Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Books are the quietest and most constant of friends; they are the most accessible and wisest of counselors and the most patient teachers.”

- Charles William Eliot

“The falsification of history has done more to impede human development than any one thing known to mankind.”

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“You may impose silence upon me, but you can not prevent me from thinking.”

- George Sand

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 8, 2023

2. Special Operations News Update - August 8, 2023 | SOF News

3. Opinion | War is hell. To this, Russia has added torture.

4. Wagner set the stage for 'quite real' move that could spark major crisis in NATO

5. Tucson’s A-10s headed to final destination as Davis-Monthan lands new special ops mission

6. Pro-China 'political elite' in the Philippines enables Chinese aggression in WPS — expert

7. Tuesday Briefing: Elite Chinese Generals Ousted

8. Here’s How Scared of China You Should Be

9. What DOD can learn about smarter innovation from a roll of toilet paper

10. Army aims to make 1 million artillery shells a year, starting in fiscal 2025

11. Long-Distance Resistance - China Media Project

12. US Navy sailor's mom encouraged him to pass military details to China, prosecutor says

13. The Ukraine War Has Found the Machinery of Western Governments Wanting

14. U.S.-Made Cluster Munitions Fuel Ukrainian Counteroffensive

15. US Army plans to grow Patriot missile defense force

16. A Missile Strikes the Heart of a Ukrainian City — and Then Another

17. Biden says he plans to travel to Vietnam 'shortly'

18. The Problem with Designating the Wagner Group as a Terrorist Organization

19. Taiwan’s Vast Surveillance Infrastructure: An Achilles’ Heel if China Invades

20. Biden to Restrict Investments in China, Citing National Security Threats

21. ‘Acceptable levels of risk’: Backing Ukraine won’t deplete U.S. arsenal, Milley says

22. Pentagon Is Keeping US Troops in Niger Even as Coup Leaders Show No Sign of Relenting

23. Modern 'triad' aims to fill capability gap, help US military compete with adversaries (Space, Cyber, and SOF)

24. 7 Things the New Sergeant Major of the Army Can Do to Restore Trust in the Military

25. Why the China cyber threat demands an airtight public-private response

26. One of America’s Favorite Generals Leads the Niger Coup

27. Opinion | Putin chokes on the Ukrainian ‘porcupine’

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 8, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2023

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces appear to have conducted a limited raid across the Dnipro River and landed on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, although it remains unclear whether Ukrainian troops have established an enduring presence on the east bank.
ISW will continue to offer a conservative assessment of the situation on the east bank of Kherson Oblast until or unless ISW observes visual confirmation of an enduring Ukrainian presence near Kozachi Lopan or other east bank settlements.
Talks between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Chinese Communist Party Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi following China’s participation in the peace talks in Saudi Arabia suggest that China is increasingly diverging with Russia on proposed settlements to end the war.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is using the recent coup in Niger and Wagner’s continued presence in Africa to maintain relevance in the Russian information space.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City line, in the eastern Donetsk-western Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Donetsk Oblast on August 8 and made advances in certain areas.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 8 and made advances near Svatove.
Russia continues to draw from its stock of Soviet-era equipment to compensate for equipment losses in Ukraine.
Russian occupation authorities are preparing for regional elections in occupied areas.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 8, 2023

Aug 8, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 8, 2023

Karolina Hird, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 8, 2023, 5:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces appear to have conducted a limited raid across the Dnipro River and landed on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, although it remains unclear whether Ukrainian troops have established an enduring presence on the east bank. Several Russian milbloggers reported on August 8 that Ukrainian forces landed up to seven boats, each carrying around six to seven people, on the east bank of the Dnipro near the settlement of Kozachi Laheri, broke through Russian defensive lines, and advanced up to 800 meters deep.[1] A Russian milblogger noted that the Russian command recently redeployed a “prepared grouping” of Russian airborne (VDV) personnel from the Kozachi Lopan area to Zaporizhia Oblast and replaced them with mobilized fighters from an unspecified unit, thereby weakening Russian defensive power in this area.[2] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo downplayed reports of the Ukrainian landing and claimed that Russian artillery fire repelled the Ukrainian boats and that there are no Ukrainian troops near Kozachi Lopan.[3] However, the majority of prominent Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces managed to utilize tactical surprise and land on the east bank before engaging Russian forces in small arms exchanges, and Saldo was likely purposefully trying to refute claims of Ukrainian presence in this area to avoid creating panic in the already-delicate Russian information space.[4] Hotspots on available NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from the past 24 hours in this area appear to confirm that there was significant combat, likely preceded or accompanied by artillery fire. By the end of the day on August 8, many Russian sources had updated their claims to report that Russian forces retain control over Kozachi Laheri, having pushed Ukrainian forces back to the shoreline, and that small arms skirmishes are occurring in shoreline areas near Kozachi Laheri and other east bank settlements.[5]

[Source: NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System over Kherson, August 8 and Esri, Maxar, Earthstar Geographics, and the GIS User Community; overlayed on ISW’s August 8 control-of-terrain map]

ISW will continue to offer a conservative assessment of the situation on the east bank of Kherson Oblast until or unless ISW observes visual confirmation of an enduring Ukrainian presence near Kozachi Lopan or other east bank settlements. ISW has not yet observed visual evidence to suggest that there are a substantial number of Ukrainian personnel or the deployment of Ukrainian vehicles near Kozachi Laheri, and the current pattern of Russian reporting is more consistent with a limited cross-river raid than a wider Ukrainian operation. Ukrainian officials have not commented on operations in this area as of this writing.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk–eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[6] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks around Bakhmut.[7] The New York Times reported on August 7 that a Ukrainian battalion commander operating in southern Ukraine described counteroffensive operations as a “marathon” and “not a sprint.”[8]

Talks between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Chinese Communist Party Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi following China’s participation in the peace talks in Saudi Arabia suggest that China is increasingly diverging with Russia on proposed settlements to end the war. The Russian and Chinese foreign ministries portrayed the conversation between Lavrov and Wang differently. The Russian Foreign Ministry reported that Lavrov and Wang “touched on a series of ‘hot’ regional topics including the Ukrainian crisis,” while the Chinese Foreign Ministry reported that the Russian and Chinese sides “exchanged views” about the war.[9] The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s description of the talks may suggest that the Kremlin is becoming dissatisfied with China’s continued efforts to promote its peace plan in international fora, which is consistent with ISW’s previous assessments that China is not interested in a “no-limits partnership” with Russia as the Kremlin desires.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is using the recent coup in Niger and Wagner’s continued presence in Africa to maintain relevance in the Russian information space. Several Wagner-affiliated Russian milbloggers and another milblogger posted an audio file on August 8 of Prigozhin discussing US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland’s trip to Niger on August 7.[10] Prigozhin claimed that he is proud of Wagner’s actions in Africa and suggested that the threat of future Wagner involvement in Niger prompted Nuland’s trip.[11] Prigozhin is likely attempting to co-opt Nuland’s trip to Niger to grandstand on one of the few threats he still has the power to execute after realizing that the fallout of Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24 is making him increasingly irrelevant in the Russian information space.

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces appear to have conducted a limited raid across the Dnipro River and landed on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, although it remains unclear whether Ukrainian troops have established an enduring presence on the east bank.
ISW will continue to offer a conservative assessment of the situation on the east bank of Kherson Oblast until or unless ISW observes visual confirmation of an enduring Ukrainian presence near Kozachi Lopan or other east bank settlements.
Talks between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Chinese Communist Party Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi following China’s participation in the peace talks in Saudi Arabia suggest that China is increasingly diverging with Russia on proposed settlements to end the war.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is using the recent coup in Niger and Wagner’s continued presence in Africa to maintain relevance in the Russian information space.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City line, in the eastern Donetsk-western Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Donetsk Oblast on August 8 and made advances in certain areas.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 8 and made advances near Svatove.
Russia continues to draw from its stock of Soviet-era equipment to compensate for equipment losses in Ukraine.
Russian occupation authorities are preparing for regional elections in occupied areas.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kupyansk and reportedly advanced on August 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and north of Ivanivka (20km east of Kupyansk).[12] Multiple Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District), Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces took positions on the landings south of Vilshana and Pervomaiske (24km east of Kupyansk).[13] Russian sources claimed that Russian assault groups pushed Ukrainian forces past Lyman Pershyi (12km northeast of Kupyansk) and out of positions along the Lyman Pershyi-Pervomaiske line.[14] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces attempted to break through Ukrainian defenses east and northeast of Kupyansk.[15] Russian sources claimed that the goal of Russian offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction is to draw Ukrainian forces from other sectors of the front to the Kupyansk area and suggested that the wider operational goal is to distract Ukrainian troops as opposed to gaining substantial territory.[16] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces have suffered heavy losses in the Kupyansk direction over the last week.[17]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Kupyansk but did not advance on August 8. The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Synkivka.[18] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Sergey Zybinsky claimed that Ukrainian forces are trying to regain lost positions in the Kupyansk direction and that Ukrainian forces conducted five unsuccessful counterattacks against Russian forces near Synkivka, Mankivka (17km east of Kupyansk), and the Usa forest (likely between Synkivka and Lyman Pershyi).[19]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and did not advance on August 8. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Artem Lysohor reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Ukrainian forces south of Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove).[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have begun consolidating positions in Novoselivske.[21] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces attacked near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and Torske (14km west of Kreminna), but did not specify an outcome.[22] Another Russian milblogger claimed that a TOS-1A thermobaric artillery crew from the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) is conducting offensive operations near Stelmakhivka.[23]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and reportedly made limited advances on August 8. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced towards Karmazynivka (13km southwest of Svatove) but that Russian forces still control the heights near the settlement.[24] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked Russian forces near the Raihorodka-Karmazynivka line.[25] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked Russian forces near Novoselivske, Novoyehorivka (15km southwest of Svatove), Zhytlivka (2km northwest of Kreminna), and Terny (16km west of Kreminna).[26] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna), Torske, and Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna).[27]

A Ukrainian reserve officer who has previously reported accurately on Russian force dispositions reported on August 8 that according to satellite imagery, Russian authorities have recently based 12 to 16 Russian helicopters at the Luhansk International Airport.[28] The officer reported that these helicopters are outside the range of Ukrainian HIMARS and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs).[29] The officer asserted that the disabling of the helicopters would compel Russian forces to vacate the airport, which would slow Russian logistics and response times.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on August 8, but did not make any confirmed or claimed advances. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Bakhmut, Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and Zaitseve (20km south of Bakhmut).[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps) repelled Ukrainian attacks near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), that Chechen “Akhmat” spetsnaz and other Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Klishchiivka, and that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[32] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 7 that elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) repelled a Ukrainian attack near Berkhivka.[33]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Bakhmut on August 8 and made claimed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Klishchiivka and pushed Ukrainian forces out of several unspecified positions.[34] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Klishchiivka is fully under Russian control.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful operations near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, Kurdyumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut), and Druzhba (18km southwest of Bakhmut).[36]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City line on August 8 and made limited advances. Geolocated footage published on August 7 shows that Russian forces made limited advances near Krasnohorivka (on the western outskirts of Donetsk City).[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Avdiivka, Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), and Marinka.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Krasnohorivka.[39] Footage published on August 8 purportedly shows artillery units of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating in the Avdiivka direction.[40]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on August 8 and did not advance. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Mykilske (27km southwest of Donetsk City near Vuhledar).[41]

Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 8 and did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Berdyansk direction.[42] The Russian MoD and Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekhov claimed that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces repelled several Ukrainian attacks near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[43] Several Russian sources, including “Vostok“ Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky who is reportedly defending in the area, claimed that Ukrainian forces crossed the Mokri Yali River and unsuccessfully attacked the northern outskirts of Urozhaine on the morning of August 8.[44]

Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack along the eastern Donetsk–western Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 8 and did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Staromayorkse (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[45]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 8 and did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol direction.[46] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian infantry attack along the Robotyne-Verbove line (up to 18km southeast of Orikhiv) on the night of August 7–8.[47] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces with armored vehicles and tank support unsuccessfully attacked Russian positions on the northern outskirts of Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv) on the morning of August 8.[48] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces managed to occupy the northern outskirts of the settlement in the morning but that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of those positions later in the day.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 8 and did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Robotyne.[50]

Russian sources made conflicting claims regarding fighting to the southeast of Orikhiv but maintained a cohesive narrative regarding the situation to the southwest of Orikhiv on August 8. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that there are positional battles near Bilohirya (16km southeast of Orikhiv), but another Russian milblogger directly contradicted this claim and claimed that there is no confirmation of fighting near Bilohirya.[51] A Russian milblogger who is reportedly defending in the area claimed that the situation is stable and calm near Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv) and Zherebyanky (26km southwest of Orikhiv).[52]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued routine artillery fire in Kherson Oblast on August 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces struck settlements along the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast, including Kherson City.[53] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed two Russian sabotage groups attempting to maneuver between unspecified islands in Kherson Oblast on boats.[54] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to use artillery fire on the (east) left bank on the Dnipro River to cover the actions of Ukrainian reconnaissance boats.[55]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia continues to draw from its stock of Soviet-era equipment to compensate for equipment losses in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet The Moscow Times reported on August 7 that Russian forces have removed around 40 percent of old Soviet tanks, mainly T-62 tanks produced between 1962 and 1975, from the Vagzhanov military storage base near Ulan-Ude, Republic of Buryatia.[56] The Moscow Times, citing satellite imagery, noted that there were 3,840 armored vehicles visible at Vagzhanov as of September 2021 and that the number dropped to 2,270 by May 2023.[57] Satellite imagery additionally revealed that Russian forces removed 32 percent of the visible armored vehicles from Vagzhanov following the declaration of partial mobilization in September 2022.[58] The Eastern Military District’s 36th Combined Arms Army (CAA) is based in Ulan-Ude, and the 36th CAA has been fighting in western Donetsk Oblast and near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border in 2023.[59] Ulan-Ude's 5th Guards Tank Brigade in particular suffered major personnel and equipment, including tank losses, during failed assaults on Vuhledar, western Donetsk Oblast, in February 2023.[60]

Chechen authorities appear to be sending the families of prominent Chechen opposition activists to fight in Ukraine as a means of punishment. Chechen human rights activist and former lawyer for Russian opposition group “Committee Against Torture” Abubakar Yangulbaev reported on August 7 that several of his relatives are now fighting with Chechen forces in Donetsk Oblast after they were forcibly mobilized by Chechen authorities.[61] Yangulbaev noted that footage posted by Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov on August 6 shows his relatives being sent to the combat zone in Ukraine.[62]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of rehabilitation schemes. A Telegram channel affiliated with the Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported on August 7 that 40 children from the Skadovsk raion of Kherson Oblast are undergoing a 21-day long “rehabilitation course” at the Raduga social rehabilitation center in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkarian Republic.[63] Even if the children return to Kherson Oblast following the trip, the circumstances of their removal from an active war zone were likely sufficiently coercive to mean that they or their guardians could not have given full consent.

Russian occupation authorities are preparing for regional elections in occupied areas. Kherson Oblast occupation election board head Marina Zakharova claimed in an interview with Russian outlet Izvestia on August 7 that she expects voter turnout in occupied Kherson to exceed 60 percent and that current voter lists list about 600,000 preliminary voters.[64] Zakharova also emphasized that the Kherson occupation administration is working closely with Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard), the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), and Ministry of Internal Affairs to provide security to polling stations.[65] Russian occupation officials will likely escalate efforts to consolidate control of occupied areas as the September 10 Russian Unified Election Day approaches, likely including law enforcement crackdowns to institute fear and coerce residents of occupied areas to vote in sham elections.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

A Russian insider source claimed that Wagner forces are withdrawing from Belarus and are either deploying to Libya or going on vacation to Russia.[66] The source claimed that the first stage of Wagner’s withdrawal from Belarus is complete and that the second wave will begin in mid-August.[67] The source claimed that Wagner personnel are not planning on returning to Belarus.[68] ISW has observed and reported on satellite imagery and other visual evidence of Wagner personnel in Belarus and has not observed evidence of a withdrawal.[69]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Special Operations News Update - August 8, 2023 | SOF News

Special Operations News Update - August 8, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · August 8, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: A East-coast-based U.S. Naval Special Warfare Operator (SEALs) performs a high-altitude low-opening jump during bilateral training with Croatian special forces. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Katie Cox, Zadar, Croatia, June 9, 2023)

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

Passing of Gen Lindsey. The first commander of U.S. Special Operations Command has passed away at age 90 – retired General James J. Lindsey served nearly four decades in the U.S. Army. He was a former commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, 18th Airborne Corps, and the 82nd Airborne Division. He entered the Army in 1952 as a private. (The Fayetteville Observer, Aug 7, 2023). He was also one of the driving forces behind the establishment of the U.S. Army Airborne and Special Operations Museum (ASOM).

Combat Diver Competition. The Special Forces Underwater Operations (SFUWO) School, C/2/2 SWTG(A), will host the 2023 Combat Diver Competition at their facility in Key West, FL on 24-28 September 2023. The format will be a three-day combat diving and maritime-focused competition, followed by a day for MAROPS CAPEX/Mod Demo and SFUWO led discussion on ARSOF’s future role in the Maritime Domain. Competitors will be challenged both mentally and physically to determine the best combat buddy pair across USASOC, NSW, MARSOC, and AFSOC.

Big Changes for AFSOC. The Air Force Special Operations Command’s new network of ‘power projection wings’ are starting to form up. The Air Force’s special operations branch is reshaping how it is organized for overseas missions. “Here’s how Air Force special ops ‘power projection wings’ will work”, Air Force Times, August 3, 2023.

New Job for Chris Miller. A retired Special Forces officer and former acting secretary of defense is taking on a new role at a portfolio company of a private investment firm. “Christopher Mller Named Interim Chief Revenue Officer at DZYNE Techologies”, GovConWire, August 7, 2023.

SF CSM now SGM of the Army. Command Sergeant Major Michael Weimer is now the senior enlisted of the U.S. Army. He has spent his entire Army career in Special Forces – with much of that time in Delta Force. “Army’s New Enlisted Leader: The Bet a Green Beret Can Lead the Rank and File”, Military.com, August 4, 2023.

Becoming a SEAL – Easier for Officers? According to one former SEAL, the Basic Underwater Demolition / SEAL (BUD/S) training is more difficult to complete for enlisted personnel than for officers. The Navy is reporting a 39% attrition rate for officers and 79% for enlisted over a five-year period. Read more in “Why Do Officers Have a Higher Success Rate Than Enlisted Men at Becoming Navy SEALs?”, SANDBOXX, August 2, 2023.

New Navy Ship Named After Navy SEAL. Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Carlos Del Toro announced today that a future Navajo-class Towing, Salvage, and Rescue (T-ATS) ship will be named in honor of Solomon Atkinson, a pioneering Navy SEAL and an Alaskan Native of the Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette Islands Reserve. (DVIDS, Aug 7, 2023).

CA JCET and MEDCAP in Benin. Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) forces partnered with the Benin Armed Forces during a Civil Affairs Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) that concluded July 20, 2023, in Cotonou, Benin. The U.S. Army’s 91st Civil Affairs Battalion collaborated with their Beninese partners to conduct this JCET and a separate Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) engagement that immediately followed. “U.S. Special Operations Command Africa partners with Benin Forces in Civil Affairs Engagement”, DVIDS, August 4, 2023.

Australian SOF and Navy SEALs Train Together. U.S. Naval Special Warfare (NSW) forces deployed in support of U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific participated in Exercise Talisman Sabre from July 17 to August 3, 2023. NSW forces worked alongside Australian special operations forces (SOF) from the Army’s 2nd Commando Regiment. “U.S. Navy SEALs, Australian Special Forces Conclude Talisman Sabre 2023”, DVIDS, August 4, 2023.

SOF History

On August 6, 1756, General Howe authorized Robert Rogers to raise a battalion of Rangers for service with the British Army.

On August 6, 2011, a U.S. Chinook helicopter, call sign Extortion 17, was shot down by the Taliban resulting in 38 deaths (30 Americans and 8 Afghans). There were no survivors. Of the U.S. fatalities were Navy SEALs who were part of the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU). Five U.S. Army helicopter crewmen also perished. One U.S. military working dog also died in the crash.

On August 10, 1944, Lt. John “Jack” Singlaub, a member of the Jedburgh teams, to work with the French Resistance fighters or Maquis groups.

Recon Team Kansas and a MoH. A Special Forces soldier who served with Military Assistance Command Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG) inserted into enemy-held territory on the Laotian border. He died during that mission. “Medal of Honor Monday: Army Capt. Lorean D. Hagen”, DoD News, August 7, 2023.

Ukraine Conflict

Slow Progress for Ukraine Counteroffensive. Russian defences have taken their toll on Ukrainian lives and equipment. After several weeks of hard fighting the Ukrainian forces have had limited success. Hopes that a counteroffensive would quickly put Ukrainian forces on the coast of the Sea of Azov are diminished. Thus far, the gains made have been done as a result of a grinding process that has taken a lot of time.

U.S. Tanks Going to Ukraine. The 31 M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks the U.S. promised to Ukraine have been refurbished and are now ready for delivery. “M1A1 Abrams Tanks Approved for Shipment”, The Drive War Zone, August 7, 2023.

Former UK SAS Conducts Training in Ukraine. Details of United Kingdom training of Ukrainian special operations forces are described in “Former British Special Forces Instructor Now Training Ex-Soldiers How to Fight in Ukraine”, Kyiv Post, August 6, 2023.

Two Americans Died in Ukraine in July. Last month two U.S. military veterans, one Army and one Marine, died in fighting while serving with Ukrainian military forces. This brings the total of Americans who have died in Ukraine since February 2022 to at least 16. “2 US military veterans killed in Ukraine during intense fighting”, Task and Purpose, August 3, 2023.

National Security

IW and MAVNI Recruitment. The importance of language skills used in developing rapport and effective advising of partner forces cannot be overstated. The U.S. military is missing the boat in not leveraging the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) that was established in 2008 but that ended several years later. “For More Effective Irregular Warfare, Bring Back the MAVNI Recruitment Program”, by Hope Hodge Seck, Irregular Warfare Initiative, August 4, 2023.

