Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:

"One must be sane to think clearly, but one can think deeply and be quite insane."
- Nikola Tesla

“[Democracy] is the line that forms on the right. It is the don’t in don’t shove. It is the hole in the stuffed shirt through which the sawdust slowly trickles; it is the dent in the high hat. Democracy is the recurrent suspicion that more than half of the people are right more than half of the time. It is the feeling of privacy in the voting booths, the feeling of communion in the libraries, the feeling of vitality everywhere. Democracy is a letter to the editor. Democracy is the score at the beginning of the ninth. It is an idea which hasn’t been disproved yet, a song the words of which have not gone bad. It’s the mustard on the hot dog and the cream in the rationed coffee. Democracy is a request from a War Board, in the middle of a morning in the middle of a war, wanting to know what democracy is.”
― E.B. White

“Unpopular ideas can be silenced, and inconvenient facts kept dark, without the need for any official ban... Anyone who challenges the prevailing orthodoxy finds himself silenced with surprising effectiveness. A genuinely unfashionable opinion is almost never given a fair hearing, either in the popular press or in the highbrow periodicals.”
― George Orwell, Animal Farm






1. The Kazakhstan Crisis: A View From Kyrgyzstan
2. Free-rider on the storm: How Russia makes use of crises in its regional environment
3. Rare Earths: Fighting for the Fuel of the Future
4. National Defense Authorization Act Seeks To Better Leverage Commercial Technology
5. Belt & Road encircles Latin America and the Caribbean
6. Air Force accused of pushing woman through elite commando training after she quit, spurring investigation
7. Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee ("2+2")
8. Shared Challenges, Strengthening Alliance at Center of U.S.-Japan Defense Meeting
9. Over-the-Horizon Is Far Below Standard
10. America’s COVID Rules Are a Dumpster Fire
11. The Biggest Threat to America Now Isn’t a Coup
12. COVID School Policies Made Me Sour on the Democratic Party
13. Terror Threat in Asian Countries Declined in 2021, Singapore Think-Tank Reports
14. QAnon networks are evading Twitter's crackdown on disinformation to pump out pro-Capitol-riot propaganda, study says
15. Keeping the Generals Out of the Afghanistan Investigation Is a Great Idea
16. US, NATO rule out halt to expansion, reject Russian demands
17. Online Warriors Are a Risky but Useful Tool for Beijing
18. VOA Exclusive: Ukraine Accuses Iran of Premeditated Terrorist Act in 2020 Plane Shootdown
19. Military Spying Controversies Return to Deeply-Rooted Issues (Taiwan)
20. In Kazakhstan, Russia follows a playbook it developed in Ukraine
21. Private efforts to get vulnerable people out of Afghanistan running on fumes
22. The Oath of Office and the Insurrection





1. The Kazakhstan Crisis: A View From Kyrgyzstan

Excerpts:
On January 7, the Kyrgyz parliament approved President Sadyr Japarov’s proposal to send Kyrgyz troops as part of the CSTO coalition to Kazakhstan. The president may feel obliged to do so, as he understands that his own country is notorious for its numerous revolutions. Revolutions and protests have overthrown three Kyrgyz presidents in 30 years and Japarov must know that he may well face the same fate. As such, he may hope that by supporting the CSTO intervention today in Kazakhstan, he is securing similar CSTO support for himself in the future.
Meanwhile, for Russia, the Kazakhstan crisis is an opportunity to flex its muscles ahead of talks on Ukraine next week with Western leaders. It is also a chance to strengthen the role of the CSTO, as this will be the organization’s first military intervention. Until now, the CSTO has mostly been a symbolic anti-Western body without much weight in the international arena. The Kazakhstan crisis is thus a model demonstrating how Russia can quickly mobilize forces if the regimes favored by Moscow are under threat.
The Kazakhstan Crisis: A View From Kyrgyzstan
In supporting the CSTO intervention today in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov is perhaps hoping to secure similar CSTO support for himself in the future. 
thediplomat.com · by Aidai Masylkanova · January 8, 2022
In supporting the CSTO intervention today in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov is perhaps hoping to secure similar CSTO support for himself in the future.
By for The Diplomat

In March 2021, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov visited Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in the Kazakh capital, Nur-Sultan.
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It is the fifth day since protests began in Kazakhstan, turning violent in recent days while the government shut down the internet. Here in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, people have actively expressed their concerns about the crisis next door on various social networks.
The mood is as if the unrest were happening here.
People are quite emotional in voicing their support for our neighbors, whom we see as a brother nation. Therefore, the news that the Kyrgyz army would participate in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) coalition to support Kazakh government forces to fight against what they have labeled “foreign terrorists” was immediately and widely condemned.
People in Kyrgyzstan began signing a petition against participating and a number of activists protested in front of the main government buildings in the capital, Bishkek. Kyrgyz also worry that participating in the CSTO mission may cause a rift between two neighbor nations. They called on the president and the parliament not to send Kyrgyz soldiers to support the corrupt Kazakh dictatorship against its people. They see the CSTO a weapon of Russian President Vladimir Putin, with which Russia can fight proxy wars to strengthen dictatorships in the former-Soviet satellite states.

Kyrgyz also note that the CSTO rejected Bishkek’s requests for support during the inter-ethnic clashes in 2010 and when the Tajik army attacked Kyrgyz civilians in bordering villages last year. Activist lawyers point out that the CSTO’s mandate to intervene is aimed at situations in which there is an act of aggression by a foreign state, which is clearly not the case now.

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, however, made his request for the CSTO intervention claiming that the country was not just experiencing domestic social unrest but an act of aggression by “foreign terrorists.”

On January 7, the Kyrgyz parliament approved President Sadyr Japarov’s proposal to send Kyrgyz troops as part of the CSTO coalition to Kazakhstan. The president may feel obliged to do so, as he understands that his own country is notorious for its numerous revolutions. Revolutions and protests have overthrown three Kyrgyz presidents in 30 years and Japarov must know that he may well face the same fate. As such, he may hope that by supporting the CSTO intervention today in Kazakhstan, he is securing similar CSTO support for himself in the future.

Meanwhile, for Russia, the Kazakhstan crisis is an opportunity to flex its muscles ahead of talks on Ukraine next week with Western leaders. It is also a chance to strengthen the role of the CSTO, as this will be the organization’s first military intervention. Until now, the CSTO has mostly been a symbolic anti-Western body without much weight in the international arena. The Kazakhstan crisis is thus a model demonstrating how Russia can quickly mobilize forces if the regimes favored by Moscow are under threat.
Authors
Guest Author
Aidai Masylkanova
Aidai Masylkanova is a visiting fellow at Harvard University. She holds master's degree from the School of International and Public Affairs of the Columbia University. She served as a political officer in the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in 2012-2013.
thediplomat.com · by Aidai Masylkanova · January 8, 2022



2. Free-rider on the storm: How Russia makes use of crises in its regional environment


Excerpts:
For the upcoming talks with the US and NATO, this pattern makes it unlikely that Russia will accept any compromise that fails to strengthen its positions in Ukraine and elsewhere in eastern Europe (unless it sees the absence of a compromise as a bigger threat to its interests in the region). The US and NATO should therefore seek the right balance between deterrence and de-escalation to convince Russia that a more cooperative approach to security is in its own interests, including transparency and confidence-building measures, as well as arms control commitments. They will also need to make clear that any attempt at destabilisation would come with a cost.
The EU, which for the time being will not take part in the talks, still struggles to comprehend Russia’s logic, as it differs fundamentally from its own approach to crises: the EU and its member states always prioritise compromise, in order to resolve a crisis, as they see stability as an interest in itself. Because the EU is unlikely to change this approach, it should at least clearly define its strategic interests in its neighbourhood and work on anticipating and preventing crises – namely, identify more precisely its own vulnerabilities and those of its neighbours, and make use of the instruments it has to reinforce its own resilience and theresilience of its eastern partners. Short of that, the EU will keep witnessing tactical gains by Russia in each and every crisis in its neighbourhood, while continuing to mistakenly assume the existence of a grand strategic design behind Moscow’s moves.
Free-rider on the storm: How Russia makes use of crises in its regional environment
Europeans too often see strategy in Russia’s tactical use of regional crises. The EU and member states should help eastern partners become more resilient in the face of such opportunism.

Director, Wider Europe programme
ecfr.eu · by Marie Dumoulin · January 7, 2022
What a difference a year makes! In autumn 2020, Russia’s position seemed to be slipping in numerous former Soviet states. In Belarus, large-scale protests appeared to herald the end of the Alyaksandar Lukashenka era. Maia Sandu’s defeat of Igor Dodon for the presidency of Moldova deprived Russia of its best political ally in the country. Kyrgyzstan’s “October revolution” saw a new generation of nationalist-leaning leaders emerge with no background in old Soviet structures. Meanwhile, in the South Caucasus, Turkey’s decisive support for Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict suggested the end of the delicate balance Russia had carefully maintained for two decades.
Yet, at the start of 2022, the picture is completely different: Russia has managed to strengthen its position across the region. The pressure this has helped generate has effectively brought the United States and NATO to the negotiating table.
The US and Russia are set to hold talks in Geneva on 10 January, and the NATO-Russia Council meets shortly afterwards, on 12 January. This diplomatic sequence could be the first step towards de-escalating tensions generated by Russia’s recent military build-up on the borders of Ukraine. Russia has put forward demands that are widely seen as non-starters for the US and NATO. And it has made these demands public, which raises the issue of Moscow’s intentions: is it really serious about these demands or are they a mere pretext to blame Washington and NATO for the failure of the talks? Or, in other words: is Russia really willing to reach a compromise or is it merely trying to push its advantage as far as possible (and admitting the possibility that the talks will fail if it does not get 100 per cent satisfaction)?
A broader look at Russia’s approach to its neighbours may reveal something about how it deals with – and makes the most of – the crises that have emerged on their territories. Over the last year, Russia has systematically used crises in its regional environment to advance its interests. By seeking tactical gains instead of crisis resolution, Russia creates confusion among rivals, real or supposed, and pushes them into a defensive posture – which in turn prevents them from developing a more ambitious strategy for the region. Throughout most of the Belarus crisis, the US and the European Union have reacted to events, trying to manage them as they unfold and guess what Moscow’s next steps will be. US and EU policymakers should be aware of this approach when discussing European security with Russia, as it makes compromise less likely, though not completely impossible.
The pattern shows Russia taking advantage of an existing crisis by making use of a whole range of potential forms of leverage: diplomacy, energy, media, and military
How has Russia strengthened its position? In the South Caucasus, after successfully mediating a ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it reinforced its military footprint by deploying peacekeepers. Russia is now able to decide the agenda of talks, as well as the formats in which these should take place. In Georgia, the attempted mediation by European Council president Charles Michel has lost momentum in face of the deep polarisation of the political landscape. The protracted political crisis is not directly benefitting Russia but it is impeding reforms and therefore affecting the EU’s influence and credibility in the country, which Moscow can only welcome.
In central Asia, the Taliban’s seizure of power in Afghanistan helped restore Russia to its role as ultimate guarantor of the security of the region’s post-Soviet republics. This has allowed it to reinforce the capacities of its bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and in September it conducted military drills in Tajikistan. Russia can now set conditions for US military cooperation with these countries, in stark contrast to the role they were able to play relating to NATO operations in Afghanistan back in the 2000s. Russia has now also started deploying troops to Kazakhstan, together with other members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, following unrest in that country.
In Belarus, Russian support helped Lukashenka hold on to power. Not only has Moscow financially supported a regime on the brink of default, it has also seconded workforce to compensate for the massive strikes in state enterprises and by journalists, replacing staff who resigned or were sacked. But Moscow’s backing was not unconditional, and Lukashenka is now increasingly dependent on Russia. He therefore had to sign up to 28 roadmaps for further integration between the two countries, which he had previously been reluctant to do. He also recognised Russia’s annexation of Crimea, thereby dooming to failure any attempt at improving an already-strained relationship with neighbouring Ukraine. The effective integration of Belarus into the Russian Federation is not yet on the agenda, but Lukashenka may no longer be able to block it.
In Moldova, the Russian government communicated openness to cooperation with the reformist government that took office after the July 2021 parliamentary election. But, by September, it had manufactured a gas crisis to remind Chisinau of its vulnerability. Though Russia denied any political agenda, it pushed Moldova to delay the reorganisation of MoldovaGaz and thus the implementation of the unbundling envisioned in the framework of EU-Moldova relations. This was a political concession that the Moldovan government had to accept before gas supplies resumed at a sustainable price.
Last but not at all least, in Ukraine, Moscow successfully blocked any meaningful discussion in the Normandy Format and pushed for direct contact between the Ukrainian government and the de facto authorities of Donetsk and Luhansk, as clearly expressed in the correspondence with French and German counterparts published by Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov (a perhaps unprecedented move). By increasing military pressure on the borders of Ukraine, first in spring 2021 and again over the last couple of months, Russia has distracted attention from the discussions that were supposed to be taking place in the Normandy Format over conflict settlement in Donbas and turned it towards a conversation with the US about European security.
Whether it will push further and initiate a direct military intervention in Ukraine beyond Donbas remains an open question. The answer will relate to the way Russian authorities see and use crises. What the last few months have shown is a pattern in which Russia takes advantage of an existing crisis to advance its interests by making use of the whole range of potential forms of leverage: diplomacy, energy, media, and other channels of influence; and, of course, military leverage. Over the last year Russia has not primarily been trying to resolve crises in its neighbourhood; it has used them in order to reinforce its own positions.
For the upcoming talks with the US and NATO, this pattern makes it unlikely that Russia will accept any compromise that fails to strengthen its positions in Ukraine and elsewhere in eastern Europe (unless it sees the absence of a compromise as a bigger threat to its interests in the region). The US and NATO should therefore seek the right balance between deterrence and de-escalation to convince Russia that a more cooperative approach to security is in its own interests, including transparency and confidence-building measures, as well as arms control commitments. They will also need to make clear that any attempt at destabilisation would come with a cost.
The EU, which for the time being will not take part in the talks, still struggles to comprehend Russia’s logic, as it differs fundamentally from its own approach to crises: the EU and its member states always prioritise compromise, in order to resolve a crisis, as they see stability as an interest in itself. Because the EU is unlikely to change this approach, it should at least clearly define its strategic interests in its neighbourhood and work on anticipating and preventing crises – namely, identify more precisely its own vulnerabilities and those of its neighbours, and make use of the instruments it has to reinforce its own resilience and theresilience of its eastern partners. Short of that, the EU will keep witnessing tactical gains by Russia in each and every crisis in its neighbourhood, while continuing to mistakenly assume the existence of a grand strategic design behind Moscow’s moves.
ecfr.eu · by Marie Dumoulin · January 7, 2022



3. Rare Earths: Fighting for the Fuel of the Future

Excerpts:

The solution begins with awareness: understanding the significance of this material and the perils of a Chinese monopoly. It is the responsibility of those who know to inform the rest and for elected officials to make it a political priority.
Passing Senator Cruz’s “ORE Act” is the next best opportunity to support long-term rare earth self-sustainment. Beyond the substantial incentives for firms in the industry, the bill includes provisions for those pursuing “secondary recovery” – a process of harvesting material from recycled devices and/or industrial waste, contributing to critical national stockpiles. The legislation also updates an existing U.S. law that would further restrict the DoD’s sourcing of rare earths from “non-allied nations” (including China) and compel them to pursue other supply chain solutions.
But the U.S. will not be the only nation affected by rare earth supply restrictions and it is foolish to only consider national solutions. Beyond an investment in domestic supply chain development, the U.S. government can do more – through diplomatic and legislative efforts – to support international business, research, and innovation in order to create a system of cooperative burden-sharing and information exchange. Long-term, committed government support for the pursuit of creative solutions that extend beyond national boundaries will help mitigate risk and allow firms to withstand the short-term costs of supply chain development and innovative exploration.
China has yet to seriously flex its strategic advantage. It cannot currently afford to alienate its top trade partners, nor does it want to encourage competitive supply chain development. But that situation can change. 1941 saw an isolated Japan act with quick, decisive violence out of desperation for a critical raw material. Considering advances in modern military technology and the interconnectedness of global economies, such a reaction today would have incalculable consequences.
The United States is neither alone nor without alternatives. But, as time passes without substantial government initiative, it becomes increasingly difficult to catch up to China and less difficult to imagine similar scenarios of future desperation.
Rare Earths: Fighting for the Fuel of the Future
Rare earths are as critical to the modern economy as oil – and China has quietly secured a near-monopoly.
By Brendan P. Dziama, Juan Manuel Chomón Pérez, and Andreas Ganser
January 08, 2022
thediplomat.com · by Brendan P. Dziama, Juan Manuel Chomón Pérez, and Andreas Ganser · January 8, 2022
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While most Americans are familiar with the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, the causes leading up to the surprise attack are much less understood. Japan’s rapidly expanding global ambitions were threatened when the United States, for geopolitical reasons, imposed export restrictions on a critical raw material that the Empire was unable to domestically and autonomously source: oil. Out of desperation, Japan felt compelled to secure a crucial supply chain through proactive violence. The global consequences were devastating.
Today, the resource has changed, but the conditions are alarmingly similar – except this time it is the U.S. facing potentially crippling restrictions. Rare earth metals, or simply “rare earths,” are the essential, irreplaceable materials powering most of modern technology and, since 1985, China has systematically gained near complete control over the global supply chain. In the U.S., free-market capitalism has long supported this industry’s competitive outsourcing to China and the government is only recently beginning to acknowledge the dangerous strategic implications.
In 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order outlining a “Strategy To Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals,” labeling them “vital to the nation’s security and economic prosperity.” Vulnerabilities in these supply chains were further realized when COVID-19 and the unprecedented response measures exposed the costly gambles of industrial outsourcing and the unintended consequences of globalization. In 2020, Senator Ted Cruz introduced the “ORE Act” to support and incentivize the development of domestic rare earth capacities and, during his first month in office, President Joe Biden included the industry among only three others in a 100-day Supply Chain Review.
Unfortunately, the proposed legislation has stalled in committee and the Department of Defense (DoD) has only made a few, comparatively smallinvestments in the industry. Unlike oil, there has been a relatively uninterrupted flow of cheap materials and products from China and thus rare earths are not enough of a priority for a short-sighted political environment.

