Quotes of the Day:
"It's all surreal for me and I don't get how such silly things can happen in a civilized world in the 21st century"
- A Ukrainian reservist learns fighting skills she hopes never to use
“Hard times create strong men.
Strong men create good times.
Good times create weak men.
And, weak men create hard times.”
- G. Michael Hopf, Those Who Remain
"I never submitted the whole system of my opinions to the creed of any party of men whatever in religion, in philosophy, in politics, or in anything else where I was capable of thinking for myself. Such an addiction is the last degradation of a free and moral agent."
-Thomas Jefferson, letter to Francis Hopkinson, March 13, 1789
1. INTERVIEW/ Joseph Yun: Biden’s best bet is to engage with N. Korea directly
2. Protecting Digital Rights in North Korea
3. Freight Piles Up at Uiju Airport
4. Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers
5. How Ukraine Crisis Hurts Korea's Economy
6. S. Korea rules out military support, deployment over Ukraine crisis
7. U.N. rapporteur calls for sending 60 mln COVID-19 vaccine shots to N. Korea
8. South Korea remains passive on US-led sanctions against Russia
9. A Practical Vision for South Korea
10. Understanding the Strengths and Vulnerabilities of North Korean Hackers
11. Beyond North Korea: The Japan-South Korea-US Trilateral in the Indo-Pacific
12. S. Korea successfully tests L-SAM missile interceptor: sources
13. Next president should take ‘consistent approach’ to NK human rights: UN expert
14. Yanggang Province couple arrested and branded as political criminals for using foreign cellphones
15. North Korea emphasizes “ideological struggle” to help soothe public discontent amid economic malaise
16. North Korea orders military education institutions to help out with Hwasong apartment construction
17. North Korea raids major illegal currency exchange office in Sinuiju
18. South Korea And The Bomb – Analysis
19. Reimagining the U.S.-Korea Relationship in the Indo-Pacific
1. INTERVIEW/ Joseph Yun: Biden’s best bet is to engage with N. Korea directly
Excerpts:
Yun said in an interview with The Asahi Shimbun that he thought the Biden administration’s “pragmatic approach” on North Korea needed to be reconsidered.
Excerpts of the interview follow:
Question: What do you think was the purpose behind North Korea’s recent ballistic missile launches?
Yun: The No. 1 reason is that North Korea finds itself in a very difficult economic situation. They’ve been hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic as you know, which has limited cross border movement of goods and services.
They’ve also been hit hard by a poor harvest and poor agricultural output throughout the year. And then another point is, of course, sanctions imposed by the United Nations through Security Council resolutions, as well as bilateral sanctions implemented by the United States and allies such as Japan, South Korea and others. So they’re in a very difficult situation.
And I do think they want to draw attention to the difficulties they’re having. The second reason is that they believe they are being ignored by the Biden administration, that the Biden administration has failed to really implement a new approach to the issue and find ways to engage with North Korea. As a result, they feel they are being ignored by the international community as well. So they want to attract some attention to that aspect.
Their third reason is, of course, to develop better weapons and better testing of various weapons, including cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles and missiles that have the ability to glide. Clearly, they are demonstrating growing technological development. So all those are reasons I believe they are testing them now.
INTERVIEW/ Joseph Yun: Biden’s best bet is to engage with N. Korea directly | The Asahi Shimbun: Breaking News, Japan News and Analysis
INTERVIEW/ Joseph Yun: Biden’s best bet is to engage with N. Korea directly
By KOJI SONODA/ Correspondent
February 22, 2022 at 09:00 JST
Joseph Yun, a former U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy, in 2018 (Asahi Shimbun file photo)
WASHINGTON--North Korea’s repeated ballistic missile launches illustrate that the dialogue-oriented policy line promoted by the Biden administration has reached a stalemate, contends one of America’s foremost experts on North Korea.
Joseph Yun, who served as U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy and was involved in negotiations with Pyongyang under both the Obama and Trump administrations, called for a more proactive policy engagement by top officials as well as President Joe Biden.
Yun said in an interview with The Asahi Shimbun that he thought the Biden administration’s “pragmatic approach” on North Korea needed to be reconsidered.
Excerpts of the interview follow:
Question: What do you think was the purpose behind North Korea’s recent ballistic missile launches?
Yun: The No. 1 reason is that North Korea finds itself in a very difficult economic situation. They’ve been hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic as you know, which has limited cross border movement of goods and services.
They’ve also been hit hard by a poor harvest and poor agricultural output throughout the year. And then another point is, of course, sanctions imposed by the United Nations through Security Council resolutions, as well as bilateral sanctions implemented by the United States and allies such as Japan, South Korea and others. So they’re in a very difficult situation.
And I do think they want to draw attention to the difficulties they’re having. The second reason is that they believe they are being ignored by the Biden administration, that the Biden administration has failed to really implement a new approach to the issue and find ways to engage with North Korea. As a result, they feel they are being ignored by the international community as well. So they want to attract some attention to that aspect.
Their third reason is, of course, to develop better weapons and better testing of various weapons, including cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles and missiles that have the ability to glide. Clearly, they are demonstrating growing technological development. So all those are reasons I believe they are testing them now.
Q: What are your thoughts about the timing of the ballistic missile launches? I was wondering if Pyongyang wanted to have some impact on the midterm elections this year.
A: No, I think they are sophisticated enough to know that they cannot affect midterm elections. American elections are not influenced by North Korean actions. It’s just not that important politically and domestically. But what is important is that a year has already passed since Joe Biden became president.
Early in Biden’s presidency, they recognized the Singapore agreement between Trump and Kim Jong Un, and so I think that gave some hope to Kim Jong Un and the regime that maybe greater pro-engagement policies would happen under Biden. But they’ve been disappointed. So I think they said we’ve given enough time for the Biden administration, but it has become what we call a backburner issue. So they want to make it once more a front burner partner issue.
Q: The Biden administration is now calling for a pragmatic approach to the problem. Do you think that will be effective to promote dialogue with North Korea?
A: No, it’s not effective to promote dialogue because we’ve seen that North Korea has rejected it. Biden’s pragmatic approach I believe is centered around “we will talk when you want to talk, but we’re not going to commit to anything, especially sanctions removal, before you show us what you’re prepared to do.” So it’s a very different approach than, say for example, the one taken by Trump, and it is much more similar, I would say, to Obama’s “strategic patience.”
Q: What should Washington do to overcome the frustration in order to promote dialogue?
A: For the North Koreans, what’s been very important is high level intervention. They experienced that during the Trump administration when Trump himself met with Kim Jong Un three times. So I would say that what Biden needs is a much higher level of engagement than the administration has been willing to do to date. It needs to show that very senior officials in the Biden administration are prepared to meet and get involved with North Korea. And so far, they’ve not shown that.
I think North Korea also needs a clear statement from Biden. I think a letter from Biden would help, but a clear statement from Biden would also help. So I think we need a much higher level of intervention from Biden to show that he is prepared to engage. Beyond that, of course, there are many other things that the Biden administration can do to show that it wants to engage.
Certainly, one of them is humanitarian assistance and especially providing COVID-19 vaccines. And another thing is, for example, having a clear statement on the end of war declaration (concerning the 1950-53 Korean War). So I think all those are factors and their willingness to discuss sanctions for example. These are all factors that could lead to renewed dialogue.
Q: Looking back at the past 10 years under Kim Jong Un’s leadership, what are your thoughts?
A: Kim Jong Un came to power, as you say, 10 years ago after his father died. So really broadly speaking, his goals are two-fold: one is regime or dynastic survival. That is his No. 1 goal by far. His No. 2 goal is to have a strong and prosperous country, to ensure the welfare of his own people, his own country, that’s the second goal. But of course it comes below regime survival.
So far, clearly he has been quite successful in regime survival. He has consolidated his own position and accomplished that by making the military happy, the security side happy. And a big element in making the military happy is to have security both inside the country and outside.
Outside, he has done that through weapons programs: nuclear weapons, missiles and other programs. And inside, he’s done that through the domestic security apparatus. So, he has succeeded in regime survival and he has made his own dynasty quite secure.
Now the question turns to how does it make his country stronger economically and more prosperous? And that’s the problem he’s having now. And he believes in order to do that, the sanctions have to be lifted, he has to get recognition from outside of normal trade and normal political relations.
And in order to do that, he must have security externally. So that’s the dilemma he’s in right now: Now that his regime is secure, how does he go about making the country stronger economically and more prosperous? It’s not achieved yet, it’s very far from being achieved.
Q: I would like to hear your perspective on the next 10 years due to your long years of service in government.
A: My view on the next 10 years is that Kim Jong Un cannot give up nuclear weapons completely, so he has to find a path in which he gives up some nuclear weapons in return for external security. And so that’s the challenge he’s facing. Give up some nuclear weapons, some nuclear sites, and in return, the United States, Japan and South Korea agree that North Korea will not be as isolated. So that to me is the critical challenge.
Q: So you mean Kim Jong Un will continue to negotiate with the United States and its allies?
A: Yes. For them, the number of missiles, the sophistication of missiles, the number of nuclear weapons, the number of nuclear materials, fissionable materials, these are all negotiating leverage. The more you have, the more you can negotiate.
So for example, he was prepared during the 2019 Hanoi summit to give up some nuclear capability in return for lifting sanctions. So ultimately, this is what negotiations will come down to.
How much can North Korea keep? How much should it give up? That is what the United States and Japan would be arguing for and in return for how much in benefits, including economic and political normalization. And so of course, the position now of the United States is they must give up everything. But it's not going to work.
Q: Looking back to fall 2017, we had a really huge crisis on the Korean Peninsula with tensions at a very high level. Do you think we will be facing that again in the next 10 years?
A: Yes, definitely, most definitely.
I think there’s a good chance that there will be ICBM test, nuclear tests I’m not sure about because China gets very, very angry with nuclear tests. So right now, I think North Korea wants to make sure China is on its side, but conducting nuclear tests will maybe prove too much for China. But more missile tests, more ICBM tests is a definite possibility, yes.
Q: I was wondering what Japan should do to handle the crisis. Should Japan strengthen its defensive capabilities against ballistic missiles or seek a more diplomatic approach?
A: I think there are three things that Japan can do. One is to make sure Japan has a very strong relationship with South Korea. I think this erosion, this deterioration, in the South Korean and Japanese relationship has been very damaging and has been a big leverage for North Korea. It has really exposed a weakness in the U.S., Japanese and South Korean alliance in dealing with North Korea. So the best thing that Japan and South Korea can do is improve bilateral relations between the two countries.
The second thing I think Japan should do is enhance its own defense. I think it means more missile defense, and I believe it needs offensive capabilities, not just defensive, but offensive capabilities to be able to target North Korea if there is imminent danger.
The third thing I think that Japan should do is create a diplomatic channel or line between Tokyo and Pyongyang. At the moment as far as I know, there is no communication between Japan and Pyongyang. Japan, as a major regional power, needs that communication and so they should spare no effort, no expense in creating a communications line with Pyongyang.
