Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Always vote for principle, though you may vote alone, and you may cherish the sweetest reflection that your vote is never lost."

- John Quincy Adams

"Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph. What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly: it is dearness only that gives everything its value."

- Thomas Paine

"Blessed are the young, for they shall inherit the national debt."

- Herbert Hoover

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 24, 2023

2. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 24, 2023

3. Defecting Russian Mi-8 Helicopter Was Lured To Ukraine: Reports

4. USASOC study outlines measures to optimize female Soldiers

5. Prigozhin’s death shows that Russia is a mafia state

6. China Casts CIA as Villain in New Anti-Spying Push

7. Early Intelligence Suggests Prigozhin Was Assassinated, U.S. Officials Say

8. China’s Crisis of Confidence in Six Charts

9. US issues threat warning after hackers break into a satellite

10. US intel believes ‘intentional’ blast downed Wagner chief’s plane

11. Ukrainian pilots will learn to fly F-16s at US Air Force’s 162nd Wing

12. Ukraine says it landed troops on the shores of Russian-occupied Crimea

13. Retired Army Lawyer Will Oversee Pentagon’s War Court

14. Meet the tiny State Department offices clearing billions of dollars’ worth of weapons for Ukraine

15. Open Source Technology and Public-Private Innovation Are the Key to Ukraine’s Strategic Resilience

16. Ukrainians Are Cutting Open U.S. Cluster Shells To Make Drone Munitions

17. The Mercenary Always Loses

18. The Dangers of Broken Trust Between Military and Elected Officials

19. Russia Crushes Drone Swarm Over Crimea One Day After Commando Raid

20. The Price of Fragmentation – Why the Global Economy Isn’t Ready for the Shocks Ahead

21. The Folly Of Merging The Indo-Pacific And Europe – Analysis

22. Putin’s Night of the Long Knives

23. The error of NATO’s ways in Asia

24. New ship named after legendary Navy SEAL and Alaska Native

25. Preparing for the next global pandemic: What a recent wargame teaches us

26. HIMARS changed the game in Ukraine, but a former US artillery officer says what they need now is a firepower boost with M26 cluster rockets.

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 24, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2023

Key Takeaways:

The Wagner Group will likely no longer exist as a quasi-independent parallel military structure following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s almost certain assassination of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner founder Dmitry Utkin, and reported Wagner logistics and security head Valery Chekalov on August 23.
Putin delivered a brief de facto eulogy of Prigozhin and reportedly deceased Wagner leadership on August 24, and portrayed Prigozhin as his loyal subordinate up until his death, the armed rebellion notwithstanding.
The Wagner Council of Commanders have notably not released a public statement following the downing of Prigozhin’s plane.
Putin’s almost certain assassination of Wagner leadership has made it very clear that the Kremlin will be outwardly hostile to those that attempt to secure independence for their own parallel military structures.
The Russian information space largely refrained from linking the Kremlin and the Russian MoD to Prigozhin’s and Utkin’s assassination.
Ukrainian forces advanced closer to the Russian second line of defense in the Robotyne area in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 24, further widening their breach of Russian defensive lines in the area.
Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk reported that Russian forces are conducting additional lateral redeployments from Kherson Oblast to the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast, suggesting that Ukrainian forces have further degraded Russian defensive lines in the area.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 24, and reportedly advanced.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along at least two sectors of the front on August 24 and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 24, 2023

Aug 24, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 24, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 24, 2023, 7:50pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00pm ET on August 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Wagner Group will likely no longer exist as a quasi-independent parallel military structure following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s almost certain assassination of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner founder Dmitry Utkin, and reported Wagner logistics and security head Valery Chekalov on August 23. The death of Wagner’s central leadership disrupts Wagner’s ability to reverse the effects of the Kremlin’s and the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) campaign to weaken, subsume, and destroy the organization following the June 24 armed rebellion.[1] The Russian MoD has reportedly established private military companies (PMCs) that have been recruiting current and former Wagner personnel to assume control over Wagner’s operations abroad.[2] Russian sources claimed that the Kremlin refused to pay the Belarusian government for Wagner’s deployment to Belarus and that financial issues were already leading to reduced payments that were causing Wagner fighters to resign.[3] Satellite imagery from August 1 and 23 shows that Wagner had dismantled almost a third of the tents at its camp in Tsel, Asipovichy, Belarus in the previous month, suggesting that the effort to weaken Wagner may have resulted in a notable flight of Wagner personnel from the contingent in Belarus.[4] Some milbloggers denied claims that Wagner fighters are dismantling their camp in Tsel, however.[5] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on August 23 that an unspecified number of Wagner personnel at camps in Belarus began preparations to return to Russia following Prigozhin’s death.[6] The central Wagner leadership had brought Wagner to the height of its independence during the offensive to capture Bakhmut and was attempting to retain some semblance of that independence in the aftermath of Wagner’s rebellion.[7] The elimination of this central leadership likely ends any remaining means Wagner had to operate independently of the Russian MoD. It remains unclear whether the Kremlin intends for Wagner to completely dissipate or intends to reconstitute it as a much smaller organization completely subordinate to the Russian MoD. A third option—restoring Wagner as a quasi-independent organization under a new commander loyal to the Kremlin—is possible but unlikely.

Putin delivered a brief de facto eulogy of Prigozhin and reportedly deceased Wagner leadership on August 24, and portrayed Prigozhin as his loyal subordinate up until his death, the armed rebellion notwithstanding. Putin characterized Prigozhin as having a “difficult fate” in which he made “serious mistakes,” and Putin noted that he had known Prigozhin since the early 1990s. Putin notably stated that Prigozhin “achieved the necessary results both for himself and what I [Putin] asked him for – for a common cause, as in these last months.” Putin’s comment implies that Prigozhin had been fulfilling Putin’s orders recently and throughout their acquaintance and notably refrains from suggesting that Prigozhin had ever betrayed Putin, but subtly indicates that Prigozhin’s loyalty through the years was not enough to offset the “serious mistake” of launching a rebellion against the Russian military leadership. Putin’s speech largely confirms ISW’s prior assessment that Prigozhin did not intend to oust Putin during his June 24 rebellion and instead saw himself as loyal to Putin while seeking to force Putin to fire the Russian military leadership as he had been demanding.[8] A Russian insider source, citing an unnamed individual who knew Prigozhin, claimed that Prigozhin was confident that Putin would forgive him.[9] Prigozhin likely underestimated how seriously his rebellion had personally humiliated Putin. Prigozhin had also apparently overestimated the value of his own loyalty to Putin. Putin places significant value on loyalty and has frequently rewarded loyal Russian officials and military commanders even when they have failed. Prigozhin’s rebellion was an act of significant insubordination despite his claim that he rebelled out of loyalty to Russia.[10] Putin’s statement was therefore a warning to those currently loyal to Putin that some mistakes are too serious for loyalty to overcome.

The exact cause of Prigozhin’s plane crash remains unclear as US and Russian sources offered varying explanations, while Wagner-affiliated channels continued to call on Russian sources to stop speculating. US officials have provided different preliminary unconfirmed explanations for the plane crash: surface-to-air missiles, a bomb aboard the aircraft, or other sabotage.[11] Pentagon Spokesperson Brigadier General Patrick Ryder stated that the Pentagon currently has no indication that a surface-to-air missile downed the plane.[12] Russian state news outlet Kommersant reported on August 23 that sources close to the Russian Investigative Committee stated that there is no reason to believe that a terrorist attack downed Prigozhin’s plane, contradicting a Russian official who immediately blamed terrorism.[13] A Russian insider source previously reported that Russian authorities are setting conditions to blame the attack on terrorism.[14] The Russian information space largely continued to speculate about the potential causes of the crash, including mechanical failure, sabotage, surface-to-air missiles, and air-to-air missiles but noted the lack of information from Russian officials.[15] Some sources claimed that Russian authorities are investigating the possibility of an explosive device planted on the wing or landing gear, and one insider source claimed that Russian authorities are investigating Prigozhin’s personal pilot and the cofounder of MNT Aero, which owned the plane.[16] Many Wagner-affiliated channels tried to minimize this speculation by calling on the information space to wait until confirmed Wagner sources publish official information.[17]

The Wagner Council of Commanders have notably not released a public statement following the downing of Prigozhin’s plane. A Russian news aggregator claimed that the Wagner Council of Commanders met on the evening of August 23 to prepare a joint statement and announce what would happen to Wagner in the near future.[18] The Wagner Council of Commanders has not released any statement as of this publication, and several Wagner-affiliated sources emphasized that circulating reports about the contents of the expected statement are false.[19] The Wagner Council of Commanders’ silence may be due to chaos and confusion within their ranks following Prigozhin’s and Utkin’s assassination or due to explicit instructions from Russian authorities to remain silent. The Kremlin may view a public statement from the Wagner Council of Commanders as an attempt to organize and reconstitute an independent Wagner force that could continue to threaten the Kremlin and the Russian MoD. Putin’s willingness to publicly assassinate the Wagner leadership is likely prompting the Wagner Council of Commanders to refrain from publicly appointing successors to Prigozhin and Utkin at this time. A member of the Wagner Council of Commanders personally selected by Putin to replace Prigozhin now would risk becoming the focus of the ire of Wagner rank and file upset about the assassination of Wagner’s leadership.

