Quotes of the Day:
SECSTATE Dean Atcheson:
"This afternoon I should like to discuss with you the relations between the peoples of the United States and the peoples of Asia....
What is the situation in regard to the military security of the Pacific area, and what is our policy in regard to it?
In the first place, the defeat and the disarmament of Japan has placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interest of our security and in the interests of the security of the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security. We have American, and there are Australian troops in Japan. I am not in a position to speak for the Australians, but I can assure you that there is no intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses of Japan, and that whatever arrangements are to be made, either through permanent settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be maintained.
This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held.
The defensive perimeter runs from Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital connections between our mutual defense requirements.
So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.
Should such an attack occur, one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from, the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations, which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression. But it is a mistake, I think, in considering Pacific and Far Eastern problems to become obsessed with military considerations. Important as they are, there are other problem that press, and these other problems are not capable of solution through military means. These other problems arise out of the susceptibility of many areas, and many countries in the Pacific area, to subversion and penetration. That cannot be stopped by military means....
. . . What we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new day which has dawned in Asia. It is a day in which the Asian peoples are on their own, and know it, and intend to continue on their own. It is a day in which the old relationships between east and west are gone, relationships which at their worst were exploitation and at their best were paternalism. That relationship is over, and the relationship of east and west must now be in the Far East one of mutual respect and mutual helpfulness. We are their friends. Others are their friends. We and those others are willing to help, but we can help only where we are wanted and only where conditions of help are really sensible and possible. So what we can see is that this new day in Asia, this new day which is dawning, may go on to a glorious noon or it may darken and it may drizzle out. But that decision lies within the countries of Asia and within the power of the Asian people. It is not a decision which a friend or even an enemy from the outside can make for them.
- SECSTATE Dean Atcheson 12 Jan 1950 / National Press Club.
"People are trapped in history and history is trapped in them."
- James Baldwin
"Trust dies but mistrust blossoms"
- Sophocles
1. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: January (December 4, 2021-January 11, 2022)
2. US Army to conduct a two-week 'guerilla war' training exercise
3. How a Beltway naval breakfast sparked China’s ire over Taiwan
4. The U.N.’s final solution to the Israel question
5. President Biden’s Tax & Antitrust Philosophy Is At War With His National Security Strategy
6. Watchdog to Audit Military's Screening for Extremists at Enlistment
7. The security consequences of America’s focus on China
8. Foreign policy analysts say US military needs to prepare for China-Russia ‘axis’
9. Australia’s Strategic Offensive
10. Opinion | What I Learned When I Tried to Close Guantanamo
11. The hero of Jan. 6 whose name must not be spoken
12. As the U.S. and Russia talk, Ukrainian troops brace for war, and they're "ready for battle"
13. The Future of Global Population
14. Whatever Happened to Soft Power? by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
15. Omicron may be headed for a rapid drop in Britain, US
16. Justice Dept. forms new domestic terrorism unit to address growing threat
17. China is using economic coercion as blackmail. The US and EU must fight back | Opinion
18. Opinion | Afghanistan Is in Meltdown, and the U.S. Is Helping to Speed It Up
19. Yale, Georgetown, Other Top Schools Illegally Collude to Limit Student Financial Aid, Lawsuit Alleges
20. Undersea cable connecting Norway and Arctic satellite station is mysteriously damaged
1. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: January (December 4, 2021-January 11, 2022)
January 11, 2022 | FDD Tracker: December 4, 2021-January 11, 2022
Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: January
Trend Overview
Edited by David Adesnik
Welcome back to the Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker. Once a month, we ask FDD’s experts and scholars to assess the administration’s foreign policy. They provide trendlines of very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative for the areas they watch. Shortly after taking office, President Joe Biden set a “goal of building a stable and predictable relationship with Russia.” Russian President Vladimir Putin has not obliged. In December, Moscow put Europe on edge with persistent threats to launch a major military offensive against Ukraine. Meanwhile, nuclear negotiations with Iran continued even though Tehran’s proxies targeted U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria with armed drones. Belatedly, the White House announced a “diplomatic boycott” of next month’s Winter Games in Beijing, yet only a handful of allies will keep their diplomats home.
With hostility growing on almost every front despite the administration’s “relentless diplomacy,” Congress signaled the need for greater strength by authorizing $740 billion in defense spending, or $25 billion more than the president requested. There was overwhelming bipartisan support for this increase, with veto-proof majorities in the House and Senate. Congress lent similar support to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which Biden signed into law just before Christmas. The United Nations is expected to release its own findings on Beijing’s human rights violations in the coming days; in December, it approved plans to spend $4.2 million on an open-ended investigation of Israel. The Biden administration dismissed the inquiry as “inherently biased and an obstacle to the cause of peace,” but could not block the funding.
Trending Positive
Trending Neutral
Trending Negative
Trending Very Negative
2. US Army to conduct a two-week 'guerilla war' training exercise
Amazing how this is being spun by some. Conspiracy theories unite! I was surprised this was not a major news focus during the Jade Helm conspiracy theories during the Obama administration. This training has been consistently conducted 4-8 times per year for decades. I have fond memories!
This is a lesson in information and influence activities and how seemingly innocuous and routine training (to us) can be spun to support conspiracy theories and political agendas.
US Army to conduct a two-week 'guerilla war' training exercise
Army will conduct a two-week 'guerilla war' training exercise in the woods of North Carolina to teach Special Forces how to overthrow an 'illegitimate government' just weeks after Biden's Justice Department announced its new 'domestic terrorism' unit
- Special Forces candidates will participate in the two-week Robin Sage training exercises in which they will practice overthrowing illegitimate governments
- Robin Sage places soldiers in a 'politically unstable' fictional country and uses 'unconventional guerrilla warfare' to defeat a 'numerically superior enemy'
- Soldiers will face off against seasoned military members and specially trained civilians during the exercise, which serves as the Special Forces final exam
- Several citizens, however, are concerned the exercise encourages soldiers to target civilians
- News of the training exercise comes at a tense time in the US, just five days after the country celebrated the first anniversary of the Capitol riot
- It also follows the DOJ's creation of a new 'domestic terrorism' unit as the nation faces what officials said is an 'elevated threat from domestic violent extremists'
Daily Mail · by Natasha Anderson For Dailymail.Com · January 11, 2022
Young Army soldiers will be battling 'seasoned freedom fighters' across two dozen North Carolina counties in a two-week 'guerrilla warfare exercise' where they attempt to overthrow an 'illegitimate government'.
News of the training exercise comes just days after the anniversary of the Capitol riot and as the Justice Department announces the creation of a new 'domestic terrorism' unit to tackle what officials said is an 'elevated threat from domestic violent extremists'.
Some questioned the close timing of the events, while others went further with fears that the Biden administration is 'preparing for American Uprising'.
'Biden's military wargames fighting and killing American "Freedom Fighters" in guerilla (sic) warfare,' one Twitter user posted in reaction to news of the guerilla warfare training on US soil.
Another Twitter user even questioned if the government was 'trying to get troops accustomed to the idea of killing fellow Americans?'
However, the guerilla training exercise, known as Robin Sage, has actually been running every few months since the 1970s.
Young soldiers will be battling 'seasoned freedom fighters' across North Carolina counties in a two-week 'unconventional guerrilla warfare exercise' - known as Robin Sage - where they attempt to overthrow an 'illegitimate government' (Pictured: Robin Sage training in July 2019)
During Robin Sage training, young soldiers will face off against seasoned service members from units across Fort Bragg, acting as opposing forces and guerrilla freedom fighters, as well as 'specially trained' guerilla civilians.
Some social media users find the exercise concerning as the 143-year-old Posse Comitatus Act bars federal troops from participating in civilian law enforcement except when expressly authorized by law. The legislation cites military interference in civilian affairs as a threat to democracy and personal liberty.
Others have implied the exercise is preparing soldiers to prevent an insurgence and fear it is training American troops how to fight their own people.
The Robin Sage exercise, which serves as the final exam in Special Forces Qualification Course training, will begin January 22 at an undisclosed location on private land.
It places soldiers in the 'politically unstable' fictional country of Pineland and forces them to conduct reconnaissance, raids, ambushes, and numerous other operations a 'numerically superior enemy'.
Robin Sage places soldiers in the 'politically unstable' fictional country of Pineland and forces them to conduct reconnaissance, raids, ambushes, and numerous other operations a 'numerically superior enemy' (Pictured: A Special Forces candidate engaging a target during Robin Sage training in 2019)
'The Special Forces candidates have to meet up with and make rapport with a third-world nation guerrilla force, train them up, and then work by, with, and through that guerrilla force to conduct combat operations against a numerically superior enemy occupying force,' retired Special Forces warrant officer Steve Balestrieri, who typically runs the course, told Business Insider.
The US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, which conducts the Robin Sage exercise, said teams are placed in a 'real world setting characterized by armed conflict' and presented with war-crime scenarios, such as a partner force wanting to execute a prisoner or destroy a village.
The soldiers are then tasked with negotiating the situations without violating war laws or losing the support of their allies.
Several citizens, however, are concerned the exercise encourages soldiers to target civilians
'Military members act as realistic opposing forces and guerrilla freedom fighters, also known as Pineland resistance movement,' the center told the Charlotte Observer.
'To add realism of the exercise, civilian volunteers throughout the state act as role players. Participation by these volunteers is crucial to the success of this training, and past trainees attest to the realism they add to the exercise.'
Several citizens, however, are concerned the exercise encourages soldiers to target civilians.
'Whether this is a routine exercise or not, the fact that it seems plausible that our own military is training on how to combat its own citizens is telling,' Scott M. argued in a comment on an article about the training.
'Over the past year. we've heard our very own commander in chief mock the ability of an armed citizenry to defend itself against government tyranny. That ability is foundational to our bill of rights and he seems to think it's a joke.'
'Obviously practice for civil war or domestic warfare,' echoed someone using the name James Bond. 'Hope it utterly fails.'
The training exercise (pictured in 2019) serves as the final exam in Special Forces Qualification Course training and will begin January 22 at an undisclosed location on private land
Retired Special Forces warrant officer Steve Balestrieri (pictured right), who typically runs the course, said soldiers have to 'meet up with and make rapport with a third-world nation guerrilla force, train them up, and then work by, with, and through that guerrilla force to conduct combat operations against a numerically superior enemy occupying force'
Despite the online criticisms, those familiar with the course allege the interactions between the 'team' and the 'guerrillas' could determine the success or failure of a mission on the battlefield.
John Black, a retired Green Beret, told Insider his Robin Sage infiltration was 'supposed to be brutal'.
'We had packed everything in preparation for more than two weeks in the field with no resupply. Two Blackhawk choppers dropped us off behind enemy lines where we were to meet our partner force in the middle of the night,' he explained.
'We walked and walked with this guy for hours in what seemed like a circle — he was lost. The captain asked to help him navigate with the map. Turned out we had been circling the camp for hours and the solution was simple — ask if he needed help.'
The retired service member argues the most important aspect of the training exercise is the hands-on lessons it provides about Special Forces operations and the prevention of a resistance or insurgent force taking power.
'As a Green Beret, I feel Robin Sage is imperative and really gets you to think about the real mission of Special Forces, to work with and through a partner force,' Black said.
Soldiers will face off against seasoned service members from units across Fort Bragg, acting as opposing forces and guerrilla freedom fighters, and specially trained civilians (Pictured: Robin Sage training in July 2019)
Teams are placed in a 'real world setting characterized by armed conflict' and presented with war-crime scenarios, such as a partner force wanting to execute a prisoner or destroy a village
'Very little of what a Green Beret does is kicking in doors and getting bad guys. Robin Sage definitely helped prepare me for life as an operator on a team,' he added.
Balestieri echoed Black's statements, saying: 'What makes Robin Special is how well and smoothly it's run from the time the student teams go into isolation until they [infiltrate] and are actively engaged with the G-Force.'
Robin Sage training - named after Col. Jerry Michael Sage (pictured) who was captured by Nazis and attempted to escape more than a dozen times before succeeding - has been conducted since 1974
'It rams home how important is, when operating in a guerrilla warfare/unconventional warfare environment, to at least have the nominal support of the population.'
Robin Sage training - named after Col. Jerry Michael Sage who was captured by Nazis and attempted to escape more than a dozen times before succeeding - has been conducted since 1974.
Public notice of the 'premiere unconventional warfare exercise' became priority in 2002 after a student was killed and another injured when North Carolina sheriff's deputy mistook the exercises for criminal activity.
Military officials claim all 'Robin Sage movements and events have been coordinated with public safety officials throughout and within the towns and counties hosting the training.'
They warn residents may hear blank gunfire and see occasional flares, but reiterate 'controls are in place to ensure there is no risk to persons or property.'
Daily Mail · by Natasha Anderson For Dailymail.Com · January 11, 2022
3. How a Beltway naval breakfast sparked China’s ire over Taiwan
Hmmm...PRC wof diplomacy? Should we really be giving in to this kind of pressure? And in this way?
How a Beltway naval breakfast sparked China’s ire over Taiwan
The U.S. Navy cut ties with a nonprofit military association late last year after Chinese officials became enraged over Taiwanese military officers being invited to a pro-forma Beltway breakfast hosted by the group.
The diplomatic firestorm erupted over a Sept. 8 event put on by the private Naval Attachés Association, according to records and emails reviewed by Navy Times, the latest example of Beijing’s prickliness when it comes to the island.
In one email, a Chinese military officer warned a Pentagon official that it was “dangerous and could lead to many consequences, intended or not,” if U.S. officials didn’t step in and get the three Taiwanese officers disinvited from the event.
Another Chinese email, sent to association leadership, with several NAA members CC’d, warned that “there is no doubt that your military personnel in Beijing will be adversely affected” if Taiwanese officers attended the breakfast.
A few months later, on Dec. 28, Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro banned Navy personnel from engaging with the NAA, a 501c8 fraternal society that brings together international naval attachés for breakfasts, talks and networking.
RELATED
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin sought to assure the Reagan Defense Forum that "China's not 10 feet tall," but was often hesitant to get specific.
“Recent actions by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have complicated the Department’s ability to utilize the Naval Attaché Association (NAA) as a forum to facilitate partner access to senior DON leadership,” according to Del Toro’s message announcing the ban.
Navy officials did not respond to questions about what specifically prompted Del Toro’s ban, and the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., did not respond to requests for comment by Navy Times’ deadline.
A defense official who requested anonymity to discuss the matter would only say the ban came after the Navy became aware “of a campaign by [China] to influence a board vote affecting the inclusivity of the NAA organization.”
NAA officials did not respond to repeated calls and emails seeking comment for this report, and it remains unclear if Taiwanese officials attended the breakfast.
Beijing’s “One China” policy contends that Taiwan is part of the mainland, not a separate country. Several U.S. presidents have walked a fine line of not formally recognizing Taiwan as an independent state while concurrently selling weapons to the island democracy.
China regularly expresses outrage over any Western outreach to Taiwan, and President Xi Jinping has dubbed his country’s quest to take control of Taiwan an “historic mission.”
U.S. military leaders have warned that a Chinese attack on the island could come within the next five years.
RELATED
Other measures include cyberattacks aimed at stealing data as well as “irregular patrols of reconnaissance aircrafts as well as UAVs,” according to Taiwan’s report.
“It is outrageous to note that three Taiwan military personnel are invited and their names appear on the NAA list,” Chinese Senior Capt. Meng Zhang wrote to the current head of the association, Spanish Capt. Pablo Murga Gomez, in a Sept. 2 email that had other NAA members CC’d. “It is known that there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is part of China.”
“The incident has been reported back to Beijing, and your Embassies will be approached through diplomatic channels,” the senior captain wrote.
Gomez pushed back in an email the following day, writing that the NAA is a “private association that fosters relationships between its members with U.S. Department of Defense sea services,” and that it welcomes “any foreign officer” assigned to the Washington, D.C., area.
On Sept. 6, Chinese Senior Col. Ge Zhang emailed a senior U.S. Pentagon official, who is not identified in the emails reviewed by Navy Times, stating that “the U.S. has no official contact of any form with Taiwan and there are not official representatives from Taiwan whatsoever in the U.S.”
Meng pinged Gomez the following day and wrote that his absence from the Sept. 8 breakfast would be “a strong protest” against the presence of the Taiwanese officials there, calling it “a blunt violation for One-China principle.”
Ge emailed the senior Pentagon official on the same day, Sept. 7, and called the Taiwanese invite “a gross interference in China’s internal affairs, a severe violation of related international laws and norms, and a blunt political provocation against China.”
Ge argued that NAA is an official organization because U.S. Navy officers attend in an official capacity.
“The U.S. side keeps a blind eye on or even encourages the participation by Taiwan military personnel in the event exclusively open to military attachés from sovereign states,” Ge wrote. “This is absolutely double-faced and in violation of the basic norms of international relationship.”
The NAA’s website appeared to be hobbled Tuesday and featured little more than a dated-looking “Work in Progress” graphic on the home page.
The home page of the Naval Attachés Association. (Screenshot)
An archived copy of the site features more content but does not list the September breakfast on its calendar.
But it does show several Navy leaders — including Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday -- as scheduled speakers for other events.
Navy officials did not respond to questions about whether Gilday and other brass attended NAA events in the past.
An archived version of the Naval Attachés Association's homepage from May 2021. (Screenshot)
IRS filings show the NAA shares an address with the headquarters of the Navy League, a nonprofit advocacy group that is largely run by retired Navy brass.
The League’s current leadership includes Gilday’s predecessor as CNO, retired Adm. John Richardson.
Mike Stevens, former Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy, the chief executive officer of the League, did not respond to repeated calls and emails seeking information about the NAA’s relationship with the organization.
Geoff is a senior staff reporter for Military Times, focusing on the Navy. He covered Iraq and Afghanistan extensively and was most recently a reporter at the Chicago Tribune. He welcomes any and all kinds of tips at geoffz@militarytimes.com.
Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members. Follow on Twitter @Meghann_MT
4. The U.N.’s final solution to the Israel question
Conclusion:
The U.N. campaign will make settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict impossible for the foreseeable future. Why would any Palestinian leader compromise so long as there is a possibility that what happened to the Jews of Europe — defamation followed by extermination, a “final solution” — could happen to the Jews of Israel with the assent of the “international community”?
The U.N. was established following World War II to prevent and resolve conflicts. Today, it promotes antisemitism and enables both terrorists and genocidaires. Acknowledgment of this reality must precede any attempt to change it.
The U.N.’s final solution to the Israel question
Its campaign of demonization and delegitimization escalates
OPINION:
Historians usually date the start of the Holocaust to June 1941 when German troops invaded the Soviet Union, identified Jewish civilians, lined them up and shot them by the thousands. Later, concentration camps equipped with gas chambers elevated the slaughter to an industrial scale.