Q: The Japanese people are keenly interested in the Japanese abduction issue. Do you anticipate any developments on this front in the future?
A: I am not optimistic at all on the abduction issue. As far as North Koreans are concerned, they believe this issue is resolved. Kim Jong Il issued an apology when he met with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and they returned some abductees. And so as far as they’re concerned, there is no issue and no more remaining abductees in North Korea. So to open this issue, it’s politically very, very difficult for North Korea.
It’s also very difficult for Japan not to open it, so my belief is that there has to be a multilateral approach on human rights issues in which the abduction issue becomes a part of a human rights agenda.
2. Protecting Digital Rights in North Korea
Excerpt:
In limiting the ability to access, use, create, and publish digital and open media, the North Korean government curtails the human rights of its citizens. Ever since access to the Internet and communication technologies became an essential part of modern society, digital rights have been recognized as an extension of human rights, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also applies to the online digital world. Closely linked to digital rights are, in fact, the right to privacy and the freedom of expression, which are both almost entirely disregarded in North Korea.[14] For this reason, advocacy groups and international organizations should advocate to ensure full respect for these human rights in North Korea in their traditional and online forms, as digital access could be the missing step to a significant opening up of North Korea.
Protecting Digital Rights in North Korea
2/22/2022
By Diletta De Luca, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations and Research
February 22, 2022
Today, North Korea (formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or the DPRK) is the least Internet-friendly country in the world, where access to the World Wide Web is only permitted to a few authorized individuals.[1] Nevertheless, Kim Jong-un’s regime, as well as many other authoritarian governments, also recognize the potential to use digital tools and Internet technologies as new forms of social and political control.[2] Considering these actions by authoritarian regimes, digital rights—the right to access, use, create, and publish digital sources and open Internet technologies—should be recognized as human rights that must be respected and protected.
Digital Tools & Authoritarian Regimes
With the diffusion of information, knowledge, and social mobilization through the Internet, political scientists once anticipated a worldwide wave of democratization.[3] Increased access to online tools was initially considered as the missing but necessary catalyst for democratization.[4] However, there are now contrasting opinions regarding the influence of digitalization under authoritarian regimes. “Cyber-optimists” regard digitalization as an opportunity for citizens to gather information that challenges state propaganda, in turn fostering anti-regime sentiment and mobilization by facilitating collective action.[5] In other words, even if authoritarian regimes impose strict control over the Internet, citizens are still able to access various information online that undermines authoritarian rule in the long term. Conversely, “cyber-pessimists” hold that repressive regimes are able to weaken anti-regime sentiment through sophisticated control over the Internet.[6] They believe that authoritarian powers have shifted their control strategy in recent decades from suppressing communication flows and engaging in censorship to strengthening surveillance mechanisms.[7] Many of today’s authoritarian powers have acquired new capabilities to control and repress individuals both inside and outside their borders by suppressing alternative voices while strengthening their political control.[8]
Digitalization Developments in North Korea
In North Korea, high-level elites have relatively free access to the Internet since members of the regime’s leadership tailor their political decision-making based on foreign trends and events.[9] Furthermore, digitalization-related developments, such as increasing cybersecurity measures and surveillance tools, are gradually unfolding in the country. A recent United Nations report highlights how North Korea is also launching cyberattacks and stealing money in the form of cryptocurrency to fund the government’s missile and nuclear programs.[10] Nevertheless, most of the population can only access a government-controlled intranet. Furthermore, all media content and broadcasts within the country are controlled by the Korean Workers’ Party, the founding and sole ruling party in the DPRK.[11] All external telecommunications signals, including Wi-Fi, are banned within the country, and government officials constantly monitor citizens’ emails and telephone communications. Central to North Korea’s Internet strategy is the severe punishments faced by citizens if found to be in possession of unauthorized online materials and information.[12] However, despite these punishments, studies and reports suggest the presence of a considerable black market from which foreign movies, cell phones, and radios that can connect to the outside world are sold. Such materials present the population with alternatives to the regime’s propaganda. Based on the opinions of cyber-optimist scholars, such exposure could in turn lead to collective action, motivating citizens to call for more freedom and openness in the country. The detachment and separation of the country from the outside world and high risks of punishment for accessing outside information, however, make a large-scale wave of social change unlikely in the short term.[13]
Implications for Human Rights in North Korea
In limiting the ability to access, use, create, and publish digital and open media, the North Korean government curtails the human rights of its citizens. Ever since access to the Internet and communication technologies became an essential part of modern society, digital rights have been recognized as an extension of human rights, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also applies to the online digital world. Closely linked to digital rights are, in fact, the right to privacy and the freedom of expression, which are both almost entirely disregarded in North Korea.[14] For this reason, advocacy groups and international organizations should advocate to ensure full respect for these human rights in North Korea in their traditional and online forms, as digital access could be the missing step to a significant opening up of North Korea.
Diletta De Luca is a graduate student at the University of Amsterdam, pursuing a Master of Science in International Relations. She focuses on authoritarian practices and gender inequality.
[4] Seva Gunitsky, “Corrupting the cyber-commons: Social media as a tool of autocratic stability,” Perspectives on Politics 13, no. 1 (2015): 42–54.
[5] Ibid.; Kris Ruijgrok, Internet Use and Protest in Malaysia and Other Authoritarian Regimes: Challenging Information Scarcity (Cham: Springer Nature, 2021).
[6] Kris Ruijgrok, “Illusion of control: how internet use generates anti-regime sentiment in authoritarian regimes,” Contemporary Politics 27, no. 3 (2020): 247–70.
[7] Gunitsky, “Corrupting the cyber-commons.”
[8] Marcus Michaelsen, “Exit and voice in a digital age: Iran’s exiled activists and the authoritarian state,” Globalizations 15, no. 2 (2018): 248–64.
[9] Talmadge, “North Korea's digital divide.”
[12] Johannes Gerschewski and Alexander Dukalskis, “How the Internet Can Reinforce Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of North Korea,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 19, no. 1 (Fall 2018): 12–19.
[13] Martha Kuhnhenn, Micky Lee, and Weiqi Zhang, “Media Liberalization: Control and Consumption of Foreign Media in North Korea, China, and East Germany,” International Journal of Communication 14 (2020): 1421–37.
[14] PSCORE, “Digital Life & Digital Rights.”
3. Freight Piles Up at Uiju Airport
Has trade restarted? Is the quarantine really a month long?
Imagery at the link below.
Freight Piles Up at Uiju Airport
New commercial satellite imagery shows an increasing amount of cargo stacked in neat, organized piles at North Korea’s Uiju Airfield, a presumed cargo quarantine center near the Chinese border.
The first cargo trains from China since the border lockdowns in 2020 arrived at the airfield just over a month ago, and the volume of goods visible in the latest image indicates additional cargo continues to arrive.
Figure 1. Overview of goods visible at Uiju Airfield.
To date, there are no signs any cargo has left the facility. Although, high-resolution satellite imagery has not been sufficiently available to be certain of this. In recent imagery, however, much of the cargo visible a month earlier appears to still be in the same place as before. If that’s correct, it means that the quarantine period for goods entering the country from China is at least a month long.
Figure 2. Close up of unmoved freight from January 21 to February 22.
North Korea has been under self-imposed isolation since the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic in January 2020, when the country closed its borders to all traffic in and out. Few goods are believed to have entered or exited the country since then. While trade statistics show some traffic between China and North Korea, it appears to have been transported by ship through Nampho port.
The country’s important rail and road entry points at Sinuiju exhibited no signs of life until mid-January, when a train crossed into China and picked up freight on three successive days and took it directly to the import center at Uiju.
Figure 3. Close up of Uiju Airfield.
Figure 4. Close up of another section of Uiju Airfield.
The latest image continues to support our earlier analysis that the center is subdivided internally into five areas. Each area has a railway platform, two large structures and a large open-air area for storage. It appears that goods are unloaded from railcars and pass through the upper of the pair of large structures, possibly for a decontamination or disinfection procedure, and then placed in the open air on the former runway. The role of the second pair of large structures is unclear, but it could be related to goods leaving the site.
4. Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers
Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers
Date and Time:
March 04, 2022 09:00 am ~ March 04, 2022 05:30 pm
Location:
DACOR Bacon House 1801 F St, NW, Washington, DC 20006
Speakers:Host Organization:
Description:Dear Friend of HRNK and IBA,
We invite you to a Hearing in connection with an Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers that is being led by HRNK and the IBA. The Hearing, which will be held on March 4, 2022 from 09:00 to 17:30 (EST), will feature (1) in-person testimony from survivors of North Korean detention centers, and (2) expert testimony on command and control structures in the Kim regime, satellite images of detention centers, etc. The goal of the Hearing is to determine culpability for alleged crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute, ranging from actors at the highest level of the regime (i.e., Kim Jong-un), to low-level guards who carry out many of the worst human rights abuses.
Four renowned international jurists – who, together, have presided over the most consequential international criminal tribunals since the Nuremberg trials – will preside over the March 4th Hearing:
1. Navi Pillay (Chair) is a South African jurist and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. During her UN tenure, Judge Pillay appointed Justice Michael Kirby to conduct the landmark UN Commission of Inquiry (2014) on human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. She also served as President of the Rwanda Tribunal and as a judge on the International Criminal Court (ICC).
2. Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi served as the former President of the ICC and currently serves as the President of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC (2021-2023).
3. Wolfgang Schomburg served as Germany’s first judge on the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals.
4. Dame Silvia Cartwright is the former Governor-General of New Zealand and served as an international judge on the Cambodia Tribunal.
The Hearing will be conducted in-person at HRNK's home, the DACOR Bacon House, 1801 F Street, NW, Washington, DC, and virtually, via Zoom. Those participating in person will have to present a form of picture ID and proof of COVID vaccination in order to access the building. All participants are required to wear masks inside the building. For security reasons, login information will be shared with confirmed virtual participants the day prior to the event. Please click here to RSVP.
Thank you for your attention and kind consideration.
Sincerely,
Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director, HRNK
Michael Maya, Director, IBA-North America
5. How Ukraine Crisis Hurts Korea's Economy
No major country will be unaffected.
How Ukraine Crisis Hurts Korea's Economy
The government has started to look into emergency responses that could minimize the impact of a looming Russian invasion of Ukraine on Korea's economy and financial markets.
President Moon Jae-in chaired a National Security Council meeting at Cheong Wa Dae on Tuesday and told officials, "We must carefully analyze the effects of the Ukraine crisis on our economy. If the crisis continues and the U.S. implements tougher sanctions against Russia, our economy will also be affected significantly."
Ukraine is only Korea's 68th-largest trading partner with bilateral trade last year amounting to US$900 million. But it accounts for a whopping 23 percent of Korea's neon gas imports, 31 percent of krypton gas imports and 18 percent of xenon gas imports used to manufacture semiconductors, perhaps Korea's most important product. A prolonged crisis could seriously damage Korea's chip output.
