Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“[Strategy] is more than a science: it is the application of knowledge to practical life, the development of thought capable of modifying the original guiding idea in the light of ever-changing situations; it is the art of acting under the pressure of the most difficult conditions."

Helmuth von Moltke, 1800–1891

“Beware of people who hide behind a façade of vague abstractions and impartiality: no one is impartial. A sharply worded question, an opinion designed to offend, will make them react and take sides. Man exists only in so far as he is opposed."

- Georg Hegel, 1770–1831

"And this I believe: that the free, exploring mind of the individual human is the most valuable thing in the world. And this I would fight for: the freedom of the mind to take any direction it wishes, undirected. And this I must fight against: any idea, religion, or government which limits or destroys the individual. This is what I am and what I am about."

-John Steinbeck, “East of Eden”

1. Perspective | Despite full integration order, women in special ops face many barriers

2. Military Must Recruit More Women, Immigrants for the Future Force, Experts Say

3. The Women of the OSS: On The Pioneering American Spies of WWII

4. The story of General Gerasimov

5. Opinion | Blinken ponders the post-Ukraine-war order

6. Countering China’s Magic Weapon Of Grand Narratives – Analysis

7. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 27, 2023

8. As fentanyl boomed, DEA removed Mexico director amid misconduct probe

9. China Doesn’t Want a U.S. Debt Default

10. Does the All-Volunteer Force Have an Expiration Date?

11. Pence: ‘I take full responsibility’ for classified documents ending up at Indiana home

12. A New Chapter for India-US Defense Ties

13. In Beijing's backyard, U.S. demonstrates its military might

14. If the U.S. can't borrow more money, why not just mint a coin to fund the government?

15. What, where, how: After the Abrams-for-Ukraine announcement, a host of questions

16. Japan gunning for strategic independence from US

17. US to buy new Abrams tanks for Ukraine because military has no spares, Pentagon says

18. Liberal hawks over realist doves in heated Ukraine debate

19. The Global Fragility Act and the Irregular Warfare Center: A Path for Diplomacy, Defense, and Development – Irregular Warfare Center

20. Russia’s Return to Gulag Economics

21. U.S. general warns troops that war with China is possible in two years

1. Perspective | Despite full integration order, women in special ops face many barriers

There is simply no excuse for this kind of treatment. Sexual assault cannot be defended on any level.

Excerpts:

Beyond the barriers, “it’s a very specialized career field,” said Lorry Fenner, director of government relations for the Service Women’s Action Network and a retired Air Force colonel. “So, I do not think it is realistic” to expect parity.

But there is much room for improvement in the military as a whole, including making Special Operations forces more attractive to women.

Despite “incremental progress,” the GAO said military leaders recognize that “forms of bias continue to exist within SOCOM, which create barriers to accessing a broad range of talent, skills, and perspectives.”

...

Watchdog interviews with 51 unnamed women reported gender discrimination, sexual harassment, sexual assault or retaliation while serving in Special Operations, experiences that made them want to leave that assignment or the military entirely. Forty-one were on active duty when questioned.

...

While the GAO warns the experiences of the women interviewed should not be extrapolated to all women in Special Operations, the sample presents a very disturbing picture of life for those in Special Operations forces. Sixty percent of the active duty Special Ops women interviewed said they experienced sexual harassment after the 2016 directive mandating gender integration and almost one-third reported being sexually assaulted. More than a third said they suffered retaliation for reporting sexual discrimination, harassment or assault.

Perspective | Despite full integration order, women in special ops face many barriers

The Washington Post · by Joe Davidson · January 27, 2023

Special Operations forces are known for overcoming dangerous obstacles to complete their missions. But the Pentagon still hasn’t overcome barriers that hinder women in the elite units, years after ordering complete gender integration.

Despite a Defense Department directive that took effect in 2016 to “fully integrate women without compromising our readiness, morale or war-fighting capacity,” less than one-tenth of the 78,000 U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) members are women, compared with about 19 percent military-wide, according to a watchdog report.

Numerical parity between men and women in special ops is not necessarily the goal, even among those who advocate for women in the military. But the women who have taken those jobs face widespread discrimination, harassment and sexual assault, issues also confronting women in the military generally.

Particularly appalling is the high percentage of Special Operations women who told the Government Accountability Office (GAO) they were sexually assaulted while on active duty.

Defense “has yet to complete a comprehensive evaluation of barriers to women or developed a plan of action for addressing identified barriers” in Special Ops, the GAO reported in a December audit.

Beyond the barriers, “it’s a very specialized career field,” said Lorry Fenner, director of government relations for the Service Women’s Action Network and a retired Air Force colonel. “So, I do not think it is realistic” to expect parity.

But there is much room for improvement in the military as a whole, including making Special Operations forces more attractive to women.

Despite “incremental progress,” the GAO said military leaders recognize that “forms of bias continue to exist within SOCOM, which create barriers to accessing a broad range of talent, skills, and perspectives.”

Fenner praised Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s efforts to eradicate a “command climate” of bias against military women. A September Pentagon fact sheet says “sexual assault and sexual harassment remain persistent and corrosive problems.”

Such problems, particularly in the Navy, have infected training for Special Ops men and women. For years, about 25 percent of prospective SEALs completed training, according to the New York Times. That fell to about half in February 2021 and only 7 percent have finished the course since then.

Special Operations leaders released a diversity and inclusion action plan in April, the GAO reported, but it “does not contain specific details or results-oriented elements such as goals, objectives, metrics, and milestones to help ensure progress is made toward improving participation rates of women.”

A Pentagon statement said it supports the GAO’s eight recommendations, including one for “a consistent process regarding the full integration of women into previously closed positions.” The GAO also called for the Pentagon to align inconsistent gender-related policies among the military services and the department as a whole, an issue earning much GAO attention. For example, the Pentagon and the Navy process harassment allegations through the complainant’s agency. In the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps, this is the responsibility of the offender’s service or command.

“As a result,” the GAO said, “there may be confusion as to which service is responsible for processing harassment complaints and they may be processed inconsistently depending on the joint environment and military services involved.”

Watchdog interviews with 51 unnamed women reported gender discrimination, sexual harassment, sexual assault or retaliation while serving in Special Operations, experiences that made them want to leave that assignment or the military entirely. Forty-one were on active duty when questioned.

Gender discrimination and a male-dominated culture were the barriers most often noted in the interviews. One interviewee cited a “mind-set” in Special Operations forces that “women are weaker and that they cannot have a family and be in SOF [Special Operations forces] at the same time.”

“I’m getting out … largely because I never got any recognition for my hard work,” a woman told the GAO. Said another: “It made me not want to be there. It felt like I would never be good enough because of my gender.”

Pregnancy and parenthood also can negatively affect a woman’s career. “I feel like I am less valued in leadership’s eyes because I am family-focused,” a Special Operations forces woman complained to the GAO.

While the GAO warns the experiences of the women interviewed should not be extrapolated to all women in Special Operations, the sample presents a very disturbing picture of life for those in Special Operations forces. Sixty percent of the active duty Special Ops women interviewed said they experienced sexual harassment after the 2016 directive mandating gender integration and almost one-third reported being sexually assaulted. More than a third said they suffered retaliation for reporting sexual discrimination, harassment or assault.

“Women said that the experience of sexual assault made it feel unsafe to continue to go to work and be in the same places as the perpetrators,” according to the GAO audit.

Harrowing experiences for women in traditionally macho workplaces are not limited to Special Ops. Patricia A. Harris, now an American Legion national vice commander, had painful encounters as one of three women among 78 soldiers in her Army Signal Corps unit. They had to hang cables by climbing poles and trees, traversing culverts and even rappelling off cliffs.

Did she face gender bias?

“Oh, absolutely,” she said, her voice rising. “Absolutely.”

Harris was a sergeant, and some men didn’t want to take her instructions. Others paternalistically sought to protect the women. When the Gulf War vet was based in Saudi Arabia, “we caught a lot of hell,” she recalled. Local men would verbally abuse and spit at them because “we weren’t supposed to be there driving and commanding men.”

But the worst encounter was her abduction by a colleague, a male sergeant.

“I started hitting him. Yes, I did,” said Harris, a 62-year-old Raleigh, N.C., resident. “And he hit me back and he hit me hard enough that he knocked me out.” When she came to, her hands and legs were taped to a chair.

Harris wasn’t raped, she recalled, but the kidnapper “did all types of other sexually explicit things.” She later learned “I was only one of eight women that he’s done this to. I was the only one that he didn’t rape.” They were all at the 1980 court-martial that resulted in his imprisonment.

Things are better for women in the military now, but improvement has been slow, “one step forward, two steps back, two steps forward, one step back,” Fenner said.

“There’s incremental change,” she added, but “changing people’s minds and hearts is difficult, especially when you still have the old guys around.”

The Washington Post · by Joe Davidson · January 27, 2023

2. Military Must Recruit More Women, Immigrants for the Future Force, Experts Say

While many will call for a new Lodge Act, it is likely not feasible in today's anti immigrant environment. Here are two articles about the history of the Lodge Act.

America’s Foreign Legionnaires

The Lodge Act Soldiers, Part I

https://arsof-history.org/articles/v5n1_lodge_act_part_1_page_1.html

America’s Foreign Legionnaires

The Lodge Act Soldiers – Part II

https://arsof-history.org/articles/v5n2_lodge_act_part_2_page_1.html

Military Must Recruit More Women, Immigrants for the Future Force, Experts Say

At symposium on building the all-volunteer force of 2040, panelists push back on criticism of diversity initiatives.

defenseone.com · by Jennifer Hlad

ANNAPOLIS, Maryland—The military must recruit more women and more immigrants—and change its culture to embrace diversity as a strength—to be successful in the future, experts said Wednesday at a symposium timed to the 50th anniversary of the all-volunteer force.

The remarks come at a time when politicians and conservative commentators have blamed “wokeness,” a catch-all term generally used to deride diversity and inclusion initiatives and programs for female service members, for what they believe is a decline in military effectiveness. For example, on Wednesday, Rep. Mike Waltz, R-Fla., recently named chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness, tweeted, “I am ready to get to work to better equip our military and turn our focus away from woke priorities and back to winning wars.”

A Reagan National Defense Survey late last year found a decreased confidence in the military among respondents, with 62 percent believing military leadership has become overly politicized, and 50 percent believing “so-called ‘woke’ practices” were undermining military effectiveness.

But Lindsay Cohn, an associate professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College, rejected the idea that “wokeness” is hurting recruiting, saying there is plenty of data showing why people don’t join the military, and “wokeness is not on the list.”

“We don’t have any indication that people are not joining the military because they’re afraid it’s too woke, or because they’re afraid it’s too soft,” Cohn said during a panel discussion at the recruiting symposium, which was organized by the Marine Corps and hosted by the U.S. Naval Institute.

Instead, she said, research shows that trust in the military is “becoming more and more a partisan issue,” and that trust is going down “primarily among Republicans”—but is still very high.

Meredith Kleykamp, an associate professor at the University of Maryland and director of the Center for Research on Military Organization, noted that the Reagan surveyors did not specifically talk to young people who could potentially join the military.

“We are not recruiting whoever the population is that is responding to that poll exclusively. We’re recruiting” 18- to 25-year-olds, who hold “very different views” about social justice, Kleykamp said. “Sometimes it feels like…we’re recruiting the people who are already in” instead of appealing to the next generation.

Data presented at the symposium by Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute and Richard Fry of Pew Research Center showed that immigrants and women are likely to make up a larger percentage of the recruiting pool in 2040, and are more likely to have the education and skills necessary to join the military. In 2022, 44 percent of 25- to 29-year-old women had at least a bachelor’s degree, compared to 35 percent of men, Fry noted.

Service recruiting data shows that the percentage of female recruits declined from fiscal 2020 to 2021 for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, but increased slightly for the Marine Corps after a decline from fiscal 2019 to 2020.

Gen. Eric Smith, the assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, noted in opening remarks that only about 25 percent of the American population is qualified to enter service, and most disqualifiers are physical—either medication or fitness.

“It’s a wicked problem, and the numbers are not in our favor,” Smith said.

Smith, who served as a recruiter and said his son is currently serving on Marine Corps recruiting duty, also said recruiters have two sayings: “Don’t try to qualify the unqualified” and “fish where there’s fish.”

But Cohn, Kleykamp, and other panelists pushed back on the latter. The military will have to be “a little inefficient” in its recruiting efforts in the future, Cohn said, and will have to “expand your idea of who the fish are.”

“I’m not saying that physical strength doesn’t matter,” or that courage doesn’t matter, she added, but “we need to stop assuming that certain segments of the population doesn’t have those things.”

Beth Asch, a senior economist at RAND, pointed out that two-thirds of the people who enlist in the military come from the group that initially did not have a propensity to serve—the “negatively propensed” group.

“Recruiting is not going after the propensed group,” Asch said, adding that the military is more an “all-recruited force,” than “all-volunteer.”

The goal of the symposium was to “seek ways to have an [all-volunteer force] in 2040 that is dominant on complex battlefields, affordable, and consistent with our national values and way of life,” said Col. Eric Reid, director of the Marine Corps’ talent management strategy group.

Smith opened the event with a warning: “War is coming again, and it always does, sadly. Some would argue it’s already begun. And if we don’t have individuals to defend this nation, then we’re going to have a different lifestyle.”

But experts said further politicization of the military will only harm those recruiting efforts.

Cohn and other panelists noted the changing demographics of the recruiting pool will require a change in culture as well, and to do that, the military must “replace the old culture with a positive alternative. You cannot simply walk into the office and say, ‘OK, everybody has to take the porn posters down, we don’t do that anymore,’ and walk out and think that we’ve changed the culture. You haven’t.”

Instead, it must be replaced with a different model, and that change must “come from the top down.” But “in the current political environment in this country, that’s difficult,” because there’s not a consensus on what the ideal culture is, she said.

Reid told Defense One the military’s "ability to recruit and retain a capable all-volunteer force could be hindered if hyper-partisan domestic politics are projected onto military policies. I worry that we will have a serious uphill fight if individual military policy decisions can be used to immediately alienate half of the national recruiting base and their influencers. Military service must remain a non-partisan calling."

Todd Harrison, managing director of Metrea Strategic Insights, said he believes the current recruiting system is on an “unsustainable trajectory,” and that to fix it, all the services must think about “who the workforce is and who we want to attract and retain.”

“Too often I see what we’re doing as a policy is trying to throw money at problems,” Harrison said, suggesting that instead, the military services should start to question long-held assumptions, such as the wisdom and necessity of frequent permanent-change-of-station moves.

And, he said, the Marine Corps must decide whether it wants to be the same in the future as it is today—and whether it wants to be fair and equitable or if it wants to be a meritocracy.

“I want the best and brightest. I want the Chinese to never dare fight us, right, because I want them to look at our force and say, ‘My god, these guys are sharp.’ I don’t care if they look at our force and say, ‘My god, they’re fair,’” he said.

defenseone.com · by Jennifer Hlad

3. The Women of the OSS: On The Pioneering American Spies of WWII

For those who say that women should not be in SOF we should recall the history of the OSS which was the precursor to not only the CIA but also USSOCOM.

We have to do better with women in SOF. We can do better. We have done better.

Excerpts:

Virginia Hall, perhaps the most famous of all the OSS female spies, was trained by the SOE because she originally worked for that organization, as an undercover agent in France before America entered the war. Known as the “Limping Lady” because she had lost one leg in a hunting accident, Hall’s accomplishments were extraordinary. An expert wireless radio operator, she helped create agent networks, recruited French civilians to establish safe houses, helped prisoners of war escape and arranged air drops of supplies for the French Resistance. The Gestapo referred to as “one of the most dangerous Allied agents in France” and vowed to find and destroy her. They failed.

The OSS employed over 13,000 personnel at its peak, 35% of them women. 7,500 of these men and women served overseas—however the number of women who served overseas as spies was a very small, elite group—and the exact number remains classified. What is certain is the very first American female spies, pioneers like Elizabeth McIntosh, Doris Bohrer and the others I’ve highlighted here, left an enormous legacy and blazed the trail for the American women who work in counterintelligence today.

The Women of the OSS: On The Pioneering American Spies of WWII

35% of those serving in the OSS, the precursor to the CIA,

were women, and yet their stories have only begun to be

told.

APRIL 9, 2021 BY JANE HEALEY

VIA LAKE UNION

crimereads.com · by Jane Healey · April 9, 2021

My fascination with the women of the Office of Strategic Services, the organization that was the precursor to the CIA in WWII, began with a Washington Post article I came across from June 2011, about two best friends in a retirement community in Virginia. Elizabeth McIntosh and Doris Bohrer lived on the same street in the Westminster at Lake Ridge Seniors Village in Prince William County. Upon meeting, they bonded over a highly unusual connection—both women had been spies overseas in WWII in the OSS, and later had long careers with the CIA. McIntosh had served in Asia, and, even at ninety-six, still struggled with the guilt over unwittingly handing off an explosive disguised as a piece of coal to a Chinese operative. The bomb ended up blowing up a train, killing hundreds of Japanese soldiers. Bohrer served in Italy, gathering intelligence on what the Nazis were building by analyzing aerial photographs.

After reading the article, I filed it away as a possible idea for my next novel and found that I could not stop thinking about it. I was aware of the British female spies of the SOE during World War II, but had never really heard much about American female spies. I began asking the questions that I always did before starting a new project—who were these women? What were their stories? This new project would ultimately become my third novel, The Secret Stealers, which releases April 1st.

Who were these women? What were their stories?

To understand the role of the women of the OSS, it’s important to first understand the organization’s overall mission and history. On June 13th, 1942, President Roosevelt authorized the establishment of the OSS in a military order, under the umbrella of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The purpose of the newly formed service was to collect and analyze strategic intelligence, but also to “enforce our will upon the enemy by means other than military action.” In other words, to engage in acts of espionage, including but not limited to, activities such as unorthodox warfare, contact with resistance groups, and subversion and sabotage.

Roosevelt appointed Major General William J. Donovan to head up this new shadow organization. Donovan, the most decorated soldier in U.S. history as a result of his heroism in World War I, was a larger than life personality with a rather unorthodox leadership style. With the country on the verge of war, Donovan had to build up the OSS from scratch very quickly. There was no time for tight security checks, so he reached out to his vast network and recruited from the upper echelons of society – Ivy league graduates, former business associates, professors from elite colleges and linguists, among others. This resulted in the OSS having a reputation as elitist, earning the nicknames “Oh So Snobby” and “Oh So Social”.

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Maggie Griggs, Donovan’s assistant, was in charge of recruitment of women in the early days of the organization. This task was difficult because of the secrecy of the OSS—she couldn’t tell the OSS recruits what type of work they would be doing, so she could only discreetly advertise for the work positions in generalities in newspapers and magazines. This made it difficult to compete with the new women’s branches of the armed forces—the Navy WAVEs and the Army WACs, which made promises of high adventure and sleek uniforms.

In her book Sisterhood of Spies:Women of the OSS, Elizabeth McIntosh recalls that “most of us, men and women, were an undisciplined collection of volunteers selected almost at random, for many reasons and for many objectives.” There is a reason Donovan referred to the members of his organization as his “glorious amateurs”. But in fairly short time, the OSS grew to include thousands of personnel stationed around the world, and its work became essential to the Allies’ military planning in the various war zones in which they were engaged.

