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Quotes of the Day:
“Free men cannot start a war, but once it is started, they can fight on in defeat. Herd men, followers of a leader, cannot do that, and so it is always the herd men who win battles and the free men who win wars.”
- John Steinbeck, The Moon Is Down
"The public as a mass does not think, will not defend what it believes, and will not analyze the propaganda which is constantly in circulation against any public man who refuses to play along with the gang."
- Manly Palmer Hall
“The evil was not in bread and circuses, per se, but in the willingness of the people to sell their rights as free men for full bellies and the excitement of games which would serve to distract them from the other human hungers, which bread and circuses can never appease.”
-Marcus Tullius Cicero
1. UNSC virtually 'paralyzed' in dealing with N.K. provocations; S. Korea to urge China, Russia to play constructive role: FM
2. N. Korea claims dam collapse in Ukraine occurred with Washington, Kyiv in 'cahoots'
3. S. Korean foreign ministry summons Chinese envoy in protest of comments on Seoul-Washington ties
4. S. Korea aims to form 'healthy' relationship with China: security adviser
5. S. Korea offers to return body of presumed N. Korean man found near western island
6. Navigating South Korea’s Plan for Preemption
7. A chain of North Korean defections is anticipated
8. China reaches out to Korean Assembly to counterweigh Yoon's bet on US
9. S. Korea may see rise in NK defectors as Pyongyang mulls reopening borders
10. There’s history behind S Korea’s nuclear desire
11. China ties will be on equal footing: Yoon’s adviser
12. Kim Yo Jong: The most powerful woman in North Korea
13. 'Dollarization' of North Korean economy, once vital, now potential threat to Kim's rule
14. Captain takes over Naval Forces Korea with his promotion held up over abortion policy
15. North Korea punishes ‘anti-socialist’ behavior with forced farm labor
1. UNSC virtually 'paralyzed' in dealing with N.K. provocations; S. Korea to urge China, Russia to play constructive role: FM
While we can say that China and Russia are paralyzing the UNSC, I think the better way to describe the situation is the China and Russia are not only complicit in sanctions evasion activities, they are complicit in north Korea's human right abuses and crimes against humanity. The responsibility for the security situation in the region should fall squeaky on the shoulders of the PRC and Russia. Of course they will counter and say it is the US hostile policy but our policy is about defending the freedom of South Korea and preventing war. It is Kim Jong Un who postures for war and receives the support of the PRC and Russia
(Yonhap Interview) UNSC virtually 'paralyzed' in dealing with N.K. provocations; S. Korea to urge China, Russia to play constructive role: FM | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 장동우 · June 9, 2023
By Chang Dong-woo
SEOUL, June 9 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's top diplomat has said the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) remains essentially paralyzed in terms of dealing with illegal provocations by North Korea, and stressed Seoul's intention to urge China and Russia to play a constructive role within the system.
In an exclusive interview with Yonhap News Agency on Thursday, Foreign Minister Park Jin noted the UNSC as being the "highest decision-making body of the U.N." but that its functions are "virtually paralyzed in regards to dealing with illegal provocations (by the North)."
The minister was apparently alluding to repeated oppositions by China and Russia, two of the five permanent members of the council with veto power, to impose additional sanctions on Pyongyang over evolving threats.
Pyongyang fired 69 ballistic missiles in 2022 alone, setting a new annual record of ballistic missile tests that far exceeded the previous record of 25.
South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin speaks during an interview with Yonhap News Agency at his office in Seoul on June 8, 2023. (Yonhap)
"I believe that continuing in this manner is not desirable for international peace and security," Park said.
The minister added that Seoul, which was newly elected as a nonpermanent member of the council for 2024-25, intends to "urge China and Russia to play a constructive role" to address the North's threats from both inside and outside the council.
This marks the third time for South Korea to serve as one of the 10 nonpermanent UNSC members. It first held a seat during the 1996-97 term. Since then, the country has seen a dramatic growth in its stature and strength on the global stage, Park assessed.
He noted that with South Korea's election to the Security Council, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration's "Global Pivotal State" diplomacy has moved into full gear and that Seoul should become more engaged diplomatically with the international community backed by its enhanced national strength.
The Global Pivotal State is the foreign policy slogan of the Yoon administration, highlighting the country's commitment to playing a more active role in tackling regional and global challenges.
Park said it was imperative for Seoul to "fulfill the responsibilities and obligations embedded in the spirit of the U.N. Charter, such as those of peace, human rights and development."