The future of U.S. security is tied directly to rare earth resource security. Failing to secure the resources needed to keep pace with technological innovation means a failure to remain globally competitive. China has had decades to develop this industrial capacity and safeguard it from global free-market challengers. At this point, private industry alone will not be able to correct this imbalance. Without robust, creative, proactive government intervention, the U.S. risks being placed in the same desperate situation that Japan faced 80 years ago.
“The Middle East Has Oil. China Has Rare Earths.” (Deng Xiaoping, 1987)
Rare earths have become a fundamental part of modern life. Cell phones, computers, televisions, and cars are among the indispensable products powered by the strong internal magnets manufactured from rare earths. Modern medical devices, communication systems, and a sustainable, “green” energy transition are entirely dependent on successful exploitation of this non-renewable resource and, as can be easily inferred, rare earths are vital for the development of military technology.
To introduce a more familiar comparison, OPEC controls 41 percent of oil production and, with that, has wielded tremendous geopolitical power for decades. This dependency compelled the United States to aggressively support the development of alternative supply chains. Today, despite China controlling approximately 60 percent of rare earth ore, producing 85 percent of the oxides, and accounting for more than 95 percent of the rare earth manufacturing, there is no comparable response.
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With growing tensions in Southeast Asia, an ongoing trade war, and mounting global pressure to combat climate change with “green” technology, the potential for a global crisis is rising. In such a situation, beyond diplomatic and economic measures, military supremacy and deterrence are essential for the United States to continue defending its interests.
To complicate matters, the ability for the U.S. to maintain any militarily competitive edge over China is largely dependent on the same vulnerable supply chain. Precision-guided weapons, stealth technology, drones, and satellites are among the key strategic defense elements that rely on rare earths. Each F-35 aircraft, shared by 14 allied nations and considered instrumental for future warfare, contains 920 pounds of rare earth material. China has already demonstrated the ability to directly affect this development.
In 2020, in response to a U.S. defense deal with Taiwan, China threatened to cut off the supply of rare earths to three U.S. defense manufacturers – including F-35 producer Lockheed Martin. While it ultimately failed to materialize, this reaction demonstrated the power of the Chinese monopoly and the costly potential consequences for the United States and its allies. It also served as a warning to any country that might indirectly challenge China’s foreign policy and an incentive for all to secure an independent and reliable rare earth supply chain.
China’s Road to Monopoly
Approximately 40 percent of the rare earth reserves currently being exploited are in Chinese mines. Although the remaining majority lies elsewhere, China has also become the leading importer of both ore and concentrates. However, having the raw material is just one part of the process.
Unlike other industrial nations, the Chinese government has been able to align and subsidize the rare earth industry according to long-term strategic plans. Over time, this created the highly competitive settings necessary for its firms to obtain an economic advantage over global competitors, while enduring any short-term financial losses.
An ever-expanding, global environmental consciousness has also played into China’s hands. The exploitation of rare earths remains a difficult and dirty business. Most industrial nations capable of such processes lack the willingness to do so in a manner that is both economically viable and environmentally responsible. In this regard, as with many others, China continues to successfully straddle the divide between capacity and tolerance.
With carefully accumulated technical expertise, low costs, relaxed regulations, and staunch support from the government, China is well poised to continue dominating this market. Furthermore, China has been responsible for filing more than 80 percent of new international patents related to rare earth technology, making the industry increasingly inhospitable to international competition.
The Competitors
MP Materials in California recently boasted delivering 15 percent of the global rare earth supply – but 100 percent of this “delivery” is sent to Chinese processing plants in the form of simple concentrates. The firm has an ambitious two-stage development strategy with a processing capacity set for 2022 and has even received $9.6 million from the DoD to support the project, but past failures in the U.S. rare earth industry leave many skeptical.

The Lynas Corporation, based in Australia, manages the only complete supply chain outside of China. However, with its only processing plant in Malaysia, a critical component is subject to somewhat unpredictable foreign governance. To “diversify [its] industrial footprint” Lynas is currently constructing a second processing plant in Australia and has received more than $30 million from the U.S. DoD to support processing plant construction in Texas.
Another key player to consider in this industry is Canada’s Neo Materials. While they do not operate any of their own mines, Neo possesses the only rare earth processing plant in Europe and, in conjunction with Energy Fuels, Inc., recently developed an inspiring “U.S.–European Rare Earth Supply Initiative,” which would be entirely independent from China.
But it’s not just the other rare earth firms looking to address global concerns. In 2018, Toyota introduced a magnet that included 50 percent less rare earth material and, since then, other auto manufacturers have joined this innovative strategy. As the self-proclaimed “world’s leading applied research organization,” Germany’s Frauenhofer-Gesellschaft is coordinating international efforts to explore more efficient rare earth harvesting methods and identify potential substitutes for the material.
As encouraging as some of these developments are, building a comprehensive, local “mine-to-magnet” supply chain to rival China requires several years, significant investment, and, in most cases, supportive environmental and fiscal policy. Without government intervention companies may not be able to maintain lofty ambitions while surviving initial losses against the entrenched Chinese monopoly.
Industrial Intervention
Despite its proud, capitalist history, the U.S. is not without precedent for industrial intervention. Occasionally such action has been taken to stabilize an economic sector in a time of crises or provide for a public “common good” not always accounted for in free market decision-making. But, most often, industrial intervention has been tolerated only in response to an apparent external threat.
After the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik, U.S. fear led to a period of massive government industrial sponsorship, bringing about a digital revolution that included the birth of the modern internet. “Operation Warp Speed” and the pursuit of a vaccine against the COVID-19 virus likewise saw tremendous levels of intervention – and very little public opposition.
With a bilateral economic situation mired in codependency and precarious security situation in the South China Sea, it is not as easy to clearly and publicly label China an external threat. Furthermore, without wide public comprehension for the relevance of this natural resource, rare earth supply chains lack the same political steam required to motivate large-scale government action.
Next Steps
The solution begins with awareness: understanding the significance of this material and the perils of a Chinese monopoly. It is the responsibility of those who know to inform the rest and for elected officials to make it a political priority.
Passing Senator Cruz’s “ORE Act” is the next best opportunity to support long-term rare earth self-sustainment. Beyond the substantial incentives for firms in the industry, the bill includes provisions for those pursuing “secondary recovery” – a process of harvesting material from recycled devices and/or industrial waste, contributing to critical national stockpiles. The legislation also updates an existing U.S. law that would further restrict the DoD’s sourcing of rare earths from “non-allied nations” (including China) and compel them to pursue other supply chain solutions.
But the U.S. will not be the only nation affected by rare earth supply restrictions and it is foolish to only consider national solutions. Beyond an investment in domestic supply chain development, the U.S. government can do more – through diplomatic and legislative efforts – to support international business, research, and innovation in order to create a system of cooperative burden-sharing and information exchange. Long-term, committed government support for the pursuit of creative solutions that extend beyond national boundaries will help mitigate risk and allow firms to withstand the short-term costs of supply chain development and innovative exploration.
Advertisement
China has yet to seriously flex its strategic advantage. It cannot currently afford to alienate its top trade partners, nor does it want to encourage competitive supply chain development. But that situation can change. 1941 saw an isolated Japan act with quick, decisive violence out of desperation for a critical raw material. Considering advances in modern military technology and the interconnectedness of global economies, such a reaction today would have incalculable consequences.
The United States is neither alone nor without alternatives. But, as time passes without substantial government initiative, it becomes increasingly difficult to catch up to China and less difficult to imagine similar scenarios of future desperation.
thediplomat.com · by Brendan P. Dziama, Juan Manuel Chomón Pérez, and Andreas Ganser · January 8, 2022




4. National Defense Authorization Act Seeks To Better Leverage Commercial Technology


Conclusion:

Although the United States military may be lagging China in leveraging commercial technology, these adjustments are a marked improvement to the status quo. Further, these provisions lay the groundwork for larger acquisition reforms that will likely occur in coming years.

National Defense Authorization Act Seeks To Better Leverage Commercial Technology
Contributor
I'm a technologist and systems engineer.
Last week, President Biden signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which specifies the annual budget for the Department of Defense and mandates how the money is spent. The bill passed both the Senate and the House handily despite having its fair share of scrutiny for issues related to selective service, sexual assault, and embargos. However, Congress was generally positive about the NDAA’s increased focus on research and development, including almost $117 billion in funding for new science and technology. More importantly, the NDAA included several much needed measures to support and reform the DoD acquisition processes. These measures focus on better leveraging technology from the commercial sector, especially in the fields of cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligence.

WASHINGTON, DC – DECEMBER 15: Sen. Roy Blunt [+] [-]
(R-MO) walks to the Senate Chambers of the U.S. Capitol Building on December 15, 2021 in Washington, DC. The Senate voted to pass the National Defense Authorization Act, which sends the bill to the desk of U.S. President Joe Biden. (Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)
Getty Images
There is a general concern that the U.S. military has fallen behind other countries, namely China, in these fields. Earlier this year, Nic Chaillan, the Air Force chief software officer, stated in his resignation: “We’re very behind in cyber, to a point that it was very scary when it comes to critical infrastructure and the lack of security.” He further stated, “While we wasted time in bureaucracy, our adversaries moved further ahead.” Moreover, a recent report from the National Security Commission on AI stated that the United States is incapable of defending itself against threats related to AI technologies. The report continues that the U.S. government is far from even being “AI-ready.”
The central reason for these issues is that the U.S. defense acquisition structure is not set up for fast-paced technologies. While the current processes are well suited for the procurement of tanks, fighter planes and aircraft carriers, they struggle when handling technology not unique to the military, especially related to information technology and electronics. In these fields, the DoD’s long-development timelines do not keep pace with the commercial sector, resulting in technology being obsolete by the time that it is fielded.

UNITED STATES – June 17: Secretary of Defense [+] [-]
Lloyd Austin, left, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley talk before the start of the Senate Appropriations Committee hearing on “A Review of the FY2022 Department of Defense Budget Request in Washington on Thursday, June 17, 2021. (Photo by Caroline Brehman/CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images)
CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images
A recent report from the RAND corporation states that other countries, including China and Russia, have historically faced similar issues with their defense acquisition processes. However, the report also states that in 2015, China set a national priority to better leverage its booming commercial sector for military technology. This “Military-civil fusion” has been successful and has advanced China’s military technology in the cyber and AI realms.
The recently approved NDAA includes provisions that support the U.S. military using commercial innovation, similar to what China accomplished. First, the NDAA mandates several studies on how to better leverage the commercial sector through changes in the DoD acquisition process. The Senate Armed Services Committee identified that the DoD tends to procure custom solutions when better commercial alternatives are available. As such, Section 807 requires that the DOD investigate the “impediments and incentives” related to the defense acquisition of commercial products and services.
Additionally, Section 824 of the NDAA requires a review of the use of Other Transaction (OT) authority. This authority has historically been used for nonstandard procurement contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements that are not subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation. In recent years, OT authority has been heavily used for prototype development especially leveraging commercial technology. With some ambiguity in the current OT policies, this review will add transparency and allow for a clear pathway for leveraging commercial technology.

Military delegates attend the two-day AOC Europe [+] [-]
electronic warfare exhibition and conference event at the Exhibition Centre Liverpool, northern England, on October 13, 2021. – AOC Europe is the flagship event produced by the Association of Old Crows (AOC) which connects organisations with interests in Electronic Warfare (EW), Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) and Information Operations (IO). AOC Europe has taken place annually for over 25 years with the aim of connecting organisations and individuals across: government, defence, industry, and academia to promote the exchange of ideas and information concerning the latest advances in electromagnetic fields. (Photo by OLI SCARFF / AFP) (Photo by OLI SCARFF/AFP via Getty Images)
AFP via Getty Images
The NDAA also formalizes the Commercial Solutions Openings (CSO) program, which was launched as a pilot program in 2017 to acquire “innovative technologies” through prize competitions and peer review of proposals. The CSO program sought to remove the high barriers of entry and low incentives associated with current processes, allowing non-traditional contractors to provide innovative solutions to the government. Both the Air Force and the Defense Innovation Unit have successfully used CSOs with commercial firms for procuring IT equipment and services. The program was set to expire at the end of this Fiscal Year; however, Section 803 of the NDAA permanently retains this program.
Furthermore, the NDAA establishes a pilot program to develop and implement novel acquisition mechanisms related to emerging technologies. Section 833 requires the DoD to establish this pilot program within 180 days and award up to four contracts related to critical modernization efforts. The NDAA enumerates specific areas of focus including “offensive missile capabilities, space-based assets, personnel and quality of life improvement, and energy generation and storage.” If successful, these mechanisms will be formalized in a future NDAA.
Although the United States military may be lagging China in leveraging commercial technology, these adjustments are a marked improvement to the status quo. Further, these provisions lay the groundwork for larger acquisition reforms that will likely occur in coming years.
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I'm an associate professor at the United States Military Academy in the Department of Systems Engineering. I've taught numerous classes covering combat modeling, decision analysis, system design, vehicle dynamics, and engines. My research interests include combat simulation, model-based systems engineering, robotics, and engine knock.
Previously, I was a mechanical engineer at the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory in the Vehicles and Robotics Group. I hold a PhD in Mechanical Engineering from MIT, an MS in Engineering Sciences from Oxford, and a BS in Aeronautics from Caltech. I'm also a combat veteran and a major in the U.S. Army Reserves.
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5. Belt & Road encircles Latin America and the Caribbean

Conclusion:

The extent of the new US and G7 commitment to Latin America should become visible in the months ahead. At the very least, the competition should enable countries in the region to get better deals from the US, Europe, Japan and China.

Belt & Road encircles Latin America and the Caribbean
China’s relations with the region have evolved far beyond the point of being a mere incipient challenge to the existing order
asiatimes.com · by Scott Foster · January 8, 2022
My recent pair of articles based on an interview with Professor David Arase of the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, published in Asia Times under the title Belt & Road Phase 2 moves beyond infrastructure and ‘Greater Eurasia’: Belt & Road expands in Africa, detailed the evolution of China’s Belt & Road Initiative beyond large infrastructure projects and its expansion in Africa.
This article follows up with a review of the Chinese economic and strategic presence in Latin America and the Caribbean, which is attracting more and more attention from concerned US foreign policy specialists.
For one thing, as Arase points out, “The number and distribution of port investment projects is impressive and can make China’s Maritime Silk Road circumnavigate the globe, from the South Pacific to Latin America, through the Panama Canal and the Caribbean to Brazil, and then to Belt & Road ports in West Africa.”
Overall, what’s happening undermines the notion that Latin America is the United States’ “backyard.” Admiral Craig Faller, the head of US Southern Command, recently told NBC News: “Chinese influence is global, and it is everywhere in this hemisphere, and moving forward in alarming ways.”
Cuba joins Belt and Road
On December 25, 2021, Cuba and China signed a “cooperation plan” for the joint promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Call it a Christmas present for US President Joe Biden, Senator Marco Rubio and others in Washington, DC, who don’t like either country. Or a reminder that Taiwan is not the only offshore island of strategic interest.
Cuba joined Belt & Road in 2018 through a memorandum of understanding. The cooperation plan, in the words of China’s Global Times, clarifies the “key… projects for China and Cuba … including infrastructure, technology, culture, education, tourism, energy, communications and biotechnology, which are in line with Cuba’s development plans for the short and long term.”
Last October, Cuba became a member of Belt & Road’s Energy Partnership. Established in 2019 to promote cooperation in renewable energy, it now has 32 members in Asia-Pacific, Central and South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America.
Along with communism, the US trade embargo has held down the Cuban economy since 1960. As an instrument of regime change, the embargo has failed. As a means of forcing the Cuban people into poverty unless and until they kowtow to the US, it has so far succeeded.
But now China may give Cuba a chance for economic development without American participation.
China – Latin America-Caribbean Forum
On December 3, 2021, the third ministers’ meeting of the China-CELAC Forum was held in the form of a video conference.
Founded in 2011, CELAC (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y del Caribe or, in English, Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) is an association for dialogue among its 33 members and with other countries and regional groupings including the European Union, China, the Russian Federation, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Turkey, the Republic of Korea and Japan.
The ministers adopted the “China-CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas (2022-2024)”, a long and detailed document covering:
  • Political and Security Cooperation
  • Trade and Investment
  • Finance
  • Agriculture and Food
  • Science and Technology Innovation
  • Industry and Information Technology
  • Aviation and Aerospace
  • Energy and Resources
  • Tourism
  • Customs and Taxes
  • Infrastructures in the Area of Quality
  • High-Quality Infrastructure Cooperation
  • Public Health
  • Sustainable Development and Eradication of Poverty
  • Culture, Art and Sports
  • Higher Education, Think Tanks and Young People
  • Media and Communications
  • Local and Community Exchanges
  • Sustainable Development
  • International Affairs and Subregional and Interregional Cooperation
Did they forget anything?
Hot-button issues for strategic thinkers in Washington, DC, and Western European capitals include:
  • Continue holding the China-Latin America Superior Defense Forum. [The Fourth and most recent China-Latin America High-level Defense Forum was held in October 2018 at the International College of Defense Studies of the National Defense University of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Participants included the Bolivian defense minister, Costa Rican security minister, chief of Uruguay’s Defense General Staff and other defense and security officials from Latin America.]
  • Deepen cooperation among financial institutions, providing financial cooperation mechanisms for the development of trade and investment projects.
  • Strengthen exchanges between scientific and technological authorities, to increase synergies between the innovation, academic, and scientific sectors of the parties.
  • Strengthen exchanges and cooperation in the peaceful civilian use of nuclear energy and nuclear technology.
  • Strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation between governments, enterprises, and research institutions in digital infrastructure, telecommunications equipment, 5G, big data, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, internet of things, smart cities, internet+, universal telecommunication services, radio spectrum management and other areas of common interest, and explore the construction of joint laboratories.
  • Strengthen exchanges and cooperation in the field of aerospace, in matters of peaceful exploration of space, space science, satellite data sharing, satellite applications, construction of ground infrastructure, personnel training and education.
  • Work toward deeper cooperation in the fields of electricity, oil, gas, renewable energies, new energies, nuclear energy for civilian use, energy technology, electromobility and equipment, geological and energy mining resources.
  • With Chinese support conduct Chinese language education, to incorporate Chinese language into member states’ national education curricula and to open Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms.
Economic and strategic challenges
China’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean have evolved far beyond the point of being a mere incipient challenge to the existing order. In fact, China has already become a major investment partner for Latin America and the Caribbean, ranking with Europe and the United States.
According to the IMF Working Paper “Chinese Investment in Latin America: Sectoral Complementarity and the Impact of China’s Rebalancing”:
  • “Over the last decade China’s investment in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has increased substantially in volume and become more diversified.”
  • “Once heavily concentrated in fossil fuels, metals, agriculture and other natural resources, Chinese investment in LAC has increasingly tilted towards manufacturing and services industries such as transport, electricity, financial services and information and communication technology.”
  • “Asia – and particularly China – accounts for almost a third of LAC’s inward foreign direct investment stock, followed by Europe and the US, with shares of 30 and 20 percent, respectively.”
Brazil has received the most Chinese attention in the region, but investments and infrastructure project loans directed at Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico have also been significant.
Electric power has become a major target of Chinese investment, with more than a dozen acquisition deals across LAC with an average size of over US$1 billion. Negotiations to build a new nuclear power plant in Argentina are currently underway.
Sizeable investments in port and harbor facilities have also been made, with projects in Mexico and Central America, the Bahamas and Cuba, Panama, Peru, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile.
Geographically, these range from Ensenada, Mexico, about 100km from the US border, and the Bahamas, off the coast of Florida, to Punta Arenas at the southern tip of Chile.
Port and harbors, which could potentially be used by the Chinese navy, are of particular concern to the US government. In 2019, American and Japanese pressure put a stop to a project in El Salvador, but now it has reportedly been revived.
China has also built a radio astronomy and satellite tracking station in Argentina, about which a spokesman for the White House National Security Council stated: “The Patagonia ground station, agreed to in secret by a corrupt and financially vulnerable government a decade ago, is another example of opaque and predatory Chinese dealings that undermine the sovereignty of host nations.”
In telecommunications, to take another example, despite the US government’s attempts to shut it down, Huawei’s market in Latin America begins in Mexico and extends to Venezuela, Brazil, Chile and Argentina. A Huawei-built undersea cable connects Brazil and Africa.
Illustration: The Crypto Sight
In addition, China Telecom Americas (CTA) proclaims on its website that it plans “to develop IP backbone infrastructure that connects its existing global network to new PoPs [Points of Presence, or network interface points] in Fortaleza, Brazil; Buenos Aires, Argentina; Santiago, Chile; Lima, Peru; Panama City, Panama; and Mexico City, Mexico, over the next 3 years.”
This, it adds, will “enable us to offer new technologies like 5G, internet of things (IoT) and smart city technologies that will greatly benefit the region.”
CTA’s network also serves Sao Paulo, Brazil, Panama and the United States, and it connects to Europe and Africa.
As of December 2021, 19 out of 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean had signed up for the Belt and Road. In addition to Cuba, they include Jamaica and six other island states in the Caribbean; El Salvador, Costa Rica and Panama in Central America; and Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay in South America.
But some of China’s biggest Latin American investment partners – notably Brazil, Argentina and Mexico – have not formally signed up to the Belt and Road.
Nevertheless, China is now the largest trading partner of Brazil, Argentina and most of the rest of South America – the exceptions being Colombia, Ecuador and the Guianas.
America responds
In September, US President Joe Biden dispatched to Columbia, Ecuador and Panama a delegation consisting of: Daleep Singh, the deputy national security advisor for international economics; David Marchick, chief operating officer of the US International Development Finance Corporation; Ricardo Zúniga, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs; and officials from the US Agency for International Development, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Treasury and others.
Their mission: to hear directly from a range of Latin American stakeholders to better understand the infrastructure needs within these countries and around the region.
At least Joe Biden knows where Latin America is. Photo: WikimediaCommons
This visit, the White House said, “demonstrated President Biden’s commitment to strengthening our ties with Latin America and to narrowing the massive global gaps in physical, digital, and human infrastructure that has been widened by the Covid-19 pandemic. The President’s vision for B3W is to work with partners that share our democratic values to finance and develop infrastructure in a manner that is transparent, sustainable, adheres to high standards, and catalyzes the private sector where possible.”
B3W is short for the Build Back Better World Initiative announced by the G7 in July 2021to counter China’s Belt & Road Initiative.
The extent of the new US and G7 commitment to Latin America should become visible in the months ahead. At the very least, the competition should enable countries in the region to get better deals from the US, Europe, Japan and China.
Scott Foster is an analyst with LightStream Research, Tokyo. Follow him on Twitter: @ScottFo83517667
asiatimes.com · by Scott Foster · January 8, 2022


