Quotes of the Day:

"The point of modern propaganda isn’t only to misinform or push an agenda. It is to exhaust your critical thinking, to annihilate truth." 

– Garry Kasparov

"The key to successful influence operations lies in credibility, consistency, and patience."

– Robert Gates

"In the wars of the future, special operations forces will be critical to identifying and eliminating threats before they can reach our shores. Their ability to operate in the shadows and adapt to evolving threats makes them indispensable in the fight against terrorism and other unconventional adversaries." 

– Robert Gates

1. Ghosts in the Machine: Irregular recruitment for an irregular force

2. Special Ops a Steady Presence in Chaotic World

3. Air Force Special Operators Developing Drone-Launched Swarms

4. GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE: Pathfinding, Transforming to Deter, Defeat Special Ops’ Evolving Enemies

5. Main Street on a Flattop aka Operation Flattop

6. HOPE, DELUSION, AND REALITY Joint Force Campaigning

7. Divisions in the Dirt: The Army’s plan for the next big war

8. US Troop Levels in Pacific Take Center Stage as Defense Secretary Huddles with Allied Defense Leaders

9. American troops return to strategic islands near Taiwan for air-assault practice

10. Will DOD need to start producing some medicines to protect troops?

11. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 6, 2024

12. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 6, 2024

13. U.S. Soldier Detained in Russia

14. Secure at Home, Putin Builds on the Alliances He Needs to Prevail in Ukraine

15. How DC became obsessed with a potential 2027 Chinese invasion of Taiwan

16. One defense strategy, two drastically different budgets

17. Soldier Shot During Special Forces Training Event After Live Ammo Mixed in with Blanks

18. Demonstration will bring simulated gunfire, helicopters to Florida during Special Operations Forces Week

19. The Drone Dilemma and the U.S. Air Force

20. America’s China Strategy Has a Credibility Problem

21. The Secret to Japanese and South Korean Innovation

1. Ghosts in the Machine: Irregular recruitment for an irregular force

Kudos to 4th PSYOP Group and to the US Army for recognizing the importance of his video and publishing this article.

For those who have not seen the excellent 3 minute 11 second video it can be viewed at this link: https://youtu.be/V6hu83yVMlU

Some thoughts:

In WWII, OSS Director William J. Donovan believed that “persuasion, penetration, and intimidation” were modern day counterparts to “sapping and mining in the siege warfare of former days.”

In the 21^st Century Former DIA and CIA Director General Michael Hayden said, "Influence operations are as essential to national security as traditional military capabilities, shaping perceptions and narratives to advance strategic objectives."

"The key to successful influence operations lies in credibility, consistency, and patience." - Robert Gates

"Influence operations are about winning hearts and minds, shaping opinions, and deterring adversaries without resorting to kinetic force." - James Stavridis

"The most effective influence operations are those that operate in the shadows, unseen but deeply felt." - H.R. McMaster

"Influence operations are a vital tool in the modern arsenal, allowing nations to project power without firing a shot." - John Allen

With these observations from senior leaders, why is it easier to get permission to put a hellfire missile on the forehead of a terrorist than it is to put an idea between someone’s ears?

I wish we would let our PSYOP professionals be fully empowered to do their jobs. Let slip the influence dogs of war.

Ghosts in the Machine: Irregular recruitment for an irregular force

By Sgt. 1st Class Tim BeeryMay 6, 2024

https://www.army.mil/article/276015/ghosts_in_the_machine_irregular_recruitment_for_an_irregular_force?utm

You’re an Army Psychological Operations officer. Faced with a recruiting challenge, you’ve been given the unenviable task to package and market a military specialty that is based on an abstract skillset to the next generation of Army soldiers. You must develop an appropriate means to reach Gen Z recruits who are not usually interested in planes, tanks, or guns. What do you do?

If your immediate thought is to create the most disruptive recruiting teaser of all time — and then do it again, you’re on the right track.

This conundrum presented itself to officers of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) in late 2021 as leaders sought to attract the next generation of PsyOp enlistees. Experts in persuasion and influence, PsyOp soldiers don’t often fit the mold of an average Army recruit. There are similarities to be sure, but a PsyOp candidate must meet a few additional requirements to excel in the specialty. These individuals live and think outside traditional norms, and recruiting efforts need to meet them through non-traditional means.

“There is a little bit of a change with the newer generation,” said Master Sgt. Matthew Johnson, the non-commissioned officer in charge of U.S. Army Special Operations Recruiting. “A lot of people who join the Army these days — they like to see the steps of the process and they want to know what is out there for them.” he said.

“If the (recruit) feels like you are pandering, you’ve lost them,” added an identity protected Army PsyOp officer who led the charge to meet the recruiting challenge. He will be referenced by the pseudonym Gray.

Johnson explained that recruiting techniques have had to adjust to a changing world, especially following 20 years of war, a global pandemic, and an ever-changing and divided political landscape. That starts with arming recruiters with the tools to speak the language to their recruits, but also meeting the need to communicate the intentionally vague characteristics of an Army specialty that deals in persuasion and influence, and is not well known, both in the force and the general public.

“The challenge there is how do you sell an intangible art form,” said Gray.

“I mean, Special Forces has (recruiting) easy,” he continued. “You show some guys on a plane, or in a halo jump, or on a stack and there's an infinite amount of ways to make that look appealing. With an intangible concept, you do it through art.” he explained.

This is what inspired Ghosts in the Machine, a thought provoking video produced by Gray and his team, which made its debut in true PsyOp fashion — unannounced, in the middle of the night — on a brand new YouTube channel, May 3, 2022. Following unprecedented success, reaction, and discourse from the first video, U.S. Army Special Operations Command has commissioned a sequel video, which extends the messaging and theme of its predecessor and leaves the viewer with a powerful call to action.

Do you believe in the power of words and ideas?

As in the first video, Ghosts in the Machine 2 leads the viewer on a journey of deep introspection. Quotes, both audible and in text, sound, images and ideas are layered in a fashion that creates tension while drawing the viewer in. Much like the PsyOp discipline, the video is persuasive and intended to elicit an emotional response. Emotion has power. Each scene has a purpose, every sound an objective. Which emotions are triggered varies depending on the viewer and it is developed in a way that each subsequent watch can trigger different emotions, Both videos are written deliberately to garner curiosity. They want the viewer to question why the content makes them feel a certain way. The objective is to harness the power of thought to find the next PsyOp candidate.

“The person who asks why is the kind of person that we’re looking for,” said Gray. “They want to understand how people work, why they do the things they do. That will help them (PsyOp soldiers) to do their job.” he said.

He continued, “So posing that in the video at the meta level, I thought, was a good exercise.”

Thought provocation is the driving factor in Ghosts in the Machine. The series is designed that way. Gray explained that his team took creative inspiration from the 1975 film Jaws where suspense is built through the knowledge that danger is lurking just out of sight, beneath the surface.

“We took the ethos that we don’t show the shark,” he said. “By creating emphasis and a vibe through sound design and imagery, the human mind takes that and makes an image far more evocative than anything we can put on screen.”

Using the power of the mind to persuade opinion and discourse is a key functional area in PsyOps. It’s fitting that the recruiting tool is designed to ignite curiosity through imagination. They seek those who seek to know more.

“Ghosts in the Machine has a two-part intent,” said Col. Mike Burns, a Public Affairs Officer with U.S. Special Operations Command. “We want to attract the candidate off the street, however we also want to attract the soldier who is currently serving, and wants to push their career even further.”

“The ideal (PsyOp) candidate is one who is very cerebral and analytical,” added Johnson. “They are people who can dive into creative problem solving.”

A military specialty that focuses on creative thinking like Psychological Operations naturally attracts a wider array of individual soldiers than a prototypical career such as infantry or human resources. Due to this variance, there is not a simple solution or demographic for recruiters to focus on. They have to attract the right candidate, and as Johnson alluded to, they have to let the candidate know what is in it for them. Being upfront and informational is key to attracting the type of talent that can excel in the power of persuasion. Finding that talent means casting a wide net.

“I feel like I can go into any high school in America and say — whether you’re in the robotics club, or the STEM club, or you're a middle linebacker, or you build sets for the drama club — if you want to make a difference in the world, we’ve got a place for you,” said Burns.

“You’re going to be welcomed, you’ll be part of a diverse team, and you’re going to make a difference,” he added.

Ghosts in the Machine is not your run-of-the-mill Army recruiting video series. In fact, it is unlike any other public facing video the Army has ever produced. It has spawned debate on social media, and traditional media, while many did not believe it was an official U.S. Army product. The use of non-traditional imagery caused Army leaders to question the initial utility of the video.

“There were little things we got pushback on like the dancing ghost,” said Johnson. “That’s not the actual logo, or crest of the Psychological Operations Command. They use the knight chess piece. So that caused pushback for us to be able to stamp that as an Army product,” he said.

There were other obstacles faced through the release as well. The use of esoteric topics, and the fear of the unknown pose a different posture than the public image the Army strives to maintain.

Through some persuasion and explanation, it was assured to those with concerns that recruiting is the perfect vehicle to break traditional norms. Both videos use irregular means to address real stakes in an inspired fashion.

“We screened (Ghost 1) for a few audiences prior to the release,” explained Gray. “We wanted to see if the recruiting angle came across and the language was appropriate. It was close enough to the line that it created a sense of urgency.”

Following a few more screen tests, Gray and his team received approval to launch the video to the entire force. It was in the middle of the night, sitting on top of a dryer in the Middle East, that he published the video. Since that time it has gained 1.6 million views, nearly 8,000 comments, close to 23,000 followers, and spawned numerous debates in both social media and traditional media about the subject matter. Ghosts in the Machine got the public to do what they had not done before, which was talk about Psychological Operations in the Army. Success of the first video led to the creation of the sequel, which has been met with enthusiasm and a signoff from the powers that be.

“With this (video), PsyOps is all in, USAREC is all in. Once it is released, it has backing and we can really capitalize on it,” said Johnson. “We will be able to get it out to the masses without the red tape of the first one.”

Gray has been an Army officer for most of his adult life. He has been a self-proclaimed “video nerd” since his teenage years. Dating back to the mid 2000s, when he would watch movie trailers online, he developed a passion for video production. Gaining inspiration from motion pictures, he built a skill set that, at first glance, seems incongruent with an Army officer.

“My whole career I’ve heard from the outside, ‘You can’t make videos in the Army’, " he laughed. “I took the mindset of, yes, I can do this. I will do this, watch me.”

Video production has been a driving factor in his career as a PsyOp officer and he has been able to spearhead multiple large products through his passion. The ability to “talk shop” has enabled him to impact the force through his fervor.

“I work with a high percentage of Combat Camera specialists,” said Gray. “Knowing the skill set gives me the ability to give these guys direction. I can talk the creative process and can get down and dirty with the actual discipline in a way that typical officers can’t,” he said.

Gray and his team produced both videos in-house. Some elements in the project were purchased, such as stock footage and sound effects, but most of the scenes and images are original and were shot and produced in the woods surrounding Fort Liberty. Props such as a mannequin head, cassette tape and Army challenge coins were acquired and used to create a professional product that looks like a production house would have created, only they were able to do it autonomously while maintaining complete creative control.

The defining feature of Ghosts in the Machine 2 is the call to action. While the first video focuses on psychological warfare and the unknown, the sequel follows the theme that words and ideas are effective weapons, and empowers the viewer to embrace their thoughts and feelings. The final scene within the video displays the text “See you at Selection” and directs the viewer to the U.S. Army Special Operations Recruiting website (GoArmySOF.com). From here they can find more information about PsyOps, Civil Affairs or Special Forces, along with prerequisites, requirements and how to reach a recruiter.

“We love the video, it looks really great,” said Johnson. “We want to do everything we can in recruiting to get it in front of as many folks as we can, to promote the 37F Psychological Operations MOS,” he said.

Once contact has been made, the recruitment staff is prepared with the tools to give recruits an in-depth view on their future path. Johnson mentioned that his team has also created a PsyOp related video intended for the recruit once they enlist, or for the current soldier who decides they want to join PsyOps. This video delves into training requirements, life at the schoolhouse and day-to-day duties of a PsyOp trainee.

“We took a camera behind closed doors, in the areas where these individuals do their training,” he said. “Our product explains the pathway to becoming a Psychological Operations Specialist. They’re gonna see Ghosts in the Machine 2, and that will engage their interest, but when they want to see how to do it, they’ll be led to a recruiter who is equipped with our video to walk them through the steps to become a 37F Psychological Operations Specialist.”

Since the release of the first video, there has been chatter among newer trainees who were influenced after seeing it, said Gray. “I was able to see the group of recruits that was in the class following the launch of the video. It showed the impact of what we did.”

While it is critically acclaimed, ultimately the measure of success for Ghosts in the Machine will show up in the recruiting classes over the next half decade or so. Much like the specialty of PsyOps itself, this recruiting tool uses intentionally vague messaging to reach a very specific purpose. The message is beneath the surface, but the intent is crystal clear: fill the nation’s call and recruit the next generation of PsyOp soldiers.

2. Special Ops a Steady Presence in Chaotic World

More articles about SOF during SOF week. NDIA recommends attending their two symposia in June.

Excerpts:

It is noteworthy that its commander, Army Gen. Bryan Fenton, told Congress that SOCOM is currently seeking to bridge gaps with industry and the private investment community to provide alternative funding streams to maximize the disruptive technology available to its warfighters.

The first enduring Special Operations Forces truth is its people are more important than hardware. The command is working with research institutions and universities to support the holistic health — physical, psychological, cognitive, social and spiritual — of its warriors. Rapidly evolving technology is profoundly impacting the future character of war, and the resilience of personnel’s cognitive health will be a key element of the command’s future decisive advantage.

Special Ops a Steady Presence in Chaotic World

5/6/2024

By Michael Bayer

https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2024/5/6/special-ops-a-steady-presence-in-chaotic-world

Defense Dept. photo

In the last several months, I have written here about the brutality of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and the attack on innocent civilians in Israel.

In addition, I have highlighted the ongoing efforts by the People’s Republic of China to militarize islands it has illegally occupied in the South China Sea and — around those islands — its increasingly unsafe and unprofessional maneuvers against the U.S. military and our allies and partners.

The consequences of these breakdowns of global norms and security across the globe are increasing human tragedy and increasing the potential for larger and more deadly conflicts.

In the middle of this chaos, the United States and the world is fortunate to have the steadying will and skill of the magnificent men and women who comprise U.S. Special Operations Forces.

In this era of strategic competition, SOF’s activities and operations are a key component of the nation’s integrated deterrence by every day helping potential adversaries conclude that today is not the day to act. This in turn improves the commander in chief’s global leadership and increases his diplomatic maneuver space while improving the risk calculations for U.S., allied and partner forces.

Special Operations Command delivers all of this as only 3 percent of the total Joint Force and a mere 2 percent of the Defense Department’s operating budget.

I am certain every reader of this column understood the command’s high operational tempo in support of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, but not everyone understands that in this return to global strategic rivalry, Special Operations Forces are in more demand than ever.

Today, geographic combatant commanders are requesting more and more special ops personnel and their critical enablers in support of campaigning activities against National Defense Strategy priorities. In addition, over the past three years, SOCOM has seen its crisis response responsibilities demand increase more than 130 percent over the previous decade’s annual average.

This high demand signal means special operators’ understanding of the rapidly evolving character of war is always fresh and experience-based, and that experience is driving the command’s urgency to modernize capabilities by incorporating emerging technologies to sustain its decisive advantage.

In recent congressional written testimony, command leaders highlighted the compelling need to modernize capabilities in five key technical challenge areas: battlespace awareness; emplacement and access; all-domain communications and computing; scalable precision effects; and warfighter performance.

In addition, the command is working closely with the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering on three of its technology priorities: biotechnologies; electronic warfare and electronic attack; and military information support operations.

It is important for all of us to understand how SOCOM is able to integrate, field and scale new technology more quickly than other parts of the Defense Department.

The answer is that the command has several distinct advantages. Beyond its unique acquisition authorities, it exploits the organization’s agility and ability to rapidly operationally test new concepts and technologies.

In addition, it is able to successfully leverage Other Transaction Authorities, including Middle Tier of Acquisition and commercial solutions openings.

This acquisition agility enables the command to benefit from rapidly changing technologies, many of which are developed and produced in the commercial sector by small companies.

It is noteworthy that its commander, Army Gen. Bryan Fenton, told Congress that SOCOM is currently seeking to bridge gaps with industry and the private investment community to provide alternative funding streams to maximize the disruptive technology available to its warfighters.

The first enduring Special Operations Forces truth is its people are more important than hardware. The command is working with research institutions and universities to support the holistic health — physical, psychological, cognitive, social and spiritual — of its warriors. Rapidly evolving technology is profoundly impacting the future character of war, and the resilience of personnel’s cognitive health will be a key element of the command’s future decisive advantage.

To experience all this up close, mark your calendars now to attend two high-impact National Defense Industrial Association conferences where the special ops community is heavily engaged: modeling and simulation, and countering weapons of mass destruction.

First, we would love to see you June 12-13 in Orlando for the 2024 Training and Simulation Industry Symposium, hosted by the National Training and Simulation Association, an NDIA affiliate. TSIS provides industry an opportunity to network and interact with Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Space Force procurement officials regarding training and simulation products and services. The symposium will provide insights on timing and funding levels of near-term and long-term opportunities, as well as acquisition strategies.

In addition, please plan on joining the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Division in Baltimore June 24-26 for the 2024 CBRN Defense Conference and Exhibition.

The conference will focus on the theme: “CWMD and Pandemic Preparedness Inflection Point -- We Must ACT NOW or Risk/Gamble the Future!”

The conference includes senior leaders from the White House and Departments of Defense and Homeland Security — along with acquisition officials — to promote the exchange of technical and operational information related to defenses against weapons of mass destruction. The three-day agenda is packed with panels covering relevant functional areas, including defensive measures, chemical weapons demilitarization, treaty compliance, industrial base issues and domestic preparedness. ND

Michael Bayer is NDIA board chair and president and CEO of Dumbarton Strategies.

3. Air Force Special Operators Developing Drone-Launched Swarms

Can we innovate as quickly as our Ukrainian friends. 

Air Force Special Operators Developing Drone-Launched Swarms

5/3/2024

By Josh Luckenbaugh

https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2024/5/3/air-force-special-operators-developing-drone-launched-swarms?utm

Air Force photo

Air Force Special Operations Command is taking advantage of “significant advancements” in autonomous aircraft technology to have their drones do a lot more than the traditional counterterrorism missions.

One concept will transform its MQ-9 medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned systems from surveillance aircraft to motherships that can dispatch smaller drones to perform a variety of missions.

The Adaptive Airborne Enterprise, or A2E, is a major part of that transformation, said its program director Col. Trey Olman.

The goal of the program is to take advantage of the “significant advancements” in automation and unmanned systems in recent years “to bring some new opportunities and capabilities to bear for AFSOC and for the DoD,” Olman said in an interview.

“There are plenty of ways to innovate manned platforms … but there has been a lot of significant headway made in the technology space in unmanned systems as of late, and A2E represents our ability to capitalize on that headway,” he said.

The new missions line up with the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which calls for the command to shift its focus from primarily counter-violent extremist organization operations to great power competition.

C. Mark Brinkley, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. spokesman, said modern conflicts from Ukraine to the Red Sea “are highlighting the value and utility of UAS to large-scale combat operations.”

“Whether they are small or large, UAS are providing valuable awareness and strike options that otherwise may not be possible with crewed aircraft due to contested environments,” Brinkley said in an email.

With A2E, the command is looking to move beyond using its General Atomics-built fleet of MQ-9 drones exclusively for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and strike operations, a command release stated.

Olman said while the MQ-9 will still “conduct its traditional role,” the command wants the platform to also “deliver mass in depth and at scale.”

“And what I mean is that the MQ-9 will be able to bring air-launched assets organically to the fight — and then deploy them when necessary — so that one platform can almost instantaneously deliver the effect of four to six platforms … without having to fly in multiple different weapons systems and park them overhead,” he said.

The MQ-9 would serve not only as a “mothership” for smaller platforms but also as a “communications relay node for backhauling all of the relevant sensing information and being a conduit for command-and-control information flowing both ways into and out of the battlespace,” he said.

With A2E, the command will have the ability to “operate multiple large and small UASs simultaneously, covering more terrain and prosecuting more targets in environments that are not currently accessible,” the release said.

AFSOC Commander Lt. Gen. Tony Bauernfeind said A2E is the command’s top acquisition priority and is “vital to thickening the Joint Force kill web throughout the spectrum of conflict.”

The command has broken up A2E development into five phases, the first three of which are currently underway, the release stated.

Phase one is transitioning from fixed ground control stations to a government-owned command-and-control interface for drones called the AFSOC Remotely Piloted Aircraft Control Suite, or ARCS — a joint venture between AFSOC and the Army’s Joint Systems Integration Laboratory, Olman said.

It will “shrink a traditional [remotely piloted aircraft] crew’s deployed footprint and provide operators with the flexibility and mobility to fly various aircraft from austere locations — whether operating from the back of an AC-130, home station or even urban environments,” the press release stated.

It also enables phases two and three of A2E: a single crew operating multiple MQ-9s at the same time and controlling multiple types of drones — ranging from small Group 1 aircraft to larger Group 5 platforms like the MQ-9.

The system “allows our operators to only have to learn one primary vehicle interface, and then it allows them to connect to different types of air vehicles from different vendors. So, we can truly have a heterogeneous formation being controlled by one operator,” Olman said.

During a series of demonstrations in December 2023, the command used the suite to exhibit two “novel capabilities,” according to the press release: control three MQ-9As simultaneously and attach and air-launch an Altius 600 — a Group 2 small drone — from an MQ-9A.

General Atomics “has been developing and testing the ability to launch various effects to include small UAS from … the MQ-9” for the last several years, Brinkley said. “The MQ-9’s flexible and agile systems architecture, coupled with its payload capacity and long endurance, makes it an ideal mothership for A2E.”

“The value that can be achieved [by] combining large and small UAS working in tandem to deliver stand-in capability at lower cost — and more importantly lower risk — is hard to ignore,” he added.

Along with Group 2 systems, special operators are also looking into two types of Group 3 systems that could be air-launched from an MQ-9, Olman said. One variant would primarily perform communications relay and sensing, and the other would be what Olman called a “swarm carrier.”

The swarm carrier would “go out at a distance and then deploy” smaller Group 2 systems, “so the [air-launched effects] could come off of the MQ-9, or they could come off of the swarm carrier going forward in the future,” he said.

One potential problem is the impact that loading increasingly heavy payloads would have on an MQ-9’s performance. The MQ-9A features seven hardpoints and the MQ-9B — which the command is also acquiring — has nine, and while “it is feasible to carry sUAS on all the hardpoints … operational use will depend on many factors, including range and endurance considerations,” Brinkley said.

“The more weight on an aircraft when it takes off, the less distance it can cover or time it can remain in the air,” he said. “But one of the key benefits of MQ-9A and MQ-9B is the ability to carry multiple payloads and still have long on-station times. That on-station time could increase every time an MQ-9 releases a small UAS during its mission because it removes some of the weight, drag and fuel use penalty, thus freeing up additional endurance depending on the various factors in the operation.”

Another challenge will be the additional training required for operators, as the command suite and the A2E human-machine interface — called Vigilant Spirit — are very different from what crews use today, Olman said.

A part of that challenge is “just a change in mindset from … more hands-on aircraft command style stick and rudder flying to more of a mission management style of flying” and “having to concern themselves with eventually larger numbers of platforms and assets and resources,” he said.

“There [is] a lot about it that is different. Every time we do an experimental event, we’re getting good lessons learned and feedback, and it’s going toward the changes that we make as we continue to develop these capabilities,” he said.

The final two phases of the program will involve a single crew controlling formations of drones from mobile and austere locations and then finally creating new effects-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance units, which could include drones, forward deployed ground forces and cyber and space operators “that can collaboratively employ UAS capabilities in permissive, contested or denied environments,” the release said.

Another demonstration is planned for this summer, the focus of which will be air-to-ground handover of small UAS, Olman said. “A2E represents the ability for air assets to be able to forward project air power for our ground teams to be able to take advantage of, and so we’re going to be going through the air-to-ground handover pieces.”

The command will also be testing out a collaborative mission autonomy software called Golden Horde, he said. Developed by the Georgia Tech Research Institute, Golden Horde will be loaded onto Group 2 UAVs, “which are then going to be collaborating with one another to go autonomously search for a target that will be located out on the range.”

Greater autonomy “allows us to create even more separation between either our humans and our autonomous platforms or our high-value assets and the autonomous platforms,” Olman said.

Currently, crews must “maintain some level of close proximity” to the drones they’re operating, he said. “We’re effectively tethered to our uncrewed systems, and that tether provides an operational risk and it provides limitations.”

“What the autonomy is going to do is allow us to put a lot more distance between those high-value assets and the autonomous vehicles that they’re releasing or communicating with, because now those smaller platforms can just drive out on their own with their own mission-type orders … which they will execute and then report back if and when needed based off of the parameters that are preset,” he said.

A lot of small- and medium-sized companies are breaking into the autonomy space, and AFSOC is collaborating with Special Operations Command to develop a government reference architecture “that will then allow vendors to build those instances of autonomy with their platforms, whether they just build software or if they build hardware that comes with autonomy on it,” Olman said. “It will allow them to provide that and plug it into our architecture.”

