Quotes of the Day:
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present… fellow citizens, we cannot escape history.
— Abraham Lincoln (1862), on the imperative on winning the Civil War
“A man can never have too much red wine, too many books, or too much ammunition”
― Rudyard Kipling
The Value of Insurgent/Resistor Intelligence in Unconventional Warfare
“There is no doubt that most partisan actions inflicted damage upon the opposing forces. Some of the damage was severe…. [However,] their second great contribution was in the field of intelligence…. [It] cannot be doubted that the partisans served well as field intelligence, especially after Army intelligence officers had been seconded to all partisan staffs in 1943. The scope was wide—the partisans were everywhere—their location ideal—behind the enemy’s front—and their instructions were detailed—in the Field Service Regulations, the Partisan Handbook, the Guide Book for Partisans, and so on.
We can be almost certain that again and again Russian attacks were mounted in those areas which partisan reports had indicated as vulnerable. The Russians during the war became expert in attacking the enemy’s weakest points: the small front-line gaps in the winter of 1941-2, the front held by German satellite troops at the beginning of the Stalingrad battle; and if there was neither gap nor satellite, it was almost always the seam between two enemy formations which the Red Army selected for its breakthrough attempts…. There was only one source which could consistently direct the Red Army against the weakest link of the enemy front, and this task… was entrusted to the partisans.
We are of course better informed about the value of French partisan intelligence. ‘In fact, the day the battle (in France) began,’ says General De Gaulle, ‘all the German troop emplacements, bases, depots, landing fields and command posts were precisely known, the striking force and equipment counted, the defense works photographed, the minefields spotted…. Thanks to all the information furnished by the French resistance, the Allies were in a position to see into the enemy’s hand and strike with telling effect.’
These words speak for themselves; no finer testimonial could be given.”
Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare (1962)
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 21 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. The Return of Statecraft – Back to Basics in the Post-American World
3. Ukraine Endgame: Putin’s Bad Options
4. North Korea’s sanctions evasion points way for Russians to bypass the west
5. White House appoints Ukraine security aid coordinator
6. Putin's Ukraine Nightmare Is Getting Worse: America Is Sending More Arms
7. How Ukraine's mud became a secret weapon in its defense against Russia
8. After 20,000 Dead Troops Putin Suddenly Claims to Care About Their Lives
9. Opinion | The only plausible path to keep the pressure on Russia
10. US Navy shoots down drone with electric-powered laser in historic first
11. Putin’s price for ending his war? A way to sell it as a victory – no matter the truth
12. Remarks By President Biden Providing an Update on Russia and Ukraine
13. Exclusive: Ex-CIA analyst says she ‘got bloodied’ in tangled U.S. war on Al Qaeda
14. 1st Special Forces Group Soldiers Experiment with Unmanned Battle Systems
15. Remarks by President Biden Before Meeting with the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Combatant Commanders
16. What Does Joe Biden Hope to Achieve in Ukraine?
17. NATO Must Welcome Ukraine
18. What Does the West Want in Ukraine?
19. Ukraine Can Win – The Case Against Compromise
20. What the PLA Is Learning From Russia’s Ukraine Invasion
21. The Endless War in Ukraine By Douglas Macgregor
22. Indo-Pacific Economic Framework: Why America Must Ensure Taiwan Is Included
23. Next Phase of War Will Be Pivotal for Russia and Ukraine, U.S. Says
24. FDD | China’s COVID-19 Crisis Threatens to Derail Xi’s Ambitious Economic Agenda
25. Ukraine War News - April 22, 2022 | SOF News
26. FDD | New State Department Report Admits Iran May Be Hiding Nuclear Activities
27. Israel has a KC-46 problem. Here’s the solution.
28. FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (FTO) DESIGNATION AND SPECIALLY DESIGNATED GLOBAL TERRORIST (SDGT) DESIGNATION
29. How Israel’s Minority Government Can Stay in Power
30. USSOCOM Invests $10M in Jet Boots Dive Propulsion Systems
31. Lawsuits against Alex Jones are a new strategy in curbing conspiracy theories
32. Civic Education Requires Liberal Education
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 21 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 21 (PUTIN'S WAR)
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko
April 21, 6:45pm ET
The Kremlin declared victory in the battle of Mariupol. Russian forces will attempt to starve out remaining Ukrainian defenders in the Azovstal Steel Plant rather than clear it through likely costly assaults. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu declared victory in the battle of Mariupol on April 21 despite the continued presence of Ukrainian forces in Mariupol’s Azovstal Steel Plant. In a staged, televised meeting, Putin ordered Shoigu to halt assaults on the plant to limit Russian casualties, claiming Russian forces have already captured the entirety of the city. The Kremlin will spin the (still incomplete) capture of Mariupol into a major victory in Ukraine to compensate for stalled or failed Russian offensives elsewhere.
The Kremlin’s reduction of the pace of operations in Mariupol is unlikely to enable the deployment of significant combat power to support other offensive operations in the coming days and weeks. Statements from US officials that Russia has not yet removed a dozen battalion tactical groups (BTGs) from Mariupol despite Putin’s claimed victory do not capture either the status of these Russian forces or other constraints on their use.[1] ISW has consistently assessed that Russian BTGs have taken high casualties in the battle of Mariupol, are degraded, and are unlikely to possess their full complement of personnel (800-900 at full strength). As with Russian operations elsewhere in Ukraine, reporting on numbers of BTGs without additional context and analysis of the combat power of these units is not a useful evaluation of Russian forces. While it is unlikely that all 12 reported BTGs were involved in the final fighting around the Azovstal plant, it will still take some time for those units that were engaged in final assaults to disengage for redeployment elsewhere. Some portion of these Russian forces will be necessary for several other missions—including maintaining the siege of the Azovstal plant, securing the rest of Mariupol against any remaining pockets of Ukrainian forces and likely partisan actions, and possibly redeploying to support Russian forces maintaining control of southern Ukraine. Russian forces will certainly be able to redeploy some units from Mariupol to offensive operations elsewhere—but Ukrainian forces have succeeded in tying down and degrading a substantial Russian force, and the Kremlin's declaration of victory has not inherently freed up 12 BTGs worth of combat power for other operations.
Key Takeaways
- The Kremlin’s declaration of victory in Mariupol is unlikely to enable the deployment of significant combat power to reinforce offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the coming days or weeks.
- Russian forces involved in the battle of Mariupol are likely heavily damaged and Ukrainian forces succeeded in tying down and degrading a substantial Russian force.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Ukraine but made only marginal gains.
- Ukrainian forces continued to halt Russian attacks around Izyum.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:
- Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
- Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
- Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.
Main effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
The Kremlin declared victory in the battle of Mariupol on April 21, though some Ukrainian forces remain in the Azovstal Steel Plant. Russian President Putin held a televised meeting with Defense Minister Shoigu (in his first confirmed public appearance since March 11) during which Shoigu claimed “the entirety of Mariupol is under the control of the Russian army” and stated Russian forces have “securely blocked” the "nationalists and foreign mercenaries” (Kremlin language for Ukrainian forces) remaining in the facility.[2] Shoigu claimed that Russian forces would require 3-4 days to finish clearing the Azovstal plant, after which Putin stated a final assault is unnecessary and ordered a full blockade of the facility to save Russian lives. The “meeting” was a managed Kremlin messaging effort claiming victory in the battle of Mariupol to be able to claim a major success without the likely costly operations required to clear out remaining Ukrainian defenders.[3] Local sources reporting fighting continued around the Azovstal plant in the last 24 hours despite Putin’s statement, but Russian forces did not conduct any major assaults against the facility.[4]
Ukrainian officials called for a local ceasefire to allow Ukrainian defenders and trapped civilians to leave Mariupol, though Russian forces will likely instead attempt to starve the remaining defenders into submission. Ukrainian Mayor of Mariupol Vadym Boychenko called for a ceasefire to allow civilians trapped in the plant to leave on April 21.[5] Deputy Ukrainian Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk expanded on this call, stating around 1,000 civilians and 5,000 wounded soldiers (with an unspecified number of unwounded soldiers) remain in the Azovstal plant.[6]
Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Ukraine but made only marginal gains on April 21. Russian forces continued to focus their assaults on Rubizhne, Severodonetsk, and Popasna and likely made local advances in Rubizhne, though Russian claims to have captured the entirety of Rubizhne are likely false.[7] The Ukrainian governor of Luhansk Oblast reported on April 21 that Russian forces control approximately half of Popasna, and street fighting is continuing across the city.[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense additionally claimed to capture Kreminna, west of Rubizhne, but ISW cannot verify this claim.[9] Russian forces are continuing to deploy reinforcements to eastern Ukraine to support further offensive actions.[10]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Izyum axis)
Russian forces continued assaults on Ukrainian positions around Izyum but did not secure any territorial gains in the past 24 hours. Russian forces may be attempting to probe Ukrainian defensive positions around Izyum prior to larger offensive operations but remain largely road-bound and unlikely to secure any major breakthroughs.[11] Russian forces continued to shell areas of Kharkiv Oblast and partially block Kharkiv city on April 21.[12]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces likely conducted local attacks on Ukrainian positions west of Kherson on April 21 but did not secure any new territory.[13] Ukrainian military sources reported on April 21 Russian forces are preparing to conduct a “referendum” to create a “Kherson People’s Republic” on April 27.[14] The Kremlin likely intends to create one or more proxy states in occupied southern Ukraine to cement its military occupation and set conditions to demand permanent control over these regions.
Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)
There was no significant change in this area in the past 24 hours.
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces will likely continue attacking southeast from Izyum, west from Kreminna and Popasna, and north from Donetsk City via Avdiivka.
- Russian forces will attempt to starve out the remaining defenders of the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol.
- Russian forces will likely increase the scale of ground offensive operations in the coming days, but it is too soon to tell how fast they will do so or how large those offensives will be. It is also too soon to assess how the Russians will weight their efforts in the arc from Izyum to Donetsk City.
[10] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/velikij-nastup-rosiyi-na-donbasi-she-ne-pochavsya-vorog-perevirye-sili-zsu-danilov.
2. The Return of Statecraft – Back to Basics in the Post-American World
The notion of grand strategy is flawed. We must shift "toward empiricism over generalization." Be more like Teddy Roosevelt than John F. Kennedy.
Argue amongst yourselves.
Excerpts:
Nonetheless, relative decline is a fact. Historians will dissect why the age of American dominance ended when it did and whether its disappearance might have been delayed or mitigated. The question now, however, is how the United States should adjust to its changing position. The response will have many elements, but the most important is attitudinal. After decades of relying on big strategic ideas that are translated into policy by complex and arduous bureaucratic processes, the U.S. government must return to statecraft. This means an approach that embodies a fine-grained comprehension of the world, the ability to quickly detect and respond to challenges, a penchant for exploiting opportunities as they arise, and, behind all of this, effective institutions for the formulation and conduct of a nimble foreign policy.
In the previous era, the United States was strong enough to get away with less-than-perfect implementation of its big ideas. Its unrivaled power granted it a wide margin of error, enough space so that Washington could get most of what it wanted, no matter what its level of competence. Today, when it is much harder for Washington to call the shots, the problems it faces demand not more abstruse strategies. They require something far earthier: skill.
...
This notion is flawed. It is of course essential to have some organizing ideas about the world—that the United States should pursue both its interests and its ideals, for example, or that it faces challenges from the rise of competitors and such developments as climate change and state failure. Decision-makers can call such ideas “grand strategy” if they must, but they should not ascribe excessive importance to them, because such general principles offer limited help when it comes to formulating specific policies. Grand strategy relies on simplifications, and yet the world is complex.
...
One element of a renewed commitment to statecraft should be a pronounced tilt in policy and intellectual circles toward empiricism over generalization. Accurately judging the environment is no small task. Over the last two decades, for example, U.S. policymakers failed to recognize the speed with which China would rise and the threat that it could pose to the United States’ world position, even though the Chinese were hardly hiding their ambitions. Washington dismissed Beijing’s military buildup and did little to counter its aggressive naval tactics in the South China Sea. The Obama and Trump administrations alike failed to secure congressional passage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the proposed trade bloc that would have helped balance China. In missing the China threat, policymakers let a priori beliefs—the kind that characterize most grand strategic thinking—get in the way of good political judgment. They adhered to a theory of development that saw global economic integration as leading to political liberalization, a hypothesis that in the case of China proved utterly false.
...
The United States’ foreign policy future will not echo the trumpet call of President John F. Kennedy’s 1961 inaugural address to “bear any burden, meet any hardship.” Rather, the United States should follow the guidance, at once principled and pragmatic, that President Theodore Roosevelt offered in his 1905 inaugural address: “Much has been given us, and much will rightfully be expected from us. We have duties to others and duties to ourselves; and we can shirk neither. We have become a great nation, forced by the fact of its greatness into relations with the other nations of the earth, and we must behave as beseems a people with such responsibilities.”
Roosevelt, who made a careful study of foreign policy throughout his career and took care to explain it to Americans beyond the cosmopolitan cities of the Northeast, was a shrewd practitioner. As assistant secretary of the navy and later as president, he helped revitalize both the army and the navy, making them fit for the needs of an emerging world power. In 1905, he seized the opportunity to broker a peace between Japan and Russia in a way that would benefit the United States. He anticipated the issues at stake in World War I long before most Americans did and advocated an earlier U.S. intervention that might well have shortened the conflict. He balanced ideals and interests. He was relentlessly curious about the world in which he operated, reading in foreign languages and traveling widely. He operated in an era in which the United States was powerful but hardly predominant and in which multiple forces were at work. His pragmatism, informed by principle, was not grand strategy. But it worked.
The Return of Statecraft
Back to Basics in the Post-American World
For more than 70 years, starting in the middle of World War II, the United States bestrode the world like a colossus. Its economy and military emerged from the war not just unscathed but also supreme. Its institutions of governance—a unified Department of Defense, a system of far-flung military commands, the National Security Council, specialized agencies for international development, and so on—were those of an effective global hegemon. Even when it was locked in a mortal struggle with the alien and hostile ideology of communism, it held most of the winning cards. And as colossi do, it elicited resentment from those not content to live in its shadow.
For anyone who hadn’t noticed the growing challenges to American dominance, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in February of this year, should have erased any doubts. International politics had clearly entered a new era, one in which the old forms of predatory state behavior had returned, and the putative global hegemon proved unable to stop it. The colossus could not get its way.
But the United States’ relative decline could be seen in many indicators long before the Russian invasion. The U.S. economy now produces under a quarter of global GDP, compared with 40 percent in 1960. The United States’ military spending is still enormous, accounting for as much as 40 percent of the world’s total, but it no longer generates the same margin of superiority it once did. The United States confronts opponents that are nimbler in adopting new technologies and modes of warfare. Its ideology of free minds and free markets faces challenges not only from foreign models of authoritarian efficiency and ethnonationalism but also from waning confidence in American institutions. A 2021 Pew Research survey found that a healthy majority of the populations of 14 countries, all U.S. allies, held the view that democracy in the United States “used to be a good example but has not been in recent years.” The insurrection that swept a mob of jeering, violent vandals into the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, to overturn President Donald Trump’s electoral loss dealt a greater blow to the United States’ reputation than did the attacks on New York and Washington 20 years earlier.
For the foreseeable future, the United States will remain powerful. Although China’s rise means that it may not have the world’s largest economy forever, it will certainly have the second-largest and possibly the most dynamic and globally connected one. It has one of the biggest and most experienced militaries on the planet, along with plentiful allies. Above all, the United States has a demonstrated resilience going back to its founding. It has been rent before, suffered grievous economic setbacks, and, time and again, bounced back.
Nonetheless, relative decline is a fact. Historians will dissect why the age of American dominance ended when it did and whether its disappearance might have been delayed or mitigated. The question now, however, is how the United States should adjust to its changing position. The response will have many elements, but the most important is attitudinal. After decades of relying on big strategic ideas that are translated into policy by complex and arduous bureaucratic processes, the U.S. government must return to statecraft. This means an approach that embodies a fine-grained comprehension of the world, the ability to quickly detect and respond to challenges, a penchant for exploiting opportunities as they arise, and, behind all of this, effective institutions for the formulation and conduct of a nimble foreign policy.
In the previous era, the United States was strong enough to get away with less-than-perfect implementation of its big ideas. Its unrivaled power granted it a wide margin of error, enough space so that Washington could get most of what it wanted, no matter what its level of competence. Today, when it is much harder for Washington to call the shots, the problems it faces demand not more abstruse strategies. They require something far earthier: skill.
IDEAS AND THEIR LIMITS
The recommendation to downplay extensive, formal strategizing in favor of deftness, strength, and agility swims against the tendency of the time. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine earlier this year came when a new U.S. grand strategy was supposedly set: focus on the rivalry with China and (more or less) leave Europe and the Middle East to their own devices. The showers of Russian missiles and bombs blew up not only Ukrainian towns but also that scheme. Even before the invasion, intellectuals were advocating the revival of grand strategy—that is, a sweeping concept for the conduct of foreign policy. Author after author has called for a new “X” article, akin to the one written by the diplomat George Kennan in these pages in 1947, which laid out the Cold War grand strategy of containment. Today, some scholars, harking back to Wilsonian idealism, have suggested that the United States should orient its policies around the creation of a new “rules-based international order.” Others have proposed “retrenchment,” a realpolitik-driven acceptance of decline and a diminished role for the United States on the world stage. There are still other grand strategic variants floating about, but all share a desire to boil down the complexities of foreign policy into a few clear dicta. What matters most, their proponents argue, is having the right intellectual framework; the rest is commentary.
This notion is flawed. It is of course essential to have some organizing ideas about the world—that the United States should pursue both its interests and its ideals, for example, or that it faces challenges from the rise of competitors and such developments as climate change and state failure. Decision-makers can call such ideas “grand strategy” if they must, but they should not ascribe excessive importance to them, because such general principles offer limited help when it comes to formulating specific policies. Grand strategy relies on simplifications, and yet the world is complex.
Ideas matter, but not as much as intellectuals and politicians think they do.
So, for that matter, is the United States. For one thing, it is both a status quo and a revisionist power. It seeks to preserve key elements of the world order—the rule of law, the free flow of trade, individual liberty—and yet because of its attachment to these ideals, it opposes and often seeks to transform those regimes that have no such attachment. For another thing, U.S. foreign policy is shaped by a complex blend of ideals and interests that vary by time and place. Just as it aligned with the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany, today it backs Saudi Arabia against Iran and Vietnam against China. Idealists who argue that the United States must repudiate any connection with unsavory partners ignore complexity in favor of dogmatic simplification.
Also guilty of this charge are the retrenchers, who dismiss all consideration of values in foreign policy. Countries that brutalize their populations, assassinate dissidents, subvert legitimate governments, and indulge in paranoid fantasies about external enemies are obviously more dangerous than other states. In the nineteenth century, the United States and the United Kingdom found themselves on opposite sides of various territorial disputes, but each side never considered the other as dangerous as both did the totalitarian dictatorships of the twentieth century.
Grand strategy abstracts policy from the contingency of personalities and unforeseeable events. The doctrine of containment, for instance, offered no particular guidance on how to manage the crises in Berlin and Cuba or the wars in Korea and Vietnam. Yet the study of history reveals the overwhelming importance of unpredictable characters and events. U.S. policy toward China must contend with the personality of Chinese President Xi Jinping, whose methods and aims go well beyond those of his immediate predecessors. An unforeseen global pandemic has caused the United States to look either pathetically weak (because it failed to stop the spread of the disease and vaccinate enough of its population) or remarkably strong (if its looser approach allows it to open its economy faster than China opens its own). And foreign leaders can take everyone by surprise. To adapt the former heavyweight champion Mike Tyson’s adage about boxing, that everybody has a plan until they get punched in the mouth, one might say that everybody has a grand strategy until Russia invades Ukraine.
THE PROBLEM WITH STRATEGY
Ideas matter, but they do not matter as much as intellectuals and politicians think they do. What matters far more is statecraft, which is about sensing, adjusting, exploiting, and doing rather than planning and theorizing. It is the skill of a judo player who may have plans but whose most important characteristic is agility. It is what the philosopher Isaiah Berlin called “understanding rather than knowledge,” an ability to “tell what fits with what: what can be done in given circumstances and what cannot, what means will work in what situations and how far.”
A focus on statecraft rather than grand strategy is particularly urgent given the speed and unpredictability of today’s challenges. The United States is set to face confrontations with three opponents—China, Iran, and Russia—in the near future. Each is a revisionist power that wishes to acquire new possessions or recover old ones in its immediate neighborhood. Each fears long-term demographic decline and economic stagnation. Each has cultivated a style of warfare—hybrid or “gray zone”—that involves sophisticated tools, including proxies, cyberwarfare, low-cost technologies, selective repression, and even murder. Each is ruled by an aging leader who may wish to see major accomplishments within the next few years before he passes from the scene. Each is ready to cooperate, on a purely transactional basis, with the others. And each is threatened, not superficially but existentially, by the notion of free politics, the rule of law, and respect for individual liberties. All of this is a recipe for sudden, possibly stupid, and most definitely dangerous decisions that no grand strategist can predict. Look no further than Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foolhardy invasion of Ukraine.
Adding to the complication is the possibility that a crisis in one area may rebound in another. The chaos on NATO’s border, for instance, could strip U.S. resources away from Asia, and indeed, it has already turned the United States’ attention back to the old cockpit of Cold War struggles. Some of the larger forces at work—climate change, democratic decay, Islamist terrorism—will present further opportunities for unpredictable crises. The United States’ goal should be to cope with this chaotic reality rather than provide an architecture for global politics.
Too often, however, Washington has incompetently executed its foreign policy, rendering any aspirations of grand strategy meaningless. The best example is the calamitous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021. On grand strategic grounds, one might have argued the case either way: cut U.S. losses and avoid the distractions of Afghanistan to focus on more important interests in East Asia or, alternatively, sustain a low-cost engagement in the country to maintain credibility and undermine radical Islamist movements in South Asia. Like most decisions in foreign policy, there were good arguments on both sides. What resulted, however, was an appalling failure of statecraft, and that is what really mattered.
Grand strategy relies on simplifications, and yet the world is complex.
The chaotic withdrawal left behind tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of Afghans who had worked with U.S. troops. It led to humiliating images of ragtag Islamists defeating the world’s sole superpower. And it dented the popularity of a president seeking to restore American prestige. It didn’t have to be this way: the pullout could have been scheduled for the end of the fighting season, the State Department could have prepared in advance special visas for Afghans who had worked with the United States, a larger temporary force could have been left to retain control of the country’s largest air base, and U.S. allies could have been forewarned so that they wouldn’t have to scramble to secure their nationals.
The debacle of the withdrawal from Afghanistan was but one of a number of self-inflicted wounds in recent years. In 2003, the George W. Bush administration invaded Iraq with no serious plan for the occupation that followed. In 2012, President Barack Obama declared that Syria’s use of chemical weapons would constitute a redline—and then never followed through when the country’s dictator, Bashar al-Assad, crossed that very line. The Trump administration, for its part, not only dismissed the importance of values in foreign policy; the president practically reveled in his relationship with Putin and (according to former National Security Adviser John Bolton) set the stage for what would have been a catastrophic exit from NATO. Even the inauguration of the AUKUS security partnership, with Australia and the United Kingdom—a moment that represented a long-term success in U.S. foreign policy—was marred by the Biden administration’s inept handling of a key ally, France, which was left humiliated by the unexpected cancellation of a major Australian-French submarine program.
None of this is to say that U.S. policymakers shouldn’t hold some core ideas—namely, that the United States should be prepared to play an active role abroad, that it has an interest in the free flow of goods and ideas, and that it favors democracy over dictatorship. U.S. policymakers in the twentieth century correctly concluded that the aggressive proclivities of revisionist dictatorships would ultimately impinge on the United States and that regimes that were repressive at home were more likely to use force abroad and toward malevolent ends. That connection has not yet been broken. Still, a basic understanding of the need to be actively engaged in the world on the basis of both values and interests provides only the most limited guidance for the conduct of policy. That is especially true at a time when the United States is not in a position to create a new world order (as it was in the 1940s) or benignly manage an existing one (as it was after the Cold War). After World War II, big new ideas were indeed required for the world order that only the United States, with its unmatched and untouched economy, could create. Today, the United States, crowded by aggressive autocracies, sliding democracies, and unpredictable global phenomena, simply cannot come up with schemes comparable to those of the immediate postwar period. Instead, it has to turn to statecraft.
RECOVERING STATECRAFT
One element of a renewed commitment to statecraft should be a pronounced tilt in policy and intellectual circles toward empiricism over generalization. Accurately judging the environment is no small task. Over the last two decades, for example, U.S. policymakers failed to recognize the speed with which China would rise and the threat that it could pose to the United States’ world position, even though the Chinese were hardly hiding their ambitions. Washington dismissed Beijing’s military buildup and did little to counter its aggressive naval tactics in the South China Sea. The Obama and Trump administrations alike failed to secure congressional passage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the proposed trade bloc that would have helped balance China. In missing the China threat, policymakers let a priori beliefs—the kind that characterize most grand strategic thinking—get in the way of good political judgment. They adhered to a theory of development that saw global economic integration as leading to political liberalization, a hypothesis that in the case of China proved utterly false.
Understanding the environment means constantly searching for linkages. Many U.S. analysts have made the mistake of treating the rise of a revanchist Russia, for example, as a matter of discrete rather than linked episodes. Moscow’s military incursions into Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 were treated as separate problems rather than a reflection of a new and dangerous course in Russian policy, one that could not be met with the Obama administration’s “reset” of U.S.-Russian relations or with Trump’s personal connection to Putin. The result: for more than a decade, the United States failed to develop and deploy the military power that it needed to deter Russian aggression.
Russian soldiers near Simferopol, Crimea, March 2014
Vasily Fedosenko / Reuters
U.S. decisions on Afghanistan, Syria, and other trouble spots were similarly treated as local and separable, with little apparent awareness that they would have global repercussions. It was surely no accident that Russia’s annexation of Crimea followed less than a year after the Obama administration failed to enforce its supposed redline on Syria’s use of chemical weapons. Nor was it likely a coincidence that Russia invaded Ukraine following the United States’ humiliating scuttle from Afghanistan.
Statecraft also entails speed. Acting swiftly is a matter not of doctrine but of mindset, culture, and preparation. In his posthumously published memoir about the fall of France in 1940, the historian and Resistance martyr Marc Bloch made a damning observation: “From the beginning to the end of the war, the metronome at headquarters was always set at too slow a beat.” The problem lay not in France’s grand strategy but in its sluggish decision-making apparatus. Therein lies another challenge for the United States in today’s world—its temptation to follow the dictum supposedly put forward by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill: “The Americans can always be trusted to do the right thing, once all other possibilities have been exhausted.” But in a world that is spinning faster and faster, the United States may no longer have the luxury of exhausting all other possibilities before doing the right thing.
