Quotes of the Day:
"After such a war against Russia, I ask you: Never, please, never tell us again that our army does not meet NATO standards. We have shown what our standards are capable of. And how much we can give to the common security in Europe and the world. How much we can do to protect from aggression against everything we value, everything you value,”
President Zelensky
"We have too many high-sounding words, and too few actions that correspond with them."
- Abigail Adams
"The superior man acts before he speaks, and afterwards speaks according to his action."
- Confucius
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 24 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. Ukraine’s troops begin a counteroffensive that alters shape of the battle with Russia.
3. Putin's war in Ukraine nearing possibly more dangerous phase
4. NATO Ignores Zelenskyy’s Plea For 1% of Its Tanks, Jets
5. U.K. Says Russian Mercenary Group Aims to Assassinate Ukraine’s President
6. Ukraine War Update - March 25, 2022 | SOF News
7. Ukraine tells the US it needs 500 Javelins and 500 Stingers per day
8. IntelBrief: The Impact of Security Cooperation and Building Partner Capacity in Ukraine
9. The US Army's Green Berets quietly helped tilt the battlefield a little bit more toward Ukraine
10. What Happens in Russia If Putin Can’t Win in Ukraine?
11. Instead of consumer software, Ukraine’s tech workers build apps of war
12. Why the U.S. Was Wrong About Ukraine and the Afghan War
13. A circular firing squad is forming in the Kremlin, with everyone pointing their guns at each other:
14. Russia 'is planning false flag attacks on its own cities - blamed on Ukraine
15. Prepare for covert war in Ukraine
16. Deter Russia’s Use of Chemical Weapons in Ukraine
17. FDD | Tehran to Pocket Billions From Lower Import Costs if Sanctions Are Lifted
18. China and Solomon Islands Draft Secret Security Pact, Raising Alarm in the Pacific
19. Ukraine should provide Japan’s wake-up call
20. First Army Warfighter Exercise in Pacific will take on large-scale operations
21. How Strategic Messaging Can Help Turn Putin Around
22. Piercing the Fog of War: What Is Really Happening in Ukraine?
23. 23. FDD | Engines of Influence: Turkey’s Defense Industry Under Erdogan
24. Putin’s Real Fear: Ukraine’s Constitutional Order
25. Ukraine’s Three-to-One Advantage
26. Russian Ship Burning in Ukraine Harbor, Hit by Missile Strike
27. Russian warship, Go F**k Yourself – A Short History of Wartime Taunts
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 24 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 24 (PUTIN'S WAR)
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko
March 24, 6:30 pm ET
Russian forces continue to make slow but steady progress in Mariupol, entering the city center on March 24, but conducted few offensive operations elsewhere in the country. Ukrainian counterattacks northwest of Kyiv in the past several days continue to relieve pressure on the city, and Russian forces continued to dig in. Ukrainian forces repelled limited Russian attacks northeast of the city and around Kharkiv.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces entered central Mariupol on March 24 and continued to take ground across the city. Local Ukrainian authorities left the city in order to better coordinate regional operations amid the deteriorating situation in Mariupol itself.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a successful attack on Russian ships docked at the occupied port of Berdyansk, likely sinking a landing ship and damaging or sinking another. Ukraine’s demonstrated ability to inflict serious damage on Berdyansk may disrupt Russian forces from renewing attempts to reinforce operations in Mariupol and around Kherson by sea.
- Ukrainian forces did not retake any territory in continuing counterattacks northwest of Kyiv but forced Russian troops onto the defensive.
- Ukrainian forces repelled renewed Russian attempts to advance toward Brovary from the northeast and complete the encirclement of Chernihiv.
- Russian forces continue to shell Kharkiv and struck a humanitarian aid delivery point, killing six and wounding 15.
- Russian forces secured several minor advances in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in the last 24 hours.
The Ukrainian government and military directly stated for the first time on March 24 that the Kremlin believes its invasion of Ukraine has entered a second, “protracted” phase. The head of Zelensky’s office, Myhailo Podolyak, stated that Russia seeks to turn the war into a partially “protracted phase” due to high losses in personnel and equipment and the lack of significant progress in any direction. Podolyak stated the Kremlin is changing its tactics and going on the defensive to reduce Russian casualties “to an acceptable (from a propaganda point of view) level.”[1] The Ukrainian General Staff similarly stated that the Russian military leadership is "beginning to realize that the available forces and means are not enough to maintain the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and are conducting defensive operations.”[2] ISW previously assessed on March 19 that Ukrainian forces have defeated the initial Russian campaign of the war and that Russian forces would likely go over to the defense.[3]
The Ukrainian General Staff stated on March 24 that the Kremlin is prioritizing restoring combat capabilities in VDV (airborne) units.[4] The General Staff reported Russian commanders are increasingly deploying reserve officers, conscripts, and obsolete armored vehicles to replace losses.[5]
We do not report in detail on the deliberate Russian targeting of civilian infrastructure and attacks on unarmed civilians, which are war crimes, because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
- Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
- Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts;
- Supporting effort 2—Mariupol; and
- Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances northward and westward.
Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis are aimed at encircling the city from the northwest, west, and east.
Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro
Ukrainian forces did not conduct any new counterattacks or secure additional terrain northwest of Kyiv in the past 24 hours. The Kyiv Oblast civilian administration reported at 6:00 am local time on March 24 that fighting was ongoing along the Zhytomyr highway, in Irpin, and in Hostomel—predominantly on the southernmost advances of Russian forces attempting to envelop Kyiv from the west.[6] Social media users depicted heavy fighting and widespread Russian shelling of civilian infrastructure in Irpin on March 24.[7] Kyiv authorities additionally reported Russian forces in Bucha and Nemishevska (just northwest of ongoing fighting in Irpin) constructed new trench lines in the past 24 hours, likely to defend against future Ukrainian counterattacks.[8] Russian forces continued to shell civilian areas under Ukrainian control.[9]
Social media users geolocated footage released by Chechen forces on March 24 to a street in Borodyanka, confirming the presence of Chechen Rosgvardia units in ongoing fighting northwest of Kyiv.[10] A pro-Russian Telegram channel released footage it claimed depicted Russian Colonel General Alexander Chayko, commander of the Eastern Military District (EMD), presenting medals to Russian servicemen on the outskirts of Kyiv on March 23.[11] ISW cannot independently confirm the location of the footage, though Chayko deploying forwards to command EMD forces operating out of Belarus would track with the observed tendency of Russian general officers to command from near the front in Ukraine.
Subordinate supporting effort — Chernihiv and Sumy axis
Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack towards Brovary on March 24.[12] Russian forces shelled the northeastern outskirts of Kyiv throughout March 23-24.[13] The Kyiv Oblast civilian administration reported at 6:00 am local time on March 24 that Russian forces were present in Baryshivska, Velyke Dymerske, Kalytyanske, and Kalynivska rayons—all areas ISW previously assessed as Russian advances.[14]
Russian forces continued sporadic and unsuccessful attacks to encircle Chernihiv on March 24. The Chernihiv City Council reported that Chernihiv “faces destruction” from heavy Russian shelling on March 24, but Russian forces did not conduct any ground offensives against Chernihiv.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported at midnight local time on March 23 that Russian forces are intensifying aerial reconnaissance over Chernihiv to conduct battle damage assessments and identify Ukrainian positions.[16] Social media users depicted the aftermath of a Russian special forces raid on a Ukrainian position in Chernihiv on March 23 and Russian forces are likely conducting ongoing tactical attacks on the outskirts of the city.[17] A senior US defense official told Voice of America that Russian forces are continuing efforts to encircle Chernihiv and remain 8-10km from the city center as of March 23.[18] Local Ukrainian media confirmed the Ukrainian General Staff’s report that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful assault on Slavutych, 30km west of Chernihiv, on March 24 as part of continuing efforts to advance towards northeastern Kyiv.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces, primarily including units of the 1st Guards Tank Army, did not conduct any offensive operations against Sumy in the past 24 hours but continued to shell the city.[20]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:
Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on Izyum, southeast of Kharkiv, and may have conducted localized counterattacks on March 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at noon local time on March 24 that Russian attacks on Izyum failed and Russian forces retreated to the “southern part of the city,” though ISW cannot independently confirm if Russian forces gave up ground.[21] The Deputy Mayor of Izyum stated on March 24 that the humanitarian situation in the city is poor due to Russian targeting of key infrastructure but that Ukrainian forces retain control of the city center.[22]
Russian forces continued to shell Kharkiv city without conducting any ground attacks in the past 24 hours.[23] Kharkiv city authorities reported Russian forces shelled a humanitarian aid delivery point at the Nova Poshta post office on March 24, killing 6 and wounding 15.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 6:00 pm local time on March 24 that Ukrainian artillery inflicted heavy losses on a BTG of the 59th Tank Regiment (of the 144th Motor Rifle Division) at an unspecified location in Kharkiv Oblast.[25]
Supporting Effort #1a—Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts:
Russian forces secured several minor advances in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in the last 24 hours. Local Ukrainian government officials in Luhansk Oblast stated on March 24 that “facts are fact” and Russian forces successfully advanced in Rubizhne and Popasna.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff claimed as of midnight local time on March 23 that Russian assaults on both towns had failed.[27] Local officials in Donetsk similarly reported ongoing Russian assaults in Avdiivka and Ocheretyne, northwest of Donetsk, on March 24.[28] Social media users observed Russian armor concentrated near Yasinovataya to support the assault on Adiivka as of late March 23.[29] Local Ukrainian officials reported Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on Marinka, west of Donetsk, throughout March 24.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported on March 24 that Russian forces are forcibly evacuating citizens in Rubizhne and Kreminna to Voronezh, Russia, though ISW cannot independently confirm this report.[31]
Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol:
Russian forces continued their grinding territorial advances in Mariupol, entering parts of the city center on March 24. Ukrainian forces confirmed that Russian forces seized the Church of the Intercession of the Mother of God in the center of Mariupol on March 24.[32] Social media users geolocated several other videos of fighting in Mariupol to areas close to the city center, confirming ongoing Russian advances.[33] Several videos circulated on social media confirm that Russian Naval Infantry and Chechen forces are participating in the fighting.[34]
Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Pavlo Kyrylenko stated on March 23 that Mariupol Mayor Vadym Boycherenko relocated to an unspecified city outside Mariupol because the mayor was unable to stay in constant contact with regional authorities due to poor signal in the city.[35] Kyrylenko added that Russian forces are intentionally targeting the city’s critical infrastructure, destroying heat, water, and electricity, forcing city authorities “to leave the city to be able to work to save the people.”
The Mariupol City Administration reported on March 24 that Russian forces are using loudspeakers to falsely claim to Mariupol residents that Zaporizhia is no longer accepting refugees, the Ukrainian government has abandoned them, and that Russian forces have captured Odesa.[36] City authorities additionally reported Russian forces have forcibly deported approximately 6,000 Mariupol residents to Russia as of March 24.[37] Russian forces likely intend to demoralize Mariupol’s defenders and residents to force the city to capitulate.
Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and advances northward and westwards:
Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations toward Mykolayiv in the past 24 hours, though Mykolayiv Oblast officials reported localized fighting continued at the border of Mykolayiv and Kherson oblasts.[38] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces continued to take measures to restore their combat capabilities and replenish supplies in order to resume offensive operations.[39] Russian forces are unlikely to be able to successfully resume their offensive toward Mykolayiv and Odesa in the near future. Local Ukrainian officials in Kryvyi Rih reported that Russian forces carried out unsuccessful attacks and have as yet been unable to move within artillery range of the city.[40]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 24 that Russian Rosgvardia units are “resorting to terrorizing the local population” in Kherson to respond to protests, and ISW has previously observed Russian forces firing at protesters in Kherson.[41] The Russian Ministry of Defense released footage on March 24 of Russian engineers clearing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Kherson Oblast, indicating likely ongoing Ukrainian resistance efforts in the region.[42]
Ukrainian forces conducted a successful attack on Russian ships docked at the occupied port of Berdyansk on March 24, likely sinking a landing ship and damaging or sinking another.[43] Competing reports claimed Ukrainian forces used TB2 drones, Tochka ballistic missiles, or local sabotage. ISW cannot currently assess the competing claims at this time. The attack likely sank the Orsk large landing ship and damaged or sank one other landing ship. Possible damage to two other Russian landing ships docked in the port is unclear. Regardless of the specific method of attack, Ukraine’s demonstrated ability to inflict serious damage on Russian landing ships docked in Berdyansk, the largest Russian-occupied port on the Black Sea (excepting Crimea), may disrupt Russian forces from renewing attempts to reinforce operations in Mariupol and around Kherson by sea.
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces will likely capture Mariupol or force the city to capitulate within the coming weeks and have entered the city center;
- Russia will expand its air, missile, and artillery bombardments of Ukrainian cities;
- Ukrainian officials suggest that Ukrainian forces may launch a larger counter-attack in western Kyiv Oblast in the coming days;
- The continued involvement of the Black Sea Fleet in the Battle of Mariupol reduces the likelihood of an amphibious landing near Odesa, Russian naval shelling of Odesa in recent days notwithstanding.
[1] https://t dot me/M_Podolyak/29.
[6] https://t dot me/kyivoda/2625.
[7] https://t dot me/kyivoda/2625; https://t dot me/stranaua/32636; https://t dot me/irpentip/3683.
[8] https://t dot me/kyivoda/2625..
[9] https://t dot me/kyivoda/2625.
[14] https://t dot me/kyivoda/2625.
[15] https://t dot me/stranaua/32653.
[19] https://kyiv.tsn dot ua/ru/gorod-sputnik-chernobylskoy-aes-v-opasnosti-okkupanty-pytayutsya-shturmovat-slavutich-2018599.html; https://ua.korrespondent dot net/ukraine/4460020-rosiiski-viiska-sshturmuuit-slavutych; https://t dot me/energoatom_ua/3853;
[22] https://t dot me/stranaua/32698.
[26] https://t dot me/stranaua/32647.
[28] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/zbilshennya-obstriliv-u-chernigovi-ta-vibuhi-u-chornobayivci-situaciya-v-regionah-zranku-24-bereznya.
[30] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/zbilshennya-obstriliv-u-chernigovi-ta-vibuhi-u-chornobayivci-situaciya-v-regionah-zranku-24-bereznya; https://t dot me/astrahandm/1898.
[35] https://t dot me/mariupolrada/8973.
[36] https://t dot me/mariupolrada/8989; https://t d to me/mariupolrada/8989.
[37] https://t dot me/stranaua/32635.
[40] https://t dot me/stranaua/32691.
2. Ukraine’s troops begin a counteroffensive that alters shape of the battle with Russia.
Note the emphasis on lower level commanders and dispersed command and control. This is what will make the Ukrainians win. (in addition to the fact the Ukrainian are fighting for freedom and their homeland while the Russians are simply fighting Putin's War).
Excerpts:
In the counteroffensive around Kyiv, the Ukrainian military ordered lower-level commanders to devise strategies for striking back in ways appropriate to their local areas. In many cases, this involved sending small units of infantry on reconnaissance missions to find and engage Russian forces that had fanned out into villages near Kyiv, a soldier on one such mission said over the weekend.
By Thursday, the intensive fighting had set so many fires in towns around Kyiv that the city was shrouded in an eerie, white haze of smoke. But signs of actual, on the ground progress were elusive. Ukrainian forces have been unable to demonstrate they control villages or towns previously held by the Russian army.
“They are fighting day and night and everything is burning,” said Olha, 33, a saleswoman who escaped from Irpin Wednesday evening, and who was not comfortable providing her full name. She was interviewed at an aid station for displaced civilians where a continuous, cacophonous rumble of explosions could be heard from the fighting nearby.
Earlier on Wednesday, Kyiv’s mayor, Vitaly Klitschko, told a news conference that Ukrainian forces had in fact pushed back Russian troops and that “almost the whole of Irpin is in Ukrainian hands.” Other Ukrainian and Western officials have also offered more optimistic accounts than could be verified from witnesses.
Ukraine’s troops begin a counteroffensive that alters shape of the battle with Russia.
Published March 24, 2022
Updated March 25, 2022, 4:55 a.m. ET
Although their claimed gains in territory are hard to quantify or verify, this picture of Ukrainian progress is aiding the country’s messaging to its citizens and to the world.
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Ukrainian soldiers with anti-tank weapons near the front lines north of Kyiv on Thursday.Credit...Gleb Garanich/Reuters
By
Published March 24, 2022Updated March 25, 2022, 4:55 a.m. ET
KYIV, Ukraine — Ukraine’s military has begun a counteroffensive that has altered the central dynamic of the fighting: the question is no longer how far Russian forces have advanced, but whether the Ukrainians are now pushing them back.
Ukraine has blown up parked Russian helicopters in the south, and on Thursday claimed to have destroyed a naval ship in the Sea of Azov. Its forces struck a Russian resupply convoy in the Northeast. Western and Ukrainian officials also have claimed progress in fierce fighting around the capital, Kyiv.
The asserted gains in territory are hard to quantify, or verify. In at least one crucial battle in a suburb of Kyiv, where Russian troops had made their closest approach to the capital, brutal street fighting still raged on Thursday and it was not clear that Ukraine had regained any ground.
But even this muddied picture of Ukrainian progress is helpful for the country’s messaging to its citizens, and to the world — that it is taking the fight to a foe with superior numbers and weaponry, and not just hunkering down to play defense.
In the counteroffensive around Kyiv, the Ukrainian military ordered lower-level commanders to devise strategies for striking back in ways appropriate to their local areas. In many cases, this involved sending small units of infantry on reconnaissance missions to find and engage Russian forces that had fanned out into villages near Kyiv, a soldier on one such mission said over the weekend.
By Thursday, the intensive fighting had set so many fires in towns around Kyiv that the city was shrouded in an eerie, white haze of smoke. But signs of actual, on the ground progress were elusive. Ukrainian forces have been unable to demonstrate they control villages or towns previously held by the Russian army.
“They are fighting day and night and everything is burning,” said Olha, 33, a saleswoman who escaped from Irpin Wednesday evening, and who was not comfortable providing her full name. She was interviewed at an aid station for displaced civilians where a continuous, cacophonous rumble of explosions could be heard from the fighting nearby.
Earlier on Wednesday, Kyiv’s mayor, Vitaly Klitschko, told a news conference that Ukrainian forces had in fact pushed back Russian troops and that “almost the whole of Irpin is in Ukrainian hands.” Other Ukrainian and Western officials have also offered more optimistic accounts than could be verified from witnesses.
The deputy police chief of Irpin, Oleksandr Bogai, said Russian soldiers were still in the town, occupying several districts and fighting Ukrainian forces. That is essentially the same situation that has persisted for nearly the entire month of the war. “There are huge explosions and a lot of smoke,” he said by telephone. “Civilians are holed up in basements. I don’t know exactly what is happening.”
In the fighting around Kyiv, civilians evacuating from the combat zone painted a picture, not so much of liberated towns but of chaotic, lethal violence.
Russia-Ukraine War: Key Developments
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Vladimir, 66, a retired furniture factory worker who declined to offer his last name, walked out of Irpin Thursday morning after his home burned down overnight.
“Nobody is putting out the fires,” he said. “My neighbor’s home burned and I saw sparks on my roof and then my house started to burn.”
Lacking water to fight the fire, he could only watch. “We should never surrender,” he said. “We will never live under the Russians again.”
3. Putin's war in Ukraine nearing possibly more dangerous phase
Putin is losing Putin's War.
Excerpts:
Robert Gates, the former CIA director and defense secretary, said Putin “has got to be stunningly disappointed” in his military’s performance.
“Here we are in Ukraine seeing conscripts not knowing why they’re there, not being very well trained, and just huge problems with command and control, and incredibly lousy tactics,” Gates said at a forum sponsored by The OSS Society, a group honoring the World War II-era intelligence agency known as the Office of Strategic Services.
Putin's war in Ukraine nearing possibly more dangerous phase
AP · by ROBERT BURNS · March 25, 2022
WASHINGTON (AP) — President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine is approaching a new, potentially more dangerous phase after a month of fighting has left Russian forces stalled by an outnumbered foe. He is left with stark choices — how and where to replenish his spent ground forces, whether to attack the flow of Western arms to Ukrainian defenders, and at what cost he might escalate or widen the war.
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Ukrainian defenders, outgunned but benefitting from years of American and NATO training and an accelerating influx of foreign arms and moral support, are showing new signs of confidence as the invading force struggles to regroup.
Russian shortcomings in Ukraine might be the biggest shock of the war so far. After two decades of modernization and professionalization, Putin’s forces have proved to be ill-prepared, poorly coordinated and surprisingly stoppable. The extent of Russian troop losses is not known in detail, although NATO estimates that between 7,000 and 15,000 have died in the first four weeks — potentially as many as Russia lost in a decade of war in Afghanistan.
Robert Gates, the former CIA director and defense secretary, said Putin “has got to be stunningly disappointed” in his military’s performance.
“Here we are in Ukraine seeing conscripts not knowing why they’re there, not being very well trained, and just huge problems with command and control, and incredibly lousy tactics,” Gates said at a forum sponsored by The OSS Society, a group honoring the World War II-era intelligence agency known as the Office of Strategic Services.