But that timetable omits something important. After his accession to power in 1933, Hitler began a campaign to demonize and delegitimize Jews, accusing them of imaginary crimes, conveying the message that Jews are a vile and guilty race, deserving of punishment.
In 1935, the Nuremberg Laws officially made German Jews second-class citizens. In 1938, thousands of German Jewish stores and homes were ransacked and burned in the pogrom known as Kristallnacht. In 1939, after the Nazi invasion of Poland, Polish Jews were confined to ghettos.
All this and more laid the groundwork for the “Final Solution to the Jewish Question,” the Nazi euphemism for the genocide of European Jews.
Before their defeat by the Allied forces, the Nazis managed to exterminate six million European Jews — two out of every three. Post-war, most countries of the broader Middle East, many of them influenced by Nazi ideology, drove out their ancient Jewish communities.
Refugees fled or, as many saw it, returned to a land in which Jews had survived for thousands of years despite multiple foreign conquests, massacres, enslavements and expulsions.
Israelis declared their independence following the departure of the British Empire from territories taken from the defeated Ottoman Empire after World War I. Israel’s founding was thus an act of anti-imperialism and de-colonialism.
Recalling this history now is relevant and perhaps urgent. For decades, the U.N. has been at the forefront of a campaign to demonize and delegitimize Israel. That campaign is now set to sharply escalate.
Last week, the U.N. approved a $4.2 million budget to establish a so-called Commission of Inquiry — essentially a Grand Inquisition targeting and vilifying Israel.
Under the auspices of Human Rights Council, a body dominated by such notorious human rights violators as China, Russia, Cuba, Pakistan, Qatar and Venezuela, an 18-member staff will be led by Navi Pillay, a former U.N. high commissioner for human rights, with “an appalling record on Israel,” in the considered judgment of Hillel Neuer, executive director of U.N. Watch.
The COI will be “dedicated to manufacturing charges and mounting a global chase to arrest and incarcerate Israeli Jews,” Anne Bayefsky, director of the Touro Institute on Human Rights and the Holocaust, wrote in a paper for the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
The ostensible inspiration for the COI is the 11-day conflict initiated by Hamas last May. Over 4,000 rockets were launched against Israeli cities, towns and villages. Israelis defended themselves, for which the COI will accuse Israelis of imaginary crimes. Hamas, by contrast, will not be seriously criticized for either its attacks on Israeli civilians or its use of Palestinians as human shields — indisputably crimes under both international and U.S. law.
Expect the COI also to broadcast the slander that Israel is an apartheid state, implying that Israel has no right to defend itself — indeed, no right to exist.
I plan to say more about the bogus charge of apartheid in future columns. Still, for now, I’ll just point out that Israel’s Arab Muslim minority, roughly 20%, enjoys rights and freedom unavailable to Arab Muslims even in countries where they constitute a majority. No positions or jobs are denied to Israeli citizens based on ethnicity or religion. Mansour Abbas, head of the Islamic Ra’am Party and an elected member of the Knesset, serves in the current Israeli governing coalition.
Gaza, from which Israelis withdrew in 2005, is ruled by Hamas. The West Bank is governed by the Palestinian Authority. Israelis have repeatedly offered to withdraw from most of the West Bank in exchange for a conflict-ending agreement. Those offers were turned down. Should Israelis withdraw without an agreement, the West Bank would become a second Gaza. Is that not obvious?
The endless drumbeat of anti-Israeli vilification by the COI is sure to energize the economic campaign against Israel (echoing the 1933 Nazi “Don’t buy from the Jews” campaign) and perhaps lead to prosecutions of Israelis by the International Criminal Court, a politicized entity whose authority is recognized by neither Israel nor the U.S.
More concerning: The “findings” of the COI “inquiry” will be used to justify the genocidal threats frequently made by the Islamic Republic of Iran, its Lebanese-based proxy, Hezbollah, and of course Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
I could fill this column with examples of such threats, but two should suffice. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has called on Muslims “to remove the Zionist black stain from human society,” adding that there is a religious “justification to kill all the Jews and annihilate Israel, and Iran must take the helm.”
When Nikki Haley was ambassador to the U.N., the Trump administration withdrew from the UNHRC, having concluded that significant reforms were unachievable. The Biden administration returned to that body this month, asserting that it can make a difference through diplomatic engagement. We shall see.
The U.N. campaign will make settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict impossible for the foreseeable future. Why would any Palestinian leader compromise so long as there is a possibility that what happened to the Jews of Europe — defamation followed by extermination, a “final solution” — could happen to the Jews of Israel with the assent of the “international community”?
The U.N. was established following World War II to prevent and resolve conflicts. Today, it promotes antisemitism and enables both terrorists and genocidaires. Acknowledgment of this reality must precede any attempt to change it.
• Clifford D. May is founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a columnist for the Washington Times.
Click to Read More and View Comments
Click to Hide
5. President Biden’s Tax & Antitrust Philosophy Is At War With His National Security Strategy
Interesting "adversaries." The right hand versus the left hand?
Excerpts:
China, which is in a race to out-innovate America, would likely treat companies like Apple and Alphabet as national treasures, and provide them with extensive protections if not outright subsidies.
The Biden administration treats them like potential threats, and seeks to constrain their operations.
Whatever the domestic political logic of attacking big tech, or the energy sector, or other leading industries may be, it seems inconsistent with the goals the national security strategic guidance seeks to advance.
You can call that an industrial policy if you want, but the notion it will make life “better, safer and easier for working families in America,” as the guidance demands, is debatable.
It is more likely to facilitate China’s rise to the status of global competitor in the few fields where the U.S. still leads.
President Biden’s Tax & Antitrust Philosophy Is At War With His National Security Strategy
Forbes · by Loren Thompson · January 12, 2022
In February of 2020, on the eve of the primary season that delivered the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination to Joe Biden, Jake Sullivan and co-author Jennifer Harris wrote a seminal commentary in Foreign Policy about the need for a national industrial policy.
Sullivan went on to become President Biden’s national security advisor, so it matters that he and Harris argued “a new grand strategy for today’s world will only be as good as the economic philosophy behind it.”
The authors insisted that U.S. national security depended on Washington reaching for “a new economic model” different from the policy framework prevailing over previous decades.
There wasn’t much mystery what drove their plea for a different approach to economic policy: China’s rapid rise to industrial parity or superiority in its competition with America demanded a rethinking of the conventional wisdom.
... [+]Wikipedia
As they put it, “advocating industrial policy (broadly speaking, government actions aimed at reshaping the economy) was once considered embarrassing—now it should be considered something close to obvious.”
These views are echoed in the Biden administration’s interim national security strategic guidance, which asserts, “in today’s world, economic security is national security.”
MORE FROMFORBES ADVISOR
The guidance begins by stating that the current moment in history “requires a new and broader understanding of national security, one that recognizes that our role in the world depends on our strength and vitality here at home.”
It proceeds to extol the virtues of resilience, innovation, competitiveness and “truly shared prosperity.”
This sounds promising, hinting that the first faltering steps towards a national economic philosophy equal to the China challenge, which began under President Trump, will be refined and extended by his successor.
However, the Biden economic philosophy, at least to date, turns out to be more a reflection of domestic political forces than external threats.
Rather than strengthening the national economy in an era of great-power rivalry, Biden’s policies are more likely to continue a secular decline in U.S. economic power that began with China’s accession to the World Trade Organization two decades ago.
With the best of intentions, President Biden has propounded a backward-looking economic philosophy that reflects little grasp of the challenges U.S. power faces today.
Consider two core features of the Biden approach, taxes and antitrust.
Taxes. Biden began his tenure by embracing an ambitious assortment of social-welfare and climate initiatives collectively known as “Build Back Better.”
Whatever the merits of those initiatives may be, the proposed method of paying for them would have greatly increased the tax burden on corporations and individual investors.
For starters, the president embraced raising the statutory income-tax rate on publicly traded corporations from 21% to 28%, only three years after the Trump administration had succeeded in lowering the rate from 35%.
When combined with the additional levies placed on corporate income at the state level, this would have increased the combined federal-state tax burden on major corporations from 26% to 32%.
But that was just the beginning, because Biden also endorsed treating long-term capital gains and dividends as normal income, meaning corporate earnings would be taxed a second time at the individual investor level at rates up to nearly 40%.
According to the Tax Foundation, combining the proposed maximum tax rates at both the corporate and individual levels, Biden’s policies would have resulted in the U.S. having the highest integrated tax rates of any OECD country.
Nearly 63% of corporate earnings could have been taxed away, reducing resources available for research and capital investment, and thereby undercutting U.S. economic competitiveness.
Before corporate tax rates were reduced under Trump, some major corporations were actually moving their headquarters overseas to avoid the high level of taxation in the U.S.
Biden’s policies, had they not been blocked by Arizona Senator Kyrsten Sinema (whose vote was crucial to passing Build Back Better legislation), would have made it much harder to restore the nation’s decaying industrial base.
Antitrust. The Biden administration inherited from the Trump years a bipartisan movement to restrain and potentially break up some of the nation’s biggest tech companies.
Biden soon made it clear that he intended to apply antitrust law to a far broader swath of the nation’s industries.
By the end of the president’s first year in office, his administration had launched antitrust investigations or other actions against the oil and gas industry; the maritime shipping industry; the meatpacking industry; the railroad industry; the insurance industry; the publishing industry; and even big-box retailers.
Some of these initiatives were tied to supply-chain problems originating in the global pandemic, but collectively they implied a distrust of economic forces as the preferred mechanism for regulating market behavior.
The administration’s trust-busting philosophy is seemingly at odds with the dictates of its national-security guidance, which emphasizes the importance of encouraging innovation.
The Boston Consulting Group’s 2021 survey of the world’s most innovative companies is dominated by U.S.-based enterprises, particularly tech firms; the four most innovative firms, in descending order of rank, are assessed to be Apple AAPL , Alphabet, Amazon and Microsoft MSFT (Facebook is ranked number 13).
The antitrust crusaders that Biden has installed at the Justice Department, Federal Trade Commission and in the White House thus are seeking to limit enterprises that have contributed disproportionately to U.S. economic growth and global influence.
Antitrust law in the U.S. first took root at a time when companies like Standard Oil operated behind the world’s highest tariff walls.
Today those tariff walls have been largely dismantled, and the biggest rivals to America’s leading innovators are headquartered overseas—especially in China.
China, which is in a race to out-innovate America, would likely treat companies like Apple and Alphabet as national treasures, and provide them with extensive protections if not outright subsidies.
The Biden administration treats them like potential threats, and seeks to constrain their operations.
Whatever the domestic political logic of attacking big tech, or the energy sector, or other leading industries may be, it seems inconsistent with the goals the national security strategic guidance seeks to advance.
You can call that an industrial policy if you want, but the notion it will make life “better, safer and easier for working families in America,” as the guidance demands, is debatable.
It is more likely to facilitate China’s rise to the status of global competitor in the few fields where the U.S. still leads.
Forbes · by Loren Thompson · January 12, 2022
6. Watchdog to Audit Military's Screening for Extremists at Enlistment
I wonder how pressure on recruiters to make their mission contribute to this problem (if there is a problem).
Watchdog to Audit Military's Screening for Extremists at Enlistment
The Department of Defense inspector general has begun an audit of how the military is doing at screening out extremists during enlistment, the latest move in a new push to root out the activity, according to a publicly released memo.
The watchdog audit comes only weeks after the Pentagon unveiled its latest report on extremism in the ranks. That report created new guidelines on activities banned for service members by adding more detail and clarity on what constitutes extremist activity, as well as active participation.
Military extremism was pushed to the forefront last year when some troops and veterans participated in the Jan. 6 riot at the U.S. Capitol. A mob clashed with police before breaking through doors and windows and stalking lawmakers in an attempt to stop the official vote count in the 2020 election after former President Donald Trump lost.
"The objective of this audit is to determine whether Military Service recruiting organizations screened applicants for supremacist, extremist, and criminal gang behavior, according to DoD and Military Service policies and procedures," the Jan. 3 inspector general memo said.
However, throughout the past year, defense officials have repeatedly noted that many of these processes are passive -- relying on either honest self-reporting or reporting by others -- rather than actively investigating and confirming a lack of extremist activity.
During the rollout of the new social media rules, the Pentagon's chief spokesman, John Kirby, stressed that the department is not planning systemic surveillance of service members' social media accounts to find infractions.
The approach has led to at least one public failure of the process to catch an extremist before they enlisted.
The military has struggled to remove some members from its ranks even after they were identified and charged.
William Braniff, the director of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), told reporters at an event on extremism in the military last month that "when military individuals or veterans participate in violent extremism domestically, they really punch above their weight, having an outsized impact."
Furthermore, Braniff's data shows that these veterans "were affiliated with no fewer than 120 different organizations around the country [like] local militia groups or local white supremacist groups without a national footprint."
7. The security consequences of America’s focus on China
Excerpts:
More generally, if the US maintains its strategic emphasis on China, it will unavoidably lose considerable geopolitical influence. Countries that lose American largesse will understandably feel less beholden to the US.
But the diminution of America’s global stature could also bring significant benefits—for both the US and the rest of the world. Strategic discipline would make the US less likely to wage unnecessary wars. The dark side of US unipolarity during much of the post–Cold War era has been America’s recklessness in resorting to military force. According to the US Congressional Research Service, in the three decades since the Cold War ended, the US has used its armed forces abroad every year. In particular, it has squandered an immense amount of blood and treasure in two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Elsewhere, America’s new geopolitical orientation will force countries that have until now counted on US protection and support to learn to fend for themselves. For example, some Middle Eastern countries have sought to rebuild ties and foster peace in preparation for American disengagement: relations between some Gulf states and Israel have improved dramatically in recent years.
In Europe, ‘strategic autonomy’ may be mostly rhetoric for now. But as the US makes it increasingly clear to its European allies that the region is a secondary priority, they will have to turn their rhetoric into action.
Former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright once claimed that the US is the world’s ‘indispensable nation’. That description has arguably been true for most of the post–Cold War era. In the age of the US–China cold war, America may be the indispensable power for East Asia, but not for other regions. As this new reality takes hold, the rest of the world will have no choice but to adapt. That could lead to more military conflict, but it could also lead to more peace.
The security consequences of America’s focus on China | The Strategist
During the Cold War, Europe was America’s strategic priority. East Asia was largely a sideshow, even though the United States fought bloody wars in Korea and Vietnam, and also provided security for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
But in the unfolding new cold war between the US and China, America’s strategic priorities have flipped. Today, US security strategy is dominated by the China threat, and East Asia has replaced Europe as the principal theatre of the world’s defining geopolitical contest. And the security consequences of this shift in America’s focus are becoming increasingly visible.
Most notably, America’s adversaries are taking advantage of its preoccupation with China to test US resolve. Iran, for example, has hardened its position in the stalemated negotiations on reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the 2015 nuclear deal from which US President Donald Trump’s administration withdrew in 2018. Iranian leaders appear to be betting that President Joe Biden will be extremely reluctant to resort to military force and get bogged down in a new Middle Eastern war when the US is planning for a potential conflict with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military threats against Ukraine are apparently based on similar calculations. Putin believes that he now has a far freer hand to restore Russia’s influence in its immediate neighbourhood, because the US can ill afford to be distracted from its strategic focus on China.
The recent actions by Iran and Russia vividly illustrate America’s strategic dilemma. To increase the likelihood of a favourable outcome in its cold war with China, the US must maintain its strategic discipline and steer clear of secondary conflicts that could divert its attention and resources. Biden’s abrupt—and botched—withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 underscores his administration’s determination in that regard.
How America’s standoffs with Iran and Russia play out remains to be seen, but it’s a safe bet that the US will sooner or later encounter similar tests elsewhere. Some regional powers will be tempted to bully weaker neighbours because they think that the US pivot to East Asia will make American military intervention much less likely.
To be sure, America’s focus on China will affect different regions differently, with much less impact on regional security in Latin America and Africa than in the Middle East. In Latin America and Africa, US policy in the coming years will likely emphasise economic, technological and diplomatic competition with China. The losers will be countries where China has negligible influence or interests.
The greatest security impact of the US strategic shift to East Asia will be felt in the Middle East, the region that relies most heavily on America for its security needs. In all likelihood, focusing on China will dramatically curtail America’s role as the region’s policeman. While the US will continue to provide arms and aid to its most important allies and partners, the Middle East as a whole will have to live without the US as its security provider.
More generally, if the US maintains its strategic emphasis on China, it will unavoidably lose considerable geopolitical influence. Countries that lose American largesse will understandably feel less beholden to the US.
But the diminution of America’s global stature could also bring significant benefits—for both the US and the rest of the world. Strategic discipline would make the US less likely to wage unnecessary wars. The dark side of US unipolarity during much of the post–Cold War era has been America’s recklessness in resorting to military force. According to the US Congressional Research Service, in the three decades since the Cold War ended, the US has used its armed forces abroad every year. In particular, it has squandered an immense amount of blood and treasure in two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Elsewhere, America’s new geopolitical orientation will force countries that have until now counted on US protection and support to learn to fend for themselves. For example, some Middle Eastern countries have sought to rebuild ties and foster peace in preparation for American disengagement: relations between some Gulf states and Israel have improved dramatically in recent years.
In Europe, ‘strategic autonomy’ may be mostly rhetoric for now. But as the US makes it increasingly clear to its European allies that the region is a secondary priority, they will have to turn their rhetoric into action.
Former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright once claimed that the US is the world’s ‘indispensable nation’. That description has arguably been true for most of the post–Cold War era. In the age of the US–China cold war, America may be the indispensable power for East Asia, but not for other regions. As this new reality takes hold, the rest of the world will have no choice but to adapt. That could lead to more military conflict, but it could also lead to more peace.
8. Foreign policy analysts say US military needs to prepare for China-Russia ‘axis’
But is it an "axis of evil?" (Apologies, I could not resist)
Foreign policy analysts say US military needs to prepare for China-Russia ‘axis’
The flags of China and Russia are shown in this undated image. Many American and European foreign policy professionals believe a Russian invasion of Ukraine — beyond the Ukrainian territory it already controls — is all but inevitable. And China-watchers say once the Beijing Olympics are over and the nation holds its Communist Party National Congress in the fall, Taiwan is likely to face a direct threat as well. (Wikimedia Commons)
(Tribune News Service) — "In a triangle with three countries, you don't want to be the one opposite the other two."
Should their interests combine, America could face a greater military and foreign policy threat than during the Cold War. That's the view of former CIA analyst Andrea Kendall-Taylor of the Center for a New American Security.
Many American and European foreign policy professionals believe a Russian invasion of Ukraine — beyond the Ukrainian territory it already controls — is all but inevitable. And China-watchers say once the Beijing Olympics are over and the nation holds its Communist Party National Congress in the fall, Taiwan is likely to face a direct threat as well.