The training of the female spies of the OSS, those who went undercover to serve in war zones, was as varied as the clandestine missions they embarked on. McIntosh attended more than one of the special training schools that had been set up on the outskirts of D.C. Her friend Doris Bohrer attended training at the OSS facility in Bethesda, Maryland that is now the Congressional Country Club.

Donovan had realized early on the strategic value of using female spies in the field through his relationships with the leaders of the SOE in the U.K. On a visit to Wanborough Manor, one of the SOE’s espionage training schools, Maurice Buckmaster, head of the SOE’s French Section, convinced Donovan that female recruits were achieving excellent results working undercover in France as couriers and wireless operators, while also engaging in acts of sabotage. Part of this success was simply because women could blend in more easily than men in the occupied territories.

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With this strong relationship established between the OSS and SOE, it made logical sense that some of the OSS female spies undergo training with the SOE. Among these trainees was the unflappable and brilliant Betty Lussier. Upon recruitment by the OSS just out of college, she was sent for special training in counterespionage and code work by the SOE at their training facility in St. Albans. Lussier became part of the OSS’s counterintelligence branch, known as X-2. She helped establish an extensive double agent net in Perpignan, France—tracking down collaborators and Nazi agents.

Virginia Hall, perhaps the most famous of all the OSS female spies, was trained by the SOE because she originally worked for that organization, as an undercover agent in France before America entered the war. Known as the “Limping Lady” because she had lost one leg in a hunting accident, Hall’s accomplishments were extraordinary. An expert wireless radio operator, she helped create agent networks, recruited French civilians to establish safe houses, helped prisoners of war escape and arranged air drops of supplies for the French Resistance. The Gestapo referred to as “one of the most dangerous Allied agents in France” and vowed to find and destroy her. They failed.

The OSS employed over 13,000 personnel at its peak, 35% of them women. 7,500 of these men and women served overseas—however the number of women who served overseas as spies was a very small, elite group—and the exact number remains classified. What is certain is the very first American female spies, pioneers like Elizabeth McIntosh, Doris Bohrer and the others I’ve highlighted here, left an enormous legacy and blazed the trail for the American women who work in counterintelligence today.

Anna Cavanaugh, the main character in my novel The Secret Stealers, is a composite of all of the amazing women of the OSS that I learned about during my research for the book. Anna’s experiences working overseas as an undercover agent in France are all based on the true stories of these incredibly brave women. My only hope is that my depiction of Anna and her female cohorts honors their remarkable legacy.

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***

crimereads.com · by Jane Healey · April 9, 2021

4. The story of General Gerasimov

This is a very important excerpt:

The annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas created the illusion that Russia is actually using the methods described in the Gerasimov concept. In both cases, “Russian bandits”, adventurers and special forces participated in the events. All this was seasoned with sinister Russian propaganda, and the West was convinced that the Gerasimov doctrine really exists.” For this reason, the researcher believes, the Kremlin’s activities are dangerous: they do not have a clear program. “Moscow has a large-scale political task — to distract, divide and demoralize [the enemy], but otherwise,” the political scientist explains, “the actions of the Russian Federation do not fit into a single concept, sometimes they even contradict each other.”

“Gerasimov’s military doctrine, as far as I understand, does not affect the management of troops,” says political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky. “It should have been used as part of the Blitzkrieg. This is an attempt to avoid major clashes. After all, according to this concept, large formations of regular troops are not needed. Everything must be done by local enemy troops who have defected to your side, PMCs, terrorist organizations and other forces that allow you to preemptively seize power in the state. In such a situation, the army supports them. Ukraine was expected to be taken entirely in the same way as it happened with Crimea in 2014. But, as we know, the blitzkrieg failed, and now Russia has to fight the old-fashioned way.

Since Russia, according to Belkovsky, did not prepare for a long confrontation and hoped to quickly break the pockets of resistance, the real state of the army and the degree of its degradation, even if they were known to Gerasimov, did not receive a proper critical assessment, and were not even reported to Putin. In Russia, none of the leaders will ever admit their mistakes. However, this does not mean that subordinates do not see them.

“Gerasimov invented this ‘military doctrine’, which, in essence, is not based on the previous experience of military science not only in Russia but also in the Western world,” says a former officer of the General Staff of the Russian Defence Ministry. “These works of his are more like the ideas of ‘red mercury’ or ‘Kremlin pill’. Everything is beautiful — only it is impossible to make it a reality. When he first tried to use his system militarily in Syria, he immediately faced the problem of controlling the occupied territory. Even taking into account a poorly prepared, poorly armed enemy, this is a problem. For example, Palmyra eventually had to be stormed twice. And in Ukraine, the idea of a ‘three-day war’ was initially doomed. A small offensive against more prepared and well-armed enemy formations in the absence of back support, the isolation of small advanced units, the lack of a clear ideological component of the operation and a bunch of mutually exclusive tasks—all this led to a global breakdown in solving the issue.”

The story of General Gerasimov

The new Russian army commander in Ukraine is the one who came up with ‘hybrid war’ strategy — and this fantasy lured Russia into a trap

https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/01/27/the-story-of-general-gerasimov-en

06:21 AM, 27 January 2023Georgy Aleksandrov, exclusively for Novaya Gazeta. Europe

The new commander of the Russian group of forces in Ukraine, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Defence Ministry Valery Gerasimov, is spoken of differently in the army. Even diametrically opposite. Some consider him an honest soldier who has reached career heights thanks to talent and perseverance. Others call the first Deputy Minister of Defence, a member of the Security Council and a hero of Russia, a huckster who despises subordinates and makes incompetent decisions that have driven the country into a military trap. Novaya-Europe has collected these estimates and studied the facts on which they are based.

A guy from a working family

Born into a working-class family, Gerasimov dreamed of the army since childhood. After graduating from military school with a gold medal, he entered the Kazan Higher Tank Command School, and then the Military Academy of Armoured Forces. Later, having already climbed many steps of the career ladder, Gerasimov studied at the General Staff Military Academy, receiving excellent grades everywhere.

The future army general began his ascent to the top of the army hierarchy as a platoon commander. This was followed by appointments as a company commander, battalion chief of staff, and then as the commander of a motorised rifle division in the Baltic Military District. Gerasimov supervised the division’s move to the Moscow Military District in August 1994. After holding several more responsible posts, in 1998 he became chief of staff of the 58th Combined Arms Army of the North Caucasus Military District, and then in 2001, he began to head this army.

At that time, Gerasimov’s subordinates were actively involved in the second Chechen campaign and were the main military force of Russia in the Caucasus. After several new promotions, in 2006, Gerasimov found himself at the head of the entire North Caucasus Military District. The following milestones of his biography were the leadership of the St. Petersburg and then Moscow military districts. On 23 December 2010, the President appointed him Deputy Chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, and on 26 April 2012, he was made commander of the Central Military District.

Valery Gerasimov at the head of the Victory Parade on May 9, 2011. Photo: Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0

“The soldiers called Gerasimov ‘Gera’,” says a former subordinate of the star commander. “He was a diligent chief of staff of the battalion, later of a tank regiment. He was disliked by many colleagues for his rapid growth in the service. Gerasimov is a big fan of the history of the Second World War. All the time, he would ask senior officers who took part in the war questions about their combat experience. There still were people from that generation in the army, those were the mid-80s. Colonels, generals, advisers. The questions were sensible. The seniors liked the smart guy, and his career developed.”

Gerasimov, according to our interlocutor, did not hesitate to carefully criticise the Soviet doctrine of a massive strike: in the USSR, in case of war with NATO, there was a plan for a large-scale invasion of tank armadas,

which, according to the plan, were supposed to capture Europe before the United States had time to send aid. Gerasimov openly said that NATO was prepared for such a turn of events and that a Soviet blitzkrieg with the advance of tank columns to the English Channel was impossible due to the low level of discipline and training of personnel. The Soviet army obviously did not reach Wehrmacht’s level.

“And Gerasimov also claimed that the USSR was entirely unprepared for conducting an information war,” our interlocutor recalls. “He has probably carried this thought with him to the present day. Because later he repeated it in his speeches on the eve of the Crimea annexation.”

In 2012, the candidacy of Valery Gerasimov for the post of chief of the General Staff was presented to president Putin by Sergey Shoigu, who headed the Defence Ministry after the scandalous resignation of Anatoly Serdyukov. On 9 November 2012, the President approved this appointment. A few days later, Gerasimov also became a member of the Russian Security Council.

Valery Gerasimov. Photo: EPA-EFE/SERGEY CHIRIKOV

Valery Gerasimov led the technical organisation and commanded the direct military operation for the annexation of Crimea and Donbas, as well as the invasion of Syria. He was the one who gave orders to the units involved in the invasion, following the instructions of the top command. In May 2016, by a classified presidential decree, the general was awarded the title of Hero of Russia. The military commander is included in the sanctions lists of the EU and Canada.

The Bellingcat expert group named Gerasimov among those involved in the operation to deliver the Buk air defence system to the combat zone, which shot down the MH17 Malaysian Boeing in the sky over Donbas on 17 July 2014.

In the list of suspects, the general’s name was next to the name of Defence Minister Shoigu.

Ukraine declared the general “the main ideologist of the war in the Donbas”. The Kyiv court arrested Gerasimov in absentia and put him on the wanted list. At the same time, Gerasimov often participates in international negotiations at the highest level.

On 11 January 2023, Sergey Shoigu appointed the general as commander of the joint group of forces in Ukraine, demoting his predecessor Sergey Surovikin to one of the deputies. The other two deputies of the commander of the joint forces were Army General Oleg Salyukov and Colonel-General Alexei Kim.

The Elusive Doctrine

The troops say that for more than ten years it has been Valery Gerasimov who really leads the Russian army, while Shoigu, who has not served in the armed forces a single day, is only the official head of the Defence Ministry. At the same time, Gerasimov allegedly not only makes all the most important decisions in the department but is also considered a real ideologist of the Russian Defence Ministry, who created an entire military doctrine. By the way, until recently, many Western experts echoed the Russian military in this, as they were convinced that Gerasimov had developed and was implementing the concept of a “new generation war” — the Russian response to the allegedly Western-inspired “orange revolutions” in Arab countries. It is clear that it is impossible to find and read this doctrine in the public domain, but it can be “felt” by studying its public mentions.

In 2013, about a year before the annexation of Crimea, Valery Gerasimov spoke to members of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences. He repeated the idea popular in those years that the collective West unleashes hybrid wars, one of the whose targets is Russia. A little later, the Chief of the General Staff published a detailed article in the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper, dubbed “The value of science in foresight”. The article was devoted to this issue. It argued that the opponents are conducting an aggressive policy against the Russian Federation in the form of colour revolutions and other non-military methods of influence, and Russia needs to develop adequate response measures.

“In the 21st century, there is a tendency to erase the differences between the state of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared, and when they begin, they do not follow the usual pattern,” Gerasimov wrote. “The experience of military conflicts, including those related to the so-called colour revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East, confirms that a completely prosperous state in a matter of months or even days can turn into an arena of fierce armed struggle, become a victim of foreign intervention, plunge into the abyss of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe and civil war.”

Further, the general recalled the “Arab Spring”, arguing that the rules of war of the 21st century have changed significantly. “The role of non-military methods in achieving political and strategic goals has increased, which in some cases have significantly surpassed the power of weapons in their effectiveness.

The current methods of confrontation are shifting towards the widespread use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military measures,

implemented with the use of the protest potential of the population. All this is complemented by covert military measures, including the implementation of information warfare measures and the actions of special forces. The open use of force is often applied under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis settlement only at a certain stage, mainly to achieve final success in the conflict.”

Gerasimov wrote that “frontal clashes of large groups of troops at the strategic and operational level are gradually becoming a thing of the past. Remote non-contact impact on the enemy becomes the main way to achieve the goals of combat and operation. The defeat of its objects is carried out to the entire depth of the territory… The use of high-precision weapons is becoming widespread. Weapons based on new physical principles and robotic systems are being actively introduced into military affairs.”

In his article, the army general argued that modern warfare involves only the targeted use of special operation forces and a stake in internal opposition, on the creation of a permanent internal front throughout the enemy’s territory, as well as the impact of information, the forms and methods of which are constantly being improved.

Western experts noticed Gerasimov’s article and began discussing Russia’s likely preparation for such a “hybrid war”,

when, instead of cumbersome formations of the armed forces, the stake will be placed on collaborators and traitors from among the local elites, acting with the support of small groups of professional special forces against the background of massive propaganda among the local population.

A year later, Crimea happened.

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Things didn’t go according to plan

“Gerasimov makes a strange impression. He is not just a military commander, but a real ideologist of Putin’s KGB-oligarchic government,” says the head of the public movement Citizen. Army. Law Sergey Krivenko. “It was he, as the commander of the General Staff, who justified the participation of volunteer detachments in combat operations, as well as the covert use of the armed forces under the guise of such volunteers. This is exactly what we saw in Crimea and Donbas [in 2014]. The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ can be called the Russian response to a fictional threat from the West to its own fear of the “orange revolution” inspired by the United States, the Soros Foundation, and so on. But the Russian leadership intimidated itself to such an extent that everything descended into an open conflict, to a war like the conflicts of the mid-twentieth century, with thousands of corpses and cities wiped off the face of the earth.”

Sergey Krivenko emphasizes that the only real operation carried out following the Gerasimov concept was the seizure of Crimea by unmarked servicemen. However, this success was misinterpreted in Russia, where everyone, including the Kremlin, believed that now the entire Russian army is capable of conducting similar operations. Only a few well-trained units operated in Crimea, and it was not worth extrapolating their characteristics to the entire army — now it has become clear to everyone.

Mark Galeotti. Photo: Bookmate

And now Western experts doubt whether it was not a hasty conclusion that Russia is really ready to use the methods of war outlined in Gerasimov’s concept. That this, roughly speaking, is not a fantasy on a military theme. So, a political scientist, and senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations in Prague, Mark Galeotti, in a column for Foreign Policy, said that he himself invented the term “Gerasimov doctrine” — to draw attention to the translation of the Russian general’s article published on his blog. “This doctrine does not exist,” Galeotti said. “And the more we convince ourselves of its existence, the longer we won’t understand how to respond to the real problems that Russia throws at us.”

According to Galeotti,

The annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas created the illusion that Russia is actually using the methods described in the Gerasimov concept. In both cases, “Russian bandits”,

adventurers and special forces participated in the events. All this was seasoned with sinister Russian propaganda, and the West was convinced that the Gerasimov doctrine really exists.” For this reason, the researcher believes, the Kremlin’s activities are dangerous: they do not have a clear program. “Moscow has a large-scale political task — to distract, divide and demoralize [the enemy], but otherwise,” the political scientist explains, “the actions of the Russian Federation do not fit into a single concept, sometimes they even contradict each other.”

“Gerasimov’s military doctrine, as far as I understand, does not affect the management of troops,” says political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky. “It should have been used as part of the Blitzkrieg. This is an attempt to avoid major clashes. After all, according to this concept, large formations of regular troops are not needed. Everything must be done by local enemy troops who have defected to your side, PMCs, terrorist organizations and other forces that allow you to preemptively seize power in the state. In such a situation, the army supports them. Ukraine was expected to be taken entirely in the same way as it happened with Crimea in 2014. But, as we know, the blitzkrieg failed, and now Russia has to fight the old-fashioned way.

Since Russia, according to Belkovsky, did not prepare for a long confrontation and hoped to quickly break the pockets of resistance, the real state of the army and the degree of its degradation, even if they were known to Gerasimov, did not receive a proper critical assessment, and were not even reported to Putin. In Russia, none of the leaders will ever admit their mistakes. However, this does not mean that subordinates do not see them.

“Gerasimov invented this ‘military doctrine’, which, in essence, is not based on the previous experience of military science not only in Russia but also in the Western world,” says a former officer of the General Staff of the Russian Defence Ministry. “These works of his are more like the ideas of ‘red mercury’ or ‘Kremlin pill’. Everything is beautiful — only it is impossible to make it a reality. When he first tried to use his system militarily in Syria, he immediately faced the problem of controlling the occupied territory. Even taking into account a poorly prepared, poorly armed enemy, this is a problem. For example, Palmyra eventually had to be stormed twice. And in Ukraine, the idea of a ‘three-day war’ was initially doomed. A small offensive against more prepared and well-armed enemy formations in the absence of back support, the isolation of small advanced units, the lack of a clear ideological component of the operation and a bunch of mutually exclusive tasks—all this led to a global breakdown in solving the issue.”

Opinion | Blinken ponders the post-Ukraine-war order

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · January 24, 2023

The Biden administration, convinced that Vladimir Putin has failed in his attempt to erase Ukraine, has begun planning for an eventual postwar military balance that will help Kyiv deter any repetition of Russia’s brutal invasion.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken outlined his strategy for the Ukrainian endgame and postwar deterrence during an interview on Monday at the State Department. The conversation offered an unusual exploration of some of the trickiest issues surrounding resolution of a Ukraine conflict that has threatened the global order.

Blinken explicitly commended Germany’s military backing for Ukraine at a time when Berlin is getting hammered by some other NATO allies for not providing Leopard tanks quickly to Kyiv. “Nobody would have predicted the extent of Germany’s military support” when the war began, Blinken said. “This is a sea change we should recognize.”

He also underlined President Biden’s determination to avoid direct military conflict with Russia, even as U.S. weapons help pulverize Putin’s invasion force. “Biden has always been emphatic that one of his requirements in Ukraine is that there be no World War III,” Blinken said.

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Russia’s colossal failure to achieve its military goals, Blinken believes, should now spur the United States and its allies to begin thinking about the shape of postwar Ukraine — and how to create a just and durable peace that upholds Ukraine’s territorial integrity and allows it to deter and, if necessary, defend against any future aggression. In other words, Russia should not be able to rest, regroup and reattack.

Blinken’s deterrence framework is somewhat different from last year’s discussions with Kyiv about security guarantees similar to NATO’s Article 5. Rather than such a formal treaty pledge, some U.S. officials increasingly believe the key is to give Ukraine the tools it needs to defend itself. Security will be ensured by potent weapons systems — especially armor and air defense — along with a strong, noncorrupt economy and membership in the European Union.

The Pentagon’s current stress on providing Kyiv with weapons and training for maneuver warfare reflects this long-term goal of deterrence. “The importance of maneuver weapons isn’t just to give Ukraine strength now to regain territory but as a deterrent against future Russian attacks,” explained a State Department official familiar with Blinken’s thinking. “Maneuver is the future.”

The conversation with Blinken offered some hints about the intense discussions that have gone on for months within the administration about how the war in Ukraine can be ended and future peace maintained. The administration’s standard formula is that all decisions must ultimately be made by Ukraine, and Blinken reiterated that line. He also backs Ukraine’s desire for significant battlefield gains this year. But the State Department, Pentagon and National Security Council are also thinking ahead.

Crimea is a particular point of discussion. There is a widespread view in Washington and Kyiv that regaining Crimea by military force may be impossible. Any Ukrainian military advances this year in Zaporizhzhia oblast, the land bridge that connects Crimea and Russia, could threaten Russian control. But an all-out Ukrainian campaign to seize the Crimean Peninsula is unrealistic, many U.S. and Ukrainian officials believe. That’s partly because Putin has indicated that an assault on Crimea would be a tripwire for nuclear escalation.

The administration shares Ukraine’s insistence that Crimea, which was seized by Russia in 2014, must eventually be returned. But in the short run, what’s crucial for Kyiv is that Crimea no longer serve as a base for attacks against Ukraine. One formula that interests me would be a demilitarized status, with questions of final political control deferred. Ukrainian officials told me last year that they had discussed such possibilities with the administration.