THE ARCHITECTURE OF COMPETENCE
Improving American statecraft should begin with an audit of the institutions that formulate and implement policy. Of all the constituent parts of the U.S. national security establishment, only one has truly engaged in harsh self-scrutiny: the U.S. Marine Corps, which after two decades of counterinsurgency warfare reoriented itself toward expeditionary warfare in the Indo-Pacific. It is not at all clear that other branches of the armed forces have done anything close, to say nothing of the government’s intelligence, international aid, and public diplomacy agencies. The failures in Afghanistan and Iraq reflected not only particular policy choices but also institutional pathologies that prevented the development of competent local forces and flooded those countries with economic aid that was as often counterproductive as it was useful. Expensive development projects, for example, facilitated corruption and siphoned off English-speaking Afghans from teaching and government work but did little to build a reliable army and police force. Yet there is very little evidence that the United States’ national security institutions are interested in painful introspection or reform.
A comprehensive institutional audit would suggest not only the reform, or even the abolition, of some organizations but also the revival of old ones or the creation of new ones. Since the dominant mode of war today is hybrid conflict, the United States needs to be much better at playing offense. To that end, it might revive the U.S. Information Agency, which spread pro-American propaganda during the Cold War before being dismantled in the late 1990s. Or it might mobilize civilian cyber-militias that could undermine hostile governments by wielding the most powerful weapon of all, the truth. The impromptu mustering of anti-Russian hackers by the Ukrainian government after Russia’s invasion is one example. The United States should also make advocacy for civil liberties both a matter of principle and a tool to weaken opponents. Russians, for example, should be bombarded with messages exposing the lies their regime feeds them, the truth regarding the human and economic losses they have experienced in and because of the war in Ukraine, and the calamitous consequences of becoming a Chinese vassal state excluded from the West.
In some cases, the problem is one not of institutions but of mindset—namely, the inability of leaders to deal with multiple crises simultaneously. There is no reason the United States cannot deal with more than one threat at a time; after all, it successfully fought in two very different theaters during World War II. But doing so requires the discipline that a generation of leaders showed in calmly dividing their time and energy among multiple problems, rather than burning themselves and their staffs out on one issue at a time in an atmosphere of continual crisis. The picture of Obama’s entire team crowded in the Situation Room to follow the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011, an operation they could do nothing to influence once it began, contrasts sharply with the behavior of American leaders the evening before D-Day. President Franklin Roosevelt watched movies, and General Dwight Eisenhower read a Western novel. According to a New York Times profile, during the withdrawal from Afghanistan, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan was getting only two hours of sleep a night—a troubling sign of a lack of decision-making discipline.
Too often, Washington has incompetently executed its foreign policy.
Some of the improvements needed are mundane indeed. More than one might think, sound foreign-policy making rests on the basics of bureaucratic behavior: clear and concise memorandums, crisply run meetings, well-disseminated conclusions, succinct and unambiguous guidance from above. Good process does not guarantee good policy, but it increases the odds of it. With that in mind, the U.S. government should pay renewed attention to the training and career management of security professionals. There are plenty of young people who wish to serve in government, but professional schools of international affairs often fail to prepare them for their actual duties.
It is long past time for Washington to invest heavily in professional education and development. Offering well-designed short courses at universities and even creating a state-run academy for foreign policy professionals from across government would cost a tiny fraction of the U.S. national security budget but could yield disproportionate results. The curriculum should focus on the mechanics of effective policymaking, as opposed to the mix of social science, current affairs, and business school organization theory that characterizes much of higher education in the field in the United States.
Restoring procedural competence also requires repairing the broken personnel system. The process for appointing people to top State Department and Pentagon posts has long been an abomination, and the problem is getting worse. A year into Joe Biden’s presidency, according to The Washington Post, the administration had vetted, nominated, and obtained Senate confirmation for just one-third of the 800 or so positions the newspaper was tracking. Some of the critical posts left vacant included the ambassadorships to South Korea and Ukraine, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, and assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. The White House and Congress, which share responsibility for these delays, need to accelerate the processing of political appointees. Their ranks should be thinned, too. Although political appointees bring fresh perspectives and a commitment to the president’s agenda, the United States could have half as many of them and still fill the upper echelons of government with a much higher proportion of noncareer officials than its peers have. As painful as both Democrats and Republicans might find it, a bipartisan push to reduce the number of political appointees and accelerate their processing would pay more dividends than any new national security document.
Statecraft also involves substantive choices—such as the persistent effort to divide one’s enemies. During the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–22, the United States maneuvered the negotiations so as to rupture the Anglo-Japanese alliance, possibly the most threatening foreign relationship at the time. In the 1960s and 1970s, it exploited the Sino-Soviet split to weaken the communist world. Today, Washington needs to drive a wedge between China and Russia—a task that will be difficult, given the anti-American and antidemocratic preoccupations of both countries’ leaders, but not unthinkable in the long term. Although Beijing and Moscow are deeply wary of efforts to pry them apart, they do have different foreign policy goals: where Russia seeks to break the international order, China seeks to bend it. Surely, the United States can find ways to play to Russian fears of Chinese dynamism, on the one hand, and to Chinese contempt for Russian bungling, on the other. The point is not to divide China and Russia in the near term, which is not feasible, but to maximize the points of friction in their relationship.
Sound foreign-policy making rests on the basics of bureaucratic behavior.
Intelligent opportunism is particularly valuable in an age of informal alliances and covert relationships. Washington has tended to downplay such ties, thinking of Afghanistan as a Taliban problem when it was also a Pakistan problem, for example, or thinking of Iraq as an al Qaeda problem instead of an Iran problem, too. The solution begins with openly and unflinchingly identifying these connections. Again, there are opportunities to divide the opposition: for instance, Washington should reinforce the simmering competition between Russia and Turkey for influence in Central Asia by tilting toward Azerbaijan (Turkey’s client) in the conflict over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Finally, U.S. statecraft must include a domestic component. For decades, U.S. foreign policy elites got used to making decisions without giving much thought to public opinion. They opened trade with China, for example, not worrying about the gutting of American industrial jobs that resulted. Today, they talk about abstract goals, such as “extended deterrence,” that make sense in Washington but will never enjoy the support of the American people. Americans have no particular reason to trust the experts who conduct foreign policy and little idea of what their leaders have signed them up for and why. Politicians have to explicitly connect developments in crisis areas to U.S. interests—clearly laying out, for example, how an independent Taiwan reflects American values (self-determination and liberty) and serves American interests (keeping one of the world’s most productive economies out of Chinese hands).
The 2022 crisis in Ukraine is a prime example of the need to substitute statecraft for grand strategy. The Biden administration, like its predecessor, correctly judged China to be the United States’ prime competitor. Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine was an unexpected jolt. What was called for was a quick and adroit reaction—and to its credit, the Biden administration was not only nimble but also cunning in its well-timed release of intelligence in the weeks before the invasion to undermine Russia’s attempts to lay the groundwork for its actions and divide Europe.
The crisis did not, of course, end there. A dangerous period looms in which Moscow will test Western resolve. It may, for example, claim a right to protect Russian speakers in the Baltic states or insist on the dismantling of NATO in eastern Europe. Worse, it might test the alliance’s commitment to collective defense by lobbing a missile or two at transshipment points for arms bound for Ukraine. To meet such threats, the United States will need not grand strategy but steadiness in confronting Russia, ingenuity in supplying Ukraine and frontline NATO allies while shutting down the Russian economy, and subtlety in guiding European rearmament.
THE CASE FOR PRAGMATISM
The United States is unique by virtue of many things—its values-based national identity, its massive size, its favorable geographic position, its overwhelming power, and its quarter-millennium history as a flawed but successful democracy. Today, however, it is entering a period of challenges for which grand strategy, with its penchant for grand simplifications, will not be very helpful. The country must navigate its way through a difficult world, manage crises, and incrementally do good where it can and confront evil where it must.
The United States’ foreign policy future will not echo the trumpet call of President John F. Kennedy’s 1961 inaugural address to “bear any burden, meet any hardship.” Rather, the United States should follow the guidance, at once principled and pragmatic, that President Theodore Roosevelt offered in his 1905 inaugural address: “Much has been given us, and much will rightfully be expected from us. We have duties to others and duties to ourselves; and we can shirk neither. We have become a great nation, forced by the fact of its greatness into relations with the other nations of the earth, and we must behave as beseems a people with such responsibilities.”
Roosevelt, who made a careful study of foreign policy throughout his career and took care to explain it to Americans beyond the cosmopolitan cities of the Northeast, was a shrewd practitioner. As assistant secretary of the navy and later as president, he helped revitalize both the army and the navy, making them fit for the needs of an emerging world power. In 1905, he seized the opportunity to broker a peace between Japan and Russia in a way that would benefit the United States. He anticipated the issues at stake in World War I long before most Americans did and advocated an earlier U.S. intervention that might well have shortened the conflict. He balanced ideals and interests. He was relentlessly curious about the world in which he operated, reading in foreign languages and traveling widely. He operated in an era in which the United States was powerful but hardly predominant and in which multiple forces were at work. His pragmatism, informed by principle, was not grand strategy. But it worked.
3. Ukraine Endgame: Putin’s Bad Options
If this conclusion is accurate and Putin recognizes his self-destruction, we could face a very dangerous way ahead.
Conclusion:
Vladimir Putin is in the process of destroying himself, and every day that passes, and every arms shipment that arrives in Ukraine, makes that outcome more inevitable.
Ukraine Endgame: Putin’s Bad Options
No matter which one he chooses, the Western response should be the same.
By JOHN NAGL and PAUL YINGLING
APRIL 21, 2022 10:08 AM ET
Ukraine’s brilliant and tenacious resistance on land, as well as the sinking of the Moskva in the Black Sea, have checked Russia’s offensive in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin would be wise to follow the advice of his countryman, chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov, and know when to stop. Instead, Putin appears intent on further escalation. In response to these events, Russia warned the United States to stop arming Ukraine, or face “unpredictable consequences.” Putin even went so far as to prescribe the weapons that the United States should not provide to the Ukrainian Army.
As Putin comes to terms with his looming defeat, he is now left with three bad, but not equally bad, options. The least bad Russian option is to sue for peace on the most favorable terms Ukraine will grant and end this pointless and reckless war. A worse option would be to go on the defensive in Eastern Ukraine and vainly hope for a more favorable correlation of forces in the future. The worst option of all would be for Russia to attempt another offensive, gambling the entire army in Ukraine on one last thrust with no hope of success. The West, in considering its responses to these actions, would do well to remember Napoleon’s advice (more or less): “Never interfere with an enemy in the process of destroying himself.”
Least Bad: Sue for Peace
Russia has not only lost the war in Ukraine, but is at risk of creating the very encirclement this war aimed to prevent. The United States and other NATO allies are pouring guns and money into Ukraine at breakneck speed. Ukraine is more fully integrated in the West than ever before. NATO is moving to strengthen its eastern flank, and many NATO members, most notably Germany, have committed to substantial increases in defense spending, Finland and Sweden are considering applying for NATO membership. Economic sanctions on Russia are not only holding, but growing: the European Union is considering banning Russian oil imports.
Faced with such a dire situation, Russia’s wisest move would be to sue for a peace that restores the status quo ante. In exchange for withdrawing its forces to their pre-invasion positions of February, Russia could ask Ukraine to recognize the independence of the Donbas region. This move might fracture the thus far rock-solid coalition against Russia, and prevent the fatal blow threatened by a European embargo on oil imports. Such a move might also shore up weakening support for Russia on the world stage, most notably in India and China. Putin could justify this retreat by characterizing its invasion as a successful punitive expedition in response to Ukraine’s (largely imagined) offenses.
While wise, this option is also unlikely. A Russian retreat and restoration of the status quo ante will be seen both at home and abroad for what it is: a defeat for the Putin regime. Like previous Russian autocrats, Putin fears his real domestic enemies far more than his imagined foreign foes. The oligarchs, generals, and spies he relies on to remain in power might reasonably conclude that his head is a small price to pay to ameliorate Russia’s suffering. Putin, a spy who took power from a frail and faltering Boris Yeltsin, understands these calculations all too well.
Worse: Defend the Donbas and Hope for Better Days
If Putin cannot end the war without losing his head, he might conclude that he can live to fight another day by going on the defensive in eastern Ukraine. Under this option, Putin would not seek any formal end to hostilities requiring Ukrainian assent. Instead, he would merely reposition his forces on defensible terrain in an attempt to hold the ground he already had before February. Putin might then adopt the maximalist aim of building sufficient combat power to resume offensive operations at some point in the future. Alternatively, he might adopt the more modest aim of transforming a ceasefire into yet another frozen conflict stuck in the netherworld between war and peace.
This strategy is doomed to failure because time is not on Putin’s side. Ukrainian nationalism and Ukrainian arms are stronger now than at the outset of the conflict, and grow stronger with each passing day. The correlation of forces has shifted decisively in Ukraine’s favor, thanks both to a surprisingly effective domestic arms industry as well as generous Western aid. Meanwhile, Russia’s military and economic position continues to weaken. On the battlefield, the Russian forces have reportedly lost more than 20,000 troops, 460 tanks, and 300 aircraft. On the home front, Western sanctions are pushing Moscow to the brink of financial default on its Western loans. Putin cannot play for time because he hasn’t any: each passing day brings new losses on the battlefield, and diminished resources at home to replace those losses.
Despite the futility of this strategy, it is the one that he will most likely adopt. Putin has isolated himself from advisors willing to tell him the truth, and this strategy allows him to remain in denial for a little while longer. His final defeat will come more slowly, but no less inevitably.
Worst: One Last Gamble
The most reckless option of all would be for Putin to attempt a final offensive to attempt to reverse the fortunes of this most unfortunate war. In this fever dream masquerading as a strategy, Putin would marshal his forces for a counterattack to cut Ukraine off from the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. Such an offensive would require the final destruction of Mariupol, already well under way. Putin would hope to limit Western assistance to Ukraine through disinformation and nuclear bluster.
The absurdity of this strategy is plain on its face. Russia didn’t have the troops, tanks, and aircraft to accomplish this objective when its military and economy were at full strength. After a month of horrific battlefield losses, it has far less. Russia’s fragile logistics system was incapable of sustaining its forces at the outset of the war, and is certainly incapable of replacing battlefield losses to support a renewed offensive. The West wasn’t cowed by Putin’s bluffs when many believed the Russian Army was a juggernaut. That Army now stands revealed as an empty shell, and Putin’s bluffs are less credible than ever.
This reckless strategy would be the most dangerous option not for Ukraine or other Western states, but for Putin himself. The approach is reminiscent of the Ludendorff offensive at the end of World War I. Faced with horrific losses on the battlefield and growing discontent at home, Germany gambled everything on one last attack on the West under the leadership of Field Marshal Erich von Ludendorff. While achieving some initial tactical success, this operation failed because Germany had neither the logistics nor the manpower to sustain the attack. The war ended with the disintegration of the Germany Army and the toppling of the German government.
The Western Response: We Can Do This All Day
No matter which option Putin chooses, the Western response should be the same: aid the Ukrainian military, relieve the suffering of the Ukrainian people, maintain the unity of the NATO alliance, and increase the military and economic costs of Russia’s continued aggression. The only elements that need to vary are the emphasis and pace of those efforts. If Putin opts for peace, the West must maintain diplomatic, economic, and military solidarity to ensure Ukraine receives the most favorable settlement possible. If he opts for defense, the West must continue its efforts to strengthen Ukraine and isolate Russia to reveal the futility of playing for time. Finally, if he opts for offense, the West must surge every form of support to Ukraine to discredit Russia’s imperial delusions fully and finally.
In his recent démarche to the U.S. demanding an end to military support for Ukraine, Putin has helpfully provided a list of those capabilities Russia most fears. The U.S. should treat this message not as a Russian ultimatum but rather as a Ukrainian shopping list. When Russia launches artillery strikes at civilian populations, the West should send Ukraine Multiple Launch Rocket Systems and counter battery radars. When Russia uses aircraft in a reckless and vain offensive, the West should redouble shipments of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and add the Patriot Surface-to-Air Missile System to the mix. When Russia dispatches its remaining tanks on a final, suicidal attack, the West should not only further accelerate shipment of Javelin and Switchblade anti-tank systems, but also begin arming Ukraine with M1 Abrams main battle tanks and other maneuver capabilities to drive Russia from Ukrainian soil once and for all. These weapons shipments are the clearest form of diplomacy, communicating to Putin that we can do this all day.
Vladimir Putin is in the process of destroying himself, and every day that passes, and every arms shipment that arrives in Ukraine, makes that outcome more inevitable.
John Nagl is a retired Army officer who teaches at the Army War College. Paul Yingling is a retired Army officer who lives and writes in Green Mountain Falls, Colorado. This article reflects their own views, not those of the Army or the Department of Defense, and is not based on any special or classified information.
4. North Korea’s sanctions evasion points way for Russians to bypass the west
north Korea leads the way in all negative ways.
North Korea’s sanctions evasion points way for Russians to bypass the west
In September 2020, a Hong Kong-registered company transferred ownership of a ship, which had disappeared from maritime tracking data bases the previous month, to the Pyongyang-based Su Ryong San Shipping Co Ltd.
According to UN monitors, the Chinese-owned company imported up to 200,000 tonnes of sanctioned North Korean coal, which it bartered with a Chinese furniture company in exchange for two shipments of fertiliser to North Korea.
The complex corporate manoeuvres constituted just a tiny part of a global network of shell companies, commodity traders, spies, cyber criminals, banks and ship operators designed to evade international sanctions on North Korean trade and financial transactions.
The operations of the network illustrate the ambiguous role played by China and Russia. Both countries are nominally committed to UN sanctions against Pyongyang, even as they turn a blind eye to the shadowy practices that keep the North Korean regime afloat.
Now, with Russia under intense pressure from western sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine, analysts are assessing what the North Korean example can teach western policymakers — not least China’s role in alleviating economic pressure on Moscow.
“North Korea is instructive in lots of ways, not least that it survives because it has externalised lots of its economy to Russia and China,” said James Byrne of the Royal United Services Institute in London.
Russian soldiers in the Ukrainian port city of Mariupol. The invasion has sparked sweeping western sanctions against Moscow © Alexander Nemenov/AFP/Getty Images
Zongyuan Liu, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, said that Russia could take advantage of Chinese “burner banks”, which facilitate illegal transactions but are then liquidated or reconstituted before their activities are discovered.
“This is an established model, and it is already used by North Korea and the Iranians,” said Liu. “But the volumes involved with Russia are so large that it will be very difficult to move the money before you get caught up in US sanctions.”
In return, “China could have more leverage over Russia in negotiating oil and gas deals, meaning it could buy Russian oil and gas at heavy discounts”, said Liu.
She added that China had lifted restrictions on Russian wheat and barley imports in February, just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Tom Keatinge, director of the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI, said that Chinese banks were already weighing up the risk of processing Russia-linked transactions on a case-by-case basis.
“Transactions being rejected at the western branches of Chinese banks on compliance grounds then get processed in Shanghai if they are deemed to be strategically important for China,” he said.
“China could well become a clearing house for Russian transactions, and there are lots of interesting tricks that can be used — whether the Mexican ‘black peso market’ model for cross-border drug financing or the age-old hawala method of using brokers to facilitate transactions without money changing hands,” said Keatinge.
But Aaron Arnold, a counter-proliferation expert who has served both in the US government and on the UN panel monitoring North Korean sanctions violations, noted Iran’s unhappy experience of attempting a “bartering system with China that was basically oil for goods”.
“Iran soon found itself awash in Chinese goods that it neither needed nor wanted,” said Arnold. “Displacing economic activity to China may alleviate some sectors, but not the economy in its entirety.”
North Korea’s destitution — its real gross domestic product was just $27.4bn in 2020, compared with Russia’s GDP of almost $1.5tn — means that sanctions-busting schemes that bring in even tens of millions of dollars or less can make a meaningful difference to a regime focused solely on survival and self-enrichment.
Allegations contained in the UN’s most recent report on North Korean sanctions violations included a Taiwanese shipping agency helping Pyongyang import tens of thousands of tonnes of oil, a North Korean spy running hotels and casinos in Cambodia, a plan to set up a factory producing arms and narcotics in Uganda and schemes for importing luxury cars and even a grand piano.
As with Russia, North Korea has a formidable cybercriminal capability. The US Treasury last week linked North Korean hackers to a $615mn crypto heist from players of Axie Infinity, a popular online game.
But Liu said a far bigger threat to the west than individual criminal operations was Russia, China and other like-minded countries accelerating efforts to construct parallel financial systems of their own. North Korea, she added, would be a “major beneficiary” of an “alliance of sanctions evaders”.
Liu cited Russian finance minister Anton Siluanov’s call this month for the Brics group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa to extend the use of national currencies and integrate their payment systems.
Several experts have linked the fate of the North Korean sanctions regime to that of the fracturing global order.
Last month, Russia’s deputy foreign minister met the North Korean ambassador to Moscow to discuss improving bilateral relations “in the context of changes happening on the international arena”.
Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, a non-resident fellow at the Stimson Center think-tank in Washington, said: “I would expect to see greater sanctions violations by Russia and China, as well as an uptick in co-operative efforts, particularly at the multilateral level, to weaken the sanctions regimes on North Korea and other countries.”
“The more Russia becomes a pariah, the less interest it will have in upholding the system,” said Keatinge. “I’m increasingly convinced that we’re going to end up with financial walled gardens — a garden in the east dominated by China, and a garden in the west dominated by the dollar.”
5. White House appoints Ukraine security aid coordinator
How effective will tis be? What kind of authority will he have? What kind of staff will he have to support the effort? What will be the "command" and coordination relationships with EUCOM, State, NATO, DSCA, etc?
White House appoints Ukraine security aid coordinator
The White House announced Thursday it has appointed a retired three-star general who previously helped coordinate the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition to manage the steadily increasing influx of military assistance for Ukraine.
A National Security Council spokesperson confirmed to Defense News retired Army Lt. Gen. Terry Wolff will “help coordinate the security assistance the U.S. and our partners are providing to Ukraine, which they are using every day to defend their country.”
“This person would also serve as the chief liaison between the United States government and our allies and partners abroad in matters relating to the transfer of existing stocks and assessment of partner capabilities, such as aircraft, heavy tanks and sophisticated weapons that could be made available to Ukraine,” Sen. Rob Portman, R-Ohio, wrote in a letter with Dick Durbin of Illinois, the Senate’s No. 2 Democrat.
The No. 2 Republican and Democrat on the Armed Services Committee — Roger Wicker of Mississippi and Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire respectively — also signed the letter.
They noted a coordinator “would be able to serve as a liaison to our domestic industry partners that are being called on to not only ensure the steady flow of defense articles to Ukraine but also to replenish United States and allied stockpiles.”
Wolff became the deputy special presidential envoy for the counter-Islamic State coalition in late 2015, and previously served as the NSC’s Iraq and Afghanistan director.
He retired in 2014, after 34 years of military service, as the Joint Staff’s director of strategic plans and policy. While in uniform, he’d served as U.S. Army Europe’s deputy commander and before that commanded the Army’s 1st Armored Division, based in Germany.
Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered the intersection of U.S. foreign policy and national security in Washington since 2014. He previously wrote for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.
Joe Gould is senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry.
6. Putin's Ukraine Nightmare Is Getting Worse: America Is Sending More Arms
Putin's Ukraine Nightmare Is Getting Worse: America Is Sending More Arms
More Weapons to Ukraine
The military aid package includes the following:
72 155mm Howitzers and 144,000 artillery rounds
72 Tactical Vehicles to tow 155mm Howitzers
Over 121 Phoenix Ghost Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems
Field equipment and spare parts.
“This afternoon, April 21, the Department of Defense (DoD) announces the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown of security assistance valued at up to an additional $800 million tailored to meet critical Ukrainian needs for today’s fight as Russian forces launch a renewed offensive in eastern Ukraine,” Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby said in a press release.
The new artillery weapons will be crucial to the Ukrainian defense in the Donbas. But to operate them effectively, the Ukrainians have to be trained or familiarized with the weapon system by the U.S. military, something which the Pentagon has already begun doing.
This is the third $800 package the U.S. has sent Ukraine in the last couple of weeks and the eighth drawdown of equipment from Department of Defense inventories since last August.
“This commitment, together with the 18 155mm howitzers announced on April 13, provides enough artillery systems to equip five battalions. The United States also continues to work with its Allies and partners to identify and provide Ukraine with additional capabilities. The United States will continue to utilize all available tools to support Ukraine’s Armed Forces in the face of Russian aggression,” the Pentagon press secretary added.
Billions in Military Aid
With the latest package of military aid, the U.S. has sent Ukraine 90 155mm howitzers. In only two weeks, the Pentagon has provided 18 howitzers in the first package and 72 howitzers in the second.
“Today, I’m announcing another $800 million to further augment Ukraine’s ability to fight in the east — in the Donbas region. This package includes heavy artillery weapons—dozens of Howitzers—and 144,000 rounds of ammunition to go with those Howitzers. It also includes more tactical drones,” U.S. President Joe Biden said on Thursday.
But the U.S. isn’t the only country sending more artillery to Ukraine. The Netherlands, Canada, and the United Kingdom are also sending artillery weapons to the Ukrainian military.
“In the past two months, we’ve moved weapons and equipment to Ukraine at record speed. We’ve sent thousands of anti-armor and anti-[air] missile[s], helicopters, drones, grenade launchers, machine guns, rifles, radar systems. More than 50 million rounds of ammunition had already been sent. The United States alone has provided 10 anti-armor systems for every one Russian tank that’s in Ukraine—a 10 to 1 ratio,” Biden added.
With the latest package of security aid, the U.S. has sent approximately $3.4 billion worth of weapons to Ukraine since the Russian invasion began on February 24. And in the last two years, the U.S. has sent a total of approximately $4.0 billion in security assistance to Kyiv.
1945’s New Defense and National Security Columnist, Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.
7. How Ukraine's mud became a secret weapon in its defense against Russia
Anyone who has served in mechanized and armored units can attest to the effects of mud on mobility. There are not enough wash racks in Ukraine to wash the mud from the tracks of Russian mechanized and armored vehicles.
How Ukraine's mud became a secret weapon in its defense against Russia
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February, its military commanders were widely seen to have discounted one very unconventional but effective weapon in Ukraine’s arsenal.
The timing of Russia’s invasion, which began on Feb. 24, coincided with what is known locally as the “muddy road season,” or “Rasputitsa” in Russian.
Mud can make Ukraine’s terrain and unpaved roads virtually unpassable.
PUBLISHED THU, APR 21 20222:54 AM EDTUPDATED THU, APR 21 20226:07 AM EDT
CNBC · by Holly Ellyatt · April 21, 2022
A member of the Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces stands on a damaged Russian tank on the outskirts of Nova Basan village in Ukraine on April 01, 2022. Russia's invasion on Feb. 24 coincided with what's known locally as the "muddy road season," or "Rasputitsa" in Russian.
Anadolu Agency | Anadolu Agency | Getty Images
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February, its military commanders were widely seen to have discounted one very unconventional but effective "weapon" in Ukraine's arsenal: its infamous muddy season.
The timing of Russia's invasion, which began on Feb. 24, coincided with what is known locally as the "muddy road season," or "Rasputitsa" in Russian. It's a phenomenon that takes place twice a year, first in spring — when the winter freeze subsides and the country's terrain and unpaved roads become virtually unpassable as they turn to mud — and then in the fall, when there can be heavy rain.
The mud is seen by military experts to have helped to slow Russia's advance in parts of the country, particularly the north. Images and video circulating online have shown Russian tanks, trucks and other armored vehicles stuck and abandoned on muddy roads or fields in Ukraine.