Border Crisis. The movement of migrants from South America, transiting Central America, and crossing the U.S. southern border has increased dramatically the last few years. One of the most dangerous spots along this travel route is the Darien Gap (Wikipedia) – the border area between Colombia and Panama. The United Nations is projecting a significant increase in migrants crossing the Darien Gap in 2023. There is an anticipated increase of registered transits (source Panana National Migration Service) from less than 50,000 in 2019 to over 400,000 in 2023. The increased movement of people attempting to enter the United States is resulting in businesses and criminal groups turning big profits. Read more in “The Predatory Economy Thriving in Panama’s Darien Gap”, by Will Freeman, America’s Quarterly, July 27, 2023. See also a Congressional Research Service publication on Border Enforcement, IN12216, August 7, 2023, PDF, 4 pages.

Help Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel with spine injuries receive the healthcare options, education, and care they need.

26th MEU (SOC). The Bataan Amphibious Ready Group and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) have arrived in the Middle East Area of Responsibility. They got there August 6th, and this is part of a preannounced DOD deployment. Iran has been stepping up their naval activities – harassing and seizing maritime vessels. The 26th may be engaged in some countermeasures to confront the Iranian activities.

Taliban Interference in UN Aid Progreams. The Taliban is increasing its influence over aid organizations working in Afghanistan, including programs managed by the United Nations, a U.S. government report warned. “Taliban Increasingly Influencing UN-Managed Aid Programs”, RFERL, August 8, 2023.

Niger Update. The military junta that took power in Niger (SOF News, Aug 2, 2023) has ignored an ultimatum by other West African nations to free the ousted president and restore the democratic government. A bloc of African nations known as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has threatened military action. Some nations, Nigeria being one of them, have moved troops to Niger’s border. The U.S. has 1,100 troops on two bases in Niger. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland met with several of the coup leaders in Niger (DoS, Aug 7, 2023); but with no apparent resolution of the situation – the talks described as frank and difficult. The ‘new’ Niger government has requested more than 1,000 French troops to depart their country.

Arrow Security & Training, LLC is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. AST offers a wide range of training and instruction courses and programs to include language and cultural services, training, role playing, and software and simulation. https://arrowsecuritytraining.com/

Upcoming Events

August 12, 2023

11th Special Forces Group Reunion

Fort Meade, MD

September 18-23, 2023

5th Special Forces Group Reunion

September 24-28, 2023

Combat Diver Competition

Special Forces Underwater Operations School

October 3, 2023

2023 Virtual MOG Mile

Three Rangers Foundation

October 16-20, 2023

SOAR XLVII

Special Operations Association

Books, Pubs, and Reports

Sentinel. The August 2023 issue of the Sentinel is now posted online. Some great reading about past and current Special Forces events. Two authors write AARs on the Special Forces Association Annual Convention held in Indianapolis, Indiana in May 2023. There are articles about Wounded Heroes of America, the first Afro-Native American who was a MAC-V Reconda advisor (Vietnam), two book reviews, and an account of the attack on FOB 4 (Vietnam) where large number of Green Berets were killed. (PDF, 20 pages). https://www.specialforces78.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/0823-Sentinel-News.pdf

Book – Jon Robert Cavaiani: A Wolf Remembered. A new book about a Special Forces NCO who spent years as a POW during the Vietnam War is a powerful memoir that pays tribute to the extraordinary life of soldier Jon Cavaini. Written by Michael B. Evers and John Siegfried, this book takes readers on a captivating journey through Jon’s remarkable experiences as a warrior, highlighting his unwavering courage, dedication, and sacrifice. Available on Amazon.com.

Podcasts

SOFCAST. United States Special Operations Command

https://linktr.ee/sofcast

The Pinelander. Blacksmith Publishing

https://www.thepinelander.com/

The Indigenous Approach. 1st Special Forces Command

https://open.spotify.com/show/3n3I7g9LSmd143GYCy7pPA

Irregular Warfare Initiative

https://irregularwarfare.org/category/podcasts/

Irregular Warfare Podcast. Modern War Institute at West Point

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385

SOF News is not a ‘money making’ enterprise; but we do have administrative, operating, and publishing expenses. Individuals and businesses provide the funds to defray these expenses. Their contributions are deeply appreciated. Learn how you can support SOF News.

sof.news · by SOF News · August 8, 2023

3. Opinion | War is hell. To this, Russia has added torture.

Excerpts:

Kyiv’s allies are wise to remember not only the war’s daunting strategic stakes but also the very real, very bloody consequences that would result from the retreat of Ukrainian forces, let alone their defeat. The war is not only about lines on a map, or Mr. Putin’s wish to reassemble the component parts of the Soviet Union, or the quantity of artillery shells and funds expended in the effort to ensure that he fails. It is also about one country’s bloody-minded attempt to subjugate and subsume another.

Opinion | War is hell. To this, Russia has added torture.

August 7, 2023 at 4:10 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Editorial Board · August 7, 2023

Russia’s pitiless assault on Ukraine is a land grab, an imperial fever dream and an unjustified war of aggression, but it is something more than that. It is also a relentless campaign of criminality aimed at eradicating Ukraine’s national identity, spirit and resolve — often by means of murder, rape and torture.

The victims of that effort are Ukrainian civilians caught behind Russia’s lines. In the suburban town of Bucha, outside Kyiv, and elsewhere, they have been randomly shot and subjected to sexual violence. Ukrainian children have been kidnapped from their parents and sent to Russia to be brainwashed, a genocidal undertaking. Last weekend, a Russian bomb struck a Ukrainian blood transfusion center, killing two people and wounding several others.

In the Ukrainian city of Kherson, whose prewar population was about 280,000, Russian forces subjected ordinary citizens to extraordinary abuse during the eight months they occupied it last year. That is underscored in new findings by the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group, an initiative established by the United States, Britain and the European Union to gather evidence of war crimes on behalf of Ukrainian prosecutors.

According to a “mobile justice team” of international lawyers and investigators working under the group’s auspices, Russian security services including the FSB, the successor agency to the Soviet-era KGB, established several dozen detention centers in and around Kherson before the southern city was liberated by Ukrainian forces last fall. The report spells out the chilling details of torture that took place in at least 20 of the sites.

Also on the Editorial Board’s agenda

D.C. Council reverses itself on school resource officers. Good.
Virginia makes a mistake by pulling out of an election fraud detection group.
Vietnam sentences another democracy activist.
Biden has a new border plan.

The D.C. Council voted on Tuesday to stop pulling police officers out of schools, a big win for student safety. Parents and principals overwhelmingly support keeping school resource officers around because they help de-escalate violent situations. D.C. joins a growing number of jurisdictions, from Montgomery County, Md., to Denver, in reversing course after withdrawing officers from school grounds following George Floyd’s murder. Read our recent editorial on why D.C. needs SROs.

Gov. Glenn Youngkin (R) just withdrew Virginia from a data-sharing consortium, ERIC, that made the commonwealth’s elections more secure, following Republicans in seven other states in falling prey to disinformation peddled by election deniers. Former GOP governor Robert F. McDonnell made Virginia a founding member of ERIC in 2012, and until recently conservatives touted the group as a tool to combat voter fraud. D.C. and Maryland plan to remain. Read our recent editorial on ERIC.

In Vietnam, a one-party state, democracy activist Tran Van Bang was sentenced on Friday to eight years in prison and three years probation for writing 39 Facebook posts. The court claimed he had defamed the state in his writings, according to Radio Free Asia. In the past six years, at least 60 bloggers and activists have been sentenced to between 4 and 15 years in prison under the law, Human Rights Watch found. Read more of the Editorial Board’s coverage on autocracy and Vietnam.

The Department of Homeland Security has provided details of a plan to prevent a migrant surge along the southern border. The administration would presumptively deny asylum to migrants who failed to seek it in a third country en route — unless they face “an extreme and imminent threat” of rape, kidnapping, torture or murder. Critics allege that this is akin to an illegal Trump-era policy. In fact, President Biden is acting lawfully in response to what was fast becoming an unmanageable flow at the border. Read our most recent editorial on the U.S. asylum system.

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Among the detainees were teachers, community activists, medical workers, law enforcement personnel and soldiers. Evidence gathered by the researchers suggests that many detainees were subjected to electrocution, often including shocks administered to their genitals. There were also reports of rape, threats of rape, beatings and waterboarding.

Of 320 detainees’ cases at more than 35 detention centers identified by the findings in Kherson, at least 43 percent cited torture, and many said they had been sexually assaulted by Russian guards.

One Russian soldier, identified as Oleksandr Naumenko, is cited as responsible for ordering genital electrocutions that were administered to 17 detainees. Investigators are trying to identify other Russians involved in torturing Ukrainian detainees. They should be tried in a court of law, no matter how long it might take to apprehend them.

The man ultimately responsible for this campaign of abuse is Vladimir Putin, the Russian dictator who ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly 18 months ago. U.S. and European authorities are in broad agreement that he should be held to account for having launched a war of aggression, the same charge that was brought against top-ranking Nazi and Japanese perpetrators who were tried and, in some cases, executed after World War II. That will likely require the establishment of a new tribunal under international as well as Ukrainian auspices.

The psychological and physical scars borne by Ukrainians underscore why so many of them regard Russia’s campaign as an existential struggle. Their plight is not just a question of territorial conquest or loss. Towns and villages that fall to Moscow’s forces are subject to atrocities whose human toll will endure for decades.

All of this horror is part of a systematic effort to erode and erase Ukraine’s determination to maintain its national identity. Last month, officials at UNESCO, the United Nations’ cultural arm, confirmed that they have verified damage to 274 Ukrainian heritage sites, including dozens of churches, museums and other sites of historical or artistic note.

Kyiv’s allies are wise to remember not only the war’s daunting strategic stakes but also the very real, very bloody consequences that would result from the retreat of Ukrainian forces, let alone their defeat. The war is not only about lines on a map, or Mr. Putin’s wish to reassemble the component parts of the Soviet Union, or the quantity of artillery shells and funds expended in the effort to ensure that he fails. It is also about one country’s bloody-minded attempt to subjugate and subsume another.

The Washington Post · by Editorial Board · August 7, 2023

4. Wagner set the stage for 'quite real' move that could spark major crisis in NATO

Excerpts:

During a meeting with Putin last month, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said Mr Prigozhin's men were asking to go West on an "excursion" to Poland's Warsaw and Rzeszow - a claim which rang alarm bells across Europe.

Reports, denied by Mr Lukashenko, have claimed in late July that some 100 Wagner fighters had relocated to the Belarusian city of Grodno, just kilometres away from the borders with Lithuania and Poland.

And on August 2, the Polish Ministry of Defence said Belarusian helicopters had crossed into the Białowieża area - a claim rejected by Minsk - which prompted Warsaw to deploy closer to the border more than 1,000 of its troops.

On August 3, Poland’s Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki issued a warning over attempts to destabilise NATO.

Wagner set the stage for 'quite real' move that could spark major crisis in NATO

EXCLUSIVE: A former member of the Russian Parliament, the Duma, described as "quite real" the possibility to see Wagner Group troops carrying out disruptive actions in Poland.

By ALICE SCARSI

08:00, Sat, Aug 5, 2023

Express · by Alice Scarsi · August 5, 2023

Hundreds of Wagner soldiers have relocated to Belarus (Image: GETTY)

Wagner Group may have set the stage for an aggressive action in Poland and Lithuania that could spark chaos within NATO.

Russian-Ukrainian politician Ilya Ponomarev noted both Moscow and Minsk have made it clear Yevgeny Prigozhin's paramilitary group is currently not backed by their governments.

This, Mr Ponomarev believes, would make Wagner look like a sole actor should it cross the border with Poland and prevent NATO from being able to trigger Article 5 - its vital principle of collective defence.

Mr Ponomarev, who was a member of the Duma between 2007 and 2016 and sided with Kyiv following the Russian invasion in February 2022, told Express.co.uk: "The main reason to be bothered by this – quite real – possibility is the fact that Wagner now has perfectly distanced itself from the Kremlin.

"There were deliberate 'leaks' that its commanders were offered to join the Russian military and that they refused; Lukashenko was also complaining in public that they are unmanageable.

The Suwałki Gap is of major strategic and military importance (Image: GETTY)

"That’s all part of the preparations if the decision to attack will actually be taken."

The politician thinks Mr Prigozhin remains a "trusted person" by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who "at least is not questioning his personal loyalty".

Indeed, Mr Prigozhin stressed the short-lived mutiny carried out by Wagner in late June targeted Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov rather than the Kremlin as a whole or Putin.

Mr Ponomarev added a possible Wagner attack may target an area southwest of the border between Lithuania and Poland also touched by Belarus and the Kaliningrad Oblast - the westernmost area of the Russian Federation.

Known as Suwałki Gap, this 40-mile-long strip of land is of major strategic and military importance as gaining control of it would isolate the Baltic states from the other NATO members on the European continent.

Mr Ponomarev said: "I think that Putin’s idea is to attack the Suwałki Gap, so that Lithuania and Poland will call for Article 5 but the Western countries will point out that Wagner is not a state actor and turn the request down. And this fact will trigger a major crisis in NATO.

"Wagner does not need to hold the position for long - just enough time to provoke the scandal."

Tensions between Belarus, which is hosting thousands of Wagner troops officially to have them train the country's army, and Poland spiked in recent days.

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Lukashenko is one of Putin's closest allies (Image: GETTY)

During a meeting with Putin last month, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said Mr Prigozhin's men were asking to go West on an "excursion" to Poland's Warsaw and Rzeszow - a claim which rang alarm bells across Europe.

Reports, denied by Mr Lukashenko, have claimed in late July that some 100 Wagner fighters had relocated to the Belarusian city of Grodno, just kilometres away from the borders with Lithuania and Poland.

And on August 2, the Polish Ministry of Defence said Belarusian helicopters had crossed into the Białowieża area - a claim rejected by Minsk - which prompted Warsaw to deploy closer to the border more than 1,000 of its troops.

On August 3, Poland’s Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki issued a warning over attempts to destabilise NATO.

The Air Force announced Wednesday that it plans to move the 492nd Special Operation Wing to Davis-Monthan from Florida’s Hulbert Field, pending the results of a final environmental impact analysis. The special operations outfit will be augmented with new aircraft and personnel from various bases around the country, including squadrons from New Mexico’s Cannon AFB, North Carolina’s Pope Army Airfield and Washington’s Joint Base Lewis-McChord.

“This is really the tip of the spear for the Air Force,” Medler said. “As we’ve seen in Afghanistan, particularly, the use of special operation forces has increased substantially. And that’s what this power projection wing is made up of, all the different components of Air Force Special Operations.”

Among the new planes coming to Tucson: The propeller-driven OA-1K, loaded with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) tech and designed to host different weapon systems that can provide close air support and precision targeting. Known as AT-802U Sky Warden when under development by L3Harris, the small, nimble aircraft is part of the Air Force’s Armed Overwatch program.

Tucson’s A-10s headed to final destination as Davis-Monthan lands new special ops mission

'End of an era’: Legendary Warthog attack aircraft to be grounded; new 'tail-dragger' prop planes in coming squadron

Posted Aug 4, 2023, 1:21 pm

Jim Nintzel

TucsonSentinel.com

tucsonsentinel.com · by Jim Nintzel

If there has been one issue that has had nearly universal bipartisan agreement in Southern Arizona for years, it’s the importance of keeping the A-10 Thunderbolt II flying above our local skies.

But the U.S. Air Force, after more than a decade of trying to retire the legendary Warthogs while spending more than $1 billion to refit the planes, is finally moving forward with plans to decommission the A-10, including the aircraft based at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base.

Three Tucson-based squadrons flying a total of 78 A-10s will become inactive and the planes will be retired, while the 47th and 357th fighter squadrons will continue A-10 training until inactivation.

A new USAF special operations wing will instead be based here, flying small turboprop planes more reminiscent of WWII fighters than anything from the jet age.

The move comes after a string of Arizona's U.S. senators and representatives have battled the Pentagon for years to maintain the A-10's presence in Southern Arizona.

Keeping the A-10 "is a mission we will not stop fighting for," said Rep. Ron Barber in 2014, joining Sen. John McCain in blasting plans to replace the attack jets with F-35 aircraft. "Ugly though it may be, it is one fine plane," he said.

Two years later, Rep. Martha McSally, herself a former A-10 pilot, said the A-10 was "critical to our national security. It continues to demonstrate its value on the battlefield against ISIS, in Europe to deter Russian aggression, and on the border with North Korea."

Davis-Monthan's economic impact on Tucson has been estimated at between $1 billion and $3 billion each year. About 1,000 positions at the base will be phased out under the plan, with those jobs replaced by slots in the replacement squadrons.

After repeatedly pushing off the retirement of the Warthogs, which were designed 50 years ago to thwart the threat of Soviet tanks if they attempted to invade Western Europe, the Air Force is now forging ahead with mothballing the jets by the end of the decade.

“It’s the end of an era,” said Robert Medler, executive director of the Southern Arizona Defense Alliance, “and the start of a great new one.”

That new era is set to begin over the next five years as Davis-Monthan becomes home to cutting-edge aircraft with an old-school appearance in the Air Force Special Operations Command’s newest power projection wing.

The Air Force announced Wednesday that it plans to move the 492nd Special Operation Wing to Davis-Monthan from Florida’s Hulbert Field, pending the results of a final environmental impact analysis. The special operations outfit will be augmented with new aircraft and personnel from various bases around the country, including squadrons from New Mexico’s Cannon AFB, North Carolina’s Pope Army Airfield and Washington’s Joint Base Lewis-McChord.

“This is really the tip of the spear for the Air Force,” Medler said. “As we’ve seen in Afghanistan, particularly, the use of special operation forces has increased substantially. And that’s what this power projection wing is made up of, all the different components of Air Force Special Operations.”

Among the new planes coming to Tucson: The propeller-driven OA-1K, loaded with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) tech and designed to host different weapon systems that can provide close air support and precision targeting. Known as AT-802U Sky Warden when under development by L3Harris, the small, nimble aircraft is part of the Air Force’s Armed Overwatch program.

The OA-1K will replace U-28 Draco fleets.

“It’s a phenomenal aircraft,” Medler said.

The Sky Wardens will be the first active-duty Air Force "tail-dragger" propeller planes intended for combat roles since the retirement of the Douglas A-1 Sky Raider 50 years ago.

Based on the small Air Tractor crop-duster, the planes can stay aloft for up to six hours and carry up to 6,000 lbs with a 200-nautical-mile combat radius, and are built for "austere operations," the manufacturer said.

DM will also welcome two MC-130J Commando II squadrons. The Commando, designed to fly clandestine missions, can drop, pick up or resupply soldiers on the battlefield as well as refuel helicopters and other aircraft.

This will be the Air Force’s third power projection wing. Officials said locating at Davis-Monthan would allow pilots to train at the Barry M. Goldwater Range, which stretches across miles of desert west of Tucson.

In a joint tri-partisan statement on Wednesday, U.S. Sens. Mark Kelly (D) and Kyrsten Sinema (I) and U.S. Reps. Ruben Gallego (D) and Juan Ciscomani (R) praised the decision, saying they would continue to work “to secure the long-term future of DM.”

“With its year-round flying weather, extensive training range space, and proximity to other military bases, Southern Arizona is a natural choice to establish this Special Operations Wing in the Southwest. These flying missions are critical to our military’s ability to outcompete our adversaries, and this decision is a positive step towards bringing them to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base that will enable the Air Force to proceed with the next set of site reviews to prepare the base for this transition," said the press release from the four.

The A-10 was significant in not being mentioned by the congressional delegation, and with the announcement of the new special operations mission, the calls to save the plane have been muted.

Jay Bickley, president of the DM50, a local organization of community leaders who advocate on behalf of Davis-Monthan, called the new missions “a tremendous addition to the base and the local community. Additionally, we are very appreciative of the continued advocacy and support of the entire Arizona delegation as we work together to ensure the future of DM.”

Tucson Mayor Regina Romero cheered the decision.

"Davis-Monthan Air Force Base is a vital economic engine in the Tucson community,” Romero said. “We are happy to welcome the new 492nd Special Forces Power Projection Wing to our city,"

Tucson leaders have long worried that mothballing the A-10 fleet would land Davis-Monthan on a list of potential base closures.

A 2017 study of the economic impact of Arizona’s military bases by the Maguire Company estimated that Davis-Monthan had a $3 billion overall impact on the Tucson economy and created more than 19,000 local jobs. Southern Arizona’s congressional representatives—from Republican McSally to Democrats Gabby Giffords, Ron Barber and Ann Kirkpartrick—pushed back hard on efforts by the Air Force to mothball the aging fleet. At one point, McSally insisted the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act include a provision requiring a “fly off” between the A-10 and its proposed replacement, the F-35.

The A-10 — described by McSally as a “badass airplane with a big gun on it” — was designed to provide close air support to troops on the battleground. First built in the 1970s, it is a heavily armored plane equipped with a 30 mm GAU-8 Avenger rotary autocannon capable of firing 3,900 rounds per minute. It can also carry air-to-surface missiles and a variety of smart bombs, and has the ability to take heavy fire while attacking tanks, armored vehicles and other targets.

Pentagon officials have said that the four-decade old design of the A-10 limits its capabilities, especially in an age when high-tech battlefield communication has become common. A-10s do not have the technology to communicate information as quickly and easily as newer jets, they have said. The Air Force has previsouly planned to replace the Warthogs with the F-35 Lightning II, and the MQ-9 Reaper, an upgraded version of the Predator drone.

Davis-Monthan will continue to be home to other missions, including hosting the headquarters of the 12th Air Force, which oversees command of Air Force operations in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as the 563rd Rescue Group.

“Rescue and special operations go hand in hand,” Medler said. “It’s a great fit for the base and the community.”

The Air Force has given no indication of plans to curtail the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group's "aircraft boneyard."

As A-10s are retired at D-M and other bases, they will likely be stored here. In June, the Air Force announced it was replacing A-10s at Moody AFB in Georgia with F-35s over the next few years, with more of the planes at Gowen Field ANG Base in Idaho being replaced by F-16s. Some of those planes have already been decommissioned and flown for storage in Tucson.

The Air Force plans to retire 21 A-10s in FY 2023, and 42 in FY 2024. There are about 273 of the planes spread across USAF, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units, with Warthogs deployed in South Korea as well as across the United States. In recent years, U.S. A-10 units have also been deployed in NATO countries in Eastern Europe.