Putin’s almost certain assassination of Wagner’s leadership has made it very clear that the Kremlin will be outwardly hostile to those who attempt to secure independence for their own parallel military structures. ISW previously assessed that Putin’s demonstrative assassination of Wagner’s leadership was meant to reassert his dominance and exact vengeance for the humiliation of Wagner’s rebellion, and specific individuals who may have planned to oppose Putin, the Kremlin, or the MoD likely took note.[20] The Kremlin will likely view any future efforts to establish independent parallel military structures explicitly through the prism of its experience with Wagner and Prigozhin. The assassination of Wagner’s leadership will likely serve as a standing threat against those with designs on creating parallel military structures reminiscent of Wagner.

The June 24 agreement between Putin, Prigozhin, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko was likely invalidated by the destruction of Prigozhin’s aircraft, and Lukashenko will likely remain silent on the matter to avoid provoking Putin and further risking his already vulnerable position. Prigozhin’s safety and survival were likely crucial to the June 24 agreement in which Putin allegedly promised unspecified “security guarantees” to Prigozhin and the Wagner Group in Belarus.[21] Prigozhin’s death likely canceled a key pillar of this agreement, rendering the rest of it moot. Lukashenko will likely remain silent on the matter so as to not provoke Putin, especially since Lukashenko’s act of directly negotiating with Prigozhin in June and then bragging about the role he had played notably embarrassed Putin. Prigozhin’s assassination has likely signaled to Lukashenko both a dramatic reduction of his negotiating space with the Kremlin and an implicit threat against his continued attempts to resist Union State integration efforts.[22]

Putin may avoid making Prigozhin a martyr, but Utkin’s assassination will likely become a long-term grievance for Wagner personnel. ISW had long assessed that Putin refrained from eliminating Prigozhin out of fears of angering Wagner personnel, and he may have determined that he had sufficiently separated Wagner from Prigozhin in the months since the rebellion and could assassinate Prigozhin without prompting a serious backlash.[23] Putin’s likely calculus for killing Utkin probably focused more on the immediate opportunity to destroy Wagner’s leadership completely and less on the ramifications of Utkin’s death. There has been an outpouring of support and condolences for both Prigozhin and Utkin following the downing of the plane on August 23, although Wagner-affiliated sources appear to be more heavily focusing on their loss of Utkin.[24] A prominent Wagner-affiliated channel posted primarily about Utkin on August 24 and stated that Utkin will be forever inscribed in Russian military history.[25] Grievances over Utkin’s assassination may become a focal point for future conflicts between the Russian military establishment and current and former Wagner personnel. Wagner personnel are unlikely to conduct immediate reprisals against those they view as responsible for Utkin’s death, however.

The Russian information space largely refrained from linking the Kremlin and the Russian MoD to Prigozhin’s and Utkin’s assassination. Russian milbloggers and insider sources largely discussed new reports about the ongoing investigation and entertained theories that an explosive device may have led to the crash.[26] One milblogger criticized the other milbloggers for devaluing the work of the departments responsible for preventing terrorist attacks by promulgating a narrative of a terrorist attack on board Prigozhin’s plane.[27] Another milblogger claimed that Wagner is a household name that will not be forgotten in Russia even if Wagner is disbanded and its personnel is persecuted.[28] A Wagner-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russia had lost its military elite – the Wagner Group – as a result of Prigozhin’s death.[29]

Ukrainian forces advanced closer to the Russian second line of defense in the Robotyne area in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 24, further widening their breach of Russian defensive lines in the area. Geolocated footage published on August 24 shows that Ukrainian forces advanced further towards the Russian defensive lines west of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) and into southern Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[30] Some Russian milbloggers indicated that Russian forces maintain limited if any, positions in southern Robotyne and that fighting continues east of Robotyne.[31] A prominent Russian milblogger expressed concern at the Ukrainian breach of Russian defensive lines in western Zaporizhia Oblast and stated that this is a critical moment on the battlefield.[32] The milblogger stated that Russian forces need to hold their positions for at least another month and a half to try to make gains in another area of the frontline and attempt to shift the battlefield situation in favor of Russian forces.[33] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valeri Zaluzhnyi responded to criticisms about the Ukrainian counteroffensive by stating that it was not a counterinsurgency but the Battle of Kursk, referencing a weeks-long World War II battle that ultimately allowed the Soviet army to regain the battlefield initiative and recapture significant swaths of territory.[34]

Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk reported that Russian forces are conducting additional lateral redeployments from Kherson Oblast to the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast, suggesting that Ukrainian forces have further degraded Russian defensive lines in the area. Humenyuk reported on August 23 that Russian forces are transferring units from the Kherson direction to the Zaporizhia direction due to the large number of wounded personnel among forces defending in Zaporizhia Oblast.[35] Humenyuk did not specify the Russian formations or units that are laterally redeploying to the Zaporizhia direction, nor did she specify whether the Russian forces are transferring to western Zaporizhia Oblast or to the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[36] Russian forces laterally redeployed elements of the 7th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division from the Kherson direction to the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area following the start of the counteroffensive in June and additional elements to the Robotyne area in western Zaporizhia Oblast in early August.[37] Humenyuk’s reporting supports ISW’s previous assessment that Russia’s lack of operational reserves will force the Russian command to conduct additional redeployments as Ukrainian counteroffensive operations continue to degrade defending Russian forces in several sectors of the front.[38] Russian lateral redeployments will likely weaken the Russian defensive lines in aggregate as these transfers offer Ukrainian forces additional opportunities for exploitation.[39] Exploiting these opportunities or preventing further lateral reinforcements will likely require Ukrainian forces to continue efforts in several sectors of the front that either pin Russian forces to a certain area or present the Russian command with dilemmas about which axes to reinforce.[40] A Ukrainian offensive focused exclusively on a single axis would allow Russian forces to laterally redeploy forces from elsewhere in Ukraine without worrying about the consequences of weakening other sectors of the front as ISW has previously observed.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated boilerplate anti-Western rhetoric at the BRICS summit on August 24 despite some members’ statements against turning BRICS into an “anti-Western” organization. Putin made claims about the BRICS countries’ “unanimous” support for the formation of a multipolar world and reiterated boilerplate Russian rhetoric aimed at painting Russia and its partners as opposing the West.[41] Some founding BRICS countries seemed less willing to fully align with Russia and its anti-Western rhetoric during the BRICS summit; Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva said that he did not want BRICS to be a “counterpoint to the G7, G20, or the United States.” South Africa’s representative in the BRICS negotiations, Anil Sooklal, stated that “BRICS is not anti-West.”[42] The BRICS countries adopted the Johannesburg II Declaration on August 24 which included standard statements promoting multilateralism and more representation for developing countries in international organizations.[43] The BRICS countries also announced that they invited Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to join the organization in 2024.[44]

Russian forces conducted a missile strike on Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on August 24. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast, an Iskander-K ballistic missile from Crimea, and likely S-300 missiles from occupied Tokmak at Dnipro City.[45] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Head Serhiy Lysak reported that Ukrainian Eastern Air Command shot down one missile but that the other Russian missiles struck transportation infrastructure in the city.[46]

Ukrainian forces conducted a limited raid on the western shore of occupied Crimea on August 24. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) posted footage and announced that Ukrainian forces landed on the shores near Olenivka and Mayak (both 116km northeast of Sevastopol).[47] The GUR reported that Ukrainian forces skirmished with Russian forces and raised a Ukrainian flag prior to leaving the shore.[48] Most Russian sources dismissed the landing as insignificant, but some prominent milbloggers expressed concern about Russian defensive vulnerabilities in the western Black Sea and western Crimea.[49]

Key Takeaways:

The Wagner Group will likely no longer exist as a quasi-independent parallel military structure following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s almost certain assassination of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner founder Dmitry Utkin, and reported Wagner logistics and security head Valery Chekalov on August 23.
Putin delivered a brief de facto eulogy of Prigozhin and reportedly deceased Wagner leadership on August 24, and portrayed Prigozhin as his loyal subordinate up until his death, the armed rebellion notwithstanding.
The Wagner Council of Commanders have notably not released a public statement following the downing of Prigozhin’s plane.
Putin’s almost certain assassination of Wagner leadership has made it very clear that the Kremlin will be outwardly hostile to those that attempt to secure independence for their own parallel military structures.
The Russian information space largely refrained from linking the Kremlin and the Russian MoD to Prigozhin’s and Utkin’s assassination.
Ukrainian forces advanced closer to the Russian second line of defense in the Robotyne area in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 24, further widening their breach of Russian defensive lines in the area.
Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk reported that Russian forces are conducting additional lateral redeployments from Kherson Oblast to the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast, suggesting that Ukrainian forces have further degraded Russian defensive lines in the area.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 24, and reportedly advanced.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along at least two sectors of the front on August 24 and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukranian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 24 and reportedly advanced. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novoyehorivka (15km southwest of Svatove).[50] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna), Kreminna, and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and that Russian forces plan to regroup and replace troops in the Lyman direction.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control most of Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk).[52] Some Russian milbloggers claimed on August 23 that Russian forces are advancing on Bilohorivka and control the road to Hryhorivka (11km south of Kreminna) from Bilohorivka, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that positional battles are ongoing near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area.[54]