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Battlefield trends are difficult to reliably discern from the outside, but some Western officials say they see potentially significant shifts. Air Vice-Marshal Mick Smeath, London’s defense attaché in Washington, says British intelligence assesses that Ukrainian forces probably have retaken two towns west of Kyiv, the capital.
“It is likely that successful counterattacks by Ukraine will disrupt the ability of Russian forces to reorganize and resume their own offensive towards Kyiv,” Smeath said in a brief statement Wednesday.
Ukraine’s navy said Thursday it sank a large Russian landing ship near the port city of Berdyansk.
Faced with stout Ukrainian resistance, Russian forces have resorted to bombardment of urban areas but made little progress capturing the main prize — Kyiv. The Pentagon said Wednesday that some Russian troops were digging in at defensive positions outside of Kyiv rather than attempting to advance on the capital, and that in some cases the Russians have lost ground in recent days.
In an assessment published Thursday, the Atlantic Council said a major Russian breakthrough is highly unlikely.
Not long before Putin kicked off his war Feb. 24, some U.S. military officials believed he could capture Kyiv in short order — perhaps just a few days — and that he might break the Ukrainian military within a couple of weeks. Putin, too, might have expected a quick victory, given that he did not throw the bulk of his pre-staged forces, estimated at more than 150,000, into the fight in the opening days. Nor did his air force assert itself. He has made only limited use of electronic warfare and cyberattacks.
Putin is resorting to siege tactics against key Ukrainian cities, bombing from afar with his ground troops largely stagnant.
Stephen Biddle, a professor of international affairs at Columbia University, says Putin’s shift is likely based on a hope that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will give up rather than allow the killing and destruction to continue.
“This plan is very unlikely to work. Slaughtering innocent civilians and destroying their homes and communities is mostly just stiffening Ukrainian resistance and resolve,” Biddle said in an email exchange.
Ukrainian units have begun counterattacking in some areas, according to John Kirby, the Pentagon press secretary. But the Ukrainians face an uphill battle even as the United States and its allies accelerate and widen a flow of critical weapons and supplies, including anti-aircraft missiles and armed drones. Biden has vowed to seek longer-range air defense systems for Ukraine as well as anti-ship missiles. Last week he approved a new $800 million package of arms for Ukraine.
Philip Breedlove, a retired Air Force general who served as the top NATO commander in Europe from 2013 to 2016 and is now a Europe specialist with the Middle East Institute, said Ukraine may not win the war outright, but the outcome will be determined by what Zelenskyy is willing to accept in a negotiated settlement.
“I think it’s highly unlikely that Russia is going to be defeated in detail on the battlefield,” Breedlove said, because Russia has a large reserve of forces it could call on. But Ukraine might see winning as forcing Russia to pay such a high price that it is willing to strike a deal and withdraw.
“I think there is a chance of that,” Breedlove said.
With the war’s outcome in doubt, so too is Putin’s wider goal of overturning the security order that has existed in Europe since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Putin demands that NATO refuse membership to Ukraine and other former Soviet states like Georgia, and that the alliance roll back its military presence to positions held prior to expanding into Eastern Europe.
NATO leaders have rejected Putin’s demands, and with uncharacteristic speed are bolstering the allied force presence in Romania, Slovakia and Hungary, which border Ukraine, and in Bulgaria, which like Ukraine sits on the Black Sea.
“We are united in our resolve to counter Russia’s attempts to destroy the foundations of international security and stability,” leaders of the 30 allied nations said in a joint statement after meeting in Brussels on Thursday.
The human tragedy unfolding in Ukraine has overshadowed a worry across Europe that Putin could, by miscalculation if not by intent, escalate the conflict by using chemical or nuclear weapons in Ukraine or attempt to punish neighboring NATO nations for their support for Ukraine by attacking them militarily.
“Unfortunately there is now not a single country that can live with the illusion that they are safe and secure,” Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiril Petkov said, referring to his fellow European members of NATO.
With that threat in mind, the United States and other allied countries have begun assembling combat forces in Bulgaria and other Eastern European NATO countries — not to enter the war directly but to send Putin the message that if he were to widen his war he would face allied resistance.
Speaking at a windswept training range in Bulgaria last week, U.S. Army Maj. Ryan Mannina of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment said the tension is palpable.
“We’re very aware that there’s a war going on only a few hundred miles from us,” he said.
—
Associated Press writer Lolita C. Baldor contributed to this report.
AP · by ROBERT BURNS · March 25, 2022
4. NATO Ignores Zelenskyy’s Plea For 1% of Its Tanks, Jets
President Zelensky is masterful at strategic communications. As someone pointed out he may not get what he wants but he will force NATO to give him what he needs.
A very unique and fascinating aspect of Putin's War is how President Zelensky is addressing countries around the world on an almost daily basis. He is addressing legislatures and tailors his message specifically for each country by putting Putin's War in the country's historical perspective.
Of course this could not be done without modern communications. I guess we can call this diplomacy via Zoom or Zoom diplomacy to garner support to cause Putin to lose Putin's War.
NATO Ignores Zelenskyy’s Plea For 1% of Its Tanks, Jets
Alliance announces four new battlegroups as GOP calls for more direct aid to Ukraine.
NATO leaders on Thursday agreed to boost military protection of its border with Russia, while ignoring Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s plea for additional military equipment.
Zelenskyy delivered a virtual address to an emergency meeting of NATO in Brussels, where President Joe Biden and other world leaders agreed to impose more sanctions and boost humanitarian support, one month into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But Zelenskyy said the alliance could “prevent the deaths” of civilians by sending more military equipment to Ukrainians fighting for their country.
“Ukraine asked for your planes. So that we do not lose so many people. And you have thousands of fighter jets! But we haven't been given any yet,” Zelenskyy said, according to a translated transcript of his remarks. “You have at least 20,000 tanks! Ukraine asked for a percent—one percent—of all your tanks to be given or sold to us! But we do not have a clear answer.”
Zelenskyy did not repeat his request for a no-fly zone or membership in NATO, according to a senior administration official.
NATO leaders did announce the establishment of four multinational battlegroups, to be located in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. The alliance also announced that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg would serve another year, until Sept. 30, 2023.
“Today, NATO leaders agreed to reset our deterrence and defense for the longer-term to face a new security reality,” Stoltenberg said at a press conference, adding that more details on the alliance’s new security posture are expected to be announced at the next NATO Summit in Madrid in June, where allies will approve a new guiding strategic concept document.
NATO allies have voiced strong support for Ukraine, but have been wary of provoking Russia into a conflict directly with the alliance that could mean World War III. But Zelenskyy warned that if the alliance does not act to help Ukrainians stop Moscow now, Russian leader Vladimir Putin will only push farther into eastern Europe.
“NATO may be afraid of Russia's actions. I am sure you already understand that Russia does not intend to stop in Ukraine,” he said. “It wants to go further against the eastern members of NATO, the Baltic states, Poland….Will NATO then stop thinking about it, worrying about how Russia will react?”
Biden touted the help the United States has provided so far, saying at a press conference after the NATO meeting that his administration has approved $2 billion in military aid to Ukraine since January 2021, including anti-aircraft systems, shoulder-mounted anti-armor missiles, small arms, ammunition, and drones in an $800 million package on March 16. Countries including Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom have also approved the delivery of military equipment to Ukraine, according to a NATO release.
But the focus at the emergency meeting was on non-military deliverables the allies could use to punish Russia and help Ukraine. The United States announced $1 billion in humanitarian assistance for Ukraine, plus an additional $320 million to fight for democracy and human rights in the country, according to a White House fact sheet. The administration is also spending more than $11 billion over the next five years to protect global food supply lines, and announced that the United States will welcome up to 100,000 refugees fleeing Russian violence.
On Friday, Biden will fly to Poland, where he suggested he would be meeting with refugees, before adding that he’s “not supposed to say where I’m going.”
The United States also announced new sanctions in coordination with the European Union and the G7 that will target more than 300 members of the Russian legislative body and 48 state-owned defense companies.
“Putin was banking on NATO being split,” Biden said “In my early conversations with him in December and early January, it was clear to me he didn’t think we could sustain this cohesion. NATO has never, never been more united than it is today.”
Biden’s speech was quickly dismissed by Republicans as not going far enough to help Ukrainian citizens under daily Russian attacks.
”With all due respect to President Biden: Unity in NATO does not matter while Ukraine is being destroyed,” Sen. Lindsay Graham, R-S.C., tweeted, adding that the United States should be doing “so much more,” including anti-ship missiles and anti-aircraft defenses.
“Ukraine's fighters have demonstrated great courage & strength,” Rep. Jackie Walorski, R-Ind., tweeted. “As he meets with world leaders, President Biden should offer Ukraine what it truly needs to defend against Putin's unprovoked war - MiGs and more lethal power. The U.S. must lead.”
5. U.K. Says Russian Mercenary Group Aims to Assassinate Ukraine’s President
Yes, Putin needs to eliminate Zelensky. On the surface he is the glue holding things together. He seems critically important to the defense of Ukraine. However, if Russia is successful in assassinating him I doubt very much it will achieve the effect Putin desires. He will be martyred and be a national hero.The people will rally around his death and their resolve will be even more hardened than it already is.
A morbid thought but if I were advising Zelensky I would be looking at grooming a successor whether it is his constitutional successor or some other leader (perhaps a general or a resistance leader) who can become the symbol and voice of Ukraine if Zelensky is assassinated. Whoever succeeds him will be a very astute strategic communications advisor.
U.K. Says Russian Mercenary Group Aims to Assassinate Ukraine’s President
Britain imposes sanctions on Wagner Group, saying the company has been ‘reportedly tasked’ with killing Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky
LONDON—The U.K. government said that Russian mercenary company Wagner Group is being used by Russia to try to assassinate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
The group of hired soldiers was “reportedly tasked” with killing Mr. Zelensky, the U.K. government said, as it announced sanctions against Wagner Group. It didn’t provide evidence or further details.
Wagner emerged from Russia’s covert interventions in eastern Ukraine in 2014, where the Kremlin worked with armed groups funded by politically connected Russian businessmen. Wagner was financed in part by multimillion-dollar catering and construction contracts for the Russian armed forces awarded to companies linked with Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former restaurateur, according to European officials.
A representative of Mr. Prigozhin called into question the existence of Wagner Group and said questions about the U.K.’s claim represented “a severe psychosis of Western media,” without commenting on the claim itself. The company couldn’t be reached for comment.
The Wagner Group has already been sanctioned by the European Union, which accuses it of being a proxy force for Russia’s Defense Ministry. The Kremlin has in the past denied any formal connections with the group.
U.K. officials have in recent weeks spoken of their worry about Mr. Zelensky’s safety amid the war in Ukraine and numerous reports of attempts on his life.
The U.K., EU and the U.S. have already imposed sanctions on Mr. Prigozhin. The U.K. has also sanctioned his mother and daughter.
Wagner Group arrived in Syria shortly after Russia entered the conflict on behalf of the Assad regime and conducted support operations such as seizing oil and gas fields and securing other government infrastructure, such as airports.
—Thomas Grove contributed to this article.
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6. Ukraine War Update - March 25, 2022 | SOF News
Ukraine War Update - March 25, 2022 | SOF News
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO. Additional topics include refugees, internally displaced personnel, humanitarian efforts, cyber, and information operations.
Photo: U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. John Ryan, 555th Fighter Squadron F-16 Fighting Falcon pilot, prepares to take off for a routine training flight at Aviano Air Base, Feb. 17, 2022. The flights will support NATO’s enhanced air policing mission; integrate with allies and partners in the Black Sea region in an increased defensive posture along NATO’s border and to reinforce regional security. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Brooke Moeder)
Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).
The Ukraine War Update will return on Monday. Some ‘SOF’ news will be in your inbox on Saturday and Sunday.
Russian Campaign Update. The Russian offensive is still stalled. The Ukrainians are conducting limited counterattacks, but those actions are not having a significant effect on the terrain currently held by the Russians. But a victory is a victory. Reports from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and other news sources indicate that the Russians are still suffering significant losses in personnel – killed, wounded, or injured. However, time is on Russia’s side. As it pours more troops, tanks, and equipment into the fight the tide could turn to the Russians favor. Because of Russia’s vast superiority in numbers it will win a war of attrition. There are indications that the Russians are picking up the pace in eastern Ukraine.
Russian Missiles. Over 1,200 missiles have been launched into Ukraine by the Russians. U.S. defense officials say that there are still plenty of missiles left in the Russian inventory. Russia is running low on air launched cruise missiles but have plenty of ground launched cruise missiles, short range ballistic missiles, and medium range ballistic missiles.
Fight for the Skies. Russian aviators are still experiencing rough times flying over Ukrainian airspace and appear to remain risk-adverse in the face of Ukrainian air defenses. Most Russian airstrikes involve air launch munitions from Belarus, Russian, and Russian-occupied Crimea airspace. The Russians have increased their drone activity in recent days. There are a host of MANPADs and mid-range anti-aircraft systems used by the Ukrainians. Read more about these systems in “Why the Skies Over Ukraine are a ‘Nightmare’ for Russian Pilots”, Coffee or Die Magazine, March 22, 2022.
Kyiv. The capital city has held fast in resisting the Russian assault. In fact, some news reports indicate that a series of small counterattacks by the Ukrainians have pushed the Russians back a bit. There is also some speculation that the Russians have pulled back a few kilometers in some places. It is likely that a combination of Ukrainian attacks and Russian’s withdrawal have moved the frontlines east of Kyiv back – where they are now about 55 kilometers from the city center. At this point, without significant units reinforcing the Russians Kyiv will likely hold out.
Kharkiv. The city’s downtown area suffered attacks from sea launched missiles. The second largest city of Ukraine is Kharkiv located in the northeast of the country and continues to be held by the Ukrainians. It is not known whether the Russians will try and take the city or just attempt to encircle it. The Russians are currently outside the ring road and are about 15 to 20 kilometers from the city center.
Mariupol. The situation for residents of Mariupol is dire. The evacuation of civilians continues. The city is experiencing constant shelling. Food and water supplies are severely limited and their are fears of starvation in the future. The Russians are making slow but steady progress in taking the city, but it is street by street, block by block fighting.
Mykolayiv. Located on the west bank of the Dnieper River close to the coast of the Black Sea, Mykolayiv is a strategic objective for the Russians that is on the road to Odessa located further west along the coast of the Black Sea. It is thought that the Russians may try to bypass this city in order to push towards Odessa; but given the current stalled offensive this is not likely to happen without additional Russian forces being committed to the fight. It is possible that the Russians want to project a sense they will try for Odessa – and tie down Ukrainian forces dedicated to its defense.
Negotiations. Every once in a while a report surfaces that the discussions between the Russians and Ukrainians are bearing fruit, but the fighting continues. There was an exchange of prisoners recently. Ten Russian prisoners of war were exchanged for 10 Ukrainian POWs. Some Russian and Ukrainian sailors were also exchanged.
NATO Conference and Other Meetings
NATO held a conference on Thursday (Mar 24) that brought world leaders to Brussels, Belgium. During his European trip President Biden announced that the U.S. would be providing over $1 billion for Ukrainian humanitarian relief. The specifics of the program has not yet been announced although it is anticipated that it will help provide food, clean water, shelter, medical supplies, and other assistance. The U.S. has deployed over 20,000 military personnel to Europe since the Russians invaded Ukraine. You can watch President Biden’s 18-minute long press conference held in Brussels, Belgium on Thursday (Mar 24).
Russia and G20. The G20 organization is a primary venue for international economic and financial cooperation. It was established in 1999 to address issues and concerns about the global economy. There are twenty members in the group including nations from around the world and the European Union. President Biden came out on Thursday (Mar 24) stating that Russia should be dropped from the organization. “Biden says he supports expelling Russia from G20”, Axios, March 24, 2022. Read about Russia’s place in the world economy in this report: Russia’s Trade and Investment Role in the Global Economy, Congressional Research Service, CRS IF12066, March 24, 2022, PDF, 3 pages.
Ukraine Allies in Graphics. The 35 countries that are attending the European Union, NATO, and G-7 summits in Brussels this week have varying degrees of economic dependencies on Russia and support to Ukraine. View a matrix that spells it out. “How Loyal Are Ukraine’s Western Allies?”, Politico, March 24, 2022.
U.S. to Welcome 100,000 Ukrainian Refugees. Over 3 million have fled to countries in Europe, and some of them may end up in the United States. The U.S. will take up to 100,000 Ukrainian refugees. A full range of pathways will be utilized to accommodate the arrival of refugees into the United States. Priority will be given to those with family in the U.S., journalists, LGBTQ people, and others. “U.S. to welcome 100,000 Ukrainian refugees”, Politico, March 24, 2022. Thus far, Poland has accepted over two million Ukrainian refugees. There are a lot of private organizations that will be assisting Ukrainians coming to this country. One of them is Welcome.US. Visit their web page on Ukraine for ways to volunteer and assist. https://ukraine.welcome.us/
More U.S. Sanctions. Washington has announced that more sanctions will be imposed on Russia. The newest ones will target the 328 members of Russia’s legislative body, some of Russia’s financial institutions, and almost 50 Russian defense enterprises. Read more in “Targeting Elites of the Russian Federation”, U.S. Department of State, March 24, 2022.
General Information
Online Event – Gates and Vickers on Ukraine War. On Wednesday (Mar 23), Dr. Robert Gates and Dr. Michael Vickers took part in a panel discussion about the Ukraine War. Gates is a former Secretary of Defense and former director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Vickers is a former Green Beret, CIA officer with the Special Activities Division, ASD SO/LIC, and former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. The event was sponsored by the OSS Society. (one hour)
Video – Weapons of Ukraine. American-made Javelins, British NLAWs, and other weapons are explained in this video featured on Defense News, March 21, 2022.
Refugees, IDPs, and Humanitarian Crisis. As of March 24, over 3,500,000 refugees have left Ukraine according to data provided by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR).
The Coming Resistance
The Russians and COIN. The war is grinding on and large scale advancements on either side are likely to be few and far between. The Russians will likely take one or more major cities in the coming weeks and defend the newly acquired territory along the eastern border and in the south. Some war observers say that the Ukrainians will mount an insurgency in these Russian-occupied areas making their stay difficult. What is ignored by many is the fact that the Russians, in some cases, have been good at counterinsurgency campaigns. “Don’t Underestimate the Bear – Russia is One of the World’s Most Effective Modern Counterinsurgents”, Modern War Institute at West Point, March 24, 2022.
Cyber and Information Operations
Telegram and War Info. The Ukraine War has seen information operations emerge as a bigger factor than in previous conflicts . . . or at least it seems that way. The Russians have firm control of the media in Russia and it is trying to sway the narrative online around the rest of the world. Telegram, an instant messaging app, has become one of the more important venues for reading the news . . . and propaganda as well. It is one of the most popular social apps in Russia and Ukraine. Learn why Telegram has become an appealing option for communications and news about the war. Read more in “Why Telegram became the go-to app for Ukrainians – despite being rife with Russian disinformation”, The Conversation, March 24, 2022.
Ukraine Bio Labs, Korean War, and Propaganda. Russia has made accusations that the United States and Ukraine are in a joint venture to deploy biological weapons. This isn’t the first time Russia has made accusations of this nature. During the Korean War Russia made similar accusations. For the most part, this propaganda was revealed for what it was – a bunch of lies. The U.S. policy maker of today could learn from the responses from the United Nations and the United States to propaganda in the 1950s. “Lessons From the First Time Russia Accused the United States of Biowarfare”, War on the Rocks., March 23, 2022.
Building Apps for War. Ukrainian digital workers have shifted focus from consumer products to assisting in the war effort. Some of the applications develop provide the ability of ordinary Ukrainians to submit location-tagged photos and videos of Russian military sightings. The data is then used by Ukrainian intelligence officials to develop the overall intelligence situation. Ukrainian developers are making apps, bots, and online tools for front-line combat and life under siege. “Instead of consumer software, Ukraine’s tech workers build apps of war”, The Washington Post, March 24, 2022.
World Response
U.K. Weapons. The British announced on Wednesday (Mar 23) that thousands of anti-armor weapons will be shipped to Ukraine. This is in addition to the thousands of anti-armor weapons already sent by the U.K. The NLAW anti-tank weapon has proven to be extremely effective against Russian armor. Ukraine has a growing need for additional anti-air and anti-tank weapons. They are rapidly burning through their inventory of these weapons and are urgently requesting more. “Ukraine tells the US it needs 500 Javelins and 500 Stingers per day”, CNN News, March 24, 2022.
Private Sector Assistance and GSOF. There are hundreds of private organizations and volunteer groups providing help to Ukrainian refugees and to those Ukrainians on the battlefield. One of them is the Global SOF Foundation (GSOF). This organization is an international special operations network that aims to advance special operations forces capabilities and partnerships to confront global and networked threats. It is currently partnering with support teams in Ukraine to provide humanitarian aid.
Commentary
Ukraine – A Success Story for Security Cooperation Assistance. The dismal advance into Ukraine by the Russian Army and the brave defense put up by the Ukrainians has captured the attention of the world. An important factor in the Ukrainian success is the transformation of its military since 2014. This improvement of Ukraine’s military capabilities was aided in part by the training, support, and military assistance provided to Ukraine since 2014 by the United States, UK, Canada, and other nations. Read more in “The Impact of Security Cooperation and Building Partner Capacity in Ukraine”, The Soufan Center IntelBrief, March 25, 2022.