Gordon G. Chang, author of "The Coming Collapse of China," thinks Americans should be more concerned.
"Defense experts are not as worried about China and Russia as they should be," says Chang. "We should not be surprised because they have not been particularly concerned for a long time."
Chang says the experts focused too much on the things that divided Beijing and Moscow rather than the issues that could unite them.
"Those dividing interests will almost certainly prevent an enduring partnership over time," Chang concedes. "But we should not care about what their relationship will be like a century from now. We should care about their effective alliance now (because) in the here and now, the pair is working closely against us and the international system."
Since signing a memorandum of understanding for military cooperation, China and Russia have engaged in multiple joint defense exercises. In 2018, Russia invited China for the first time to its largest annual defense exercise. A year later, they held their first-ever joint bomber patrols along the Korean Peninsula, drawing warning shots from South Korean pilots.
The two nations have also increased their economic cooperation. Bilateral trade between China and Russia reached more than $120 billion in 2021, a significant increase from 2020 despite the impacts of COVID. And the newly-completed Power of Siberia pipeline is expected to send 1.3 trillion cubic feet of Russian natural gas to China by the year 2025.
China and Russia are so close now that Chang considers them the New Axis. The question is, what are they after?
"I doubt that China would invade Taiwan this year given that Beijing has the Olympics next month and President Xi Jinping has his hands full trying to manage Omicron, the economy, and the upcoming Party Congress meeting later in the year," says Zach Cooper, a Senior Fellow in Foreign and Defense Policy at American Enterprise Institute (AEI). "The real worry is how China and Russia help each other in terms of technology-sharing and by posing challenges that make it hard for the United States to focus on one region at a time."
Cooper acknowledges concerns about a simultaneous Ukraine and Taiwan invasion scenario, but he thinks that is an incredibly low likelihood event this year.
"We will see lots of diplomatic coordination and some defense technology cooperation, but I don't expect deep operational trust between the two militaries, and I think the two sides are working on different timetables," says Cooper. "Russia wants action now in Ukraine (but) China likely does not want to get into a fight over Taiwan this year, so I think the coordination will continue, but it will be of a different sort than some are suggesting the last few weeks."
Chang's fear is that a foreign policy misstep could result in a two-front challenge to the West.
"Once either China or Russia, intentionally or accidentally starts a conflict, the other could act, either in coordination or on its own, taking advantage of the situation," says Chang. "So, let's say China starts a conflict with Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, or India. Russia could move against Ukraine."
The Biden administration has yet to lay out a strategy for confronting either nation or driving a wedge between them. Biden was elected touting his extensive foreign policy experience, but in the wake of the Afghanistan withdrawal fiasco, Biden's foreign policy approval ratings are underwater with the American people.
"Neither Xi Jinping nor Vladimir Putin seems to be particularly impressed with the United States at the moment," says Chang. "Deterrence is breaking down."
When it comes to what each nation brings to the table militarily speaking, Cooper says China is ahead in some areas.
"We certainly have a set of programs that are developing various hypersonic capabilities, but China already has conventionally-armed ballistic missiles with anti-ship capabilities, so it has an edge there," says Cooper.
"China is at least a half-decade ahead of us in hypersonic technology, probably more like a decade," says Chang. "Once, in the 1960s, the United States was the world leader in hypersonic flight (but) we did not develop the tech in the hope that we could entice Beijing and Moscow into similar restraint and, in short, we deluded ourselves about the nature of the Chinese and Russian regimes, (so) Americans should be furious at their policymakers."
Chang also sees a slight advantage for China when it comes to artificial intelligence.
"China is certainly ahead of us in quantum communications."
Quantum communication is defined by research and development company PicoQuant as a field of applied quantum physics closely related to quantum information processing and quantum teleportation.
"It's most interesting application is protecting information channels against eavesdropping," says PicoQuant in a webpage on quantum communication.
In terms of undersea capabilities, Cooper believes the U.S. has a clear lead. The same with space and cyber, generally speaking.
"We have perfected carrier flight operations, which the Chinese are just getting comfortable with, but China has quantity, which as the saying goes can have a quality all its own," says Cooper. "So, we may be ahead in many areas, but China may not need to be our equal to pose serious problems since in many areas it will likely field more systems at less expense than the American military."
America is also using high-tech training like the Synthetic Training Environment (STE) Live Training System to give U.S. pilots the ability to train against the fighters and weapons used by China and Russia in a virtual "real world" experience.
"The more realistic our training the better prepared our forces will be, but this is hard to observe for the opponent," says Cooper. "So this may be more helpful in a war-fight than for deterrence purposes."
9. Australia’s Strategic Offensive
Conclusion:
The U.S. remains the main Pacific military counterweight to China, whose military budget far exceeds Japan and Australia’s combined. Yet in a conflict over Taiwan, Australia and Japan would be the two nations most likely to aid Taipei besides the U.S. This defense agreement strengthens that deterrence and contributes to a more stable Pacific.
Australia’s Strategic Offensive
A pact with Japan is the latest move to resist China’s coercion.
WSJ · by The Editorial Board
Australian soldiers from 'Battle Group Eagle' participate in an Urban assault as part of Exercise 'Talisman Sabre 21' in Townsville, Australia, July 27, 2021.
Photo: Ian Hitchcock/Getty Images
The last few months have been a whirlwind for Australia’s defense diplomacy as the South Pacific nation of 26 million braces itself against Chinese advances in the region. The latest example is Canberra’s new Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Tokyo, which makes it easier for Australia’s military to conduct operations out of Japan, and vice versa.
The new pact sets the legal terms for visiting forces in each country, and is notable because Tokyo has been reluctant to coordinate closely on military matters with any nation except the U.S. The RAA will give Aussie forces more access to Japanese territory, facilitating joint operations in the Northern Pacific, including contested waters in the East and South China Seas. Japanese forces can exercise with Australia in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific.
China’s behavior under President Xi Jinping has cratered its previously stable relationship with Australia. A rift over Canberra’s decision not to use Huawei technology because of espionage and security risks accelerated amid the Covid-19 pandemic, when Beijing’s diplomats bludgeoned Prime Minister Scott Morrison for calling for an inquiry into the coronavirus’s origins. China began a campaign of economic sanctions against the country’s exports, demanded Australia’s press and representatives cease criticism of Chinese policies, detained one Australian citizen and put a second on trial.
Australia has also had a front-row seat to China’s naval buildup, which could be used to threaten Australia’s trade further if it doesn’t bend the knee politically. Australian defense planners are watching China’s strategic inroads in Pacific island nations closer to Australia’s borders like the Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Vanuatu.
The Morrison government has responded with creativity. It rejoined naval exercises with the so-called Quad of India, Japan and the U.S. in 2020. Then came the Aukus submarine technology sharing agreement with the U.S. and U.K. last September. That was followed by a major contract with South Korea to fortify Australian artillery, signed in December.
The U.S. remains the main Pacific military counterweight to China, whose military budget far exceeds Japan and Australia’s combined. Yet in a conflict over Taiwan, Australia and Japan would be the two nations most likely to aid Taipei besides the U.S. This defense agreement strengthens that deterrence and contributes to a more stable Pacific.
Copyright ©2022 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
WSJ · by The Editorial Board
10. Opinion | What I Learned When I Tried to Close Guantanamo
Excerpts:
This means that after almost two decades, it is almost certain that the United States will never be able to extract the punishment it seeks in the 9/11 cases. That we cannot even bring the conspirators to trial is a national embarrassment. But because of our government’s own misconduct, we should give up the illusion that we will ever be able to put them to death.
The Biden administration should instead pursue the only logical way out of this mess: Seek plea agreements that will ensure life imprisonment for the 9/11 and USS Cole conspirators. Striking any sort of deals with those accused of horrific acts of terrorism has been and will remain unpopular. But it will resolve a major part of the unfinished business at Guantanamo, since life sentences can be served in other facilities. Any such plea agreements should be coordinated with the families of the 9/11 victims, and the defendants should be required to cooperate with those families, who are still pursing civil litigation against those who allegedly facilitated the attacks.
Plea deals for the 9/11 conspirators will be politically controversial. But having Guantanamo enter a third decade of operations should be morally unacceptable. To close the facility, Biden should exhibit the same focus on Guantanamo that Obama did, but with even greater creativity for the toughest cases. In doing so, he can close another chapter in the war on terror and move our nation closer to the realization of its democratic aspirations — under the glare of a world watching to see whether the rule of law will endure in America.
Opinion | What I Learned When I Tried to Close Guantanamo
Magazine
Opinion | What I Learned When I Tried to Close Guantanamo
The diplomat who headed Obama's efforts to shutter the notorious prison on what it'll take to get the job done.
Watchtower security teams at Camp X-Ray rehearse for handling incoming detainees on January 11, 2002 in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. | Shane T. McCoy/Getty Images
Opinion by LEE WOLOSKY
01/11/2022 12:15 PM EST
Lee Wolosky has served under four U.S. presidents in legal and national security positions, most recently as Special Counsel to President Biden and, before that, as President Barack Obama’s Special Envoy for Guantanamo Closure. He is a partner at the law firm of Jenner & Block LLP, which has represented both Majid Kahn and certain of the 9/11 families.
I was somewhere on the New Jersey Turnpike when Donald Trump became president. After completing my service as President Barack Obama’s Special Envoy for Guantanamo Closure, I drove home to New York from Washington, D.C. on Jan. 20, 2017.
The day before, I had left the State Department for the final time. My staff and I removed the signage adorning our suite’s front door. Trump had promised to reverse Obama’s closure policy, vowing instead to load up the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay with “some bad dudes.” We knew the office dedicated to closing Guantanamo would itself soon be shuttered.
Still, we had a lot to be proud of. In the frenetic 18 months from the time I was sworn in, we had dramatically reduced the population of Guantanamo, transferring 75 detainees to 15 countries. My staff and I traveled constantly, shuttling from Guantanamo, to countries around the world with which we were negotiating to resettle detainees, to the White House Situation Room where final transfer decisions were frequently made. The president and the vice president were regularly and intently involved in our efforts. I realized Obama was tracking our work a little too closely when he inquired one day: “How is the potential detainee transfer to Benin coming?”
I had come to learn (as the president had already to his great dismay) that the legal and policy morass that had developed around Guantanamo meant it could not simply be “closed.” A task that many saw as a matter of decisively turning the page on a dark chapter in American history turned out to be much messier, more tedious and more legally and politically fraught than I anticipated. It was a hard enough diplomatic challenge to convince foreign partners to agree to take in former Guantanamo detainees. At home, the hyper-polarized political environment and myriad legal obstacles made the process even harder. The detention facility and surrounding legal infrastructure had been thrown together hastily in the shadow of a horrific national trauma, with little attention to future legal repercussions, including the likelihood of winning criminal convictions. In large part, the Guantanamo mess is self-inflicted — a result of our own decisions to engage in torture, hold detainees indefinitely without charge, set up dysfunctional military commissions and attempt to avoid oversight by the federal courts.
Now we stand 20 years from the opening of Guantanamo on Jan. 11, 2002. The United States has left Afghanistan, and the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks has come and gone. The alleged perpetrators still have not been tried, and numerous other men remain held in indefinite detention without charge. President Joe Biden is completing his first year in office. My State Department office remains empty. Our longest war has ended, yet Guantanamo endures.
The challenges presented by closing Guantanamo have not changed — but nearly everything else has. The world has moved on from the 9/11 era; even more than during the Obama years, Guantanamo feels today like a relic of another time. Biden, who will be remembered as the president who ended a war that three of his predecessors could or would not, should recommit to closing the facility for good. This may require bolder solutions than his predecessor and some imperfect compromises — including finally abandoning the experiment with military trials — as well as the same resolve and leadership Biden demonstrated in extricating the United States from Afghanistan. The time has come to finish the yearslong process of restoring U.S. moral credibility by untangling the knots that we ourselves tied in Guantanamo.
By the time I took the job in July 2015, we knew it would be hard for Obama to fulfill his campaign promise of closing the notorious detention facility in Cuba. A principal reason was a law passed by Congress during his first term that purported to prevent the president (in my view, probably unconstitutionally) from transferring any Guantanamo detainees to the United States for any purpose. Before that, it was taken as a given that although we would resettle as many prisoners as possible abroad, a handful of those awaiting military commission trials — such as the 9/11 and USS Cole co-conspirators — would have to remain in U.S. custody, ideally at a secure location other than Guantanamo.
But Congress’ transfer ban effectively trapped those detainees in Cuba, preventing Obama from closing Guantanamo (without taking unilateral action for which some believed he lacked the legal authority). So we focused intensely and unremittingly on getting as many people as we could out before the end of Obama’s presidency, even if the facility itself would not be closed at that time.
For a detainee to be able to leave Guantanamo, the first step was a careful whole-of-government review to determine whether that individual’s continued detention was necessary to counter an ongoing, significant threat to the United States. If all six agencies and departments involved in the review unanimously concluded that it was not, the detainee became “approved for transfer.” Then, it was my job to negotiate his repatriation to his country of origin or resettlement to a third country, along with security arrangements and diplomatic assurances intended to maximize the chances for successful reintegration to life outside Guantanamo.
The negotiations were difficult, but I welcomed the task because, unlike in other areas of diplomacy, success or failure could be easily and quantifiably measured. Given the way my position was set up, I was able to wield the considerable, full leverage of U.S. diplomacy and find hidden opportunities. Countries agreed to take detainees for a number of reasons. Some foreign leaders thought the facility was an abomination and simply wanted to help us close it. Some partners were reluctant to even entertain the notion despite having benefited disproportionately from the enormous investment of American blood and treasure since 9/11 to keep us — and them — safe. I told them, sometimes repeatedly, that we were all obligated to help where we could, including with winding down Guantanamo.
Others wanted entirely unrelated concessions in exchange for a commitment to resettle detainees. Early in my tenure, I went to breakfast with a foreign ambassador I had known for some time. He opened the meal by graciously offering on behalf of his country to take up to 20 Guantanamo prisoners. I was ecstatic. By the time the meal was done, it was clear that the offer was contingent on the sale of highly advanced military hardware. No deal.
Some leaders liked Obama personally and agreed to take detainees as an act of personal goodwill. I caught a plane to one country after receiving an email from the national security adviser, who had briefly discussed resettling detainees with that country’s president on the margins of a conference. As this president walked me into his offices, he said: “So this is important to President Obama?” When I confirmed that it was, he said: “If it is important to President Obama, it is important to me. We will do it.” The rest of the meeting consisted of pleasantries. Easiest deal I ever did.
By the end of Obama’s time in office, we had largely succeeded in accomplishing our revised mission. Almost 800 individuals had passed through Guantanamo since it opened in 2002, and 116 were detained there when I took office in 2015. But as I drove across the George Washington Bridge on Inauguration Day, only 41 remained. For a few of those, we had negotiated transfer deals that we ran out of time to implement. The remainder included hardened terrorists like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who had been (and remains) caught up in yearslong military commission proceedings, hampered by, among other things, the lack of established legal procedures that has plagued their cases from the start.
I was not optimistic that there would be much, if any, progress in the years ahead, but was proud of the hard work we had done to release detainees who had never been charged with a crime and did not pose a threat to our security. As the curtain closed on the Obama administration, we had made progress in reducing the injustice of indefinite detention without charge. But the stain on the United States represented by Guantanamo remained.
I thought little of Guantanamo in the years that followed, partly because of the demands of my legal practice and partly because of the deep freeze that fell over the issue during the Trump presidency. Trump didn’t end up loading up Guantanamo with “bad dudes,” and never acted on his reported impulse to send Americans infected with Covid there. Only a single detainee left the prison (under an agreement negotiated during the Obama administration) and none of the remaining ones became eligible for transfer.
Yet the costs of maintaining the facility continued to grow. By the time Trump took office, the United States was spending hundreds of millions of dollars per year to operate the facility, or approximately $13 million per detainee per year. (Compare that with the annual cost of $78,000 for maintaining a prisoner in the federal Bureau of Prisons, which houses scores of convicted terrorists with no reported security incidents). The facility itself — meant to be temporary when set up in 2002 — was also physically deteriorating.
Then there were the reputational and national security costs. It was no coincidence that when ISIS executed Western hostages, it dressed them in orange jumpsuits evocative of those worn by early Guantanamo detainees. The facility and the imagery associated with it incite hatred against the United States and serve as a recruitment tool for terrorists. That’s why leaders of both parties — including George W. Bush, John McCain, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice — came to support its closure, and hundreds of detainees left Guantanamo during Bush’s presidency after he partially reversed course on the matter.
Trump, of course, didn’t care about any of that. Keeping people at Guantanamo was consistent with his desire to get tough on bad guys — even if some of the bad guys were sick, basically as old as he was and unable to be charged with crimes. To be fair, Trump was leveraging the deep politicization of Guantanamo that had taken hold long before he became president. From what had once been a largely bipartisan objective to shut down the facility, Guantanamo became a political football, with Republicans intent on frustrating Obama’s presidency wherever they could.
Some Republican members of Congress admitted in private that the facility should be closed, even as they ranted in public about “releasing terrorists.” The prison endures as a product not just of America’s mistakes in the fight against terrorism but also of the toxic brand of politics that began during the Obama era and have only worsened since.
I began to think again about Guantanamo again in early 2021. We had a new commander-in-chief — one who, as vice president, had been fully committed to Obama’s closure policy. In the four years since Biden had last held office, the world seemed to have moved on even more definitively from the era of the war on terror — a sentiment punctuated by Biden’s decision to complete the withdrawal from Afghanistan by the 20th anniversary of 9/11. The president was committed to reorienting the country toward countering current and future threats, including China.
And yet here we stand on the other side of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and Guantanamo persists as an anachronistic relic of the prior era. The U.S. national security establishment has a way of operating on inertia for years or decades. In the months leading up to 9/11, when I served on the National Security Council’s counterterrorism directorate, I was surprised to see how many government resources were still oriented toward the defunct Soviet threat. You could count on two hands the number of NSC staff who knew anything substantive about al Qaeda — yet sitting at our desks, I and many others would learn almost instantly of minor seismic disturbances in Siberia.
Guantanamo remains open by virtue of that same inertia. And it is past time to retire this relic of the forever wars. To be clear, I have always believed the United States was right to detain presumed enemy combatants in the early 2000s and to take the most aggressive steps to track down and capture those who attacked us on 9/11. But that was decades ago. The threat environment has fundamentally shifted. Al Qaeda is mostly dismantled — at least, the centralized command and control structure in Afghanistan that attacked us in 2001 is gone. Domestic terrorist groups have become a more pressing threat than foreign ones. And the primary adversaries we now face are nation-states, not the non-state actors we feared in the wake of 9/11.