As Blinken weighs options in Ukraine, he has been less worried about escalation risks than some observers. That’s partly because he believes Russia is checked by NATO’s overwhelming power. “Putin continues to hold some things in reserve because of his misplaced fear that NATO might attack Russia,” explained the official familiar with Blinken’s thinking. This Russian reserve force includes strategic bombers, certain precision-guided weapons and, of course, tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.

Blinken’s refusal to criticize Germany on the issue of releasing Leopard tanks illustrates what has been more than a year of alliance management to keep the pro-Ukraine coalition from fracturing. Blinken has logged hundreds of hours — on the phone, in video meetings and in trips abroad — to keep this coalition intact.

This cohesiveness will become even more important as the Ukraine war moves toward an endgame. This year, Ukraine and its allies will keep fighting to expel Russian invaders. But as in the final years of World War II, planning has already begun for the postwar order — and construction of a system of military and political alliances that can restore and maintain the peace that Russia shattered.

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · January 24, 2023

6. Countering China’s Magic Weapon Of Grand Narratives – Analysis

Unfortunately the link to the "magic weapon" goes to The Australian but is completely behind a paywall so I cannot access it.

This is an article about the competition for influence that we need to ponder and discuss.

We forget the grand narrative of America. We need to recall how to employ that narrative as we did during the Cold War but I fear our political divide in today's America prevents us from presenting such a narrative.

Countering China’s Magic Weapon Of Grand Narratives – Analysis

eurasiareview.com · by Hudson Institute · January 27, 2023

By John Lee

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has developed a magic weapon that complements its accumulation of material power: its success in shaping grand narratives in the Indo-Pacific region about China and America. The genius is that these narratives condition countries to accept Chinese policies meekly even if those policies oppose their national interests.

The magic weapon is a narrative buttressed by five basic messages:

1. Chinese dominance is the historical norm and is inevitable.

2. The objectives of the CCP are permanent and unchanging.

3. A CCP-led China is fundamentally undeterrable.

4. Beijing is prepared to pay any price to achieve its core objectives.

5. The US is an increasingly weak and unreliable ally.

Accepting these propositions greatly diminishes the motivation for regional states to resist or counter even the most coercive policies, even if we profoundly disagree with China’s behavior. Striking an uneven bargain becomes seemingly preferable to foolishly balancing against the future inevitable dominant power.

The power of these narratives for Beijing is that once we accept the five basic messages as a given, then the only reasonable action is for regional states (including American allies) to compromise and alter their objectives to maximize gains, avoid instability, and ultimately prevent war. The onus is then placed on America to step back or accept blame for the resulting instability.

America needs to engage and prevail in this space of grand narratives rather than vacate the ground, as it has largely done. There are six counternarratives for which ample evidence exists and which America should relentlessly advance:

1. Xi Jinping and the CCP are engaged in a high-risk and high-cost approach to pursuing China’s growing ambitions abroad while concealing significant internal weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

These include the rapid accumulation of debt in the domestic financial system and the deteriorating capacity of local governments to fund public and social goods.

2. Despite the Chinese message that it does not need America and other advanced economies to achieve its objectives, Beijing cannot achieve its external objectives without the cooperation of America and other major advanced economies.

Despite its economic size, its economic tools and levers in the world are surprisingly limited in important respects. Even the resilience of its domestic economy is enormously vulnerable to American policies.

For example, China remains reliant on American dollar transactions for international trade and investment. It relies heavily on importing high-tech components, machinery, know-how, and intellectual property from America.

3. Xi’s high-risk approach is causing immense angst. The more the public attributes failures to Xi’s actions, the more pressure he will face internally.

4. The Chinese narrative that the United States is distant and therefore unreliable contradicts history. When Washington makes a decision, it is prepared to expend enormous blood and treasure to achieve its objectives and come to the aid of its allies. This same mindset still applies to America.

5. America needs to actively contest the argument that a Sino-centric economic and strategic order will be benevolent and guarantee material benefits for all participants.

The evidence for this lack of benevolence is compelling. For example, Chinese industrial policies have contributed to a more than threefold increase in ASEAN’s trade deficit with China over the past decade. China is more a taker of technology than a source of it, unlike America.

6. Chinese history is not one of benevolence and peace. Chinese empires have expanded and contracted through war and conquest. The “Middle Kingdom” is not a uniquely benevolent or unchanging entity. It is an expansionary power that will ultimately extend its influence through coercion and force if it can do so.

*About the author: John Lee is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute

Source: This article was published by the Hudson Institute

eurasiareview.com · by Hudson Institute · January 27, 2023

7. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 27, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2023

Key Takeaways

Kremlin insiders reportedly told Bloomberg that Russian President Vladimir Putin is preparing a new offensive to regain the initiative that may begin as early as February or March 2023.
The Kremlin confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is issuing preemptive pardons for convicts who serve in Russian operations in Ukraine.
A visual investigation by a Russian opposition outlet confirmed that Russian authorities are deporting children from occupied Kherson Oblast to occupied Crimea.
Russian officials denied reported explosions near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on January 26.
The Russian military command is likely attempting to restrict mibloggers’ frontline coverage to regain control over the Russian information space ahead of the new offensive. These restrictions—if planned—are likely a part of the Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s efforts to professionalize the Russian Armed Forces.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna on January 26 and January 27.
Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, on the western outskirts of Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian sources did not report that Russian forces continued localized offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast on January 27.
Russian officials claimed that the conscription age will not change in the upcoming 2023 spring conscription cycle.
Russian occupation authorities are continuing to intensify efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian legal and administrative structures.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 27, 2023

Jan 27, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, George Barros, Layne Philipson, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 27, 7:40 ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Kremlin insiders reportedly told Bloomberg that Russian President Vladimir Putin is preparing a new offensive to regain the initiative that may begin as early as February or March 2023. Russian officials, Kremlin advisors, and other unspecified knowledgeable figures who spoke on condition of anonymity reportedly told Bloomberg that Putin seeks to conduct a new major offensive and that he believes that Russia’s tolerance to accept causalities will allow Russia to win the war in the long run despite Russian failures so far.[1] This report is consistent with ISW’s current assessment and forecast that the Kremlin is likely preparing to conduct a decisive strategic action—most likely in Luhansk Oblast—in the next six months intended to regain the initiative and end Ukraine’s current string of operational successes.[2] ISW previously assessed that the decisive strategic action in Luhansk Oblast could be either a major offensive or a Russian defensive operation to defeat and exploit a Ukrainian counteroffensive.[3]

Recent limited Russian ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast may be intended to disperse Ukrainian forces and set conditions for an offensive in Luhansk.[4] Russia is redeploying elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division from Belarus to Luhansk Oblast.[5] This recent development suggests that the planned Russian offensive referenced in the Bloomberg report is most likely aimed at Luhansk Oblast though it could also occur in the Vuhledar area in western Donetsk. This new offensive is extremely unlikely to target northern Ukraine from Belarus. There continues to be no indication that Russian forces are forming strike groups in Belarus; Russian elements in Belarus are largely using Belarusian infrastructure and training capacity for training rotations.[6] Russian milbloggers are also increasingly writing off the notion of a second attack against Kyiv as an information operation and are suggesting that the most likely target for a Russian offensive would be in eastern Ukraine or neighboring Kharkiv Oblast.[7]

The Kremlin confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is issuing preemptive pardons for convicts who serve in Russian operations in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on January 27 that he cannot provide additional information about presidential decrees on pardons because they are protected by "various classifications of secrecy."[8] Peskov’s statement confirms that Putin has been issuing preemptive presidential pardons to convicts, the majority of whom are likely recruited into the ranks of the Wagner Group. Russian Human Rights Council member Eva Merkacheva stated in early January that convicts recruited by Wagner are pardoned before their release from penal colonies.[9] ISW previously assessed that these preemptive presidential pardons may be driving further recruitment within penal colonies and likely empower Wagner to operate with greater impunity in the theater.[10]

A visual investigation by a Russian opposition outlet confirmed that Russian authorities are deporting children from occupied Kherson Oblast to occupied Crimea. Russian opposition outlet Verstka examined photos posted to an "Adoption in Moscow Oblast" website that showed 14 children aged two to five from Kherson Oblast at the Yolochka orphanage in Simferopol, occupied Crimea.[11] Verstka noted that the Yolochka orphanage is subordinate to the Crimean Ministry of Health and specializes in the care of children with nervous system issues, mental and behavioral disorders, hearing and vision problems, and HIV.[12] The Yolochka orphanage’s official work mandate provides for the education of its children with "patriotism and citizenship" on the grounds that "Crimea is located in the south of Russia" and the generation of "awareness of oneself as a citizen of multinational Russia."[13] Russian outlet RIA Novosti reported on Yolochka in 2020 and stated that children under Yolochka’s care were severely malnourished and neglected by orphanage leadership, prompting the intervention of the former Kremlin-appointed Commissioner on Children’s Rights Anna Kuznetsova (the predecessor of current Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova).[14] Verstka’s investigation confirms that elements of the Russian occupation infrastructure in occupied areas of Ukraine are actively involved in the deportation and handling of Ukrainian children, as ISW has previously assessed.[15] Head of the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) Filippo Grandi reiterated on January 27 that Russia is consistently in violation of "the fundamental principles of child protection" by putting Ukrainian children up for adoption.[16]

Russian officials denied the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) report of explosions at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on January 26, without accusing Ukrainian forces of being responsible for these explosions. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi reported on January 26 that IAEA observers at the ZNPP informed him about explosions and detonations near the facility that indicated nearby military activity.[17] The reference to military activity is notable as the IAEA routinely fails to comment on the Russian military’s activities on and near the ZNPP. Russian officials claimed that no explosions occurred near the plant and that the IAEA observers likely heard sounds of an artillery duel a considerable distance from the ZNPP.[18] Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed that the IAEA was playing a political role to support Ukraine and amplified Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Head Sergey Naryshkin’s claim that Ukrainian forces are using nuclear power plants throughout Ukraine to store military equipment.[19] The fact that Russian officials did not frame the event as a Ukrainian provocative shelling of the plant diverges from the routine Russian response to reports of explosions near the ZNPP. Russian officials will likely continue to use interactions with the IAEA to push for it to recognize its ownership of the ZNPP, and de facto recognize its illegal annexation of Zaporizhia Oblast.

The Russian military command is likely attempting to restrict milbloggers’ frontline coverage to regain control over the Russian information space ahead of a possible new offensive. Alexander Kots—a member of the Russian Human Rights Commission under Russian President Vladimir Putin and a prominent milblogger—stated that there are rumors that Russian authorities will require war correspondents to wear bright blue press vests to identify themselves as journalists in the combat zone.[20] Kots and other milbloggers criticized the rumored decision, claiming that high-visibility vests will only help Ukrainian forces deliberately target war correspondents embedded in Russian units.[21] Some milbloggers even admitted that they have been hiding their "PRESS" labels for years and noted that this allowed hundreds of war correspondents to independently work on the frontlines without anyone’s formal orders.[22] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) First Deputy Information Minister Danil Bezsonov also argued that generals who are introducing these regulations should be responsible for each war correspondent’s death after making them an easily visible target on the ground.[23] One milblogger accused the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) of deliberately introducing new bureaucratic requirements that will limit the milbloggers’ ability to operate on the frontlines.[24]

These plans for restrictions—if they exist—are likely a part of the Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s efforts to professionalize the Russian Armed Forces. ISW previously reported that Russian milbloggers and nationalist figures had criticized the regulations introduced by the Russian military command requiring servicemen of Russian conventional forces to shave and banning them from using personal vehicles and cell phones on the frontlines.[25] Gerasimov and the Russian MoD are likely attempting to formalize guidance for embedded reporters in Russian units, which is a standard practice in professional militaries aimed at maintaining operational security on the frontlines. The Russian milbloggers’ reaction is likely rooted in their fear that these press vests are little more than a Russian MoD ruse to strip the milbloggers of their independence from Russian government oversight given that they will likely need to undergo complex bureaucratic procedures to receive the Russian MoD’s permission to operate on the front lines to acquire the vests.

The Russian military command may also be attempting to resurrect its previously unsuccessful censorship efforts targeting the critical milblogger community. ISW previously reported that the Russian MoD conducted several unsuccessful attempts to promote self-censorship among milbloggers from different nationalist factions—including Wagner-affiliated milbloggers—in summer and fall 2022.[26] Russian military command also previously attempted to promote self-censorship among milbloggers by pushing the narrative that Russian milbloggers have been violating Russian operational security by uploading combat footage or revealing Russian positions online.[27] It is unclear if Russian President Vladimir Putin is supporting these restrictions given that he had been appeasing pro-war milbloggers by meeting with them, allowing them to autonomously operate on the frontlines, and tolerating their criticisms.[28] The Kremlin is also continuing to integrate some select milbloggers by offering to let them host TV shows on Russian state broadcasters.[29] The Russian MoD may be conducting its own line of effort to silence the milbloggers independent of Putin. ISW will continue to monitor to see if Putin overrules the Russian MoD’s efforts to silence milbloggers.

The Russian MoD’s effort to restrict embedded milbloggers in conventional units will not silence all milblogger criticism online, however. A Russian milblogger observed that restrictive measures such as government-distributed press vests will further solidify Wagner Group as the dominant source of independent frontline information since Wagner will not abide by such restrictions. The Russian MoD’s tactic to suppress information from the frontlines would create a vacuum in the information space for Wagner-affiliated milbloggers, who have a significantly stronger distaste for the Russian MoD, to fill. Russia’s use of unconventional military formations will also undermine the effectiveness of such regulations.

Key Takeaways

Kremlin insiders reportedly told Bloomberg that Russian President Vladimir Putin is preparing a new offensive to regain the initiative that may begin as early as February or March 2023.
The Kremlin confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is issuing preemptive pardons for convicts who serve in Russian operations in Ukraine.
A visual investigation by a Russian opposition outlet confirmed that Russian authorities are deporting children from occupied Kherson Oblast to occupied Crimea.
Russian officials denied reported explosions near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on January 26.
The Russian military command is likely attempting to restrict mibloggers’ frontline coverage to regain control over the Russian information space ahead of the new offensive. These restrictions—if planned—are likely a part of the Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s efforts to professionalize the Russian Armed Forces.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna on January 26 and January 27.
Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, on the western outskirts of Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian sources did not report that Russian forces continued localized offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast on January 27.
Russian officials claimed that the conscription age will not change in the upcoming 2023 spring conscription cycle.
Russian occupation authorities are continuing to intensify efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian legal and administrative structures.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces reportedly conducted a reconnaissance-in-force operation in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast on January 27. A milblogger claimed that Russian forces broke through Ukrainian defenses near Ternova (38km northeast of Kharkiv City) penetrating 500 meters deep.[30]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna on January 26 and January 27. Secretary of the General Council of United Russia Andrey Turchak claimed that Kreminna is the most challenging segment of the frontline due to Ukrainian attempts to break through Russian defensive lines following his reported visit to the area on January 26.[31] Turchak also claimed that Russian airborne forces are maintaining defenses in the Kreminna direction. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 26 that the 254th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) repelled Ukrainian assaults and exchanged fire at a distance of 50-100 meters from Ukrainian forces near Kreminna.[32] The Ukrainian General Staff stated on January 27 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Ploshchanka (16km northwest of Kreminna), Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna), and Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna).[33]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on January 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamyanske (30km northeast) and Paraskoviivka (6km north); and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (6km southwest).[34] Geolocated footage shows Ukrainian artillery striking a Russian crossing on the Bakhmutivka River just northwest of Sil, indicating that Russian forces have advanced northwest of Soledar up to about this point.[35] Ukrainian sources also confirmed that Russian troops captured Krasnopolivka (just northwest of Soledar) and Dvorichchia (just southwest of Soledar).[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group fighters in the Soledar area are trying to push through Ukrainian defenses near Blahodatne (directly west of Soledar).[37] Geolocated combat footage shows Ukrainian troops engaging Wagner Group fighters in the Miasokombinat suburb of northeastern Bakhmut, indicating that Wagner continues to incrementally advance within Bakhmut itself.[38] A Russian milblogger also claimed that fighting is ongoing on the southern outskirts of Paraskoviivka.[39] Russian sources additionally claimed that Wagner forces southwest of Bakhmut in the Klishchiivka area are trying to push northwest toward Ivanivske to cut the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway.[40]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on January 27. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Vodyane and Nevelske and on the southwestern outskirts near Marinka.[41] Geolocated footage from January 14 shows that Russian forces have advanced within Vodyane.[42] Russian sources claimed that Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces captured Vodyane on January 26.[43] Geolocated footage of Russian infantry positions shows that Russian troops have also marginally advanced in Pisky, also on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops fighting in western Marinka seized the initiative.[45]

Russian forces conducted a ground attack in western Donetsk Oblast on January 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled a Russian attack on Vuhledar, 30km southwest of Donetsk City.[46] Geolocated combat footage suggests that Russian troops captured Mykilske, on the southeastern outskirts of Vuhledar.[47] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Advisor Yan Gagin claimed that fierce battles are ongoing on the outskirts of Vuhledar and that Russian troops have entrenched themselves on the southeastern and eastern outskirts of the settlement.[48] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), reported that the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and other Eastern Military District and DNR elements are operating in the area.[49] Social media footage shows Russian troops firing on Vuhledar with a TOS-1A Thermobaric artillery system.[50] The use of a military district-level artillery asset suggests that the Russian command may be prioritizing advances in the Vuhledar area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are redeploying from Bakhmut to defend Vuhledar.[51]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources did not report that Russian forces continued localized offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast on January 27. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces launched localized offensives along the line of contact in Zaporizhia Oblast in previous days and captured several settlements.[52] ISW has not seen any visual confirmation that Russian forces have captured any settlements in the area and continues to assess that Russian sources likely made these claims to distract from the lack of progress in the Russian offensive to capture Bakhmut.[53] The lack of reporting on localized Russian offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast suggests that these operations were likely limited in scope.

Russian forces continued routine artillery and MLRS strikes west of Hulyaipole and in Kherson and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on January 27.[54] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued to strike Kherson City.[55]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials claimed that the conscription age will not change in the upcoming 2023 spring conscription cycle. The St. Petersburg Oblast administration published a draft resolution on January 26 about the conscription of its citizens from April to July of 2023 that states that the age of conscription remains between 18 and 27 years of age.[56] Russian Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov stated on January 26 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has no reason to adopt a new conscription age increase for the upcoming spring conscription cycle.[57] Kartapolov had stated on January 11 that Russian officials could raise the upper threshold for the conscription age to 30 years of age in the 2023 spring conscription cycle.[58] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu initially proposed increasing the conscription age bracket to 21 to 30 years of age at the annual Russian MoD Board meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 21, 2022.[59]

High-ranking Russian figures continue to criticize Russian citizens who fled the country to avoid mobilization. Patriarch Kirill of Moscow (head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church) gave a speech to the Russian State Duma on January 26 and stated that Russian citizens who fled the country out of fears about mobilization likely did so because of "false values imported from outside" of Russia and that they need spiritual help.[60] Patriarch Kirill pointed to the flight of Russian citizens in response to mobilization as evidence that the Russian government needs to adopt education standards that emphasize "patriotism."[61] Patriarch Kirill recently called on the Russian government to exclude Orthodox priests from mobilization efforts and military service, revealing that even Kremlin-affiliated institutions find the prospects of further mobilization unpopular.[62]

Russian officials proposed a bill that would allow Russian authorities to allocate confiscated property for defense purposes. The Russian government proposed a bill on January 27 that would allow Russian officials to send light industry goods confiscated in cases of administrative offenses to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Emergency Situations.[63] The Russian Federal Property Management Agency reportedly destroys these confiscated goods according to the existing administrative code.[64] Russian outlet RBK reported on January 17 that the Russian government's commission on legislative activities approved the bill after the Russian Ministry of Finance initially proposed it.[65] This change to the administrative code will likely not produce enough new materials to notably offset the Russian MoD‘s systemic problems in provisioning Russian forces in Ukraine.

Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian forces are experiencing significant shortages of junior commanders in frontline units in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Andriy Chernyak reported on January 27 that Russian forces have approximately 40 percent of junior commander positions in units on the frontline unfilled.[66] Chernyak stated that these vacancies in platoon and company commanders contribute to Russian units conducting assaults without command and proper interaction between formations.[67] A Russian milblogger argued on January 27 that many Russian military commanders continue to face bureaucratic challenges that stymie the Russian military’s ability to address problems and train new personnel.[68] Russian force generation efforts since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine have likely failed to produce enough adequately trained personnel who could fill these vacancies, many of which are likely the result of high casualties. ISW has previously reported that an independent open-source investigation found that Russian officers represent a sizeable portion of confirmed Russian military deaths in Ukraine.[69]

Ukrainian sources reported that the Wagner Group is attempting to recruit deported Ukrainian prisoners from occupied territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 27 that Russian occupation officials deported 3,500 prisoners from Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts to Russian-occupied Crimea, where the Wagner Group is currently trying to recruit them.[70]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities are continuing to intensify efforts to integrate occupied territories into Russian legal and administrative structures. Kherson Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo signed a decree on January 24 that replaces the Civil-Military Administration of Kherson Oblast with the legal name of Kherson Oblast Administration, claiming that the measure will begin normalization efforts during "peacetime."[71] Saldo claimed that the decree brings occupied Kherson Oblast authorities and other government bodies in line with Russian legislation in accordance with the Russian Federal Law "On the General Principles of Organization of Public Power in the Subject of the Russian Federation." The decree recognizes occupied Kherson Oblast as a federal subject (region) of Russia with a structure of executive authority that includes the Kherson Oblast Governor (Saldo), ministries, departments, services, and other departments.[72] Saldo published a list of employment opportunities in the Kherson Oblast Administration on January 27, suggesting that Russian occupation authorities continue to struggle with recruiting and maintaining a sufficient pro-Russian workforce in occupied territories.[73] Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on January 27 that LNR officials submitted a draft law to the Russian Ministry of Trade to transfer occupied Luhansk Oblast to the Moscow time zone, which is one hour ahead of Ukraine time and does not participate in daylight savings time.[74]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing efforts to close Ukrainian Evangelical Baptist Christian communities and establish the Kremlin-affiliated Moscow Patriarch Orthodox Church as the dominant religion in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on January 27 that he visited Moscow Patriarchate Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill in Moscow following Kirill’s invitation.[75] Balitsky claimed that he and Patriarch Kirill discussed issues of church-state relations, the functioning of churches in the region, and the changes in spiritual lives in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[76] ISW reported on January 26 that Russian occupation officials in Zaporizhia Oblast are attempting to establish the Kremlin-affiliated Moscow Patriarchate Orthodox Church as the dominant faith in the region.[77]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses it very unlikely that Russian or Belarusian forces will attack northern Ukraine in early 2023 and has thus restructured this section of the update to orient away from the previous most dangerous course of action warning forecast about a Russian offensive against northern Ukraine to report on significant activity in Belarus. ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus.)

There is still no indication that Russian forces are forming a strike group in Belarus as of January 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 27.[78]

The Russian military is expanding its air force presence in Belarus. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on January 27 that Russian and Belarusian air elements continue deploying to Belarusian airfields under the rubric of continued joint tactical flight exercises.[79] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian units continue training in Belarus and that Russia is increasing its aviation forces in Belarus under the guise of joint exercises.[80]

Some Belarusian elements are practicing river crossing exercises. The Belarusian MoD reported on January 27 that unspecified Belarusian sapper elements conducted a pontoon bridge river crossing exercise on the Neman River in Grodno, Belarus.[81] The Belarusian MoD reported on January 26 that elements of the Belarusian 38th Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade conducted a river crossing exercise in BTR-82A in an unspecified location.[82]

Belarusian mechanized forces continue conducting exercises across Belarus. The Belarusian MoD reported on January 27 that unspecified elements of the Belarusian 339th Separate Mechanized Battalion conducted unspecified combat training tasks at the Uruchcha Training Ground near Minsk, Belarus.[83] The Belarusian MoD also reported that an unspecified mechanized battalion of the Belarusian 11th Separate Mechanized Brigade deployed to an unspecified area for a combat readiness test. Unspecified elements of the Belarusian 6th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade conducted BMP-2 and small arms live fire exercises at the Gozhsky Training Ground in Grodno, Belarus, on January 26.[84]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[8] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/16900187

[9] https://ria dot ru/20230109/zaklyuchennye-1843702450.html

[11] https://verstka dot media/rossijskie-vlasti-vyvezli-ne-menee-14-sirot-iz-hersona/; https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/01/27/verstka-nashla-14-detey-sirot-vyvezennyh-iz-hersona-v-krymskom-dome-rebenka-elochka

[12] https://verstka dot media/rossijskie-vlasti-vyvezli-ne-menee-14-sirot-iz-hersona/; https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/01/27/verstka-nashla-14-detey-sirot-vyvezennyh-iz-hersona-v-krymskom-dome-rebenka-elochka

[13] http://elochka-dom dot ru/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%87%D0%B0%D1%8F-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%BC%D0%B0.pdf

[14] https://ria dot ru/20200904/siroty-1576702715.html

[18] https://tass dot ru/politika/16897115 ; https://t.me/vrogov/7361 ;

[36] https://defence.org dot ua/dailybrief/2023-01-23/

[48] https://t.me/readovkanews/51485; https://tass dot ru/politika/16900769; https://t.me/wargonzo/10542

[51] https://t.me/kommunist/15246; https://ria dot ru/20230127/ugledar-1847808096.html?in=t; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7108

[56] https://www.gov.spb. dot ru/static/writable/documents/2023/01/26/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%82_%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F_%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BD%D0%B0_2023.doc

[57] https:www.interfax dot ru/russia/883327

[58] https://www.pnp dot ru/social/povyshat-prizyvnoy-vozrast-khotyat-nachat-uzhe-v-etom-godu.html

[60] http://www.patriarchia dot ru/db/text/5999511.html

[61] http://www.patriarchia dot ru/db/text/5999511.html

[62] https://glavcom dot ua/ru/news/mobilizatsija-popov-patriarkh-kirill-vymalivaet-u-putina-poblazhku-897366.html ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122422

[63] https://sozd.duma dot gov.ru/bill/285558-8

[64] https://www.rbc dot ru/economics/17/01/2023/63c53ad39a7947d8d5c0ed18 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/27/pravitelstvo-predlozhilo-peredavat-minoborony-konfiskovannye-odezhdu-i-obuv-v-kachestve-gumanitarnoy-pomoschi

[65] https://www.rbc dot ru/economics/17/01/2023/63c53ad39a7947d8d5c0ed18

[66] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/pfbid07BC198... ua/rus/news/rosiyi-brakue-molodshih-komandiriv-gur-rozpovili-1674809440.html

[67] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/pfbid07BC198... ua/rus/news/rosiyi-brakue-molodshih-komandiriv-gur-rozpovili-1674809440.html

[70] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/27/okupanty-vyvezly-z-tot-35-tys-uvyaznenyh/

[72] ttps://t.me/SALDO_VGA/336

understandingwar.org

8. As fentanyl boomed, DEA removed Mexico director amid misconduct probe

As fentanyl boomed, DEA removed Mexico director amid misconduct probe

The Washington Post · by Mary Beth Sheridan · January 27, 2023

MEXICO CITY — As illegal fentanyl was surging across the U.S. southwestern border, the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Mexico office was in turmoil for more than six months with a director recalled to Washington while investigators probed his conduct, according to current and former U.S. officials.

The investigation, which has not been previously reported, came at a critical time. Cooperation between the DEA and Mexican authorities had deteriorated under the nationalist government of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Drug overdose deaths in the United States, meanwhile, were soaring to record levels, as Mexico consolidated its role as the No. 1 source of fentanyl in the United States.

The move left the DEA regional office in Mexico City, which oversees the agency’s operations in Mexico and Central America, without a full-time resident director for at least six months beginning in June 2021 — just as the Biden administration was starting to confront the crisis.

The upheaval in one of the DEA’s most important offices was an embarrassing distraction as agents tried to work with Mexico’s corruption-ridden security agencies to deter drug trafficking, according to several U.S. officials who worked in the country in recent years.

“You can’t fix what’s going wrong in the Mexican government if your own house is on fire,” said one ex-DEA agent. Like other current and former U.S. officials, he spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive personnel matter.

This week the Justice Department’s internal watchdog said it had found that a DEA regional director misused agency funds for his birthday party and for “unallowable items” during trips by the agency’s top official. The director was ultimately “removed from DEA” based on a second investigation, the Office of the Inspector General said in a summary, but it provided no details.

The office didn’t identify the official. The DEA’s former Mexico regional director, Nick Palmeri, confirmed to The Washington Post that the statement referred to him. He blasted the release, which he said “erroneously states that I was removed from the DEA.” His departure, he wrote in a WhatsApp message, “should be considered as a forced retirement.”

He said the investigation into his spending “was used as part of an ill-conceived narrative to remove me from my position” due to an internal feud at the agency.

The agency, asked about the case, said: “The DEA holds its 10,000 employees to the highest standards of conduct and professionalism. When an employee is found to have not lived up to those standards, DEA takes decisive action, including removal from the agency.”

The episode is the latest black eye for an agency that’s been buffeted by corruption scandals, including the jailing of a Miami-based DEA agent who pleaded guilty in 2020 to diverting more than $9 million from undercover operations to fund pricey sports cars, luxury travel and parties.

Palmeri, a onetime New York City police officer who had worked at the DEA office in Guadalajara, Mexico, and later held a senior role in the agency’s New York office, was known as a talented investigator. He started as regional director in Mexico City in early 2020.

It was a particularly challenging moment. López Obrador had reduced cooperation with the DEA, citing Mexico’s sovereignty and a shift in policy from focusing on capturing drug kingpins to running social programs for youth and the poor.

Then the coronavirus pandemic struck.

The virus swept through the DEA’s office in the Pacific coast city of Mazatlán, Mexico, after agency employees held meetings in violation of embassy health protocols, according to four current and former U.S. officials. Two DEA agents became so ill they were medivacked to the United States, they said.

Things only got worse for the DEA. In October 2020, U.S. authorities arrested former Mexican defense minister Salvador Cienfuegos in Los Angeles on drug-trafficking allegations. That provoked such outrage in Mexico that the Trump administration dropped the charges and sent the general home. López Obrador, unmollified, signed a law sharply limiting the DEA’s activities in the country, and his administration held up visas for about 20 American agents for months.

Amid the turbulence, officials at DEA headquarters began receiving reports of alleged mismanagement in the Mexico office. In June 2021, Palmeri was ordered back to Washington as investigators probed the allegations.

In the report summary released Wednesday, the inspector general’s office said the regional director had used DEA funds intended for professional gatherings for an inappropriate activity: his own birthday party. The director also approved payment for “unallowable items” during trips by the DEA’s top official, the office said, dipping into funds that were supposed to be used for sensitive drug investigations. It did not describe the items.

Among the incidents that investigators scrutinized was a party on a yacht organized for then-DEA acting administrator Timothy Shea during a visit to Panama, according to current and former DEA agents. It was not clear whether the investigators found any wrongdoing; Shea, a Trump appointee, declined to comment. Palmeri said that renting the yacht was “100% justified and professional” and that “the results and relationships cultivated” on his watch with “minimal expenditures” were worth it. Another former DEA agent said the yacht was rented because restaurants in Panama were off-limits during the pandemic.

The inspector general’s office decided not to seek criminal prosecution, it said in its statement. But the DEA had opened a second investigation into several other questions, including whether Palmeri had improper relationships with defense attorneys for drug traffickers, according to current and former U.S. officials knowledgeable about the probe.

That’s a sensitive subject for the DEA: Last May, federal prosecutors charged a retired agency supervisor in Miami and an active-duty agent with taking part in an alleged scheme to pass law enforcement information to defense attorneys representing traffickers.

The DEA declined to provide any details on that second probe. But the Associated Press, citing internal agency documents, said one focus was a two-day visit by Palmeri and his wife in early 2021 to a home in the Florida Keys owned by David Macey, a prominent defense attorney. The trip violated agency rules aimed at avoiding the appearance of impropriety, the AP said.

Palmeri, in a message to The Post, acknowledged making the visit but said he hadn’t been involved in a case linked to Macey in years.

The AP said Palmeri also met privately with a confidential source during that trip. “There was no contemporaneous official DEA documentation” on the debriefing, a violation of DEA policy, investigators wrote, according to the AP. A former DEA official with knowledge of the investigation confirmed to The Post that the meetings were central to the probe.

Palmeri said he never engaged in any unethical behavior. “I strongly deny improper contact with defense attorneys,” he told The Post. He blamed the investigation on a “personal vendetta” by another DEA official, whom he declined to identify. He said the probe had concluded with a recommendation that “I be terminated.”

As for the inspector general’s report, he said, items were “taken out of context.” His expenditures on activities with Mexican officials “were professional” and benefited the U.S. government, he said, and any minor procedural violations were “most often resolved with corrective actions.” Palmeri left the agency in March 2022.

One of Palmeri’s former colleagues said he was an outstanding investigator but had the freewheeling, bigger-than-life style of many DEA agents who’d built their careers in New York. “They were programmed differently,” with major roles in some of the country’s biggest drug cases, assembled by highly aggressive prosecutors, the ex-official said. “It was okay to stay on the edge.”

While Palmeri was out of Mexico and under investigation, officials said, the DEA periodically sent a respected senior official, Paul Knierim, to fill in. A permanent replacement was named in November 2021. But that new director, Todd Zimmerman, didn’t move to the country full time until mid-2022, according to a State Department official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss personnel matters.

While Palmeri was being investigated, U.S. law enforcement was facing a mounting fentanyl crisis. More than 107,000 Americans died of drug overdoses in 2021, the latest data available. Two-thirds of those were caused by fentanyl. The synthetic opioid has become the leading cause of death for Americans ages 18 to 49, according to a Post analysis of death data for 2021 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

The flow of the cheap drug across the U.S. border shows no sign of diminishing. The DEA seized more than 50 million illegal fentanyl tablets last year — twice the number in 2021 — and over 10,000 pounds of fentanyl powder. Mexico’s two biggest drug cartels, which traffic most of the U.S. fentanyl, are the “DEA’s top operational priority,” the agency’s administrator, Anne Milgram, said in December.

Kevin Sieff in Mexico City and Scott Higham, Perry Stein and Cate Brown in Washington contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Mary Beth Sheridan · January 27, 2023

9. China Doesn’t Want a U.S. Debt Default

China Doesn’t Want a U.S. Debt Default

Washington takes on financial risks that Beijing can’t afford.

By Arthur R. Kroeber, managing director of GaveKal Dragonomics.

Foreign Policy · by Arthur R. Kroeber · January 27, 2023

The big political drama in Washington over the next few months will be the fight over the federal debt ceiling. The worst-case scenario is that Congress refuses to raise the ceiling and the U.S. Treasury defaults on its debt. Since U.S. Treasury debt powers the entire world financial system, the result could be a massive global economic crisis. If that happens, how well would the world’s second-biggest economy, China, survive the crash? And would a U.S. default give China an opening to create a new global financial system less dependent on the dollar?

The good news is that a U.S. default is improbable. Most likely, Congress will reach a deal under which the debt ceiling is raised now in exchange for promises of federal spending cuts later. This is what the “Tea Party” Congress did in 2011 and the outcome that Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell has forecast.

If negotiations fail, the Biden administration still has plenty of options to prevent a default, ranging from accounting tricks to a decision to ignore the debt ceiling altogether, on the grounds that it violates the U.S. Constitution’s requirement for timely repayment of all federal debts.

This article was originally published in ChinaFile.

But strange things sometimes happen in Washington. If the United States did default, how bad would the damage be? No one knows for sure; the world economy is just too complex. One real possibility is a global financial crisis and economic depression worse even than the one in 2008-09. This is because the huge U.S. Treasurys market underpins the global financial system in two ways. Much credit around the world is priced, directly or indirectly, in relation to the interest rates on U.S. Treasurys. And many loans both in the United States and in the rest of the world depend on U.S. Treasurys as collateral.

In a default, interest rates on U.S. Treasurys would skyrocket (because investors would demand a higher rate in exchange for taking the risk that they might not be paid back), and Treasurys might no longer be usable as collateral (because their underlying value would not be clear). The entire world financial system could simply freeze. Moreover, one of the main tools used to contain the 2008-09 crisis—massive money creation by the Federal Reserve to fund purchases of U.S. Treasurys—might not work if the Treasurys market stopped functioning.

As in 2008-09, a global economic meltdown would hurt China a lot. It would fare slightly better than most other countries because it runs a closed-off financial system that relies mainly on domestic savings and is protected from the ups-and-downs of global financial instability by capital controls. But the impact of a U.S. debt default would still be devastating. In 2008-09, the loss of trade finance and collapse in global demand sent China’s exports plummeting by nearly 20 percent, and upwards of 20 million workers lost their jobs.

Fifteen years ago, China’s government could respond by unleashing a massive debt-financed economic stimulus program because the country’s debt level, at 140 percent of GDP, was relatively low and it still had significant needs for infrastructure and housing. Today, the space for maneuver is far narrower: Debt has soared to nearly 300 percent of GDP, and both infrastructure and housing are seriously overbuilt.

Though severe, the economic consequences to China of a U.S. default would probably not be threatening to the Chinese Communist Party’s power. Whatever pain the Chinese people were forced to suffer could rightly be blamed on outside forces. And in a pinch, the government could still support a minimum level of growth by adding to its debt pile, since it would be borrowing from its own future, not from foreign creditors.

This leads us to the second question. If the United States defaults, could China create a substitute system built around the renminbi? The short answer is no.

The U.S. Treasurys market is huge and deeply intertwined with the rest of the world. (That’s why a default would be so bad.) There is $23.9 trillion in Treasury bonds outstanding; foreigners hold $7.5 trillion, or 31 percent, of that pile. Daily trading last year averaged $600 billion. In practice, this means it is easy for large companies and governments to hold Treasurys in any amount, trade large volumes quickly, and easily obtain or dispose of as much collateral as they need for borrowing.

China’s government bond market is nowhere near big enough, liquid enough, or integrated enough with the rest of the world to substitute for U.S. Treasurys. According to calculations by my colleagues, the total value of Chinese government bonds on issue—$3.3 trillion—is less than half the value of U.S. Treasurys held by foreigners. The foreign holdings of Chinese government bonds are a mere $340 billion, one-twentieth of the country’s Treasury holdings. The daily turnover of China’s government bond market is $30 billion, about 5 percent of the Treasurys market average.