The bigger problem is Russia, which is Korea's 10th-largest trading partner. If the West implements tougher sanctions against the Vladimir Putin regime, they could seriously affect Korea's exports of cosmetics, plastics and car parts.
Last year, Korea's exports to Russia increased 45 percent to $10 billion, while imports rose 63 percent to $17.4 billion. When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Korea's exports to Russia halved.
Korean automakers and electronics makers in Russia would also experience problems securing components.
Another risk is volatility in global grain markets. Russia and Ukraine account for a staggering 25 percent of global wheat exports and 14.8 percent of global corn shipments. Prices would inevitably surge in the event of a war.
6. S. Korea rules out military support, deployment over Ukraine crisis
(LEAD) S. Korea rules out military support, deployment over Ukraine crisis | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS remarks, details from para 5)
By Kim Deok-hyun
SEOUL, Feb. 23 (Yonhap) -- South Korea is not considering military support and deployment in connection with the crisis in Ukraine but is leaving various possibilities open concerning sanctions on Russia, Cheong Wa Dae said Wednesday.
"While looking into how the situation will unfold going forward and what effects it will have on us, we're studying what we can do," a senior presidential official told reporters. "Military support and deployment are not among them."
Asked whether the United States asked South Korea to join in sanctions against Russia, the senior Cheong Wa Dae official said the U.S. has repeatedly outlined its plans to impose export controls and financial sanctions while discussing such issues with allies.
"Major Western nations have expressed willingness to join in sanctions," the official said. "We are also looking at this while leaving various possibilities open."
Western nations have imposed new sanctions against Russian banks and individuals after Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered troops into separatist regions of eastern Ukraine.
As a responsible member of the international community, South Korea has been in close consultations with the U.S. and other nations over whether to join sanctions against Russia, the official said.
However, the official declined to give a clear answer on whether South Korea will join anti-Russia sanctions, saying it is still unclear about how the situation is unfolding in Ukraine.
"In any case, necessary measures must be taken to minimize the negative impact on our economy and ensure that people engage in stable economic activities," the official said.
South Korea will also hold close consultations with relevant nations to prevent the Ukraine crisis from posing a threat to peace efforts on the Korean Peninsula, the official said.
In January alone, North Korea conducted seven missile tests, including two of what it claims to be a hypersonic missile and an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), heightening tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
kdh@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. U.N. rapporteur calls for sending 60 mln COVID-19 vaccine shots to N. Korea
Human rights are a national security issue in addition to a moral imperative.
A buried lede:
He also expressed concern about Seoul having decided not to co-sponsor a U.N. resolution condemning the North's human rights record for three years in a row, calling it "a step backwards."
U.N. rapporteur calls for sending 60 mln COVID-19 vaccine shots to N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
By Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, Feb. 23 (Yonhap) -- The U.N. special rapporteur on North Korea's human rights made an emphatic call Wednesday for the world to offer 60 million COVID-19 vaccine doses to the reclusive country to help it break "out of isolation."
Tomas Ojea Quintana made the appeal amid concerns the North's apparent reluctance to engage with the outside world due to the pandemic would worsen its economic woes and human rights conditions, and hamper nuclear diplomacy with the regime.
"I call on the international community to agree on a strategy to provide the DPRK with 60 million doses of vaccination to cover at least two shots of the entire population," he told a press conference in Seoul. DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Quintana called the proposed vaccine provision "the key" to opening the North's borders, resuming interaction with the outside world and bringing it out of isolation.
He arrived here on Feb. 15 on a nine-day mission designed to prepare for his annual report to be submitted to the U.N. Human Rights Council next month.
The North, with a population of over 25 million, claims to have no COVID-19 cases. It has yet to begin an inoculation program against the virus but has employed stringent border controls in a sign of its wariness about the pandemic.
Quintana said Pyongyang seems to have rejected the vaccines allocated through the COVAX Facility, a global vaccine distribution platform, as it appears wary it could face "some kind of pressure" from the outside world.
"The information we have, the North Korean authorities are suspicious about receiving just the partial number of vaccines and then being subject to some kind of pressure to then receive the rest of the shots," he said.
Quintana redoubled calls for Pyongyang to take steps to improve its human rights conditions.
"It is the responsibility of the DPRK to respect and protect human rights under the international human rights law, which has been neglected for decades," he said.
Commenting on South Koreans abducted by the North and South Korean prisoners of war from the 1950-53 Korean War, Quintana said North Korea's human rights issues should not be "neglected" during future negotiations with the North.
He also expressed concern about Seoul having decided not to co-sponsor a U.N. resolution condemning the North's human rights record for three years in a row, calling it "a step backwards."
Quintana's latest trip to Seoul marks his seventh since taking office in August 2016 and will likely be his last before his term ends in August.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
8. South Korea remains passive on US-led sanctions against Russia
South Korea remains passive on US-led sanctions against Russia
An armored vehicle rolls down a street outside Donetsk, the territory controlled by pro-Russian militants, in eastern Ukraine, late Tuesday. Russian President Vladimir Putin has raised the stakes in the Ukraine standoff by recognizing the independence of rebel regions in the country's east. AP-Yonhap
By Nam Hyun-woo
South Korea remained lukewarm, Wednesday, about joining U.S.-led sanctions against Russia for ordering troops into separatist regions of eastern Ukraine. Seoul's stance appears to be affected by the possible economic damage to South Korean companies operating in Russia.
Seoul has been under pressure to join the anti-Russia campaign as the Kremlin uses military force in Ukraine and the U.S. strengthens measures to contain further aggression.
According to a senior Cheong Wa Dae official, Cheong Wa Dae is "looking closely into the situation with various possibilities open."
"As a member of the international community, we are closely communicating with the U.S. and other related nations," the official said. "However, it remains uncertain how the situation will unfold, so the government is preparing for multiple scenarios while being open to every possibility."
The official said the U.S. has been consulting with its allies over sanctioning Russia, but did not specify whether the South Korean government has received an official request to join the sanctions.
When asked if South Korea would join the U.S.-led sanctions against Russia, he declined to comment on further details, noting that South Korea has been discussing the matter through a diplomatic channel.
Earlier, a source familiar with this matter, however, said there has been no official request from the U.S. government calling on Seoul to join the sanctions.
A senior White House official said in a press call Wednesday that the U.S. and its allies and partners _ the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Australia _ have decided to slap sanctions against Russia.
The U.S. announced sanctions on two major Russian banks, political elites and the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline linking Germany.
Canada blocked its citizens from making financial transactions with the two pro-Russia breakaway regions in Ukraine, whose independence Russian President Vladimir Putin recognized. Australia slapped travel and financial restrictions, Japan banned transactions of new Russian bonds on its soil and the European Union also agreed to a package of sanctions against Russia.
President Moon Jae-in speaks with National Security Advisor Suh Hoon during a National Security Council meeting at Cheong Wa Dae, Tuesday. Yonhap
An official at Seoul's foreign ministry also reiterated South Korea's initial stance of calling for a "peaceful resolution through dialogue and negotiations" and added that South Korea is "closely monitoring the situation while sharing information with the U.S. and other countries."
The government's stance is believed to have been affected by concerns about the economic impact on South Korean firms operating in Russia.
Currently, Hyundai Motor, Kia, Samsung Electronics and other big name South Korean firms are operating in Russia. If the sanctions are expanded and dollar transactions become unavailable in Russia, those companies will have to use the Russian ruble, whose value is anticipated to drop in the wake of the sanctions, possibly dragging down South Korean firms' revenues.
When Moscow annexed Crimea in 2014, South Korea's exports to Russia declined 54 percent from $10.13 billion in 2014 to $4.69 billion in 2015.
South Korea is also wary of Russia's possible influence on inter-Korean relations.
President Moon's inter-Korean peace initiative has been deadlocked after North Korea test fired a string of ballistic missiles so far this year. To find a breakthrough, the Moon Jae-in administration is seeking China, Russia and other countries with close ties to Pyongyang to help resume stalled talks.
Against this backdrop, Seoul's hardline message on Putin's hostile move in Ukraine will not be helpful for Moon's peace initiative, although experts said the benefits of not imposing sanctions will not be big enough to bring a Russia-led breakthrough in the inter-Korean stalemate.
"Even if Seoul keeps a low profile regarding Russia, chances are slim that President Putin will exert Russia's influence to entice North Korea to return to talks," said Shin Beom-chul, director of the Center for Diplomacy and Security at the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy. "It seems that the South Korean government sees no immediate benefit by imposing sanctions on Russia, and seeks to follow the Western side in a passive stance."
9. A Practical Vision for South Korea
This is from the ruling party candidate for president of South Korea.
I do not think any candidate in South Korea can create a national consensus anymore than a president in the US can.
Conclusion:
For all these issues, a national consensus is paramount. The political leader of a country must lead by having the country come together through an open and democratic debate, believing in citizens’ collective wisdom, which always comes to the best decision with enough information, time, and deliberation. A pragmatic mindset, and a clear understanding of the challenges our country faces, is what South Korea needs most right now.
A Practical Vision for South Korea
How Seoul Can Lead in Asia and Spur Growth at Home
February 23, 2022
South Korea has much to celebrate. It is among the world’s top ten economies, home to numerous innovative companies at the forefront of new technologies, and its pop culture has become a global phenomenon. South Korea can, and will, play a leading role on the international stage on important issues such as COVID-19, climate change, and global supply chain resilience. The country remains a linchpin in the U.S.-led alliance system that protects liberal democracy and fosters global economic growth. Close to home, however, South Korea faces major challenges—not just with North Korea but also in its relations with China and Japan. A rigid ideology and empty sloganeering won’t help deal with those challenges. What the country needs is pragmatism and a focus on problem solving.
As governor of Gyeonggi Province, which is home to more than a quarter of South Koreans and shares a border with North Korea, I learned that lesson again and again. A hub of manufacturers in Gyeonggi produce semiconductors and high-end displays for televisions and smartphones. Whenever there is conflict with North Korea, it is Gyeonggi that feels the reverberations first. Its western coast is a short distance away from China and the province is home to Camp Humphreys, the largest U.S. power projection base in the Pacific. Residents of Gyeonggi know perhaps better than anyone just how interlinked South Korea’s future is to its relationship with neighboring countries and the United States.
A Practical Approach to North Korea’s Nuclear Issue
The thorniest problem facing the Republic of Korea is North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. The Kim Jong Un regime’s recent ballistic missile launches are deeply concerning. Through the ROK-U.S. alliance, Seoul will continue to make Kim understand that South Korea is absolutely resolute and capable of dealing firmly with any military strikes or provocations. However, any solution for North Korea’s denuclearization must be peaceful. Saber rattling achieves little: glibly advocating for a preemptive strike against Pyongyang, for example, evokes Cold War posturing that is no longer relevant and serves only to stoke fear and division. A second Korean War, which would likely be a nuclear war, is unacceptable. It is important to win a war; it is even more important to win without a war. This can be achieved with a mixture of deterrence, diplomacy, and dialogue. The Biden administration’s “calibrated and practical” approach to North Korea has emphasized this approach.