Overall, the Air Force is looking to retire about 300 aircraft soon, from the A-10s and F-15s to a B-1 bomber.

tucsonsentinel.com · by Jim Nintzel

6. Pro-China 'political elite' in the Philippines enables Chinese aggression in WPS — expert

There are useful idiots and outright sympathizers and exploiters everywhere.

Excerpts:

Marcos “should now firmly address these continuous violations of our sovereignty rights over the West Philippine Sea,” Rodriguez said.

Without naming names, the lawmaker also took a jab at the Philippines’ ambassador to China, Jaime FlorCruz, who he implied was not acting on the issue.

“The President should also order our unusually quiet and inactive ambassador there to return to Manila and to replace him with a lower-level diplomatic officer,” he said.

After Manila accused Beijing's coast guard of firing water cannon at its vessels in the disputed sea, China said on Sunday it had taken "necessary controls" against Philippines boats that had "illegally" entered its waters.

The Philippines’ allies such as the US, Britain, Canada, Japan and Australia have also issued statements condemning the use of water cannons on the Philippine Coast Guard.

Pro-China 'political elite' in the Philippines enables Chinese aggression in WPS — expert

philstar.com · by Cristina Chi

MANILA, Philippines — Efforts of the “political elite” in the Philippines to gain greater influence with the Chinese government have contributed to the apparent failure of bilateral talks to deter Chinese aggression in the West Philippine Sea, a political analyst said.

Political scientist Cleve Arguelles said this is most recently illustrated in China's water cannon attack on members of the Philippine Coast Guard less than a month after former President Rodrigo Duterte visited Chinese President Xi Jin Ping — a meeting which current President Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. said he was aware of.

Duterte’s fly-by-night visit to the Chinese leader “is just the latest among a series of actions that he took that continues to undermine our national interests in securing our territories and EEZ in the West Philippine Sea,” Arguelles said.

“I see it as a continuation of Duterte’s pivot to China policy in which we heed the call of Xi and the Chinese government to engage in more bilateral talks directly with them rather than bring in the rest of the international community in the conversation,” Arguelles said.

Since taking office in 2022, Marcos has strayed from the China-friendly foreign policy pursued by his predecessor and insisted on strengthening ties with the United States.

Marcos, however, has also said that Duterte’s unannounced visit to the Chinese president did not and should not require his permission.

The Senate, which is dominated by Marcos' allies, has filed several measures seeking to condemn and end Chinese harassment of Filipino fishermen in the disputed waters.

One Senate resolution (PSR 707) authored by Senate President Juan Miguel Zubiri seeks to cut bilateral talks between Manila and Beijing.

“As a middle power, the Philippines is not well-placed to benefit from bilateral talks with an aggressive superpower like China. It means we’re unlikely to get favorable responses and our claims will remain underrecognized,” Arguelles said.

Bilateral talks between the Philippines and China would also mostly consist of Beijing insisting on “their economic and military might than submit to international norms and law in resolving issues,” the political science expert said, making country-to-country negotiations more favorable to the Chinese government.

‘Bigger threat’ posted by PH elite

Actions by members of the political elite like Duterte who continue to weaken the country’s territorial claims in its maritime row with China “is a far bigger threat to our national security than China itself,” Arguelles said.

“Duterte’s and his allies’ attempts to appease Xi by setting aside the landmark Arbitral Ruling and withdrawing from international efforts to strengthen rules-based international order didn’t make the challenge to secure our waters easier,” Arguelles added.

Ongoing reclamation projects in Manila Bay also have project ties with a Chinese company blacklisted for helping Beijing build infrastructure and militarize artificial islands in the South China Sea.

In 2020, Duterte insisted on keeping business ties with Chinese firms that Washington had blacklisted, asserting through his spokesperson that pursuing projects with Chinese firms is in the country’s "national interest."

Shrinking diplomatic ties

Meanwhile, Rep. Rufus Rodriguez (Cagayan de Oro, 2nd District) said that the continued harassment of Filipino vessels in the West Philippine Sea should lead to the “shrinking” of diplomatic ties between the two countries.

Rodriguez called on Marcos to “downgrade” the Philippine embassy in Beijing to signal the country’s protest and condemnation of incidents of Chinese harassment of Filipinos.

Downgrading an embassy in a country means that the office would have reduced functions and also send a message of less-than-friendly diplomatic relations.

Marcos “should now firmly address these continuous violations of our sovereignty rights over the West Philippine Sea,” Rodriguez said.

Without naming names, the lawmaker also took a jab at the Philippines’ ambassador to China, Jaime FlorCruz, who he implied was not acting on the issue.

“The President should also order our unusually quiet and inactive ambassador there to return to Manila and to replace him with a lower-level diplomatic officer,” he said.

After Manila accused Beijing's coast guard of firing water cannon at its vessels in the disputed sea, China said on Sunday it had taken "necessary controls" against Philippines boats that had "illegally" entered its waters.

The Philippines’ allies such as the US, Britain, Canada, Japan and Australia have also issued statements condemning the use of water cannons on the Philippine Coast Guard.

philstar.com · by Cristina Chi

7. Tuesday Briefing: Elite Chinese Generals Ousted

Tuesday Briefing: Elite Chinese Generals Ousted

The New York Times · by Amelia Nierenberg · August 7, 2023

Newsletter

Morning Briefing: Asia Pacific Edition

Also, South Korea relocates an international scout convention as a typhoon looms.

Aug. 7, 2023, 4:42 p.m. ET

President Xi Jinping has brought China’s military leadership to heel.Credit...Florence Lo/Reuters

Upheavals in China’s military

Xi Jinping, China’s leader, set out to clean up the once-corrupt military a decade ago. But now his crown jewel — the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, which manages conventional and nuclear missiles — is under a shadow.

Last week, Xi abruptly replaced top generals in the force. One, Gen. Li Yuchao, had been installed by Xi as the force’s top commander early last year. His deputy, Gen. Liu Guangbin, and the political commissar of the force, Gen. Xu Zhongbo, have also vanished from public view. The move came just days after Xi removed China’s foreign minister, Qin Gang, whom he had also elevated.

This unexplained shake-up suggests suspicions of graft or other misconduct: Most experts believe that Li and other senior officers may be accused of siphoning some of the enormous spending going into the fast-expanding force. A scandal could reinforce Xi’s conviction that officials can be kept from straying only with scrutiny and pressure.

Context: Xi created the department in 2015, and an expert said that “Xi talks about the P.L.A. Rocket Force as being central to future conflicts.” Virtually all members of China’s military elite owe their rise to Xi, which gives him a firm grip on power.

Related: The Philippines Coast Guard released a video that showed a Chinese Coast Guard vessel firing a water cannon at one of its ships in the South China Sea.

In 2016, an international tribunal backed the Philippines in its territorial claims over the contested waters. China has said it would not abide by the ruling.

Attendees of the World Scout Jamboree prepare to leave the campsite.Credit...Kim-Yeol/Newsis, via Associated Press

South Korea’s embattled Jamboree

For the World Scout Jamboree, which draws scouts from across the globe every four years, woes continue. Yesterday, South Korea announced that all participants would leave the campsite early because Typhoon Khanun was nearing.

Already, at least 138 people at the event had been hospitalized from heat exhaustion. Three national scouting organizations left the campsite early. And a South Korean contingent withdrew, claiming that organizers had mishandled allegations of a sexual offense on the campgrounds.

“This event will go down in history as a very unlucky event,” the secretary general of the World Organization of the Scout Movement said.

Details: More than 43,000 teenagers from 158 countries flew to South Korea to attend the Jamboree. The typhoon is expected to make landfall on Thursday.

A fighter in southern Ukraine.Credit...Diego Ibarra Sánchez for The New York Times

A look inside the counteroffensive

In order to understand Ukraine’s slow counteroffensive, The Times spent two weeks with Ukrainian marines trained and supplied by NATO. The troops said they were prepared for the long and grinding fight ahead. “It’s not a sprint,” one commander said. “It’s a marathon.”

Details: Casualties are heavy. Experienced commanders lead undertrained recruits. And some brigades are trying to fight with vehicles better suited to fighting a counterinsurgency in the deserts of the Middle East than the Russian Army in the lush forests of Ukraine.

Other updates:

Ukraine replaced the Soviet emblem on the Motherland Monument, a towering behemoth in Kyiv, in an ongoing effort to remove tributes to Russian power.
Ukraine said it detained a Ukrainian woman who was trying to gather intelligence about President Volodymyr Zelensky’s movements for Russia.

THE LATEST NEWS

Around the World

The Bibby Stockholm, center, can accommodate 500 people.Credit...Toby Melville/Reuters

Britain moved a group of migrants to a barge. The government hopes it will save money, but critics see it as part of a hardening of migration policy.
Niger closed its airspace after its neighbors threatened military action, but there’s no sign of intervention so far.
An Israeli strike near Damascus killed four soldiers, Syrian state media said.

World Cup

Sam Kerr, center, celebrated after the match.Credit...Mark Baker/Associated Press

Australia beat Denmark, 2-0, as Sam Kerr returned to play after an injury, making it to the quarterfinals.
England also advanced after it beat Nigeria in penalty kicks.

A Morning Read

Left, the Palais Garnier in Paris. Right, the Louvre Museum.Credit...Baptiste Hermant

“Rooftoppers” take photos from the tops of skyscrapers, often for social media. Some have died recently, raising criticism of the risky stunts.

ARTS AND IDEAS

A blind-dating event in South Korea.Credit...Seongnam City

A government-sponsored flirtation

South Korea has the world’s lowest fertility rate — so some of its cities are hosting blind dating events for singles. They’ve been popular, but few yield couples.

In the city of Jinju, the events have produced 11 couples in 12 years. In Gumi, only 13 such couples have married since 2016. Officials in both cities do not know how many children the event-matched couples have had.

That’s because the events miss the point, young people say. It’s not that they don’t want to be married, but they point to the high costs of child care, unaffordable homes, slim job prospects and crushing work hours as obstacles. Women also fear workplace discrimination if they have children.

Related: You know about dating apps. How about “date-me docs”? These online profiles read like the personal ads of yore and aim at a more meaningful connection than a swipe might allow.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Credit...Nico Schinco for The New York Times. Food Stylist: Barrett Washburne.

Sizzle mint for this zucchini salad.

Beware of shoddy A.I.-written travel guides.

Dive into “Bridge,” a trippy novel about a young woman trying to find and save her family.

Brace yourself for “Klondike,” a story of a Ukrainian family fighting for normalcy after Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was downed in 2014.

Play the Spelling Bee. (If you’re stuck, the Bee Buddy can help.) And here’s the Mini Crossword, Wordle and Sudoku.

That’s it for today’s briefing. See you tomorrow. — Amelia

P.S. Play our new weekly history quiz.

We’d welcome your ideas: briefing@nytimes.com.

Amelia Nierenberg writes the Asia Pacific Morning Briefing for The Times. More about Amelia Nierenberg

The New York Times · by Amelia Nierenberg · August 7, 2023

8. Here’s How Scared of China You Should Be

The five questions we must answer. I think number 3 is the key question.

No. 1: Is China’s economic future bright, dark, or somewhere in between?

No. 2: Will U.S. export controls work?

No. 3: Is Xi Jinping another Mao Zedong or another Lee Kuan Yew?

No. 4: Will Asia balance effectively?

No. 5: What will the rest of the world do?

Here’s How Scared of China You Should Be

It all depends on the answers to these five questions.

Walt-Steve-foreign-policy-columnist20Stephen M. Walt

By Stephen M. Walt, a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.

Foreign Policy · by Stephen M. Walt · August 7, 2023

A critical issue in current debates on U.S. grand strategy is the priority the country should place on competing with China. How many resources (money, people, time, attention, etc.) should the United States devote to this problem? Is China the greatest geopolitical challenge the United States has ever faced, or a colossus with feet of clay? Should countering China take precedence over all other problems (Ukraine, climate change, migration, Iran, etc.), or is it just one issue among many and not necessarily the most important?

For some observers—such as Elbridge Colby—countering China is the highest priority, and U.S. leaders must not allow themselves to be distracted by Ukraine or any other foreign-policy issues. My occasional co-author John Mearsheimer and my Harvard colleague Graham Allison seem equally concerned about the China challenge, and especially by what they see as a rising risk of war. A recent Council on Foreign Relations task force argued that military trends in Asia were shifting in China’s favor and called for redoubled efforts to reinforce deterrence, especially in the Taiwan Strait. Hal Brands and Michael Beckley think China’s power is nearing its peak and there’s little Beijing can do to arrest its eventual decline, but they see this potential window of opportunity as a cause for alarm rather than reassurance. By contrast, my Quincy Institute colleague Michael Swaine and Cornell University scholar Jessica Chen Weiss think we are exaggerating the danger China poses and worry that the two states will fall into a self-fulfilling spiral of suspicion that will leave both worse off no matter who ends up on top.

These varied assessments are but a small sample of the opinions you can find about China’s future trajectory these days. I don’t know who’s right—and neither do you—and I freely admit that some of these observers know a lot more about China than I do. I have my hunches, of course, but I’m mostly frustrated that the community of serious China watchers hasn’t achieved more of a consensus. As a public service, therefore (and maybe to inspire them a little), here are my top five big questions about China. The answers to these questions would tell you a lot about how worried you should be.

No. 1: Is China’s economic future bright, dark, or somewhere in between?

Power in international politics ultimately rests upon economics. You can talk all you want about “soft power,” the genius of individual leaders, the importance of “national character,” the role of chance, and much more, but the bottom line is that a country’s ability to defend itself and shape its broader environment ultimately depends on its economic strength. You need a large population to be a great power, but you also need substantial wealth and a diverse and sophisticated economy. Hard economic power is what enables a state to build lots of sophisticated weapons and train a first-class military, provide goods and services that others want to buy and that can enrich its own citizens’ lives, and generate surpluses that can be used to build influence around the world. Being recognized by others as competent and economically successful is also a good way to earn their respect, get them to listen to your advice, and enhance the appeal of one’s political model.

China’s economic performance over the past 40 years has been extraordinary, and no serious person believes its economy is going to deteriorate so much that it drops out of the great-power ranks. But as its sluggish post-COVID performance suggests, China’s economy is now facing growing headwinds that are unlikely to abate. Its population is aging and declining, which means ever-fewer workers will be supporting an ever-growing number of retirees. Youth unemployment is over 21 percent, and total factor productivity growth has declined sharply over the past decade. China’s financial system remains opaque and debt-ridden, and the real estate sector—a major source of prior growth—is especially troubled. Put these things together, and it’s easy to see why many analysts are pessimistic about its long-term prospects. As I’ll discuss in a moment, U.S. policy and the quality of Chinese leadership could make these problems worse.

Yet shorting China would be a risky bet. Its industries dominate some important sectors—including solar and wind technology—and its electric car industry is outperforming the rest of the world. Three of the world’s top construction companies (including the one with the largest annual revenues) are Chinese. It has gone to considerable lengths to secure access to critical minerals and metals and may eventually be in a position to deny some of them to others. There is every reason to expect China to remain a major economic player far into the future. The big question is whether it will blow past the United States, remain permanently behind on most dimensions of economic power, or achieve rough parity. If you knew the answer to that question, you’d be a long way to knowing just how worried you should be.

No. 2: Will U.S. export controls work?

How you answer the first question depends in part on whether you think the Biden administration’s economic war against China will be successful. By denying China access to advanced semiconductors (and related technologies), the United States is hoping to retain technological supremacy in this important sector. Although U.S. officials insist that these measures are limited to narrow national security concerns (what National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan characterized as a “small yard and high fence”), the real aim seems to be to slow China’s technological advance more broadly.

The question is whether this campaign will succeed over the longer term. Even a partial decoupling is never cost-free, and these restrictions will slow innovation in the United States and in the other countries that must go along with the U.S. campaign if it is to work. Technological barriers are never 100 percent effective, and this policy gives China a huge incentive to become more self-sufficient over time. For these and other reasons, well-informed experts disagree about how effective these measures will be.

Let’s not forget that when export controls do work—as they did against Japan in 1941—the target state may not sit back and take it. China is already retaliating against U.S. firms and allies, and its countermeasures may not stop there.

The bottom line, however, is that if you think this campaign is going to work well, you’d be much less concerned about the long-term challenge that China poses to U.S. primacy or the existing global order. If you think it may work for a while but not forever, or that it will eventually trigger a backlash in China and in some other key countries, you ought to be a lot more concerned.

No. 3: Is Xi Jinping another Mao Zedong or another Lee Kuan Yew?

China’s rapid rise began under its post-Mao “collective leadership,” even if Deng Xiaoping was “first among equals” in the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy. Today, however, Xi has concentrated power to an extent unseen since Mao himself and cultivated a Mao-like cult of personality in which his thoughts are considered infallible and his decisions cannot be questioned.

Letting one person have unchecked power in a country is usually a recipe for disaster. No human being is infallible, and allowing an ambitious and willful person to operate without constraint makes it more likely that big mistakes will be made and go uncorrected for a long time. Just consider Mao’s ill-conceived Great Leap Forward (which caused a famine that killed millions), or the damage China suffered during the Cultural Revolution. If that’s not warning enough, consider the costs of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s disastrous views on monetary policy or the trainwreck Elon Musk is presiding over at the social media site formerly known as Twitter.

To be sure, there are a handful of individuals who defy the odds, consistently beat the market, and never seriously put a foot wrong. Maybe Warren Buffett or Lee approach this level of wisdom, but most leaders fall well short. My point is that China’s near- to medium-term future depends a lot on whether Xi is even half as smart as he thinks he is. He’s clearly a genius at consolidating power—as the recent purge of former Foreign Minister Qin Gang and several top military officers reminds us—but he also mismanaged the pandemic, undermined some of the brightest stars in the Chinese economy, and has presided over a steady decline in China’s global image. And the more power he amasses, the worse his policy judgments seem to be. Those of you who are bearish about China’s economic prospects might take heart in the fact that he’s probably in the job for life.

No. 4: Will Asia balance effectively?

One of Xi’s major failures was not doing more to discourage China’s neighbors from joining forces to keep Beijing in check. China’s rising power was bound to be of some concern to other Asian states, but openly proclaiming China’s global ambitions, embracing “wolf warrior diplomacy,” overreacting to perceived slights, and employing aggressive salami tactics against Taiwan and in the South China Sea made the problem worse.

The result? India and the United States continued to move closer, and they are now joined by Japan and Australia in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. The AUKUS agreement has strengthened strategic ties (and security collaboration) between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Japan is increasing its defense spending rapidly and mending its delicate relations with South Korea. Farther afield, the European Union is becoming less enamored with Chinese investment, and public opinion in Europe and Asia has become much warier of China’s global role.

That said, the ultimate effectiveness of these measures remains to be seen. As I’ve written previously, a balancing coalition in Asia faces significant collective action problems, and Europe isn’t going to take on a major strategic role there. The distances separating these states are vast (which may tempt some states to pull back if trouble starts far away), nobody wants to lose complete access to the Chinese market, and countries like South Korea and Japan have a troubled past. Many of these states may want to let Uncle Sam handle China while they free-ride, which will undermine deterrence and could eventually lead to a backlash here in the United States. These same states also tend to get nervous if the United States becomes too confrontational, because they don’t want to be collateral damage in a Sino-American clash.

America and its Asian partners are actively balancing today—as balance of power/threat theory would lead us to expect—but whether they do enough of the right things is hardly a foregone conclusion. If they do, Chinese hegemony in Asia is much less likely and the risk of war goes down. If not, you should probably worry a bit more. Here, a lot depends on whether the United States can lead a potentially fractious coalition and find the sweet spot between doing too much and doing too little. Who wants to take a bet on that?

No. 5: What will the rest of the world do?

The final issue isn’t about China, per se; it’s about how the rest of the world is responding. A clear pattern is emerging: The Asian states most worried about China are moving closer to each other and gravitating toward the United States; most of Europe is reluctantly following America’s lead because they are still dependent on U.S. protection and thus don’t have much choice; Russia has little choice but to stick with its only major power partner; and medium powers around the world are hedging their bets, diversifying their strategic supply chains (trade and investment, diplomatic ties, and military support) and trying to avoid having to pick a side. For South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and some others, rivalry between China and the United States is an opportunity to play the great powers off each other and benefit from ties with both.

The key issue here is which of the two strongest powers plays this new game most effectively. The United States has squandered a lot of good will in the developing world over the past 30 years, and its failures have given China an opportunity. But China’s own actions—including the vaunted Belt and Road Initiative—haven’t been the game-changers many expected. Looking ahead, it’s easy to see a world order that looks surprisingly like the early Cold War: the U.S. aligned with Europe and much of East Asia and the Pacific, China aligned with Russia and some key states in the developing world, and other medium powers oscillating between them. The lineup on these scorecards isn’t a perfect match, and some of the players will have switched teams, but the overall pattern resembles the one we’ve seen before.

One more thing…

There may also be known unknowns out there, too. If you really want to worry about China, or if inflating the threat is part of your job description, you can always fall back on scary scenarios whose veracity is almost impossible for outsiders to determine. The Red Scare in the 1950s is a classic example: Lots of Americans genuinely believed that their society was being infiltrated and undermined by scores of people who pretended to be patriotic citizens but were in fact secretly loyal to their evil Kremlin overlords. Such fears were vastly overblown but also hard to disprove, for how can we ever know another person’s innermost thoughts and loyalties?

Viewed in this light, what are we to make of the recent New York Times story describing U.S. efforts to find and eliminate computer malware that Chinese hackers are said to have secretly embedded in critical U.S. infrastructure, perhaps in the hope of disrupting or delaying a U.S. military response to a future conflict? Fears of a cyber-Pearl Harbor have been around for a long time, but the article suggests that the danger is very real. It’s hard to know just how worried we should be, however, because we don’t know how effective the malware might be and we can never be 100 percent certain there isn’t some even more dangerous code lurking somewhere that our cybersecurity folks haven’t found yet.

Perhaps we should be really worried, but what struck me about the Times piece, which is based on interviews with unnamed senior administration officials (that is, on officially sanctioned leaks), is that it says almost nothing about U.S. efforts to do similar things in China. It quotes one Chinese official complaining about the cyberattacks it faces, which he says come mostly “from sources in the U.S.,” but otherwise the article is silent on what our own cyber-warriors are up to. It is hard to believe that China has been planting malware in critical U.S. infrastructure for years and those well-funded geniuses at the National Security Agency or U.S. Cyber Command have just been playing defense. If that is the case, we’ve got bigger problems to worry about.