Russian officials claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance on August 24. The Russian MoD and Russian Central Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Alexander Savchuk claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Synkivka, Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove), Novoyehorivka, Hryhorivka, Torske, Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna), the Serebryanske forest area, and Berestove (30km south of Kreminna).[55]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut direction on August 24 and advanced north of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage published on August 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced west of Zaliznyanske (12km northwest of Bakhmut).[56] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Bakhmut.[57] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces continue to gradually advance in the Bakhmut direction.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made unspecified advances near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and captured Russian forward positions west of the settlement.[59] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Pivnichne (21km southwest of Bakhmut).[60]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked north of Bakhmut near Vesele (19km north of Bakhmut) on August 24.[61]

The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited unsuccessful ground attacks near Nevelske (14km southwest of Avdiivka) on August 24.[62]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front on August 24 but did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults south of Avdiivka, near Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka), and northwest of Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[63] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian assaults in Marinka and south of Avdiivka were unsuccessful.[64]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 24 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[65] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Pryyutne and Staromlynivka (15km south of Velyka Novosilka).[66] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces control Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) but that the speed of Ukrainian advances in the area has slowed.[67]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 24 and advanced closer to Russian secondary defensive lines. Geolocated footage published on August 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in southern Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[68] Additional geolocated footage published on August 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces also advanced east of Robotyne towards Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[69] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified success in the direction of Novodanylivka (5km south of Orikhiv) and Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv).[70] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to advance near Robotyne and towards Novopokropivka on the evening of August 23.[71] Some Russian sources claimed on August 24 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Novoprokopivka, however.[72] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted armored attacks in southern Robotyne and east of the settlement.[73] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces only control the northern part of Robotyne and one Russian milblogger claimed that neither side controls central Robotyne.[74] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces control most of the settlement, however.[75] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled five Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne and near the Balka Uspenivka area (11km southeast of Orikhiv).[76]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 24 but did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Mala Tokmachka (9km southeast of Orikhiv).[77] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces counterattacked in Robotyne and pushed Ukrainian forces from the northern part of the settlement.[78]

Ukrainian forces continued limited raids on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on August 24. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command posted footage and reported that Ukrainian forces temporarily raised a large flag on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[79] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck several Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups that landed on unspecified islands in the Dnipro River delta and repelled several groups attempting to land on the east (left) bank between Hola Prystan (10km southwest of Kherson City) and Kardashynka (7km south of Kherson City).[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions near Oleshky (8km southeast of Kherson City) and the Antonivsky Bridge.[81]

Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the command post of an unspecified element of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) in Tokmak on August 24.[82]

Russian forces reportedly struck a Ukrainian S-300 air defense system in Mykolaiv Oblast. Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Russian airstrikes destroyed two missile launchers, a radar station, and the command-and-control center of a Ukrainian S-300 system near Zelenyi Hai (13km east of Mykolaiv City), Mykolaiv Oblast.[83] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the strike was a response to the Ukrainian strike on a Russian air defense system in Crimea on August 23.[84]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue preparations for the September 2023 regional elections. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration claimed that it trained its final batch of election observers.[85] Russian Public Chamber official Alena Bulgakova claimed that the Russian Public Chamber has trained 50,000 election observers and hopes to train 100,000 observers by the start of elections.[86] Russian authorities likely aim to use election observers to falsely portray elections in occupied Ukraine as transparent and legitimate.[87] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported that the Kherson branch of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party adopted an election platform and that the Kherson branches of the Russian Communist, Liberal Democratic, and Just Russia parties will also vote for election platforms.[88] Russian Central Election Commission Chairperson Ella Pamfilova claimed that the elections in occupied Ukraine are highly competitive.[89] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian and occupation authorities are struggling to find willing collaborators or attract Russians to take positions in occupation administrations, however.[90]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) countries will participate in the “Combat Brotherhood” joint exercises in Belarus from September 1 to 6.[91]

Belarusian maneuver elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus. The Belarusian MoD stated that elements of the 11th and 120th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigades conducted live fire and other tactical exercises.[92]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 24, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-24-2023

Key Takeaways

The Kuomintang (KMT) is facing several internal disputes as the party falls further behind in the presidential election polls.
The flagship CCP journal Qiushi republished a February article by Xi Jinping on August 15 that emphasized “Chinese-style modernization.” This content of the publication and its reprinting indicates that the party aims to buttress support for spreading its political and economic governance models in formerly colonized countries.
The CCP outlet Red Flag Manuscript published an article on August 14 about the necessity of recapturing the spirit of “revolutionary patriotism” embodied by the Chinese military during the Korean War. The content of the article indicates that creating ideological alignment amongst PLA leadership is becoming increasingly necessary in order to prepare for future wars.

CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, AUGUST 24, 2023

Aug 24, 2023 - Press ISW

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 24, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson, Eli Kravinsky, and Ian Jones of the Institute for the Study of War, Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: August 22 at 5pm

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

The Kuomintang (KMT) is facing several internal disputes as the party falls further behind in the presidential election polls.
The flagship CCP journal Qiushi republished a February article by Xi Jinping on August 15 that emphasized “Chinese-style modernization.” This content of the publication and its reprinting indicates that the party aims to buttress support for spreading its political and economic governance models in formerly colonized countries.
The CCP outlet Red Flag Manuscript published an article on August 14 about the necessity of recapturing the spirit of “revolutionary patriotism” embodied by the Chinese military during the Korean War. The content of the article indicates that creating ideological alignment amongst PLA leadership is becoming increasingly necessary in order to prepare for future wars.

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

The Republic of China (Taiwan) Vice President and Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Lai Ching-te transited through the United States on August 12 and August 16. ISW will produce a forthcoming follow-up article to the pre-transit August 9 publication.

The Kuomintang (KMT) is facing several internal disputes as the party falls further behind in the presidential election polls. A faction in the party sought and failed to replace the KMT Chairman Eric Chu, who risked drawing the KMT into another scandal. Several KMT officials also recently left the party and raised concerns over the KMT’s internal decision-making process.[1] An August 21 Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation Poll shows Hou as polling at 13.6 percentage points of support compared to the leading candidate, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Lai Ching-te, at 43.4 percentage points.[2] This is a change from July when Hou polled 20.2 percentage points while Lai polled 36.4 percentage points.[3]

KMT Chairman Eric Chu publicly stated his support for Taiwan People’s Party Hsinchu Mayor Kao Hung-an after the Taipei District Prosecutors indicted her for corruption on August 14.[4] This angered KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih’s campaign manager Jin Pucong because he did not want the Hou campaign to become involved in the scandal.[5] A faction within the KMT also unsuccessfully submitted a proposal on July 19 to replace Chu as the party chairman.[6] Chu also stated in July that party “guns should be [focused] externally.”[7]
Several local KMT officials have also left the party. Former Miaoli County Magistrate Hsu Yao-Chang left the KMT on August 22 criticizing the KMT’s “minority decision-making and backroom politics.”[8] Hsu previously caused controversy by stating that “we not only want the DPP to step down, we also want to take down the KMT” at a rally with Terry Gou.[9] Gou is an ROC billionaire who maintains a popular base of support in the KMT.

The failure of the KMT to address these internal disputes and regain its footing in the polls likely would deny the CCP its most preferred ROC presidential candidate to influence cross-strait policy. ISW assessed in May that the CCP is framing the ROC presidential election as a choice between peace and war, which provides the party leverage points over the cross-strait policy of the three major Taiwanese political parties.[10] ISW also assessed that this electoral framing would confer leverage over a KMT administration. It would enable the CCP to frame cross-strait economic integration and political dialogue on the PRC’s terms as necessary to maintain peace.[11]

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update...

The flagship CCP journal Qiushi republished a February article by Xi Jinping on August 15 that emphasized “Chinese-style modernization.” This content of the publication and its reprinting indicates that the party aims to buttress support for spreading its political and economic governance models in formerly colonized countries. Xi drew on the historical memory of Western modernization as one “full of bloody crimes such as war, slavery, [and] colonialism” that caused developing countries great suffering. He stated that China experienced “the tragic history of aggression and humiliation by Western powers” and will “never repeat [this] old path.”[12] Xi parlayed this shared historical memory of colonial grievance into a counter narrative that “Chinese-style modernization” is purely peaceful and economically responsible.[13] The timing of the release in the week before the ongoing BRICS summit, as well as the article’s harsh anti-Western tone, suggests the party’s aim was to degrade Western influence while exporting its own authoritarian model to developing countries.