Any solution for North Korea’s denuclearization must be peaceful.
The failure of the February 2019 Hanoi summit between Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump showed that the “Big Deal” approach the Trump administration pursued—whereby Pyongyang would give up all its nuclear weapons and programs at an early stage of denuclearization—is unlikely to succeed. It would be better to begin by pushing for North Korea to take meaningful steps for denuclearization in return for partial rewards. This does not mean that sanctions should be eased immediately; rather, if North Korea takes significant measures to denuclearize, the United Nations and the international community should implement sanctions relief in response in a phased manner. Of course, if North Korea fails to keep its promise of denuclearization, sanctions should be immediately restored. To create an environment conducive to the negotiation, the global community, including South Korea, should buttress its humanitarian assistance for North Korea by providing COVID-19 vaccinations and medical supplies and helping to reunite families who were separated during the partition of the two Koreas.
The North Korea issue is complicated by the growing rivalry between the United States and China. Some critics argue that South Korea maintained “strategic ambiguity” between the world’s two superpowers, giving the false impression that South Korea has been tilting away from the United States. This claim is simply wrong. There is nothing ambiguous about South Korea’s stance. The United States is the sole treaty ally of the Republic of Korea. The alliance was forged in the fire of the Korean War and over time has evolved into a comprehensive partnership. The joint statement that South Korean President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Joe Biden issued in May 2021 went far beyond security priorities and covered diverse issues such as the response to COVID-19, climate change, and even space exploration. The two countries already enjoy a relationship of remarkable breadth and depth, which will continue to be upgraded in the coming years.
Pragmatic Diplomacy Toward Neighboring Countries
South Korea must also maintain a partnership with China, which is the country’s largest trading partner, accounting for a quarter of South Korea’s trade volume. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, millions of Koreans and Chinese visited each other’s countries for business and tourism. Pragmatism dictates that in order to address critical issues such as North Korea’s nuclear program, peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, cross-border environmental pollution, and the COVID-19 response, Seoul needs to get along with Beijing.
This is not to say South Korea should be accommodating to China, and South Koreans have good reason to be concerned by Beijing’s increasingly assertive behavior. But overt antagonism serves neither South Korea’s national interests nor its alliance with Washington. Without Beijing’s cooperation in persuading North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, North Korea will depend more on China, making it more difficult to find a resolution to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs.
It is past time that South Korea pulled its weight in achieving carbon neutrality.
Another challenge the next president of South Korea will need to grapple with is relations with Japan, a fellow democracy in Northeast Asia and a major trading partner. It is regrettable that Tokyo’s unwillingness to let go of its imperial past continues to hamper trilateral cooperation between Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Since the Republic of Korea and Japan normalized relations in 1965, the two countries have been able to build a healthy bilateral relationship by debating the legacy of Japan's colonization of Korea and its conscription of Koreans during World War II on a separate track from economic cooperation and cultural exchange. The high point in the bilateral relationship was the 1998 joint declaration between South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi: Japan unprecedentedly expressed remorse and offered a heartfelt apology for its colonial rule. This opened a new chapter in the bilateral relationship by widening avenues for cultural and people-to-people exchanges.
In 2018, however, after South Korea’s Supreme Court ruled that Japanese corporations must pay reparations for their use of Korean forced labor during World War II, Tokyo imposed retaliatory export controls on three key chemicals—photoresists, hydrogen fluoride, and fluorinated polyimide—critical for making South Korea’s semiconductors and high-end displays used for televisions and smartphones. This was a shocking act of economic coercion to settle a historical grudge, and it led to the current nadir in relations between Seoul and Tokyo. The South Korean government and South Korean corporations quickly identified alternate sources of high-tech materials from within the ROK and other countries; this nimble action prevented the trade war from damaging the global supply chain of semiconductors. While promoting economic, social, and diplomatic cooperation, the two countries should look back to the spirit of the Kim-Obuchi declaration, which committed to endeavoring in good faith to overcome the legacy of tragic historical wrongdoings.
South Korea’s Regional and Global Aspirations
South Korea is committed to expanding its ties to nations across Asia, as is best evidenced in the New Southern Policy, which fortified links with India and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which is, notably, South Korea’s second-largest trading partner. South Korea should continue to expand on helping to create a free and open Indo-Pacific: promoting free trade as well as human exchange will help buttress the region’s public health, green growth, digital innovation, and supply chain resilience.
On climate change, it is past time that a major manufacturing economy such as South Korea pulled its weight in achieving carbon neutrality. To promote renewable energy, South Korea should invest significantly in renewable energy infrastructure, building the foundation for future industries. One such investment could be the construction of an “energy superhighway”—a smart grid that would allow the transfer and sale of electricity generated through solar and wind power. The South Korean government should also establish a new Ministry of Climate Change and Energy dedicated to climate change, green growth, and the transformation of energy and industrial sectors.
For all these issues, a national consensus is paramount. The political leader of a country must lead by having the country come together through an open and democratic debate, believing in citizens’ collective wisdom, which always comes to the best decision with enough information, time, and deliberation. A pragmatic mindset, and a clear understanding of the challenges our country faces, is what South Korea needs most right now.
10. Understanding the Strengths and Vulnerabilities of North Korean Hackers
north Korea defies expectations? The cyber/north Korean experts I know have no head their expectations defied.
Conclusion:
Pyongyang continues to defy miscalculated expectations regarding its cyber capabilities by successfully employing a series of sophisticated cyberattacks that target new and developing financial technology. As North Korea will likely continue to adapt its cybercrime tactics targeting cryptocurrency to circumvent obstacles presented by economic sanctions, the United States and its allies must increase joint efforts to counter this grave threat.
Understanding the Strengths and Vulnerabilities of North Korean Hackers
Pyongyang continues to defy miscalculated expectations regarding its cyber capabilities by successfully employing a series of sophisticated cyberattacks that target new and developing financial technology.
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The international community often incorrectly correlates North Korea’s lack of access to modern computer hardware within its borders to inferior offensive cyber capabilities. As demonstrated in a new report released by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), North Korea has rapidly expanded its illicit activity within the cyber domain under sustained economic pressure from decades of sanctions. As such, Pyongyang will likely continue to adapt its cybercrime operations to evade the full brunt of economic sanctions as innovation within the crypto space, such as cryptocurrency, continues to outpace current regulation of financial technology The report also outlined major flaws in North Korean cyber operations, as well as areas where the United States and its allies can expand coordination to counter North Korea-led cyber-enabled financial crime.
In partnership with data provided by leading blockchain analysis firm TRM Labs, CNAS provides in-depth analysis of Pyongyang’s demonstrated ability to exploit cryptocurrencies by investigating three separate case studies of North Korean hacks targeting cryptocurrency exchanges. Through analyzing these hacks, the report outlined key strengths and vulnerabilities in North Korea’s ability to steal, launder, and liquidate funds. A major takeaway from the study was that North Korean hackers demonstrated only moderate concern over eventual attribution of their crimes, meaning that the process of laundering stolen funds was not executed as seamlessly as the initial hack. This signals that Pyongyang is aware of the lack of legal retribution for its illicit cyber activities, thus preferring speed over total obfuscation. For example, only one North Korean national has ever been extradited to the United States to face money laundering charges, and this was an extraordinarily rare case. Additionally, North Korean hackers have demonstrated steady improvements in the complexity of their hacks and laundering operations, including the use of cryptocurrency mixers and over-the-counter brokers to hide the origin of the stolen crypto and the initial hack.
The cornerstone of why North Korean hackers continue to outpace U.S., South Korean, and other democratic nations’ cybersecurity strategies is surprisingly simple. While Washington and other nations tasks their intelligence and defense agencies with a wide range of domestic and foreign security issues, Pyongyang instructs its own agencies with a much narrower set of duties: support the Kim regime at all costs through information and economic espionage. As such, the report suggests that U.S. policymakers should invest more resources and research into analyzing the strengths and weaknesses in Pyongyang’s cyber capabilities. Since potential gains from cyber intrusions targeting financial institutions and new financial technology significantly outweigh the potential punitive risks for North Korean hackers, Pyongyang will likely increase its illicit cyber operations.
In response, the CNAS report provided eight total policy recommendations to strengthen cyber resilience against North Korean hackers, highlighting the various roles of domestic and foreign policymakers and the private sector. One recommendation includes the executive branch designating specific research on state-sponsored cybercrime groups within the new National Cryptocurrency Enforcement Team (NCET). The Department of Justice recently appointed a seasoned prosecutor, Eun Young Choi, to lead the new crypto unit, signaling government efforts to jumpstart research on cryptocurrency-related crime after four months of inactivity following the establishment of the NCET in October 2021.
Another recommendation calls for the Treasury Department to expand sanctions designations to any individual or entity supporting and/or facilitating North Korean cybercrime, including telecommunication companies providing technical services, know-how, and equipment to North Korea that its hackers use to conduct malicious cyber operations. Major Russian and Chinese telecommunication companies have indirectly supported North Korean cybercrime by providing increased internet bandwidth and connectivity to North Korean operatives, and some reports indicate North Korean hackers have even operated inside China-based hotels. An important note is that sanctioning telecommunication companies that help provide internet connection to Pyongyang will likely not impact the civilian population in North Korea. Unless given specific permission by the North Korean regime, accessing the internet is illegal and ordinary North Koreans instead access the country’s intranet, known as the Kwangmyong. Lastly, the report also calls for both Washington and Seoul to include cryptocurrency-related illicit activity within the ongoing U.S.-ROK cyber working group discussed during the 2021 summit between President Joe Biden and President Moon Jae-in.
Pyongyang continues to defy miscalculated expectations regarding its cyber capabilities by successfully employing a series of sophisticated cyberattacks that target new and developing financial technology. As North Korea will likely continue to adapt its cybercrime tactics targeting cryptocurrency to circumvent obstacles presented by economic sanctions, the United States and its allies must increase joint efforts to counter this grave threat.
11. Beyond North Korea: The Japan-South Korea-US Trilateral in the Indo-Pacific
This line of effort from the new strategy is important. I think the Biden administration has been making a lot of effort in this area since it took office. I just hope it can achieve some positive results.
Conclusion:
Hence, to conclude, the Japan-South Korea-U.S. mechanism is a crucial piece in the United States’ broad Indo-Pacific strategy and it can, moving forward, play a consequential role in the security and stability of the region. Already a foremost framework in terms of coordinating action against North Korea’s increasingly aggressive actions, the trilateral must now respond to the traditional security challenges in the Indo-Pacific as a whole. The China issue is not entirely separate from North Korea. Beijing too has shown itself to be a nuclear power all too willing to use military action and economic coercion to its own benefit. Here, the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral must take a long view and act as a stabilizing platform for alliance politics.