The demonstration this summer is the first time AFSOC is “dipping our toe into those waters” with autonomy, “and it’s really exciting for the team because autonomy is really one of those areas that is probably going to … change the nature of what we do and how we do it moving into the future,” he said. ND

4. GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE: Pathfinding, Transforming to Deter, Defeat Special Ops’ Evolving Enemies

GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE: Pathfinding, Transforming to Deter, Defeat Special Ops’ Evolving Enemies

5/6/2024

By Melissa Johnson

https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2024/5/6/government-perspective-pathfinding-transforming-to-deter-defeat-special-ops-evolving-enemies

Defense Dept. photo

As Special Operations Command’s acquisition executive, I honorably serve and support the elite special operations force warfighter.

Although we face more challenges in today’s battlespace than ever before, we stand ready to equip our team to win. To deter near-peer adversaries, defeat violent extremists and rapidly respond to crises worldwide, it is imperative these warfighters are equipped with war-winning, transformational capabilities and systems.

I am grateful for the opportunity to serve for a third time in the command, dual-hatted as its acquisition executive and the director of acquisition, technology and logistics, or AT&L.

I stand on the shoulders of those who have gone before me. And while delivery speed to the warfighter has been the foundation of the command’s acquisition enterprise, we cannot solely rest on the success of the past. The challenges before us are more complex, and to increase decision speed, agility, precision and lethality, AT&L must connect as a Special Operations Forces “family of systems” and do so with the greater Joint Force. To rapidly develop, produce and field leading edge capabilities at scale, taking risks and pathfinding are more important than ever.

Equipping the world’s premier warfighter with war-winning capabilities requires the best acquisition talent, period. I go back to the idea of what it means to be a SOF acquirer. We recruit and retain a diverse, highly trained and experienced multi-functional team. But it doesn’t stop there. It’s our responsibility to build a bench with the next generation of acquisition leaders motivated to trailblaze and pioneer ground-breaking capabilities. Our acquisition leaders must continue to be determined to defeat a relentless enemy and constantly focus on winning. We owe this to the special operations warfighter.

The close relationships acquisition, technology and logistics has with the operational community is a key reason I have always been drawn to Special Operations Command. These relationships are essential in building trust between the acquirer and operator, which demonstrates development and operations at its best.

In addition, our partnerships with the other services, the interagency and international partners are critical in sharing best-of-breed technology.

Technology is at the forefront of AT&L’s daily business, and we need the most advanced technology, but it takes much more than that to win. Technology enables capability, which is ultimately part of a system that integrates within a system of systems. While it’s not feasible to connect every system to each other, we must drive the architecture to ultimately increase effectiveness, efficiency and lethality of special ops warfighters.

Providing transformational capabilities requires advanced software and artificial intelligence algorithms to reduce unnecessary burdens on the warfighter, enhance warfighter performance, increase battlespace awareness and increase placement and access for operators.

The acquisition, technology and logistics enterprise is highly effective as a separate agency reporting directly to the SOCOM commander, co-located with headquarters. As a separate and distinct agency, we foster a culture of taking risks and empowering at the lowest capable level.

The chain of command between the program manager to the program executive officer or acquisition executive is very short, which enables quick decisions. This culture drives my passion. Our team is committed to leveraging all the tools in the acquisition toolbox to rapidly deliver at the speed of Special Operations Forces. But we can’t do this alone. We need the help of industry, academia and the other services to bring their perspective and capabilities.

Developing, producing and sustaining special operations-unique systems requires strong partnerships with industry, and AT&L has a long history of working with both large and small companies that work together with program teams to deliver rapidly to the warfighter. However, the ecosystem must be expanded to the investment community to meet the needs of an increasingly complex threat environment.

Optimizing the use of SOFWERX, our public-private partnership, as a venue to reach small businesses, entrepreneurs and academia, accelerates ideas into fieldable systems. In addition, we are increasing collaboration with the private capital investment ecosystem to share the command’s areas of interest and identify viable pathfinders. This is a great opportunity to maximize the power of the private capital market against hard special operations problems and to accelerate technology into their capabilities.

Like the command’s elite operators, its acquirers’ ability to go fast is based on many factors. Key among those factors is the excellence in their craft, their dedication to the mission, close partnership with the operational community and industry and a willingness to take managed risks.

The combination of these factors is what make the command’s acquisition, technology and logistics leaders trusted experts. The credibility that comes from delivering at the speed of Special Operations Forces enables freedom of action. This team is dedicated to equipping our warfighters to deter and if necessary defeat those who threaten the country and its interests. I couldn’t be prouder to serve with these amazing professionals. ND

Melissa Johnson is U.S. Special Operations Command’s acquisition executive.

5. Main Street on a Flattop aka Operation Flattop

A fascinating story. from Matt Armstrong. What if....?

Excerpts;

Though the State Department was interested in pursuing the idea, the Navy Department was less interested. The Navy, according to a memo to Public Affairs from Policy Planning, “did not have any commitment to supply a carrier and crew and to finance the operation” and, State further learned, “would find it difficult to get a crew together, and that they had absolutely no funds to pay for activating, reconditioning, and for fuel and other operating expenses.” There were also concerns that the maximum clearance in the hanger deck may pose challenges to the proposed buildings, plus concerns over the “very real problems of carrying any female personnel aboard.”

“Main Street on a Flattop” would have been something. I can’t help but wonder, however, if something might not have happened to the ship. The Russians were very worried about what today we call an information war. On March 26, 1947, for example, the Associated Press reported the State Department’s Voice of America “is finally making itself heard in Russia.” Operating under the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, VOA had started experimenting with broadcasting to Russia early that month, but there had been trouble. On March 27, it was discovered that the doors to VOA’s transmitter in Munich carrying the Russian language broadcast “had been broken and the switch of the antenna had purposely been ‘reversed’ so that it was directed to South America rather than to Moscow.” (VOA then had six antennae at that Munich site.) In violation of international law, the Soviet Union began jamming VOA in April 1949, suggesting the US was winning the “war of ideology” by that point. What might the Russians have done to the ship? State was well aware of the possibilities of subversive action against the ship, as could be seen in its review of the program. We’ll never know, but now you know about the proposal that was seriously considered to convert an aircraft carrier into a weapon of public diplomacy.

Main Street on a Flattop aka Operation Flattop

https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/main-street-on-a-flattop-aka-operation?utm

Shipping a "typical American town" around the world in a carrier to counter disinformation and fix misinformation about the US and democratic life

MATT ARMSTRONG

MAY 06, 2024

1

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Appearing in the November 27, 1948, edition of Collier’s, a popular weekly magazine, was an interesting story about converting the aircraft carrier USS Valley Forge into a floating exhibition about the United States. Built for the war but commissioned more than a year after hostilities ended, the ship would hold a functioning Main Street, USA and tour the world, showing people in other countries what the US was really like. Russian disinformation campaigns and less-aggressive but still damaging misinformation abounded, causing political, societal, and economic strife.

The article imagined the re-worked ship traveling to Trieste, Italy. Before making port, the carrier’s planes, stowed above deck, flew off to a local air base.

The U.S.S. Valley Forge has deliberately stripped herself of the offensive power that makes her one of the world’s most formidable fighting units. Her captain is not apprehensive; the planes can be recovered in a matter of hours. But as the Valley Forge heads north again, slides through the Gulf of Venice and finally into Trieste’s magnificent harbor, she is no longer a warship. She is a ship of peace—the Freedom Ship…

…on the Valley Forge we have something besides guns and ammunition. On the hangar deck of the carrier we have a secret weapon. It is the equivalent of the atomic bomb. It is called truth; it is the weapon the men in the Kremlin most fear, against which they erected their Iron Curtain Specifically, it is the truth about America.

The planes were on the flight deck because the exhibition space was below. And quite the exhibition space it was to be.

On the hangar deck is a slice of America. We have taken two blocks out of Main Street, U.S.A., and transported them across the ocean. We have put a world’s fair afloat. Call it a floating exposition, but perhaps Freedom Ship is a better name.

On one side of the street are houses, a section out of a modern school, and a library. On the other side are the stores, the shops, the drugstore and the newsstand, just as they appear in Middletown, U.S.A.

All of Trieste are invited to the ship. In the story, D’Agostolini, an American sailor speaking Italian, guides a Trieste family, the Lerners, through the scenes.

There are three houses on the residential side of the street. They are new houses, but they are not particularly pretentious. D’Agostolini makes it plain that not every American owns his own home, and that we still have a housing shortage. But he points out that every American has the opportunity of owning houses such as these. In other countries—it is not necessary to name them—it is not permitted that a man own his own home. The Lerners understand this.

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They explore a house with its electric refrigerator (“almost every [American] home has an electric refrigerator, radio and vacuum cleaner”). They discuss kitchen gadgets, explained not by the sailor but “an attractive girl in uniform—a Wave.” Then they visit the library where there are plenty of books and “prints of the best works of American artists.”

It was a propaganda tenet of Goebbels—since adopted by the Soviet propagandists—that America is a cultural void. For fifteen years the Lerners have been drenched with this story. But in the library they find the truth.

They visit several businesses on this Main Street in the flattop.

The Lerners cross the street to inspect the shoe store. Hans Lerner takes the shoes in his hands, as one does when building them or repairing them. He understands these shoes. They are good. They do not squeak, as do the shoes made by another certain great nation. And they will last. He examines the machinery for repairing these shoes, sees how certain tasks that he does by hand are, in this shop, accomplished quickly and efficiently by machine. Hans Lerner is convinced.

On the corner they stop at the drugstore. To the Lerners, an American drugstore—complete from soda fountain to the stocks of medicines—seems incredible. “Is it true," Hans Lerner asks, remembering the trouble and expense he had with his daughter’s pneumonia, “that penicillin is sold so—openly, and not on the black [market]?

Then they visit the newsstand, stocked with newspapers printed on the ship for Trieste.

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Overall, it’s quite the story of literally shipping a “typical American town” around the world to “exemplify the American Way of Life,” as it was described in a December 7, 1948 meeting of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. And yes, George Kennan was serving as the Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the time, and he was present.

The program was to be financed and organized by American businesses but under the supervision of the State Department.

Operation Flattop fit the imperative identified in NSC 4, signed December 18, 1947, which said, in part,

The USSR is conducting an intensive propaganda campaign directed primarily against the US and is employing coordinated psychological, political and economic measures designed to undermine non-Communist elements in all countries. The ultimate objective of this campaign is not merely to undermine the prestige of the US and the effectiveness of its national policy but to weaken and divide world opinion to a point where effective opposition to Soviet designs is no longer attainable by political, economic or military means. In conducting this campaign, the USSR is utilizing all measures available to it through satellite regimes, Communist parties, and organizations susceptible to Communist influence.

The US is not now employing strong, coordinated information measures to counter this propaganda campaign or to further the attainment of its national objectives. The extension of economic aid to certain foreign countries, particularly in Europe, is one of the principal means by which the US has undertaken to defend is vital interests. The nature and intent of this aid and other US contributions to world peace is unknown to or misunderstood by large segments of the world's population. Inadequate employment of information measures is impairing the effectiveness of these undertakings.

The State Department’s Office of Public Affairs, lead by the career foreign service officer George V. Allen, reviewed the Operation Flattop concept and, acknowledging limitations, suggested further consideration. Bear in mind that this office and the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs had far greater authority over a vastly larger portfolio than the USIA Director, established in 1953 and disestablished in 1999, would ever enjoy, with the same being true for today’s Assistant Secretary of State for Global Public Affairs (as the office has been renamed, apparently) and the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

The Public Affairs Area believes that the Department of State must consider “Project Flat-top” in respect to:

a. U.S. foreign policy

b. The existing U.S. Information Program in support of foreign policy.

The Public Affairs Area believes the Department of State should indicate its approval of the objectives of “Project Flat-top” which are presumed to be:

a. To present a faithful picture of a section of everyday American life,

b. To portray the fruits of a healthy economy based on democracy and, therefore, by implication to further the progress of the European Recovery Program.

But there were pitfalls. “Careful planning is necessary” and the potential “possibility of serious negative developments” must be considered.

a. U.S. efforts in the field of propaganda have heretofore been discreet and have had a character of service and interest to the other countries involved: e.g., exchange of students, professors and technicians, libraries; information for government officials, press, educators. The exclusively propaganda nature of the “flat-top” project might well be resented, particularly since the most recent spectacular project involving ships from America was the “Friendship Train,” a welfare project, a gesture from the people of the U.S.A. to the people of Europe (France, Italy, Germany).

b. The use of an aircraft carrier, the appearance of which may be disguised, but the identity of which cannot be concealed, may arouse unfavorable cement in the area visited.

c. Too splendid a presentation may induce in some countries disbelief, in some countries envy, in some countries resentment.

d. Too commonplace a presentation may result in disillusion.

e. U.S. industry may not support the project which, once endorsed by the State Department, becomes in part its responsibility to carry out.

f. U.S. industry may respond satisfactorily from the financial viewpoints but may express dissatisfaction with the scope, or manner of presentation.

The enumerated advantages were not as numerous, but they were significant.

• “Material objects are more effective propaganda, in many cases, than word.”
• “Such a project can reach people who do not read newspapers, or whose newspapers are heavily censored, or who do not listen to tho Voice of America.”
• “The spectacular nature of the project assures extraordinary attention and unusual publicity, producing an important secondary propaganda effect.”

Public Affairs’s list of requirements and planning principles to qualify the project went from a-i, with several sub-bullets, including:

a. That every effort be made to give the project a non-propaganda primary objective, e.g., filling the hold of the ship with supplies for schools (paper, pencils, chalk, maps, copy books) for distribution at the ports visited, or use of the ship for the transportation of students during the season when shipping is at a premium. The propaganda presentation would be much less likely to provoke resentment if it appeared to be the secondary of the cruise.

f. That control of the personnel aboard the ship be the responsibility of the Department of the Navy, officers of which should br instructed to emphasize the possible unfavorable impact on United States foreign policy of undisciplined behavior afloat or ashore.

g. That the itinerary be confined, at first, to the smallest area practicable, possibly northern or western Europe, with a view to determining reactions to the project before a wider area is visited.

h. That a system be established for the limitation of visitors to the exhibit with a view to preventing overrunning by mobs or “packing” by elements hostile to the United States.

State provided a well thought approach to the program. However, four months later, on April 18, 1949, the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, George V. Allen, a career foreign service officer and the third person to hold the position since it was established in December 1944, wrote to his staff about “Operation Flattop” they could ignore the idea, at least for now.

I understand from my last talk with Mr. Beck that he himself was dubious about the effectiveness of the “Main Street on a Flattop” project. He seemed dubious, in fact, that anything could avoid increasingly hostile relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. I think we can presume that the project has been dropped unless we hear something further.

Mr. Beck was Thomas H. Beck, the president of Collier’s. It was apparently his idea, or at least was its chief private sector cheerleader.

Though the State Department was interested in pursuing the idea, the Navy Department was less interested. The Navy, according to a memo to Public Affairs from Policy Planning, “did not have any commitment to supply a carrier and crew and to finance the operation” and, State further learned, “would find it difficult to get a crew together, and that they had absolutely no funds to pay for activating, reconditioning, and for fuel and other operating expenses.” There were also concerns that the maximum clearance in the hanger deck may pose challenges to the proposed buildings, plus concerns over the “very real problems of carrying any female personnel aboard.”

“Main Street on a Flattop” would have been something. I can’t help but wonder, however, if something might not have happened to the ship. The Russians were very worried about what today we call an information war. On March 26, 1947, for example, the Associated Press reported the State Department’s Voice of America “is finally making itself heard in Russia.” Operating under the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, VOA had started experimenting with broadcasting to Russia early that month, but there had been trouble. On March 27, it was discovered that the doors to VOA’s transmitter in Munich carrying the Russian language broadcast “had been broken and the switch of the antenna had purposely been ‘reversed’ so that it was directed to South America rather than to Moscow.” (VOA then had six antennae at that Munich site.) In violation of international law, the Soviet Union began jamming VOA in April 1949, suggesting the US was winning the “war of ideology” by that point. What might the Russians have done to the ship? State was well aware of the possibilities of subversive action against the ship, as could be seen in its review of the program. We’ll never know, but now you know about the proposal that was seriously considered to convert an aircraft carrier into a weapon of public diplomacy.

6. HOPE, DELUSION, AND REALITY Joint Force Campaigning

Good timing with SOF week. Note the references to USSOCOM.

I really think we may be making a mistake with CHina as the pacing threat. I think we need to look at the synergistic effects of a mutually supporting threat group of China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea (and even violent extremist organizations and state sponsors of terrorrism). Sure, China and Russia with their nuclear weapons, could be considered an existential threat to the US.

Excerpts:

The nature of the threat has also changed radically since the Soviet era. The Department of Defense (DoD) faces significant challenges from adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, who primarily employ gray zone tactics to challenge the existing international order dominated by the United States. These tactics, which include cyber and space operations, disinformation, economic coercion, and the use of proxy forces, are designed to fall below the threshold of U.S. military response and exploit vulnerabilities in the conventional approach to warfare.  

...

The current structure of the Joint Force, with its conventional focus and relegation of asymmetric warfare capabilities primarily to Special Operations Forces (SOF), fails to effectively address the continuous competition continuum. The specialized capabilities of asymmetric experts within the force are underutilized, and there is a lack of integration between the conventional forces and these asymmetric capacities. Metaphorically, these rivals are running the ball right up the Joint Force gut, and the Joint Force keeps lining up to stop the pass.

In response, the DoD must embrace a broader view of asymmetry, encompassing not just military strategies but also political-strategic and operational dimensions. Asymmetry involves acting, organizing, and thinking differently to exploit the opponent's weaknesses and achieve strategic advantages. This could mean adjusting time perspectives, employing innovative technologies, or integrating unconventional methods alongside traditional military tactics.

Ultimately, the implication for the Joint Force is to recognize and adapt to the distinct ways in which rivals engage in competition and to demonstrate an ability to successfully confront asymmetry. This requires a robust, integrated approach that prepares for conflict and actively campaigns in peace, using all available tools to out-compete adversaries. Developing a global asymmetric strategy, led by a unified command and informed by asymmetric experts, is essential to protect and advance national security interests against the preferred attack methods by adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

HOPE, DELUSION, AND REALITY Joint Force Campaigning

Three Vital Changes to Facilitate a Global Campaign

By Monte Erfourth

Strategy Central – May 4, 2024

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/hope-delusion-and-reality-joint-force-campaigning

“If the Joint Force does not change its approach to strategic competition, there is a significant risk that the United States will “lose without fighting.” Time is of the essence, and it is not on the side of the Joint Force."

      -     The Joint Concept for Competing 10 February 2023

STRATEGIC COMPETITION AND THE JOINT FORCE

The Department of Defense (DoD) has been navigating a strategic shift for nearly seven years, moving its focus from counterterrorism to engaging in strategic competition with other major powers. This transition, underscored in two successive National Defense Strategies, reflects an expanded mission to contain terrorism while simultaneously confronting specific nation-states.

To compete and prevail in conflict if necessary, the DoD will defend, expand, and realize national security interests by defending the homeland, deterring nuclear attacks and aggression, and building the Joint Force and its support structure. The Joint Force will use Joint Integrated Campaigning to advance and protect interests by deterring aggression, preparing for conflict if competition fails, and countering adversaries’ threatening competitive strategies while supporting the efforts of inter-organizational partners.

The core aim of the 2022 DoD National Defense Strategy (NDS) is to ensure national security by deterring threats through integrated deterrence, proactive campaigning, and the cultivation of enduring advantages. This approach demands a nuanced understanding, as it spans a spectrum of at least five domains and a geopolitical landscape that convulses from peace to conflict while continuously adapting evolving global dynamics.

Key military leaders, such as former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairmen General Joseph F. Dunford and General Mark A. Milley, have emphasized the blurred lines between peace and war as seen by our adversaries, describing their tactics as a form of "conflict without combat." Countries like Russia, China, and Iran exemplify this strategy by seeking to disrupt the international order and pursue their expansionist and strategic objectives through a mix of asymmetric and conventional tactics.

In theory, a combination of integrated deterrence and campaigning achieves conflict avoidance. In practice, the Joint Force must find a way to do everything, everywhere, all the time while working with the interagency, international allies, and partners in the rough and tumble of the global fight for power and access to resources. The United States has all the elements of national power to thwart the coalition of adversarial powers such as China, Russia, and Iran who aim to force the U.S. from its global leadership role. Without a unified and proactive approach, the risk of losing strategic dominance in global affairs looms large, especially against the backdrop of a coalition of adversarial powers such as China, Russia, and Iran. A fragmented approach to strategy, coupled with a dissonant command structure and an inability to convey risk to civilian decision-makers, severely hampers the military's ability to do its part in maintaining the nation’s global supremacy. This leaves the U.S. with a critical vulnerability because the current strategies and structure are not aligned to effectively counter the primary methods used by rival nations to erode U.S. power.

This document identifies three primary challenges that hinder effective integrated campaigning. First, there is a notable gap in the unity of command across the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and functional areas. This lack of cohesion inhibits strategic and operational synergy, which is essential for executing comprehensive military strategies against multiple threats concurrently. Second, current U.S. strategies are predominantly oriented towards conventional warfare and tend to overlook the subtler, asymmetric strategies employed by adversaries. These gray zone tactics, which include cyber warfare, economic coercion, and disinformation campaigns, often fall below the threshold of traditional U.S. military responses and are therefore not sufficiently countered. Lastly, there is an inability to convey the risks of military action or inaction. The tendency to seek permission for military action without a way to convey political risk, the risk of inaction, the risk to the IA-partners-allies, or the probability of reprisal is simply unacceptable given today’s technological tools.

Hope that we can protect and advance our interests with the current ill-suited structure, strategy, and acceptance of risk leaves the military out of step with the reality of asymmetric attacks and our rival's desire to avoid a direct conflict. Despite sound doctrinal advice and a steady drum beat of criticism about the Joint Force response to competition, the military seems content to ignore reality and live with the delusion that all is well. Addressing these internal vulnerabilities is crucial for the United States to retain and solidify its strategic dominance. This article will delve into specific issues and solutions to overcome these obstacles.

Integrated Campaigning: Unity of Command

To better understand the challenges of strategy and command, one must slog through doctrine and the current structure mandated by law. While the armed services build the force, it falls to the Joint Staff to make sense of fitting them together and developing doctrine and strategies to employ them. The eleven Geographical and Functional Combatant Commands receive the forces, develop limited theater strategies based on DoD strategy, and “fight” as a Joint Force.

The Joint Force has lived with the current structure since the Cold War. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act restructured the military chain of command, creating a direct line from the President through the Secretary of Defense to Combatant Commanders. This Act also established seven theaters of operation (6 terrestrial and 1 space) within the Combatant Command.[1] Despite developing a useful structure and chain of command, there are problems with it, especially given the current geopolitical environment. 

The system built in the Soviet era now faces a multipolar problem that is not restricted to a predominant theater. The Department of Defense does not have a unified global campaign strategy. Each theater develops independent campaign plans that are minimally coordinated with the other GCCs. Despite developing the Global Campaign Plans (GCP) and creating a “Coordinating Authority” for particular threats, the GCPs remain largely parochial. The absence of directional authority means no Global Commander is accountable for degrading, deterring, or defeating rival operations across several theaters to the Secretary of Defense or President.[2]Consequently, seven separate and loosely coordinated local campaigns are barely synchronized across theaters in terms of time, space, or effects. This prevents the United States from fully leveraging its global capabilities and creates a gap in American deterrence. China and Russia are keenly aware of this situation and exploit it as it suits them.[3]

Despite efforts to align various global plans with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and UCP, the current command structure lacks a unified operational or strategic commander. While CJCSI 3100.01F recognizes the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as the key integrator of global military strategy, Title 10 does not designate a global integrator of military operations, leaving this role to the SECDEF or the President by default.[4] The Office of the Secretary of Defense, not structured or directed for such a role, inadvertently becomes the de facto global operational headquarters. The President and/or the SECDEF may direct the Joint Staff to coordinate actions among COCOMs, but typically only relies on the Joint Staff for directing administrative and limited operational tasks. The Joint Staff itself is not equipped or authorized to serve as the global command center for Joint Force operations.

The structural flaw creates a critical operational vulnerability: no unified command is responsible for global operations against the five strategic threats identified in the NDS. The geographic confines within which each GCC operates limit their perspective and capacity to a fraction of the global problem. As outlined by the UCP, the current authority structure allows horizontal command extension but does not facilitate comprehensive coordination or strategic integration across the GCCs.

This structural fragmentation is compounded by having five separate strategies crisscrossing five domains while subdivided by eleven commands. This poses a stark challenge to the fundamental military principle of unity of command. Without a global commander, synchronized and timely coordination across GCCs is unfeasible. To rectify the question of command unity, the five principal threats may be assigned a separate global commander, one commander over them all, or several Joint Task Force elements be assigned to specific threats. There are other options, but all of these solutions imply a radical restructuring.

The function of command and control is constant; the form of providing it is open to debate. The fundamental quality of the command choice boils down to one thing: effectiveness. Change in structure should never be the first choice as it often comes at great expense and added confusion. Change for change's sake would be detrimental. However, change that brings effectiveness to military campaigning is required and must be sought even if it appears infeasible under the current military and political framework.

Integrated Campaigning: Asymmetry Not Addressed

The nature of the threat has also changed radically since the Soviet era. The Department of Defense (DoD) faces significant challenges from adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, who primarily employ gray zone tactics to challenge the existing international order dominated by the United States. These tactics, which include cyber and space operations, disinformation, economic coercion, and the use of proxy forces, are designed to fall below the threshold of U.S. military response and exploit vulnerabilities in the conventional approach to warfare.

