-19 outbreak was praised as setting an example for other developed nations, although South Korea is now facing surging cases due to the Omicron variant. The rise of Korean cultural heft in the world may also be associated positively with Moon’s administration, despite no direct influence, and Moon has often evoked natural pride in Korean cultural ambassadors.
But Moon also leaves with certain unfulfilled promises, including a thwarted attempt to broker peace with North Korea. His initial moves to reconcile with North Korea seemed to yield results, starting with an invitation to Kim Jong-un for the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics and a 2018 Singapore summit between Kim and Donald Trump. This cordiality did not last very long– Trump and Kim failed to reach any agreement in the 2019 Hanoi summit and the North Korean military blew up an inter-Korean liaison office in the demilitarised zone in 2020, before resuming missile testing that continues till date.
Moon’s administration was also rocked by real estate scandals and sexual harassment accusations against party leaders, including the Mayor of Seoul, Park Won-Soon.
Moon is set to leave office with a decent approval rating. However, South Korea has a history of succeeding administrations having prosecuted previous Presidents, and Yoon had pledged to look into irregularities in the Moon administration if he was elected.




13. North Korean threat actors target news outlets and fintechs with a Google Chrome vulnerability

The all purpose sword at work.

Excerpts:
Since the threat consists of an exploit allowing attackers to execute remote code via a vulnerability in Google Chrome, it is advised to deploy the patch as soon as possible, which can be easily done via Group Policy Object (GPO).
In addition, it is advised to use blocking and anti-phishing software or browser plugins like Enhanced Safe Browsing for Chrome, in order to block the fraudulent websites created by the attackers.
In some cases, the attackers served the exploit kit via legitimate website. The only solutions not to be infected in these cases would be to always stay up to date with software, and if possible, deactivate JavaScript.
To protect from phishing attempts, users should never click on a link coming from an unknown sender. If coming from a seemingly legitimate company, users should first check carefully if the link delivered in the email leads to the legitimate website.

North Korean threat actors target news outlets and fintechs with a Google Chrome vulnerability
techrepublic.com · March 30, 2022
Image: Sergey Nivens/Shutterstock
Threat actors from North Korea have been exploiting a vulnerability in Google Chrome to target certain users with remote code, particularly news outlets, software vendors and fintechs in the United States.
CVE-2022-0609 is a remote code execution vulnerability affecting Google Chrome. According to Google, a patch was released on Feb. 14, 2022, while the first evidence of an exploitation of the vulnerability dates to Jan. 4, 2022.
On Feb. 10, Google’s TAG (Threat Analysis Group) team discovered two distinct threat actors using that vulnerability to target U.S.-based organizations spanning news media, IT, cryptocurrency and fintech industries. It is possible that more organizations and countries have been targeted in those attack campaigns.
Operation Dream job
The threat actors behind the previously reported “Operation Dream job” are one of the two actors leveraging the CVE-2022-0609 vulnerability.
Individuals from 10 different news media have been targeted by the threat actor, in addition to software vendors, domain name registrars and web hosting providers. All in all, more than 250 people have been targeted by this campaign.
The attacking scheme started with emails reaching these people, pretending to be job opportunities coming from Disney, Oracle and Google (Figure A).
Figure A
Image: Google. Spoofed job offer website made by the attackers.
The links in the fraudulent emails led the user to fake job offer websites which served a hidden iframe triggering the exploit kit.
Operation AppleJeus
The second threat actor exploiting the CVE-2022-0609 vulnerability has already been known for a previous attack campaign called Operation AppleJeus.
More than 85 people from fintech industries and cryptocurrency have been targeted in the current attack campaign.
Two legitimate fintech companies have been compromised in order for the attackers to add a malicious iframe on the legitimate websites, serving the exploit kit to infect visitors. In other cases, Google observed fake websites also serving the exploit kit, and already set up to distribute trojanized cryptocurrency applications.
The exploit kit
Users have been served the exploit kit either by visiting a legitimate website compromised by the attackers or by being led to fake websites created by the threat actors. In all cases, an iframe started the infection chain.
The exploit kit contained multiple stages and components. For starters, heavily obfuscated JavaScript code was used to fingerprint the visiting system. The code collected probing information like browser user-agent, screen resolution and more, which were sent back to the exploitation server. Based on the data, the visitor would be served the Chrome remote code execution (RCE) exploit and additional JavaScript code. The exact conditions for a visitor to be served the exploit are unknown, since all the code analyzing the data is hosted on the attacker’s server.
If the Chrome exploit was successful, the additional JavaScript code would launch the next stage, referenced within the script as “SBX,” a common acronym for “Sandbox escape.” Unfortunately, stages following the initial exploitation of the Chrome exploit could not be recovered by Google’s TAG team.
In an attempt to protect their exploits, the attackers deployed multiple techniques to make it harder for security teams to recover any of the stages. The iframe is only served at specific times and unique IDs were used in infecting links to avoid the exploit kit to be served more than once from the same link. Each stage has also been heavily encrypted with the AES algorithm, including the clients’ responses. No additional stage would be served if all the previous ones would not be completed.
In addition to the exploit kit, Google’s TAG team also found evidence of specific links built for Safari on MacOS or Firefox leading to known exploitation servers, yet none responded at the time of Google’s investigation. It is therefore impossible to know what exploit would be triggered, if any, for those different browsers.
Who are these attackers?
According to Google, the two threat actors originate from North Korea. Both groups used the exact same exploit kit. The kit being private, it is possible that both groups work for the same entity and share tools. Yet the two probably operate with different mission sets and different deployment techniques. It is also possible that more North Korean government-backed attackers might have access to the same exploit kit.
How to protect from this threat
Since the threat consists of an exploit allowing attackers to execute remote code via a vulnerability in Google Chrome, it is advised to deploy the patch as soon as possible, which can be easily done via Group Policy Object (GPO).
In addition, it is advised to use blocking and anti-phishing software or browser plugins like Enhanced Safe Browsing for Chrome, in order to block the fraudulent websites created by the attackers.
In some cases, the attackers served the exploit kit via legitimate website. The only solutions not to be infected in these cases would be to always stay up to date with software, and if possible, deactivate JavaScript.
To protect from phishing attempts, users should never click on a link coming from an unknown sender. If coming from a seemingly legitimate company, users should first check carefully if the link delivered in the email leads to the legitimate website.
Disclosure: I work for Trend Micro, but the views expressed in this article are mine.