After the 2008-09 crisis, because it decided it was too dependent on the dollar-driven global financial system, China tried hard to internationalize the renminbi. Its efforts have borne little fruit. The renminbi accounts for just 2.8 percent of global official central bank reserves (compared with 60 percent for the U.S. dollar and 20 percent for the euro), a figure that has not changed much in the past several years. Similarly, it makes up just 2.4 percent of global trading in foreign exchange.

China has failed to internationalize the renminbi for the same reason it is relatively insulated from global financial shocks: capital controls. Bringing money in and out of China still requires permission from Beijing. From the Chinese government’s point of view, this is good. When economic conditions worsen in China, it is hard for Chinese citizens to take their money out and park it abroad. And by limiting the amount of money foreigners can bring into China and controlling the conditions under which they can take it out, Beijing reduces the risk that a global financial panic leads to a damaging outflow of foreign investor capital. As a result, Beijing does not have to work so hard to maintain domestic financial stability.

The problem is that if you want to create a substitute for the U.S. Treasurys market—and for the world’s linchpin currency, the U.S. dollar—you have to accept those risks. International investors need to feel confident that they can put as much money as they want into your bonds, that the value of those holdings will stay relatively stable, and that they can cash out whenever they want with no penalty.

At present, foreign investors generally do not believe that China’s government bond market can deliver any of those things. They are perfectly happy to put small amounts into Chinese bonds to diversify their portfolios or to take advantage of short-term rises in the value of the renminbi. But more than one central banker has told my research team that they are reluctant to put much of their reserves into Chinese bonds because they worry the funds would not be available when they really needed them—i.e., in an emergency. That sentiment is even more strongly held by private financial institutions that trade far more frequently and want a source of safe collateral to back daily transactions.

In short, the reason the U.S. Treasurys market is such an indispensable part of the global financial system is that the United States is willing to take on financial risks that no other country—even one as big as China—dares to and has proved over many decades that it can manage those risks safely. There is, perhaps unfortunately, no alternative. So, if reckless politicking in Washington forces the market to freeze up, the world will suffer immense economic and financial damage. Like everyone else, China will be an unlucky bystander, forced to wait until the United States can sort out its internal disputes and resume its stewardship of the global financial system.

Arthur R. Kroeber is managing director of GaveKal Dragonomics, an independent global economic research firm, and editor of its journal, China Economic Quarterly.

Foreign Policy · by Arthur R. Kroeber · January 27, 2023

10. Does the All-Volunteer Force Have an Expiration Date?

Excerpts:

But to return to the question asked at the beginning of this essay, my own opinion is that while the All Volunteer Force might not have an imminent expiration date, it does have a reduced capacity to generate manpower that might not sustain current force levels. Any legislative initiatives offering free college will take away another incentive for service and create even a deeper crisis. As part of the Unified Quest Human Performance Seminar in 2016 looking at the requirements for future soldiers, I headed the Physical Attributes Working Group that recommended to the leadership of Training and Doctrine Command that the Army vary its physical requirements by specialty, instead of making everyone an infantryman. We were strongly rebuffed then, but that idea deserves consideration now. Cutbacks in MWR support and medical staffing should be relooked to combat negative perceptions of military quality of life. The services need to pursue initiatives with robots and artificial intelligence to replace people. While Russian tanks are more vulnerable than ours because of the open ammunition storage for an automatic loader, that does reduce crew requirements for each tank. Can we make similar, but safer and smarter, adjustments to our own weapon systems? Perhaps the Army especially needs to look at a different mix of active and reserve forces, and we shall have to wait and see if the elimination of vaccine mandates helps both components. However, the nation has to avoid settling for the national security strategy that it can afford instead of the one that it needs. Policy makers need to consider some sort of hybrid approach involving national service opportunities. Or else the nation may have to resign itself to undermanned ships and hollow ground forces that endanger our security.

Even the Gates Commission realized that their AVF needed an effective stand by draft for emergencies. Court decisions supporting male-only registration were based on a combat exclusion rule that no longer exists, and Congress recently came very close to requiring women to register also. Other Congressmen have been trying to abolish the draft completely. Either course will have significant political repercussions that need to be resolved before the nation faces a future crisis requiring expansion of military forces. The 2022 NDA required DoD to appoint an Executive Agent for National Mobilization and prepare a report by this past December on how it would induct, train, equip, and integrate as many as a million new service members brought in through the Selective Service System. That agent has still not been appointed, and if the required report was ever done it was based on many bad assumptions.

Though today’s situation is unique, many of these concerns about the long term viability of the All-Volunteer Force have been voiced before. The conclusion of a voluminous RAND study of the evolution of the AVF, written in 2006 when the AVF was under fire from a number of directions, is worth citing in closing. “Ultimately, however, the ability to grow the all-volunteer force will depend on the willingness of young men and women to join. Increased incentives have always proven to stretch enlistments, but there is a limit. So far the all-volunteer force has proven to be very resilient, but the all-volunteer force does not lend itself to guarantees."

Does the All-Volunteer Force Have an Expiration Date?

By Conrad Crane

January 28, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/01/28/does_the_all-volunteer_force_have_an_expiration_date_878344.html

Thomas Gates, chairman of The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Force in 1970, appears to have been an adept wordsmith. Supporting President Nixon’s own predilections, Gates wrote in his final report to the President that the commission “unanimously believe that the nation’s interests would be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective stand-by draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts.” What he did not say, was that there was not unanimity on the viability of the concept. Crawford Greenewalt, chairman of the Finance Committee of E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., thought there was something immoral in “seducing” young people to die for their country with money, and was concerned about the impacts of turning honorable military service with all its risks into “just another job.” General Lauris Norstad, another commission member, shared Mr. Greenewalt’s concern that an all-volunteer armed force would not be representative of the total population and would only recruit from narrow segments. They were also distrustful of econometric projections and shared worries about rising costs with the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Greenewalt actually suggested the wording Gates used to hide the differences among the commission members. When Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor met with the commission, he kept referring to the proposed volunteers as “mercenaries.” Eventually frustrated member Milton Friedman responded with “Let’s make an agreement. If you promise to stop calling my volunteers ‘mercenaries,’ I will promise to stop calling your draftees ‘slaves.’” But as the concept moved forward, the different perceptions remained. And while even draftees deserve to be adequately taken care of, the move to an all-volunteer force accelerated and magnified increases in pay and benefits.

With the current recruiting crisis, it appears that those concerns about the long-term viability of the AVF expressed more than fifty years ago were well founded, and have been joined with others. In FY2018 for example, military pay and benefits were the single largest expense category for the DoD budget, comprising more than one third. If total compensation funding, including for civilians and contractors, is tallied, that consumed half of the budget. That amount was matched by personnel expenditures outside the DoD budget, for the Department of Veterans Affairs and Treasury payments for retiree pensions and TRICARE for Life. Without counting Social Security payments to veterans and retirees, pay and benefits for DoD personnel and veterans accounted for about 15% of the total federal budget of 4.1 trillion dollars. That was an even larger percentage of discretionary spending. But such costs are unevenly distributed among the services, not surprisingly the Army had the largest expenditures for military pay and benefits, bearing 42% of the total. People are expensive. Over 69 billion dollars of 178 in the Army’s FY23 budget request are for military personnel costs, and there are other associated expenditures in operations and construction categories. (As a point of comparison, the whole DoD budget in 1971 was about 78 billion dollars.) After an increased trajectory of compensation designed to close pay gaps with the private sector overshot the mark by 2010, DoD executed a number of reforms to reduce personnel costs, including accepting reduced raises and increasing TRICARE health care expenses. In the Army, Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) activities were cut back and forced to pay their own way. Despite assurances from Army leadership, many groups have expressed concern about the impact of eliminating thousands of service medical billets. Complaints by veterans groups managed to reduce planned DoD cuts in medical billets by 2027 from 17.000 to 13,000, but they still remain concerned about long term impacts.

Some of those changes may be contributing to the current crisis, with a decreasing opinion of the quality of military life. A 2021 survey by the Military Family Advisory Network revealed that only 62.9% of military and veteran families would recommend military life, down from a 74.5% result only two years earlier. That is a particularly disturbing statistic since military service has become more and more a “family business” with a 79% of enlistees having military family members who served. Most cited reasons for not recommending military life included that it is not family friendly, pay is low compared to the stressful demands from work, bad leadership, inadequate healthcare, and too frequent moves and deployments. Those negative perceptions also contribute to a recline in retention, another part of the problem set.

For recruiting approaches, the Marines emphasize their Warrior Ethos, the Navy presents images of adventure and service to the world, and the Air Force and Space Force exploit their technology. Of all the armed forces, the Army’s advertising has gone the furthest towards presenting service as “just another job,” emphasizing learning new skills and self-actualization. Why should American youth pick a job that can get them killed or injured if it is nothing really special? I recently watched a Sunday night professional football game. During the broadcast there was one military recruiting commercial. There were also four different appeals from wounded warrior groups for financial support, with graphic images showing maimed veterans. I once visited a friend who commanded the transportation brigade at Fort Eustice when that branch school was there. He related to me that many of his school staff and instructors were wounded veterans of Afghanistan and Iraq, transferred from combat arms to remain on active duty. Some had lost limbs, others were recovering from other visible traumatic injuries. He told me that he believed their presence was good for retention, showing that the Army took care of its own. But the impact on recruiting was catastrophic, as he watched parents drag their sons and daughters away from venues involving his wounded comrades.

This perception of the broken veteran permeates our culture. We proclaim “disabled” or “wounded” veteran on our license plates. We celebrate their victories in the Paralympics and make ourselves feel good with news stories about charitable contributions to build or improve their homes. Movies and novels are rife with characters with PTSD. There are literally thousands of registered charities benefitting injured service members, veterans and their families. A large percentage of those casualties are infantrymen and Marines. At a recent Heritage event, the current head of Army recruiting, Major General Johnny K. Davis discussed the difficulty the Army was having recruiting infantrymen and other “maneuver, fires, and effects” specialties. That is despite a $50,000 bonus for infantry recruits, and a further $35,000 that can be earned during that first enlistment. Between 2002 and 2013, 30% of Army recruits failed to complete 36 months of service. Perhaps recruiters should be rated on how many of their enlistees finish their term instead of just how many they get to start it. Marine Corps advertising has monopolized the focus on combat, presenting itself as the service to deal with the most dangerous threats to the nation’s security, aiming to attract those recruits most willing to face risks fighting on the battlefield. A recent Army decision to return to “Be All You Can Be” as its recruiting theme is not going to entice a young person to risk their lives in the most dangerous occupations.

In the second volume of his lengthy History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Edward Gibbon described how the motivations for military service changed over the course of a society’s development. “Barbarians are urged by the love of war; the citizens of a free republic may be prompted by a principle of duty; the subjects, or at least the nobles, of a monarchy, are animated by a sentiment of honor; but the timid and luxurious inhabitants of a declining empire must be allured into the service by the hopes of profit, or compelled by the dread of punishment." In a Fall 2020 poll of American youth ages 16-21, when asked the question ”In the next few years, how likely is it that you will be serving in the Military?”, only 11% answered “definitely” or “probably”. By gender, the numbers were 7% for women and 14% for men. By far the two most important reasons not to serve were the fears of suffering physical injury or PTSD. A Quinnipiac poll earlier this year that asked the question of Americans whether they would be willing to defend the homeland if it was attacked by Russia. 38% of total respondents said they would flee instead. Only 55% said they would actually fight, 40% of Democrats. While I suspect that those numbers would change if there was an actual attack, without one those who profess no desire to fight now are not likely to support military service by themselves or family members. This is not a unique problem to just our prosperous democracy. Others with much smaller militaries have the same problem with recruiting. The Germans have had to lower their enlistment age to 17 to try to find enough citizens to serve.

To further complicate the situation, those sections of the United States with the strongest anti-vaccination sentiments and resulting mistrust of government are in areas and among groups that have historically been most acceptant of military service. The military response to COVID might also have been a factor in that significant drop in satisfaction with military life. Facing queries from skeptical Congressmen, DoD and the Army continued to downplay any impact of COVID mandates on recruiting and retention, while the Marine Corps moderated its restrictions. The Marine Corps Commandant admitted that vaccine mandates were making recruiting especially difficult in the South. Eventually Congressional action forced the Pentagon to drop the vaccine mandate, and there is even consideration now for restoring backpay for some who were discharged because of resistance to it. There are precedents for backing off from vaccine requirements, as DoD was forced to do with anthrax two decades ago. Recently appeals have been granted for restoration of benefits for veterans discharged for refusal to take that vaccine.

As Crawford Greenewalt realized, military service is not just another job. The Army especially should adjust its recruiting pitches to better reflect the essential services it performs for the nation, and to emphasize the honor of being a soldier. A parent in one of the Army-Navy football game pregame introductions on CBS stated that the contest is the only game where everyone who is playing in it is willing to die for everyone watching it. We need to rejuvenate Gibbons’ concept of duty in a free republic to inspire military service. The Army, which has the biggest recruiting shortfalls, is the American “Swiss Army knife” for all kinds of service opportunities to exploit a desire to meet obligations to the nation and the world.

But to return to the question asked at the beginning of this essay, my own opinion is that while the All Volunteer Force might not have an imminent expiration date, it does have a reduced capacity to generate manpower that might not sustain current force levels. Any legislative initiatives offering free college will take away another incentive for service and create even a deeper crisis. As part of the Unified Quest Human Performance Seminar in 2016 looking at the requirements for future soldiers, I headed the Physical Attributes Working Group that recommended to the leadership of Training and Doctrine Command that the Army vary its physical requirements by specialty, instead of making everyone an infantryman. We were strongly rebuffed then, but that idea deserves consideration now. Cutbacks in MWR support and medical staffing should be relooked to combat negative perceptions of military quality of life. The services need to pursue initiatives with robots and artificial intelligence to replace people. While Russian tanks are more vulnerable than ours because of the open ammunition storage for an automatic loader, that does reduce crew requirements for each tank. Can we make similar, but safer and smarter, adjustments to our own weapon systems? Perhaps the Army especially needs to look at a different mix of active and reserve forces, and we shall have to wait and see if the elimination of vaccine mandates helps both components. However, the nation has to avoid settling for the national security strategy that it can afford instead of the one that it needs. Policy makers need to consider some sort of hybrid approach involving national service opportunities. Or else the nation may have to resign itself to undermanned ships and hollow ground forces that endanger our security.

Even the Gates Commission realized that their AVF needed an effective stand by draft for emergencies. Court decisions supporting male-only registration were based on a combat exclusion rule that no longer exists, and Congress recently came very close to requiring women to register also. Other Congressmen have been trying to abolish the draft completely. Either course will have significant political repercussions that need to be resolved before the nation faces a future crisis requiring expansion of military forces. The 2022 NDA required DoD to appoint an Executive Agent for National Mobilization and prepare a report by this past December on how it would induct, train, equip, and integrate as many as a million new service members brought in through the Selective Service System. That agent has still not been appointed, and if the required report was ever done it was based on many bad assumptions.

Though today’s situation is unique, many of these concerns about the long term viability of the All-Volunteer Force have been voiced before. The conclusion of a voluminous RAND study of the evolution of the AVF, written in 2006 when the AVF was under fire from a number of directions, is worth citing in closing. “Ultimately, however, the ability to grow the all-volunteer force will depend on the willingness of young men and women to join. Increased incentives have always proven to stretch enlistments, but there is a limit. So far the all-volunteer force has proven to be very resilient, but the all-volunteer force does not lend itself to guarantees."

Conrad Crane is the senior research historian at the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the positions of the War College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

The views contained in this article are the author's own and not that of the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense.

11. Pence: ‘I take full responsibility’ for classified documents ending up at Indiana home

Again, I do not want to engage in this controversy. However, I think it is important to point out that the former Vice President seems to have responded in the most appropriate way: accepting full responsibility and pledging to fully cooperate.

Pence: ‘I take full responsibility’ for classified documents ending up at Indiana home

BY BRETT SAMUELS - 01/27/23 4:29 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/3833630-pence-i-take-full-responsibility-for-classified-documents-ending-up-at-indiana-home/

Former Vice President Mike Pence on Friday said he takes “full responsibility” for classified documents ending up at his home in Indiana and pledged to cooperate with any investigation into how it happened.

“During the closing days of administration, when materials were boxed and assembled, some of which were shipped to our personal residence, mistakes were made,” Pence told Fox News in his first public comments since his office disclosed earlier this week that classified records were found at his residence.

“We were not aware of it at the time until we did the review just a few short weeks ago,” he continued. “But I take full responsibility for it, and we’re going to continue to support every appropriate inquiry into it.”

Pence said he’s “very confident” that he and his team were “very careful and cautious” handling classified materials during his time in Congress and as vice president.

Pence’s team disclosed Tuesday that his attorneys conducted a search of his Indiana home out of an abundance of caution following news that classified documents were found at President Biden’s Delaware home and a former Washington, D.C., office he used after leaving the White House in 2017.

Greg Jacob, an attorney representing Pence, wrote to the National Archives on Jan. 18 to notify it that Pence had directed a search two days earlier that turned up two boxes with some materials bearing classified markings.

FBI officials took possession of those two boxes on Jan. 19, as well as two other boxes with copies of administration records, Jacob said. He wrote that the documents with classified markings were “inadvertently boxed and transported” to Pence’s home, and that Pence was not aware of them until they were found earlier this month.

The discovery came after Pence had repeatedly denied having classified materials in his possession as he criticized Biden over the classified documents being found at his home and office.

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Pence had advocated for a special counsel to be appointed in Biden’s case after one was announced to oversee an investigation into former President Trump’s possible mishandling of classified information.

Asked Friday if he believes a third special counsel is needed to oversee his own handling of classified documents, Pence deferred to the Justice Department and Attorney General Merrick Garland.

“And, again, I — this was an unfortunate development,” Pence said. “And I think it’s important that our office simply cooperate fully in any investigation by either the Department of Justice, the Archives, or the Congress of the United States, and we’re determined to do that.”

12. A New Chapter for India-US Defense Ties

Excerpts:

Above all, a high-level roadmap, blessed by the two leaders, would reduce the bureaucratic inertia that all too often becomes a drag on the India-U.S. relationship. Having time-bound tangible outcomes would help mitigate frustrations due to mismatched expectations and competing priorities (technology sharing, for example) and insulate defense ties from frictions in other parts of the relationship. Momentum toward achievable objectives would in turn create confidence to pursue more ambitious, long-term projects, such as cooperation on unmanned fighters.

The famous 4th century BCE Indian strategist Chanakya, whose name adorns the address of the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, wrote extensively about the importance of fortifying the state when facing an adversary. Heeding his advice, the logic behind a India-U.S. defense roadmap could not be more compelling. Time is short and another crisis is brewing. China is closely watching the Ukraine war, eager to import lessons learned to improve its warfighting abilities along the LAC, particularly when it comes to countering unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and prosecuting counter-ISR operations. The recent clash in Arunachal Pradesh demonstrated that tensions along the LAC are not going to subside anytime soon.

Both sides can ill-afford waiting for the next crisis to act decisively. Meaningful defense cooperation requires political will and long-term planning. By pursuing an ambitious defense roadmap, New Delhi and Washington can do just that, while injecting momentum into the broader partnership and sending a strong signal to partners and adversaries alike in the Indo-Pacific.