The spread of CCP governance and economic influence in developing countries previously undermined the international definition of human rights in October 2022. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) successfully garnered votes from several African countries to help defeat a motion in the United Nations to debate human rights abuses against Uyghurs in Xinjiang. This came after the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report on August 31, 2022, that assessed PRC actions in Xinjiang “may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.”[14] The PRC’s success in voting down the debate despite the report demonstrates the international implications for global governing norms that arise from the party’s authoritarian economic and political support in developing countries.

The CCP outlet Red Flag Manuscript published an article on August 14 about the necessity of recapturing the spirit of “revolutionary patriotism” embodied by the Chinese military during the Korean War.[15] The content of the article indicates that creating ideological alignment amongst PLA leadership is becoming increasingly necessary to prepare for future wars.

The article entitled “Carrying Forward the Great Spirit of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea” discusses the heroism and patriotism of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV). It also conveys the lessons on instilling a revolutionary mindset that the Chinese people should carry into the modern day.

The main audience of Red Flag Manuscript includes PLA leadership, CCP party theorists, and everyday party cadre. Readers of this article would likely recognize that its evaluations on the state of the modern PLA reflect several enduring self-criticisms that can be traced back to 2012 when Xi Jinping stated his intention to increase the PLA’s combat abilities across all services.[16] The most commonly mentioned weakness within PLA academic journals and publications such as PLA Daily is the lack of effective PLA leadership. One of the most commonly cited criticisms is known as the “Five Incapables,” which states that many PLA officers are not capable of judging situations, understanding the intentions of higher authorities, making operational decisions, deploying troops, or dealing with unexpected situations.[17] This description of many PLA officers as incapable of basic military leadership stands in stark contrast to the heroic historical figures discussed in the article. This contrast emphasizes how lacking modern PLA leaders are by comparison. As the article mentions, significant attention within the PLA has been given to reforming ideological education and political work to instill patriotic values in the ranks of PLA soldiers. While this may result in future generations of PLA leadership more closely adhering to party ideology, current educational reform efforts do not address the full extent of problems within current PLA leadership.

The article’s timing reflects the continued salience of these ideas and their current relevance to the PLA. In an October 2020 speech commemorating the 70th anniversary of China’s entry into the Korean War, Xi Jinping characterized the war as a victory for China against U.S. injustice and imperialism.[18] According to Xi, the “martial spirit” displayed by the CPV should guide the Chinese people to overcome today’s challenges. Xi then reminded the audience that it is sometimes necessary to “use war to prevent war,” and use the military victory to win respect. The phrase “using war to prevent war” refers to the party’s idea that escalation and smaller conflicts can be useful tools in preventing a large-scale war.

The author of the article, Fan Jing, has researched theories of military political work on behalf of the Military Political Work Research Institute of the Academy of Military Sciences for many years.[19] The Academy of Military Sciences is a high-level research institute of the PLA, and the Military Political Work Research Institute conducts research concerning the political work done within the PLA. Fan has published over 60 articles on the subject, including a longer piece on the lessons of the Korean War published a year earlier.[20] While the general sentiment of these two pieces is similar, the first article provided a purely historical overview of the conflict, whereas the more recent article stated that the heroism of the past should characterize the PRC’s future actions as it works towards the goal of national rejuvenation.

3. Defecting Russian Mi-8 Helicopter Was Lured To Ukraine: Reports

Defecting Russian Mi-8 Helicopter Was Lured To Ukraine: Reports

Claims swirl around a Mi-8 combat transport helicopter and its crew that ended up in Ukrainian hands.

THOMAS NEWDICK

PUBLISHED AUG 23, 2023 6:26 PM EDT

thedrive.com · by Thomas Newdick · August 23, 2023

In what’s probably one of the more remarkable stories to come out of the Russia-Ukraine air war, reports emerged today of an apparent defection to Ukraine by a Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS, in its Russian abbreviation) Mi-8AMTSh Hip combat transport helicopter, in what is claimed to have been a long-planned Ukrainian intelligence operation.

If true, not only did the Mi-8 and at least some of its crew end up in Ukrainian hands, but the helicopter’s cargo consisted of undisclosed parts for VKS Su-27 and Su-30SM Flanker fighters, which were being transported between two airbases. That is the claim made by the Ukrainska Pravda newspaper, citing sources in Ukrainian defense intelligence, and the chief of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence has also confirmed the basics of the story.

Those Russian airbases have not been named, and the exact route taken by the helicopter into Ukraine is unclear, although there are suggestions it landed somewhere near Poltava, in central Ukraine.

The approximate location of Poltava in Ukraine. Google Earth

The reports suggest that Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence planned the operation over a six-month period, before achieving success. The pilot of the Hip was apparently convinced to defect, with members of his family already having been moved to Ukraine for their own safety. It is not known if there was also a financial incentive, but that would not be unheard of in this kind of situation.

The most comprehensive account of the incident was provided by the head of the Main Directorate of Intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, speaking to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. He confirmed that the operation had happened, stating:

“We were able to find the right approach to the man, we were able to create the conditions to take out the whole family unnoticed, and ultimately create the conditions so that he was able to overrun this aircraft with a crew that did not know what was going on. When they realized where they had landed, they tried to run away. Unfortunately, they were destroyed; we would have liked to [take them] alive, but we have what we have.”

Budanov said the captured helicopter was now in Kyiv and that the pilot wanted to stay in the country.

Russian sources also confirmed that a VKS Mi-8ATSh had ended up in Ukraine, bu provided different reasons as to why. According to Fighterbomber, a prominent pro-Russian military channel on Telegram, the incident took place “a couple of weeks ago,” after the helicopter’s crew lost their way.

“The crew, for some reason, lost their bearings and crossed the border,” Fighterbomber stated, as well as confirming that a photo circulating in Ukrainian media was that of the Mi-8 involved.

The Mi-8 crossed the border into Ukraine with three individuals on board, Fighterbomber says, although the identity of the others is unclear. For normal transport missions, the Mi-8AMTSh is operated by a crew of three: pilot, pilot-navigator, and flight technician.

Fighterbomber also refuted claims that the pilot’s family had been moved to Ukraine in advance and said that they were in contact with relatives of all crew members.

The same Russian source also agreed that two crew members were likely killed, in an apparent firefight with Ukrainian soldiers:

“Realizing where they landed, [the crew] attempted to take off, but were shot while the helicopter was on the ground. Presumably, two crew members died, and the commander was taken hostage.”

None of these specifics can be independently verified, at this stage.

Not surprisingly, for an operation of this scope, Ukrainian officials have otherwise provided little in the way of detail.

However, Andriy Yusov, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence, told state television: “There will be official information. We need to wait a little bit — we are working on it, including with the crew.”

That statement would seem to cast doubt on claims that both other crew members had been killed.

At the same time, Yusov appeared to confirm the general aspects of the incident, including that a Mi-8 had landed in Ukraine.

That’s not to say the Hip might not genuinely have become lost and accidentally crossed the Ukrainian border before landing in hostile territory. It could also potentially have been forced down by enemy action or a technical malfunction.

On the other hand, a defecting and compliant VKS combat pilot would be a very valuable intelligence windfall for Ukraine. As one of the latest versions of the long-established Mi-8 Hip design, the Mi-8AMTSh may also be of interest for closer examination, especially if fitted with some of the more modern Russian self-protection equipment.

Meanwhile the various Flanker jet parts — depending on what exactly they consisted of — could potentially yield even greater intelligence benefits. All this could be useful for Ukrainian allies, too, with an established intelligence-sharing program to better understand various bits of Russian defense technology and tactics and share these lessons.

Either way, the incident is another embarrassment for the Russian Armed Forces and the VKS in particular.

Just three days ago, an apparent Ukrainian drone strike on Soltsy-2 airbase in Russia destroyed at least one Tu-22M3 Backfire bomber, evidence of which we were able to look at in more detail thanks to satellite imagery that emerged yesterday.

A close-up of a Planet Labs satellite image showing the burned remains of a Russian Tu-22M3 Backfire bomber destroyed during a Ukrainian drone attack last week at the Stoltsy-2 airbase in Russia. PHOTO © 2023 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

That incident, taking place more than 400 miles north of the Ukrainian border, was just the latest in a string of Ukrainian attacks, or attempted attacks against the VKS outside of Ukraine. These have mainly targeted VKS bombers, but also highly valuable airborne early warning platforms, at bases in Russia, Russian-occupied Crimea, and Belarus.

While the bombers of the VKS have maintained a steady campaign of mainly missile strikes against Ukrainian targets, including civilian ones, the tactical aviation arm — including helicopters — has been generally less effective, especially against Ukrainian ground-based air defenses, which have extracted a heavy toll. As a result, the VKS has not yet managed to establish air superiority over Ukraine, despite the much inferior equipment and small size of the Ukrainian Air Force.

Nevertheless, there are signs that the VKS has been more successful in holding back the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive, with attack helicopters in particular scoring valuable kills against Ukrainian armor. At the same time, changing tactics have seen VKS tactical jets lobbing glide bombs against battlefield and infrastructure targets, in a tactic against which Ukrainian air defenses are apparently impotent — at least for the time being.