That's prompted some disbelief among Russia analysts and military experts, who said Russia's military commanders should have been better prepared for conditions on the ground, and able to avoid the quagmire caused by Ukraine's muddy spring terrain.
It's a phenomenon familiar in the history books: Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion of Russia in 1812 was famously slowed by the mud, as were Hitler's armies, which invaded the then-Soviet Union in 1941 and encountered the same logistical problems posed by the mud and inhospitable terrain that Russian troops have faced in the last few weeks.
A photo taken in the spring of 1942 of German army vehicles on muddy terrain in Ukraine, then a part of the Soviet Union.
Ullstein Bild | Ullstein Bild | Getty Images
Russia's military should've known better what conditions their forces would face, experts said.
"Ukrainian mud and what is known in Russian as 'rasputitsa' is the period after the winter where you get impassable roads ... this has been known about for hundreds of years, literally Napoleon had this problem. So yes, it is a tactical feature that is advantageous for the Ukrainians and it was particularly important in the north where it is a lot more wooded," Maximilian Hess, fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, told CNBC.
It was initially believed that Russia would achieve a quick victory in Ukraine. But the country faced strong resistance from Ukrainian forces, which Western allies have helped to equip with weaponry.
Prior to the invasion, Russia had amassed over 100,000 troops along its border with Ukraine and had carried out military drills with its ally Belarus, which lies to the north of Ukraine. But Moscow had insisted repeatedly that it had no plans to invade.
Russian and Belarusian armed forces conduct joint military drills on Feb. 12, 2022. Despite such military exercises ahead of the invasion, military analysts have said the first phase of the war showed a lack of planning, preparedness and tactical skill among Russia's military command and soldiers, many of whom are conscripts.
Anadolu Agency | Anadolu Agency | Getty Images
Despite the military exercises ahead of the invasion, military analysts have said the first phase of the war — which has seen Russia gain ground in the south and east of the country but fail to make strides in the north, with its forces now pulled back and concentrating on eastern Ukraine — showed a lack of planning, preparedness and tactical skill among its military command and soldiers, many of whom are conscripts.
Hess said just Russia's inability to deal with Ukraine's muddy season "shows real issues with the professionalism of the military."
"It raises real questions for me ... the Russians have been doing these [military] drills and practicing this foreign invasion for almost a decade now and they still didn't think, or didn't have enough coordination, to put the right units in the right places, and to move in the right way to best deal with something [the mud] that has literally been known to be a problem for 300 years."
Ukrainian soldiers examine a seized Russian tank at a woodland in Irpin, Ukraine, on April 01, 2022.
Anadolu Agency | Anadolu Agency | Getty Images
Sam Cranny-Evans, a research analyst at the U.K. defense think tank RUSI, told CNBC that most of Russia's military vehicles would have been able to cope with the mud in Ukraine, but problems had arisen from multiple vehicles using the same tracks, a foreseeable problem for any military commander with a basic understanding of "terramechanics" — or "the interaction of soil with off road vehicles."
"A lot of their vehicles would be fine moving through mud, providing that they didn't repeatedly drive through the same track," he said.
"But I would argue that other things have limited their maneuver more in terms of their reliance on railheads and roads for their logistics," he said, adding that the size of Ukraine also posed an extra challenge to Russia's war machine, particularly for units farther away from Russia, such as those in northern Ukraine.
Many of these units have since beaten a tactical retreat to focus on eastern and southern regions, where the second phase of the war is currently playing out in the Donbas and along the Black Sea.
Another Russian army tank recaptured by the Ukrainian army Borodyanka city near Kyiv, Ukraine, in early April.
Nurphoto | Nurphoto | Getty Images
CNBC · by Holly Ellyatt · April 21, 2022
8. After 20,000 Dead Troops Putin Suddenly Claims to Care About Their Lives
I sense a lack of sincerity in Putin.
After 20,000 Dead Troops Putin Suddenly Claims to Care About Their Lives
UNDER PRESSURE
The Russian leader suddenly seems self-conscious about his own image in the war after weeks of setbacks and troop death cover-ups.
Updated Apr. 21, 2022 11:17AM ET / Published Apr. 21, 2022 6:20AM ET
via Twitter
“I consider the proposed storming of the industrial zone unnecessary. I order you to cancel it,” he told Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in a televised meeting, referring to Russian troops’ bid to storm the Azovstal plant where the last remaining Ukrainian troops in the city have been fending off a full Russian invasion for weeks. Ukraine has warned that many civilians remain trapped inside the plant as well.
In remarks bound to raise eyebrows after Moscow has spent nearly two months trying to cover up its own devastating losses in Ukraine—during which time they lost some 20,000 troops, according to Ukrainian estimates—Putin went on to claim his decision stemmed from a desire to protect human lives.
“This is an instance when we must think… I mean we must always think, but in the given situation even more so… about the preservation of the lives and health of our soldiers and officers,” he said.
“There’s no need to climb into these catacombs and crawl underground through these industrial facilities,” he said. “Block off this industrial area so that not even a fly can get through.”
His remarks come after a Ukrainian commander holed up in the plant issued a desperate appeal to the international community earlier this week, warning that “hundreds of civilians” were trapped there and there were “only a few days, or even hours” left for them amid heavy bombardment by Russian troops. On the eve of Putin’s announcement, the Ukrainian presidential administration had also called for negotiations in the city “without any conditions” to “save” Ukrainian soldiers and civilians.
Bizarrely, Putin went on to congratulate Shoigu on what he described as the successful “liberation” of Mariupol, despite the fact that the city has essentially been wiped off the face of the Earth after nearly two months of Russian attacks. (A 91-year-old Jewish survivor of the Nazi occupation of Mariupol in 1941 was among those killed during Russia’s siege, making Putin’s claims of the Kremlin acting to “de-Nazify” Ukraine all the more laughable.)
For many Russia observers, the unexpected announcement was seen as a veiled admission that the Kremlin is becoming aware of its need to save face in light of mounting reports of disillusionment among Russian troops, major losses, and perhaps even the sinking of the country’s most powerful battleship, the Moskva, which sparked outrage even among some of Putin’s most loyal propaganda figures. (Moscow’s repeated claim that all of the 500 or so sailors on board were rescued, and that the ship was not downed by Ukrainian missiles, has been torn to shreds by family members of those on board who disputed those claims in interviews with independent media outlets.)
And even as Putin lauded what he described as a successful operation to take control of Mariupol on Thursday, the city’s mayor said there was new evidence of Russian troops going to great lengths to mask civilian deaths and possibly their own military losses.
“The locals have told us that near Manhush [outside Mariupol] they have dug a 30-meter mass grave and are transporting bodies there in trucks that they are trying to hide,” Vadym Boychenko said in televised comments.
Ukrainian authorities have said that up to 22,000 civilians have been killed in the city since Russia’s takeover on March 1.
9. Opinion | The only plausible path to keep the pressure on Russia
Conclusion:
International relations are often about choosing strategy over ideology. During the Cold War, Washington made common cause with Mao’s China — among many unsavory regimes — to put pressure on the Soviet Union. If Washington wants to prevail in this new cold war with Russia, it needs to be similarly strategic in its outlook.
Opinion | The only plausible path to keep the pressure on Russia
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The next phase of the war in Ukraine is now apparent. Over the next weeks and months, Russian forces will try to expand control of their occupied territories in eastern Ukraine and dig in. The Ukrainian army and people will resist fiercely, and low-grade battles will likely persist in these areas, as they have in the Donbas region since 2014. That means the only way out of this conflict is to put enough pressure on Russia to force it to the negotiating table and seek sanctions relief in exchange for a peace deal.
To achieve this, the coalition against it needs the staying power to maintain and even ratchet up sanctions and embargoes against Moscow. And that is only conceivable in a scenario in which energy prices come down from their current highs. If oil prices remain over $100 a barrel — and they could easily go much higher — Europe will soon enter a recession, and the entire global economy will see a drop off of growth and political backlash against the sanctions. This would almost certainly mean the collapse of the coalition against Russia, as countries search for ways to gain cheaper energy. That is surely Vladimir’s Putin’s hope.
The only plausible path to keep the pressure on Russia while not crippling the global economy is to get oil prices down. And the only sustainable way to do this is to get the world’s largest “swing producer,” Saudi Arabia, as well as other gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, to increase production of oil.
U.S. oil production is expanding as fast as it can. There are other paths worth trying — such as easing the embargo on Venezuela and returning to the Iran nuclear deal — but the gulf states can easily expand production by millions of barrels a day and keep those supplies flowing well into the future. Yet, despite several entreaties by the United States, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have refused to significantly increase production.
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That brings us to the central issue: Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia. In the past, President Biden has called Saudi Arabia a “pariah” and the prince “a thug.” He has yet to hold a formal meeting with him. In return, MBS (as he is often called) has refused U.S. requests to increase oil production and has moved to strengthen his relations with Russia and China.
In a soon-to-be-published Council on Foreign Relations special report, Steven Cook and Martin Indyk propose a grand bargain in which the United States would improve relations with MBS and make more explicit pledges to protect Saudi Arabia in return for a series of Saudi moves, from working to end the war in Yemen to recognizing Israel to taking more explicit responsibility for the murder of journalist and Post contributing columnist Jamal Khashoggi.
It is an idea worth taking seriously and expanding to include the UAE, other gulf states and Egypt. Despite their surface disagreements with Washington, all these countries want more solid U.S. guarantees regarding their security in an increasingly unstable Middle East. The Saudis were distressed that, after the 2019 drone attacks on their oil facilities by Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen, the Trump administration did practically nothing to retaliate. The UAE faced a similar attack in January and was likewise distressed that the Biden administration was not more active in responding.
There is a way for Washington to forge a new security umbrella in the region that includes Israel, Egypt and the gulf states. It would stabilize the security environment, foreclose the prospects of a nuclear arms race in the region and provide access to energy for the industrialized world. But that path would have to include making up with Mohammed bin Salman.
I don’t make this argument lightly. Jamal Khashoggi was my friend. In fact, when I visited Saudi Arabia in 2004, he was my companion and guide. I miss him dearly even now. But the fact of the matter is MBS is likely to rule Saudi Arabia for the next 50 years. He is an absolute ruler (like all his predecessors), but within the country he is viewed as a modernizer and is extremely popular with Saudi youths for curtailing the powers of the religious police, opening the country up to entertainment and tourism, and giving women greater freedoms. Most of those who advocate continuing the ostracism of MBS — including this paper’s editorial board — do not explain when or how it will ever end, leaving U.S.-Saudi relations in a permanently frozen dysfunctional state.
International relations are often about choosing strategy over ideology. During the Cold War, Washington made common cause with Mao’s China — among many unsavory regimes — to put pressure on the Soviet Union. If Washington wants to prevail in this new cold war with Russia, it needs to be similarly strategic in its outlook.
10. US Navy shoots down drone with electric-powered laser in historic first
Hopefully will be fielded as an effective capability.
US Navy shoots down drone with electric-powered laser in historic first
Isabel Keane - 4h ago
The US Navy shot down a drone using an electric-powered laser for the first time earlier this year.
© Provided by Metro
The Navy shot down a drone using a new electric-powered laser for the first time in February (Picture: Lockheed Martin)
The newly-created laser was tested on a drone in New Mexico, where it was beamed from the deck of a warship in February.
Laser weapons have several advantages, according to the Navy, including that they can disable sensors and assess the damage they could inflict on targets. Due to the laser being entirely electric, they also pose a lower threat than other military weapons or bombs.
They also require no explosives or propellants, which makes them safer, according to TechSpot.
‘The Navy performed similar tests during the 1980s but with chemical-based laser technologies that presented significant logistics barriers for fielding in an operational environment,’ said Dr Frank Peterkin, of the Office of Naval Research.
‘Ultimately, those types of lasers did not transition to the fleet or any other service,’ he added.
The military branch’s Layered Laser Defense (LLD) took down the drone on the machine, which represented a subsonic cruise missile.
The weapon, designed and built by Lockheed Martin, could take out unmanned aerial systems, fast attack boats and in-bound air threats.
The Office of Naval Research carried out tests on the laser in February at the Army’s High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.
The LLD was tested against an array of targets, including unmanned fixed-winged aerial vehicles and quadcopters as well as the high-speed drones that mimicked subsonic cruise missile replacements.
‘Innovative laser systems like the LLD have the potential to redefine the future of naval combat operations,’ said Chief of Naval Research Rear Adm. Lorin C. Selby. ‘They present transformational capabilities to the fleet, address diverse threats, and provide precision engagements with a deep magazine to complement existing defensive systems and enhance sustained lethality in high-intensity conflict.’
Laser weapons also provide a new level of precision and speed for naval warfighters while offering more simplified logistics to keep ships and their crews safe.
There are currently no plans to put the LLD weaponry into action.
11. Putin’s price for ending his war? A way to sell it as a victory – no matter the truth
So only Putin will believe his own lies. No one else in the world will believe his description of victory.
Putin’s price for ending his war? A way to sell it as a victory – no matter the truth | Keir Giles
Even tiny territorial gains will allow Russia to declare success, regroup, and wait to reopen hostilities at a time of its choosing
As Russia builds up its offensive operations in the east of Ukraine, many in the west have suggested that Vladimir Putin has ordered his forces to deliver success in Mariupol in time for Russia’s Victory Day, on 9 May. That’s an assessment based largely on circumstantial evidence and the cult status of Victory Day itself – but it’s not one that’s supported by what Russia is telling its own population, where domestic propaganda channels are no longer making promises of a swift end to the conflict.
Nevertheless, Putin is free to declare victory by whatever artificial deadline he chooses. Russia has already reinvented what its war was supposed to achieve, and can do so again if necessary. Moscow can say it has achieved its aims regardless of the facts on the ground and call an end to its “special operation” at will. This would present Ukraine with another harsh dilemma – the need to fight on while Russia appears to be offering peace, risking the erosion of support from western backers who would prefer an end to the fighting even if, in the long term, it could mean the end of Ukraine.
A unilaterally declared end to the war by Russia will cause Ukraine’s western partners to push Kyiv to follow suit, which Volodymyr Zelenskiy may be unable to resist. Those partners will also slacken their material support for continuing operations if he is seen to be continuing the war “unnecessarily”. With or without a 9 May deadline, there are good reasons for Russia to seek a temporary end to the fighting, not least to allow its battered forces to regroup. A declaration of victory would provide the “off-ramp” for Russia that would actually be useful to Moscow, unlike many of the options presented at the beginning of the year by western leaders who were trying to avoid conflict in the first place.
Rather than aiming at steamrollering the Ukrainian defences regardless of cost, Russia’s offensive could have far more limited and deliberate ambitions. The eventual, inevitable end of Ukrainian resistance in Mariupol can be presented as a major strategic victory. And with Russia and its propagandists continuing to depict the Azov battalion based there as a neo-Nazi organisation, this also means Russia can claim a major success in its aim of “de-nazification” of Ukraine. Russia enjoys almost total control of the information that reaches large sectors of its population, so even insignificant territorial gains can be sold as major breakthroughs.
Ukraine cannot continue the war indefinitely without major economic aid and increased military assistance. The country’s infrastructure is under attack; key exports have been interdicted by Russian maritime blockade; its military are suffering constant attrition; and its population is reeling from trauma inflicted by Russian occupiers. If western backers don’t offer enough support, Ukraine could find the burden of this war unsustainable.
By contrast, Russia can – if it wishes – devote resources and manpower to this war for far longer. At the same time, Ukraine is fully aware that Russia will not conclude agreements on ending the war in good faith, and that an end to the conflict will do nothing to relieve the suffering of Ukrainians under occupation. Ukraine has a moral imperative to relieve its citizens who are facing terror and deportation in Russian-occupied territories.
If Zelenskiy accepts peace, Ukraine will be unable to hinder Russian plans for the occupied territories. The Kremlin is already reported to be planning staged referendums in occupied Ukraine, replicating the 2014 referendum it used to give false legitimacy to its seizure of Crimea. While the west and Ukraine will shoulder the burden of reconstructing Ukraine’s many destroyed cities, its economy and armed forces, Russia will be able to restart the war when it feels the timing is right. As ever, pursuing a “temporary” ceasefire risks creating a country permanently divided between Russian-occupied territory and a Ukrainian rump state. It could also foster enduring low-level conflict that Russia could choose to reactivate at will.
An extended period of high-intensity fighting will be most damaging for Ukraine. But it also presents other risks for Russia, too. Its military leaders are now fully aware of the nature of the war it has started and of the strength of Ukrainian resistance. This may lead to a more cautious approach. After over a decade of Russia building up its armed forces at enormous expense, only for them to suffer shattering loses in the early stages of the Ukraine campaign, Russia’s generals will want to preserve as much of their combat power as possible for the next phase of their war on the west.
Putin also has other deadlines to meet. Russia is holding presidential elections in March 2024. Although Putin claims that he has “not yet decided” whether he will be seeking re-anointment, he will need the Russian public to think of Ukraine as a success long before they are asked to vote for him, no matter how fictitious the eventual election result may be. This could be a reason for Russia seeking a pretext to end (or at least scale down and conceal) its campaign in Ukraine, after declaring that it has been a success.
A small (and possibly even fictitious) territorial gain in Ukraine, over and above the capture of Mariupol, would provide Russia’s propagandists with a viable story to sell their population. If Putin not only persuades himself that his campaign in Ukraine wholly or partly achieved its aims, but also believes that the damage incurred by Russia’s military was tolerable rather than critical, the next of his wars will arrive sooner rather than later.
Keir Giles works with the Russia and Eurasia programme of Chatham House. He is the author of Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West
12. Remarks By President Biden Providing an Update on Russia and Ukraine
Remarks By President Biden Providing an Update on Russia and Ukraine | The White House
Roosevelt Room
10:01 A.M. EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Good morning, everyone. Sorry to keep you waiting a little bit. I had the honor of spending some time with the Ukrainian Prime Minister, who’s in town today. And he is meeting with some of my Cabinet members, including the Secretary of Treasury and others.
And we had a — a good discussion. I talked about what I’m about to tell you about today, as well as — he was thanking the American people for their support, understands it’s significant, and was — we talked about keeping everyone together, in terms of Europe, the European Union, and others, in the effort to stop Putin’s brutality.
But before I head out to the West Coast, I want to quickly update the American people on the latest steps we’re taking to support the people of Ukraine and to hold Putin accountable for his brutal and bloody war.
Russian forces have retreated from Kyiv, leaving behind them a horrifying evidence. And you’ve seen it and you reported it — your folks. And, by the way, I — I don’t say this often, but I think we should give enormous credit to the folks in your agencies that are on the ground in Ukraine, in these spots. And they’re — they’re really — I’ve spoken to several of them. It’s a — we owe them. But uncovering these evidences of their atrocities and war crimes against the Ukrainian people — it’s so clear to the whole world now.
Now they’ve launched and refocused their campaign to seize new territory in eastern Ukraine.
And we’re in a critical window now of time where that — they’re going to set the stage for the next phase of this war.
And the United States and our Allies and partners are moving as fast as possible to continue to provide Ukraine the forces that they need — the weapons they need — excuse me — and the equipment they need — their forces need to defend their nation.
Last week, I signed an $800 million package of security assistance to Ukraine that included new capabilities like artillery systems and armored personnel carriers — equipment that is responsive to Ukraine’s needs and tailored to support the intensified fighting in the Donbas region, which is a different war than in other places because both — topographically it’s different. It’s flat, it’s not in the mountains, and it requires different kinds of weapons to be more effective.
Today, I’m announcing another $800 million to further augment Ukraine’s ability to fight in the east — in the Donbas region.
This package includes heavy artillery weapons — dozens of Howitzers — and 144,000 rounds of ammunition to go with those Howitzers. It also includes more tactical drones.
In the past two months, we’ve moved weapons and equipment to Ukraine at record speed.
We’ve sent thousands of anti-armor and anti-[air] missile[s], helicopters, drones, grenade launchers, machine guns, rifles, radar systems. More than 50 million rounds of ammunition had already been sent.
The United States alone has provided 10 anti-armor systems for every one Russian tank that’s in Ukraine — a 10 to 1 ratio.
We’re sharing and will continue to share significant, timely intelligence with Ukraine to help defend them against Russian aggression.
And on top of this, these direct contributions from the United States, we’re facilitating; we’re the outfit facilitating the significant flow of weapons and systems to Ukraine from other Allies and partners around the world, like the S-300 long-range, anti-aircraft systems that Slovakia recently transferred to Ukraine. We are getting them in there.
We won’t always be able to advertise everything we — that our partners are doing to support Ukraine in its fight for freedom.
But to modernize Teddy Roosevelt’s famous advice: Sometimes we will speak softly and carry a large Javelin. Because we’re sending a lot of those in as well.
You know, but we’re not — we’re not sitting on the funding that Congress has provided for Ukraine. We’re sending it directly to the frontlines of freedom, to the fearless and skilled Ukrainian fighters who are standing in the breach.
You got to admit, you have — must be amazed at the courage of this country, the resolve that they’re showing, not just the milit- — their military, but the average citizen: men and women, young — young men, young women as well.
It’s — you know, the sustained and coordinated support of the international community, led and facilitated by the United States, has a — is a significant reason why Ukraine is able to stop Russia from taking over their country thus far.
Every American taxpayer, every member of our Armed Forces can be proud of the fact that our country’s generosity and the skill and service of our military helped arm and repel Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, to beat back Putin’s savagery that tried to seize Ukraine’s capital and wipe out Ukraine’s government.
The Battle of Kyiv was a historic victory for the Ukrainians. It was a victory for freedom, won by the Ukrainian people with unprecedented assistance by the United States and our Allies and our partners.
Now — now we have to accelerate that assistance package to help prepare Ukraine for Russia’s offensive that’s going to be more limited in terms of geography, but not in terms of brutality — not in terms of brutality.
Combined with our recent drawdowns, it will ensure a steady flow of weapons and equipment into Ukraine over the next few weeks.
However, with this latest disbursement, I’ve almost exhausted the drawdown authority I have that Congress authorized for Ukraine in a bipartisan spending bill last month.
In order to sustain Ukraine for the duration of this fight, next week I’m going to — have to be sending to Congress a supplemental budget request to keep weapons and ammunition flowing without interruption to the brave Ukrainian fighters and to continue to deliver economic assistance to the Ukrainian people.
Hope — and my hope is and my expectation is Congress would move and act quickly. And I want to thank the Congress — Democrats and Republicans — for their support for the people of Ukraine.
Our unity at home, our unity with our Allies and partners, and our unity with the Ukrainian people is sending an unmistakable message to Putin: He will never succeed in dominating and occupying all of Ukraine. He will not — that will not happen.
In addition to bolstering Ukraine’s resistance on the battlefield, we’re also demonstrating our support for the people of Ukraine.
Today, the United States is announcing that we intend to provide an additional $500 million in direct economic assistance to the Ukrainian government.
This brings our total economic support for Ukraine to $1 billion in the past two months.
This is money the government can help use to help stabilize their economy, to support communities that have been devastated by the Russian onslaught, and pay the brave workers that continue to provide essential services to the people of Ukraine.
You know, these past weeks have seen a terrible human cost of Putin’s ambition for conquest and control. Approximately two thirds — two thirds — of all Ukrainian children have been displaced from their homes. More than 5 million Ukrainians have fled their country. It’s an absolute outrage. The idea this is happening approaching the second quarter of the 21st century is just — (sighs).
Last month, when I was in Europe, I announced that the United States would welcome 100,000 Ukrainians so that we share in the responsibility of supporting Ukrainians fleeing Putin’s war machine.
We’ve already welcomed tens of thousands of Ukrainians to the United States.
And today, I’m announcing a program, “Unite for Ukraine” — a new program to enable Ukrainians seeking refuge to come directly from Europe to the United States.
This new humanitarian parole program will complement the existing legal pathways available to Ukrainians, including immigrant visas and refugee processing.
It will provide an expedient channel for secure, legal migration from Europe to the United States for Ukrainians who have a U.S. sponsor, such as a family or an NGO.
This program will be fast. It will be streamlined. And it will ensure the United States honors its commitment to go to the Ukrainian people and need not go through our southern border.
We’re also continuing to ratchet up the pressure on Putin and further isolate Russia on the world stage.
Yesterday, the Treasury Department rolled out additional measures to crack down on the entities and individuals attempting to evade our unprecedented sanctions — not just ours, but throughout the West.
Today, I’m announcing that the United States will ban Russian-affiliated ships from our ports, as they did in Europe.
That means no ship — no ship that sails under the Russian flag or that is owned or operated by Russian interests will be allowed to dock in a United States port or access our shores. None. None.
This is yet another critical step we’re taking in concert with our partners in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada and — further to deny Russia the benefits of the international economic system that they so enjoyed in the past.
We don’t know how long this war will last. But as we approach the two-month mark, here’s what we do know:
Putin has failed to achieve his grand ambitions on the battlefield. After weeks of shelling Kyiv, Kyiv still stands.
President Zelenskyy and his democratically elected government still remain in power.
And the Ukrainian armed forces, joined by many brave Ukrainian civilians, have thwarted Russia’s conquest of their country.
They have been bolstered from day one by an unstinting supply of weapons, ammunition, armor, intelligence from the nations of the free world led by us, the United States.
As Russia continues to grind out the military advances and — their military advances and the brutalities against Ukraine, Putin is banking on us losing interest. That’s been my view; you’ve heard me say this from the beginning. He was counting on NATO, the European Union, our allies in Asia cracking, moving away. He’s betting on Western unity will crack. He’s still betting on that.
And, once again, we’re going to prove him wrong. We will not lessen our resolve. We’re going to continue to stand with the brave and proud people of Ukraine. We will never fail in our determination to defend freedom and oppose tyranny. It’s as simple as that.
So, again, I want to thank the American people — thank the American people for their support of the Ukrainian people. This is our — this is our responsibility, it seems to me, and we’ve been able to hold the whole world together in this effort.
So, thank you very much. Thank you.
Q Mr. President —
THE PRESIDENT: I’m going to take just one or two questions. I’ve got a plane to catch.
Q What does — what does Putin claiming control over Mariupol mean? Is that — how significant is that?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, it’s questionable whether he does control Mariupol. One thing for sure we know about Mariupol: He should allow humanitarian corridors to let people on that steel mill and other places that are buried under rubble to get out — to get out. That’s what any, any, any head of state would do in such a circumstance.
And so, there is no evidence yet that Mariupol has completely fallen.
Q Mr. President, on Title 42, sir, are you considering delaying lifting Title 42?
THE PRESIDENT: No. What I’m considering is continuing to hear from my — my —
Well, first of all, there’s going to be an appeal by the Justice Department because, as a matter of principle, we want to be able to be in a position where if, in fact, it is strongly concluded by the scientists that we need Title 42, that we be able to do that.
But there has been no decision on extending Title 42.
Thank you.
Q Mr. President, how long can the U.S. maintain the level and pace of this military support for Ukraine?
THE PRESIDENT: I — well, we have the capacity to do this for a long time. The question is: Are we going to continue to maintain the support of the international community and keep the pressure on Putin to prevent him from overrunning the country? Number one. And, number two, make sure we continue to maintain the economic sanctions, which, over time — and we’re beginning to see it — are devastating their economy and their ability to move forward.