The detainees themselves are also relics of another time and place. The oldest turns 75 this year. Many stand to die in Guantanamo. What’s more, it’s often forgotten that only a handful of these individuals are accused of direct complicity in attacks that targeted Americans. Many others committed crimes that can be, and long ago should have been, prosecuted in places like Israel, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Malaysia or Kenya.
If these detainees had been white and not brown or Black, is there any realistic chance the United States — a country committed to the rule of law — would imprison them without charge for decades? I don’t think so.
In addition to all the old reasons for closing Guantanamo, Biden’s commitment that the United States set a democratic, rules-based example for the world — with human rights as a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy — provides new impetus. Shuttering the prison will help restore American credibility in the struggle against authoritarianism, which Biden has correctly identified as a principal challenge to democratic governance and U.S. global leadership.
Biden should finish the job Obama started, including, if necessary, through more aggressive steps than Obama took. In particular, he should look for ways to end the stalled experiment with trying detainees through military commissions. He should consider relying more heavily on facilitating foreign prosecutions for tough cases and ultimately releasing detainees who cannot be charged with a crime in this or another country. And to the extent necessary, Biden should look to inherent presidential powers under Article II of the Constitution to finally shutter Guantanamo.
The Biden administration (in which I recently served, but on issues unrelated to Guantanamo) has made some halting progress. In July, the administration repatriated Moroccan national Abdul Latif Nasser, who had spent 19 years at Guantanamo without charge. Nasser was one of the prisoners for whom we negotiated transfer deals in 2016, but which we could not implement before the end of Obama’s term.
Of the 39 detainees now remaining at Guantanamo, a total of 13 are cleared to leave. Fourteen are being held without charge — the so-called forever prisoners. The remaining 12 have been charged but are subject to interminable military commission proceedings — all of which are weighed down by the prisoners’ allegations that they were tortured in U.S. custody.
Those cleared to leave should be transferred as soon as possible through diplomacy led by a senior official with a clear mandate to get the job done. For those who have not been charged by military commissions (and even perhaps for some who have), a sustained effort will be necessary to determine whether it will be possible to build legal cases that can be prosecuted in foreign courts in countries like Israel, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia or the UAE. For both categories of detainee, the process can be slow and occasionally frustrating, but with dedicated staff and high-level attention, it can be done before Biden leaves office.
If Biden succeeds at getting those 27 prisoners out of U.S. custody, the dozen remaining cases will be the toughest. These include Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the other 9/11 co-conspirators, and those suspected of attacking the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen in 2000. They represent the tough core of the Guantanamo problem, cases familiar to many Americans and whose resolution remains politically fraught. For years, the United States has tried and failed to use military trials to impose death sentences on these terrorists. It is increasingly clear that will never happen.
The case of Majid Khan illustrates why the cases against the 9/11 co-conspirators are going nowhere. Khan pled guilty to a range of charges a decade ago and has been a longtime cooperator with U.S. authorities. This past October, he told the world at his sentencing hearing that the Americans had tortured him — an issue that infects every military commission case. A jury comprised of senior military officers called Khan’s treatment “a stain on the moral fiber of America” and recommended he receive clemency as a result.
Khan’s case forced the United States to confront what it had long sought to avoid: the possibility of a public reckoning with torture and mistreatment of detainees at the hands of U.S. personnel. Instead of confronting this issue through an in-court examination of the mistreatment Khan alleges he endured in U.S. custody (complete with witnesses testifying under oath about barbaric treatment unbecoming of the United States), the government renegotiated Khan’s plea agreement. As a result, Khan should leave Guantanamo as soon as this year when his sentence concludes. The path is now clear for other detainees charged in the military commissions (including in capital cases, which Khan’s was not) to seek similar redress for the treatment they, too, endured.
This means that after almost two decades, it is almost certain that the United States will never be able to extract the punishment it seeks in the 9/11 cases. That we cannot even bring the conspirators to trial is a national embarrassment. But because of our government’s own misconduct, we should give up the illusion that we will ever be able to put them to death.
The Biden administration should instead pursue the only logical way out of this mess: Seek plea agreements that will ensure life imprisonment for the 9/11 and USS Cole conspirators. Striking any sort of deals with those accused of horrific acts of terrorism has been and will remain unpopular. But it will resolve a major part of the unfinished business at Guantanamo, since life sentences can be served in other facilities. Any such plea agreements should be coordinated with the families of the 9/11 victims, and the defendants should be required to cooperate with those families, who are still pursing civil litigation against those who allegedly facilitated the attacks.
Plea deals for the 9/11 conspirators will be politically controversial. But having Guantanamo enter a third decade of operations should be morally unacceptable. To close the facility, Biden should exhibit the same focus on Guantanamo that Obama did, but with even greater creativity for the toughest cases. In doing so, he can close another chapter in the war on terror and move our nation closer to the realization of its democratic aspirations — under the glare of a world watching to see whether the rule of law will endure in America.
11. The hero of Jan. 6 whose name must not be spoken
Partisan, perhaps. But we cannot shy away from what happened on 1/6/2021 and wedo need to view what happened in a nonpartisan way and from only a Consitutional perspective.
Excerpt:
Oddly, Biden instead seemed to claim personal credit for the stand that Pence took, as if he, rather than Pence, had been the man in the arena on Jan. 6: “I did not seek this fight brought to this Capitol one year ago today, but I will not shrink from it either. I will stand in this breach. I will defend this nation.” That’s what Pence actually did.
Biden stated: “To me, the true patriots are the heroes who defended this Capitol. Congressmen, Democrats, Republicans stayed. Senators, representatives, staff — they finished their work the Constitution demanded. They honored their oath to defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic.”
Chief among them was the unmentioned Vice President Mike Pence. Biden and Harris would have served the country well had they singled him out for special appreciation. But like some of the Trump bitter-enders to whom Pence is now anathema, his name is not to be uttered.
The hero of Jan. 6 whose name must not be spoken
The Hill · by Joseph Bosco, opinion contributor · January 11, 2022
President Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris missed a unique opportunity to generate some much-needed national unity when they commemorated the one-year anniversary of Jan. 6, 2021.
They rightly recalled the disgraceful events of that dark day and characterized them correctly as an attack on American democracy, a deliberate attempt to prevent the peaceful transfer of power. The tragic irony is that most participants on the ground had been convinced by the apocalyptic urgings of former President Trump and his coterie that they were the ones defending American democracy against an attempt to subvert it by forces on the left.
The unprecedented measures taken to enable voting during the pandemic provided fertile ground for conspiracy theorists and election losers to manipulate public opinion with charges of fraud. The arguments reflected a lack of faith in the integrity of U.S. institutions and the fundamental resilience of the American system. It was fed by Trump’s own refusal to accept democracy’s self-correcting capacity through regular elections. For all the rioters’ claims of resisting tyranny, Jan. 6 resembled less a skirmish in the Revolutionary War than a foray during America’s Civil War. The display of Confederate flags showed that some of the Capitol invaders openly welcomed that comparison.
Trump’s selfish intentions were actually foreshadowed less than 24 hours earlier when Georgia held an election for two Senate seats that would determine the fate of the Republicans’ 52-48 majority. If Trump’s own doomsday rhetoric was to be believed, the fate of the republic was at stake on Jan. 5, 2021, every bit as much as on Nov. 3, 2020 — even more so because by then the House of Representatives and the White House were already destined to be in the hands of progressive Democrats.
Yet, instead of rallying Georgia’s Republicans to reelect at least one of their GOP senators and keep control of the Senate, Trump spent most of his speech again bemoaning his Nov. 3 loss and the alleged fatal flaws in Georgia’s election process. He managed to depress enough of the Republican vote to squander both seats and give Democrats control of the U.S. Senate.
Trump followed up his Georgia fiasco by repeating his subversion of Republican prospects in Virginia’s gubernatorial election last November. He questioned GOP candidate Glenn Youngkin’s devotion to “the MAGA cause,” and thus his electoral suitability, and even called on Republicans to boycott the 2022 and 2024 elections if his 2020 defeat was not retroactively undone.
After Youngkin won, despite Trump’s belated and counterproductive “endorsement,” and Trump took credit anyway, he circled back to his Georgia obsession. He gratuitously observed that progressive Democrat Stacey Abrams would have been a better governor than Republican
Trump’s betrayal of the Republican Party pales in significance to his attempted subversion of the U.S. Constitution on Jan. 6, which Biden and Harris greatly relished in reliving — and inappropriately linked to today’s Democratic legislative agenda. But they failed to offer a well-earned grace note that would have gone a long way to advance the nation’s healing.
Harris recalled “the resolve I saw in our elected leaders when I returned to the Senate chamber that night … not to yield but to certify the election; their loyalty not to party or person but to the Constitution of the United States.” She did not mention the name of the one person most exemplary of that resolve — former Vice President Mike Pence, who was uniquely targeted by the rioters and positioned to submit to or defy their unconstitutional demands. He alone held the power to further disrupt, or to restore, the constitutional process. Despite all the pressure from Trump and his allies, Pence refused to abandon or subvert his constitutional responsibilities.
Harris likened Jan. 6 to other traumatic dates in modern U.S. history — Dec. 7, 1941, and Sept. 11, 2001. But she might also have included Nov. 22, 1963, April 30, 1968, and June 4, 1968, when John Kennedy, Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy, respectively, were assassinated for political reasons. Some of the Capitol invaders were quite explicit in their own murderous intentions, shouting “Hang Mike Pence,” while, as Biden said, “literally erecting gallows to hang the vice president.” Pence did not flinch.and the words Harris used when she introduced Biden — “a public servant with the character and fortitude to meet this moment” — could well have been used to describe Pence’s unwavering stand.
Biden’s speech made a passing reference to “some courageous men and women in the Republican Party … trying to uphold the principle of that party,” but like Harris, he failed to credit Pence for his brave defense of the Constitution. Biden could have reminded the country that just as he performed his vice presidential duty in 2016 and declared Trump’s electoral victory over Hillary Clinton, Pence carried out his constitutional responsibility to ensure a peaceful transfer of power. Biden and Harris could have noted that no vice president in the history of the nation has had to perform that normally routine function under more difficult and extreme circumstances, with intense pressure not only from a mob threatening his life but also from the president himself.
Oddly, Biden instead seemed to claim personal credit for the stand that Pence took, as if he, rather than Pence, had been the man in the arena on Jan. 6: “I did not seek this fight brought to this Capitol one year ago today, but I will not shrink from it either. I will stand in this breach. I will defend this nation.” That’s what Pence actually did.
Biden stated: “To me, the true patriots are the heroes who defended this Capitol. Congressmen, Democrats, Republicans stayed. Senators, representatives, staff — they finished their work the Constitution demanded. They honored their oath to defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic.”
Chief among them was the unmentioned Vice President Mike Pence. Biden and Harris would have served the country well had they singled him out for special appreciation. But like some of the Trump bitter-enders to whom Pence is now anathema, his name is not to be uttered.
Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He is a nonresident fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies and a member of the advisory board of the Global Taiwan Institute. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA.
The Hill · by Joseph Bosco, opinion contributor · January 11, 2022
12. As the U.S. and Russia talk, Ukrainian troops brace for war, and they're "ready for battle"
As the U.S. and Russia talk, Ukrainian troops brace for war, and they're "ready for battle"
CBS News senior foreign correspondent Holly Williams is in eastern Ukraine, speaking with military leaders who are preparing for a potential war with Russia, and hoping to prevent another land-grab.
The Cold War ended 30 years ago with the collapse of the Soviet empire. But Williams found Ukrainian soldiers fighting — with help from the United States — against separatists backed by Russia, and the U.S. government has warned that Russia could be on the brink of a new invasion.
On the frozen frontline of the conflict, Williams was led through icy trenches that have carved the country in two. Ukraine is an American ally that has been fighting a bloody, Russian-backed rebellion since 2014. More than 14,000 people have reportedly been killed in those seven years.
Commander Andriy, a 22-year veteran of Ukraine's armed forces, is worried. He believes there's a very real chance that Putin will order his forces to invade once again.
This winter, Russia has massed as many as 100,000 troops along Ukraine's border. It has also tested its new hypersonic missiles, which may be capable of evading American air defense systems.
Some analysts believe a full Russian ground invasion, with tanks, artillery and armored vehicles rolling over the border, would only be possible after the ground here freezes solid, but in the trenches, troops told CBS News they believe it could happen any time.
Putin rejects the concerns voiced by Ukraine, the U.S. and its NATO allies, insisting that it's Russia suffering at the hands of Western aggression. He has demanded security guarantees from the U.S. and NATO, including removing NATO troops from much of eastern Europe.
But some say Putin is playing a game of Cold War-style brinkmanship.
"He wants to be treated like a great leader. He wants Russia to be treated like a great power," Ukrainian political analyst Taras Berezovets told CBS News. He believes Putin is merely using Ukraine, and the threat of a new invasion, as a pawn to get what he wants from the West.
"He thinks that if he shows his power here, he shows violence here, in Ukraine… Western leaders can say, 'Okay, we should deal with Putin and should treat him like we used to treat Soviet Union and communist leaders.'"
The U.S. has been helping to train Ukraine's frontline soldiers. Last year, Washington supplied nearly half a billion dollars in military assistance, including anti-tank missiles. In two phone calls with Putin last month, President Biden threatened Moscow with more sanctions if Russia does invade, but he said he would not send American troops.
Some analysts think Putin believes the U.S. is in decline as a superpower, and that he senses an opportunity for Russia to gain clout on the world stage, at the expense of the democratic West.
"From his perspective, he thinks that democracy [is] becoming weaker, weaker and weaker," Berezovets told Williams.
Hundreds of miles from the frontline, in Ukraine's capital of Kyiv, they've renovated old bomb shelters for civilians to use in case of a Russian attack. Williams visited one of the shelters, which were originally built during the Cold War, when Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union and the enemy, ironically, was America.
A Ukrainian army soldier is seen in a trench in Verkhnotoretske village, on the frontline between Ukraine and Russian-backed rebels, in eastern Ukraine, December 27, 2021. Andriy Andriyenko/SOPA Images/LightRocket/Getty
Back on the frontline, the troops in the trenches want no part of a new, Russian empire, even if it means making the ultimate sacrifice to prevent it.
"All my soldiers, in this time, ready for battle," Commander Andriy told CBS News.
"You're all ready to die to save Ukraine from Russian invasion?" Williams asked him.
"Not only I, all my soldiers," he replied.
Download our Free App
For Breaking News & Analysis Download the Free CBS News app
13. The Future of Global Population
A fascinating review essay from one of the foremost experts in economics and demography.
Excerpts:
Singer sees this point, too. But after taking us through the arithmetic that points to his vastly larger planetary population projections for some centuries hence, he commits a sort of rhetorical hit and run, leaving readers whose credulity may already be strained to take his word for it that such outcomes are indeed viable. There is no need to consider the question of how such a populous world could sustain itself, he avers, since centuries from now "there will be a lot more technology and knowledge, and the question is likely to look rather different from how it looks today." "In brief," he concludes, it's "not our problem."
For those inclined to take Singer seriously — as I am — that dismissal is flatly dissatisfying; for some readers, it might raise questions about his entire treatment of population. Nonetheless, I believe he is correct to maintain that a future world population of either 250 million or 250 billion could be in keeping with a modern society of the type he describes. Singer's mind-stretching demographic conjectures are merely outlandish, not positively insane.
The case for a prosperous modern society with 250 million people in it seems straightforward enough. Picturing a world containing only two Japans, trading extensively with each other and exploiting all the Earth's natural resources in their commerce, is not really much of a leap. Challenges and constraints would surely arise from long-term population decline, but a question about the planet's carrying capacity would not be one of them.
The Future of Global Population
Current Issue
Homo sapiens have probably always instinctively worried about the survival of their kind. And since the beginning of recorded history, civilized peoples have been considering the future of human numbers intellectually. In the book of Genesis, the Lord tells Abraham that his descendants shall be as numerous as the stars in the sky and the grains of sand on the seashore — very good news, of course, but a sum beyond reckoning at the time. Since then, mortal man has been busy developing quantitative techniques to enumerate populations he cares about, and to calculate the hypothetical world population of humans — their quantity, their geographic distribution, and their profile — far into the future.
Population enumerations known as "censuses" originated in the imperial decrees of standing empires in East Asia and the Mediterranean — including one that famously involved the town of Bethlehem — thousands of years ago. But government capabilities and priorities have really only allowed for a relatively accurate estimation of the size of the global human family since the 1980s, when the post-Mao Chinese Communist Party divulged to the rest of the world the tabulated contours of China's enormous population.
Of course, the tools for computing future trajectories of world population were in hand long before the China reveal. Those came out of simple arithmetic and algebra, and were honed into a particular sort of applied mathematics in the field of inquiry known as "demography," which took that name in the mid-19th century. Although estimating and projecting national and global populations might seem like a negligible task from the lofty vantage point of pure mathematics or theoretical physics, the practical instruments required for these undertakings were not self-evident — they required some effort to design and improve. Gradually, demographers assembled the foundations for today's quantitative approach to analysis and projection of national and global population trends: life tables, stable-population theory, the cohort-component analysis method, and, most recently, stochastic projections.
Taken together, these and other allied demographic tools now permit a formal, detailed, and, in some ways, elegant quantitative assessment of the prospective evolution of any population's size and structure. The project is critically abetted by the convenient fact that, since extraplanetary travel and interspecies mutation are off the table (at least for the time being), the human population is a closed system: The initial population net of births, deaths, and migration must equal the population of the end state, with everyone aged accordingly. In short, everything must add up from one period to the next.
Such tools afford precise and exacting calculation of the coming population of the world and its subsidiary political groupings. But there is a catch: To use these modeling methods, one must "input" assigned values for future mortality, fertility, migration, and more. And at this portion of the program, we find today's demographers almost completely at sea.
Though they do well enough with long-term survival trends under non-catastrophic conditions (their actuarial insights underpin the life-insurance industry, which has not yet gone out of business), population experts have nothing reliable to offer about the longer-term outlook for fertility or migration — the other indispensable elements of population arithmetic. So it is that almost all population projections issued nowadays by authoritative and expertly staffed institutions are cautious in nature — incrementally inching fertility assumptions upward or downward from today's registered levels, guessing that tomorrow's international migration flows will be the same as today's plus or minus a couple of points.
A field of study in this condition is asking for a shock. And this was the state of play in the demography business when Max Singer — the late polymath, iconoclast, and co-founder of the Hudson Institute — intruded with his 2011 opus, History of the Future.
Singer was never afraid to make bold, sweeping, and confident predictions. But he also had the uncanny capacity to make those predictions in ways that poked at the weaknesses of confident professionals in various arenas. And this was certainly the case with that still underappreciated work.