So how scared should you be? I don’t know. If history is any guide, the United States is more likely to overreact to a possible China challenge than to under-respond, and the current bipartisan enthusiasm for confronting China on multiple fronts supports that prediction. But whether you think we are doing too much or too little depends to a considerable extent on how you answer the five questions listed above. I’d be ever so grateful if some smart China experts put their heads together and tried to narrow the range of disagreement. It would be even better if they did so publicly and laid out their sources and reasoning in as much detail as possible so that those of us who care about these questions could have better-informed debates on this vital strategic question.

Foreign Policy · by Stephen M. Walt · August 7, 2023

9. What DOD can learn about smarter innovation from a roll of toilet paper

More than just software. Two things to consider - low tech and information operations (infomercials?)

Excerpts:

The Charmin tear-line innovation had to solve two problems: support “reliable one-hand tearing dispensability” and be “commercial scale converting-process friendly.” That’s it. One requirement concerned its function; the other, its production.

Only after identifying perforation patterns that satisfied both one-handed tearing and commercial-scale production requirements did the inventors refine the innovation by imposing additional specifications. (In this case, they wanted a pattern that conveyed “luxury, elegance, softness and/or strength” and would be noticeable enough to consumers to be differentiable.) By doing so, the inventors followed a common innovation mantra: Fall in love with the problem, not the solution. Essentially a warning against the Einstellung effect, this statement reminds innovators that their priority is to identify and understand the problem to be solved and to remain flexible, even agnostic, to the solution.

Consider another P&G product that embodies this approach: Swiffer. Now a billion-dollar brand, Swiffer was designed to do one thing: quickly and easily remove large and small particulate from floors. Multiple manual and powered models were developed and tested before settling on the simple design still in use today. Once the rough design was finalized, attention shifted to myriad other considerations, such as the pattern of the weave in the cloth, the color of the stick, and joint designs that could offer both flexibility and strength.

However, the true poster children for this mantra are the products often featured in infomercials. Estimated to exceed $250 billion, the market for infomercial products is growing even as the networks they are broadcast on decline. Companies like Rodan + Fields (Proactiv skincare), Telebrands (PedEgg, Slice-O-Matic, Hurricane Spin Mop), and Beachbody (P90X) generated hundreds of millions in revenue and became household names simply by developing products that solved one or two problems exceptionally well.

What DOD can learn about smarter innovation from a roll of toilet paper

Its focus on Silicon Valley has obscured lessons from the less-techy world of consumer products.

By MARGAUX HOAR and ROBYN M. BOLTON

AUGUST 8, 2023 06:26 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Margaux Hoar

The headlines are familiar: “The U.S. Must Harness the Power of Silicon Valley to Spur Innovation.” “Start-Ups Bring Silicon Valley Ethos to a Lumbering Military-Industrial Complex.” Yet the defense community opines that DOD either has an innovation problem or an innovation adoption one. What if it also has an “innovation role-models problem?” That is to say, what if focusing so singularly on Silicon Valley is itself holding back innovation?

Defense leaders, policymakers, and practitioners spend a lot of energy on innovation. There are a Defense Innovation Board, a Defense Innovation Unit, a Defense Innovation Marketplace, and Defense Innovation Pathways. Every DOD federally funded research and development center and prominent national security think tanks have all produced recommendations on the subject. Search Defense One’s’ own archives, and you will find hundreds of articles that mention it.

Defense innovators and thought leaders recognize that most innovation happens outside the purview of traditional government research and development organizations. It’s why the Defense Innovation Unit and the new Office of Strategic Capital were created. Besides gaining access to commercial innovations themselves, leaders and practitioners are also interested in learning how the private sector innovates so successfully. However, we believe that DOD has been far too focused on Silicon Valley and tech innovators when there is much to be learned from other commercial sectors. This article elaborates on lessons from product and process—i.e., non-tech—innovation, using an unlikely source as inspiration: toilet paper.

Over the past several months, Procter and Gamble rolled out Charmin Smooth Tear, an innovation in their Charmin product line. It’s a little thing—a change in the perforation pattern from a straight line to wavy—and yet it is the product of years of toil and intellectual capital. According to Liza Sanchez, P&G Vice President, Charmin Research & Development, this innovation was “a 5-6 year project, including phases such as product design, consumer appeal, equipment design, and manufacturing process, to establish this new and highly sophisticated perforation capability system in our manufacturing plants.”

This change makes it easier to tear individual squares with a single hand and creates an aesthetically pleasing, almost luxurious, roll. While supporting a single-handed tear is not exactly a national-security priority, the product’s patent reveals clues about smarter innovation, even for the DOD. Specifically: consider scale requirements much earlier in the process and focus on the smallest possible set of requirements before incorporating and refining additional desirable features.

Start with scale

Charmin Smooth Tear was not the first time the engineers at P&G attempted to improve Charmin’s tearing. The inventors share in the patent that “previous approaches failed because they did not consider the impacts” of large-scale production characteristics. Any perforation design had to withstand the speeds and volumes required for machinery to mass-produce millions of rolls of toilet paper. Said Sanchez: “This is the first time in the history of toilet paper that [they] brought an entirely new technology into this space.” Delivering this innovation required “an entirely new module to the manufacturing line, which required precision engineering to get the tolerances of the equipment right and inventing and bringing in new proprietary technology to make this possible.”

P&G is not the first company to discover the importance of designing for scale early in the process. It’s estimated that for every innovation a company launches, 99 others fail to pass key internal hurdles. The top reason is that they don’t lead to a viable product; the next-most-common reason is that the organization does not have the time, resources, or capabilities required to produce them.

It’s also unlikely that P&G will be the last company to experience this lesson. Most “best-in-class” innovation frameworks and processes fail to account for scale until the final step of the process, if at all. Scale is not mentioned in the most common approach, Human-Centered Design, nor its widely adopted Design Thinking framework. the Lean Startup methodology treats scale as the natural outcome of repeated experiments, each occurring with larger and larger audiences. Given this lack of attention, it isn’t surprising that companies ultimately deem 20 percent of their innovation projects infeasible.

A few companies, however, consider scaling requirements at the optimum time: right after concluding that a proposed product fits a market sufficiently large to justify the investment. Take TomTom, the Dutch consumer electronics manufacturer whose TomTom Go created the personal-navigation device category. Launched in 2004, the device sold about a quarter-million units in its first year, five million in 2006, and 12 million in 2008. This growth was enabled by the company’s early and intent focus on managing cash, operations, and quality. “All part of the iceberg no one sees,” TomTom’s CEO and cofounder Harold Goddijn explained to McKinsey in a 2015 interview.

Scaling problems are common in DOD innovation too. Innovations commonly fall into the “valley of death“ while moving from prototype and experimentation to production and fielding. For small-business innovation programs (Small Business Innovation Research, or SBIR; and Small Business Technology Transfer, or STTR), the transition from phase II (prototyping) to phase III (commercialization) is quite low. One study found less than 10 percent of Air Force programs moved to phase III. An article about special operations acquisition touts a 25 percent rate as “among the highest in the Defense Department.” This transition can be difficult because small businesses lack sufficient capital to sustain themselves through the DOD budget cycle or innovators fail to consider the warfighter’s operating conditions. But it can also result from an inability to produce at the volumes and speeds required to be useful.

Silicon Valley’s focus on software—comparatively easy to duplicate and distribute—can obscure the difficulties in making the physical products that the U.S. military needs. DOD decision-makers and industry innovators must ask questions early about the feasibility of production. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency defined a set of questions in the 1970s to determine whether a project should be undertaken, affectionately known as the Heilmeier Catechism. There should be a similar set of questions for innovations; let’s call it the Charmin Inquiry. It could include questions such as: 1) What is required for mass production of this innovation? What challenges or blockers do we anticipate in mass production, such as supply limitations, production tolerance limitations, and worker skill shortages? 2) What dependencies exist? What other innovations are required to ensure this technology’s success? 3) What conditions must be met for this innovation to become a program of record? Is there a clear “owner” of the program? What requirements can/should it satisfy?

Start with the fewest possible requirements

The Charmin tear-line innovation had to solve two problems: support “reliable one-hand tearing dispensability” and be “commercial scale converting-process friendly.” That’s it. One requirement concerned its function; the other, its production.

Only after identifying perforation patterns that satisfied both one-handed tearing and commercial-scale production requirements did the inventors refine the innovation by imposing additional specifications. (In this case, they wanted a pattern that conveyed “luxury, elegance, softness and/or strength” and would be noticeable enough to consumers to be differentiable.) By doing so, the inventors followed a common innovation mantra: Fall in love with the problem, not the solution. Essentially a warning against the Einstellung effect, this statement reminds innovators that their priority is to identify and understand the problem to be solved and to remain flexible, even agnostic, to the solution.

Consider another P&G product that embodies this approach: Swiffer. Now a billion-dollar brand, Swiffer was designed to do one thing: quickly and easily remove large and small particulate from floors. Multiple manual and powered models were developed and tested before settling on the simple design still in use today. Once the rough design was finalized, attention shifted to myriad other considerations, such as the pattern of the weave in the cloth, the color of the stick, and joint designs that could offer both flexibility and strength.

However, the true poster children for this mantra are the products often featured in infomercials. Estimated to exceed $250 billion, the market for infomercial products is growing even as the networks they are broadcast on decline. Companies like Rodan + Fields (Proactiv skincare), Telebrands (PedEgg, Slice-O-Matic, Hurricane Spin Mop), and Beachbody (P90X) generated hundreds of millions in revenue and became household names simply by developing products that solved one or two problems exceptionally well.

This approach is somewhat anathema to the software development model. Developers might start with a minimum viable product, which delivers the smallest number of features to function. However, this “no-frills” version intends to get user feedback for continuous refinement. Over time, developers add and refine features in a pipeline of changes so frequent they are now called “continuous”: continuous integration, continuous deployment, and continuous delivery.

While continuously adding or changing innovation requirements is a best practice in Silicon Valley, it can be disastrous outside the software world. Consider the littoral combat ship, probably the most commonly cited example of DOD trying to solve too many problems simultaneously. The ship came in over budget, late, and ultimately unsatisfactory—ironic in a vessel intended to use swappable modules to focus on a single mission at a time. Or consider drones, an area where Rep. Rob Wittman has said that “chasing requirements” leads to cost overruns and delivery delays.

While defense platforms are necessarily more complex than a roll of toilet paper, they can still benefit from judicious requirements definitions. This is reflected in some corners of DOD. For instance, DARPA’s mosaic warfare concept composes mission capabilities across different platforms and sensors. In space and terrestrially, the services are looking at shifts from exquisite, multi-mission platforms to single-capability systems that can be more quickly produced and more expendable (due to lower cost). And yet they must fight against DOD’s tendency to pile on acquisitions and even exercises to eke more capability out of each investment. More DOD innovators should consider focusing on doing one thing well and examine the institutional blockers that need to be moved to do so.

Lessons beyond the Valley

Analogies and role models will always be imperfect matches to our needs. It’s why we’re encouraged to have more than one role model and multiple mentors. Different examples of “good” allow us to pick and choose the right model for the right need. DOD needs to look beyond Silicon Valley for private-sector models of effective innovation.

The Defense Innovation Board’s members represent a relatively limited set of disciplines—tech, finance, academia, and former government roles—though innovation does not exclusively occur in those arenas. Similarly, the current and former Defense Innovation Unit directors hail from the tech world, though DIU’s purview extends beyond just software and IT capabilities. Expanding the backgrounds of defense innovation advisors and leaders would be a productive first step to building a more extensive set of role models.

It might not be as sexy as a new app, but toilet paper has lessons that can inform DOD’s pursuit of innovation. Perhaps expanding who DOD turns to for lessons on innovating is what’s been missing.

Margaux Hoar has been providing advice and insight to DOD leaders for nearly 20 years. She is an advocate for new ways of thinking and is an innovator herself. She led a study that informed the stand-up of the United States Space Force and drove strategic changes at Amazon Web Services. The opinions expressed here are her own.

Robyn M. Bolton is an expert in corporate innovation with over 20 years experience. Formerly at P&G, she was on the team that developed and launched Swiffer and Swiffer WetJet. Robyn is a Harvard Business School graduate and alumna of The Boston Consulting Group and Innosight, Clayton Christensen’s strategy and innovation consultancy. She is the founder of MileZero, an innovation advisory firm. The opinions expressed here are her own.

defenseone.com · by Margaux Hoar

10. Army aims to make 1 million artillery shells a year, starting in fiscal 2025

The next war we will need to be able to build the iron mountain (or multiple ones). Which of course means we have to protect them. Just in time logistics will not be a feasible procedure.

Army aims to make 1 million artillery shells a year, starting in fiscal 2025

New manufacturing techniques helping U.S. ramp up production of critical munition need.

defenseone.com

Army aims to make 1 million artillery shells a year, starting in fiscal 2025 - Defense One

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By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor, Defense One

August 7, 2023

New manufacturing techniques are moving the Army toward its goal of producing 85,000 155mm artillery shells per month, starting in fiscal 2025, the assistant Army secretary for acquisition said Monday.

The push is meant to help Ukraine keep up the pace of its counteroffensive and to replenish depleted U.S. stockpiles and even help other countries build up their own supplies after the Ukraine war highlighted the importance of the munition in large-scale conflict.

“Between supporting Ukraine, replenishing ourselves and supporting other countries, allies, we expect to use that capacity. That’s the overall reason we’re doing it,” Doug Bush told reporters.

“You do the math on the [roughly] 80,000-a-month. I mean, that’s a million a year,” he said.

The United States isn’t the only country working to supply Ukraine with 155mm shells. But as Ukraine battles a much larger force, one now dug in behind heavily fortified lines of defense in the country’s east, its artillery units are burning through the munition faster than it is being replaced. Ukrainian gunners are also wearing out the firing tubes on their howitzers at a rate never before seen, which has forced the United States to send cluster munitions as a “bridging capability,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in July.

Artillery shells are less complicated than many weapons developed for or consumed in the conflict, but the United States and other allies have struggled to increase production capacity. The challenges start with creating new lines to make the munitions’ metal components, Bush said.

“Then you also have to be investing in additional—what’s referred to as load assemble pack capacity, which is filling the shells with explosives so they now become functional weapons. That capacity expansion is also underway at at least two locations. And then the final piece is bringing in additional production, either overseas or domestically, for the charges that go behind the shell…for the propellant that actually shoots that out of the cannon. Those require additional production of the explosives that goes in those propellant materials, called triple base propellant. So all of those things do have to come together…I think we’re getting the resources, getting on contract and just working really closely every day with our industry partners to help them knock down barriers to get there,” he said.

Bush said new computer-assisted manufacturing techniques are helping to reduce complexity and time in manufacturing the new shells. For instance, shell production in the past required workers to heat metal and then just bang it on it to fold it into the proper shape. New techniques use rotary machines to produce casings faster with less energy and heat.

“Those things have been enabled by just more precise computer controlled equipment. So this is advanced manufacturing coming to artillery shell production” to add precision and consistency, he said.

The United States will also be increasing production of more sophisticated munitions that have proven their worth on Ukrainian battlefields. Among them is the Army’s month-old LASSO, for Low Altitude Stalking and Strike Ordnance, which are drones that loiter in the air and crash into their target once detected..

“On the UAS side, I think in some cases, yes, what we’re sending to Ukraine is also going to fit into our future plans. So we are initiating a new program or to provide infantry units primarily with a loitering attack munition,” Bush said.

NEXT STORY: AI-powered health monitors may boost readiness, Army’s next top enlisted leader says

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11. Long-Distance Resistance - China Media Project

Some important food for thought here. Of course every situation is unique but I think we should be observing for potential lessons.

Excerpts:

The government’s concern with “long-distance resistance” was underscored earlier in the month by the arrest warrants and bounties issued on the heads of eight prominent overseas activists from Hong Kong, including the territory’s youngest elected lawmaker Nathan Law. Family of the “Hong Kong Eight” have since been taken in by police for questioning, and another five people have been arrested for running a shopping app accused of aiding Law, a resident of the UK since 2020.

Zhang said he has been vindicated by the emergence of these new forms of resistance: he predicted, when the national security law was first promulgated, that the opposition would not simply “go quiet and go into hiding.” On the contrary, they would “study the law thoroughly” and become “more and more sophisticated” in how they express dissent.

Despite continuous invocations from top leadership in Hong Kong, “soft resistance” remains poorly defined. But far from a bug, this ambiguity is its main feature: it can be used to describe any form of disagreement with the government no matter how mild or, even in the current hostile environment, lawful it may be. “Long-distance resistance” is similarly vague — Zhang at one point gestures merely to “insufficiently patriotic behavior” (不夠愛國的行為) — but it is ultimately more concerned with where than what.

Long-Distance Resistance - China Media Project

遠對抗

AUG 8, 2023 | RYAN HO KILPATRICKThe latest bogeyman invoked by pro-establishment thought-leaders in Hong Kong, “long-distance resistance” refers to any activism carried out by Hong Kong people beyond the city’s borders — framing what was once normal political engagement as an imminent national security threat.

chinamediaproject.org

Hong Kong has moved “from chaos to order” under the national security law imposed by Beijing in 2020, according to the city’s leaders. The pro-democracy protests that brought millions to the streets have been quashed; critical media outlets have been silenced; opposition politicians have all been jailed, forced into exile, or barred from contesting office.

Yet enemies of the state only seem to multiply.

This mix of triumphalism and paranoia among Hong Kong’s Beijing-backed elites demands the creation of new threats to justify a crackdown with no end in sight. Zhang Zhigang, a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and head of the One Country Two Systems Research Institute, has identified its latest target: “long-distance resistance” (遠對抗), a companion to the now frequently invoked threat of “soft resistance” (軟對抗).

Soft Resistance

In a July 27 editorial for Hong Kong’s Ming Pao newspaper, Zhang wrote that “soft resistance” is like an amoeba; “long-distance resistance” is just one “genetic variation” thereof. Many self-exiled activists, he says, are continuing to oppose the government from their new bases abroad, beyond the reach of national security police.

The government’s concern with “long-distance resistance” was underscored earlier in the month by the arrest warrants and bounties issued on the heads of eight prominent overseas activists from Hong Kong, including the territory’s youngest elected lawmaker Nathan Law. Family of the “Hong Kong Eight” have since been taken in by police for questioning, and another five people have been arrested for running a shopping app accused of aiding Law, a resident of the UK since 2020.

Zhang said he has been vindicated by the emergence of these new forms of resistance: he predicted, when the national security law was first promulgated, that the opposition would not simply “go quiet and go into hiding.” On the contrary, they would “study the law thoroughly” and become “more and more sophisticated” in how they express dissent.

Despite continuous invocations from top leadership in Hong Kong, “soft resistance” remains poorly defined. But far from a bug, this ambiguity is its main feature: it can be used to describe any form of disagreement with the government no matter how mild or, even in the current hostile environment, lawful it may be. “Long-distance resistance” is similarly vague — Zhang at one point gestures merely to “insufficiently patriotic behavior” (不夠愛國的行為) — but it is ultimately more concerned with where than what.

In an article in August 2023 for Think Hong Kong, Chan Hoi-man, a prominent pro-establishment commentator and member of the Beijing-based Chinese Association of Hong Kong & Macao Studies, characterized the national security law’s inability to neutralize critics abroad as a legal “loophole” waiting to be plugged. Writing that amendments to the city’s Crimes Ordinance regarding seditious intent do not specify their extraterritoriality in all provisions, he argues that supplementary local legislation “could clarify that all provisions have extraterritorial effects.”

Article 23 demonstration on July 1, 2003.

In Hong Kong, talk of a locally legislated security law is a reference to Article 23 of the Basic Law, the mini-constitution that came into effect with the 1997 transfer to Chinese sovereignty. This commits local authorities to pass their own national security legislation — a move hitherto stalled due to overwhelming public resistance. When then-Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa attempted to pass a security law under Article 23 in 2003, half a million Hongkongers rallied against it. It was the biggest protest the Special Administrative Region had ever seen, and it forced the government to shelve the bill indefinitely.

But according to the new, official version of events, this historic display of people power was actually a foreign plot to force a “color revolution” on the city. In a video published on Facebook one day before Chan’s article, the city’s security chief Chris Tang said the 2003 march was a test run of Hong Kong opposition “cultivated” by foreign forces to endanger national security — a dramatic revision of Tung Chee-hwa’s reaction at the time, when he said he “fully understood” and even shared the human rights concerns of “fellow Hong Kong citizens” who joined the rally.

Secretary for Security Chris Tang’s video uploaded on August 2, 2023.

All this adds to the steady, growing drumbeat of rhetoric under Chief Executive John Lee backing a revival of Article 23 to plug every “loophole” left by the already wide-ranging national security law and further intensify the government’s crackdown. In his Ming Pao piece, Zhang Zhigang writes that “the old ways cannot be relied upon” to deal with the threat of “long-distance resistance.” He suggests that constantly widening the scope of the national security law is “exactly what the opposition wants” since it makes the case for them that the law is simply a bludgeon to crush any and all dissent.

Zhang’s solution, however, is even more unsettling: the creation of a social, political, and educational environment in which the national security law itself is rarely needed since critical thoughts about “changing the way the power structure in Hong Kong is formed” are neutralized in their infancy — before they can coalesce into competing schools of thought, much less political action.

Ryan Ho Kilpatrick

CMP Managing Editor

chinamediaproject.org

12. US Navy sailor's mom encouraged him to pass military details to China, prosecutor says

The old, "my mother told me to do it" excuse.

US Navy sailor's mom encouraged him to pass military details to China, prosecutor says

AP · August 9, 2023

SAN DIEGO (AP) — The mother of a U.S. Navy sailor charged with providing sensitive military information to China encouraged him to cooperate with a Chinese intelligence officer, telling her son it might help him get a job with the Chinese government someday, the prosecution said Tuesday.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Fred Sheppard made the accusation at a hearing in federal court in San Diego in urging the judge not to release Jinchao Wei, who was arrested last week on a rarely used espionage charge.

Prosecutors did not name the woman in court. As a result of that The Associated Press could not try to find her or people who could comment on her behalf.