Before he passed, Major Sutherland expressed astonishment at how far ties between the two countries had progressed in the decades since his mission to Himalayas. The foundations are indeed robust, but much more remains to be done. The present geopolitical environment demands that both countries press down on the accelerator to deepen defense ties and put in place a robust and resilient architecture to help India defend its sovereignty and further U.S. security interests in the Indo-Pacific.

A New Chapter for India-US Defense Ties

Biden and Modi have a robust engagement calendar. The U.S. should leverage these opportunities to develop an ambitious roadmap for deepening defense ties with India.

thediplomat.com · by Basant S. Sanghera · January 27, 2023

On a cold night in November 1962, Major David Sutherland of the United States Air Force flew his C-130 transport aircraft to new heights – literally – as he made a resupply mission to a remote airstrip outside the Indian city of Leh in the Himalayas. The People’s Liberation Army had invaded India a month prior, and the Kennedy administration responded by stepping up military assistance to India, sending vital supplies and evacuating wounded Indian troops.

Though often forgotten by both Indians and Americans today, U.S. assistance to India during the 1962 Sino-Indian War – amid the Cuban Missile Crisis at that – was an incredible moment of bonhomie between the two democracies during an otherwise frosty Cold War relationship. For Sutherland, the mission to India was an exciting sojourn during his military career. When I last spoke with him a few years ago, he fondly recalled memories of sipping chai with Indian troops, visiting the Taj Mahal, and enjoying savory meals at the Ashok Hotel in between missions.

58 years later, the United States again stepped up to assist India in a moment of crisis. Following the June 2020 Galwan clash along the China-India Line of Actual Control (LAC) that left 20 Indian military personnel dead, the United States rushed to provide valuable support and supplies, including cold weather gear and munitions, in record time.

Over the past two years, China has continued its unpredictable and unsettling behavior along the LAC. Just last month, Chinese and Indian troops exchanged blows in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. (Coincidently, it was Kennedy’s ambassador to India – John Kenneth Galbraith – who recognized Arunachal as part of the Indian union.) And while U.S. support has continued, more needs to be done in both New Delhi and Washington to build a defense relationship that meets the demands of the moment.

Following Galwan, swift U.S. assistance was made possible by the investments both countries had made to deepen interoperability and logistics coordination, namely through defense enabling agreements like the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement, which vastly expanded bilateral information sharing, and the Logistics Supply Agreement of 2016. This alphabet soup of enabling agreements was just one of several ingredients in a maturing partnership that included increased defense trade and investment, maritime cooperation, complex exercises, technological exchanges, and the Obama administration’s designation of India as a “Major Defense Partner.” Not only has India-U.S. defense cooperation directly contributed to enhancing India’s military preparedness along the LAC, it has also served as the “tip of the spear” driving the larger strategic convergence between the two countries over the past two decades.

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Time is now ripe to resharpen the spear. In recent years, the India-U.S. relationship has been performing below its full potential. Bilateral differences over Ukraine and sanctions, a lackluster trade agenda, and the absence of a U.S. ambassador in New Delhi have contributed to this malaise. But 2023 presents an important opportunity to reverse this trend and restore momentum.

The Senate will hopefully move soon on confirming an envoy to New Delhi. President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi will have multiple opportunities to meet this year, including at the G-20 Summit in September, and Secretaries Antony Blinken and Lloyd Austin will travel together to New Delhi for the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue. Putting defense on top of the agenda under an ambitious roadmap could provide the Biden administration an opportunity to make its own unique mark on the U.S.-India strategic partnership.

Much akin to the Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership (NSSP), which revamped export control and civil nuclear cooperation during the Bush administration, a defense roadmap would outline tangible, reciprocal steps for both sides to drive the defense partnership forward. Let’s call it “Major Defense Partner 2.0” or the “Defense Technology and Interoperability Roadmap.” Under such an umbrella framework, ad-hoc efforts or initiatives would be replaced with a systematic plan of action to make the defense relationship more predictable and resilient.

The United States, for example, could support India’s inclusion as a trusted partner under the Arms Export Control Act and loosen technology export controls in exchange for India agreeing to a major joint military industrial project (think jet engines or naval fighter aircraft). As the United States looks to refurbish its defense industrial base in the wake of the Ukraine conflict, India can play a central role in a network of trusted suppliers. But for India to realize this opportunity, it will require New Delhi to offer the right mix of incentives to build the business case for U.S. firms, such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to create economies of scale and guaranteed orders for Indo-U.S. private-sector joint ventures.

A defense roadmap could also complement lines of effort already underway, including on artificial intelligence and the Pentagon’s dialogue on emerging technologies, and set new ambitious targets for undersea domain awareness (UDA) cooperation. India could take steps to increase interoperability with U.S. forces through the adoption of Link 16 and assigning additional liaison officers. Both sides could deepen habits of cooperation through additional exercises and rotational presence, with bureaucratic red-tape like visas and clearances waived beforehand. Congress could even play a supporting role by authorizing funds to pilot joint technology projects, much akin to the Israel-U.S. Binational Industrial Research and Development Foundation established in the 1970s.

Above all, a high-level roadmap, blessed by the two leaders, would reduce the bureaucratic inertia that all too often becomes a drag on the India-U.S. relationship. Having time-bound tangible outcomes would help mitigate frustrations due to mismatched expectations and competing priorities (technology sharing, for example) and insulate defense ties from frictions in other parts of the relationship. Momentum toward achievable objectives would in turn create confidence to pursue more ambitious, long-term projects, such as cooperation on unmanned fighters.

The famous 4th century BCE Indian strategist Chanakya, whose name adorns the address of the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, wrote extensively about the importance of fortifying the state when facing an adversary. Heeding his advice, the logic behind a India-U.S. defense roadmap could not be more compelling. Time is short and another crisis is brewing. China is closely watching the Ukraine war, eager to import lessons learned to improve its warfighting abilities along the LAC, particularly when it comes to countering unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and prosecuting counter-ISR operations. The recent clash in Arunachal Pradesh demonstrated that tensions along the LAC are not going to subside anytime soon.

Both sides can ill-afford waiting for the next crisis to act decisively. Meaningful defense cooperation requires political will and long-term planning. By pursuing an ambitious defense roadmap, New Delhi and Washington can do just that, while injecting momentum into the broader partnership and sending a strong signal to partners and adversaries alike in the Indo-Pacific.

Before he passed, Major Sutherland expressed astonishment at how far ties between the two countries had progressed in the decades since his mission to Himalayas. The foundations are indeed robust, but much more remains to be done. The present geopolitical environment demands that both countries press down on the accelerator to deepen defense ties and put in place a robust and resilient architecture to help India defend its sovereignty and further U.S. security interests in the Indo-Pacific.

Basant S. Sanghera

Basant S. Sanghera is the current principal for South Asia at The Asia Group and previously served as director for India at the U.S. National Security Council.

thediplomat.com · by Basant S. Sanghera · January 27, 2023

13. In Beijing's backyard, U.S. demonstrates its military might

At the link is a video of the flight deck of the USS Nimitz. It may not deter China but everytime I see carrier operations it makes me proud of the power of our Navy. I am alway amazed at the choreographed actions of the sailors on the flight deck. It seems to me it is an example of teamwork on a scale that is nearly unrivaled. (okay, a battalion in the attack of an objective talkies pretty good team work too!)

https://www.reuters.com/world/beijings-backyard-us-demonstrates-its-military-might-2023-01-27/

In Beijing's backyard, U.S. demonstrates its military might

Reuters · by Joseph Campbell

ABOARD THE NIMITZ, South China Sea, Jan 27 (Reuters) - Over a few hours under grey skies, dozens of combat planes and helicopters roar on and off the flight deck of the aircraft carrier Nimitz, in a demonstration of U.S. military power in some of the world's most hotly contested waters.

MH-60 Seahawk helicopters and F/A-18 Hornet jets bearing pilot call signs like "Fozzie Bear", "Pig Sweat" and "Bongoo" emit deafening screams as they land in the drizzle on the Nimitz, which is leading a carrier strike group that entered the South China Sea two weeks ago.

The group's commander, Rear Admiral Christopher Sweeney, said the tour was part of a U.S. commitment to uphold freedom of passage in the waters and airspace of a region vital to global trade.

"We are going to sail, fly and operate wherever international norms and rules allow. We're going to do that safely and we're going to be resolute about that," Sweeney told Reuters on Friday.

"It's really just about sailing and operating obviously with our allies and partners in the area and assuring them of free and open commerce and trade in the Indo-Pacific."

A U.S. presence in the South China Sea, a conduit for about $3.4 trillion of annual trade, has been welcomed by allies like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia, but it continues to rile rival China, which sees the exercises as provocations in its backyard.

[1/5] Crew members signal to a F/A-18E Super Hornet fighter jet preparing to take off for a routine flight on board the U.S. USS Nimitz aircraft carrier during a routine deployment to the South China Sea, Mid-Sea, January 27, 2023. REUTERS/Joseph Campbell

China claims historic jurisdiction over almost the entire South China Sea, which includes the exclusive economic zones of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines.

Beijing has been conducting regular exercises too and maintains a large presence of coast guard and fishing vessels far off its mainland - a source of frequent tension with its neighbours.

The Nimitz Carrier Strike Group 11 includes the guided-missile cruiser Bunker Hill and the guided-missile destroyers Decatur, Wayne E. Meyer and Chung-Hoon. The Chung-Hoon on Jan. 5 sailed through the sensitive Taiwan Strait, irking China.

That came two weeks after a Chinese navy J-11 fighter jet caused alarm when it came within 10 feet (3 metres) of a U.S. Air Force plane over the South China Sea.

Sweeney said it was crucial for international rules to be followed and said the U.S. presence in the South China Sea demonstrated its commitment to its regional allies.

"We've operated in the same body of water as the Chinese or the Singaporean navy or the Filipino navy since we've arrived and it's all been safe and professional," he said.

"We're going to sail, fly and operate wherever international waters allow us to, so we're not going anywhere."

Reporting by Joseph Campbell; Writing by Martin Petty; Editing by Jonathan Oatis

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Joseph Campbell

14. If the U.S. can't borrow more money, why not just mint a coin to fund the government?

So, should we mint a trillion dollar coin?

If the U.S. can't borrow more money, why not just mint a coin to fund the government?

NPR · by Wailin Wong · January 27, 2023

The Indicator from Planet Money explores how a trillion-dollar platinum coin could get the country around the debt ceiling limit.

ARI SHAPIRO, HOST:

The U.S. can't legally borrow any more money - not unless the debt ceiling is lifted. But it can still mint money. And that has some folks asking, why not just mint a coin to keep funding the government - specifically, a trillion-dollar platinum coin? Wailin Wong and Darian Woods from our daily economics podcast, The Indicator From Planet Money, have more.

WAILIN WONG, BYLINE: The notion of a trillion-dollar platinum coin traces back to a now-defunct blog focused on Modern Monetary Theory. This is a branch of economics that argues that governments that control their own currency and borrow in that currency can just create the money they want to spend. The only real limit to this ability is inflation.

ROHAN GREY: The government is the issuer of the currency. It makes the money. And so in that respect, it has always had, what I call nowadays, a big infinity sign in its bank account.

DARIAN WOODS, BYLINE: Rohan Grey is an assistant professor of law at Willamette University, where he specializes in contracts and financial institutions and the regulation of money. Rohan says the government could actually fund its operations without raising the debt ceiling, without needing to borrow at all. It could just create the money as it needed.

WONG: The authority would come from a 1996 law that says basically...

GREY: The Treasury Secretary may, in their discretion, mint and issue platinum coins of whatever denomination, quantities, specifications, designs as the Treasury Secretary may choose.

WONG: So here's how the coin would work. The U.S. Mint, which is part of the Treasury Department, would create a platinum coin with a face value of $1 trillion. The Treasury would take this coin to the Federal Reserve, and the Fed would accept it as a deposit. Now, the government can use that money to pay government salaries and Social Security benefits and whatever else.

WOODS: Rohan says the government has always had the authority to coin money, but it's kind of like everybody forgets about this until the country enters another debt ceiling crisis.

GREY: So what the coin represented was - it's a symbol of the money power we've always had but forgotten.

WONG: I mean, it's a symbol, but it's also something that you are advocating for as a real policy option.

GREY: Yes, because the policy option that we're facing right now is that we are about to drive off the cliff.

WONG: But there are reasons why economists and policymakers are not all just furiously tweeting #mintthecoin.

LOUISE SHEINER: Gut instinct is that it is a gimmick.

WONG: Louise Sheiner is an economist at the Brookings Institution. And Louise says the economics of the trillion-dollar coin are completely sound. For example, she doesn't think it will lead to inflation.

SHEINER: The amount of spending the Treasury would be doing is no different than if the debt limit wouldn't bind. So it's not more spending. It's not like, oh, I'm going to just increase spending.

WOODS: The coin wouldn't actually circulate in the economy. The government would use the trillion dollars to pay its bills, just like it would have if it was borrowing money normally.

WONG: So Louise doesn't object to the mechanics of the coin. It's the legal and political feasibility piece of this that really dooms the idea for her.

SHEINER: There are so many murky questions about whether or not it's legal and would it be challenged, and that's just a mess. You wouldn't prevent the chaos in the debt market that we're all worried about from the debt ceiling breach.

WOODS: Even if the U.S. Mint makes the platinum coin, the Fed might not accept it. Janet Yellen raised this concern over the weekend when asked about the coin. Louise says that the Fed wants to stay out of it.

Darian Woods.

WONG: Wailin Wong, NPR News.

NPR · by Wailin Wong · January 27, 2023

15. What, where, how: After the Abrams-for-Ukraine announcement, a host of questions

What, where, how: After the Abrams-for-Ukraine announcement, a host of questions - Breaking Defense

In picking the precise type of M1 tank to send, the US must choose between giving Ukraine the best tech possible and risking the capture of secrets by Russia.

By ASHLEY ROQUE and SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.

on January 27, 2023 at 2:48 PM

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · January 27, 2023

An M1A2 fires during a competition at Fort Benning, Ga. in 2022 (Army photo by Spc. Joshua Taeckens)

WASHINGTON — In the wake of the dramatic announcement by President Joe Biden this week that American-made Abrams main battle tanks will be sent to Ukraine, the White House and the Pentagon have left a myriad of questions unanswered. What specific kind of Abrams will be fending off Russian forces? When exactly will these tanks be delivered and ready for combat? And what kind of process did the Pentagon go through, or is still going through, to come to those decisions?

Statements from senior military officials suggest key details remain unresolved — including the specific variant and sub-variant of the Abrams in play. The same day as Biden’s announcement, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology Douglas Bush told reporters that he was still creating a laundry list of options for Pentagon officials to consider before deciding which way to go.

“It’s not just the tanks,” he said. “We have to be able to [deliver] tanks, support equipment, the training, the ammunition, the fuel… It’s really a bigger picture.”

Just a day later, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh told reporters the Defense Department had settled on the M1A2 variant. The decision was made, in part, because the US does not have an “excess” of Abrams tanks of the earlier, less sophisticated M1A1 model in its stock, she said.

Later that day, however, a Pentagon spokesperson told Breaking Defense, “While we’re not able to provide specific details on the specifications of the variant at this time, it is our intent to procure the M1A2 tank through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) funding even as we consider several other options.” That wording suggests the question of the M1A2 remained at least partly open, as is the question of which of several sub-variants the US was comfortable giving Kyiv.

As for the delivery timeline, a senior administration official told reporters the same day as Biden’s announcement that it would take “months as opposed to weeks” to deliver the vehicles to Ukraine. In the meantime, the US would establish a comprehensive training program for Ukrainian forces and set up the necessary maintenance and logistics infrastructure. Beyond that, exact estimates on when Ukrainian crews could be manning Abrams in combat were scarce, as was information about exactly where the tanks would come from.

In the meantime, the Ukrainians are expected to more quickly absorb and fight with German Leopard tanks, whose transfer was announced the same day as the Abrams. But while the Pentagon deliberates and plans, there’s time to look at some options. What Abrams models are available, where are they, and how fast could they get to Ukraine?

A US Army M1A2 Abrams heavy tank unloads from a transport ship in Poland in 2017. (Photo Credit: Capt. Orlandon Howard)

Tanks Already In, Or Heading To, Europe

If the Pentagon sticks to its current plan and uses USAI for the Abrams, that means it won’t be pulling from active US stocks like a presidential drawdown would, so Army tanks in the US are most likely safe.

But if plans change, perhaps the fastest way to get Abrams tanks to Ukraine would be for the US to pull from its Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) already in Europe. Retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of US Army forces in Europe, said the US should have all the equipment for two US Army armored brigades — including about 87 late-model M1A2 tanks each — already on the continent. APS stockpiles are intended for Army units to roll out in an emergency, but, Hodges argued, aiding Ukraine should qualify. (Biden said the US plans to send Ukraine 31 Abrams tanks, enough for one Ukrainian battalion.)

“If the administration had the sense of urgency to help Ukraine win, then they’d bring Ukrainian tank crews and commanders to Poland or Germany to match them up with these tanks for training and then put them on a train to Ukraine to be employed how and where and when the Ukrainian General Staff is ready,” he wrote in a Jan. 26 email to Breaking Defense. “This could all happen within the next two or three months.”

Older versions could also be available, because the Marine Corps disbanded its tank fleet in 2021 and transferred more than 400 M1A1s to the Army. The state of these vehicles is not publicly known, but the US State Department is currently selling some of those to countries including Poland, the first European nation to receive a US Abrams tank deal.

Warsaw announced earlier this month that it inked a deal to begin receiving 116 M1A1s later this year, in addition to a previous deal for 250 upgraded M1A2s that are expected to be delivered mid-decade. Poland’s announcement showcases the relative speed of delivery for the legacy M1A1s versus the M1A2 tanks. (The US Army has not responded to questions about the latter’s current production timeline.)

A host of factors come into play for production delivery dates, industry officials have explained in the past: The process is traditionally like a queue, so when an order comes in, it gets in line behind other deals. In this case, Ukraine would be getting in line behind existing US orders, including ones from countries like Poland and Taiwan. But here’s the catch: The administration can re-prioritize the queue and bump Ukraine up ahead of other countries already waiting for years.

The State Department did not immediately respond to questions about the Abrams tank production line and whether this week’s Ukraine announcement has any bearing on other orders for M1A1s or M1A2s.

Singh and other defense officials have also used the word “new” when referring to M1 Abrams bound for Ukraine. However, they probably don’t mean that in its most literal sense. The Army is not producing new tanks, but instead it is working with prime contractor General Dynamics, and other industry partners, on upgrades to existing hulls, drawn from a vast surplus of M1s demobilized after the Cold War. Establishing a production line for “new” Abrams would certainly be one way to delay delivery for years.

US Army M1 Abrams tank with Trophy Active Protection Systems (APS) and improved protection for machinegun operator. (Rafael photo)

The Devil In The Sub-Variant Details

In order to figure where the tanks should come from, the Pentagon first has to decide which types of tanks to give Ukraine.

The administration has obscured the details, likely in part on purpose to keep the Russians guessing, and in part because policy has changed so fast that at least some officials seemed to be getting whiplash. But there’s also a delicate balance to be kept between providing maximum performance to Ukraine and exposing American secrets to capture by Russia.

While all M1 Abrams models use the same AGT1500 engine, they vary widely in their armor, electronics, and even weapons. The original M1 introduced in 1980 had an already-obsolescent 105 mm main gun, but as soon as possible the Army swapped it out for the much more potent Rheinmetall 120 mm, also used on most Leopard 2s. (If any 105 mm M1s still exist, they’re in deep storage and would take months to overhaul.)