China, for instance, leverages a broad spectrum of strategies, including the use of state-controlled forces, academic and industrial espionage, lawfare, economic coercion, and informational and psychological operations against the U.S. and its allies. Russia utilizes disinformation and cyber operations, in addition to irregular proxy forces and direct military engagements, as seen in Ukraine. Both Iran and North Korea, while more limited in scope, follow similar methods of asymmetric engagement. These strategies enable these nations to exert influence and achieve strategic goals without triggering a full-scale military response from the U.S.

The DoD acknowledges this shift in the nature of threats but continues to prepare predominantly for conventional conflicts, possibly overlooking the subtler but equally dangerous aspects of strategic competition. Despite strategic declarations of preferring to win without fighting, this focus on conventional warfare preparation reveals a gap between stated intentions and practical application. The United States has a revealed preference for conflict that creates a gap between what it recognizes is happening in reality and what is actually doing about the problem. U.S. rivals exploit this gap by engaging in activities that intentionally avoid crossing American red lines and conflict, thereby avoiding significant retaliation or resistance in the “competition zone”.

Integrated deterrence is the strategy proposed to counter these asymmetric threats, aiming to combine military capabilities with diplomatic, economic, and informational tools (DIMEFIL) to outmaneuver adversaries in peace rather than just in war. However, the lack of a unified command and a comprehensive asymmetric strategy across all domains and threats poses a considerable challenge to implementing this approach effectively. The DoD needs to develop and integrate campaigns that attack the strategies of adversaries and degrade the means that enable them.

The current structure of the Joint Force, with its conventional focus and relegation of asymmetric warfare capabilities primarily to Special Operations Forces (SOF), fails to effectively address the continuous competition continuum. The specialized capabilities of asymmetric experts within the force are underutilized, and there is a lack of integration between the conventional forces and these asymmetric capacities. Metaphorically, these rivals are running the ball right up the Joint Force gut, and the Joint Force keeps lining up to stop the pass.

In response, the DoD must embrace a broader view of asymmetry, encompassing not just military strategies but also political-strategic and operational dimensions. Asymmetry involves acting, organizing, and thinking differently to exploit the opponent's weaknesses and achieve strategic advantages. This could mean adjusting time perspectives, employing innovative technologies, or integrating unconventional methods alongside traditional military tactics.

Ultimately, the implication for the Joint Force is to recognize and adapt to the distinct ways in which rivals engage in competition and to demonstrate an ability to successfully confront asymmetry. This requires a robust, integrated approach that prepares for conflict and actively campaigns in peace, using all available tools to out-compete adversaries. Developing a global asymmetric strategy, led by a unified command and informed by asymmetric experts, is essential to protect and advance national security interests against the preferred attack methods by adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Integrated Campaigning: Risk Aversion

A more assertive approach to competition necessitates a nuanced discussion of risk tolerance and the assumptions underlying the red lines that signify actors’ perceived response thresholds. While policymakers set these thresholds, the military must provide a broad spectrum of options to address asymmetric threats, such as disruptive cyberattacks or aggressive influence operations that do not surpass the lines. These options should be developed with a clear understanding of the political decision space and the level of risk leaders are willing to accept without stifling innovation or action. This can be achieved by providing empirical evidence on past performance and using AI to generate risk models well suited to the geo-political environment.

A scientific approach to risk involves both quantitative and qualitative analyses. Quantitative analysis assesses the effects of actions by measuring the impact and outcomes utilizing mathematical and statistical modeling. Examples would be battle damage assessment, number of violent attacks, or audience size in information operations. Qualitative analysis, on the other hand, evaluates effects based on subjective judgment using non-quantifiable information. For example, determining the possible results at access, placement, and influence generated while training or operating with allies and partners. This would be a judgment based on human interaction with only a few tangible elements of evidence. Despite the subjective aspect, developing frameworks to capture and store the information can and should be done. Both data types should be captured in an AI-powered system to generate analysis revealing results, trends, and relationships. 

During the Global War on Terror, decision-makers became accustomed to lower-risk activities, but interactions with capable nation-state competitors in a complex strategic environment demand a recalibration of political risk assessments. Political, ethical, legal, and military considerations must guide the development and deployment of military options, with due consideration given to policymakers’ limitations. The Joint Force must convey to policymakers with a more scientific approach that a proactive posture in campaign form carries increased risk, but a reactive stance will pose a greater risk from long-term threats.

The current reactive strategies predominantly focus on deterrence through a static posture. This approach is less effective against dynamic threats that require an agile and preemptive strategy. A more dynamic campaign approach provides a spectrum of offensive options aimed at decisively influencing adversaries' actions and forcing them into dilemmas that disadvantage them in strategic competition. Such an approach should synergize various actions globally to safeguard and advance U.S. interests.

Joint Force leaders should also consider when not to engage, potentially supporting interagency or multinational partners better suited to specific missions or allowing rivals to compete among themselves. This team approach will benefit U.S. interests more than defaulting to direct military engagement. In this dynamic framework, competitive campaigning should contribute to a global strategy that protects and promotes U.S. national security interests. This requires a dynamic global strategy with an asymmetric focus, innovative command and control structures, a campaign culture, and a better use of all of the tools available to the elements of national power.

To increase risk tolerance, the U.S. military should focus on restructuring command and control (C2), enhancing ethics training, and exerting a more deliberate influence in the information environment. This approach is particularly pertinent against adversaries during the Global War on Terror, where the U.S. benefitted from superior technical and organizational capabilities. However, against more capable adversaries, this model needs adaptation to maintain operational agility and strategic flexibility.

The relationship between asymmetry and risk in global military campaigns is crucial. Asymmetric strategies, such as cyberattacks or influence operations, often incur higher risks due to their potential to trigger unforeseen and widespread consequences. A global campaign integrating asymmetric tactics heightens complexity and risk, particularly if interagency and international partners are misaligned. Nevertheless, these risks must be balanced against the potential cost of inaction or reactive postures which could result in diminished global influence and competitiveness.

Asymmetric options should also focus first on non-kinetic methods targeting the human domain, cyberspace, and the information environment, emphasizing deception and influence over destruction. That does not mean that hard targets or sabotage should be ignored, only that the former are generally lower in risk and potentially more conducive to competition. If sabotage is part of the deception, for example, then it should be considered, and the risks should be fully detailed using a scientific approach. These efforts should align with broader interagency campaigns, supporting or leading as conditions warrant.

Adopting a comprehensive, integrated competitive strategy involves significant risks, including potential overextension and misalignment with interagency and allied efforts. However, the failure to adapt to the evolving nature of global competition presents a more severe risk of losing U.S. global dominance without ever fighting for it. Although policymakers set these thresholds, the military must provide a broad spectrum of options to manage asymmetric threats effectively. These options should be developed with an awareness of political decision space and the risks leaders are willing to accept, encouraging innovation without being constrained excessively by the fear of escalation. They must also account for perceptions and redlines of the adversary. Enhancing risk management practices and adopting a proactive, dynamic campaign approach are essential to maintaining U.S. strategic superiority in an increasingly competitive global environment.

CONCLUSION

It’s hard to imagine maintaining the United States’ position as the global leader with a dissonant command structure, failing to address rivals’ primary way of attacking the U.S. position, and having no means to successfully account for risk when seeking permission to campaign. To achieve its full potential, the Joint Force must overcome three major challenges to integrated campaigning:

• Dissonant Command Structure: The document highlights a significant gap in the unity of command across the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and functional areas. This fragmentation inhibits strategic and operational synergy, which is essential for executing comprehensive military strategies against multiple threats concurrently.
• Asymmetry Not Addressed: Current U.S. strategies remain heavily tilted towards conventional warfare, overlooking adversaries' subtler, asymmetric strategies. These gray zone tactics, including cyber warfare, economic coercion, and disinformation campaigns, often fall below the threshold of U.S. military response and are thus not sufficiently countered.
• Risk Calculation Improvement: Adopting a more scientific approach to risk must include quantitative and qualitative analyses. The Joint Force should use advanced analytics and AI to better understand and predict the outcomes and impacts of various military and non-military actions. This would allow for more informed decision-making and enable proactive rather than reactive responses to global threats.

To maintain U.S. global dominance, the Joint Force requires a unified command and strategy that can effectively address both conventional and asymmetric threats. To achieve this, an integrated strategic framework should be developed that takes into account all elements of national power (DIME) while considering both conventional and asymmetric threats. A unified commander and a fully integrated strategy will have the best chance to deter adversaries and maintain U.S. strategic advantages when executed as a campaign.

By enhancing risk assessment through a blend of quantitative and qualitative analyses, the Joint Force can utilize advanced analytics and AI to predict the outcomes and impact of various actions, enabling informed and proactive decision-making. As risk calculus is incorporated into the planning and “battle updates,” the unified commander must strive for a campaign that achieves strategic outcomes by coordinating effects globally in time and space. Risks, operational agility, and adaptability must be incorporated to account for the evolving threat landscapes.

There is a lack of urgency and operational focus on continuous campaigning against the threats posed by state adversaries’ actions in the gray zone. Special Operations Forces' expertise in asymmetric warfare should also be effectively utilized. Any campaign to compete with nation-states must value results, not activity for the sake of doing something. The SECDEF must cultivate a culture that values skilled empirical assessment and integrated campaigning. This will help to enhance the execution of strategies and ensure more effective outcomes. 

It seems delusional to think the Joint Force is successfully campaigning across eleven commands, with five distinct strategies and in five domains without a unified command or strategy. The Joint Force is doing its best with an antiquated structure that no longer conforms to the reality of the nation's current threats. Change should be taken with great care and much deliberation, but change it must. If not, we are left to hope for the best. As we all know, hope is not a viable course of action.

[1]https://www.defense.gov/About/combatantcommands/#:~:text=The%20Defense%20Department%20has%2011,forces%20in%20peace%20and%20war.&text=U.S.%20Africa%20Command%20protects%20and,defense%20capabilities%20of%20African%20nations.

[2] Campaign Planning Handbook. AY 2023. Pg 4. https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/wpcontent/uploads/AY23_Campaign_Planning_Handbook.pdf

[3] Monte Erfourth. “Open Letter to a USSOCOM Commander.” Strategy Central March, 2024. https://www.strategycentral.io/post/open-letter-to-a-ussocom-commander

[4] CJCSI 3100.01F https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%203100.01F.p

7. Divisions in the Dirt: The Army’s plan for the next big war

Large scale combat operations are certainly the most dangerous threats the US faces. But are they most likely? We have to be able to address the most dangerous threats (and focus on being able to deter them by having the demonstrated capability to defeat our enemies in large-scale combat) while at the same time we must execute campaigns against the most likely threats. This is especially necessary when our adversaries are deterred and ressort to asymmetric capabilities to compete with us and try to "win without fighting."

Divisions in the Dirt: The Army’s plan for the next big war

armytimes.com · by Todd South · May 6, 2024

Thousands of enemy troops pour across the border, invading the sovereign nation of Pirtuni — a staunch U.S. ally.

The “Donovians” rush infantry, armor and anti-aircraft systems across their border — which looks much like Russia — into Pirtuni, which resembles Poland on a map. In response, the “Pirtunians” rapidly assemble their own division to counter the attack, but they need support.

The Army’s 3rd Battalion, 4th Security Force Assistance Brigade, already in the region working with local forces, lends its aid, and more troops are coming. Thousands of soldiers from the 1st Armored Division quickly arrive, followed by a battalion of Marines and Air Force assets of all stripes are on stand-by.

Pouring over maps stretched out across folding tables inside an abandoned building at Fort Irwin’s National Training Center in California, 1st Armored Division commanders, mission planners, operations and intel officers, and a host of other soldiers try to decide how best to respond to the combined live and simulated campaign — a wargame designed to get them ready for a conventional fight.

They’d spent months preparing, rehearsing how to maintain control when on the move, or under fire. They practiced hiding in buildings instead of relying on custom-built tent cities — a far cry from the sprawling bases of the so-called Forever War era. They limited their communications to reduce their electromagnetic and visual footprint, dumping big satellite dishes, computer server stacks and fields of antennas in favor of commercial equipment and low-profile radios.

Maj. Johannes Halthen briefs Col. Jayson Morgan, 1st Armored Division Field Artillery commander during National Training Center Rotation Fort Irwin, Calif., Jan. 24, 2024. (Maj. Jessica Rovero/Army)

For roughly two weeks, the 1st Armored Division moved nonstop, finding the enemy and striking from hidden locations all while marching through their battle plan to push back the invaders. Sleepless nights and long, cold, windy days piled on units who’d never done this kind of work en masse.

Many of those at the training exercise, which took place in January, spent their careers fighting insurgencies and terrorist groups in brigades of perhaps 4,000 soldiers or even smaller units. That was by design. The Army converted to a modular brigade combat team formation in the early 2000s for a more nimble global force.

But, as the U.S. shifted its focus toward adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, the Army had to examine its role, and how it would fit into the new strategy. The Army sees its role as providing major ground combat power for large-scale combat operations. To do that, they’ll have to fight with divisions and corps — which range from 12,000 to 45,000 soldiers, respectively. Those formations’ headquarters units will orchestrate the battle, striking deep with long-range fires, attack aircraft and hooking into joint capabilities from the Air Force, Navy and Marines.

The last time the service fought with a division was in the 2003 Iraq invasion. Before that, the last major combat operation of that scale was in 1991 during the Persian Gulf War.

The service regularly conducts simulated training events designed to stress-test division headquarters staff on their duties and combat functions. But experts say keystroke-type exercises can’t expose weaknesses in fieldcraft — or the realities of combat.

This is why the Army began sending these headquarters units to the field in 2020, where they took part in combined exercises, such as the recent fictional invasion of the equally fictitious Pirtuni — actual soldiers in the field doing live fire training, working against an opposition force both in real life and also in simulated computer-driven scenarios.

Leaders dubbed the effort “divisions in the dirt.”

A 1st Armored Division soldier monitors radio traffic during the unit's rotation at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif., Jan. 20, 2024. (Staff Sgt. Julie Jaeger/Army)

A division cavalry squadron conducted a limited rotation at Fort Irwin in 2020. In 2023, the 3rd Infantry Division’s headquarters did a similar rotation.

“You have real soldiers driving real equipment, flying real helicopters, traveling hundreds of kilometers a day and dealing with fatigue and dealing with rain and cold and equipment maintenance,” said 1st Armored Division Command Sgt. Maj. James Light.

The 1st Armored Division’s rotation in January was the first large-scale rotation with the subordinate units that they’d direct in an actual conflict — division artillery, a combat aviation brigade, air defense and a sustainment brigade.

Plans call for a division headquarters rotation at least once a year, with 1st Infantry Division scheduled for January 2025. The remaining rotations will continue to be focused on brigades.

“As a rotation, they’re completely different,” said Col. Ted Stokes, III Corps operations officer. “Really, a brigade is looking at mastering the close fight, tank on tank, Bradley on infantry fighting vehicle. A division approaches the fight much differently. They’ve got a lot of sensors collection, a lot of fires capability to shape the enemy force before they get into the close fight.”

When a brigade goes to war it moves its smaller units, such as battalions, companies and platoons around the map. Those units have primarily ground combat vehicles, infantry and limited fire support capability. The brigade must call on outside units or its command for extra tools such as air support, long-range fires or electromagnetic attacks.

But when a division hits the battlefield, it’s moving entire brigades or their capabilities into the fight. So, it has those extra tools at its fingertips. And the division command uses those assets to destroy anything threatening their lower brigades. Pulling that off takes countless rehearsals, ensuring all of the moving parts are in sync. Building that kind of muscle memory can take years.

“In 10 years, they’ll be doing a division rotation,” Lt. Col. Tim Boswell, division chief of plans. “They will be me, if it’s that young company commander, in 10 years they’re going to be the chief of plans. It’s more the future for them and what it’s going to look like.”

Soldiers assigned to 75th Field Artillery Brigade supporting 1st Armored Division fire a Multiple Launch Rocket Systems during the unit's rotation at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif., Jan. 21, 2024. (Pfc. Aliza/Army)

Testing an Army division

The National Training Center has been the testing ground for Army units for decades. During the Global War on Terror tens of thousands of soldiers sweated out their time “in the box” as they practiced their trade. It often served as the final measure of their readiness before heading to actual combat.

The 1,200-square-mile training area is well-suited for brigade-centric training. Trainers can replicate the distances a brigade would encounter, forcing commanders to operate as they would in theater. The training staff are experts at stressing the units. The cadre serve multi-year tours and conduct dozens of virtual battles annually using tactics pulled from the latest combat reports.

But a division fight is larger, ranges farther and adds more complicated scenarios requiring timing, communication and coordination between more and distinct types of units.

Depending on the makeup, an armored brigade combat team holds about 4,000 soldiers, 400 tracked vehicles and 800 wheeled vehicles. The opposition force is typically another brigade-sized element.

In the 1st Armored Division rotation, which only included its headquarters and enabling brigades, the division brought more than 3,000 soldiers, and 400 vehicles — the unit drew another 500 vehicles from the training center. The combination of real-life and simulated soldiers, support staff and Pirtuni fighters totaled 70,000, said Maj. Gen. Kurt Taylor, NTC commander.

Maj. Gen. James Isenhower, 1st Armored Division commander, began planning the rotation with the training center more than a year ago. He knew he needed realistic field conditions to stress his unit.

To conduct a division-level operation with a partner force defending its territory, Isenhower had to stretch distances, which meant his units might be 60 miles apart or more. Fighting an enemy division meant his soldiers would see constant targeting, strikes and attacks.

A soldier with 4th Security Force Assistance Brigade supporting 1st Armored Division advises a simulated allied partner during the unit's at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif., Jan. 23, 2024. (Spc. Richard Monyer/Army)

In a typical brigade rotation, the unit might run one or two deep attacks of more than 100 miles with aircraft. He needed at least one deep attack each day.

Units needed to communicate by a variety of methods over long distances. That meant leaving some portions of the command back at Fort Bliss, Texas, more than 800 miles away.

Another aspect of communication needed testing: working through an intermediary and loosening control. The “Pirtunians” were the lead in this fight. The armored division’s headquarters, enabling brigades and a simulated division were supporting their offensive and defensive moves.

The Americans were there to help, but they were not in charge.

That meant working through the Security Forces Assistance Brigade team embedded with the Pirtunians and providing their allies with options as they moved through the battlespace, rather than simply telling them what to do and where to go, as they would with their own units.

This scenario echoes what’s happening now in Ukraine — a larger force invading an ally that has U.S. equipment and training. Should the Army enter such a fight for real, a nearby division would race to the nation’s aid, as the 1st Armored Division did during training, and roll out its toolkit of weapons and forces wherever they were needed most.

Retired Lt. Gen. Thomas Spoehr, senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Army Times the shift to divisions makes sense given the need for large-scale combat coordination.

“It takes the (command and control) of a division with its increased signal capacity to best employ an allied unit,” Spoehr said. “Those kinds of capabilities don’t exist at the brigade.”

But even that command and control footprint must be more efficient on the modern battlefield where adversaries can detect, and strike, in minutes.

Even the smaller tactical command post for a corps is large, including as many as 20 tents, three large satellite terminals and 40 vehicles or more, Stokes said.

“That’s going to be seen on a battlefield and that’s going to be destroyed,” he said.

Isenhower’s soldiers practiced setting up in buildings. In the months leading up to the rotation, they used an airfield hangar and an abandoned warehouse at Fort Bliss. They constructed an ad hoc command post in the downtown El Paso County Coliseum.

Soldiers had to learn to set up antenna arrays in shadows and hide equipment so that the building looked the same as it did before becoming their hidden headquarters.

The unit ditched their bulky stacks of servers, traveling light and lowering their electronic footprint; they used commercial tools for internet access, hiding their presence in plain view online; and minimized or altogether cut other forms of communication, like smartphones.

The division remained split into its standard forms — main, rear, tactical, early entry command posts and a mobile command group.

The setup created more friction than other exercises, which was the point.

The various command posts would hand off control of the simulated fight when one needed to move or “jump” to avoid detection.

During one jump, about 10 minutes into the movement the main command post was hit with simulated artillery, so they went down while the tactical post was still moving, said Maj. Nicholas Drake, a III Corps planner. The commanding general moved from the main to his mobile command group, a couple of vehicles and skeleton staff to run the operation until the tactical post could re-establish communications.

“It’s easy to synchronize a staff when you’re all sitting in the same room,” said Lt. Col. Nate Garner, division operations officer. “You definitely had to trust in the plan and the planning because you can’t have the control that you would if you’re all sitting in the same room.”

Lt. Col. Ronald Yuhasz, commander of the 4th Battalion, 60th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, briefs his unit’s planned actions during the 1st Armored Division’s Combined Arms Rehearsal at Fort Irwin, Calif., Jan. 15, 2024, in preparation for the National Training Center Rotation. (Master Sgt. Jose Ibarra/Army)

Soldiers under surveillance

From the moment these soldiers left their home stations at Fort Bliss and Fort Cavazos, Texas someone was watching. Opposition forces, in the form of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at the training center, had been searching for online information, mobile phone data, and using other tracking means.

Civilian role players at the training center snapped selfies and photos of the soldiers’ locations, passing on information much as an adversarial population might in a real warzone.

Lt. Col. Brian Burbank, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment information operations officer, said his team used social media, low earth orbit commercial satellite imagery, and electromagnetic spectrum assets along with fake information.

Taylor, the NTC commander, likened mobile phone use to a previously deadly combat practice. Soldiers learned a hard lesson in World War II foxholes that lighting a cigarette at night would give away their position, often drawing a sniper’s bullet.

“I’m convinced the cell phone is the new cigarette in the foxhole,” Taylor said.

For instance, there have been numerous accounts on both sides in the Russia-Ukraine war that have shown how mobile devices gave away troops’ positions, getting them killed.

The opposition force uses online information and commercial equipment to track units’ aircraft back to their home station and even trace individual mobile phones to see where troops live, eat and sleep.

But the staff has shared these vulnerabilities with the wider Army.

“Since we published that article we have not successfully been able to track the deployment and employment of (tactical) aviation,” said Lt. Col. Eric Megerdoomian, the opposition force aviation operations officer.

Units face constant attack

Division soldiers during that January training exercise did not sit back, far from danger, and pick their targets. Training center opposition forces simulated 100 artillery strikes daily, forcing them to move often.

In recent years, the training staff added more than 100 drones to their arsenal and sent swarms of 20, as many as six times a day, to harass the division’s defenses, Taylor said.

The center also used integrated air and missile defense systems equipped with laser targeting for simulated strikes on division aircraft.

To stretch the division’s aviation reach, 1st Armored Division flew a 300-mile round trip deep strike on two targets using two dozen Apache helicopters at night masking the movement by flying close to the ground.

Support aircraft ran electromagnetic detection and interference on the enemy’s sensors and simulated defenses. Fixed-wing Air Force aircraft provided extra protection from anything targeting the division’s helicopter fleet.

The long flight stressed distances that attack helicopter pilots don’t routinely fly in training, Megerdoomian, the opposition aviation officer, said. The experienced pilot, with more than 3,500 hours of flight time, said he was exhausted after 12 hours in the aircraft, half of that in flight.

Apache helicopters with the 1st Armored Division positioned at a Forward Area Resupply Point during the unit's rotation at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif., Jan. 19, 2024. (Spc. Jeffrey Garland/Army)

On the offensive side, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Calvin Cameron, the division’s senior targeting officer, said firing live rounds during the training meant synchronizing many moving parts.

Much of that is done at the moment, ensuring that friendly Apache helicopters aren’t flying in the path of an artillery round or rocket. Part of targeting is also seeing where the fight is headed. At the same time, the unit is planning targets three days out, anticipating where the battle will go, Cameron said.

On the second to last day of the two-week exercise, the division’s main command post was concealed in buildings at a forward operating base running their mission. But other units coming to join them in the area gave away their position.

The Donovians were able to find them by tracking their reinforcements and strike with a simulated theater ballistic missile, much like what actually hit U.S. troops on Al Asad Air Base, Iraq in January 2020.

The simulated missile strike at the training center caused nearly 60 casualties ranging from sprained ankles to KIA.

Field time for everyone

Across the ranks of the division and corps, one thing was clear: Whether it’s logisticians delivering supplies on long nighttime drives, pilots flying extended missions, or moving command posts and rotating sleep schedules — a division fight can’t be simulated fully from behind a desk. It must be trained in the field.

If the division’s rotation is any indicator, support units such as combat aviation brigades, artillery, sustainment and air defense will see a lot more field training soon. And soldiers won’t have to wait for a combat training center rotation to practice.

Division Command Sgt. Maj. James Light said that even in future simulated exercises at home station, soldiers will be going into the field to practice their tasks.

The Army spent a generation fighting one kind of war against terrorists and insurgents. To do that, it shelved its skills on moving big units across big battlefields fighting a big enemy.

The 1st Armored Division’s rotation is the service’s first tangible step toward relearning how to fight big wars.

About Todd South

Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.

armytimes.com · by Todd South · May 6, 2024

8. US Troop Levels in Pacific Take Center Stage as Defense Secretary Huddles with Allied Defense Leaders

US Troop Levels in Pacific Take Center Stage as Defense Secretary Huddles with Allied Defense Leaders

military.com · by Konstantin Toropin · May 3, 2024

HONOLULU -- Amid a gathering of top defense leaders from across the Pacific in Hawaii, Pentagon officials said Thursday that the U.S. not only needs to grow its ties in the region but also bolster the number of troops there to deter China.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, while standing alongside his counterparts from Australia, Japan and the Philippines, said that the four leaders "discussed how we can deepen our trilateral cooperation to strengthen stability and security."