6. Air Force accused of pushing woman through elite commando training after she quit, spurring investigation



Air Force accused of pushing woman through elite commando training after she quit, spurring investigation
airforcetimes.com · by Rachel Cohen · January 8, 2022
Editor’s note: After this article’s publication, a source provided records documenting how the female special tactics officer candidate quit during solo land navigation training, but still was offered the opportunity to return.
Air Force Special Operations Command boss Lt. Gen. Jim Slife is calling for an inspector general investigation after claims surfaced that his organization is unfairly pushing an unqualified female airman through special tactics officer training.
If she completes the program, she would become the first woman to make it into the elite special tactics field — a major win for the Air Force.
On Wednesday, however, an anonymous member of the AFSOC community raised questions in an letter about whether the airman is receiving preferential treatment to stay in the pipeline, despite allegedly quitting multiple times.
A special tactics source provided the full anonymous letter to Air Force Times on Thursday, as well as course records documenting an instance in which the female candidate self-eliminated during a land navigation event. Elements of the letter were corroborated by a second special tactics source who witnessed a separate instance in which the candidate quit in pool training.
“If you were to ask the [special tactics] brothers in the community, ‘Are women ready to serve as SOF operators?’, the answer would be yes,” the letter reads. “The community is ready for a female operator; however, it has [to] be the right female that is capable of meeting the same standards asked of the men.”

Special tactics operators assigned to the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron, watch a CV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft assigned to the 8th Special Operations Squadron, take off from the Eglin Range Complex, Florida, Dec. 8, 2021. (Tech. Sgt. Carly Kavish/Air Force)
Special tactics is the Air Force’s name for a collection of commando jobs, including combat controllers, pararescue and special reconnaissance airmen, who are all led by special tactics officers. It’s a small cohort within the far larger AFSOC world, comprising roughly 1,000 operators, and is the most decorated community in the Air Force since the Vietnam War.
The situation highlights fear in the special tactics community that Slife and other AFSOC officials want to push a woman through the pipeline at all costs to score political points that could lead to prestigious assignments and promotions.
“It seems like there’s a mentality that we need to be on the cutting edge of this,” a special tactics instructor familiar with the situation told Air Force Times. “It’s like, we have someone that’s close and need to make sure it happens.”
AFSOC under a microscope
In the letter, the author claimed the female airman has tried to quit training three times — twice in water training sessions and once during a solo land navigation course. They also alleged she was given extra chances to prove herself, as well as preferential treatment not afforded to other trainees who quit, such as working directly under Slife at AFSOC headquarters.
“All accounts were ‘brushed under the rug’ since she was closely looked at, and her status monitored by Congress and AFSOC leadership (O-6 and above) on a weekly basis,” the letter alleged.
In a statement emailed to Air Force Times Thursday, Slife said that most of what the author asserted about the woman “is either factually incorrect or missing important context” that would change their perception. AFSOC declined to specifically address any of the points made in the letter, citing privacy concerns.
Slife reached out to the special tactics community in a letter Friday, assuring them that AFSOC has not lowered its standards to accommodate women. Air Force Times obtained the letter the same day.
RELATED

More than five years after the Jan. 1, 2016, deadline to let women into all-male special warfare fields, they are still a rarity in parts of Air Force Special Operations Command.
“Our standards in the operating forces are tied to mission requirements, and the only time we should change the standards is when the mission changes,” he wrote. “We do make changes in how we train airmen in order to improve the effectiveness of our training, but we do not lower our standards. … Period.”
The commander’s letter did not address the claim that the female trainee quit multiple times and was reinstated, or explain how new norms remain rigorous compared to older eras.
“It’s easy to conflate standards and norms, because over time, the norms we establish can come to be viewed as ‘the standard,’” Slife wrote. “Years ago, the norm was to assess candidates via [indoctrination.] We learned there was a better way to assess and select candidates for special tactics training, and we migrated away from Indoc.”
AFSOC now uses a model referred to as “assessment and selection,” or “A&S.”

Lt. Gen. Jim Slife, head of Air Force Special Operations Command, is calling for the service's inspector general to investigate claims that his organization is pushing an unqualified female airman through special tactics officer training. (Tech Sgt. Victor Caputo/Air Force)
Slife said he has asked Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall to direct the service’s inspector general to conduct an independent investigation into the allegations in the email.
“The results of that independent review will be provided to the secretary, and we can trust the secretary will take steps he believes are in the best interest of the department,” the three-star general added.
The anonymous missive went viral on social media, catching the eye of Rep. Dan Crenshaw (R-Texas), a former Navy SEAL. His office did not respond to a query on whether the congressman had discussed the situation with the Air Force.
“We cannot sacrifice training standards. Ever. Full stop. If this account is true, our military needs to address it now,” Crenshaw wrote on Twitter.
Training begins
The female airman began Phase II of special tactics officer training in 2018, a weeklong process to decide who gets to start years of formal special tactics courses.
The special tactics instructor who spoke to Air Force Times, but did not author the letter, backed the complaint in an interview.
The instructor was there for a water confidence session in which the female candidate allegedly gave up during her first attempt at Phase II. “Water con” is one of the more arduous parts of special tactics training, and it’s not uncommon for trainees to lose consciousness or suffer hypoxia during particularly intense sessions.
Completing certain events later in the training pipeline — such as underwater knot tying, drownproofing or buddy breathing using a snorkel — is a prerequisite to attending mandatory combat diver courses.
RELATED

A female airman will soon begin formal training to become an Air Force combat controller, the closest any enlisted woman has gotten so far to breaking that glass ceiling.
During a nighttime water con session, the female candidate got out of the pool and quit, saying she felt she was holding her team back, the instructor told Air Force Times.
“It was a huge deal,” he recalled. “All of the cadre got called into a room to discuss what happened.”
After talking with a senior instructor, she was allowed to continue training with the rest of the Phase II candidates.
At another point, candidates had to complete a timed 8-mile march with weighted rucksacks. The woman finished on time, the instructor said, but struggled on the “monster mash” portion at the end, which involved flipping a large tire as a team.
“She just physically couldn’t flip the tire,” the instructor said. “The team handed her a kettlebell and she just kind of walked behind the team for the rest of the iteration.”
However, there were positives: She had “super high” peer evaluations, meaning her fellow officer candidates thought highly of her during the weeklong Phase II, according to the instructor. But the letter and the instructor agreed the situation was certainly irregular.
“It is against societal norms for the ST community to keep a quitter through the entirety of Phase II … people that quit are not normally invited back,” the letter reads. “The hype of having a female present radiated through the community.”

Having just completed the Battlefield Airmen Training Group’s combat controller course of initial entry, candidayes perform flutter kicks in a creek Aug. 30, 2018, at Joint Base San Antonio-Medina Annex, Texas. (Airman 1st Class Dillon Parker/Air Force)
She eventually came back to Phase II the next year, but was unanimously passed over by instructors to enter the special tactics program once more, according to the letter. Then, the author said, leaders hand-picked her as a trainee candidate anyway.
Women “have the ability to provide SOF with access into places that men cannot go,” the author wrote. “This is certainly true, but at what cost?”
The female airman started formal special tactics training at Hurlburt Field in January 2020. That process takes two to three years to graduate.
The author alleged that during a course to prepare airmen to learn how to dive in combat, held at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, Texas, the female candidate gave up while in the pool and was sent back to Hurlburt.
“There she was allowed to attend … a more relaxed version of the pre-dive course, despite the course officially being run in Texas by the 350th [Special Warfare Training Squadron],” the letter claimed. “She completed the special pre-dive course at the [Special Tactics Training Squadron] in Hurlburt Field and then continued on with the pipeline.”
The candidate left for Combat Control School at Pope Army Airfield in North Carolina in spring 2021, according to the letter. CCS is known as the toughest and most technical part of the special tactics pipeline.
There, the author claimed, the airman pulled herself out of a solo land navigation event in which trainees are tasked with using a map and compass to find their way to multiple points in the woods. Documentation of this was also provided to Air Force Times. Course records showed the female officer self-eliminated but was marked as able to return.
“When a self-elimination occurs, the student is typically returned to their previous duty assignment and either reclassified by the Air Force or given the option to separate from the military,” the letter said. “She was presented very different circumstances.”

Combat Control School students assigned to the 352nd Battlefield Airman Training Squadron are ambushed at their drop-off point during a tactics field training exercise at Camp Mackall, N.C., Aug. 3, 2016. The FTX is a culmination of tactics learned in the first year of the combat control team pipeline, which entails weapons handling, team leader procedures, patrol base operations, troop leading and small unit tactics under fire in one mission. (U.S. Air Force photo/Senior Airman Ryan Conroy)
Preferential treatment or unique insight?
Back at Hurlburt, Col. Matthew Allen, then commander of the 24th Special Operations Wing, and Vice Commander Col. Allison Black, allegedly tried to convince the woman to stay in training and discussed her eventually getting to work in a highly selective special mission unit, according to the letter’s author.
“No one is offered positions at special mission units without going through the required application and assessment process,” AFSOC spokeswoman Capt. Savannah Stephens said.
The author said the candidate opted to leave the pipeline nonetheless, and later took a job at AFSOC headquarters. Stephens confirmed that the woman was assigned as a staff officer at Hurlburt.
According to the letter, the female airman designed new standards for combat controllers despite neither earning a special tactics beret nor holding other jobs within AFSOC. Stephens did not confirm the nature of the woman’s work.
“This action demoralizes the community and has created rifts amongst operators,” the author said. “Working directly for a three-star general officer in this way is atypical for any training candidate that quits the ST pipeline.”
The letter also mentions multiple reports filed throughout her time in AFSOC, including a deep-dive on the woman’s experience in training and an equal-opportunity complaint that she was coerced into quitting.
RELATED

The special operations community is giving itself a once-over.
“We do not have information on a EO complaint,” Stephens said. “If filed, these details would be protected under the Privacy Act.”
When asked whether the command held an investigation into how the AFSOC community treats women, as the letter said, Stephens responded that the organization constantly looks at ways to improve itself.
“Promoting a culture of professionalism, dignity and respect is of the utmost importance to the command,” she said.
The instructor who spoke to Air Force Times denied that cadre members were harsher on the woman than they are on male candidates.
Instructors do harass trainees to a certain extent to push them to their limits, but the public eye tempers what is said and done. Many AFSOC members outside of special tactics also work at Hurlburt, meaning visitors were constantly dropping in to watch training events, especially during Phase II.
“You didn’t want to be the guy who was attacking [her],” the instructor said. “People from the wing would come down and watch, especially the pool sessions. … You can’t be cussing, you’re definitely getting on [trainees], but you can’t go over the top because there’s just too many eyes.”
According to the letter, the woman’s status as a trainee was reinstated Monday. She will be allowed to pick up where she left off in the Special Tactics Training Squadron and start Combat Control School again in April, the author said.

A special tactics operator stationed at the 352nd Special Operations Wing at RAF Mildenhall uses a scope to look at a target while training for close air support during exercise Valiant Liberty at RAF Sculthorpe Training Range, U.K., March 9, 2020. (Staff Sgt. Rose Gudex/Air Force)
The author alleged that Maj. Spencer Reed, the school’s commander, told the 352nd Special Warfare Training Squadron that the woman “WILL graduate, regardless of if she meets standards or not.”
“[She] will gain a coveted ST beret and the title of the first female STO, despite the negative effects it has on the rest of the ST community,” the letter said.
When asked about that allegation Friday, a command public affairs spokesperson denied it.
“No, we can explicitly say that the ST training pipeline standards, that are tied directly to mission accomplishment, have not changed for a specific trainee, male or female,” the spokesperson said. “If an individual meets the standards and wants to be in a specific career field, he or she will have the opportunity based solely on skill and ability, not gender.”
The community itself is grappling with the letter’s fallout. An unnamed special operations squadron held an all-hands meeting Wednesday to “remind our airmen to maintain professionalism and operational security both in person and online,” Stephens told Air Force Times.
“There were multiple topics of discussion including teamwork, trust, OPSEC and professionalism,” she added. “There is no ‘gag order’ placed on any airmen.”
While AFSOC doesn’t know the author’s identity, Slife chastised the anonymous writer for singling out the female trainee through “abusive bullying and vindictive harassment.”
“I am simply left profoundly disappointed someone in our community would treat a fellow airman in this fashion,” Slife wrote. “To the author of the anonymous email and those who share the same perspective, please know it is you who haven’t met our standards.”
Rachel Cohen joined Air Force Times as senior reporter in March 2021. Her work has appeared in Air Force Magazine, Inside Defense, Inside Health Policy, the Frederick News-Post (Md.), the Washington Post, and others.
Kyle Rempfer is an editor and reporter whose investigations have covered combat operations, criminal cases, foreign military assistance and training accidents. Before entering journalism, Kyle served in U.S. Air Force Special Tactics and deployed in 2014 to Paktika Province, Afghanistan, and Baghdad, Iraq. Follow on Twitter @Kyle_Rempfer


7. Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee ("2+2")

The administration continues to demonstrate the central importance of alliances to US national security.
Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee ("2+2")
The text of the follow statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America and the Government of Japan on the occasion of the 2022 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee.
Begin Text:
Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Defense Austin, Minister for Foreign Affairs Hayashi, and Minister of Defense Kishi convened the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee virtually in Washington, DC and Tokyo, Japan on January 6 and 7, 2022, respectively.
The Ministers strongly reaffirmed their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region and recognized the U.S.-Japan Alliance’s critical role as the cornerstone of regional peace, security, and prosperity. They expressed their determination to constantly modernize the Alliance and strengthen joint capabilities by fully aligning strategies and prioritizing goals together, to address evolving security challenges in an ever more integrated manner, with partners and across all instruments of national power, domains, and the full spectrum of situations. They acknowledged the urgent challenges presented by geopolitical tensions, the COVID-19 pandemic, arbitrary and coercive economic policies, and the climate crisis, and renewed their commitment to the rules-based international order as well as fundamental values and principles. Witnessing a rapid and opaque military expansion that jeopardizes the regional strategic balance, the Ministers shared their concerns about the large-scale development and deployment of nuclear weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles, and advanced weapons systems such as hypersonics. They also discussed the trend of increasing malign activities in the cyber, space, and other domains, and attempts to change the status quo through coercive or predatory means short of armed conflict.
Japan reiterated its resolve to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities to bolster its national defense and contribute to regional peace and stability. The United States welcomed Japan’s resolve and expressed its determination to optimize its posture and capabilities in the Indo-Pacific as expressed in the recently completed Global Posture Review. The United States restated its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear. The two sides affirmed the critical importance of ensuring that U.S. extended deterrence remains credible and resilient.
The Ministers expressed their concerns that ongoing efforts by China to undermine the rules-based order present political, economic, military, and technological challenges to the region and the world. They resolved to work together to deter and, if necessary, respond to destabilizing activities in the region. They reaffirmed their support for unimpeded lawful commerce and respect for international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea. They shared their intention to strengthen information-sharing practices, including through efforts to collect and analyze data regarding coercive behavior that undermines regional peace and stability. The Ministers voiced concern about China’s activities in the East China Sea, which further undermine regional peace and stability. The United States reiterated that it stands in firm solidarity with Japan in opposing any unilateral action that seeks to change the status quo or to undermine Japan’s administration of the Senkaku Islands, and reaffirmed that Article V of the Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. The Ministers also reiterated their strong objections to China’s unlawful maritime claims, militarization and coercive activities in the South China Sea and recalled with emphasis that the July 2016 award of the Philippines-China arbitral tribunal, constituted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), is final and legally binding on the parties. The Ministers expressed serious and ongoing concerns about human rights issues in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Hong Kong. They committed to cooperate with all who share a commitment to respect for freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, international law, multilateralism, and a free and fair economic order. They underscored the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.
Reaffirming their commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the Ministers urged North Korea to abide by its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions, expressed strong concerns over its advancing nuclear and missile development activities, and confirmed the need for an immediate resolution of the abductions issue. They committed to deepen cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, which is critical for shared security, peace, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.
The Ministers renewed the September 2021 commitment, with fellow Quad members Australia and India, to promote the free, open, rules-based order. They supported their respective security and defense cooperation with Australia as evidenced by the signing of the landmark Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement, Japan’s first asset protection mission for an Australian vessel last November, and the AUKUS partnership. They welcomed greater engagement in the Indo-Pacific by European partners and allies, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, as well as through the EU and the NATO, and expressed support for their expanded multilateral exercises and deployments.
The Ministers reaffirmed their strong support for ASEAN’s unity and centrality and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. They noted the need to augment security cooperation and capacity-building initiatives with partners in Southeast Asia and Pacific Island countries. They condemned violence committed against the people of Myanmar and resolved to sustain efforts toward the immediate cessation of all violence and a swift return to the path of inclusive democracy.
In addressing the increasingly challenging regional security environment, the United States and Japan resolved to ensure alignment of Alliance visions and priorities through key forthcoming national security strategy documents. Through its strategic review process, Japan expressed its resolve to examine all options necessary for national defense including capabilities to counter missile threats. Japan and the United States underscored the need to closely coordinate throughout this process and welcomed our robust progress on evolving Alliance roles, missions, and capabilities, and on bilateral planning for contingencies.
The Ministers underscored the critical importance of strengthened cross-domain capabilities, particularly integrating the land, maritime, air, missile defense, space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, and other domains. Stressing the need to advance readiness, resiliency, and interoperability, they welcomed the deepening of cooperation, including asset protection missions and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, and realistic training and exercises, as well as flexible deterrent options and strategic messaging. They also committed to increase joint/shared use of U.S. and Japanese facilities, including efforts to strengthen Japan Self-Defense Forces’ posture in areas including its southwestern islands.
The Ministers welcomed the consensus on a new Host Nation Support arrangement and the signing of the Special Measures Agreement that will expand and reallocate Japan’s support for U.S. forces to enhance Alliance readiness and resiliency. The Ministers reaffirmed that the total amount of Japan’s Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) funding will be 164.1 billion yen to fund prioritized projects, subject to the completion of all necessary procedures for such budget request, and lauded the establishment of a new training capability category that will enable increased bilateral training and cooperation.
The Ministers committed to strengthen and reinforce information security practices and infrastructure, as demonstrated by the May 2021 Exchange of Notes on enhanced security measures for classified military information related to Advanced Weapon Systems. Sharing concerns over ever more complex and destructive threats stemming from malicious cyber actors, and the risks they pose to national security, the Ministers affirmed that strong network defenses, and joint responses to the full range of cyber threats, are an Alliance imperative. They urged states to abide by international law and implement consensus norms of responsible behavior, including that states should not knowingly allow their territories to be used for internationally wrongful acts.
The Ministers renewed their commitment to a secure, stable, and sustainable space domain and to establishing norms of responsible behavior. They concurred on deepening cooperation on space domain awareness, mission assurance, interoperability, and joint responses to serious threats to, from and within space, including by continuing discussion on proliferated low earth orbit satellite constellations.
The Ministers committed to pursue joint investments that accelerate innovation and ensure the Alliance maintains its technological edge in critical and emerging fields, including artificial intelligence, machine learning, directed energy, and quantum computing. The Ministers concurred to conduct a joint analysis focused on future cooperation in counter-hypersonic technology. They also welcomed the framework Exchange of Notes on Cooperative Research, Development, Production and Sustainment as well as Cooperation in Testing and Evaluation, based on which the two sides will advance and accelerate collaboration on emerging technologies. They stressed collaboration on streamlined procurement and resilient defense supply chains.
The Ministers underlined their commitment to continue construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab/Henokosaki area and in adjacent waters as the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. The United States welcomed Japan’s decision in its JFY 2022 draft budget to fund construction of the Mageshima facility consistent with the 2011 SCC document. The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of bilateral coordination for combating COVID-19, sharing timely information on incidents and accidents, as well as mitigating impacts on and supporting strong relationships with local communities. They confirmed the importance of accelerating bilateral work on force realignment efforts, including land returns and the consolidation of U.S. facilities in Okinawa, and the relocation of approximately 4,000 Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam beginning in 2024.
The Ministers reiterated the collective resolve of the Alliance and underscored their commitment to working in close partnership to preserve peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.