The VKS was also struck another blow today, when its commander, Gen. Sergei Surovikin, was relieved of his command. His became the highest-level sacking yet of a military commander, after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s abortive mutiny in June. Prigozhin had previously publicly voiced his support for Surovikin, which seems to have sealed the general’s fate.

The fallout from that attempted coup may have also claimed the life of Prigozhin, whose business jet crashed in northern Russia today, killing all on board, as you can read about here.

Surovikin was put on extended leave before being removed and the repercussions may well extend beyond the VKS. After all, there are now questions about whether Surovikin was aware of the plans for the mutiny or perhaps even aided it.

Taken together with the reported Mi-8AMTSh defection, this has turned out to be an altogether highly unfortunate day for the beleaguered Russian Aerospace Forces.

Contact the author: thomas@thedrive.com

thedrive.com · by Thomas Newdick · August 23, 2023

4. USASOC study outlines measures to optimize female Soldiers

We have seen the reports about women in SOF for the past couple days. This is from the Army PAO.

The 106 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.soc.mil/wia/women-in-arsof-report-2023.pdf

The report was signed out by LTG Braga. I recommend reading the report to get a fuller picture of the issues and the recommendations rather than the somewhat sensational reporting.

Whatever you might think of these issues, USASOC is being transparent and airing all the issues publicly as well as the plans to make improvements.

USASOC study outlines measures to optimize female Soldiers

https://www.army.mil/article/269270/usasoc_study_outlines_measures_to_optimize_female_soldiers?utm

By Joe Lacdan, Army News ServiceAugust 22, 2023

WASHINGTON — To better address obstacles facing female Soldiers serving in special operations units and to retain its top talent, Army Special Operations Command outlined 42 recommendations in a study released Monday.

The research’s findings will guide USASOC in optimizing female warfighters while noting their physical and anatomical differences.

“It is not about providing accommodations for women,” said USASOC Command Sgt. Maj. JoAnn Naumann. “It's providing tools that allow women to maximize their performance and continue to serve at all levels and across time.”

During the yearlong study, researchers found that 44% of the female Soldiers surveyed said they experienced equipment-fitting challenges relating to body armor, helmets and ruck systems. The problem can impact women’s abilities to perform basic Soldier maneuvers and skills.

Female Soldiers also reported that the time they spent planning pregnancies negatively impacted their careers, leading to Soldiers scheduling childbearing around career milestones or avoiding pregnancy entirely, according to the 106-page report, titled, “Breaking Barriers: Women in Army Special Operations Forces.”

Researchers held more than 40 focus groups and interviews with women and men from across the force. The study focused on the areas of equipment fitting, childcare, gender bias, social support, sexual harassment, pregnancy and postpartum, and morale and wellbeing. Retired Lt. Gen. Francis Beaudette, former USASOC commander, initiated the 2021 study, which had more than 5,000 respondents. Additionally, the survey addressed other concerns including challenges of small-statured Soldiers and access to healthcare.

The study also explored attitudes towards females serving in combat and special operations units. The survey results showed Soldiers had a favorable view of women serving in special operations units with no reported decline in morale. About 72% of women and 64% of men surveyed said they would support their daughter joining Army special operations units.

According to findings, 80% of men reported that gender-related concerns had no impact on their decision to remain in special operations forces. Researchers found most gender-biased comments and attitudes during the study came from senior NCOs, indicating a difference in generational views, Naumann said.

“Although disappointed by some of the findings and comments in the study, we are committed to addressing these issues with candor and transparency,” Lt. Gen. Jonathan Braga, USASOC commander wrote in the report’s introduction.

“To change culture takes time,” Braga added. “We have to be better — we must be better.”

The Women in ARSOF Initiative outlined three lines of effort to address the hurdles: mentorship and sponsorship, health and readiness, and modernization.

For mentorship and sponsorship, units can create a “culture of excellence” through education and accountability, said Lt. Col. Rachel Cepis, the director of the Women in ARSOF Initiative. For example, the Army can host more educational forums where Soldiers can learn how to schedule duties around breastfeeding or deal with postpartum related issues, as well as women’s health and nutrition.

Survey participants that have had children listed the top five postpartum challenges: (1) depression, stress, and anxiety, (2) inability to perform to the same level as the unit, (3) lactation, (4) maternity leave, and (5) diastasis recti abdominus.

Focus group participants said they experienced hardship finding adequate care during and after pregnancy. Soldiers also voiced concerns about pregnancy hindering career progression and having adequate breastfeeding locations, as well as convalescent leave following miscarriages.

The 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Carson, Colorado began a female mentorship program, while the 3rd Special Forces Group and 528th Sustainment Brigade at Fort Liberty, North Carolina, plan to establish a similar initiative at each battalion headquarters. The 528th Sustainment Brigade also hosts monthly engagements with female Soldiers.

“We're looking at it holistically. I'm excited to see the growth of women in our formation in all positions,” Cepis said. “And I'm thrilled that we're looking at ways to help them perform at their maximum potential.”

“This is about driving change and making ultimately, ARSOF and the [Defense Department] better,” she added.

In the second line of effort, health and readiness, USASOC partnered with Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine in Natick, Massachusetts to study physiological, metabolic and psychological responses during and after completion of extreme and prolonged training. USASOC has also submitted four topics to the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services 2024 research solicitation: (1) women’s physical and physiological characteristics of elite female warfighters, (2) pregnancy and postpartum impacts on readiness, (3) long and short-term impacts of intentional dehydration, and (4) endocrine adaptations of female warfighters.

Cepis said USASOC is working with the Army, SOCOM, and academic partners to study the effects of menstrual cycles on female warfighters and ways to maximize performance. USASOC plans to examine sicknesses and illnesses that females suffer in the field and explore how to avoid musculoskeletal injuries related to female anatomy differences, she added.

Finally in modernization, the study recognizes the anatomical and anthropometric differences between men and women and Army Combat Capabilities Development Command [DEVCOM] at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland will be modernizing dress and duty uniforms as well as body armor that better fits the varying body types and sizes.

USASOC has done limited user assessments with the Army Modular Scalable Body Armor, a lightweight, adjustable bulletproof vest, and the Army Integrated Helmet Protection System, a multi-faceted head gear, which consists of protection and retention systems, a helmet cover and hearing protection.

The Women in ARSOF Director has partnered with DEVCOM to better develop items ranging from pregnant female service uniforms to female urinary devices.

USASOC founded the Women in ARSOF Initiative to specifically study female-modernization challenges while advising Army and SOF senior leaders. ARSOF also began publishing a newsletter series, created an online platform and developed a portal site to keep Soldiers updated on the study findings and ongoing efforts.

“I have never felt so heard and understood in my career until [the newsletter] started being published,” wrote a 25-year-old Soldier who has spent five years in special operations forces.

USASOC, headquartered at Fort Liberty, North Carolina, trains, equips and educates special operations units in support of the joint force.

5. Prigozhin’s death shows that Russia is a mafia state

Excerpts:

For all that, Mr Prigozhin’s death marks the further decay of the Russian state. Mr Putin is a supreme example of why never-ending one-man rule is so ruinous. The more power is concentrated, the more Mr Putin and his obsessions, whims and resentments become the face of Russia itself.

The killing of Mr Prigozhin extends that dismal pattern. After mutinies challenge the state’s monopoly of the use of force, a healthy country restores order using the justice system. Mr Putin prefers ostentatious violence instead. Yet this will not restore order so much as reimpose the balance of terror. It further distances Russia from the rule of law and the institutions that every modern country depends on for competent and steady government. It leaves Russia in a miserable state.

Prigozhin’s death shows that Russia is a mafia state

A healthy country uses justice to restore order. Mr Putin uses violence instead

Aug 24th 2023

The Economist

As we published this editorial, it was not certain that Yevgeny Prigozhin’s private jet was shot down by Russian air-defences, or that the mutineer and mercenary boss was on board. But everyone believes that it was and that his death was a punishment of spectacular ruthlessness ordered by Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin. And that is the way Mr Putin likes it.

If Mr Prigozhin is confirmed dead, Mr Putin will emerge stronger. For the moment at least, he will have seen off the biggest immediate threat to his 23-year rule. But the death also exposes the growing weakness of the system he created. Mr Putin has pretensions to being the tsar of a great power, but in reality his rotting empire runs as never before on lies, bribery and repression. And, as this killing shows, Russia’s ultimate authority is terror.

Mr Prigozhin’s Embraer jet came down in the Tver region north-west of Moscow on August 23rd. He and other commanders of the Wagner mercenary group were listed among the ten passengers on the flight manifest. Mr Prigozhin was a violent man. He grew rich from working in the kleptocracy that surrounded Mr Putin. He recruited convicts from Russia’s jails to fight in Ukraine and sent them to their deaths. His men are accused of crimes against humanity, especially in Africa, where Wagner makes much of its money.

None of that appeared to bother Mr Putin who, on the contrary, rewarded Mr Prigozhin with new business and extra responsibilities. But everything changed in June when, as a protest at the prospect of his men being absorbed into the regular army, he marched Wagner troops to within 200km of Moscow. Lacking the foresight to prevent the mutiny or the strength to crush it, Mr Putin was humiliated. So he cut a deal and Mr Prigozhin called off the mutiny.