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techrepublic.com · March 30, 2022

14. N.Korea may be preparing new nuclear tests to improve arsenal, U.S. and allies say

N.Korea may be preparing new nuclear tests to improve arsenal, U.S. and allies say
Reuters · by Josh Smith
SEOUL, April 1 (Reuters) - There are increasing signs that North Korea could soon test a nuclear weapon for the first time since 2017 in a bid to improve its arsenal and increase political pressure, U.S. and South Korean officials and analysts said.
Two U.S. officials told Reuters that there were indications, including activity near the Punggye-ri nuclear site, that Pyongyang may be preparing for some sort of test, though an exact timing was unclear. read more
A South Korean military official confirmed that they were tracking activity to restore one of the tunnels used for nuclear tests.

Pentagon spokesman John Kirby declined this week to comment, but said Washington is concerned about the possibility of new tests because they would be an opportunity for North Korea to enhance its arsenal.
"Every time you test you learn.... We know that this is a programme that they want to improve," he told a briefing on Tuesday. "And so of course, we're concerned about efforts to do that."
Analysts say that more testing could help North Korea reach its stated goals of making smaller nuclear warheads and improving their reliability.
A resumption of nuclear tests could send political shockwaves through the region. China and Russia had joined the United States and other United Nations Security Council members in sanctioning Pyongyang over its previous tests, but in the wake of last week's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) flight, both Beijing and Moscow signalled opposition to any new measures and said sanctions should be eased.
Liu Xiaoming, China's envoy for Korean affairs, has called on all sides to show restraint, but said the root cause of tensions is Washington's failure to address North Korea's legitimate security concerns and to reciprocate steps Pyongyang had taken since 2018.
On Thursday State Department spokesman Ned Price said Washington remains open to talks, but that continued provocations by North Korea would incur additional responses from the international community.
A NUCLEAR SITE REBORN
North Korea has conducted all six of its nuclear tests in deep tunnels dug under the mountains at Punngye-ri. In 2018 it used explosives to close old entrances in front of invited foreign media but not international experts, raising questions about the extent of the demolition.
That year Pyongyang declared a voluntary moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and its ICBMs. Since then, it has said it is not bound to that because of a lack of reciprocal moves by the United States and its allies. Last month, it test-fired ICBMs for the first time since 2017.
Commercial satellite imagery from Thursday shows probable new excavation at the site's South Portal, just east of a former tunnel entrance that was destroyed as part of site dismantlement efforts in 2018, 38 North, a U.S.-based programme that monitors North Korea, said in a report.
Although some South Korean media reports suggested that workers were building "shortcuts" to connect with the test tunnels as quickly as possible, it seems more likely they were trying to excavate into a stable point rather than digging through the fractured rock around the former entrance, 38 North said.
The organisation noted that some technical buildings such as the site's command and control centre were not destroyed in 2018.
Since December, satellite imagery has showed activity at the main administrative area, the Vienna-based Open Nuclear Network (ONN) said in a report this week.
Notably, the South Portal tunnel that North Korea appears be reactivating was not previously used for testing, the ONN report said. Piles of what might be logs, often used to shore up such tunnels, have also been spotted, it added.
A separate 38 North report said satellite imagery shows increased activity around North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launching Station, after leader Kim Jong Un ordered its expansion as part of a programme to launch spy satellites to monitor military moves by the United States and its allies.