The first upgunned model was the M1A1, made in several subvariants with steadily stronger armor — M1 armor is modular, so you can replace outdated or battle-damaged slabs for new ones — and better electronics, such as GPS navigation and intelligence-sharing networks.

The latest variant is the M1A2 — the one Ukraine will get, at least based on most recent statements — which keeps the 120 mm main gun, modified to take new types of ammunition, but radically upgrades the electronics. The most important upgrade was a high-tech targeting system called the Commander’s Independent Thermal Viewer. In essence, the CITV is a mini turret atop the main turret, with its own set of sensors able to swivel in any direction, so while the gunner is lining up one target, the tank commander is already scanning for the next. Since most tank battles since World War II come down to who shoots (accurately) first, the A2’s “hunter-killer” system is a lethally important upgrade over the M1A1 — not to mention most of the Soviet-era tanks Russia and Ukraine still use.

The basic M1A2 has been upgraded several times, especially its electronics, which have become more modern and easier to maintain with every overhaul. The first System Enhancement Package improved the armor. SEPv2, the current mainstay model, focused on improved computers, network communications, and second-generation infrared sights. SEPv3, in production since 2018, upgrades protection against roadside bombs and adds an armor-protected Auxiliary Power Unit to keep running all the tank’s electronics while the gas-guzzling engine is turned off. (Earlier Abrams had an APU kludged on outside the armor, where a stray bullet could turn it to scrap). SEPv4, now in development, features a new laser sight and third-generation infrared sensors. Both SEPv3 and v4 are compatible with the Trophy Active Protection System, a kind of mini-missile defense that shoots down incoming anti-tank missiles and RPGs, but Trophy is in short supply and made in Israel, which has generally not allowed weapons exports to Ukraine.

Sources are cagey about other details related to the upgrades because so much of it is classified, and the US has to weigh its desire to give Ukraine the best tanks available with the limited numbers of the very latest models and the danger of one falling into hostile hands.

The US is especially sensitive about the M1’s armor, which for all current variants reportedly includes plates of ultra-dense depleted uranium. DU is non-radioactive — in fact, it’s less reactive than regular uranium, because all the radioactive isotopes have been removed to make nuclear fuel, which is why it’s called “depleted” — but it’s potentially toxic if ingested or inhaled, as could happen to the tank crew if an enemy round slams through the plate. (In that case, though, the crew has more immediate problems).

So every Abrams sold to foreign customers, even close allies like Australia, has the depleted uranium armor removed. Some of the older M1A1s being prepped for export, say to Poland, may have already had this process performed. But the more modern M1A2s all have the DU plates, and swapping them out adds weeks to the delivery timeline.

In the end, it could be many days or weeks before all these details are settled. In the meantime, the conversation appears to have moved on to what’s the next key weapon system for Ukraine’s fight against Russian invaders.

16. Japan gunning for strategic independence from US

Again, a comment about declining confidence in the US commitment.

Excerpts:

According to the plan, Japan intends to research and develop hypersonic weapons, improved high-speed glide bombs, improved Type 03 surface-to-air missiles, target observation munitions, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) and sea mines.

Japan also intends to purchase unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), improved Type 12 anti-ship missiles, high-speed glide bombs, SH-60K anti-submarine helicopters, anti-ship missiles for maritime patrol aircraft, improved torpedoes with silent power units and Tomahawk cruise missiles.

These acquisitions could be interpreted as a step towards achieving more strategic independence from the US while simultaneously building its asymmetric warfare capabilities vis-à-vis China.

In particular, Japan’s plan to acquire hypersonic weapons, high-speed glide bombs and anti-ship missiles for maritime patrol aircraft points toward developing indigenous deterrent capabilities independent from US security guarantees.

While Japan has been under the US nuclear umbrella since 1951, there are doubts over Washington’s willingness to use nuclear weapons in defense of Japan.

Japan gunning for strategic independence from US

Japan’s remilitarization to gather pace with acquisition of hypersonic missiles, glide bombs, UUVs and other weapons to be aimed at China

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · January 28, 2023

Japan plans to spend big on long-range standoff weapons and asymmetric capabilities, signaling a potential change in longstanding notions of deterrence and military doctrine.

The Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD) has unveiled a lengthy list of equipment and weapons slated for research, development and mass acquisition, the latest indication of Tokyo’s rapid remilitarization to counter China, North Korea and Russia’s rising threats.

According to the plan, Japan intends to research and develop hypersonic weapons, improved high-speed glide bombs, improved Type 03 surface-to-air missiles, target observation munitions, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) and sea mines.

Japan also intends to purchase unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), improved Type 12 anti-ship missiles, high-speed glide bombs, SH-60K anti-submarine helicopters, anti-ship missiles for maritime patrol aircraft, improved torpedoes with silent power units and Tomahawk cruise missiles.

These acquisitions could be interpreted as a step towards achieving more strategic independence from the US while simultaneously building its asymmetric warfare capabilities vis-à-vis China.

In particular, Japan’s plan to acquire hypersonic weapons, high-speed glide bombs and anti-ship missiles for maritime patrol aircraft points toward developing indigenous deterrent capabilities independent from US security guarantees.

While Japan has been under the US nuclear umbrella since 1951, there are doubts over Washington’s willingness to use nuclear weapons in defense of Japan.

Japanese sailors aboard the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) ship JS Hyuga direct a US Marines MV-22 Osprey to land during the Dawn Blitz 2015 exercise off the coast of Southern California. Photo: AFP / Mark Ralston

Janes Defense writer Takahashi Kosuke cites retired admiral Kawano Katsutoshi saying that US presidential elections every four years and always unpredictable American public opinion raises fundamental questions about the constancy and reliability of US extended deterrence for its allies.

Indeed, the longstanding strategic logic of US extended deterrence may have already been broken.

As Asia Times has previously reported, China and North Korea may already have capabilities to strike the US mainland from bastions in the South China Sea or within their territories using highly-lofted trajectory launches – making it unlikely the US would retaliate using nuclear weapons in defense of Japan when its territories are threatened by nuclear attack.

Although Kosuke noted that late prime minister Shinzo Abe mentioned NATO-style nuclear-sharing as an option for Japan, they would most likely remain under US control in such an arrangement.

Japan is thus now quickly developing indigenous deterrent capabilities. Asia Times has reported on Japan’s plans to acquire long-range cruise missiles for counterstrike purposes and its belated hypersonic weapons projects.

Apart from building an indigenous deterrent, those standoff weapons may enable Japan to strike outside China and North Korea’s A2/AD defenses, eliminating key targets while staying beyond the range of enemy weapons.

However, to shoot far Japan needs to see far. Tokyo currently has limited intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for its planned missile arsenal – although its plans to acquire target observation munitions and UAVs may aim to address this capability gap.

Japan plans to launch a constellation of 50 small satellites for ISR purposes, with the first one intended to be launched in 2024, according to a November 2022 article in Yomiuri Shimbun.

Apart from building its own space-based ISR capabilities, Japan could also use US space-based ISR. However, relying on the US for targeting data may defeat the purpose of building independent deterrent capabilities.

The acquisition of sea mines, torpedoes and anti-submarine helicopters points to building an asymmetric edge to counter China’s increasingly powerful navy, now the largest in the world in terms of hull numbers.

Members of the Chinese Coast Guard stand in formation on board their vessel after it anchored at Manila port on January 14, 2020. Photo: AFP / Stringer

Japan depends on sea lanes of communication (SLOC) for delivery of its strategic resources, specifically oil. However, being an island nation, Japan is vulnerable to a Chinese naval blockade that could seek to block the fuel Japan’s warplanes and warships need to sustain prolonged operations.

As Japan lacks nuclear-powered warships, they may have to cut off operations to refuel, limiting their capabilities to provide a persistent presence in critical SLOCs such as the Nansei Islands nearby China.

Japan’s acquisition of sea mines may thus be an effort to plug this capability gap. As noted by Asia Times, smart sea mines that can be turned on and off to allow the passage of friendly ships and triggered by specific acoustic, pressure, or magnetic signatures from enemy warships are an effective means of enforcing selective control in critical SLOCs.

Japan’s planned UUV acquisitions, meanwhile, may indicate a move to build offensive mining capabilities against People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLA-N) North Sea Fleet bases such as Qingdao, Lushun and Xiaoping.

Japan’s torpedo acquisition may be aimed at arming its new Taigei-class submarines against China’s increasing number of significant combatants including its three aircraft carriers, Type 055 cruisers, Type 075 amphibious assault ships and Type 39 C/D Yuan-class submarines.

Japanese Special Defense Forces are getting more offensive. Image: AFP / EPA

Aside from their decreased noise signature, Japan’s new torpedoes may feature improved performance in shallow and deep waters, indicating envisioned operations in crowded SLOCs or coastal areas close to enemy naval bases.

Japan’s acquisition of additional anti-submarine helicopters may be in line with a strategy to use its Southwest Islands as dispersed staging areas for anti-submarine operations, with its helicopter-capable warships serving as mobile “lily pads” to refuel and rearm for sustained operations.

Deploying these helicopters on Japan’s Southwest Islands will increase their survivability compared to deploying them to ships that can be sunk in action. Their dispersed island deployment also boosts their possible coverage area, undermining China’s submarine efforts to blockade Japan or break out into the Western Pacific in a potential wider conflict with the US.

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · January 28, 2023

17. US to buy new Abrams tanks for Ukraine because military has no spares, Pentagon says

US to buy new Abrams tanks for Ukraine because military has no spares, Pentagon says

Stars and Stripes · by Doug G. Ware · January 26, 2023

Idaho Army National Guard trains in 2019 with an M1A2 Abrams tank at the Orchard Combat Training Center near Boise. (Mason Cutrer/Idaho Army National Guard)

WASHINGTON — New Abrams tanks will be purchased by the U.S. to supply to Ukraine because the Defense Department doesn’t have any spares, delaying the shipment as Ukrainian forces prepare for an expected Russian offensive, a Pentagon spokeswoman said Thursday.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin recommended to President Joe Biden to obtain the tanks through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative — a funding program that procures military equipment from industry rather than from existing Defense Department stocks, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said.

“We just don’t have these tanks available in excess in our U.S. stocks,” she told reporters at the Pentagon.

Singh also said Ukraine will get 31 modified M1A2s Abrams, which is the newest and most sophisticated version of the tank that first entered service in the early 1990s.

The M1A2 has advanced equipment such as an independent thermal sight and can fire at two different targets virtually at the same time without having to lock on to them sequentially. It also has an automatic firefighting system in the crew compartment and can actively deflect computerized inbound missiles.

The U.S. version of the M1A2 also has armor and munitions made with depleted uranium, an extremely dense metal. However, Singh declined to provide any details about the tanks that the Ukrainians will receive. Federal policy forbids the U.S. from sending classified armor packages to other countries, according to several news reports.

Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh speaks Thursday, Jan. 26, 2023, during a news briefing at the Pentagon. (Jack Sanders/Department of Defense)

Pentagon officials have said it will be several months before Ukraine receives the American battle tanks. Some experts have speculated Ukraine might not see them until late 2023 or early 2024.

“You have to remember … these tanks are going to require training, maintenance, sustainment that’s going to take a very long time,” Singh said.

Singh also pushed back Thursday against criticisms that Pentagon officials reversed their review about sending Abrams tanks to Ukraine. Last week, defense officials said the tank might not work for Ukraine due to complex maintenance requirements and because they run on jet fuel and often need spare parts in the field. When the announcement to send the tanks came Wednesday, officials said equipment and weapons needs for Ukraine are always changing as the war against Russia evolves.

“[Our] position when it came to the Abrams has not changed,” she said. “It is going to be a challenge to sustain and maintain these tanks. That said, following the [Ukrainian] contact group meeting [in Germany last week] … Secretary [Austin] came away from those conversations feeling that we needed to provide a long-term commitment to Ukraine. That is why he recommended to the president that we provide the Abrams.”

The Defense Department has not announced where Ukrainian troops will be trained on the tanks, but officials have said it will occur somewhere outside Ukraine. A group of Ukrainians are now at Fort Sill, Okla., learning how to operate the Patriot missile defense system.

“We just don’t have a timeline,” Singh said. “We are trying to get the training set up but … where that’s going to be and when, I just don’t have that.”

Ukraine also will receive other battle tanks in the coming weeks that are expected to help them fend off invading Russian forces. This includes Challenger tanks from Great Britain, and Germany announced Wednesday that it will send a number of its Leopard 2 tanks.

Last week, news reports said German officials didn’t want to commit the Leopard 2 to Ukraine until the United States agreed to send Abrams tanks. The Pentagon has said there was no link between the decision to send the Abrams and Germany’s decision to send the Leopards.

Stars and Stripes · by Doug G. Ware · January 26, 2023

18. Liberal hawks over realist doves in heated Ukraine debate

Excerpts:

The Biden stance reflects US respect for the outstanding performance of the Ukrainian military on the battlefield and also the growing resistance to appeasing an outright aggressor.

That would be a recipe for encouraging more territorial demands from the Putin regime, and perhaps embolden China to put even more pressure on Taiwan.

At the same time, the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in the last quarter of 2022 was a reminder to its supporters in NATO and elsewhere that great powers can and do lose wars against smaller adversaries.

With the right level of military support in 2023, Ukraine could realistically defeat Putin’s invading army.

Ultimately, the hawkish liberal vision of helping to ensure Putin’s defeat has seemingly prevailed because it offered the best prospect of justice for the victim of aggression. It also bolsters an international rules-based order threatened by the illegal use of force.

Liberal hawks over realist doves in heated Ukraine debate

Diminished doves coo for negotiated peace while ascendent hawks squawk Putin needs to pay for his rule-busting aggression

asiatimes.com · by Robert G Patman · January 28, 2023

The recent decision by Olaf Scholz’s German government to supply Ukraine with Leopard 2 tanks – after weeks of clear reluctance to provoke Vladimir Putin – was more than a domestic policy shift.

It also demonstrated how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could prove to be a tipping point in a long-running battle of ideas between two schools of thought in the field of international affairs.

Scholars refer to the two camps as liberals and realists. A defining characteristic of liberalism is its view that global politics is an arena where moral values, legal norms and institutions are crucial for regulating the behavior of states and increasing the prospects of cooperation and peace.

The classical realist or “realpolitik” tradition, by contrast, remains skeptical about peace. It believes states are essentially driven by the pursuit of power and national interests through reliance on military might. It views the international arena as essentially anarchic.

These two approaches have been visible in much of the commentary following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. In particular, the two camps have clashed over how the war in Ukraine should end.

End game: Russian president Vladimir Putin visiting an arms production facility in Saint Petersburg, January 18, 2023. Photo: Getty Images via The Conversation

Appeasement or resistance?

On the one hand, many realists believe the only way out of the current conflict is a negotiated peace. That involves recognizing, in the words of US political scientist John Mearsheimer, the “taproot of the current crisis is NATO expansion.”

Ukraine must be encouraged, in some shape or form, to concede territory to Russia in order to end the invasion. Realists say it’s important for the West to recognize the legitimate security interests of a great power in Ukraine, and to avoid running the risk of Moscow forming a permanent alliance with China.

Moreover, they claim Ukraine cannot defeat the Russian occupation force because, if necessary, Putin will use nuclear weapons to ensure a “victory” – a prospect that worsens the stability of Europe and the world.

On the other hand, liberal hawks – sometimes called neo-idealists – maintain Russia’s Ukraine invasion is such a fundamental violation of the UN Charter that it has eliminated the moral and practical scope for a diplomatic compromise.

Negotiation in this context would only reward Putin’s aggression and undermine an international rules-based order that sought to uphold the territorial integrity and political independence of all states.

Hawks and doves

Liberals acknowledge there are two ways of ending Putin’s annexation attempt in Ukraine. First, the Putin regime has the option of belatedly recognizing its invasion is illegal and withdrawing its troops to the internationally recognized borders of Russia.

Second, allies and supporters of Ukraine should ensure that Kiev is sufficiently armed and equipped to fight a just war. Putin’s invading army is either defeated or the costs of the invasion become too high and Moscow is obliged to end its occupation.

Nearly 12 months on, it’s clear among the states supporting Ukraine that the hawkish liberal view – that Putin’s military venture must fail – has steadily edged out the dovish realist perspective that Putin should be appeased with some sort of land for peace deal.

Germany’s decision to supply tanks to Ukraine exemplifies the shift in thinking. But the ascendency of the liberal hawks is the product of long and short-term trends before and during the Ukraine conflict.

For one thing, a realist worldview has not sat comfortably with an increasingly interconnected world. Having struggled to explain events like the end of the Cold War and 9/11, realist diplomats and scholars have nevertheless insisted that great powers still call the shots in world politics.

The NATO factor

The Russian invasion has also significantly eroded the realist case for ending the conflict.

The argument that NATO enlargement caused the Putin regime to attack looks unconvincing. It was not Washington but the states of Eastern Europe, historically fearful of Russian dominance, that clamored for NATO membership.

Indeed, many neighboring states have backed President Volodymyr Zelensky’s view that Putin’s invasion is part of a Russian imperial project that can be traced back to Peter the Great and which seeks to reestablish a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.

Furthermore, Zelensky has successfully rejected any suggestion of moral equivalency between his democratically elected government and Putin’s authoritarian regime, whose invading troops are suspected of committing war crimes.

The Zelensky government has vowed it has the right to fight “until it regains all its territories” from Moscow, and the Biden administration in the US has swung strongly behind this position.

Great powers can lose

The Biden stance reflects US respect for the outstanding performance of the Ukrainian military on the battlefield and also the growing resistance to appeasing an outright aggressor.

That would be a recipe for encouraging more territorial demands from the Putin regime, and perhaps embolden China to put even more pressure on Taiwan.

A German Leopard 2 heavy battle tank of the type destined for Ukraine. Image: Getty Images via The Conversation

At the same time, the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in the last quarter of 2022 was a reminder to its supporters in NATO and elsewhere that great powers can and do lose wars against smaller adversaries.

With the right level of military support in 2023, Ukraine could realistically defeat Putin’s invading army.

Ultimately, the hawkish liberal vision of helping to ensure Putin’s defeat has seemingly prevailed because it offered the best prospect of justice for the victim of aggression. It also bolsters an international rules-based order threatened by the illegal use of force.

Robert G Patman is Professor of International Relations, University of Otago

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

asiatimes.com · by Robert G Patman · January 28, 2023

19. The Global Fragility Act and the Irregular Warfare Center: A Path for Diplomacy, Defense, and Development – Irregular Warfare Center

It is good to see the Global Fragility Act highlighted. I do not think this is common knowledge.

They always leave out north Korea (the strategy described, not the IWC).

The five pilot countries/region present a wide range of multi-dimensional challenges: social, economic, governance, security, and more. Russia, China, Iran, and violent non-state actors continue to compete for influence in the GFA countries through competitive statecraft and irregular conflict.

Excerpt:

Given the alignment, opportunities for the IWC to support GFS implementation should be explored. The structure for collaboration is already established: ASD(SO/LIC), the designated DoD lead for the GFA, provides oversight for the IWC. Furthermore, the IWC has the expertise and means to advance a deeper understanding of a range of current and future threats. The IWC is ready and willing to provide tailored design-thinking workshops, contextual research, and educational opportunities to facilitate the development of comprehensive local solutions with the host nations, DoS, and USAID.

