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Quotes of the Day:
"The time will come when diligent research over long periods will bring to light things which now lie hidden… Many discoveries are reserved for ages still to come, when memory of us will have been effaced."
– Seneca
"They follow the Hitler line - no matter how big the lie; repeat it often enough and the masses will regard it as truth."
– John F. Kennedy
"I’m telling you a lie in a vicious effort that you will repeat my lie over and over until it becomes true."
– Lady Gaga
1. U.S. will do 'all' it can to back S. Korea in case of China's economic coercion: official
2. Bracing for security risks ignited by Trump
3. 'Lockheed Martin' Of Asia! Despite Aussie Snub, Hanwha Emerges 'Big Player' In Global Defense Market
4. S. Korea to participate in U.S.-led cyber exercise this week
5. N. Korea slams U.S., other countries for seeking alternative to U.N. sanctions monitoring panel
6. Exploitation and Desperation: Human Rights Violations and Labor Conditions of North Korean Workers Dispatched Overseas
7. South Korea brings hypersonic tech to the Aukus table in a sign Seoul is moving closer to the US and its other allies
8. Fed Up With Jerome Powell? South Korea Is Getting There
9. North Korean weapons are killing Ukrainians. The implications are far bigger
1. U.S. will do 'all' it can to back S. Korea in case of China's economic coercion: official
Excellent. This is good news. We made a major strategic mistake by not coming to the defense of South Korea when China conducted economic warfare due to the stationing of THAAD in Korea.
(Yonhap Interview) U.S. will do 'all' it can to back S. Korea in case of China's economic coercion: official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 5, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, May 4 (Yonhap) -- The United States will do "all" it can to support South Korea in the event of China's economic coercion against the Asian ally, a U.S. official has said, driving home an emphatic message: Washington has Seoul's back.
Melanie Hart, the head of the State Department's economic coercion response team, made the remarks during a recent phone interview with Yonhap News Agency, stressing that the U.S. is "ready" and "willing" to engage with Seoul on coercion issues if need be.
Her remarks came amid a lingering sense that the U.S. did not take sufficient action when China took thinly veiled economic retaliation against South Korea following Seoul's 2016 decision to host a U.S. THAAD anti-missile system on its soil to counter North Korean threats.
"If South Korea faced economic coercion, we would do all we can," Hart said during the interview Friday. "We are all in for South Korea and any other partners who face Chinese economic coercion. We have your back."
Seen as a key foreign policy tool, economic coercion refers to China leveraging its massive economic heft and other means to extract a policy concession from a country that has deep economic and other ties with the world's second-largest economy.
Following the decision on the THAAD installation, South Korea experienced a bitter case of apparent economic retaliation by China, which included a ban on Korean cultural content and restrictions on Chinese group tours to Korea. In the midst of the worrisome episodes, the U.S. was largely absent, stoking a sense of disappointment among South Koreans.
The State Department in Washington (Yonhap)
Now with her eight-member team in place, Hart, the senior China adviser in the office of Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment Jose Fernandez, highlighted America's readiness to help South Korea and other partners in case of China's economic pressure.
"A nation or economy is welcome to reach out to us at any time. We are here when South Korea needs us, ready and willing to engage," she said.
"We are here to support our partners in doing what they can in advance to understand exactly what their risks are and look for ways to be more resilient," she added.
Her team was created when Washington needed to deal with a high-profile case involving Lithuania in the fall of 2021. That year, the Baltic state came under intense economic pressure from Beijing as it opened the Taiwanese Representative Office in Vilnius -- without using the China-endorsed name, Taipei.
The team is nicknamed the "firm" as it is modeled after a consulting firm that provides information and other forms of support to a client and remains available whenever that client is in need, while leaving the client to make his or her own decisions.
If a "client" country asks for assistance, the team is known to harness America's diplomatic expertise and resources to help it with an assessment of its economic vulnerabilities, information on how to tackle them and other forms of support.
"What we aim to do is lay out options, share information, offer assistance, and engage other allies and partners, but every step of the process is that country's choice," Hart said. "In no way is the United States seeking to insert itself into a country's decision-making."
Asked about how her team would help South Korea should it fall under China's economic pressure, she said the kind of U.S. support depends on specific situations that might flare up.
"We don't promise in advance any particular type of help or economic assistance, because the ways in which we and our allies and partners would help vary depending on the scenario," she said.
The creation of her team was made public recently as Seoul and Washington have been deepening economic security cooperation in the midst of the U.S.' push to diversify and reshape global supply chains for semiconductors and other industrial sectors to reduce heavy reliance on China.
Such economic collaboration between the allies has raised fresh concerns over the possibility of South Korea drawing the ire of China.
To address such concerns, a State Department official, who requested anonymity, took note of an agreement on trilateral cooperation to overcome economic coercion that South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida reached during their Camp David summit in August.
"We are already partnering together to bolster supply chain resilience and capacity to respond to economic coercion and global supply chain disruptions," the official said. "As we all get better at making all of our supply chains resilient, this will become less of an issue."
Despite the team's readiness to back allies and partners, questions linger over to what extent the U.S. can help them at a time when Washington is striving to "de-risk" the tense Sino-U.S. relationship marked by an intense strategic rivalry.
"We don't censor ourselves or hold back from doing smart, important things with allies and partners based on whether or not China might complain about it," the unnamed official said.
"We view this work as really critical because the international system that we all depend on doesn't work if nations don't have the space to make their own choices in their own national interests. We need independent nations to be free to make their own choices from coercion."
Thus, Washington views its anti-coercion efforts to support partners as a "core" U.S. national interest, the official stressed.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 5, 2024
2. Bracing for security risks ignited by Trump
Published: 02 May. 2024, 19:40
Bracing for security risks ignited by Trump
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-05-02/opinion/editorials/Bracing-for-security-risks-ignited-by-Trump/2038730
Former U.S. President Donald Trump made it clear that he would stick to his previous position of demanding more defense co-sharing from South Korea than the current level, which he perceives as “free of charge,” if he returns to the White House upon winning the presidential election in November. In a recent interview with Time Magazine, the former U.S. president implied that he would press on with his previous idea of a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea if “the very wealthy country” pays “very little.” He was quoted as saying, “Why would we defend somebody? … They’re a very wealthy country and why wouldn’t they want to pay?”
It is the first time Trump laid out his position on Korea’s defense costs in the middle of the U.S. presidential race. He sent the clear message that Seoul should expect a fresh round of bargaining once he is back.