On the likely trilateral summit involving South Korea, the United States and Japan in Washington later this year, Park said the exact timing of the gathering has yet to be determined. He expected related consultations to proceed while taking into consideration each country's situation.
In this file photo, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (R) speaks with U.S. President Joe Biden (L) and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida ahead of their three-way talks in Hiroshima, Japan, on May 21, 2023. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
Park said he expects Yoon, and his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, Joe Biden and Fumio Kishida, respectively, to discuss various current issues based on common interests and benefits in their prospective meeting.
On South Korea's alliance with the U.S., which celebrates its 70th anniversary this year, Park said ensuring the establishment and joint operation of their envisioned new Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) was a key priority of the government.
Park, however, added he did not rule out the possibility of cooperating with friendly nations in the region, such as Japan, in responding to the shared threats of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities if necessary.
"Once the NCG between South Korea and the U.S. is well established, I believe that it would be possible to discuss such a cooperative relationship with Japan as well," he said.
On the prospects of inter-Korean dialogue, Park said South Korea "is always open for talks with North Korea."
South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin (L) speaks during an interview with Yonhap News Agency at his office in Seoul on June 8, 2023. (Yonhap)
Observers, in particular, are keeping close tabs on whether Park meets with North Korea's top diplomat, Choe Son-hui, at this year's ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) expected to be held next month in Indonesia.
"I do not want to speculate on whether North Korean officials will attend this year's ARF or not. However, if there is an opportunity for dialogue with North Korea, I would like to engage in open and frank discussions on measures to achieve progress in denuclearization based on my government's 'Audacious Initiative,'" Park said.
The initiative, publicly proposed by Yoon last year, promises to offer economic incentives to North Korea in return for Pyongyang's commitment to denuclearization.
Regarding Japan's plan to release contaminated water from the crippled Fukushima nuclear power plant, the minister said the government's priority at the moment was to wait for the results of the recent on-site visit by South Korean experts and that by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
"(The government) will announce the results of a comprehensive safety assessment. If there are any issues identified during the safety review, we will raise them with the Japanese side and engage in sufficient consultations," Park said.
odissy@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 장동우 · June 9, 2023
2. N. Korea claims dam collapse in Ukraine occurred with Washington, Kyiv in 'cahoots'
The Propaganda and Agitation Department are now writing pure fiction, creating new stories out of whole cloth.
For your reading pleasure the actual KCNA report is pasted below the Yonhap article.
Excerpt:
The collapse of the Kakhovka dam is "nothing but another farce and the second 'Nord Stream' case cooked up by the U.S. and Ukraine in cahoots to shift the responsibility for humanitarian disaster onto Russia and create a political and military environment favorable for the so-called counteroffensive operation of Ukraine," Ri said.
N. Korea claims dam collapse in Ukraine occurred with Washington, Kyiv in 'cahoots' | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · June 9, 2023
SEOUL, June 9 (Yonhap) -- North Korea claimed Friday the latest collapse of a dam in Ukraine was the result of a scheme cooked up by Washington and Kyiv in "cahoots" to shift responsibility for the humanitarian disaster to Russia amid Moscow's war with Ukraine.
The North said the U.S., Ukraine and other western countries are "basely" passing on all responsibility for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam to Russia at a time when the world is concerned about humanitarian and material damage by the incident, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
In an article carried by the KCNA, O Song-jin, a researcher at the North's Institute of International Studies, described the dam collapse as the second case of "Nord Stream" blasts.
Blasts occurred in September last year that ruptured Nord Stream natural gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea linking Russia and Germany, but who was behind the explosion has yet to be determined.
The collapse of the Kakhovka dam is "nothing but another farce and the second 'Nord Stream' case cooked up by the U.S. and Ukraine in cahoots to shift the responsibility for humanitarian disaster onto Russia and create a political and military environment favorable for the so-called counteroffensive operation of Ukraine," Ri said.
He also said Ukraine is "fully motivated to commit such hideous crimes with the connivance of the U.S.," given that the explosion inflicted huge damage in what it called the Ukraine regions newly integrated into Russia.
The Kakhovka dam in southern Ukraine, which is located on the Dnipro River in an area controlled by Russia, collapsed Tuesday, causing massive flooding and triggering residents' evacuation. Ukraine and Russia have blamed each other for the disaster.