The Global Fragility Act and the Irregular Warfare Center: A Path for Diplomacy, Defense, and Development – Irregular Warfare Center

irregularwarfarecenter.org

January 27, 2023

The Global Fragility Act and the Irregular Warfare Center: A Path for Diplomacy, Defense, and Development

Kevin D. Stringer, PH.D. – Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired

Madison Urban – IWC Analyst

Introduction

Wicked problems litter the security environment. They are opaque challenges, caused by multiple factors, and constantly evolving. These problems can be conceptualized through a myriad of lenses, each of which produces different possible solutions, and any intervention to address the range of solutions becomes part of the ecosystem itself and any negative impact cannot be undone, only mitigated. Such problems can take years to understand and take decades of effort to bring about progress. In an effort to undermine the United States and the current international order, strategic competitors are leveraging statecraft and irregular conflict methods to capitalize on the wicked problems of state fragility and increase their influence, resource access, and bargaining power.

Seeing the enormity of the diverse challenges posed by state fragility and the structural barriers that exist within the U.S. government that can inhibit progress, Congress passed the Global Fragility Act (GFA). The stated strategic priorities of the GFA and the intent to increase coordination with interagency, international, and non-governmental partners intersect directly with the Irregular Warfare Center’s (IWC) mandate to build the Department of Defense’s (DoD) capacity to counter irregular threats in collaboration with key allies and partners. With the recent announcement of Haiti, Libya, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, and Coastal West Africa (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Togo) as the pilot countries/region, the opportunity to begin developing creative solutions to wicked problems has arrived.

Overview of the Global Fragility Act and Global Fragility Strategy

The GFA passed in December 2019 with strong bipartisan support in the House and Senate. The GFA directs the president, Department of State (DoS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and DoD to jointly “establish a comprehensive, integrated, ten-year strategy…focus[ed] on addressing long-term causes of fragility and violence” and select at least five priority countries/regions as pilots for initial operationalization. Prevention, not stabilization, must be the priority for at least two of the five countries/regions. Congress authorized $200 million annually from 2020-2024 to fund the effort and an additional $30 million annually for a Complex Crisis Fund that USAID oversees to support prevention or responses to emerging or unforeseen events.

The execution of the GFA is based on interagency, international, and non-governmental cooperation. The GFA implementation report explicitly outlines the roles of DoS, USAID, and DoD. The State Department, in particular the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and the Director of the Office of Foreign Assistance, leads the GFA effort, develops the strategy, and oversees its implementation. The Assistant to the Administrator for the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization at USAID is in charge of implementing non-security prevention and stabilization efforts. The DoD, led by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), plays a supporting role.

Released in 2020, the 10-year overarching strategy, known as the Global Fragility Strategy (GFS), outlines the DoD’s role as such:

The Department of Defense (DoD) serves in a supporting role to manage and prevent conflict and address global fragility through specialized activities including Civil Affairs, psychological operations, information operations engagements, institutional capacity-building, and security cooperation. DoD utilizes the defense support to stabilization (DSS) process to identify defense stabilization objectives in concert with other United States departments and agencies; convey them through strategic documents; organize to achieve them; and prioritize requisite defense resources.

Beyond defining the roles of the three primary U.S. government implementation partners, the GFS explicitly distinguishes between externally driven nation-building and the GFA’s goal of supporting and uplifting locally-driven political solutions. The goal is partnership and buy-in from governments serious about “target[ing] the political factors that drive fragility.”

GFA and IWC Mission Alignment

The GFA and the IWC align in mission and in spirit. Co-developing knowledge, building global networks of practitioners, and facilitating efforts to address current and future threats with partners are central to the IWC’s mission. The IWC’s “big tent” approach aims to develop partnerships with a wide variety of stakeholders including DoD offices, interagency members, international partners, regional centers, and civilian universities. These priorities mirror the GFA’s requirement that implementation plans are developed in conjunction with a range of relevant U.S. government entities, international partners, and non-governmental organizations.

Previously, the IWC advocated for the development of long-term strategies akin to the one the GFA promulgates. This legislation constitutes an important congressional acknowledgment of the need for and willingness to create extended timelines to address a diverse panoply of wicked problems. A decade is significantly longer than most government planning efforts and sets up a strategy that will outlive the administration it was created under. Too often, strategies—predominantly at the national level—shift when administrations change, or even within an administration’s tenure, leading to inconsistent efforts that struggle to build or sustain momentum and success. In the context of strategic competition, where adversaries are content to use time and patience to erode or outwait U.S. will and exertions, dedicated long-term efforts aimed at stabilization and mitigation of violent and violence-enabling activities are crucial. The GFA sets an important precedent for emphasizing longer time horizons and offers an interagency foundation and framework that could apply to a wider array of countries and issue sets. In a sense, the GFA could be a model for campaigning across the wider interagency and international community.

GFA and IWC Topical Alignment

Beyond the alignment in mission, there is an overlap between stabilization and irregular conflict with strategic competitors. The GFS connects the two by stating that fragility “provides fertile ground for violent extremists and criminal organizations,” “erodes international peace,” and “can enable authoritarianism, external exploitation, and increase the influence of the United States’ competitors in both physical and digital realms.” All of this interplay culminates in a situation where states “struggle to assure basic security, territorial sovereignty, and the rule of law, lacking a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.” In the overtly violent activities, the IWC has the most obvious point of intersection, although a broader range of irregular conflict-enabling activities is also of relevance.

The five pilot countries/region present a wide range of multi-dimensional challenges: social, economic, governance, security, and more. Russia, China, Iran, and violent non-state actors continue to compete for influence in the GFA countries through competitive statecraft and irregular conflict. Most of the GFA pilot countries have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with China to create economic investment opportunities as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. While the economic investment itself might not be violent, the expansion of Chinese influence and aid could enable future military expansion. For instance, Beijing is reportedly looking to build military bases and ports in West Africa. Chinese investment in Papua New Guinea has sparked similar fears in the South Pacific. Russian private military companies have been active previously in Mozambique and remain active in Libya. Furthermore, many GFA countries are also targets of Russian disinformation campaigns. Iranian economic investment and international development projects further attest to an intense struggle for influence across the continent. Thwarted terrorist plots in multiple African states, including Ghana, by individuals connected to the Iranian Quds Force evidences the potential for terrorist violence to spread as well. Finally, violent non-state actors continue to expand and conduct attacks in the GFA countries, particularly those on the African continent. The influence of these state and non-state actors could profoundly impact stability and pose current and future irregular threats.

Opportunities for Collaboration

Given the alignment, opportunities for the IWC to support GFS implementation should be explored. The structure for collaboration is already established: ASD(SO/LIC), the designated DoD lead for the GFA, provides oversight for the IWC. Furthermore, the IWC has the expertise and means to advance a deeper understanding of a range of current and future threats. The IWC is ready and willing to provide tailored design-thinking workshops, contextual research, and educational opportunities to facilitate the development of comprehensive local solutions with the host nations, DoS, and USAID.

Depending on the timelines and structure of the GFS, the IWC could support GFS implementation by facilitating tailored design-thinking workshops. Design methodology is particularly relevant in understanding the complexities of wicked problems as it uses both creative and critical thinking methodologies to understand the environment and utilizes systems thinking concepts to craft solutions to advance toward an acceptable future condition. Design-thinking workshops could help GFA countries and U.S. agencies examine the local challenges, understand the complexities of the situation, identify the problem or problems needing to be addressed. Building on that, the workshops can then develop a range of acceptable future outcomes and plans the U.S. would be willing to help them achieve, and then craft the plans and find the broad variety of international and local resources needed to address those problems. Workshops such as these are a proven way to engage the variety of contributors and stakeholders to develop and sustain local solutions.

The IWC could also generate research and tailor educational opportunities for each of the GFA countries related to strategic competition, competitive statecraft, and irregular conflict concerns that cut across political, social, economic, and security issues. The IWC is also the only center within the DoD with the charter to amplify the efforts of other DoD regional centers related to irregular threats. The IWC’s position could be instrumental in connecting and coordinating efforts with the Asia Pacific Center, Africa Center, and the Perry Center for Western Hemispheric Defense Studies to produce and distribute research on ongoing irregular threats and activities that could enable future irregular warfare campaigns in the GFA pilot countries. Such endeavors could also include connections with international and U.S. universities that focus on irregular conflict studies or tapping into a broader network of scholar-practitioners. Beyond supporting efforts to more deeply understand the complexities and drivers of fragility and its intersection with irregular threats, the IWC also can develop educational opportunities to translate information into knowledge. Such opportunities could take the form of interactive tabletop exercises, simulations, and war gaming. Concretely, an adept combination of design-thinking methodology, selected subject matter experts, and simulations/gaming could catalyze GFA implementation.

Conclusion

By mandating a long-term strategy and multi-stakeholder approach, the structure and passage of the GFA indicates some level of recognition of the pitfalls inherent to effective strategy development. The GFA provides the nation an opportunity to overcome traditional and understandable “silos” that exist between DoS, USAID, and DoD. The relationships, procedures, and learning that will occur through the GFS process will surely be invaluable as the U.S. looks to create effective solutions to a number of complex problems. Similarly, the newly established IWC has the authority, resources, and talent to support the comprehensive, multiagency effort needed for success by creating bridges between the departments and the GFA nations, thus facilitating increased collaboration, partnerships, and harmonization.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, or the Center for Irregular Warfare.

Download a PDF of this publication by clicking the icon to the left.

About the Author(s):

Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., is the Chair of Education for the Irregular Warfare Center.

Madison Urban is an analyst at the Irregular Warfare Center.

irregularwarfarecenter.org

20. Russia’s Return to Gulag Economics

Excerpts:

Since Putin’s plan to win a short military war in Ukraine has visibly failed, Russia is getting ready to wage a long and devastating war in Ukraine. To do so, it must adjust the economy to the new conditions and increase weapons production. Many military plants and manufacturers have been working around the clock for months now, but still cannot satisfy the growing demand without new supplies of workers. Russia’s prison population of 450,000 provides a potentially large number of unskilled workers.

But the Stalinist labor tradition was equally ruthless toward scientists and the highly skilled. When his security services needed to conduct secret research, they just arrested scientists and engineers and sent them to special installations, the sharashkas, which were closed off from the outside and heavily guarded. The motivation was provided through threats that scientists and engineers filing to provide quick results would be sent to the (even worse) labor camps. Alexander Solzhenitsyn was the most famous guest of one such facility, a sharashka in Marfino, east of Moscow. The facility still exists and is now one of the most successful Russian surveillance research centers, a world leader in biometric recognition technologies which identify a speaker by his or her voice on the phone.

Some members of the State Duma, including a vice-speaker, Boris Chernyshov, had voiced the idea “of resurrecting mobilization-type design bureaus” as early as October. “We together — scientists, government, military — must return the good old Soviet traditions. Scientists will be called upon to solve not only military but also state problems,” Chernyshov said.

Putin’s Russia, never deterred by comparisons to the country’s bloody Soviet past, gives every indication that it will rummage still deeper into Stalin’s repressive toolkit.

Russia’s Return to Gulag Economics

January 27, 2023

Irina Borogan and Andrei Soldatov

Putin’s regime is seeking inspiration from the Stalin era to fill huge gaps in the labor force.

cepa.org · by Irina Borogan, Andrei Soldatov · January 27, 2023

Under the growing pressures of war, the Russian military-industrial complex is experiencing acute shortages in manpower. With so many workers mobilized and with casualties rising (now estimated to be “significantly, well over” 100,000), the authorities are beginning to look at another, time-honored source of cheap labor — the prison population.

Convicts have rarely been so sought after in Russia, at least since Stalin’s time. The notorious Wagner mercenary group, a Kremlin-authorized private army, has already been recruiting convicted criminals with the offer of get-out-of-jail-free cards for those able to survive six months on the Ukrainian frontlines.

Those dubious about Wagner’s deal will now be steered towards the manufacture of tanks and other weaponry.

Russian demand for industrial workers has increased dramatically since the war in Ukraine started, and there is apparently no other way to satisfy it.

It’s hardly a secret that the country has been experiencing a shortage of locksmiths, welders, and turners for a very long time. And now Russia just doesn’t have enough workers to manufacture missiles and tanks for Putin’s war in Ukraine.

Uralvagonzavod, the largest tank manufacturer in the country, failed to hire enough workers, even the unskilled, and has no choice but to use convicts to fill the gap. Hundreds of prisoners from a penal colony in the Sverdlovsk region will soon be sent to Uralvagonzavod.

According to the Russian government, the shortage of workers in the military-industrial complex will soon reach 400,000 people, including 120,000 professionals with higher education. Given that the industry employs two million workers and engineers, this is a very significant number. To begin with, factories tried to make up for shortages by poaching personnel from private industry — after mobilization, military industries could offer protection against the call-up — and from the retired. The leading manufacturer of armored personnel carriers, the Kurgan factory, even promised to provide housing and guarantee the employment of family members.

But it didn’t solve the problem: in September alone, the month of mobilization, manpower shortages in the military sector increased by 7%. Thus the need for convicts.

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The tradition of using prison labor to satisfy the state’s needs originated in Stalin’s times, when millions of prisoners in Gulag labor camps, notorious for inhuman conditions, were mercilessly exploited to build roads and factories, dig channels and extract minerals.

The Kremlin is not embarrassed by this loud historical echo. Even before the war, in 2021, the government supported a plan developed by the Russian railway behemoth RZD along with the prison service to use convicts to build a new section of the Baikal-Amur Mainline track (BAM) in Siberia, a railway running from Lake Baikal in eastern Siberia to the Sea of Japan in the Far East.

Launched by Stalin in the 1930s, that project claimed the lives of tens of thousands of Gulag prisoners, but the Kremlin accepted the idea of using free prison labor. The war has simply provided a justification to return to the old methods.

Since Putin’s plan to win a short military war in Ukraine has visibly failed, Russia is getting ready to wage a long and devastating war in Ukraine. To do so, it must adjust the economy to the new conditions and increase weapons production. Many military plants and manufacturers have been working around the clock for months now, but still cannot satisfy the growing demand without new supplies of workers. Russia’s prison population of 450,000 provides a potentially large number of unskilled workers.

But the Stalinist labor tradition was equally ruthless toward scientists and the highly skilled. When his security services needed to conduct secret research, they just arrested scientists and engineers and sent them to special installations, the sharashkas, which were closed off from the outside and heavily guarded. The motivation was provided through threats that scientists and engineers filing to provide quick results would be sent to the (even worse) labor camps. Alexander Solzhenitsyn was the most famous guest of one such facility, a sharashka in Marfino, east of Moscow. The facility still exists and is now one of the most successful Russian surveillance research centers, a world leader in biometric recognition technologies which identify a speaker by his or her voice on the phone.

Some members of the State Duma, including a vice-speaker, Boris Chernyshov, had voiced the idea “of resurrecting mobilization-type design bureaus” as early as October. “We together — scientists, government, military — must return the good old Soviet traditions. Scientists will be called upon to solve not only military but also state problems,” Chernyshov said.

Putin’s Russia, never deterred by comparisons to the country’s bloody Soviet past, gives every indication that it will rummage still deeper into Stalin’s repressive toolkit.

Irina Borogan and Andrei Soldatov are Nonresident Senior Fellows with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). They are Russian investigative journalists, and co-founders of Agentura.ru, a watchdog of Russian secret service activities.

cepa.org · by Irina Borogan, Andrei Soldatov · January 27, 2023

21. U.S. general warns troops that war with China is possible in two years

U.S. general warns troops that war with China is possible in two years

The Washington Post · by Dan Lamothe · January 28, 2023

China could be at war with the United States two years from now, a top Air Force general predicted in a bombastic and unusual memo to troops under his command, asserting a significantly shorter timeline before potential conflict than any other senior U.S. defense official to date.

Gen. Michael A. Minihan, who as head of Air Mobility Command oversees the service’s fleet of transport and refueling aircraft, warned personnel to speed their preparations for a potential conflict, citing Chinese President Xi Jinping’s aspirations and the possibility that Americans will not be paying attention until it is too late.

“I hope I am wrong,” Minihan wrote. “My gut tells me we will fight in 2025. Xi secured his third term and set his war council in October 2022. Taiwan’s presidential elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a reason. United States’ presidential elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a distracted America. Xi’s team, reason, and opportunity are all aligned for 2025.”

Minihan then directs airmen who are qualified to use a weapon to “fire a clip into a 7-meter target with the full understanding that unrepentant lethality matters most” sometime in February.

“Aim for the head,” he said.

Minihan’s memo encourages the thousands of troops under his command to prepare for war in several other regards. All personnel reporting to him should “consider their personal affairs” and be more aggressive about training, he instructs.

“Run deliberately, not recklessly,” he writes. “If you are comfortable in your approach to training, then you are not taking enough risk.”

The memo, first reported Friday by NBC News, is dated Feb. 1 — which is still days away — and was distributed to Minihan’s subordinate commanders. An Air Force spokeswoman, Maj. Hope Cronin, verified its authenticity, writing in a statement shared with media after the memo began circulating on social media that Minihan’s order “builds on last year’s foundational efforts by Air Mobility Command to ready the Air Mobility Forces for future conflict, should deterrence fail.”

Before taking over at Air Mobility Command in 2021, Minihan served in a variety of influential roles in the Pacific beginning in 2013. They include a stint as the deputy commander of Indo-Pacific Command, with purview of China and Taiwan, from September 2019 to August 2021.

The general’s memo coincides with an effort by the Pentagon to reset 20 years of counterinsurgency wars in the Middle East and as the Biden administration continues to equip Ukraine with billions of dollars in security assistance as it strives to fight off a Russian invasion.

Senior U.S. officials have warned for some time that an ascendant China may launch an assault on Taiwan, which is governed independently. The Defense Department under President Biden and his predecessor, President Donald Trump, has declared China its primary long-term concern, citing Beijing’s rapid military expansion and assertive behavior in recent years.

But U.S. officials have offered mixed messages on whether and when China might attempt to take Taiwan. In 2021, Adm. Phil Davidson, then the chief of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, predicted Beijing could make such an attempt by 2027. That timeline has since been dubbed “the Davidson window” by some national security scholars.

In light of its concerns about China, the Pentagon has sought to expand military partnerships with willing partners throughout the Pacific. This month, the U.S. and Japanese governments disclosed that a Marine Corps unit on the Japanese island of Okinawa will be refashioned into a force capable of hopping islands in the region and directing long-range missiles at adversaries.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, speaking Jan. 11 during a news conference alongside Japanese officials, said that the United States had observed some “very provocative behavior” from Chinese forces in an attempt to push international norms. But he also downplayed concerns that China may launch an assault on Taiwan any time soon.

“We’ve seen increased activity in aerial activity,” Austin said. “ … We’ve seen increased surface vessel activity around Taiwan. And again, we believe that they endeavor to establish a new normal, but whether or not that means that an invasion is imminent, I seriously doubt that.”

Minihan, who entered the Air Force as a C-130 pilot, has previously captured attention for his strident, colorful language.

In September, he said at a military conference outside Washington that the Air Force had caused the largest “pile of our nation’s enemy dead” within the U.S. military.

“Lethality matters most,” he added, according to Task & Purpose, a military publication. “When you can kill your enemy, every part of your life is better. Your food tastes better. Your marriage is stronger.”

The Washington Post · by Dan Lamothe · January 28, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

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FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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