Early in the book, Singer describes the characteristics and dynamics of a future world of modern, free, developed societies with some specificity. When it comes to population, however, he opines that
the method used in most of this book doesn't work; since modern demography has not had enough time to reach a steady state it is quite possible that the demography of already-modern countries does not reveal how modern countries will behave in the future. Also, the future in this as in many other areas depends on future human choices and values, not on the inherent features of modernity.
The future global-population prospect, he observes, will turn mainly on childbearing patterns in the years ahead — but significantly, in his judgment, "we cannot say that below-replacement-level fertility is an inevitable result of modernization....Fertility rates are independent of death rates; they depend on people's desire for children."
This brings Singer to a consequential conclusion about the future demographic outlook of our planet. In his words:
Demographers have long proposed that...birth rates would eventually come into balance with death rates, and world population would level off....In fact, the experts are importantly wrong. There is no justification for the comforting theory that in the long run, once we have adjusted to new living conditions and low death rates, birth and death rates will be more or less the same and world population will be reasonably stable.
Under conditions of modernity, he argues, a society's long-term fertility level could be either below replacement level or somewhat above it, depending on attitudes about the family and other key values that are not going to be predetermined by material conditions or other predictable factors. This means that the future population of our planet could be vastly different from today's in either direction. "In short," he writes, "one of the things we don't know about the modern world of the future is how many people will live in it." He posits the fantastically useful concept of a Columbus unit — a period of about half a millennium, the time between Christopher Columbus's arrival in America and our own day — and suggests that the world's population a Columbus unit from now might be as low as 250 million or as high as 250 billion. Either trajectory, he insists, could be "both feasible and plausible."
Singer's prognoses were not taken seriously by most demographers when History of the Future was released 10 years ago, and they would perhaps enjoy only a slightly less frosty reception from the profession today. Singer is an untrained interloper and a disciplinary trespasser; he does not use the special language of the guild, know its secret handshakes, or acknowledge its totems. And his exposition makes a few small errors that, while ultimately trivial, provide pedants and small-minded know-it-alls an excuse for wholesale dismissal of his work.
Yet if we dare to look at the big picture, as Singer invariably did over his lifetime, we can see that he grasped much about the population question that others, including many ostensible demographic experts, did not understand back then and still do not understand today. There is an impressive wisdom, nuance, and analytical power in his demographic disquisition, although his simple, unassuming style of reasoning and writing may lead some readers to breeze through and underestimate a text worth pondering. Instead of following suit, we should take up the challenge Singer's boldness proposes and apply the tools of demography beyond their usual medium-term boundaries.
CHOOSING CHILDLESSNESS
Singer focuses on fertility, recognizing what demographers have long known: that under conditions of orderly progress, fertility is the dominant driver of population growth and structure — the most important factor in any regularly convened population's size and composition.
Over the past century and a half, social science has striven to understand the forces accounting for differences in fertility within and among nations, and for changes in fertility patterns and trends over time. A vast compendium of studies has examined all manner of factors — material, cultural, psychological, technological — that might be determinants of fertility or fertility change. Income, education, urbanization, infant mortality, the status of women, and the availability of modern contraceptives are just a few of the preferred theoretical influences on fertility that the past generation or so of researchers has been examining. But as social historian Charles Tilly pointed out in the 1970s, "the problem is that we have too many explanations which are individually plausible in general terms, which contradict each other to some degree, and which fail to fit some significant part of the facts." This unsatisfactory state of affairs has far-reaching implications, for if scholars cannot robustly explain fertility change in the past, they certainly cannot predict it in the future.
In the 1990s, Lant Pritchett (along with Lawrence Summers) provided a major, if seemingly simple, advance in the study of fertility's determinants: They showed that wanted fertility — the number of children women say they desire — is a persuasively accurate predictor of fertility, both across countries and over time, even after statistical controls. Although this finding was a reassuring reality check of sorts — confirming human agency in family formation, as opposed to heedless animal procreation — it was not welcomed by all quarters of the population-research community, least so by would-be population planners who asserted a sizeable "unmet demand" for family planning in low-income countries purportedly beset by "unwanted excess fertility."
Singer is undistracted by these little controversies, proceeding instead as if it is plainly obvious that fertility is a matter of desired family size. "The world we get," he argues, "will depend on how many children people want to have and to raise." In so saying, he dismisses the materialist and developmentalist temptation to think about fertility patterns in so-called "structural" terms.
It's an assumption that suggests we have been living through a revolution in human desires. Today, the global fertility rate is down by over half since the 1960s. With India and Bangladesh as new members to the club, over two-thirds of humanity may be living in sub-replacement-level countries and territories. All around the world, people have more of almost everything, from income and education to housing, appliances, and free time — almost everything, that is, except children. Whether this great worldwide turn to smaller families is due to the rise of some common, newly shared outlook, or to meaningfully different, localized viewpoints that happen to push childbearing trends in a common downward direction, is an as-yet unanswered question.
In the 1980s, European demographers came up with the theory of the "Second Demographic Transition" to explain their region's slide into a seemingly permanent sub-replacement fertility regimen. They pointed to the fragmentation of the traditional family, the rise in single-parent homes, and the new normal of co-habitation and unmarried motherhood as the immediate culprits. But the driving engine, according to this exegesis, was an overarching shift in values among the rising generation of prospective European parents — an almost heliotropic turn toward what the theorists called "self-actualization."
We may wonder whether this describes what has taken place in the still unfolding birth collapse in East Asia, a region steeped in its own very different tradition. Co-habitation and premarital sex may be on the rise in many of those societies, but illegitimacy and single parenthood are, as a rule, still severely stigmatized. Instead, we see what has been termed a "flight from marriage" as well as a rise of mass childlessness in Japan — the region's demographic pioneer — leading the way to a future in which a slight majority of today's young women complete their lives without any biological grandchildren.
As to new norms about premarital sex, Japan offers the curious and contrary example of a country in which the rising generation of young people are increasingly unlikely to have ever had sexual relations with a partner and increasingly likely to express an aversion to sex altogether — a pattern so seemingly atypical of our species as to evoke thoughts about pre-extinction.
And then there is the plunge into sub-replacement underway in low-income societies. Today, the overwhelming majority of people in sub-replacement societies live outside the affluent and democratic West. The case of China might seem to be explained by Beijing's monstrous one-child policy, but that program was shelved by 2016, and available evidence suggests the mainland has marched even deeper into sub-replacement since then. In the greater Middle East, a number of Muslim-majority countries are either flirting with sub-replacement or embracing it with abandon, the poster child for the latter being the Islamic Republic of Iran — a closed society run by a repressive clerisy whose capital reports a fertility level lower than Zurich's.
Now it is true that Iran meets some criteria for a "modern society" — it is highly urbanized, for example, and many or most men and women of childbearing ages there appear to have at least a secondary education. What then to make of impoverished Myanmar/Burma — predominantly rural and still struggling with mass illiteracy — where four decades of sustained fertility decline has brought the nation to the threshold of sub-replacement, or maybe even beyond?
As a practical matter, we have no idea how low fertility can go, or for how long; we only learn by looking in the rearview mirror, after the latest demographic results have been tabulated and released. In the early 1950s, Luxembourg was the lowest of the low, with just under two births per woman; a half-century later, it was the territory of Macao, with an eye-popping fertility rate of 0.85 — almost 60% below replacement level. Macao, of course, is more of a city than a nation. But today, countries like South Korea and Taiwan are registering national fertility rates approaching 1.0; last year, South Korea's capital city of Seoul reported a rate of just 0.64 — less than a third of that required for long-term population stability without in-migration. Within living memory, most demographers would have said such patterns were impossible in times of peace and plenty. Popular behavior — mass decisions by ordinary people about the size and contours of their own families — may continue to confound the experts.
But Singer takes the fact that we have lived through a period of drastic and hard-to-explain changes in fertility to mean that things might change again — at least in the long run. A prolonged return to above-replacement fertility rates at some point in the coming generations is surely possible. The point is crucial to Singer's vision of the demographic future, and most demographers today don't rule it out. The U.N. Population Division's (UNPD) "high variant" fertility scenario envisions a contingency of steady, above-replacement fertility for the "more developed regions," though the experts are hazy about just why this should be possible.
Singer invokes the United States as an outlier with regard to the general Western disposition toward sub-replacement. Evidence was on his side at the time he was writing. Indeed, for almost a generation before History of the Future appeared, America's fertility rate was very close to replacement level; I myself wrote of "American demographic exceptionalism" thenabouts. Barely a decade on, U.S. childbearing patterns no longer look so exceptional: Fertility has been sliding steadily since the Great Recession and, in 2019, was almost 20% below replacement level. With the Covid-19 pandemic shock, U.S. fertility fell further in 2020 — and probably did so again in 2021.
But Singer also adduces the case of Israel — his own beloved second home — to make his point. There, it looks as if he is on much stronger ground, at least for now. Israel is a fully modern society — except for its fertility level, which, in 2019, was 3.01. The fertility rate of its Jewish population was 3.09 — very close to the 3.16 reported for Israeli Muslims — and has risen markedly since the early 1990s, when it hit a low of 2.62. Ultra-Orthodox communities are of course part of Israel's population arithmetic, but above-replacement fertility is also characteristic of the less observant and even secular strata of the Jewish population there. Overall fertility for Jerusalem was just under 3.9 in 2019 — and by the looks of things, quite similar for Muslims and Jews. By these figures, fertility levels in the capital of this modern society would have been two or three times as high as those in the capitals of Mexico (1.3), Turkey (1.5), and India (1.5) at the time.
This fascinating demographic laboratory has continued to surprise contemporary students of population, exposing the limits to our understanding of demographic science again and again. Contemporary Israel's demography is indeed unique among modern Western states, but is its example generalizable? Or does it depend instead on inherently irreproducible qualities like Zionism, the call of modern Judaism, the constant testing by hostile neighbors of the nation's will to survive and flourish?
Singer downplays these aspects of the Israeli experience, discussing instead the family- and child-friendly ethos there and implying the same could take root in modern societies elsewhere. He may well be right, but it is worth pondering exactly what sorts of intellectual, moral, or political circumstances might be required to elicit a sustained surfeit of births over deaths from modern peoples less certain of their covenant with their Creator.
Barring catastrophes of Biblical proportion (which have occurred with some regularity, and not only in Biblical times), Singer seems likely correct that, at some point in the future, humanity will mainly or entirely be comprised of "modern" societies, broadly defined — at least for a while, until something else comes along. And his prognosis for world-population trends is also generally persuasive: It is possible to imagine a total world population much smaller than today's, under conditions of orderly progress, but also one much larger. Either is more plausible than the presumption that some kind of homeostatic self-regulatory mechanism will suddenly assert itself. We have seen scant evidence of this over the past thousand years, let alone the past century. And population trends observed in other species do not provide adequate guidance for our own, given that we can purposely control and progressively alter our own mortality schedules and fertility patterns, along with the resource base that sustains our total population.
Within amazingly broad boundaries, we can also choose our own living arrangements, child-rearing traditions, and family constellations. Even the sociobiological assumption that humans have a built-in urge to continue their own lineage — what scientists call a "nurture imperative" — seems to be open to question in light of recent observed experience. A more cautious formulation might suggest that those familiar and seemingly universal traits are witnessed in humans whose lines survive, and in populations that are not replaced.
This conspicuous capacity of human beings to alter their own demographic rhythms makes the forecasting of their future population numbers even more hazardous than for other species. Demographers have attempted to finesse the conundrum most recently with the development of stochastic projections, which incorporate a probabilistic range of future trajectories based on parameters established from amassed observations of previous demographic experience.
These projections are an inventive exploration in applied math, and Singer gives a nod to them in his text. But like many demographic professionals today, he ultimately overestimates their promise. Stochastic projections are just fine for charting the likelihood of an outcome governed by fixed and immutable mathematical or physical relationships — a full house in poker, say, or a super-high tide. But the sum total of human demographic experience at the time of Columbus would have badly misled the stochastic projections of where the world ended up today. The same might well be true of our using today's experiences to guide projections about human fertility and mortality patterns a dozen or so generations from now.
CARRYING CAPACITY
You don't have to be a demographer to know that compound interest is a fearsome force. In population projections, sustained deviations from replacement fertility bring us into unfamiliar or even unimaginable new worlds within a surprisingly small measure of historical time.
For an idea of the range of alternative population futures that leading experts within the demographic profession regard as plausible for the year 2100 — about three generations from now — consider illustrative global projections from Austria's Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital. Researchers there contrast several scenarios, and the result is a foretaste of what may lie in store — one that is in some respects even more daring than Singer's.
In the lower-fertility scenario, global fertility is approaching 1.3 by the end of the 21st century. The world adult population averages 14.5 years of schooling, with male and female life expectancy both approaching 100. The median age is over 60. In this vision of the future, total population peaks at 8.7 billion in 2050 (up from about 7.7 billion in 2020) and then falls to 7.2 in 2100. On that fertility path, humanity would total around 250 million by 2200 and under 100 million by 2300.
The world of the higher-fertility scenario, meanwhile, has a notional population of over 13.6 billion in 2100. With a hypothetical combined life expectancy not yet at 75 and less than 9.5 mean years of schooling for adults, this version of 2100 would pass muster as "modern" under Singer's definition. With a fertility rate of over 2.3, it would be on track to surpass a population of 100 billion by 2600 — a Columbus unit or so away from us on the other side. Getting to 250 billion by then would take more "lift," but the UNPD's "constant fertility" scenario, which holds global childbearing patterns at their 2019 levels for the rest of time, would manage to accomplish this feat a good bit more quickly. The world would hit 250 billion in this scenario even with unending sub-replacement fertility in today's more developed regions between now and then — after all, a rapidly growing world may have waning as well as waxing populations within it; over the long haul, it is only the tempo of growth in the waxing areas that sets the global pace.
Singer sees this point, too. But after taking us through the arithmetic that points to his vastly larger planetary population projections for some centuries hence, he commits a sort of rhetorical hit and run, leaving readers whose credulity may already be strained to take his word for it that such outcomes are indeed viable. There is no need to consider the question of how such a populous world could sustain itself, he avers, since centuries from now "there will be a lot more technology and knowledge, and the question is likely to look rather different from how it looks today." "In brief," he concludes, it's "not our problem."
For those inclined to take Singer seriously — as I am — that dismissal is flatly dissatisfying; for some readers, it might raise questions about his entire treatment of population. Nonetheless, I believe he is correct to maintain that a future world population of either 250 million or 250 billion could be in keeping with a modern society of the type he describes. Singer's mind-stretching demographic conjectures are merely outlandish, not positively insane.
The case for a prosperous modern society with 250 million people in it seems straightforward enough. Picturing a world containing only two Japans, trading extensively with each other and exploiting all the Earth's natural resources in their commerce, is not really much of a leap. Challenges and constraints would surely arise from long-term population decline, but a question about the planet's carrying capacity would not be one of them.
Imagining a world with 250 billion people — Singer's most provocative scenario — is a whole different matter. At the moment, it would be patently impossible to house, feed, and take care of 30-plus times the world's current human population even at the most miserable margin of survival. But Singer's assertion is neither hopelessly frivolous nor impossibly fanciful for a world one Columbus unit away, especially if we consider the scientific and technological leaps that separated the world of 1492 from our own.
Let us consider the carrying-capacity problem of a 250-billion-person world in the most simplistic of terms by briefly addressing three of the most obvious and unforgiving constraints: shelter, food, and energy.
Taking shelter as our starting point, let's assume our 250 billion people will reside on the land surface of the planet, currently 57.5 million square miles. This works out to almost 4,400 persons per square mile (including the Sahara, Antarctica, the Himalayas, etc.). By that metric, the entire world would be about as densely populated as current-day Malta, and over three times as densely as South Korea. This sounds pretty cozy. If we posit that each person is allotted 2,000 square feet of personal space, 250 billion people would occupy nearly one-third of the planet's land surface — about 18 million square miles, or, roughly speaking, the combined land mass of North and South America plus Australia. On the other hand, if these same 250 billion individuals inhabited a mile-high, 100-story structure with 50-plus-foot ceilings per floor, the entire edifice would fit inside the borders of Texas. A corresponding structure for "just" 100 billion people would fit within the borders of Nebraska. It may not be a way of life that many today would choose, but our nomad ancestors might feel much the same upon learning of our current (and almost immeasurably more prosperous) urban existence.
What about food? Today, we could not feed anywhere near 250 billion people. But we could feed more than our current planetary population — by some assessments, vastly more. And this has been the case for quite some time. In the 1970s, Roger Revelle — president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and a leading American scientist of his day — published two studies in Scientific American estimating that, at the time, the world had the resource capacity to produce enough food annually to feed around 40 to 50 billion people.
To be clear, Revelle's was a logistical engineering-style assessment of potential production capacity that assumed all would be supplied with a modest diet of starchy staples and adequate nutrients for a healthy life — a command-planning view of what rationing could provide, not an economic inquiry into what paying customers would prefer for themselves. And it was hotly contested at the time: Paul Ehrlich, the specialist on insect populations and author of The Population Bomb, contended in 1971 that the world could feed no more than 1.2 billion on a sustainable basis, or roughly a third of the world population at the time. But Revelle was no amateur on the subjects of environment and sustainability — in fact, in the 1950s, he was one of the first researchers to establish the connection between atmospheric carbon-dioxide concentrations and atmospheric temperature, the foundation of current scientific work on climate change.
The question of how many mouths our planet can feed is no longer avidly and constantly investigated by scientists, and for good reason: The global food crises of the mid-1960s and early 1970s are far behind us. Indeed, for a generation or more, the discussion of a global Malthusian specter has been relegated to a fringe of quasi-religious true believers. Yes, hundreds of millions still suffer from undernutrition and food insecurity, but in a world patently awash with food and sloshing in wealth, this is clearly a purchasing-power problem increasingly characteristic of the few, not a production problem for the many.
If we were to revisit the question of how many mouths the world could feed today, we would be addressing it with today's technology. Presumably, our production possibilities are considerably greater than they were back in the 1970s, and in future centuries, those vistas could perhaps expand vastly further. Current global food production is constrained by, among other things, the realities of photosynthesis: At present, plant life converts solar energy into biological mass with an efficiency of under 5%, and the efficiency of conversion to edible matter is yet lower. In nature, a conversion rate of up to 47% is observed in certain algae, while under laboratory conditions, a photon can be converted into cellular chemical energy with an efficiency of up to 73% — this in existing, unmodified plant life. Such frontiers mean the potential planetary yield of foodstuffs could be much higher than what we imagine it could be today, even with some of the world's potentially arable land displaced for the habitation of a notional 250 billion people.