Seoul and Washington set the foundation for defense cost-sharing for the U.S. Forces Korea every five years by revisiting the Special Measures Agreement (SMA). In 2021, the two countries agreed that Korea contribute $1.03 billion for the cost-sharing, up 13.9 percent from its payment in 2019 and 2020. From 2022 to 2025, they agreed to raise defense cost-sharing according to Korea’s defense budget growth rate from the previous year. During the 11th SMA negotiations in 2019 under Trump, Washington demanded Seoul bear $5 billion, nearly five times the previous amount. Since the negotiations were concluded after President Joe Biden was inaugurated, Trump could stick to the earlier number of $5 billion.
The return of Trump puts Seoul in a sticky spot. U.S. bargaining with a military ally amid alarming North Korean threats and tighter military cooperation between Pyongyang, Beijing and Moscow will expose security loopholes to North Korea in the perilous geopolitical climate.
Trump has been misrepresenting the facts about South Korea, inflating the 28,500-strong U.S. troops in the South to 35,000 and claiming South Korea is paying “very little” for them. Although we cannot know if the remark was intentional, we still can expect Trump to demand monetization of the security alliance.
Few can bet surely on the U.S. presidential election results due to the tight race. We must ready ourselves meticulously for every risk. The government must first correct Trump and set the record straight. It must conclude the SMA negotiations that began last month as soon as possible, and the government must prepare a system for a security alliance that can’t be changed regardless of who wins the U.S. election. The National Assembly must demonstrate bipartisanship on the critical issue of national interests.
3. 'Lockheed Martin' Of Asia! Despite Aussie Snub, Hanwha Emerges 'Big Player' In Global Defense Market
Excerpts:
Although Austal rejected the proposal, Hanwha declared its unwavering commitment to the potential agreement, especially in light of the growing defense cooperation between the two countries.
Hanhwa’s desire to purchase a significant Australian defense manufacturing company comes as South Korea emerges as a key defense exporter. With two major global defense exporters — Russia and the United States — currently grappling with the Ukraine war, South Korean defense manufacturers have gained prominence as viable alternatives.
Yoon Suk-yeol, the President of South Korea, is a fervent supporter of his nation’s developing defense sector, which aims to generate an increasing share of the world’s arms.
During his opening address at last October’s Seoul International Aerospace and Defense Exhibition (ADEX), Yoon said, “We aim to become the world’s fourth-largest defense equipment exporter.” Yoon also pledged to promote military equipment on his trips abroad.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ranked Korea as the world’s ninth-largest arms exporter from 2018-2022. It was one of the two Asian nations to appear among the top 25 exporters (the other being China in fourth place).
The success of South Korean defense exports is extraordinary, as its weapons sales increased by a whopping 74 percent compared to 2013-17. In 2022, South Korean arms exports registered a 140 percent rise to a record US $17.3 billion.
'Lockheed Martin' Of Asia! Despite Aussie Snub, Hanwha Emerges 'Big Player' In Global Defense Market
eurasiantimes.com · by Sakshi Tiwari · May 3, 2024
South Korea’s defense industry has emerged as a leading defense exporter in Asia. Spearheaded by ‘Hanhwa Defense,’ South Korean defense exports have propelled the Asian nation into an exclusive club.
Earlier this month, the second-largest shipbuilder in the world, Hanwha Ocean Co., announced that it had successfully negotiated the terms and price of a buyout bid for Austal, an Australian defense shipyard purportedly valued at $662 million. However, Austal quickly rejected the offer.
In a recent communique, the Australian government clarified that the possible acquisition deal by Korean military behemoth Hanwha Group for Australian shipbuilder Austal did not worry Australia’s government.
Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles said, “Ultimately, this is a matter for Australia, they are a private company. From the government’s perspective, we don’t have any concern about Hanwha moving in this direction.”
Marles pointed out that Canberra regarded Australia as a “strategic” shipbuilder and that, regardless of Austal’s future, security measures about intellectual property and sensitive technology will need to be implemented.
“Were there anything that was to transpire about Hanwha that would need to be managed in that context as well,” he said.
Although Austal rejected the proposal, Hanwha declared its unwavering commitment to the potential agreement, especially in light of the growing defense cooperation between the two countries.
Hanhwa’s desire to purchase a significant Australian defense manufacturing company comes as South Korea emerges as a key defense exporter. With two major global defense exporters — Russia and the United States — currently grappling with the Ukraine war, South Korean defense manufacturers have gained prominence as viable alternatives.
Yoon Suk-yeol, the President of South Korea, is a fervent supporter of his nation’s developing defense sector, which aims to generate an increasing share of the world’s arms.
During his opening address at last October’s Seoul International Aerospace and Defense Exhibition (ADEX), Yoon said, “We aim to become the world’s fourth-largest defense equipment exporter.” Yoon also pledged to promote military equipment on his trips abroad.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ranked Korea as the world’s ninth-largest arms exporter from 2018-2022. It was one of the two Asian nations to appear among the top 25 exporters (the other being China in fourth place).
The success of South Korean defense exports is extraordinary, as its weapons sales increased by a whopping 74 percent compared to 2013-17. In 2022, South Korean arms exports registered a 140 percent rise to a record US $17.3 billion.
A significant chunk of this meteoric rise can be attributed to Hanhwa Defense, which has been expanding in a fashion similar to the big defense manufacturers of the West, like Lockheed Martin.
Hanhwa, The Lockheed Martin Of Asia?
The military and the arms industry in South Korea have a close relationship, which enables them to reorganize domestic orders to create space for export production and to increase output in the nation’s highly industrialized manufacturing base. This trend has been observed in Hanhwa, the biggest defense manufacturer in South Korea.
Over the years, Hanhwa has become a key global player, mainly owing to its state-of-the-art equipment and hot-running production lines. The manufacturer has said it intends to triple its production capacity to meet the burgeoning international demand.
In July 2022, Poland signed an agreement with South Korea to purchase hundreds of K2 tanks, K9 Howitzers, and several Chunmoo Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS). Of these, the K9 Howitzers and Chunmoo MLRS are produced by Hanhwa companies.
The deal was considered a big win for Hanhwa and forced the company to add more workers and increase production lines. The first shipment of the Howitzers was delivered within months of placing the order.
Hanwha Aerospace announced last week that it had signed a $1.64 billion deal to supply 72 Chunmoo rocket artillery units to Poland.