Reporting by Josh Smith; Additional reporting by Idrees Ali in Washington; Editing by Gerry Doyle
Reuters · by Josh Smith



15. Sohae Satellite Launch Station: Activity Gradually Picks Up


Sohae Satellite Launch Station: Activity Gradually Picks Up - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
38north.org · by Jenny Town · March 31, 2022
Launch Pad
Figure 1. Covered materials on the launch pad gradually decreasing.

Image © 2022 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected]
By March 31, those covered materials were gone, and three stacks of new light-colored materials have been newly placed on the southern edge of the launch pad, near the bridge leading to the fuel and oxidizer bunkers. The purpose of these materials is unknown.
Figure 2. Covered materials are gone and new materials have arrived.
Image © 2022 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected]
Arrival of Vehicles
Sometime between March 26 and March 31, a number of vehicles have arrived at Sohae and are parked in both the VIP housing area and the Administration and Security Headquarters. This kind of activity has been observed in the past in the lead up to satellite launches, to prepare or inspect these accommodations for VIP observers. It may also indicate further site visits in the coming weeks by high level officials to monitor progress.
Figure 3. Vehicles observed around VIP housing and Administration and Security Headquarters.

Figure 3. Vehicles observed around VIP housing and Administration and Security Headquarters. Image © 2022 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected]

Figure 3. Vehicles observed around VIP housing and Administration and Security Headquarters. Image © 2022 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected]
“Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Sohae Satellite Launching Ground,” Rodong Sinmun, March 11, 2022.
  1. [2]
Ibid.
  1. upgrades instructed by Kim Jong Un during his March 11 site visit.[1] While the full extent of those improvements will likely take a considerable while to complete, as time will be needed to manufacture and bring in specialized components, activity is gradually picking up around the complex. Whether this new activity is related to the overall improvement plan or are short-term measures in preparation for a satellite launch in the near future is unclear.
  2. [2]
38north.org · by Jenny Town · March 31, 2022


16. Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: Probable Spoil at the South Portal


Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: Probable Spoil at the South Portal - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
38north.org · by Jenny Town · March 31, 2022
Commercial satellite imagery from March 31 indicates probable new excavation activity at the South Portal of Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site. Snow patterns on the March 31 image indicate heavily trafficked roads around the South Portal and surrounding southern support area, whereas roads to the other portals remain snow covered. What appears to be a new spoil pile has formed across from the Tunnel No. 3 complex (as designated by North Korean diagrams, aka, the South Portal [see Figure 8 of 38 North’s report from May 2018]) leading to an area just east of the former tunnel entrance that was exploded as part of site dismantlement efforts in 2018. While some reports have suggested North Korea is trying to build a shortcut to these test tunnels, it seems more likely it has chosen to excavate into a stable point rather than digging through the fractured rock around the former entrance.
Figure 1. Heavy traffic and probable new spoil around the South Portal.
Satellite image © 2022 Maxar Technologies. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected]
Figure 2. Close up of South Portal.
Satellite image © 2022 Maxar Technologies. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected]
This new probable excavation activity, along with reports of repair and erection of support buildings in this southern support area over the past few months, appears to indicate attempts to restore the South Portal for future use. It is worth noting that some technical buildings like the Command and Control Center were not destroyed in 2018, which enables restoration of earlier site capabilities.
38north.org · by Jenny Town · March 31, 2022