The downing of the jet suggests that Mr Putin has reneged—and emerged on top. The wonder is that Mr Prigozhin did not see it coming. For as long as the Wagner boss was alive, he remained a source of instability. His death and Mr Putin’s apparent disregard for everyone else on the aircraft serve as a public example to any other would-be tsars of where treachery leads in the mafia world that the Kremlin has built.

The elimination of Mr Prigozhin will also strengthen Mr Putin’s control over Russia’s army, which conspicuously failed to stop the mutineers in June. It is surely no coincidence that on the same day the plane came down, General Sergei Surovikin, who was suspected of supporting Wagner’s mutiny in June, was formally sacked. Meanwhile, Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff, and Sergei Shoigu, the minister of defence, two Putin loyalists who were the butt of Mr Prigozhin’s scorn for their graft and incompetence, remain in office.

Wagner forces may grumble. Some are in Belarus, where the despot Alexander Lukashenko will be looking over his shoulder. There is talk of a second march on Moscow, but Wagnerites are more likely to choose wealth and self-preservation than loyalty to a dead commander. Meanwhile, Russia’s positions in Africa are cemented by corruption, not principle.

For all that, Mr Prigozhin’s death marks the further decay of the Russian state. Mr Putin is a supreme example of why never-ending one-man rule is so ruinous. The more power is concentrated, the more Mr Putin and his obsessions, whims and resentments become the face of Russia itself.

The killing of Mr Prigozhin extends that dismal pattern. After mutinies challenge the state’s monopoly of the use of force, a healthy country restores order using the justice system. Mr Putin prefers ostentatious violence instead. Yet this will not restore order so much as reimpose the balance of terror. It further distances Russia from the rule of law and the institutions that every modern country depends on for competent and steady government. It leaves Russia in a miserable state. ■

The Economist

6. China Casts CIA as Villain in New Anti-Spying Push

China Casts CIA as Villain in New Anti-Spying Push

State-security ministry accuses two Chinese citizens of spying for U.S. as espionage fears grip both countries

By Chun Han Wong

Updated Aug. 24, 2023 9:45 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-casts-cia-as-villain-in-new-anti-spying-push-74e112b0

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns recently said his agency has ‘made progress’ in rebuilding its intelligence operations in China. PHOTO: AMANDA ANDRADE-RHOADES/ASSOCIATED PRESS

SINGAPORE—Chinese leader Xi Jinping is expanding a campaign to harden the country against foreign efforts to steal its secrets, with his spymasters warning citizens abroad to guard against enticement from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

The Ministry of State Security—China’s main civilian intelligence agency—recently accused two Chinese nationals of spying for the U.S., saying both were recruited by the CIA while living overseas. It publicized the cases soon after CIA Director William Burns said the agency had made progress in rebuilding its spy network in China, an assertion that drew widespread attention on Chinese social media.

The disclosures are part of the Chinese state-security ministry’s first-ever public foray on social media, where it has solicited the public’s help in fighting espionage and other threats to national security. In its debut post on the popular do-everything app WeChat on Aug. 1, titled “Counterespionage Requires Mobilization of an Entire Society,” it urged ordinary Chinese to help build a “people’s line of defense for national security.”

The ministry’s social-media offensive lands amid rising tensions and mutual distrust between the U.S. and China, with each power portraying the other as a strategic threat. Both sides have also traded spying allegations, with Washington accusing Beijing of running cyberattacks and espionage efforts against American targets, and vice versa.

Early Intelligence Suggests Prigozhin Was Assassinated, U.S. Officials Say

Preliminary findings indicate it wasn’t surface-to-air missile that took down Wagner leader’s plane

By Michael R. Gordon

Follow, Warren P. Strobel

Follow, Matthew Luxmoore

Follow and Alan Cullison

Updated Aug. 24, 2023 3:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/wagner-prigozhin-russia-assassinated-intelligence-3e456fab

The plane carrying Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner paramilitary group, crashed as the result of an assassination plot but wasn’t shot down by a surface-to-air missile, U.S. officials said.

The preliminary U.S. government assessments, which officials stressed are incomplete, suggest that a bomb exploded on the aircraft or that some other form of sabotage caused the crash northwest of Moscow.

The Russian government has said it is investigating the cause of the crash, but hasn’t offered an explanation. Social-media channels close to Prigozhin’s Wagner have claimed that the aircraft was downed by a Russian military antiaircraft missile.

“We have no information at this time to suggest that a surface-to-air missile was launched against the private aircraft reportedly carrying Yevgeny Prigozhin,” a senior Biden administration official said.

U.S. satellites with infrared sensors can detect the heat from missile launches, and none was detected at the time the plane was downed, defense officials said.

U.S. officials, however, haven’t determined what specifically led to the crash and have stopped sort of publicly asserting that the downing was an assassination, although numerous officials have privately concluded that.

“Our initial assessment is that it is likely Prigozhin was killed,” Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder, a Pentagon spokesman, said at a briefing Thursday. It was the first time the U.S. confirmed Prigozhin’s death.

Ryder didn’t describe the downing as an assassination, and said the U.S. is still assessing the episode.

The day after Prigozhin’s death, his supporters flocked to makeshift memorials to pay tribute to a man who had staged a short-lived uprising against Moscow.

Watch: Putin Breaks Silence, Offers Condolences After Death of Prigozhin

China’s Crisis of Confidence in Six Charts

Chinese households are losing faith in the nation’s future and could drag down the entire economy

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-crisis-of-confidence-in-six-charts-8fd36f9f?utm

By Nathaniel Taplin

Updated Aug. 24, 2023 12:00 am ET

What ails China?

There are plenty of answers, from demographics to geopolitics to trade. But the key problem might boil down to household finances and, just as important, everyday citizens’ deeply shaken confidence that their lives will keep improving following China’s Covid-19 emergency.

Why look at households specifically? China has a serious debt and productivity problem, especially in the state-owned and local-government sectors, but that has been true for years. Exports are falling, but China has weathered trade downturns before. Moreover, private manufacturing and infrastructure investment are actually holding up relatively well.

What is really new and notable about the current slowdown is a combination of exceptionally weak consumer prices, consumption, services-sector investment and property investment. All of that points firmly at households.

Reduced willingness to spend and take risks by families also undermines other parts of the economy in pernicious and self-reinforcing ways: consumption directly, and investment indirectly because household borrowing, mainly through mortgages, has long helped keep cash-strapped property developers and local governments above water.

The shift to thrift

Chinese household debt, primarily mortgage debt, has risen so rapidly over the past decade that, as a percentage of disposable income, it is now approaching pre-2009 U.S. levels according to some analysts.

But there is a critical difference with the precrisis U.S.—China isn’t facing a tidal wave of mortgage delinquencies. Instead, households are paying down mortgage debt rapidly and retrenching financially in general.

This rise in risk aversion has many causes, but several of Beijing’s key policies during the pandemic probably contributed—especially the three-year spell of “zero-Covid” policies that damaged the services-sector jobs engine and the crackdown on property-developer leverage that forced developers to delay the delivery of “presold” houses to families.

Getting stiffed

The key thing to understand is that Chinese households are actually giant lenders to a linchpin of the economy: property developers. About 90% of homes sold in China in 2021 were “presold,” meaning developers sold families rights to yet-to-be-built apartments.

In essence, Chinese households took out interest-paying mortgages—and then passed on that cash, interest-free, to property developers in return for apartments that didn’t yet exist. Property developers in turn fill local-government coffers by purchasing land for development.

To fully appreciate what a bad deal this was, consider that mortgage loans in China also tend to be “recourse.” That means if home buyers walk away, banks can still go after their other assets.

When big, financially stressed developers such as

Evergrande began defaulting on these obligations to households in 2021, buyers responded by abandoning the market and paying down debt. Individual residential mortgage debt outstanding actually fell outright by 200 billion yuan, or about $28 billion, in the first half of 2023.

Hard times in the job market

To make matters worse, the housing crisis came as the economy’s key job engine—the services sector—was already under threat from Beijing’s “zero-Covid” policies and a regulatory crackdown on the internet platform economy, which, according to some estimates, accounts for about a quarter of urban jobs.

The services sector, which until 2020 had accounted for all the net job growth in China since 2012 and absorbs most highly educated graduates, shed a net 12 million jobs between 2020 and 2022, according to official figures. Strong exports helped paper over the cracks for a while, but as China was finally reopening in early 2023, the pandemic-era export boom was reversing.

As a result, China entered the second quarter of 2023 with deeply wounded service and construction sectors, and a manufacturing engine threatening to stall out. The job market has struggled to find its footing, and a record coterie of new college graduates—many of whom fled the 2021 and 2022 job market for higher education—has pushed youth unemployment over 20%.

Crisis of confidence

The battered job and property markets have translated into pervasive pessimism: Households are saving at much higher levels than before the pandemic and expressing deep skepticism about further increasing consumption or buying a home.