So, the most important thing right now is maintain the unity. So far, so good.
Thank you very much.
Q How much money are you going to ask for in the supplemental? How much money in the supplemental, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: The answer — that’s being decided now. And I’m asking the Defense Department to put together what they think we need.
Thank you.
10:14 A.M. EDT
13. Exclusive: Ex-CIA analyst says she ‘got bloodied’ in tangled U.S. war on Al Qaeda
Wow!
Exclusive: Ex-CIA analyst says she ‘got bloodied’ in tangled U.S. war on Al Qaeda
- Summary
- CIA operative who helped inspire lead character in ‘Zero Dark Thirty’ talks with Reuters in first-ever interview
- Alfreda Scheuer rejects criticism of her questioning of Qaeda suspects who underwent torture
- ‘I'm proud that I wasn't on the sidelines’ - ex-CIA analyst Scheuer
WASHINGTON, April 20 (Reuters) - In the 2012 Hollywood hit “Zero Dark Thirty,” a red-haired Central Intelligence Agency analyst played by Jessica Chastain travels to a secret CIA prison and watches a colleague waterboard a screaming Al Qaeda suspect, then lock him in a box a little bigger than a mini-fridge, to make him talk.
In 2002, red-haired CIA analyst Alfreda Scheuer, then known by her maiden name Bikowsky, traveled to a secret CIA prison to watch the torture of Al Qaeda suspect Abu Zubaydah, who was waterboarded and locked in a “dog box,” Senate investigators reported.
The Central Intelligence Agency had granted the filmmakers unprecedented access to agency officials, and outlets from NBC News to The New Yorker reported that Chastain’s character was patterned partially on Scheuer, citing her position but omitting her name because the agency said her work was classified.
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For two decades Scheuer was a central figure in some of the major controversies of America’s war on Islamist extremist groups, including secret detention centers and brutal interrogations. CIA operatives normally operate in a dark, shadowy world, but Scheuer’s experiences found the spotlight.
Scheuer retired from her most recent role as deputy chief of Homeland and Strategic Threats late in 2021 and agreed to talk to Reuters this year. It’s the first interview she’s ever done, she said, and she decided to speak to make clear she was not forced out of the agency but left on her own terms. By policy, the CIA doesn’t discuss individual employees or confirm whether they worked at the agency.
Over several calls that lasted two and half hours, Scheuer said she couldn’t discuss individual cases because they were classified. But in a broad sense, she said waterboarding cited in government reports was not torture, insisted such techniques can work and said any criticism of her was largely the result of her taking risks to combat terrorism.
“I got bloodied,” she said, alluding to criticism of her agency in government and media reports, “and kept coming back to try again and again to do something. I'm proud that I wasn't on the sidelines. I didn't bury my head in the sand.”
The New Yorker once dubbed Scheuer, again citing her position but omitting her name, as the “Queen of Torture,” writing that “she gleefully participated in torture sessions.”
Scheuer called the description, which found its way into multiple media reports, false and a caricature. She believes a male operative would not have been described the same way.
“I got that title because I was in the arena,” she said. “In fact, I raised my hand loud and proud and you know, I don't regret it at all.”
A Senate investigation does not allege Scheuer personally tortured any suspects. She said her role was as a “subject matter expert,” not an interrogator.
“There is a very clear line between an interrogator and a debriefer,” she said. “A debriefer is a subject matter expert who asks questions.”
The CIA’s press secretary, Susan Miller, declined to comment about Scheuer, but said simply: “CIA’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques ended in 2007.”
Now out of the CIA, Scheuer’s career has taken a turn: She is a “life coach,” running a business called YBeU Beauty, focusing on helping women “look good, feel good, and do good.” It is a world removed from her prior life, with the website featuring photos of her, thoughtful and confident.
“I know what it’s like to leave your comfort zone to try something new,” she writes on the site. “I had finished a three decades + career as a senior government executive leading teams, mostly females, tasked with no-fail missions, taking smart risks, and even making life-and-death decisions. I loved every minute of it.”
‘BUMP IN THE NIGHT’
Scheuer says she was recruited to the CIA while a graduate student at Tuft University’s Fletcher School in 1988 by the now-deceased CIA officer Duane “Dewey” Clarridge, who founded the agency’s Counterterrorism Center. Clarridge would go on to face a perjury indictment for his testimony about the Iran-Contra affair. He was pardoned by President George H.W. Bush before trial.
In a job interview conducted by phone, she said, “He asked me what the hell was I thinking and why did I want to come work in the center,” the insider nickname for the CIA.
“I believed in things that go bump in the night and I wanted to do something about it,” she said she replied. “He just kind of laughed and he seemed satisfied with that.”
By “things that go bump in the night,” she said, she meant evil, “and it can prevail if good people don’t do something about it.”
She started as a summer graduate intern at the CIA, she said, and then, in 1990, became a staffer. Early on, she said, her focus was on state-sponsored groups such as Hezbollah.
But that shifted. In 1996, the CIA started a unit specifically to target Osama Bin Laden, who was emerging as a new phenomenon in extremism. The “Zero Dark Thirty” main character is thought to be based on an amalgam of CIA operatives, including Scheuer, though she was not central in the quest to hunt down Bin Laden.
The new unit was called “Alec Station,” headed by a CIA analyst named Michael Scheuer. She told Reuters she joined Alec Station in 1999, after Michael Scheuer had left as chief. They married in 2014 and she took his name.
Michael Scheuer has in recent years espoused conspiracy theories, and called on then President Donald Trump to impose martial law after he lost the election. He has said QAnon, the bogus conspiracy theory that Trump was battling pedophiles among Democrats, Hollywood and the “deep state,” has often been correct. Michael Scheuer declined an interview request, telling Reuters: “This is her show. I’m not going to participate.”
Scheuer will not say if she agreed with her husband’s ideas but said she debates him on some issues. “He doesn't always get a fair deal,” she said.
Over two decades ago, as the threat from Al Qaeda grew and its members plotted to hijack U.S. airliners and fly them into the World Trade Center, she was in the thick of the intelligence fight.
The CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were supposed to work together to combat Al Qaeda, but the cooperation was fraught with miscommunication and missteps, government reports say. Better coordination, federal inquiries concluded, could have helped the U.S. identify or question potential terrorists before 9/11.
After joining Alec Station, Scheuer rose to deputy chief and then, she says, its chief.
A 2005 CIA Inspector General report said the CIA “failed to pass the travel information” about Al Qaeda attackers to the FBI before 9/11. “Cultural walls – real and perceived – continued to hamper coordination” between the FBI and CIA, said then-FBI director Robert Mueller.
Scheuer disputes that the CIA was at fault but instead questioned the FBI’s priorities. “FBI was very, very, very focused on building a legal case and not trying to, you know, prevent an attack,” she said.
Mark Rossini, a former FBI agent who worked with the CIA at the time, criticized the assertion. “She's flat out wrong,” he said. “What a bunch of insulting horseshit. Holy Christmas!”
‘SOLEMN DUTY’
On September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda hijackers crashed four planes into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and a field in Pennsylvania. Soon after, the CIA pushed an “enhanced interrogation” program that rapidly altered the way the U.S. gathered intelligence and permitted torture and a web of secret prisons in Thailand, Poland and Lithuania.
Some details of the CIA’s actions have been exposed in a Senate Intelligence Committee investigation in 2014, and in court cases. The Senate report cites Scheuer over 20 times regarding the effectiveness of the “enhanced interrogation” techniques, though her name is redacted and she is referred to as the “Deputy Chief of Alec Station.”
The first subject of officially sanctioned torture was Abu Zubaydah, captured in Afghanistan in 2002 and suspected erroneously at the time of being a major figure in Al Qaeda. Scheuer flew to the CIA’s black site in Thailand, referred to in the Senate report as “DETENTION SITE GREEN,” to watch Abu Zubaydah.
Interrogators on the scene had said they believed he had no more intelligence to share. But since headquarters wanted the questioning to continue, Scheuer and a legal officer arrived “to observe the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.”
“I won’t get into the details of what I saw,” Scheuer said, but added: “We took it as a solemn duty to get to the truth to save other lives. Everyone I saw conducted themselves with the utmost professionalism. It doesn’t mean I took any joy in it.”
For 20 days, Abu Zubaydah was subjected to “enhanced interrogation techniques on a near 24-hour-per-day basis,” the Senate report found. He was waterboarded two to four times a day, kept nearly naked and locked in a larger coffin-like box or a smaller “dog-box.”
Abu Zubaydah, who has never been charged, remains detained 20 years later at Guantanamo Bay Detention Center. Joseph Margulies, one of his lawyers, said classification rules preclude him from discussing whether his client remembered Scheuer. “This is how torture became embedded,” he told Reuters. “This is, ‘We had to do it.’ Man, that’s how torture became part of American life.”
Senate investigators also said Scheuer flew to Poland, to another black site, to debrief Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, as he was being tortured. He underwent “standing sleep deprivation” and was waterboarded 183 times.
Senate investigators say Scheuer questioned Mohammed during an intense torture session, after emailing he was “gonna be hatin’ life on this one.” Reuters couldn’t determine who she emailed. The investigators said she misread intelligence from another detainee about Black American Muslims in Afghanistan and asked Mohammed about an allegation no one had made: that he planned to recruit Black Americans in the United States for an attack. Under torture, the report said, Mohammed appeared to fabricate such a plot.
Scheuer said she did not make inaccurate claims. “The intelligence that we got was exceptionally good,” she said. “And was, I mean, could not be better than from the horse’s mouth.”
She added: “Everything was done with a clear purpose to obtain intelligence that we needed to thwart the next attack and to find the rest of the network. Period.”
Scheuer emerged in the public eye in 2005, after the “extraordinary rendition” of Khalid El Masri, an innocent man. Extraordinary rendition was the term used for the capture and imprisonment of suspects, and transfers to other countries, without warrants, arrests, extradition or courts.
El Masri was a German citizen whose name resembled the nom-de-guerre of a suspected 9/11 associate. The CIA flew him from the Balkans to Kabul and threw him incommunicado into a small cell with a bucket for a toilet for four months, in a prison called the “Salt Pit.” All along, government investigators found, it should have been clear he was the wrong man.
CIA officials and reports said Scheuer pushed to imprison El Masri. A Senate report said she was not disciplined even though she advocated strongly for his detention. A CIA IG report concluded that Alec Station “exaggerated the nature of the data” linking him to terrorism. Scheuer said she did not want to “relitigate” the matter, but added, “I do just want to communicate that I don't have any regrets.”
After that case, the press began writing about her, including a 2005 Washington Post story citing her “spiked hair that matched her in-your-face personality.” She said it was telling that news accounts referred to her “spiked hair” style, or, in another case, mentioned “red lipstick.”
Scheuer said she has never worn red lipstick. “There was definitely a contingent of old school – you know – old boy network types who resented me,” she added.
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Reporting in Washington by Aram Roston. Editing by Ronnie Greene
14. 1st Special Forces Group Soldiers Experiment with Unmanned Battle Systems
"Robots don't bleed"
1st Special Forces Group Soldiers Experiment with Unmanned Battle Systems
14 hours ago
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Soldiers from the 1st Special Forces Group conducted two weeks of hands-on experimentation with Project Origin Unmanned Systems at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. US Army photo by VIDS Corp
Dugway Proving Ground isn’t going to be an international tourist destination anytime soon. Not unless you like an intensely hot environment with lots and lots of nothing punctuated here and there with deadly chemical weapons and biological agents.
It is, however, the perfect place for testing all kinds of cool new military gear.
A member of the 1st Special Forces Group interacts with a vehicle from Project Origin Unmanned Systems at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. US Army photo by VIDS Corp
Members of 1st Group recently conducted two weeks of hands-on interactive experimentation with Project Origin Unmanned Systems at Dugway Proving Grounds. Engineers from Army US Army Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM) Ground Vehicles Systems Center collected information on how the SF soldiers utilized the systems and what technologies and behaviors were desired from the new equipment.
Project Origin vehicles were born out of Ground Vehicle Systems Center’s rapid prototyping to get working prototypes of unmanned systems into field trials as rapidly as possible. The goal is to have them put through their paces and evaluated by some of the best-trained soldiers in the world.
The Green Berets attended rigorous orientation and new equipment familiarization training on standard operating procedures for Robotic Combat Vehicles (RCV) for the fourteen-day experiment. In addition, the SOPs were closely followed to conduct many real-world designed mission-oriented exercises, including live-fire exercises both day and night.
Weapons employed during these live-fire exercises included the M240 and M2 machine guns and the MK19 automatic grenade launcher.
US Army GVSC Project Origin Live Fire Testing, 2021. Approved for public distribution. Video courtesy of YouTube and DEVCOM GVSC
Todd Willert, the manager of Project Origin, tells us: “These live-fire operations were critical to determining the military utility of the Robotic Combat Vehicle unmanned technology.” First, of course, these vehicles must prove their combat worthiness under simulated combat conditions.
Willert went on to say: “The unit was successful with integrating the systems into their formation for both offensive and defensive operations.”
The uncrewed vehicles were tested with various mission payloads: those that assist in long-range reconnaissance operations, concealment, electronic warfare, and resupply operations.
The “why” in all of this should be pretty obvious from looking at the first image in this article. “Robots don’t bleed.” There is no longer a need to risk bloodshed during these more mundane military operations. Warfighters will be freed up to do the highly specialized tasks that only trained human soldiers can do.
The unmanned systems, such as those tested in Project Origin, will be an adjunct to the fighting men, a force multiplier increasing our capabilities in the field as well as increasing our firepower overall.
These types of tests give us a glimpse at the future of warfare. They are part of the Army’s Robotic Technology Kernel. This is part of the Modular Open System Architecture-based library of software that can be used for ground autonomy along with the warfighter machine interface. It’s all part of the Army’s library of modular software used by soldiers to control robotic vehicles. The Army tells us this will enable standard unmanned maneuver capabilities across the ground fleet.
Translation: Unmanned vehicles aren’t just for the Air Force anymore. Get used to seeing multiple autonomous or semi-autonomous armed and unarmed vehicles on the battlefield of tomorrow. As the number of humans in our Army decreases due to failures in meeting our recruiting goals, something has to step in and take their place to maintain our fighting strength.
These vehicles will, of course, have to interface with the warfighter in some way. That’s what the soldiers of 1st SFG are looking at right now.
The future is here, and Project Origin has played a big part in shaping that future.
15. Remarks by President Biden Before Meeting with the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Combatant Commanders
Remarks by President Biden Before Meeting with the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Combatant Commanders | The White House
Cabinet Room
4:28 P.M. EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Okay. Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary Hicks, and General Milley, my — and all our other outstanding military leaders around this Cabinet table: I’m honored to welcome you to the White House. And I really mean it — I’m honored to welcome you to the White House.
Above all, I want to thank each of you for your dedication to the service of this country and your members, families, and the longstanding service that you’ve all put in.
I also want to recognize the groundbreaking nature of this gathering. For the first time in the proud history of the Armed Forces, we not only have highly — highly quai- — hali- — a highly qualified woman as Vice President, but as Deputy Secretary of Defense and two women combatant commanders. And it’s an important milestone, I think, that speaks to how we’re harnessing the strength and diversity of our country in making sure women succeed in the military and throughout their careers.
As I said when I got elected — and I didn’t think people thought I meant it — but my administration is going to look like America. And I mean that sincerely. Not just in the military, but across the board. That’s where our strength comes from, in my view.
And today, I want to hear from all of you on your assessments on what you’re seeing in the field and across our forces.
And the strategic environment is evolving rapidly in the world, but that means our plans and force posture have to be equally dynamic. Things are changing. And, you know, ensuring that — the security of the American people, our interests, and the interests of our Allies means having to constantly adapt to anything and everything that’s happening around the world.
And we’re seeing this very day the need for adapt — adaptation as a consequence of our standing with Ukraine against Putin’s brutal and unjustified war.
And I want to applaud the exceptional work you’re doing to arm and equip brave Ukrainians that defend their nation. I don’t know about you, but I’ve been to Ukraine a number of times before the war. I’ve spoken to the Rada. I was deeply involved in what was going on in Ukraine. And I knew they were tough and proud, but I tell you what: They’re tougher and more proud than I thought. I’m amazed what they’re doing with your help, in terms of providing advice and — and weaponry we’re providing, along with the rest of NATO.
Weapons and ammunition are flowing in daily. And we’re seeing just how vital our alliances and partnerships are around the world.
Our Allies are stepping up, amplifying the impact of our response. And NATO is united, focused, and energized as it’s ever been.
When I was a kid in the United States Senate in my 30s and in my 40s, I was chairman of the NATO subcommittee — the Foreign Relations Committee. I — not because of me or any particular thing, but I’ve never seen NATO as united. I know all the — I — I’m confident, in my view, just — this was Biden speaking — that I don’t think that Putin counted on being able to hold us together.
And I’ve spoken well over 150 times to our NATO Allies, either — like, yesterday, there were four- — how many on —
MR. SULLIVAN: Twelve of them.
THE PRESIDENT: How many?
MR. SULLIVAN: Twelve.
THE PRESIDENT: Twelve, yesterday for a couple hours. They — they are — they’re — they’re stepping up.
And the same is true of the Indo-Pacific, where our allies are the foundation for the future we want to see in that vital region of the world.
Your central, indispensable mission to deter aggression from all our enemies, if required, is — is on display, and to fight, to win wars remain critical to American power.
And as Commander-in-Chief, I — I rely on your advice and maintain our — to maintain our military edge and remain the ultimate guarantor of America’s security.
Quite frankly, even though I’ve been Vice President for 8 years and a senator for 36, I didn’t fully appreciate that — how the rest of the world literally looks to us as the leader of the free world. I mean, looks to us in very precise, specific ways. And something you all fully, fully understand.
And I rely, as I said, on your device — your advice and your ability to maintain our military edge.
And, you know, in return, I promise you — and I hope it’s been demonstrated since I’ve been President — that we as a nation will uphold the sacred duty we have and we owe you, our military men and women, to prepare, properly equip you before we send you into harm’s way. And when we do, to care for those and your family when you come home. And that’s why we’re doing so much at the — at the Veterans Affairs as well. It’s a — it’s a — it’s a sacred obligation.
And so, I want to thank you all again. I’m looking forward to our discussion.
And I thank the press for coming in. Thank you.
4:34 P.M. EDT
16. What Does Joe Biden Hope to Achieve in Ukraine?
Excerpts:
Beyond any question, Putin’s war of choice in Ukraine has been immoral and unnecessary. The world is rightly repulsed by what Russia has done and it is entirely appropriate that severe penalties be imposed on Moscow. What Washington must ensure, however, is that its responses ensure first and foremost preserve U.S. national security and America’s ability to prosper. Working towards early war termination and making certain the conflict does not escalate beyond Ukraine’s borders facilitates both objectives and are essential.
Biden must thread the needle in leading a Western response that adequately punishes Russia yet avoids going too far in ways that could, inadvertently, result in a direct clash between Russia and NATO. Any such action could spin out of control and all too easily escalate into a nuclear exchange. The consequences for the United States of a nuclear war would be catastrophic, and potentially wipe out millions of Americans. It is the president’s number one obligation to ensure it never gets to that point.
What Does Joe Biden Hope to Achieve in Ukraine?
Ensuring American National Security – and Avoiding Nuclear War – is Biden’s Top Priority in Ukraine – While all the focus in the Western world has understandably been focused on urgently providing Ukraine with the weapons it needs to blunt Russia’s invasion, we need to simultaneously consider what’s next. It is vital that the White House quickly determines the long-term strategic objectives necessary to ensure our security well into the future.
Unfortunately, while establishing such objectives are critical to forming efficient and successful policies, strategic thinking has become rare in Washington. Failure to even identify, much less attain, strategic objectives regarding America’s war in Afghanistan from the Bush through Trump Administrations, for example, was a major reason for our failure there and cost our country dearly.
After President Bush gave the military an attainable mission on the initial attack in 2001, he later changed the mission to an amorphous “nation-building” objective that never had an attainable set of tasks. As a result, the Bush Administration – nor any that followed him – never articulated an achievable end-state in the war. It should stand to reason (but rarely does in Washington): if there is no clearly defined end-state, there will be no objective set of metrics by which an Administration will even know if its policy is a success or failure.
Absent such metrics, each Administration and each commanding general in Afghanistan was left to define success on their own, which rarely aligned with previous leaders, and often outright clashed. The result of these muddied, ambiguous policies? Twenty years of frustration and ultimate strategic failure, capped off by our ignominious withdrawal last August and the elevation of the Taliban back into power in Kabul.
Current Ukraine Policy
The United States has been at the forefront of considerable action in Europe since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine last February. Biden has led the way on imposing on Moscow multiple rounds of the most severe sanctions ever to be imposed on another country, he has publicly demonized Putin, and continues to provide billions of dollars of weapons to the Ukrainian military. What Biden has not provided, however, is an articulation of the intent of these actions, or what outcome he hopes all his actions will produce.
Various leaders and opinion-makers have offered thoughts on what the Administration is (or should be) trying to accomplish. One possibility is that the U.S. provides weapons to Ukraine for the purpose of helping Kyiv stop Moscow’s invasion and ultimately drive them from Ukrainian territory. While such an objective may seem appealing, the likelihood of succeeding short of a direct U.S. boots-on-the-ground presence is very low. It would take years and tens of billions of dollars to generate a force of sufficient size and power in Ukraine to drive Russian troops out – and even then would have a minimal chance of success.
Two other ideas broached in Washington include regime change in Moscow to oust Putin and using the war in Ukraine as a proxy against Russia as a means of progressively weakening Putin’s forces long-term. There is currently no possibility of unseating Putin (and even less prospect that whoever followed him would be better) and trying to bleed Moscow dry would necessarily dramatically increase the destruction of Ukrainian cities and cause a spike in the number of people killed (not to mention Russia may escalate their offensive in response to our attempts and achieve a military victory).
A somewhat more troubling possibility is that there simply is no guiding strategy behind the Administration’s policies; just actions in response to Russian military moves with no particular outcome desired, short of causing pain to Putin. The big problem with such a course is that absent a coherent, logical, and guiding strategic objective, these individual policies are unlikely to produce outcomes beneficial to the United States, and may even work at cross-purposes, making our situation worse.
A U.S. Policy that Would Make Sense
To guide its overall policy vis-à-vis the Russo-Ukraine War, the Administration should establish two priority objectives: the preservation of U.S. national security and the securing of our population’s ability to prosper. Every action taken, every policy enacted would have to support or facilitate those twin goals. Anything that doesn’t support that – or anything that works at cross-purposes to it – must be avoided.
The following policies would all foster the attainment of the two objectives and would be mutually supportive of each other. First, the U.S. should, in coordination with European allies, continue the current practice of providing Ukraine with sufficient arms and ammunition to defend itself for the purpose of making further Russian advances too costly in blood and equipment that the two sides reach a negotiated end to the war.
Though there is virtual universal desire in the West to see Russia defeated and driven from Ukraine, there is minuscule chance of creating an offensive force in Ukraine that could force Moscow back into its territory without dramatically increasing the scale of the war within Ukraine (which would greatly increase the physical destruction of Ukraine’s cities and dramatically increase the number of civilians killed – and still would offer limited hope of eventual military success).
Second, and in conjunction with providing Kyiv with arms to defend itself, Washington should marshal all its diplomatic power, working with Ukraine’s senior government officials, European governments – and behind the scenes even with Moscow – to help the parties find a mutually agreeable path to war termination.
I fully realize seeking a negotiated settlement is an unpalatable option right now, owing to the severe carnage and likely war crimes that have already been committed in the war. But the most likely result of refusing to pursue this outcome is the extension of the war, the deepening of the death and destruction suffered by yet more Ukrainians, and the growing possibility that a future settlement will be even less to Kyiv’s advantage. For America, the longer the war drags on, the longer the chance of escalation, whether by mistake, miscalculation, or accident.
Lastly, Biden should keep his red line squarely on protecting the United States from any attack and honoring our Article 5 NATO obligations. Already most of the Balkan nations have vowed to increase their defense spending and improve their military capacity; Germany has likewise announced an infusion of $100 billion to strengthen its armed forces. Anything that results in European states increasing their responsibility for their security is to be applauded, while the U.S. reinforces its stalwart declaration that it will provide decisive military backup in the event of an attack on NATO.
Washington’s Bottom Line
Beyond any question, Putin’s war of choice in Ukraine has been immoral and unnecessary. The world is rightly repulsed by what Russia has done and it is entirely appropriate that severe penalties be imposed on Moscow. What Washington must ensure, however, is that its responses ensure first and foremost preserve U.S. national security and America’s ability to prosper. Working towards early war termination and making certain the conflict does not escalate beyond Ukraine’s borders facilitates both objectives and are essential.
Biden must thread the needle in leading a Western response that adequately punishes Russia yet avoids going too far in ways that could, inadvertently, result in a direct clash between Russia and NATO. Any such action could spin out of control and all too easily escalate into a nuclear exchange. The consequences for the United States of a nuclear war would be catastrophic, and potentially wipe out millions of Americans. It is the president’s number one obligation to ensure it never gets to that point.
Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Daniel L. Davis is a Senior Fellow for Defense Priorities and a former Lt. Col. in the U.S. Army who deployed into combat zones four times. He is the author of “The Eleventh Hour in 2020 America.” Follow him @DanielLDavis
17. NATO Must Welcome Ukraine
There are those who argue that such a move will cause escalation because Putin will go to any length to prevent this. And others will argue that had we allowed Ukraine to join NATO it would have prevented Putin's war. But we cannot argue the counterfactual now.
Excepts:
A strong U.S. commitment to support Ukrainian membership in NATO is vital to persuade other members to follow suit. Because the key to success will be Germany and France, early, high-level engagement with Berlin and Paris will be important. Their opposition in 2008 doomed progress on Ukrainian membership, and without their consent a new effort will go nowhere. Both countries, however, are strong advocates for bringing Ukraine into the EU. NATO membership would represent a small additional step and would bring the U.S. in as a guarantor as well.
Putin invaded Ukraine ostensibly because NATO was moving too close to Russia’s borders and threatened its security. That argument never held any water. But even if it did, the invasion of Ukraine has brought NATO still closer to Russia’s borders. The alliance is set to permanently station large numbers of troops on its eastern frontier. Finland, which shares an 830-mile border with Russia, will join NATO, as will Sweden. And Ukraine, which prior to the invasion faced the longest odds of ever joining NATO, might well enter the alliance after all.
Few modern leaders have miscalculated as badly as the Russian president has. Ukraine’s acceptance into NATO would represent the final defeat of his failed strategy.
NATO Must Welcome Ukraine
Let Ukraine In
A former U.S. ambassador to NATO makes the case that the alliance should welcome Kyiv.
After suffering embarrassing defeats in the past couple of months, Vladimir Putin is doubling down on his war. He is rearming, resupplying, and repositioning Russian forces for a major new onslaught in eastern Ukraine. Even if his troops are finally able to dislodge Ukraine’s, however, that’s unlikely to be enough to satisfy him. He may agree to a cease-fire or a negotiation to give his military time to regroup. But as long as Putin is in power, Russia will continue to do whatever it can to reverse the post–Cold War settlement that has animated Putin ever since the Soviet Union collapsed.