Beyond North Korea: The Japan-South Korea-US Trilateral in the Indo-Pacific
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On February 13, Japan, South Korea, and the United States held a foreign minister-level tripartite meeting in Hawai’i to further discuss and deliberate the growing nuclear threat posed by North Korea. After continued efforts to grow its nuclear and ballistic missile program in 2021, Pyongyang carried out seven missile tests in January 2022 alone – a significant acceleration in its testing and demonstration activities. These tests, according to a U.N. report, involved new short-range (and, in one case, intermediate-range) missiles “incorporating both ballistic and guidance technologies and using both solid and liquid propellants,” a hypersonic guiding warhead, and a maneuverable re-entry vehicle. Through the tests, the U.N. experts found that the North also demonstrated enhanced capabilities for “rapid deployment, wide mobility (including at sea), and improved resilience of its missile forces.”
In response to such provocative and “unlawful activities,” Japan, South Korea, and the United States came together to condemn North Korea’s missile launches and reaffirm their shared determination and approach.
The Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral, which evolved post-Cold War to contend with the threat of North Korea, has clearly become a fundamental pillar for security and stability in Northeast Asia. The trilateral is a key aspect of the U.S. security framework in the region, and both Japan and South Korea prominently feature in the U.S. Indo-Pacific policy.
How does the trilateral shape Washington’s outlook towards the Indo-Pacific region as a whole? Will its focus remain concentrated on the dangers of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, via mechanisms like its Trilateral Coordination Oversight Group, or will it look to become a stabilizing platform for alliance politics in the Indo-Pacific?
Japan and South Korea in the U.S. Regional Outlook
Although both Japan and South Korea are key cornerstones of the U.S. hub-and-spokes alliance system in the region, the deterioration of Japan-South Korea relations over historical grievances has been an obstacle for trilateral cooperation. The U.S. role in the region has therefore involved acting as a mediator between the two neighboring states, pushing for repair and rapprochement of Japan-South Korea ties to ensure continued functioning of the high-stakes trilateral alliance. One example of this is the U.S. role in negotiating the Japan-South Korean 2015 agreement to end the “comfort women” dispute (which refers to the roughly 200,000 Korean women forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese military during the World War II), which has long been a major point of contention in Japan-South Korea ties and could deepen the wedge between them.
With Japan and South Korea as arguably the United States’ two most important allies in the Indo-Pacific, it is no surprise that they feature in Washington’s new Indo-Pacific Strategy released in February 2022. The strategy seeks to direct more security resources and diplomatic efforts to the Indo-Pacific to counteract China and preserve the free and open Indo-Pacific, and hopes to achieve this largely through “strong and mutually reinforcing coalitions.” It specifically mentions that the U.S. hopes to deepens its individual alliances with Japan and South Korea, and that the U.S. “will also encourage our allies and partners to strengthen their ties with one another, particularly Japan and the ROK.” There is also a subsection focused on “expand[ing] U.S.-Japan and ROK cooperation,” which pledges to engage trilaterally over North Korea issues and also other priorities such as supply-chain resilience, infrastructure development and women’s empowerment. “Nearly every major Indo-Pacific challenge requires close cooperation among the United States’ allies and
partners, particularly Japan and the ROK,” the strategy states.
The Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral not only complements the U.S. strategy but has been identified as crucial to its achievement. Japan and South Korea have significant influence in the Indo-Pacific, and their cooperation will be needed in the areas where the United States is pushing for augmented action against China and North Korea.
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The Trilateral: New Momentum in the Indo-Pacific?
Over the last few years, in response to the changing security situation in the Indo-Pacific, there has been serious momentum building for the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral, which is re-centralizing it as a crucial security partnership. U.S. foreign policy and its attempts to promote multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific are one contributing factor, as are some efforts for engagement and deeper diplomatic ties between Tokyo and Seoul in the face of shared security threats. The security environment of the Indo-Pacific is a significant element contributing to recognizing the importance of the trilateral.
Therefore, while the trilateral remains especially necessary to maintain peace and security in Northeast Asia and counter the nuclear threat of North Korea, it is now recognized as an important mechanism for securing the whole Indo-Pacific region. The trilateral is a necessary framework to preserve the liberal democratic order and prevent democratic backsliding and authoritarianism that could destabilize the Indo-Pacific. The United States, alongside two of the most important democracies in the region, represent a significant mass of power in support of democracy to counter authoritarian and belligerent powers China and North Korea.
In a press conference with U.S. President Joe Biden, former Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide made it clear that trilateral cooperation is essential with regards to both North Korea and the overall peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, and that South Korea must be involved for effective action in the region.
The Quad Narrative
Furthermore, as a crucial part of U.S. security strategy in the Indo-Pacific, the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral can work closely with like-minded partners such as Australia and India, for instance through the Quad format, thus further strengthening this coalition of democracies.
The Fourth Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting, held on February 11 in Melbourne, culminated in a joint statement that complimented the objectives of the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral by stressing that cooperation is more effective against “coercion” such as Chinese economic and military expansion. The Quad statement also condemned the recent North Korean missile launches. Moreover, following the Quad Summit, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that while confrontation with China was not inevitable, there were real and widespread concerns over China’s increasingly aggressive behavior, and worries that situations like Ukraine and the Russia-China “no limits strategic partnership” could serve to embolden Beijing and destabilize the Indo-Pacific.
In this context, the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral meeting complemented the Quad’s latest session, because it emphasized the same commitments for security against North Korea and China and further banded these states together as the major democracies of the Indo-Pacific to counter authoritarian threats.
The trilateral also complements the “Quad Plus” narrative – a more inclusive mini-lateral of like-minded countries committed to preserving the rules-based liberal international order and which has a multipolar view of the world. Japan is already a member of the Quad, and South Korea has been floated as a potential addition to make the group into “Quad Plus.” Increasingly, countries like China and North Korea are being constrained by the synergy of countries like Japan and South Korea and their opposing outlook. Their association with the United States in their trilateral and participation in the Quad Plus framework would be an extension of this and would make the overall influence more impactful.
Calibrating Seoul’s Lukewarm Indo-Pacific Outlook
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The one drawback to more intense cooperation between the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral and Indo-Pacific mechanisms like the Quad could be South Korea’s lukewarm approach toward the Indo-Pacific (including forums like the Quad). This outlook is rooted in Seoul’s balancing act diplomacy as it attempts to walk a fine line between the United States and China. Seoul is careful not to appear a part of any overtly anti-China framework, as South Korea is dependent on China both for its economic growth and for any meaningful engagement with Pyongyang on denuclearization (a priority under President Moon Jae-in).
However, Seoul’s viewpoint may change after the upcoming presidential elections in March 2022. The conservative presidential contender, Yoon Suk-yeol, for instance, has strongly criticized the Moon administration for being too pro-China. He has argued that Seoul cannot be partners with China while Beijing remains a key ally of North Korea – the South’s “main enemy” – and instead advocated for further deepening ties with Seoul’s primary security partner, the United States. Yoon has also expressed interest in improving Seoul’s ties with Tokyo, a prospect that looks more promising now considering newly-elected Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s more “dovish” outlook vis-à-vis South Korea. Accordingly, the likelihood for greater collaborations between the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral and the Quad (and the Quad Plus), and by extension South Korea’s greater turn toward the Indo-Pacific, in the future is immense.
Hence, to conclude, the Japan-South Korea-U.S. mechanism is a crucial piece in the United States’ broad Indo-Pacific strategy and it can, moving forward, play a consequential role in the security and stability of the region. Already a foremost framework in terms of coordinating action against North Korea’s increasingly aggressive actions, the trilateral must now respond to the traditional security challenges in the Indo-Pacific as a whole. The China issue is not entirely separate from North Korea. Beijing too has shown itself to be a nuclear power all too willing to use military action and economic coercion to its own benefit. Here, the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral must take a long view and act as a stabilizing platform for alliance politics.
12. S. Korea successfully tests L-SAM missile interceptor: sources
Hopefully this will be a contribution to integrated missile defense with the US (and hopefully Japan) in the near future.
S. Korea successfully tests L-SAM missile interceptor: sources | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Feb. 23 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's military on Wednesday conducted a successful test-firing of a long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM) under development, informed sources said, in an apparent move to counter North Korea's evolving missile threats.
The state-run Agency for Defense Development oversaw the launch at a testing site in Taean, 150 kilometers southwest of Seoul, following a series of North Korean missile launches last month, including hypersonic and intermediate-range missiles.
Details on the flight test remain unknown, but it was reportedly designed to see if the L-SAM interceptor can fly on an intended trajectory and fall accurately on a preset spot.
The South Korean military has been seeking to deploy the L-SAM by 2026 as part of the country's multilayered, low-tier missile defense program. The L-SAM is designed to shoot down incoming missiles at altitudes of around 50-60 kilometers.
The launch came amid speculation the military could advance the timing for the L-SAM deployment, after the North Korean missile launches in January raised questions over South Korea's interception capabilities.
If deployed, the L-SAM interceptor would form a key part of South Korea's anti-missile program, which includes the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile and a medium-range surface-to-air missile.
The U.S. Forces Korea also runs a THAAD anti-missile battery in South Korea.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
13. Next president should take ‘consistent approach’ to NK human rights: UN expert
It would be helpful if the ROK and US governments could synchronize a human rights upfront approach to north Korea.
Excerpts:
The UN special rapporteur emphasized that the issues “are ongoing and should never be neglected by (UN) member states from the DPRK human rights agenda and during any negotiations.”
Ojea Quintana explained that 516 Korean victims who were abducted after the Korean War still remain in North Korea. He went on to say that tens of thousands of abductees and prisoners of war from the Korean War are staying in North Korea.
Last week, Ojea Quintana also met Lee Rae-jin, the elder brother of a South Korean fisheries official killed by North Korean soldiers after drifting across the inter-Korean maritime border in the western sea in September 2020.
The UN special rapporteur raised questions about the decision of the South Korean presidential office and the Coast Guard to appeal the court ruling on providing undisclosed information of the official’s death to his family.
Ojea Quintana encouraged the government to “comply with his right to know exactly what happened to his brother, which was upheld by the court.”
The UN special rapporteur on North Korea’s human rights plans to submit his last report on findings and recommendations to the Human Rights Council in March 2022.
Ojea Quintana’s term ends in August, but North Korea has not granted his visit to the country despite repeated requests.
Next president should take ‘consistent approach’ to NK human rights: UN expert
UN rapporteur calls for providing 60 million COVID vaccine doses to N. Korea
Published : Feb 23, 2022 - 18:25 Updated : Feb 23, 2022 - 18:30
Tomas Ojea Quintana, UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, speaks at a press conference in Seoul. (Yonhap)
A UN expert on Wednesday called on the next South Korean president to take a “consistent approach” to North Korean human rights issues, pointing to the Moon Jae-in government’s decision to stop co-sponsoring a UN resolution as a bad precedent.
Tomas Ojea Quintana, the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, underscored that the next South Korean government should maintain consistency in dealing with North Korean human rights issues.