However, one military official also said that the U.S. needs "an improved force posture and it needs to be west of the International Date Line ... so that we can have a lethal and combat credible force" closer to China, Russia and North Korea.

Austin's day of meetings with his counterparts in the region comes as China continues to expand its campaign of harassing and threatening nearby countries and their ships in the South China Sea.

On Tuesday, the Philippine coast guard announced that two of its ships were rammed and shot with water cannons by vessels from the Chinese coast guard. The incident is just the latest in a growing number of skirmishes that are only increasing in frequency.

Defense officials at the Pentagon told reporters that incidents like this are "really worrisome operational behavior and coercion" and "a topic that we're going to focus on together."

Earlier in April, Austin assured Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. that the long-standing mutual defense treaty "extends to both countries' armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft -- including those of its coast guard -- anywhere in the Pacific, including the South China Sea," according to Pentagon spokesman Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder.

However, Gilberto Teodoro Jr., the Philippine defense secretary, told reporters that he didn't want to discuss "a scenario when or in what occasions the [defense treaty] may be invoked,” before noting that its invocation "will be a political decision, at the end of the day."

But as incidents between China and the Philippines continue to simmer, the U.S. military official said there is a worry that there aren't enough U.S. service members in the region to respond to a possible, future incident or offer "a lethal and combat credible force forward."

The military official noted to reporters that, while the Indo-Pacific has about 300,000 assigned forces, only about 80,000 of those are west of the International Date Line, which passes through the center of the Pacific, and the bulk of those are in Japan.

However, simply moving troops into the region permanently is not on the table since there are both legal and political constraints.

In February, the Philippines agreed to increase the number of military camps that the U.S. will be allowed to maintain in the country to nine. However, those are not bases with permanently stationed troops but rather locations that the U.S. military has access to should it need them.

Meanwhile, Australia recently inked a historic deal, commonly called "AUKUS," that will see the U.S. provide the island nation with its much-coveted, nuclear-powered submarine technology. However, the military official noted that "Australia's constitution prevents us basing in Australia."

The solution, officials say, is to continue to build relationships with allies and increase the tempo of exercises and troop rotations through the region.

Austin said that he and the other leaders are "looking to conduct more maritime exercises and activities among our four countries," while officials at the Pentagon said that the aim for the meetings was to generate "'no kidding' proposals for collective action."

"We need to create opportunities for training environments, for locations that they can do rotational visits to," the military official said.

Austin acknowledged that "we're clear-eyed about the challenges that exist throughout the region and so we'll need to continue to work together."

"But that's why we're here -- because we share a common vision," Austin said.

military.com · by Konstantin Toropin · May 3, 2024

9. American troops return to strategic islands near Taiwan for air-assault practice

American troops return to strategic islands near Taiwan for air-assault practice

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · May 5, 2024

Pfc. Jorze Jauand, a 25th Infantry Division infantryman, secures an area during a Balikatan air-assault drill on Batan Island, Philippines, May 5, 2024. (Jonathan Snyder/Stars and Stripes)

BATAN ISLAND, Philippines — U.S., Philippine and Australian troops are practicing raids on wind-swept islands south of Taiwan — the sort of mission they may need to execute if conflict breaks out over the island or in the South China Sea.

Early Sunday, 76 members of the Hawaii-based 25th Infantry gathered with about a dozen Australian soldiers on Calayan, an isle in the Luzon Strait separating the Philippines’ main island from Taiwan.

The troops loaded onto UH-60 Black Hawks and CH-47 Chinooks flown by the 25th Aviation Brigade and traveled 80 miles north to Batan, a dumbbell-shaped isle about 120 miles south of Taiwan.

The choppers landed in a grassy field beside Boulder Bay, a stony, wave-battered coastline near Mount Iraya, a 3,310-foot active volcano. They were met there by 35 Filipino troops who arrived a day earlier.

“Our main objective is to continue to integrate with our partners, both the Filipinos and Australians,” Army Capt. Mike Shipley told Stars and Stripes on Batan.

“These are guys who we could, one day, fight alongside on the battlefield,” said Shipley, who commands Company A, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment.

Soldiers with the 25th Infantry Division walk toward a CH-47F Chinook helicopter during a Balikatan air-assault drill on Batan Island, Philippines, May 5, 2024. (Jonathan Snyder/Stars and Stripes)

A CH-47F Chinook helicopter flies 25th Infantry Division soldiers over Batan Island, Philippines, during the Balikatan exercise, May 5, 2024. (Jonathan Snyder/Stars and Stripes)

Soldiers with the 25th Infantry Division walk toward a CH-47F Chinook helicopter during a Balikatan air-assault drill on Batan Island, Philippines, May 5, 2024. (Jonathan Snyder/Stars and Stripes)

Batan and several nearby islands are next to the Bashi Channel, which links the Philippine and South China seas, where Beijing has territorial disputes with many of its neighbors, including the Philippines.

The channel is a route for China’s navy to the east coast of Taiwan and the Pacific. It’s also a potential transit point for U.S. forces headed to the Taiwan Strait from Guam.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has stated his intent to reunite the self-governing and democratic island of Taiwan with mainland China, by force if necessary.

The air assault onto Batan was part of the annual Balikatan exercise that includes 16,000 troops, mostly from the U.S. and Philippines. Balikatan — “shoulder to shoulder” in Tagalog” — began April 22 and wraps up Friday.

During last year’s exercise, 25th ID soldiers, Marines and Filipino troops air-assaulted onto Batan, Calayan and Fuga. That training sent a message to China that America is ready to defend its ally’s sea territory, Maj. Gen. Joseph Ryan, then-commander of 25th ID, said at the time.

Soldiers with the 25th Infantry Division are loaded onto a CH-47F Chinook during a Balikatan air-assault drill on Batan Island, Philippines, May 5, 2024. (Jonathan Snyder/Stars and Stripes)

Soldiers with the 25th Infantry Division exit a CH-47F Chinook during air-assault exercise on Batan Island, Philippines, May 5, 2024. (Jonathan Snyder/Stars and Stripes)

During Sunday’s air assault, Sgt. Michael Kawell, a squad leader, sweated in the morning sun while his buddies sought shade under coconut trees near the landing zone.

He said the troops, who spent time at Fort Magsaysay and Camp Melchor F. dela Cruz on Luzon before heading to the islands, spent three days on Calayan. They marched across the island to check out an airfield.

They expect to remain on Batan in the coming days for more reconnaissance patrols to check out the local airfield and port, Kawell said. U.S. Army and Filipino divers were preparing to clear debris from the seabed at the port on Sunday to improve vessel access.

“The waiting is the hardest part,” he said of the mission’s downtime. “If you are training, time goes by fast. The waiting sucks.”

In their downtime, the soldiers have been climbing trees, picking and eating coconuts, Kawell said. They sleep in hammocks tied between coconut trees.

“It’s a good day for us any time we get to sleep in a hammock and not in a hole,” he said.

Looking up at Mount Iraya, Kawell compared Batan to Hawaii.

“It seems like we landed at the lowest point on the island,” he said. “So, wherever we go, we are probably going to walk up hill.”

Balikatan will include additional island air assaults by members of the Hawaii-based 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment and Filipino troops, Army Col. Rob Shaw, who commands 25th ID’s 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, said in an April 22 phone interview from Fort Magsaysay.

This mission has given troops an idea of the Pacific’s vastness, Kawell added.

“You are in Hawaii and then you fly all the way out here and it’s still the Pacific,” he said.

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · May 5, 2024

10. Will DOD need to start producing some medicines to protect troops?

Excerpts:

Warren said she plans to introduce legislation that would direct the Defense Department to manufacture drugs, devices, vaccines and other products when DOD determines there are risks of shortage or quality concerns.

“Most of the time DOD will continue to purchase drugs from the commercial drug market. But there are some instances where it makes sense for DOD to produce the medication itself, for example, when DOD is the only customer,” Warren said. DOD spends more than $5 billion a year on pharmaceuticals, she said, which is about 2% of the entire U.S. commercial pharmaceutical market.

A number of drugs that are used in the military are not commonly needed in the commercial market, defense officials testified. Some of these are drugs that are needed to fight infectious diseases and are not commercially available because there’s no market for them.

Will DOD need to start producing some medicines to protect troops?

militarytimes.com · by Karen Jowers · May 3, 2024

Longstanding problems with drug shortages are prompting senators to seek more solutions for the military medical system, including the possibility of having the military manufacture some medications.

Senators are calling for a return of manufacturing medicines in the United States due to national security concerns over risks to the Defense Department’s pharmaceutical supply chain, and possible risks to service members and their families.

But that includes the possibility of some military manufacturing, according to Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., chair of the Senate Armed Services subcommittee on personnel, during a hearing on April 30.

“It’s a critical national defense issue. It’s also critical to the health of our people,” Warren said. One issue is that commercial manufacturers don’t have the right incentives in place to produce many drugs in the U.S.

Additionally, she said, “we don’t even have the right information in place to require meaningful domestic manufacturing and meaningful insight into the supply chain to know we are safe in the drugs we are getting,” and their ingredients.

Warren said she plans to introduce legislation that would direct the Defense Department to manufacture drugs, devices, vaccines and other products when DOD determines there are risks of shortage or quality concerns.

“Most of the time DOD will continue to purchase drugs from the commercial drug market. But there are some instances where it makes sense for DOD to produce the medication itself, for example, when DOD is the only customer,” Warren said. DOD spends more than $5 billion a year on pharmaceuticals, she said, which is about 2% of the entire U.S. commercial pharmaceutical market.

A number of drugs that are used in the military are not commonly needed in the commercial market, defense officials testified. Some of these are drugs that are needed to fight infectious diseases and are not commercially available because there’s no market for them.

If the manufacturing challenges are too great for smaller — but needed — quantities of drugs, Warren said, the government may have to move to military manufacturing. “Otherwise, we’re just not going to get them. Or we’ll pay prices that are so outrageous that it would have been cheaper to have built [the manufacturing facilities] internally,” she said.

One example of that is the adenovirus vaccine. While adenovirus typically causes mild cold or flu-like symptoms, she said, “it is a major cause of serious respiratory illness among service members, particularly those who are in basic training.” That’s why the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research developed the adenovirus vaccine and licensed it to private industry.

But in the 1998-1999 time frame, DOD exhausted its last supply of the vaccine after the sole manufacturer decided to stop making it. At that time, DOD estimated that the lack of vaccine would lead to about 10,000 preventable infections from adenovirus, over 4,200 medical visits by recruits, and over 850 hospitalizations within a year, said Bryce H.P. Mendez, a specialist in defense health care policy for the Congressional Research Service, testifying before the panel. “To an extent, DOD did observe that,” he said.

But that’s not unique, Mendez told lawmakers, adding that the Defense Department has had challenges over many decades in getting certain medicines. Current challenges include the production of medicines to address anthrax, botulism, cholera, hemorrhagic fevers, and others, he said.

Lawmakers should consider legislation that establishes clear options for creating a government-owned facility to manufacture priority health products to meet the military’s needs, said Melissa Barber, an expert in pharmaceutical manufacturing who is a postdoctoral fellow at the Yale School of Medicine, Yale Law School and Yale Collaboration for Regulatory Rigor, Integrity and Transparency. “Such a facility would ensure reliable access to quality drugs for service members, as well as generate significant cost savings.” For example, she told lawmakers, the current contract for producing the adenovirus vaccine costs the government about $38 million a year. “That’s a lot of money to pay for a single vaccine,” she said.

Barber cited an Army report that estimated the startup costs for the government to manufacture the adenovirus vaccine would be about $100 million, with annual costs of about $10 million. DOD would break even in about three years by building and operating its own facility for producing that vaccine, she said.

Government-owned and operated facilities for manufacturing medicines is not a new concept, Barber said. The first example she’s aware of, she said, is during the Civil war, when the U.S. Army set up facilities to manufacture some needed medicines.

The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research does vaccine research and manufactures test batches, but its manufacturing is limited, and the military relies on commercial manufacturers for quantity.

RELATED

Despite drug shortages, military has mostly been able to find alternative supplies

National supply chain issues are causing more drug shortages, according to reports. But the military appears okay for now.

The larger problem of drug shortages

According to the Food and Drug Administration, almost half of the drugs on DOD’s operational medicines list are in shortage, and most of these are generics, Warren said. This list includes drugs necessary for warfighting, she said. Some of those in short supply include the blood thinner heparin, the common anesthesia drug midazolam and morphine for pain management.

And many drugs, and their key ingredients, come from foreign manufacturers, including China. The Defense Department has less visibility over its operations, and thus, the safety of the drugs.

Following a congressionally-mandated requirement, DoD analyzed 12,917 specific drugs, or about 10% of the total U.S. marketplace as part of efforts to evaluate the military pharmaceutical supply chain. The medicines are identified in the FDA Essential Medicine List. Only a quarter of the drugs analyzed have domestic manufacturers.

According to DOD’s November report, 27% of the drugs analyzed are at a very high risk because they are either dependent on Chinese manufacturers using Chinese ingredients, or were derived from unknown sources.

“I don’t know anybody in their right mind who trusts anything made in China,” said Sen. Rick Scott, R-Fla., the ranking member of the panel.

“During COVID, we learned the hard way that relying on non-allied countries for our medical supply chain poses a real danger. For that reason, it is imperative that we work to ensure DOD supply chains are independent from non-allied nations for necessary pharmaceutical treatments,” Scott said. “In future contingencies, these supply chains could easily cease to exist.”

Defense officials are assessing the chain, and developing policies and procedures to enable the allocation of resources in the case of supply chain disruptions, said Dr. Lester Martinez-Lopez, assistant secretary of defense for health affairs.

When a DOD provider can’t get a critical drug because of the shortage, that provider has to look at alternatives, Martinez-Lopez said. He used the example of amoxicillin, an antibiotic made overseas, used for basic infections. “Let’s say I don’t have it. Now I have to [use] another antibiotic, at the same time I’m trying to combat resistance to antibiotics, using an antibiotic that’s not indicated for that condition. So there I lose twice. One, because I’m not giving the right antibiotic to my patient, but on top of that, I’m losing ground on my fight against antibiotic resistance.”

In other cases, such as when an epinephrine injection is not available to treat a severe allergic reaction, he said, “that can be life and death. We don’t have hours to decide what the alternate is. So that might translate into a life, right on the spot. So this creates a conundrum for all health care professionals. I don’t think it’s just us. It’s across the nation, we’re facing this.”

Questioned by Scott about buying from China, Matthew R. Beebe, director of acquisition for the Defense Logistics Agency agreed that the military shouldn’t buy from them, but said the reality is that current regulations sometimes require it. “We don’t buy from China unless it’s the only source available,” Beebe said. If the end product is available domestically or from a country that’s an ally, that’s where they buy it, he added.

“But we don’t always have visibility over the sourcing,” the ingredients used to make the medicines which are called active pharmaceutical ingredients, and the ingredients used to make those APIs, Beebe said.

About 5% of the active pharmaceutical ingredients are coming from China, said Martinez-Lopez, but officials aren’t able to determine the source of about 20% of the remainder.

The percentage of those unknown sources is “equally troubling, that I don’t even know how to characterize the risk,” Beebe said. He and the other officials said they support bringing more manufacturing back to the U.S.

Scott questioned the witnesses about why the military couldn’t just immediately stop buying any pharmaceuticals that are sourced or produced in any way in China. Because of the volume of pharmaceuticals that would fall into that category, it would mean some medicines wouldn’t be available, officials said.

Of the 60 vital medicines in the U.S. about 20% are solely sourced in China, said retired Army Col. Victor A. Suarez, founder of Blu Zone Bioscience & Supply Chain Solutions.

For many of these medicines, it’s not economically viable for companies to manufacture them here in the U.S., Suarez said. Over the last several decades, much of drug manufacturing has moved overseas. China has used its competitive advantages — such as cheap labor — to drive down prices, and that has forced some U.S. companies out of business.

And 40% of generic drugs sold in the U.S. have just one manufacturer, Warren said.

Scott asked the DOD witnesses to help craft a letter to a number of associations in the health care community, to invite them to a conference call for ideas on helping build a domestic market for pharmaceuticals. The letter would come from DOD and other government officials as well as from members of Congress, Scott said.

About Karen Jowers

Karen has covered military families, quality of life and consumer issues for Military Times for more than 30 years, and is co-author of a chapter on media coverage of military families in the book "A Battle Plan for Supporting Military Families." She previously worked for newspapers in Guam, Norfolk, Jacksonville, Fla., and Athens, Ga.

11. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 6, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2024

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin appears to be re-intensifying a reflexive control campaign targeting Western decision-making using nuclear threats and diplomatic manipulation.
• Russian elites and Kremlin officials are reportedly vying for influential positions in the Russian government ahead of the Russian presidential inauguration on May 7 to prematurely secure powerful roles in the event that Russian President Vladimir Putin leaves power around the end of his new term.
• A Russian insider source, who has routinely been accurate about past Russian military command changes, claimed that the Russian military command appointed the commanders and chiefs of staff of the newly formed Leningrad and Moscow military districts (LMD and MMD).
• The Kremlin continues tightening the restrictions on individuals it designates as “foreign agents,” restricting their ability to serve in government roles, likely in a disguised purge of officials who do not adequately align with the Kremlin.
• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a successful maritime drone strike against a Russian patrol boat in occupied Crimea on May 6, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly adapting their maritime drones to combat Russian defensive measures.
• Russia may be switching sides in the Sudanese civil war to support the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in pursuit of a Red Sea naval base for Russia, which would align Iranian and Russian Sudanese policy and create opportunities for increased Iranian-Russian cooperation in Sudan and the broader Red Sea area.
• Russia has pursued a Red Sea port since 2008 to protect its economic interests in the area and improve its military posture by increasing its ability to challenge the West in the broader region, including in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean.
• Russia backing the SAF would greatly benefit Iran by aligning Iranian and Russian policy and strategy in the region, which would advance Iran’s own aims of securing a Red Sea base in Sudan.
• The Kremlin is additionally pursuing secondary objectives, including sidelining Ukrainian and US influence in Sudan, through its outreach to the SAF.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances northwest of Svatove, near Avdiivka, in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
• Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian authorities have created the infrastructure necessary to conscript Ukrainians in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and plan to conscript more than 150,000 Ukrainians into the Russian army in an unspecified time period.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 6, 2024

May 6, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 6, 2024

Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Liam Karr, and Frederick W. Kagan

May 6, 2024, 7:15pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on May 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin appears to be re-intensifying a reflexive control campaign targeting Western decision-making using nuclear threats and diplomatic manipulation. Reflexive control is a key element of Russia’s hybrid warfare toolkit — it is a tactic that relies on shaping an adversary with targeted rhetoric and information operations in such a way that the adversary voluntarily takes actions that are advantageous to Russia.[1] Soviet mathematician Vladimir Lefebvre defined reflexive control as “the process of transferring the reasons of making a decision” to an adversary via “provocations, intrigues, disguises, creation of false objects, and lies of any type.”[2] Russia has frequently used nuclear saber-rattling throughout the course of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine to cause the West (Russia’s self-defined adversary) to stop providing military support for Ukraine, and this nuclear saber-rattling has become a frequently used form of Russian reflexive control.[3]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on May 6 that Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the Russian General Staff to prepare to conduct non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons exercises to “practice the preparation and use” of tactical nuclear weapons.[4] The Russian MoD stated that these exercises will involve missile formations of Russia’s Southern Military District (SMD) as well as Russian aviation and naval forces. The Russian MoD and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) both notably claimed that Russia will conduct nuclear exercises in response to “provocative statements and threats” made by Western officials against Russia.[5] The Russian MFA accused the US of deploying ground-based intermediate and short-range missiles “in various regions around the world,” which the Russian MFA claimed allows Russia to reciprocate in kind.[6] The Russian MFA also claimed that it will consider the arrival of F-16s to Ukraine as a provocation because Russia will consider F-16s carriers of nuclear weapons, a boilerplate threat that Russian officials have been making since Western states first committed to sending F-16s to Ukraine in summer 2023.[7] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev accused US, French, and British officials of considering sending their troops to Ukraine and claimed that this justifies Russia testing its tactical nuclear weapons.[8] Medvedev also directly threatened a “world catastrophe” as a result of Western involvement in Ukraine and warned of Russian strikes against Washington, Paris, and London.

Russian officials, particularly Medvedev, are critical elements of Russia’s efforts to use nuclear rhetoric as a form of reflexive control, as ISW has frequently reported.[9] Russian officials consistently time nuclear readiness exercises and vague threats of nuclear retaliation with important Western policy decisions regarding the war in Ukraine to force Western decision-makers to self-deter and temper their support for Ukraine. The current apparent resurgence of nuclear rhetoric, this time in the form of planned tactical nuclear weapons exercises, coincides with the imminent arrival of Western weapons in Ukraine. Russian officials are likely using the nuclear weapons information operation to discourage Ukraine’s Western partners from providing additional military support and to scare Western decision-makers out of allowing Ukrainian forces to use Western-provided systems to attack legitimate military targets in Russia. Russian troops engage in routine nuclear exercises as part of this wider nuclear rhetoric information operation, but ISW continues to assess that Russia is highly unlikely to use a tactical nuclear weapon on the battlefield in Ukraine or anywhere else.[10]

The Russian MFA also summoned the British and French ambassadors to Russia as part of the wider ongoing reflexive control campaign aimed at discouraging Western governments from supporting Ukraine.[11] The Russian MFA claimed that it summoned British Ambassador to Russia Nigel Casey in connection with recent statements by British Foreign Minister David Cameron asserting that Ukraine has the right to strike military targets inside of Russia.[12] The Russian MFA accused Cameron of “escalating” the conflict by stating that Ukraine has the right to strike within Russia and warned that Russia can respond by striking “any British military facilities and equipment on the territory of Ukraine and beyond its borders.”[13] Russian MFA Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova and Kremlin newswire TASS also reported that Russia summoned the French Ambassador to Russia due to French leadership’s “belligerent statements and the growing involvement of France in the conflict in Ukraine,” in response to French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent calls for expanded Western security assistance to Ukraine.[14] Russia likely summoned these ambassadors to discourage France and the UK, and by extension the rest of the West, from providing further support for Ukraine.