At the same time, the United States and its NATO allies are speeding up delivery of heavier weapons to help Ukraine withstand the coming Russian onslaught, if not actually win the war. There is a larger question that both sides, particularly the West, will need to address soon, though: What happens to Ukraine once the fighting slows or the war stops?
The answer is straightforward: For Ukraine to be truly free and independent, it will have to be a member of the European Union and NATO. Although Moscow will no doubt object, Putin’s brutal aggression makes clear that only European countries that are members of NATO can be truly secure. And NATO should welcome Ukraine into the fold.
Ironically, Moscow’s unprovoked aggression is proof that its long-standing complaint about NATO moving too close to its borders was little more than a convenient excuse for its revisionist aims. The alliance posed no threat to Russia, and prior to the war, President Joe Biden and other NATO leaders made clear that they would not come to Ukraine’s defense. Had Ukraine been a member, however—alongside the Baltic states and all non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact—Russia would have been unlikely to invade for fear of a wider military confrontation that it would surely have lost. Far from NATO being the proximate cause of war, NATO’s absence enabled Putin to act.
Since February 24, when Putin invaded, many European nations have undergone a wholesale reevaluation of their security needs. Germany now understands that dialogue and trade are no substitute for deterrence and defense when it comes to dealing with an autocratic country like Russia. Finland and Sweden are on the verge of joining NATO, something few experts had thought possible before the invasion, given their centuries of neutrality and independence. Others are increasing defense spending, dispatching weapons to Ukraine, and bolstering the forward military presence in NATO’s eastern flank.
This transformation in thinking about European security and the threat Russia poses should also guide the Western approach to the future of Ukraine. Already, the EU has moved swiftly. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen traveled to Kyiv on April 8 and assured President Volodymyr Zelensky that the first major step for Ukraine’s accession would take “a matter of weeks,” rather than the usual years. Although Ukraine’s application still faces many hurdles, considerable momentum has built to bring the country into the EU as swiftly as possible.
As part of its membership in the bloc, Ukraine will receive a security guarantee from other EU members: The Treaty of the European Union includes a mutual-defense clause of the type that Ukraine has demanded as part of any peace negotiation or cessation of hostilities with Russia. Although this is important, there are two problems with relying on this alone to ensure Ukraine’s long-term security against Russian aggression. First, even if fast-tracked, EU accession will likely take many months, if not a year or two. Second, although the EU’s security guarantee is significant, it doesn’t bind the U.S., Europe’s ultimate protector, to Ukrainian defense.
Fortunately, both of these shortcomings can be overcome with NATO membership. Joining the alliance itself is straightforward, requiring the unanimous agreement of NATO’s 30 member states and their ratification of NATO’s governing treaty, including its Article 5 collective-defense provision. And because the U.S. is a leading member, bringing Ukraine into NATO also extends America’s security guarantee to its territory.
We have been here before. In 2008, Ukraine sought an invitation to apply for NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP), which prepares aspirant nations for membership in the alliance. Sharp disagreement among allies blocked a decision, leading to the vague commitment that Ukraine (and Georgia) “will become members of NATO.” Until now, key allies such as Germany and France have rejected inviting Ukraine to join NATO, for fear of provoking Russia. Now that Moscow has demonstrated that it need not be provoked to commit aggression, NATO must reverse course and bring Ukraine into the alliance as soon as possible.
There are, of course, numerous obstacles, practical and otherwise, to bringing Ukraine into NATO. Zelensky has suggested that he would be willing to forgo NATO membership, but only, his advisers have said, if Kyiv received legally binding security guarantees that were even “stronger than NATO’s.” Zelensky’s stance represents his understandable disillusion with the alliance, which has failed not only to deliver on membership but to come to Ukraine’s defense even when it has been subject to an unprovoked attack. That is why an initiative, led by the U.S. and other major military allies such as Britain, France, and Germany, to offer Ukraine swift entry into NATO would reassure Kyiv that the alliance’s security guarantee is serious and real.
Putin would undoubtedly object to Ukraine’s NATO membership and threaten “political and military consequences,” as Russia has in the case of Finland’s and Sweden’s prospective accession to the alliance. But he has already invaded Ukraine and committed grievous atrocities against its population. He could escalate further, using chemical or nuclear weapons, but that would risk widening the conflict. Ultimately, there is not much that Russia can do to prevent Ukraine from entering NATO.
Perhaps the biggest practical obstacle is that part of Ukraine’s territory is likely to be contested, if not, as in the case of Crimea, under foreign occupation for the foreseeable future. Indeed, if the current aggression settles into the kind of back-and-forth fighting that has characterized the conflict in the Donbas for the past eight years, NATO would be inviting into its ranks a country actively at war. That would be unprecedented, but it need not be impossible. Kyiv and its new NATO allies could agree that Ukraine would continue to bear the brunt of fighting in the east, and that NATO countries would continue to supply it with the weapons and intelligence it needed to defend itself. They could also agree that NATO would not directly intervene in the conflict unless Russia again threatened Kyiv or the viability of the Ukrainian state. Similar arrangements could be made with respect to any occupied territory in Ukraine.
Strong advocacy and careful diplomacy will be necessary to bring this about. The U.S. will be key to both. So far, the Biden administration has done a terrific job of building a powerful, united coalition of Western states to weaken and isolate Russia, and assist Ukraine militarily and financially. Washington has led this effort from the start. It now needs to do the same to unite NATO members behind the idea of inviting Ukraine to join.
Fortunately, many of the top people in the administration, including the president himself, are likely to look favorably on the effort. Biden has a strong record of supporting both NATO’s enlargement and Ukraine’s development as a democracy free of corruption. The war and its brutality have affected the president to his core, and he will see the value of deterring Putin from ever again invading Ukraine. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan share the president’s perspective and predilections on this score. Although Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s views on Ukraine’s potential NATO membership are less certain, he has shown a determination to support the commander in chief. Others within the administration, including Victoria Nuland, the No. 4 at the State Department, who as the U.S. ambassador to NATO in 2008 pushed forcefully to give Ukraine a MAP, could no doubt use their considerable skills to advance that cause.
A strong U.S. commitment to support Ukrainian membership in NATO is vital to persuade other members to follow suit. Because the key to success will be Germany and France, early, high-level engagement with Berlin and Paris will be important. Their opposition in 2008 doomed progress on Ukrainian membership, and without their consent a new effort will go nowhere. Both countries, however, are strong advocates for bringing Ukraine into the EU. NATO membership would represent a small additional step and would bring the U.S. in as a guarantor as well.
Putin invaded Ukraine ostensibly because NATO was moving too close to Russia’s borders and threatened its security. That argument never held any water. But even if it did, the invasion of Ukraine has brought NATO still closer to Russia’s borders. The alliance is set to permanently station large numbers of troops on its eastern frontier. Finland, which shares an 830-mile border with Russia, will join NATO, as will Sweden. And Ukraine, which prior to the invasion faced the longest odds of ever joining NATO, might well enter the alliance after all.
Few modern leaders have miscalculated as badly as the Russian president has. Ukraine’s acceptance into NATO would represent the final defeat of his failed strategy.
18. What Does the West Want in Ukraine?
As LTG Jim Dubik has mentored me: What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that will sustain, protect,and advance our interests?
Conclusion:
The conclusion is clear: the United States and its NATO partners should consult with one another and with Ukraine over the aims of the war. The United States and NATO also need to refine their plans for deterring and responding to any Russian attacks on other countries or any Russian use of weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, Western success will be highly unlikely to involve a peace treaty, a true end to the conflict, or regime change in Russia. Instead, success for now could consist of a winding down of hostilities, with Russia possessing no more territory than it held before the recent invasion and continuing to refrain from using weapons of mass destruction. Over time, the West could employ a mix of sanctions and diplomacy in an effort to achieve a full Russian military withdrawal from Ukraine. Such success would be far from perfect, just preferable to the alternatives.
What Does the West Want in Ukraine?
Defining Success—Before It’s Too Late
April 22, 2022
Vladimir Putin launched his war against Ukraine with expansive aims that, if achieved, would have essentially ended that country’s existence as a sovereign state. Faced with costly military setbacks, the Russian president has since defined success down, refocusing the Russian military operation on consolidating its hold in Ukraine’s east and south.
Curiously, Western aims in Ukraine have been far less clear. Almost all the debate over what to do has focused on means: on the quantity and quality of military aid to provide the country, on the wisdom of establishing a no-fly zone over Ukrainian airspace, on the extent of economic sanctions on Russia. Little has been said about what either side would have to concede in order to end the war. Also left unsaid is whether an end to the conflict would need to be formalized in a treaty signed by Russia and Ukraine or simply accepted as a reality.
Answering the question of how this war should end is vital as the struggle with Russia enters a critical moment, with a large battle looming. Wars can end when a major gap emerges between the belligerents so that one side can impose terms on the other, or when both sides realize that outright victory is not in the cards and decide it is better to settle for less than bear the costs of carrying on. In either situation, the end of the war can be codified in legal documents that address questions of territory and political and economic arrangements, or the conflict can simply wind down, coming to a de facto end without a formal peace. World War II was an example of the former; the Korean and Gulf Wars, the latter.
In principle, success from the West’s perspective can be defined as ending the war sooner rather than later, and on terms that Ukraine’s democratic government is prepared to accept. But just what are those terms? Will Ukraine seek to recover all the territory it has lost in the past two months? Will it require that Russian forces withdraw completely from the Donbas and Crimea? Will it demand the right to join the EU and NATO? Will it insist that all this be set forth in a formal document signed by Russia?
The United States, the EU, and NATO need to discuss such questions with one another and with Ukraine now. Western goals will inevitably be influenced by what happens on the ground, but what happens on the ground should not determine those goals; instead, policy aims should influence what is sought on the ground. To be sure, the Ukrainians have every right to define their war aims. But so do the United States and Europe. Although Western interests overlap with Ukraine’s, they are broader, including nuclear stability with Russia and the ability to influence the trajectory of the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs.
It is also essential to take into account that Russia gets a vote. Although Putin initiated this war of choice, it will take more than just him to end it. He and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will both have to consider what they require in the way of territory and terms to halt hostilities. They will also have to decide if they are prepared not only to order an end to the fighting but also to enter into and honor a peace agreement. Another complexity is that some aspects of any peace, such as the lifting of sanctions against Russia, would not be determined by Ukraine alone but would require the consent of others.
Meaningful consultations are essential if policy is not to be made carelessly and on the fly. And they are essential to preventing major fault lines from opening up between Ukraine and the United States and Europe, and even within NATO.
THREE FUTURES
It is impossible to know if the Russian military will be able to realize its ambitions of asserting greater control in the Donbas region and establishing a land bridge to Crimea—and, if it is able to, whether Putin will again revise his war aims, in this case upward. What is almost certain is that no legitimate Ukrainian government would formally accept an outcome so favorable to Russia. The atrocities that Russian forces have committed during the fight have made it far harder for Kyiv to let Moscow leave the negotiating table with anything that would seem like a reward for its brutality. Zelensky may also believe (for good reason) that allowing Russia to maintain a hold on Ukraine’s territory would make it difficult, if not impossible, for Ukraine to remain sovereign in any meaningful sense. On this score, the West should continue to provide support to Ukraine, to prevent Putin’s aggression from succeeding in Ukraine and from setting a dangerous precedent that would constitute a challenge to order everywhere. So even if Putin were prepared to cease major military operations in exchange for keeping a large swath of Ukraine, the war would probably continue at some level, much as it has in the so-called frozen conflict in the Donbas since 2014.
One alternative to a scenario favoring Russia would be a stalemate. Things would stand more or less where they did before the invasion, with Russia occupying Crimea and exercising de facto control through its proxies over parts of the Donbas. Such a future would come about if Ukraine clawed back some of what Russia has gained over the past two months but if neither Ukraine nor Russia were able to achieve decisive military progress. This outcome could be acceptable to Ukraine, which has a powerful incentive to end a war that has caused so much death and destruction. It would be peace at a price, but potentially a price worth paying. And in principle, Putin, too, might support such an outcome, judging that there was little to gain from continuing the fight. If, as part of this scenario, Ukraine agreed not to join NATO, he might also calculate he could persuade many Russians that the country had won the war, even if it didn’t acquire much territory. If such a consensus emerged, it would be one worth supporting.
The Ukrainians have every right to define their war aims. But so do the United States and Europe.
But it seems overly optimistic to imagine that a military stalemate would pave the way for a diplomatic settlement. Putin would be hard-pressed to make a plausible case that such a muddied result justified the military, diplomatic, and economic costs of his war. Moreover, given his past rhetoric, he seems unlikely to sign away all claims to Ukraine, accepting its permanent separation from Russia and letting it choose a liberal, Western-oriented path for itself, including membership in the EU. The near certainty that such an outcome would not result in major sanctions relief, an end to war crimes investigations, or calls for reparations also argues against Putin accepting this scenario. A stalemate would almost certainly become an open-ended conflict. And again, many in Ukraine would reject any arrangement that left Russia in control of any Ukrainian territory.
A third future would be defined by Ukrainian military success. Russia would be forced to accept not merely the pre-2022 status quo but the pre-2014 status quo. In theory, this would be an ideal outcome for Ukraine, which would regain all the sovereignty it has lost in the past eight years, and for international order, as it would reinforce the norm that territory must not be acquired by force. In practice, however, things would be more complicated. Even if Ukraine succeeded in ousting Russian troops, the country would still be vulnerable to missile and artillery attacks emanating from Russia, to say nothing of cyberattacks and political interference. Even more important, it is near impossible to imagine Putin accepting such an outcome, since it would surely threaten his political survival, and possibly even his physical survival. In desperation, he might try to widen the war through cyberattacks or attacks on one or more NATO countries. He might even resort to chemical or nuclear weapons. It is far from certain that Russia has the mechanisms in place to prevent Putin from ordering such escalation if he decided he had nothing to lose.
The potential for Russian escalation raises the question of whether at this point it would be wise for Ukraine to attempt to take back all of the Donbas and Crimea. Arguably, these aims are better left for a postconflict, or even a post-Putin, period in which the West could condition sanctions relief on Russia’s signing of a formal peace agreement. Such a pact might allow Ukraine to enjoy formal ties to the EU and security guarantees, even as it remained officially neutral and outside NATO. Russia, for its part, might agree to withdraw its forces from the entirety of the Donbas in exchange for international protections for the ethnic Russians living there. Crimea might gain some special status, with Moscow and Kyiv agreeing that its final status would be determined down the road.
HISTORY’S ADVICE
As the United States contemplates its strategy for Ukraine, it is useful to keep in mind two lessons of the Cold War. The first was to avoid direct armed conflict with the Soviet Union unless vital U.S. interests were threatened. The second was to accept less than optimal outcomes so as to avoid threatening vital Soviet interests, something that could all too easily lead to war. This recognition that there were limits to the United States’ goals meant deciding not to roll back Soviet advances in Eastern Europe after Moscow crushed the 1956 revolution in Hungary and the 1968 revolution in Czechoslovakia. It meant stopping Israeli forces from decimating the Egyptian Third Army after they surrounded it near Cairo during the 1973 war between the Soviet-allied Arab states and the U.S.-allied Israel. And it meant accepting communist rule in the Soviet Union itself. Such restraint was articulated in the doctrine of containment as developed by the diplomat George Kennan. But over time, as Kennan suggested, the successful application of containment could add to pressures that would undermine communism—as it eventually did, after four decades.
The first lesson of the Cold War is reflected in existing Western policy toward Ukraine. From the outset of the crisis, the United States made it clear that it would not place boots on the ground or establish a no-fly zone, since doing so could bring U.S. and Russian forces into direct contact and raise the risk of escalation. Instead, Washington and its NATO partners opted for an indirect strategy of providing arms, intelligence, and training to Ukraine while pressuring Russia with economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation.
As for the second lesson, the United States’ and NATO’s decision to pursue their aims through limited means has worked to a considerable extent. That choice has not prevented Russia from destroying Ukraine’s civilian centers, but the battle between the armed forces of the two countries has favored Ukraine. The question now is whether the West should embrace limited ends, eschewing military efforts to oust Russia from all of Ukraine or demanding regime change in Moscow as a condition of stopping the war.
Meaningful consultations are essential if policy is not to be made carelessly and on the fly.
Whatever goals the West ultimately settles on, requiring that the war end with a formal peace agreement should not be one of them. The problem is not that it is impossible to come up with a plausible formula for mutual compromise that leaves each side better off; it is that depending on the formula, one or both sides might judge that they are better off continuing a war that holds out the possibility of a better outcome than they would be signing a pact that rules it out. With both countries still eyeing the possibility of military gains and wanting to avoid appearing weak, a formal pact appears out of reach for the foreseeable future.
All this points to a long war. It will likely be fought mostly in Ukraine’s east and south, although Russia would retain the ability to attack other targets. The elements of a strategy for a long-term, open-ended war are well known: provide Ukraine with the weapons, ammunition, training, and intelligence it needs to defend itself against Russia; make sure that NATO remains strong enough to discourage Russia from escalating the conflict or preventing supplies from reaching Ukraine; reduce energy imports from Russia as much as possible and as soon as possible.
The conclusion is clear: the United States and its NATO partners should consult with one another and with Ukraine over the aims of the war. The United States and NATO also need to refine their plans for deterring and responding to any Russian attacks on other countries or any Russian use of weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, Western success will be highly unlikely to involve a peace treaty, a true end to the conflict, or regime change in Russia. Instead, success for now could consist of a winding down of hostilities, with Russia possessing no more territory than it held before the recent invasion and continuing to refrain from using weapons of mass destruction. Over time, the West could employ a mix of sanctions and diplomacy in an effort to achieve a full Russian military withdrawal from Ukraine. Such success would be far from perfect, just preferable to the alternatives.
19. Ukraine Can Win – The Case Against Compromise
Let us not ever forget the first sentence in this excerpt:
Ukrainians will, of course, pay the ultimate price for victory. The more they resist and fight back, the more that Putin will work to inflict greater pain on civilians and destroy the country’s infrastructure. But as the country’s response to recent Russian actions in Bucha shows, the Ukrainians are a difficult people to break. The more brutal the Kremlin’s tactics get, the more the Ukrainian people are willing to fight for their homeland. So long as they believe that they can win, they will sacrifice a tremendous amount on behalf of Europe. Ukraine’s allies are morally obligated to support their efforts.
They are also strategically obligated to help; there is more in this war for the West than just creating a Ukraine whole and free. If Ukraine can win, the ultimate result will be a weakened Russia, without the military capabilities to launch further aggression against neighboring states. This is by itself an essential outcome. Russia’s war in Ukraine is the greatest threat to the transatlantic alliance in decades, and defeating Moscow is critical to protecting global security. It is also important for protecting liberal values and ideals. At a time when democratic institutions are under stress, a resounding win in Ukraine would be a victory for democracy over authoritarianism—a chance to revitalize liberalism, as the Biden administration aims to do.
Creating more “frozen conflicts” (which are never actually frozen) is not the answer in Ukraine. The United States has a window of opportunity to shift the trajectory of the war in the country so that Russia is forced not just to stop but to fully retreat. This will require swift action and resolute vision, with a laser-beam focus on victory. Now is not the time for handwringing and timidity.
Ukraine Can Win
The Case Against Compromise
April 22, 2022
Over the past weeks, Moscow’s war on Ukraine has taken a turn. After failing to seize Kyiv, Russian forces pulled back to Belarus and Russia, leaving behind a trail of civilian casualties, and regrouped in Ukraine’s east with the aim of making additional gains in the Donbas. Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed General Alexander Dvornikov, also known as the “butcher of Syria,” to lead his country’s campaign. This week, he launched a new, more brutal military offensive in Ukraine’s east.
But as the Ukrainians begin fighting against the renewed assault, Western policy is lagging behind the reality of war on the ground. Some U.S. and European policymakers are advocating for a negotiated solution to the invasion in which both sides compromise. They are doing so even though Russia has murdered, raped, and tortured thousands of civilians, and even though giving the country control over the Donbas would mean condemning more Ukrainians to a similarly horrible fate. They are pushing for an agreement despite the fact that Russia is a bad-faith actor with a long track record of rejecting diplomatic efforts. The experience of the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics suggests that Putin would use newly occupied areas as launch pads for further attacks in Ukraine and neighboring states. A negotiated solution, even if it was possible, would not bring about peace but permanent security instability in Europe.
The West understands that Moscow is brutal and untrustworthy. U.S. President Joe Biden has called the invasion a genocide, and European leaders have publicly accused Putin of war crimes. But from the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Western leaders have behaved as if they do not believe that Ukraine can defeat Russia on the battlefield and have instead pursued talks. Germany, for example, has shied away from providing tanks, and French President Emmanuel Macron has made multiple attempts to negotiate with Putin, saying that “there is no other way out [of the war] than a ceasefire and good faith negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.” As a result, Western leaders are signaling that they would be willing to accept Russian territorial gains in exchange for an end to the invasion. Despite Moscow’s stumbles, the conventional thinking goes, the Russian military is simply too big to fail.
But this assumption is false: Ukraine can, in fact, win a clear military victory. Its forces were able not just to stop Russia from reaching Kyiv; with the help of limited defensive weapons from the United States and NATO, they were able to launch counteroffensives around Kyiv, Chernihiv, and other locations in the north. Against all odds, the Ukrainian military has proved capable of doing more than holding the line; it has proved capable of forcing Russian forces to retreat.
Western leaders have behaved as if they do not believe that Ukraine can defeat Russia.
It will be up to the Ukrainians to define the full terms of victory. As President Volodymyr Zelensky said in a recent interview, Ukraine will not give up territory in the east to end the war. At the very least, this means victory would entail an immediate return to the 2014 status quo, along with a negotiated pathway to restoring Ukraine’s full territorial integrity—including the two “People’s Republics.” Crimea is a more difficult issue, but it is possible to envisage a settlement that leaves its status in contention. (This was how the Soviet Union and the West handled Moscow’s claims to sovereignty over the Baltic states, which the Kremlin then seized in 1940.)
The West must give Ukraine the weapons, training, and cyber-support it needs to achieve these aims in the short term and sustain them in the long term. The West should do so to both help the Ukrainians and help itself]: Ukraine has been valiantly fighting not just for its own freedom but for the freedom of all of Europe. The United States, NATO, and the European Union are aware of what is at stake and owe Ukraine all the support they can muster.
ROUT THE RUSSIANS
As Biden said in his historic speech in Warsaw, the war in Ukraine is not just about Ukraine—it is a battle between democracy and autocracy. But the Western policy response has not reflected the gravity of these words. Instead, the United States and Europe have been overly cautious, contradictory, and riddled by fears that they will provoke a Russian escalation. In early March, for example, the United States assessed that sending Soviet fighter jets from Poland was an escalation and ruled it out. Yet at the same time, it decided that sending tanks from NATO allies was not, and the Biden administration agreed to help transfer them. Similarly, Washington has seemingly decided against sending U.S. air defense missile systems directly to Ukraine. But when Slovakia transferred an S-300 missile system earlier this month, it solicited little response from Moscow except a claim that Russian forces had destroyed it.
Thankfully, there are signs that—at least on security assistance—the United States is becoming more assertive. Washington has already provided more than $3 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since February 24. On April 10, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said the Biden administration would take “aggressive action” to help Ukraine succeed on the battlefield. In the days that followed, the White House announced two $800 million package of direct military support, for the first time providing armored personnel vehicles and I-155 artillery, heavy weapons that the Ukrainians have requested for weeks and that will be critical on the front lines.
These are steps in the right direction, but Ukraine needs much more if it is to have a chance of pushing Russia back in the east. Concretely, this means that the administration must move quickly and in coordination with allies to provide Ukraine with more of the weapons it is requesting, especially long-range drones, air missile defense systems, fighter jets, and bombers. Ukraine’s greatest weakness has been in air defense, which has allowed Russia to decimate Ukrainian cities. The United States and NATO have said that they will not enforce a no-fly zone because it would put NATO forces in direct confrontation with Russian ones, but the alliance should not rule out a limited no-fly zone with clearly stipulated rules of engagement aimed at protecting humanitarian corridors. Despite concerns that a no-fly zone of any kind would lead to direct confrontation with Russia, escalation in not inevitable if the NATO clearly defines the scope of the operation—security for humanitarian passages in very limited geographic areas—and communicates this publicly and privately to Moscow. At the very least, allies should provide Ukraine’s forces with the ability to impose a no-fly zone themselves over the country’s own airspace.
Europe, in particular, must do much more to supply weapons to Ukraine. The European Union has committed 1.5 billion euros in security assistance since the February invasion, but that pales in comparison with the 35 billion euros the bloc has paid Russia for energy over the same period of time. Germany has ostensibly committed to sending more heavy weapons to Ukraine, but it has yet to deliver any, and it does not have a clear timetable for doing so. Indeed, German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht has said that weapons deliveries from government sources have reached their limit and that it will not send tanks to Ukraine because it is afraid of depleting its stock. Other allies who are willing to send Soviet-era, heavier weapons have also raised concerns about depleting their military reserves and are looking to the United States for replacements.
Europe, in particular, must do much more to supply weapons to Ukraine.
Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, then, hinges on Washington’s ability to ensure supply lines not just to Kyiv but also to allies on NATO’s eastern flank. The United States will need to establish channels to all these countries in a way that is consistent, sturdy, and deep. In his testimony to Congress, General Mark Milley, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Armed Services Committee that he expects the war in Ukraine will be a long-term conflict spanning years, and so Ukraine must have a steady supply of arms for its immediate needs and to ensure it has the ability to defend itself in the future. Washington will need to ramp up military production, reduce delays in foreign military sales, and work with allies to increase their production capacities of lighter weapons and supplies—such as body armor and spare parts. It may also need to train Ukrainians to maintain and fly F-16s and operate other Western-made weapons systems. NATO also has a key role to play in replacing weapons and conducting training. The alliance can and should create a mechanism for gathering and distributing resupplies from and to member states. It must also establish a hub, perhaps in Poland or Romania, where it can provide training to Ukrainian forces on how to use new equipment.
But helping Ukraine win will require more than just military support. Putin claims that the West’s policy of “economic blitzkrieg” on Russia has failed. The United States and Europe should prove him wrong by quickly ramping up economic sanctions on Russia, which are currently not strong enough to have an immediate effect on the military trajectory of the war. Washington should impose secondary sanctions on Sberbank, Russia’s top bank, which might force countries and firms currently doing normal business with Russia to curtail their exposure. And the United States and its allies must fully sanction all of the ten largest Russian commercial banks—including Gazprombank, which handles energy transactions for the gas monopoly Gazprom.
Targeting Gazprombank and Gazprom is especially essential. The ultimate Achilles’ heel of the Russian economy is energy exports, which fuel Putin’s war chest. Lithuania has become the first European country to stop imports of Russian gas, and Poland announced that it will end Russian coal imports within the next few weeks and phase out oil and gas imports by the end of the year. The rest of the continent is slowly coming along; in response to the atrocities in Bucha, the European Commission proposed a ban on Russian coal imports. Although this is a good start, as long as gas continues to flow from Russia to Europe, the continent will remain beholden to Moscow. The United States must pressure Europe to end its energy dependence more quickly. This won’t be easy, given how reliant the continent is on Russian gas. The EU economy will take an immediate hit for ending this relationship, but the hit to Russia will be exponentially greater.