“Now what we would like to see from the international community, especially from the United Nations Human Rights Framework, is a consistent approach from the Republic of Korea movement toward North Korea,” Ojea Quintana said at a press briefing held in Seoul.
“When I say consistent, it will be important not to see dramatic changes in the approach to the North Korean situation and in particular the human rights agenda,” he told reporters on the last day of his last official visit to South Korea that began Feb. 15.
Ojea Quintana said the Moon Jae-in government’s pullback from co-sponsoring a UN resolution on North Korea’s human rights situation lacks consistency.
The Moon Jae-in government took a step back in 2019, and only participated in the consensus of the UN resolution from then, as part of its efforts to promote reconciliation with North Korea.
“That was an unexpected change in the stance of the ROK government, which was not consistent with the United Nations consensus about how to approach human rights in North Korea,” the UN expert told reporters, clarifying his opposition to Seoul’s decision.
“On the issue of the ROK’s role on UN human rights resolutions, I once again expressed my concern that withdrawing from co-sponsoring these resolutions is a step backwards and could send the wrong message to the DPRK government.”
N.Korea's draconian lockdown restrictions
Speaking at the press conference, the UN special rapporteur also urged the North Korean regime, with the international community’s help, to take action to start administering COVID-19 vaccines.
Ojea Quintana expressed concerns about the Kim Jong-un regime’s COVID-19 lockdown measures that have continued for more than two years since January 2020.
The UN expert said Pyongyang has the “responsibility” to maintain the balance between curbing the COVID-19 pandemic and protecting human rights including access to adequate food, basic necessities and freedom of movement.
“The draconian measures taken by the government with regards to the restrictions in the country due to the pandemic do not comply with international human rights law,” Ojea Quintana said.
“I am mindful that all countries have to take necessary measures to prevent COVID-19, but governments also have a duty to comply with their human rights obligations.”
At the same time, Ojea Quintana called on the international community to “agree on a strategy to provide the DPRK with 60 million doses of vaccinations to cover at least two shots of the entire population.”
The UN expert underscored that the action would be the “key to opening the DPRK’s borders and resuming its interactions with the international community and bringing it out of isolation.”
North Korea has not yet responded to the international community’s proposal to provide COVID-19 vaccines through the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access facility. North Korea and Eritrea are the sole countries that have not rolled out and administered COVID-19 vaccines.
In respect to North Korea’s unresponsiveness, Ojea Quintana elucidated Pyongyang has concerns about “receiving just a partial number of vaccines and then being subjected to some kind of pressure to receive the rest of the shots.”
But the UN expert added that the UN has not yet proposed the vaccine donation plan to North Korea.
Prisoners of war, abducted victims
During his last trip to South Korea, Ojea Quintana also had his first in-person meeting with three former South Korean prisoners of war who escaped North Korea. He also last week met families of South Koreans who were abducted by North Korea during and after the Korean War.
The UN special rapporteur emphasized that the issues “are ongoing and should never be neglected by (UN) member states from the DPRK human rights agenda and during any negotiations.”
Ojea Quintana explained that 516 Korean victims who were abducted after the Korean War still remain in North Korea. He went on to say that tens of thousands of abductees and prisoners of war from the Korean War are staying in North Korea.
Last week, Ojea Quintana also met Lee Rae-jin, the elder brother of a South Korean fisheries official killed by North Korean soldiers after drifting across the inter-Korean maritime border in the western sea in September 2020.
The UN special rapporteur raised questions about the decision of the South Korean presidential office and the Coast Guard to appeal the court ruling on providing undisclosed information of the official’s death to his family.
Ojea Quintana encouraged the government to “comply with his right to know exactly what happened to his brother, which was upheld by the court.”
The UN special rapporteur on North Korea’s human rights plans to submit his last report on findings and recommendations to the Human Rights Council in March 2022.
Ojea Quintana’s term ends in August, but North Korea has not granted his visit to the country despite repeated requests.
14. Yanggang Province couple arrested and branded as political criminals for using foreign cellphones
Information is an existential threat to the regime.
Yanggang Province couple arrested and branded as political criminals for using foreign cellphones
The couple and even their twelve-year-old son will be taken to a political prisoner camp, a source told Daily NK
A view of Hyesan, in North Korea’s Yanggang Province. (Daily NK)
A couple from Samsu County, Yanggang Province, was arrested last year by North Korea’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) for using foreign mobile phones and has been branded “political criminals.”
“A couple living in Samsu County, a 45-year-old and a 38-year-old, had long been using foreign mobile phones illegally,” a source in Yanggang Province told Daily NK on Feb. 21. “They were caught through the MSS surveillance network and stood trial on Feb. 9.”
According to the source, the trial was conducted at the Samsu County Cultural Center, and presided over by MSS officials and members from the “non-socialist and anti-socialist unified command.” Once the verdict was delivered, the MSS determined the couple’s punishment.
During the trial, the MSS revealed that the couple typically used foreign mobile phones at the wife’s family home in Pochon County. In September of last year, the wife made a call while on her family’s farm plot when the signal was caught by an MSS radio locator, and the family’s “espionage activities” came to light during their arrest, the MSS claimed.
More specifically, the MSS explained that the provincial Military Security Command conducted a thorough search of the couple’s house in Samsu County and the wife’s old family home in Pochon. During the search, five Chinese mobile phones were discovered and retrieved from the old family home, where they were hidden deep inside an underground potato storage area.
The MSS mentioned that upon restoration and analysis of the deleted data from the phones, there was no doubt that the couple had been sending information about North Korea’s internal affairs, rumors floating amongst North Korean residents, and even pictures of various North Korean documents.
The MSS instilled a sense of fear among locals by warning them that it can restore records from decades ago, and that simply deleting the content of mobile phones, computers, or other devices does not permanently erase the content.
“The ruling stated that the couple was involved in the second biggest espionage case to occur in Samsu County in the last ten years or so. The MSS labelled the couple as political criminals, branding them ‘insignificant’ spies who sympathized with the enemy’s anti-Republic schemes to destroy the country,” the source added.
As a result, the couple and even their twelve-year-old son will be taken to a political prisoner camp, according to the source.
The MSS further stated that it would banish six other families related to the couple to a remote mountain area in Paekam County because they had received the couple’s “dirty money” to support their living.
The source claimed that residents of Samsu County who watched the trial could not believe that such a serious case had actually occurred because the MSS frequently fabricates “espionage cases” to instill fear among the people.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Jong So Yong is one of Daily NK’s freelance reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
15. North Korea emphasizes “ideological struggle” to help soothe public discontent amid economic malaise
You cannot eat ideology. But it is all the regime has to "feed" the people. The regime must control the population above all else. It fears the people more than it fears the US.
North Korea emphasizes “ideological struggle” to help soothe public discontent amid economic malaise
In particular, the authorities are stressing that the “vital, serious socio-political problem” currently facing the country is “uprooting non-socialist and anti-socialist phenomenon”
North Korean authorities are focusing on “ideological struggle” to soothe public discontent amid worsening economic difficulties due to the protracted COVID-19 crisis. In fact, over half of an educational reference document distributed right before the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee at the end of December focused on “ideological training.”
In the materials, North Korean authorities apparently encouraged party members and workers to avoid ideological laxity and display loyalty to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un by repeating Kim’s statements and orders from the Central Committee and Politburo meetings that followed the Eighth Party Congress.
The materials, exclusively obtained by Daily NK recently, begins with a quote by Kim, who called on followers to make the ruling Workers Party of Korea into a “studying party,” and to “firmly arm” officials, party members, and workers with the “Central Committee’s revolutionary ideology.”
The introduction explains the meaning of “Era of Our State First” and “Principle of Putting the People First,” mottos that represent the ideological regime behind Kim’s leadership. This suggests the party is continuing to work on systematizing “Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideology.”
The materials define the “Era of Our State First” as the result of the party’s “wholehearted focus on the people by boldly meeting history’s challenges” and the amplification of its own power, as well as a “new age of pride and prosperity” born of the historical struggle to bolster the dignity and status of the state.
That is to say, the materials make “development of the people’s economy” and “unity and struggle to overcome foreign pressure” key goals.
In particular, North Korean authorities are stressing that the “vital, serious socio-political problem” currently facing the country is “uprooting non-socialist and anti
Screenshot of documents recently obtained by Daily NK (Daily NK)
-socialist phenomenon” and “thoroughly establishing a socialist lifestyle.”
The materials mentioned “tactical directions” to wipe out “non-socialist and anti-socialist phenomenon” and “establish a socialist lifestyle,” as well as “revolutionary ideological attacks,” “aggressive defense,” and “intense struggle.”
In fact, the word “struggle” appears 19 times in the 16-page document. This means the authorities continue to underscore the ban on anything embracing capitalist culture and capitalist forms and severe punishment of all attempts to enjoy or permit them.
In the materials, the authorities stressed that “anti-socialist and non-socialist phenomenon” are, essentially, “expressions of capitalist ideology,” and that abandoning the struggle against those phenomena represents a “betrayal” that “abandons revolutionary and class principles.”
By designating even tacit approval of anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior short of complicity in said behavior as “betrayal,” the authorities are demanding that all citizens act as “watchers” for such activity.
At the Fourth Plenary Meeting that followed the distribution of the materials, North Korean authorities designated the eradication of anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior as a key task and ordered measures to strengthen the country’s socialist legal system.
The recent increase in crackdowns and punishments based on the country’s law to eradicate “reactionary ideology and culture” could be seen along the same lines.
Kim In-tae, a senior researcher at the South Korean Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), told Daily NK that North Korea “has been strengthening its basic direction of self-reliance since the collapse of summit talks the United States in Hanoi in February 2019, while bolstering internal controls and propaganda activities.”
Against this background, North Korea is actively using the COVID-19 pandemic as a “mechanism to completely close windows of communication with the outside world and bolster internal controls,” he added.
16. North Korea orders military education institutions to help out with Hwasong apartment construction
Disappointment among officers who thought they were having "the best year of their lives." (CGSC joke for those who know).
North Korea orders military education institutions to help out with Hwasong apartment construction
The order was issued the day after Kim Jong Un attended the groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of the new apartments
North Korean state media reported on Feb. 13 that the Hwasong apartment project groundbreaking ceremony was held on Feb. 12. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
North Korean authorities have issued an order to military education-related organizations, including Kim Il Sung Military University, to deploy personnel for the construction of 10,000 new housing units in Pyongyang’s Hwasong area.
According to a Daily NK source in Pyongyang on Tuesday, the Ministry of Defense issued the order on Feb. 13, calling on the recipients to respond with a loyal “Yes, sir!” to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s call to build yet another 10,000 housing units in the “revolutionary capital.”
Notably, the order was issued the day after Kim attended the groundbreaking for the construction of the apartments.
Basically, it underscored that Kim — who has been unable to produce economic results that effectively bolster his authority in the 10 years since he took power — has called on the military to play a major role this year in achieving the goal of stabilizing economic livelihoods through “construction politics.”