K239 Chunmoo MLRS
According to data from the NH Research & Securities published last year, Hanwha Aerospace held a 55% market share for howitzers worldwide. With the Poland deal, that percentage could increase to 68%.
Within a short period, Changwon Plant 3 of Hanwha Aerospace has increased the production of K9 155mm self-propelled howitzers. It was previously reported that with the opening of the third production unit, which was slated for April 2024, the annual output would rise to 240 K9s.
The K9 howitzers are undoubtedly the most popular equipment produced by Hanhwa. In February this year, media reports suggested that the Hanwha Aerospace Co. was working with Romania to sign a 1 trillion won ($751 million) contract to sell its K9 howitzers. If and when the deal is signed, it will be the company’s first export agreement with Romania and its sixth in Europe.
Besides Poland and Romania, Vietnam recently indicated it was planning to procure the South Korean Hanwha K9 self-propelled howitzer (SPH) for the People’s Army of Vietnam. Indian Army already operates the K9 and has deployed them near China border.
K9 Thunder – Wikipedia
Earlier this year, on a visit to Korea, Dr. David Perry, the president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI), inspected the cutting-edge defense technology of South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean and Hanwha Aerospace, indicating the country’s interest in the equipment.
While Canadian officials have not expressed interest in any particular system, Hanhwa said it looked forward to providing submarines to the Canadian Navy.
Hanhwa has also signed a contract for defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia. As per the MoU, Hanwha will be involved in the ministry’s medium to long-term objectives, which include armored vehicles, ground weapons systems, and robot and satellite-based surveillance systems.
Hanwha Aerospace’s Australian division was able to secure a US$2.4 billion deal in December to supply Australia with 129 Redback infantry fighting vehicles. It was Hanwha’s second export to Australia after the K-9 self-propelled howitzer contract from 2021.
There is another equipment that has risen to fame in recent times: the South Korean FA-50 or T-50 aircraft. The fighter has been sold to several countries, including Indonesia, Iraq, Philippines, Poland, Thailand, and Malaysia. While Hanhwa does not manufacture the jet, it provides critical equipment, including digital cameras (ACCTVS), intercoms (ICS), smart multi-function displays(SMFD), etc.
Last month, Hanwha Aerospace produced its 10,000th military engine, marking a significant turning point in the company’s domestic aviation engine development and production. The 10,000th aircraft engine, the F404 powering the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) Air Force’s TA-50 trainer jet, was rolled out with a ceremony at Changwon Plant I.
File Image: FA-50 with US Bomber
Additionally, in honor of reaching an important milestone in engine manufacturing, Hanwha Aerospace broke ground on a 16,530-engine production facility. There, F414 engines for the KF-21 fighter aircraft fleet will be produced under license from General Electric.
Hanhwa has been expanding in a fashion not seen before in South Korea. The company has manufacturing units in Germany, the United States, Malaysia, China, and Vietnam. In addition, it has marketing and sales operations in Australia, Canada, Japan, China, and South Korea.
After making forays into new markets, the US-based subsidiary of South Korea’s largest defense contractor hopes to establish itself as a leading provider of land systems in the US by the end of this decade. This was stated by John Kelly, Chief Executive Officer of Hanwha Defense USA, who noted, “All options are on the table,” to help the company reach its objective
A major selling point of South Korea’s weaponry is its compatibility with NATO and US systems. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the nation accounts for 4.9% of NATO and its member nations’ military purchases, making it the third-largest provider of weaponry to the organization.
eurasiantimes.com · by Sakshi Tiwari · May 3, 2024
4. S. Korea to participate in U.S.-led cyber exercise this week
Excellent. We (like minded democracies) must be able to compete, fight, and win in the cyber domain.
S. Korea to participate in U.S.-led cyber exercise this week | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 5, 2024
SEOUL, May 5 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's Cyber Operations Command will participate in a U.S.-led multinational cyber exercise this week to strengthen its capabilities to counter malicious cyber activities, Seoul's defense ministry said Sunday, amid growing security threats from North Korea.
Nine personnel from the South's military will join the Cyber Flag exercise to be held from Sunday through Saturday (local time) in the U.S. state of Virginia, according to the defense ministry.
The online exercise is designed to hone skills for multinational cooperation in countering cyberthreats and share intelligence against enemies' cyber activities.
Since 2011, the U.S. Cyber Command has conducted the cyber exercise annually to enhance the readiness of Washington, its allies and partner countries against security threats in the online domain.
This year's exercise involves 18 nations, including the "Five Eyes" intelligence alliance, which consists of the U.S., Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and other partner countries.
It will mark South Korea's third participation in the exercise since the nation first joined it in 2022.
Choi Byong-ok (L), the director general of the defense ministry's defense policy bureau, shakes hands with Mieke Eoyang, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy, as they meet for the allies' Cyber Cooperation Working Group session at the ministry in Seoul on May 9, 2023, in this file photo released by the ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 5, 2024
5. N. Korea slams U.S., other countries for seeking alternative to U.N. sanctions monitoring panel
Even if China and Russia are complicit in north Korean sanctions evasion, other countries working together can still maintain pressure on the regime and work to prevent sanctioned items from reaching the north as well as cut into the regime's proliferation activities, We know this has affects because the regime continues to attack the efforts to enforce sanctions. It won't quite reach strategic strangulation campaign levels but it is better than not enforcing sanctions at all. And we need to continue to call out China's and Russia's malign activities.
N. Korea slams U.S., other countries for seeking alternative to U.N. sanctions monitoring panel | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 5, 2024
SEOUL, May 5 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Sunday denounced the United States and other countries for seeking an alternative to the United Nations monitoring panel that enforced sanctions against Pyongyang, saying that such a move will be doomed to face "self-destruction."
North Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Kim Song issued a statement condemning Seoul, Washington, Tokyo and 47 other countries for jointly calling for "objective" and "independent" analysis regarding the enforcement of anti-North Korea sanctions as the mandate of the panel of experts ended last month due to Russia's veto on its renewal.
During a trip to Seoul in April, U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield said the U.S. will work with South Korea to explore "creative" and "out of the box" ways to find an alternative to the experts' panel, even outside of the U.N. system.
The North Korean envoy said the end of the monitoring panel is a "judgment made by history on an illegal, plot-breeding organization" and called the panel of experts a tool for the U.S. and other Western nations to "stamp out a sovereign state's right to existence."