Russian elites and Kremlin officials are reportedly vying for influential positions in the Russian government ahead of the Russian presidential inauguration on May 7 to prematurely secure powerful roles in the event that Russian President Vladimir Putin leaves power around the end of his new term. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on May 6 that its sources in the Kremlin claimed that the Russian elites began actively speculating about who would join the new Russian government after Putin’s inauguration and noted that some elites are “tense” hoping for promotions and worrying about demotions.[15] Another source close to the Russian government told Meduza that Kremlin officials and Russian elites are currently trying to occupy the “highest possible position” in case Putin’s upcoming six-year presidential term is his last due to his age. ISW has not observed any indications that Putin intends to leave power after the conclusion of his upcoming presidential term. Putin’s possible efforts to position elites to succeed him and elites’ efforts to position themselves within the government are likely therefore premature. One source claimed that Russian elites are speculating that Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin or Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko could become the next Russian Prime Minister, while other sources expressed doubt that current Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin would resign. A source close to the Russian Federal Assembly told Meduza that Russian Duma deputies are already prepared to re-approve Mishustin as Prime Minister. Two sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration and government stated that Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District Yury Trutnev and Kemerovo Oblast Governor Sergei Tsivilev want new positions in the Russian government and suggested that Trutnev could head an unspecified government ministry and Trutnev could take a leading job in the Presidential Administration. Meduza’s sources close to the Kremlin stated that they have no information regarding Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s potential resignation in the wake of Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov’s April 24 arrest and claimed that Shoigu “still has the opportunity to work on his job, at least until the completion of this phase of the [war in Ukraine].” Position changes among Russian elites are unlikely to have major effects on in Russia’s domestic and international decision-making and policy planning, however. A source close to the Russian Presidential Administration claimed that Putin is focused on conservatism, removing all dissenters, victory in the war in Ukraine, and “turning to the East,” likely referencing deepening Russian relations with China, Iran, and North Korea. Putin appears to be attempting to create ideological homogeneity among the Russian elite, which is consistent with ISW’s continued assessment that Putin values personal loyalty (and, by extension, the sharing of his worldview) over professional achievement.[16]

A Russian insider source, who has routinely been accurate about past Russian military command changes, claimed that the Russian military command appointed the commanders and chiefs of staff of the newly formed Leningrad and Moscow military districts (LMD and MMD). The insider source claimed that Russian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin became the commander of the LMD, echoing claims from a Russian regional outlet from March 31.[17] The insider source claimed that the former commander of the 36th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Eastern Military District), Lieutenant General Valery Solodchuk, became the LMD Chief of Staff.[18] The insider source claimed that Solodchuk commanded an unspecified Russian group of forces responsible for the Russian state border in February 2024, during which he “quickly found a common language” with Lapin, resulting in Solodchuk‘s appointment to LMD Chief of Staff. Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev reportedly became the commander of the Moscow Military District (MMD). Lieutenant General Mikhail Zusko, who commanded the 58th CAA (SMD) in 2022, reportedly became the MMD Chief of Staff.[19] ISW cannot confirm the insider source’s claims but notes that the source has been highly accurate about past military command changes.[20]

The Kremlin continues tightening the restrictions on individuals it designates as “foreign agents,” restricting their ability to serve in government roles, likely in a disguised purge of officials who do not adequately align with the Kremlin. The Russian State Duma unanimously passed a bill in its second and third readings on May 6 that prohibits individuals designated as “foreign agents” from running in Russian elections for or serving at any level of government.[21] The bill stipulates that any government officials who are also designated as foreign agents have 180 days to somehow remove themselves from the list of foreign agents before Russian authorities strip the officials of their office.[22] The bill also prohibits foreign agents from serving as election observers or election proxies — individuals appointed to campaign on behalf of high-level candidates.[23] The bill notably prevents the Russian authorities from designating election candidates as foreign agents during the course of the election.[24] It is unclear how many incumbent Russian officials this bill will affect. Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin stated that foreign agents can participate in Russian elections after authorities remove the foreign agent designation.[25] The Kremlin has recently been cracking down on foreign agents and expanding the legally prosecutable definition of extremism — both labels that deprive Russians of certain rights and increasingly portray Russians who gain these designations for expressing anti-war sentiment as directly opposing the Kremlin itself.[26] The Kremlin may be pushing this bill through now to coincide with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s May 8 inauguration and subsequent new cabinet.[27]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a successful maritime drone strike against a Russian patrol boat in occupied Crimea on May 6, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly adapting their maritime drones to combat Russian defensive measures. The GUR-published footage on May 6 of a GUR Magura V5 maritime drone striking a Russian Project 12150 Mangust-class patrol boat in Vuzka Bay near occupied Chornomorske, Crimea.[28] The GUR stated that the destroyed Mangust-class patrol boat was likely worth $3 million. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) destroyed five Ukrainian maritime drones near the northwestern Crimean coast and published footage purportedly of a Russian helicopter striking one of the drones.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces had adapted the drones to defend against Russian strikes, particularly from helicopters, with heat-seeking missiles and to break through containment booms.[30] Several prominent Russian milbloggers expressed anger that the Russian military bureaucracy is causing Russian forces to respond too slowly to Ukrainian maritime drone adaptations.[31]

Russia may be switching sides in the Sudanese civil war to support the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in pursuit of a Red Sea naval base for Russia, which would align Iranian and Russian Sudanese policy and create opportunities for increased Iranian-Russian cooperation in Sudan and the broader Red Sea area. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Representative for the Russian President in Africa and the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov met with SAF head Abdel Fattah al Burhan and several other Sudanese officials during a two-day visit to Sudan on April 28 and 29.[32] Bogdanov stated that his visit could lead to increased cooperation and expressed support for “the existing legitimacy in the country represented by the [SAF-backed] Sovereign Council.”[33] France-based Sudanese news outlet Sudan Tribune reported that Russia offered “unrestricted qualitative military aid” during the meetings and also enquired about its longstanding but unimplemented agreement to establish a naval base in Port Sudan.[34]

Bogdanov’s discussions indicate that the Kremlin is willing to risk the gold it had been getting from supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which are fighting a civil war against the SAF, to advance its longstanding Red Sea basing ambitions. The Wagner Group had been arming and training the RSF since the outbreak of the civil war in April 2023 due to preexisting ties owing to the RSF’s control of Sudan’s gold mines.[35] However, the civil war has halted some Wagner-linked gold operations, and it is unclear if this support has continued to the same extent after the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023.[36] US officials and an independent report from non-profit groups claimed that Wagner smuggled out an estimated 32.7 tons of gold worth $1.9 billion during the first year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[37]

Russia has pursued a Red Sea port since 2008 to protect its economic interests in the area and improve its military posture by increasing its ability to challenge the West in the broader region, including in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean.[38] Russian President Vladimir Putin had previously made an agreement with Sudan’s longtime dictator Omar al Bashir in 2017 for a Red Sea base capable of stationing 300 Russian servicemembers and four ships in exchange for various kinds of military and regime security support.[39] The Kremlin subsequently supported both the RSF and SAF after Bashir’s ouster in 2019 to pursue an implementation of the deal.[40] RSF Commander General Hemedti led these negotiations after the RSF and SAF overthrew Sudan’s civilian-led transitional government in 2021, but the civil war that broke out between the RSF and the SAF once again put the deal on hold.[41] The SAF controls Sudan’s coast, making it the key gatekeeper for any naval base.[42]

Russia backing the SAF would greatly benefit Iran by aligning Iranian and Russian policy and strategy in the region, which would advance Iran’s own aims of securing a Red Sea base in Sudan. Iran strengthened its bilateral relations with the SAF throughout 2023 and started sending drones to the SAF in late 2023 and early 2024.[43] The Wall Street Journal reported in March 2024 that Iran unsuccessfully attempted to use these ties and promises of a helicopter-carrier ship to secure a permanent naval base in Port Sudan.[44] Iran seeks a Red Sea naval base for reasons similar to Russia's–to project power further westward. Iran would use a Red Sea base to support out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping. This power projection includes threatening Red Sea shipping traffic and creating opportunities to launch attacks into Israel with systems fired from surface combatants.

The Kremlin may also align its Sudan policy with Iran to lighten its own military commitments. Russian insider sources reported in mid-April that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) was redeploying Russian soldiers from unspecified MOD-affiliated Africa Corps units to the Ukrainian border.[45] These demands from the Ukraine war compound ongoing capacity issues stemming from Africa Corps’ recruitment struggles.[46] Russia aligning with Iran would enable the Kremlin to coordinate aid with Iran and potentially free the resources and soldiers that it had devoted to supporting the RSF.[47] Bogdanov met with Iranian Deputy PM Ali Bagheri Kani two days before leaving for Sudan when they discussed "the importance of bilateral ties and regional issues,” indicating they are already coordinating on the issue.[48]

The Kremlin is additionally pursuing secondary objectives, including sidelining Ukrainian and US influence in Sudan, through its outreach to the SAF. The Sudan Tribune reported that Bogdanov enquired about Sudanese military cooperation with Ukraine during his visit.[49] Ukraine has provided military support to the SAF as one of its many initiatives to boost support in Africa as many African countries have been ambivalent about or supportive of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[50] The Wall Street Journal reported that Ukraine sent nearly 100 Ukrainian special forces soldiers to Sudan at Burhan’s request in August 2023 that have supported the SAF through occasional combat, drone support, training, and supplies provision.[51] Ukraine‘s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) claimed on April 17 that the Kremlin planned to launch an information operation accusing Ukrainian forces of illegally using Western weapons in Sudan to discredit Ukraine and undermine Western support for Ukraine.[52]

Russia's backing of the SAF also risks undermining impending US-backed peace talks.[53] The US has been urging a resumption of peace talks after US-Saudi efforts failed throughout 2023.[54] Other foreign intervention contributed to these failures by emboldening actors to take hardline negotiating stances.[55]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin appears to be re-intensifying a reflexive control campaign targeting Western decision-making using nuclear threats and diplomatic manipulation.
• Russian elites and Kremlin officials are reportedly vying for influential positions in the Russian government ahead of the Russian presidential inauguration on May 7 to prematurely secure powerful roles in the event that Russian President Vladimir Putin leaves power around the end of his new term.
• A Russian insider source, who has routinely been accurate about past Russian military command changes, claimed that the Russian military command appointed the commanders and chiefs of staff of the newly formed Leningrad and Moscow military districts (LMD and MMD).
• The Kremlin continues tightening the restrictions on individuals it designates as “foreign agents,” restricting their ability to serve in government roles, likely in a disguised purge of officials who do not adequately align with the Kremlin.
• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a successful maritime drone strike against a Russian patrol boat in occupied Crimea on May 6, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly adapting their maritime drones to combat Russian defensive measures.
• Russia may be switching sides in the Sudanese civil war to support the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in pursuit of a Red Sea naval base for Russia, which would align Iranian and Russian Sudanese policy and create opportunities for increased Iranian-Russian cooperation in Sudan and the broader Red Sea area.
• Russia has pursued a Red Sea port since 2008 to protect its economic interests in the area and improve its military posture by increasing its ability to challenge the West in the broader region, including in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean.
• Russia backing the SAF would greatly benefit Iran by aligning Iranian and Russian policy and strategy in the region, which would advance Iran’s own aims of securing a Red Sea base in Sudan.
• The Kremlin is additionally pursuing secondary objectives, including sidelining Ukrainian and US influence in Sudan, through its outreach to the SAF.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances northwest of Svatove, near Avdiivka, in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
• Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian authorities have created the infrastructure necessary to conscript Ukrainians in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and plan to conscript more than 150,000 Ukrainians into the Russian army in an unspecified time period.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Svatove amid continued ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on May 6. Geolocated footage published on May 5 and 6 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced east of Stelmakhivka and south of Krokhmalne (both northwest of Svatove), respectively, and a Russian milblogger reported that Russian forces advanced 300 meters on the eastern outskirts of Stelmakhivka.[56] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 6 that Russian forces captured Kotlyarivka (northwest of Svatove), and Russian milbloggers subsequently claimed that the capture of Kotlyarivka allowed elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]) to completely seize Kyslivka (northwest of Svatove), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[57] Russian milbloggers previously claimed that Russian forces captured Kyslivka on April 27.[58] Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Svatove near Pishchane and Berestove; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske and Novosadove; west of Kreminna near Torske; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area and Bilohorivka.[59] Elements of the Russian 204th “Akhmat” Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly operating in forests near Kreminna.[60]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Siversk direction northeast of Bakhmut on May 6, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka.[61] Elements of the “GORB” detachment of the 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps (LNR AC) are reportedly operating near Spirne.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations towards Chasiv Yar on May 6, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that intense fighting continued on the eastern flanks of Chasiv Yar near Bohdanivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar) and Ivanivske (east of Chasiv Yar).[63] The Ukrainian 5th Assault Brigade posted footage of Russian “turtle tanks” with constructed metal anti-drone covers operating under the cover of a smokescreen near Bakhmut.[64] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian bridge across the Siversky-Donets Donbas canal east of Chasiv Yar.[65] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled attacks near Ivanivske and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[66] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[67]

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Avdiivka amid continued offensive operations west of the settlement on May 6. Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows that Russian forces advanced along the E50 highway in eastern Netaylove (southwest of Avdiivka).[68] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that fighting continued in Netaylove.[69] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novopokrovske (northwest of Avdiivka) up to two kilometers and that Russian forces reached the outskirts of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Ocheretyne and about 15km northwest of Avdiivka), although ISW has not yet observed confirmed Russian advances in these areas.[70] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the residential area in eastern Umanske (west of Avdiivka).[71] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces are attacking towards Kalynove from positions in Arkhanhelske (both north of Avdiivka).[72] The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued Russian attacks northwest of Avdiivka near Novooleksandrivka and Novoprokovske; west of Avdiivka near Umanske and Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Netaylove and Nevelske.[73] Elements of the Russian “Lavina” Battalion (132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating north of Avdiivka in the Keramik-Novokalynove-Arkhanhelske area, and elements of the 24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade are reportedly operating near Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka).[74]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to advance west of Donetsk City, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline on May 6. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have advanced towards western Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) and that there is heavy fighting in the area of the industrial zone west of the recently-seized brick factory.[75] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn reported that small individual Russian groups (likely around squad-size) are trying to storm Krasnohorivka, but that heavy Ukrainian artillery fire is preventing them from consolidating gains and conducting further attacks.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have captured “most” of Paraskoviivka (southwest of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of Russian control over the settlement and another milblogger claimed that fighting is still only ongoing on the eastern outskirts.[77] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued Russian attacks west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka and Paraskoviivka.[78] Elements of the Russian 14th Artillery Brigade and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[79]

Russian forces continued limited and unsuccessful ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on May 6. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported Russian attacks northeast of Vuhledar near Vodyane and south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and Staromayorske.[80] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwards up to one kilometer east of Urozhaine, and another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Urozhaine, although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[81] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Vuhledar; elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces and EMD) are reportedly operating near Prechystivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka); and elements of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are operating near Hulyaipole (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[82]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional engagements in the area on May 6. Geolocated footage published on May 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southern Robotyne.[83] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued in Robotyne.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that part of Robotyne is a contested “gray zone.“[85] Elements of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District) and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[86] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Brigade) and drone operators of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[87]

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast amid continued positional engagements in the area on May 6. Geolocated footage published on May 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced north of Oleshky (southeast of Kherson City).[88] Positional engagements continued near Krynky.[89] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces are using up to 300 strike drones per day against Ukrainian positions throughout southern Ukraine.[90] Pletenchuk also stated that Russian forces are trying to gain control over Nestryha Island in the Dnipro River Delta (southwest of Kherson City) and are suffering significant losses. A Russian source claimed that Nestryha Island is a contested “gray zone” and that high water levels are complicating any offensive operations to establish control over the islands in the Dnipro River Delta[91] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are increasingly conducting guided glide bomb strikes against west (right) bank Kherson Oblast.[92]

12. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 6, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-6-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces began conducting targeted airstrikes against Hamas in eastern Rafah. Israeli officials have suggested that a clearing operation into the area is imminent.
• Ceasefire negotiations: Hamas altered and approved the text of the Egyptian-proposed ceasefire deal. Israeli officials said the altered text is “far from Israel’s essential demands.”
• Iran: A senior Iranian military officer described how Iran and the Axis of Resistance could destroy Israel with a multi-front ground attack. The comments suggest Iran is continuing to develop and refine its theory on how to destroy Israel.
• Iraq: A member of an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia suggested that Iranian-backed forces may soon resume their attacks on US forces.

IRAN UPDATE, MAY 6, 2024

May 6, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, May 6, 2024

Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Kelly Campa, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 4:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) began conducting targeted airstrikes against Palestinian militias in eastern Rafah on May 6.[1] IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari stated on May 6 that the IDF Air Force struck 50 targets around Rafah in the past day as part of preparations for a clearing operation into Rafah.[2] Local journalists posted geolocated footage from May 5 and 6 showing extensive Israeli airstrikes and artillery fire into eastern Rafah.[3] An Israeli Army Radio journalist reported that the airstrikes killed at least 30 Palestinians in Rafah overnight.[4] The IDF Air Force has previously conducted airstrike waves as part of shaping efforts to enable ground maneuvers necessary to clearing operations.[5]

Israeli officials suggested on May 6 that an Israeli clearing operation into eastern Rafah is imminent. The Office of the Israeli Prime Minister announced on May 6 that Israel would “continue the operation in Rafah to exert military pressure on Hamas” to achieve Israeli war aims.[6] An official in the Israeli war cabinet told Israeli media that the Rafah operation will likely start “this week.”[7] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, and the head of the IDF Operations Directorate, Maj. Gen. Oded Basiuk, discussed “the IDF’s expected operational plans in the Gaza Strip, with an emphasis on the Rafah area” on May 6.[8] Gallant previously told Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip on May 5 that he anticipates “a powerful operation in Rafah in the near future" because Israel has “identified signs that Hamas does not intend” to reach a ceasefire agreement with Israel.[9] A Hamas senior official said on May 6 that an Israeli clearing operation into Rafah would “put negotiations in jeopardy” and threatened a strong military response.[10]

The IDF issued evacuation orders on May 6 for the parts of eastern Rafah targeted by the Israeli air campaign.[11] The IDF estimates that 100,000 Gazans are currently in this area.[12] The evacuation order directed the evacuees to an expanded “humanitarian services area” in Khan Younis.[13] The IDF first announced the expansion of the al Mawasi humanitarian zone on April 28 but announced additional details on May 6 about the services available in the expanded area.[14] The IDF says the zone north of Rafah “includes field hospitals, tents, and increased amounts of food, water, medicine, and other supplies.”[15] Israeli ground forces have cleared much of the area to which evacuees are instructed to move. The IDF also warned Gazans against approaching the Egyptian or Israeli borders and that north of Wadi Gaza is “still a dangerous combat zone.”[16] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent noted that the evacuation zone covers three Hamas battalions' areas of responsibility.[17]

Hamas altered and then approved the Egyptian-proposed ceasefire agreement on May 6.[18] Hamas framed itself as approving the original agreement rather than the altered one. Hamas officials told al Jazeera that they accepted “the proposal put forth by international mediators,” while Israeli media reported that Hamas had significantly changed the text of the agreement since Egypt and Israel iterated on April 26.[19] An anonymous Israeli official told Axios that the altered text is “practically a new proposal.”[20]

Hamas added stipulations to the agreement for a permanent ceasefire and the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip.[21] CTP-ISW has previously assessed, however, that Hamas would not likely adhere to the permanent ceasefire for which it is advocating given that Hamas has violated previous ceasefires and that Hamas remains committed to destroying Israel. Hamas has not changed its maximalist demands in negotiations since December 2023.

Hamas also changed in the agreement the pace at which Hamas would release Israeli hostages. Hamas said that it would release three hostages every week, while the original Egyptian-proposed agreement involved Hamas releasing three hostages every three days.[22]

Israeli leaders rejected the new agreement that Hamas submitted.[23] The Israeli war cabinet framed the altered text as “far from Israel’s essential demands.” The Office of the Israeli Prime Minister stated that it will send a delegation to continue negotiations.

A senior Iranian military officer described how Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” could destroy Israel with a multi-front ground attack. Maj. Gen. Gholam Ali Rashid, who is the commander of the Iranian Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, discussed the Iranian theory on how to destroy Israel in an interview with English-language, Tehran-based Iran Daily on May 5.[24] Rashid asserted that the Hamas attack into Israel in October 2023 highlighted Israeli vulnerability and the weakness of the IDF. Rashid argued that Hamas’ attack affirmed that the Axis of Resistance could destroy Israel by launching surprise attacks from Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank simultaneously. He added that such an attack would involve 10,000 fighters from Lebanon, 10,000 fighters from the Gaza Strip, and 2,000–3,000 from the West Bank. Rashid likened such an attack to the Beit ol Moghaddas operation that Iran conducted to liberate Khorramshahr during the Iran-Iraq War. This interview with Rashid is especially noteworthy given his role in commanding the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is the highest Iranian operational headquarters and is responsible for joint and wartime operations.[25]

Rashid’s comments echo a similar strategic concept that IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami articulated in August 2022.[26] Salami described his idea of how to destroy Israel during an interview with the official website of the Office of the Supreme Leader. Salami stated that the Axis of Resistance should conduct ground attacks into Israel from multiple fronts and with increasing frequency. Salami argued that such attacks would generate internal displacement and instability and ultimately collapse the Israeli state. Rashid’s interview suggests that Iranian military leadership is continuing to develop this idea and refining it based on lessons from the Israel-Hamas war.

Rashid’s comments also signaled confidence that the Axis of Resistance has the advantage against Israel and will ultimately defeat it in the current war.[27] This message was likely part of an information operation meant for Western consumption given that Rashid gave these comments to an English-language outlet.

Rashid separately repeated the Iranian regime argument that it could have inflicted greater damage on Israel during its drone and missile attack on April 13, 2024.[28] Rashid argued that Israel would collapse without Western support and that 80 percent of the Iranian projectiles would have struck Israel if the United States and its partners did not intercept any. Rashid also repeated the regime assertion that the IRGC Aerospace Force used only “20 percent of its offensive capabilities” in the attack.[29] Other senior IRGC officials have made similar arguments in recent days, emphasizing that Iran could have launched a larger drone and missile attack than it did against Israel.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces began conducting targeted airstrikes against Hamas in eastern Rafah. Israeli officials have suggested that a clearing operation into the area is imminent.
• Ceasefire negotiations: Hamas altered and approved the text of the Egyptian-proposed ceasefire deal. Israeli officials said the altered text is “far from Israel’s essential demands.”
• Iran: A senior Iranian military officer described how Iran and the Axis of Resistance could destroy Israel with a multi-front ground attack. The comments suggest Iran is continuing to develop and refine its theory on how to destroy Israel.
• Iraq: A member of an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia suggested that Iranian-backed forces may soon resume their attacks on US forces.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces struck Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure across the Gaza Strip. The IDF 143rd Division struck a Hamas command-and-control site inside an UNRWA compound in the central Gaza Strip on May 5.[31] The IDF said that it used precision weapons in the strike to minimize harm to civilians.[32] The IDF Air Force targeted several Palestinian militia sites across the Gaza Strip, including launch sites and booby-trapped buildings, on May 6.[33] The IDF 679th Armored Brigade directed an airstrike targeting a Palestinian squad near Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip.[34] Local Palestinian sources separately reported Israeli artillery fire in Beit Lahia, Juhor ad Dik, and Zaytoun.[35]

Seven Palestinian militias conducted at least 12 indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces near the Netzarim corridor on May 6.[36] Israeli forces have established forward operating bases along the Netzarim Corridor to facilitate raids into the northern and central Gaza Strip.[37] Palestinian militias have claimed almost daily indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces near the Netzarim corridor since April 18.[38] A PIJ sniper also targeted Israeli forces east of Shujaiya, north of the Netzarim corridor, on May 6.[39]

The rocket attack that Hamas conducted targeting Kerem Shalom on May 5 killed four Israeli soldiers.[40] Hamas fired 14 rockets targeting Israeli forces at Camp Amitai near Kerem Shalom, according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent.[41] The IDF was preparing equipment there for a clearing operation into Rafah. Israeli media suggested that the Hamas attack influenced the decision of the Israeli war cabinet to issue evacuation orders for eastern Rafah on May 6.[42] The IDF Air Force struck a Palestinian sniper position and militia infrastructure near Rafah at the location from which Hamas launched the attack.[43]

Palestinian militias conducted three indirect fire attacks into southern Israel on May 6. Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters fired rockets at two Israeli towns near the Israel-Gaza Strip border.[44] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine separately mortared Israeli forces near the Sufa military site on the Israel-Gaza Strip border.[45]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least five locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on May 5.[46] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting Israeli forces in Tulkarm on May 5 and 6.[47] Israeli forces killed one Palestinian fighter, destroyed an IED production site, and confiscated small arms in Tulkarm.[48] IDF engineers also uncovered several IEDs planted in the area.[49]

Israeli forces detained 13 wanted individuals during raids across the West Bank on May 6.[50]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least four attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on May 5.[51] Lebanese Hezbollah launched a one-way attack drone targeting Israeli forces in Metula on May 6.[52] Israeli media reported that the drone wounded two Israelis but did not specify whether they are civilians.[53]

The IDF and local Syrian sources reported that unspecified fighters launched rockets from Syria targeting Ramat Magshimim in the southern Golan Heights on May 5.[54] An IDF spokesperson stated that the rockets landed in open areas and did not cause casualties or material damage.[55] Israeli forces targeted the launch site in Daraa Province, Syria, with artillery fire.[56]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

A political member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba (HHN) suggested on May 6 that Iranian-backed militias would resume attacks targeting US forces if the Iraqi federal government does not end the US-led international coalition’s mission in Iraq.[57] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias suspended attacks targeting US forces in January 2024 after a one-way drone attack killed three US personnel in Jordan.[58] The HHN politician claimed that Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani vowed to the Shia Coordination Framework, Parliament, and Iraqi people to remove US forces from Iraq.[59] The politician also reiterated the need for Sudani to establish a timeline for the removal of US forces from Iraq. CTP-ISW previously observed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have appeared divided on whether to resume attacks on US forces in recent weeks.[60]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed six attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on May 5. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed that it conducted an attack targeting the Ashkelon oil port using Arqab cruise missiles on May 6.[61] This attack marks the fourth time that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed an Arqab cruise missile attack since May 2.[62] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed five drone attacks targeting an IDF airbase in Eilat, the Leviathan Natural Gas Field in the Mediterranean Sea, the “Johannesburg” base, the “Yarden” base in the Golan Heights, and an unspecified IDF facility on May 5 and 6.[63] The IDF reported on May 5 that its fighter jets intercepted an unmanned aircraft that entered Israeli airspace from the east.[64]

Iraqi Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC) Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh discussed counterterrorism cooperation with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus on May 6.[65] Fayyadh and Assad emphasized the need to strengthen cooperation to ensure border security and eliminate terrorist elements that threaten Iraqi and Syrian security.[66]

Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government President Nechirvan Barzani discussed economic and security cooperation with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on May 6. Barzani met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Adm. Ali Akbar Ahmadian, President Ebrahim Raisi, and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian.[67] Barzani emphasized that his government will not allow “third parties” to use Iraqi Kurdistan to threaten Iranian security during his meeting with Ahmadian, presumably referring to long-standing Iranian accusation that Israeli intelligence services and Kurdish militias use Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations into Iran.[68] Barzani and Ahmadian also discussed “fully implementing” the March 2023 security agreement between Iran and Iraq that requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups away from the Iran-Iraq border.[69] Raisi separately stated that security is the foundation for expanding economic cooperation with Iraqi Kurdistan during his meeting with Barzani on May 6.[70]

Barzani’s visit comes amid an uptick in discussions about border security between Iranian and Iraqi officials. Ahmadian recently discussed the March 2023 security agreement with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qasem al Araji on the sidelines of the 12th Russian International Security Summit in Moscow on April 23.[71] Iranian Deputy Interior Minister Majid Mir Ahmadi separately discussed border security and the March 2023 security agreement with Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari and Araji in Baghdad on May 1 and 2, respectively.[72]

Iran is hosting its first Nuclear Science and Technology Conference in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province, between May 6-8.[73] Iranian media reported that the conference is meant to showcase Iranian nuclear achievements.[74] Various countries, including Russia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe, are participating in the conference.[75] The Russian delegation includes the deputy industry and trade minister and the vice president of the Russian Kurchatov Institute.[76] The United States designated the Kurchatov Institute as a Specially Designated National in 2022 for aiding Russia’s “harmful foreign activities.”[77] Iran and Russia previously agreed in the late 1990s for Iranian nuclear specialists to train at the Kurchatov Institute.[78] International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi traveled to Iran on May 6 to meet with Iranian officials and attend the nuclear conference in Esfahan.[79]

13. U.S. Soldier Detained in Russia

Did he meet a Russian girlfriend online or in South Korea?