Could the War Spillover to the Balkans? Dimitar Bechev, a lecturer at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, explains the politics that will keep the Balkans free from conflict related to the Ukraine War. “War Won’t Be Coming Back to the Balkans”, War on the Rocks, March 24, 2022.
Deterring Russia – Ukraine Needs Aircraft. Two former U.S. Air Force generals argue that fighter aircraft should be given to Ukraine. (Air Force Magazine, Mar 22, 2022).
Russia’s Chemical and Biological Weapons. The threat of Russia using its chemical and biological weapons in the Ukraine War has NATO, Ukraine, and others on edge. This is likely a ‘red line’ for the United States and NATO that would require a response. Russia has used chemical weapons in past conflicts, notably in Chechnya and Syria. Matthew Bunn of Harvard University is interviewed on the prospect of Russia using chemical and biological weapons and the likely response of NATO. “Russia’s remaining weapons are horrific and confounding”, The Harvard Gazette, March 23, 2022.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, defense, or the current conflict in Ukraine then we are interested.
Maps and Other Resources
UNCN. The Ukraine NGO Coordination Network is an organization that ties together U.S.-based 501c3 organizations and non-profit humanitarian organizations that are working to evacuate and support those in need affected by the Ukraine crisis. https://uncn.one
Maps of Ukraine
Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.
UNHCR Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation
Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.
Janes Equipment Profile – Ukraine Conflict. An 81-page PDF provides information on the military equipment of the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces. Covers naval, air, electronic warfare, C4ISR, communications, night vision, radar, and armored fighting vehicles, Ukraine Conflict Equipment Profile, February 28, 2022.
Arms Transfers to Ukraine. Forum on the Arms Trade.
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7. Ukraine tells the US it needs 500 Javelins and 500 Stingers per day
Is this a want or a need? I think it is an absolute necessity.
I wonder if the US defense manufacturers have reopened their lines to restart or increase production. I wonder how our war stocks are being depleted?
Ukraine tells the US it needs 500 Javelins and 500 Stingers per day
CNN · by Zachary Cohen and Oren Liebermann, CNN
(CNN)Ukraine has updated its extensive wishlist of additional military assistance from the US government in the past several days to include hundreds more anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles than previously requested, according to a document provided to CNN that details the items needed.
The Ukrainians have submitted similar lists in recent weeks but a recent request provided to US lawmakers appears to reflect a growing need for American-made Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and Javelin anti-tank missiles -- with Ukraine saying it urgently needs 500 of each, daily.
In both cases, Ukraine is asking for hundreds more missiles than were included in a similar list recently provided to US lawmakers, according to a source with knowledge of both requests.
The new list comes as the Ukrainians have claimed they face potential weapons shortages amid an ongoing Russian assault -- prompting some pushback from US and NATO officials who stress that more military aid is already going into the country.
By March 7, less than two weeks into Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the US and other NATO members had sent about 17,000 anti-tank missiles and 2,000 anti-aircraft missiles into Ukraine.
Read More
Since then, NATO countries, including the US, have kept the pipeline of weapons and equipment flowing, even as Russia has threatened to target the shipments.
The last of a US $350 million security assistance packaged approved in late February arrived in Ukraine within the last few days, a senior defense official said, while the next two packages totaling $1 billion have already started to arrive.
President Joe Biden said Thursday that "armor systems, ammunition and our weapons are flowing into Ukraine as I speak." The defense official said it would be "multiple flights over many days" to get the equipment to Eastern Europe before it enters Ukraine at multiple land border crossings.
Meanwhile, on Wednesday, the United Kingdom announced it would ship 6,000 more missiles, including anti-tank and high explosive weapons, to Ukraine, along with approximately $33 million in financial backing for the Ukrainian military.
The list provided to CNN details several other urgent needs, including: jets, attack helicopters and anti-aircraft systems like the S-300.
Two types of Russian-made jets are listed in the document, including one designed to provide close air support for troops on the ground. Ukraine has asked for 36 of each aircraft, according to the list provided to CNN.
Some lawmakers in Congress believe the US should provide Ukraine with the weapons they're requesting as quickly as possible.
Sen. Jacky Rosen, a Democrat from Nevada, visited Poland and Germany last weekend to meet with civil society organizations helping Ukrainian refugees who've arrived in those countries as well as US troops stationed abroad helping with humanitarian efforts.
Rosen said her biggest takeaway from the trip was the "sense of urgency" on the ground.
"They need all the tools to not just survive the war, but to win the war, so whether we provide them air-to-ground missiles, drones, all the military support," Rosen told CNN.
CNN's Ellie Kaufman contributed to this report.
CNN · by Zachary Cohen and Oren Liebermann, CNN
8. IntelBrief: The Impact of Security Cooperation and Building Partner Capacity in Ukraine
IntelBrief: The Impact of Security Cooperation and Building Partner Capacity in Ukraine - The Soufan Center
March 25, 2022
AP Photo/Emilio Morenatti
Bottom Line Up Front
- The Ukrainian military has benefited significantly from security cooperation efforts of the U.S. and its allies, which have provided Kyiv with training and weapons that have proved crucial so far in bleeding Russian forces.
- In addition to training provided by the U.S., the U.K. and Canada have also provided training, while a plethora of Western and NATO countries have provided supplies, equipment, weaponry, and ammunition.
- Since 2014, the U.S. has supplied Ukraine with more than $2.5 billion in military assistance, including supplying the Ukrainian military with everything from counter-mortar radars to Javelin anti-tank missiles.
- According to a recent report from Yahoo News, secret support provided by CIA paramilitaries was indispensable to Ukrainian forces, including snipers and other elite units who benefited from this covert action training program.
Many analysts covering Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have been shocked as much by the former’s pitiful military performance as they have by the latter’s success. The Ukrainian military of 2022 stands in stark contrast to the Ukrainian military of 2014. The difference, in addition to the remarkable grit and determination of those fighting against the Russians, is the transformation of Ukraine’s military during the eight years between Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its most recent invasion, which began in earnest on February 24. The United States engages in security cooperation efforts and programs to build the partner capacity of U.S. allies all over the world. Every one of these partnerships is beset by certain challenges and setbacks, with instances of success less common than failures. What is difficult, if not impossible to account for, and something available in droves in the case of Ukraine, is the will to fight. That cannot be bestowed by an external ally, but when marshaled effectively, in combination with the necessary contextual factors that enable hope for success, can be combined with robust security cooperation to make a lasting impact on the battlefield.
The U.S. came under immense criticism and Congressional scrutiny following the rapid collapse of the Afghan government and military in August 2021. In that case, twenty years of funding, training, and the provision of equipment seemingly disappeared over the course of the Taliban’s multi-week offensive, which saw Afghan forces abandon their fighting positions, allowing the insurgents to ransack city after city before seizing the capital, Kabul. However, in this instance, the U.S. had already publicized a deadline for withdrawal, and security and intelligence analysts broadly foretold of a Taliban takeover, undercutting motivations for viable sustained combat by the Afghan military. With Ukraine, years of security cooperation have clearly yielded significant results, with Ukraine performing valiantly in battle against one of the largest militaries in the world. Ukraine’s military readiness, ability to adapt on the battlefield, and integration of light infantry with anti-tank weapons, drones, and artillery fire is tangible proof of the benefits of Western security cooperation efforts. Ukrainian combat experience in the Donbas has also hardened its forces and given them a level of familiarity with how the Russians operate. In addition to training provided by the U.S., the United Kingdom and Canada have also provided training, while a plethora of Western and NATO countries have provided supplies, equipment, weaponry, and ammunition.
Since 2014, the U.S. has supplied Ukraine with more than $2.5 billion in military assistance. This assistance has included training and equipping the Ukrainian military, supplying everything from counter-mortar radars to Javelin anti-tank missiles. Ukraine was at the center of the first impeachment of former U.S. President Donald Trump, who attempted to extort Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy by threatening to withhold crucial military assistance unless Zelenskyy agreed to help Trump dig up dirt on his political rivals, something Zelenskyy flatly refused to do. Several officials in the Trump administration attempted to justify Trump’s actions, labeling the Ukrainian government as corrupt and its military as ramshackle and overmatched. Fast forward to the current day, and the U.S. and its allies have opened the floodgates, sending Ukraine advanced weaponry as well as Soviet-made air defense systems, including the SA-8, that were secretly acquired years ago as part of a long-running clandestine project. At a meeting yesterday in Brussels, Belgium, NATO leaders pledged to provide Ukraine with even more weaponry and training, offering reassurance that there was no easing up on taking the fight to Russia more than a month into the conflict.
According to a recent report from Yahoo News, secret support provided by paramilitaries from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was also indispensable to Ukrainian forces, including snipers and other elite Ukrainian forces who benefited from this covert action training program. The results are evident on the battlefield, where Ukrainian forces have killed between 7,000 and 15,000 Russian troops, according to some estimates, including numerous high-ranking officers, among them multiple Russian generals. The program also trained Ukrainians on operational security, covert communications, and other high-end technology to help evade surveillance and limit digital signatures that could make them vulnerable to Russian electronic warfare. Indeed, after witnessing how the conflict has unfolded over the first four weeks, Ukraine is turning out to be a potential model for security cooperation assistance, highlighting the need for follow-on studies THAT attempting to unearth exactly what has made Kyiv so successful in confronting Russia.
9. The US Army's Green Berets quietly helped tilt the battlefield a little bit more toward Ukraine
As successful as this may be judged some day in the familiar, no one should rest on their laurels. I am sure there are operators on the ground who describe how this could have been much better. It would be useful to listen to their critiques because success will be based on luck, seized opportunities, and visionary leaders and not on established processes with established authorities. This may not be able to be replicated effectively in the future without the same visionary leadership.
There is also one element that is not mentioned which I believe made a huge contribution and that is contractors. I know retired Green Berets who were contributing to this effort as contractors and still making a difference and who live "SF for life."
The US Army's Green Berets quietly helped tilt the battlefield a little bit more toward Ukraine
The U.S. Army's Special Forces, better known as Green Berets, have had a deep impact on Ukraine's fight to defend itself from a Russian invasion, despite not being directly involved in the conflict.
"Ukraine was taken very seriously by Special Forces," retired Green Beret Sgt. Maj. Martin Moore told Fox News Digital.
After Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, a move that faced minimal resistance, the Ukrainian military began an effort to modernize its forces to prepare for possible further Russian incursions into the country. The U.S. military also quickly stepped in to help, with the Army's Green Berets taking on a critical role in training Ukrainian forces.
"They immediately set upon a great effort to protect to Ukraine, to provide training," Moore said. "There's nobody better at training than Green Berets. These are people that can teach."
While elite military units such as the Navy SEAL teams garner widespread attention, the Army's Green Berets are fanned out across the world helping armies prepare for wars similar to the one now being fought in Ukraine. This work is typically done quietly, something Moore said Green Berets prefer.
"They do something different," Moore said. "They go where nobody else is and find out what is possible."
Moore said Green Berets are a "force multiplier," improving the combat capability of the international forces they work with. He stressed that they are not about "raids and ambushes," but about having an "unparalleled understanding of the place" where they are operating.
Green Berets are required to learn a foreign language as part of their training and are constantly trained in the political, economic and cultural complexities of the regions in which they are assigned to operate. This unique skill set allows them to partner with foreign forces for training and at times to fight alongside them.
Those skills have been put to use in Ukraine since 2014, with Green Berets and members of the Army's National Guard advising and training Ukrainian forces at Yavoriv Combat Training Center in western Ukraine. It's the same facility Russia attacked with rockets on March 13, killing 35. The Americans had already left, vacating the facility and moving troops deployed there to Germany in February.
Part of the job Green Berets did at Yavoriv was to train their Ukrainian counterparts to set up militia units that could wage guerrilla warfare against an invading force. The Ukrainian military can now put those lessons to use, with the government actively encouraging its citizens to join the fight against Russian forces.
Civilians practice moving in groups at a military training exercise. Alexey Furman/Bloomberg via Getty Images
But the work Green Berets are doing in Europe hasn't stopped, with forces still stationed in Europe helping prepare partner countries for the possibility of a Russian invasion farther into Europe. Such a move would be a mistake for Russia, Moore told Fox News Digital, arguing that the invasion of Ukraine has already gone poorly in part because of U.S. assistance, and a further move into NATO territory would go even worse.
"Russia has a horrible thing waiting for them if they want to push this thing further," Moore said.
10. What Happens in Russia If Putin Can’t Win in Ukraine?
Planners plan for the worst case more than they plan for success.
What Happens in Russia If Putin Can’t Win in Ukraine?
It’s tempting to think the strongman could fall and democracy could revive, but a more likely scenario is “Tehran on the Volga.”
March 23, 2022, 4:00 AM EDT
The world has been transfixed by Ukraine’s fight for survival. As the war drags on, we’d better start considering what will become of Russia, as well.
President Vladimir Putin’s nation has now been subjected to an isolation more sudden and total than that experienced by any major power in recent history. What that leads to may not be pretty.
Since late February, Russia has been hit with punishing economic, trade and financial sanctions. It is careering toward a debt default, as a rapid technological decoupling is also underway. Foreign firms are fleeing the country, while Russian teams are excluded from international competitions in soccer and other sports. Even the International Cat Federation has barred Russian felines from its events.
Russia isn’t some tinpot tyranny like Cuba or North Korea; it is a major power whose population was, until recently, deeply connected to its larger global environment. Now, Russia is suffering a degree of international ostracism that typically happens only when a country is at war with the world.
What will this mean for Moscow if its conflict with Ukraine drags on for months or years to come? We can imagine a few scenarios, all of which would pose nasty challenges for Russia, and some of which could be quite concerning for America and its allies.
The rosiest is a “Moscow Spring,” in which the costs of conflict lead to regime change and a rebirth of the democracy Russia experienced fleetingly in the 1990s. Russian elites push Putin aside and make peace with Ukraine. Having experienced the consequences of aggression and autocracy, the more urban, liberal swaths of Russian society demand a broader political opening and the country’s reintegration into the world. Just as isolation helped convince South Africa to ditch apartheid in the late 1980s, foreign opprobrium forces dramatic change in Moscow’s foreign and domestic policies.
The odds of this scenario materializing are slim. Two decades of Putinism have left Russia with a weak, fragmented opposition. The president has surely tried to coup-proof his regime by co-opting the security and intelligence services and pitting them against one another. And even if Russia did experience a revolution, look out: The history of the 1990s cautions us that instability and even chaos could follow.
A second, more plausible scenario is “Wounded Giant.” Here, Putin uses his control of the security services to hang onto power and repress whatever popular discontent isolation produces. He exploits the black-market opportunities that sanctions inevitably create to compensate loyal cronies. Russia becomes more dependent on China as it seeks economic and technological alternatives to the West.
What changes is not so much Russian policies but Russian power: The cost of slogging ahead is continued attrition of the economy, retarded technological modernization and a long-term weakening of Moscow’s military potential. This scenario isn’t great for the Western and Pacific democracies, but it isn’t terrible, either: Against a more sluggish, stagnating Russia, the U.S. could fare well enough in a protracted rivalry.
There is a third, darker scenario: “Tehran on the Volga.” Here, isolation and radicalization go hand in hand. Educated, upwardly mobile Russians leave the country, ridding the regime of its most outspoken liberal critics. Hard-liners embrace a “resistance economy” premised on self-sufficiency and avoiding the contaminating influence of the West. Aggressive internal purges, relentless propaganda and the fanning of militant nationalism produce a Russian variant of fascism. When Putin eventually falls, he is replaced by an equally repressive, ambitious and xenophobic leader.
Russia thus becomes a superpowered Iran with nuclear weapons — a country that is permanently estranged from the world and compensates for weakness with heightened belligerency. Far from retreating in its confrontation with the West, this Russia might dial up the intensity of that struggle — pursuing wide-ranging programs of sabotage in Europe or more aggressively training its cyberweapons on targets in the U.S. and other democratic countries.
The eventual reality could diverge from any of these scenarios, of course. But the exercise illustrates two important points.
First, Washington needs to start thinking seriously about Russia’s long-term trajectory. In 1989, the administration of President George H.W. Bush quietly created a planning group to consider what might happen amid earthshaking changes in the Soviet Union. Regardless of what happens in this crisis, Russia is big and powerful enough that its trajectory will be vital to the overall health of the international order — which means that the U.S. needs to be ready for whatever direction the country takes.
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Second, be careful what you wish for. The U.S. and its allies are rightly using devastating sanctions, along with tenacious Ukrainian resistance, to impose heavy costs on a Russian regime that has flagrantly violated the most basic norms of international behavior. Appeasement and military intervention are the only obvious, and abhorrent, alternatives to this policy. But we have only begun to consider what its long-term consequences might be.
Even in the best-case scenario, the U.S. would confront enormous challenges helping a liberalizing Russia emerge from authoritarian rule. More plausibly, Washington could face a recalcitrant, perhaps even a further radicalized, Russia instead. The war in Ukraine will eventually end, but America’s problems with Russia may only be getting started.
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11. Instead of consumer software, Ukraine’s tech workers build apps of war
Of course it is by necessity, but Ukraine is exemplifying the whole of society approach.
As an aside I hope our cyber people as well futures people, concept developers, and intelligence analysts are studying this phenomena both to learn what we can use effectively in the future as well as to learn what our future adversaries may do as they adapt during conflict.
Social media and apps: The new face of war?
Excerpts:
Now, they build apps of war — an unprecedented digital infrastructure designed for both front-line combat and the realities of life under siege.
There are glossy online tools for rallying anti-Kremlin protests and documenting war crimes. There are apps for coordinating supply deliveries, finding evacuation routes and contributing to cyberattacks against Russian military websites.
There’s even an app people can use to report the movements of Russian troops, sending location-tagged videos directly to Ukrainian intelligence. The country’s minister of digital transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, told The Washington Post they’re getting tens of thousands of reports a day.
Ukrainians have skillfully used social media to neutralize propaganda in Russia, rally spirits at home and mobilize antiwar sentiment around the world.
Instead of consumer software, Ukraine’s tech workers build apps of war
Valentine Hrytsenko, the marketing chief of a Ukrainian security-system company, was fleeing Kyiv with his 1-month-old in the first hours of the war when he got the Facebook message: What did his company’s coders know about air-raid sirens?
The head of a Ukrainian app developer, Stepan Tanasiychuk, had friends who’d struggled to hear the haunting alarms triggered by civil-defense workers anytime the military radioed in missile strikes. The Cold War relics weren’t audible in bomb shelters or outside cities — a critical flaw for Ukrainians desperate to evade surprise attacks.
But Hrytsenko’s company, Ajax Systems, had for years built apps that could alert a person’s smartphone even in sleep or silent mode. Tanasiychuk knew it, because he owned one of their home-security systems himself.
Working from homes and shelters, a hastily assembled team of programmers from both companies built the siren app “Air Alert” in a single sleepless day. And every day since, they have rolled out updates to what has become the most downloaded app in all of Ukraine. More than 4 million people use it today.
“Yesterday, some soldiers … told us this app had saved their lives,” Hrytsenko said. “We feel very proud … to help the country to fight.”
In peacetime, the programmers of Ukraine’s tech scene crafted the consumer software that powered homegrown start-ups and some of Silicon Valley’s biggest names.
Now, they build apps of war — an unprecedented digital infrastructure designed for both front-line combat and the realities of life under siege.
There are glossy online tools for rallying anti-Kremlin protests and documenting war crimes. There are apps for coordinating supply deliveries, finding evacuation routes and contributing to cyberattacks against Russian military websites.
There’s even an app people can use to report the movements of Russian troops, sending location-tagged videos directly to Ukrainian intelligence. The country’s minister of digital transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, told The Washington Post they’re getting tens of thousands of reports a day.
Ukrainians have skillfully used social media to neutralize propaganda in Russia, rally spirits at home and mobilize antiwar sentiment around the world.
But the apps show how the invaded country has weaponized the Internet’s power in a subtler way, expanding the reach of strained civilian resources and crowdsourcing the nation’s urban defense.
The displaced Ukrainians who built the apps said they’re realistic about the impact they’ll have in a devastating war. But they said they are pouring their lives into the tools on the chance they could help stop the carnage, working even as they stock up on body armor, uproot their families and dig in for the battles ahead.
The developers say Ukraine was primed for this kind of resistance. Boosted by project-outsourcing budgets from the West, the country’s tech sector has become a digital juggernaut, with thousands working for homegrown start-ups and American tech giants including Google, Oracle, Snap and Amazon’s Ring.
Many of the software designers, engineers and hackers who called Ukraine home have seen their traditional work disrupted and been thrown into lives of uncertainty, fear and national pride. Nearly all of them still have functioning Internet.
In Russia, independent media has been squashed, dissenting voices arrested and the nation’s Internet clogged with propaganda and conspiracy theories about a war the Kremlin won’t let people call a war.
Its leader, the 31-year-old Fedorov, had previously launched an online marketing agency that ran Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s winning “e-Zelensky” election campaign. Since the war began, Fedorov has used his visibly brash social media persona to pressure tech companies in the West to defy the Russian state.
The app has become a lifeline — and a popular one, ranking within the top three most downloaded apps in Ukraine all month, data from the analytics firm Sensor Tower show.
