Quotes of the Day:
From the Wall Street Journal, 2/11/2022:
In 2008, when Barack Obama was running in the Democratic presidential primary, he delivered a celebrated speech rebuking his former pastor, Rev. Jeremiah Wright, for expressing “a profoundly distorted view of this country—a view that sees white racism as endemic, and that elevates what is wrong with America above all that we know is right with America.”
In other words, Mr. Obama was saying the same thing as the Texas legislature: that racism is a betrayal of America’s authentic principles. Meanwhile, in 2003 President George W. Bush gave a speech in Senegal reflecting on the history of American slavery, in which he declared that “My nation’s journey toward justice has not been easy and it is not over,” and that “African-Americans have upheld the ideals of America by exposing laws and habits contradicting those ideals.”
- Adam Kirsch
"People are trapped in history and history is trapped in them."
- James Baldwin
“[Free] government…must act by general and equal laws that are previously known to all…In this sense…liberty is the perfection of civil society.”
- David Hume
1. FACT SHEET: Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States
2. President Biden Announces 2 Diplomatic Nominees (Republic of Korea and Iceland)
3. Kim Jong-un congratulates Iranian president on 43rd revolution anniversary
4. Status quo not an option for Korean Peninsula: S. Korean FM
5. The 2022 Session of the North Korean Legislature: Strengthening Import Substitution and State Control While the Economy Stagnates
6. South Korean Views Of Rising Tensions Between Russia And The Ukraine
7. Ban on Leaflets for NK Exposes Hypocrisy of SK Government
8. Protesters tear up Chinese flag during rally in Seoul over Olympic refereeing
9. 3.1 magnitude natural quake hits near N. Korea's nuclear test site: KMA
10. S. Korean FM due in Hawaii for talks with U.S., Japan on N. Korea
11. Mansions & yachts of North Korea's mysterious elite revealed in satellite pics
1. FACT SHEET: Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States
A lot to parse. It is interesting that we have an INDO-PACIFIC strategy before we have a National Security Strategy (and we will have a National Defense Strategy before we have an NSS. In the administration's defense they did issue its internim stragei guaince in March 2021 which has formed the basis for all the subsequent stragtgic planning. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf
Fact sheet text below. Some will complain there is not enough detail while others will say it is too prescriptive.
It is interesting that the strategy acknowledges the last three administrations:
Since then, administrations of both political parties have shared a commitment to the region. The George W. Bush Administration understood Asia’s growing importance and engaged closely with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and India. The Obama Administration significantly accelerated American prioritization of Asia, investing new diplomatic, economic, and military resources there. And the Trump Administration also recognized the Indo-Pacific as the world’s center of gravity.
One major criticism is does this strategy answer the question of why this is important to the American people? While it makes sense ot foreign policy and national security professionals (read elite) and practitioners take it for granted and as an article of faith that what happens in the INDO-PACIFiC will have a direct effect on all aspects of the US, no case has been sufficiently made to the American people there are only passing references and comments). My recommendation is that the follow-up discussions about the strategy by administration and cabinet officials must include the explanation of this strategy in terms of what it means for the American people.
But I can work with these ends, ways, and means to develop supporting campaign plans. I would have liked to have seen an articulation of the assumptions, constraints, and restraints and allocated resources but I know those must be all in the classified documents.
INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY ELEMENTS
STRATEGIC ENDS: Advance a free and open IndoPacific that is more connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.
STRATEGIC WAYS: Strengthen the U.S. role and build collective capacity with allies and partners and with regional institutions.
STRATEGIC MEANS: Modernized alliances; flexible partnerships, including an empowered ASEAN, a leading India, a strong and reliable Quad, and an engaged Europe; economic partnership; new U.S. defense, diplomatic, development, and foreign-assistance resources; sustained focus on and commitment to the region at all levels of the U.S. government.
Key points:
"Consistent with our broader strategic approach, we will prioritize our single greatest asymmetric strength: our network of security alliances and partnerships."
Across the region, the United States will work with allies and partners to deepen our interoperability and develop and deploy advanced warfighting capabilities as we support them in defending their citizens and their sovereign interests. We will continue to modernize our treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, the ROK, the Philippines, and Thailand; steadily advance our Major Defense Partnership with India and support its role as a net security provider; and build the defense capacity of partners in South and Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.
We are deepening our five regional treaty alliances—with Australia, Japan, the ROK, the Philippines, and Thailand—and strengthening relationships with leading regional partners, including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands. We will also encourage our allies and partners to strengthen their ties with one another, particularly Japan and the ROK. We will support and empower allies and partners as they take on regional leadership roles themselves, and we will work in flexible groupings that pool our collective strength to face up to the defining issues of our time, particularly through the Quad.
"Integrated deterrence will be the cornerstone of our approach."
"geopolitical competition." (strategic competition and great power competition is not used).
The United States will pursue five objectives in the Indo-Pacific—each in concert with our allies and partners, as well as with regional institutions. We will:
• ADVANCE A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC
• BUILD CONNECTIONS WITHIN AND BEYOND THE REGION
• DRIVE REGIONAL PROSPERITY
• BOLSTER INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY
• BUILD REGIONAL RESILIENCE TO TRANSNATIONAL THREATS
INDO-PACIFIC ACTION PLAN (10 lines of effort)
DRIVE NEW RESOURCES TO THE INDO-PACIFIC
LEAD AN INDO-PACIFIC ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
REINFORCE DETERRENCE
STRENGTHEN AN EMPOWERED AND UNIFIED ASEAN
SUPPORT INDIA’S CONTINUED RISE AND REGIONAL LEADERSHIP
DELIVER ON THE QUAD
EXPAND U.S.-JAPAN-ROK COOPERATION
PARTNER TO BUILD RESILIENCE IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS
SUPPORT GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
SUPPORT OPEN, RESILIENT, SECURE, AND TRUSTWORTHY TECHNOLOGIES
Taiwan:
We will also work with partners inside and outside of the region to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, including by supporting Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, to ensure an environment in which Taiwan’s future is determined peacefully in accordance with the wishes and best interests of Taiwan’s people. As we do so, our approach remains consistent with our One China policy and our longstanding commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.