A long-running survey of urban bank depositors by the central bank found that about 58% of respondents indicated a preference for boosting savings deposits in the second quarter, slightly down from December 2022’s 62% but up close to 15 percentage points since mid-2019. Only 24.5% were inclined to boost consumption.

Actual growth in savings deposits remains high, too: above 15% on a three-month annualized basis, according to the research consulting firm Gavekal Dragonomics. That compares with a pre-Covid average pace of about 10%.

Breaking the downward spiral

China’s economy is still growing, and incomes—for those with jobs—are rising. But as long as China remains stuck in a negative feedback loop of failing developers, falling home prices and skittish households, it might be difficult to arrest the economy’s slide.

That risks pessimistic expectations becoming firmly entrenched, in turn prompting even higher saving and an economy with less momentum. It could also trigger larger problems in the financial system as developers and local governments—and their bankers—struggle to fill the hole in the financing ecosystem left by retrenching households.

To break the feedback loop, the central government probably needs to flex its own balance sheet with big fiscal transfers to households, or indirectly bail out property developers—and reverse course on some of the aggressive regulatory measures that have alienated foreign investors and some domestic entrepreneurs.

But it remains unclear if Beijing will take such steps. For one, Beijing might be wary of big direct spending because its effective liabilities—in the form of local government debt—are substantial. Having invested so much political capital painting housing speculation, tech moguls and dependence on foreigners as social maladies in recent years, an explicit reversal now could amount to a significant political risk: in essence, an admission that more of the central leadership’s signature policies have failed.

Write to Nathaniel Taplin at nathaniel.taplin@wsj.com

Appeared in the August 25, 2023, print edition as 'China Faces a Crisis of Confidence'.

9. US issues threat warning after hackers break into a satellite

US issues threat warning after hackers break into a satellite

Three teams at the DEF CON 23 convention met a government challenge to hack satellite in orbit.

defenseone.com · by John Breeden II

It seems like nothing is off limits for threat actors to target these days. Hospitals, schools, charity organizations and even municipalities have all been successfully targeted by malicious cyberattacks in recent years. And now, it seems like attackers are even looking into space for new systems to try and compromise.

Last week, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the FBI, the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, issued a warning about increased attempts to attack both satellites in orbit and the intellectual property of companies developing space technologies.

The warning comes just about a month after three teams at the DEF CON 23 convention in Las Vegas managed to hack a government satellite in orbit. Those attacks were conducted with the full permission of the government as part of the U.S. Space Force’s Hack-A-Sat competition. Three of the teams that successfully breached the security of the orbiting satellite were awarded up to $50,000 in prize money for demonstrating how such an attack could be conducted. This was the first time that hacker groups were able to prove that it was now possible to circumvent the cybersecurity protections of satellites in orbit.

In addition to hacking, the recent warning points out that other less technical tactics are also being used to try and compromise or steal information about U.S. space technologies. The warning states that “Foreign intelligence entities (FIEs) use cyberattacks, strategic investment (including joint ventures and acquisitions), the targeting of key supply chain nodes and other techniques to gain access to the U.S. space industry.”

Defense One sister publication Nextgov/FCW talked with one of the leading experts on aviation and satellite security, Jeff Hall, about the new warning memo and the unique characteristics and challenges of cybersecurity in space. Hall has over 25 years of experience working with private industry, the DOD and other government agencies and has served as a Navy Cybersecurity Safety—or CYBERSAFE—aviation cybersecurity technical area expert and cyber warfare subject matter expert. He is currently a consultant with the NCC Group.

Nextgov/FCW: What are some of the key differences and additional challenges involved with protecting a computerized asset in space, like a satellite, versus an Earth-based asset?

Hall: There are many different aspects to this. Some of the key ones include:

The distances involved: The distance between Earth and satellites in space can cause delays or disruptions in communication, making it difficult to detect and respond to cyber-attacks.

Radiation: Satellites are exposed to high levels of radiation in space, which can cause hardware failures and software errors if components are not radiation hardened — and that’s a very expensive proposition. This can make it difficult to detect and respond to cyber attacks, as the malicious code may be hidden within the legitimate code that has been corrupted by radiation.

Limited resources: Satellites have purpose-built embedded systems with limited resources, including processing power, memory and storage. The technology is potentially older, since a satellite's life span can extend up to 15 years.

Remote Access: This makes satellites vulnerable to cyberattacks from anywhere in the world.

Complexity: Satellite systems are complex and heterogeneous, making it difficult to identify and patch all vulnerabilities.

Lack of awareness: Many satellite operators are not aware of the cyber threats they face, or don’t have the resources to implement effective cybersecurity measures.

Nextgov/FCW: And in addition to attacking satellites directly, can attackers also go after the data that is streaming to and from them?

Hall: Most definitely. And as to how that should be protected, the best thing is to use end-to-end space encryption to also secure the entire space to ground system.

Nextgov/FCW: That is a lot of challenges. Are there any advantages to securing a satellite’s cybersecurity compared to an Earth-based asset?

Hall: Yes, the advantages come from having a secure ground station using encrypted links and authentication.

Nextgov/FCW: The special bulletin also mentions other dangers for aerospace operations beyond the direct hacking of assets. Can you talk about some of those threats?

Hall: Unclassified counterintelligence updates indicate that foreign adversaries are employing a range of techniques, including insider threats, cyber penetrations, supply chain attacks and blended operations that combine some or all of these methods.

They are also using legal and quasi-legal methods, together with acquisitions, mergers, investments, joint ventures, partnerships and talent recruitment programs to acquire U.S. technology and innovation.

Nextgov/FCW: I realize that those methods of stealing intellectual property mostly fall outside of cybersecurity, but do you have any advice about how to mitigate them?

Hall: The best ways to guard against that includes using classification and handling markings; limiting access to only those who have a need to know; placing physical and technological restrictions on files; and fostering a culture that prioritizes data confidentiality.

In addition to fostering a data-confidentiality culture and following other aspects of Hall’s advice, the Department of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations has set up both a 24-hour tip line and an online forum for submitting tips about any kind of attack against space assets. This can include information about both direct cyberattacks and some of the quasi-legal activities mentioned in the recent warning memo.

John Breeden II is an award-winning journalist and reviewer with over 20 years of experience covering technology. He is the CEO of the Tech Writers Bureau, a group that creates technological thought leadership content for organizations of all sizes. Twitter: @LabGuys

defenseone.com · by John Breeden II

10. US intel believes ‘intentional’ blast downed Wagner chief’s plane

US intel believes ‘intentional’ blast downed Wagner chief’s plane

By Emma Burrows and Aamer Madhani, The Associated Press

militarytimes.com · by Emma Burrows · August 24, 2023

Editor’s note: This story was last updated at 5:40 p.m. EST.

A preliminary U.S. intelligence assessment concluded that an intentional explosion caused the plane crash presumed to have killed a Russian mercenary leader who was eulogized Thursday by Russian President Vladimir Putin, even as suspicions grew that he was the architect of the assassination.

One of the U.S. and Western officials who described the initial assessment said it determined that Yevgeny Prigozhin was “very likely” targeted and that the explosion falls in line with Putin’s “long history of trying to silence his critics.”

The officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to comment, did not offer any details on what caused the explosion, which was widely believed to be vengeance for the mutiny in June that posed the biggest challenge to the Russian leader’s 23-year rule. Several of Prigozhin’s lieutenants were also presumed dead.

Pentagon spokesman Gen. Pat Ryder said press reports that a surface-to-air missile took down the plane were inaccurate. He declined to say whether the U.S. suspected a bomb or believed the crash was an assassination.

Details of the intelligence assessment surfaced as Putin expressed his condolences to the families of those who were reported to be aboard the jet and referred to “serious mistakes” by Prigozhin.

A Russian serviceman inspects a part of a crashed private jet near the village of Kuzhenkino, Tver region, Russia, Thursday, Aug. 24, 2023. (AP)

The jet carrying the founder of the Wagner military company and six other passengers crashed Wednesday soon after taking off from Moscow with a crew of three, according to Russia’s civil aviation authority. Rescuers found 10 bodies, and Russian media cited anonymous sources in Wagner who said Prigozhin was dead. But there has been no official confirmation.

President Joe Biden, speaking to reporters on Wednesday, said that he believed Putin was behind the crash, though he acknowledged that he did not, at that time, have solid information verifying his belief.

“I don’t know for a fact what happened, but I’m not surprised,” Biden said. “There’s not much that happens in Russia that Putin’s not behind.”

The passenger manifest also included Prigozhin’s second-in-command, who baptized the group with his nom de guerre, as well as Wagner’s logistics chief, a fighter wounded by U.S. airstrikes in Syria and at least one possible bodyguard.

It was not clear why several high-ranking members of Wagner, including top leaders who are normally exceedingly careful about their security, were on the same flight. The purpose of their joint trip to St. Petersburg was unknown.

At Wagner’s headquarters in St. Petersburg, lights were turned on in the shape of a large cross, and Prigozhin supporters built a makeshift memorial, piling red and white flowers outside the building Thursday, along with company flags and candles.

In this first comments on the crash, Putin said the passengers had “made a significant contribution” to the fighting in Ukraine.