But some of its most prominent features are unmistakably militaristic. The app’s developers have started allowing ordinary Ukrainians to submit location-tagged photos and videos of Russian military sightings — as well as tips on “suspicious” people who might be invaders or saboteurs. The data, Fedorov told The Post in an interview, are aggregated onto a map visible to Ukrainian intelligence officials working on defense and counterstrikes.
Ministry officials have also begun pushing the app’s capabilities into controversial frontiers. Fedorov said on social media this week that his team, which once used facial recognition scans to verify Ukrainians’ identities for government services, has started adapting the face-scanning technology to identify the faces of dead Russian soldiers.
A ministry official told The Post last week that the project is “in very early development” and would likely rely on software offered by the facial recognition firm Clearview AI, which has been criticized by international governments for fueling its database with billions of people’s face photos taken from social media and other websites.
Ukrainian officials say the technology would help refute the Kremlin’s claims that only a small number of soldiers have been killed during what it has called a limited military operation. Fedorov told Reuters that Ukrainian authorities had already used the dead soldiers’ identifications to contact their relatives back in Russia. Those claims could not be independently confirmed.
Officials in Fedorov’s agency are also working on systems to mass-dial Russian phone numbers to share the grisly truth about the war in hopes of spurring antiwar dissent. “We have all changed. We started doing things we couldn’t even imagine a month ago,” Fedorov said in a roughly translated Instagram post Wednesday. “Thank you to everyone for the fight.”
For people wanting to report Russian military locations and behaviors without the Diia app, they can send information to eVorog, a ministry chatbot on the messaging service Telegram. After verifying that the sender is not Russian, the chatbot asks for the exact location of the military “equipment or occupiers” alongside a photo or video of the scene. That information, the ministry said, is then sent to the Ukrainian military to “quickly repel the enemy.”
Ukraine’s Security Service, its top law-enforcement agency, runs a separate Telegram bot, @stop_russian_war_bot, that allows people to submit sightings of “suspicious” people or vehicles. Images promoting the tool on Facebook, Instagram and Telegram show a Russian tank in the crosshairs, a QR code for easy downloading and a question in Ukrainian: “Did you see the enemy?”
Many other Ukrainian agencies have rolled out their own online tools. The country’s Office of the Attorney General has created a website for reporting war crimes that allows anyone to submit photos, videos and geolocation data for further investigation of a long list of potential horrors.
The office uses the data and other reports to offer daily estimates of possible war crimes. A checkbox on the reporting site lists “torture (beatings, rape, mutilation),” “murders, injuries to medical personnel” and “use by the occupier of civilian clothes.”
The Ukrainian Information Ministry’s Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security has used Google forms to organize antiwar protests in 18 cities around the world, with questions like “How many people could you theoretically bring to a rally?”
And Ukraine’s International Legion of Territorial Defense, a foreign legion founded last month to recruit volunteer fighters from around the world, created a glossy website with tips for traveling to the battlefield: “It is recommended, if available, to bring your military kit … [including] helmet [and] body armor.”
An interactive map on the site allows visitors to see how many volunteers traveled from each country. Russia, in red, is shown as “negative 14,000” — Ukraine’s unconfirmed assessment of the number of Russian soldiers killed in action.
Official government accounts have shared such numbers constantly on social media. On Instagram, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs posts daily tallies of what the Russian military has lost, including 1,578 armored vehicles, 517 tanks and 42 military drones.
The country has also used Telegram to give directions to hundreds of thousands of “IT Army” volunteers on which Russian websites to overload. Ukrainian fighters have also used social apps to exact more direct punishment; a Wall Street Journal journalist said Ukrainian soldiers and Territorial Defense volunteers have used the messaging app Viber to direct artillery fire at Russian troops.
Beyond the government-led efforts, Ukrainian tech companies have unveiled a number of their own wartime tools. There’s Prykhystok, a site for coordinating room-sharing arrangements to house Ukrainian refugees escaping active war zones.
There’s an evacuation site from the nonprofit UkraineNow that connects volunteer drivers with people looking to hitch a ride. Another site, Pomich, made by the Ukrainian freight-tech start-up Cargofy, helps link up truck owners with people seeking to move food and humanitarian supplies.
There’s a wartime job board for online-work requests: Web developers, graphic designers, language translators and online anti-propaganda volunteers. And then there are apps like Play for Ukraine, an online puzzle game that, in the background, uses the player’s Internet connection to blast thousands of online requests at Russian websites in hopes of helping take them down.
Most of the efforts are untested, and each carries its own risks in a war zone where thousands have already been killed. One refugee-housing site, for instance, faced criticism that a lack of security checks for hosts could mean people might end up staying somewhere dangerous. (The site has since relaunched with a more aggressive process for verifying hosts’ identities.)
But the Russian invasion has clearly given Ukrainian tech workers a new calling, and several said they were emboldened by the idea that they were building tools for the public good.
Tanasiychuk, founder of the development firm Stfalcon that helped with Air Alert, had previously led a team doing outsourced app projects for Western companies looking to plan bus routes and sell concert tickets. The closest they’d come to the military action was a cheeky smartphone game released shortly after Russia invaded Crimea, Last Outpost, centered on a soldier defending his homeland against waves of invaders in Russian hats.
Developing and updating Air Alert, he said, often felt like a chaotic jumble of late-night calls and Telegram chats. To get it to work, the private-industry coders had to work with federal authorities and local units for emergency services and civil defense. They also had to design a digital system so the operators of the old-school analog sirens could easily ping millions of phones; now, when a possible airstrike is reported, they hit two buttons instead of one.
The coders weren’t sure how it’d be received, writing in an announcement: “The app was developed in an emergency during one day, so there may be some minor problems.” But within a day of its debut on the app stores, it was downloaded more than 100,000 times. Google has since made the alert notifications available for all users in Ukraine.
The air-raid warnings have become a powerful symbol of a nation on edge: In one of his daily video reports this week posted to Telegram, President Zelensky held up his phone while a siren played, saying, “We hear this for hours, days, weeks.”
But the app’s developers also feel it is a symbol of what a driven team can accomplish. Even as they scramble to keep their day jobs running, they have continued to roll out free, once-a-day updates fixing bugs and adding new monitored regions. Upcoming versions will include new types of alarms for shelling, street fighting and chemical-weapons attacks.
“It’s the best thing me and my team did in our lives,” Tanasiychuk said. “Each team member, they worked also for their parents, their neighbors, their relatives. They were worried for them … and if you have this feeling, you can break mountains.”
Cat Zakrzewski and Rachel Lerman contributed to this report.
12. Why the U.S. Was Wrong About Ukraine and the Afghan War
I wonder how many assessments from actual soldier and operating on the ground working with indigenous forces are included in intelligence assessments.
I will bet there are a multitude of operators who got it right and knew how long the Afghans would hold out and how well the Ukrainians would fight. Did anyone ask them.
I will never forget when we were developing the revised SORO case book on revolutionary and insurgent warfare and Paul Tompkins (the project lead and visionary for ARIS) convened a conference out at Camp MacKall. He brought together all the authors and researchers (PhDs) of the studies as well as operators, mostly Special Forces NCOs and warrant officers, as well as CIvil Affairs and PSYOP personnel. One of the PhDs briefed his study on Afghanistan. When he was done an SF Master Sergeant politely said he had some different information and views about one of the tribal areas and he clearly articulated the difference and provided some very insightful information. The author asked how he knew this and what were his research sources. He said he knew this from serving in the area on multiple tours and getting to know the tribal leadership on a personal basis. The author and researchers were taking notes and trying to soak up this primary source information. They were in awe of his knowledge.
If our intelligence analysts are not getting information from these kinds of "primary sources" we are missing the boat.
Why the U.S. Was Wrong About Ukraine and the Afghan War
U.S. intelligence agencies thought the Afghan military would last longer and predicted Kyiv would fall faster, showing the difficulty of assessing fighting spirit.
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A class teaching civilians combat skills this month in Lutsk, Ukraine.Credit...Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times
By
March 24, 2022
Ukrainian citizens learned to make Molotov cocktails from government public service announcements, then recorded themselves setting Russian armored vehicles on fire. Ukraine’s soldiers waited in ambush and fired Western-provided missiles at Russian tanks. The country’s president recorded messages from the streets of his capital, urging his country to fight back against the invaders.
It was a stark contrast from a different set of images, just seven months ago, when the Taliban rolled into Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul, unopposed. Most Afghan troops abandoned their uniforms and weapons. The president fled to the United Arab Emirates, leaving his country to the Taliban militants it had fought for some two decades.
The intelligence community and American military appear to have misjudged both countries’ will to fight, according to lawmakers. In Afghanistan, intelligence agencies had predicted the government and its forces could hold on for at least six months after the U.S. withdrawal. In Ukraine, intelligence officials thought the Russian army would take Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, in two days. Both estimates proved wrong.
Assessing how well and how fiercely a military, and a nation, will defend itself is extraordinarily difficult. There are many factors to consider, including its leadership, the supplies at its disposal, the strength of the enemy and whether an opposing force is seen as an invader.
The miscalculations demonstrate that even in an age of electronic intercepts and analysis assisted by vast data collection, human relationships still matter in accurately assessing the morale of a country or military. Former intelligence officials say that is why it is critically important that the perspectives of people working directly with partner forces reach policymakers in Washington.
Had the U.S. view of Afghanistan been more realistic, efforts to evacuate Afghans who had assisted the American war effort could have begun earlier — or perhaps some of the billions of dollars put toward training Kabul’s military could have been spent in other ways.
With Ukraine, according to lawmakers on both sides of the aisle, if the United States had had a better sense of how strong and effective the Ukrainian resistance would be against a Russian invasion, it might have sent more weapons to the country sooner.
Ukrainian fighters with the Territorial Defense Forces being trained in first aid this month in Kyiv.Credit...Lynsey Addario for The New York Times
“Assessing the will to fight in advance of a conflict like this is difficult. However the lesson of the last year is we have to figure out how to do that,” said Senator Angus King, a Maine independent and a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. “If we had known in advance how strong the Ukrainians would be and how weak the Russians would be, we might have been able to preposition more equipment and had aid to the Ukrainians flow in faster, based on the assumption they had a real chance.”
How badly the intelligence agencies got it wrong is subject to debate. Ahead of the invasion, Ukraine experts “clearly and repeatedly” told policymakers in the White House and Congress that Ukraine’s government and people “probably would resist a Russian invasion,” a U.S. official said.
But intelligence reports are usually hedged. And under questioning from Senator Tom Cotton, Republican of Arkansas, Lt. Gen. Scott D. Berrier, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said this month that, before the invasion, he had thought the Ukrainians were not as ready for an attack as they needed to be.
“Therefore, I questioned their will to fight. That was a bad assessment on my part because they have fought bravely and honorably,” General Berrier said.
In an interview, Mr. Cotton said the intelligence agencies were at their best assessing Russia in the lead-up to the invasion. Once the invasion began, the assessments of Ukraine’s capabilities and Russia’s military were “less than stellar.” Still, he said, judging how effective a country’s defenses will be ahead of a potential attack is tricky.
“Will to fight is not a discrete area of intelligence you can go out and collect on it,” Mr. Cotton said. “It’s not like how many working fighters did an air force have? There’s a lot of subjectivity.”
Recent counteroffensives by the Ukrainian military suggest that the country’s leaders are resolved to do more than simply defend Ukraine against the Russian invasion. Over the last week, Ukrainian forces have used tanks and fighter jets to attack Russian positions outside Kyiv and other cities in a way that demonstrates that their objective is not to take back territory, but to destroy Russian forces. It is a sign of not only savvy strategy but a clear intent by Ukraine to defeat the Russian military and win the war.
Representative Adam B. Schiff, Democrat of California and the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said it was easy to overstate what the intelligence community got wrong, both in Ukraine and Afghanistan. Last summer, intelligence agencies repeatedly warned that the Afghan government would collapse and that military leaders were surrendering to the Taliban, Mr. Schiff said.
Mr. Schiff said that he had asked during intelligence briefings if Ukraine would fight a Russian invasion and was told by officials that, yes, they would, but that it was difficult to know what that would mean in concrete terms.
“If there was a blind spot, I think it was less in believing Ukrainians wouldn’t fight and more about believing the Russian military was more capable than they turned out to be,” Mr. Schiff said.
Russia believed that it would face little effective resistance from the Ukrainian military, and that it could quickly march to Kyiv, rather than having to engage in a slow grinding war, according to U.S. intelligence agencies.
That misjudgment was amplified by the Russian military’s struggle with complex maneuver warfare, supply problems, broken-down vehicles and lack of secure communications, former U.S. intelligence officials said.
Workers weld hedgehog barriers, which serve as anti-tank obstacles, this month in a factory in Odessa, Ukraine.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
“No one doubted the will of the Ukrainians, but given the small size of their army, analysts assessed there were limits to their capability to fight a war on a modern battlefield,” said Douglas H. Wise, a retired senior C.I.A. officer and a former deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. “With the scale of the Russian military dwarfing Ukraine’s much smaller size, analysts ran the numbers and assessed they would not prevail.”
Intelligence officials also had no way of predicting the leadership abilities of Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, which have proven key in rallying the country to the fight. One reason for the misjudgment was that the Ukrainian government, including Mr. Zelensky, was initially skeptical of American intelligence that Russia was going to invade.
Two weeks before the invasion, Mr. King asked intelligence officials how Mr. Zelensky would handle the attack. Mr. King had argued that had President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan not fled in the face of an advancing enemy force, Kabul might have lasted longer, and he wanted to know what Mr. Zelensky would do.
“Will he be Churchill or Ghani?” Mr. King asked.
The officials replied that Mr. Zelensky had publicly played down the likelihood of an invasion, but they simply did not know how he would respond.
Russia-Ukraine War: Key Developments
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“But boy, when the chips were down,” Mr. King said in an interview this week, “he channeled his inner Churchill.”
The United States has a bad track record of assessing its partner forces stretching back to Vietnam, when U.S. officials thought the South Vietnamese army would be able to hold off the north after the American withdrawal. Indeed, the more the United States has invested in training partner forces, the less cleareyed officials have been on their prowess.
In Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, American officials believed the units they had trained would fight longer and harder than they did. It is nearly impossible to make an objective analysis of the fighting spirit of a partner force in those situations, former intelligence officers said.
“To get the data you have to become close to your partner and the minute you do that, lack of bias goes out the window,” Mr. Wise said.
Other former intelligence officials argue it is often the officers who train and work with partner forces who can accurately assess the will to fight. But that information is sometimes overlooked as it is passed up to analysts in Washington, said Marc E. Polymeropoulos, a former senior C.I.A. official who oversaw operations in Europe and the Middle East and served several times in Afghanistan.
“If you ask operations officers about will to fight, they will tell you the truth based on their being on the ground with a partner,” he said. “I think any operations officer would have told you that the Afghan regular army did not have that will to fight on their own, if we left, and consistently would have said that over and over again.”
Whether the United States is prepared to handle such assessments better in the future is unclear. It is already confronted with a similar issue as it tries to help Taiwan deter a possible attack from China.
Residents and volunteers cleaning up debris and repairing windows on Wednesday after a strike in Kyiv.Credit...Ivor Prickett for The New York Times
“The question is whether the Taiwanese would exhibit the same fighting spirit as the Ukrainians,” said Rep. Mike Gallagher, Republican of Wisconsin and a member of the House Intelligence Committee. “The answer matters. Because if we suspect not, then we need to be moving more aggressively to help the Taiwan military reform and fix their reservists, the infrastructure and make them a more lethal and more difficult target before it’s too late.”
Intelligence officials believe the Russian war in Ukraine is failing. But they think President Vladimir V. Putin will adjust his tactics, doubling down on the hard-line attacks he has employed in recent weeks or looking to escalate the situation in a bid to force the West to end its support for Ukraine.
The idea that Ukraine is certain to lose may no longer be universally accepted, but some lawmakers think the Biden administration is still underestimating the Ukrainian military.
“Zelensky’s endgame may be victory, it may be getting Russian troops off his soil,” Mr. Cotton said. “Even if you didn’t think that a month ago, you have to concede it is certainly a possibility now.”
13. A circular firing squad is forming in the Kremlin, with everyone pointing their guns at each other:
In addition to the vaunted "tiger team" planning for Putin's use of nuclear weapons, I hope they or another tiger team is planning for when Putin falls. Are we ready for when that happens? That work will overlap with the nuclear tiger team because the period when Putin believes he is significantly threatened and when he actually falls will likely be the most dangerous time.
A circular firing squad is forming in the Kremlin, with everyone pointing their guns at each other: Vladimir Putin's regime looks under serious threat for the first time since he came to power, writes Professor MARK GALEOTTI
- Western counter-intelligence campaigns are being aimed at the secretive FSB
- In Russia, anyone can be denounced as a warmonger or a traitor, or even both
- Putin has been picking off key figures in the secret police, the FSB, and politicians in a bid to retain his hold on power as the war continues
PUBLISHED: 18:03 EDT, 24 March 2022 | UPDATED: 19:43 EDT, 24 March 2022
Daily Mail · by Professor Mark Galeotti, Putin's Biographer, For The Daily Mail · March 24, 2022
When the demonic despot Joseph Stalin suffered a severe stroke at his country estate outside Moscow in March 1953, his four closest cronies rushed to the scene.
None of them, all candidates to succeed the dictator as leader of the Soviet Union, wanted to see Stalin live. But all were afraid of what might happen if he died.
Eventually, the secret police chief Lavrentiy Beria spoke up: ‘Why are you in such a panic? Can’t you see, Comrade Stalin is sleeping soundly. Don’t disturb him!’
No doctor was summoned for hours. Stalin kept sinking and died a few days later.
With a similar miasma of indecision gripping Vladimir Putin’s inner circle today, his regime looks under serious threat for the first time since he came to power in 2000.
Mikhail Mizintsev, Director of the Russian National Defence Management Centre, left, Russia's Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, right, and President Vladimir Putin view an exhibition of military technology ahead of an extended meeting of the Russian Defence Ministry Board in the National Defence Management Centre in Moscow
The war in Ukraine has turned into a disaster and everyone is looking for other people to blame. Anyone can be denounced as a warmonger or a traitor, or even both.
Naturally, the seething atmosphere of mistrust is being stoked by intelligence services both in Ukraine and the West.
The counter-intelligence campaigns are aimed in particular at the FSB, the successor to the KGB, which is the keystone of Putin’s government.
Senior FSB officers are ruthless, highly competent opportunists. They do not support the war out of patriotic mania, or because they subscribe to Putin’s bare-chested cult of personality.
Anatoly Bolyukh, deputy head of the 5th Service of the Federal Security Service, head of the operational information department
Like the rest of Putin’s henchmen, they are motivated by greed and their aim is personal power.
They want to make lots of money and spend it on properties in London and the Med, or on sending their children to Western schools.
Currently, sanctions make that very difficult. As a result, they are getting worried – nobody in the FSB wants Russia to become the European equivalent of North Korea.
But I do not believe there’s an FSB coup brewing, at least not yet. Russians know their own history and they understand that regime change only happens when the secret police, the military and the politicians all act together – as they did in 1991 when president Mikhail Gorbachev was overthrown.
But Putin has been picking off key figures in all three of these poles of power. First to hear the knock on the door was Colonel General Sergey Beseda, head of the foreign intelligence branch of the FSB, who was arrested two weeks ago, along with his deputy Anatoly Bolyukh, on suspicion of embezzling money from the slush fund meant for bribing foreign officials.
Sergey Orestovich Beseda, 68, a Russian politician and government agent who is the head of the 5th Service of the Federal Security Service, since 2009, and is a Colonel General
But his real crime might have been to encourage Putin’s belief that Ukrainians were eager for regime change and the Russian invaders would be welcomed by flag-waving crowds bearing bouquets of flowers.
Next for the chop was Roman Gavrilov, the deputy head of the National Guard, who stands accused of leaking classified information to the West and ‘squandering fuel’.
The truth is Putin is furious because many young soldiers in the National Guard, a paramilitary force whose peacetime role was to quell protests in Russian cities, are protesting themselves. In Ukraine, they feel they are being treated as cannon fodder.
Gavrilov’s arrest allegedly brings the total number of generals sidelined over the bungled invasion to nine. Politicians have not been spared either, with two of Putin’s closest associates joining the missing list.
Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu has not been seen in public for more than 12 days amid rumours of ‘heart problems’.
Many suspect this is a diplomatic ruse and that the truth is that Shoigu has fallen foul of Putin’s rampant paranoia after his youngest daughter Ksenia, 31, posted a photo on social media, posing with her baby in the blue and yellow of the Ukrainian flag.
Then there is Anatoly Chubais, widely seen as the man who talent-spotted Putin in the 1990s and launched his political career.
Anatoly Chubais, special representative of Russian President for relations with international organizations to achieve sustainable development goals, attends a session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum
Chubais was rewarded with a series of lucrative sinecures… but on Wednesday he enraged his protege by resigning in protest at the war and fleeing to Turkey.
Never since the collapse of the Soviet Union has there been such fervid rumour and counter-rumour in the Kremlin. A circular firing squad is forming, with everyone pointing their guns at each other.
And when conscripts start returning from the Ukraine front, bringing with them horror stories of the war, the political temperature will only rise.