The United States will defend our interests, deter military aggression against our own country and our allies and partners—including across the Taiwan Strait—and promote regional security by developing new capabilities, concepts of operation, military activities, defense industrial initiatives, and a more resilient force posture.
Korea:
As the DPRK continues to develop destabilizing nuclear and missile programs, we will continue to seek serious and sustained dialogue, with the goal of complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and addressing its ongoing human-rights violations and improving the lives and livelihoods of the North Korean people. At the same time, we are strengthening extended deterrence and coordination with the ROK and Japan to respond to DPRK provocations, remaining prepared to deter—and, if necessary, defeat—any aggression to the United States and our allies, while bolstering counter-proliferation efforts throughout the region. While reinforcing extended deterrence against nuclear- and ballistic-missile systems and other emerging threats to strategic stability, the United States will seek to work with a wide set of actors, including our rivals, to prevent and manage crises.
I would have liked to have seen a recognition of the importance of unification. Note the strong emphasis on trilateral cooperation with the ROK, Japan, and US and this is in fact one of the 10 lines of effort.
As I said a lot to analyze. I recall learning from Peter Feaver many years ago when he spoke to our class at the National War College that there are two ways to write a strategy at the national level. The first is to use a small team that writes a tight strategy to meet the President's intent. The second is to write a consensus document with a lot of interagency input (allowing each department to "protect their equities."). The first results in a strategy that really conforms with the President's intent, guidance, and world view. But it risks having less "buy-in" from across the interagency. The second can gain wide buy-in across the interagency but may result in a more watered down less focused strategy. My sense is this strategy was likely developed by Kurt Campbell and a very small team of writers.
The real test will be in execution.
There are 3 messages in the strategy with the obvious internal and external target audiences:
The strategy lays out our values (What we say we stand for)
It provides fairly detailed guidance on what we are going to do (What we say we are doing or going to do).
The real (and most important) message is in execution (What we are actually doing) - what we are really doing is the actual message (actions speak louder than words).
Will this strategy be put into execution? Or will it merely go on the shelf as one of our historical aspirational documents. We should evaluate the actions of all our national instruments of power against this construct - as an example, State's Global Engagement Center should be evaluating this on a daily basis to ensure our actions provide the intended message.
FACT SHEET: Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States
FEBRUARY 11, 2022
•
“We envision an Indo-Pacific that is open, connected, prosperous, resilient, and secure—and we are ready to work together with each of you to achieve it.”
President Joe Biden
East Asia Summit
October 27, 2021
The Biden-Harris Administration has made historic strides to restore American leadership in the Indo-Pacific and adapt its role for the 21st century. In the last year, the United States has modernized its longstanding alliances, strengthened emerging partnerships, and forged innovative links among them to meet urgent challenges, from competition with China to climate change to the pandemic. It has done so at a time when allies and partners around the world are increasingly enhancing their own engagement in the Indo-Pacific; and when there is broad, bipartisan agreement in the U.S. Congress that the United States must, too. This convergence in commitment to the region, across oceans and across political-party lines, reflects an undeniable reality: the Indo-Pacific is the most dynamic region in the world, and its future affects people everywhere.
That reality is the basis of the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States. This strategy outlines President Biden’s vision to more firmly anchor the United States in the Indo-Pacific and strengthen the region in the process. Its central focus is sustained and creative collaboration with allies, partners, and institutions, within the region and beyond it.
The United States will pursue an Indo-Pacific region that is:
- FREE AND OPEN
Our vital interests and those of our closest partners require a free and open Indo-Pacific, and a free and open Indo-Pacific requires that governments can make their own choices and that shared domains are governed lawfully. Our strategy begins with strengthening resilience, both within individual countries, as we have done in the United States, and among them. We will advance a free and open region, including by:
- Investing in democratic institutions, a free press, and a vibrant civil society
- Improving fiscal transparency in the Indo-Pacific to expose corruption and drive reform
- Ensuring the region’s seas and skies are governed and used according to international law
- Advancing common approaches to critical and emerging technologies, the internet, and cyber space
- CONNECTED
A free and open Indo-Pacific can only be achieved if we build collective capacity for a new age. The alliances, organizations, and rules that the United States and its partners have helped to build must be adapted. We will build collective capacity within and beyond the region, including by:
- Deepening our five regional treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, and Thailand
- Strengthening relationships with leading regional partners, including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands
- Contributing to an empowered and unified ASEAN
- Strengthening the Quad and delivering on its commitments
- Supporting India’s continued rise and regional leadership
- Partnering to build resilience in the Pacific Islands
- Forging connections between the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic
- Expanding U.S. diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands
- PROSPEROUS
The prosperity of everyday Americans is linked to the Indo-Pacific. That fact requires investments to encourage innovation, strengthen economic competitiveness, produce good-paying jobs, rebuild supply chains, and expand economic opportunities for middle-class families: 1.5 billion people in the Indo-Pacific will join the global middle class this decade. We will drive Indo-Pacific prosperity, including by:
- Proposing an Indo-Pacific economic framework, through which we will:
- Develop new approaches to trade that meet high labor and environmental standards
- Govern our digital economies and cross-border data flows according to open principles, including through a new digital economy framework
- Advance resilient and secure supply chains that are diverse, open, and predictable
- Make shared investments in decarbonization and clean energy
- Promoting free, fair, and open trade and investment through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), including in our 2023 host year
- Closing the region’s infrastructure gap through Build Back Better World with G7 partners
- SECURE
For 75 years, the United States has maintained a strong and consistent defense presence necessary to support regional peace, security, stability, and prosperity. We are extending and modernizing that role and enhancing our capabilities to defend our interests and to deter aggression against U.S. territory and against our allies and partners. We will bolster Indo-Pacific security, drawing on all instruments of power to deter aggression and to counter coercion, including by:
- Advancing integrated deterrence
- Deepening cooperation and enhancing interoperability with allies and partners
- Maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait
- Innovating to operate in rapidly evolving threat environments, including space, cyberspace, and critical- and emerging-technology areas
- Strengthening extended deterrence and coordination with our ROK and Japanese allies and pursuing the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