"The hostile forces may set up the second and third expert panels in the future, but they are all bound to meet self-destruction with the passage of time," he said in the statement carried by the North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency.
"If the U.S. and its followers persistently pursue the anachronistic hostile policy toward the DPRK, instead of drawing a lesson from the recent case, they will face a more miserable strategic defeat," he warned, using the acronym of North Korea's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
This file image, captured from U.N. Web TV on Nov. 15, 2019, shows North Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Kim Song (C) speaking at a session of the U.N. General Assemlbly. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 5, 2024
6. Exploitation and Desperation: Human Rights Violations and Labor Conditions of North Korean Workers Dispatched Overseas
Another reason why we need a human rights upfront approach.
This report cites some of the excellent work done by HRNK.
Excerpt:
In conclusion, the dispatch of North Korean workers overseas represents a severe violation of human rights and international labor standards. The exploitation and forced labor of these workers not only perpetuate the oppression and enslavement of North Korean citizens but also enable the North Korean regime to generate revenue for its illicit activities. The international community must take concerted action to end these egregious labor practices and ensure that the human rights of North Korean workers are upheld. By enforcing international laws and conventions, the international community can work towards ending the exploitation of North Korean laborers and promoting fundamental labor rights and human dignity for all.
Exploitation and Desperation: Human Rights Violations and Labor Conditions of North Korean Workers Dispatched Overseas - শুদ্ধস্বর
shuddhashar.com · by Diletta De Luca and Damian Reddy · April 30, 2024
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To earn foreign revenue, the North Korean regime subjects its citizens to forced labor and egregious human rights abuse. The international community must do more to end these egregious labor practices and ensure that their human rights are upheld.
In recent years, the exploitation of North Korean workers overseas has emerged as a glaring concern with significant implications for international labor and human rights standards. Despite the existence of established frameworks safeguarding workers’ rights, the North Korean regime persistently engages in practices that violate such international regulations, subjecting its citizens to forced labor and egregious human rights abuses. This exploitation not only perpetuates a cycle of suffering for North Korean workers but also serves as a fundamental revenue source for the regime, funding its nuclear weapons program at the expense of the well-being of its people (Cullinane, 2013; Choe, 2023). This article aims to shed light on the breach and violations of international labor standards by the North Korean regime and calls for the international community to advocate for the protection and safeguards of the human rights of the people of North Korea.
The dispatch of North Korean workers overseas is a systemic practice that is tightly controlled by the North Korean regime, which is known for sending its citizens to work in various countries under conditions that violate international labor laws and human rights standards (Kim et al., 2019). While some workers are employed directly by foreign companies, most of them are supervised and regulated by regime entities, which take the majority of their wages, effectively turning them into “state-owned laborers” (Human Rights Watch, 2006).
Reports and testimonies from North Korean escapees indicate that workers often have limited freedom of movement, are subjected to strict surveillance, and have their passports confiscated, “trapping” them in the host countries (Ministry of Unification, 2023; Scarlatoiu, 2023). A recent investigation conducted by The New Yorker (Urbina, 2024) additionally disclosed that the majority of the female workers are subjected to sexual violence by their managers and that they are often kept within the factories against their will, facing severe punishment or even death if they try to escape. Women constitute a vulnerable group suffering intersectional oppression at the hands of the North Korean regime.
The countries that most engage with the North Korean regime and unlawfully receive North Koreans overseas are Russia and China, but some cases of North Korean workers dispatched to States in the Middle East and Africa have also been recorded in the last decade (Ham & Kim, 2019; Holmes & Philipps, 2017; The Korea Times, 2016). North Korean workers dispatched to Russia are often employed in industries such as logging, construction, and shipbuilding, and North Koreans sent to China work in industries such as garment manufacturing, construction, and agriculture.
Complicit countries that allow North Koreans to work and be exploited in their countries include Russia, China, and various countries in the Middle East and Africa. These countries often turn a blind eye to the exploitative conditions faced by North Korean workers as their employment is cheaper and presents greater economic advantage compared to establishing regulated contracts. The larger profit margin gained by private companies or States leads to the neglect of the necessity of ensuring human rights standards for the workers.
The working conditions faced by North Korean laborers are often characterized by exploitation, abuse, lack of labor rights, and unsafe environments. Many workers are subjected to long hours, low wages, and poor living conditions, often without access to proper healthcare or legal protections (Human Rights Watch, 2006; Scarlatoiu, 2023). These conditions violate fundamental labor rights as outlined in the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which includes the principles of freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, and the elimination of forced or compulsory labor (ILO, 1998).
Additionally, the ILO defines forced or compulsory labor as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily” (art. 2 of the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930). From the data collected from interviews with North Korean escapees conducted by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), it emerged that workers do not willingly volunteer for such overseas assignments but are usually forced to do so by the regime. This violates internationally recognized human rights standards and is prohibited under various international conventions, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 4, 1948) and the ILO’s Forced Labour Convention (n. 29).
Furthermore, North Korea is a party to four main international human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). All provide important workers’ rights protections, and as a party to these international human rights treaties, North Korea has a legal obligation to protect these rights and ensure the safety and protection of its workers (UNHCR, 2006).
In addition to forced labor and poor working conditions, the wages earned by North Korean workers are often heavily garnished by the North Korean regime (Scarlatoiu, 2023). Reports suggest that a significant portion of their earnings, sometimes as high as 90%, is siphoned off by the regime, with only a fraction being returned to the workers (US Department of State, 2023). This exploitation of wages is a clear violation of the right to just and favorable remuneration as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 23).
The trafficking and exploitation of North Korean workers contribute to a situation where they are effectively being exploited as a source of revenue for the North Korean regime. These workers are deprived of their fundamental rights, and their labor is being exploited to sponsor an oppressive regime and support its illicit activities, including its nuclear weapons development program (Scarlatoiu, 2023). This not only violates international labor standards but also sustains a system that perpetuates human rights abuses within the country.
The dispatch of North Korean workers has also been raising concerns about the international community’s complicity in these violations. Host countries where North Korean workers are employed hold a responsibility to ensure that the workers’ rights are protected and that they are not subjected to forced labor or exploitation. Several countries have been complicit in enabling these abuses by continuing to allow the employment of North Korean workers within their borders despite the known labor rights violations associated with their employment (Scarlatoiu, 2023).