8. Shared Challenges, Strengthening Alliance at Center of U.S.-Japan Defense Meeting


Shared Challenges, Strengthening Alliance at Center of U.S.-Japan Defense Meeting
defense.gov · by C. TODD LOPEZ
Increased tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and the strengthening of military relations were the topics of discussion when U.S. and Japanese diplomatic and defense leaders met virtually for the 2022 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Meeting.
Participating in the discussion from the U.S. were Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, and Rahm Emanuel, ambassador to Japan. Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa and Defense Minister Kishi Nobuo represented Japan.
12:31
During opening remarks, Austin touched on the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
"We know how strong that alliance is today," Austin said. "It remains the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the region. We're rightly proud that it's built upon a foundation of not just common interests but also shared values."

Yama Sakura Planning
Soldiers with 1-1 Special Forces Group conduct planning and process targets with their Japan Ground Self-Defense Force counterparts during Yama Sakura 81 at Camp Itami Dec. 11, 2021.
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Photo By: Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class Donovan Zeanah
VIRIN: 211211-N-UC197-1020R
However, Austin also noted that some of the interests shared by the U.S. and Japan are at risk due to growing aggression in the Indo-Pacific.
"We're meeting against a backdrop of increased tensions and challenges to the free, stable and secure Indo-Pacific region that we both seek ... challenges posed by North Korea's nuclear ambitions and by the coercive and aggressive behavior of the People's Republic of China." Austin said.
To counter those threats, the U.S. and Japanese militaries are looking for ways to enhance readiness and strengthen integrated deterrence capabilities. Last month, he said, the U.S. and Japan concluded participation in the military exercise Yama Sakura 81. This latest iteration of the exercise was the largest it has been in 40 years.
The Yama Sakura annual training exercise focuses on the defense of Japan with bilateral planning, coordination and interoperability between the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force and U.S. military units.
Austin also noted that last month the U.S. and Japan completed the military exercise Resolute Dragon, a bilateral field training exercise held in Japan which focused on integrated deterrence and involved over 4,000 service members from the U.S. Marine Corps and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.


Dragon Task
A Japanese soldier with the 4th Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force assembles a communication system as part of a launching unit fire mission drill during military exercise Resolute Dragon in Camp Hachinohe, Japan, Dec. 10, 2021.
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Photo By: Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Jonathan Willcox
VIRIN: 211210-M-QU139-1004
"We truly remain grateful for the support that Japan continues to provide U.S. forces deployed there ... and for an extraordinary level of mutual cooperation against the full spectrum of military capabilities," he said. "We will — and we must — continue to work even more closely together."
Thursday's virtual meeting builds on discussions held last year in Tokyo, Austin said, and will help the two nations develop a framework for cooperation going forward.
"This framework will include, first, enhancing alliance capabilities across all domains; also evolving our roles and missions to reflect Japan's growing ability to contribute to regional peace and stability; and optimizing our alliance force posture to strengthen deterrence," he said.
defense.gov · by C. TODD LOPEZ

9. Over-the-Horizon Is Far Below Standard


Excepts:
Over-the-horizon has for years been employed by the United States in Somalia and is now the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan, too. In the Sahel, France is similarly planning to reduce its troop presence in the region as part of its dismantling of Operation Barkhane, aiming instead to mainly contribute with air power through the European Union’s Operation Takuba.
While targeted air support might help achieve tactical victories, over-the-horizon as a counterterrorism strategy is unlikely to yield any strategic victory in combating terrorism in the long term. As a strategy, over-the-horizon is not designed to win the global war against terrorism but to mitigate the terrorist threat in a short-term perspective. And even that will be troublesome in the context of Afghanistan and in the Sahel, just as it has been in Somalia.
If Biden’s objective is to prevent future Afghanistan-orchestrated terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland, he might be successful in delaying any such event. Occasionally, he may even be able to issue a press statement announcing the killing of an al Qaeda or Islamic State leader. But if his ambition is to eradicate those actors posing the terrorist threat, he will undoubtedly fail.


Over-the-Horizon Is Far Below Standard
Foreign Policy · by Tore Hamming, Colin P. Clarke · January 5, 2022
Why terrorists will welcome Biden’s counterterrorism strategy.
By Tore Hamming, a non-resident fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King’s College, and Colin P. Clarke, the director of research and policy at the Soufan Group.
An X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System drone is towed into the hangar bay of the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush on May 13, 2013 in the Atlantic Ocean. U.S. Navy via Getty Images
“We conduct effective counterterrorism missions against terrorist groups in multiple countries where we don’t have a permanent military presence. If necessary, we will do the same in Afghanistan,” said U.S. President Joe Biden on Aug. 16, commenting on the situation in Afghanistan after the Taliban’s rapid takeover of the country. “We’ve developed counterterrorism over-the-horizon capability that will allow us to keep our eyes firmly fixed on any direct threats to the United States in the region and to act quickly and decisively if needed.”
The person tasked with managing that over-the-horizon campaign, Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, leader of U.S. Central Command, is less optimistic. McKenzie has said that he does not believe the U.S. military is currently capable of confronting the terrorism threat that various militant groups in Afghanistan may pose.
History suggests McKenzie is right and that, over time, the U.S. military will grow ever less capable of handling the threat due to a lack of intelligence assets on the ground in Afghanistan. The U.S. military has a mixed record of targeted air attacks, even with troops on the ground, yet the current challenge in Afghanistan exceeds any previous experience due to the complex nature of the deteriorating security environment. Not only is Afghanistan governed by a group hostile to the United States; the country’s immediate neighbors do not offer a particularly welcoming platform from where the United States could realistically expect to conduct an effective counterterrorism campaign.
“We conduct effective counterterrorism missions against terrorist groups in multiple countries where we don’t have a permanent military presence. If necessary, we will do the same in Afghanistan,” said U.S. President Joe Biden on Aug. 16, commenting on the situation in Afghanistan after the Taliban’s rapid takeover of the country. “We’ve developed counterterrorism over-the-horizon capability that will allow us to keep our eyes firmly fixed on any direct threats to the United States in the region and to act quickly and decisively if needed.”
The person tasked with managing that over-the-horizon campaign, Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, leader of U.S. Central Command, is less optimistic. McKenzie has said that he does not believe the U.S. military is currently capable of confronting the terrorism threat that various militant groups in Afghanistan may pose.
History suggests McKenzie is right and that, over time, the U.S. military will grow ever less capable of handling the threat due to a lack of intelligence assets on the ground in Afghanistan. The U.S. military has a mixed record of targeted air attacks, even with troops on the ground, yet the current challenge in Afghanistan exceeds any previous experience due to the complex nature of the deteriorating security environment. Not only is Afghanistan governed by a group hostile to the United States; the country’s immediate neighbors do not offer a particularly welcoming platform from where the United States could realistically expect to conduct an effective counterterrorism campaign.
During a U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee hearing last October, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl testified that the U.S. intelligence community had assessed that both the Islamic State-Khorasan, or ISIS-K, and al Qaeda “have the intent to conduct external operations, including against the United States, but neither currently has the capability to do so. We could see ISIS-K generate that capability in somewhere between six or 12 months.” This underlines a more general perception that the Islamic State would use Afghanistan as a future hub to prepare and execute acts of terrorism in the West, a sentiment that is only aggravated by news that the group is now present in most Afghan provinces. Moreover, the Taliban have so far proved ineffectual as counterinsurgents, as their draconian approach has been counterproductive and helped the Islamic State-Khorasan recruit new members.
In mid-December, McKenzie commented that al Qaeda’s numbers in Afghanistan were up slightly since U.S. forces withdrew in August. McKenzie went on to say: “We’re probably at about 1 or 2 percent of the capabilities we once had to look into Afghanistan.” This means the threat from al Qaeda is metastasizing at the same time as the U.S. capability to combat transnational jihadi groups is reaching a nadir. The Islamic State-Khorasan, for its part, could very well seek to build up its external operations planning network in order to execute attacks outside Afghanistan. As the analyst Asfandyar Mir has suggested, “intra-jihadi competition incentivizes outbidding violence,” a worst-case scenario that could see al Qaeda and the Islamic State-Khorasan grow in strength over the coming months.
The premise of an over-the-horizon strategy is that technological acumen can adequately compensate for on-the-ground involvement. The idea is that remotely controlled airstrikes relying on signals intelligence (SIGINT) can target active operational cells and leadership figures and, in effect, decimate the organization’s top strategists and commanders.
Yet this premise rests on two key analytic flaws. One is the issue of intelligence collection to inform kinetic operations, and the other is how too often leadership decapitation is pursued as a strategy in and of itself rather than a tactic.
The catastrophic drone attack on Aug. 29, 2021, that U.S. forces believed targeted an active operational Khorasan cell but that turned out to be an U.S.-employed aid worker and his family is the most vivid proof of the challenge the U.S. military is confronted with now. While human sources do not prevent such tragedies entirely, they minimize the risk of flawed information if managed correctly. And with the errant strike and resulting civilian casualties garnering significant media attention, the U.S. Defense Department is likely to be more hesitant in ordering similar strikes in the future. The result will be a reticence to strike terrorist networks as they reconstitute, ceding the advantage to violent extremists as they seek to recruit, recuperate, and rearm.
The growing overreliance on SIGINT has been in process over the past two decades and is problematic because it limits intelligence gathering to specific types of communications. Terrorists who have eschewed communicating via cellphone and moved to a courier system will help insulate themselves from electronic eavesdropping. Additionally, relying solely on SIGINT makes it almost impossible to validate information, including distinguishing enemies’ psychological operations from authentic information. While SIGINT might be a useful method to gain access to selectors, it cannot replace the information provided by human sources in terms of information about social networks, routines, appearance, and authenticity.
The second flaw relates to the question of leadership decapitation as an effective counterterrorism strategy. That leadership decapitation hardly works is nothing new, and it may even produce unintended consequences. For two decades, the U.S. military, assisted by partners, has targeted leadership figures in militant Islamist networks in countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Somalia. While losing a leader or a key network hub may represent a setback for a group, history shows that those individuals over time are replaced. Proving this point, in Afghanistan since 2015, the United States has killed five consecutive Khorasan leaders with little impact on the group.
Jihadis’ internal communication demonstrates that the constant circling of drones does scare them, limits their movement as they concentrate more on operations security, and occasionally eliminates a senior figure. Yet the kind of pressure and impact it entails is manageable for them. The most effective and successful terrorist groups are learning organizations, and as such, they adapt accordingly.
Instead, the strategy runs the very real risk of helping militants to recruit and mobilize, using collateral damage to further their cause and rally the population to their side. And that is likely much more valuable to groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State than losing a senior commander now and then.
That is the scenario we are now looking into in the context of Afghanistan. While al Qaeda and the Islamic State will suffer from occasionally losing senior members of their organizations, they will generally profit from a much safer operational environment, enabling them not only to rebuild and strengthen transnational networks but also to plan operations.
We know from history that terrorists benefit from having a safe haven, and the operational environment in a Taliban-governed Afghanistan will undoubtedly provide groups such as al Qaeda with an unprecedented platform to restore the losses of the past 20 years. It is thus highly likely that the Afghanistan-Pakistan region will reestablish itself as the center of gravity for the global al Qaeda network both in terms of its leadership structure and its global operations.
Over-the-horizon has for years been employed by the United States in Somalia and is now the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan, too. In the Sahel, France is similarly planning to reduce its troop presence in the region as part of its dismantling of Operation Barkhane, aiming instead to mainly contribute with air power through the European Union’s Operation Takuba.
While targeted air support might help achieve tactical victories, over-the-horizon as a counterterrorism strategy is unlikely to yield any strategic victory in combating terrorism in the long term. As a strategy, over-the-horizon is not designed to win the global war against terrorism but to mitigate the terrorist threat in a short-term perspective. And even that will be troublesome in the context of Afghanistan and in the Sahel, just as it has been in Somalia.
If Biden’s objective is to prevent future Afghanistan-orchestrated terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland, he might be successful in delaying any such event. Occasionally, he may even be able to issue a press statement announcing the killing of an al Qaeda or Islamic State leader. But if his ambition is to eradicate those actors posing the terrorist threat, he will undoubtedly fail.
Tore Hamming is a non-resident fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King’s College.
Colin P. Clarke is the director of research and policy at the Soufan Group and a senior research fellow at the Soufan Center. Twitter: @ColinPClarke

Even if the Taliban wanted to serve as a safe haven, there’s no reason to think terrorists would want to take up the offer.
Foreign Policy · by Tore Hamming, Colin P. Clarke · January 5, 2022

10. America’s COVID Rules Are a Dumpster Fire



Excerpts:

Most experts said that, where possible, they’d still rather see tests being deployed to gauge isolation’s ideal length. Here, a positive result is probably more useful: It says someone definitely shouldn’t be exiting solitude prematurely. The negatives are trickier, though, and if our testing problems persist, it raises questions over whether shorter isolations are worth pursuing before we can fix them. Truncations won’t work if the tests we need to guide them don’t work. Barring good accuracy or availability, as seems to be the case for at least some people now, maybe it’s useful to pivot back to the default: the safety of 10 days, and, as Brown’s Ranney recommends, using symptoms as a guide—“don’t stop isolating if you’re still feeling sick.”

But that ship has sailed. The CDC has, once again, reminded us of its pandemic stance: that even bathed in collective threat, health and risk are personal pursuits; that porous public guidelines are, apparently, an invitation for people to patch the holes as they see fit. The whole point of leaving isolation should be to return to the world—to end a period of solitude. On the other side of infection, though, people still seem to be pretty much on their own.