- Continuing to deliver on AUKUS
- Expanding U.S. Coast Guard presence and cooperation against other transnational threats
- Working with Congress to fund the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the Maritime Security Initiative
- RESILIENT
The Indo-Pacific faces major transnational challenges. Climate change is growing ever-more severe as South Asia’s glaciers melt and the Pacific Islands battle existential rises in sea levels. The COVID-19 pandemic continues to inflict a painful human and economic toll across the region. And Indo-Pacific governments grapple with natural disasters, resource scarcity, internal conflict, and governance challenges. Left unchecked, these forces threaten to destabilize the region. We will build regional resilience to 21st-century transnational threats, including by:
- Working with allies and partners to develop 2030 and 2050 targets, strategies, plans, and policies consistent with limiting global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius
- Reducing regional vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation
- Ending the COVID-19 pandemic and bolstering global health security
2. President Biden Announces 2 Diplomatic Nominees (Republic of Korea and Iceland)
President Biden Announces 2 Diplomatic Nominees
FEBRUARY 11, 2022
•
WASHINGTON – Today, President Joe Biden announced his intent to nominate the following individuals to serve as key diplomats in his administration:
- Philip S. Goldberg, Nominee for Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Korea
- Carrin F. Patman, Nominee for Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Iceland
Philip S. Goldberg, Nominee for Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Korea
Philip Goldberg is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, class of Career Ambassador, and currently is the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Colombia. Over his career, Goldberg has served as Chargé d’Affaires, a.i. of the U.S. Embassy Havana, Cuba; Ambassador to the Philippines; Ambassador to Bolivia; and Chief of Mission of the U.S. Office in Pristina, Kosovo. Other assignments include serving as the Senior State Department Fellow at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, Assistant Secretary of State (Intelligence and Research), and as the State Department’s Coordinator for the Implementation of United Nations Resolution 1874 on North Korea Sanctions. Goldberg also was the Chargé d’Affaires a.i. and Deputy Chief of Mission in Santiago, Chile; Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs; and Plan Colombia Coordinator at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota. Among his earlier positions, he served as Chief of Staff for the Deputy Secretary of State and as Political-Economic Officer in South Africa. Goldberg earned a B.S. degree from Boston University. He achieved the rank of Career Ambassador in 2018 and is the recipient of a Presidential Distinguished Rank Award, two Presidential Meritorious Rank Awards, and the National Intelligence Silver Seal Medallion.
Carrin F. Patman, Nominee for Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Iceland
Carrin Patman is the chair of the Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County, Texas, an organization with a 1.3 billion budget, 4,100 employees, and 1,300-square-mile service area containing 3.9 million people. Prior to taking on her present role, Patman was a partner of Bracewell LLP, where she worked as a trial lawyer for three decades handling major litigation involving commercial disputes, securities matters, antitrust and competition issues, and regulatory compliance. She has a distinguished record of civic engagement, including current or past service as a member of the Houston Chapter of the International Women’s Forum, and on the boards of the Greater Houston Partnership and the Houston-Galveston Area Transportation Policy Council. Patman’s earlier commitments to public service include her role as a Founding Board Member of The Center for Women in Law, and as Executive Committee Member of Girls, Inc. of Greater Houston and Sheltering Arms Senior Services. Patman earned her B.A. from Duke University and her J.D. degree from the University of Texas School of Law. She has received multiple awards and was the first woman to receive the Karen H. Susman Jurisprudence Award, given by the Anti‐Defamation League Southwest Region.
3. Kim Jong-un congratulates Iranian president on 43rd revolution anniversary
The axis of evil persists. A common question about both countries: How do you deal with a country that takes hostages as a matter of policy? How can such a country be trusted? How can any deal with such a country be expected to work?
Kim Jong-un congratulates Iranian president on 43rd revolution anniversary | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Feb. 12 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has sent a congratulatory message to the Iranian president on the occasion of the 43rd anniversary of the Islamic Revolution of the Middle Eastern country, according to Pyongyang's foreign ministry Saturday.
In the message sent to Iranian President Seyyed Ebrahim Raeisi on Friday, Kim congratulated Iran for the anniversary and expressed hope that bilateral cooperation will "further expand and develop in various fields," according to the ministry.
Kim also said the friendship between the two countries was "forged on the road of joint struggle against imperialism" and said he wished for Iran's success in achieving "prosperity and development of the country."
In a separate statement, the ministry also highlighted its special ties with Iran, stating that the two nations have long forged "the relations of friendship and cooperation in the joint struggle for independence against imperialism."
Iran and North Korea set up diplomatic relations in April 1973. Western countries have accused the two of trading missile and nuclear parts and technology for decades.
odissy@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. Status quo not an option for Korean Peninsula: S. Korean FM
The problem is denuclearization will not and cannot occur before unification. Unification is the only condition that will lead to an end of the nuclear and missile programs, the threats to the ROK and the region and the human rights abuses being committed against the Korean people living in the north.
(LEAD) Status quo not an option for Korean Peninsula: S. Korean FM | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with remarks from Foreign Minister Chung, minor edits throughout; RECASTS headline, lead; CHANGES slug; ADDS photo)
By Byun Duk-kun
HONOLULU, Feb. 11 (Yonhap) -- Maintaining the status quo is not an option when it comes to North Korea, South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong said Friday, urging the North to quickly return to dialogue.
The top South Korean diplomat also insisted maintaining the status quo would actually lead to greater instability not only on the Korean Peninsula but throughout Northeast Asia while having global implications.
"As I have repeatedly said publicly, maintaining status quo in the Korean Peninsula issues is not an option," Chung said while speaking with reporters in Honolulu.
"As time passes, North Korea's nuclear missile capability will continue to develop, and if that happens, the security conditions of the Korean Peninsula will worsen and that will lead to instability not only on the Korean Peninsula but in Northeast Asia and the entire world," he added.
Chung is currently on a visit to Hawaii for bilateral and trilateral talks with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi that will focus on ways to bring North Korea back to the discussion table.
Chung's visit here follows a series of North Korean missile launches this year.
The U.S. says the North fired nine ballistic missiles during seven rounds of missile tests in January, marking a record number of missile tests it conducted in a single month.
Pyongyang has maintained a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing since late 2017, but said in January that it may consider restarting all temporarily-suspended activities.
The North's missile launches in January included the firing of an intermediate-range ballistic missile which was the longest-range missile launched by North Korea since November 2017.