Right now, most ordinary people in Russia believe the state TV version, that a successful military operation is underway to oust a neo-Nazi cabal in Kyiv and prevent ethnic cleansing or even nuclear genocide against Russians in Ukraine.
When that lie is exposed, the people might start to turn against the man at the top. How his cronies respond to that will determine Putin’s fate.
Mark Galeotti is honorary professor at the University College London School of Slavonic and East European Studies and author of We Need To Talk About Putin
Daily Mail · by Professor Mark Galeotti, Putin's Biographer, For The Daily Mail · March 24, 2022
14. Russia 'is planning false flag attacks on its own cities - blamed on Ukraine
Looking for justification for future atrocities.
Russia 'is planning false flag attacks on its own cities - blamed on Ukraine - which could kill thousands of civilians in bid to justify general mobilisation of troops', exiled politician warns
- Russian politician Ilya Ponomarev claimed the attacks on Russian cities will be blamed on Ukrainian saboteurs
- He warned of terrorist-style attacks being orchestrated by FSB security service
- Ponomarev said plot to blame Kiev for attacks was leaked by security source
PUBLISHED: 06:03 EDT, 24 March 2022 | UPDATED: 06:09 EDT, 24 March 2022
Daily Mail · by Will Stewart for MailOnline · March 24, 2022
Russia is believed to be plotting a wave of attacks on its own cities in a false flag operation led by the FSB that it will blame on Ukraine to justify a general mobilisation of troops, an exiled Russian politician has warned.
Ilya Ponomarev, 46, claimed the Russian security service is preparing to target chemical plants in Russia in attacks that will see thousands of civilians die.
The terrorist-style operations will be blamed on Ukrainian saboteurs, claimed Ponomarev, who eight years go was the only Russian politician to vote against Vladimir Putin's annexation of Crimea.
Ponomarev said the plot, which had been leaked by a security source, will be used to justify a general mobilisation in order to compensate for crippling losses for the Russian troops during their barbaric invasion of Ukraine.
A senior NATO military officer yesterday said the alliance estimates that Russia has suffered between 30,000 and 40,000 battlefield casualties in Ukraine through the first month of the war, including between 7,000 and 15,000 killed.
Ilya Ponomarev, 46, claimed the Russian security service is preparing to target chemical plants in Russia in attacks that will see hundreds of civilians die
The politician claimed the FSB is planning to target chemical and oil plants in the false-flag attacks, with the Voskresensk Mineral Fertilisers chemical plant (pictured) - Europe's largest producer of phosphate-based fertilisers - among the priority targets
Despite mobilising a force of between 150,000 and 200,000 Russian troops, Moscow failed to anticipate anything other than weak resistance by the Ukrainian forces - likely owing to Russian intelligence failures.
'After the failure of the blitzkrieg in Ukraine, Moscow faced the problem of an acute shortage of personnel to compensate for the losses incurred,' Ponomarev said.
'At the same time, the state leadership has repeatedly insisted that a general mobilisation will not be introduced.
'In order to play back on this issue, a very weighty pretext is needed: the deaths of thousands of civilians, which can be blamed on Ukraine.'
It was an echo of the alleged bombing of Russian homes apartment blocks in 1999 triggering the Second Chechen War, and also ushering Putin into the Kremlin.
The politician claimed the FSB is planning to target chemical and oil plants in the false-flag attacks, with the Voskresensk Mineral Fertilisers chemical plant - Europe's largest producer of phosphate-based fertilisers - and the Moscow oil refinery in Kapotnya among the priority targets.
Despite mobilising a force of between 150,000 and 200,000 Russian troops, Moscow failed to anticipate anything other than weak resistance by the Ukrainian forces - likely owing to Russian intelligence failures. Pictured: A charred Russian tank on the front line in the Kyiv region on March 20
Ponomarev said: 'A source close to the Russian law enforcement agencies told Utra February [Russian anti-war group] that the Federal Security Service [FSB] is preparing an explosion at a chemical or oil refinery near Moscow or another large Russian city in such a way that the wind carries toxic substances to residential areas.
'As a result, hundreds, and possibly thousands of people should die.
'It is planned to blame Ukrainian saboteurs for this.'
He claimed: 'More than 20 enterprises are considered as sabotage [targets], but the Voskresensk Mineral Fertilisers chemical plant and Moscow oil refinery in Kapotnya are the priority ones.
'Explosions at these enterprises, which are located in residential areas, could lead to numerous casualties.
'In addition, both of these sites are located southeast of the centre of the Russian capital, and with a southeast wind, a poisonous cloud could cover the entire city.'
FSB is planning to target chemical and oil plants in the false-flag attacks, with the Moscow oil refinery in Kapotnya believed to be among the targets
He warned: 'Explosions are also possible in public places, in particular, in the underground train network.
'Various options are in the works, and Muscovites will not necessarily be the victims of the planned terrorist attack.
Pomomarev said: 'If you live in a large Russian city or near potentially dangerous sites, and you have the opportunity to leave, for example, to a village, we strongly recommend that you do just that.
'We also do not recommend using the metro during rush hours or visiting crowded places.
'Remember, Putin and his entourage will do anything to stay in power.'
The ex-MP left Russia for exile in Ukraine after his solo vote against the annexation of Crimea in the Russian parliament, an act which won widespread admiration in the West.
A technology entrepreneur, he remains in exile, and is a campaigner against the war in Ukraine.
His mother was an assistant to Roman Abramovich when he was an MP.
He was a former vice-president of Yukos oil company.
Daily Mail · by Will Stewart for MailOnline · March 24, 2022
15. Prepare for covert war in Ukraine
Prepare for covert war in Ukraine
If the West isn't willing to watch Vladimir Putin win in Ukraine but is also not willing to intervene directly to stop him, then it will likely need to devise extensive clandestine means to supply a nationwide insurgency.
So far, the West has had it easy.
With little planning or concern about Russian attacks, the Europeans and Americans have moved a lot of weaponry over the borders. The Russian advance has been ill-planned, poorly executed, and costly in materiel, soldiers, and surrounding civilian populations. Put another way, it has been more or less a typical Russian military campaign. Putin’s army may soon unravel. Its logistical lameness and ineptitude with combined-arms action have been stunning even for those who suspected that Moscow’s revamped, "professional" military wasn’t even close to U.S. standards. But Russian commanders will learn from their mistakes.
With heavy artillery and missiles clearing the way, they may grind forward. Russia’s formidable helicopter gunships, which almost neutralized the Afghan resistance, could become decisive quickly if the Ukrainians lack the means to shoot them down. The Russians could leave Kyiv surrounded and attack western Ukraine in massed numbers. In a long war, the delivery of military supplies and humanitarian aid could become vastly more difficult. A sensible American strategist would assume the worst-case scenario.
Are the CIA and the Pentagon ready for an unrelenting Russian advance?
Beyond the enormous covert task that would be required, the U.S. would need to position forces at the Polish and Romanian borders, the key staging grounds for clandestine routes, in case Russian planes, cruise missiles, or drones cross the border. On occasion, the Red Army blew up depots in Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan war. U.S. forces will be essential to convince Putin that any attack on the Poles or Romanians will be treated as an attack on Americans — the sine qua non for effective deterrence. It’s been a while since the CIA undertook such a massive "covert" effort.
During the Soviet-Afghan war, most of the heavy lifting was done by the Pakistani army and the Afghan Mujahideen. A similar situation would happen with Ukraine, where the Ukrainian army or insurgents, if the army’s command structure collapses, would have to do the most dangerous work getting arms and humanitarian aid where it’s needed. The serious difficulties the Ukrainian forces have had in receiving targeting intelligence from the West will surely get worse if the Russians slowly crush larger units of the Ukrainian army. Ukrainian insurgents may well need lots of secure, high-speed devices that can communicate with Western intelligence services. Devices that aren’t compromising when they fall into Russian hands. We might also discover that Ukrainian units could operate more lethally and efficiently if they had European or American paramilitary intelligence officers embedded with them. Their capture is highly unlikely to provoke a wider war; are we prepared to deploy them if the Russians envelop most of the country?
If most of Ukraine is in rubble, if millions more have fled west, what happens then? The pressure in the West will surely grow on both the Left and Right for concessions to Putin. The French and the Germans, who have complicated and conflicted histories with Moscow, will likely be the first Europeans to pressure Kyiv to give up more ground to permanent Russian control as a means to stop the war. It will take resolve in the West to withstand the humanitarian ceasefire appeals, made by well-meaning Westerners and Russian propaganda, to ensure that Putin sustains a mortal battlefield defeat. It’s one thing to realize that no more "resets" are possible with this dictator; it’s another to realize that the only Western objective should be his fall.
A wounded Putin will undoubtedly seek revenge. As important, Xi Jinping needs to see that adventurism can topple autocracy. The Chinese overlord so far hasn’t broken significantly with Moscow. The cost to the U.S. for supporting Ukraine will be peanuts compared to what would happen if Xi made a move on Taiwan. If we don’t have the courage to support the Ukrainians, who are the ones dying, and our democratic European allies, to whom we are intimately intertwined, we won’t defend a much more distant Taiwan.
There never has been a plausible pivot to Asia. The two-war doctrine that dominated American thinking throughout the Cold War realistically assessed the threats in both Europe and the Far East. That assessment is no less true today: Fascist China is vastly more powerful and potentially aggressive than its communist predecessor; Putin’s revanchism has led to major war in Europe.
To avoid even worse, the White House should tell the CIA to start mapping out every conceivable way to bring lethal aid to Ukrainians, wherever they are fighting.
Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former case officer in the CIA, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
16. Deter Russia’s Use of Chemical Weapons in Ukraine
We must remember the words of Sir Lawrence Freedman.: "Deterrence works, until it doesn't."
How many times has Putin used chemical weapons?
Excerpts:
How Biden handles Russia’s chemical threats will either deter Moscow and other adversaries from using these weapons or encourage it. The world must hold Russia accountable for its past use of chemical weapons, while deterring Putin from using these weapons again.
Deter Russia’s Use of Chemical Weapons in Ukraine
How Biden handles threats will dissuade Moscow and other adversaries from using these weapons—or encourage it.
President Joe Biden warned on Monday that Vladimir Putin “is considering using” chemical weapons in Ukraine, pointing to baseless Russian allegations that Ukraine has these banned weapons. Moscow, which has actually used such weapons in attempts to assassinate opponents of the Putin regime, spouted similar lies about the use of chemical weapons in Syria. As Russian forces suffer heavy losses and increasing resort to scorched-earth tactics to overcome staunch Ukrainian resistance, Putin may believe that chemical weapons attacks—blamed on Ukraine—could provide a military advantage or boost his war’s domestic legitimacy.
The Biden administration and its allies should take the long-overdue step of suspending Russia from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or OPCW, which is dedicated to eliminating chemical weapons. At the same time, the allies should strive to deter Putin by warning that Russia will pay a price on the battlefield if it uses chemical weapons.
In 2018, Russia’s military intelligence service used a debilitating nerve agent, Novichok, in the attempted murder of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in the United Kingdom. While the Skripals survived, a mother of three was killed. Moscow struck again in 2020, employing Novichok to poison Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, this time inside Russia. After both attacks, Washington and its allies levied economic sanctions against Russia, but they failed to convince Putin to abandon his chemical weapons program.
Recent Russian statements could presage a chemical weapons attack in Ukraine. Two weeks ago, for example, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused America and Ukraine of planning a chemical or biological weapons attack that they would design to look as though Moscow had perpetrated it. Russia’s Defense Ministry repeated that claim last week, alleging that Ukraine and the West are preparing to use “poisonous substances” against civilians and “accuse Russia of using chemical weapons.” Moscow’s propaganda machine has dutifully amplified these and other Russian allegations at home and abroad.
On March 10, Pentagon officials told reporters that the U.S. government has “picked up indications” Moscow may be planning a so-called “false-flag” attack against Ukrainians to raise “a potential pretext” for the use of chemical weapons in Ukraine. Russia could also try to use a false-flag attack to boost domestic approval of the war. Since February, Moscow has sought to justify its invasion and delegitimize the Ukrainian government through baseless accusations regarding Kyiv’s alleged intent to develop or use various weapons of mass destruction.
The State Department has countered Russia’s assertions by noting that while the United States is in compliance with the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, Moscow is not. Russia, Ukraine, and the United States have all signed the convention, which requires countries to eliminate any existing chemical weapons stockpiles and commit not to develop or possess such weapons in the future. Yet Moscow’s previous use of Novichok is proof that Russia has an undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in violation of the treaty.
Moscow’s allegations about Ukraine are straight out of its playbook in Syria, where the Russian military has supported the regime of dictator Bashar al-Assad since 2015. The United States estimates that the Assad regime, Russia’s longtime client, “has used chemical weapons at least 50 times since the Syrian conflict began.” Moscow has provided the regime with political cover, including at the OPCW and United Nations.
In 2018, for example, Russia baselessly accused the United Kingdom of pressuring Syria’s “White Helmets” aid group into staging a chlorine gas attack actually conducted by regime forces. Moscow has since repeatedly claimed, without providing evidence, that Syrian militants are planning false-flag chemical weapons attacks, although so far these warnings have not correlated with Russian or Assad regime use of chemical weapons.
Despite all this, Russia remains a member in good standing of the OPCW. This must change immediately. Washington and its allies should press for Russia’s suspension, just like they did with the Assad regime last April after Damascus refused to admit its continued possession and use of chemical weapons. That move had bipartisan support, as would Russia’s suspension. While primarily a political penalty, it would also prevent Moscow from continuing to manipulate OPCW votes to serve Russia’s and Syria’s narrow interests, and from using the organization as a platform to spread lies.
At the same time, Putin must be made to understand that “there’ll be severe consequences” if it uses chemical weapons in Ukraine, as Biden warned on Monday. While Biden probably will not order direct military retaliation, Washington and its allies should warn that Putin’s use of any weapon of mass destruction would force them to consider more aggressive military support for Ukraine, such as reviving plans to provide Polish MiG-29s to Ukraine or offering cruise missiles.
How Biden handles Russia’s chemical threats will either deter Moscow and other adversaries from using these weapons or encourage it. The world must hold Russia accountable for its past use of chemical weapons, while deterring Putin from using these weapons again.
Anthony Ruggiero was formerly senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense on the U.S. National Security Council.
Andrea Stricker is a research fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.
17. FDD | Tehran to Pocket Billions From Lower Import Costs if Sanctions Are Lifted
Excerpts:
If Washington lifts sanctions, the regime will benefit greatly in the short and long term. Iranian imports during the next Persian calendar year (April 2022 to March 2023) will likely total around $60 billion if U.S. sanctions are lifted. Using Shariatmadari’s 20 percent figure, the lower cost of imports would save the Islamic Republic $12 billion. That is in addition to the almost $131 billion in foreign assets to which Iran will gain access following U.S. sanctions relief, not to mention tens of billions of dollars in additional export revenue.
These funds will help Tehran mitigate domestic discontent, solidify geopolitical gains across the Middle East, and open new battle fronts in its quest to dominate the region. None of this would serve U.S. national interests.
FDD | Tehran to Pocket Billions From Lower Import Costs if Sanctions Are Lifted
fdd.org · by Saeed Ghasseminejad Senior Iran and Financial Economics Advisor · March 24, 2022
Washington and Tehran may soon strike an agreement to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In exchange for temporary nuclear concessions, the United States will lift sanctions against Iran, providing the Islamic Republic with significant economic benefits, including cheaper imports.
Western sanctions, along with oil price cycles, have driven fluctuations in Iranian imports over the last decade. Iran’s imports rose consistently from 2001 until 2011, when the Iranian economy came under significant pressure from international sanctions, contributing to a steep decline in Iranian imports. The interim nuclear agreement struck in late 2013 temporarily suspended some sanctions, leading to a small rise in Iranian imports. The JCPOA, which was negotiated in 2015 but took effect in January 2016, caused Iran’s imports to increase slightly that year despite low oil prices. Iranian imports then peaked in 2017 as the oil price increased.
In 2018, the Trump administration exited the nuclear deal and re-imposed sanctions on the Islamic Republic. Iran’s imports declined by 21 percent despite a 28 percent increase in the price of oil. In 2020, U.S. sanctions and the global recession triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic pushed Iranian imports down to their lowest nominal level since 2004. They bounced back the following year amid loose sanctions enforcement by the Biden administration, the global economic recovery, and rising inflation.
Note: Each year reflects import data from April of that year through March of the following year, corresponding with the Persian calendar. The import data for 2021 are based on the author’s estimate. The source of import data is Iran’s central bank. The source of oil price data is the online data aggregator Macrotrends.
Sanctions not only deprive the Islamic Republic of revenue with which to purchase imports, but also make those imports more expensive. This derives primarily from the increased transaction costs and perceived risk of doing business with Iran, and from the smaller pool of business counterparties willing to work with Iran.
In April 2021, Mohammad Shariatmadari, the regime’s labor minister, said sanctions had increased the cost of imports by 20 percent. Assuming that figure held constant for the Persian calendar year 1400 (April 2021 to March 2022), during which time the Islamic Republic imported an estimated $50.8 billion worth of goods and services, then sanctions cost the regime almost $10 billion that year. Assessments of the increased cost by other Iranian officials and media sources have varied widely, between 8 to 30 percent.
If Washington lifts sanctions, the regime will benefit greatly in the short and long term. Iranian imports during the next Persian calendar year (April 2022 to March 2023) will likely total around $60 billion if U.S. sanctions are lifted. Using Shariatmadari’s 20 percent figure, the lower cost of imports would save the Islamic Republic $12 billion. That is in addition to the almost $131 billion in foreign assets to which Iran will gain access following U.S. sanctions relief, not to mention tens of billions of dollars in additional export revenue.
These funds will help Tehran mitigate domestic discontent, solidify geopolitical gains across the Middle East, and open new battle fronts in its quest to dominate the region. None of this would serve U.S. national interests.
Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior advisor on Iran and financial economics at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’s Iran Program and Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP). For more analysis from Saeed, the Iran Program, and CEFP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Saeed on Twitter @SGhasseminejad. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_Iran and @FDD_CEFP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Saeed Ghasseminejad Senior Iran and Financial Economics Advisor · March 24, 2022
18. China and Solomon Islands Draft Secret Security Pact, Raising Alarm in the Pacific
Excerpts:
American officials have also become increasingly concerned. In interviews over the past few years, they have often cited the Solomons as a grave example of China’s approach throughout the Pacific, which involves cultivating decision makers to open the door for Chinese businesses, migration and access to strategic resources and locations — most likely, the Americans believe, for civilian and military uses, at sea, and for satellite communications.
Many Pacific islands, including Kiribati and Fiji, have seen a sharp increase in Chinese diplomats, construction deals and Chinese migration over the past five years. Disputes and tensions have been growing over Beijing’s role in a region that has often either been ignored or been seen as little more than dots on the map for great powers to toy with.
Last month, during a visit to Fiji that focused heavily on competition with China, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken announced that the United States would soon open an embassy in the Solomon Islands after closing one in the 1990s. It is still many months from being operational, and on Friday, American officials did not initially respond to requests for comment.
“They certainly can do more and faster,” Mr. Wale, the Solomons opposition leader, said. “They just seem to be dragging their feet.”
China and Solomon Islands Draft Secret Security Pact, Raising Alarm in the Pacific
The leaked agreement, if signed, could help the Chinese Navy block shipping routes that played a vital role in World War II.
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Li Keqiang, left, the Chinese premier, and Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare of the Solomon Islands reviewing an honor guard during a ceremony in Beijing in 2019.Credit...Mark Schiefelbein/Associated Press
By
Published March 24, 2022Updated March 25, 2022, 1:47 a.m. ET
SYDNEY, Australia — A leaked document has revealed that China and the Solomon Islands are close to signing a security agreement that could open the door to Chinese troops and naval warships flowing into a Pacific Island nation that played a pivotal role in World War II.
The agreement, kept secret until now, was shared online Thursday night by opponents of the deal and verified as legitimate by the Australian government. Though it is marked as a draft and cites a need for “social order” as a justification for sending Chinese forces, it has set off alarms throughout the Pacific, where concerns about China’s intentions have been growing for years.
“This is deeply problematic for the United States and a real cause of concern for our allies and partners,” Charles Edel, the inaugural Australia chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said on Friday.
“The establishment of a base in the Solomon Islands by a strategic adversary would significantly degrade Australia and New Zealand’s security, increase the chances of local corruption and heighten the chances of resource exploitation.”
It is not clear which side initiated the agreement, but if signed, the deal would give Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare of the Solomon Islands the ability to call on China for protection of his own government while granting China a base of operations between the United States and Australia that could be used to block shipping traffic across the South Pacific.
Five months ago, protesters unhappy with Beijing’s secretive influence attacked the prime minister’s residence, burned businesses in the capital’s Chinatown and left three people dead. Now the worst-case scenario some Solomon Islanders envision would be a breakdown of democracy before or during next year’s election, with more unrest and the threat of China moving in to maintain the status quo.
Damaged Chinatown shops in Honiara, Solomon Islands, after protests in November 2021.Credit...Piringi Charley/Associated Press
The leaked document states that “Solomon Islands may, according to its own needs, request China to send police, armed police, military personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces to Solomon Islands to assist in maintaining social order, protecting people’s lives and property.”