And what of the energy needs of such a populous planet? Powering a society containing 250 billion humans is, under present parameters, an unthinkably daunting prospect. As of 2019, over five-sixths of the world economy's energy consumption comes from hydrocarbons and fossil fuels. Raising global per-capita energy use to U.S. levels would imply something like a tripling of world energy consumption, and a global population of 250 billion would be over 30 times larger than the current total. Even setting aside the hardly incidental question of how to provide for more than a hundred-fold increase in commercial-fuel supplies, the steady consumption (that is, burning) of monumentally greater amounts of non-renewable energy would have huge, and very possibly calamitous, consequences for the global environment, the climate, and perhaps even human life.
Fortunately, there is an extraordinary source of renewable energy that humanity has barely begun to harness commercially. It is, for all intents and purposes, inexhaustible, as well as completely environmentally friendly. While it does cause significant warming, relying upon it to power the human economy will not cause climate change. I am referring, of course, to the sun.
The star around which our planet circles bathes it in non-stop energy. The sheer magnitude of this flow is difficult to comprehend, even when put in terms of numbers. According to estimates from Sandia National Laboratories (we could use other sources, of course; the figures are not in dispute), annual earthly sunshine has an energy value of almost 90,000 terawatts. That is nearly 5,000 times as much energy as humanity currently consumes from all commercial sources combined. Even if every person in a population of 250 billion used 10 times as much energy as the people of the world do today, this would still amount to less than a tenth of the annual solar radiation absorbed by our planet. If humanity could devise extremely efficient methods for the capture, storage, transmission, and application of such energy — each of these a gigantic "if" — it would theoretically be possible to support a mind-boggling quarter-trillion humans on much higher living standards than any national population has yet enjoyed — and to have plenty of solar energy left over for the cultivation of food, the flourishing of a planetary green canopy, the maintenance of healthy oceans and aquatic life, and so on.
But what if human ingenuity proved not up to the task of converting sunlight into commercial power on the aforementioned scale? Leaving aside the possibility of fossil fuels altogether, there would always be the option of relying on nuclear power.
Centuries from now, we could have currently unimagined possibilities for amazingly safe and efficient nuclear technology. With perfect conversion of mass into energy, the energy use of a population of 250 billion, with each person harnessing 10 times as much energy as our current planetary average, could be satisfied for an entire year on the basis of a cube of water just 100 meters in length on each edge. A cubic mile of water would contain enough energy to satisfy those same needs for over 4,000 years. Lest one fear we might run out of water this way, over 300 million cubic miles of water are found on the Earth's surface. And in any case, water would not be the only non-renewable resource that might be so converted — the mass of planetary water reserves are infinitesimal compared to its iron reserves, for example.
None of these musings is meant to suggest the desirability of that future world — I doubt many of us alive today would want to live in such a place, even if it promised more freedom and higher living standards than we ourselves enjoy today. Furthermore, I do nothing here to demonstrate that such a world is either viable or sustainable. But it could be viable and it could be sustainable given a Columbus unit of technological advance — and it could be so without suspending the laws of thermodynamics, resorting to interplanetary mass migrations, or throwing ourselves on the mercy of wormholes to portal our descendants to alternate multiverses.
This is an extended way of saying that, from our current vantage point, Singer's judgement about the range of plausible world-population alternatives some centuries from now looks about right, at least to me. The choices of future generations could take us very far in either direction, and we should not pretend to know which way those choices will point. In this regard, Singer's boldness is not excessive; indeed, in some important ways, it may fall short.
POSSIBLE FUTURES
Simon Kuznets, the Nobel laureate and great student of modern economic development, often made the point that experts in economics and other disciplines did not have a good track record of discerning what the future might look like. In his view, science-fiction writers were better at this, and not by accident. As he explained:
Experts are usually specialists skilled in, and hence bound to, traditional views; and they are, because of their knowledge of one field, likely to be cautious and unduly conservative. Hertz, a great physicist, denied the practical importance of shortwaves, and others at the end of the 19th century reached the conclusion that little more could be done on the structure of matter. Malthus, Ricardo, and Marx, great economists, made incorrect prognoses of technological changes at the very time that the scientific bases for these changes were evolving. On the other hand, imaginative tyros like Jules Verne and H. G. Wells seemed to sense the potentialities of technological change. It is well to take cognizance of this consistently conservative bias of experts in evaluating the hypothesis of an unlimited effective increase in the stock of knowledge and in the corresponding potential of economic growth.
In his excursions into demographics, Singer was most assuredly an "imaginative tyro." Though he lacked professional demographic training, he was also wholly unencumbered by the caution and undue conservatism that training could impart. He was free as well from other biases characteristic of, and perhaps even useful for success within, that learned guild.
Singer's independent and unconventional way of thinking, seasoned by his uncommon vision and leavened with his signature intuition, made him a most welcome intruder into the domain of population studies. Peering ahead five centuries into the demographic future is just not something most properly minted demographers would dare to do. And yet, that hardly makes the venture unsound, much less worthless. It would be amazing if Singer did not turn out to be wrong in many respects in his forecasts for that distant future world, but his diagnostic approach is intrinsically valuable and instructive: Indeed, it illustrates the virtue and the benefit of exercising a trained and informed imagination — what economist Marcus Noland in another context called "rigorous speculation" — on the big questions of world affairs.
But at this point, having praised Singer's boldness at some length, it is time to chide him just a bit for his timidity. In his plunge into the demography of our descendants a Columbus unit removed from our time, he may actually have been unduly cautious and conservative himself — too steeped in the sense that the ways with which we are familiar are the natural order, and that things shall always be thus. Singer may have figured he had tested his readers' patience and trust quite enough, and so feared losing them altogether. But since he set the length of the field — one Columbus unit of time, to be precise — it seems unsporting not to play on it with gusto.
To begin, Singer's assumptions about future mortality and life expectancy might be far too conservative. On this, he asserts, "the upper limit on life expectancy...is not much more than eighty-five or ninety-five [years]." Singer may be right — this is a hotly contested issue in the life sciences, and some respected researchers side with him. But others do not, and the contrarians have some compelling evidence on their side.
For about 180 years — since 1840 — the world's top female life expectancy at birth has shot unrelentingly upward, and the trajectory is uncanny: an almost straight line traversing three centuries. The "best in class" populations have changed over time — from Norway to New Zealand to Japan and, most recently, Hong Kong — but the gradient has not; instead, it has held steady at an almost three-month increase for every calendar year. And for nearly a century, these data have consistently and sequentially shattered expert pronouncements on the ceiling for human life expectancy.
As of 2017, the top female life expectancy at birth — 87.6 years, in Hong Kong — was on the same slope as it was in the 1840s, and with no sign of slowing down. In modern societies, ever more people are living to once impossible ages. According to the Human Mortality Database, over 60% of Swedish women born in 1928 lived to age 80, while about 29% lived to age 90 — staggering proportions that have been steadily increasing over time. Corresponding year-of-birth data are not available for Hong Kong, but period life tables point to a conditional 80% survival rate for women to age 80 and a 50% survival rate to age 90 on current mortality schedules. Even without programmatic human enhancement, we might be on a path to a life expectancy above 100 years — and perhaps far above that amount — for most earthlings, and maybe not too far into the historic future.
An ordinary lifespan in excess of a century would invite a major rethink of where education, child-rearing, work, and extended periods of leisure fit within the ordinary life-cycle routine. There is also the question of family. With long lives, low fertility rates, and pervasive voluntary childlessness, a sizeable fraction of the future human population could inhabit societies where the extended kinship networks so familiar to the human experience become a bygone tradition. These would be societies with few siblings or children and only the odd collateral relative — where a person's closest biological kin would be his living ancestors. In such settings, we might find out exactly how sociable humans can be — how plastic and malleable the seemingly human desire for family actually is, and how serviceably the substitute of Johann Goethe's bruited notion of Wahlverwandtschaften, or "elective affinities" (i.e., chosen relations) can perform in practice. Indeed, we may have already entered a time when humans will not deem it unnatural to define "family" exactly as they wish, no matter what they might wish.
Finally, there is the great and terrible question of future fertility trends. We take it for granted that we human beings are driven by a deep urge to replace ourselves. Learned and elevated thinkers have argued that this is a biological call, fused into our very DNA. An entire sub-discipline of science known as "sociobiology" has been examining and codifying such notions for decades.
But we come to the question from the perspective of lineages that have been continued over time, and the brute fact of the matter is that most human lineages have not done so. To my knowledge, no one has yet attempted a careful calculation of how many family lines have died out for the roughly 100 billion Homo sapiens ever born, but the answer is likely most, and possibly the overwhelming majority.
Suggestive is the inquiry into the historical demography of Iceland, an almost perfectly closed population until recently, and one with accurate records dating back centuries. By the reckoning of the deCODE Genetics project, 92% of Icelandic women born since 1972 are descended from just 22% of the nation's women from the 1848-92 period, and "just 7% of the women born in the early eighteenth century period are the ancestresses of 62% of contemporary women." Take such trends back scores of millennia, and it is not difficult to see why genetic researchers are now hypothesizing that the entire population of the planet today might be traced back to as few as 25 unique original "out of Africa" women very long ago.
We may be inclined to regard defunct lineages as a "supply" problem, with harsh conditions precluding survival of offspring and continuation of families despite parents' best efforts — and this may indeed be most of the story. But it may also be the case that humanity has suffered from a "demand" problem over time as well. The widely noted epidemic of sex aversion among the rising generation of Japanese youth is only the most acute and most curious recent example of what may be a much more general human attribute — insufficient interest in procreation to sustain kith and kin. This feature of the human condition may go back a long way: In his study of Genesis, Leon Kass reminds us that the Lord in this sacred text repeatedly enjoins mankind to "be fruitful and multiply." If volitional fecundity were the natural order of things, why the command?
How will modern societies and the states that govern them cope with the prospect of long-term population decline in the centuries ahead, given the assumption of constantly increasing scientific and technological capabilities over this same period? Singer is of course correct that desired family size is the key determinant of human family size, so long as voluntary human procreation and childbearing are the determinant of human birth patterns.
But what if that most basic of human bonds is severed? What if, in some advanced future, a shrinking and dying society should decide it prefers to forestall decline and eventual departure not through "imports from abroad" but through "domestic manufacture"?
The temptation to resort to the non-maternal production and non-familial upbringing of human creatures could characterize a world where the total number of "legacy humans" was rising — indeed, demographically declining societies in such a world might regard their relative diminution as more reason to venture into so dark a realm. Opening this door, of course, would also inescapably invite "improvement" and "enhancement" of the pre-existing legacy models — stretching or redefining the very meaning of the term "human" and setting evolution on a forced march directed by our own conceit. A Columbus unit from now — in a world that has the technological wherewithal to house and feed a few hundred billion people — the horrific notion that some fraction of the planetary population might be "non-traditional models," so to speak, is worth consideration.
It is not hard to imagine such a planet enjoying high living standards, at least by the yardsticks we currently measure them with. It is, however, nearly impossible to imagine such a world being free — and it seems highly unlikely that it could be peaceful in the sense we now mean.
Population trends may therefore pose a greater threat to the future of modern societies than Singer's work would lead us to expect. It is incumbent on us the living to devote unflinching attention to this and other currently remote possibilities, to take the future seriously, and to recognize how much of a difference our choices can make — and how important it is to help human beings learn to choose well.
Nicholas Eberstadt holds the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute. This essay was originally presented at a Hudson Institute conference celebrating the life of Max Singer, Hudson’s co-founder.
14. Whatever Happened to Soft Power? by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Excerpts:
The January 6, 2021, insurrection at the US Capitol certainly damaged US soft power. But those who would mourn the death of American democracy prematurely should bear in mind that the 2020 election drew an unprecedented turnout despite the pandemic. The American people are still able to unseat a demagogue in a free and fair election.
This is not to suggest that all is well with American democracy or its soft power. Trump eroded many democratic norms that now must be restored. Biden has made strengthening democracy at home and abroad a goal of his presidency, but the results remain to be seen.
No one can be certain about the future trajectory of any country’s soft power. But there is no doubt that influence through attraction will remain an important component of world politics. As Mark Twain famously quipped, “The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.” The same is true of soft power.
Whatever Happened to Soft Power?
Jan 11, 2022
With the news dominated by dramatic examples of countries using coercion, intimidation, and payoffs to advance their interests, the power of attraction would seem to be irrelevant in international relations. But it still matters, and governments ignore its potential at their peril.
CAMBRIDGE – As 2021 drew to a close, Russia had massed troops near its border with Ukraine; China had flown military jets near Taiwan; North Korea was still pursuing its nuclear-weapons program; and Taliban fighters were patrolling the streets of Kabul. Seeing all this, friends asked me: “Whatever happened to soft power?”
- Add to Bookmarks
Previous
Next
One answer is that it can be found in other recent events, such as President Joe Biden’s virtual Summit for Democracy, which was attended by representatives from more than 100 countries. Having been excluded, China took to the airwaves and social media to proclaim that it had a different and more stable type of democracy than the one being extolled by the United States. What we were seeing was a great-power competition over soft power, understood as the ability to influence others by attraction rather than by coercion or payment.
When I first wrote about soft power in 1990, I was seeking to overcome a deficiency in how analysts thought about power generally. But the concept gradually acquired more of a political resonance. In some respects, the underlying thought is not new; similar concepts can be traced back to ancient philosophers such as Lao Tse. Nor does soft power pertain only to international behavior or to the US. Many small countries and organizations also possess the power to attract; and in democracies, at least, soft power is an essential component of leadership.
Still, the concept is now generally associated with international relations. As the European Union developed into its current form, European leaders increasingly made use of the term. And ever since 2007, when then-Chinese President Hu Jintao declared that China must develop its soft power, the government has invested billions of dollars in that quest. The challenge now is for China to implement an effective smart-power strategy. If it can effectively pair its growing hard power with soft power, it will be less likely to provoke counter-balancing coalitions.
Soft power is not the only or even the most important source of power, because its effects tend to be slow and indirect. But to ignore or neglect it is a serious strategic and analytic mistake. The Roman Empire’s power rested not only on its legions, but also on the attraction of Roman culture and law. Similarly, as a Norwegian analyst once described it, the American presence in Western Europe after World War II was “an empire by invitation.” No barrage of artillery brought down the Berlin Wall; it was removed by hammers and bulldozers wielded by people who had been touched by Western soft power.
Smart political leaders have long understood that values can create power. If I can get you to want what I want, I will not have to force you to do what you do not want to do. If a country represents values that others find attractive, it can economize on the use of sticks and carrots.
A country’s soft power comes primarily from three sources: its culture; its political values, such as democracy and human rights (when it upholds them); and its policies (when they are seen as legitimate because they are framed with an awareness of others’ interests). A government can influence others through the example of how it behaves at home (such as by protecting a free press and the right to protest), in international institutions (consulting others and fostering multilateralism), and through its foreign policy (such as by promoting development and human rights).
During the COVID-19 pandemic, China has tried to use so-called “vaccine diplomacy” to bolster its soft power, which had been damaged by its secretive handling of the initial outbreak of the coronavirus in Wuhan. The government’s efforts have been aimed at reinforcing its Belt and Road Initiative, which supports infrastructure projects in many parts of the world.
But international polls show that the results have been disappointing. In measures of attractiveness, China lags behind the US on all continents except Africa, where the two countries are tied. One reason for China’s lower level of soft power is its heavy-handed use of hard power in pursuit of an increasingly nationalist foreign policy. This has been on full display in its economic punishment of Australia and in its military operations on the Himalayan border with India.
China has a smart-power problem. After all, it is difficult to practice vaccine diplomacy and “wolf-warrior diplomacy” (aggressive, coercive browbeating of smaller countries) at the same time.
True, international polls showed that the US also suffered a decline in soft power during Donald Trump’s presidency. But, fortunately, America is more than its government. Unlike hard-power assets (such as armed forces), many soft-power resources are separate from the government and are only partly responsive to its purposes. For example, Hollywood movies showcasing independent women or protesting minorities inspire others around the world. So, too, does the charitable work of US foundations and the freedom of inquiry at American universities.
Firms, universities, foundations, churches, and protest movements develop soft power of their own. Sometimes their activities will reinforce official foreign-policy goals, and sometimes they will be at odds with them. Either way, these private sources of soft power are increasingly important in the age of social media.
The January 6, 2021, insurrection at the US Capitol certainly damaged US soft power. But those who would mourn the death of American democracy prematurely should bear in mind that the 2020 election drew an unprecedented turnout despite the pandemic. The American people are still able to unseat a demagogue in a free and fair election.
This is not to suggest that all is well with American democracy or its soft power. Trump eroded many democratic norms that now must be restored. Biden has made strengthening democracy at home and abroad a goal of his presidency, but the results remain to be seen.
No one can be certain about the future trajectory of any country’s soft power. But there is no doubt that influence through attraction will remain an important component of world politics. As Mark Twain famously quipped, “The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.” The same is true of soft power.
15. Omicron may be headed for a rapid drop in Britain, US
Good news? I hope so.
Excerpts:
Omicron could one day be seen as a turning point in the pandemic, said Meyers, at the University of Texas. Immunity gained from all the new infections, along with new drugs and continued vaccination, could render the coronavirus something with which we can more easily coexist.
“At the end of this wave, far more people will have been infected by some variant of COVID,” Meyers said. “At some point, we’ll be able to draw a line — and omicron may be that point — where we transition from what is a catastrophic global threat to something that’s a much more manageable disease.”
That’s one plausible future, she said, but there is also the possibility of a new variant — one that is far worse than omicron — arising.
Omicron may be headed for a rapid drop in Britain, US | AP News
AP · by MARIA CHENG and CARLA K. JOHNSON · January 11, 2022
Scientists are seeing signals that COVID-19′s alarming omicron wave may have peaked in Britain and is about to do the same in the U.S., at which point cases may start dropping off dramatically.
The reason: The variant has proved so wildly contagious that it may already be running out of people to infect, just a month and a half after it was first detected in South Africa.
“It’s going to come down as fast as it went up,” said Ali Mokdad, a professor of health metrics sciences at the University of Washington in Seattle.
At the same time, experts warn that much is still uncertain about how the next phase of the pandemic might unfold. The plateauing or ebbing in the two countries is not happening everywhere at the same time or at the same pace. And weeks or months of misery still lie ahead for patients and overwhelmed hospitals even if the drop-off comes to pass.
“There are still a lot of people who will get infected as we descend the slope on the backside,” said Lauren Ancel Meyers, director of the University of Texas COVID-19 Modeling Consortium, which predicts that reported cases will peak within the week.
ADVERTISEMENT
The University of Washington’s own highly influential model projects that the number of daily reported cases in the U.S. will crest at 1.2 million by Jan. 19 and will then fall sharply “simply because everybody who could be infected will be infected,” according to Mokdad.
In fact, he said, by the university’s complex calculations, the true number of new daily infections in the U.S. — an estimate that includes people who were never tested — has already peaked, hitting 6 million on Jan. 6.