America’s COVID Rules Are a Dumpster Fire
If you’re confused by the CDC’s new isolation guidelines, you’re not the only one.
The Atlantic · by Katherine J. Wu · January 6, 2022
On Tuesday, the CDC officially dropped the detailed, 1,800-word version of its new isolation guidance for people who have been infected by the coronavirus. So far, the best way I’ve got to sum it up is this: Hunker down for five days instead of the typical 10, then do what you want. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
Okay, sorry, that’s overly simplistic. Here’s the slightly longer version: You can leave isolation after five days, without a negative test, if you’re not severely sick; you’re not immunocompromised; you’re not in a correctional facility, in a homeless shelter, or on a cruise ship; and you feel that your symptoms are mostly gone, if you had any at all.
Sorry, sorry. There’s actually more. If you do leave isolation after day five, the CDC would like you to, please, until you’re past day 10, still wear a mask everywhere you go, and not eat inside of restaurants, and not mingle with high-risk people, and not travel. Okay, fine, you may travel if you must; just don’t forget that mask. You can test out of isolation, by the way, if you like. First, though, you have to find a test—make sure it’s a rapid antigen test—and take it “towards the end” of your five-day isolation. Just please, still wear that mask until day 10, though remember that negative results can’t rule out infection, and that antigen tests tend to perform best when they’re taken repeatedly over a couple days, and also, you don’t technically have to test at all.
If you’re overwhelmed, you’re not the only one. In the week and a half since the CDC said that it was planning to update its isolation guidance, I’ve heard almost exclusively harsh reactions from experts, who have criticized the recommendations as convoluted, wishy-washy, and even unscientific. The guidance reads like a nightmarish choose-your-own-adventure book, they’ve told me. It lacks crucial caveats, can’t seem to make up its mind on the role of testing, and asks people to do so, so much before they can get back to daily life. “It’s a hot mess,” one researcher told me. “Unnecessarily confusing,” someone else decreed. “Of all the communication stumbles since February 2020, this one ranks in the top three,” another said.
Such a mess has, unfortunately, become par for the course in the CDC’s handling of the pandemic. The agency is yet again punting the responsibility of infection control to the masses; allowing people’s fates to splinter by timing, by testing, by … whatever, is hardly good incentive for the public to read the instructions, much less follow them to a T. At a time when Omicron cases are already shattering records nationwide, the costs of muddled messaging are extraordinarily high. I asked Alison Buttenheim, who studies the intersection of vaccines and human behavior at the University of Pennsylvania, if she thought people would just give up on trying to parse the guidelines and simply improvise their own end-of-isolation rules. “I think people already have,” she said.
A pause for some charitableness here. Obviously, we’re in crisis right now, and the CDC has been tasked with an extraordinarily difficult job—debuting new guidance that’s simple, scientific, equitable, and also palatable, based on evidence that’s both limited and rapidly evolving by the day. People have been bandying about the idea of a shortened isolation period for many, many months; such a move could have a hefty social and economic impact right now, as infection rates surge and workplaces, hospitals, and schools across the nation empty out. Briefer isolations, if managed safely, could help keep the country afloat. The new guidelines are meant to do that, Jade Fulce, a public-affairs specialist at the CDC, told me. They “focus on the period when a person is most infectious,” and “facilitate individual and societal needs, return to work, and maintenance of critical infrastructure.” The recommendations are also accompanied by a “consumer-friendly summary,” she said, of how to interpret them.
The experts I spoke with for this story describe the instructions a bit differently—labyrinthine, perhaps even a little brazen and overly crude. As the isolation guidelines stand, they’re relying pretty heavily on a single number for everyone: five, the minimum number of days people should now be isolating, unless they are seriously sick or immunocompromised. It’s true that, on average, SARS-CoV-2 contagiousness does tend to peak fairly early on in infection, right around the time symptoms start (if they do at all), before dropping off precipitously. Past day five, most people don’t seem to carry enough virus to reliably spread it to others. But that’s a coarse population trend, and problematic to apply at the individual level, where there will be dizzying diversity, Katelyn Jetelina, an epidemiologist at the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, told me. One study estimates that roughly 30 percent of people may remain infectious after day five.
Some individuals, even ones who aren’t seriously sick, have anecdotally reported finding gobs of virus in their nose well into their second week post-symptom-start, which matches what Susan Butler-Wu, a clinical microbiologist at the University of Southern California, sees with diagnostic tests in her lab. A lot of the data the new recommendations are based on also predate Omicron, which could still upend much of our understanding of transmission dynamics. A five-day isolation might eclipse most people’s window of contagiousness, but certainly not all of them—which means people might be unknowingly reentering social settings while still awash in virus. “I’m very nervous about the idea of ‘five days, whatever, you do you,’” Butler-Wu told me. (Fulce, of the CDC, said that the mask-until-day-10 instruction was meant to address lingering risk. But that hinges on people actually masking, and masking effectively.
A safe approach to shortened isolations is still achievable, experts told me, but they’d like to see at least two huge amendments to the CDC’s menu of options: a vaccination clause, and a testing requirement, both of which could lower the chances that someone peaces out of isolation prematurely. I wrote about such an abbreviated-isolation model last month. Studies have repeatedly shown that the defensive oomph offered by COVID shots can substantially curb contagiousness; most post-vaccination infections are also asymptomatic or rather mild—cases that, generally speaking, appear to be less infectious overall. It makes sense to give people who are up to date on their shots more wiggle room to exit isolation earlier, especially if that egress is accompanied by “one or two negative test results,” Megan Ranney, an emergency physician at Brown University, told me.
Ironically, those caveats already exist for the agency’s guidance on quarantine: People who are up to date on their shots don’t have to cloister themselves following viral exposures; everyone else still does, though they can test out of quarantine on day five, as long as they mask for another five days after. (A reminder that isolation’s what people do once they know they’re infected; quarantine is what they do after an exposure.)
Last week, when the CDC first announced the shift in guidance in a press release, it didn’t mention testing out of isolation at all, prompting backlash. The longer version of the recommendations published this week somehow made things worse. Although the agency noted that people could test if they wanted to, and said they should act on the results—lengthening isolation after a day-five positive, for instance—the agency did not actively champion testing in the first place. The entire thing reads as deeply self-conflicted, experts told me. “It gives the impression that we don’t know what we’re talking about,” Taison Bell, a critical-care and infectious-disease physician at UVA Health in Virginia, told me. At worst, “I think it actually disincentivizes testing,” Jetelina said. “If you’re positive, you have to stay in isolation longer.”
The CDC did not answer my questions about why vaccination and testing hadn’t been more tightly woven into its new isolation guidelines. But several experts told me they suspected that certain logistical hurdles might have factored in. A vaccination clause, for example, would have added yet more complexity. Not all vaccinated people will reach the same level of protection; anti-infection defenses also naturally ebb over time, while new variants throw certain dynamics into flux. And a testing requirement would be impossible to closely adhere to on large scales, because testing in the United States right now is full-on chaosPeople can’t access tests; people can’t afford tests. Some federal aid is coming, but not soon enough, or in sufficient quantity—not to break potentially hundreds of thousands of people out of isolation each day. Even if the CDC were to simply recommend isolation to those who are able to manage it, there could be equity issues, as only the privileged capitalize on the perks of testing, and others are left to navigate transmission in the dark.
There’s a technological hurdle too. No test result can offer a perfect proxy for contagiousness. PCR laboratory tests can take days to return results, and are so sensitive that they sometimes stay positive past the point at which people stop spewing infectious virus. Rapid, at-home antigen tests, though faster, miss the virus when it’s present only at lower levels, and are easy to mishandle—they risk releasing someone who’s still contagious. The weirdness of Omicron might be muddying those waters further still. Early reports suggest that at least some nose-swab antigen tests are failing to turn positive early on in infection, even while people are symptomatic, positive by PCR, and blazingly contagious—and researchers aren’t yet sure if it’s because of Omicron’s anatomical preferences, or a quirk in how test and variant interact. Either way, if the products can’t catch the virus on its upswing, it’s possible they’ll also struggle on its way back down. The pattern makes Alex McAdam, a pathologist at Boston Children’s Hospital, worried that antigen negatives won’t gift us the stellar “Get out of isolation free” card that many hope they will.
Most experts said that, where possible, they’d still rather see tests being deployed to gauge isolation’s ideal length. Here, a positive result is probably more useful: It says someone definitely shouldn’t be exiting solitude prematurely. The negatives are trickier, though, and if our testing problems persist, it raises questions over whether shorter isolations are worth pursuing before we can fix them. Truncations won’t work if the tests we need to guide them don’t work. Barring good accuracy or availability, as seems to be the case for at least some people now, maybe it’s useful to pivot back to the default: the safety of 10 days, and, as Brown’s Ranney recommends, using symptoms as a guide—“don’t stop isolating if you’re still feeling sick.”
But that ship has sailed. The CDC has, once again, reminded us of its pandemic stance: that even bathed in collective threat, health and risk are personal pursuits; that porous public guidelines are, apparently, an invitation for people to patch the holes as they see fit. The whole point of leaving isolation should be to return to the world—to end a period of solitude. On the other side of infection, though, people still seem to be pretty much on their own.
The Atlantic · by Katherine J. Wu · January 6, 2022

11. The Biggest Threat to America Now Isn’t a Coup

For your reference.

The Atlantic Daily: The Biggest Threat to America Now Isn’t a Coup
The Atlantic · by Caroline Mimbs Nyce · January 7, 2022
One year ago, the siege began. Politicians and their staffers ran for cover as the Capitol effectively became a war zone.
When the haze cleared, we vowed not to forget. But the attack on American democracy did not end that day. A year later, it has only deepened: The Republican Party, supported by elites who’ve turned against democracy, has put the Big Lie and specious claims of voter fraud at the center of its platform. Now fewer than half of its voters accept the 2020 election results.
At The Atlantic, which has covered the crisis from the start, we devoted our latest issue, plus a slate of stories published today, to the continuing fallout.
Further reading: In his newsletter, David French offers a thought experiment: What if Vice President Mike Pence had said yes on January 6?
(Jon Challicom / Getty)
The news in three sentences:
(1) President Joe Biden condemned the January 6 attack in a speech. (2) Global coronavirus cases hit a record-setting 9.5 million last week, according to the World Health Organization. (3) Dozens were killed amid unrest in Kazakhstan.
Today’s Atlantic-approved activity:
Give money to charity, but don’t tell anyone about it.
A break from the news:
Not everyone catches baby fever. That’s okay.
The Atlantic · by Caroline Mimbs Nyce · January 7, 2022

12. COVID School Policies Made Me Sour on the Democratic Party


Excerpts:

Many liberals and institutional leaders thought that no one could fault them for being too cautious, especially when it came to children. But I can, and I do. The University of Oxford medical ethicist Euzebiusz Jamrozik said recently on a podcast that ethical public-health responses must rely on a few key principles. One of those is “proportionality,” meaning that the intervention must be proportionate to the risk. A Bloomberg article noted in March that children in the U.S. were about 10 times as likely to be killed in a car crash as by COVID-19. Closing school for more than a year was disproportionate the same way that forbidding parents to drive would have been.

Jamrozik also said that reciprocity and equity and fairness are supposed to guide public-health strategies. Policy makers must identify not just the benefits and harms of particular strategies, but also the distribution of those benefits and harms.

None of this has shaken my support for the Democratic agenda, which I still endorse wholesale. What I’ve lost is my trust that the party is truly motivated to act in the interests of those they claim to serve. How can I get excited about universal pre-K proposals, for example, when K–12 is in shambles?

In the first week of January, the Cleveland public-school system, where my youngest is now enrolled, returned to remote learning due to the spread of the Omicron variant. This time I decided I wouldn’t even bother logging on. Domestic responsibilities spiral pretty quickly when you have kids at home. And if I had any energy left over from cooking and cleaning, I wanted to devote it to paid work. That felt like the right decision since I can’t rely on unemployment this year and my business expenses have continued to pile up.

I keep hoping that Democrats will wake up to the full range of health and social needs Americans are trying to balance right now, but that doesn’t seem likely. A friend now refers to herself as “politically homeless,” and more and more that’s how I feel as well.


COVID School Policies Made Me Sour on the Democratic Party
The Atlantic · by Angie Schmitt · January 7, 2022
Until recently, I was a loyal, left-leaning Democrat, and I had been my entire adult life. I was the kind of partisan who registered voters before midterm elections and went to protests. I hated Donald Trump so much that I struggled to be civil to relatives on the other side of the aisle. But because of what my family has gone through during the pandemic, I can’t muster the same enthusiasm. I feel adrift from my tribe and, to a certain degree, disgusted with both parties.
I can’t imagine that I would have arrived here—not a Republican, but questioning my place in the Democratic Party—had my son not been enrolled in public kindergarten in 2020.
Late that summer, the Cleveland school system announced that it would not open for in-person learning the first 9 weeks of the semester. I was distraught. My family relies on my income, and I knew that I would not be able to work full-time with my then-5-year-old son and then-3-year-old daughter at home.
Still, I was accepting of short-term school closures. My faith in the system deteriorated only as the weeks and months of remote-learning dragged on long past the initial timeline, and my son began refusing to log on for lessons. I couldn’t blame him. Despite his wonderful teacher’s best efforts, online kindergarten is about as ridiculous as it sounds, in my experience. I remember logging on to a “gym” class where my son was the only student present. The teacher, I could tell, felt embarrassed. We both knew how absurd the situation was.
Children who had been present every day the year before in preschool, whose parents I had seen drop them off every morning, just vanished. The daily gantlet of passwords and programs was a challenge for even me and my husband, both professionals who work on computers all day. About 30 percent of Cleveland families didn’t even have internet in their home prior to the pandemic.
I kept hoping that someone in our all-Democratic political leadership would take a stand on behalf of Cleveland’s 37,000 public-school children or seem to care about what was happening. Weren’t Democrats supposed to stick up for low-income kids? Instead, our veteran Democratic mayor avoided remarking on the crisis facing the city’s public-school families. Our all-Democratic city council was similarly disengaged. The same thing was happening in other blue cities and blue states across the country, as the needs of children were simply swept aside. Cleveland went so far as to close playgrounds for an entire year. That felt almost mean-spirited, given the research suggesting the negligible risk of outdoor transmission—an additional slap in the face.
Things got worse for us in December 2020, when my whole family contracted COVID-19. The coronavirus was no big deal for my 3- and 5-year-olds, but I was left with lingering long-COVID symptoms, which made the daily remote-schooling nightmare even more grueling. I say this not to hold myself up for pity. I understand that other people had a far worse 2020. I’m just trying to explain why my worldview has shifted and why I’m not the same person I was.
By the spring semester, the data showed quite clearly that schools were not big coronavirus spreaders and that, conversely, the costs of closures to children, both academically and emotionally, were very high. The American Academy of Pediatrics first urged a return to school in June 2020. In February 2021, when The New York Times surveyed 175 pediatric-disease experts, 86 percent recommended in-person school even if no one had been vaccinated.
But when the Cleveland schools finally reopened, in March 2021—under pressure from Republican Governor Mike DeWine—they chose a hybrid model that meant my son could enter the building only two days a week.
My husband and I had had enough: With about two months left in the academic year, we found a charter school that was open for full-time in-person instruction. It was difficult to give up on our public school. We were invested. But our trust was broken.
Compounding my fury was a complete lack of sympathy or outright hostility from my own “team.” Throughout the pandemic, Democrats have been eager to style themselves as the ones that “take the virus seriously,” which is shorthand, at least in the bluest states and cities, for endorsing the most extreme interventions. By questioning the wisdom of school closures—and taking our child out of public school—I found myself going against the party line. And when I tried to speak out on social media, I was shouted down and abused, accused of being a Trumper who didn’t care if teachers died. On Twitter, mothers who had been enlisted as unpaid essential workers were mocked, often in highly misogynistic terms. I saw multiple versions of “they’re just mad they’re missing yoga and brunch.”
Twitter is a cesspool full of unreasonable people. But the kind of moralizing and self-righteousness that I saw there came to characterize lefty COVID discourse to a harmful degree. As reported in this magazine, the parents in deep-blue Somerville, Massachusetts, who advocated for faster school reopening last spring were derided as “fucking white parents” in a virtual public meeting. The interests of children and the health of public education were both treated as minor concerns, if these subjects were broached at all.
Obviously, Republicans have been guilty of politicizing the pandemic with horrible consequences, fomenting mistrust in vaccines that will result in untold numbers of unnecessary deaths. I’m not excusing that.
But I’ve been disappointed by how often the Democratic response has exacerbated that mistrust by, for example, exaggerating the risks of COVID-19 to children. A low point for me was when Virginia Democratic gubernatorial candidate Terry McAuliffe inflated child COVID-hospitalization numbers on the campaign trail. It was almost Trumplike. (If I lived in Virginia, I admit I probably would have had to sit out the recent gubernatorial election, in which the Republican candidate beat McAuliffe.)
Less extreme, but perhaps just as harmful to social cohesion, was the widespread refusal among rank-and-file Democrats to seriously wrestle with the costs of pandemic-mitigation efforts. Beyond the infuriating nonresponse to school closures—“kids are resilient”—the discussion regarding masks has also been oblivious at times. Research shows that good masks worn correctly can slow the spread of the coronavirus, but it’s silly to suggest that they have no drawbacks. They are uncomfortable and a barrier to communication—and that’s just for adults.
Because masks took on symbolic importance, however, simply attempting to add nuance to the debate—cloth masks versus KN95s, masking adults versus masking toddlers—was treated like vaccine skepticism: beyond the pale.
Generally speaking, the left-leaning rhetorical response to the pandemic seems out of line with stated Democratic values. Even when my kids returned to school, for example, I had no option for paid sick leave to care for them when they got sick. Why did I hear so little about that immense social problem and so much shaming of the women who dared to complain about having their kids stuck at home? All in all, the party that supposedly focused on “systemic” issues was obsessed with demanding personal sacrifice. And the burden fell most heavily on mothers of young children, essential workers, and low-income children. (Conversely, they fell lightly on one very vocal, core Democratic constituency: college-educated office workers.)
Many liberals and institutional leaders thought that no one could fault them for being too cautious, especially when it came to children. But I can, and I do. The University of Oxford medical ethicist Euzebiusz Jamrozik said recently on a podcast that ethical public-health responses must rely on a few key principles. One of those is “proportionality,” meaning that the intervention must be proportionate to the risk. A Bloomberg article noted in March that children in the U.S. were about 10 times as likely to be killed in a car crash as by COVID-19. Closing school for more than a year was disproportionate the same way that forbidding parents to drive would have been.
Jamrozik also said that reciprocity and equity and fairness are supposed to guide public-health strategies. Policy makers must identify not just the benefits and harms of particular strategies, but also the distribution of those benefits and harms.
None of this has shaken my support for the Democratic agenda, which I still endorse wholesale. What I’ve lost is my trust that the party is truly motivated to act in the interests of those they claim to serve. How can I get excited about universal pre-K proposals, for example, when K–12 is in shambles?
In the first week of January, the Cleveland public-school system, where my youngest is now enrolled, returned to remote learning due to the spread of the Omicron variant. This time I decided I wouldn’t even bother logging on. Domestic responsibilities spiral pretty quickly when you have kids at home. And if I had any energy left over from cooking and cleaning, I wanted to devote it to paid work. That felt like the right decision since I can’t rely on unemployment this year and my business expenses have continued to pile up.
I keep hoping that Democrats will wake up to the full range of health and social needs Americans are trying to balance right now, but that doesn’t seem likely. A friend now refers to herself as “politically homeless,” and more and more that’s how I feel as well.
The Atlantic · by Angie Schmitt · January 7, 2022



13. Terror Threat in Asian Countries Declined in 2021, Singapore Think-Tank Reports

A positive effect of COVID?

Excerpts:
Elsewhere, the Armed Forces of the Philippines drew praise for retaking terror bases in the southern region of Mindanao.
Nationwide, “the number of successful terrorist incidents dropped from 134 in 2019, to 59 incidents in 2020 and 17 in 2021, the analysts said, defining a successful incident as an attack that injured or killed others.
The analysis noted that government-imposed COVID-19 lockdowns affected terror operations.
“Given they significantly limited the movements of the general population, as well as those of terrorists, this has rendered terrorist logistics vulnerable to being detected more readily,” it said.
Terror Threat in Asian Countries Declined in 2021, Singapore Think-Tank Reports
Terrorist threats in Southeast and South Asian countries declined in 2021, a Singapore think-tank said in its annual threat assessment published this week, noting that COVID-19 movement restrictions had “flattened the curve of terrorism.”
There were fewer terror-related incidents in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Bangladesh as governments battled the pandemic, according to the Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis report published by researchers at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
In Thailand in 2021, meanwhile, violent incidents connected to an insurgency in the far south were similar to those in the previous year, the researchers found.
“Ultimately, the 2021 survey underscored the continuing imperative for states to address the longer-term underlying grievances that fuel violent extremism,” the analysis said.
In Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest country, the number of attacks and plots by violent extremist Islamic militant groups dipped during the past two years compared with before the outbreak of COVID-19, according to the report.
Jamaah Ansharut Daulah’s (JAD) relatively stagnant activities in 2020-2021 and the decline of Eastern Indonesia Mujahideen’s (MIT) terror activities in 2021, it said, “can be partly attributed to movement restrictions and higher costs associated with domestic travels due to the pandemic.”
In 2021, JAD was involved in at least nine incidents, including five using explosive materials. Those included two suicide bomb attacks and a suicide bomb plot, compared with 11 incidents the previous year.
Police were the most common targets of terrorist incidents in Indonesia, the analysis found. Others targeted by Indonesian extremists last year were “civilians, including Christians, as well as both Indonesian and mainland Chinese,” the report said.
On Tuesday, Indonesian security forces announced they had killed Ahmad Gazali, a suspected MIT member, in the mountains of Central Sulawesi province, cutting MIT’s membership down to only three.
Both MIT and JAD are pro-Islamic State (IS) extremist groups.
Malaysia, Philippines
The analysis specifically linked the COVID-19 pandemic to the drop in terror activities in Malaysia last year.
“The pandemic-driven movement restrictions that hampered inter-state and international movements also ‘flattened the curve of terrorism’ in Malaysia,” it said.
Authorities made no terror-related arrests in Peninsular Malaysia last year – but made about 15 in Sabah between May and September. There were seven arrests in 2020; 72 in 2019; 85 in 2018; 106 in 2017 and 119 in 2016, the analysis found.
Still, the analysis expressed concern that terror threats had moved online.
“The government-imposed lockdowns have forced people to spend more time online, raising the likelihood of vulnerable individuals being exposed to radical ideologies in the cyber domain. Around the region, groups such as IS have increased their recruitment and radicalization efforts through social media during the pandemic,” it said.
Elsewhere, the Armed Forces of the Philippines drew praise for retaking terror bases in the southern region of Mindanao.
Nationwide, “the number of successful terrorist incidents dropped from 134 in 2019, to 59 incidents in 2020 and 17 in 2021, the analysts said, defining a successful incident as an attack that injured or killed others.
The analysis noted that government-imposed COVID-19 lockdowns affected terror operations.
“Given they significantly limited the movements of the general population, as well as those of terrorists, this has rendered terrorist logistics vulnerable to being detected more readily,” it said.
Bangladesh
In Bangladesh in 2021, “there were two failed attacks compared to four successful ones in 2020,” the report said, adding that authorities had arrested about 130 terrorist suspects nationwide.
Neo-JMB, a pro-Islamic State breakaway faction of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, “appeared to target law enforcement agencies, churches, noted Hindu and Buddhist personalities and workers of non-governmental organizations,” the analysis said.
It also said that Neo-JMB sought to “‘train all its members in the production of IEDs,’ as well as ‘chloroform bombs to target buses, classrooms and public places in its bid to kill silently.’”
Thailand
In Thailand’s insurgency-hit southern border region, 423 violent incidents were recorded, leaving 104 dead and 169 injured through November 2021, according to the report. The scale was similar to 2020 when 335 violent incidents occurred, leaving 116 dead and 161 injured.
In the Muslim-majority Deep South, as the region is known, more than 7,000 people have been killed since separatist groups resumed an insurgency against the Buddhist-majority 18 years ago.
The Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the Deep South’s largest separatist group, scaled down its militant operations on humanitarian grounds in April 2020 because of the pandemic. The analysis said this led to a “significant decline in violence.”
“In 2021, the BRN maintained low-level operations, so as not to aggravate the already perilous situation for southern residents,” it said.
After avoiding peace talks with government officials, in early 2020, BRN rejoined the efforts brokered by Malaysia. A source from the government team said the two sides met virtually in 2021 and the BRN submitted a ceasefire proposal in May, according to the analysis.
“BRN proposed the establishment of an autonomous ‘Patani Darussalam,’ in which the Patani people had the right to design their own education and economic systems. In addition, their Malay language and identity were to be officially recognized and preserved,” it said.