This photo, provided by the Associated Press on June 8, 2023, shows a village in Kherson of Ukraine, an area controlled by Russia, which was flooded by the collapse of the Kakhovka dam. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · June 9, 2023
Kakhovka Dam Collapse is Only Second Nord Stream Case: Int'l Affairs Analyst of DPRK
https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1686273142-233310586/kakhovka-dam-collapse-is-only-second-nord-stream-case-intl-affairs-analyst-of-dprk/
Date: 09/06/2023 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) | Read original version at source
Pyongyang, June 9 (KCNA) -- O Song Jin, a researcher at the Institute of International Studies of the DPRK, issued the following article titled "The collapse of the Kakhovka dam is only the second Nord Stream case" on Friday:
The dam of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant on the lower River Dnipro in Ukraine collapsed on June 6, sparking off great uneasiness and concern of the international community.
More than half of the floodgates of the dam of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant were severely damaged and a large amount of water in the reservoir was discharged, resulting in over 10 meters rise in the water level of the River Dnipro, inundating thousands of houses and causing over 20 000 flood victims.
The international community is expressing serious concern, saying that the principal dam, which had been used to supply drinking and irrigational water to one of the three main granaries of the world, was destroyed to cause serious humanitarian and ecological environment damage and that it might trigger the worldwide increase of grain prices.
At the time when the whole world is concerned about human and material losses caused by the dam's collapse, Ukraine and the U.S. and other Western countries are basely moving to shift all responsibilities onto Russia.
The Zelenskiy authorities are trying to shift the blame for the collapse of the Kakhovka dam onto Russia, claiming that Russia exploded the dam from its inside. And the U.S. and Western media are spreading the absurd rumor that the recent incident was a deliberate destruction by Russia aimed at checking the Ukrainian army's counterattack expected in the southern region.
But the awl in the sack can never be hidden.
Zelenskiy, who likes to bluff, said that the collapse of the dam would have no effect on Ukraine's efforts for restoring its territory, only to self-deny the assertion that Russia had destroyed the dam to prevent the advance of the Ukrainian troops.
As for the Ukrainian army's counterattack the Kiev clique is loudly talking about, it is not so great for Russia to take such clumsy measures as destroying the dam in its hands.
Although the Ukrainian army launched a large-scale ground attack some days ago, it is only losing thousands of troops, tens of tanks, armored cars and many other weapons and equipment every day, far from breaking through the Russian armed forces' defense line.
This shows that the counteroffensive operations of the Zelenskiy clique, which had been allegedly prepared for a long time under the military support of the United States and the West, are being frustrated before the impregnable defence line of the heroic Russian army.
Under such circumstances, the assertion of the Kiev authorities and the West that Russia is trying to inundate by itself the areas of the powerful defense zone built with much effort and greet the Ukrainian army's counterattack cannot be viewed otherwise than invalid sophism.
On the other hand, taking into account the fact that the explosion of the dam caused the paralysis of Russia's drinking water supply system for the Republic of Crimea and inflicted huge material damage on the peaceable residents in the region that was newly integrated into Russia, the Zelenskiy authorities are fully motivated to commit such hideous crimes with the connivance of the U.S.
It is not fortuitous that on the day when the dam of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant collapsed, The Washington Post reported that CIA had known about the plan of the Ukrainian special operation group to blow up gas pipelines three months before the underwater explosion of a "Nord Stream" gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea last year, the cause of which has not yet been clarified.
This is undeniable evidence proving the international community's view that the U.S. and Ukraine were behind the case of the explosion of the "Nord Stream" gas pipeline which had been used to supply Russian natural gas to Western Europe.
It is self-evident who is vitally interested in the recent humanitarian disaster, in the light of the sinister intention of Ukraine making desperate efforts to accuse Russia of war crimes by employing all means and methods and of the intention of Russia adjusting the intensity of its military operations to prevent damage to peaceable residents as much as possible.
The case of the collapsed Kakhovka dam is, after all, nothing but another farce and the second "Nord Stream" case cooked up by the U.S. and Ukraine in cahoots to shift the blame for humanitarian disaster onto Russia and create a political and military environment favorable for the so-called counteroffensive operation of Ukraine.
All facts go to prove once again before the world that the Zelenskiy clique is the horde of hooligans who unhesitatingly sacrifice the lives of innocent peaceable residents to prolong their political remaining days.
So, it doesn't matter to say that the responsibility for all the sudden cases that would occur in relation with the Ukrainian situation in the future rests, in any case, with the Ukrainian authorities and the U.S. controlling them.
No matter how hard the U.S. and the Zelenskiy authorities try to confuse right and wrong, their trick can never blind the stern eyes of the international community.