In Britain, meanwhile, new COVID-19 cases dropped to about 140,000 a day in the last week, after skyrocketing to more than 200,000 a day earlier this month, according to government data.
Numbers from the U.K.’s National Health Service this week show coronavirus hospital admissions for adults have begun to fall, with infections dropping in all age groups.
Kevin McConway, a retired professor of applied statistics at Britain’s Open University, said that while COVID-19 cases are still rising in places such as southwest England and the West Midlands, the outbreak may have peaked in London.
The figures have raised hopes that the two countries are about to undergo something similar to what happened in South Africa, where in the span of about a month the wave crested at record highs and then fell significantly.
“We are seeing a definite falling-off of cases in the U.K., but I’d like to see them fall much further before we know if what happened in South Africa will happen here,” said Dr. Paul Hunter, a professor of medicine at Britain’s University of East Anglia.
ADVERTISEMENT
Dr. David Heymann, who previously led the World Health Organization’s infectious diseases department, said Britain was “the closest to any country of being out of the pandemic,” adding that COVID-19 was inching towards becoming endemic.
Differences between Britain and South Africa, including Britain’s older population and the tendency of its people to spend more time indoors in the winter, could mean a bumpier outbreak for the country and other nations like it.
On the other hand, British authorities’ decision to adopt minimal restrictions against omicron could enable the virus to rip through the population and run its course much faster than it might in Western European countries that have imposed tougher COVID-19 controls, such as France, Spain and Italy.
Shabir Mahdi, dean of health sciences at South Africa’s University of Witwatersrand, said European countries that impose lockdowns won’t necessarily come through the omicron wave with fewer infections; the cases may just be spread out over a longer period of time.
On Tuesday, the World Health Organization said there have been 7 million new COVID-19 cases across Europe in the past week, calling it a “tidal wave sweeping across the region.” WHO cited modeling from Mokdad’s group that predicts half of Europe’s population will be infected with omicron within about eight weeks.
By that time, however, Hunter and others expect the world to be past the omicron surge.
“There will probably be some ups and downs along the way, but I would hope that by Easter, we will be out of this,” Hunter said.
Still, the sheer numbers of people infected could prove overwhelming to fragile health systems, said Dr. Prabhat Jha of the Centre for Global Health Research at St. Michael’s Hospital in Toronto.
“The next few weeks are going to be brutal because in absolute numbers, there are so many people being infected that it will spill over into ICUs,” Jha said.
Mokdad likewise warned in the U.S.: “It’s going to be a tough two or three weeks. We have to make hard decisions to let certain essential workers continue working, knowing they could be infectious.”
Omicron could one day be seen as a turning point in the pandemic, said Meyers, at the University of Texas. Immunity gained from all the new infections, along with new drugs and continued vaccination, could render the coronavirus something with which we can more easily coexist.
“At the end of this wave, far more people will have been infected by some variant of COVID,” Meyers said. “At some point, we’ll be able to draw a line — and omicron may be that point — where we transition from what is a catastrophic global threat to something that’s a much more manageable disease.”
That’s one plausible future, she said, but there is also the possibility of a new variant — one that is far worse than omicron — arising.
___
The Associated Press Health and Science Department receives support from the Howard Hughes Medical Institute’s Department of Science Education. The AP is solely responsible for all content.
AP · by MARIA CHENG and CARLA K. JOHNSON · January 11, 2022
16. Justice Dept. forms new domestic terrorism unit to address growing threat
Excerpts:
From 2016 to 2019, the number of domestic terrorism suspects arrested per year fell from 229 to 107, before jumping to 180 in 2020. Since 2020, the number of open investigations has grown rapidly. FBI Director Christopher A. Wray has previously said that to handle the caseload, he more than tripled the number of agents and analysts working on domestic terrorism cases.
At Tuesday’s hearing, conservative lawmakers pushed Olsen and Sanborn to explain and justify a memo Garland wrote last year urging more scrutiny of threats against school officials. Grassley said the memo had “a chilling effect on freedom of speech.”
Olsen and Sanborn said the school-threats issue was a small part of their divisions’ work. Olsen said such matters were largely handled by other Justice Department components — including the criminal division and civil rights division — while the national security division played an “advisory role.”
Sanborn said the issue “is not a particular focus for the counterterrorism division,” adding that the FBI would only get involved if there was an allegation of a violation of federal law. She also sought to downplay the significance of the FBI’s efforts to track such cases by applying a particular record-keeping tag, saying that was “simply an administrative process to be able to better analyze trends.”
Justice Dept. forms new domestic terrorism unit to address growing threat
The Washington Post · by Matt Zapotosky and Devlin Barrett Today at 4:30 p.m. EST · January 11, 2022
The Justice Department is forming a new domestic terrorism unit to help combat a threat that has intensified dramatically in recent years, a top national security official said Tuesday.
Matthew G. Olsen, the head of the Justice Department’s national security division, announced the creation of the unit in his opening remarks before the Senate Judiciary Committee, noting that the number of FBI investigations of suspected domestic violent extremists — those accused of planning or committing crimes in the name of domestic political goals — had more than doubled since the spring of 2020.
Olsen said that the Justice Department previously had counterterrorism attorneys who worked both domestic and international cases and that the new unit would “augment our existing approach.”
His testimony came just a few days after the anniversary of the Jan. 6, 2021, riot at the Capitol, an event that some lawmakers say showed that the FBI underestimated the threat posed by domestic extremists and violence-prone members of far-right groups.
“This group of dedicated attorneys will focus on the domestic terrorism threat, helping to ensure that these cases are handled properly and effectively coordinated across the Department of Justice and across the country,” Olsen said.
The hearing was convened to assess the threat of domestic terrorism a year after the Jan. 6 attack. It often devolved into partisan bickering over the riot, which involved hundreds of Trump supporters who marched to the Capitol after a rally outside the White House, and the violence and looting that erupted at some racial justice protests in 2020.
Sen. Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.) opened the hearing with a video showing footage and news coverage from the Jan. 6 riot, taking aim at Republicans for not being fully supportive of congressional efforts to investigate the attacks on police officers, threats against lawmakers and attempts to undo Joe Biden’s electoral victory.
“They are normalizing the use of violence to achieve political goals,” Durbin said.
Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) countered with a video showing unrest in Portland, Ore., and elsewhere. “These anti-police riots rocked our nation for seven full months, just like the January 6 assault on the Capitol rocked the nation,” he said.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) lambasted Olsen and Jill Sanborn, the head of the FBI’s national security branch, for not answering certain questions about Jan. 6-related criminal charges or about whether any FBI informants encouraged or participated in the violence.
“Your answer to every damn question is ‘I don’t know, I don’t know, I don’t know,’ ” Cruz railed at Olsen. To Sanborn, he suggested that undercover FBI agents or informants may have spurred on the rioters — an assertion for which there is no known evidence but which Sanborn would not categorically rule out.
“Ms. Sanborn, a lot of Americans are concerned that the federal government deliberately encouraged illegal violent conduct on January 6th,” Cruz said, asking her whether that was true.
“Not to my knowledge, sir,” she replied.
She and Olsen sought to assure lawmakers that the Justice Department is investigating and prosecuting all of those who committed crimes, no matter what motivated them. Olsen said authorities had arrested and charged more than 725 people, including more than 325 facing felony counts, in connection with their roles in the Jan. 6 attack.
The FBI is seeking to identify and arrest more than 200 additional suspects.
Sanborn said the bureau had opened more than 800 cases in connection with the riots during the summer 2020 and arrested more than 250 people.
The bureau assessed racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism and anti-government violent extremism as being the most “lethal” terrorism threats, Sanborn said. She added that the FBI had recently elevated anti-government violent extremism as a priority, on par with racially motivated violent extremism, homegrown violent extremism and extremism planned or inspired by the Islamic State.
The breach of the Capitol has spurred new political and policy debates about failures of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to prevent the attack, and about how the government combats domestic terrorism.
The Justice Department and the bureau have faced criticism in recent years for not focusing as intensely on domestic terrorism as they do internationally inspired threats, though officials have insisted they take both matters seriously.
Last year, the White House released a national strategy to address the problem, calling for, among other things, new spending at the Justice Department and FBI to hire analysts, investigators and prosecutors.
Historically, domestic terrorism investigations come with more procedural and legal hurdles than cases involving suspects inspired by groups based outside the United States, such as the Islamic State or al-Qaeda. The charge of material support for a foreign terrorist group, for instance, has no legal equivalent for someone eager to commit violence in the name of domestic political goals.
As a result, domestic terrorism investigators frequently settle for filing gun or drug charges, and often those are filed in state — not federal — court, which can mask the overall extent of extremist threats.
Democrats pressed Olsen to explain why prosecutors had not sought tougher sentences in Jan. 6 cases by seeking enhancements for terrorism. Olsen did not answer the question directly, saying each case had to be evaluated on its particular facts. He pointed to recent remarks from Attorney General Merrick Garland, who suggested such enhancements could come as prosecutors win convictions in more-serious cases.
Where precisely to draw lines about who is or who isn’t a domestic terrorist is also a subject of debate. At the hearing, Sanborn said that last year, there were four attacks conducted by domestic violent extremists, resulting in 13 deaths. She did not identify or describe the incidents, and FBI officials did not provide any details in response to questions from The Washington Post in the hours after the hearing.
Federal law defines domestic terrorism as criminal acts within the United States that are dangerous to human life and that appear to be intended “to intimidate or coerce a civilian population . . . to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or . . . to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”
After the Jan. 6 attack, Democrats said the Justice Department and FBI did not aggressively pursue domestic terrorism cases during the Trump administration.
From 2016 to 2019, the number of domestic terrorism suspects arrested per year fell from 229 to 107, before jumping to 180 in 2020. Since 2020, the number of open investigations has grown rapidly. FBI Director Christopher A. Wray has previously said that to handle the caseload, he more than tripled the number of agents and analysts working on domestic terrorism cases.
At Tuesday’s hearing, conservative lawmakers pushed Olsen and Sanborn to explain and justify a memo Garland wrote last year urging more scrutiny of threats against school officials. Grassley said the memo had “a chilling effect on freedom of speech.”
Olsen and Sanborn said the school-threats issue was a small part of their divisions’ work. Olsen said such matters were largely handled by other Justice Department components — including the criminal division and civil rights division — while the national security division played an “advisory role.”
Sanborn said the issue “is not a particular focus for the counterterrorism division,” adding that the FBI would only get involved if there was an allegation of a violation of federal law. She also sought to downplay the significance of the FBI’s efforts to track such cases by applying a particular record-keeping tag, saying that was “simply an administrative process to be able to better analyze trends.”
The Washington Post · by Matt Zapotosky and Devlin Barrett Today at 4:30 p.m. EST · January 11, 2022
17. China is using economic coercion as blackmail. The US and EU must fight back | Opinion
Have we mapped about the economic warfare battlefield and the lines of effort we must fight on? How do we describe the ends, ways, and means and the constraints, restraints, risks, and assumptions in economic warfare? Who is responsible for orchestrating the US campaign in economic warfare? Of course it is one element of political warfare. Who is responsible for that?
China is using economic coercion as blackmail. The US and EU must fight back | Opinion
Newsweek · by Ben Weingarten · January 11, 2022
For decades, Taiwan has been walking a fine line that broadly suited everyone: neither being part of mainland China, nor officially declaring independence. The People's Republic of China could maintain its claim over it. Yet Taiwan was free to develop as a vibrant liberal democracy and modern economy. And the democratic world was able to develop ties with both, so long as they steered clear of the sovereignty issue and adhered to the so-called 'One China' policy.
But that has changed. Through its actions and the rhetoric of its Secretary-General Xi, China has shown it is no longer willing to accept this status quo. Likewise, the free world needs to rethink its approach.
During Secretary-General Xi's term as leader, Beijing has ramped up the hybrid attacks on Taiwan. It targets Taiwan's democracy with disinformation. It throws its diplomatic weight around the world stage to coerce multilateral bodies and institutions to leave Taiwan out in the cold. And it has launched increasingly aggressive and dangerous military incursions into Taiwan's airspace.
China is actively threatening democratic Taiwan. To date, many in the free world have turned a blind eye to this. They feared Beijing's threats and economic coercion, and they have been willing to go along with China's unilateral efforts to redefine and corrupt what Beijing now calls the "One China principle." Beijing wants it to mean that no other country can have any economic or political relations with Taipei.
We cannot allow that to happen.
File: China’s President Xi Jinping attends a welcome banquet at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, on April 26, 2019. During a year-end press conference on December 29, 2021, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said it predicted more intense struggles with Taiwan and the United States in 2022. NICOLAS ASFOURI/AFP via Getty Images
The Taiwan status quo exists alongside an American policy best described as strategic ambiguity. In short, it may be implied that the United States would support Taiwan if China were to attack, but the exact scale and scope of any response has been purposefully left undefined.
Several times, President Biden has been much less ambiguous in his views. China and Taiwan are one area of foreign policy which unites both sides of the aisle in Washington.
The doctrine of strategic ambiguity may have worked well in the past. But Xi Jinping's China is not the China of the past. Some more strategic clarity is needed. That is not to say the United States should give Taiwan a security guarantee similar to NATO's Article 5 mutual defense clause. But the United States could become less covert in its support for Taipei.
For the United States, there is a self-interest in defending Taiwan. If Taiwan were to fall, the shifting balance of power in the wider Indo-Pacific would be devastating for the cause of freedom and democracy around the world. In this regard, Europe cannot sit on the sidelines either, criticizing America for its more robust approach to China, allowing America to do all the heavy lifting in the Indo-Pacific, while at the same time trying to maintain a mercantilist status quo with Beijing.
We're seeing some good early signs. Recently, the European Parliament overwhelmingly backed a resolution urging upgraded ties between the EU and Taiwan, including a new investment agreement. The new German government, with a Green Foreign Minister, has steered more towards a values-based foreign policy. And Lithuania has left a Chinese economic grouping in Central Europe known as the 17+1 and opened economic relations with Taiwan. These actions are entirely consistent with the "One China Policy" as they make no assertions about the sovereignty of Taiwan.
But China is fighting back against European states' sovereign rights to develop ties with Taipei. In response to Lithuania's move, China has unleashed a volley of economic coercion against the small European state, restricting its exports and tying up more than a thousand containers of goods which Lithuanian businesses already paid for in Chinese ports, creating supply chain and cash flow crises across Lithuania and beyond.
China is bullying a NATO Ally and EU Member to affect its sovereign economic and political decisions. This is a test for the free world. If we leave Lithuania alone to fend for itself against Beijing, this super weapon of economic coercion will be directed at others to force democracies to submit to Beijing's will.
In the short term, we should offer Lithuania loans to cushion the effects of economic disruption; the EU should signal that China's actions are distorting the EU's entire single market and respond with countermeasures.
The EU is working on creating an anti-coercion instrument that would give it tools to fight back against exactly this kind of behavior. But the EU's real challenge is not whether it has the right legal instruments; it's whether it has enough political will to defend Lithuania's right to make its own choices.
In the longer term, the free world could create an "Economic Article 5" to blunt China's abuse of strategic investment and economic coercion to geopolitical ends. NATO's famous Article 5 states that an attack on one ally is an attack on all. Likewise, an "Economic Article 5" would illicit a response from like-minded democracies—not just NATO allies, but a broader global Alliance—to support a state or business facing economic coercion from an autocracy.
Beijing uses its economic might to blackmail countries and corporations because it is effective. It's worked in cases from fast fashion brands that faced boycotts after questioning human rights abuses to Australian wine manufacturers who have faced swingeing tariffs after governmental relations deteriorated. Russia also uses economic levers to achieve geopolitical aims, notably by weaponizing its gas supplies. We need to neutralize the effects of these tactics by authoritarian states.
Europe and the United States also share a common interest in the Indo-Pacific: to keep it free, open and as democratic as possible. Europe's role in this may not be to dispatch a fleet of aircraft carriers (although it participates in freedom of navigation missions). But it can also upgrade its political and economic relationship with Taiwan, for example, by unblocking a bilateral investment agreement that was put on ice while the EU sought an agreement with China. Upgrading economic ties is as much in our interests as Taiwan's, given the considerable assets Taiwan has in hi-tech areas such as semiconductors.
Europe and the U.S. should collectively seek out a new approach to China—something that the Biden Administration offered the EU even before its inauguration. Our relationship with Taiwan should not be reduced to just military support or one specific investment agreement; it cuts to the question of whether we are willing to stand up for the lynchpin of freedom and democracy in a region where both are under increasing pressure from autocracy and dictatorship.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen was NATO Secretary General (2009-2014) and Danish Prime Minister (2001-2009). Today he is CEO at consultancy Rasmussen Global, and Founder of the Alliance of Democracies Foundation.
The views in this article are the writer's own.
Newsweek · by Ben Weingarten · January 11, 2022
18. Opinion | Afghanistan Is in Meltdown, and the U.S. Is Helping to Speed It Up
Excerpts:
I can understand the reluctance, which may also be intended to maintain leverage over the Taliban. But I’ve seen over the past two decades how Western powers have consistently overestimated their ability to get Afghan authorities — whoever they are — to acquiesce to their demands. Governments that were utterly dependent on U.S. security and financial support brushed off pressure to adopt Washington’s preferred peacemaking, war-fighting and anti-corruption strategies.
That’s not to say that the West should abandon efforts to get the Taliban to respect human rights and cooperate on security priorities. But expectations should be modest.
The Taliban are never going to have a policy on women’s rights that accords with Western values. They show no signs of embracing even limited forms of democratic governance. Nor is it likely they will ever take active measures to destroy or hand over remnants of Al Qaeda, even though they might keep a lid on them.
No one in Washington or European capitals can be pleased to contemplate working with this kind of government.
But the alternative is worse, foremost for the Afghans who have no choice but to live under Taliban rule and who need livelihoods.
The tough choice must be made.
Opinion | Afghanistan Is in Meltdown, and the U.S. Is Helping to Speed It Up
Guest Essay
Afghanistan Is in Meltdown, and the U.S. Is Helping to Speed It Up
Jan. 11, 2022
Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times
Send any friend a story
As a subscriber, you have 10 gift articles to give each month. Anyone can read what you share.
By
Ms. Miller is the director of the Asia program at the International Crisis Group.
When the United States withdrew from Afghanistan last summer, it was left with a critical choice: allow the collapse of a state that had mostly been kept afloat by foreign aid or work with the Taliban, its former foes who were in power, to prevent that outcome.
More than four months after the last U.S. military flight left Kabul, the Biden administration has yet to take a clear decision, opting to muddle along with half-measures amid an escalating humanitarian crisis. Time is running out.
The United States should swallow the bitter pill of working with the Taliban-led government in order to prevent a failed state in Afghanistan. Kneecapping the government through sanctions and frozen aid won’t change the fact that the Taliban are now in charge, but it will ensure that ordinary public services collapse, the economy decays and Afghans’ livelihoods shrink even further.