14.QAnon networks are evading Twitter's crackdown on disinformation to pump out pro-Capitol-riot propaganda, study says  

Excerpts:
Dilley followed the rise of 4 networks promoting QAnon propaganda, operating from August 2020 to the present. Some of the constituent accounts were removed by Twitter in that timeframe, but many remained operative, Dilley told Insider.
The most prominent network had 1,500 accounts, producing messages clustering around several core themes.
They include false claims about the January 6 insurrection, conspiracy theories that the 2020 election was stolen from Donald Trump, and a selection of far-right talking points. Many were closely tied with networks of white nationalist accounts.
Other smaller ones clustered around wellness, or spirituality themes, highlighting how the political aspect of the movement overlaps with people hostile to mainstream scientific narratives.
Dilley listed techniques she said were commonly used to evade Twitter bans:
  • Replacing banned accounts with new ones under near-identical names
  • Communicating QAnon messages via images, which are much harder to track and regulate.
  • Using hashtags and phrases with small textual variations to evade automated bans.

QAnon networks are evading Twitter's crackdown on disinformation to pump out pro-Capitol-riot propaganda, study says
Business Insider · by Tom Porter

A person wears a QAnon sweatshirt during a pro-Trump rally on October 3, 2020 in the borough of Staten Island in New York City.Stephanie Keith/Getty Images
  • QAnon accounts are evading Twitter's attempts to ban them, per research seen by Insider.
  • Academic Laura Dilley described strategies that seem to skirt Twitter's enforcement efforts.
  • The movement continues to spread conspiracy theories and glorify the Capitol riot.
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Networks of QAnon accounts are using unusual tactics to evade Twitter's ban on disinformation and flood the platform with conspiracy theories, a study shared with Insider found.
Twitter has sought to prevent the QAnon movement from operating on its platform, purging more than 70,000 accounts in the wake of the Capitol riot on January 6, 2021.
But, the study showed, large networks of supporters and influencers are continuing to operate there.
Laura Dilley, an associate professor in the Department of Communicative Sciences and Disorders at Michigan State University, tracked their workings and shared the findings with Insider.
Hashtag swapping, pop-up accounts and hard-to-track images
Dilley followed the rise of 4 networks promoting QAnon propaganda, operating from August 2020 to the present. Some of the constituent accounts were removed by Twitter in that timeframe, but many remained operative, Dilley told Insider.
The most prominent network had 1,500 accounts, producing messages clustering around several core themes.
They include false claims about the January 6 insurrection, conspiracy theories that the 2020 election was stolen from Donald Trump, and a selection of far-right talking points. Many were closely tied with networks of white nationalist accounts.
Other smaller ones clustered around wellness, or spirituality themes, highlighting how the political aspect of the movement overlaps with people hostile to mainstream scientific narratives.
Dilley listed techniques she said were commonly used to evade Twitter bans:
  • Replacing banned accounts with new ones under near-identical names
  • Communicating QAnon messages via images, which are much harder to track and regulate.
  • Using hashtags and phrases with small textual variations to evade automated bans.
"The networks were clearly fairly dynamic in their ability to change hashtags on the fly, for example WWG1WGA [a popular QAnon slogan meaning "Where we go one we go all"] is changed to WWGiWGA, which though a slight variant won't be picked up in automated searches for banned hashtags," said Dilley.
The QAnon movement emerged in 2017, coalescing around the conspiracy theory that a child-abuse ring was being run by elites linked to the Democratic Party. Adherents revere Donald Trump as a saviour figure.
After the January 6 insurrection there was a sweeping crackdown on the movement by the platform. QAnon adherents were on the front line at the Capitol attack, and the and the movement had vigorously embraced the false election-fraud claims that inspired the riot.
Many were able to maintain a presence on the platform despite the crackdown, and rebuild their networks rapidly, partly using backup accounts.
The users were able to make new profiles with "similar or identical profile pictures, often with Twitter handles that were variants of suspended account handle names," Dilley wrote.
"Digital astroturfing"
Dilley found that the networks often posted the same messages at the same time. Others were able to rapidly gain massive followings after similarly-named accounts were banned. This, to her, was a sign of centralized, coordinated QAnon promotion, either by humans or also by so-called bots, automated accounts operating in a coordinated cluster rather than being run by real people.
The use of automated accounts to spread disinformation is banned by the Twitter.
Dilley called this coordinated activity "digital astroturfing", an allusion to covert "astroturfing" political campaigns that are designed to create an illusion of grassroots activism.
"This is the first research to definitively show evidence of digital astroturfing in the online promotion of QAnon on Twitter. Further, the research establishes that QAnon promotional activity on Twitter was closely linked with and indeed promoted by a wide variety of networks that span white nationalism," Dilley wrote in the study.
A source at Twitter disputed that large-scale automation was being allowed on the platform. The source requested anonymity, telling Insider that commenting by name on such issues often provokes death threats.
The source said the company's efforts to suppress QAnon were made complex by it not being a single organization, like a terror group, but a set of overlapping conspiracy theories.
Dilley's study builds on a 2020 Insider report that found pro-Trump operative Jason Sullivan, who billed himself "The Wizard of Twitter", operating an app that allowed users to give over their accounts to post coordinated messages.
The app evaded Twitter's bot ban because the accounts were mostly behaving in authentic ways, but could behave with the coordination of bots for brief periods to push a desired message.
Dilley suggested that the networks in her study could be using something similar to work together.
She said that straight after starting up new accounts, QAnon influencers were able to rapidly gain large followings, further demonstrating top-down campaign coordination and possible automation.
The Twitter source said that they had detected no evidence of large-scale automation in the networks. Banned accounts could quickly gain large followings via backup accounts by coordinating on other platforms such as Telegram, said the source.
Help from Russia?
Parts of the networks, Dilley said, appear to be getting significant support from Russia.
The accounts, some of which had tens of thousands of followers, were designed to appear as though they belonged to Trump-supporting Americans.
They were highly active across all of the networks identified in the study, promoting QAnon propaganda in English. However the accounts would occasionally start tweeting in Russian, or use its Cyrillic script.
One account unmasked itself as Russian seemingly by accident, Dilley said. The account posted the Russian word for fire, where it appeared to mean to have posted a fire emoji instead, said Dilley. The account resumed communicating in English, and the message was eventually deleted.
According to reports, Russian intelligence has sought to boost the QAnon movement. It may even have helped to seed the "pizzagate" conspiracy theory, a key precursor of the movement, Rolling Stone reported in 2017.
The Twitter source pushed back against suggestions that Russian security agencies were involved. They said that QAnon was a highly global movement, and that its claims are circulated and promoted by users in various countries.
They said that the accounts identified as possible Russian actors by Dilley were more likely ordinary Russians engaging with QAnon themes.
Dilley said that the study exposes serious failings by Twitter to halt disinformation on its platform in the wake of the Jan 6 riot.
"Unless Twitter gets serious in its commitment to keeping permanently banned individuals off of its platform, the company will continue to be morally culpable for enabling activities of spreading disinformation, fomenting civil unrest, and undermining democracy," she said.
Twitter did not provide a response on the record.
Business Insider · by Tom Porter


15.  Keeping the Generals Out of the Afghanistan Investigation Is a Great Idea

A provocative thought piece from Colonel Anderson.

Excerpts:

Who then should make up the congressionally mandated Afghanistan investigation commission? There are many retired midgrade officers who served in Afghanistan and have gone on to succeed in business and in the academic world over the past few decades; some are now in Congress. The same holds true of any number of enlisted personnel who have achieved advanced degrees.
People who saw the war up close should make up the commission. There should also be retired State Department and CIA operatives who knew what was really going on while the generals acted as combat tourists, occasionally visiting the troops and handing out challenge coins.
Without the perspective of those who did the real fighting, we will learn nothing.

Keeping the Generals Out of the Afghanistan Investigation Is a Great Idea
military.com · by 6 Jan 2022 Military.com | By Gary Anderson · January 6, 2022
Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps colonel who served as a special adviser to the deputy secretary of defense and as a civilian adviser in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to opinions@military.com for consideration.
Our general officers should not be allowed to investigate themselves, and any conclusions about the rapid collapse of the Afghan government and its military forces inevitably will be tied to the actions of those officers who for two decades shaped U.S. strategy.
The recently passed annual defense policy bill includes a requirement for a new study of the failures in Afghanistan. In the past, it was pro forma to appoint retired flag rank officers, usually four-stars, to lead such an investigation. The current legislation precludes the generals and admirals who were part of the problem, as well as members of Congress serving since 2001, ostensibly a roundup of all of those who were responsible for the decisions made in Afghanistan.
That is a good call, but giving the Investigation three years is not; the war will be ancient history by then.
Several recent opinion polls suggest that the traditionally high regard that Americans have held for our military is eroding. But a closer look shows that the public still respects our troops. It's senior military leadership that is losing the trust of the public. Americans appear to be far ahead of Congress, which let the generals who fouled up the Afghan evacuation off the hook with a proverbial slap on the wrist during hearings last fall.
The sad truth is that our flag rank officers have become merely another political interest group. They know that upon retirement they will be appointed to the boards of think tanks, corporations and universities. Going along to get along is the norm, and one never criticizes another member of the club.
This careerist, risk-avoiding atmosphere has been developing for years. Not all modern general officers are guilty, but far too many are. This goes a long way in explaining why no senior flag officer demanded that serious questions be asked about the course of the war in Afghanistan while their subordinates, particularly in the enlisted ranks, knew it was going sideways for two decades.
I listened as soldiers and Marines complained bitterly of being told that they had to abandon terrain that they had fought hard to take and hold because a general officer miles away had decided that it was no longer important or that the Afghans would take over, when it was obvious that they were not ready. Some of the revolving door American commanders in Kabul tinkered at the margins, but none had the intestinal fortitude to ask the really hard questions such as:
  • Why did we create an Afghan army in our own image? Soldiers from Herat in the west were defending Kabul while soldiers from Kabul were defending distant Herat. Regional forces would have made sense. That was the way the Taliban organized; they were not dependent on outside supplies that might or might not arrive, or far away chairborne Afghan generals who were pocketing soldiers' pay. Such a reorganization was possible even as late as 2019, but the idea was never seriously considered.
  • Why was the Afghan air force not a priority? Given the nation's abysmal road system, the only way to support remote army posts was by air. The Afghan air force was always a secondary consideration. Support to the air force was one of the first capabilities to be eliminated as the decision to leave was implemented while remote outposts were being left to wilt on the vine, and no American general officer had the moral courage to go public with the fact that the organization could never be self-sustaining.
  • About roads, why was the completion of the Ring Road, which would have connected the nation to Kabul, never a military priority? Instead, construction was left to often corrupt civilian contractors who lacked the ability and force protection to operate in contested areas. In 2012, my civilian District Support Team and our military partners in the remote northwest of Badghis Province were still totally dependent on NATO aerial resupply. That was 11 years after the initial NATO incursion. Nonetheless, no U.S. commander voiced opposition to handing over the province's defense to the Afghan government, which was totally unprepared to assume the responsibility. Instead of publicly telling President Barack Obama the truth, the American commander of NATO forces, Gen. John Allen, punted.
  • Finally, as it became obvious that we were going to quit the country, why was the defensible Bagram Air Base abandoned in the dead of the night and the vulnerable Kabul Airport chosen as a point of embarkation? This was military incompetence of the highest order. Thirteen service members died unnecessarily, and no one has yet been held accountable. The same holds true with a drone strike that decimated an innocent Afghan family.
Who then should make up the congressionally mandated Afghanistan investigation commission? There are many retired midgrade officers who served in Afghanistan and have gone on to succeed in business and in the academic world over the past few decades; some are now in Congress. The same holds true of any number of enlisted personnel who have achieved advanced degrees.
People who saw the war up close should make up the commission. There should also be retired State Department and CIA operatives who knew what was really going on while the generals acted as combat tourists, occasionally visiting the troops and handing out challenge coins.
Without the perspective of those who did the real fighting, we will learn nothing.
military.com · by 6 Jan 2022 Military.com | By Gary Anderson · January 6, 2022


16. US, NATO rule out halt to expansion, reject Russian demands

Seems like no NATO expansion is one of Putin's demands.

US, NATO rule out halt to expansion, reject Russian demands
By MATTHEW LEE and LORNE COOK
yesterday

WASHINGTON (AP) — The United States and NATO on Friday roundly rejected Russian demands that the alliance not admit new members amid growing concerns that Russia may invade Ukraine, which aspires to join the alliance.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said Russia would have no say over who should be allowed to join the bloc. And, they warned Russia of a “forceful” response to any further military intervention in Ukraine.
Their comments amounted to a complete dismissal of a key part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demands for easing tensions with Ukraine. Putin wants NATO to halt membership plans for all countries, including Ukraine. The former Soviet republic is unlikely to join the alliance in the foreseeable future, but NATO nations won’t rule it out.
Blinken and Stoltenberg spoke separately following an extraordinary virtual meeting of NATO foreign ministers. The meeting of the North Atlantic Council was the first in a series of high-level talks over the next week aimed at easing the tensions.
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“We’re prepared to respond forcefully to further Russian aggression, but a diplomatic solution is still possible and preferable if Russia chooses,” Blinken told reporters in Washington. He categorically dismissed Russia’s claim that NATO had pledged not to expand eastward following the admission of several former Soviet satellites after the end of the Cold War.
“NATO never promised not to admit new members; it could not and would not,” Blinken said, accusing Putin of raising a strawman argument to distract from Russian military moves along the Ukrainian border.
“They want to draw us into a debate about NATO rather than focus on the matter at hand, which is their aggression toward Ukraine. We won’t be diverted from that issue,” Blinken said,
Earlier in Brussels, Stoltenberg made similar remarks as the allies prepared for the flurry of diplomatic contacts that will begin between the U.S. and Russia in Geneva on Monday and move to a NATO-Russia Council meeting and a pan-European meeting with Russia on Wednesday and Thursday.
“We will not compromise on core principles, including the right for every nation to decide its own path, including what kind of security arrangements it wants to be a part of,” Stoltenberg said.
The NATO-Russia Council meeting will be the first in more than two years and will give NATO ambassadors the chance to discuss Putin’s security proposals with Russia’s envoy face to face.
Much contained in documents Moscow has made public — a draft agreement with NATO countries and the offer of a treaty between Russia and the United States — appears to be a non-starter at the 30-country military organization, despite fears that Putin might order an invasion of Ukraine.
NATO would have to agree to halt all membership plans, not just with Ukraine, and to end military exercises close to Russia’s borders. In exchange, Russia would respect the international commitments it’s signed up to on limiting wargames, as well as end aircraft buzzing incidents and other low-level hostilities.
Endorsing such an agreement would require NATO to reject a key part of its founding treaty. Under Article 10 of the 1949 Washington Treaty, the organization can invite in any willing European country that can contribute to security in the North Atlantic area, as well as fulfill the obligations of membership.
Blinken said Moscow was well aware that NATO would not accept the demands.
“Certainly part of (Putin’s) playbook is to put out a list of absolutely non-starter demands and then to claim that the other side is not engaging and then use that as somehow justification for aggressive action,” Blinken said.
Stoltenberg said the Russian military buildup that sparked the invasion worries has continued.
“We see armored units, we see artillery, we see combat-ready troops, we see electronic warfare equipment and we see a lot of different military capabilities,” he said.
This buildup, combined with Russia’s security demands, and its track record in Ukraine and Georgia, “sends a message that there is a real risk for a new armed conflict in Europe,” Stoltenberg said.
Russia annexed Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and later backed a separatist rebellion in the country’s east. Over more than seven years, the fighting has killed over 14,000 people and devastated Ukraine’s industrial heartland, known as Donbas.
Russia denies that it has fresh plans to attack its neighbor, but Putin wants legal guarantees that would rule out NATO expansion and weapons deployments. Moscow says it expects answers to its security proposals this month.
Despite the rhetoric, Ukraine simply cannot join NATO with Crimea occupied and fighting in the Donbas because the alliance’s collective security guarantee — that an attack on one ally is considered to be an attack on them all — would draw it into war if the country became a member.
Indeed, NATO’s help in the event of an invasion is unlikely to involve major military muscle.
“Ukraine is a very close partner,” Stoltenberg said. “We provide support to Ukraine. But Ukraine is not covered by NATO’s collective defense clause because Ukraine is not a NATO member.”
Blinken and Stoltenberg did say that the U.S. and NATO are willing to discuss arms control with Moscow, but that Putin cannot be permitted to impose restrictions on how the organization protects member countries close to Russia’s borders like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
“We cannot end up in a situation where we have a kind of second-class NATO members; where NATO as an alliance is not allowed to protect them in the same way as we protect other allies,” he said.
The NATO-Russia Council was set up two decades ago. But NATO ended practical cooperation with Russia through the NRC in 2014 after it annexed Crimea. Wednesday’s meeting will be the first since July 2019. NATO officials say Russia has refused to take part in meetings as long as Ukraine was on the agenda.
___
Cook reported from Brussels. AP writers Samuel Petrequin and Sylvie Corbet in Paris contributed to this report.