U.S. Soldier Detained in Russia

Arrest of unidentified Army staff sergeant follows charges of theft

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/u-s-soldier-detained-in-russia-ce8cbccb?mod=latest_headlines

By Gordon Lubold

Follow

Updated May 7, 2024 3:55 am ET

The Kremlin has denied that Russia is intentionally victimizing U.S. nationals. PHOTO: VLADIMIR SMIRNOV/ZUMA PRESS

WASHINGTON—A U.S. soldier was arrested in Russia after being charged with theft, the Pentagon said, the latest case of an American being detained by Russian authorities since the start of the war in Ukraine.

The soldier, an Army staff sergeant who hasn’t been identified, was arrested in the port city of Vladivostok in eastern Russia on Thursday, according to officials, allegedly after he stole from a woman there.

“The Army notified his family and the U.S. Department of State is providing appropriate consular support to the soldier in Russia,” the Army said in a statement without disclosing his name. “Given the sensitivity of this matter, we are unable to provide additional details at this time.”

The U.S. learned about the arrest after Russia notified the State Department, according to Army officials. NBC earlier reported the soldier’s arrest.

There are two Americans considered to be wrongfully detained in Russia, including Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, and Paul Whelan, a corporate security director and former U.S. Marine. Gershkovich was detained in 2023. He is being held on an allegation of espionage that he, the Journal and the U.S. government vehemently deny. Whelan was arrested in 2018 before the Ukraine invasion. Whelan and the U.S. government deny charges against him.

Alsu Kurmasheva, who holds dual U.S.-Russian citizenship and works for Prague-based Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, was taken into custody in October on a charge of failing to register as a foreign agent. Kurmasheva has denied wrongdoing. The White House has called for Kurmasheva’s release. State Department officials have said Russia has brought baseless charges against her. The U.S. is closely monitoring Kurmasheva’s detention but hasn’t reached a decision on whether she is being wrongfully detained, a State Department official has said. Several other U.S. citizens are also in Russian custody, awaiting trial or serving prison sentences.

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President Biden called on Russia to immediately release WSJ’s Evan Gershkovich and Russian-American journalist Alsu Kurmasheva at the 2024 White House Correspondents’ Association dinner. Photo: Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty

The Kremlin has denied that Russia is intentionally victimizing U.S. nationals.

It wasn’t clear why the soldier who was on leave had traveled to Russia or if he had permission to go there. He had finished a deployment in South Korea and was expected to relocate to a base in Texas, officials said.

The State Department advises Americans not to travel to Russia, citing a variety of reasons including the unpredictable consequences of Russia’s war with Ukraine and “the potential for harassment and the singling out of U.S. citizens for detention by Russian government security officials.” The advisory also warns of “the arbitrary enforcement of local law.”

U.S. military members who go on leave are generally expected to inform their superiors if they are traveling to a country considered a U.S. adversary or that is sensitive politically.

The case is reminiscent of the case of Travis King, an American soldier in South Korea who crossed the Demilitarized Zone into North Korea without permission in 2023.

King had faced punishment by the U.S. Army and was expected to board a flight home, then inexplicably left the airport and made a run for the border, where he entered North Korea. He was held for about two months in North Korea before being deported. There was no indication so far that the soldier detained in Russia faced any disciplinary action.Write to Gordon Lubold at gordon.lubold@wsj.com

Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the May 7, 2024, print edition as 'American Soldier Detained In Russia'.

14. Secure at Home, Putin Builds on the Alliances He Needs to Prevail in Ukraine

Excerpts:

Since the invasion two years ago, Putin has nurtured close relationships with a host of countries who share his wariness of the U.S. and the West. Iran has provided missiles and drones. North Korea has sent ammunition and other weapons. In Africa, Putin’s efforts to cast himself as a defender of traditional religious values have won him admirers across a slice of nations that used to look to the West, while the Russian leader’s media handlers played up the positive response he received during a tour to the Middle East in December, where he tried to drive a wedge between Arab nations and the U.S. over the war in Gaza.

None are closer than China, however. There are signs that their interests will align more tightly in the months and years to come after China’s President Xi Jinping earlier declared that their relationship would have “no limits.”

Secure at Home, Putin Builds on the Alliances He Needs to Prevail in Ukraine

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/putin-inauguration-russian-president-524636fe?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inauguration took place nearly two months after his win in a carefully choreographed election. PHOTO: SERGEI BOBYLYOV/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

By Ann M. SimmonsFollow

May 7, 2024 6:39 am ET

Vladimir Putin was inaugurated as Russia’s president for another six-year term in lavish style at the Kremlin after sidelining or eliminating his rivals, and is now focused squarely on the war in Ukraine—and the alliances he needs to secure a victory.

Since the invasion two years ago, Putin has nurtured close relationships with a host of countries who share his wariness of the U.S. and the West. Iran has provided missiles and drones. North Korea has sent ammunition and other weapons. In Africa, Putin’s efforts to cast himself as a defender of traditional religious values have won him admirers across a slice of nations that used to look to the West, while the Russian leader’s media handlers played up the positive response he received during a tour to the Middle East in December, where he tried to drive a wedge between Arab nations and the U.S. over the war in Gaza.

None are closer than China, however. There are signs that their interests will align more tightly in the months and years to come after China’s President Xi Jinping earlier declared that their relationship would have “no limits.”

In his inauguration address at the Grand Kremlin Palace Tuesday, Putin returned to his familiar theme of creating what he called a multipolar world order, which could challenge the influence of the West. 

“We have been and will be open to strengthening good relations with all countries that see Russia as a reliable and honest partner. And this is truly the global majority,” he told the 2,600 or so guests gathered in the hall.

Soldiers march during the inauguration ceremony of Vladimir Putin as Russian President in the Kremlin. PHOTO: ALEXANDER KAZAKOV/SPUTNIK/KREMLIN POOL/EPA-EFE/SHUTTERSTOCK

“We do not refuse dialogue with Western states,” he continued. “The choice is theirs: Do they intend to continue trying to restrain the development of Russia, continue the policy of aggression, continuous pressure on our country for years, or look for a path to cooperation and peace.” 

Putin “obviously values the China relationship above all and the Chinese seem to be tilting toward Russia now more than ever before,” said Donald Jensen, a senior advisor for Russia and Europe at the Washington-based United States Institute of Peace.

Beijing played a crucial role in the early days of the war by providing a destination for Russian oil and gas after Western sanctions closed off markets in Europe and much of the rest of the world, giving Russia time to put its economy on a war footing. While China has refrained from supplying weapons and ammunition, it does provide crucial microelectronic components and other materials from routers to ball bearings that the U.S. says can be used to support Russia’s war effort. Putin has said he plans to visit China later this month, when he and Xi are expected to deepen their political and economic ties, countering what they have said are U.S. attempts to dominate the world order.

Xi is visiting Europe this week, where, among other things, he will visit Serbia to mark the 25^th anniversary of NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which killed three people and badly rattled China-U.S. relations. The U.S. apologized for the bombing, which it blamed on outdated maps, but China has persistently used the incident as an argument against NATO’s expansion and widening reach.

China’s President Xi Jinping, as part of a diplomatic tour of Europe, attended a state dinner with French President Emmanuel Macron, at the Élysée Palace in Paris on Monday. PHOTO: NATHAN LAINE/BLOOMBERG NEWS

The Chinese leader is also traveling to Hungary to meet with Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has forged close economic ties with Beijing and has consistently pushed back against EU initiatives to help Ukraine.

“China is a lifeline” for Russia, said Leon Aron, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. But while there is “no love for Iran or North Korea,” Putin needs those countries, too, he added

Besides its drones, U.S. officials have warned that Iran might soon send ballistic missiles to Moscow. After North Korea provided materiel, Russia blocked the United Nations from monitoring international sanctions against Pyongyang, questioning their value and proposed a time limit be imposed on them. Washington and its allies have said they believe Moscow’s move is aimed at preventing scrutiny of the growing arms pipeline between Pyongyang and Moscow, a claim Russian officials have dismissed.

“What you have is those four countries forming, indeed, an axis,” Jensen said. “It’s a partnership of convenience and it serves Moscow’s interests at the moment to keep them more or less together, despite their differences,” he added.

Putin also plans to hold talks with the leaders of Cuba, Laos and Guinea-Bissau after the inauguration, in another indication of his focus on deepening Russia’s overseas relationships.

Guests gather before Russia’s President Vladimir Putin’s inauguration ceremony at the Kremlin. PHOTO: MIKHAIL SINITSYN/SPUTNIK/AFP

Putin can afford to place nearly all his attention on the war and these foreign alliances because there is very little in the way of domestic opposition anymore. An escalating wave of repression has silenced nearly all his critics. The best known, Alexei Navalny, died in an Arctic prison camp in February in circumstances that still haven’t been fully explained. Others have fled into exile or, like Vladimir Kara-Murza, are serving long prison terms.

Aron described Tuesday’s inauguration, which took place nearly two months after Putin’s win in a carefully choreographed election, as far removed from a democratically structured process. Rather, “it’s the final phase in self-coronation,” he said.

Political analysts expect Putin’s domestic concerns to center solely on perpetuating his increasingly centralized command. There is growing anticipation that an expected cabinet reshuffle will see some prominent figures edged out with die-hard loyalists moved closer to Putin’s inner circle. On Thursday, the country will commemorate Victory Day, Russia’s most important civic holiday, which commemorates the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany, where observers expect Putin to make hayof Moscow’s recent battlefield gains after months of fighting.

His longer-term focus, though, will likely be on maintaining and building the relationships that have put Russia on the cusp of achieving a decisive edge in the war while undermining the U.S., which has its own presidential election due later this year.

Putin “will be spending most of his time thinking about the war and that includes thinking about foreign relations because Russia is not in a position economically to take on the entire West by itself,” said Brian Taylor, a professor of political science at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs.

Kate Vtorygina contributed to this article.

Write to Ann M. Simmons at ann.simmons@wsj.com

15. How DC became obsessed with a potential 2027 Chinese invasion of Taiwan

Is this the proverbial bus to Abilene? 

Does an "obsession" with a Taiwan invasion cause failure in strategic competition?

How DC became obsessed with a potential 2027 Chinese invasion of Taiwan

Defense News · by Noah Robertson · May 7, 2024

At a summit near San Francisco in November, the leaders of America and China turned to the biggest threat to their relationship.

The topic was Taiwan, which China’s government considers part of its rightful territory and has threatened to take by force. When it came up, according to an American official who later spoke to the press, Chinese leader Xi Jinping grew exasperated — not at the risk of war, but at the timeline.

“Xi basically said: ‘Look, I hear all these reports in the United States [of] how we’re planning for military action in 2027 or 2035,’ ” the official said.

“ ‘There are no such plans,’ ” Xi said in the official’s telling. “ ‘No one has talked to me about this.’ ”

That first year, 2027, is a fixation in Washington. It has impacted the debate over China policy — a shift from the long term to the short term. It’s also helped steer billions of dollars toward U.S. forces in the Pacific. And in the last several years, it’s been a question mark hanging over the Biden administration’s approach to the region.

According to U.S. intelligence, Xi has told the Chinese military it needs to be ready to invade Taiwan by that year. But ready to invade is different than will invade; American officials stress the year isn’t a deadline.

Defense News spoke to sources in Congress, the Pentagon and Washington-based think tanks to understand what may be the most important, most misunderstood year in Sino-U.S. relations. The message was that 2027 has exposed a rift in Washington’s China strategy. The U.S. is more focused on the country it calls its “pacing challenge,” but experts disagree on whether it’s running a sprint or a marathon — and if it can prepare for both.

China “will not renounce the use of force as a possibility” around Taiwan, said David Finkelstein, who studies the Chinese military at the Center for Naval Analyses. “So the military option hangs over the Taiwan Strait like Damocles’ sword.”

The Davidson window

In the years leading up to 2021, Sino-U.S. relations had soured. Washington had become more confrontational during Donald Trump’s presidency, in large part as a response to Beijing’s own aggression. The People’s Liberation Army was — and still is — bulking up quickly, with weapons, reforms and exercises that could enable an invasion of Taiwan. Lawmakers concerned the U.S. was falling behind had just created the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, an effort to rush more money to military leaders in the region.

With that backdrop, Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, began his questioning at a 2021 hearing.

“The common theme I hear with regard to China’s actions under Xi Jinping’s leadership is alarm,” Sullivan said, citing concerns over Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China’s strong-arming of U.S. allies like Australia and India.

Sullivan then asked the sole witness that day — Adm. Phil Davidson, the retiring head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command — whether that changed the odds of a conflict around Taiwan.

“The threat is manifest during this decade,” Davidson said at the end of his answer, “in fact, in the next six years.”

Adm. Phil Davidson, the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command at the time, tours a memorial on Sept. 12, 2019, while visiting with Philippine military members. (MC1 Robin W. Peak/U.S. Navy)

It’s rare to find a true before-and-after moment on an issue as complex as Sino-U.S. relations. This, said several experts, was one.

“It set off these warning alarms that broke outside the niche community and into the broader policy conversation in D.C.,” said a Republican congressional aide, granted anonymity because the individual was not authorized to talk to the press.

The concern it generated earned a nickname: the “Davidson window,” shorthand for the near-term threat of an attack on Taiwan.

And that changed how Congress spent money. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative doesn’t have its own budget, but in the last few years the U.S. has spent more on its forces in the region. Indo-Pacific Command sends Congress a yearly list of priorities, including what doesn’t make the Pentagon’s budget request.

The latest wish list has called for $26.5 billion in spending. And while $11 billion didn’t make the cut in the Pentagon’s fiscal 2025 budget request, that means about $15 billion did, with the chance lawmakers may add more in the next spending bill.

Congress also gave the Pentagon $1 billion in annual authority to send Taiwan weapons. The recently passed national security supplemental includes almost $2 billion to replace whatever the Pentagon sends, along with $2 billion more in financing to purchase American equipment.

“You can draw a direct line between Adm. Davidson’s comments and the ability to get something like the foreign military financing for Taiwan through,” the congressional staffer said.

Suddenly, in a considerable number of hearings, members of Congress were asking military leaders about their windows.

At the start of the summer, the chief of naval operations and the commandant of the Marine Corps said they shared Davidson’s concerns.

Gen. Mark Milley, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in a later hearing that Davidson’s comments were based on a speech from Xi, calling on China’s military to “develop capabilities to seize Taiwan and move it from 2035 to 2027.”

U.S. officials haven’t shared the text of that speech.

‘I hope I am wrong’

This became the standard line across the administration — affirmed by Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns.

“President Xi has instructed the PLA [People’s Liberation Army], the Chinese military leadership to be ready by 2027 to invade Taiwan. But that doesn’t mean that he’s decided to invade in 2027 or any other year as well,” Burns said during a TV interview in February 2023.

Amphibious assault vehicles of the Chinese People's Liberation Army move in formation at sea during a live-fire training exercise held in 2023. (Xie Wenjian/Chinese Defense Ministry)

And as the hearing with Milley showed, that distinction is easy to miss. Then-Rep. Elaine Luria, D-Va., argued with the general over whether other witnesses had said China would invade by 2027.

Milley said no, but added a caveat: “Intent is something that can change quickly.”

The back-and-forth showed two factors that have defined the 2027 debate ever since: For one, it’s hard to keep the year from looking like a timeline; and second, even though ability and intent are different, they’re still related.

The first issue has been clear in the three years since Davidson testified. More officials were pressed to offer their own assessments.

In fall 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said China wants to unify with Taiwan on a “much faster timeline” than the U.S. expected. Then-Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday soon after said his service needed a “fight tonight” approach to the region.

Then in early 2023, a memo from Gen. Mike Minihan, head of Air Mobility Command, leaked.

“I hope I am wrong,” it read. “My gut tells me we will fight [China] in 2025.”

After this last case, the Pentagon intervened. Officials began repeating a new talking point: Conflict with China is “neither imminent nor inevitable.” They’ve stuck to that assessment ever since.

But by then, said a senior defense official, granted anonymity to speak freely, the concerns around 2027 had spread widely.

People around Washington would call the official’s office to ask if China would invade that year and whether the U.S. is ready. Since then, the official said, the misconception has become less common.

“It’s not like Xi Jinping has a calendar up in his office with a date in 2027 marked ‘invade Taiwan,’ ” the official said.

In fact, many of the experts who spoke with Defense News said it’s unlikely any Chinese leader would set a deadline. Chinese law doesn’t have timelines for an attack on Taiwan; it has conditions, particularly an attempt by the island to declare independence.

And Xi hasn’t scrapped China’s policy toward the island, which calls for unification without war. Some leading China analysts don’t think invading the island is a legacy issue for him.

“Xi is a politician,” said Toshi Yoshihara, who studies the Chinese military at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments think tank. “All politicians want options, so the last thing you want is to be tied to a deadline.”

‘Seed corn’

The Pentagon doesn’t dismiss 2027 altogether. That’s because it’s a real goal for China’s military — just a nuanced one.

China’s government has set a series of year-based goals throughout this century, almost like mile times a runner wants to hit while training to win a race.

The most important one is 2049, which is 100 years after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. By then, China’s leaders want to reach “national rejuvenation” — or as they see it, again becoming the world’s most powerful country. A core part of that goal is unification with Taiwan.

Members of the media look at the Taiwanese developed large UAV Teng Yun, which resembles the American MQ-9 Reaper and can stay aloft for up to 24 hours, at the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology in Taichung in central Taiwan on Nov. 15, 2022. (Walid Berrazeg/AP)

China has also set short- and medium-term markers. The earlier one is 2027, the 100th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army. It was added to China’s calendar in 2020. The midterm one is 2035.

“It’s a yardstick,” said Chad Sbragia, a researcher at the Institute for Defense Analyses and former head of the Pentagon’s China policy.

The logic isn’t so different from how the U.S. works. Take an initiative like Replicator, for example. Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks has pledged to field thousands of drones by August 2025, which forces the Pentagon to move faster and offers a chance for accountability.

China’s military goals aren’t that specific. Instead, they’re captured in somewhat vague phrases repeated by Chinese officials. By 2035, the modernization of its armed forces should be “basically complete.” By 2049, it wants to have a “world-class” military.

The official said it’s not totally clear — to both the American and Chinese governments — what those phrases mean.

The goals for 2027 are more detailed, though hard to translate from the original Chinese. Here’s how it’s described in the Pentagon’s 2023 report on China’s military strength:

“‘Accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization,’ while boosting the speed of modernization in military theories, organizations, personnel, and weapons and equipment.”

The aims are simpler than they sound, the defense official said.

Two Taiwanese Kuang Hua VI-class missile boats maneuver at sea during a military drill on Jan. 31, 2024. (Annabelle Chih/Getty Images)

The first half focuses on the military’s equipment, its ability to gather data, and its ability to communicate or jam its enemies. The second part refers to doctrine — or the ability for all the different parts of the People’s Liberation Army to fight together.

These are the main areas where China thinks its military must improve if the nation is to surpass its rivals, most of all the United States. Others include corruption and the long time since China last fought a war, which means its leaders have less data on how their forces could perform today.

These goals all matter for a potential fight with Taiwan, though the official stressed that any conflict is still just that — potential. China’s government would prefer to annex the island without a war, and may think a stronger military could force Taiwan into negotiations. The defense official said it’s difficult to judge whether China is on pace to reach its goals, which are more difficult to measure than simply a weapons inventory.

“The amount of military equipment they’re producing is eye-watering,” Sbragia said.

In response, some people, like U.S. military leaders in the Pacific and hawkish lawmakers, say America needs to surge money to its forces in the region. American law doesn’t require the nation to defend Taiwan, but U.S. President Joe Biden has said several times that it would.

Others, such as officials in the Biden administration, argue the U.S. can’t fixate on a threat this decade.

“We don’t really get to choose one or the other,” the defense official said. “We don’t get to say we’re going to pour all of our resources into being ready right now and shortchange what we think we need to invest in for the future.”

Not everyone agrees the U.S. can do both. Even those that do — such as former Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., who until recently led the House’s committee focused on competition with China — argue the U.S. should be spending much more on the effort.

But China will likely be a long-term competitor — as illustrated by its goals, which stretch decades into the future. One of the benefits of the 2027 debate in Washington, multiple China experts told Defense News, is that it’s made America’s government take that competition more seriously.

But they also gave a warning: America shouldn’t think there’s zero chance of conflict before that year, and if nothing happens after that date, it shouldn’t get complacent.

That means spending the money it can on the short-term threat while also upgrading U.S. forces for the long term, said Zack Cooper, who studies U.S.-China strategic competition at the American Enterprise Institute think tank.

“We don’t want to be eating our seed corn,” he said.

About Noah Robertson

Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.

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Defense News · by Noah Robertson · May 7, 2024

16. One defense strategy, two drastically different budgets

Excerpts:

U.S. intelligence officials say Chinese President Xi Jinping has set a goal for the nation’s military to modernize enough to carry out an invasion of Taiwan — which China views as a rogue breakaway province — as early as 2027.

The Air Force says that, while it wrestles with spending caps under the Fiscal Responsibility Act, it leaned toward research and development more than procurement to ensure future capabilities remain on track.

The Navy, in contrast, contends that if it must deter or fight China in this “decade of concern,” it would do so with the fleet it has today, not the one it hopes to develop in the decades to come.

As the services determine their approaches, lawmakers are weighing in on whether the United States will be ready to face China in time.

One defense strategy, two drastically different budgets

Defense News · by Stephen Losey · May 7, 2024

Call it a tale of two China strategies.

The U.S. Air Force and Navy are each preparing for a potential fight in the Pacific against China, perhaps in the next couple of years, under the guidance of the same National Defense Strategy. But this uncertain timing overlaps uncomfortably with a mountain of modernization priorities for each service.

Add to that budget caps for fiscal 2024 and fiscal 2025, and the two services have responded with very different budget strategies.

On one side, the Air Force’s proposed FY25 budget would trim its procurement account by $1.6 billion from the prior year, while boosting research, development, test and evaluation spending by nearly that amount. In the process, the service expects to reduce its fighter jet purchases by 12.

For its part, the Navy has found itself in a shooting war in the Red Sea while also trying to increase its presence in the Pacific region to deter China. The service has prioritized paying for current operations and personnel in its FY25 spending request. Procurement spending is flat, while research and development drops 5%.

U.S. intelligence officials say Chinese President Xi Jinping has set a goal for the nation’s military to modernize enough to carry out an invasion of Taiwan — which China views as a rogue breakaway province — as early as 2027.

Chinese President Xi Jinping is displayed on a screen as Type 99A2 battle tanks participate in a 2015 parade in Beijing. (Ng Han Guan/AP)

The Air Force says that, while it wrestles with spending caps under the Fiscal Responsibility Act, it leaned toward research and development more than procurement to ensure future capabilities remain on track.

The Navy, in contrast, contends that if it must deter or fight China in this “decade of concern,” it would do so with the fleet it has today, not the one it hopes to develop in the decades to come.

As the services determine their approaches, lawmakers are weighing in on whether the United States will be ready to face China in time.

Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va., said at a March conference China could try to take Taiwan by force as early as 2027, noting that fielding capabilities at the turn of the decade will be too late.

“Anybody that uses a metric or time frame and says, ‘We’ll get this stuff done by 2030′ — wrong answer,” Wittman said at the McAleese & Associates event. “2027 needs to be the metric. That’s how we will have the opportunity to deter [China].”

A pattern of differing approaches

At least one expert told Defense News it’s normal for the Navy and Air Force to take different approaches on modernization.

In general, the Navy has taken a more strategic, methodical route to accomplishing its aircraft modernization goals, holding back on buying next-generation aircraft until technology matures and prices come down, said Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute think tank who focuses on defense budgets.

In the meantime, the Navy has bought aircraft already in production to fill out its inventory. For example, over the last decade, the service repeatedly extended its fourth-generation F/A-18E/F Super Hornet production line to avoid a fighter jet shortfall. It introduced its fifth-generation F-35C in 2019, well after the Marine Corps’ F-35B in 2015 and the Air Force’s F-35A in 2016.

Sailors perform maintenance on an F/A-18E Super Hornet from the hanger bay of the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier John C. Stennis. (MCSN Tomas Compian/U.S. Defense Logistics Agency)

“That’s why for about a decade, until just recently, the Navy had a higher aircraft procurement budget than the Air Force,” Harrison said. “The Air Force approach has been more about chasing new technologies and shiny objects that are dangled in front of them.”

The Air Force is now simultaneously trying to buy the F-15EX, a new version of a legacy fighter, and the F-35A, while “getting knee-deep” into developing a sixth-generation fighter program called Next Generation Air Dominance, or NGAD, Harrison said.

“They’re trying to buy three different generations of fighters all at the same time,” he said. “And it looks like they just aren’t sure where they want to place their bets. That’s an unsustainable approach, and it looks like it’s catching up to them. They just don’t have the resources to continue buying three different lines of three different generations of fighters all at once.”

But if China moves to reclaim Taiwan in 2027, Harrison said, the Air Force is “going to come up short. They’re not going to have the future systems like NGAD in time, and they’re not going to have the quantity of fifth-gen and fourth-gen fighters that they would likely need in those scenarios. … They’re destined to fall short on quantities with this approach.”