Chung urged the North to refrain from further provocation and return to open discourse.
"Our government strongly urges North Korea not to translate its mention of possibly lifting the moratorium on testing into action and return to the dialogue table," the top South Korean diplomat said.
"I believe the North can come to dialogue and make any demands they may have to the U.S. or us. (We) once again strongly urge North Korea to do so," added Chung.
Seoul has been pushing for a formal declaration to the end to the Korean War as a way of restarting dialogue with the North.
However, White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan earlier hinted at possible differences between Seoul and Washington over when such a declaration could or should be made, saying, "We may have somewhat different perspectives on the precise sequence or timing or conditions for different steps."
Chung insisted there has been no difference of opinion between the allies from the start.
"I believe the U.S. has no discomforting thoughts over an end of war declaration. I believe it must be done because North Korea too has noted the need for an end of war declaration with us and China also has consistently supported such a move," he said.
"I believe it will be done."
His remarks come after South Korean President Moon Jae-in said Seoul and Washington have agreed on the wording of the Seoul-proposed declaration in a joint interview with Yonhap News Agency and seven other global newswires this week.
"There has been no difference of view between South Korea and the U.S. on the timing (of the declaration)," Chung reiterated.
Chung's talks with his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, set to be held Saturday, will follow talks between the countries' top nuclear envoys here on Thursday.
"There was significant preparation work done between the top nuclear negotiators, and so I look forward to productive consultations based on such work," Chung said.
Noh Kyu-duk, South Korea's top nuclear envoy, said on Thursday he had very meaningful and productive meetings with his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, Sung Kim and Takehiro Funakoshi, respectively.
"First, we shared our views on the seriousness of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and discussed several ways to engage with North Korea," he said.
North Korea has refrained from attending any denuclearization negotiations since late 2019. It also remains unresponsive to all U.S. overtures.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. The 2022 Session of the North Korean Legislature: Strengthening Import Substitution and State Control While the Economy Stagnates
Very useful initial analysis.
The 2022 Session of the North Korean Legislature: Strengthening Import Substitution and State Control While the Economy Stagnates
North Korea’s legislative body, the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), met in Pyongyang for its annual meeting from February 6-7, 2022. Leader Kim Jong Un did not attend. Instead, Choe Ryong Hae chaired the meeting in his capacity as chairman of the Standing Committee, the SPA’s top governing body.
The SPA passed new laws on childcare and the protection of overseas Koreans. No further details were provided in the Rodong Sinmun report, except that the SPA passes such laws according to the DPRK constitution.[1] This is a reminder that the SPA, which is often referred to in international media as a “rubberstamp parliament,” has the capacity to be a very active and powerful player in North Korean politics under the right circumstances.[2]
But for now, the main value of the SPA sessions from an analytical point of view is their regular and standardized reporting on the state and outlook of the North Korean economy. Each year, the premier of the Cabinet reports on the broader picture, and the minister of finance supplies rare numbers.
The key points in the 2022 reports can be summarized as follows:
- Sanctions and the global health crisis are identified as major problems.
- The line of strengthening the state’s control over the economy has been confirmed.
- Efforts at import substitution continue.
- Rural development is a key strategy, drawing on inputs from various sectors.
- An allegedly new separate position for agriculture has been created to support this new strategic line of rural development.
- Foreign trade is to be recentralized, taking back the autonomy granted to enterprises in the earlier years of Kim Jong Un’s rule.
- Main economic indicators, such as revenue and expenditure, were stagnate at low levels in 2021 and are expected to remain so in 2022.
- A mysterious new item called “income from money collection” (집금수입) was introduced, with a remarkable reported increase of 680 percent.
- Pandemic-related expenses are listed as a separate budget item and will increase by one-third compared to 2021.
- Critical remarks on revenue generation are not included in the English version of Rodong Sinmun.
The Premier’s Report
The report was delivered by Kim Tok Hun in his capacity as premier of the Cabinet.[3] In keeping with the kinds of public statements issued by North Korean officials, including Kim Jong Un, Kim Tok Hun mentioned difficulties and problems in the country’s economy, and identified sanctions and the global health crisis as the main reasons.
In accordance with main strategic events, such as the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021 and the Fourth Plenum in December 2021, Kim Tok Hun emphasized the Cabinet’s focus on strengthening the state’s unified guidance and control over the economy. Many of the details of his report also hint at a more aggressive pursuit of the country’s long-standing strategy of import substitution.
The status of the national economy is seen by the North Korean state as a strategic area, and, thus, official data needs to be taken with a grain of salt. Compared to the previous year, when most figures suggested an economic decline, the 2022 report created the impression of stagnation. However, it also included a few hints at stronger growth in some areas. For example, according to the premier, the industrial output plan of 2021 was fulfilled at 148 percent. Cement production has grown nine percent stronger than expected, which has been touted as an important achievement because it is part of Kim Jong Un’s newly announced focus on rural development.
Other noteworthy details from the premier’s report include a focus on metal and chemical industries, and the continued effort to establish a C1 chemical industry.[4] If successful, the latter would be a key part of the country’s import substitution strategy, especially for crude oil. In a similar vein, energy production is going to come mainly from hydropower, for which the mountainous country has favorable conditions as long as reservoirs can balance the very uneven rainfall during the year. Thermopower is going to be developed and expanded in parallel and will mainly rely on high-quality domestic coal. Kim Tok Hun also mentioned efforts to reduce the transmission loss of electricity, which is indeed a key structural problem of North Korea with its aged power grid that requires substantial investment and modernization. Moreover, North Korea will continue to explore for natural gas. No details were provided, but previous efforts have included offshore reserves along the country’s east coast.
For years, North Korea has been under international scrutiny for cyber activities. In this context, it is interesting to note that the premier described three main tasks for the country’s IT industry in 2022. These included: further developing the telecommunications infrastructure, expanding the domestic production of electronic goods and putting government affairs on an IT basis. The latter could mean anything, including paperless office and video conferencing, both of which had been promoted before. No further details were provided.