Complicit countries that allow North Koreans to work and be exploited in their countries include Russia, China, and various countries in the Middle East and Africa. These countries often turn a blind eye to the exploitative conditions faced by North Korean workers as their employment is cheaper and presents greater economic advantage compared to establishing regulated contracts. The larger profit margin gained by private companies or States leads to the neglect of the necessity of ensuring human rights standards for the workers. In turn, their employment also allows the North Korean regime to profit from their labor while disregarding their rights and well-being. Such States’ complicity is a clear violation of international human rights standards and labor conventions (Scarlatoiu, 2023).
In response to these violations, the international community has taken steps to address this issue. The United Nations (UN) has repeatedly condemned the North Korean regime’s human rights record and nuclear proliferation activities and, specifically to this concern, called for an end to the forced labor of its citizens overseas. In 2017, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2397, which called on UN Member States “to repatriate all DPRK nationals earning income and all DPRK government safety oversight attachés monitoring DPRK workers abroad” (UN 1718 Sanctions Committee, n.d.).
By violating the sanctions established by the Security Council, China and Russia breach the legislation that they agreed upon with their veto power. Furthermore, several entities have implemented sanctions to prohibit the influx of North Korean workers abroad. For instance, the United States (US) implemented the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act (NKSPEA) in 2017, which includes provisions to sanction countries that continue to illicitly employ North Korean workers (US Government, 2016).
Furthermore, the US enacted the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which built upon the NKSPEA by expanding and strengthening sanctions against North Korea (US Congress, 2017). Notably, Section 321(b) (22 U.S.C. § 9241a) of CAATSA provides for additional measures to pressure the North Korean regime towards denuclearization, as well as targeting individuals and entities involved in certain activities, such as human rights abuses and illicit financial transactions. The European Union (EU) has also taken steps to combat human rights and labor violations against North Koreans. In 2022, the EU enacted legislation aimed at prohibiting the import of goods produced by North Korean forced labor, designed to prevent the exploitation of North Korean workers overseas and to hold accountable any entity benefitting from such exploitative practices (European Parliament, 2023; Alexandrova, 2019; European Parliament Legislative Observatory, 2022).
It remains essential and urgent for the international community to continue to pressure both North Korea and the countries that employ its workers under conditions of abuse to end these exploitative labor practices, which in turn finance the expanding nuclear weapons program of the North Korean regime. The enforcement of international laws and conventions, such as the ILO’s Forced Labour Convention and Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, is crucial in holding responsible parties accountable and deterring such violations of human rights. Additionally, diplomatic efforts should be made to encourage host countries to abide by their legal obligations and ensure the protection of the rights of all workers within their borders while holding accountable those who violate legally binding international directives established (UN General Assembly, 1990).
In conclusion, the dispatch of North Korean workers overseas represents a severe violation of human rights and international labor standards. The exploitation and forced labor of these workers not only perpetuate the oppression and enslavement of North Korean citizens but also enable the North Korean regime to generate revenue for its illicit activities. The international community must take concerted action to end these egregious labor practices and ensure that the human rights of North Korean workers are upheld. By enforcing international laws and conventions, the international community can work towards ending the exploitation of North Korean laborers and promoting fundamental labor rights and human dignity for all.
References
Alexandrova, I. (2019). “The European Union’s Policy Toward North Korea: Abandoning Engagement,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, 33−62.
Choe, S. (2023, April 3). “North Koreans Trapped in ‘State-Sponsored Slavery’ in Russia,” The New York Times,www.nytimes.com/2023/04/03/world/asia/north-korea-human-rights.html.
Cullinane, S. (2013, April 9). “How does North Korea make its money?,” CNN,www.cnn.com/2013/04/09/business/north-korea-economy-explainer/index.html.
European Parliament Legislative Observatory (2022). “Prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market,” 2022/0269 (COD), oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2022/0269(COD)&l=en.
European Parliament News (2023). “Towards an EU ban on products made with forced labour,”www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20231016IPR07307/towards-an-eu-ban-on-products-made-with-forced-labour.
Ham, J. & Kim, S. (2019, September 24). “Despite UN Sanctions, North Koreans at Work in Senegal,” VOA News,www.voanews.com/a/africa_despite-un-sanctions-north-koreans-work-senegal/6176412.html.
Holmes, O. & Philipps, T. (2017, July 5). “‘Guest workers’: the North Korean expats forced to feed the regime,” The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/05/north-koreas-global-money-makers-us-scolds-countries-hosting-guest-workers.
Human Rights Watch (2006). “North Korea: Workers’ Rights at the Kaesong Industrial Complex,”www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/korea1006/korea1006.htm.
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Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea (2023). “2023 Report on North Korean Human Rights,”www.unikorea.go.kr/cms/getFile.do?file=2023042617462058449.pdf&orgname=2023%20Summary%20of%20the%20Report%20on%20North%20Korean%20Human%20Rights(Ministry%20of%20Unification).pdf&mgmtId=MGMT_0000004142&siteId=SITE_00003&filePath=eng_unikorea/common/file/&count=Y.
Scarlatoiu, G. (2023). “North Korean Workers Officially Dispatched to China & Russia. Human Rights Denial, Chain of Command & Control,” The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea,www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Overseas_Workers_0926.pdf.
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Urbina, I. (2024, February 6). “Inside North Korea’s forced labor program,” The New Yorker,www.newyorker.com/magazine/2024/03/04/inside-north-koreas-forced-labor-program-in-china.
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shuddhashar.com · by Diletta De Luca and Damian Reddy · April 30, 2024
7. South Korea brings hypersonic tech to the Aukus table in a sign Seoul is moving closer to the US and its other allies
South Korea brings hypersonic tech to the Aukus table in a sign Seoul is moving closer to the US and its other allies
- South Korean Defence Minister Shin Won-sik has confirmed Seoul is in talks to take part in Pillar 2 of the defence alliance
- Analysts say South Korea could ‘bring a great deal of expertise to any collaboration’ with its hypersonic weapons knowledge
Seong Hyeon Choi
+ FOLLOWPublished: 8:00pm, 5 May 2024
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3261304/south-korea-brings-hypersonic-tech-aukus-table-sign-seoul-moving-closer-us-and-its-other-allies
South China Morning Post · May 5, 2024
He confirmed the two countries discussed the possibility that South Korea could contribute to the defence technology sharing pact between Australia, Britain and the US.
“During today’s meeting, we also discussed the possibility of partnering with Aukus Pillar 2,” Shin said.