The unethical crimes of the U.S. and the Kiev authorities that caused a grave humanitarian disaster to gratify their unjust interests should be certainly punished by justice.
The Zelenskiy clique, which has driven the destiny of the country and nation into the mire of war with the backing of foreign forces, is bound to meet doom in "Noah's flood". -0-
www.kcna.kp (Juche112.6.9.)
3. S. Korean foreign ministry summons Chinese envoy in protest of comments on Seoul-Washington ties
Just as a reminder of CHinese foreign policy principles.
The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non- interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
Who does or does not adhere to diplomatic norms?
Excerpts:
During the meeting, Xing called for Seoul's support for Beijing's "One China" principle, claiming Seoul-Beijing relations have recently faced "external challenges."
Chang warned the remarks were in potential violation of the Vienna Convention, which regulates the mission of promoting friendly relations of diplomatic envoys, and that it could be seen as interference of South Korea's domestic politics.
Foreign Minister Park Jin also strongly criticized Xing's remarks, saying the ambassador "went too far."
"There are diplomatic norms, and the role of an ambassador is to enhance friendship, not to spread misunderstandings," Park told reporters after speaking at a forum in Seou
S. Korean foreign ministry summons Chinese envoy in protest of comments on Seoul-Washington ties | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 장동우 · June 9, 2023
SEOUL, June 9 (Yonhap) -- The foreign ministry summoned the top Chinese envoy to South Korea on Friday to lodge a complaint over the ambassador's controversial remarks on South Korea's ties with the United States, denouncing the comments as interference of internal affairs.
First Vice Foreign Minister Chang Ho-jin called in Chinese Ambassador Xing Haiming earlier in the day, and "sternly warned" against the envoy's "unreasonable and provocative" remarks, the ministry said in a message to reporters.
The move came a day after Xing expressed his discontent with South Korea's diplomacy with the U.S. and that Seoul may wrongly bet on U.S.-China competition during a meeting with opposition leader Lee Jae-myung.
During the meeting, Xing called for Seoul's support for Beijing's "One China" principle, claiming Seoul-Beijing relations have recently faced "external challenges."
Chang warned the remarks were in potential violation of the Vienna Convention, which regulates the mission of promoting friendly relations of diplomatic envoys, and that it could be seen as interference of South Korea's domestic politics.
Foreign Minister Park Jin also strongly criticized Xing's remarks, saying the ambassador "went too far."
"There are diplomatic norms, and the role of an ambassador is to enhance friendship, not to spread misunderstandings," Park told reporters after speaking at a forum in Seoul.
Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Xing Haiming (L) speaks with Lee Jae-myung, leader of the main opposition Democratic Party, before their dinner meeting at the envoy's residence in Seoul on June 8, 2023. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
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en.yna.co.kr · by 장동우 · June 9, 2023
4. S. Korea aims to form 'healthy' relationship with China: security adviser
Confident diplomacy means the ROK will stand up to China and defend ROK values and interests and not bow to Chinese demands.
Excerpts:
"Relationships between countries should be based on mutual respect," Cho said in a keynote speech for a conference to assess the first-year diplomacy and security policy of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration.
"We will form healthy South Korea-China relations through a 'confident' diplomacy that is befitting to the increased national power of the Republic of Korea and the expectations of the people," he said.
When we examine ROK-PRC relations we should consider the new ROK NSS.
Excerpts here:
China: We aim to foster a healthier and
more mature relationship with China built on mutual respect and reciprocity.
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992, the ROK- China relationship has experienced remarkable progress in various fields over the past 30 years. Korea and China should now move beyond quantitative growth and make qualitative strides, collaborating closely on a global scale in accordance with their international standings.
Enhancing strategic communication and expanding tangible cooperation with a public impact
Diverse communication between Korea and China is essential to further develop a mature and healthy bilateral relationship. To achieve this, we intend to actively promote exchanges and communication at various levels, including mutual visits and regular communication between top leaders and foreign ministers, strategic dialogues between vice ministers of foreign affairs, and vice-minister-level diplomatic and security dialogues.
Additionally, the government will strive to achieve visible results in areas where the public can directly feel the impact of cooperation, such as supply chain management, FTA follow-up negotiations, fine dust, and climate change. We will also actively seek to enhance people- to-people and cultural content exchanges to strengthen our relationship.
Safeguarding national interests with confident diplomacy anchored in principles
The government is committed to addressing matters related to our sovereignty, rights, and interests in a consistent and resolute manner based on national interests and principles. At the same time, we will reinforce a continuous communication system for effectively managing current issues. Specifically, we will make it clear that the THAAD deployment is a matter of our security sovereignty.