A potentially significant sentence in the premier’s report concerned foreign trade. In the early years of Kim Jong Un’s rule, there were economic policy changes that had the potential to develop into actual reforms. Among them were decentralization and a higher autonomy for North Korean enterprises. Under certain conditions, they could directly trade with their foreign partners without having to go through a central ministry, which was standard in state socialist countries of the former Eastern bloc. Kim Tok Hun’s remark that: “the external economic sector will keep pushing forward the work to recover the unitary trade system of the state (국가의 유일무역제도)” is an indicator that such changes are being undone.
A somewhat odd but quite telling detail in the premier’s report was the inclusion of both the biological virus (COVID-19) and an ideological one in the same sentence: “Lots of achievements were also made in the emergency epidemic prevention work to check the inroads and spread of the vicious virus (악성비루스) sweeping the world and in the endeavor to sweep away anti-socialist and non-socialist practices.” Obviously, North Korea is very concerned about an ideological “infection” and is willing to take all necessary measures to prevent it, which does not bode well for its human rights situation.
Budget Report
The report on the execution of the 2021 budget and the plans for 2022 was delivered by Minister of Finance Ko Jong Bom.[5] As usual since 2002, no absolute figures were provided. Rodong Sinmun only published an eclectic combination of percentages and growth rates, using their own and not always consistent terminology. A list of key Korean terms and their official English translation in the 2022 report has been compiled below to allow for more continuous tracking. The list also includes items that were explicitly mentioned in the 2022 report.
Glossary of Terms and Positions in the 2022 State Budget Report[6]
KoreanEnglish거래수입금Sales tax국가기업리득금State-run enterprises’ income협동단체리득금Profits of cooperative institutions감가상각금은Depreciation expenses부동산사용료Real estate tax사회보험료Social insurance (premium)재산판매 및 가격편차수입Income from property sales and price fluctuation집금수입Income from money collection특수경제지대수입Income from special economic zones중앙예산수입Central budgetary revenue국가예산지출State budgetary expenditure경제건설에 대한 투자Investment in economic construction과학기술부문Investment in the sci-tech field국가방위력강화Bolstering national defense capabilities교육부문Education보건부문Public health문화부문Culture체육부문Sports
The actual numbers as reported by the minister of finance largely show stagnation, with achieved and expected growth rates being in the range of one percent or less. The graph below shows that North Korea’s economy was far from making a recovery in 2021. If the state budget figures are used as a rough proxy for growth rates of the overall economy, it would appear that the country’s leadership does not expect this to change in 2022.
Graph 1. Official Annual Growth Rates (in%) of the North Korean State Budget (2000-2022)
Compiled by: Ruediger Frank. Source: KCNA, Rodong Sinmun.
Four items from the finance minister’s report deserve a closer look.
First, there is the remarkable increase of 680 percent (or 6.8 times, as written in the Korean version) of an item that has not appeared in reporting on the state budget during the last years: “income from money collection” (집금수입). It can only be speculated as to what this means, but it is certainly not just a euphemism for regular taxes, as these are listed separately and would not allow for such a massive increase. It is known that the North Korean state has repeatedly asked its citizens for “voluntary” contributions for patriotic reasons, which brings the gold collection drive in South Korea during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/1998 to mind. Anecdotal reports also indicate that some unusual monetary measures were taken in North Korea in 2021; most notably the introduction of a money substitute called donp’yo (money ticket). Keeping this in mind and considering the newly strengthened focus on the domestic economy and state control, catalyzed by the pandemic and the resulting collapse of North Korea’s foreign trade, such unusual measures need to be taken seriously. These could be temporary coping measures or new, long-term structural approaches, but regardless, they indicate a certain sense of urgency or even crisis.
The second item that stands out in the 2022 budget report is at least partly connected to the pandemic, which is not surprising. The amount to be spent on “emergency epidemic prevention” is to be increased by 33.3 percent in 2022 compared to the previous year. However, no actual amount has been published, and the text of this report suggests that the fight against the pandemic has become a separate budget item. This is supported by the fact that expenses for “public health” will only grow by 0.7 percent in total.
A third noteworthy issue is an, allegedly, “exclusive item for agriculture” that was added to the budget. This is in line with the newly announced strategic line of promoting rural development but is, in fact, a questionable claim since “agriculture” was listed as a separate item in budget reports until 2017 when it was supposed to grow by 4.4 percent. For 2022, no growth rate in agriculture has been projected.
Last but not least, when comparing the English and the Korean versions of Rodong Sinmun’s reporting on the budget, there are more differences than usual. In particular, a few paragraphs of criticism have been omitted from the English version of the Finance Minister’s report. These include when Ko spoke at length about deficiencies (결함) in executing the state budget in 2021, the failure of “some units” in showing the necessary resolve to collect revenue as planned, and officials focusing on their own units while lacking a sense of responsibility for the national economy as a whole.
In conclusion, the results of the 2022 SPA session were largely as expected. It confirmed some of the key strategies that had been announced at major party events in 2021, such as strengthening the state’s control over the economy, expanding import substitution, and putting a strategic focus on rural development.
- [1]
“The Sixteenth Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” Rodong Sinmun, February 8, 2022.
- [2]
The case of the East German Volkskammer in the brief but decisive period between the peaceful revolution of October 1989 and German unification one year later can serve as one example of this. In fact, Article 91 of the DPRK Constitution stipulates that the SPA “elects or recalls the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission,” which is Kim Jong Un’s official position as the leader of North Korea.
- [3]
“조선민주주의인민공화국 내각의 주체１１０(２０２１)년 사업정형과 주체１１１(２０２２)년 과업에 대하여,” Rodong Sinmun, February 8, 2020.
- [4]
The one-carbon (C1) process converts carbon compounds into other useful products, such as “high-value-added chemicals,” fuel and fertilizer.
- [5]
“조선민주주의인민공화국 내각의 주체１１０(２０２１)년 사업정형과 주체１１１(２０２２)년 과업에 대하여,” Rodong Sinmun.
- [6]
Compiled by Ruediger Frank. Source: Ibid.