Wei is one of two sailors based in California accused of providing sensitive military information to China — including details on wartime exercises, naval operations and critical technical material. Prosecutors have not said whether the two were courted or paid by the same Chinese intelligence officer as part of a larger scheme.

The Justice Department charged Wei, 22, under a Espionage Act statute that makes it a crime to gather or deliver information to aid a foreign government.

Both sailors have pleaded not guilty.

Prosecutors have said Wei, who was born in China, was first approached by a Chinese intelligence officer in February 2022 while he was applying to become a naturalized U.S. citizen, and admitted to the officer that he knew the arrangement could affect his application. Even so, prosecutors say he provided the officer detailed information on the weapons systems and aircraft aboard the Essex and other amphibious assault ships that act as small aircraft carriers.

In arguing against his release, Sheppard told the court on Tuesday that when Wei went home for Christmas to see his mother, who lives in Wisconsin, she was aware of her son’s arrangement. She also encouraged him to keep helping the Chinese intelligence officer because it might get him a job someday with China’s Communist party after he leaves the U.S. Navy, Sheppard said.

The AP asked Wei’s defense attorney Jason Conforti in an email if he could speak on behalf of Wei’s mother and provide a response to the prosecution’s allegations. The AP also asked if he could provide contact information for her. The attorney did not immediately respond to the email.

Sheppard told the court that the intelligence officer told Wei that he and the Chinese government were willing to fly him and his mother to China to meet them in person, and that Wei searched online for flights to China this spring.

Sheppard said the officer also told Wei to buy a computer and phone to pass the information, and that if Wei provided a receipt, the Chinese government would reimburse him for the expenses.

Conforti told the court that Wei is not a danger to the community and no longer has access to any military information.

Sheppard countered that Wei’s actions put thousands of sailors at risk by revealing sensitive information on Navy ships.

The judge ruled to keep him in federal custody without bond.

The indictment alleges Wei included as many as 50 manuals containing technical and mechanical data about Navy ships as well as details about the number and training of Marines during an upcoming exercise.

Sheppard said Wei has made $10,000 to $15,000 in the past year from the arrangement. If convicted, he could face up to life in prison.

The Justice Department also charged sailor Wenheng Zhao, 26, based at Naval Base Ventura County, north of Los Angeles, with conspiring to collect nearly $15,000 in bribes from a Chinese intelligence officer in exchange for information, photos and videos involving Navy exercises, operations and facilities between August 2021 through at least this May.

The information included plans for a large-scale U.S. military exercise in the Indo-Pacific region, which detailed the location and timing of naval force movements.

AP · August 9, 2023

13. The Ukraine War Has Found the Machinery of Western Governments Wanting

Mostly a critique of the UK but lessons for us all.

Conclusion:

It would be easy to blame these problems on politicians. Politicians always like to preserve decision-making space. But it is also the case that civil servants have given the illusion of choice long beyond the point at which decisions have to be made. Culturally, Western governments have spent decades writing long-term strategies and managing small-scale, short-term crises like terrorist attacks. It appears the institutional memory of how to cohere the operational level of war has atrophied. This malady is correctable, but only if we can acknowledge that there is a problem to be addressed.

The Ukraine War Has Found the Machinery of Western Governments Wanting

While the provision of Western support to Ukraine has seen some notable successes, the slow pace of decision-making has made it more difficult to capitalise on Russian weaknesses.

Dr Jack Watling

Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare

Military Sciences

rusi.org

There is a triumphalism to Western governments’ messaging over the war in Ukraine. As Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin told the UK’s House of Commons Defence Committee, Russia has expended about half of its combat power over the past 18 months, a result of Ukrainian bravery and the steady supply of arms by Ukraine’s international partners. US and UK intelligence successes in providing early warning of Russia’s intentions, combined with the unity and expansion of NATO, all contribute to a sense that Western defence establishments are not only doing what is right, but doing it well.

The upbeat narrative is partly justified. But the war in Ukraine has also highlighted significant deficiencies in the machinery of government across NATO capitals, and it is vital that these are corrected to ensure the readiness of the Alliance for future threats. The most glaring deficiency is the inability of Ukraine’s partners to appreciate the lead times between decisions and their desired effects.

This deficiency is being demonstrated at great cost in Ukraine’s current offensive. That Ukraine would need to be on the offensive by late 2022 was already acknowledged in assessments as early as April of that year. The capability requirements for such operations were becoming apparent from July, and reports to Western capitals were articulating clear training, equipment and support needs from September. Despite the requirements being known and understood, the decision to provide this support was not taken until January 2023, with the implementation of these decisions still in the process of being carried out.

Had the decision to equip and train Ukrainian forces been taken and implemented when the requirements were identified in the autumn, Ukraine would have had a much easier task in reclaiming its territory

The delay between knowing what was needed and agreeing to do it has proven very costly. The disarray among Russian forces in the winter of 2022–3 following a chaotic mobilisation and a lack of preparedness for winter warfare left them vulnerable early in 2023. Luckily for Ukraine and its partners, this weakness was extended by the stupidity of General Valery Gerasimov, who embarked upon an ill-conceived series of offensive operations using under-trained troops throughout February, slowing the preparation of Russian defences.

The decision to provide equipment for offensive operations in mid-January 2023, however, meant that it did not start arriving until February and March. Ukrainian units then had two months of training to understand how to operate the equipment, which is a very short period. From March onwards, Russian defences in the south went from being nascent to formidable, as the Ukrainians were not on the attack and Russian forces were free to improve their fortifications. Ukraine was therefore forced to go on the offensive before its units were fully prepared, because not doing so would have seen the task exceed the capabilities of the available forces. Had the decision to equip and train Ukrainian forces been taken and implemented when the requirements were identified in the autumn, Ukraine would have had a much easier task in reclaiming its territory.

Russian incompetence in launching offensive operations in January 2023 saved Ukraine’s allies from the full consequences of their indecision. The Ukrainian offensive may yet succeed. But the price has risen steeply because of Western lethargy. If this was a one-off example, it might be seen as a consequence of complex political factors. But this lethargy is a feature and not a bug. Indicators and warnings that Ukraine would be attacked were reaching Western capitals from July 2021, with confidence hardening from September. By December the US and UK intelligence communities were sufficiently confident to make their conclusions public, but it was not until January 2022 that serious efforts were made to try to equip Ukraine, by which time the range of systems that could be provided with enough time left to offer training on them was narrow.

For all the UK’s boasting of its ‘Fusion Doctrine’ and cross-government working, the war in Ukraine has seen more interdepartmental feuding than collaboration across Whitehall

The failure to recognise decision points risks causing Ukraine serious problems in 2024 also. The massive consumption of ammunition from deficient NATO stockpiles was evident from June 2022. Across the board, assessments were clear that Western capitals needed to expand production of munitions and key spare parts like barrels. Here, however, the urgency felt in defence ministries has not been recognised across government. In the UK, for instance, while the Ministry of Defence has had the power to purchase materiel from the international market, sending UK money abroad and kicking the impending shortfall down the road, there has been little cross-government strategy on expanding production.

The UK has no barrel machine, for example. Setting one up could create skilled forging jobs, contributing to the government’s ‘levelling up’ agenda. But no such forward thinking has taken place. Now the lead time to rectify these deficiencies risks being shorter than the remaining available munition stocks. For all the UK’s boasting of its ‘Fusion Doctrine’ and cross-government working, the war in Ukraine has seen more interdepartmental feuding than collaboration across Whitehall.

It would be easy to blame these problems on politicians. Politicians always like to preserve decision-making space. But it is also the case that civil servants have given the illusion of choice long beyond the point at which decisions have to be made. Culturally, Western governments have spent decades writing long-term strategies and managing small-scale, short-term crises like terrorist attacks. It appears the institutional memory of how to cohere the operational level of war has atrophied. This malady is correctable, but only if we can acknowledge that there is a problem to be addressed.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

Have an idea for a Commentary you’d like to write for us? Send a short pitch to commentaries@rusi.org and we’ll get back to you if it fits into our research interests. Full guidelines for contributors can be found here.

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14. U.S.-Made Cluster Munitions Fuel Ukrainian Counteroffensive

DPICM.

Graphics and video at the link.

U.S.-Made Cluster Munitions Fuel Ukrainian Counteroffensive

Bombs are destroying Russian trenches and artillery systems in an area where Kyiv’s troops had struggled to advance

By Ian Lovett and Nikita Nikolaienko

Aug. 8, 2023 7:23 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-made-cluster-munitions-fuel-ukrainian-counteroffensive-c45c305f?

ZAPORIZHZHIA, Ukraine—Newly delivered, American-made cluster munitions have given fresh impetus to Ukraine’s campaign to retake territory captured by Russia, after weeks of little progress.

Ukrainian soldiers say they have used the cluster bombs—which release dozens of smaller bomblets and can cause devastation over a broader area than ordinary artillery shells—to hit concentrations of Russian infantry, groups of vehicles and other targets, clearing the way for ground advances.

Kyiv’s counteroffensive operations have struggled in the face of wide minefields and Moscow’s superior air power, which have impeded large-scale efforts to use Western-supplied tanks and armored vehicles to reach and punch through lines of entrenched Russian forces.

While the cluster bombs alone won’t tilt the battlefield balance of power decisively in Ukraine’s favor, soldiers say they have helped them retake Russian positions that they had struggled to reach.

The munitions have been coupled with a change in tactics, which has allowed Ukrainian troops to advance to within striking distance of the main Russian defensive lines in some places. That progress has come with substantial casualties.

US Army plans to grow Patriot missile defense force

Defense News · by Jen Judson · August 8, 2023

HUNTSVILLE, Ala. — The U.S. Army will grow its Patriot air and missile defense force structure, the head of Space and Missile Defense Command told reporters in an Aug. 8 briefing.

“The Army senior leaders — from the secretary [to] the chief — they recognize the demands on the Patriot force,” Lt. Gen. Daniel Karbler said at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium. “We are addressing that through increasing our Patriot units that are out there.”

Karbler would not specifically say how many more Patriot units the Army plans to field, noting he did not want to get ahead of Army senior leadership. “We have a requirement to grow Patriot force structure; we will grow Patriot force structure,” he said.

Congress requested the Army report on whether it needs more Patriot batteries in the fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act. The Army has 15 Patriot battalions across the active force with funding authorized to build one more.

The demands on the Army’s air defense force has been a longtime issue for the service. Patriot units have traditionally held the record for the highest operational tempos across the service for more than a decade, with deployment times that have sometimes gone above the traditional six- to nine-month rotations.

Even though the service wants to grow air defense units, it is facing headwinds when it comes to recruiting. “We’re going to have the same accessions and recruiting challenges that the rest of the Army, the rest of the services, are facing,” Karbler said. “The Army can throw certain levers to help incentivize a young specialist to come into the Army and come into the air defense branch.”

The Army has received some help including pay incentives and trying to stick to dwell restrictions, but the challenge is recruiting air defenders, Karbler told Defense News last year at the same conference.

One way to recruit air defenders, Karbler said this year, is to “see if there’s opportunities for soldiers who want to re-enlist to enlist, to come into the Patriot force. I can’t just snap my fingers today and make a sergeant, but I can offer a re-enlistment incentive to a young specialist to switch over to air defense.”

Because of these challenges, while the Army will grow Patriot force structure, “we are not going to grow as fast as we want to in terms of meeting some of the tempo challenges that we have here now.”

But, he added, “it’s also not just a Patriot challenge, right? Integrated air and missile defense is a joint endeavor, and so between our joint partners and our allied partners, everybody has contributed to support air and missile defense globally.”

About Jen Judson

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

16. A Missile Strikes the Heart of a Ukrainian City — and Then Another

A Missile Strikes the Heart of a Ukrainian City — and Then Another

By Gaëlle Girbes and Marc Santora

Reporting from Pokrovsk and Kyiv, Ukraine

Aug. 8, 2023

The New York Times · by Marc Santora · August 9, 2023

Ukrainians say the explosions 37 minutes apart in Pokrovsk, which killed at least nine people and injured 82 others, were a “double tap” intended to kill rescuers responding to the first strike.

The aftermath Tuesday morning of Russian shelling in Pokrovsk, a small city in eastern Ukraine, twice in quick succession on Monday, that killed at least nine people.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Aug. 8, 2023

In the center of a small Ukrainian city, rescuers shrouded in smoke and dust dug through what remained of buildings and bodies on Tuesday, looking for survivors after a pair of missile strikes that President Volodymyr Zelensky said had killed at least nine people and wounded 82 others.

Two Russian missiles hit the city center of Pokrovsk, in the Donetsk region, just 37 minutes apart and in nearly the same location on Monday evening. They seriously damaged at least 12 multistory buildings, including a hotel that lay in ruins and a five-floor apartment block with its top floor partly sheared away and its windows blasted out.

Pools of blood in the rubble were still wet on Tuesday, human flesh littered the wreckage, and the smell of smoldering fires hung in the air. On the ground floor of the apartment building, Corleone’s, an Italian restaurant that was popular with volunteers and journalists traveling to the front, was destroyed. Cafes, other businesses and a prosecutor’s office were damaged, and a playground was covered with debris.

Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed that its forces had hit a command post of Ukrainian troops in Pokrovsk, according to the Russian state news agency Tass, which referred to the city by its Soviet-era name, Krasnoarmeysk — Russian for “Red Army town.”

The attacks killed at least nine people and wounded 82 others, including 38 emergency service workers.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Ukrainian officials rejected the assertion. “Of course this claim by Russia’s deceitful propaganda has no basis in reality,” Serhii Cherevatyi, a spokesman for Ukraine’s forces in the east, told Ukrainian Pravda.

Ukrainians said the explosions at 7:15 and 7:52 p.m. Monday local time in Pokrovsk appeared to be a “double-tap attack,” hitting the same target twice, with the second strike maximizing casualties among rescuers and onlookers responding to the first one. That is a tactic Russian forces have used before in Ukraine and Syria.

“This is a deliberate decision of the terrorists to cause the greatest pain and damage,” Mr. Zelensky said on Tuesday in his nightly video address.

One of the confirmed dead and 38 of the injured were emergency workers, officials said. The toll would have been higher, said Pavlo Kyrylenko, head of the regional administration, if the authorities had not received a warning about 10 minutes before the second strike and moved many people away. (The Ukrainian air defenses often detect launches or incoming missiles.)

“If there had been a crowd of people and no additional measures had been taken literally in 10 minutes, the consequences would have been much worse,” he said on national television.

Assessing the damage in Pokrovsk.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

The emergency worker killed, Andrii Omelchenko, 52, was the deputy chief of the State Emergency Service for the region.

The search for survivors continued after nightfall, at times lighted only by the fires burning in the ruins. It was suspended overnight because of the threat of additional attacks, according to Ihor Klymenko, Ukraine’s minister of internal affairs.

By late Tuesday, 122 tons of rubble had been hauled away, the emergency service said.

Also on Monday evening, Russian forces bombed a village in the Kharkiv region in the country’s northeast, killing two civilians and wounding nine others, according to Oleg Sinegubov, the head of the regional administration. That, too, was a double-tap strike, he said, and four of those injured were emergency workers.

The double strike in Pokrovsk, which Ukrainian officials said was made with Iskander short-range ballistic missiles, was devastating even for residents who had largely grown accustomed to living within 30 miles of the front lines.

Stunned residents gathered outside their ruined homes, waiting to survey the damage and hoping to salvage what they could.

The Russian strikes hit the center of Pokrovsk twice on Monday evening, 37 minutes apart, devastating a hotel and other buildings.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

One woman begged to get up to her third-floor apartment, where her cat was trapped on the balcony. The building was unstable, she was told. Eventually, firefighters were able to reach the cat and return it to her.

The devastation at Corleone’s was reminiscent of a Russian missile strike in June on a popular pizza restaurant in Kramatorsk, to the northeast, that killed 11 people, including 14-year-old twin sisters, and wounded 61.

Since invading last year, Russian forces have regularly barraged not only civilian infrastructure that the Kremlin calls legitimate military targets, but also civilian sites with no relationship to the war effort, and often far from the battlefield.

That has continued even as Ukraine has waged a slow-moving counteroffensive in the south and east, forcing the Russians to concentrate more of their energies there. The Ukrainian forces have been bolstered by extensive training and weaponry from the West, and by conscription that has swelled its military.

That military expansion has been a source of corruption that Kyiv is trying to tackle, Ukraine’s State Bureau of Investigation said on Tuesday, announcing that it had opened 112 cases against enlistment officers since the invasion almost a year and a half ago, including 10 in the past week.

Last week, the bureau detained the head of the Kyiv District Territorial Center for Recruitment and Social Support, whom it did not name, accusing the official of taking part in a large-scale scheme to produce fictitious documents claiming that draft-age men were unfit to serve and allowing them to leave the country — for a bribe of $10,000 apiece.

Similarly, the bureau detained the head of one of Kyiv’s military administration departments, also unnamed publicly, accusing him of drawing comparable documents for three men. Men between the ages of 18 and 60 have not been allowed to leave the country since the invasion, with narrow exceptions, but the State Border Guard says some are arrested every day for trying.

Some Western officials have voiced doubts about pouring money into Ukraine, a country that has long been notorious for official corruption. Mr. Zelensky has worked at sending the message that he is meeting the problem head-on.

Gaëlle Girbes reported from Pokrovsk, Ukraine, and Marc Santora from Kyiv, Ukraine. Victoria Kim contributed reporting from Seoul, and Gaya Gupta and Anushka Patil from New York.

Marc Santora has been reporting from Ukraine since the beginning of the war with Russia. He was previously based in London as an international news editor focused on breaking news events and earlier the bureau chief for East and Central Europe, based in Warsaw. He has also reported extensively from Iraq and Africa. More about Marc Santora

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 7 of the New York edition with the headline: In the Heart of a City, Devastated by One Missile, and Then Another

The New York Times · by Marc Santora · August 9, 2023

17. Biden says he plans to travel to Vietnam 'shortly'

Biden says he plans to travel to Vietnam 'shortly' | CNN Politics

CNN · by Donald Judd · August 9, 2023

CNN —

President Joe Biden on Tuesday said that he plans to soon visit Vietnam in an effort “to change our relationship,” with the Southeast Asian nation.

“I’m going to be going to Vietnam shortly, because Vietnam wants to change our relationship and become a partner,” he said, according to press pool reports from a campaign reception.

Biden’s off-camera remarks in Albuquerque, New Mexico, come as his administration is seeking to counter China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region.

CNN has asked the White House for details on Biden’s remarks previewing travel to Vietnam.

Last year, Biden, along with leaders from Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) during a visit to Tokyo.

The announcement had marked one of the centerpieces of Biden’s visit to the continent.

CNN · by Donald Judd · August 9, 2023

18. The Problem with Designating the Wagner Group as a Terrorist Organization

Excerpts:

Further, designating Wagner would complicate ways we deal with our partners, especially in Africa. There is a technical aspect that would make it difficult for us to conduct business with African regimes that have interacted with Wagner if the group were to be designated as a terrorist organization. More importantly, there is a symbolic aspect of labeling a group that came in as an alternative to Western actors as a terrorist organization. In places like Mali or Central African Republic, governments invited Wagner in the wake of French disengagement, which was accompanied by a wave of anti-French and anticolonial sentiments. Throwing a terrorist designation into the mix would further complicate our foreign policy efforts in Africa.

Finally, the United States has already designated Wagner as a transnational criminal organization, a much more appropriate designation. The US Treasury Department has also successfully sanctioned Prigozhin and many of his Wagner partners. There are intelligence and information operations that can be conducted to undermine the group’s effectiveness and influence without designating it a terrorist organization. These are exactly the efforts we should continue with to counter an irregular warfare tool of the Russian government instead of relying on a highly visible but problematic terrorist designation.

The Problem with Designating the Wagner Group as a Terrorist Organization - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Elena Pokalova · August 9, 2023

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Recently, a UK report on Russia’s Wagner Group has once again restarted calls for the UK government to designate Wagner as a terrorist organization. This follows the Lithuanian parliament’s unanimous proclamation of the Wagner Group as a terrorist organization in March and, a month later, the French parliament’s unanimous adoption of a nonbinding resolution calling on the EU to designate Wagner as a terrorist organization. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed such initiatives, urging that “every manifestation of terrorism must be destroyed, and every terrorist must be convicted.” Given the brazen atrocities Wagner has committed in Ukraine and elsewhere, the calls to further sanction the group are definitely understandable. However, the Wagner Group hardly qualifies as a terrorist organization. Rather, it is the Kremlin’s quasi-state agent of influence and should be treated as such. Not all entities that commit atrocities and crimes against humanity are terrorist groups and designating them would be a dangerous slippery slope.

First of all, terrorist organizations engage in acts of violence for a political purpose. They are nonstate actors that often challenge state legitimacy and use terrorist attacks as an asymmetric means to fight against the usually militarily superior government forces. For example, al-Qaeda is a transnational nonstate organization that treats the United States as its main enemy and uses terrorist violence in the name of a declared goal to expel the US presence from Muslim lands. The Islamic State in turn is more focused on the “near enemy”—namely, what it considers to be apostate regimes in the Muslim world—and has used terrorist violence to establish and protect its version of the Islamic caliphate in place of such regimes. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, another group designated as a foreign terrorist organization, has used terrorism to challenge the Sinhala rule in Sri Lanka with the objective to establish an independent Tamil state.

The Wagner Group, on the other hand, does not pursue a coherent political agenda of its own. Its operations have ranged from security assistance to political advising to military action, all of which have been tailored to various objectives the Kremlin sets out, not those determined by the group itself. For example, in Ukraine Wagner was clandestinely involved in the takeover of Crimea before moving to support Russia’s activities in the Donbas. The Group’s head, Yevgeny Prigozhin, eventually acknowledged that his Wagner Group of “Russian patriots” was active in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics to protect Russia’s interests as early as 2014. In Syria, Wagner deployed to support the regime of Bashar al-Assad while the Russian government denied any responsibility over what it characterized as private citizens who chose to fight in foreign countries. In Sudan, Wagner arrived to prop up the regime of Omar al-Bashir, and in Mali Wagner came in the wake of the French withdrawal to provide counterterrorist assistance. The group’s objectives have varied based on location, reflecting Moscow’s geostrategic interests in each specific place. There is very little evidence that in any of these places the Wagner Group has pursued a political agenda separate from that of the Kremlin. It has served as a shadowy structure carrying out the Kremlin’s foreign policy rather than a nonstate organization that uses terrorism for political ends.