The Pentagon released footage of a Chinese aircraft approaching a U.S. aircraft over the South China Sea.

The Navy, for its part, acknowledges it would enter a hypothetical 2027 battle with the fleet it has today. So even as its ship and aircraft fleet have shrunk in size in recent years amid the decommissioning of Cold War-era platforms, the service has focused on the readiness of the ships and planes it would take to war.

The Navy has launched several data-driven efforts aimed at quickening maintenance, and it has looked to field software updates and other capabilities that can be rapidly implemented on existing platforms, rather than built into those of the future.

Navy Under Secretary Erik Raven told Defense News all the services are driven “to be ready to execute the [National Defense Strategy] over the near, the medium and the longer term. Each service will come to that with a slightly different view on how to execute that strategy. But we’re fundamentally all aligned to execute that strategy.”

While the Navy has sided with Wittman’s push to be ready by 2027, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said at the McAleese conference his service must take a longer view.

“It’s a risk balance over time,” Kendall said. “If you fixate only on 2027, you’re going to find that in ’29 you’re in big trouble.”

‘We got pinched’

Maj. Gen. Dave Tabor, director of programs for the Air Force’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, told Defense News the service must be able to field enough existing capabilities and continue developing the next generation of aircraft to stay on the cutting edge. To do that, he said, the service had to strike a fine balance between R&D and procurement.

And with the Fiscal Responsibility Act’s budgetary caps pushing the Air Force to make tough choices, R&D came out on top.

“At the end of the day, we got pinched by the topline,” Tabor said, and six F-35s and six F-15EXs got cut. “The result is relatively minimal to our overall rollout, but it’s 12 jets [cut] that last year we were thrilled to have.”

The consequences of the FRA’s budgetary caps started to come into focus last summer after the Air Force had drawn up its program objective memorandum, which spells out the service’s spending plans over the next five years, Tabor said.

“We knew that [the FRA] was coming; we didn’t know how it was going to manifest,” he added.

Then-Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. CQ Brown speaks with airmen during a stop at Travis Air Force Base, Calif., on Aug. 4, 2022. (Senior Airman Alexander Merchak/U.S. Air Force)

Top Air Force leaders, including then-Chief of Staff Gen. CQ Brown, current Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin and Secretary Kendall, convened in June for a high-level meeting called Corona South. A key topic of discussion, Tabor said, was what to put on the chopping block to meet the budget caps. The matter remained unsettled as Corona South wrapped up, he added, and only became more clear after submitting the program objective memorandum at the end of June.

In hindsight, the Air Force would have liked a clearer picture of its budgetary outlook earlier, though service leaders ended up relatively satisfied with the result, Tabor said.

“Building a 90% solution is a whole lot different than building a 100% solution and taking 10% out of it, and the latter is kind of what we ended up with,” he said. “The approach was [preserving capabilities that provide] relative value to the joint fight and what did the least amount of damage to what we had already done.”

If a conflict with China were to erupt, he added, systems now in the works — such as NGAD, the B-21 Raider stealth bomber and artificial intelligence-operated drones known as collaborative combat aircraft — would allow the Air Force to fight in ways it never had before.

NGAD and the collaborative combat aircraft ended up winners in the Air Force’s proposed R&D budget: The former’s funding in 2025 would jump by $815 million to more than $2.7 billion, and CCA spending would increase by $165 million to $557 million.

But Harrison and Heather Penney, a former F-16 pilot and senior resident fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, said the Air Force can’t count on having newer capabilities, such as NGAD, fielded in the early 2030s. Such a time frame could be overly optimistic, they agreed, given the advanced technology that must be refined for NGAD and the track record of some nascent aircraft programs failing to stay on schedule.

This concept art shows a concept for the U.S. Air Force's future fighter, known as Next Generation Air Dominance. (Boeing)

“When was the last time we ever saw an advanced capability show up on time and on budget?” Penney said. The B-21′s apparent success so far is “an exception to how we’ve seen everything else happen. The capabilities [intended for NGAD], in terms of fully operationally capable — that’s not 2030. We’re talking 2035, 2040.”

Tabor said NGAD is “proceeding at pace” and that, even if it falls behind schedule, “we’re prepared with other capabilities to mitigate risk” for a conflict with China.

‘Something has to give’

For the Navy, prioritizing current operations over future platforms wasn’t a choice; it was an operational imperative.

The Navy reported it has lobbed a billion dollars’ worth of missiles into the skies of the Middle East since October, shooting down drones and missiles launched by the Yemen-based Houthi rebel group. The service hasn’t publicly estimated the cost of its operations there, which include the higher-than-usual tempo of daily operations for ships and planes, the extension of the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group’s deployment in the fall, and what’s likely to be a greater maintenance bill.

“Where the Department of the Navy really placed its priorities is on our fundamental mission of being forward-deployed around the world so that if a crisis hits, we’re there on the scene,” Raven, the undersecretary, told Defense News days after releasing the FY25 budget. “Readiness and people were the two top priorities that really came through in this budget.”

The Navy asked for $87.6 billion for operations and maintenance, up $3 billion from FY24. It also continued a recent focus on munitions, asking for $6.6 billion to buy weapons and expand the industrial base that builds them.

But it had to then cut procurement and R&D. The Navy asked for six ships, compared to the seven it previously expected to include in its FY25 budget. It also asked for 75 planes, compared to the 94 it previously planned to purchase.

Naval special warfare operators use a submarine exploration diver propulsion vehicle during underwater training in the waters near Virginia Beach, Va., on Jan. 7, 2024. (MC1 Trey Hutcheson/U.S. Navy)

This took a toll on all three of the Navy’s key modernization programs: its own Next Generation Air Dominance, which includes a manned and unmanned family of systems to replace the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fleet; the SSN(X) next-generation attack submarine that will follow the Virginia class; and the DDG(X) next-generation destroyer that will follow the Arleigh Burke class.

The Navy’s NGAD effort took the biggest financial hit: The service wants $454 million in FY25, compared to $1.5 billion in FY24, for the F/A-XX piloted aircraft portion of the program.

The SSN(X) program faces the most significant delay: The service now says it will begin acquisition in the early 2040s, compared to a previous 2035 start and a 2031 plan before that.

Raven said the Navy had to take risk here, given the FRA budget caps.

“If we’re going to prioritize people and readiness, something has to give, and we saw the best benefit in taking more risk in that longer-term modernization,” he told Defense News. “But budget caps have consequences. There are hard choices being made in this year’s budget.”

Down the line, Raven added, “there may be opportunities to learn from the Air Force as it develops its path to some of these same types of technologies” — such as their separate NGAD programs.

Though lawmakers like Wittman have expressed a preference for prioritizing readiness over future fleet size and capability, one expert warned the Navy is digging itself a hole it will struggle to get out of.

“Given the long lead time to design and build capital assets such as ships and aircraft, the U.S. Navy has entered its version of a ‘doom loop’ where funds for future ships are deferred to pay for today’s readiness — which ensures tomorrow’s readiness will also suffer, as new ships are required to maintain readiness,” Mackenzie Eaglen, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, told Defense News.

“Readiness and fleet size are inextricably linked,” Eaglen added. “It’s shortsighted to believe they are separate and distinct.”

The Air Force, after decades of deferred modernization, now faces a “massive gap” between its current reality and the vision Kendall crafted for transforming the service through next-generation systems, Penney said. But it can’t achieve that vision without pouring its money into research and development.

“Nobody’s wrong here, and nobody’s right,” she said.

About Stephen Losey and Megan Eckstein

Stephen Losey is the air warfare reporter for Defense News. He previously covered leadership and personnel issues at Air Force Times, and the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare at Military.com. He has traveled to the Middle East to cover U.S. Air Force operations.

Megan Eckstein is the naval warfare reporter at Defense News. She has covered military news since 2009, with a focus on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operations, acquisition programs and budgets. She has reported from four geographic fleets and is happiest when she’s filing stories from a ship. Megan is a University of Maryland alumna.

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Defense News · by Stephen Losey · May 7, 2024

17. Soldier Shot During Special Forces Training Event After Live Ammo Mixed in with Blanks

Fortunatley the soldier was not klilled and is in stable condition. I would not want to be the investigating officer for this. But a number of questions come to mind.

Soldier Shot During Special Forces Training Event After Live Ammo Mixed in with Blanks

military.com · by Steve Beynon · May 6, 2024

All live weapon training for the Army's Special Forces units, and most of the elements that support them, will be shut down for much of this week due to a safety stand-down -- after a soldier was accidentally shot during a training event, the service confirmed to Military.com.

A 7th Infantry Division soldier at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state was accidentally shot April 25 by a 1st Special Forces Group soldier with an M249 Squad Automatic Weapon, or SAW, light machine gun, according to one source with direct knowledge of the situation. The injured soldier was in stable condition and recovering at Madigan Army Medical Center.

Starting Tuesday, all Special Forces, civil affairs and psychological operations units will have a three-day safety stand-down. The pause includes all scheduled live weapons training being canceled, according to Maj. Russell Gordon, a spokesperson for 1st Special Forces Command.

The incident occurred during force-on-force training when live ammunition was accidentally mixed in with blanks. Blank ammo is commonly used in training and acts in all the same ways as live ammunition does in real weapons, except there is no projectile.

The Army typically takes great care to keep blank and live ammunition separate, and contaminating one set of the ammunition with the other is considered among the most damning safety mishaps possible.

"It is prudent of us to take immediate actions now to do an internal assessment as part of a safety stand-down," Gordon said in a statement to Military.com.

It's unclear how live ammunition made its way into blank fire training. Service officials are still investigating the incident.

The two types of ammunition are visually very distinct. It's unclear whether the SAW was loaded with a belt of live ammunition. That weapon, which uses 5.56mm rounds, can also be fired using a rifle magazine, in which a small number of live rounds could have been more easily mixed in, though that would still be an egregious error.

All units were ordered to conduct an inventory of all of their arms rooms and ensure that the ammunition storage is in compliance with Army regulations. Team rooms, where Special Forces soldiers often store gear, will be inspected by senior leadership. Units will also have an amnesty period for soldiers to turn in ammunition that may not be currently stored properly.

Noncommissioned officers will also receive additional training related to ammunition handling and conducting safe firearms training.

This Special Forces safety stand-down follows an unrelated stand-down in February, when the Army National Guard grounded its helicopters after back-to-back AH-64 Apache crashes. Two Mississippi Guardsmen died in one incident, and two Utah Guardsmen were injured in a separate crash.

military.com · by Steve Beynon · May 6, 2024

18. Demonstration will bring simulated gunfire, helicopters to Florida during Special Operations Forces Week

I would have stayed the rest of the week in Tampa if they had put on an unconventional warfare and psychological warfare exercise but of course it would take months if not years to complete it and no one would be able to observe the activities of the underground and auxiliary. UW just doesn't make for a good mod demo. (though we did attempt to demonstrate UW unique skills at Ft Liberty in 2007-2008) But UW and psychological warfare just does not have the breathtaking excitement of a good direct action hit.

Demonstration will bring simulated gunfire, helicopters to Florida during Special Operations Forces Week

Stars and Stripes · by Sharon Kennedy Wynne · May 6, 2024

Members assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command fire blank rounds from a helicopter during a Special Operations Forces (SOF) demonstration in downtown Tampa, Fla., May 18, 2022. (Joshua Hastings/U.S. Air Force)

(Tribune News Service) — Don’t be alarmed if you hear explosions this week, the city of Tampa warns. Simulated gunfire and low-flying helicopters will be on display Wednesday near the Tampa Convention Center, as the U.S. Special Operations Command hosts a capabilities demonstration from noon to 1 p.m.

The public is invited to observe this rare display of military-tactical might, the city said in its announcement and warning. A rehearsal of the event will take place a day earlier on Tuesday starting at noon.

“The ‘Battle of the Bay’ is one of the most exciting parts of the Special Operations Forces Week annual conference,” the city’s announcement said. “More than 170 United States Special Operations Command and international service members from 10 nations will take part in [a] mock scenario defending the city of Tampa from ‘hostile invaders.’ Helicopters, boats, drones, ATVS, scuba divers and much more will all be involved in the demo. This is as close to a real-life mission as it gets.”

A noise advisory will be in place for those in the downtown Tampa area surrounding the Tampa Convention Center. Those with sensitivity to loud noises may want to avoid the area. Wearing a form of hearing protection is recommended for those in attendance.

Traffic around the convention center will be affected both Tuesday and Wednesday from 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. South Franklin Street will be blocked off from Channelside Drive to the Westin Hotel and at the Water Street intersection. During the closures, traffic will detour to Beneficial Drive.

Attendees are advised that construction work is ongoing in front of the convention center and may affect travel times. Boat access to the Seddon Channel will be restricted both days from 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. to participating Special Operations Teams only.

The best views of the demonstration are from higher vantage points, including the Harbour Island Bridge. The demonstration will also be visible around the convention center, Riverwalk and Bayshore Boulevard.

The SOF Week conference is expected to draw more than 16,000 people.

©2024 Tampa Bay Times.

Visit tampabay.com.

Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

Stars and Stripes · by Sharon Kennedy Wynne · May 6, 2024

19. The Drone Dilemma and the U.S. Air Force

Excerpt:

Whether or not the decades-long streak of air dominance is over does not portend the impending irrelevance of the U.S. Air Force. The future battle for control of the air against peer and near-peer adversaries will require the capabilities of all of the armed services operating closely together. It is not a “reinvention of the U.S. Air Force,” but a reimagining of joint efforts to gain control of the air. Adversary air forces have certainly paid attention to how the U.S. military approached drone use during the previous two decades. Accounting for mass in war when facing swarms of unmanned aerial systems — as either sensors or weapons, or both — requires hard conversations that will generate implementable solutions for air defense and air superiority. Decisions on roles and missions that drive resourcing strategies should enable the joint force to better understand and prepare for the feasibility of air superiority and air defense now and in future threat environments. Force protection of servicemembers in forward locations remains a high priority for commanders at all echelons, and the solution to the air and missile threat will require a multi-service effort that enables both air superiority and air defense as a holistic objective of joint air dominance.

The Drone Dilemma and the U.S. Air Force - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Clifford Lucas · May 7, 2024

A surface-launched weapon traveling through the air struck and killed U.S. servicemembers in the Middle East, ending the decades-long streak of air dominance keeping U.S. forces on the ground safe from aerial attacks. A recent articleargued that this almost-71-year streak of air dominance ended in Jordan on Jan. 28, 2024, when three U.S. servicemembers were killed in a one-way attack-drone strike, threatening the relevance of today’s U.S. Air Force. If one agrees the U.S. Air Force is approaching irrelevance on account of one-way attack drones, then perhaps the streak ended 33 years ago. For the event described in the first sentence is not from January 2024; rather, it is describing the SCUD missile attack that killed 27 servicemembers in Saudi Arabia on Feb. 25, 1991, during Operation Desert Storm.

There is certainly a consistent threat from drones, missiles, and rockets resulting in U.S. servicemember casualties, apparent from the more than 150 attacks by Iranian-backed militia groups on U.S. locations in Iraq and Syria since January 2021, as well as the missile attack from Iran in January 2020. However, the problem with the argument about the Air Force’s supposed irrelevance, voiced by Dave Barno and Nora Bensahel, is that it is missing the context of how control of the air is accomplished. To understand this, we must look beyond how air superiority is gained and maintained by the U.S. Air Force to the key role U.S. Army air defense plays in this mission, as well as the greater similarities between one-way attack drones to surface-to-surface missiles rather than traditional air-to-surface attacks. The drone dilemma ought not raise questions of a particular armed service’s relevance in the struggle for air dominance. Rather, it is a reason for leaders to revisit how roles and missions are allocated across the military services and to assess resources for air defense capabilities that are affordable, scalable, and fully integrated with the fight for air superiority.

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Air Superiority or Air Defense?

To borrow from and paraphrase Miles’ Law: How you fight for control of the air depends on your viewpoint — on the ground looking up, or in the air looking out and down. Joint Publication 3-30, Joint Air Operations, discusses control of the air in armed conflict and defines three degrees of control — air parity, air superiority, and air supremacy. These degrees are not measured by the effect that the “blue force” has on the “red force,” but rather in the degree to which the latter can interfere with the former’s ability to conduct operations. Therefore, it is important to recognize that the degree to which one controls the air is more often a temporary outcome than one of permanence. Especially in areas of limited conflict, the idea that air superiority can provide complete impunity from air attack is likely unrealistic. Control of the air is accomplished through multiple missions in which the U.S. Air Force tends to focus on offensive actions to gain and maintain freedom of action, while the U.S. Army leans toward defense from air and missile attacks. The offensive culture of airmen is apparent in the choice of terminology, preferring “control of the air” over “air denial.” Air and missile defense, both active and passive, is a joint force requirement for air defense and force protection, making control of the air a truly joint mission. The understanding of air superiority and air defense is even more critical when planning for force protection during operations in the gray zone between cooperation and armed conflict.

Internal Department of Defense debates on the responsibility for air defense have generated scar tissue over the previous eight decades, dating back at least to the 1948 Key West Conference. The strife among the services for resources created the need for multiple written agreements among senior leaders to settle disputes. In November 1956, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson signed a “Roles and Missions” memorandum designating responsibilities for air defense, with the U.S. Army as principal for point defense and the U.S. Air Force as principal for area defense. Point defense is all about protecting a specific important thing or place from immediate threats, using weapons or systems designed to shoot down or disable those threats before they hit. Area defense is about protecting a larger zone or area from enemies, using measures that can cover more ground and are not just focused on one specific target.

Wilson’s memorandum also designated responsibility for overseas areas to the air component commander, adding that an Army unit in a combat zone is responsible for its own local defense. The U.S. Army understood this to mean the field Army commander, not the air component commander, would be responsible for air defense in the airspace over a specific combat area, thereby fracturing the unity of an integrated air defense under a single commander. The Lemay–Decker Agreement in 1962 sought to rectify this disagreement and increase effectiveness with the understanding that the air component commander would designate air defense regions, the commanders of which would normally delegate authority for control of organic army air defense assets to the field army commander. Despite continued attention through many iterations of reviews and studies, the roles and missions debate over air and base defense continues as passionately and unsettled today as it did in 1947.

Surface-to-Surface or Aerial Attack?

A one-way attack drone operates similarly to a surface-to-surface missile in that they are both launched with the intent of striking a target in the opposing forces’ area. Detection of such launches can be difficult as radar and other passive capabilities try to distinguish between ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones — all with different flight paths, speeds, and ordnance capacities. That detection, designation, and ultimate disposition are normally accomplished under the area air defense commander’s authority. Today, missions for control of the air tend to allocate the defense against aerial threats, surface-launched missiles, and rockets to ground-based U.S. Army air defense assets. This is not to argue that fighter aircraft could not or would not defend against one-way attack drones. In fact, they are doing just that over the Red Sea. But the primary responsibility of fighter assets remains dealing with enemy aircraft, not just the weapons they carry.

Drones have expanded the definition of aerial threats, but they should not simply be considered aircraft because they fly. When an adversary launches an unmanned aerial system, it is often difficult to ascertain whether it is carrying weapons, is acting as an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset, or is a one-way attack drone. U.S. Army air defenders are being called upon to identify, categorize, and react to unmanned aerial systems at an increasing rate due to the sheer volume of drones in contested airspace, recently earning one air defender the moniker “Ace of Syria.” Understanding how to classify unmanned aerial systems in the airspace above battlefields will help ensure militaries are prepared to defend against incoming threats to ground forces and therefore should be addressed soonest.

The Drone Dilemma

To be clear, the expanded use of drones recently in the sub-domain that some call the “air littoral” presents a dilemma that requires a review of how the U.S. military gains and sustains air superiority and conducts effective air defense. The current division of air defense responsibilities across the armed services may no longer be appropriate when faced with swarms of unmanned aerial systems, some of which are more of a direct threat to ground forces than others. The ubiquitous nature of drones on today’s battlefields is a technological advancement that is changing the character of war. Due to the low cost and commercial availability of their components, these unmanned aerial systems are increasing in number across the world — but their capabilities are not new. Notably, drones can also create dilemmas within the borders of the United States and are not solely an overseas battlefield issue, as Langley Air Force Base recently experienced. Developing a joint solution that synchronizes both active and passive air defense capabilities and accounts for increased ambiguity in targeting is the first step in gaining control of the air. Once that is accomplished, the next step would be to produce a scalable version of that capability to account for mass in war and for limited-scale operations in strategic competition.

Whether or not the decades-long streak of air dominance is over does not portend the impending irrelevance of the U.S. Air Force. The future battle for control of the air against peer and near-peer adversaries will require the capabilities of all of the armed services operating closely together. It is not a “reinvention of the U.S. Air Force,” but a reimagining of joint efforts to gain control of the air. Adversary air forces have certainly paid attention to how the U.S. military approached drone use during the previous two decades. Accounting for mass in war when facing swarms of unmanned aerial systems — as either sensors or weapons, or both — requires hard conversations that will generate implementable solutions for air defense and air superiority. Decisions on roles and missions that drive resourcing strategies should enable the joint force to better understand and prepare for the feasibility of air superiority and air defense now and in future threat environments. Force protection of servicemembers in forward locations remains a high priority for commanders at all echelons, and the solution to the air and missile threat will require a multi-service effort that enables both air superiority and air defense as a holistic objective of joint air dominance.

Become a Member

Clifford Lucas is an Air Force officer and a non-resident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a joint production of Princeton’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point. Lucas is a special operations aviator with over 1,800 combat hours in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. He is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Weapons School, the College of Naval Command and Staff, and the Secretary of Defense’s Strategic Thinkers Program. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent those of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, the Modern War Institute, the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Image: Midjourney

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Clifford Lucas · May 7, 2024

20. America’s China Strategy Has a Credibility Problem

Treasure and blood but this piece focuses on treasure.

Excerpts:

Conflict with China would impose staggering economic costs on the United States before even a single sanction is imposed. Economic resilience is, therefore, essential and requires delinking critical supply chains from China, a process that is well underway. In the event of war with Beijing, Washington must be prepared to establish emergency economic support measures and stimuli to soften the blow to U.S. workers, farmers, consumers, and firms. As part of this, deeper economic integration with close partners, including through a reformed trade policy that firmly centers security and resiliency interests, must be on the table. Continued U.S. prosperity, whether in wartime or through a prolonged process of delinking from China, will require securing enhanced market opportunities elsewhere in order to compensate for the loss of the Chinese market.

The U.S. government must also transform its bureaucracy to prepare for what would be the most complex sanctions program in the modern era. Although war planning is a well-established practice within the U.S. defense community, it is pursued on an ad hoc and reactive basis in the economic agencies. Washington must, therefore, institutionalize a strategic planning process for economic statecraft, as well as planning for a range of potential crisis or conflict scenarios with China. Such planning would mature economic statecraft strategy, enable greater integration of economic tools with military options, and facilitate deeper conversations with international partners.

War with China would be an economic catastrophe. Sanctions can help avoid it, but only if the United States plays its modest hand well. A better sanctions strategy is essential to this effort, and so, too, is ratcheting up pressure on Russia. If the United States and its partners cannot effectively isolate Russia from the global economy, then there is little hope that they would fare better against the far greater challenge of China. Both Beijing and Washington are learning important lessons from the ongoing battle over Ukraine, and the United States must make sure that China is impressed by U.S. credibility and resolve. If Beijing is not, then the U.S. sanctions threat, modest though it may be, will be removed as a meaningful deterrent from U.S.-Chinese conflict scenarios. That would make the current situation even more dangerous.

America’s China Strategy Has a Credibility Problem

A Muddled Approach to Economic Sanctions Won’t Deter Beijing

By Emily Kilcrease

May 7, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Emily Kilcrease · May 7, 2024

In future crises or conflicts in U.S.-Chinese relations, the economic dimension will be critical. Yet Beijing currently has good reason to doubt the credibility of Washington’s sanctions threats. This is because the United States’s response has been muted in the face of recent Chinese provocations, including Beijing’s efforts to erode democracy in Hong Kong, the dispatching of a spy balloon over the United States, and Chinese aggression in the South China Sea.

Sanctions are a crucial part of the U.S. foreign policy toolkit, and they encompass a broad range of economic restrictions, including financial sanctions, export controls, and trade restrictions. They are intended to coerce entities or individuals into a course of action. The United States has many powerful sanctions at its disposal—including those that could eject major Chinese firms from the global financial system, and weaponize the central role of the U.S. dollar in it. But Washington has preferred instead to respond to provocations by imposing controls on a handful of Chinese firms or personal sanctions on Chinese officials. Rather than using more powerful sanctions, the United States has opted for a more limited approach of imposing sanctions related to technology and levying tariffs and trade restrictions to counter China’s economic practices.

This measured response is defensible, as more extreme measures could be seen as an act of economic war and would escalate tensions with China. Yet Washington’s restraint may also be dangerous, encouraging China to assume that it would not face harsh sanctions even if conflict broke out over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or other potential flashpoints. This question is becoming more pressing as the United States grows increasingly concerned about China’s support of Russia’s defense industrial base. That support was at the top of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s agenda during his recent visit to Beijing, which was quickly followed by a fresh raft of sanctions on Russia’s defense suppliers, including a handful of entities in China. Washington must decide whether to ramp up the use of its most powerful sanctions on Beijing now, as part of the broader effort to support Ukraine, or to preserve its leverage to deter or respond to a direct confrontation between the United States and China later.