It allows China to provide “assistance on other tasks” and requires secrecy, noting, “Neither party shall disclose the cooperation information to a third party.”
Matthew Wale, the leader of the opposition party in the Solomon Islands’ Parliament, said he feared that the “very general, overarching, vague” agreement could be used for anything.
“The crux of it is that this is all about political survival for the prime minister,” he said. “It has nothing to do with the national security of Solomon Islands.”
For Beijing, the deal could offer its own potential reward. “China may, according to its own needs and with the consent of Solomon Islands, make ship visits to, carry out logistical replenishment in and have stopover and transition in the Solomon Islands,” the draft states.
It also says the Solomons will provide “all necessary facilities.”
The Chinese Embassy in the Solomon Islands did not immediately reply to an email seeking comment.
Australia, which has traditionally been the islands’ main security partner — also sending police officers to quell the unrest in November at the government’s request — responded swiftly to the leaked document.
“We would be concerned by any actions that destabilize the security of our region,” Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs said in a statement. “Members of the Pacific family are best placed to respond to situations affecting Pacific regional security.”
Australian soldiers outside the airport in Honiara, Solomon Islands, in November after violence broke out in the capital.Credit...Gary Ramage, via Associated Press
Despite such affirmations, Australia has been losing influence in the Solomons for years. The larger country has a history of condescending to the region, downplaying its concerns about climate change and often describing it as its own “backyard.”
Mr. Sogavare has made no secret of his desire to draw China closer. In 2019, soon after he was elected, he announced that the island would end its 36-year diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, the self-governing island that China claims as its own, in order to establish official ties with Beijing. He argued that Beijing would deliver the infrastructure and support that the country needed.
The Sogavare government quickly signed agreements giving Chinese companies the right to build roads and bridges, and to reopen one of the country’s gold mines. A Chinese company even tried to lease the entire island of Tulagi.
That deal was eventually deemed illegal, after critics rose up in anger. Residents of Tulagi and Malaita, an island province where local leaders expressed strong opposition to China, have said that bribes are constantly being paid by proxies of Beijing with bags of cash and promises of kickbacks for senior leaders often made during all-expenses-paid trips to China.
The violent protests in November in the Solomon Islands reflected those frustrations. They erupted on the island of Guadalcanal, in the capital, Honiara, where American troops fought a brutal battle against the Japanese starting in 1942. The clashes were sparked by anger over allegations of China-fueled corruption and a perceived unequal distribution of resources, which has left Malaita less developed despite having the country’s largest population.
Mr. Sogavare has made no secret of his desire to draw China closer. In 2019, he met with China’s leader, Xi Jinping, in Beijing.Credit...Pool photo by Parker Song
Malaita’s premier, Daniel Suidani — who has banned Chinese companies from Malaita while accepting American aid — said that the anger stemmed from “the national government’s leadership.”
“They are provoking the people to do something that is not good,” he said in November.
Mr. Wale, the opposition leader, said he has encouraged the prime minister to negotiate with Malaita, with little success.
“The political discourse over these things is nonexistent,” he said, adding that the proposed agreement with China would make the relationship more volatile.
The Latest on China: Key Things to Know
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Marriages and divorces. Faced with a soaring divorce rate, China introduced a rule forcing married couples to undergo a 30-day “cooling off” period before formally parting ways. The move seems to have been effective at reducing divorces, but is unlikely to help with a demographic crisis fueled by a decline in marriages.
Anna Powles, a senior lecturer at the Center for Defense and Security Studies at Massey University in New Zealand, said the recent upheaval and continued insecurity pointed to high levels of stress on the government over the pandemic, the economy and “longstanding concerns about the capturing of the state and political elites by foreign interests.”
“Some of the biggest implications here are about how strategic competition is disrupting local government,” Dr. Powles said.
American officials have also become increasingly concerned. In interviews over the past few years, they have often cited the Solomons as a grave example of China’s approach throughout the Pacific, which involves cultivating decision makers to open the door for Chinese businesses, migration and access to strategic resources and locations — most likely, the Americans believe, for civilian and military uses, at sea, and for satellite communications.
The national flag of the Solomon Islands in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 2019.Credit...China Stringer Network/Reuters
Many Pacific islands, including Kiribati and Fiji, have seen a sharp increase in Chinese diplomats, construction deals and Chinese migration over the past five years. Disputes and tensions have been growing over Beijing’s role in a region that has often either been ignored or been seen as little more than dots on the map for great powers to toy with.
Last month, during a visit to Fiji that focused heavily on competition with China, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken announced that the United States would soon open an embassy in the Solomon Islands after closing one in the 1990s. It is still many months from being operational, and on Friday, American officials did not initially respond to requests for comment.
“They certainly can do more and faster,” Mr. Wale, the Solomons opposition leader, said. “They just seem to be dragging their feet.”
Edward Wong contributed reporting from Washington.
19. Ukraine should provide Japan’s wake-up call
Some interesting questions:
Would NATO — or select NATO members — help Japan? Without NATO membership, no NATO member is willing to directly defend Ukraine; but these countries are providing ammunition and equipment. Even if we assume other U.S. allies want to assist, geography and the lack of access to nearby bases could challenge quick and sustained support. Japan has made significant efforts to get closer strategically with key U.S. allies, but Japan should consider whether it could further enmesh itself with these states. Possible options include joint operational planning, reciprocal basing and prepositioning equipment in Japan.
The Ukraine crisis has demonstrated war can occur at any moment. Japan should ensure it is fully prepared for a potential Chinese threat.
Ukraine should provide Japan’s wake-up call
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has drawn concern and comparison to what China may have in mind for Taiwan. U.S. partners and allies can use this crisis to help them better understand — and adjust — their response to a potential future Taiwan crisis.
In Japan, the public is debating what Ukraine’s invasion could mean for Taiwan, adding momentum to discussions of “enemy base strike capability.” The attention has gotten so great that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned Japan not to join any U.S.-led coalition against China. But given China’s history of provocations, it could behoove Japanese leaders to devote renewed attention to how they would deal with a Taiwan crisis, especially as it could include an attack on Japan. There are four items Japan should be considering.
The first is readiness of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Japan’s demographic decline has resulted in a smaller and older force, leaving personnel deficits in its services. Combined with consistent criticism that not all SDF exercises are geared toward realistic scenarios, policymakers could benefit from examining whether the SDF forces are at sufficient levels of combat readiness.
It is assumed that Tokyo would call up reserves, but this is not a large pool and their readiness levels are unknown. If significant combat losses were to occur, what options would Tokyo would have since a draft is unconstitutional? Policymakers should give more thought to increasing personnel staffing and creating more realistic exercises.
A second issue is the legal structure for operational responses. At the onset of any conflict, rapid political decisions are required. Because Japan’s current legal interpretations prevent any use of force until three political conditions are fulfilled, Tokyo may have to wait for a direct attack before operational actions can be taken.
For example, although Japan can legally position the SDF outside of bases in peacetime, it requires the permission of landowners. Similar limitations confront U.S. forces. Without the ability to quickly position forces outside of existing bases — even before hostilities begin — much of the initial battlespace could be ceded to China. Because these limitations are known, Japanese policymakers could benefit from considering what can be pre-approved to ensure political timelines do not hamper critical operational timelines.
A third issue is ensuring necessary capabilities and capacities. China has spent years investing in capabilities that can bring lethal force rapidly across the Taiwan Strait via major naval and airborne elements, accompanied by waves of missile strikes. Those same capabilities threaten Japan.
This suggests the need for Japan to prioritize some types of weapons over others. For example, a deep magazine of anti-air and anti-ship missiles and a large fleet of multiple-launch rocket systems would appear necessary. And because the distance from China provides Japan some operational advantages, maintaining its robust air fighter fleet and surface and sub-surface fleets is critical.
In addition to stockpiling ballistic missile interceptors, Japan could give more attention to establishing mobile integrated air and missile defense capabilities to address Chinese cruise missiles and air power. Japan could particularly benefit from focusing on capabilities available today, such as more Patriot batteries, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system and the more mobile U.S. Army Tactical Missile System or High Mobility Artillery Rocket System.
Sustainment capabilities also would likely be critical as any East China Sea conflict would require operations over a vast maritime domain where forward basing of key logistics capabilities could be vulnerable. Most of these are on Japan’s four main islands, not near Taiwan. This not just limits operational flexibility, but necessitates robust air and sea lift, aerial and maritime refuelers and well-stocked munition depots in different locations.
Japanese policymakers should ask themselves whether current efforts are sufficient. For example, are three Ōsumi-class ships sufficient for combat sealift needs? Are Japan’s C-130 and C-2 cargo planes capable of quickly transporting Patriot anti-air and Type-12 anti-ship missile batteries? Similarly, are the SDF’s fleet of maritime oilers and aerial refuelers adequate for concurrently supporting high-end combat in different areas? Finally, are the SDF’s concealment and deception efforts sufficient to avoid heavy damage? If the answer to any of these is negative, now is the time to consider how to address these shortfalls.
A final issue is external support. Ukraine has been able to stay in the fight not just because of the tenacity of its people, but because of external assistance. While Japan would expect any attack to be met by U.S. support, if the U.S. is also involved in a conflict, Japan could face numerous challenges.
Although Japan has domestic suppliers for munitions, it is highly dependent on foreign military sales. Because the U.S. would also be dependent on similar U.S. suppliers during a conflict, U.S. production capacity to supply Japan could be constrained. Are there bilateral prioritization agreements to ensure the requisite defense materiel without crowding out each other?
Would NATO — or select NATO members — help Japan? Without NATO membership, no NATO member is willing to directly defend Ukraine; but these countries are providing ammunition and equipment. Even if we assume other U.S. allies want to assist, geography and the lack of access to nearby bases could challenge quick and sustained support. Japan has made significant efforts to get closer strategically with key U.S. allies, but Japan should consider whether it could further enmesh itself with these states. Possible options include joint operational planning, reciprocal basing and prepositioning equipment in Japan.
The Ukraine crisis has demonstrated war can occur at any moment. Japan should ensure it is fully prepared for a potential Chinese threat.
Jeffrey W. Hornung is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corp.
20. First Army Warfighter Exercise in Pacific will take on large-scale operations
First Army Warfighter Exercise in Pacific will take on large-scale operations
FORT LEAVENWORTH, Kansas – The Army’s next Warfighter Exercise will feature a scenario in the Pacific for the first time, according to Col. Bryan Babich, the service’s Combined Arms Center’s Mission Command Training Program commander.
The Warfighter Exercise is the Army’s capstone training event for the Corps and Division echelons and is conducted for each every two years. It’s an immersive 10-day exercise typically focused on forward passage of formational lines, long-range precision fires and a wet gap crossing, usually culminating in a transition to a defensive posture.
These exercises commonly set up a command post in the field under canvas using tactical communications. The post then relocates at least once during the exercise, allowing troops to practice the complicated and delicate balance of transferring control of systems and processes to a smaller command post, Babich said.
These exercises have previously focused on scenarios related to the Middle East, Korea and the Baltic countries in Europe, Babich told Army Secretary Christine Wormuth during a briefing here on May 21.
“We’re seeing it play out in real time today” in Europe, Babich noted.
Allies and partners have participated in previous warfighter efforts; the U.K. and France are some of the most recent participants.
Late last year, Wormuth said she envisions five core tasks for the Army in the Pacific, should a conflict break out there. The Army would be a “linchpin” for the joint force to establish and secure staging areas and joint operating bases for air and naval capability and forces and would need to be prepared to provide integrated air and missile defense and sustainment to the joint force, including secure communications networks and munitions stocks.
The service would provide command-and-control across operational echelons and also ground-based, long-range precision fires. The Army could also counterattack using its maneuver forces.
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With the U.S. military out of Afghanistan and operations in the Middle East no longer competing for resources and attention, the Army must chart its path in a great power conflict, and do so after decades of struggling to push modernization programs across the finish line.
Earlier this year, Babich’s planning team met with U.S. Army Pacific Command chief Gen. Charles Flynn to make initial plans for the warfighter exercise, though it won’t kick off until September.
The exercise will include all of the core tasks Wormuth has highlighted, Babich said.
“The exercise is exactly what you would expect it to be,” he added. “It is a counter-attack in the event of an enemy incursion in an area that you would expect us to focus on in a warfighter exercise.”
In other recent Army exercises, like Pacific Pathways and Defender Pacific, the service operated in Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, Japan and the Philippines as well as in a series of smaller countries. The service’s Forager exercises focused on executing operations from the second island chain into the first island chain into Asia.
The first island chain runs parallel to the mainland of the Asian continent, starting in the Kuril Islands, through the Japanese Archipelago; including Taiwan and the northwestern portion of the Philippines; and finishing in Borneo. The second island chain runs parallel to the first farther out to sea and includes Japan’s Bonin Islands and Volcano Islands; the Mariana Islands, including Guam; and the Western Caroline Islands, and extends to Western New Guinea.
Babich said Flynn wants to push the envelope in the Warfighter Exercise. “He wants to come up and come out with the outcomes that form potential gaps and what we need in terms of logistics with the [Army Prepositioned Stocks] and in terms of force structure,” Babich said.
In a break from previous exercises, the first part will focus on “Joint Forcible Entry Operations,” meaning there won’t be forces on the ground in the area of operation when the exercise starts, he said. Units will need to create windows of opportunity to move onto territory in a contested environment.
The exercise is connected to a war game series focused on 2026 which Flynn is already conducting. The scenario will take place during the same time with capability and equipment the service predicts it will have by that period.
A key consideration for this scenario is how to build and defend bases and the logistics of bringing equipment and soldiers in by boat or through an air assault, as well as how to sustain supply lines in a contested environment.
While previous exercises were focused on fires and intelligence, the Pacific scenario “really kind of reverses this with the emphasis areas on protection, logistics and command and control,” Babich said.
The event will put more emphasis on the maritime domain, but will also have a focus on cyber and space domains, which is new to the exercise, he added.
The exercise will experiment with the Extended Range Cannon Artillery system and the Precision Strike Missile, Babich said.
And the Army will stretch and test its command-and-control capability across a wide array of locations, from the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii, the 4th ID out of Fort Carson, Colorado, and 1st Corps out of Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state as well as a potential element of the Corps on a naval vessel. Fort Leavenworth’s opposition forces and a logistics component based at Fort Lee, Virginia, will also tie into the exercise.
“It’s going to stress that [C2] system and just kind of help us build our readiness and learn where we’re challenged,” Babich said.
In a smaller event leading up to the Warfighter Exercise, the 3rd ID at Fort Stewart, Georgia, will soon run an experiment with a “penetration division structure and capabilities,” Babich noted. Fort Hood will bring observer controllers to collect data on how the division fights as a penetration division.
Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts from Kenyon College.
21. How Strategic Messaging Can Help Turn Putin Around
Is collective action and popular uprising by the people possible in Russia?
Conclusion:
There are few centers of opposition in Russia that frighten Putin. The loss of confidence in him by ordinary Russians may prove the most powerful and information is the way to arouse their opposition.
How Strategic Messaging Can Help Turn Putin Around
Cracks in the Russian leader's popular support can be deepened with careful appeals to the nation’s history and sense of greatness.
Vladimir Putin can be forced end his war in Ukraine if enough Russians turn against it. Information warfare targeting Russians and appealing to the nation’s history and sense of greatness may force him to back down.
The Levada Centre, an independent analytical center registered in Russia as a foreign agent, polled Russians in 2021 and the first two months of 2022. The surveys showed strong support for Putin and his narrative that the U.S. and NATO as responsible for the Ukraine crisis. Indeed, Putin’s support increased from 64 percent in September and 71 percent in February. Even the prospect of sanctions appeared more likely to increase anti-Western sentiments than to reduce support for Putin.
But the Russian leader will find sustaining the information bubble difficult. Information warfare can separate Putin and his vanity from Russians, Russian culture, and Russia’s place in history. This task requires subtlety. We must allow the Russian populace to avoid humiliation, while mobilizing them against Putin’s regime.
What messages might resonate? Directly asking Russians to stop the war might not. Russian media has convinced most of the country’s public that this is not a war and that Putin does what is necessary. Messaging should focus on what the invasion means to Russia’s heritage as a great nation and to daily lives. Here are some messages that may resonate with Russians. The video that Arnold Schwarzenegger released on March 17 brilliantly illustrates the correct way to articulate this message. He identifies with a Russian athletic icon, praises the Russian people, relates his own experience with Russia and Russians in a glowing way, talks about their greatness, and only then pivots to the war. It is powerful and resonant, and points the way to message to Russians.
Casualties are an Achilles heel for Putin, who will try to hide the body bags. Reportedly, he is sending the dead and wounded to Belarus to keep them out of sight from Russians. Let’s make certain Russians know the reality that the war is killing the young sons of families whom Putin’s team lied to, telling these ill-trained conscripts that the invasion was a training exercise. The implicit message deprives Putin of the will and purpose that Count Carl von Clausewitz deemed essential to success in warfare. Putin’s arrogance and insensitivity to the sentiments of mother’s concern for a son offers a powerful message for opposing the war.
A good way to complement this message would be to communicate that instead of fighting Nazis, an ill-prepared Russian army is slaughtering innocent women and children and destroying whole cities, leaving them in ruins and its citizens starving. The message deprives Putin of the moral high ground, another factor von Clausewitz recognizes is important. Putin launched the invasion in hopes of Making Russia Great Again and winning respect. This messaging will drive the narrative that he’s made Russia a global pariah guilty of committing war crimes. No self-respecting Russian will respond favorably to that idea.
The thrust of messaging should be an appeal to Russians to demand leadership that worthy of the nation’s greatness, rather than direct attacks on Putin, which they may be less likely to believe. One exception is Putin’s personal corruption. But how that message is formulated matters. Merely calling him corrupt won’t be sufficient. Showing his hypocrisy, the cardinal sin in politics, might. The key is to show Putin is profiting at their expense. For example, communicating that he apparently bought a billion-dollar estate with public-health funds may strike a chord.
Let’s remind Russians that while invading a neighbor, ostensibly to extend Russian influence, Putin has turned a blind eye to encroaching Chinese influence in eastern Russia. The Washington Post has pointed out that some Russians there worry about and resent Chinese immigration and influence, and fear a Chinese invasion. Let’s play to their concern.
Russians depend on air travel to get around their country. Aeroflot and airline Aurora use Airbus and Boeing planes. Western aircraft manufacturers are already declining to support the Russian-owned planes, creating operational problems. Strategic communication should blame Putin for this disruption.
News reports reveal that Putin is driving many of its brightest minds in technology and innovation abroad. That supports a message that the war is undercutting Russia’s economic future – and opportunities for families to share in a brighter future.
High-visibility business, sports, cultural, and political figures whom Russians recognize have called for stopping the war. Magnifying those voices sends the message that influencers whom Russians admire and respect agree that the war is wrong. Statements can originate in the West in English. They can then migrate to Russia, using subtitles. Russians seem less likely to dismiss these expression as “western propaganda.”
We should work to turn the Kremlin’s narrative about the Soviet Union’s role in WWII against it. The message is that a people who sacrificed in that war cannot tolerate the destruction against Ukraine.
Finally, let’s attack Putin’s arrogant support for elites, who stole their wealth from the people at the expense of Russia’s future. A 2013 Credit Suisse report estimates that 35 percent of Russia’s wealth is owned by the wealthiest 110 individuals. Let’s drive the message that heir riches, plundered from the Russian people, have hurt the lives of ordinary Russians.
There are few centers of opposition in Russia that frighten Putin. The loss of confidence in him by ordinary Russians may prove the most powerful and information is the way to arouse their opposition.
Dell Dailey, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general, has led numerous special operations units and the Department of State’s counterterrorism efforts. James P. Farwell has advised U.S. Special Operations and the Defense Department. The opinions expressed are their own and not those of the U.S. government, its agencies, departments, or combatant commands. We acknowledge the excellent suggestions offered by Dr. Ofer Fridman of the Centre for Strategic Communications, Dept. of War Studies, King’s College, U. of London and cyber expert Rafal Rohozinski of the SecDev Group.
22. Piercing the Fog of War: What Is Really Happening in Ukraine?
Conclusion:
As the United States and its partners contemplate the road ahead, we urge them to remember the lesson that President John F. Kennedy offered successors as the main takeaway from the Cuban Missile Crisis. In his words: “Above all, while defending our vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.”
In conclusion, to return to the fundamental truths about war with which we began, our answers to these core questions remind us of two more truths. Once begun, wars take on a life and momentum of their own. And finally: war is hell.
Piercing the Fog of War: What Is Really Happening in Ukraine?
We are skeptical about what we are reading, hearing, and seeing from reporters and commentators talking as if they found a way to pierce the fog, unmask the protagonists, and discover what is actually happening in Ukraine.