“We support Aukus Pillar 2 activities and we do welcome that members are considering Korea as an Aukus Pillar 2 partner.”
It was the first time Seoul had confirmed its discussion to join the alliance. Last month the Aukus defence chiefs said the three countries were considering expanding the second pillar of Aukus, naming Japan as one of the possible future member states.
03:38
Aukus will ‘get done’, Biden tells Australia’s Albanese during visit to Washington
Aukus will ‘get done’, Biden tells Australia’s Albanese during visit to Washington
Beijing has criticised Tokyo’s possible participation in Aukus, arguing that Japan should “earnestly reflect on its history of aggression, abandon the practice of forming a small military and security circle and truly pursue the path of peaceful development”.
Launched in 2021, Aukus has two key pillars: Pillar 1 supports Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines, while Pillar 2 focuses on cutting-edge technologies, including quantum computing, artificial intelligence and hypersonics.
While the first pillar is limited to the core trio with no plans for additional member states, the expansion would take place in the second pillar, where not only Japan but also South Korea, New Zealand and Canada were reportedly listed as prospective partners.
“Korea is a country with deeply impressive technology where we do have shared values,” Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles said after the 2+2 meeting.
“As Aukus Pillar 2 develops, there will be opportunities in the future, and we’re seeing that play out in relation to Japan as well.”
The 2+2 meeting in Melbourne saw Australian and South Korean foreign ministers Penny Wong and Cho Tae-yul as well as defence ministers Richard Marles and Shin Won-sik meet to discuss future Aukus partnerships. Photo: AFP
Hypersonic technology is one of the core areas in Pillar 2 that Seoul is likely to contribute to. Hypersonic missiles travel more than five times faster than the speed of sound and approach targets from a much lower angle, making them harder to detect with conventional missile defence systems.
Only two countries – Russia and China – are reportedly operating hypersonic missiles in their militaries, while the US and its allies are still in the development phase of supersonic weapons technology.
The US cancelled its development plans for a hypersonic AGM-183A air-launched rapid response weapon in 2023 after repeated test failures, focusing instead on developing smaller hypersonic attack cruise missile systems.
South Korea has also been developing hypersonic missile technology in response to recent threats from North Korea’s continuous nuclear and ballistic missile programme that included the development of its own supersonic missile technologies.
In August 2020, then-South Korean defence minister Jeong Kyeong-doo first revealed Seoul’s development plans for hypersonic missiles. A test prototype of a South Korean hypersonic cruise missile, dubbed “Hycore” was then revealed in 2021.
Hycore will reportedly start testing this year. It is expected to have a speed of up to Mach 6.2 and start its service by the early 2030s as air-to-ground missiles on South Korea’s home-grown fighter jet KF-21 Boramae.
An ability to collaborate on key projects in long-range strike via hypersonics, as well as counter-hypersonic defensive systems, would enable the ROK to bring a great deal of expertise to any collaboration
Malcolm Davis, analyst
Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said that adding South Korea’s advanced defence and high technology sector, including its developments in priority areas such as hypersonics, would be a “good contributor” to Aukus Pillar 2.
“I think an ability to collaborate on key projects in long-range strike via hypersonics, as well as counter-hypersonic defensive systems, would enable the ROK [Republic of Korea] to bring a great deal of expertise to any collaboration, and potentially open up new avenues for development,” Davis said.
“For example, one area that could be pursued beyond military technologies would be hypersonic-based rapid space access, and that would build into the critical opportunities for space collaboration between Australia and the ROK in the space sector.”
Davis stressed that a “perceived challenge from authoritarian adversaries” was the main driver making hypersonics a priority area in Aukus Pillar 2.
“[China and Russia] are more advanced in their development and deployment of such technologies and the tactical benefits of prompt strike capabilities with enhanced range, and an ability to penetrate integrated air and missile defences,” Davis said.
“It’s absolutely vital that the Aukus members and their partners such as South Korea and Japan develop both the offensive hypersonic strike capabilities to hold at risk Chinese forces at greater range, and also develop effective counter-hypersonic systems to defeat Chinese hypersonic threats.”
Since 2019, Beijing has operated the DF-17, a medium-range missile system equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). With a range of 1,600km (1,000 miles), the DF-17’s “primary purpose” is “striking foreign military bases and fleets in the western Pacific”, according to a Pentagon report in 2022.
A military parade in 2019 revealed China’s medium-range missile, the DF-17, to the world, but later it was revealed that the DF-27 had also been produced but was kept under wraps. Photo: Weibo
There is also the DF-27, an intermediate-range ballistic missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle and a range of 5,000 to 8,000km – enough to strike Hawaii from the Chinese mainland – which China has reportedly had since at least 2019.
Davis said Beijing would “strongly oppose” any move by Seoul to support or take part in the defence technology sharing partnership.
“It is certain that China will criticise and probably pressure Seoul to step back from such a move, and may try to exploit internal political dynamics in ROK,” he said.
James Lewis, a senior vice-president and director of the strategic technologies programme at the Washington-based think tank Centre for Strategic and International Studies, said Seoul’s participation in Aukus Pillar 2 would be a way to “signal that it is moving closer to the US and its allies”.
“The Koreans probably hope that tech cooperation is less provocative. Korea is rethinking its foreign policy, and while it would prefer to not provoke China, they are not willing to be a tributary state,” Lewis said.
“It’s also a signal to China that playing the neighbourhood bully has consequences. ROK looking at Aukus is a political gesture short of military alliance but moving a step closer.
“On the technology point, the ROK is worried that it is losing its technological edge and looking for outside help to rejuvenate. Aukus might be good for that as an antidote for tech parochialism.”
South China Morning Post · May 5, 2024
8. Fed Up With Jerome Powell? South Korea Is Getting There
Fed Up With Jerome Powell? South Korea Is Getting There
Forbes · by William Pesek · May 4, 2024
Rhee Chang-yong, governor of the Bank of Korea.
SeongJoon Cho/Bloomberg
Just about everything Governor Rhee Chang-yong and his team at the Bank of Korea thought they knew about 2024 is being turned upside down.
China isn’t rebounding the way many economists expected. The Federal Reserve isn’t going to cut interest rates five times. Japan isn’t exiting quantitative easing, a realization that has the yen disappearing in real time. The dollar’s biggest rally since the early 1990s is defying financial gravity despite the U.S. national debt approaching $35 trillion.