6. South Korean Views Of Rising Tensions Between Russia And The Ukraine
South Korean Views Of Rising Tensions Between Russia And The Ukraine
Forbes · by Scott Snyder · February 11, 2022
... [+]Russian Foreign Ministry\TASS via Getty Images
South Koreans may feel somewhat distant from the Ukrainian crisis, and the most likely impacts on South Korea are secondary effects of rising Russo-Ukrainian tensions. Even so, the South Korean foreign ministry took notice of U.S. diplomatic evacuation steps by announcing a January 25 travel advisory to most of the Ukrainian provinces adjacent to Russian territory and maintaining close contact with around 565 Korean nationals, most of whom are currently located in or near Kyiv.
The primary direct impacts on South Korean interests are economic. The South Korean government has primarily shown concerns that a potential conflict would create supply chain disruptions and price spikes in international markets that would be passed onto South Korea. Russia is South Korea’s twelfth largest trading partner, but South Korean exports containing advanced U.S.-originating technological components could be banned for sale in Russia as a result of the imposition of strict Western sanctions in retaliation for a Russian military incursion into Ukraine. South Korea will also face rising energy and food prices due to the possibility that flows of Russian oil and natural gas may be interrupted or curtailed or that lower Ukrainian wheat production might result in higher prices on the international market. A potential conflict will also generate financial pressures on the thirteen Korean companies active in Ukraine and the forty Korean companies active in Russia.
The second dimension of the impact of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict on South Korea involves debates about the credibility of the United States as an alliance partner. The United States does not have an alliance with Ukraine, but U.S. efforts to cooperate with NATO to deter Russian aggression will influence ongoing South Korean evaluations of U.S. credibility as a security guarantor. In addition, U.S. efforts to build a coalition in opposition to Russian aggression will generate expectations for South Korea to align with like-minded countries to voice support of the inviolability of national borders.
The third dimension of rising Russo-Ukrainian tensions involves its impact on the bandwidth of American political leaders to simultaneously address challenges in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. There is always concern in South Korea that a major conflict in Europe or the Middle East will lower the U.S. priority given to Asian issues in general and the North Korean challenge in particular. The U.S. ability to secure Russian cooperation on the enforcement of UN Security Council-imposed sanctions in response to North Korean missile tests will further diminish in the context of rising Russo-Ukrainian tensions. An associated risk of such conflict involves concerns about North Korean or Chinese opportunistic efforts to take advantage of American distraction to raise tensions or pursue objectives of their own at a moment when the United States is overstretched. North Korea would be well-poised to take advantage of the Ukrainian crisis by piggybacking on potential Chinese opportunism regarding Taiwan.
South Korea’s default position when it comes to major conflicts in Europe and the Middle East has been to lie low and focus on insulating economic interests in the region, even in the context of pressures to join in on sanctions and cut economic ties. But South Korea’s importance as a major political actor and middle power in a global context and rising U.S. expectations of South Korea as a like-minded strategic partner are generating expectations for the Asian nation to take a more active role in support of global norms rather than viewing such conflicts solely through the lens of economic considerations.
MORE FOR YOU
... [+]SERGEY BOBOK/AFP via Getty Images
Forbes · by Scott Snyder · February 11, 2022
7. Ban on Leaflets for NK Exposes Hypocrisy of SK Government
This law is a major human rights, political, and geostrategic failure.
Ban on Leaflets for NK Exposes Hypocrisy of SK Government
On Jan. 28 activist Park Sang-hak became the first person to be indicted in South Korea under a law that criminalizes the sending of leaflets to North Korea. The rationale for the prosecution is “harming or gravely endangering people’s lives and bodies”.
But Park does not endanger anyone’s limbs, much less lives.
One of over 33,000 North Korean defectors in South Korea, Park has for years worked with his organization Fighters for Free North Korea (FFNK) to send huge balloons across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which serves as the de facto land border between the two Koreas. They carry rice, money, medicine, bibles, and most importantly leaflets and USB drives full of incendiary attacks on Kim Jong-un and his family, including some very unflattering epithets for the North Korean leader.
Activists hope that such balloons and their contents will reach people in North Korea, taking much needed supplies as well as information inside the restrictive regime.
After Moon Jae-in, a center-leftist, became president in 2017 promising peace and co-existence with the North, attempts were made to improve inter-Korean relations, not least at the historic April 2018 DMZ summit between Moon and Kim. While those peace initiatives have stalled, activists like Park continued the balloon campaign from South Korean soil, and the North called on Seoul to stop them.
Among the changes is the law’s one and only penal provision: banning the use of propaganda speakers and the display of any visual materials about the North around the DMZ, and forbidding the distribution of leaflets as well as USBs and money—all on the ground that they may “cause harm or serious danger to Korean citizens’ lives and bodies.”
Park of course defied the ban in April 2021, leading to the indictment.
In April 2021 Park's organization FFNK released more balloons near the DMZ, violating the new law criminalizing leaflets to North Korea.
The problem with the law is clear. Many non-governmental organizations including mine, Open Net, have criticized it for restricting freedom to communicate with North Koreans, and infringing their access to information. The only way for these anti-Kim leaflets to hurt anyone is if the Kim regime responds to the words with swords or worse. But Seoul’s logic is that a peaceful critic can be criminally answerable for the violent response of the one being critiqued.
The South Korean government has justified the law as a restriction only on the means of speech, not the content. It says the law does not stop people from speaking out against North Korea and is designed to reduce the military tension that supposedly rises whenever anti-NK leafleting activities take place, and to thereby protect the people living near the DMZ.
But as Open Net has already pointed out before, the text of the law belies that claim of such intent. The law bans all “distribution of leaflets, etc.” regardless of where it takes place and what they are for. If Park floated balloons carrying leaflets from Busan at the southern end of the peninsula, without any possibility of reaching North Korea, but somehow harmed or seriously endangered Koreans’ lives or bodies, he would still be indicted under this law.
It is also revealing of the government’s censorial desire that the law bans speakers and visual displays only in the vicinity of the DMZ, but leafleting from anywhere is criminalized. In theory, even when it is from the United States!
Balloons do not have a realistic chance of crossing the Pacific, but the law targets other activities that could be conducted against North Korea from overseas. It defines “leaflets, etc.” as “leaflets and objects including advertising, print materials and memory devices, etc.”. Also departing from its strict lexiconic definition, the term “distribution” (salpo 살포) in the law is clarified as “sending to unspecified multiple North Korean people” and “transporting into North Korea (including through a third country)”.