17. North Korea’s “Checkerboard” Threat: Obstacles & Opportunities for the US-ROK Alliance



I participated in this working group along with a number of other Korea specialists.
North Korea’s “Checkerboard” Threat: Obstacles & Opportunities for the US-ROK Alliance • Stimson Center
stimson.org · March 31, 2022
Executive Summary
Motivated by notable advancements displayed during the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) October 2020 and January 2021 military parades, as well as the ongoing stalemate in U.S.-DPRK and inter-Korean relations, Stimson’s 38 North program convened a military working group to discuss and provide recommendations for the U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance to meet this evolving threat.
Over the summer and early fall of 2021, 38 North, with help from its partner, the Korea Defense Veterans Association, brought together experts, including former U.S. and ROK military officers, civilian defense officials, analysts, and academics. Gen. (Ret.) Vincent K. Brooks, Korea Defense Veterans Association (KDVA) Chairman and former commander of the United Nations Command, U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea in the Republic of Korea, chaired the working group, which was organized and moderated by 38 North Fellow Dr. Clint Work, with the assistance of 38 North’s Research Associates Natalia Slavney and Iliana Ragnone.
Although North Korea’s rollout of new ballistic missiles during the parades dominated international headlines for weeks, the numerous improvements to conventional military hardware, communications, and weaponry was the bigger story, given the standard narrative that its conventional capabilities are considered a depreciating asset. These developments indicate that North Korea’s defense and military capabilities have grown and evolved despite severe international sanctions and COVID-related restrictions. Simply put, North Korea continues to signal its intention to develop and modernize its nuclear and conventional capabilities, regardless of where U.S.-DPRK or inter-Korean relations stand.
At the outset, the working group considered a range of low-, medium-, and high-risk scenarios of how North Korea’s conventional capabilities may evolve in the near- to mid-term future as a baseline for discussion. However, the group quickly reached a consensus that, in practice, the threat could evolve in a “checkerboard” manner, with some capabilities remaining rather modest while others advance more quickly.
Over the course of several meetings, the group discussed steps the alliance should take now as well as how it might need to evolve based on changing North Korean capabilities and the checkerboard threat. The following recommendations emerged from the group’s discussions:
  • Consider if the alliance is properly organized, equipped, and trained against a North Korean checkerboard threat and how the changing security environment on and around the Korean Peninsula requires the alliance to rethink how it conducts operations.
  • Think of key U.S.-ROK alliance military and civilian infrastructure as strategic infrastructure; reduce reliance on fixed infrastructure where possible, and, otherwise, increase the defense and hardening of these sites.
  • Take a whole-of-government approach that integrates defense planning with crisis management, running exercises that challenge different sectors of critical infrastructure on a rotating basis.
  • Build greater “combinedness” at levels between the U.S.-ROK infantry division and Combined Forces Command (CFC) Headquarters (HQ), aiming for the alliance to be in a continuous, coordinated, and combined state on a day-to-day basis.
  • Reorient military exercises to “train to failure”—designing scenarios that expose shortcomings—and report on those shortcomings in respective ROK and U.S. systems, as well as up through the CFC’s bilateral national command authorities.
  • Better coordinate and create layers of air and missile defense systems, rather than pushing for full integration of systems, and rehearse how they would operate together.
  • Create a strategic communications plan that informs and educates the press, public and political leaders on key issues—such as, wartime operational control (OPCON) transition—involving U.S. and ROK presidents as well as Cabinet-level officials.
  • Continue to confront barriers to information sharing and integration, as well as differences in authority and jurisdiction between the U.S. and ROK’s respective cyber operations, identifying key differences between South Korea’s national interests and authority and alliance interests and operations.
Scene Setter: North Korea’s Conventional Military Improvements and the “Checkerboard” Threat
In October 2020 and January 2021, the DPRK alarmed many U.S. and ROK government officials and Korea experts with parades showcasing advancements in its conventional weapons and missile systems. These new capabilities, as well as the ongoing stalemate in U.S.-DPRK and inter-Korean relations, brought a Stimson 38 North working group together to consider low-, medium- and high-risk scenarios of how North Korea’s conventional capabilities may evolve in the near- to mid-term future.
In the low-risk scenario, the Korean People’s Army’s (KPA) capabilities remained relatively stagnant, with modest improvements in conventional forces enabling more effective military demonstrations and limited provocations. Under this scenario, the group suggested focusing on the U.S.-ROK alliance’s cyber defense and countering North Korea’s growing nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.
As part of the medium-risk scenario, select KPA capabilities improved with a qualitative gap growing between its most capable elements and much of the force. The KPA would possess increased lethality and improved capabilities suited to limited offensive operations by select units as well as defensive operations. The group felt consideration should be given to prioritizing the alliance’s theater-level counter-missile and counter-UAV efforts, including detection, active and passive defense, and capacities to disrupt and/or destroy the North’s notably increased conventional strike capabilities.
In the high-risk scenario, the KPA’s conventional capabilities increased significantly across the board. This included the ability to conduct more precise and lethal high-intensity combat operations—at least for limited periods of time—and to inflict serious losses on high-value equipment during defensive operations. Given this scenario, the working group recommended a broader approach to force development in order to enhance deterrence by denying limited attacks and rapidly overcoming North Korea’s defenses in wartime.
Early in its discussions, the working group quickly reached a consensus that, in practice, the alliance will likely encounter a checkerboard threat, where some capabilities will remain low, others will reach a medium threat level, and still others a high level. Accordingly, this report assumes North Korea’s capabilities will advance in a mixed manner, discusses the challenges that poses for the U.S.-ROK alliance, and provides recommendations for how to prepare against an evolving threat.







V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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