Finally, the United States must deploy cyberoffense capabilities to disrupt Russia’s military campaign. Ukraine’s cyberdefenses—much like its overall defenses—have performed far better than anticipated, repelling denial of service attacks and identifying malware before Russia could deploy it. Ukraine has also mobilized an army of independent cyber-hacktivists to attack military and critical infrastructure targets in Russia. And Washington sent out “cyber-mission” teams in the lead-up to the war to support Ukraine’s cyberdefense capabilities. But the United States can do much more to bolster Ukraine’s offensive capabilities while covertly deploying U.S. assets to jam Russian military communications on the battlefield, especially weapons systems’ communication links, and disrupt day-to-day financial operations in Russia. This would effectively force Russia to fight a war on two fronts—one on the literal battlefield and the other in the cyber-domain—further depleting the government’s resources.
THE PRICE OF VICTORY
Winning in Ukraine won’t be cheap, materially or politically. The United States will need to spend more than the $14 billion that Congress committed to Ukraine last month to achieve all these aims. It will need to pressure its allies in Europe. And it will have to manage more nuclear saber rattling from Moscow by sending clear messages about what Washington will do if Putin resorts to using nuclear weapons in Ukraine, rather than constraining itself by promising not to take certain steps.
Although the United States must consider Moscow’s nuclear capacity as it formulates policy, the country cannot be deterred by Putin’s bluffs, as it sadly has been. (The Biden administration, for instance, ruled out sending MiGs to Ukraine as too “provocative.”) It is dangerous if the Russian president believes he can use these weapons to intimidate the United States from defending its allies and interests, especially because Putin’s objectives go well beyond establishing control in Ukraine. In his long speech before launching the February 24 offensive, Russia’s president made clear that he would like to have sway over all the states in the former Soviet Union, including NATO members in the Baltics. If Putin can successfully frighten the United States and win in Ukraine, he will feel emboldened. The likelihood of a Russian offensive against a NATO member will then increase significantly, as will the risks of an even greater international catastrophe. The costs of defeating Putin in Ukraine may be high, but they are far lower—and far less risky—than the costs of defeating him in Estonia.
A resounding win in Ukraine would be a victory for democracy over authoritarianism.
Ukrainians will, of course, pay the ultimate price for victory. The more they resist and fight back, the more that Putin will work to inflict greater pain on civilians and destroy the country’s infrastructure. But as the country’s response to recent Russian actions in Bucha shows, the Ukrainians are a difficult people to break. The more brutal the Kremlin’s tactics get, the more the Ukrainian people are willing to fight for their homeland. So long as they believe that they can win, they will sacrifice a tremendous amount on behalf of Europe. Ukraine’s allies are morally obligated to support their efforts.
They are also strategically obligated to help; there is more in this war for the West than just creating a Ukraine whole and free. If Ukraine can win, the ultimate result will be a weakened Russia, without the military capabilities to launch further aggression against neighboring states. This is by itself an essential outcome. Russia’s war in Ukraine is the greatest threat to the transatlantic alliance in decades, and defeating Moscow is critical to protecting global security. It is also important for protecting liberal values and ideals. At a time when democratic institutions are under stress, a resounding win in Ukraine would be a victory for democracy over authoritarianism—a chance to revitalize liberalism, as the Biden administration aims to do.
Creating more “frozen conflicts” (which are never actually frozen) is not the answer in Ukraine. The United States has a window of opportunity to shift the trajectory of the war in the country so that Russia is forced not just to stop but to fully retreat. This will require swift action and resolute vision, with a laser-beam focus on victory. Now is not the time for handwringing and timidity.
20. What the PLA Is Learning From Russia’s Ukraine Invasion
We all must be learning.
Remember that the Gulf War and the 1990's revolution in military affairs (and growing US military technical dominance) "gave us" the seminal work of "Unrestricted Warfare" from the two PLPA colonels. How will Unrestricted Warfare be updated after Putin's War?
Excerpt:
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine is no less significant than the 1990 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War in strategic studies. The previous two wars enabled the PLA to make new observations and learn new things, eventually contributing to the modernization of China’s military thought.
Be that as it may, war is still an extension of politics. A small country may have sufficient courage and will to make a bellicose big country think twice before using force. The best defense, however, is to have the ability to prevent war, which hinges on sufficient preparation for war. The question for Taiwan is how its people can build the will to defeat the enemy, how Taiwan’s military can formulate a strategy that can deter the enemy from attacking, and how Taiwan can use foreign diplomacy to create an environment where no war is possible. The aim is to prevent a crisis situation in the Taiwan Strait from escalating into full-blown conflict, namely to make China know better than to rush into military action. This is where the national strategy of a small country like Taiwan should lead.
What the PLA Is Learning From Russia’s Ukraine Invasion
China is watching Russia’s military mistakes in Ukraine and will apply those lessons to its battle planning for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
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On February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine in what Moscow calls a “special military operation.” The ongoing war has already had a great impact on the whole world. China, in particular, has become a focus of attention in the international community because of its close interactions with Russia in recent years. Its stance on the armed conflict in Ukraine is a matter of great concern to many countries, especially to Western ones.
Militarily, the war will leave a lasting impact. Although the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), acting on lessons learned from the 2003 Iraq War, has built joint operations capabilities in the style of U.S. forces and has come up with its own version, known as integrated joint operations, China’s military remains structurally under the influence of the Russian military. This helps explain why in the PLA’s most recent round of reforms in 2016, there were discernible traces of influence from Russia’s previous military restructuring of the same kind. Because of that, Russian forces’ performance on the battlefield in Ukraine has become a case study for the PLA to glean lessons from.
Will the mistakes made by the Russian military after its restructuring and the problems with its command mechanism stemming from organizational design be repeated by the PLA in its future military operations? This possibility is quite concerning for Chinese military planners, particularly because Russian forces, despite having been considered superior to their Ukrainian counterparts prior to the war, are now in a stalemate where there is no sure win for either side. Will the PLA end up in the same situation if it attacks Taiwan?
Air and Sea Blockade vs. Direct Attacks on Enemy Headquarters
In terms of military strength, Ukraine alone could not hold out against invading Russian forces for more than a month. It can keep on fighting mainly because of support from the United States, member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other partners such as Japan and Australia. That support comes in the form of military supplies, including electronic jamming equipment, to be used against Russian forces. The support brings a new dimension to the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
In the event of an armed conflict between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, the United States may directly deploy troops, as it did when dispatching two aircraft carrier battle groups to waters near Taiwan during the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. However, it does not mean that the U.S. will not get involved at all, as the war in Ukraine has shown. Although the U.S. and NATO member states do not have a direct military presence on the Ukrainian battlefield, they have been providing assistance to Ukrainian troops via satellites, electronic warfare aircraft of various types, and early warning aircraft. With a constant flow of electronic signals from these countries, Ukrainian forces have been able to anticipate Russian movements ahead of time, as seen in quite a few instances of Russian forces suffering deadly attacks. In other words, although the U.S. military might not necessarily be directly involved in an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the future, it could still provide electronic intelligence to Taiwan to help the island defend against invaders effectively.
The takeaway for China is that the PLA, in any would-be campaign against Taiwan in the future, should take an approach quite distinct from the tactics of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), as it is commonly understood. Specifically, the PLA can assume that the U.S. military will not be directly involved in a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. It will rather be indirectly involved in a way similar to what it has been rumored to be doing in the ongoing armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, namely providing electronic intelligence to friendly forces. Faced with the U.S. military’s possible new way of playing a part in a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, the PLA, in its execution of “joint operations against a big island” (a euphemism for invading Taiwan) and in pursuit of the objective of “first engagement as decisive engagement,” will factor in more variables.
Contrary to speculations by all sides shortly after the breakout of the war, Russian forces failed to take Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, within a short period of time, resulting in the war becoming a prolonged one that could be quite unfavorable to Moscow in the long run. Taking advantage of the situation, Western countries sped up their provision of arms to Ukraine to assist with its resistance against Russian invaders. This development might stimulate the PLA to consider new tactics to ensure the success of any landing operations (whether amphibious or triphibious) against Taiwan. Those options could include enforcing an air and sea blockade against Taiwan to prevent other countries from providing assistance to it and employing superior air and sea forces to block the Taiwan Strait from interference in the form of other countries’ electronic reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft.
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However, the greatest difference between Taiwan and Ukraine in terms of geopolitics and associated strategy is that the former is an island while the latter is a continental country. Air and sea forces have a bigger role to play in Taiwan. In other words, if Taiwan starts using its ground forces to fend off invaders, it means that the PLA has already gained partial command of the air and the sea, a prerequisite for the launch of landing operations. Under the circumstances, Taiwan’s ground forces need to have high mobility and modularized field air defense capabilities so as to be able to strike back despite the enemy gaining command of the air.
Airports vs. Amphibious Assault Ships
In the first 72 hours of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, paratroopers were tasked with the mission of advancing on Kyiv within the shortest time possible so as to achieve the objective of “first engagement as decisive engagement,” which was based on the scenario that occupying Ukraine’s political center quickly would not only achieve the effect of decapitation but also contribute to the establishment of a pro-Russia regime to better control Ukraine afterwards.
Things did not turn out as planned, however. Russian air assault troops could not fulfill the mission of seizing Kyiv in a prompt manner. They even had to withdraw in mid-April from positions around Kyiv, which they had occupied to encircle the capital. Only some Russian troops stayed in northern Ukraine to check Ukrainian forces there. Russian forces’ failure to take Kyiv was mainly attributed to their inability to occupy Antonov Airport shortly after the breakout of the invasion. Although Russian airtroopers managed to control the airport within a short time, artillery shelling from Ukrainian forces rendered the airport unsuitable for plane landings and takeoffs. Russian forces’ reach was greatly restricted as a result
In addition, although Russian forces have high-altitude airspace under their control, their fighter planes and helicopters are prone to attacks from Ukrainian field air defense systems while flying at low altitudes. There have been quite a few instances of Russian helicopters and fighter planes executing close air support missions being hit by U.S.-made Stinger missiles fired by Ukrainian soldiers. The main reason that similar incidents continue to happen again and again is that Ukrainian forces have established sufficient field air defense systems for defense against Russian invaders. Also, Russian helicopters might have flown too deep into enemy airspace.
The lesson is that lightly armed air assault troops conducting airborne landings in an area with important military assets like airports are very likely to lose the positions they have just taken to enemy troops several times their number. And if enemy forces own drone-guided field air defense systems, any airports taken from them will in all likelihood not be able to operate normally. That might be the reason why Russian forces, even when they had control, could not use Antonov Airport in a way that could help them achieve the goal of occupying Kyiv within 72 hours.
By contrast, the PLA does not need to seize Taiwan’s airports. Different from Ukraine, which boasts favorable operational terrain and depth, the entirety of Taiwan lies within the reach of the PLA’s projection power, despite having a strait to separate it from mainland China. The PLA has been working hard on improving its ability to project forces across the Taiwan Strait over the years.
It means that China does not need to capture and use Taiwan’s airports. The PLA only needs to disable them by launching intensive missile strikes on the runways of these airports. The PLA could use aircraft carriers or Type 075 amphibious assault ships to project air power instead, without having to take the trouble to preserve Taiwan’s airports at the cost of incurring danger for itself.
Unlike the Type 071 amphibious assault ship, the Type 075 has a full-length flight deck for helicopter operations, bringing about great changes to the PLA’s amphibious operations. The main task for the Type 075 is to carry a considerable number of helicopters and, along with heavy air-cushion landing craft, contribute to landings on beaches to penetrate the defense lines of the enemy.
In the scenarios mentioned above, the biggest problem facing the PLA is that its main amphibious forces, whether the marine corps or amphibious combined arms brigades of the army, do not have helicopter-borne assault elements. Previously, helicopter-borne assault forces were mostly assigned to the 15th Airborne Corps, which has been transformed into the Air Force Airborne Corps in the most recent round of military reform. However, as shown by its own name, the Air Force Airborne Corps is under the control of the air force, and thus not suitable for joint operations in modern-day ground warfare.
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To deal with the problem, starting from 2017, the PLA has transferred helicopter-borne troops of the Air Force Airborne Corps to the army’s aviation branch. The biggest problem that the PLA Army has encountered in its efforts to develop the aviation branch is that the branch’s main task is to provide fire support for ground forces, without developing an equivalent capability in transporting personnel. There has been a shortage of large helicopters like Taiwan’s CH-47 Chinooks to transport heavy artillery to the battlefield. This is a point that we will keep watching out for in days to come.
Conclusion
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine is no less significant than the 1990 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War in strategic studies. The previous two wars enabled the PLA to make new observations and learn new things, eventually contributing to the modernization of China’s military thought.
Be that as it may, war is still an extension of politics. A small country may have sufficient courage and will to make a bellicose big country think twice before using force. The best defense, however, is to have the ability to prevent war, which hinges on sufficient preparation for war. The question for Taiwan is how its people can build the will to defeat the enemy, how Taiwan’s military can formulate a strategy that can deter the enemy from attacking, and how Taiwan can use foreign diplomacy to create an environment where no war is possible. The aim is to prevent a crisis situation in the Taiwan Strait from escalating into full-blown conflict, namely to make China know better than to rush into military action. This is where the national strategy of a small country like Taiwan should lead.
GUEST AUTHOR
Ying-Yu Lin
Dr. Ying-Yu Lin is an adjunct assistant professor at the International Master Program in Asia-Pacific Affairs, National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan. He is also a research fellow with the Association of Strategic Foresight. Lin received his Ph.D from the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University. His research interests include the development of PLA capabilities and cybersecurity issues.
21. The Endless War in Ukraine By Douglas Macgregor
I wonder how those "Macgregor units" in Breaking the Phalanx would fare in Ukraine?
Excerpts:
Meanwhile, Americans outside of the Washington bubble are beginning to see the Biden Administration and its supporting cast in congress as an old warship at sea that is “not under command;” a battleship without a captain that behaves like a runaway train. There is a sense that in the absence of strong presidential leadership, moral posturing in U.S. foreign policy eventually translates into pressure for U.S. military action against Russia that, given the choice, most Americans do not want.
Washington’s ruling political class thinks it stands so high as to be out of the reach of fate and accountability. It’s not the case. The last 20 years of failed military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have taught Americans that moral pretensions do not make America stronger. In truth, conflicts fought in the name of lofty moral principles intensify violence and make realistic postwar settlements difficult, if not possible. Nowhere is this difficulty more pronounced than in Ukraine.
The Endless War in Ukraine
President Joe Biden and the U.S. Congress have committed the American People to a moral crusade designed to justify an open-ended proxy war in Ukraine against Russia. Proxy war—a conflict in which the U.S. is aligned with a belligerent (Ukraine) but is not directly involved—appeals to Washington because Ukrainians, not Americans, fight or die in the conflict.
Of course, blurring the line between war and peace with Moscow is dangerous; only more so in Ukraine, because Russian Military Operations cannot be stopped unless the American People are prepared to go to war. This recognition has not prevented an expanding U.S. military commitment to Ukraine in the form of military advice and materiel assistance, but U.S. assistance cannot change the reality that more weapons and better intelligence support from Washington and its NATO allies will not secure victory for Ukrainian Forces.
Consider history. America’s war against Japan in the Pacific was decided more by the sheer weight of U.S. Naval Power than by any specific weapon system or platform. The war in Ukraine is no different. New weapon systems in the hands of Ukrainian forces compelled Russian formations to adjust their tactics, but Russian strategy toward Ukraine is unchanged.
There is little doubt that the massive influx of weapon systems from the U.S. and its NATO allies has extended the war in Ukraine well beyond its normal end point, but forces that are immobilized in defensive positions do not win wars. In war, the exaggerated faith in human courage and will power is always a poor answer to overwhelming, accurate, and devastating firepower.
Before sending more weapons to Ukraine, President Biden and his bipartisan supporters in the Senate might want to reconsider fighting the war to the last Ukrainian. Washington must explain to the American People what the U.S. gains strategically by sacrificing Ukraine in a war Ukrainians cannot win. Otherwise, Washington’s ruling class will end up like President Lyndon Johnson and his Cabinet in George Ball’s words, “Like a flock of buzzards sitting on a fence, sending the young men off to be killed.”
Washington’s timing for the proxy war in Ukraine is also problematic for reasons that have nothing to do with Ukraine. President Biden’s approval ratings are falling through the basement. Thanks to open borders, Illegal drug, and human trafficking is occurring on an industrial scale to the point where fentanyl is now the leading cause of death for Americans ages 18 through 45.
America’s economy is decelerating and sliding into recession, or worse. Supply chain disruptions that predate the war in Ukraine are worsening with the result that global prices, especially for oil, natural gas, food, and fertilizer are soaring. It’s no surprise that beyond the confines of the Washington Beltway, many Americans think public order and the rule of law, the hallmarks of American Civilization, are breaking down.
There is no doubt that the Western information campaign that demonizes Russia and ignores the last 30 years of U.S. policy decisions that made the conflict in Ukraine inevitable has had an impact. Few, if any, Western News Media point out that in Ukraine, media are treated as an instrument for state interests. The tendency is to blacken Russia’s image and results in an acute lack of Western interest in discovering crimes that Ukrainian forces perpetrate.
Thanks to politicized American media that largely exclude political views that challenge the Biden Administration’s prevailing narrative on Ukraine, there are plenty of senior officers in the Pentagon and in U.S. European Command embraces the idea of war with Russia. In addition to believing that Washington is morally obligated to lead another dubious Wilsonian crusade for human rights and liberal democracy in Eastern Europe, many senior officers also harbor concerns that Russian success in Ukraine will further weaken America’s national credibility; a motive for the 1965 decision to intervene in Vietnam.
Meanwhile, Americans outside of the Washington bubble are beginning to see the Biden Administration and its supporting cast in congress as an old warship at sea that is “not under command;” a battleship without a captain that behaves like a runaway train. There is a sense that in the absence of strong presidential leadership, moral posturing in U.S. foreign policy eventually translates into pressure for U.S. military action against Russia that, given the choice, most Americans do not want.
Washington’s ruling political class thinks it stands so high as to be out of the reach of fate and accountability. It’s not the case. The last 20 years of failed military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have taught Americans that moral pretensions do not make America stronger. In truth, conflicts fought in the name of lofty moral principles intensify violence and make realistic postwar settlements difficult, if not possible. Nowhere is this difficulty more pronounced than in Ukraine.
Douglas Macgregor, Col. (ret.) is a senior fellow with The American Conservative, the former advisor to the Secretary of Defense in the Trump administration, a decorated combat veteran, and the author of five books. His latest is Margin of Victory, (Naval Institute Press, 2016).
22. Indo-Pacific Economic Framework: Why America Must Ensure Taiwan Is Included
Excerpts:
Not since the 1990s has there been a more decisive decade ahead, and the Biden Administration has a strategic opportunity to repatch the wires of the economic order with the proposed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and craft a novel approach to multilateral economic engagement that can truly bring democracies closer together. No other democratic ally of the United States is under as much threat, more deserving to be a part of this initiative, and arguably critical to its success than Taiwan.
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework: Why America Must Ensure Taiwan Is Included
The growing power of revisionist authoritarian regimes is fundamentally rewiring the norms and institutions of the existing rules-based order. Despite the immediate consequences of war, the tools they are wielding that have the most long-term transformative effects on the existing order are not military power but state-led economic power. While seriously contending with authoritarian hard power is mission-critical to prevailing in a future military conflict (made all the more real by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine), these tools have limited applicability in other critical domains in strategic competition among great powers and signaling on matters that have a more proximate effect on the political intercourse that will define the features of the existing order. To compete effectively with this type of challenge, democracies need to strengthen their economic ties with one another.
The Biden Administration’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan appropriately diagnosed that “[m]uch of what we think of as ‘power’ will be measured and exercised in the 21st century in economic terms. According to trade and technology.” For its part, the Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy has accurately prescribed committing more diplomatic and security resources to the Indo-Pacific region. This effort requires robust economic commitments as well. Ostensibly in recognition of this need after the former administration pulled out of the TPP, the Biden Administration has formally indicated its intent to launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to develop a “novel approach to promoting durable, broad-based economic growth.”
The IPEF, however, cannot stand alone. President Biden’s decision to convene the Summit for Democracy in December 2021 should be applauded. It represents a bold initiative when the world is at a critical geopolitical inflection point. Yet, if the Biden Administration is serious about leading in the Indo-Pacific, and not least preserve but advance a rules-based order, it cannot rely simply on military strength; a robust, affirmative, and inclusive economic agenda is critical to its overall success. Towards that end, President Biden is right to try to bring democracies and market economies closer together to shape the rules of the road and promote their shared interests. This is an opportunity not presented since the 1990s after the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union.
Yet, the signals currently coming out of Washington on IPEF, however, are troubling, especially since the Biden Administration appears non-committal at best about the prospects of including Taiwan—a leading democratically, Asian economic and technological power—to become a member of this new initiative, even as it invited Taipei to participate in the Summit for Democracy.
On its own merits, there are no doubts that Taiwan can substantially contribute to most pillars of interest under IPEF considerations: 1) digital and emerging technologies; 2) supply chain resilience; 3) infrastructure; 4) clean energy, 5) decarbonization; 7) tax; and 8) anti-corruption.
The Biden Administration can and should make clear that including Taiwan in IPEF is not about poking China—it implicates nothing about the sovereign status of Taiwan—it is about facilitating a high-standard economic framework in the region with a robust Asian economic and technological power in the 21st century. Moreover, including Taiwan in IPEF is not about supporting its independence but the need to ensure that a robust democracy, free-market economy, reliable and constructive partner of the US in the heart of the Indo-Pacific is able to participate in the emerging economic order.
As China’s coercive behaviors increases, including Taiwan as a part of a multilateral economic framework led by the United States, while certainly ambitious and challenging, is arguably as if not more effective for providing for its overall security than even a bilateral trade agreement or even some provisions of military assistance. Also, Taiwan is particularly vulnerable to trade disruptions and excluding Taiwan in IPEF would leave it more susceptible to China’s coercion, especially since other economies would be more unwilling to bear the brunt of political pressure from Beijing.
If these trends are left unaddressed in the face of rapid regional economic integration through initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, it would further marginalize and isolate Taiwan—which is what Beijing wants. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Randy Schriver recently stated concerning the matter of Taiwan’s inclusion in IPEF: “The absence of support [for Taiwan] falls short of the administration’s own integrated deterrence policy, which it claims to promote in its relationship with Taiwan.”
While there is truth to concerns that some countries may be hesitant to join the IPEF if it included Taiwan, as long as the United States is willing to lead the effort, it may find more support than expected for the initiative among Indo-Pacific economies—even if it included Taiwan. The same logic applies to the Trump Administration’s inclusion of Taiwan in its Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom.
As the Biden Administration considers the path forward for IPEF, it should take note that leaving Taiwan out of IPEF would represent a missed opportunity to signal that it is serious about enhancing greater solidarity among global democracies and crafting a novel approach to multilateral economic engagement. Indeed, it should not be forgotten that signaling was the primary motivation behind the UK’s push for a trade agreement with the US in 1938. And, as former US Trade Ambassador Mike Froman, noted “signaling was as important as economics to the United States’ first-ever free-trade agreement, which was concluded with Israel in 1985.”
Not since the 1990s has there been a more decisive decade ahead, and the Biden Administration has a strategic opportunity to repatch the wires of the economic order with the proposed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and craft a novel approach to multilateral economic engagement that can truly bring democracies closer together. No other democratic ally of the United States is under as much threat, more deserving to be a part of this initiative, and arguably critical to its success than Taiwan.
Russell Hsiao is the executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute, a senior fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, and an adjunct fellow at Pacific Forum.
23. Next Phase of War Will Be Pivotal for Russia and Ukraine, U.S. Says
Excerpts:
As Russian forces push into the Donbas, they will extend their supply lines and could confront the same logistics shortfalls that bedeviled them before, officials said.
“We’ll see in the next few weeks how much they’ve learned and how much they’ve fixed,” General Hodges said.
Even if Russian forces prevail in the next month or so, the specter of that army then advancing on western Ukraine or beyond Ukraine’s borders — a real fear at the start of the war — now seems far-fetched, several officials said.
“Win, lose or draw, the Russian military is likely to be a spent force after this next phase,” said Michael Kofman, the director of Russia studies at CNA, a research institute in Arlington, Va. “Russia would be hard-pressed to sustain any campaign beyond the Donbas.”
But the senior Defense Department official warned that for Mr. Putin, all of Ukraine — not just the Donbas — has always been the ultimate prize.
Next Phase of War Will Be Pivotal for Russia and Ukraine, U.S. Says
April 21, 2022, 5:24 p.m. ETApril 21, 2022
April 21, 2022
April 21, 2022, 5:24 p.m. ET
A Russian rocket struck a residential neighborhood in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on Thursday. U.S. officials still expect the war to be long and grinding.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
WASHINGTON — Senior Biden administration officials say they believe that the next four weeks will shape the eventual outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine, with long-lasting ramifications that will influence the drawing of the map of Europe for decades to come.
While the officials still expect the war to be long and grinding, they say that it is imperative to rush Ukraine as many new weapons as possible — especially long-range artillery and anti-artillery radar — to push back Russia’s new advance in the eastern Donbas region.
Reflecting the renewed sense of urgency, President Biden announced on Thursday that the United States would send Ukraine an additional $800 million in military aid, the second such package in just over a week.
Mr. Biden said the latest aid package sent “an unmistakable message” to President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia: “He will never succeed in dominating and occupying all of Ukraine.”
In remarks at the White House, Mr. Biden said that while the United States would announce many details of the arms it is shipping to Ukraine, some of the weaponry would be kept secret. The president borrowed, and modified, a famous line by Theodore Roosevelt, saying that the United States would “speak softly and carry a large Javelin,” a reference to the antitank weapon that the Ukrainians have used effectively against Russian armor.
Determined to move swiftly, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III and Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke with allies around the world this week and characterized the next month as pivotal.
If Russia can push through in the east, Mr. Putin will be better positioned at home to sell his so-called “special military operation” as a limited success and claim he has secured protection for Ukraine’s pro-Russia minority, American officials said. He might then seek a cease-fire but would be emboldened to use the Donbas as leverage in any negotiations, they said. The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss operational matters.
But if the Ukrainian military can stop Russia’s advance in the Donbas, officials say Mr. Putin will be faced with a stark choice: commit more combat power to a fight that could drag on for years or negotiate in earnest at peace talks.
The first option might mean a full national mobilization, officials say, and is politically risky for the Russian leader.
The next phase of the war “will be critically important,” said Peter Maurer, the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, who visited Ukraine in March. “The escalation of hostilities in Donbas, and all areas affected by the armed conflict, is of utmost concern.”
At the Pentagon this week, both Mr. Austin and General Milley have had nonstop phone calls and meetings with allies centered on one topic: weapons. Mr. Austin spoke with his Romanian counterpart on Monday and with the Spanish defense minister on Tuesday. On Wednesday, he met with the Polish defense minister, and on Thursday, he huddled with his Czech counterpart.
President Biden with Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III, center, and Gen. Mark A. Milley, right, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the White House on Wednesday. On Thursday, Mr. Biden announced an additional $800 million in military aid for Ukraine.Credit...Sarahbeth Maney/The New York Times
With all four, the discussions were the same, officials said: how to ship more powerful weapons to Ukraine in the coming weeks.