Second, terrorist organizations thrive on publicity. In fact, the very use of terrorist attacks is meant to draw public attention to the political agenda of the organization and to provoke governments to react and sometimes overreact to such displays of violence. Iconically, the world’s reaction to September 11 was exactly what al-Qaeda aimed for with this high-profile terrorist attack meant to reach worldwide audiences. Some terrorist organizations try to legitimize their displays of violence through claiming minimal civilian casualties—as the Irish Republican Army did by telephoning warnings before some of its bomb attacks. Others, like the Islamic State, make their terrorist attacks as gory as possible and aim to kill maximum numbers of “infidels.” Inevitably, though, as Brian Jenkins famously put it, all terrorist organizations “want a lot of people watching.” Terrorist organizations claim attacks through their social media channels, praise suicide bombers in their official publications, and often use past terrorist attacks in their recruitment propaganda to draw in new members.

In contrast, the Wagner Group was conceived as a secretive organization that has largely operated outside the public purview up until 2022. Prigozhin worked with Russia’s Ministry of Defense to design Wagner as a quasi-state agent of influence to covertly advance Russia’s foreign policy objectives while allowing for plausible deniability for the Russian government. As a result, much of Wagner’s work has been shrouded in secrecy with no claims of attacks or declarations of ownership. Up to 2022 Prigozhin consistently denied connections to the group and until 2023 Wagner did not officially exist on paper. Prigozhin has sued Bellingcat founder Eliot Higgins for libel for publicizing Wagner’s activities. Three Russian journalists investigating Wagner’s involvement in the Central African Republic were mysteriously murdered. Thus, for almost a decade Wagner has eschewed taking responsibility for its actions and has shied away from claiming any political objectives.

Only recently did Yevgeny Prigozhin emerge from the shadows. After the 2022 invasion of Ukraine Prigozhin released public videos that featured him recruiting inmates in Russian prisons to go fight in Ukraine. More coverage followed with Wagner’s onslaught on Ukrainian towns like Soledar and Bakhmut. But such publicity was not to claim Wagner’s actions and connect the group to some broader political goal. Instead, Prigozhin has been using Wagner as his trump card in a bid for political influence. Touting Wagner as his own private force, Prigozhin has been able to make some inflammatory statements about Russia’s Ministry of Defense and has even dared criticize President Vladimir Putin himself. He has boldly used the group to demonstrate his own power. In the group’s recent mutiny attempt, Prigozhin positioned Wagner as his personal fighting force capable of competing with Russia’s military, which is different from a terrorist organization fighting for a political ideology.

Which brings us to the third difference—the presence of ideological motivation in terrorist recruitment. Terrorist organizations attract all sorts of members, including those who seek opportunities for easy enrichment. However, most members of terrorist groups do not join for money. For example, thousands of individuals from all over the world headed to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State because they felt it was their sense of duty to migrate to the caliphate, not because they wanted to get paid. In fact, many of them raised their own funds to travel and brought money for the organization.

This is not the case with Wagner. Wagner members do not join for ideological reasons. They join for money. Wagner pays salaries that are much higher than the average Russian salary of around $555 per month. The core of the group was formed by former military and GRU (Russia’s military intelligence) officers who joined Wagner for better salaries. Recruits for Ukraine in 2014–2015 received 80,000 rubles (around $836) and contractors who went to Syria got 150,000 rubles per month (around $1,567). Starting in 2022, Wagner’s vacancy announcements promised to pay 240,000 rubles a month (around $2,507). The newest, and the most numerous, wave of Wagner recruits comes from prisons. But again, official pardon and money have been the motivating factors for prisoners to join, not ideological radicalization common in terrorist recruitment in detention facilities. Wagner membership is a job, not an ideological calling.

The lack of a coherent political agenda independent from the Russian state, the secretive nature of its violence, and its recruitment based on monetary contracts explain why Wagner is not a terrorist organization. A natural next question is: Do these differences matter? If the Wagner Group commits atrocities, why shouldn’t we designate it a terrorist organization anyway?

The use of terrorist designations for entities that do not qualify is a dangerous slippery slope. We have already seen how some countries have used counterterrorist legislation to delegitimize certain groups. Notoriously, Turkey has used its counterterrorist provisions to jail hundreds of oppositional journalists. China has persecuted its Uyghur population under the guise of a terrorist threat. Russia has liberally applied the terrorist label to critics of its war in Ukraine. In order to discourage such misapplications of counterterrorist provisions we need to remain consistent about our own application of the terrorist label.

Further, designating Wagner would complicate ways we deal with our partners, especially in Africa. There is a technical aspect that would make it difficult for us to conduct business with African regimes that have interacted with Wagner if the group were to be designated as a terrorist organization. More importantly, there is a symbolic aspect of labeling a group that came in as an alternative to Western actors as a terrorist organization. In places like Mali or Central African Republic, governments invited Wagner in the wake of French disengagement, which was accompanied by a wave of anti-French and anticolonial sentiments. Throwing a terrorist designation into the mix would further complicate our foreign policy efforts in Africa.

Finally, the United States has already designated Wagner as a transnational criminal organization, a much more appropriate designation. The US Treasury Department has also successfully sanctioned Prigozhin and many of his Wagner partners. There are intelligence and information operations that can be conducted to undermine the group’s effectiveness and influence without designating it a terrorist organization. These are exactly the efforts we should continue with to counter an irregular warfare tool of the Russian government instead of relying on a highly visible but problematic terrorist designation.

Elena Pokalova is a professor at the National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs and the author of “The Wagner Group in Africa: Russia’s Quasi-State Agent of Influence,” published in July 2023 in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Information agency BelTA, via Wikimedia Commons

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Elena Pokalova · August 9, 2023

19. Taiwan’s Vast Surveillance Infrastructure: An Achilles’ Heel if China Invades

As an aside this is from an Infantry 2LT on a Fulbright to Taiwan studying in graduate school at Chengchi University.

Will the talent management (or industrial personnel management) system allow his career to be managed so that he becomes a "China hand" with multiple tours in INDOPACOM? Will the Army and DOD/Joint Force be able to exploit his education (and I assume) his Mandarin language skills?

Excerpts:

Others might contend that even without the existing surveillance infrastructure, Chinese technological expertise and hardware would enable the CCP to independently manufacture a surveillance apparatus by bringing thousands of cameras and supporting equipment along with invading forces. However, the key to preventing an insurgency from forming would be the rapidity with which the CCP could establish this system. Taiwan’s surveillance infrastructure has been built up over years in a permissive environment. Creating a surveillance system of similar scale to Taiwan’s preexisting infrastructure would require costly manpower, manpower which might not be available or used for other purposes, and one that might be stymied by protests, rebellion, or a nascent insurgency. Far easier would be to use the existing system in place that has already been established in Taiwan.

Despite the government’s best efforts to convince people of the benefits of the system—by highlighting the impact on crime, for instance—the potential negatives severely outweigh the benefits should an invasion occur. These steps don’t necessarily have to result in the dismantling of cameras. Even simply removing cameras that have facial recognition technology or dispersing centralized camera nodes would make it more difficult for the CCP to reappropriate this technology, without markedly decreasing Taiwan’s current ability to combat crime. However, the greatest obstacle to this change may be the Taiwanese people themselves. Taiwan’s digital surveillance is largely accepted by the public and therefore remains a relatively low political priority in comparison to Taiwan’s policy toward China. For now, the Taiwanese people control their own cameras—but they should prepare for a day they may not.

Taiwan’s Vast Surveillance Infrastructure: An Achilles’ Heel if China Invades - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Reed Bauer · August 8, 2023

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He who controls the cameras, controls the future. Or at least the future of Taiwan.

US policymakers are focused on a wide range of scenarios in which China would conduct an invasion of Taiwan. One of these, and one of the most likely, is a fait accompli in which China invades and isolates the island before US forces are able to respond. Given that, vital to enabling any US response would be the ability of Taiwanese leaders to conduct an insurgency that provides space for maneuverability and prevents the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from solidifying control. Yet there is a wildcard in this scenario: Taiwan’s extensive surveillance state. More specifically, there is a risk that the CCP could reappropriate surveillance infrastructure to prevent such an insurgency from occurring.

At first glance, it may seem like Taiwan is ripe for an insurgency campaign against any CCP invasion. For one, as numerous scholars have pointed out, mountainous terrain facilitates insurgent movements. Three of Taiwan’s largest metropolitan centers, Taipei, New Taipei City, and Taichung, are located in mountainous basins, and over half of the island’s terrain is mountainous—a natural geography that would make it difficult to establish control over the island. Meanwhile, cities on the eastern side such as Taitung and Hualien are effectively isolated from the rest of the island, with few roads connecting them to the west. Likewise, Taiwan’s population density, one of the highest in the world, would allow for insurgencies to disperse among the country’s urban centers, where 80 percent of residents live.

However, there is one key factor that would frustrate any nascent insurgencies—the surveillance apparatus constructed by Taiwan’s government and already in place on the island. The level of surveillance on Taiwan is extensive and penetrates deeply into Taiwanese society, and many of these systems would be difficult to undo should the CCP invade. The most obvious example of this is the level of CCTV surveillance in cities. In response to a series of high-profile robberies in 2010, the Taipei police department implemented the installation of over 11,000 cameras in Taipei. As of 2015, police across the island nation managed over 155,000 security cameras from control centers throughout the country. Taipei alone now has over 30,000 CCTV cameras, and by some accounts, the island is the third most surveilled society on earth, with one camera for every five and a half people. This high level of surveillance coverage would undoubtedly be used by the CCP to monitor population movements, track insurgents, and monitor the Taiwanese public for any indicators of resistance.

In fact, many of these cameras are in part manufactured by Chinese companies, despite an apparent blacklisting by the Taiwanese government. One report from Taiwan’s CommonWealth Magazine found that products from Hikvision, a Chinese technology company, were routinely found in CCTV cameras, including outside the Hsinchu Industrial Park, where Taiwan constructs the world’s most advanced semiconductors, and at National Taipei University. Another report found that over seven hundred private cameras in Taipei had Huawei chips and were unknowingly live streaming online.

Yet the level of surveillance extends beyond simply CCTV cameras. Taiwan received global recognition for its COVID-19 response, and rightfully so. Yet part of this response was due to government cooperation with telecommunications companies to create an “electronic fence,” which used telecommunications companies to track the movements of citizens in quarantine. It notified police when users left their quarantine areas or even for turned off their phones. While Taiwan’s digital fencing has been suspended, the mechanics for this system remain in place and could be easily reinstated by the CCP. For example, the CCP could reinstitute an electronic fence that monitors citizens who violate a curfew, as well as monitor the number of people in a specific area to identify potential protests, sending People’s Liberation Army soldiers to suppress them before they even begin.

Even before COVID-19, privacy advocates in Taiwan had already raised concern that the level of surveillance is a violation of Taiwan’s constitution. From 2015 to 2016, the Taiwanese government made nearly seventy thousand requests for digital information, including location tracking, communication records, and personal information. In some ways, this is of course beneficial to the Taiwanese government, as this system has helped the Taiwanese police investigate espionage that occurs on the island. Yet having this infrastructure in place means that it can be reappropriated in an invasion scenario, allowing for the CCP to monitor digital conversations and target attempts to organize a resistance.

Should an invasion occur, the CCP has both the means and the experience to reappropriate this surveillance apparatus to brutally repress any internal rebellion that may occur in Taiwan. Companies such as Hikvision have been essential in constructing the same type of tools that the CCP uses in the mass of surveillance of Hong Kong and Xinjiang. For example, in Hong Kong, the CCP requires users to link SIM cards to their identities, mirroring policies in China, which are then used to track movement. In Xinjiang, security cameras developed by Hikvision use facial recognition to track citizens who may pose a what Beijing’s determines to be a security threat, monitoring their behavior, including linking them to private vehicles. Infrastructure with similar capabilities is in place in Taiwan. The Taiwan Railways Administration has installed cameras using facial recognition Taiwan, and while the feature is not currently activated, the capability remains.

Some analysts argue that in the event of an invasion, the United States should take proactive measures to dismantle and destroy infrastructure that would enable CCP surveillance. However, the significant downside to this approach is a lack of discrimination which could effectively leave Taiwan digitally isolated from the rest of the world, ceding “discourse power” to the CCP. While discourse power is often discussed in the context of global discourse, it would be vital in the case of a Taiwan conflict, and for obvious reasons. Maintaining the ability to shape global opinion can influence the extent to which third-party actors are willing to provide Taiwan aid, as well as the extent to which countries would economically sanction China. Losing the ability to communicate with the rest of the world would result in an inability to articulate Taiwan’s position to a global audience. The experience of Ukraine since Russia’s February 2022 invasion is a case in point. Kyiv’s ability to broadcast Russian war crimes in Bakhmut and the abduction of Ukrainian children by Russian soldiers put Russia on a propaganda defensive, and reinforced negative public opinion of Russia’s aggression. In any Taiwan invasion, the Taiwan government must maintain the ability to present its narrative to the world.

Others might contend that even without the existing surveillance infrastructure, Chinese technological expertise and hardware would enable the CCP to independently manufacture a surveillance apparatus by bringing thousands of cameras and supporting equipment along with invading forces. However, the key to preventing an insurgency from forming would be the rapidity with which the CCP could establish this system. Taiwan’s surveillance infrastructure has been built up over years in a permissive environment. Creating a surveillance system of similar scale to Taiwan’s preexisting infrastructure would require costly manpower, manpower which might not be available or used for other purposes, and one that might be stymied by protests, rebellion, or a nascent insurgency. Far easier would be to use the existing system in place that has already been established in Taiwan.

Despite the government’s best efforts to convince people of the benefits of the system—by highlighting the impact on crime, for instance—the potential negatives severely outweigh the benefits should an invasion occur. These steps don’t necessarily have to result in the dismantling of cameras. Even simply removing cameras that have facial recognition technology or dispersing centralized camera nodes would make it more difficult for the CCP to reappropriate this technology, without markedly decreasing Taiwan’s current ability to combat crime. However, the greatest obstacle to this change may be the Taiwanese people themselves. Taiwan’s digital surveillance is largely accepted by the public and therefore remains a relatively low political priority in comparison to Taiwan’s policy toward China. For now, the Taiwanese people control their own cameras—but they should prepare for a day they may not.

Reed Bauer is a second lieutenant in the United States Army infantry. He is currently a Fulbright scholar and master’s student at National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, the Fulbright Program or the United States Department of State. Thank you to the Foundation of Scholarly Exchange for their academic and financial support.

Image credit: Solomon203

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Reed Bauer · August 8, 2023

20. Biden to Restrict Investments in China, Citing National Security Threats

Excerpts:

Biden officials have talked with allies in recent months to explain the measure and encourage other governments to adopt similar restrictions, including at the Group of 7 meetings in Japan in May. Since then, Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, has urged the European Union to introduce its own measure.

The administration is expected to give businesses and other organizations a chance to comment on the new rules before they are finalized in the months to come.

Claire Chu, a senior China analyst at Janes, a defense intelligence company, said that communicating and enforcing the measure would be difficult, and that officials would need to engage closely with Silicon Valley and Wall Street.

“For a long time, the U.S. national security community has been reticent to recognize the international financial system as a potential warfighting domain,” she said. “And the business community has pushed back against what it considers to be the politicization of private markets. And so this is not only an interagency effort, but an exercise in intersectoral coordination.”

Biden to Restrict Investments in China, Citing National Security Threats

By Ana Swanson

Ana Swanson covers trade and the U.S.-China economic relationship. She reported from Washington.

Aug. 8, 2023

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

The New York Times · by Ana Swanson · August 8, 2023

The measure to clamp down on investments in certain industries deemed to pose security risks, set to be issued Wednesday, appears likely to open a new front in the U.S.-China economic conflict.

The restrictions issued by President Biden will bar private equity and venture capital firms from making investments in certain high-tech sectors.Credit...Kenny Holston/The New York Times

The Biden administration plans on Wednesday to issue new restrictions on American investments in certain advanced industries in China, according to people familiar with the deliberations, a move that supporters have described as necessary to protect national security but that will undoubtedly rankle Beijing.

The measure would be one of the first significant steps the United States has taken amid an economic clash with China to clamp down on outgoing financial flows. It could set the stage for more restrictions on investments between the two countries in the years to come.

The restrictions would bar private equity and venture capital firms from making investments in certain high-tech sectors, like quantum computing, artificial intelligence and advanced semiconductors, the people said, in a bid to stop the transfer of American dollars and expertise to China.

It would also require firms making investments in a broader range of Chinese industries to report that activity, giving the government better visibility into financial exchanges between the United States and China.

The White House declined to comment. But Biden officials have emphasized that outright restrictions on investment would narrowly target a few sectors that could aid the Chinese military or surveillance state as they seek to combat security threats but not disrupt legitimate business with China.

“There is mounting evidence that U.S. capital is being used to advance Chinese military capabilities and that the U.S. lacks a sufficient means of combating this activity,” said Emily Benson, the director of project on trade and technology at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.

The Biden administration has recently sought to calm relations with China, dispatching Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen and other top officials to talk with Chinese counterparts. In recent speeches, Biden officials have argued that targeted actions taken against China are aimed purely at protecting U.S. national security, not at damaging the Chinese economy.

At the same time, the Biden administration has continued to push to “de-risk” critical supply chains by developing suppliers outside China, and it has steadily ramped up its restrictions on selling certain technologies to China, including semiconductors for advanced computing.

The Chinese government has long restricted certain foreign investments by individuals and firms. Other governments, such as those of Taiwan and South Korea, also have restrictions on outgoing investments.

But beyond screening Chinese investment into the United States for security risks, the U.S. government has left financial flows between the world’s two largest economies largely untouched. Just a few years ago, American policymakers were working to open up Chinese financial markets for U.S. firms.

In the past few years, investments between the United States and China have fallen sharply as the countries severed other economic ties. But venture capital and private equity firms have continued to seek out lucrative opportunities for partnerships, as a way to gain access to China’s vibrant tech industry.

The planned measure has already faced criticism from some congressional Republicans and others who say it has taken too long and does not go far enough to limit U.S. funding of Chinese technology. In July, a House committee on China sent letters to four U.S. venture capital firms expressing “serious concern” about their investments in Chinese companies in areas including artificial intelligence and semiconductors.

Others have argued that the restriction would mainly put the U.S. economy at a disadvantage, because other countries continue to forge technology partnerships with China, and China has no shortage of capital.

Nicholas R. Lardy, a nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, said the United States was the source of less than 5 percent of China’s inbound direct investment in 2021 and 2022.

“Unless other major investors in China adopt similar restrictions, I think this is a waste of time,” Mr. Lardy said. “Pushing this policy now simply plays into the hands of those in Beijing who believe that the U.S. seeks to contain China and are not interested in renewed dialogue or a ‘thaw.’”

Biden officials have talked with allies in recent months to explain the measure and encourage other governments to adopt similar restrictions, including at the Group of 7 meetings in Japan in May. Since then, Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, has urged the European Union to introduce its own measure.

The administration is expected to give businesses and other organizations a chance to comment on the new rules before they are finalized in the months to come.

Claire Chu, a senior China analyst at Janes, a defense intelligence company, said that communicating and enforcing the measure would be difficult, and that officials would need to engage closely with Silicon Valley and Wall Street.

“For a long time, the U.S. national security community has been reticent to recognize the international financial system as a potential warfighting domain,” she said. “And the business community has pushed back against what it considers to be the politicization of private markets. And so this is not only an interagency effort, but an exercise in intersectoral coordination.”

Ana Swanson is based in the Washington bureau and covers trade and international economics for The Times. She previously worked at The Washington Post, where she wrote about trade, the Federal Reserve and the economy. More about Ana Swanson

A version of this article appears in print on , Section B, Page 3 of the New York edition with the headline: Biden Set to Clamp Down on Financial Flows to China

The New York Times · by Ana Swanson · August 8, 2023

21. ‘Acceptable levels of risk’: Backing Ukraine won’t deplete U.S. arsenal, Milley says

Excerpts:

The defense secretary’s “guidance to us is, ‘Do not, in any category of munitions, take us below levels that are acceptable levels of risk.’ I’m not going to go into those details, but we monitor it very, very closely,” Gen. Milley said. “So we are not going to jeopardize our own national security needs and capabilities to engage in combat operations with ammunition stockages, etc. We’re not going to put ourselves at that level of risk.”

The immense arms outflow has dwarfed what NATO allies have sent to Kyiv. Shipments have included more than 2,000 Stinger anti-aircraft systems, over 10,000 Javelin anti-armor systems and more than 2 million 155 mm artillery rounds, the Pentagon said this week.

Douglas R. Bush, assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology, said the U.S. defense industry is producing artillery rounds at a rate of 24,000 per month and is on track to produce more than 80,000 rounds per month in the next year as it ramps up in support of Ukraine.

In a wide-ranging conversation about the Ukraine-Russia war, Gen. Milley stressed that it is far too early to draw any major conclusions about Ukraine’s 2-month-old counteroffensive in the disputed Donbas region despite “sobering” official assessments of Kyiv’s success to date against dug-in Russian forces. He acknowledged that “there’s a lot of fog” about the state of the Ukrainian advance, which by most accounts appears to be moving slower than Western military observers and planners have hoped.

‘Acceptable levels of risk’: Backing Ukraine won’t deplete U.S. arsenal, Milley says

Despite critics, Joint Chiefs head says U.S. weapons vital for Kyiv's 'existential fight'

washingtontimes.com · by Ben Wolfgang

Exclusive

By - The Washington Times - Tuesday, August 8, 2023

EXIT INTERVIEW: Army Gen. Mark A. Milley has had a momentous — and at times polarizing — four-year run as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Presidents Trump and Biden. In the second of a series of articles ahead of the scheduled end of his tenure in October, Gen. Milley sat down with senior Washington Times military correspondent Ben Wolfgang to discuss some of the achievements and controversies of his time as the Pentagon’s highest-ranking military officer.

U.S. weapons stockpiles will not drop below “acceptable levels of risk” despite the constant flow of arms to Ukraine, said Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pushing back on the idea that America may be putting itself in danger by sending such a massive amount of military aid to Kyiv for its war with Russia.