“We remember this, we know, and we will not forget,” the president said in a televised interview with the Russian-installed leader of Ukraine’s partially occupied Donetsk region, Denis Pushilin.

Putin recalled that he had known Prigozhin since the early 1990s and described him as “a man of difficult fate” who had “made serious mistakes in life, and he achieved the results he needed — both for himself and, when I asked him about it, for the common cause, as in these last months. He was a talented man, a talented businessman.”

Russian state media have not covered the crash extensively, instead focusing on Putin’s remarks to the BRICS summit in Johannesburg via video link and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Several Russian social media channels reported that the bodies were burned or disfigured beyond recognition and would need to be identified by DNA. The reports were picked up by independent Russian media, but The Associated Press was not able to independently confirm them.

Prigozhin supporters claimed on pro-Wagner messaging app channels that the plane was deliberately downed, including suggesting it could have been hit by a missile or targeted by a bomb on board. Those claims could not be independently verified.

Sergei Mironov, the leader of the pro-Kremlin Fair Russia party and former chairman of the upper house of the Russian parliament suggested on his Telegram channel that Prigozhin had been deliberately killed.

“Prigozhin messed with too many people in Russia, Ukraine and the West,” Mironov wrote. It now seems that at some point his number of enemies reached a critical point.”

Russian authorities have said the cause of the crash is under investigation.

Kuzhenkino resident Anastasia Bukharova, 27, said she was walking with her children Wednesday when she saw the jet, “and then — boom! — it exploded in the sky and began to fall down.” She said she was scared it would hit houses in the village and ran with the children, but it ended up crashing into a field.

“Something sort of was torn from it in the air, and it began to go down and down,” she added.

Numerous opponents and critics of Putin have been killed or gravely sickened in apparent assassination attempts, and U.S. and other Western officials long expected the Russian leader to go after Prigozhin, despite promising to drop charges in a deal that ended the June 23-24 mutiny.

“It is no coincidence that the whole world immediately looks at the Kremlin when a disgraced ex-confidant of Putin suddenly falls from the sky, two months after he attempted an uprising,” said German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, while acknowledging that the facts were still unclear.

“We know this pattern … in Putin’s Russia — deaths and dubious suicides, falls from windows that all ultimately remain unexplained,” she added.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy also pointed the finger. “We have nothing to do with this. Everyone understands who does,” he said.

Soon after the plane went down, people on social media and news outlets began to report that it was a Wagner plane. Minutes after Russian state news agencies confirmed the crash, they cited the civil aviation authority as saying Prigozhin’s name was on the mainfest.

Prigozhin was long outspoken and critical of how Russian generals were waging the war in Ukraine, where his mercenaries were some of the fiercest fighters for the Kremlin. For a long time, Putin appeared content to allow such infighting — and Prigozhin seemed to have unusual latitude to speak his mind.

But Prigozhin’s brief revolt raised the ante. His mercenaries swept through the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don and captured the military headquarters there without firing a shot. They then drove to within about 200 kilometers (125 miles) of Moscow and downed several military aircraft, killing more than a dozen Russian pilots.

Putin first denounced the rebellion — the most serious challenge to his 23-year rule — as “treason” and a “stab in the back.” He vowed to punish its perpetrators, and the world waited for his next move, particularly since Prigozhin had publicly questioned the Russian leader’s justifications for the war in Ukraine.

But instead Putin made a deal that saw an end to the mutiny in exchange for an amnesty for Prigozhin and his mercenaries and permission for them to move to Belarus.

Now many are suggesting the punishment has finally come.

“The downing of the plane was certainly no mere coincidence,” Janis Sarts, director of NATO’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, told Latvian television.

The Institute for the Study of War argued that Russian authorities likely moved against Prigozhin and his top associates as “the final step to eliminate Wagner as an independent organization.”

Abbas Gallyamov, a former speechwriter for President Putin turned political consultant, said Putin had to step in because, by carrying out the mutiny and remaining free, Prigozhin “shoved Putin’s face into the dirt front of the whole world.”

Failing to punish Prigozhin would have offered an “open invitation for all potential rebels and troublemakers,” so Putin had to act, Gallyamov said.

Videos shared by the pro-Wagner Telegram channel Grey Zone showed a plane dropping like a stone from a large cloud of smoke, twisting wildly as it fell, one of its wings apparently missing. A free fall like that typically occurs when an aircraft sustains severe damage, and a frame-by-frame AP analysis of two videos was consistent with some sort of explosion mid-flight.

Burrows reported from London.

11. Ukrainian pilots will learn to fly F-16s at US Air Force’s 162nd Wing

What if we had begun the training last summer?

All military failures (Cohen and Gooch) are the result of a failure to learn, a failure to adapt, and a failure to anticipate. Could we not have anticipated the need for air superiority long ago?

Ukrainian pilots will learn to fly F-16s at US Air Force’s 162nd Wing

By Noah Robertson and Stephen Losey

Defense News · by Noah Robertson · August 24, 2023

WASHINGTON — The U.S. will begin training Ukrainian F-16 pilots within two months, Pentagon Press Secretary Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder said in a briefing Thursday.

While he didn’t give specific numbers, he said there would be “several” pilots and “dozens” of maintainers trained. This follows comments earlier in the week that the U.S. would participate in the process only if the Netherlands and Denmark — who are leading the transfer of planes — reached capacity.

“We know that as the Danes and the Dutch prepare to train those pilots that at a certain point in time in the future, capacity will be reached,” Ryder said.

The training will begin in October at Morris Air National Guard Base in Tucson, Arizona, and will be conducted by the Air National Guard’s 162nd Wing, Ryder said. In September, the pilots will first receive English language training tailored to the training at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas.

Details on the curriculum, including its speed and the kind of training that will be offered, are still uncertain, Ryder said. They partially will depend on the experience level of the Ukrainian pilots.

The 162nd Wing carries out international F-16 pilot training and has trained pilots from 25 countries to fly the fourth-generation fighter, the Air Force said in a fact sheet. Morris Air National Guard Base sits next to the Tucson International Airport and uses some of the airport’s facilities such as its runway.

The wing has three squadrons that fly its F-16 Fighting Falcons, as well as maintenance squadrons to keep the fighters in the air and other units.

An Air Force official said in a Thursday email that pilots without prior flight experience could learn to fly the F-16 in about eight months, as part of the service’s standard F-16 basic qualification course.

Pilots who have previous experience flying other fighters can learn to fly the F-16 in about five months under the Air Force’s transition qualification track, the official said.

The F-16, versions of which have been flown by the Air Force for more than 40 years, can carry weapons such as the AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile and AIM-120 advanced medium range air-to-air missile, or AMRAAM. It can fly of speeds up to Mach 2, and has a total range of about 2,000 miles, according to the Air Force’s website.

In total, up to 61 Dutch and Danish F-16s could eventually be transferred to Ukraine. The Netherlands have 42 available, according to Prime Minister Mark Rutte.

Denmark said Aug. 20 it would send 19 F-16s to Ukraine. Because the planes are an American system, they first need to be approved by the State Department — a process Secretary of State Antony Blinken said would be expedited.

The Danish military announced Aug. 20 that it had started training eight Ukrainian pilots to fly F-16s as part of this effort, and that another 65 service members will be trained to maintain the fighters and provide other support. Those Ukrainians have already arrived at Skrydstrup Air Base in Denmark, the nation said.

Other countries in Europe, including Greece and Norway, will also contribute, either training pilots or donating fighters.

“Our F-16 coalition is proving its efficiency,” Zelenskyy wrote on X, formerly Twitter, on Monday.

Today’s announcement is the latest milemarker in the effort to deliver the fighters to Ukraine, which has been asking for them for more than a year. Initially, the administration declined. Yet, as with so many other systems eventually sent to Kyiv during the war, that stance eventually changed.

“We could certainly have started earlier, but there were much higher priorities,” Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said in May.

The fighters may be a symbolic victory for Ukraine. But they won’t aid its slogging counteroffensive, which has so far failed to puncture dug-in Russian defensive lines. The fighters aren’t expected to arrive until mid-to-late 2024, and air defenses on both sides of the war still threaten anything flying.

Instead, the aircraft are part of a long game to improve Ukraine’s self-defense. The focus now is on supplying the planes and training personnel, but Kyiv will also need improved airfields and ground equipment to keep operating them once delivered, Ryder said.

“We’re talking months, not weeks, obviously. And as we said from the very beginning in May, this is about the long term support to Ukraine,” Ryder said.

About Noah Robertson and Stephen Losey

Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.

Stephen Losey is the air warfare reporter for Defense News. He previously covered leadership and personnel issues at Air Force Times, and the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare at Military.com. He has traveled to the Middle East to cover U.S. Air Force operations.

12. Ukraine says it landed troops on the shores of Russian-occupied Crimea

Ukraine says it landed troops on the shores of Russian-occupied Crimea

https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/24/europe/ukraine-crimea-operation-russia-intl/index.html?utm

By Tim Lister and Olga Voitovych, CNN

Updated 10:31 PM EDT, Thu August 24, 2023

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