In the order, the Ministry of Defense called on units to respond to the expectations of the party, which hopes to open an age of “great prosperity in construction” with a “sea change” by producing clear results in housing construction.
Another glimpse of the intentions of the North Korean leadership can be found in the fact that military education institutions rather than regular combat units are being mobilized for the construction.
Cadets from military academies and officer training schools were deployed in months-long shifts during last year’s construction of 10,000 housing units in Pyongyang’s Songsin and Songhwa areas. This year’s construction will presumably follow a similar pattern.
The authorities also clearly aim to actively mobilize idle personnel while emphasizing how the “entire party, entire people and entire military” must carry out construction work together.
The source said the party has ordered that the entire nation take part in a “life-or-death” effort to achieve efforts to carry out, supply, and otherwise support construction efforts, thinking of these projects as a “second post-war reconstruction.” In this situation, the authorities believe it is better to mobilize more soldiers or military school cadets “who receive food from the state,” he added.
However, military academy cadets are not fully embracing the authorities’ call for them to become the “tip of the spear” of construction efforts.
The source said students are sneering at the order, saying, “We come to school to become military and political leaders, but leave as construction workers.”
Meanwhile, military academies and officer training schools across the country have also been tasked with other construction tasks besides Kim’s prized Hwasong apartment project in Pyongyang.
Specifically, the Ministry of Defense issued orders to schools and students according to region, service and specialty, including Kim Il Sung Military University, Kim Jong Il University of Military Politics and Kim Il Sung University of Politics in Pyongyang, the Air Force Academy in North Hamgyong Province, and the “Navy Academy” in South Hamgyong Province.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
17. North Korea raids major illegal currency exchange office in Sinuiju
But we do know that along with information foreign currency is a threat to the regime.
North Korea raids major illegal currency exchange office in Sinuiju
“The authorities found USD 80 million at the office," a source told Daily NK
North Korean authorities recently raided a large illegal currency exchange office in Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province. The raid comes as foreign currency exchange rates have risen in North Korea since the resumption of the North Korea-China freight train service in mid-January.
“Earlier this month, the central government dispatched personnel to raid an illegal currency exchange office in Sinuiju,” a source in North Pyongan Province said on Monday. “The authorities found USD 80 million at the office.”
According to the source, the person running the exchange office was a woman in her 40s. “She also made a lot of money elsewhere, but she mainly was involved in the currency exchange business,” he added.
Considering the fact that last year’s trade between North Korea and China was USD 318 million, the exchange office is likely one of the largest currency exchange offices in North Korea. Moreover, given the size of the capital funds the exchange office had in its possession, it was more likely to be a place where corporations or foreign companies conduct currency exchanges, rather than individuals.
As part of efforts to improve management of the country’s currency amid economic difficulties, North Korea has been issuing “money vouchers” and taking measures such as banning the use of foreign currency. Illegal currency traders, however, have been an obstacle to implementing these policies.
In fact, Daily NK reported in December last year that North Korean authorities had arrested money changers accused of obstructing the circulation of money vouchers, mainly in large cities such as Pyongyang, Sinuiju (North Pyongan Province), and Chongjin (North Hamgyong Province).
From a vantage point in China, apartments can be seen being built in Sinuiju’s Ponbu District. (Daily NK)
At the time, the authorities said that the reason for the arrest was that the money vouchers were exchanged for an amount lower than their actual value and that the money changers had made unfair profits by using the vouchers to buy imported goods, gasoline, and diesel, among other things.
This recent raid also seems to be part of the country’s crackdown to “correct the monetary order.” However, this time, the violations seem to be more related to how foreign currency is used, rather than money vouchers.
“The currency trader [in Sinuiju] established a close relationship with the Ministry of State Security and received high commissions when facilitating transactions between China and North Korea,” the source said. “She was arrested and then punished, but I am not exactly sure what punishment she received.”
North Korea’s Administrative Penalties Law punishes violations related to the mismanagement of foreign currency (Article 183), use of foreign currency (Article 184), and the siphoning off of foreign currency (Article 185).
Specifically, these violations include: having in possession an amount of foreign currency that exceeds set limits; receiving or handing out foreign currency to sell or purchase equipment or goods illegally; and, the storage of foreign currency without permission with another country’s banks, companies, or individuals by North Korean companies, factories or individuals.
The punishment for these acts include unpaid labor for up to three months, and in more severe cases, unpaid labor for over three months, re-education through forced labor, forced resignation, dismissal, or removal from office.
However, as North Korea is trying to establish a new “order” for money and foreign currency management, there is a possibility that, in order to set an example, this recent crackdown may involve a higher level of punishment than the punishments set out by the law.
Meanwhile, overseas Chinese (hwagyo) who were involved with the money changers were also arrested by China’s Ministry of Public Security. “After the North Korean authorities caught the money changers, two overseas Chinese involved were also arrested in China,” the source said.
It is possible that North Korea and China may have cooperated in investigations to target those involved in illegal foreign exchange transactions between the two countries.
Translated by Gabriela Bernal
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Mun Dong Hui is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about his articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
18. South Korea And The Bomb – Analysis
Excerpts:
At least at present, a plurality of the South Korean public
values the alliance with the US more than it desires nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation advocates might still find it worrying that around one-third of the country would choose nuclear weapons over its relationship with America. The Washington Post op-ed is right that the alliance faces
challenges, and that Washington’s regional security objectives are not always in alignment with Seoul’s (
particularly on
China). But it would be far more productive to address those challenges together and strengthen the alliance rather than doomsday-prepping as if the alliance has already failed. The US should engage in low-cost alliance maintenance to inspire more confidence in the its commitments to the relationship and demonstrate a higher prioritisation of Korean Peninsula security issues. This could include reaffirming commitments to extended deterrence and United States Forces Korea (USFK) through diplomatic visits and talks, collaborating on implementing conventional counterforce
measures, actively engaging with North Korea on the prospective end-of-war
declaration, and finding ways to improve strategic cohesion with South Korea on political and defence issues.
South Korea And The Bomb – Analysis
By Chris Gowe*
Recent domestic public polling has once again drawn attention to the internal debate over South Korean nuclearisation. Widely circulated results from a September 2021 Asan Institute survey showed that nearly 70 per cent of South Korean citizens support the development of an indigenous nuclear capability, while 61 per cent support reintroducing a tactical option. The Fall 2021 KINU Unification Survey similarly demonstrated that a growing majority of South Koreans support possessing nuclear weapons, but noted that support for nuclear armament fell considerably when respondents were asked to choose between nuclear weapons and US forces in Korea.
Nonetheless, concerns about North Korea’s accelerated buildup of military capabilities and uncertainties in the US-South Korea alliance have shaken confidence in US extended nuclear deterrence, leading some conservative politicians to renew calls for the redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea. Others have gone as far as to recommend that Seoul pursue its own domestic nuclear weapons programme. These sentiments and stressors are not new. Recent calls for nuclearisation fit into a broader history of a country that has attempted to covertly develop nuclear weapons and faces persistent regional security threats that make a nuclear capability look desirable to some.
In some ways, South Korea is already charting a path towards nuclearisation. In October 2021, Seoul successfully tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), becoming the first nuclear non-possessor state to test such a system. SLBMs are usually acquired by countries looking to secure a second strike nuclear capability. There are also plans to construct a small modular nuclear reactor at the Gampo atomic research complex for submarine propulsion—despite a US treaty that limits nuclear materials to civilian purposes. South Korea already has a high-level of nuclear latency, and deployment of reactors using highly enriched uranium (HEU) would only shorten the time necessary for it to develop a nuclear weapon. These developments have prompted speculation about Seoul’s potential nuclear ambitions.
Arguments in favour of proliferation are underpinned by a belief that North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons, and concerns about the reliability of US extended nuclear deterrence in a potential conflict. In a Washington Post op-ed, two American academics made the case for proliferation on these grounds. Due to a “weakening” of the US-South Korea alliance and the two countries’ diverging regional security objectives, the authors argued that Seoul would be better off developing its own nuclear capabilities to hedge against the growing threat from Pyongyang. They suggest that the US should “render political support‘’ for such a move. Other analysts have rejected this proposal—arguments in favour of nuclear proliferation are not mainstream in DC. Still, given the mainstreaming of arguments for possession, it is important to understand what stressors might be motivating proposals for nuclearisation, consider ways to address Seoul’s defence insecurities, and mitigate the temptation to go nuclear.
Stressors
Recent developments have lent credence to calls for South Korea to pursue its own nuclear weapons programme. For one, former President Trump and his transactional view of alliances shook confidence in US defence commitments. Trump badgered Seoul over the cost of maintaining US troops in South Korea, and reportedly even threatened to withdraw them. Even President Biden has in in some ways exacerbated these concerns among traditional allies, irking close partners on Afghanistan and AUKUS.
Potential changes to the US nuclear doctrine are also at play. The Biden administration through its ongoing nuclear posture review floated adopting a ‘no first use’ policy, which would have drastically limited US ability to provide nuclear deterrence guarantees. It walked back only after vehement protests from allies. The review is reportedly still leaving up for consideration a “sole purpose” policy, which would narrow the US nuclear use doctrine to circumstances such as a direct attack on the US or responding to a nuclear strike. Under such a policy, threats to US allies in the form of chemical or conventional weapons would be excluded from US extended nuclear deterrence. US allies such as South Korea and Germany, which depend on the nuclear umbrella as non-possessor states, oppose the proposed shift in policy.
Another concern is that the Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advancements might make it more difficult for the US to intervene in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Since the DPRK’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) are now capable of striking major US cities, as is believed to be the case with the Hwasong-14 and 15, the risk to the US of retaliation in a conflict would be significantly higher. These are the sort of factors driving some to recommend that Seoul consider an individualistic approach to its own security through nuclearisation.
Bad Tradeoffs
Proposals recommending an indigenous bomb raise the question of whether South Korea’s security situation would actually be improved by such an acquisition. It is not certain what effect the development of South Korean nuclear capability would have on North Korea’s nuclear use decision-making. One worst-case possibility is that the prospect of a nuclear Seoul alone drives Pyongyang to the point of considering a preemptive strike. At minimum, the risks and costs of miscalculation on the Korean Peninsula would grow without any improvement in deterrence. North Korea has repeatedly demonstrated that it will not hesitate to cut-off vital bilateral communication lines over any perceived slight to the regime. A nuclear-armed South would increase the North’s paranoia in a situation where those risk management guardrails happened to be out-of-service. Moreover, if another “nuclear domino” falls in Asia, the opportunity cost of others becoming NPT breakout states would also be lowered. It’s possible to imagine a cascading proliferation effect in the neighbourhood and an overall deteriorated security environment.