Few economies are more on the frontlines of these crosscurrents than South Korea. Its open and sizable economy is also caught directly in the middle of economic tensions between Beijing, Tokyo and Washington. How Rhee’s team and President Yoon Suk Yeol’s administration balance trade ties with China, fallout from a plunging yen and Seoul’s vital security alliance with the U.S. will be quite the case study in multi-tasking.
This week, Rhee admitted that the BOK is now reconsidering the timing of rate cuts that economists had expected. The reason: a weaker won than traders had anticipated and a firmer-than-expected Korean economy. Again, trends that Rhee’s team probably didn’t see coming back on January 1.
Speaking at an Asia Development Bank conference in Tbilisi, Georgia, Rhee explained that “whether the rate cut timing will be pushed back, how much it will be pushed if it is, or if it will even come will be the question that needs to be reviewed. I wouldn’t call it starting from scratch. But the situation has changed since April.”
Much of the confusion stems from the wildly mixed signals emanating from the globe’s most powerful monetary authority — the Fed in Washington. There, Chairman Jerome Powell knows as much about what his team will do next as any of us. One day, traders are convinced the Fed’s next move will be slash rates. The next, the Lawrence Summers take that the Fed’s next act will be to tighten sounds more and more plausible.
As the former U.S. Treasury secretary sees it, hopes that inflation will soon drop to 2% from 3% are proving increasingly fanciful. Summers worries that a rate cut in the months ahead would just toss more monetary fuel on the fire, meaning easier policy would only backfire.
Here, Powell’s take is hard to discern. This week, Powell offered something for both sides — the hawks and the doves. The former crowd heard him explain that while inflation has cooled over the past year, it remains higher than hoped. As the Fed’s statement said: “In recent months, there has been a lack of further progress toward the committee's 2% objective.” Later, Powell added that “we remain highly attentive to inflation risks.”
The inflation doves got their due from Powell when he raised the specter of the supply-side distortions from the pandemic era “unwinding” in virtuous ways. In other words, who really knows where short-term rates are headed?
Certainly not Rhee and his fellow policymakers. In recent comments, Rhee has cited the about-face at Fed headquarters in Washington, and the dollar’s resulting surge, as complicating factors in Seoul.
The won isn’t plunging as fast as the Japanese yen — it’s down 4.5% so far this year versus the yen’s 7.8% drop. But strong dollar rallies don’t tend to go well for Asia. And more than a quarter century after the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, the region is grappling with challenges that echo that era.
One is fear of huge capital outflows as more liquidity rushes toward dollar assets. Another: that Korea might import increased inflation thanks to a weak exchange rate.
As Middle East tensions intensify, Russia pushes on with its Ukraine invasion, OPEC cuts oil production and the U.S.-China trade war heats up, global prices are far more likely to rise than fall in the months ahead. A weaker won will only heighten the risks Korea will import inflation.
The high odds that the dollar’s rally will continue complicate Rhee’s year. As the magnetic force around the globe’s reserve currency strengthens, officials in Korea, China, Japan and Southeast Asian economies will have their work cut out for them in keeping currencies aloft.
It’s not all bad for Korea, of course. For all the worries about downward pressure on the won, Korea’s exports are experiencing a healthy boost. The value of overseas shipments jumped 11.1% from a year earlier in the first 20 days of April.
But with the Fed prolonging the “higher for longer” era for U.S. yields, Rhee’s job is becoming more and more challenging by the day. The same goes for peers through the region who could be excused for being equally fed up with the mixed signals coming from Washington.
Forbes · by William Pesek · May 4, 2024
9. North Korean weapons are killing Ukrainians. The implications are far bigger
Everyone neglects north Korea and its potential impact.
Graphics, maps, and photos at the link: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68933778
Excerpts:
For all the recent talk of Kim Jong Un preparing to start a nuclear war, the more immediate threat is now North Korea's ability to fuel existing wars and feed global instability.
Ms Kimachuk works for Conflict Armament Research (CAR), an organisation that retrieves weapons used in war, to work out how they were made. But it wasn't until after she had finished photographing the wreckage of the missile and her team analysed its hundreds of components, that the most jaw-dropping revelation came.
It was bursting with the latest foreign technology. Most of the electronic parts had been manufactured in the US and Europe over the past few years. There was even a US computer chip made as recently as March 2023. This meant that North Korea had illicitly procured vital weapons components, snuck them into the country, assembled the missile, and shipped it to Russia in secret, where it had then been transported to the frontline and fired - all in a matter of months.
"This was the biggest surprise, that despite being under severe sanctions for almost two decades, North Korea is still managing to get its hands on all it needs to make its weapons, and with extraordinary speed," said Damien Spleeters, the deputy director at CAR.
North Korean weapons are killing Ukrainians. The implications are far bigger
BBC · by Jean Mackenzie,
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An unusual-looking wreckage that hold many clues
On 2 January, a young Ukrainian weapons inspector, Krystyna Kimachuk, got word that an unusual-looking missile had crashed into a building in the city of Kharkiv. She began calling her contacts in the Ukrainian military, desperate to get her hands on it. Within a week, she had the mangled debris splayed out in front of her at a secure location in the capital Kyiv.
She began taking it apart and photographing every piece, including the screws and computer chips smaller than her fingernails. She could tell almost immediately this was not a Russian missile, but her challenge was to prove it.
Buried amidst the mess of metal and spouting wires, Ms Kimachuk spotted a tiny character from the Korean alphabet. Then she came across a more telling detail. The number 112 had been stamped onto parts of the shell. This corresponds to the year 2023 in the North Korean calendar. She realised she was looking at the first piece of hard evidence that North Korean weapons were being used to attack her country.
"We'd heard they had delivered some weapons to Russia, but I could see it, touch it, investigate it, in a way no-one had been able to do before. This was very exciting", she told me over the phone from Kyiv.
Since then, the Ukrainian military says dozens of North Korean missiles have been fired by Russia into its territory. They have killed at least 24 people and injured more than 70.
For all the recent talk of Kim Jong Un preparing to start a nuclear war, the more immediate threat is now North Korea's ability to fuel existing wars and feed global instability.
Ms Kimachuk works for Conflict Armament Research (CAR), an organisation that retrieves weapons used in war, to work out how they were made. But it wasn't until after she had finished photographing the wreckage of the missile and her team analysed its hundreds of components, that the most jaw-dropping revelation came.