As images flash across our screens incessantly, and we search for signals in the blizzard of words about what is happening in Ukraine, we remind ourselves that we are members of the audience in a theater of war (and we hope before not too long, peace). On the battlefield, there can be no question about the fact that real bombs and bullets are destroying buildings and killing human beings. (So, we are sure this is not just a sequel to Wag the Dog.) But as the protagonists fight on the battleground and in economic and financial markets, they are at the same time engaged in an intense information war. Each actor attempts to shape the narratives, find images that reinforce its messages, and craft words that stir emotions to sustain the morale of its warriors and citizens. Each is also working to impact the views and actions of governments and publics in the wider world.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s career as a comedian pretending to be president prepared him brilliantly for his current role as a wartime president whose actions and words have made him a true global statesman. As analysts, we also note that he has taken information warfare to the next level. If, as it is often said, Vietnam was the first war to be fought on television, Russia’s war against Ukraine is the first major war to be fought on social media.
As Winston Churchill did in the darkest days of Britain’s defiance of the Nazi Blitz, Zelenskyy is courageously rallying his citizens and soldiers to fight the invaders. He is also showing the world what leadership looks like—persuading nations around the globe to provide both material and moral support. Taking a page from Churchill’s defiance of Adolf Hitler’s onslaught, Zelenskyy intends to hang on for as long as possible—hoping against hope for a miracle on the battlefield or that somehow the United States will come to save his country.
Our hearts go out to the brave Ukrainian fighters and citizens, and we are praying that Vladimir Putin’s invasion fails. Nonetheless, as professional analysts trying to make sense of what we are seeing, we begin by reciting what we most confidently know: namely, the fundamental truths about war that have been learned over centuries of experience. The “fog of war” is dense and thickened by disinformation and propaganda; “truth is the first casualty of war” (since, as Churchill said, combatants must wrap their campaigns in a bodyguard of lies); a Clausewitzian “friction” frustrates perfect plans when they have to be translated into operations; “first reports are always wrong”; and “wars are much easier to start than to end.” These have become clichés because each captures a basic truth about war.
Since these truths have been reflected in every war that we have observed and studied (and that one of us has fought in), we start our analysis each morning by reciting them to ensure we have our feet on a solid foundation as we try to interpret the latest reports. This leaves us with a degree of skepticism about what we are reading, hearing, and seeing from reporters and commentators talking as if they found a way to pierce the fog, unmask the protagonists, and discover what is actually happening. But then we ask ourselves—and each other—ten key questions—and force ourselves to write down our best guesses about the answers.
1. How is the military war going on the battlefield?
We find it more difficult to make confident judgments than most commentators. In essence, we agree with the “senior [Department of Defense] official” quoted in The New York Times this week, who when pressed to give his assessment of the war would only say: “a very dynamic and active battlefield.” While it is clear that Russian ground and air forces have significantly underperformed, and that the defiance of Ukrainian fighters and the population exceeded all expectations, we do not agree with those who have concluded that Russia has “lost” or even that it is “losing” as claimed by a number of prominent American observers. Ukraine’s military deserves high marks for slowing the Russian advance, destroying hundreds of tanks and dozens of airplanes. Nonetheless, when comparing the map of Ukraine at the start of Russia’s invasion on February 24 with today, it is clear that the line of control and the line of conflict have steadily moved west. One-quarter of the Ukrainian population has fled from their homes. Russia now controls twice as much Ukrainian territory as it did when the war began. In our assessment, Russia is currently regrouping and adjusting its strategy for the next phase of the war in which it will rely on more destructive artillery and rocket bombing of cities as it continues to try to grind down Ukrainian opposition.
Some around Putin appear to have been as delusional about a quick, easy victory as U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld was in 2003 when he imagined that U.S. forces would be greeted as “liberators” in Iraq and American troops would be home for Thanksgiving. In contrast to observers who expected a short war, we did not. The Nazi blitzkrieg did not capture Paris until the thirty-ninth day. In Afghanistan, the timelines of war for Americans in 2001 and Russians in 1979 stretch out to thousands of days.
One key variable is the number of Russian combat deaths, which appear to be approaching the number of Americans lost in the eight years of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Nonetheless, history suggests that Russia knows how to absorb losses, contain failures, recover, and find a more effective strategy to achieve the goals it sets for itself. So before joining in the celebrations of Russia’s failure, we remind ourselves that on day forty-two of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush stood under a banner declaring “mission accomplished” and announced the end of major combat operations. In fact, combat continued for another 3,153 days during which more than 150,000 people died.
2. Will Russia transition to an aggressive total war?
Putin’s disappointment with his army’s initial performance, which made efforts to avoid killing civilians, has given way to increasingly aggressive and brutal moves against civilian buildings and infrastructure. Russia is targeting the civilian population: Slavic, Christian, and Russian speaking (whom Putin has claimed are actually Russians). Putin has still not moved to the unlimited destruction he ordered against Grozny in Chechnya or Aleppo in Syria. If Russian losses mount and the stalemate continues for weeks, we consider it likely that Russia will inflict Grozny-type destruction on select Ukrainian cities—starting with Mariupol.
3. When will negotiations end the military campaign?
Successful negotiations require that the parties have overlapping “zones of agreement.” At this stage of the fighting, both sides have fortified their positions and think time is on their side. Russia continues to demand a replacement of the Ukrainian government (“de-nazification”), the demilitarization and neutralization of Ukraine, recognition of Crimea as Russian, recognition of the independence of the Donbas “republics,” and significant changes in NATO deployments in former Warsaw Pact countries. We expect that Putin might drop his “de-nazification” rhetoric, knowing that Zelenskyy is the only Ukrainian leader with enough legitimacy to sell a political agreement to the Ukrainian people that prevents a prolonged insurgency. While Zelenskyy has given up on joining NATO in the foreseeable future and signaled a willingness to accept Ukraine’s neutrality, he insists that he will do this only if he is given rock-solid security guarantees. He has also made it plain that he will not endorse the Donbas or Crimea’s autonomy, sovereignty, or annexation. Thus, until the price of war is perceived as heavier than the price of concessions, it does not seem likely that we will see a cease-fire or concrete negotiations.
Currently, there is no plausible mediator or mediating mechanism. In the theater of peace, we expect to see an increasing number of leaders jumping onto the stage seeking their moment in the limelight. As we have seen already, this will include meetings, phone calls, and statements—all quickly leaked to the press. But from Emmanuel Macron to Naftali Bennett to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and a lengthening list of others, none has a serious prospect of making much difference in ending the war yet. What is needed is a serious mediator who would be able to engage both Putin and Zelenskyy on an equal footing, nudge them to adjust their demands, help them to bridge wide gaps, and even propose an initial framework. Among the contenders for this role so far, Bennett has made more progress than any of the others—though he has limited his role to “mailbox,” not mediator. The individual with the greatest opportunity to play this role is Chinese president Xi Jinping, the only world leader who might be persuasive to Putin. But other than a cosmetic bow, Xi has so far chosen not to do so.
Certainly, negotiations will be multilayered. They will have to include not just the protagonists in the military war, but also the United States and European Union who are waging economic war. Since Putin has now become so indelibly a pariah, we assess that it is unlikely that the bulk of sanctions will be removed so long as it remains Putin’s Russia, thus making the obstacles to a successful agreement that much more formidable.
4. What about Zelenskyy and the future of Ukraine?
A comedian who became a leader at a time when many leaders became clowns, Zelenskyy rightly commands admiration around the world. Nevertheless, if Russia conquers Kyiv, or if Zelenskyy is killed or flees into exile, then it is likely that Moscow will appoint a puppet government in Ukraine.
If Kyiv falls to the Russians, one possible future would be the establishment of a pro-Russian government in the eastern part of Ukraine, while the Zelenskyy government withdraws to Lviv and governs the west of the country. We cannot imagine Zelenskyy or any other Ukrainian successor of a rump state formally accepting Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory. Nonetheless, they might agree to an end of active fighting along a line of control across from which a Russian puppet government rules in the East.
5. If Russia installs a puppet government or annexes part of Ukraine, will a popular resistance develop?
We think yes. As the United States discovered in Afghanistan and Iraq, occupying the capital city and changing the government is the easy chapter in the campaign. Dealing with a resistance movement is complex, costly, and can take years. It is not clear to what extent Russian cruelty and brutality will be effective in suppressing the resistance, even if it is supported by neighboring NATO members. Given the development of Ukrainian national identity in recent years and its success in rising up to defy Putin’s aggression in the past month of combat, it is unlikely that such a puppet regime could gain enough support of the Ukrainian people to suppress an insurgency. Russian forces would thus likely remain in Ukraine.
6. What are the prospects of the war in Ukraine leading to war between NATO and Russia?
A NATO-Russia war remains unlikely. The actions of both the U.S.-led NATO and Russia in the first month of war show clearly that both sides recognize the risks of direct conflict and are making significant efforts to avoid it. NATO countries are sending Ukraine unprecedented numbers of surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank missiles, drones, and other war materiel. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has warned that “any cargo moving into the Ukrainian territory which we would believe is carrying weapons would be fair game,” and Russia’s attack on the Yavoriv military facility 15 miles from the Polish border, which had been receiving and storing arms from NATO countries, underlined the point. Wary of such warnings, the United States and Poland have not sent Poland’s MiG-29s to Ukraine.
NATO’s escalation ladder of potential actions includes: Arming Ukrainian forces with nonlethal materiel, like armor or strategic intelligence; arming Ukrainian forces with lethal materiel, like missiles or tactical targeting intelligence; a small, random incident—perhaps lethal to some Russian forces—that can be contained and isolated; a NATO-enforced No-Fly Zone for limited humanitarian corridors; a NATO-enforced No-Fly Zone over substantial Ukrainian territory; use of NATO airfields for Ukrainian pilots and aircraft attacking Russian forces.
As Zelenskyy pressures NATO to climb this ladder and provide more support, there remain some uncertainties about where Putin will draw the line. Putin certainly does not want war with NATO or the United States. He has exercised great care not to cross the border of NATO countries for fear of such a war. Still, he has attempted to deter Europeans by threatening that their strangling economic measures could force him to resort to a military response. We judge that Putin will not conduct operations against NATO allies in the Baltics in the short or medium terms. After the slow slog in Ukraine, so many Russian casualties, and such a united Western response, we think that Putin is unlikely to pursue ambitions beyond Ukraine in the near future.
7. How is Russia employing its cyber capabilities?
Like others, we have been surprised by the relative lack of Russian strategic cyber operations and electronic warfare against Ukrainian critical infrastructure and command-and-control systems that would complement kinetic operations. From our seats in the theater of war and peace, we observe that Zelenskyy holds live video sessions with the parliaments of Europe, the Knesset, or the U.S. Congress on a near-daily basis. He holds regular evening television broadcasts. He is constantly making head of state phone calls and posting direct appeals in videos on social media. Reportedly, the United States provided Zelenskyy and Foreign Minister Dymtro Kuleba with secure mobile satellite phones to ensure they can safely reach American officials at any time from any place. The Ukrainian military’s command-and-control communications systems appear to be functioning adequately. Where is the previously feared Russian cyber dominance? Whether Russia is withholding this weapon for use against the United States or Europe at a later stage of the war, or whether this is vivid example should lead us to discount prior claims about what cyber can do remains a puzzle for us.
8. How effective are the economic sanctions imposed on Russia?
Putin thought that he could build a sanctions-proof Fortress Russia by amassing $650 billion in offshore reserves. That theory did not work. The scale of the economic assault that the United States and European Union have mobilized and the extent of the damage to the Russian economy and elite have been the biggest surprises for Putin and his team. The effectiveness of sanctions, embargoes, and other instruments of economic warfare are reflected in the fall of the ruble, the collapse of trade in anything but commodities, and the departure of international companies. There is also the long-term geopolitical effect of sanctions that may lead Europeans to reduce their dependence on Russian energy resources and weaken Russian leverage, though in reality, that transition would take many years.
On the other hand, Russia’s economy is complex. As the war has created fears of disruption, the price of oil and gas has spiked. Since the war began, Russia has been receiving more than half a billion dollars daily from its sales of oil and gas. On March 3, it received $720 million from gas sales to Europe alone. Thus, it is difficult to judge how economic pain will influence Putin’s choices. The key question is whether Putin will conclude that the costs of continuing the war so far exceed its benefits such that he will turn to a diplomatic path and accept less than he had demanded. At this point, we think that is unlikely to happen soon.
9. What are the implications for China and Taiwan?
China is the only major power supporting Putin’s war. China has set aside its core foreign policy principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and accepted risks to its economy in order to back its closest partner. This reflects the fact that over the past decade, Xi has built one of the most operationally significant alliances in the world. As detailed in “Will China Have Putin’s Back?,” Russia and China share a common adversary (the United States) and a common objective (to weaken America while building a post-American order). The two nations have built a thick web of cooperation in trade, investments, intelligence, weapons development, military exercises, and diplomacy.
Could Xi now be having second thoughts about the “no limits” partnership with Moscow that the 5,000-word communique that capped the Xi-Putin summit at the opening of the Beijing Olympics declared? Certainly, he and his colleagues have to be thinking about: the underperformance of Russian soldiers, weaponry, and logistics; the rapid and massive response of the “Global West,” including Japan and Australia, that is willing to upend decades of economic, financial, and trade relationships to punish aggression; the beginning of the end for Putin, who will become an isolated pariah regardless of the outcome of the war; the growing domestic disturbances across Russia; the promise of prolonged popular resistance or insurgency in Ukraine even if Russia sacks Kyiv and installs a puppet regime.
On the other hand, if the U.S.-led sanctions and other forms of economic warfare were to prove effective in crippling Russia, China has to fear that it could be the next target. If the West were to succeed in “canceling” Putin, his circle of oligarch supporters, and other Putinistas, China would have to be concerned about its own vulnerabilities to something similar. Thus, at this point, we have seen no concrete evidence to suggest that China is seeking to constrain Russia’s war.
If Russia had achieved a quick victory at low costs, and the West’s response essentially mirrored the sanctions imposed after Crimea, the likelihood of a Chinese move against Taiwan would have increased. Watching the performance of what Putin had advertised as a new modern army with the capacity to “fight and win,” the repeated breakdowns and malfunctions of Russia’s most modern military equipment and logistics, and the ferocity of the U.S.-led Western response, we suspect Beijing is pausing to review its plans for military action against Taiwan.
10. Will Putin go nuclear?
As of this writing, since we believe that Putin still thinks he can achieve his goals on the battlefield, we see any use of nuclear weapons as highly unlikely. If, however, Putin’s only alternative was humiliating defeat, we fear that this could become a live option.
As he sent Russian soldiers to invade Ukraine, Putin ordered his nuclear arsenal to “special combat readiness” and threatened “consequences as you have never experienced in your history.” After seven decades in which no nuclear weapon has been used in war, many today assume that a “nuclear taboo” makes any deliberate use of nuclear weapons unthinkable. We suggest they think again.
A person who did not hesitate to bomb one of his nation’s own cities into rubble could certainly contemplate using low-yield nuclear weapons to destroy a Ukrainian city. Exploring that path, he might even take a page from the U.S. playbook in ending World War II. Putin could consider delivering a low-yield nuclear weapon to destroy one of Ukraine’s small cities, call on Zelenskyy to surrender—and threaten that if he did not, invite him to watch what a Ukrainian Nagasaki looks like.
As the United States and its partners contemplate the road ahead, we urge them to remember the lesson that President John F. Kennedy offered successors as the main takeaway from the Cuban Missile Crisis. In his words: “Above all, while defending our vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.”
In conclusion, to return to the fundamental truths about war with which we began, our answers to these core questions remind us of two more truths. Once begun, wars take on a life and momentum of their own. And finally: war is hell.
Graham T. Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is the former director of Harvard’s Belfer Center and the author of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?
Amos Yadlin is former Chief of Israel’s Defense Intelligence and a Senior Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
Image: Reuters.
23. FDD | Engines of Influence: Turkey’s Defense Industry Under Erdogan
FDD | Engines of Influence
Turkey’s Defense Industry Under Erdogan
fdd.org · by Aykan Erdemir Turkey Program Senior Director · March 24, 2022
Introduction
Turkish weaponry is helping Ukrainian troops fight off the Russian invasion of their homeland. The chief of Ukraine’s air force called the Turkish-built TB-2 drones “life-giving” as he confirmed they had struck Russian targets. Time magazine called the TB-2 “Ukraine’s Secret Weapon Against Russia.” Yet Turkey’s Deputy Foreign Minister Yavuz Selim Kiran underscored that Ankara did not provide these drones to Kyiv as military aid, saying, “They are products Ukraine purchased from a private company.” Ankara’s delicate balancing act between Moscow and Kyiv is partly a result of its ongoing attempts to find alternatives to NATO weapons systems by developing an indigenous defense industry, tapping into Ukrainian defense technology, and purchasing the S-400 air defense system from Russia.
Turkish weaponry has also shaped the outcomes of several recent clashes in the Middle East and beyond. In Syria, the TB-2 helped defeat a Russia-backed Syrian government offensive in Idlib in 2020. In Libya, Turkish arms helped turn the tide against an offensive by the self-styled Libyan National Army of Khalifa Haftar. In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkish drones contributed to a decisive Azerbaijani victory. Turkey’s ongoing effort to launch fixed-wing drones from its first multipurpose amphibious assault ship, the TCG Anadolu, has the potential to bring Turkish drones into action in other conflicts. Given their combat record and substantial interest from international buyers, Turkish arms will continue to play a role in combat in multiple theaters of interest to the United States and NATO.
However, there has been a backlash in response to civilian casualties resulting from the use of Turkish drones, as well as Ankara’s lack of concern for how buyers use its weapons. For example, Turkish drone strikes in northeast Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan, which left children dead or injured, have drawn criticism. In January, following a Turkish drone strike in northeast Syria where a 4-year-old boy lost his leg, Nadine Maenza, the chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, called out Ankara’s “drone attacks on civilians” as “destabilizing.” Similarly, Ethiopia caused a global outcry in February with its use of Turkish drones in strikes that killed nearly 60 civilians in a displaced people’s camp in the country’s northern region of Tigray.
The potential roles Turkey’s defense industry can play, both in strengthening NATO by deterring its adversaries and in undermining NATO and its values through trade and partnerships with the alliance’s adversaries, require a concerted transatlantic strategy in relations with Ankara. Over the last few years, the appetite of Western countries to sell weapons systems and components to Turkey has diminished as Ankara’s egregious human rights abuses at home and belligerent policy abroad have strained ties with its NATO allies. Many Western governments, including the United States, Canada, Germany, France, Spain, Sweden, and Austria, have instituted certain export restrictions on Turkey. These restrictions have incentivized Ankara to find alternate suppliers and to build a domestic arms industry capable of producing advanced weapons.
Turkey currently relies on alternate suppliers as a stopgap measure and as a source of technology while building up its domestic arms industry over the long-term. Ankara’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system and its interest in Moscow’s Su-35 fighters reflect Ankara’s shift to new defense partners. Turkey has been reasonably successful at reducing its dependency on arms imports, decreasing them by 59 percent in the five-year period of 2016-2020, as compared to 2011-2015. The government hopes that Turkey’s move toward self-sufficiency will eventually enable the country to pursue a foreign and security policy less restricted by its transatlantic allies.
The expansion of Turkey’s domestic arms industry is rooted not only in external factors, but also in domestic political concerns. The domestic production of advanced weapon systems has significant propaganda value, allowing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to claim he is restoring Turkey to great power status, reminiscent of the Ottoman Empire. While Ankara often announces breakthroughs and new systems and then fails to deliver them, building a potent domestic arms industry may allow that propaganda to become reality.
A strong domestic arms industry could also help lift Turkey’s struggling economy by boosting exports. The Turkish defense sector’s total exports from 2016 through 2020 increased by 30 percent compared to 2011 through 2015. Exports also provide much needed foreign currency in light of Turkey’s depleted net international reserves.
To date, the Turkish defense industry remains dependent on importing key inputs. The inability to produce engines is a major bottleneck that Ankara seeks to overcome. Turkey’s indigenous arms industry is heavily reliant on importing engines for drones, armored vehicles, and ships, which Ankara then exports as complete systems. Ukraine is the most promising partner for defense cooperation with Turkey. Open-source data indicates significant cooperation on engine manufacturing.
At the same time, Turkey is heavily reliant on the United States and Germany for engines that it puts into armored vehicles. In developing its Altay main battle tank, Ankara tried to source an engine from German tank manufacturer Rheinmetall, but was stymied by an unofficial German embargo following Turkish incursions into northern Syria. Turkey then turned to South Korean manufacturers Doosan and S&T Dynamics to supply Altay’s engine and transmission. Yet engine production remains a key vulnerability for the Turkish defense industry.
This report tracks recent trends in the Turkish defense industry and identifies the policy challenges it presents for the United States and its allies. Erdogan’s policies not only provide NATO’s adversaries with opportunities to exploit tensions within the transatlantic alliance, but also could lead to the proliferation of advanced capabilities to state and non-state actors that seek to challenge the United States. By wielding a mixture of positive and negative incentives and engaging with Turkey’s quasi-state defense industries to the exclusion of Erdogan’s loyalists, Washington can help deter Ankara from deepening its defense industry partnerships with Russia and other NATO adversaries. This could represent an important step toward bringing Turkey back into the NATO fold following a potential opposition victory in 2023.
24. Putin’s Real Fear: Ukraine’s Constitutional Order
This is what all authoritarian leaders fear. We need to use this to the advantage of the free world.