After weeks of focusing on antitank and antiaircraft weaponry like Javelins and Stingers, the new shipments over the last week have included long-range artillery, tactical vehicles and mobile radar systems to help the Ukrainians detect and destroy Russian artillery positions.
Other countries are sending tanks, more artillery and anti-ship missiles.
General Milley’s phone log this week looks like a roll call of countries with heavy artillery and weaponry: Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Turkey.
A senior Defense Department official described the next month as a crucial turning point for both Russia and Ukraine. This phase of the battle ostensibly favors Russia to some degree, as Russian troops move over more open terrain as opposed to getting bogged down in cities.
But the official said the Pentagon believed that with the right weapons and a continuation of high morale and motivation, the Ukrainian forces might not only stop the Russian advance, but also push it back.
“The Russians are in a weakened state from which they may well be able to recover given enough time and new conscripts,” said Evelyn N. Farkas, the top Pentagon policy official for Russia and Ukraine during the Obama administration, when Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula. “Therefore, it is paramount to strike at them now with everything we can give the Ukrainians.”
Current and former U.S. military commanders with experience in Ukraine and Europe agreed.
“It is make or break for Ukraine in that they must stop the Russian advance to seize all of the Donbas,” Maj. Gen. Michael S. Repass, a retired former commander of U.S. Special Operations forces in Europe who has been involved with Ukrainian defense matters since 2016, wrote in an email.
If Mr. Putin succeeds in seizing the east and establishes a land corridor to Crimea, General Repass said that Moscow would have a stronger position in any negotiated settlement.
“In another month, I anticipate exhaustion on both sides without a military decision/outcome either way,” General Repass wrote. “A stalemate means Putin wins, and if Putin ‘wins’ we are in for a rough ride.”
To try to prevent such an outcome, current and former American commanders say Ukraine’s army will seek to disrupt Russia’s military buildup around the eastern city of Izium and other important staging areas with long-range artillery and armed drone attacks.
“It is also about disrupting the Russians while they are still in reconstitution and preparation mode, before they can really get back up on their feet,” said Lt. Gen. Frederick B. Hodges, a former top U.S. Army commander in Europe who is now with the Center for European Policy Analysis.
Even as Moscow narrows its goals and consolidates its army in southern and eastern Ukraine, the outcome of the war remains unclear at best, military analysts said. Indeed, the underlying weaknesses in the Russian force, which were exposed in the early weeks of the conflict, have not necessarily gone away, they said.
For instance, the thousands of Russian reinforcements pouring into Ukraine — including mercenaries, conscripts and troops pulled from far eastern Russia and Georgia — have not trained together, analysts said.
Ukrainian soldiers towed a captured Russian tank in Nova Basan, Ukraine, this month. As Russian forces push into the Donbas, they will extend their supply lines and could confront the same logistics shortfalls that bedeviled them before, officials said.Credit...Ivor Prickett for The New York Times
The battered units that retreated from northern Ukraine will also need time to regroup. Some will be replenished and sent back to the fight. But others are so damaged that their remaining pieces will be patched together into one new unit, analysts said.
“They don’t have many options for generating new forces if the current units face too much attrition,” said Rob Lee, a Russian military specialist at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and a former U.S. Marine officer.
“Once this offensive begins in earnest, Russia will face more losses,” Mr. Lee said. “At a certain point, attrition will be too great and will limit the Russian military’s ability to effectively conduct offensive operations.”
As Russian forces push into the Donbas, they will extend their supply lines and could confront the same logistics shortfalls that bedeviled them before, officials said.
“We’ll see in the next few weeks how much they’ve learned and how much they’ve fixed,” General Hodges said.
Even if Russian forces prevail in the next month or so, the specter of that army then advancing on western Ukraine or beyond Ukraine’s borders — a real fear at the start of the war — now seems far-fetched, several officials said.
“Win, lose or draw, the Russian military is likely to be a spent force after this next phase,” said Michael Kofman, the director of Russia studies at CNA, a research institute in Arlington, Va. “Russia would be hard-pressed to sustain any campaign beyond the Donbas.”
But the senior Defense Department official warned that for Mr. Putin, all of Ukraine — not just the Donbas — has always been the ultimate prize.
24. FDD | China’s COVID-19 Crisis Threatens to Derail Xi’s Ambitious Economic Agenda
Excerpts:
Still, in an attempt to stabilize China’s economy, Xi will probably embrace some policies that run counter to his autarkic agenda. Those include bailouts for China’s distressed housing sector and additional stimulus for private-sector entities, as well as a concerted push to restart manufacturing to sustain export-driven growth.
Interestingly, U.S. policymakers could potentially leverage China’s continued reliance on Western capital and technology to shape Xi’s behavior, at least in the short to medium term. Selectively deepening China’s dependence on the United States in certain sectors could constrain his appetite for antagonizing Washington while he struggles to sustain China’s economic recovery.
FDD | China’s COVID-19 Crisis Threatens to Derail Xi’s Ambitious Economic Agenda
fdd.org · by Craig Singleton Senior Fellow · April 21, 2022
The fallout from Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping’s failed zero-COVID-19 policies threatens to undermine public trust in CCP governance in ways not seen since the Tiananmen era. To maintain economic and social stability, Xi will probably have to temporarily abandon some elements of his ambitious macro-economic agenda, thereby delaying his goal of reducing China’s reliance on overseas markets.
Following a COVID-19 surge, approximately 373 million people living in 45 Chinese cities have come under some form of lockdown since March. Residents in lockdown cannot leave their homes, even to purchase food, and are subject to mandatory, sometimes daily, COVID-19 testing. Authorities have also begun forcibly evicting citizens so their homes can be converted into quarantine shelters. Rising caseloads have strained China’s hospital system, leaving the country’s at-risk populations, including the elderly, unable to access basic healthcare services.
Desperate, frustrated citizens have begun sharing anti-CCP content on Chinese social media, the sheer volume of which has overwhelmed censors. In Shanghai, the separation of COVID-19-positive children from their parents led to a virtual uproar, after which officials reversed the policy. Details about rampant food shortages have also been disseminated widely, as have reports regarding sporadic protests.
The prevalence and tone of anti-CCP social media content suggests that citizens are extremely dissatisfied with Xi’s handling of the outbreak and increasingly skeptical about the CCP’s COVID-19 surveillance protocols. Some pro-government figures, such as Hu Xijin, the former editor of the state-run tabloid Global Times, have stated that reports about civil unrest reinforce impressions that the fight against COVID-19 is “overwhelming” officials.
Lockdowns are also battering China’s economy, leading Premier Li Keqiang to issue several stark warnings about China’s economic outlook. While China’s GDP grew by 4.8 percent during the first quarter of 2022, Chinese government statistics attributed much of this growth to export-driven activities recorded before the lockdowns. After lockdowns were ordered, the unemployment rate in 31 major Chinese cities rose to 6 percent, a record high. Among those aged 16 to 24, unemployment increased to 16 percent.
COVID-19-related disruptions also dragged down China’s hyper-leveraged housing sector, which accounts for roughly one-third of Chinese GDP. Home sales plunged 25.6 percent in the first quarter, while new construction starts dropped 17.5 percent. Real estate conglomerates, including troubled developer Evergrande, refused to release 2021 earnings data, raising concerns about their liquidity. Meanwhile, the closure of Shanghai’s container port, the world’s largest, has stranded hundreds of cargo vessels offshore, exacerbating existing supply chain disruptions.
China now appears unlikely to achieve its annual growth target of “around 5.5 percent,” and Xi’s poor handling of the crisis is leading many Chinese citizens to question the CCP’s stewardship. The longer lockdowns remain in effect, the higher the probability of social unrest. Nevertheless, Xi is unlikely to retreat from his zero-COVID-19 campaign. Doing so would undermine the CCP’s claims regarding the superiority of China’s political system and would damage Xi’s legitimacy given that state-run media have portrayed him as “personally issuing commands” in China’s battle against COVID-19.
Still, in an attempt to stabilize China’s economy, Xi will probably embrace some policies that run counter to his autarkic agenda. Those include bailouts for China’s distressed housing sector and additional stimulus for private-sector entities, as well as a concerted push to restart manufacturing to sustain export-driven growth.
Interestingly, U.S. policymakers could potentially leverage China’s continued reliance on Western capital and technology to shape Xi’s behavior, at least in the short to medium term. Selectively deepening China’s dependence on the United States in certain sectors could constrain his appetite for antagonizing Washington while he struggles to sustain China’s economic recovery.
Craig Singleton, a national security expert and former U.S. diplomat, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’s China Program. For more analysis from Craig and the China Program, please subscribe HERE. Follow Craig on Twitter @CraigMSingleton. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Craig Singleton Senior Fellow · April 21, 2022
25. Ukraine War News - April 22, 2022 | SOF News
Ukraine War News - April 22, 2022 | SOF News
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO. Additional topics include refugees, internally displaced personnel, humanitarian efforts, cyber, weapons shipments, and information operations.
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Big Picture of the Conflict
What Does Russia Want? The answer to the question is best approached in the context of time. The pre-invasion goals have certainly been modified. Perhaps the minimal goals of Russia were always set as a ‘land bridge‘ from the Russian border, through the Donbas region along the coast of the Sea of Azov to Crimea. Beyond that, are a host of objectives that the Russians had hoped to achieve.
And the Gas Fields? Was one of the objectives the vast gas reserves of Ukraine? The country has Europe’s second-largest known reserves of natural gas, about 80 percent located east of the Dnipro River. Krystyna Marcinek argues that the advantages of owning the Ukrainian gas fields appear too small to justify the costs of the invasion, are too hard to occupy, and almost impossible for Russia to exploit. “Russia Does Not Seem to be After Ukraine’s Gas Reserves”, RAND Corporation, April 11, 2022.
Donbas Offensive? There are numerous reports that the Russians have launched their long-awaited offensive for the capture of the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. The past few days have seen an increase in artillery, rocket, and missile attacks. Attacks are taking place along a large front with some small gains made by the Russians. Thus far there hasn’t been a lot of ‘shock and awe’. Victory by May 9th? Some military analysts are suggesting that the next two weeks will see a major push by Russia to secure more territorial gains in Donbas – in time for the annual May 9 Victory Day parade.
Airpower. Ukraine’s air force is a little bit bigger now than it was a few weeks back. The shipment of airplane parts and components to Ukraine has helped them repair and put into service more airframes. The country started the war in the latter part of February with over 70 combat aircraft but has suffered some losses over the past two months. An increase of 20 aircraft is a significant event for the Ukrainians. “Ukraine Resurrects 20 planes with fresh spare parts”, Coffee or Die Magazine, April 20, 2022.
Maritime Activities. The fight over eastern Ukraine is, for the most part, a land war. However, one observer of the conflict argues that the U.S. and others are affected by “sea blindness”. He provides a detailed account of the ‘maritime war’ taking place within the larger context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. “The Russo-Ukrainian War at Sea: Retrospect and Prospect”, War on the Rocks, B.J. Armstrong, April 21, 2022.
Tactical Situation
Mariupol – Operation Cancelled? Victory Declared! In a public forum President Putin ordered his Russian troops to hold off on any clearing operation of the Azovstal steel plant in Mariupol where the last of the city’s defenders (probably about 2,000?) are making a final stand. At least half of the Ukrainian combatants are wounded, with some still fighting. There are reported to be between 1,000 to 2,000 civilians – most of them women and children – in tunnels and bunkers underneath the huge industrial complex. Located on the Sea of Azov, the coastal city of Mariupol has been under siege by the Russians for almost two months. This city is situated along the coastal road network that would provide Russia with a land bridge between Russia and the Crimea. Read more in “Putin calls off storming of Mariupol steel plant, tells Shoigu to blockade it”, The Washington Examiner, April 21, 2022.
President Zelensky said on Thursday (Apr 21) that Ukraine is preparing to ‘unblock’ Mariupol through military or diplomatic means. It is doubtful Ukraine can relieve the city and break the Russian encirclement. The Russians will likely just attempt to ‘starve’ the remaining defenders out. The Russians have about 12 BTGs deployed in Mariupol – not clearing the industrial complex with free up some of these BTGs for the fight in other parts of the Donbas region.
Situation Maps. Russia now has 85 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in Ukraine, many of them committed to the Donbas offensive. The Russians have made only minimal gains in the Donbas region in the last few days. The Ukrainians have been successful in stopping Russian advances in the area around Izyum. War in Ukraine by Scribble Maps. Read an assessment of the Russian offensive campaign by the Institute for the Study or War (April 21, 2022). View more Ukraine SITMAPs that provide updates on the disposition of Russian forces.
General Information
Negotiations. Other than prisoner exchanges – last count there were six conducted – not much has happened in the way of negotiating an end to the conflict. On Thursday, the Ukrainian government announced another prisoner exchange. 19 Ukrainian POWs were released including ten soldiers and nine civilians – some of whom were wounded.
Refugees, IDPs, and and a U.S. Welcome. View the UNHCR Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation (Updated daily), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine. President Biden announced a new process to welcome Ukrainians fleeing Russia’s invasion. It is called “Uniting for Ukraine”. Read a news release by the Department of Homeland Security on the topic (Apr 21, 2022).
Tanks. When the war started Russia’s military was cited as having ten times the number of tanks than Ukraine – many of them spread throughout Russia. The number of tanks that Russia invaded Ukraine with in late February certainly outnumbered those of Ukraine. But now it appears that imbalance has been modified. Ukraine now has (at least according to the Pentagon) more tanks in Ukraine than Russia. This is due to the huge armor losses Russia has sustained through combat, abandonment, or maintenance breakdown. Ukraine has been capturing damaged or abandoned Russian tanks, fixing them, and returning them to combat with Ukrainian crews. In addition, Soviet-era tanks are arriving from East European countries as well.
A Little Tank History. A museum and warehouse at Fort Benning houses some Russian tanks, some captured during the 1911 Gulf War. The Army’s Cavalry and Armor Collection allows soldiers to climb over and into Soviet-era tanks to learn more about them. “What this old Russian tank tells us about the invasion of Ukraine”, Task & Purpose, April 21, 2022.
Cyber and Information Operations
Moscow’s Propaganda Spokesperson. A U.S. State Department news release highlights the role of Dmitri Peskov – a Russian who has served as Vladimir Putin’s spokesperson since 2008. He has played a key role in propaganda and disinformation campaigns over the decade and more. “Faces of Kremlin Propaganda: Dmitri Peskov”, U.S. Department of State, April 18, 2022.
‘Signaling’ – Russia and U.S. Methods. Putin has been ‘signaling’ to the West and United States that nuclear weapons may be a consideration if they escalate their support for Ukraine. While many are dismissing these threats as posturing, some observers are wondering if the West should do some ‘signaling’ of their own. And that perhaps the use of cyber operations could be a signaling response. However, some critics believe (the authors of this article) the potential implications of misperceptions surrounding cyber operations targeting nuclear systems during a crisis with a nuclear-armed adversary are simply too significant. “Cyber Signaling and Nuclear Deterrence: Implications for the Ukraine Crisis”, War on the Rocks, April 21, 2022.
Will Russia Step up Cyber Attacks? Now that the Donbas offensive is underway, many analysts believe that Moscow will increase its cyberattacks both in Ukraine and around the world. The U.S. critical infrastructure could be a future target according to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Several recommendations were outlined by CISA to mitigate the Russian cyber threat. “Russia May Ramp Up Cyber Attacks as Putin Pushes into Donbas, U.S. Warns”, Newsweek, April 20, 2022.
World Response
Sanctions – Hurting Russia’s Military. The ability of Russia to resupply its forces has been diminished due to economic sanctions imposed by the West and other allies around the world. The Russian military has lost thousands of tanks and armored vehicles over the past two months – damaged in combat, abandoned, or down with maintenance issues. Some of the components and parts needed to restock these weapons systems are no longer available because of sanction-imposed supply chain issues. Howard Altman explores this issue in detail – “Sanctions Are Strangling Russia’s Weapons Supply Chain”, The War Zone, April 18, 2022.
Finland – No Longer Neutral? Finland’s parliament has begun discussing the implications and risks of NATO membership. Finland shares an 830-mile land border with Russia and has followed a pragmatic course in its relationship with Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine led to a huge shift in pubic opinion – with many supporting Finland joining NATO. (The Guardian, April 21, 2022).
Biden Meets Ukraine PM. Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal spent some time with President Biden in Washington, D.C. on Thursday (Apr 21). He is the highest-ranking Ukrainian official to visit D.C. since February 24th, the beginning of the war. No word on when Biden will visit Kyiv.
Relationships in Middle East are Realigning. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted some deep thinking on the part of some countries in the ME. Among them are Israel, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. Read more in “War in Ukraine is changing relations in the Middle East”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), April 22, 2022.
More Weapons for Ukraine
Another $800 Million Package. On Thursday (Apr 21) the United States announced additional weapons will be sent to Ukraine. This latest weapons transfer will almost deplete the drawdown authority that the President has. More weapons packages will need to be authorized by Congress through a supplemental budget request. This latest package will contain more heavy artillery and tactical drones. About 50 Ukrainian soldiers are currently receiving training on the 155mm howitzers. This new authorization is the eighth drawdown of equipment from DoD inventories since August 2021 for Ukraine. (Defense News, Apr 21, 2022).
The new package announced on Thursday includes:
- 72 155mm howitzers and 144,000 artillery rounds
- 72 tactical vehicles to tow 155mm howitzers
- 121 Phoenix Ghost tactical drones
- Field equipment and spare parts
‘Ghost’ Drones for Ukraine. Over 120 Phoenix Ghost Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems, manufactured by AEVEX Aerospace, are heading to Ukraine. The drones are similar to the Switchblade – small and quickly deployable. They can fly short distances and pack a small explosive warhead used to attack light vehicles and personnel. The United States has already delivered hundreds of Switchblade drones to Ukraine, including some training to Ukrainian soldiers. (Breaking Defense, Apr 21, 2022)
Norway to Provide AA System. The Norwegian government has decided to donate Mistral air defense systems to Ukraine. It has a range of up to six kilometers and is intended for use against low-flying aircraft. The Norwegians are providing their entire inventory of Mistral missiles – numbering slightly over 100. “Norway to donate air defence system to Ukraine”, Euractiv.com, April 21, 2022.
Spain Shipping 200 Tons of Weapons. Trucks, ammunition, and other types of war equipment are heading to Poland for an ultimate transfer to Ukrainian military forces. The Spanish Navy transport ship Ysabel is currently under way with 200 tons of equipment.
Commentary
Brinkmanship and Nuclear Weapons. For decades the U.S. had buried the thought of the use of nuclear weapons in Europe. But times have changed. Tyler Bowen argues that some serious thought should be given to the possibility of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and NATO’s Crisis of Nuclear Credibility”, War on the Rocks, April 20, 2022.
Podcast – Helping Ukraine Win. Spirit of America founder and CEO Jim Hake discusses his entrepreneurial approach to providing private U.S. assistance in the form of non-lethal aid to Ukraine. The Truth of the Matter, CSIS | Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 19, 2022, 21 minutes.
“Are We Letting Putin Win?” Dr. Guy Millere, a professor at the University of Paris and author of 27 books on Europe, writes that Washington may be agreeable to giving Putin a small victory and an off-ramp to end the Ukraine War. Millere believes that the U.S. is more concerned with ending the war – even if Putin gets some of what he wants – at the cost of Ukraine. “Are We Letting Putin Win?”, Gatestone Institute, International Policy Council, April 21, 2022.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, defense, or the current conflict in Ukraine then we are interested.
Maps and Other Resources
UNCN. The Ukraine NGO Coordination Network is an organization that ties together U.S.-based 501c3 organizations and non-profit humanitarian organizations that are working to evacuate and support those in need affected by the Ukraine crisis. https://uncn.one
Maps of Ukraine
26. FDD | New State Department Report Admits Iran May Be Hiding Nuclear Activities
Conclusion:
President Joe Biden should not reward Tehran with sanctions relief worth tens of billions of dollars — and possibly much more — while ignoring serious nonproliferation breaches. Instead, the United States should lead an effort at the next Board of Governors meeting to censure Iran for its non-compliance with its NPT obligations.
FDD | New State Department Report Admits Iran May Be Hiding Nuclear Activities
Anthony Ruggiero
Senior Fellow
Andrea Stricker
Research Fellow
fdd.org · by Anthony Ruggiero Senior Fellow · April 21, 2022
The Biden administration has “serious concerns” about “possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran,” according to an annual report the State Department released on Tuesday. The administration’s admission that Tehran continues to stonewall inspectors and conceal its nuclear activities shows why it would be a serious mistake to revive a weaker version of the 2015 nuclear deal, whose verification and enforcement mechanisms were already deficient.
The new findings on Iran are part of a larger publication that assesses countries’ compliance with agreements pertaining to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. The latest edition of this annual report discusses the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) investigation into Iran’s undeclared nuclear activities at four locations. The State Department notes that Tehran has not cooperated with the agency’s probe at those four sites, which involved Iran’s possible use or storage of nuclear material and equipment or undeclared nuclear activities.
Questions also remain about the fourth location, the site of the Islamic Republic’s alleged experiments with a uranium metal disc. In the State Department’s previous annual report, which covered 2020, the Biden administration warned that “even small amounts of undeclared uranium metal in Iran would be of serious proliferation concern given its applicability to nuclear weapons research and development.” Just last month, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi told the agency’s Board of Governors that Tehran did not declare experiments relating to this nuclear weaponization activity, violating Iran’s safeguards agreement with the agency.
While Tehran’s behavior has not changed, the new compliance report omits strong language that last year’s edition used in reference to Iran’s undeclared nuclear activities. That report stated: “These issues raise significant questions of what Iran may be trying to hide, and whether Iran is in compliance with its safeguards obligations today.” (Emphasis in the original.)
The report covering 2020 also declared that “Iran’s intentional failure to declare nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards would constitute a clear violation of Iran’s CSA [Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement] required by the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and would constitute a violation of Article III of the NPT itself.” This is no less true today.
The most recent report assesses, like the previous edition, that “Iran is not currently engaged in key activities associated with the design and development of a nuclear weapon.” Yet other sections of this year’s report show Tehran is moving toward weaponization.
For example, regarding Iran’s production of 20 percent enriched uranium metal, the report states: “Although uranium metal has civilian and conventional military applications, producing it is also a key nuclear-weapons-related capability because Iran would need to convert weapons-grade uranium from the gaseous form used in enrichment into metal to make nuclear weapon components.”
In addition, subsequent revelations have shown that Iran hid and camouflaged weaponization projects after restructuring its nuclear program in 2003. As such, the U.S. government may not have adequate information to reliably report on such activities. Of the four sites the IAEA now seeks to investigate, three came to light only after the Mossad’s 2018 exposure of Tehran’s secret nuclear archive. Furthermore, the IAEA has never visited several other sites mentioned in the archive.
In the previous edition of its compliance report, the State Department emphasized that the “ongoing investigations and Iran’s failure for much of the reporting period to provide the necessary cooperation with the IAEA in connection with them raise concern with regard to Iran’s compliance with its obligation to accept safeguards under Article III of the NPT.” That is no less true today. Iran is violating its fundamental non-proliferation commitments, not just the terms of the problematic 2015 nuclear deal.
President Joe Biden should not reward Tehran with sanctions relief worth tens of billions of dollars — and possibly much more — while ignoring serious nonproliferation breaches. Instead, the United States should lead an effort at the next Board of Governors meeting to censure Iran for its non-compliance with its NPT obligations.
Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Andrea Stricker is a research fellow. Anthony previously served in the U.S. government for more than 19 years, including as senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense (2019-2021) on the National Security Council. They both contribute to FDD’s Iran Program, International Organizations Program, and Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP). For more analysis from the authors, the Iran Program, the International Organizations Program, and CMPP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Anthony and Andrea on Twitter @NatSecAnthony and @StrickerNonpro. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_Iran and @FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Anthony Ruggiero Senior Fellow · April 21, 2022
27. Israel has a KC-46 problem. Here’s the solution.
Israel has a KC-46 problem. Here’s the solution.
By Bradley Bowman and Enia Krivine
Apr 21, 01:01 PM
Eying growing and distinct threats that may require the United States and Israel to conduct long-range airstrikes, both militaries urgently need to replace their aging aerial refueling fleets with the modernized KC-46A. The problem is the aircraft has been plagued by development challenges and delays.
The good news is there are steps the U.S. and Israel can take together to avoid further delays and reduce the time it takes for Israel’s Air Force to use its KC-46s in real-world missions once the new tanker arrives.
An announcement Tuesday that Boeing and the U.S. Air Force have agreed on a plan to further upgrade the aircraft’s problematic Remote Vision System is a positive sign. Regardless, even as Iran continues to inch toward a nuclear weapons capability, Israel knows it likely won’t receive its first KC-46 from the United States until 2025 or later. That’s a problem given Israel’s reliance on decades-old 707 refuelers that are increasingly expensive, difficult to maintain and lack some of the capabilities of the KC-46.
This is a concern for the United States, too. When the Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced the administration’s approval of the sale of KC-46s to Israel in March 2020, the agency noted that “the sale improves Israel’s national security posture as a key U.S. ally,” lessens the burden on U.S. aerial refueling assets and serves U.S. national interests.
At this point, to expedite the delivery of the KC-46 to Israel and lock in Jerusalem’s place in the queue for the aircraft, the most important thing is to finalize the contract for the Israeli KC-46 aircraft. If this contract is not signed by August, the delivery of the KC-46 to Israel may be delayed by an additional year.
But finalizing the contract is not enough, and the U.S. Air Force should not stop there.
Israel’s Air Force needs the ability to employ its KC-46s in operations against adversaries. That requires Israeli pilots who know how to fly the aircraft and use its avionics, crews that can operate the KC-46′s refueling capabilities, fighter pilots who know how to receive fuel from the tanker, and ground personnel who possess the requisite maintenance and sustainment know-how. That’s a daunting list of capabilities that will take time to develop.
Once Israel receives its KC-46s, it could take months before they’re ready to be employed in vital, real-world operations. The good news, however, is that these capabilities can be developed in both the United States and Israel long before the first Israeli KC-46s arrive.
American F-35A and Israeli F-35I jets approach a U.S. Air Force KC-10 Extender for aerial refueling in 2020. Refueling midair is a critical capability that provides endurance during long missions. (Master Sgt. Patrick OReilly/U.S. Air Force)
The U.S. Air Force should start by allotting training slots for Israeli pilots, crew members and maintainers in the appropriate KC-46-related courses in fiscal 2023 and fiscal 2024. The goal should be for Israel to have the necessary personnel trained in advance of the earliest possible arrival date of the KC-46.
This flight crew training is conducted at Altus Air Force Base in Oklahoma, consisting of academic, simulator and flight portions. In anticipation of receiving KC-46s, Tokyo sent Japan Air Self-Defense Force personnel to Altus to complete this training, and the U.S. Air Force should ensure Israelis have the same opportunity. An initial cadre of Israeli KC-46 maintenance personnel, who would later train other Israelis, could also be trained in the United States.