17. Online Warriors Are a Risky but Useful Tool for Beijing

Excerpts:
The consequences of China’s assertive and nationalist foreign policy are building, and the Chinese government will eventually have to take that step back in order to preserve vital economic ties. For example, the European Parliament has already signaled it will not approve the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment until Beijing removes the sanctions on its members. How will the Chinese public react then? In the past, China has backed off once-passionate nationalist commitments; the anti-Soviet protests and fiery border disputes of the 1960s didn’t hinder a cool, sensible solving of most border problems with the Soviet Union and then Russia in the 1980s and 1990s, but it took years of distance to allow that.
As a great power, China cannot be offended by every action worldwide. Boycotts and online targeting affect not only foreign companies, but also the Chinese citizens who work for them, some of whom might lose their jobs and income because of affected or closed businesses. At the same time, cyber-armies worsen China’s image abroad and might force some foreign companies to leave China. Starting online fires risks Beijing itself getting burnt.
Online Warriors Are a Risky but Useful Tool for Beijing
Foreign Policy · by Andreea Brinza · January 7, 2022
An expert's point of view on a current event.
Cyber-nationalists are uncomfortably reminiscent of the Red Guards of the 1960s.
By Andreea Brinza, the vice president of the Romanian Institute for the Study of the Asia-Pacific.
A Chinese 100-yuan note is held in front of an image of a Chinese Red Guard from the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai on April 10, 2008. Mark Ralston/AFP via Getty Images
When China’s Cultural Revolution began in 1966, the Red Guards were at its forefront. Under the spell of propaganda and nationalism, with the goal of helping Mao Zedong spread the red sprout of communism, the Red Guards—mostly adolescents, some as young as 14—started an assault on China’s society and its elites, from party leaders to teachers.
Asked to destroy the “Four Olds” (old ideas, old culture, old habits, and old customs), the Red Guards picked their targets, whether philosopher Confucius or military leader Lin Biao, based on both direction from the top and their own local vendettas and whims. One could end up in the crosshairs for being a political leader who opposed Mao’s policies or a farmer who dressed a little better than the rest of the village. Those chaotic times, which resulted in purges, deaths, and social disruption, left a deep scar on China and its people, visible even today in the Chinese Communist Party leadership’s fear of chaos and uncontrolled mass movements.
Today, decades after the Cultural Revolution, a new type of popular army has risen in China. Driven by the same nationalism and propaganda, the cyber-Red Guards, with the same mix of grassroots inspiration and direction from the top, are defenders of China’s delicate feelings. Whether they’re targeting a foreign company, a K-pop group, or a foreign basketball team, they bring back uncomfortable memories of Mao’s Red Guards and the fervor to punish offenders.
When China’s Cultural Revolution began in 1966, the Red Guards were at its forefront. Under the spell of propaganda and nationalism, with the goal of helping Mao Zedong spread the red sprout of communism, the Red Guards—mostly adolescents, some as young as 14—started an assault on China’s society and its elites, from party leaders to teachers.
Asked to destroy the “Four Olds” (old ideas, old culture, old habits, and old customs), the Red Guards picked their targets, whether philosopher Confucius or military leader Lin Biao, based on both direction from the top and their own local vendettas and whims. One could end up in the crosshairs for being a political leader who opposed Mao’s policies or a farmer who dressed a little better than the rest of the village. Those chaotic times, which resulted in purges, deaths, and social disruption, left a deep scar on China and its people, visible even today in the Chinese Communist Party leadership’s fear of chaos and uncontrolled mass movements.
Today, decades after the Cultural Revolution, a new type of popular army has risen in China. Driven by the same nationalism and propaganda, the cyber-Red Guards, with the same mix of grassroots inspiration and direction from the top, are defenders of China’s delicate feelings. Whether they’re targeting a foreign company, a K-pop group, or a foreign basketball team, they bring back uncomfortable memories of Mao’s Red Guards and the fervor to punish offenders.
Today’s online legion is not as young as the Red Guards were, but they are mostly people born after 1980, who grew up with computers, phones, and internet but were also exposed to a huge amount of patriotic education and propaganda. They are sometimes called “Little Pinks,” though the original term no longer captures their diversity. The term wumao was originally coined to describe paid propagandists who work online for all levels of the Chinese state, but became slang for nationalist posters in general—leading to the coinage of the term ziganwu (roughly “self-supplying wumao”) to indicate that these posters don’t receive financial compensation for their actions. Regardless, what unites today’s cyber-Red Guards is a patriotic desire to protect China from perceived foreign attacks or slights.
Recently, companies such as Walmart and Intel were added to the list of Western companies targeted by Chinese netizens. Walmart allegedly ceased sale in its China locations of products manufactured in Xinjiang, because of suspicions of forced labor in the Chinese region. Intel also tried to distance itself from products from Xinjiang. These developments were amplified by a new U.S. law that banned products imported from Xinjiang, unless companies proved the products weren’t made with forced labor.
The online pressure from China was successful: Intel apologized to China for telling its suppliers not to source products or labor from Xinjiang. The pressure mixed grassroots efforts and state power: Walmart was targeted by China’s anti-corruption agency.
These weren’t unusual cases. Shortly after the European Union imposed sanctions on four Chinese officials and an organization involved in the abuses taking place in Xinjiang, China called on patriotic netizens to boycott H&M, a Swedish clothing company that in 2020 announced it would stop buying Xinjiang cotton because of the risk of it being sourced from forced labor.
In China, these boycott movements are supported by three entities: the government, the companies, and the masses. Although the central government keeps a relatively low profile during many boycotts, in reality the cyber-Red Guards’ uproar is used as a non-official tool to punish or pressure a country or foreign company. On the world stage, official sanctions or tariffs are promptly reciprocated and abusive economic measures can be easily reported to the World Trade Organization. But popular boycotts, seen as grassroots movements instead of government actions, are harder to counter, though sometimes just as efficient. The government might provide rhetorical support and state or party entities might even decisively amplify small organic campaigns—in the H&M case, a Weibo post by an account of the Communist Youth League brought the boycott to a wide audience. Regardless of official boosts, in China’s tightly managed online environment, no campaign could ever achieve success without the government allowing it to grow.
Companies and public figures are also involved in boycott movements in China. Out of their need to dissociate themselves from “toxic” issues and project a patriotic and trustworthy image, they ride the nationalistic wave. For example, H&M products were also boycotted by the e-commerce platforms Alibaba, JD.com, and Pinduoduo, which removed the products because of the public criticism. Xiaomi, Huawei, and Vivo app stores removed the H&M app from their offerings, while DiDi, Baidu, and Meituan erased H&M shops from their maps. Online publications might join the train to boost their traffic or image during the boycotts, as well.
The boycott of H&M was also led by celebrities, such as singer Wang Yibo, singer and actress Victoria Song, and actor Huang Xuan, who announced they were breaking their endorsement contracts with H&M. Celebrities also cut ties with Nike, which together with Burberry, Adidas, New Balance, and Zara were on the list of boycott targets. In the recent Intel case, singer Karry Wang broke ties with the U.S. company.
Finally, the most visible boycott participants are the masses, who mostly do not have financial or political interests but feel a responsibility to stand up for China, or even anger against foreign entities that seem anti-China and need to be punished. In this category, we should also add influencers on Weibo or other platforms, some of whom might be driven by personal, instead of patriotic, interests. These people preach patriotic actions while criticizing Western companies or Chinese people seen as Western apologists—and in the process gain more followers. This movement becomes a force that helps the party and government both internally and externally.
Crusading against foreigners is an old tactic, and it’s sometimes an offline one too. Back in 2012, when Sino-Japanese tensions grew following the Japanese government’s decision to buy a group of islands known as the Senkaku (in Japan) and Diaoyu (in China), Chinese citizens didn’t just peacefully protest against Japan. They started boycotting Japanese goods, companies, and tourism, and even attacking Japanese businesses, such as a mall owned by Japanese company AEON and a Panasonic factory, and destroying Japanese stores and cars owned by Chinese citizens. Not only did the Chinese government approve of and support the protests, it facilitated the transportation of protesters via tour buses. As a result, many Japanese companies temporarily closed their factories in China due to concerns about violence.
In 2017, Chinese netizens boycotted South Korean companies because of the South Korean government’s deployment of a U.S. missile defense system. South Korean company Lotte had provided the Korean government with land to host the system, which was meant to protect against North Korean missile threats. Online Chinese anger didn’t stop at Lotte; it extended to boycotting tourism in South Korea, K-dramas, and K-pop, affecting China’s relations with South Korea and becoming a serious diplomatic conflict between the two countries.
In October 2020, the Chinese cyber-army started canceling K-pop group BTS after its leader made comments about the Korean War. Over the past few years, numerous episodes of fights and criticism between Chinese and South Korean netizens have contributed to a sharp deterioration of China’s image among the South Korean public.
The Cultural Revolution and the Red Guards left a deep mark on China’s history, having affected the country’s stability and put at risk even the existence of the party. Mao succeeded in calming spirits by dispersing the youth to the countryside, stopping the growth of the dangerous movement. But most of the people implementing today’s boycotts are young people born long after the Cultural Revolution, who learned little from or forgot about those past experiences.
Censorship and instigation have been powerful tools for public control in China. But the government is playing a risky game, because the nationalist fervor it is stoking could come back to haunt it. In diplomacy, sometimes one needs to take a step back—something hard to explain to online movements.
The consequences of China’s assertive and nationalist foreign policy are building, and the Chinese government will eventually have to take that step back in order to preserve vital economic ties. For example, the European Parliament has already signaled it will not approve the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment until Beijing removes the sanctions on its members. How will the Chinese public react then? In the past, China has backed off once-passionate nationalist commitments; the anti-Soviet protests and fiery border disputes of the 1960s didn’t hinder a cool, sensible solving of most border problems with the Soviet Union and then Russia in the 1980s and 1990s, but it took years of distance to allow that.
As a great power, China cannot be offended by every action worldwide. Boycotts and online targeting affect not only foreign companies, but also the Chinese citizens who work for them, some of whom might lose their jobs and income because of affected or closed businesses. At the same time, cyber-armies worsen China’s image abroad and might force some foreign companies to leave China. Starting online fires risks Beijing itself getting burnt.
Andreea Brinza is the vice president of the Romanian Institute for the Study of the Asia-Pacific, where she analyses the geopolitics of China and East Asia. She is also a Ph.D. student, researching the Belt and Road Initiative.
Foreign Policy · by Andreea Brinza · January 7, 2022


18. VOA Exclusive: Ukraine Accuses Iran of Premeditated Terrorist Act in 2020 Plane Shootdown



VOA Exclusive: Ukraine Accuses Iran of Premeditated Terrorist Act in 2020 Plane Shootdown
January 08, 2022 0:15 AM
UPDATE January 08, 2022 0:16 AM
voanews.com · by Michael Lipin
WASHINGTON —
Ukraine is sharpening its accusation that Iran played a sinister role in the 2020 shootdown of a Ukrainian passenger plane over Tehran as the world marks the second anniversary of the tragedy.
"What happened on January 8th, 2020, was a terrorist act committed against a civilian aircraft," Oleksiy Danilov, Ukraine's National Defense and Security Council secretary, said Wednesday in an exclusive interview with VOA Persian.
Danilov also expressed frustration with what he said was Iran's refusal to cooperate in investigating and providing compensation for the downing of Ukrainian International Airlines Flight PS752.
Iran has acknowledged firing missiles that struck the plane and killed all 176 people on board, but it called the incident an accident and blamed it on a misaligned air defense system and human error by the missile operators. The plane had taken off from Tehran minutes earlier, carrying mostly Iranians and Iranian Canadians who were flying to Kyiv en route to Canada.
The Iranian forces who shot down the Ukrainian plane had been on alert for a U.S. response to a missile strike that Iran launched on American troops in Iraq several hours earlier. Iran had attacked the U.S. troops, wounding dozens, in retaliation for a U.S. airstrike that killed top Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad five days previously.
Danilov noted that before and after Iran's pre-dawn missile strikes on Flight PS752, Iranian authorities had allowed other civilian jets to take off from Tehran airport. "We have the impression that they [the Iranians] had been waiting specifically for our plane. We can assume this," he said.
Danilov said those who allegedly were waiting to strike the UIA jet were senior Iranian officials. "It must have been an order from senior management. No [air defense] operators can make such a decision on their own."
The Ukrainian security official's accusations regarding Iran's role in the incident were tougher and more detailed than his previous ones.

FILE - A general view of the debris of Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752, which was shot down after takeoff from Iran's Imam Khomeini airport, on the outskirts of Tehran, Iran Jan. 8, 2020.
'Conscious attack'
In an April 2021 interview with Canada's Globe and Mail newspaper, Danilov said he believed the Iranian downing of Flight PS752 was "intentional" and a "conscious attack."
Ukrainian news site Ukrinform later quoted Danilov as saying in May 2021 that Kyiv was "more and more inclined" to call the Iranian missile strikes a "terrorist act." Danilov was responding to a Canadian judge's ruling that month that the "missile attacks were intentional" and "the shooting down of the civilian aircraft constituted terrorist activity under applicable federal law."
The Ontario court's ruling came as part of a civil lawsuit brought by relatives of six Flight PS752 victims against Iranian officials, whom they blamed for the tragedy. In a further decision announced Monday, the court awarded the plaintiffs $84 million in damages "for loss of life caused by terrorism."
Iran's U.N. mission in New York did not respond to a VOA request for comment on Danilov's latest statements that the downing of Flight PS752 was a premeditated, terrorist act. VOA made the request in a voicemail on the Iranian U.N. mission's phone line and in messages sent to the mission by email and on Twitter.
In a separate email exchange with VOA on Friday, Ukraine's former deputy prosecutor general, Gyunduz Mamedov, used even sharper language to describe Iran's role in the shootdown.
Mamedov, who was involved in Ukraine's ongoing criminal investigation of the incident while serving as deputy prosecutor general from 2019 to 2021, said the investigation remains in a pretrial stage in which the classification of the alleged crime is being determined.
"The pre-trial investigation is considering various categories of crime, including an act of terrorism," Mamedov wrote. "It also is likely that the downing of an aircraft will be classified as a war crime."
Ukraine has not disclosed evidence that Iran's shooting down of Flight PS752 was part of a premeditated, intentional act.

FILE - Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau speaks at a memorial service for the victims of the shootdown of Ukrainian Airlines Flight PS752, at the Saville Community Sports Centre in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, Jan. 12, 2020.
'Full reparations'
Canada, which lost 55 citizens and 30 permanent residents in the shootdown, has not publicly shared Ukraine's assessments of a sinister Iranian role in the incident.
But Canada joined Ukraine and two other nations whose citizens were among the victims, Britain and Sweden, in issuing a statement Thursday vowing to "hold Iran accountable for the actions and omissions of its civil and military officials that led to the illegal downing of Flight PS752 by ensuring that Iran makes full reparations for its breaches of international law."
The four nations, which joined together as an International Coordination and Response Group for the victims of Flight PS752, also said that after a first round of talks in July 2020, Iran rejected their January 5 deadline to resume negotiations on their collective demand for reparations. They said they would "now focus on subsequent actions ... to resolve this matter in accordance with international law."

Ukrainian National Defense and Security Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov speaks to VOA Persian in an exclusive Skype interview Jan. 5, 2022.
Danilov told VOA that not only has Iran paid no compensation to the Ukrainian victims' families, but its cooperation with Ukraine's criminal investigation was nonexistent.
In a statement issued Friday, Iran's Foreign Ministry said Tehran has sent letters to embassies of relevant governments declaring a readiness to pay the families of 30 foreign victims.
The Iranian statement said Tehran was ready for "bilateral" talks with the countries whose citizens were killed in the shootdown. But it accused some of those nations, without naming them, of committing "illegal actions" and "trying to exploit this painful incident and the plight of the survivors for their own political purposes."
Britain, Canada, Sweden and Ukraine have insisted on multilateral negotiations.
Trial questioned
Iran's Foreign Ministry also noted that the Iranian judiciary has held several court sessions since opening a trial in November of 10 military personnel charged in connection with the shootdown.
In his VOA interview, Danilov questioned the credibility of that trial. "We don't know whether these people are really responsible, because the processes that took place in Iran were held behind closed doors and foreign representatives were not allowed inside to confirm that this was a transparent, democratic procedure," he said.
In explaining his belief that the downing of the Ukrainian plane was intentional, Danilov told the Globe and Mail in his April 2021 interview that Iran might have used it as a pre-dawn distraction to calm an escalating confrontation with the more powerful U.S. military.
He also cited Iran's use of a Russian-made missile system to strike the jetliner. Ukrainian military experts have said such a system is unlikely to mistakenly shoot down a passenger plane.
This story was a collaboration between VOA's Persian and Ukrainian services and English News Center. Kateryna Lisunova of VOA Ukrainian and Arash Sigarchi of VOA Persian contributed.
voanews.com · by Michael Lipin



19. Military Spying Controversies Return to Deeply-Rooted Issues (Taiwan)

Conclusion:

In this way, the issue of spying in the Taiwanese military reflects a much broader social phenomenon. One expects few remedies in light of how such issues do not only pertain to the military or other government institutions, but proves a broader issue in Taiwanese society as a whole. 
Military Spying Controversies Return to Deeply-Rooted Issues
語言:
Photo Credit: 玄史生/WikiCommons/CC
THERE HAVE BEEN increased concerns about espionage in the Taiwanese military after a report by Reuters that was released late last month.
According to the report, China conducting spying efforts through a number of ways. This could include recruitment efforts conducted by individuals posing as businessmen visiting Taiwan, or by offering gifts and free trips to current or former military personnel, which would sometimes be used to blackmail individuals into providing further information. This took place at levels including former generals, including the head of the National Defense University, and members of President Tsai Ing-wen’s security detail. 
Ministry of National Defense headquarters. Photo credit: 玄史生/WikiCommons/CC
Chinese spying in the Taiwanese military has long been a known issue. Apart from the fact that this may make the details of Taiwan’s defense strategies known to China, there is particular concern regarding the fact that this may make the US more reluctant to share sensitive technologies with Taiwan, for fear that this will result in such technologies being leaked to China. More generally, regional allies may be reluctant to share information with Taiwan for fear that this will end up in China’s hands. The report also brought up the possibility of troops led astray by rogue military leaders in wartime. 
Since the report was released, the Ministry of National Defense has responded that it is confident in its ability to detect Chinese spies. For its part, the Tsai administration is likely to reassure on the issue. Yet the problem may ultimately have deep roots. 
The Taiwanese military has historically been seen as a bastion of pan-Blue Chinese nationalism and a KMT institution. This is why members of the military would be willing to spy for the Chinese government, with the view that Taiwan is a part of China, and that in the present, Taiwan should unify with China. As such, the persistence of ROC nationalism encourages such spying efforts to take place–and one notes that military institutions continue to adhere to ROC nationalism and promote it within their ranks, something that may compound the issue. 
Likewise, the view of the military as a KMT institution goes back to authoritarian times, in which members of the military, police, teachers, and public servants were generously rewarded by the KMT in return for political loyalty. Apart from lucrative pensions, members of such groups also lived in comparatively privileged neighborhoods, had preferential hiring for certain positions, and other benefits. Besides material benefits, members of such groups were also publicly esteemed by the KMT. 
Such groups sometimes view themselves as having lost such privileges after Taiwan’s democratization. Indeed, one notes that the KMT has leveraged hard on the issue, seeking to rally up such groups’ sense of disenfranchisement to attack the Tsai administration. Adding to this sense of disenfranchisement, another sticking point is that the Tsai administration reformed Taiwan’s pension system to prevent the pension system from going bankrupt. There is, then, not only an ideological reason as to why Taiwanese military personnel would spy for China, but also a material component. The Chinese government offering rewards to members of the military in return for spying on its behalf, then, probably dovetails with this fact. 
Photo credit: Kliu1/WikiCommons/CC
And, indeed, it is the case that the KMT’s pro-unification position continues to be a valid position in Taiwanese politics. As a result, the actions of pro-unification politicians that carry out actions such as visiting China and conducting meetings with Chinese counterparts–even when they hold positions that allow them access to sensitive information–naturalizes when military officials do the same. 
Even Ko Wen-je’s city-based exchanges between Shanghai and Taipei can be seen in line with this phenomenon. Furthermore, one has seen similar incidents in other fields, as well, far beyond just the military. One case in point is the appointment of Kuan Chung-ming as president of National Taiwan University, despite allegations that he taught in China–violating measures that would have blocked him from working in China shortly after serving at a ministerial-level position in government under the Ma administration.
In this way, the issue of spying in the Taiwanese military reflects a much broader social phenomenon. One expects few remedies in light of how such issues do not only pertain to the military or other government institutions, but proves a broader issue in Taiwanese society as a whole. 