The broadness of the law’s language means that even running a website advertising critical books about North Korea from the United States would be punishable under it. Forget about trying to get materials about, say the market economy, into North Korea through China. That, too, would be illegal and subject to prosecution in South Korea.
The ultimate effect of the law is to stop critical speech about North Korea from getting to North Koreans, no matter what the South Korean government claims.
The price of breaking the law is heavy: up to three years of imprisonment or a fine of up to 30 million won (25,000 USD). The punishment extends even to those who simply make an attempt. This is not necessary. The Supreme Court of Korea already ruled in 2016 that the authorities were justified in stopping the leafleting activity near the DMZ given what happened in 2014 with North Korean guards spraying bullets into civilian areas in the South. That judicial decision empowered the police to prevent activities that they reasonably perceive will cause immediate physical harm, making any criminal prosecution gratuitous.
Ironically, the Moon administration is dominated by democracy activists who battled the military dictatorship in the 1980s, and their biggest faction—the National Liberation or NL—made a name for themselves at the time by fighting heroically to exercise their right to communicate with and visit North Koreans. Some, such as Im Soo-kyung who later became a lawmaker, served long prison sentences for it.
And in an act of hypocrisy, those same people with the NL background in the government supported the amendment that would put Park in prison for sending messages to North Koreans, no doubt because he comes from the other side of the political spectrum and hates the Kim family.
It would be a fitting counterpart to South Korea’s existing National Security Act, which punishes praising North Korea and its leaders. That law has long been criticized by the UN Human Rights Committee and progressive political groups within the country as infringing on both human rights and freedom of speech. It also makes no sense given that the governments around the world routinely exchange pleasantries in order to build amicable relationships; why shouldn’t South Koreans say nice things about North Korea if they wanted to?
But instead of doing away with such an arcane law, the Moon administration has imposed yet one more suffocating restriction on South Koreans. Already, if they praised Kim Jong-un, they could go to prison. And now, if they try to say critical things about him to North Koreans, they can also go to prison.
Koreans on both sides of the DMZ are victims of these laws, not to mention activists like Park Sang-hak, who is facing a lengthy uphill legal fight against a hypocritical government.
Cover: Park Sang-hak holds up a blown-up copy of the leaflet that goes into his balloons in a promotional video shared by his organization FFNK.
8. Protesters tear up Chinese flag during rally in Seoul over Olympic refereeing
How big was the protest? We need more photos and information to assess this.
Protesters tear up Chinese flag during rally in Seoul over Olympic refereeing | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Feb. 11 (Yonhap) -- A conservative South Korean civic group tore up the Chinese flag during a rally near the Chinese Embassy in central Seoul on Friday to protest controversial refereeing against some of South Korea's short track speed skaters at the Beijing Winter Olympics.
Members of the civic group, which calls itself the Righteous People, held a protest rally in front of the Seoul Central Post Office near the Chinese Embassy in the Myeongdong area, demanding that China apologize for what it calls biased refereeing at the Olympics.
They ripped up the Chinese flag, known as the Five-star Red Flag, by hand.
Lee Eun-taek, head of the civic group, said he got very angry to see China undermining the spirit of the Olympics after culturally appropriating "hanbok" (traditional Korean clothes) and kimchi from Korea.
A woman, who introduced herself as a 20-something who once dreamed of becoming an athlete, said unfair refereeing can break the dreams of young people and condemned the South Korean government for not saying a single word of protest to the Chinese government.
In the men's 1,000m semifinals on Monday, South Korea's Hwang Dae-heon and Lee June-seo each got disqualified from their respective heats for an illegal pass and lane change, respectively. Those decisions each allowed Chinese skaters to advance to the final, and the host country ended up collecting gold and silver medals.
ycm@yna.co.kr
(END)
9. 3.1 magnitude natural quake hits near N. Korea's nuclear test site: KMA
Since I received the alert for this event I have been waiting to see if there are any other reports saying this might not be an earthquake.
(LEAD) 3.1 magnitude natural quake hits near N. Korea's nuclear test site: KMA | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with more details, background info; ADDS photo)
SEOUL, Feb. 11 (Yonhap) -- A 3.1 magnitude natural earthquake hit near North Korea's nuclear testing site Friday, South Korea's state weather agency said.
The quake occurred about 40 kilometers north-northwest of Kilju, North Hamgyong Province, at 10:35 a.m., according to the Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA).
Kilju is where North Korea's Punggye-ri nuclear testing site is located. A total of 25 earthquakes with a magnitude of 2.0 or bigger have struck regions near Kilju since 1978, with a 3.2 magnitude quake that occurred Sept. 23, 2017, being the strongest.
The epicenter of Friday's quake was at a latitude of 41.3 degrees north and a longitude of 129.21 degrees east at a depth of 17 km. The KMA said the quake occurred naturally.
Friday's quake was the strongest one to hit the Korean Peninsula this year, according to the KMA.
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
10. S. Korean FM due in Hawaii for talks with U.S., Japan on N. Korea
A major line of effort in the new Indo-Pacific strategy:
EXPAND U.S.-JAPAN-ROK COOPERATION
Nearly every major Indo-Pacific challenge requires close cooperation among the United States’ allies and partners, particularly Japan and the ROK. We will continue to cooperate closely through trilateral channels on the DPRK. Beyond security, we will also work together on regional development and infrastructure, critical technology and supply-chain issues, and women’s leadership and empowerment. Increasingly, we will seek to coordinate our regional strategies in a trilateral context.
S. Korean FM due in Hawaii for talks with U.S., Japan on N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
HONOLULU, Feb. 11 (Yonhap) -- South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong was set to arrive in Hawaii on Friday for discussions with his U.S. and Japanese counterparts on ways to restart dialogue with North Korea.
Chung is set to hold bilateral and trilateral talks with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi on Saturday.
It will mark the first in-person meeting between the top diplomats of the three countries since U.S. President Joe Biden took office over a year ago in January 2021.
The foreign ministerial talks will follow a trilateral meeting of the countries' top nuclear envoys held here Thursday.
"We had a very good discussion -- very detailed, substantive discussion about recent developments," U.S. Special Representative for the DPRK Sung Kim said after holding bilateral and trilateral talks with his South Korean and Japanese counterparts, Noh Kyu-duk and Takehiro Funakoshi, respectively.