Conclusion:
So Putin’s war is a consequence of his fear that Russia as it is today will inevitably slip from his grasp and that more democratic-leaning leaders there, not just those in Ukraine, will one day petition to become members of NATO and that it will become a state of consent. If the West can protect Ukraine — with advanced anti-ship, anti-aircraft, and other defensive weapons, with a sustained airlift and land convoy of food and medicines, with global economic ostracism of Putin’s regime — that day will come.
Putin’s Real Fear: Ukraine’s Constitutional Order
March 24, 2022
March 24, 2022
Commentators analyzing Vladimir Putin’s motivations for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine often cite his claims that Ukraine’s NATO aspirations threatened to bring alliance bases to the frontier of Russia. Or they may point to statements and actions they think suggest he wants to resurrect the former Soviet Union or the Russian Empire. But if that is really what is driving Putin, why is there no indication that he has any territorial ambitions on Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and other former republics of the USSR. It’s Ukraine, not Turkmenistan. Russia is the dominant political force in the region; if it is trying to recreate the Soviet empire, why hasn’t it attempted to simply incorporate these other states? If they are already vassals, as some would say, why was Belarus the only former Soviet republic (other than Russia) to vote against the March 2 United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan abstained, while Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan did not vote.)
It is important for speculation about Putin’s imperial ambitions or his alleged concern about NATO not to deflect from a focus on what is the greatest animating fear for Putin: a liberal democracy on his doorstep in the form of the constitutional order of Ukraine.
That is why NATO – and especially the United States — must take a stand in Ukraine. Americans have been discouraged in recent years by repeated attacks on democracy the world over as well as in the United States. The democratic backsliding in Europe, such as in Hungary and Poland, has been particularly disheartening to many Americans, given the U.S. role in helping reunite Europe after the Cold War.
Now in Ukraine, an entire population, led by a courageous president, is risking its survival or being forced to flee horrific bombardment in a fight for democracy, for the ideals that Americans have so long espoused.
In contradiction to Putin’s claim that Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO poses a unique and looming threat to Russia’s frontier, seizing Ukraine would actually accomplish just that. If the invasion succeeds and Ukraine becomes a part of Russia, bases inside Poland or any other NATO countries neighboring Ukraine would then really be on Russia’s doorstep. In fact, Putin ignored all evidence that NATO had no plans to admit Ukraine anytime in the near future, and even furthered Ukraine’s aspirations to accession with his own actions in 2014, when he exponentially multiplied Ukraine’s – and Eastern Europe’s — security concerns by seizing Crimea and triggering the war in the Donbas.
For Putin, Ukraine has been the outlier. Ukraine has been pursuing freedom and democracy determinedly, though haltingly, on its own, and it has had a good deal of success. The fact that this democratic process has been playing out on Putin’s doorstep, perhaps most notably with the 2014 “Revolution of Dignity” against his stooge, then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, is terrifying to Putin.
In the information age, a state of terror such as the one that Putin’s Russia has become, cannot countenance states of consent, especially next door. It is Ukraine’s constitutional order — with its independent (though still troubled) judicial system, freedom of the press, multiparty politics, largely legitimate elections, vibrant civil society, and general respect for human rights — that Putin cannot tolerate, lest it provide too tempting an example for democratic activists in his own country who have vehemently opposed him at great risk to their lives and to the public in general that shares so many ties to the people in Ukraine. The “peaceful coexistence” of the Cold War is, in this respect, not acceptable to Putin.
Allowing Russia to advance its borders wouldn’t mollify Putin with some lessening of his perception of a national security threat, so long as each new border abuts the territory of a NATO member. In fact, Putin himself signaled as much in his December demands to the alliance, which included, for instance, that NATO withdraw infrastructure from its own member States in Eastern Europe.
The principal U.S. intention in agreeing to NATO’s expansion to the former Warsaw Pact countries beginning in 1999 was not to create a cordon sanitaire around Russia. Rather, the expansion was intended to shore up the nascent domestic movements toward liberal democracy within those former Soviet satellites. It was the constitutional, not the international, objective that drove NATO enlargement.
So Putin’s war is a consequence of his fear that Russia as it is today will inevitably slip from his grasp and that more democratic-leaning leaders there, not just those in Ukraine, will one day petition to become members of NATO and that it will become a state of consent. If the West can protect Ukraine — with advanced anti-ship, anti-aircraft, and other defensive weapons, with a sustained airlift and land convoy of food and medicines, with global economic ostracism of Putin’s regime — that day will come.
IMAGE: People take a knee during a moment of silence at a rally in support of Ukraine on Pennsylvania Ave in front of the White House in Washington, DC on March 13, 2022. (Photo by SAMUEL CORUM/AFP via Getty Images)
25. Ukraine’s Three-to-One Advantage
I of course strongly agree with Bonaparte's dictum about the moral. I think this is what will make Ukraine win. They are fighting for their freedom. I believe in the end this will be the decisive factor if.....However, we should not take this for granted and not help to properly equip them to fight and win. We need to ensure we provide them with the right weapons and equipment that will help them win.
Conclusion:
I wasn’t in a position to verify anything Jed told me, but he showed me a video he’d taken of himself in a trench, and based on that and details he provided about his time in the Marines, his story seemed credible. The longer we talked, the more the conversation veered away from the tangible, technical variables of Ukraine’s military capacity and toward the psychology of Ukraine’s military. Napoleon, who fought many battles in this part of the world, observed that “the moral is to the physical as three is to one.” I was thinking of this maxim as Jed and I finished our tea.
In Ukraine—at least in this first chapter of the war—Napoleon’s words have held true, proving in many ways decisive. In my earlier conversation with Zagorodnyuk, as he and I went through the many reforms and technologies that had given the Ukrainian military its edge, he was quick to point out the one variable he believed trumped all others. “Our motivation—it is the most important factor, more important than anything. We’re fighting for the lives of our families, for our people, and for our homes. The Russians don’t have any of that, and there’s nowhere they can go to get it.”
Ukraine’s Three-to-One Advantage
It’s not technology or tactics that has given Ukrainian fighters their greatest edge.
A few nights ago in Lviv, after an early dinner (restaurants shut at 8 p.m. because of curfew), I stepped into the elevator of my hotel. I was chatting with a colleague when a man in early middle age, dressed and equipped like a backpacker, thrust his hand into the closing door. “You guys American?” he asked. I told him we were, and as he reached for the elevator button, I couldn’t help but notice his dirty hands and the half-moons of filth beneath each fingernail. I also noticed his fleece. It had an eagle, a globe, and an anchor embossed on its left breast. “You a Marine?” I asked. He said he was (or had been—once a Marine, always a Marine), and I told him that I’d served in the Marines too.
He introduced himself (he’s asked that I not use his name, so let’s just call him Jed), and we did a quick swap of bona fides, exchanging the names of the units in which we’d both served as infantrymen a decade ago. Jed asked if I knew where he could get a cup of coffee, or at least a cup of tea. He had, after a 10-hour journey, only just arrived from Kyiv. He was tired and cold, and everything was closed.
A little cajoling persuaded the hotel restaurant to boil Jed a pot of water and hand him a few tea bags. When I wished him a good night, he asked if I wanted some tea too. The way he asked—like a kid pleading for a last story before bed—persuaded me to stay a little while longer. He wanted someone to talk with.
As Jed sat across from me in the empty restaurant, with his shoulders hunched forward over the table and his palms cupped around the tea, he explained that since arriving in Ukraine at the end of February, he had been fighting as a volunteer along with a dozen other foreigners outside Kyiv. The past three weeks had marked him. When I asked how he was holding up, he said the combat had been more intense than anything he’d witnessed in Afghanistan. He seemed conflicted, as if he wanted to talk about this experience, but not in terms that could turn emotional. Perhaps to guard against this, he began to discuss the technical aspects of what he’d seen, explaining in granular detail how the outmanned, outgunned Ukrainian military had fought the Russians to a standstill.
First, Jed wanted to discuss anti-armor weapons, particularly the American-made Javelin and the British-made NLAW. The past month of fighting had demonstrated that the balance of lethality had shifted away from armor, and toward anti-armor weapons. Even the most advanced armor systems, such as the Russian T-90 series main battle tank, had proved vulnerable, their charred husks littering Ukrainian roadways.
When I mentioned to Jed that I’d fought in Fallujah in 2004, he said that the tactics the Marine Corps used to take that city would never work today in Ukraine. In Fallujah, our infantry worked in close coordination with our premier tank, the M1A2 Abrams. On several occasions, I watched our tanks take direct hits from rocket-propelled grenades (typically older-generation RPG-7s) without so much as a stutter in their forward progress. Today, a Ukrainian defending Kyiv or any other city, armed with a Javelin or an NLAW, would destroy a similarly capable tank.
If the costly main battle tank is the archetypal platform of an army (as is the case for Russia and NATO), then the archetypal platform of a navy (particularly America’s Navy) is the ultra-costly capital ship, such as an aircraft carrier. Just as modern anti-tank weapons have turned the tide for the outnumbered Ukrainian army, the latest generation of anti-ship missiles (both shore- and sea-based) could in the future—say, in a place like the South China Sea or the Strait of Hormuz—turn the tide for a seemingly outmatched navy. Since February 24, the Ukrainian military has convincingly displayed the superiority of an anti-platform-centric method of warfare. Or, as Jed put it, “In Afghanistan, I used to feel jealous of those tankers, buttoned up in all that armor. Not anymore.”
This brought Jed to the second subject he wanted to discuss: Russian tactics and doctrine. He said he had spent much of the past few weeks in the trenches northwest of Kyiv. “The Russians have no imagination,” he said. “They would shell our positions, attack in large formations, and when their assaults failed, do it all over again. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians would raid the Russian lines in small groups night after night, wearing them down.” Jed’s observation echoed a conversation I’d had the day before with Andriy Zagorodnyuk. After Russia’s invasion of the Donbas in 2014, Zagorodnyuk oversaw a number of reforms to the Ukrainian military that are now bearing fruit, chief among them changes in Ukraine’s military doctrine; then, from 2019 to 2020, he served as minister of defense.
Russian doctrine relies on centralized command and control, while mission-style command and control—as the name suggests—relies on the individual initiative of every soldier, from the private to the general, not only to understand the mission but then to use their initiative to adapt to the exigencies of a chaotic and ever-changing battlefield in order to accomplish that mission. Although the Russian military has modernized under Vladimir Putin, it has never embraced the decentralized mission-style command-and-control structure that is the hallmark of NATO militaries, and that the Ukrainians have since adopted.
“The Russians don’t empower their soldiers,” Zagorodnyuk explained. “They tell their soldiers to go from Point A to Point B, and only when they get to Point B will they be told where to go next, and junior soldiers are rarely told the reason they are performing any task. This centralized command and control can work, but only when events go according to plan. When the plan doesn’t hold together, their centralized method collapses. No one can adapt, and you get things like 40-mile-long traffic jams outside Kyiv.”
The individual Russian soldier’s lack of knowledge corresponded with a story Jed told me, one that drove home the consequences of this lack of knowledge on the part of individual Russian soldiers. During a failed night assault on his trench, a group of Russian soldiers got lost in the nearby woods. “Eventually, they started calling out,” he said. “I couldn’t help it; I felt bad. They had no idea where to go.”
When I asked what happened to them, he returned a grim look.
Instead of recounting that part of the story, he described the advantage Ukrainians enjoy in night-vision technology. When I told him I’d heard the Ukrainians didn’t have many sets of night-vision goggles, he said that was true, and that they did need more. “But we’ve got Javelins. Everyone’s talking about the Javelins as an anti-tank weapon, but people forget that the Javelins also have a CLU.”
The CLU, or command launch unit, is a highly capable thermal optic that can operate independent of the missile system. In Iraq and Afghanistan, we would often carry at least one Javelin on missions, not because we expected to encounter any al-Qaeda tanks, but because the CLU was such an effective tool. We’d use it to watch road intersections and make sure no one was laying down IEDs. The Javelin has a range in excess of a mile, and the CLU is effective at that distance and beyond.
I asked Jed at what ranges they were engaging the Russians. “Typically, the Ukrainians would wait and ambush them pretty close.” When I asked how close, he answered, “Sometimes scary close.” He described one Ukrainian, a soldier he and a few other English speakers had nicknamed “Maniac” because of the risks he’d take engaging Russian armor. “Maniac was the nicest guy, totally mild-mannered. Then in a fight, the guy turned into a psycho, brave as hell. And then after a fight, he’d go right back to being this nice, mild-mannered guy.”
I wasn’t in a position to verify anything Jed told me, but he showed me a video he’d taken of himself in a trench, and based on that and details he provided about his time in the Marines, his story seemed credible. The longer we talked, the more the conversation veered away from the tangible, technical variables of Ukraine’s military capacity and toward the psychology of Ukraine’s military. Napoleon, who fought many battles in this part of the world, observed that “the moral is to the physical as three is to one.” I was thinking of this maxim as Jed and I finished our tea.
In Ukraine—at least in this first chapter of the war—Napoleon’s words have held true, proving in many ways decisive. In my earlier conversation with Zagorodnyuk, as he and I went through the many reforms and technologies that had given the Ukrainian military its edge, he was quick to point out the one variable he believed trumped all others. “Our motivation—it is the most important factor, more important than anything. We’re fighting for the lives of our families, for our people, and for our homes. The Russians don’t have any of that, and there’s nowhere they can go to get it.”
26. Russian Ship Burning in Ukraine Harbor, Hit by Missile Strike
This is an excellent operation however the Ukrainians did it. It points a nice counterpoint on what happened to the island guards who told the Russian ship to "F*** You."
Russian Ship Burning in Ukraine Harbor, Hit by Missile Strike
Ukrainian forces destroyed a large Russian landing ship Thursday, March 24, leaving the ship burning at its pier after a missile strike at the Ukrainian port of Berdyansk, about 50 miles southwest of the besieged city of Mariupol.
A Ukrainian general confirmed the strike to Coffee or Die Magazine. Brig. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, chief of Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, told Coffee or Die that Ukrainian forces had hit a Russian Alligator-class landing ship with a land-based rocket while it was docked at Berdyansk. Though only lightly armed, such a ship carries troops and materiel. With a capacity of about 1,000 tons, the 1960s-era ship could carry as many as 20 modern tanks, though it was unknown what was on board when the vessel was hit.
A Russian cargo ship burns at the port of Berdyansk, struck by a Ukrainian missile, while a second Russian cargo ship sails away, with a plume of smoke emerging from its bow. Video capture from Twitter.
Budanov would not say how the Ukrainians had targeted the ship but provided videos and pictures of what appeared to be an explosion on the ship at or soon after impact. Those videos matched extensive video of the burning ship shared on social media outlets, including Twitter, Telegram, and TikTok, which appeared to show the ship suffering a series of explosions after being hit, consistent with fire consuming stores of ammunition, fuel, or other explosive material on board.
***BREAKING***
Now beyond any reasonable doubt that a #Russian Navy Alligator Class landing ship exploded in #Berdiansk, Ukraine
Reportedly a Ukrainian ballistic missile strike. Two Ropucha Class ships also present, observed sailing away as fire raged pic.twitter.com/eg8kXp6jfy
Other ships identified as Russian cargo transports were seen steaming out of the harbor as the stricken ship burned.
Ukrainian Brig. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov provided this picture to Coffee or Die of a large explosion on board a Russian Alligator-class landing ship burning in Berdyansk harbor after being struck with a Ukrainian missile.
The stricken ship is relatively small — about 100 meters long, roughly akin to a larger US Coast Guard cutter, but only about a third the size of equivalent ships in the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command — but its loss could prove a major setback to Russian logistics if its navy is unable to reliably land supplies at the port. Berdyansk is one of the few ports in Ukraine under Russian control, while the major port cities of Odesa and Mariupol remain in Ukrainian hands.
Budanov would not say what kind of ground-launched missile had been used in the attack, but a Twitter post from Elint News, which tracks weapons and equipment used in Ukraine, noted a Russian-language post on Telegram from Saturday that appeared to capture wreckage from a Tochka-U short-range ballistic missile on the ground at Berdyansk.
On March 19th RT reported posted footage of the remains of a Ukrainian Tochka-U short-range ballistic missile reportedly at the port in Berdyansk which was said to be shot down, meaning Tochka-U’s were in range of the port a few days ago. https://t.co/jx4DmxsOkN pic.twitter.com/IQpxrbRo7f
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27. Russian warship, Go F**k Yourself – A Short History of Wartime Taunts
Russian warship, Go F**k Yourself – A Short History of Wartime Taunts | Small Wars Journal
Russian warship, Go F**k Yourself – A Short History of Wartime Taunts
By William Plowright
In the days following the launch of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, one particular event quickly went viral. In the story, on February 24th a Russian naval vessel radioed a group of Ukrainian soldiers stationed on the unpopulated Snake Island, ordering them to surrender or face death. Though vastly overpowered, the Ukrainian soldiers radioed back their simple response; “Russian warship, go f*** yourself.” According to the story, the small group of thirteen soldiers were obliterated by the firepower.
The story was later amended, as more information became available. The group were actually border guards, and not soldiers. They all lived, and were taken prisoner by the Russians. But the story had already taken flight and gained its own meaning beyond the literal events of what actually happened. The Ukrainian Postal service adopted the phrase as its slogan, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy promised to award the highest possible honour – Hero of Ukraine – to all thirteen men.
All armies have their battle cry, from the cry of Clan Cameron of Scotland’s Western Highlands crying “Chlanna nan con thigibh a’ so ‘s gheibh sibh feòil! (“Sons of the hounds, come here and get flesh!” to the high-pitched Confederate “Rebel Yell” from the American Civil War of 1861 to 1965. Research has shown that battle cries are ubiquitous across human cultures in one form or another, and serve a variety of roles, from raising morale, to coordinating action, or to motivate combatants before launching an attack.
And they work. Fighting in Myanmar in the Second World War in 1943, Victoria Cross winner Halvaldar Gaje Ghale charged Japanese machine guns at the top of a hill, covered in blood from his wounds, screaming the Gurkha war cry “Ayo Gorkhali!” (“Here come the Gurkhas”), as he led his outnumbered men into a brutal hand-to-hand skirmish that they eventually won. The power of the battle cry can not be denied.
Come and Taken Them
The wartime taunt, is a slightly different variation of the battle cry, intended to poke humour at one’s enemy, to show confidence in the face of threat. Whereas a battle cry may be to rally troops, a war taunt is often a response, especially one to in the face of potential loss. No one seems courageous or noble when taunting a weaker opponent but taunting a more powerful rival can be unifying. Humor has long been noted to be an integral part of military culture, including dark humor in the face of death or loss.
One of the most famous war taunts in history is undoubtedly that of Spartan King Leonidas, Battle of Thermopylae during the Second Persian Invasion of Greece in 480 BCE. When ordered by the Persian invaders to “Hand over your arms”, the Spartan King famously replied “come and take them.” The taunt in Greek (μολὼν λαβέ, or Molon Iabe) has such a place in history, that it has come to mean many things to many people. One example is the American pro-gun lobby, who splatters the phrase on t-shirts alongside MAGA slogans, supposedly in opposition to some elite that is planning to restrict their right to bear arms.
Nuts
As technology has developed, war taunts have been spread over larger distance. The invention of the telegraph and radio fundamentally changed warfare, allowing not only greater coordination between opponents, but also allowing them to communicate with each other from distance.
In 1944 as the Allied forces advanced into Germany, they met resistance in the Battle of the Bulge, as the German offensive known as the Battle of the Bulge. The German commander sent a somewhat eloquent telegram for the American General George S. Patton to surrender, saying: “The fortune of war is changing… There is only one possibility to save the encircled U.S.A. troops from total annihilation: that is the honorable surrender of the encircled town.” Patton sent his response to the Germans in a single word; “Nuts.”
As we have entered the era of the internet, and social media online discourse has trended towards confrontation, and violent conflicts are fundamentally changing as confrontation moves from the battlefield to the Twittersphere.
Idiots
In 2015, as the Islamic State rose to power in Syria and Iraq, the online hacktivist collective known as Anonymous declared war on the brutal insurgent group. This confrontation took place completely online, and Islamic State could have been rightly concerned about the effects that a massive international cyber attack could cause. The Islamic State, perhaps, unconsciously echoing Patton, tweeted their taunt to Anonymous’ announcement in a single word, “Idiots.”
Although the crisis in Ukraine is still relatively young, the narrative so far has been passionate Ukrainian resistance in the face of Russian aggression and incompetence. Few things sum this up as well as the slogan “Russian Warship, Go Fuck Yourself.”
But it is worth remembering what sometimes happens to those who lead with taunts. The Spartan soldiers were slaughtered in the Battle of Thermopylae. Leonidas himself was beheaded, and Persians did indeed take his weapons. The Islamic State’s confidence to stand up to the world seems arrogant and naive in retrospect, and their fate is well known.
Whereas people all over the world may take solace in the Ukrainian response of “Russian warship, go f*** yourself”, it is worth remembering that stories about taunts to superior forces often end in tragedy and not comedy.
About the Author(s)
William Plowright
I am currently a Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at Durham University. I have also worked as an aid worker for the last ten years in Syria (during the Russian intervention), as well as in Afghanistan, DRC, Yemen, Palestine, Libya, CAR and others. I have published a book with Routledge on Armed Groups (based on research in Syria), with a second book coming out later this year. I have written for The Conversation.
https://will-plowright.com/
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