20. In Kazakhstan, Russia follows a playbook it developed in Ukraine


In Kazakhstan, Russia follows a playbook it developed in Ukraine
theconversation.com · by Lena Surzhko Harned
Add Kazakhstan to the list of former Soviet republics whose independence is now being threatened by Russia. Russian leader Vladimir Putin is using a similar playbook in Kazakhstan to one that he has used over almost a decade to threaten the sovereignty of Ukraine.
What began as protests over rising fuel prices on Jan. 2, 2021, quickly escalated into violent clashes on the streets of Kazakhstan. On Jan. 5, Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, a firm ally of Putin’s, requested support from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, of which Putin’s Russian Federation is the leading member. Russia has responded decisively by sending paratroopers, special operations troops and equipment as part of a nearly 3,000-strong force to Kazakhstan.
Tokayev explained his request by claiming that protesters are really “a band of terrorists” trained abroad. On Jan. 7, Tokayev escalated the conflict: “I have given the order to law enforcement and the army to shoot to kill without warning,” Tokayev said.
As a scholar of post-Soviet Ukraine, Russia’s involvement in Kazakhstan looks very familiar to me. It’s similar to what happened in Ukraine beginning in 2014, when peaceful protesters were met with violence by the government and a protest grew into a revolution that ultimately overthrew the Russian-backed leadership of the country.


Protests against rising fuel prices in Kazakhstan have turned violent in recent days. AP Photo/Vladimir Tretyakov
Dangerous neighborhood
Seizing on that moment of domestic unrest in 2014, Putin gave direct orders to annex Crimea, a Ukrainian territory home to a key Russian naval base. Shortly afterward, he supported a war mounted by so-called Russian-speaking separatists in Ukraine’s eastern regions.
For more than eight years now, the Russian Federation has continued to support that conflict in Ukraine and has recently threatened Ukraine with a full invasion. This most recent version of Putin’s aggression toward Ukraine came in November 2021, when he staged 175,000 troops along the Ukraine border. His goal: to use a potential invasion as leverage to stop Ukraine from joining the alliance of Western countries known as NATO.
In Kazakhstan, as in Ukraine in 2014, the Russian government explains its military presence as appropriate and requested by a legitimate government. As in Ukraine, the Russian government emphasizes that external forces are responsible for unrest in the former Soviet republic. As in Ukraine, the Russian Federation has pointed out the need to protect a Russian-speaking population.
These tendencies of the Russian government to assert dominion over former territories that it lost during the breakup of the Soviet empire demonstrate that Russia is willing to act quickly and do anything to keep control of its neighborhood. I see this as an important message about what the Western leaders can expect from a meeting with Russian officials in Geneva on Jan. 10 to discuss the conflict building again along Ukraine’s border and Russia’s demands that NATO not expand to Ukraine.
Soviet and Russian legacies
Russia has long seen Kazakhstan as within its sphere of influence. In a press conference on Dec. 23, 2021, Putin called Kazakhstan a “Russian-speaking country in every sense of the word.”
Earlier Putin claimed that before the collapse of the Soviet Union, “Kazakhs never had a state of their own.” In December 2020, two members of Russia’s parliament claimed that territories of northern Kazakhstan were “a big gift” from Russia to Kazakhstan.
Such claims are reminiscent of the language that Putin has applied to Ukraine. He has often claimed that Ukraine was not a real country, including in an article published by the Kremlin in July 2021, in which he claimed that “modern Ukraine is entirely the product of the Soviet era.”
The use of the same terminology does not bode well for Kazakhstan.
Putin’s references to a Russian-speaking population in Kazakhstan are reminiscent of the experience of Ukraine’s Crimea region. In April 2014, Russian soldiers appeared on the streets of Crimea, forced Ukrainian soldiers to leave their posts, and oversaw a so-called referendum that allowed for Crimea to be integrated into the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation said then, and continues to claim, that its interest in Ukraine is a continued concern for the welfare of the Russian speakers in Ukraine, which in Russia’s view is being oppressed.
Controversial Russian politician Vladimir Zhirinovski claimed on Jan. 6, 2021, that Russian speakers in Kazakhstan are similarly oppressed by Kazakh language requirements. Zhirinovski is a radical figure in Russian politics, but it is usually assumed that he voices the more extreme claims of the Russian government.

Kazakh police have faced off against large crowds of demonstrators. AP Photo/Vladimir Tretyakov
Protecting from foreign invaders
Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev claimed that the protests in his country were fueled by the “free press” and foreign forces who were sponsoring terrorist activity in his country. The Russian government willingly accepted this terminology. Tokayev did not specify which external forces he meant.
Putin has long claimed that the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine in 2014, which ousted his ally, President Viktor Yanukovich, was really a coup sponsored and coordinated by the U.S.
Similar arguments about outside influences were made by the embattled Belarusian dictator, Alexander Lukashenko, about the anti-government protesters in Russia-aligned Belarus in 2020.
The spokesperson for the Russia Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, said on Jan. 6 that there is a need to stop extremism in Kazakhstan. Her words came in response to European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell’s concerns over the Russian troop deployment.
This consistent message supports Putin’s narrative about the need to protect Russia and the countries in its neighborhood against what he regards as destabilizing influences like the U.S. and NATO, which, according to Putin, support and promote anti-government extremists and revolutions in the region.

Russian troops take part in drills on Dec. 14, 2021, in the Rostov region near its border with Ukraine. AP
Show of strength
Putin continues to cultivate an image as a decisive leader who responded to a call from a neighboring country to “help Kazakhstan overcome this terrorist threat.”
His actions in Kazakhstan, I believe, are aimed at both internal and foreign audiences.
Domestically, Russian media see Russian troops as a part of a multilateral peacekeeping response, which includes troops from Belarus and Armenia. Deployment of so-called peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan in the middle of instability and violence will be portrayed in Russia as a huge achievement for Putin.
This is also a message to Ukraine and the West. Putin will not hesitate to show strength to achieve Russia’s goals. Russia now has nearly 100,000 troops along the Ukrainian border. And while there was a reported withdrawal of 10,000 soldiers in late December in a de-escalation effort, most of the troops and military equipment remain.
Geneva outlook
Negotiations in diplomacy require compromise. However, Russia is entering the talks in Geneva with an ultimatum toward NATO and the U.S.
Russia’s demands, according to Reuters, include a “halt to NATO enlargement, no deployment of its weapons systems in Ukraine and an end to "provocative” military exercises" in the region.
Russian action in Kazakhstan should serve as a sobering reminder to Western countries that Russia is willing to act decisively to protect its interests and retain its influence in the neighboring countries.
[Understand key political developments, each week. Subscribe to The Conversation’s politics newsletter.]
theconversation.com · by Lena Surzhko Harned


21. Private efforts to get vulnerable people out of Afghanistan running on fumes


Private efforts to get vulnerable people out of Afghanistan running on fumes
by Mike Brest, Defense Reporter |   | January 08, 2022 06:45 AM
Washington Examiner · January 8, 2022
The nongovernmental organizations made up of veterans who have spent months working tirelessly to get vulnerable people out of Afghanistan are continuing their efforts in 2022 — even as people and resources are drying up.
Various groups were created as others swiftly diverted their attention to helping people who want to leave Afghanistan to do so following the U.S. military’s chaotic withdrawal at the end of August, with many Americans and Afghan allies left behind.

The groups, collectively, help hide, transport, and protect vulnerable Afghans who worked alongside the military, though some stressed an exhaustion of resources and the need for additional governmental help in recent interviews.
Lt. Cmdr. Scott Mann, a veteran who served for more than two decades before retiring, is a senior adviser on Task Force Pineapple, a group of veterans who have leveraged their connections in Afghanistan for this purpose.
“There's veterans that have emptied their 401Ks, they've emptied their savings accounts,” he told the Washington Examiner in a phone interview. “And our veteran population is really damaged from this too. I mean, the ones that they've been on, like the world's longest 911 call. They haven't been able to hang up the phone because they're the lifeline to these people, and they're not gonna hang up the phone. So now they're being re-traumatized — we're seeing suicidal ideations go up.”
“People are moving on to other things,” and “donations are slowing to a trickle,” he explained, demonstrating the difficulties they’re having maintaining the funds necessary to continue their operation, which he said costs $15,000 a day.
The “scale and magnitude of this problem” caught Mann off guard, he said, referring to the groups and their mission as a “David and Goliath thing.”
Task Force Pineapple is also struggling through the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, as they need to feed the people they’re sheltering.
More than half the country’s population is expected to face “acute food insecurity” from November through March 2022, according to projections from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification.
The United States froze roughly $10 billion of funds that belonged to the Taliban following their takeover in mid-August, which has also contributed to the worsening humanitarian situation.
Ninety-three percent of Afghans had insufficient food consumption in the weeks after the Taliban overthrew the Ghani government, 13 percentage points higher than it was on the day it collapsed, according to the World Food Program’s Afghanistan Food Security Update from September.
Special Operations Association of America founder and former Green Beret Daniel Elkins, whose group predates the fall of the Ghani government and had started evacuations before then as well, previously told the Washington Examiner that they increased their efforts when requests “started to exponentially climb.”
Both he and Mann spoke critically of the Biden administration’s efforts, or lack thereof, that they said spurred them and countless other veterans into action.
“The government was unable to execute this and they failed, and there needs to be accountability and questions around why that happened,” Elkins said in a phone interview earlier this week. “But the silver lining is the American people rallied, right. The community that we represent, the special operations community said, OK, well, we're going to do this on our own backs, even though we're not over there [and] we don't have the funding of the U.S. government.”
“I think that there are many who have lost faith. I think there are many who are angry and upset, but to me, I look at the people who rallied around one another to save lives,” he added. “And I do feel like that gives hope for our democracy.”
Another area of concern in Afghanistan is the security threat from terror groupsISIS-K, the Afghanistan affiliate of the Islamic State, and al Qaeda could reconstitute as soon as this spring, according to various defense officials.
ISIS-K, which took responsibility for the bombing outside of the Kabul airport that the U.S. and allied troops were using for evacuations that killed 13 U.S. service members and nearly 200 people in total, is “getting their collective s*** together,” Mann explained, adding that if another attack occurred against the U.S., “our response is gonna be probably to saddle back up, except this time it'll be with my kid, your kid, and a new generation of warriors and go back to Afghanistan, you know, in some fashion.”
The State Department did not respond to a request for comment from the Washington Examiner.
Washington Examiner · January 8, 2022


22. The Oath of Office and the Insurrection

All of us who have taken the oath should reflect on it as should all Americans whether they have taken the oath or not.

The Oath of Office and the Insurrection
warroom.armywarcollege.edu · by Joseph Chapa · January 7, 2022
The officiant in such ceremonies often points out to the honoree and to those in attendance that the U.S. military oath of office stands apart from others around the world in that we swear an oath, not to a monarch, nor to a head of state, but to the Constitution.
I first swore an oath to support and defend the Constitution in 2006 at the Old North Bridge in Concord, Massachusetts. It was the “rude bridge that arched the flood,” as Ralph Waldo Emerson put it, where “embattled farmers stood // and fired the shot heard round the world.” There was no Constitution then; only a tacit agreement between the thirteen colonies to throw off the bonds of tyranny. Thomas Jefferson would formalize the language of that agreement the following year. It was the thirteen sovereign states’ duty, he wrote, “to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.” The throwing off—the Revolutionary War—took place from 1775 to 1783, but the new guards would not be in place until the first nine of the thirteen states ratified the U.S. Constitution in 1787 and 1788. It is that document I swore to support and defend against all enemies foreign and domestic at the Old North Bridge in 2006 and now, fifteen years in, I bear true faith and allegiance to the same.
In those fifteen years, I have attended countless enlistment, commissioning, and promotion ceremonies. The officiant in such ceremonies often points out to the honoree and to those in attendance that the U.S. military oath of office stands apart from others around the world in that we swear an oath, not to a monarch, nor to a head of state, but to the Constitution. This much is true. But I have heard several officiating officers follow this statement up with a second: that in the United States military, our oath is to the idea of America. This is false.
On the 6th of January 2021, the Constitution was threatened by “enemies domestic.” Insurrectionists breached the Capitol intending to disrupt Congress’s efforts to “open all the Certificates,” as Article II, Section I of the Constitution requires, so that “the Votes [could] then be counted.” According to CBS News, at least ten percent of the more than 700 people charged in connection with the insurrection have served in the U.S. military. Each of those 81 current or former military service members has—at least once, perhaps several times—raised their right hand and sworn an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic.
Most of those who stormed the Capitol and threatened members of Congress did so because they believed it was the right thing to do. I have no doubt that those who participated believed the election was stolen. I have no doubt that they believed—however mistakenly—that they were acting in the best interest of the country. I have no doubt that they committed their violent and illegal acts to defend and secure their own idea of America. But even if all this is true, their actions were at odds with the oath they had previously sworn. When people leave military service, surely they are absolved of their oath. I am not making the strong claim that January sixth insurrectionists violated their oaths of office. I am making the weaker claim that one can believe oneself to be fighting for one’s country while at the same time contradicting the words of the oath.
The oath I swore, and the oath sworn by at least 81 of those charged in the insurrection, was not always to do what I believe to be in the best interest of the country. I did not swear to support and defend the idea of America, or American values, or democratic ideals—because since this country’s founding, serious Americans have disagreed about just what the idea of America ought to be, and which values are American, and which ideals are democratic.
In reality, you and I probably do not always agree about what the idea of America is or ought to be. Biden supporters and Trump supporters do not agree on an idea of America. Jefferson and Hamilton did not agree on the idea of America. Slavers and abolitionists and those held in bondage did not agree on the idea of America—and the country went to war over it. And the iron-sharpening work of disagreeing over and debating ideas about what America is and ought to be has made us better, not worse. Realizing the idea of America has been the work of the country since its founding. But even this debating and sharpening is not that to which I swore an oath. I did not swear an oath to make us better. My oath was to support and defend the Constitution.
Though the words of the oath have changed over time, the requirement that military members swear an oath is established in the very Constitution modern servicemembers swear to support and defend. Article VI, clause 3 says that “the Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.” The very first bill signed into law in the United States in 1789 established language for that oath. “I … do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United States.”
Changes in the oath over time reveal how Americans have thought about duty and obligation to one’s country. Between 1790 and 1862, military members (both officer and enlisted) swore, not to support and defend the Constitution, but to “bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America, and to serve them honestly and faithfully against all their enemies.” But this oath would prove insufficient against the pressures of civil strife. As soldiers abandoned their positions in the United States military and took up positions in the armies of the Confederacy, surely they violated the spirit of their oaths, but did they violate the letter?
The purpose of the ironclad test was to “ensure that government officials were not supporting, or had not supported, the Confederacy.”
In 1862, in the midst of war, Congress decided the 1790 oath lacked specificity about the threat from enemies domestic, and so they established a new and much lengthier oath for officers. Often called the “Ironclad Test Oath,” federal officials were required to swear that they had “never voluntarily borne arms against the United States” and had “voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto.” The purpose of the ironclad test was to “ensure that government officials were not supporting, or had not supported, the Confederacy.” This oath also returned to the 1789 oath’s reference to the Constitution but added something new: “I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States, against all enemies, foreign and domestic.”
Shortly thereafter, in 1868, the officer oath was shortened, removing the ironclad test, and resulting in the oath officers swear today—the same oath I swore at The Old North Bridge in 2006. The enlisted oath underwent additional changes in 1950 and 1962 until, ultimately, it too culminated in a promise, among other things, “to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.”
It is true that we swear an oath to support and defend a document rather than a person. And, in one sense, this is a startling discovery. In Federalist 74, Alexander Hamilton insisted that to ensure the alacrity that military force demands, the military must submit to a single commander in chief. “Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.” And yet, so confident was the first Congress that our loyalty must be to the government as outlined in the Constitution and not to any single part of it, that the military oath was then, and is now, to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.
If we, officials in the federal government, were to abandon the oath we swore to the Constitution because the situation is just too dire, or because our current circumstances are unprecedented; or in the name of ideas, values, and ideals, we would be like the person who swears to love and honor and serve their spouse in sickness and in health, only later to say, “but how could I have known how sick they would get?”
The oath I swore was not to an idea but to words in the English language; engrossed on parchment; augmented with a Bill of Rights; and amended several times since. The actions of the 81 military veterans who participated in the insurrection were at odds with the oath they had previously sworn because they sought—by whatever means—to violate Article II, Section I of the Constitution.
This is not, of course, to say that our oath is to the Constitution as it was written in 1787. Nor is it to say that the Constitution can’t be amended even now. In Washington’s farewell address, he reminds us that “the basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and to alter their constitutions of government. But the Constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all.”
I offer no elixir that will cure us of the many maladies our political community suffers. Instead, I offer but this one method for treating our symptoms: Many who have sworn an oath to support and defend the Constitution, myself included, should spend more time studying the Constitution.
I have been asked to officiate three weddings. Each time, I asked the couple to sit down with me in advance to discuss what their wedding vows mean and why they are important. I have, in the past, been asked to administer the oath of office as well. I regret not insisting upon the same reflection and intentionality in preparing for the oath of office as I have in preparing for the wedding vows. Lt Col Kenneth Keskel, on whose work I have relied heavily throughout this essay, has written that “prior to taking their oath upon commission or reaffirming it upon promotion, too few officers take the time to read and study the document they swear to support and defend.” On this accusation I am guilty. If I am ever again given the honor of administering an enlistment, commissioning, or promotion oath of office, I will ask the honoree to re-read the Constitution, and I will re-read it, too. Just as we do not swear an oath to a monarch, we likewise do not swear an oath to a nebulous political idea. We swear instead to support and defend a real, and solid, and concrete thing.
Joseph Chapa is an officer in the U.S. Air Force and holds a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Oxford. His book, Is Remote Warfare Moral? with PublicAffairs Books will be out in July 2022.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Credit: Constitution Image by Lynn Melchiori from Pixabay
warroom.armywarcollege.edu · by Joseph Chapa · January 7, 2022











V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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