In an exclusive interview with The Washington Times, Gen. Milley said he and other top Defense Department officials closely monitor the number of American munitions on hand and won’t allow it to drop below an acceptable threshold, though he would not be more specific. The debate about Ukraine is growing in Washington’s political and national security circles, including its prospects for a definitive victory against the invading Russian army and at what point the Biden administration may push Ukraine more aggressively toward peace negotiations.

The 18-month-old war has been a drain on U.S. munitions stockpiles. Many are warning that the country’s defense industrial base overall is increasingly stressed and unable to meet demand. Some national security analysts have sounded the alarm about current shortfalls and the ability to quickly replenish munitions for an unexpected conflict.

Gen. Milley said the Pentagon is working closely with the defense industry to refill supplies as rapidly as possible. He said the level of aid to Ukraine does not and will not endanger U.S. national security.

“We monitor this every day for [Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin] and for the president. We give them reports every day,” he told The Times.

The defense secretary’s “guidance to us is, ‘Do not, in any category of munitions, take us below levels that are acceptable levels of risk.’ I’m not going to go into those details, but we monitor it very, very closely,” Gen. Milley said. “So we are not going to jeopardize our own national security needs and capabilities to engage in combat operations with ammunition stockages, etc. We’re not going to put ourselves at that level of risk.”

The immense arms outflow has dwarfed what NATO allies have sent to Kyiv. Shipments have included more than 2,000 Stinger anti-aircraft systems, over 10,000 Javelin anti-armor systems and more than 2 million 155 mm artillery rounds, the Pentagon said this week.

Douglas R. Bush, assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology, said the U.S. defense industry is producing artillery rounds at a rate of 24,000 per month and is on track to produce more than 80,000 rounds per month in the next year as it ramps up in support of Ukraine.

In a wide-ranging conversation about the Ukraine-Russia war, Gen. Milley stressed that it is far too early to draw any major conclusions about Ukraine’s 2-month-old counteroffensive in the disputed Donbas region despite “sobering” official assessments of Kyiv’s success to date against dug-in Russian forces. He acknowledged that “there’s a lot of fog” about the state of the Ukrainian advance, which by most accounts appears to be moving slower than Western military observers and planners have hoped.

Ukraine’s counteroffensive and its broader fight throughout the conflict have been highly dependent on Western military aid, including major shipments of U.S. artillery, anti-aircraft systems and missile defense batteries. All told, the U.S. has given Ukraine more than $41 billion worth of systems, weapons, equipment and other military aid since the start of the war in February 2022.

Some of the Biden administration’s recent strategic decisions seem to be driven by munitions shortages or the fear of shortages.

Supplies of cluster munitions were met with fury from critics who say the weapons pose a much higher risk of accidental civilian deaths. President Biden signaled in an interview with CNN that cluster munitions were the only option because both Ukraine and the U.S. were short on key 155 mm artillery rounds.

“And we’re low on it,” the president said of those artillery rounds, acknowledging publicly that U.S. stockpiles are drying up. The specific figures remain classified.

‘An existential fight’

Gen. Milley stressed that U.S. assistance goes far beyond numbers on a page and is a piece of a much bigger equation.

“It’s our job to make sure he, the secretary of defense, and the president stay continuously informed, and Congress, stay continuously informed about those levels [of munitions], and to work with industry in order to replenish things and so on, so forth,” Gen. Milley said. “At the same time, we need to make sure that Ukraine has what it needs to successfully defend itself. The issue of Ukraine is much bigger than Ukraine. For Ukraine, this is an existential fight. So the Russians are trying to overrun Ukraine. … So it’s an existential fight for Ukraine. But for Europe, for the United States, for other countries in the world, it’s much bigger than that.

“It’s about a set of rules that were put in place by the United States, really, at the end of World War II that prevents large powers from arbitrarily changing borders by the use of military force for their own self-aggrandizement,” he said.

Despite the high stakes, recent data suggests that Americans may be souring on the heavy flows of aid to Ukraine. A Pew Research survey in June found that 28% of Americans say the nation is giving “too much” aid to Ukraine, up from 12% in May 2022, three months after Mr. Putin launched the invasion.

That shift has been driven largely by a change in attitude among Republicans, 44% of whom now say the U.S. is providing too much aid, up from 17% in May 2022, the Pew report said. The number of Democrats who say the U.S. is providing too much aid has gone up from 8% to 14% over the same period.

High-profile Republicans in Congress have increasingly tied the massive amount of U.S. aid to the questionable proposition that Kyiv will ever achieve a clear victory.

“Supplies that will take years to replenish are being exhausted by Ukraine in a matter of weeks,” a group of 19 congressional Republicans, including Sens. Mike Lee of Utah and Rand Paul of Kentucky, wrote in a letter to Mr. Biden this year. “There are appropriate ways in which the U.S. can support the Ukrainian people, but unlimited arms supplies in support of an endless war is not one of them. Our national interests, and those of the Ukrainian people, are best served by incentivizing the negotiations that are urgently needed to bring this conflict to a resolution.”

The notion that the U.S. and Ukraine should prioritize peace negotiations rather than an open-ended war could gain more traction through the rest of the year, especially if Ukraine’s counteroffensive shows no clear, high-profile progress.

Gen. Milley acknowledged that the Ukrainian forces face a tough test to navigate deadly minefields and ultimately try to pierce defensive lines that the Russians have spent months fortifying, but he said it is too early to conclude whether the counteroffensive will succeed.

“They are fighting on their own turf, but they’re executing offensive combined arms maneuver warfare, which is very, very difficult to do,” he said. “And they’re going through some highly dense minefields that are obviously very dangerous.

“There’s a lot of fog, there’s fear, there’s blood, there’s violence,” Gen. Milley said. “And at the pointy end of the spear here, there are Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in very intense conventional warfare at a very high cost to both sides. And it is not over. And I think it would be premature to say victory or defeat one way or another just yet. It’s not over yet.”

• Ben Wolfgang can be reached at bwolfgang@washingtontimes.com.

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22. Pentagon Is Keeping US Troops in Niger Even as Coup Leaders Show No Sign of Relenting

Pentagon Is Keeping US Troops in Niger Even as Coup Leaders Show No Sign of Relenting

military.com · by Konstantin Toropin · August 8, 2023

The Pentagon is not only keeping U.S. troops in place in Niger but pointing to their presence as a vote of confidence in the people of the West African nation, even as hope for a restoration of the democratically elected government begins to dwindle.

"We're going to continue to engage from a military standpoint," Sabrina Singh, a Defense Department spokeswoman, told reporters at a briefing Tuesday. "I think the fact that our force posture has not changed sends a message that we're committed to the region, we're committed to Niger."

The country has been a partner in the U.S. efforts against terror groups in the region -- including the location of an American drone base -- but was thrown into turmoil last month when its military rose up and deposed the first democratically elected and seated president in decades, leaving the future uncertain.

"We are hopeful that there will be a diplomatic resolution to this attempted coup that took place in Niger," Singh said, notably referring to the situation as an "attempted coup."

Pentagon officials have been cautious about using the term "coup" since it carries legal implications for U.S. foreign policy and military assistance.

The Pentagon statement comes less than a day after a top State Department official gave a grim assessment of the situation in the African nation after having met with the leaders of the military junta that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum from power two weeks ago. The news became public in the early hours of July 27.

"These conversations were extremely frank and at times quite difficult," Acting Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland told reporters on a call Monday.

Nuland said she met with the leader of the junta -- Brig. Gen. Moussa Salaou Barmou -- as well as three colonels supporting him.

"They are quite firm in their view on how they want to proceed, and it does not comport with the constitution of Niger," Nuland said.

Meanwhile, French news outlet Le Monde reported Tuesday that the junta led by Barmou has begun to consolidate power in the country by appointing its own prime minister and several top military officers to key government posts.

Singh stressed that the U.S. does not want to "abandon Nigeriens that we've partnered with that we've trained with over many years," before adding that "Niger is, of course, an important ally within the region when it comes to counterterrorism and other operations."

However, one of the beneficiaries of this training has been Barmou himself.

Nuland noted that he "is somebody who has worked very closely with U.S. Special Forces over many, many years." Several media outlets, including The New York Times, reported that Barmou was trained at Fort Benning, Georgia (now renamed Fort Moore), and that he attended the National Defense University -- self-described as the "nation's premier joint professional military education institution" -- in Washington, D.C.

The Pentagon even released images of Barmou meeting with and embracing the head of U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Lt. Gen. Jonathan Braga, less than two months ago.

"So, we were able to go through, in considerable detail, the risks to aspects of our cooperation that he has historically cared about a lot," Nuland told reporters.

Meanwhile, the role of the Wagner group -- a cadre of mercenaries controlled by the Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin -- continues to remain an unsubstantiated but ever present worry among U.S. officials.

Singh said that the Pentagon continues to see the mercenary group "trying to take responsibility for activities that happen within Africa," but she was quick to add that officials "have seen no indications they have anything to do with the events in Niger and have not seen any assistance so far flown in from Wagner forces."

Nuland said she raised the topic of the mercenary group with Barmou but added that she "would not say that we learned much more about their thinking on that front."

Meanwhile, Singh did say that the Pentagon's continued presence in the country is heavily contingent on American citizens and service members being safe from harm.

"If their lives are at risk, of course, we're going to make that change and, of course, we will address that," Singh said.

-- Konstantin Toropin can be reached at konstantin.toropin@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @ktoropin.

military.com · by Konstantin Toropin · August 8, 2023

23. Modern 'triad' aims to fill capability gap, help US military compete with adversaries (Space, Cyber, and SOF)

I wonder if the nuclear community might be upset with Cyber, Space, and SOF for stealing their "triad" moniker.

Excerpts:

“The reason we coalesced around the term ‘triad’ because it means so many things. Again, anyone who’s our age or older can remember the … ’60s, ’70s, ’80s — all that of where ‘triad’ just meant so many different things. It meant deterrence theory, it meant the three different legs of the [nuclear] triad, it meant tactics, techniques and procedures, it meant developing actual weapons systems, it meant contributing towards deterrence theory,” Lt. Gen. Jon Braga commander of Army Special Operations Command, said during a presentation at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium on Tuesday.

He continued: “My proposal is that the same thing is needed today in competition … from the modern day triad, because our adversaries are actually using against us to impose doubt and cost and coerce — in some cases, [to] assure their own friendly network, but certainly to deter us from actions.”

Modern 'triad' aims to fill capability gap, help US military compete with adversaries

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · August 8, 2023

The “modern triad” — a combination of space, cyber and special operations capabilities — is needed to address the new paradigm of activity that is occurring below the threshold of armed conflict known as the competition space or gray zone, officials say.

Unveiled last year, the Army has begun exercising and demonstrating this concept in which its components pair their unique capabilities that span across the globe to provide integrated packages for commanders.

“The reason we coalesced around the term ‘triad’ because it means so many things. Again, anyone who’s our age or older can remember the … ’60s, ’70s, ’80s — all that of where ‘triad’ just meant so many different things. It meant deterrence theory, it meant the three different legs of the [nuclear] triad, it meant tactics, techniques and procedures, it meant developing actual weapons systems, it meant contributing towards deterrence theory,” Lt. Gen. Jon Braga commander of Army Special Operations Command, said during a presentation at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium on Tuesday.

He continued: “My proposal is that the same thing is needed today in competition … from the modern day triad, because our adversaries are actually using against us to impose doubt and cost and coerce — in some cases, [to] assure their own friendly network, but certainly to deter us from actions.”

Unlike the United States, which has long viewed conflict under the binary states of war and peace, adversaries have viewed it as a continuum seeking to achieve their objectives without firing a shot. As such, America’s competitors have begun to be more active in this gray zone sphere, leveraging non-kinetic capabilities such as cyber, electronic warfare, intelligence, information and influence operations in order to subvert the U.S. and its allies, officials say.

The new modern triad is one way the military has sought to address this paradigm shift and provide commanders additional capabilities to combat adversary activity.

In February, the Joint Staff published a concept for competing in this gray zone or competition space, formally recognizing the Department of Defense is engaged in a competition on a daily basis below the threshold of all-out war or conflict.

Braga noted that from observations in Ukraine, there has been an ongoing game of escalation as new capabilities and offensives are presented.

The capabilities of the triad can help manage escalation and possibly deter actions — either below the threshold of conflict or during conflict — or prevent situations from getting worse, he suggested.

“When you bring on a new piece of equipment, a new weapon system, a new technique, it’s a question every time for policymakers: ‘Are you contributing towards escalation or towards deterrence?’” he said. “We have to be better at developing those capabilities for the policymakers and being able to deliver on those effects in order to make informed decisions that we look at a larger contribution to actually strategic deterrence there.”

Braga is concerned about not only winning potential high-end conflicts, but also preventing them from breaking out in the first place.

“That’s what’s before us,” he said. “I really think the weight of that burden, while not 100% on the legs of the triad, we certainly have a major role to play in that, an outsized ability to influence and prevent and contribute towards deterrence in this modern day triad.”

For a real-world example of how these capabilities have demonstrated tangible results, Braga pointed to Ukraine.

“Jump forward to Ukraine and look at everything from one-way attack drones to the use of satellite communications to help assist with deep sensing, the use of cyber effects, … information ops,” he said. “Sixteen-thousand Russian soldiers have deserted, 16,000 have been taken off the battlefield without having to expend kinetic rounds. That’s by a combination of effects, delivery effects, I would suggest, that have been assisted by space capability, cyber capability, human capability and just old-school information operations there. That’s a dramatic effect. That has few comparisons even dating back to some old information ops in our World War II chapters when we worked very closely with our Brit partners there.”

Others have noted that the capabilities the triad can provide to commanders and policymakers will present new and more complex problems to adversaries.

“When confronted with a constantly changing situation, then our leaders can employ the triad to create new combinations of capabilities, methods and effects to pose new dilemmas for the adversaries,” Lt. Gen. Daniel Karbler, commander of Army Space and Missile Defense Command, said. “The triad is valuable in competition as commanders have to consider the possibility that overt military action may escalate towards armed conflict … The combined use of space, cyber and SOF capabilities provides other options to commanders that are less likely to cause escalation. Triad capabilities can provide commanders with options to defeat, destroy, disrupt, or manipulate energy networks, information and decision-making.”

Karbler noted that the triad has advanced beyond concept and the Army’s components have been exercising it and developing tactics.

“When you look at what the triad demonstrates and its ability to integrate, synchronize space, cyber, SOF capabilities at the most effective tactical echelon, and then it expands options for creating advantages to exploit — that’s what commanders are looking for. That’s what our ground commanders [are] looking for. That’s what the joint force is looking for,” he said.

At the four-star, joint combatant command level, U.S. Special Operations Command has begun to take note of what the Army components have done and is examining it to see if it applies to its mission.

The other services haven’t exactly created a formalized “triad” to date, though officials pointed to the fact that Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command also serves as the service’s space component. It also conducts cyber operations for Socom through its responsibilities to U.S. Cyber Command under what’s known as Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber Marines.

For its part, the Navy’s 10th Fleet/Fleet Cyber Command is also the service component for space as well, taking an integrated approach to cyber and space capabilities.

Non-kinetic capabilities can help provide commanders a greater understanding of the battlespace to make more informed decisions.

“One of the biggest things that I think from my perspective, when I’m thinking about the competition sphere, is what can I produce for Gen. Braga and Gen. Karbler in terms of situational understanding of what the environment might look like,” Lt. Gen. Maria Barrett, commander of Army Cyber Command, said. “It could be the cyberspace environment, it could be the electronic warfare environment, it could be the information operations environment.”

Conversely, those leaders could bring their insights to Army Cyber, which through its big data platform can make sense of the information from sensors and data sources.

“If you’ve got a big data platform that can do things at a classified and unclassified level and I can take things off of sensors that … produce something that is then layered and makes sense, now you have an understanding of what is happening in the competition space at a level that maybe previously you did not have,” Barrett said. “That sets the conditions for delivering effects in crisis and conflict.”

While there aren’t any overt examples from the U.S. side of the triad’s uses or successes, likely given the classified nature of these operations and capabilities, Barrett noted that she’s seen practical examples within Central Command.

Officials noted that each component of the triad won’t always be featured equally. Depending on the situation or problem, it could be one or two that play a bigger role.

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · August 8, 2023

24. 7 Things the New Sergeant Major of the Army Can Do to Restore Trust in the Military

Conclusion:

Your job is a hard one. It may often feel lonely, as responsibility is isolating. Cheap praise will be in constant supply from people who want to be close to power. In contrast, being a steady hand on the wheel is hard, and often not recognized until long after encouragement would have been comforting. We do not need more characters who want to be transformational, but leaders who can rightly be called reformational. I ask that you use your influence to be a rising tide that elevates everything within your reach and restore dignity to the office you now hold. The force needs it. The nation needs it. I pray you lead well.

7 Things the New Sergeant Major of the Army Can Do to Restore Trust in the Military

By Chase Spears

August 09, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/08/09/7_things_the_new_sergeant_major_of_the_army_can_do_to_restore_trust_in_the_military_971735.html?mc_cid=44a217f84f&mc_eid=70bf478f36

On Friday Michael Weimer became the 17th Sergeant Major of the Army. He assumed the role in a time of significant strain on the force due to turbulent political factors, a service component seemingly unsure of how to position itself in the post Global War on Terrorism era, and a steady drumbeat of institutional scandals. Being the Sergeant Major of the Army is a tough role on a good day, but that is not the kind of day in which Weimer enters the office. In the final days of my military career, I offer some thoughts on how our newest top Sergeant Major can steward the position to help restore a sense of stability to the force.

First, take input from beyond the echo chamber. In recent years top Army officials have largely disregarded voices from significant portions of the population, claiming a desire to ‘look like America.’ Instead of preserving the trust of all Americans, they merely traded sympathies from one segment of the public to another. One cannot gather an accurate social pulse by excluding the worldview of half the nation. Focus on people and standards, rather than intersectional self-identities.

Second, social media channels are only one avenue for keeping your fingers on force sentiment. An hour on Twitter does not replace an hour walking the motorpool. Too many among us fell for a deception that all soldiers are on Twitter, and thus every military leader should “get on the bus” with them, and engage at whatever level the most junior user would want. This #miltwitter grouping is plagued by military-affiliated social revolutionaries, and has become a place of disrespect and hostility within the ranks, “a circular firing squad in a cone of silence, where everybody is just taking each other out.”^[i] The behavior among this grouping of mostly U.S. Army members degrades military professionalism, and has repeatedly drawn the Army unnecessarily into negative news cycles. Let your online presence be a reflection of your leadership, rather than a place to be pulled from your purpose.

Third, avoid being drawn into social activism in your official capacity. Social and political movements come and go. Yet too many senior military officials have recently been caught up in them, some even launching informational counter fires against political commentators. It had been understood in the age of Huntingtonian thought that the military stayed out of socio-political fights, opting instead to be more a ‘dignified’ element of governmental structure.[ii] However, we have watched as prominent voices among the #miltwitter grouping call for installation commanders to ban channels such as Fox News over its critique of progressive military policy. Many among them label politically inconvenient facts as disinformation, and malign, through tantrums of ad hominem, those who share such data. Army Regulations prohibit such behavior, those rules are rarely enforced when it comes to online expression. Polls show an alarming drop in favorable public sentiment in the military, partly in response to such behavior. No amount of marketing campaigns will reverse that trend. Only a change in actions can bridge the widening divide. Social stability requires a sense of principled permanence from the military. In a storm-tossed sea, be a lighthouse firmly anchored upon a solid foundation.

Fourth, be discriminate with whom you associate. There has been a trend of senior military officials who give platform, and even preference in future duty assignments, to connections made on social channels. There seems to be a belief that because a particular soldier is loud and fits a popular narrative, that person is a useful influencer to align with. Those self-imagined stars inevitably prove unhelpful. Yet senior-leader endorsements of them remain a matter of record. Train our NCOs to avoid this trap. Perhaps they will gain influence with their officers to do likewise.

Fifth, surround yourself with competent, mature, respectable public affairs counsel. Anyone who employs an antagonistic approach, and who would advocate for the same with your official channels, is telling you that he or she is unqualified to offer sound counsel. Keep this point at the forefront of your thinking throughout your tenure. Apply it with all your courtiers.

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Sixth, define what words like readiness and lethality actually mean. These, among others, have become nothing more than pieces of value terminology: vague, meaningless words that tie to human emotions to make people feel pressured to agree with whatever idea you tie to them. Senior officials attach them to every imaginable policy change, regardless of the relevant facts. Then the force echoes, because no one wants to be accused of inhibiting readiness or lethality. This practice dumbs the military mind and distracts from actual combat training. Push the Army to produce legitimate definitions, and then discipline the force to use those terms in proper setting and context.

Finally, issue an apology on behalf of the Army for its participation in DoD’s unlawful and unscientific COVID shot requirement, and the particularly heartless way in which the Army prosecuted it. In that one move, your legacy will be secured as one of the good guys and endear you forever in the hearts of the most principled men and women remaining in uniform.

Your job is a hard one. It may often feel lonely, as responsibility is isolating. Cheap praise will be in constant supply from people who want to be close to power. In contrast, being a steady hand on the wheel is hard, and often not recognized until long after encouragement would have been comforting. We do not need more characters who want to be transformational, but leaders who can rightly be called reformational. I ask that you use your influence to be a rising tide that elevates everything within your reach and restore dignity to the office you now hold. The force needs it. The nation needs it. I pray you lead well.

MAJ Chase Spears will soon retire from the U.S. Army after serving a 20 year career in public affairs both as an enlisted soldier and officer. He recently completed a transition fellowship as Chief of Staff to Kansas State House Representative Pat Proctor and is a doctoral candidate at Kansas State University. His opinions are his own and should not be construed to be those of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, U.S. Government, nor any other affiliated agencies.

Notes:

[i] Qtd. in Mark Vielledent, Social Media in the Post-Digital Era: U.S. Army Senior Leaders’ Perceived Risk, doctoral dissertation (Gainesville, 2022), 124

[ii] Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (London: 1867)

25. Why the China cyber threat demands an airtight public-private response

We are all soldiers on the battlefield in cyberspace.