The United States and its partners must urgently devise a clearer sanctions strategy that maximizes the modest economic leverage that they have over Beijing. This strategy should center on keeping China in the global financial system, in order to maintain a key U.S. advantage. At the same time, however, the United States must work to build the credibility of its threat to impose swift and severe sanctions on China if Beijing crosses certain redlines. It can do this by transforming its economic statecraft policy—that being its use of economic leverage to pursue geopolitical aims—through a strategic process that is integrated with military planning and carried out in cooperation with key international partners. War planning must be embedded within the economic agencies, critical supply chains delinked from China, and this strategy must also clearly convey Washington’s willingness to impose serious sanctions, when warranted. The United States must also work to strengthen its economic resiliency, as well as that of its partner countries around the globe, to withstand the economic shocks that would follow from a military conflict with Beijing.

LASHED TOGETHER

Research from the Center for a New American Security paints a disturbing picture of how modest U.S. economic leverage is when mapped across the full range of strategic economic activities that would support China’s ability to sustain a military campaign. These resources include access to military and dual-use technology, as well as to strategic globally traded commodities such as energy, and the overall health of the Chinese economy. Most U.S. sanctions would not be imposed unless there were an active conflict. But at that point sanctions could neither deter nor impair Chinese capabilities. To deter, they must be signaled clearly in advance, at a time when Chinese decision-making can still be influenced. But the reality is that political resolve to impose sanctions is unlikely to emerge until a crisis is well underway, which limits their strength as a deterrent.

The United States has already imposed a high level of restrictions on China related to military goods. Washington has sought for decades to limit the strength of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and successive U.S. administrations have used export controls to try to degrade Chinese military capabilities, including through a long-standing arms embargo and controls on dual-use items, including satellites, aerospace technologies, and microelectronics. And yet China’s military modernization has continued apace. According to the Department of Defense’s annual report on China’s military in 2023, Beijing is increasingly capable of projecting its power globally and countering U.S. interventions in a conflict along China’s periphery.

Political resolve to impose sanctions is unlikely to emerge until a crisis is well underway, which limits their strength as a deterrent.

Having already denied the export of goods with direct military application, the United States now faces the difficult task of slowing the growth of China’s commercial technology ecosystems in areas that might have military use, regardless of whether the technologies are designed specifically for military purposes. The Biden administration’s export controls on advanced chips, AI, and supercomputing were imposed to freeze China’s indigenous development of these technologies, on the assumption that any advances would eventually benefit the PLA. Washington’s expansive export control policy, which China has denounced as containment by another name, complicates U.S. efforts to align with international partners, many of whom support “de-risking” from China but hesitate at the more provocative approach of freezing China’s technological development. Moreover, these efforts cannot swiftly degrade China’s military capacity, meaning that their value lies not in their ability to deter China in the near term but in their ability to reduce Chinese capabilities to such an extent that Beijing’s long-term decision-making will have to change.

U.S. export control policy is currently focused on denying China access to chokepoint technologies, which are those critical technologies of which the United States, along with its close allies, are the dominant global producers. This bid to deny Chinese access was seen most clearly when Washington imposed strict export controls and proposed investment restrictions to end Beijing’s access to the software and machinery needed to make advanced chips. Focusing solely on chokepoint technologies, however, is too narrow a perspective, as it does not eliminate Chinese leverage to exert its own coercive economic pressure on the United States at other points in the supply chain. Even in the semiconductor sector, for example, controls could theoretically be tightened to ban all exports of chip-making machinery to China. But U.S. leverage is counterbalanced by China’s ability to impose costs on the United States at other points, including back-end packaging and final electronics assembly, not to mention China’s growing share of legacy chip manufacturing. This pattern is replicated across sectors whose goods pass through the United States and China.

Nor will it be easy for Washington to deny China access to key commodities, including energy, which can be easily acquired from a diverse range of suppliers. This is particularly true of a product like oil, which is available from producers in many countries that will not align with U.S. sanctions—Russia and the Gulf states, in particular. More aggressive measures, such as secondary sanctions that threaten third-party countries that sell energy to China, could be considered. They are, however, unlikely to fully halt supply, and secondary sanctions have a bad track record of worsening relationships with international partners and being difficult to enforce. If the United States wants to fully halt energy supplies to China, economic tools alone will be insufficient.

THE ALMIGHTY DOLLAR

The United States does, however, enjoy a clear advantage in the financial sector. The dollar has a privileged position in the global financial system, as most international transactions are denominated in the currency. Those international transactions that are not nonetheless rely on U.S. financial institutions. This is a problem for China, which holds 56 percent of its foreign exchange reserves in U.S. dollar assets. Beijing’s ability to neutralize this vulnerability is constrained by the basic structure of the global financial system and by China’s own capital control policies, which limit the utility of the renminbi for cross-border transactions. U.S. sanctions that weaponize the essential role of the U.S. dollar would undoubtedly cause significant harm to China’s economy.

But there are important caveats to this U.S. advantage in the financial sector. A credible threat of severe sanctions on major Chinese banks, which are the largest in the world, is the most powerful economic tool that the United States can use to deter China from invading Taiwan. Actually imposing these sanctions, however, could trigger global financial instability and spark turmoil in U.S. dollar markets. European cooperation would be essential, for the euro’s easy convertibility and the maturity of European financial markets would allow the currency to replace the U.S. dollar in many international transactions. This could potentially enable international transactions outside the scope of U.S. sanctions.

Cutting off Chinese banks would also mean that they could no longer facilitate the international transactions that enable China’s exports, leading to negative repercussions across global supply chains. China is so broadly and deeply integrated into the world’s economy that if U.S. policymakers were to impose heavy restrictions on the country the shocks would be felt around the globe. Such heavy financial sector sanctions would almost certainly provoke strong resistance from other major economies, as well as the global South, which would be hit particularly hard by spillover effects.

TIME AND CHANCE

Sanctions alone cannot deter Chinese aggression. Instead, they should be used as an important component of a broader strategy of integrated deterrence that deploys all instruments of national power to influence Chinese thinking about the costs of its aggressive foreign policy, including any potential actions against Taiwan. An effective U.S. sanctions strategy should play to U.S. strengths in the financial sector while reserving the most severe measures for acute crises or conflicts. The United States may not be able to escalate to a full sanctions attack on China’s financial sector, including full blocking sanctions on the major Chinese banks and the People’s Bank of China, given the high risk of unintended consequences. If and when financial sector sanctions are used, they will necessarily be deployed on a smaller scale, heightening the importance of timing to ensure they have the most disruptive effect. Maximizing impact requires resisting prematurely frittering away U.S. leverage by using financial sector sanctions to manage tensions with China that do not rise to a crisis or conflict threshold. Beijing’s economic interests are a powerful incentive for it to remain integrated in the U.S.-dollar-dominated global financial systems. Rather than pushing China out through increased use of financial sanctions, keeping the country enmeshed in the global financial system preserves an unmatched point of U.S. leverage.

Strategic restraint on financial sector sanctions must be balanced with the need to build credibility for the threat of their imposition. For example, the United States may be approaching the point where it needs to impose sanctions on Chinese banks facilitating the continued flow of microelectronics to Russia, thereby powering its war machine. Months of U.S. diplomatic efforts and more limited technology sanctions have failed to dissuade Chinese companies from shipping these critical goods to Russia. A U.S. response that does not use powerful sanctions, after repeatedly calling out problematic Chinese actions, risks being read by Beijing as indicative of Washington’s reluctance to robustly target Chinese financial institutions. Separately, the United States should also consider the role of financial sector sanctions in responding to China’s nonmilitary coercion of Taiwan. The United States must strike a delicate balance: using these tools enough that they are taken seriously without using them so much that they make China flee dollar-based systems.

The most credible sanctions threat will be one that is supported by U.S. allies and partners. In nearly every strategic sector, U.S. leverage will be strongest when coordinated with other advanced industrialized nations. A broad sanctions coalition reduces, though it does not eliminate, China’s evasion options. But constructing a coalition will be no easy task. Although the United States may be able to count on Five Eyes partners and the G-7, cooperation from the global South is a much more doubtful prospect. The United States should seek to secure these countries’ support by offering them positive inducements to remain neutral, and engage with them in good faith to mitigate the damage that sanctions would inevitably cause to their economies.

GUARDING THE HOME FRONT

Conflict with China would impose staggering economic costs on the United States before even a single sanction is imposed. Economic resilience is, therefore, essential and requires delinking critical supply chains from China, a process that is well underway. In the event of war with Beijing, Washington must be prepared to establish emergency economic support measures and stimuli to soften the blow to U.S. workers, farmers, consumers, and firms. As part of this, deeper economic integration with close partners, including through a reformed trade policy that firmly centers security and resiliency interests, must be on the table. Continued U.S. prosperity, whether in wartime or through a prolonged process of delinking from China, will require securing enhanced market opportunities elsewhere in order to compensate for the loss of the Chinese market.

The U.S. government must also transform its bureaucracy to prepare for what would be the most complex sanctions program in the modern era. Although war planning is a well-established practice within the U.S. defense community, it is pursued on an ad hoc and reactive basis in the economic agencies. Washington must, therefore, institutionalize a strategic planning process for economic statecraft, as well as planning for a range of potential crisis or conflict scenarios with China. Such planning would mature economic statecraft strategy, enable greater integration of economic tools with military options, and facilitate deeper conversations with international partners.

War with China would be an economic catastrophe. Sanctions can help avoid it, but only if the United States plays its modest hand well. A better sanctions strategy is essential to this effort, and so, too, is ratcheting up pressure on Russia. If the United States and its partners cannot effectively isolate Russia from the global economy, then there is little hope that they would fare better against the far greater challenge of China. Both Beijing and Washington are learning important lessons from the ongoing battle over Ukraine, and the United States must make sure that China is impressed by U.S. credibility and resolve. If Beijing is not, then the U.S. sanctions threat, modest though it may be, will be removed as a meaningful deterrent from U.S.-Chinese conflict scenarios. That would make the current situation even more dangerous.

• EMILY KILCREASE is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy, Economics, and Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.

Foreign Affairs · by Emily Kilcrease · May 7, 2024

21. The Secret to Japanese and South Korean Innovation

Excerpts:

Startup capitalism’s ability to boost technological supremacy therefore gives a country a competitive edge over friends and foes alike. Government support allows startups and especially big conglomerates with large financial and human resources to take a long-term approach toward economic planning, aware that funding will continue even if there are short-term economic disruptions such as a financial crisis or a pandemic. This approach also means that the government will underpin research and firms moving into new sectors where success isn’t guaranteed, a risk that often stifles private-sector innovation in other countries.

As a case in point, South Korea and Japan are world leaders in energy-efficient shipping because their governments bet on the long-term importance of this sector, while the United States and Europe gave up on a competitive shipping industry decades ago. In late February, U.S. Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro toured Japanese and Korean shipyards, promoting the collaboration taking place with their American counterparts to revive the U.S. shipbuilding and maintenance industry. South Korea and Japan produce a large share of the world’s most technologically advanced vessels, such as the ships that carry liquefied natural gas and ammonia. Their strength in this sector is at least partly driven by government-conglomerate-startup cooperation. In the case of South Korea, startups developing new technologies are paired with large conglomerates via a network of government-funded Creative Economy Innovation Centers, where they can gain access to mentoring, space, and funding while sharing their ideas and products. The center in Ulsan focuses on shipbuilding specifically, with Hyundai Heavy Industries as the anchor partner. Meanwhile, graduates from the national university in Busan, a traditional feeder of engineers for the shipping industry, have close links with shipbuilding conglomerates throughout their studies, even if they want to develop their own projects and launch their own firms. As for Japan, the government recently announced plans to promote startup-large incumbent collaboration to create a national champion for next-generation shipbuilding. The United States does not have similar programs that encourage specialized training cohorts at specific universities.

The Secret to Japanese and South Korean Innovation

How Tokyo and Seoul Partner With Startups—and What Silicon Valley Can Learn

By Ramon Pacheco Pardo and Robyn Klingler-Vidra

May 7, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Ramon Pacheco Pardo and Robyn Klingler-Vidra · May 7, 2024

Japan and South Korea are innovation and tech powerhouses. They are home to leading firms in many of the high-tech sectors powering global economic growth and usually rank near the top of innovation indexes. To get to where they are today, both countries harnessed the combined power of their public and private sectors for decades. The innovation strategies they used challenge the model mythologized by Silicon Valley: the individual genius who comes up with a brilliant idea and receives funding from venture capitalists acting in a private capacity. In the United States, the perception is that startups should work by themselves, often with the aim of disrupting existing companies and industries.

Despite rhetorical claims about their goals to build their own Silicon Valleys, the governments and firms of Japan and South Korea believe that cooperation among new startups and existing conglomerates is crucial to boosting economic competitiveness, especially in frontier technologies, such as semiconductors, robotics, energy-efficient shipping, and electric batteries. Japan and South Korea have created an open innovation ecosystem in which government agencies, large firms, and smaller startups all support one another.

As competition between the United States and China heats up, the model pursued by Seoul and Tokyo suggests that startups are central to a competitive economy, but their potential is limited if they are working on their own. A national economy benefits more when startups work with government and existing big companies. Today, the United States is not the paradise for maverick entrepreneurs depicted in television shows and Hollywood movies. Instead, it already has traces of the approach found in Japan and South Korea. American policymakers should acknowledge this reality and lean into it to increase the country’s economic and technological competitiveness.

CHANGE FROM WITHIN

Japan and South Korea publicly embrace the sentiment that startups are open innovation resources for large conglomerates. Their national policies foster smaller, more agile firms and encourage them to work with their bigger peers to support the innovativeness of the country as a whole. Startups inject new ideas, talent, and ways of working into large Japanese and Korean firms so that they can compete with American, Chinese, and European rivals. The director of a startup support center funded by the Korean government put it to us this way: the government wants to inject “innovative DNA” into the country’s chaebol, or large industrial conglomerates, so that the countries’ legacy firms do not go the way of Motorola or Nokia, two tech companies that were known for their earlier pathbreaking products but lost their innovation mojo along the way and got left behind.

Take the case of Korea’s K-Startup Grand Challenge, a government program providing support for startups to become internationally competitive. Launched by the conservative government of Park Geun-hye in 2016, the program was continued by the liberal Moon Jae-in and continues to thrive today under the administration of independent-turned-conservative Yoon Suk-yeol. Funded and managed by the government and based at Pangyo Techno Valley—South Korea’s version of Silicon Valley, in the Seoul metropolis—the program brings together startups from across the world competing for the chance to join an accelerator in South Korea. This program serves as a springboard for these firms to expand in South Korea and across Asia thanks to a combination of funding, mentorship, peer learning, office space, and connections with the chaebol. A crucial metric of the success of the program is to identify licensing and partnership agreements with the country’s chaebol, which are also involved in mentoring. That is, government largess is contingent on startups partnering with Samsung, Hyundai, LG, or any other of the big South Korean firms.

Japan and South Korea don’t see the point of undercutting their existing large companies.

Japan launched a nearly identical program in 2018. Under the J-Startup Initiative, Japan’s postwar conglomerates, known as keiretsu, partner with the country’s main banks to fund and support potential “unicorns”—privately held startups that achieve a valuation of $1 billion. The program was not construed as a vehicle for startups to displace incumbents but to encourage them to work hand in hand. Six years later and after two changes in government, the initiative continues with the same ethos of large conglomerates providing support to new startups. Its initial goal was to help build 100 unicorns by 2023. The J-Startup Initiative has yet to achieve this, although Japan has produced 20 unicorns during that time (as well as what are called “hidden unicorns,” companies that achieve valuations of more than $1 billion by way of acquisition). In 2022, the government of Fumio Kishida announced its goal to foster 100 new unicorns by 2027 and spark the creation of 10,000 startups during that time.

These are just two examples of the many ways in which Seoul and Tokyo bring together government, large legacy firms, and startups to promote innovation and economic growth. Similar startup initiatives in the United States, such as Small Business Innovation Research, invest in startups directly but without involving large firms as collaborators, judges, or mentors. Silicon Valley promotes stories of David-sized startups defeating Goliath-like conglomerates, but Japan and South Korea don’t see the point of excluding, or even undercutting, their existing large companies. In this way, David works with (or even for) Goliath, fueling national capabilities at the world’s technological frontier.

CALIFORNIA DREAMIN’

Most people think of Silicon Valley as a land where the invisible hand of the market ensures the survival of the fittest: startups steered by young minds with brilliant ideas working out of garages while getting their funding from venture capitalists to develop the next big thing. These entrepreneurs will one day become the next Bill Gates, Elon Musk, Steve Jobs, or Mark Zuckerberg. Central to the myth of Silicon Valley is the idea that upstart entrepreneurs will create new companies that will replace today’s big firms, thus disrupting industries when not creating entirely new ones. As PayPal co-founder Peter Thiel’s Zero to One book title suggests, many aspiring tech founders understand their mission as “building the future.” On their minds are Microsoft and Apple and the personal computer in the 1980s or Tesla and electric vehicles today. Those without the imagination to come up with the next world-changing product fear they won’t receive funding or, worse, will lose millions, if not billions, of dollars and will have to leave Silicon Valley to pursue other lines of work.

Although this concept of Silicon Valley is based on truth, it does not exactly reflect reality. Today, the U.S. technology sector is dominated by only a handful of companies that make some of the world’s most valuable products. These big firms, such as Alphabet, Amazon, and Microsoft, also act as technology platforms for today’s startups, hosting research campuses and running accelerators -- programs for coaching and mentoring fledgling startups. They are also the key acquirers of new inventions. In the past, these young companies forced Altavista or Packard Bell into bankruptcy. Now, they are seeking to guard against others who could put them out of business. The big tech firms thwart any threat posed by co-opting startups as users of their technologies, as recipients of their investment, and as mentees.

A ship at Hyundai Heavy Industries shipyard in Ulsan, South Korea, May 2015

Kim Hong-Ji / Reuters

This integration of startups into industrial dynamics is part of what we call “startup capitalism,” an economic model in which startups contribute to employment, innovation, and growth. Startup capitalism is increasingly ubiquitous globally, with policymakers around the world striving to create their own high-tech cluster, often signaled by the use of a local Silicon Valley (such as the Chilecon Valley in Santiago or Silicon Roundabout in London). Though startups are often hailed as crucial innovation agents, as the reality of today’s Silicon Valley shows, they are more often open innovation tools for incumbent firms to boost their own competitiveness. Big firms invest in new potential unicorns that, in turn, leverage the distribution channels and talent pools of the big firms.

Despite these changes to how Silicon Valley functions, U.S. policy remains in an antagonistic relationship with today’s tech giants. On the one hand, small startups continue to be celebrated, while large firms, especially technology firms, are summoned to congressional hearings for aggressive questioning, and they are increasingly the targets of antitrust lawsuits. On the other hand, the U.S. government is a huge technology customer and is actively limiting rival countries’ access to the country’s cutting-edge technologies, especially semiconductors. The U.S. government tries to keep Big Tech in check but also understands its importance to U.S. national security. Government support is not given, for fear of being seen as wasting taxpayers’ money on companies that are already among the world’s most valuable.

American policy therefore misses out on the power that an open innovation model could bring. U.S. policymakers do not actively engage their country’s large firms as partners in startup policy. This helps explain why the Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS Act are spending billions of dollars in grants and rebates to attract foreign semiconductor, electric battery, and electric car firms to the United States. Simply put, American firms cannot compete with their foreign peers in some areas of hardware and manufacturing that demand long-term thinking and huge upfront investment. The governments of Japan and South Korea have not made this same mistake.

INNOVATE OR DIE

Japanese and South Korean policymakers realized much earlier the role startups can play in their countries’ national security strategies. Startups fuel Japan’s and South Korea’s prowess in technologies that are critical to national security—such as semiconductors, AI, and advanced materials. Defense contractors are no longer the main drivers behind a country’s competitive edge. Instead, getting ahead also hinges on national supplies of cutting-edge technologies and the inventive people behind them. The United States’ consideration of banning or forcing the sale of TikTok—and China’s opposition to the move—underscores the centrality of technology competition today. Although full-blown war between the superpowers remains unlikely, the United States and China know they can inflict pain on each other when it comes to achieving technological superiority.

Startup capitalism’s ability to boost technological supremacy therefore gives a country a competitive edge over friends and foes alike. Government support allows startups and especially big conglomerates with large financial and human resources to take a long-term approach toward economic planning, aware that funding will continue even if there are short-term economic disruptions such as a financial crisis or a pandemic. This approach also means that the government will underpin research and firms moving into new sectors where success isn’t guaranteed, a risk that often stifles private-sector innovation in other countries.

As a case in point, South Korea and Japan are world leaders in energy-efficient shipping because their governments bet on the long-term importance of this sector, while the United States and Europe gave up on a competitive shipping industry decades ago. In late February, U.S. Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro toured Japanese and Korean shipyards, promoting the collaboration taking place with their American counterparts to revive the U.S. shipbuilding and maintenance industry. South Korea and Japan produce a large share of the world’s most technologically advanced vessels, such as the ships that carry liquefied natural gas and ammonia. Their strength in this sector is at least partly driven by government-conglomerate-startup cooperation. In the case of South Korea, startups developing new technologies are paired with large conglomerates via a network of government-funded Creative Economy Innovation Centers, where they can gain access to mentoring, space, and funding while sharing their ideas and products. The center in Ulsan focuses on shipbuilding specifically, with Hyundai Heavy Industries as the anchor partner. Meanwhile, graduates from the national university in Busan, a traditional feeder of engineers for the shipping industry, have close links with shipbuilding conglomerates throughout their studies, even if they want to develop their own projects and launch their own firms. As for Japan, the government recently announced plans to promote startup-large incumbent collaboration to create a national champion for next-generation shipbuilding. The United States does not have similar programs that encourage specialized training cohorts at specific universities.

EMBRACE REALITY

U.S. policymakers need to help facilitate this marriage between big firms and new startups. Because, although appealing, the Silicon Valley myth is, well, a myth. Startups are already providing solutions to problems that keep incumbent firms up at night rather than posing an existential threat to them. The origin story of Silicon Valley was also never fully true. The government has long been a key protagonist in Silicon Valley’s success. Billions of dollars in federal and state funding—including Small Business Innovation Research—were crucial in developing Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurial ecosystem as early as the 1950s. Government largess in support of American entrepreneurs has continued over the decades. As a case in point, Tesla has dramatically benefited from federal tax credits offered consumers for the purchase of electric cars. It is estimated that the firm has received almost $3 billion in state and local subsidies and incentives since its launch. And last year, when Silicon Valley Bank—favored by startups—was about to go bust, the U.S. Treasury Department, the U.S. Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, came to its customers’ rescue.

Similar to Japan and South Korea, the United States has a fairly high industrial concentration. This means that different industries are dominated by a small number of large firms. This truth is widely accepted in Japan and South Korea, even if politicians and the public sometimes decry this state of affairs. The United States should also accept reality and embrace the value of large firms, particularly in high-tech sectors. As Robert Atkinson and Michael Lind argued in their 2018 book, Big Is Beautiful, the U.S. government should accept that big companies are driving American prosperity. Although antitrust oversight is necessary, market-power concerns should not preclude cooperation with big firms when beneficial for the U.S. economy, innovation, and national security. The relationship between the U.S. government and its leading tech firms is now largely one of apprehension and mistrust. And there are good reasons for this, such as threats to the health of the country’s democracy or the harm that tech can do to children and teenagers. Government regulators and lawmakers should rightly hold monopolistic and competition-busting firms and businesspeople to account.

Silicon Valley promotes stories of David-sized startups defeating Goliath-like conglomerates.

At the same time, there should be a more open approach toward the role of large firms in the modern startup-fueled economy. To begin with, U.S. policymakers should be unafraid of pairing innovative startups with large incumbents. After all, startups can have more innovative thinking, and many entrepreneurs welcome rather than reject stronger ties with big firms from which they feel they can learn and partner to achieve scale. This could take the form of government-sponsored competitions in which successful startup applicants, whether American or foreign, are paired with preselected big firms willing to support their growth. The government would act as the matchmaker and also provide the funding for startups to be able to work together with their larger peers. The U.S. government should also consider launching a program to provide long-term support for startups in sectors that may be crucial to the country’s future growth and prosperity—but which could prove to be a bust. Take the case of robotics. A U.S. government body could set up a ten-to-20-year strategy to support startups that may or may not produce the next generation of, say, humanoid robots. The bet may fail, but if successful, it could make the United States one of the leaders in this industry for decades to come. This strategy should not avoid working with big firms already focusing on this sector but rather welcome them as partners with government and startups themselves. And the Biden government seems to be moving in this direction. The recently launched CHIPS Women in Construction Framework counts Intel and Micron as anchor partners in U.S. efforts to boost the number of women in the construction sector, with special focus on the semiconductor industry.

The Silicon Valley myth fuels the idea that large firms should not be viewed as sources for innovation and therefore should not work with government and startups. The United States, as a result, is inhibiting its own productive potential. It supports startups directly while challenging its own lead firms and investing billions in foreign companies to operate in the United States. In Japan and South Korea, the cooperation between startups and large firms is openly pursued because the national benefits are apparent to all.

• RAMON PACHECO PARDO is Professor of International Relations at King’s College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at Vrije Universiteit Brussel.
• ROBYN KLINGLER-VIDRA is Associate Professor in Entrepreneurship and Sustainability at King’s Business School.
• They are the authors of the forthcoming book Startup Capitalism: Northeast Asia’s Startup-Fueled Innovation Strategies.

Foreign Affairs · by Ramon Pacheco Pardo and Robyn Klingler-Vidra · May 7, 2024