Admittedly, as the U.S. Air Force ramps up its fielding of the KC-46, many of these training programs and schools may have limited slots, and the Pentagon cannot afford to delay the training of American airmen. To avoid that scenario and ensure Israel has the necessary personnel trained in time, Congress should work with the Air Force now to ensure the U.S. KC-46 training base has the necessary resources, personnel and throughput for FY23 and beyond.
Once the Israeli personnel are trained, the Pentagon and Israel’s Defense Ministry should use the U.S. Air Force’s Military Personnel Exchange Program to embed some Israeli pilots as well as crew and maintenance personnel in U.S. Air Force units already operating the KC-46. That will create valuable opportunities for Americans and Israelis to share best practices, increasing the readiness of both air forces and improving their ability to operate together.
As a potential hurdle to this plan, some might cite the fact that the U.S. Air Force is not expected to declare the KC-46 has reached initial or full operational capability before 2024, but that misses the point.
The U.S. Air Force’s KC-46s have already flown over 10,000 missions since January 2019, operating above every continent except for Antarctica. That includes four U.S. KC-46s operating from Morón Air Base in Spain and conducting air refueling over Germany and Poland for U.S. fighters and bombers bolstering NATO’s eastern front following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Despite some of its development challenges, the KC-46 is already approved to refuel 85% of the aircraft in the Pentagon’s inventory that are capable of aerial refueling.
Accordingly, once Israelis start to complete the KC-46 training in the U.S., there will be ample opportunities to embed them in U.S. Air Force KC-46 units conducting operations.
To reinforce these programs, Air Mobility Command, working with Central Command, should also look for opportunities to forward deploy U.S. KC-46s to Israel for a few weeks or months, just as Air Mobility Command is already doing in Europe. That would help Israelis prepare for the arrival of their own KC-46s and answer open questions regarding the tanker’s ability to refuel Israeli F-16I fighter aircraft.
RELATED
Are these costly stealth fighters too precious to use? Or perhaps the Israeli Air Force is not sufficiently confident in the F-35 or its pilots’ proficiency in operating the fifth-gen fighter.
From an American perspective, such a plan would also support the Pentagon’s dynamic force employment concept and the Air Force’s agile combat employment concept.
Dynamic force employment, introduced in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, seeks to employ U.S. combat power with more agility and flexibility. As commander of U.S. European Command, Gen. Tod Wolters testified on March 29 the concept’s goal is “to demonstrate operational unpredictability to adversaries, improve deterrence and support allies.”
Similarly, the Air Force describes its doctrine of agile combat employment as a means “to assure allies and partner nations of US support, alter adversary or enemy understanding of friendly intentions and capabilities, posture to deter aggression, or gain a positional advantage.”
The temporary forward deployment of U.S. KC-46s to Israel would directly support these American warfighting concepts.
If the U.S. Air Force and Congress act now to help Israel prepare for the arrival of its KC-46s, they can minimize the time between receipt of the aircraft and their employment in combat operations. That will be good for both Israel and the United States.
Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Enia Krivine is senior director of the Israel Program.
28. FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (FTO) DESIGNATION AND SPECIALLY DESIGNATED GLOBAL TERRORIST (SDGT) DESIGNATION
A very useful graphic and resource. Please go to the link to view it if it does not come through in this message.
FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
(FTO) DESIGNATION
AND
SPECIALLY DESIGNATED GLOBAL TERRORIST
(SDGT) DESIGNATION
April 21, 2022
Together, the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) designations pack a powerful one-two punch. Removing either would weaken Washington’s ability to target Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Impact
FTO
SDGT
Victims — including Gold Star Families — can sue for civil damages arising from the provision of material support to a terrorist organization
Yes
1
2
Allows for U.S. government asset freezes/financial sanctions
3
(for entities in U.S. jurisdiction only)
4
(to include targeting of any financial institution connected to U.S. financial system)
Bans U.S. visa issuance and admission into the United States
5
6
Legal threshold for criminal prosecution for providing material support to a terrorist organization
Conviction requires proof that violators knew they were providing support to an organization engaged
in terrorism 7
Conviction requires proof that a U.S. person “willfully” provided support to a terrorist organization — a higher
standard of proof 8
Extraterritorial application
9
(explicitly stated; applicable anywhere to anyone)
10
(not explicitly stated; applicable only to U.S. persons or anyone who causes a U.S. person to violate sanctions against an SDGT)
Criminal penalty for providing material support to a terrorist organization
Up to life in prison 11
Up to 20 years in prison 12
Violators subject to civil fines and property forfeitures
13
14
Absent a change in the IRGC’s behavior, removing the organization from the FTO or SDGT lists or otherwise weakening sanctions against the IRGC would set a dangerous precedent and undermine the integrity of terrorism sanctions.
Notes
-
Over the past 30 years, Congress has repeatedly made it easier for American victims of terrorism to sue aiders and abettors of terrorism, by creating a private right of action against those that provide support to designated FTOs. 18 U.S.C. §2339B creates civil liability for anyone who “knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so.” 18 U.S.C. §2333(d)(2) also establishes civil liability for aiding and abetting or conspiring with an organization designated as a “foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §1189).”
- 18 U.S.C. §2339B refers to FTOs, not SDGTs, as does 18 U.S.C. §2333(d)(2), which establishes civil liability for attacks committed, planned, or authorized by an FTO, but not for attacks committed, planned, or authorized by SDGTs.
-
Under the current law, any individual or entity in the United States or otherwise subject to U.S. jurisdiction is prohibited from conducting transactions with the government of a designated state sponsor of terrorism, including Iran. It is also unlawful for any such individual or entity to knowingly provide “material support or resources” to a designated FTO, and U.S. financial institutions may be required to block all FTO assets. Foreign corporations that knowingly provide support to a designated FTO can be found civilly or criminally liable, provided they are subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
-
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration issued Executive Order 13224 for SDGT designations, providing expanded legal authorities for the State Department and Treasury Department to target such individuals and entities. Specifically, the authority enabled the United States to target terrorist financiers that access the U.S. financial system. In 2019, the executive order was expanded to include the application of secondary sanctions on any individuals or entities, including businesses, that allow their services to be used by SDGTs. That expansion further increased the risk associated with providing financial services to terrorists. Such conduct, however, must touch upon the United States or a U.S. person.
-
Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are inadmissible to, and in certain circumstances removable from, the United States. There are multiple indices and criteria for immigration restrictions.
- There are no immigration restrictions attached to an SDGT designation.
- The prosecution must prove only that the defendant “knowingly” provided material support or resources to an FTO. Such a crime is punishable by life in prison if the material support or resources provided to the FTO resulted in the death of any person. That penalty would disappear if the IRGC were delisted.
- Criminal prosecution for engaging in a significant transaction with an SDGT, in violation of Executive Order 13224, requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant willfully violated sanctions against the SDGT.
- The extraterritorial application is explicitly stated throughout the statute with respect to material support for an FTO. For example, the FTO statute allows the U.S. government to prosecute anyone, including foreign nationals, who conspire to provide material support or resources to, or receiving military-type training from, a designated FTO or engage in other terroristic activities, even when such conduct was committed entirely outside of the United States.
- The criminal penalties associated with an SDGT designation apply to all individuals or entities subject to U.S. jurisdiction, wherever located, and to anyone that causes such an individual or entity to violate sanctions against that SDGT deliberately or inadvertently. But those penalties apply only to conduct that occurred in the United States or was committed by a U.S. person.
-
Severe criminal penalties are applied throughout the FTO statute, including with respect to providing material support to a terrorist organization. Specifically, anyone who knowingly provides material support or resources to an FTO or attempts or conspires to do so could face imprisonment for up to 20 years. If that support results the death of any person, the maximum penalty is life imprisonment.
-
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), from which the criminal penalties for the SDGT designation are derived, any person who “willfully” provides, attempts or conspires to provide, or aids or abets in the provision of material support to an SDGT “shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $1,000,000, or if a natural person, may be imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both.” The knowledge standard — “willfully” — is much higher than that in the FTO provision.
- The FTO statute includes civil penalties for noncompliance, particularly with respect to financial institutions that fail to comply with freezing certain accounts. Each violation carries a civil penalty of $50,000 or twice the amount of which the financial institution was required to retain possession or control.
-
Under IEEPA, anyone who violates sanctions is subject to a civil penalty of $250,000 or twice the amount of the transaction that is the basis for the penalty.
Design by Daniel Ackerman
Development by Pavak Patel
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29. How Israel’s Minority Government Can Stay in Power
How Israel’s Minority Government Can Stay in Power
The loss of a majority in the parliament is a damaging setback for both Bennett and Lapid. However, it is still too soon to count either of them out.
Israel’s “change government” is not yet one year old, but it has already lost its parliamentary majority after the unexpected departure of a single lawmaker. However, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett built his coalition on a solid foundation of mutual mistrust and common dislikes—so solid, in fact, that it just might hang on to power for the foreseeable future.
Two unusual features of Israel’s constitutional architecture, both of recent vintage, ought to lend substantial resilience to Bennett’s coalition. First, a simple vote of no confidence cannot bring down the government. Instead, there must be a “constructive” vote of no confidence that installs a new coalition, ready to govern. Second, in the event of early elections, the premiership would automatically pass from Bennett to his understudy, Alternate Prime Minister Yair Lapid. In tandem, these provisions have the unintentional effect of lending considerable durability to coalitions based more on shared antagonism than positive agendas.
Israel famously has no written constitution, just a set of easily amendable Basic Laws.
This setup has led to constant tinkering with the rules of the political game, including a brief—and, by most accounts, disastrous—experiment with direct elections for prime minister. When the Knesset put an end to this experiment in 2001, it didn’t just cancel the direct election law; it also copied a reform from Germany’s Basic Law that requires constructive votes of no confidence.
For the Germans, this provision precluded a repeat of the traumas of the Weimar era, when Communists and Nazis could join up for repeated no-confidence votes, even though their loathing for each other rendered impossible the formation of a new government. In Israel, the idea that the Far Left and Far Right (or perhaps, ultra-Orthodox and Arab, or some other odd-couple combination) might create a similar sort of chaos started to seem like a distant but real possibility by the early 2000s, enough to merit including the German provision in the Israeli basic law.
In the Knesset, the opposition now has exactly sixty out of 120 seats. But even if it had sixty-one, the ideological divides among them would make it all but impossible to forge an alternative coalition. In addition to Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud, the opposition includes the far-right Religious Zionism party and the three Arab parties of the Joint List, who mostly oppose the existence of a Jewish state and whose leaders often make common cause with Israel’s enemies. The latter, it is safe to assume, have no interest in returning Netanyahu to the prime minister’s bureau.
As long as Netanyahu remains atop the Likud, he will need at least six or seven or possibly more defections from Bennett’s coalition to form an alternative government, which is an extreme long shot since resentment of Netanyahu is the glue that brought Bennett’s coalition together.
In the meantime, Israel is governed by a minority government, a situation not without challenges, but not without precedent either. During two pivotal years preceding his assassination, Yitzhak Rabin governed without a majority. Besides a constructive vote of no confidence, a government can fall if it fails to pass a budget, but the Knesset just passed one for the next fiscal year. Moreover, a majority coalition isn’t necessary to pass a budget, since abstentions or defections from the opposition—for a price, of course—can squeeze a budget through.
The second quasi-constitutional provision now lending durability to Bennett’s government is the two-year-old rule that created the position of alternate prime minister, an invention of the 2020 coalition agreement between Benjamin Netanyahu and the Blue and White bloc led by Benny Gantz, which fought Netanyahu to a draw in three consecutive elections in a span of twelve months. The government that foisted this awkward constitutional formulation onto Israeli politics didn’t last long enough to see it have any impact, but the provision is still written into Israel’s Basic Law, and it formed the basis of the current coalition agreement as well.
Coalitions in Israel have always been complicated and unwieldy, but until very recently, they were generally dominated by one large party (except for the various “unity governments” of 1984-1990). Yet parties have now become personality vehicles rather than coherent ideological or social groupings, and the Knesset has gradually transitioned from a collection of a few large parties and many smaller ones to a collection of medium and mostly smaller parties.
As long as this remains the case, coalitions are likely to require rotation agreements that allow two leaders to divide the prime minister’s tenure. The current prime minister, after all, leads a party that won only seven seats in the 120-seat chamber, so he could hardly insist on a full four-year term.
The alternate prime minister, then, is not just another made-up cabinet position designed to smooth over coalition-making. It’s a dramatic, if under-appreciated, constitutional reform that has effectively created a bicephalous regime, not just in the last two governments, but in all likelihood for many more to come. This kind of alternation may, in fact, become a model for other parliamentary democracies struggling with increasingly fractious coalitions that have no dominant members.
The law does more than just provide for a rotation in the role of prime minister without needing the government to resign and regain the confidence of parliament. Among its many provisions, perhaps the most relevant to the stability of Bennett’s government is the one that triggers an automatic rotation if a government’s term is cut short by early elections.
This means that if the opposition gains a sixty-first member who enables it to dissolve the Knesset and hold new elections, it will be installing Yair Lapid as prime minister, not Benjamin Netanyahu. And there he will stay as caretaker until a new government is formed. There is little reason to believe that the bloc of pro-Netanyahu parties can win the clear majority at the polls that eluded them in four election cycles in 2019, 2020, and 2021. The longer the stalemate, the longer the more moderate Lapid, not the rightist Bennett, remains in power.
To be sure, the loss of a parliamentary majority is a damaging setback for both Bennett and Lapid. Every bit of legislation will be a slog, and many worthwhile initiatives are probably now doomed to defeat. But thanks to their parties’ shared antagonisms and the constitutional provisions that empower minority governments, it is still too soon to count either of them out.
Shany Mor is an Adjunct Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a Research Fellow at the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at Reichman University. Follow him on Twitter @ShMMor
Image: Reuters
30. USSOCOM Invests $10M in Jet Boots Dive Propulsion Systems
USSOCOM Invests $10M in Jet Boots Dive Propulsion Systems
US Special Operations Command has awarded Patriot3 Inc. a $10 million contract for the acquisition of Jet Boots Dive Propulsion Systems through 2027.
The roughly 25-pound (11-kilograms) low noise propulsion system comprises a pair of thrusters attached to a diver’s legs, increasing range and speed reportedly up to four knots.
Jet Boots-equipped divers have reportedly swum a dozen miles on a pack of two batteries each.
Maneuverable Swimming Experience
The thrusters allow drivers hands-free movement underwater and to change direction through head movement during underwater operations such as “reconnaissance, search and rescue, patrol, and hull inspections.”
According to the Virginia-based manufacturer, the system’s fifth-generation thrusters “eliminate the need for dynamic oil filled shaft seals,” and the power cable “attaches to the thruster at a 45 degree angle improving mobility and clearance for gear.”
Jet Boots Dive Propulsion Systems. Image: Patriot3 Inc.
Hot-Swappable Battery
Moreover, the ”new Thruster Leg Plate provides the operator 6 inches (15 centimeters) of vertical adjustability in its mounted position.”
Jet Boots run on a lithium-ion battery which can be swapped while still on. Other than the thrusters and battery, the system consists of a control box and harness.
The control box regulates speed and power with a power switch, adjustable thrust knob and a LED battery state of charge indicator. The power switch allows the operator to turn the LED light on and off depending upon the task.
The Jetboots DPS (Diver Propulsion System) has been designed specifically for combat diver operations and is compatible with standard issue military dive gear.
31. Lawsuits against Alex Jones are a new strategy in curbing conspiracy theories
Hmmm....Let's bankrupt all these conspiracy theorists.
Lawsuits against Alex Jones are a new strategy in curbing conspiracy theories
Sandy Hook parents’ lawsuits spark new hopes — and fears — about what this means for the future of online disinformation.
Misinformation Reporter
April 21, 2022
Alex Jones’ website Infowars submitted high-profile bankruptcy filings this week, the latest chapter in his ongoing legal battle with relatives of victims of the Sandy Hook Elementary School massacre. Some are cautiously wondering if the families’ defamation lawsuits could offer a new model for battling the spread of harmful conspiracy theories.
American defamation law is famously deferential to free speech, particularly when made in good faith and particularly in instances when public figures are involved. But lawsuits brought against Jones by families of children and educators slaughtered by a gunman at Sandy Hook in 2012 represent a new use of this established tool.
Jones has been a vocal proponent of a disinformation campaign against the victims of the mass shooting in Newtown, Connecticut. He has falsely asserted that that mass shooting was a hoax and that the grieving families were crisis actors. Relatives filed three lawsuits in 2018, claiming that Jones exposed them to targeted harassment, including death threats.
“Spreading false facts that are knowingly defamatory of a person or company is exactly what defamation laws protect against. They protect peoples’ (and companies’) reputations, a perfect way to chill false speech,” said Ed Klaris, a media and intellectual property expert, in an email.
The Sandy Hook lawsuits are a bit different, however, because they don’t focus on harm against one individual’s reputation, said Roy Gutterman, a media law and First Amendment expert who directs the Tully Center for Free Speech at Syracuse University.
“Most defamation cases really focus on an individual plaintiff,” he said. “So, in some ways, these lawsuits against Alex Jones and Infowars are kind of a novel way to rein in this new genre of conspiracy theory-related information.”
But any defamation case is a double-edged sword, he cautioned, opening the door for potential action against many types of media, not just explicit disinformation peddlers.
“We’re always afraid of a slippery slope,” said Gutterman. “Who’s to say that today’s Infowars won’t be tomorrow’s mainstream media that somebody has a problem with?”
The defamation question
Jones has long maintained that his outlandish claims constitute protected free speech.
In a 2017 custody battle with his ex-wife, his lawyers asserted that Jones is “a performance artist.” Defending against the Sandy Hook lawsuits, lawyers said that Jones’ claims about the families were “rhetorical hyperbole.” This would grant him more First Amendment protection allowed to purveyors of parody, satire or “pure opinion.”
“But you can’t have it both ways,” Gutterman said. “You can’t propagate false information and say, ‘No one’s taking me seriously anyway.’”
The defamation lawsuits against Jones — whose claims against the Sandy Hook families transpired over years — reveal a different landscape for American libel laws, Gutterman said. The landmark Supreme Court case governing libel is 1964′s New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
In that case, the paper of record was sued by the Montgomery, Alabama, police commissioner for running an advertisement critical of his department’s treatment of civil rights protesters, which contained some factual inaccuracies. The court ruled in favor of the Times, determining that a defendant must knowingly or intentionally publish false information.
In sworn depositions, Jones has said that he understands the Sandy Hook massacre was not a hoax.
“People involved in First Amendment law right now are wringing their hands about where the Times v. Sullivan standard plays out in a modern media landscape,” said Gutterman. “1964 … was a different era. I don’t know if we could have anticipated some of the crazy false information we’re seeing nowadays spreading on social media.”
This is not the first time in recent memory that defamation laws have been leveraged in a disinformation case. The voting companies Dominion Voting Systems and Smartmatic are engaged in defamation suits against right-wing media outlets and individuals, including Fox News, OANN, and allies and lawyers to former president Donald Trump, for baseless claims that their machines had contributed to election fraud.
In general, adjudicating defamation lawsuits is challenging, said Gutterman, because U.S. law seeks to balance the primacy of free speech against harms caused. In the modern age of social media, those harms can spread further and faster than when early precedent was set.
“These cases put media people in a precarious position. You want to support free flow of information and robust public debate on public issues,” he said. “But we need to rein in blatantly false and harmful information.”
The potential expense of being found liable for libel can also hamstring traditional media outlets, particularly smaller ones, said Klaris.
“That’s why we so rarely see major investigations into powerful (wealthy) people and companies,” he said. “That’s why the media is handicapped as the Fourth Estate.”
The bankruptcy case
Jones’ Infowars, a website and a radio program of the same name, often spreads far-right and outlandish conspiracy theories, such as 9/11 trutherism — the idea that the U.S. government is responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks — and Pizzagate, which alleged that Hillary Clinton and others operated a child sex trafficking ring out of a D.C. pizza restaurant.
That website and two other companies owned by Jones — IWHealth and Prison Planet TV — filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on Sunday in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Jones faces a trial in the next month to determine the amount of damages owed to plaintiffs in one of the lawsuits filed in that state. That could have dismantled Jones’ assets, according to a bankruptcy declaration filed Monday.
Chapter 11 allows a company to remain in business while restructuring or attempting to negotiate its debts. It also places pending civil litigation on hold.
One lawyer representing plaintiffs in Connecticut called the filing a delay tactic.
Jones “will be held accountable for his profit-driven campaign of lies against the Sandy Hook families who have brought this lawsuit,” said attorney Chris Mattei in a statement Monday.
According to the filings, Infowars claims its assets are worth $0 to $50,000, while its liabilities range from $1,000,001 to $10 million. Paperwork also states that Jones and his companies have spent $10 million handling the Sandy Hook lawsuits and set aside $725,000 for the bankruptcy administration as well as $2 million for settlements.
Those liabilities include the prospective judgment on behalf of the Sandy Hook plaintiffs, said Klaris, the media lawyer.
Notably, it is Jones’ companies — not him as an individual — filing for Chapter 11 protection.
This may be to protect his own personal finances from coming under scrutiny, experts say. Plaintiffs believe he may be using the move to hide assets, diverting to companies owned by family members when they first filed suit in 2018.
A new lawsuit filed April 6 alleges that Jones moved $72 million from his parent company to himself and to shell companies.
“Jones may have taken money out of the companies so they will have to search high and low for money he disbursed,” said Klaris. “In one way the plaintiffs won. They put Infowars out of business. But in another, they will have a hard time collecting.”
And no matter what becomes of those companies, Jones as a person can begin again, Klaris added.
“Jones may start a new company under a new name and continue to peddle his disinformation. Nothing in the law would stop him from doing that.”
The courts’ role in the battle over disinformation
Nevertheless, this case may provide a “blueprint for future lawsuits when fake news causes some palpable damage,” according to Gutterman.
The Sandy Hook families can point to real-life harm from online disinformation. Because of the relentless attention cast on them, they were subject to scrutiny, harassment and stalking. One family, for example, has had to move 10 times and now lives in hiding.
But proving liability from disinformation is not always so easy. In the case of Dominion Voting Systems, for example, the company will have to demonstrate that news outlets knowingly published false information that it engaged in a voter fraud conspiracy.
And as these lawsuits wind through the courts, they could alter defamation law. Some experts worry about the effects this could have on the media landscape.
“Ironically, Infowars going out of business will chill legitimate media,” said Klaris.
Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.
Anya van Wagtendonk is the misinformation reporter at Grid, focusing on the impact of false information on policy, elections and social behavior.
32. Civic Education Requires Liberal Education
He is talking about the real liberal and not the political progressive liberal of partisan politics today. Real conservatives used to espouse the importance of a true liberal education.
Civic Education Requires Liberal Education
Are liberal education and civic education related?
Perhaps the immediate answer is “No.” At its best, a decent liberal education teaches students to think deeply and widely for themselves, opening their minds to the search for the truth about nature and mankind’s most weighty matters. But an education in civics seems to have a more concrete aim: to teach an appreciation for our country and to encourage patriotism.
Though we might think that these are two separate and distinct forms of teaching and subject matters, we would be wrong. The corruption of liberal arts in contemporary America – an education that has become narrow, scattered, and increasingly ideological – is part and parcel of the near destruction of civic education in America.
I believe that the undermining of civic education had at its beginnings with the multicultural slogan that rang out from Stanford University and changed so much in the world of higher education: “Hey, hey, ho, ho, Western Civ has got to go!” And gone away it has.
Today pick up most any university catalogue you choose. You will find required courses in social justice, alternative lifestyles, and the like. Then try to count the number of required courses devoted to American history or Western Civilization. Virtually none exist.
Over the last two to three generations, civic education fell as liberal education itself fell. And I believe that civic education can only rise if liberal education rises with it – or even perhaps if liberal education rises first.
A true civic education cannot exist without a deep and serious understanding of our principles, history, literature, religious traditions, and culture, with all its difficulties and its accomplishments. Without that knowledge, civic education can quickly become shallow and preachy. Without being firmly grounded in the principles that underlie our nation and on the memory of those who fought for them, civic education will fail.
Let’s think about Thomas Jefferson, who was perhaps the most liberally educated person of his day. His education made him an amateur archeologist, a skilled architect, a valuable diplomat, our third president, founder of the University of Virginia, and the eloquent author of those basic principles of liberty and equality that gave America hope and direction. It seems likely that he could read in six languages and was fluent in four. There was hardly a scientific discovery in his time of which he didn’t have knowledge nor were there many classic or philosophic texts beyond his understanding.
Jefferson learned from his study of political philosophy the self-evident truths that lay behind the writing of his – and our – Declaration of Independence. Spurn its history or disdain its author but know that without the vision of human equality that the Declaration contains, our country would not exist.
Or consider John Witherspoon, a professor of moral philosophy and an early president of what would later become Princeton University. Among those who studied under Witherspoon were nine future cabinet members, 12 governors, 21 senators, 39 congressmen, three Supreme Court justices, a vice president, and a president (James Madison), who was also one of five of Witherspoon’s students to serve as a delegate at the Constitutional Convention.
In ways far from modern commencement addresses, Witherspoon famously admonished his students: “Do not live useless and die contemptible.” To Witherspoon, to go to college and not draw from it things not only useful to yourself but especially useful to your country would have seemed a tragic waste.
Still, we may admit that learning all that the liberal arts might offer was absolutely needed in our early leaders. But what of today? The liberal arts, with all its history and philosophy, the study of great books and seminal ideas hardly seem relevant. Do we really need Jefferson and Witherspoon to help us understand our world today?
Yes, because we Americans are collectively all rulers. What we know and what we believe shape not only our individual lives but our civic lives.
We shouldn’t live in ignorance of our national principles and the arguments for them. We shouldn’t be unaware of our history or that of other countries. We shouldn’t be manipulated by the latest slogan, the newest emotional crusade, or by appeals to our passions and biases. We shouldn’t choose those whose only claim is for being known as our leaders.
Our studies should aim, Cardinal John Henry Newman wrote, “at raising the intellectual tone of society, cultivating the public mind, supplying true principles to popular enthusiasms and fixed aim to popular aspirations, giving enlargement and sobriety to the ideas of the age, and refining the intercourse of private life.” Together, liberal and civic education form a kind of communal sensibility and a solid, deep civility.
But let me give the last word to the man we celebrate as the Father of our Constitution: James Madison. In Federalist 10, he wrote that there were three evils to which all democracies are prone: ignorance, instability, and injustice. The last two could, he hoped, be mitigated by constitutional arrangements and institutional structures – the separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, and the like. But there were no political arrangements that could solve the first problem: ignorance. For that, a rich, broad, and liberal education would be the foremost remedy. And not just for our leaders but for all of us who choose our leaders. As Madison wrote, “What spectacle can be more edifying or more seasonable, than that of Liberty & Learning, each leaning on the other for their mutual & surest support?”
If we have hope of reviving a deep and patriotic love of America and a vibrant civic understanding of the principles on which this nation is based, then a revival of serious liberal education is a necessity. To quote Jack Miller, “The battle for the soul of our country will be won or lost in our classrooms.”
John Agresto is a longtime professor of politics and the retired president of St. John’s College in Santa Fe, New Mexico. He is also a member of the board of the Jack Miller Center. His latest book, which will explore both liberal education and American democracy, is “The Death of Learning” (forthcoming from Encounter Books in August 2022).
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