Why the China cyber threat demands an airtight public-private response

c4isrnet.com · by Tom Guarente · August 8, 2023

It may not be a household name to most Americans, but the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency is vital to our national defense, responsible, in its own words, for leading “the national effort to understand, manage, and reduce risk to the cyber and physical infrastructure that Americans rely on every hour of every day.”

So, what did CISA’s director tell lawmakers about the cyber threat posed by China?

“This, I think, is the real threat that we need to be prepared for, and to focus on, and to build resilience against,” Jen Easterly told the Aspen Institute in Washington in June. “Given the formidable nature of the threat from Chinese state actors, given the size of their capability, given how much resources and effort they’re putting into it, it’s going to be very, very difficult for us to prevent disruptions from happening.”

Easterly is far from alone. On March 8, the five directors of the most senior intelligence agencies advised the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the Chinese Communist Party represents the leading threat to U.S. national security and leadership globally.

“China uses cyberattacks below the threshold of war to coerce its rivals,” according to a recent report by consulting firm Booz Allen. “For instance, it has targeted American critical infrastructure to deter U.S. involvement in Asia. China’s cyberattacks can affect government agencies, global corporations, and small businesses—either directly or via cascading risks.”

Indeed, the litany of infamous attacks linked to Chinese hackers reads like a greatest hits of cyber terrorism. They include the massive data breach at the federal Office of Personnel Management in 2015, the Equifax breach in 2017, an attack in 2021 on six state governments’ computer networks, and the theft of trillions in intellectual property from about 30 multinational companies.

This is all scary stuff. But the increasingly stealthy and dangerous activities linked to China beg the question of whether both the government and the private sector are truly taking these cyber threats seriously enough and sufficiently working to get ahead of future attacks.

I’m not sure we are.

I think back to a panel discussion I had with several governors a couple of years ago on the topic of emergency preparedness. The governors had much to say about their response plans for a hurricane, flood, or other natural disaster. But when I asked what they’d do in the event of a major cyberattack sabotaging key infrastructure, some adopted a deer-in-the-headlights gaze, while others muttered something to the effect of, “We’d call our CIO.”

That moment confirmed for me that U.S. preparedness suffers from what could be called a visibility gap—the lack of an organized, integrated approach to threat analysis, strategy, and information sharing among decentralized federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector.

Take, for example, the findings of the bipartisan Cyberspace Solarium Commission charged with developing a strategic approach to cyber defense. The group’s executive director recently criticized the system for managing cyber risk among critical infrastructure sectors as obsolete and said it hampers private-sector cooperation.

What’s needed is a consistent, proactive, collaborative effort that brings the government and private sector together as much as possible. The private sector can’t wait for the government to lead, and vice versa. The time is now for holistic action by both.

Fortunately, some of this already is bubbling up.

CISA’s Shields Up program was launched in February 2022 to foster information sharing about cybersecurity threats, products, and other resources after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Agency director Easterly has said CISA could soon start a similar campaign focused on China.

This program is proving helpful so far in uncovering and understanding crucial risks, identifying attack vectors, recommending ways to shore up defenses, and containing any exploits.

Such work has become especially important as the growing use of interconnected devices—such as beacons and sensors used to control and operate power and gas supplies, nuclear power plants, oil refineries, and other critical systems—dramatically increases the potential areas for attackers to target.

Meanwhile, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a Commerce Department office that develops cybersecurity best practices, recently announced a new initiative to work with the private sector and others in government to improve cybersecurity in supply chains.

And, though it’s not specific to cyber security, the Defense Department’s decision to explore ways to partner with commercial space companies to access their services during national security emergencies is another great example of how effective public-private sectors can be. The DoD is considering creating the space equivalent of the civil reserve air fleet, or CRAF, a program the Pentagon conceived 70 years ago to leverage commercial airlift capacity in emergencies.

The benefits of stronger public-private collaboration can even spill over into better awareness of the risks posed by artificial intelligence, which represents a new expansion of the attack surface. As generative AI advances, it creates troubling new scenarios such as a hacker creating convincing replicas of voice recordings and images that can be used for fraudulent activities such as identity theft and deepfakes.

Whether it’s dealing with the noted threat from China, or addressing the growing threat surface that AI technologies are now introducing, the country simply can’t afford information silos and disjointed, disorganized responses to important problems.

The emergence of a rapidly growing threat surface demands that our actions match our rhetoric. Our nation must go beyond the rhetoric and legacy approach to analyzing and discussing the challenge and instead embrace a model that focuses on outcomes and time to impact. While we take time to discuss, our adversaries are introducing the next threat.

The time is now for robust public-private collaboration and activation. We can’t afford otherwise.

Tom Guarente is Vice President of External and Government Affairs at Armis, an asset visibility and security company.

26. One of America’s Favorite Generals Leads the Niger Coup

Of course SOF will be criticized and blamed for this event. Yes, we must accept risk every time we train and engage with foreign forces. I just wonder how many coups were prevented due to the influence of US SOF and training on human rights, civil military relations and democratic values? Oh that is right, we cannot prove a negative or something that did not happen and as one of my many great Sergeants Major said, the house that is not burning does not make the news.

One of America’s Favorite Generals Leads the Niger Coup

Brig. Gen. Moussa Salaou Barmou, long courted by Washington as a partner against Islamist extremism, has emerged as the main diplomatic channel between the U.S. and the junta

By Michael M. PhillipsFollow

Updated Aug. 9, 2023 12:46 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/niger-coup-us-trained-general-65b5ecd6?mod=hp_lead_pos8&utm

NAIROBI—American military commanders were dismayed last month when a clique of top army officers seized power in Niger, the U.S.’s main ally in the fight against Islamist militants in West Africa.

What stung perhaps most sharply were televised images of one particular man, Brig. Gen. Moussa Salaou Barmou, among the coup plotters.

Barmou is a guy the U.S. military has courted for almost 30 years. He is a guy the U.S. sent to Washington, D.C.,’s prestigious National Defense University. He is a guy who has invited American officers to his home for dinner. He is a guy in charge of elite forces crucial to stemming the flood of al Qaeda and Islamic State fighters across western Africa.

“Brig. Gen. Barmou,” a U.S. defense official said just a few months ago, “is the guy.”

He may still be.

In the two weeks since Niger’s coup, Barmou has emerged as the main diplomatic channel between the U.S. and the junta. American officers and diplomats have his number in their cellphones and think he’s their best chance of restoring democracy and preventing a messy regional war that would plunge one of the poorest parts of the world deeper into crisis.

Barmou sat down in Niamey, Niger’s capital, for two hours on Monday with Victoria Nuland, the acting U.S. deputy secretary of state. The talks have so far proved frustrating. But Nuland, knowing Barmou’s long affinity for the U.S., urged him to broker a deal that would allow Niger and its longtime Western allies to get back to fighting al Qaeda, Islamic State and Boko Haram militants and stop the country from becoming another African outpost for Russia and its paramilitary Wagner Group.

“A lot of us who like him are sort of hoping he can help guide this thing to a soft landing,” said retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Mark Hicks, who headed American special-operations forces in Africa from 2017 to 2019 and considers Barmou a close personal friend.

Thousands demonstrated in front of the French embassy in Niamey during a rally in support of the military coup that overthrew the elected president, Mohamed Bazoum. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

And yet the fact remains that there is no more vivid symbol of the dashed hopes of the U.S. counterterrorism campaign in western Africa than Barmou, a man vital to U.S. strategy until their interests diverged.

Sahel strategy

The Sahel is a semiarid band just south of the Sahara where jihadists have killed thousands in recent years, turning it into one of the world’s biggest battlefields in the 20-plus-year battle against Islamist extremists. The heart of U.S. military approach is to dispatch American commandos to train local special forces to lead the campaign. Barmou, whose troops comprise Niger’s finest fighting force, was a linchpin of that approach.

“The loss of a stronghold in Niger, if that’s the consequence of the coup, would be a setback for U.S. strategic interests in the region,” said Hicks. Niger “was the island of stability in the sea of jihadist unrest.”

Over the past two years, military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and now Niger have cast doubt on whether the U.S. can help Sahelian countries defend themselves against Islamist insurgencies, while keeping Moscow from taking advantage of the instability.

Neighboring countries, led by regional powerhouse Nigeria, have threatened to send troops to Niger to rescue ousted President Mohamed Bazoum, who is still held prisoner in Niamey, and return him to power. Military juntas in Burkina Faso and Mali, which has hired Kremlin-linked Wagner mercenaries in a failed attempt to suppress its own militant threat, have pledged support for Niger’s new military regime.

Taking Sides

Eleven West African countries, led by Nigeria, have said they might send troops to Niger to reverse last month's coup and restore President Mohamed Bazoum to office. Two military-run countries—Burkina Faso and Mali—have backed Niger’s new ruling junta.

Supports coup

Against coup

CAPE

VERDE

NIGER

U.S.-built drone base

SENEGAL

U.S.-Nigerien

commando bases

MALI

THE GAMBIA

BURKINA

FASO

GUINEA-BISSAU

U.S. special-ops

headquarters

NIGERIA

SIERRA LEONE

IVORY

COAST

GHANA

LIBERIA

TOGO

BENIN

500 miles

500 km

Jake Steinberg/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The standoff raises the possibility that the Sahel could be consumed by a new regional war and the existing Islamist insurgency.

Until the junta promoted him to chief of defense staff, Barmou commanded Niger’s special forces. His men worked shoulder-to-shoulder with American Green Berets up until the moment of the July 26 uprising against Bazoum, just over two years after he took office. Like Barmou, Bazoum was a U.S. favorite and the Biden administration immediately demanded he be returned to power.

The U.S. has spent some $500 million building up Niger’s defense forces, including at a $110 million, American-built drone base in the town of Agadez, and stations some 1,100 American troops in the country. U.S. commandos share outposts with Barmou’s troops in the towns of Ouallam, where they fight local al Qaeda and Islamic State franchises, and Diffa, where combat operations focus on Boko Haram militants who conduct attacks around Lake Chad.

In the wake of the military revolt, the U.S. has suspended its training of Nigerien forces and cut some other military assistance to Niger. Should the State Department formally declare the uprising a coup, American law would require further reductions in military aid. The U.S. has vowed to continue food and other humanitarian assistance to Niger.

Barmou is well aware the coup could cost him critical combat support—no more joint training, tactical advice from U.S. Green Berets or American drones sending real-time surveillance.

“If that is the price to pay for our sovereignty, then let it be,” Barmou wrote to The Wall Street Journal a few days after the coup. He didn’t respond to further questions for this article.

A view of the Sahel, near Ouallam, Niger, a vast swath of the continent that has been exploited by Islamist extremists. PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Barmou’s men worked closely with American Green Berets until the July uprising. Above, Nigerien commandos trained with U.S. troops in Ouallam in November. PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

‘Extremely frank’

American officials are trying to figure out whether Barmou has decided he and his fellow generals are the best hope for stabilizing Niger, or if he’s willing to help negotiate a path back to civilian rule.

Nuland, the deputy secretary of state, described this week’s talks with Barmou in Niamey as “extremely frank and at times quite difficult”—diplomat-speak for heated and unsuccessful.

“They are quite firm in their view on how they want to proceed, and it does not comport with the constitution of Niger,” Nuland told reporters after the meeting. During her talks with Barmou, Nuland played on his long ties to U.S. Special Forces, reminding him that Niger risks losing American military assistance unless democratic order is restored.

Other West African security officials say Washington’s success in getting Barmou on their side will be pivotal. One senior army officer from the region said American diplomatic efforts remain the best hope for an outcome “without any bloodshed.”

“The U.S.A. will have to choose—stay in Niger or leave the place to Wagner,” the officer said.

The military has been the center of Barmou’s life since he was 12 years old, when, inspired by a neighbor, he left Niger for military school in Ivory Coast. He then moved on to a military academy in Cameroon.

Barmou’s father, a civil servant after Niger’s independence from France in 1960, discouraged his son from joining the army, hoping instead that he’d carry on with his studies.

But the younger Barmou was determined and joined up in 1989. The U.S. military pegged him early as a rising star and took steps to draw him into the American orbit.

In 1994, he attended an English-language course at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio. Now he’s so fluent in English, French and Hausa—a language spoken from Nigeria to Sudan—that one U.S. officer said at international conferences the general sometimes seemed to lose track of which one he was speaking.

The U.S. government sent Barmou to a series of courses at what was then called Fort Benning, Ga., training him to lead infantry attacks and parachute from airplanes. Among other interactions, he attended courses at the Joint Special Operations University, adjacent to U.S. Special Operations Command headquarters in Tampa.

As early as the 1990s, Niger recognized the threat from Islamist extremists, who at the time were pouring out of Algeria in search of sanctuary in Niger, Barmou recalled.

“While some other countries denied the fact that they had a terrorism issue, and some were still trying to negotiate with the terrorists, in Niger we decided we aren’t going to let this happen,” Barmou said in an interview in November.

In 2004, Barmou assumed command of Niger’s first special-forces company, trained by American commandos. He left the position three years later, moved to Washington, D.C., and earned a master’s in strategic security studies from National Defense University, on a campus where the Potomac and Anacostia rivers meet.

Back in West Africa, militant groups affiliated with al Qaeda and, later, Islamic State began to gain ground both through brutality and nimble exploitation of existing village grievances, such as disputes over land rights between herders and farmers. In some cases, al Qaeda fighters solidified their positions by marrying local women.

First, the militants swarmed Mali, and by 2017 they were conducting attacks in Burkina Faso and Niger. That year, four U.S. and five Nigerien soldiers were killed in an Islamic State ambush in the village of Tongo Tongo. American Green Beret teams have largely advised Barmou’s troops from positions out of harm’s way.

The U.S. considers Niger’s special forces to be among West Africa’s best, and, after military leaders in Mali and Burkina Faso kicked out Western troops, Washington looked to Niger as a firebreak against violent extremists. The U.S. was especially relieved that Niger showed no inclination to hire Wagner mercenaries.

“Since the very beginning, we’ve had this solid partnership with the U.S.,” Barmou said in November. “They’re very important for us.” Less than six weeks before Nigerien troops blockaded President Bazoum in his residence, the U.S. military posted a photo of Barmou smiling and embracing the commander of U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Lt. Gen. Jonathan Braga, at a Niamey air base shared by Nigerien and American troops. The visit’s aim was to discuss antiterrorism policy and tactics, according to an accompanying tweet.

Barmou embraces an unidentified American serviceman before a meeting in Niamey in June. The U.S. military tweeted the photo. PHOTO: STAFF SGT. AMY YOUNGER/U.S. AIR FORCE

At times, those professional alliances merged into personal friendships. Barmou once brought a cooked goat to a safe house in Niamey for a dinner with Hicks, then the American special-operations commander, and U.S. Embassy personnel.

That wasn’t the case with France, Niger’s former colonial power, and in meetings with U.S. counterparts, Barmou freely aired anti-French sentiments. In 2021, he hosted a New Year’s Eve party at his Niamey home, inviting U.S. and British but not French officers, according to a U.S. officer. The officer said Barmou resented France’s practice of conducting its own operations against militant groups without consulting Nigerien commanders.

Despite the slow start to talks between the U.S. and the junta, Barmou’s American friends hope he has the political wiggle room and personal inclination to lobby for a solution that keeps Niger on Washington’s side.

Nuland, however, left this week’s meeting with Barmou without so much as a promise of further talks. The junta declined to allow her to visit Bazoum, the imprisoned elected president, or Gen. Omar Tchiani, who in a matter of hours had gone from commander of Bazoum’s presidential guard to Bazoum’s self-appointed replacement.

“So we were left to have to depend on Mr. Barmou to make clear, again, what is at stake,” Nuland said.

Write to Michael M. Phillips at Michael.Phillips@wsj.com

27. Opinion | Putin chokes on the Ukrainian ‘porcupine’

On the subject of partisan resistance I often read comments about how civilian partisans lose protections under the Geneva convention if they participate in resistance operations which I assume is legally correct. But those who question this seem to imply that civilians should "protect" their protections under the Geneva convention and not participate in civilian partisan resistance. There are two issues with that. First, do the Russians honor the Geneva conventions and law of land warfare? Second, if civilians are faced with the existential threat to their existence from Russia should they not use all means to defend themselves, to include participating in resistance operations to defend their homeland? Should they suffer as slaves on their knees rather than die fighting on their feet?

Excerpts:

Putin still seems to believe he can exhaust Ukraine. Perhaps he imagines that if his battered army holds on, a pliant Donald Trump will return to the White House and give him what he wants. But Putin must contend with what I’d call the “three Ps” — a propaganda battle that he’s losing; a partisan warfare campaign inside territories Russia claims to have annexed; and growing political fragmentation at home.

“‘Waiting us out’ may be a bad bet on their part,” argues one senior administration official. I think he’s right.

...

On the propaganda front, the fence-sitters of the Global South appear to be leaning toward Ukraine. Representatives of Brazil, India, South Africa and Turkey met this past weekend in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to hear Ukrainian officials outline a peace proposal that centers on full withdrawal of Russian forces. A Chinese representative attended the gathering, which Ukraine’s foreign minister called a “breakthrough” and “a historic victory.”

...

Let’s turn to partisan warfare, and Ukraine’s armed resistance to Russia’s attempts to swallow the four regions it “annexed” last year. Social media reports describe a string of guerrilla attacks this year. Take the Zaporizhzhia region that borders the Sea of Azov: Russian officials or collaborators there were hit by two car bombs in January; an IED in February; a car bombing in March; a bomb in April; and two car bombs, a blown railway line and a sniper attack in June.

...

Finally, Putin faces increasing problems at home because of the convulsions created by his misadventure in Ukraine. A brilliant summary of Russia’s growing political disarray was published in Foreign Affairs this week by Tatiana Stanovaya, a well-connected analyst with the Carnegie Russian Center.

Opinion | Putin chokes on the Ukrainian ‘porcupine’

Columnist

August 8, 2023 at 6:45 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · August 8, 2023

As the Ukrainian military grinds forward in a costly summer offensive that hasn’t yet produced a breakthrough, there’s a palpable frustration in Kyiv and in Washington. Maybe it’s a useful moment to recall one of Ukraine’s hidden strengths. Biden administration officials called it the “porcupine strategy.”

Here’s how I paraphrased one White House official’s description of the challenge ahead in January 2022, a month before Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his attack: “How can the United States and its allies help Ukraine become a porcupine — a prickly, stubborn nation that would be hard for an invading Russian army to digest?”

Whatever else you say about the Ukraine war, that strategy has worked. Ukraine has proved utterly indigestible for the Russian military. Putin’s assault on Kyiv in the early months was a disastrous failure. The porcupine pushed the invaders back last year in Kharkiv and Kherson. And now, kilometer by kilometer, Ukraine is slowly advancing in the south and east.

“We adopted a strategy to make it as challenging as possible for Russia” if it invaded, explained Jon Finer, the deputy national security adviser. And it worked: Russia didn’t swallow Ukraine, and it probably never will.

Ukraine’s goal has now shifted from blocking the invaders to driving them out. But breaching Russian minefields has been agonizingly difficult — and costly in lives and equipment. Ukraine might yet achieve its goal of cutting the Russian corridor to Crimea this year and putting that prize at risk. But in just three months, October’s mud is likely to stall Ukraine’s advance.

Putin still seems to believe he can exhaust Ukraine. Perhaps he imagines that if his battered army holds on, a pliant Donald Trump will return to the White House and give him what he wants. But Putin must contend with what I’d call the “three Ps” — a propaganda battle that he’s losing; a partisan warfare campaign inside territories Russia claims to have annexed; and growing political fragmentation at home.

“‘Waiting us out’ may be a bad bet on their part,” argues one senior administration official. I think he’s right.

On the propaganda front, the fence-sitters of the Global South appear to be leaning toward Ukraine. Representatives of Brazil, India, South Africa and Turkey met this past weekend in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to hear Ukrainian officials outline a peace proposal that centers on full withdrawal of Russian forces. A Chinese representative attended the gathering, which Ukraine’s foreign minister called a “breakthrough” and “a historic victory.”

Russia’s response has been denial: Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov sputtered that the “futile” meeting was “doomed to failure.”

Let’s turn to partisan warfare, and Ukraine’s armed resistance to Russia’s attempts to swallow the four regions it “annexed” last year. Social media reports describe a string of guerrilla attacks this year. Take the Zaporizhzhia region that borders the Sea of Azov: Russian officials or collaborators there were hit by two car bombs in January; an IED in February; a car bombing in March; a bomb in April; and two car bombs, a blown railway line and a sniper attack in June.

Partisans in occupied Crimea reportedly blew up a gas pipeline in March and attacked railway lines in May and June and an ammunition dump in July. It’s a dirty war. Fighters are said to have attacked one collaborator while he was in a barber shop in Luhansk; they reportedly poisoned Russian officers who were celebrating Russian Navy Day in Mariupol, killing two and wounding 15.

Russia has cruelly tried to suppress resistance in these regions — transporting children from the occupied areas to Russia, and forcing residents to obtain Russian passports for medical care. These ghastly tactics are reminiscent of Joseph Stalin’s attempts to transfer populations and redraw borders. But the result now for Russia will probably be to create more indigestible lumps of opposition.

Putin might imagine that he can turn Ukraine into another “frozen conflict” if he drags the fighting on. But a generation of Ukrainians is learning to hate Russians, and the guerrilla-style combat will continue. Ukraine’s goal “is to put the lie to Russia’s claim of annexation and show how costly this will be,” says the senior U.S. official.

Finally, Putin faces increasing problems at home because of the convulsions created by his misadventure in Ukraine. A brilliant summary of Russia’s growing political disarray was published in Foreign Affairs this week by Tatiana Stanovaya, a well-connected analyst with the Carnegie Russian Center.

“The war has begun to change Russia, and profound internal shifts are likely underway — in Putin’s regime, in the elites’ perception of Putin, and in the public’s attitude toward the war,” she writes.

A fragmenting, demoralized Russia is a devil’s playground. In their disorientation, Russians seek order and victory. According to internal polls cited by Stanovaya, Russians support Putin more strongly than before the war, they’re angrier at the West and they express strong support for their troops. Russia’s internal disarray poses a severe dilemma for Putin, but it’s very dangerous for the West, too.

The simple fact is that Russia is choking on Ukraine. The porcupine won’t get any easier to swallow, no matter how long the war lasts.

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · August 8, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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