This week's meetings in Honolulu follow a barrage of North Korean missile launches.
North Korea fired nine ballistic missiles in seven rounds of launches in January, the largest number of missile tests the country has conducted in a month.
They also included the launch of an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the longest-range missile fired by the North since November 2017.
Noh said the countries are seeking new and creative ways to bring North Korea back to the dialogue table.
"First, we shared our views on the seriousness of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and discussed several ways to engage with North Korea," he said earlier of his talks with the U.S. and Japanese nuclear negotiators.
"I think the meetings were very meaningful and productive," he added, noting the discussions between the countries will resume when their top diplomats meet here Saturday.
North Korea has refused to attend any denuclearization negotiations since late 2019. It also remains unresponsive to all U.S. overtures.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
11. Mansions & yachts of North Korea's mysterious elite revealed in satellite pics
Mansions & yachts of North Korea's mysterious elite revealed in satellite pics
THE decadent lives of North Korea's elite have been exposed, as satellite images reveal where close allies of dictator Kim Jong-un live in luxury and hoard their riches.
While the average wage in North Korea is just £1,200 a year, the super-rich in this secretive communist dictatorship have amassed vast wealth, including fleets of expensive European cars, designer clothes, and cognac.
9
9
Many of North Korea's elite live in and around the capital PyongyangCredit: Jupiter Images
9
Taebodong, concentrated around the enormous Ryugyong HotelCredit: Getty - Contributor
9
Kim has up to 13 properties around North KoreaCredit: Rex
Google Maps images from space show large mansions, leafy gated compounds, and even beach resort inside the so-called "Hermit Kingdom".
Tyrant Kim Jong-un has his own residence in a secret compound near the port city of Wonsan on North Korea's east coast.
In 2020, it was reported that Kim had a new villa built at the secluded coastal spot at the southern tip of the Hodo peninsula, where Google Maps images showed his Princess yacht - valued at around $7m (£5.2m) in 2013 - moored up.
Michael Madden, a US-based expert on North Korea, told The Sun Online: "This is the same residential compound that Dennis Rodman visited during one of his visits to the country."
The non-resident fellow at the Stimson Center went on: "Some sources claim that the Wonsan compound is Kim Jong-un's primary residence.
"That is to say, he has an official residence in Pyongyang, but spends much of his time in the Wonsan residence."
Michael previously compared Wonsan to Donald Trump's Mar-a-Lago in Florida, calling it "one of his favourite houses".
Kim's new villa is on the opposite side of the Yonghung Bay from Wonsan, where there is an existing villa and cluster of large houses home to North Korea's elite.
Wonsan has become one of the more surprisingly touristy parts of North Korea and even features a water park.
Reuters has previously reported that the city is dotted with guest villas and serviced by a private beach, basketball court, and private train station.
Nearby is the tourist town of Wonsan-Kalma, a brand-new Dubai-like beach resort next to an airport spread along a 4km beach.
Many of the country's wealthiest have residences in the capital Pyongyang, particularly along Changkwang Street and in Taebodong.
"North Korean elites have a few residential compounds in Pyongyang where they live," Michael went on.
"Wealthy North Koreans generally hide their money in their homes."
This often takes the form of hard foreign currency, as opposed to the weaker North Korean won.
Many of the wealthiest North Koreans live in and around Changkwang Street near Pyongyang's "forbidden city" where KJU's HQ is located as well as his official residence.
We are talking about homes with gilded marble
Michael MaddenNonresident fellow, Stimson Center
Taebodong is another of the capital's wealthiest areas, concentrated around the huge, unfinished Ryugyong Hotel, the so-called "Hotel of Doom".
The tallest building in North Korea, it stands at 330m tall and dominates the city's skyline.
Kim is believed to have up to 13 significant compounds around the country where he can live, although he only appears to regularly use half of them.
Wonsan is particularly useful for Kim as its location allows him to easily travel to other areas along the eastern coast, or return quickly to Pyongyang in his private train, or along a special highway designed solely for his use.
North Korea's elite can be divided into two main categories; those including Kim and his family, and those who earn their money through trade activity and state contracts.
The latter group manages and operates large trading corporations that "technically belong to the ruling Workers' Party of Korea or the Korean People's Army," Michael went on.
He said: "The core elite families - like Kim Jong-un's - have billions of US dollars. When we get to the trader cohort, and small business owners, it could be well into the hundreds of millions in US dollars."
Michael also gave a glimpse into the lavish lifestyles of North Korea's elite.
9
Changgwang Street in Pyongyang is home to many of the city's eliteCredit: Google Maps
9
Hodo Peninsula, where Kim keeps his yachtCredit: google maps
9
Samsok is home to one of Kim's presidential housesCredit: google maps
9
Kim's Princess yacht has previously been seen moored up at Wonsan
9
Wonsan-Kalma, North Korea's very-own Dubai
"We are talking about homes with gilded marble, fine carpets and other design appointments, high-end electronics, luxury cars such as Mercedes and Maybachs, designer shoes, and bags," he said.
"One of the most famous stories about elite North Koreans is that in the early 2000s, the DPRK was the largest single buyer of Hennessey cognac.
"It's a common misperception that this was the late leader Kim Jong-Il's private stock. Rather, it was meant for other North Korean elites - either as personal gifts or something to be served at the leader's parties."
Although North Korea has successfully quelled any hopes of an uprising from ordinary people, Michael said that tensions exist within the country's elites.
"We are already seeing the regime bringing some members of the mercantile classes to heel," he added.
In 2020, preview.ph gave an insight into life for North Korea's rich kids.
A surprising number of western brands can be purchased in Pyongyang by those who have the resources, from luxury brands such as Chanel and Prada to more affordable chains including Zara, H&M, Adidas, and Nike.
They get around the country's strict fashion rules banning short skirts and sleeveless shirts by dressing up to go to the gym.
Plastic surgery is becoming more common for the 1%, as they look to emulate procedures popular in South Korea, including eyelid surgery or nose implants.
The secrecy shrouding North Korea means Google Maps often provides the most accurate image of the country.
The discovery was made following a report by Washington think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) who identified the site as the Hoejung-ni bunker.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