That’s not in the interest of anyone, including the United States after 20 years of investment and engagement. A failed state would be fertile ground for extremist groups to thrive, with little room for the West to work with the government — no matter how imperfectly — to prevent further threats.
It’s no surprise that the United States and its allies responded to the Taliban takeover with punitive measures: halting the flow of aid that had been paying for three-fourths of public spending, freezing Afghan state assets abroad, cutting the country off from the global financial system and maintaining sanctions on the Taliban — which now penalize the entire government they head. That playbook is how Washington typically tries to punish objectionable regimes. But the result has been catastrophic for civilians.
Devastating droughts, the pandemic and the Taliban’s incompetence in governing have all played roles in creating what may be the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. But the West’s immediate steps to isolate the new regime triggered Afghanistan’s meltdown. This was especially the case because the countries that shut off the aid spigot had, over 20 years, enabled the Afghan state’s dependency on it.
Isolation was fast and easy to do: It cost no money or political capital and satisfied the imperative of expressing disapproval.
With aid organizations raising ever-more-desperate alarms, the United States and other Western nations have taken incremental steps to help Afghans by trying to work around the Taliban. Funding for emergency aid delivered by the United Nations and humanitarian organizations has grown, with Washington providing the largest share, nearly $474 million in 2021. The U.S. government also has gradually broadened humanitarian carve-outs from its sanctions and has taken the lead in getting the Security Council to issue exemptions from U.N. sanctions, making it easier for those delivering aid to carry out their work without legal risk.
But these steps are insufficient. The food, support for health care and limited other types of aid being provided will go only so far to alleviate the dire conditions Afghan civilians are experiencing. Restoring a minimally functioning public sector and stopping Afghanistan’s economic free-fall will require lifting restrictions on ordinary business and easing the prohibition on assistance to or through the government. Without that, there’s little hope that humanitarian aid can be more than a palliative. And if the prohibition stands, continued dependence on relief aid is virtually guaranteed because circumventing the state will ensure its institutions wither.
The United States should draw a distinction between the Taliban as former insurgents and the state they now control.
This starts by beginning to lift sanctions on the Taliban as a group (leaving sanctions on some individuals and an arms embargo in place); funding specific state functions in areas such as rural development, agriculture, electricity and local governance; and restoring central-bank operations to reconnect Afghanistan to the global financial system.
Support for public services is especially important because not only do Afghans need those services, but the government is also the country’s single largest employer.
Taking these steps also will serve Western interests. It will help curb growing migration from the country and rising illicit narcotics production by Afghans desperate for income. It could also produce at least limited opportunity for getting the Taliban to cooperate with the United States to suppress terrorist threats from the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan and other groups.
Afghanistan will undoubtedly be more impoverished under the Taliban than it was in recent years, and no country will restore aid to the scale the last government enjoyed. But the population needs a glide path for a diminishing level of support, rather than the abrupt cutoff that hit the economy with a shock wave.
Western capitals’ concerns that such measures would bolster the Taliban’s stature or their ability to divert funds to nefarious purposes could be addressed by imposing restrictions and monitoring.
It’s not surprising that the United States and its allies are reluctant to do much beyond helping hungry Afghans survive this winter. They’re likely troubled by the precedent of legitimizing a militant Islamist group that took power through force. And appearing to turn a blind eye to the Taliban’s past and current human rights violations is deeply unappealing.
I can understand the reluctance, which may also be intended to maintain leverage over the Taliban. But I’ve seen over the past two decades how Western powers have consistently overestimated their ability to get Afghan authorities — whoever they are — to acquiesce to their demands. Governments that were utterly dependent on U.S. security and financial support brushed off pressure to adopt Washington’s preferred peacemaking, war-fighting and anti-corruption strategies.
That’s not to say that the West should abandon efforts to get the Taliban to respect human rights and cooperate on security priorities. But expectations should be modest.
The Taliban are never going to have a policy on women’s rights that accords with Western values. They show no signs of embracing even limited forms of democratic governance. Nor is it likely they will ever take active measures to destroy or hand over remnants of Al Qaeda, even though they might keep a lid on them.
No one in Washington or European capitals can be pleased to contemplate working with this kind of government.
But the alternative is worse, foremost for the Afghans who have no choice but to live under Taliban rule and who need livelihoods.
The tough choice must be made.
Laurel Miller (@LaurelMillerICG), the director of the Asia program at the International Crisis Group, was the deputy and then acting special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. State Department from 2013 to 2017.
19. Yale, Georgetown, Other Top Schools Illegally Collude to Limit Student Financial Aid, Lawsuit Alleges
Uh oh.
Yale, Georgetown, Other Top Schools Illegally Collude to Limit Student Financial Aid, Lawsuit Alleges
A new federal suit adds to continuing efforts to change college admissions practices
According to a lawsuit filed in Illinois federal court late Sunday by law firms representing five former students who attended some of the schools, the universities engaged in price fixing and unfairly limited aid by using a shared methodology to calculate applicants’ financial need. Schools are allowed under federal law to collaborate on their formulas, but only if they don’t consider applicants’ financial need in admissions decisions. The suit alleges these schools do weigh candidates’ ability to pay in certain circumstances, and therefore shouldn’t be eligible for the antitrust exemption.
The suit seeks damages and a permanent end to the schools’ collaboration in calculating financial need and awarding aid.
College admissions practices are being challenged more broadly and pillars of the decades-old admissions system are crumbling.
Georgetown University’s campus in Washington.
Photo: kevin lamarque/Reuters
The Supreme Court is expected to decide as soon as this week whether to take up two cases centered on affirmative action, involving Harvard University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Amherst College in October said it would stop giving an edge to applicants whose parents attended the school, placing it among the first elite schools to ditch legacy preferences. And in part because the pandemic made it difficult for students to take the ACT and SAT, thousands of colleges shifted to a test-optional policy for recent and current applicants. Hundreds of those schools have since extended the offer for at least a few more years.
In addition to Yale, Georgetown and Northwestern, other named defendants in the suit are: Brown University, the California Institute of Technology, the University of Chicago, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Duke University, Emory University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Notre Dame, the University of Pennsylvania, Rice University and Vanderbilt University.
Lawyers say more than 170,000 former undergraduate students who received partial financial aid at those schools going back up to 18 years could be eligible to join the suit as plaintiffs.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s campus in Cambridge.
Photo: Adam Glanzman/Bloomberg News
A Yale spokeswoman said the school’s financial aid policy is “100% compliant with all applicable laws,” while a Cal Tech spokeswoman said the school has confidence in its aid practices and a Brown spokesman said the complaint was without merit.
Representatives from Columbia, Cornell, Duke, Georgetown, Northwestern, Notre Dame, Penn, Rice and the University of Chicago declined to comment on pending litigation, and MIT said it would respond in court in due time. The other schools didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment on the suit.
Colleges have been accused of anticompetitive behavior before: In 2019, an industry group representing college admissions officers agreed to allow more aggressive recruiting practices, after the Justice Department threatened continued legal action over what it said was anticompetitive behavior.
In 1991, all eight members of the Ivy League and MIT were charged with price fixing. Prosecutors said representatives from the schools would meet to discuss their anticipated aid offers for students who had been admitted to more than one school. This practice unfairly limited price competition, prosecutors said. Schools said the approach eliminated bidding wars and allowed students to choose schools based on fit rather than on price.
The eight Ivy League schools signed a consent decree and MIT agreed to a separate settlement ending that practice.
Newsletter Sign-up
Education
Select coverage from the WSJ's education bureau on the state of schools and learning, curated by bureau chief Chastity Pratt and sent to you via email.
SUBSCRIBE
In 1994, Congress passed legislation exempting from antitrust violations schools that practice need-blind admissions, allowing them to create common guidelines for how to assess an applicant’s financial need when putting together aid packages. They still couldn’t discuss aid offers for individual applicants. In response, 28 schools created what is known as the 568 Presidents Group—named for the section of that law allowing for collaboration on aid formulas. The group typically meets a few times a year to discuss its calculations.
The law benefited schools by allowing them to bypass bidding wars for low-income applicants, but in exchange the schools were barred from favoring wealthy applicants to minimize how much money they gave away in scholarships.
The new lawsuit alleges that members of that group are violating federal law because they aren’t entirely need-blind. Rather, lawyers say, at least some of the schools consider financial need by giving an admission edge to children of wealthy donors. Some also weigh applicants’ finances when admitting them off the waiting list and look at finances in admission decisions for certain programs, the suit alleges.
“While conspiring together on a method for awarding financial aid, which raises net tuition prices, defendants also consider the wealth of applicants and their families in making admissions decisions,” said Eric Rosen, a partner at Roche Freedman involved in the suit who was a lead prosecutor on the federal Varsity Blues college admissions-cheating investigation in 2019.
The suit was filed in the Northern District of Illinois by the firms Roche Freedman, Gilbert Litigators & Counselors, Berger Montague and FeganScott.
The antitrust exemption is set to expire in September, unless Congress renews it, but attorneys in the case say schools would still be responsible for overcharging students in prior years.
20. Undersea cable connecting Norway and Arctic satellite station is mysteriously damaged
Undersea cable connecting Norway and Arctic satellite station is mysteriously damaged
- An undersea comms cable connecting Svalbard and mainland Norway has failed
- The disruption could prove disastrous as there is now only one connection left
- If the other cable fails, the island will be completely cut off from the mainland
- The cables power a huge Arctic satellite station and bring internet to Svalbard
- It comes as Britain's most senior naval officer warned that Russia may look to cripple such vital undersea communications wires supporting the UK
PUBLISHED: 09:06 EST, 11 January 2022 | UPDATED: 11:53 EST, 11 January 2022
Daily Mail · by David Averre For Mailonline · January 11, 2022
An undersea fiberoptic cable which provides vital internet connection and communications links between mainland Norway and the Svalbard archipelago in the Arctic Ocean has mysteriously been put out of action.
The outage on the subsea communications cable, which is the northern most cable of its kind in the world, occurred on January 7 but was only revealed to the public yesterday by Space Norway, who owns and maintains the technology.
The disruption, which occurred on one of two fiberoptic cables, could prove disastrous as it means there is now only one connection between the mainland and Svalbard with no backup.
The cables provide essential power for Space Norway to run the Svalbard Satellite Station (SvalSat), and also enable broadband internet connection on the islands.
Should the second cable fail before repairs are made, Svalbard's citizens and SvalSat will be effectively cut off from Norway.
It comes as Britain's newly appointed chief of the defence staff, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, warned that Russia may look to cripple such vital undersea communications wires supporting the UK.
In an interview at the weekend, Radakin said there had been 'a phenomenal increase' in Russian submarine activity over the past 20 years, adding: 'Russia has grown the capability to put at threat those undersea cables and potentially exploit them.'
A pair of undersea cables provide essential power for Space Norway to run the Svalbard Satellite Station (SvalSat - pictured), and also enable broadband internet connection on the islands. Should the second cable fail before repairs are made, Svalbard's citizens and the arctic SvalSat satellite station will be effectively cut off from Norway
The fault in the cable, which runs from Longyearbyen in Svalbard to Andoeya on Norway's north coast, was detected between 80 - 140 miles from Longyearbyen at a point where the cable runs from less than 0.2 miles deep to over 1.3 miles deep under the surface between the Greenland, Norwegian and Barents seas
It comes as Britain's newly appointed chief of the defence staff, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, warned that Russia may look to cripple such vital undersea communications wires supporting the UK (pictured: Russian submarine RFS Rostov Na Donu, Feb 26, 2021)
The press release from Space Norway said the power outage was first detected at 4:10 am local time on Friday morning, and that the cable has been out of order since.
The fault in the cable, which runs from Longyearbyen in Svalbard to Andoeya on Norway's north coast, was detected between 80 - 140 miles from Longyearbyen at a point where the cable runs from less than 0.2 miles deep to over 1.3 miles deep under the surface between the Greenland, Norwegian and Barents seas.
Space Norway did not provide details of the outage, the extent of the damage or how it was caused, but confirmed that an cable-laying vessel will need to be dispatched to administer repairs.
The company stressed that communication between Svalbard and the mainland was still operational, but admitted that there is no only one cable functioning with no redundancy system should it fail.
More than 97 per cent of the world's communications are transmitted through sub sea optical fibre cables surrounded by armouring wire and a Polyethylene cover
The SvalSat site is located atop a mountainous ridge on Svalbard and consists of more than 100 satellite antennas vital for polar orbiting satellites.
The site represents one of only two ground stations from which data can be downloaded from these types of satellites on each of the Earth's rotations, making it a valuable asset.
However, Russian authorities have previously suggested the SvalSat site may also be used to download data from military satellites as well as commercial ones, despite Svalbard being located in a designated demilitarised zone - accusations which have fuelled suspicions that Russian submarines may be responsible for the outages, though there is no evidence of this as yet.
The SvalSat site is located atop a mountainous ridge on Svalbard and consists of more than 100 satellite antennas vital for polar orbiting satellites. The site represents one of only two ground stations from which data can be downloaded from these types of satellites on each of the Earth's rotations, making it a valuable asset.
There is global network of undersea cables responsible for carrying 97 per cent of international communications, and there is increased speculation that disabling such cables, or trying to gain access to them, could represent an integral part of modern warfare in the digital age.
Largely owned and installed by private companies, are designed to withstand the natural rigours under the sea and cannot be cut easily, but military submarines and unmanned submersibles have the capability to damage or sever the connections.
Space Norway says it will examine the undersea cables and investigate the reason behind the power outage along with Norway's Ministry of Justice and Public Security.
How Putin could black out Britain: Top military man warns Russian sabotage could wreck undersea cables that supply our internet and $10 trillion of financial deals a day
- 97 per cent of international communications are sent through sub-sea cables
- The cables linking all continents are thousands of feet below the ocean's surface
- Admiral Sir Tony Radakin believes Russia could target this vital network
BY DAVID WILKES FOR THE DAILY MAIL
Thousands of feet under the ocean lies a global network of internet cables responsible for carrying 97 per cent of international communications.
In a digital age, these physical cables, sheathed in steel and plastic, are central to how we function. If they were to be disabled, it would not just prevent us accessing the web on our phones and laptops — it would disrupt everything from agriculture and healthcare to military logistics and financial transactions, instantly plunging the world into a new depression.
According to experts, this doomsday scenario ranks alongside nuclear war as an existential threat to our way of life.
And the newly appointed chief of the defence staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin reckons Russia is the hostile power most likely to cripple these vital arteries.
In an interview at the weekend, he said there had been 'a phenomenal increase' in Russian submarine activity over the past 20 years, adding: 'Russia has grown the capability to put at threat those undersea cables and potentially exploit them.'
Any such interference would be treated with the utmost seriousness. Asked whether destroying cables could be considered an act of war, Britain's most senior military officer said: 'Potentially, yes.'
Russian President Vladimir Putin, pictured, has been investing heavily in his country's submarine fleet, including developing technology to interfere with sub sea cables
The good news is the cable manufacturers do not make things easy for would-be saboteurs.
The cables, largely owned and installed by private companies, are designed to withstand the natural rigours under the sea and cannot be cut easily.
Typically just over an inch in diameter, they consist of fibre optics — strands of glass as thin as a hair — in the centre, surrounded by galvanised steel wire armouring and then, on the outside, a plastic coating.
They are engineered to the 'five nines' standard — meaning they are reliable 99.999 per cent of the time, a level generally reserved for nuclear weapons and space shuttles.
But, armed with hydraulic cutters attached to their hulls, Russian submersibles would make short work of the hosepipe-thin cables. Alternatively, divers or remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) fitted with cutters could do the job.
One ship identified as a serious threat is the Yantar. Officially described by the Russian navy as a 'research' ship, it carries two mini submarines designed for engineering missions which can examine areas up to 3.75 miles underwater.
Just four months after it took to the sea for the first time in 2015, Yantar triggered concern in intelligence circles when it was detected just off the U.S. coast on its way to Cuba where undersea cables make landfall near Guantanamo Bay.
In shallower waters, a vessel could deliberately drag an anchor along the seabed to rip the cables apart. Such an attack could be covered up by passing it off as an innocent fishing-boat accident.
Last August, the Yantar was seen off Ireland's Donegal-Mayo coastline. Despite having territorial waters ten times the size of its land mass, Ireland has just one naval vessel to monitor the four cables that link it to the U.S. and the eight connecting it to Britain. Out at sea, the cables are even more vulnerable, as they are often hundreds or thousands of miles from the nearest naval bases capable of identifying, monitoring and intercepting hostile ships.
There are also fears that Yantar's submersibles could carry technology capable of tapping the cables.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, pictured, commissioned research vessels which can target sub sea cables
Around the world there are 436 of these cables, containing between them more than 800,000 miles of fibre optics.
The daddy of them all is the Asia American Gateway which is 12,430 miles long.
Each cable contains between four and 200 optical fibres — one fibre can transmit as much as 400GB of data per second, or enough for about 375 million phone calls.
A single cable containing eight fibre-optic strands could transfer the contents of Oxford's Bodleian Library — which contains more than 12 million books, journals and manuscripts — across the Atlantic in about 40 minutes.
They are far more important than satellite communications, which account for just 3 per cent of global traffic. As futuristic as satellites may sound, this mode of transmission has been in decline since the early 1990s as fibre-optic cables gained the ascendance.
'Short of nuclear or biological warfare, it is difficult to think of a threat that could be more justifiably described as existential than that posed by the catastrophic failure of undersea cable networks as a result of hostile action,' states a report from the Policy Exchange think-tank written in 2017 by the now Chancellor Rishi Sunak, who was then a backbench MP.
Every day the cable network carries $10 trillion worth of financial transfers. The report says: 'In the words of the managing director of one major telecoms firm: 'Cascading failures could immobilise much of the international telecommunications system and internet . . .
'The effect on international finance, military logistics, medicine, commerce and agriculture in a global economy would be profound . . . Electronic funds transfers, credit card transactions and international bank reconciliations would slow . . . such an event would cause a global depression'.'
Sunak's report recommended that undersea cables should be designated as critical national infrastructure and 'cable protection zones' should be established.
Meanwhile, British ships and other military assets protect cables in areas such as the North Atlantic. Last week it emerged the sonar equipment of one of those ships, a frigate called HMS Northumberland, was crashed into by a Russian submarine in late 2020.
At the time of the collision, the ship had deployed a Towed Array, a tube up to two miles long fitted with hydrophones to listen under the water, and it is this element the sub is believed to have hit.
As tensions rise between Russia and the West over countries like Ukraine and Kazakhstan, such incidents are likely to become a lot more common.
Daily Mail · by David Averre For Mailonline · January 11, 2022