The US has never tolerated the idea of a nuclear South Korea. Seoul pursuing nuclearisation would likely coincide with the virtual end of the alliance. Indeed, the arguments laid out in the Washington Post op-ed are predicated on the notion that the alliance with the US is at odds with South Korea’s security concerns. This implies a choice between the alliance and nuclear weapons. It’s a self-fulfilling prophecy where a major impetus for a South Korean nuclear deterrent is the supposed weakening of the alliance, yet efforts to develop such a capability would itself be a major challenge to the relationship.
Reintroducing nuclear weapons to South Korea would also amount to abandoning any potential diplomatic solution towards denuclearisation or peace on the Korean Peninsula. While the prospects of coaxing Pyongyang to denuclearise are dim, it would be much less inclined to do so down the road if giving up its nuclear weapons meant being at a disadvantage to a nuclear Seoul. South Korea walking out of the NPT will have disastrous consequences for the global non-proliferation regime. Further, diplomatic initiatives for peace and denuclearisation with North Korea would become completely impossible, which would be a huge blow for efforts towards regional peace and stability.
What may end up being the most powerful deterrent against efforts to procure an indigenous bomb is the economic and political isolation South Korea would incur as an NPT breakout state. The US generally levies sanctions against governments that engage in proliferation activities. While a less likely target as a traditional ally, South Korea could be subject to these if it goes down the nuclear path. As an export-oriented economy, Seoul would suffer huge losses if it were on the receiving end of economic sanctions responding to nuclear weapons development. If it was directly faced with the reality of these consequences, the steam would be let out of proposals for nuclearisation.
At least at present, a plurality of the South Korean public values the alliance with the US more than it desires nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation advocates might still find it worrying that around one-third of the country would choose nuclear weapons over its relationship with America. The Washington Post op-ed is right that the alliance faces challenges, and that Washington’s regional security objectives are not always in alignment with Seoul’s (particularly on China). But it would be far more productive to address those challenges together and strengthen the alliance rather than doomsday-prepping as if the alliance has already failed. The US should engage in low-cost alliance maintenance to inspire more confidence in the its commitments to the relationship and demonstrate a higher prioritisation of Korean Peninsula security issues. This could include reaffirming commitments to extended deterrence and United States Forces Korea (USFK) through diplomatic visits and talks, collaborating on implementing conventional counterforce measures, actively engaging with North Korea on the prospective end-of-war declaration, and finding ways to improve strategic cohesion with South Korea on political and defence issues.
Chris Gowe is a recent graduate of American University and a former research intern with the Asia-Pacific
19. Reimagining the U.S.-Korea Relationship in the Indo-Pacific
Excerpts:
As a core component of upholding the liberal rules-based order in the region, market-driven economic cooperation is too important for the United States to pursue below its full potential. Given its own constraints at home, Washington should start thinking more laterally beyond emerging issues of importance. In other words, the United States should also pursue how different countries in the Indo-Pacific can add different value toward shared regional goals – both with and independent of direct cooperation with the United States.
In this sense, there is ample space to build on the foundations of South Korea’s economic outreach in the region. With a vested interest in the strength of the existing international order, South Korea is already highly active in the region through non-military means. Therefore, for the United States, the relationship with South Korea should be better recognized as a “values multiplier” and not just a “force multiplier.”
Reimagining the U.S.-Korea Relationship in the Indo-Pacific - Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
South Korea is reluctant to take a side in the growing rivalry between the United States and China. Some have contended that the onus is on Seoul to better align its Indo-Pacific initiative with that of the United States by prioritizing regional security issues. However, given key constraints, both countries and the region would realistically benefit more from Washington placing a greater emphasis on South Korea’s economic contributions to supporting the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.
No matter how you frame it – “a shrimp among whales,” “stuck in the middle,” or “between a rock and a hard place” – South Korea is among the countries most affected by the ongoing great power competition between the United States and China. The military alliance with Washington is a core pillar of Seoul’s foreign policy, but its economy is also highly dependent on trade with China. However, this picture is further complicated by the high and growing value of trade and investment with the United States, as well as China’s important role in resolving the North Korea security issue. As tensions between Beijing and Washington have intensified and fault lines started to take form, South Korea has pursued “strategic ambiguity” to avoid picking a side, a strategy which is unlikely to change soon. Still, there is more that the United States can do to enhance its relationship with South Korea in the Indo-Pacific, particularly on economic issues.
Under the Trump administration, the United States’ “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy was disproportionately focused on traditional security matters and countering a more assertive China. Seoul, however, was hesitant to wholly embrace this initiative to avoid invoking Beijing’s ire. China is by far South Korea’s largest export destination, representing about 25 percent of total goods exports. As an economy highly dependent on exports, South Korea is particularly vulnerable to Beijing weaponizing this interdependence. This was on clear display after Seoul’s deployment of THAAD, an American anti-ballistic missile defense system, which triggered Chinese economic coercion that cost the South Korean economy anywhere between $7.5 and $25 billion.
Further, Beijing is a critical player in successfully resolving the North Korea issue and can either be a competitor or collaborator for influence in Pyongyang. The best reflection of this might be that between March 2018 and June 2019 – the height of Trump’s diplomacy with Pyongyang – North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Chinese president Xi Jinping met five times, while Trump and Kim only met three times.
Recognizing the need to diversify the country’s major economic and diplomatic relationships, South Korean President Moon Jae-in launched his own regional initiative known as the New Southern Policy (NSP) in 2017 and the NSP Plus in 2020. With the ambitious goal of elevating ties with ASEAN and India to the levels of South Korea’s relations with the likes of the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, the NSP is centered around the “three Ps”: peace, prosperity, and people. In practice, however, the “peace” issues of the NSP that deal with security have lagged behind the development- and exchange-focused aspects of the initiative, resulting in a divergence with the more security-focused American regional strategy.
To bridge the gap between Seoul and Washington under Trump, the most prescribed remedy among experts was that the Moon administration should direct greater attention to the peace pillar. However, the structural constraints which led Seoul to be more hesitant in these areas have not fundamentally changed since and are likely to remain for years to come. Any increased emphasis on regional security would be too limited to transform United States-South Korea relations in the Indo-Pacific. As long as the U.S. competition with China remains a core component of Washington’s Indo-Pacific approach, Seoul’s enthusiasm for American regional initiatives is likely to be tempered. To shore up this crucial shortcoming, the United States could better utilize South Korea’s strengths by focusing on a less contentious area: economic engagement.
To its credit, the Biden administration has broadened the number of opportunities for greater regional cooperation with South Korea. In addition to making alliances more of a two-way street, Biden has pushed for the Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue (the Quad) – a group consisting of the United States, India, Japan, and Australia – to specifically address vaccine development and distribution, climate change, and emerging technologies. These areas are where South Korea has a competitive advantage and demonstrated leadership, and are also areas that are less likely to be perceived as anti-China.
On the other hand, the Biden administration’s answer to Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is poised to fall short of the leadership on trade that many in the region want the United States to return to. A shift in the domestic landscape after Trump’s election has made the United States’ return to the mega-regional trade agreement’s successor, the Comprehensive and Progressive TPP (CPTPP), a political non-starter, which is likely the impetus for the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework to be announced early this year. Though details have not been announced, the Biden administration has been clear that this will not be a traditional trade agreement. Rather, it will be a “flexible” arrangement to “define shared objectives” for issues such as trade facilitation, standards for the digital economy and technology, and supply chain resiliency. In contrast, China is a party of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – the largest trade agreement in the Indo-Pacific and the world – and is seeking to join the CPTPP.
As a core component of upholding the liberal rules-based order in the region, market-driven economic cooperation is too important for the United States to pursue below its full potential. Given its own constraints at home, Washington should start thinking more laterally beyond emerging issues of importance. In other words, the United States should also pursue how different countries in the Indo-Pacific can add different value toward shared regional goals – both with and independent of direct cooperation with the United States.
In this sense, there is ample space to build on the foundations of South Korea’s economic outreach in the region. With a vested interest in the strength of the existing international order, South Korea is already highly active in the region through non-military means. Therefore, for the United States, the relationship with South Korea should be better recognized as a “values multiplier” and not just a “force multiplier.”
South Korea has been deepening its economic ties within the region on its own. Prior to the pandemic in 2019, its total trade amounted to $151.3 billion with ASEAN countries and $20.7 billion with India, both up nearly 30 percent from 2016 levels. Seoul played a key role in facilitating this increased trade through trade agreements with ASEAN and India, entering into force in 2007 and 2010 respectively, and will further economic engagement with ASEAN through RCEP. As of 2019, total South Korean foreign direct investment (FDI) among ASEAN countries has amounted to nearly $10 billion, constituting 15 percent of the country’s overall FDI. Through the NSP, the South Korean government has taken an even more active role to build regional commercial ties with new initiatives such as the creation of the Korea-South & Southeast Asia Business Coalition.
Southeast Asia is also a clear priority in South Korea’s Official Development Assistance (ODA). Aid to ASEAN members almost doubled from $234.6 million in 2010 to $472.8 million in 2019. That year, aid to Southeast Asia represented 15 percent of its total ODA, with five ASEAN members landing among the top 10 recipients of South Korean aid. Additionally, the South Korean government announced plans to double ODA to six ASEAN countries from the 2019 level to $151 million by 2023. Seoul has added further value by drawing from its own experience of going from a developing to a developed economy and its expertise in areas such as digital infrastructure and smart cities.
However, there have been limitations to South Korea’s efforts. Seoul fell below its stated target of $200 billion in trade with ASEAN by 2020. South Korea’s share of ASEAN members’ imports also decreased from 7.7 percent in 2017 to 6.9 percent in 2020, though largely driven by an 18.2 percent drop in exports to Indonesia in 2020. ODA and FDI to Southeast Asia also trails behind other advanced countries. For instance, in 2019, South Korea’s $2.4 billion in new investment to ASEAN ranked 17th among countries. When its nearly $5.5 billion in new investment ranked sixth just a year earlier, it was still well behind the EU’s collective $25.8 billion and Japan’s $23.3 billion. Further, much of South Korea’s investment is concentrated in Vietnam – particularly in manufacturing electronic goods for export, but also increasingly in consumer goods. As of 2019, about half of South Korea’s trade and investment in ASEAN is with Vietnam.
These economic engagement challenges should not be expected to disappear completely; nevertheless, by prioritizing South Korea’s role in the region as a highly engaged and responsible economic player, Washington would do more to help alleviate concerns in Seoul about great power competition, while advancing market-based principles and growth in the Indo-Pacific. Such a move would undoubtedly encourage South Korea to redouble its economic activity with the region and take on more responsibilities in key forums and issue areas. Although Seoul cannot realistically be expected to outperform larger economies, it can help to catalyze more trade and development, particularly in critical Fourth Industrial Revolution areas where South Korea has demonstrated expertise. In a contest of over which values will govern the future of the region, this is ultimately as important to the United States as traditional security cooperation.
. . .
Kyle Ferrier is a Fellow and Director of Academic Affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America. He was formerly a regular contributor to The Diplomat’s “The Koreas” section from 2018 to 2021 and holds an MSc in International Political Economy from the London School of Economics.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