It was bursting with the latest foreign technology. Most of the electronic parts had been manufactured in the US and Europe over the past few years. There was even a US computer chip made as recently as March 2023. This meant that North Korea had illicitly procured vital weapons components, snuck them into the country, assembled the missile, and shipped it to Russia in secret, where it had then been transported to the frontline and fired - all in a matter of months.
"This was the biggest surprise, that despite being under severe sanctions for almost two decades, North Korea is still managing to get its hands on all it needs to make its weapons, and with extraordinary speed," said Damien Spleeters, the deputy director at CAR.
Over in London, Joseph Byrne, a North Korea expert at the defence think tank the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), was equally stunned.
"I never thought I would see North Korean ballistic missiles being used to kill people on European soil," he said. He and his team at RUSI have been tracking the shipment of North Korean weapons to Russia ever since Mr Kim met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Russia in September of last year to strike a suspected arms deal.
Using satellite imagery, they have been able to observe four Russian cargo ships shuttling back and forth between North Korea and a Russian military port, loaded with hundreds of containers at a time.
In total RUSI estimates 7,000 containers have been sent, filled with more than a million ammunition shells and grad rockets - the sort that can be fired out of trucks in large volleys. Their assessments are backed up by intelligence from the US, UK and South Korea, though Russia and North Korea have denied the trade.
"These shells and rockets are some of the most sought-after things in the world today and are allowing Russia to keep pounding Ukrainian cities at a time when the US and Europe have been faltering over what weapons to contribute," Mr Byrne said.
Buying and firing
But it is the arrival of ballistic missiles on the battlefield that has concerned Mr Byrne and his colleagues the most, because of what they reveal about North Korea's weapons programme.
Since the 1980s North Korea has sold its weapons abroad, largely to countries in the North Africa and the Middle East, including Libya, Syria and Iran. They have tended to be old, Soviet-style missiles with a poor reputation. There is evidence that Hamas fighters likely used some of Pyongyang's old rocket-propelled grenades in their attack last 7 October.
But the missile fired on 2 January, that Ms Kimachuk took apart, was seemingly Pyongyang's most sophisticated short-range missile - the Hwasong 11 - capable of travelling up to 700km (435 miles).
Although the Ukrainians have downplayed their accuracy, Dr Jeffrey Lewis, an expert in North Korean weapons and non-proliferation at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, says they appear to be not much worse than the Russian missiles.
The advantage of these missiles is that they are extremely cheap, explained Dr Lewis. This means you can buy more and fire more, in the hope of overwhelming air defences, which is exactly what the Russians appear to be doing.
This then raises the question of how many of these missiles the North Koreans can produce. The South Korean government recently observed North Korea has sent 6,700 containers of munitions to Russia, it says that Pyongyang's weapons factories were operating at full-tilt, and Dr Lewis, who has been studying these factories through satellites, reckons they can churn out a few hundred a year.
Still reeling from their discovery, Mr Spleeters and his team are now trying to work out how this is possible, given that companies are banned from selling parts to North Korea.
Many of the computer chips that are integral to modern weapons, that guide them through the air to their intended targets, are the same chips that are used to power our phones, washing machines and cars, says Mr Spleeters.
These are being sold all over the world in staggering numbers. Manufacturers sell to distributors in their billions, who sell them on in their millions, meaning they often have no idea where their products end up.
Even so, Mr Byrne was frustrated to learn how many components in the missile had come from the West. It proved that North Korea's procurement networks were more robust and effective than even he, who investigates these networks, had realised.
From his experience, North Koreans based overseas set up fake companies in Hong Kong or other central Asian countries to buy the items using predominantly stolen cash. They then send the products onto North Korea, usually over its border with China. If a fake company is discovered and sanctioned, another will quickly pop up in its place.
Sanctions have long been considered an imperfect tool to combat these networks, but to have any hope of working they need to be regularly updated and enforced. Both Russia and China have refused to impose new sanctions on North Korea since 2017.
By buying Pyongyang's weapons, Moscow is now violating the very sanctions it once voted for as a member of the UN Security Council. Then earlier this year it effectively disbanded a UN panel that monitored sanctions breaches, likely to avoid scrutiny.
"We are witnessing the real-time crumbling of UN sanctions against North Korea, which buys Pyongyang a lot of breathing space", Mr Byrne said.
All this has implications that reach far beyond the war in Ukraine.
"The real winners here are the North Koreans", said Mr Byrne. "They have helped the Russians in a significant way, and this has bought them a tonne of leverage".
In March, RUSI documented large amounts of oil being shipped from Russia to North Korea, while railcars filled with what are thought to be rice and flour have been spotted crossing the countries' land border. This deal, thought to be worth hundreds of millions of pounds, will boost not only Pyongyang's economy, but its military.
Russia could supply the North with the raw materials to continue making its missiles, or even military equipment such a fighter jets, and - at the most extreme end - the technical assistance to improve its nuclear weapons.
Additionally, the North is getting the chance to test its latest missiles in a real-war scenario for the first time. With this valuable data, it will be able to make them better.
Pyongyang: A major missile supplier?
More troubling still is that the war is providing North Korea with a shop window to the rest of the world.
Now that Pyongyang is mass producing these weapons, it will want to sell them to more countries, and if the missiles are good enough for Russia, they will be good enough for others, said Dr Lewis - especially as the Russians are setting the example that it is okay to violate sanctions.
He predicts going forward that North Korea will become a big supplier of missiles to countries in the China-Russia-Iran bloc. In the wake of Iran's assault on Israel this month, the US said it was "incredibly concerned" that North Korea could be working with Iran on its nuclear and ballistic weapons programmes.
"I see a lot of gloomy faces when we talk about this problem," said Mr Spleeters. "But the good news is that now we know how reliant they are on foreign technology, we can do something about it".
Mr Spleeters is optimistic that by working with manufacturers they can cut off North Korea's supply chains. His team has already succeeded in identifying and shutting down an illicit network before it was able to complete a critical sale.
But Dr Lewis is not exactly convinced.
"We can make it harder, more inconvenient, maybe raise the cost, but none of this is going to prevent North Korea from making these weapons," he said, adding that the West had ultimately failed in its attempt to contain the rogue state.
Now not only are its missiles a source of prestige and political power, but they are also generating it vast amounts of money, explains Dr Lewis. So why would Kim Jong Un ever give them up now?
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BBC · by Jean Mackenzie,
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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