S. Korea aims to form 'healthy' relationship with China: security adviser | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이민지 · June 9, 2023
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, June 9 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's national security adviser said Friday the country aims to establish a "healthy" relationship with China, stressing that "mutual respect" should be the foundation for such bilateral ties.
National Security Adviser Cho Tae-yong made the remarks at a forum a day after Chinese Ambassador to Seoul Xing Haiming expressed his discontent with South Korea's diplomacy with the U.S. during a meeting with opposition leader Lee Jae-myung.
During the meeting, Xing called for Seoul's support for Beijing's "One China" principle, claiming that Seoul-Beijing relations have recently faced "external challenges."
"Relationships between countries should be based on mutual respect," Cho said in a keynote speech for a conference to assess the first-year diplomacy and security policy of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration.
"We will form healthy South Korea-China relations through a 'confident' diplomacy that is befitting to the increased national power of the Republic of Korea and the expectations of the people," he said.
Cho also hinted the government may protest Xing's remarks through its diplomatic channels. When asked about what he meant by mutual respect, Cho told reporters that the foreign ministry will "take good care" of the issue.
National Security Adviser Cho Tae-young delivers a keynote speech during a conference on June 9, 2023, assessing the first-year diplomacy and security policy of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration. (Yonhap)
Cho, meanwhile, lambasted North Korea's nuclear and missile developments as the "most immediate" and "substantive" security threat that has also jeopardized the lives of the North Korean people.
The conservative Yoon administration has taken a stern stance in dealing with the secretive regime's human rights violations since taking power in May last year.
"While the North Korean regime is carried away with its missile and nuclear developments, its people are suffering from the worst economic crisis and human rights violations," Cho said, noting that Pyongyang's botched attempt to launch what it claimed to be a satellite-carrying rocket cost what could have fed its people for 10 months.
The security adviser called for having a "clear perception" on which country is an "enemy" that threatens Seoul's survival and security and which country will stand with Seoul against such threats.
"To guard universal values, like freedom, human rights and rule of law, as well as an international order, based on principles and rules, our government will cooperate with other countries that can share values and pursue shared interests," he said.
Against such a backdrop, Cho said that Seoul will move to further advance its strategic alliance with Washington. He also assessed that the recent move to mend ties with Tokyo, stemming from the growing need for bilateral cooperation, is making swift developments.
Principal National Deputy Security Adviser Kim Tae-hyo reaffirmed the importance of freedom as a key policy goal.
"In terms of diplomacy in the Republic of Korea, the value of freedom is not simply an issue of style or personal preference but a matter of decisive interest and survival," Kim said in the luncheon address, stressing that only countries with freedom can achieve technological and economic developments.
Key officials and participants pose for a photo during a conference assessing the first-year diplomacy and security policy of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration on June 9, 2023. (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 이민지 · June 9, 2023
5. S. Korea offers to return body of presumed N. Korean man found near western island
Regarding north Korea not responding to phone calls, in the past the duty officers have resorted to sending messages via bullhorn.
Excerpts:
She called on the North to swiftly clarify whether it will accept the body through the now-suspended inter-Korean liaison communication channel.
The ministry was not able to send a related notice to the North as the secretive regime has remained unresponsive to daily routine calls with South Korea through the liaison communication channel since April.
(LEAD) S. Korea offers to return body of presumed N. Korean man found near western island | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · June 9, 2023
(ATTN: CHANGES headline; UPDATES with minor edit throughout)
SEOUL, June 9 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's unification ministry said Friday it plans to send back the body of a presumed North Korean man found near a western island in May.
The body was discovered in waters off Ganghwa Island in the Yellow Sea on May 19 and the man, believed to be in his 20s or 30s, seems to be a North Korean, given his belongings, according to the ministry.
"The government plans to send the body and his belongings at 3 p.m. on June 16 via the border village of Panmunjom on humanitarian grounds," Lee Hyo-jung, the ministry's deputy spokesperson, said at a regular press briefing.
She called on the North to swiftly clarify whether it will accept the body through the now-suspended inter-Korean liaison communication channel.
The ministry was not able to send a related notice to the North as the secretive regime has remained unresponsive to daily routine calls with South Korea through the liaison communication channel since April.
His belongings discovered by South Korean military officials included a North Korean train ticket. Items suspected to be drugs were also founded, but a forensic probe showed drug-related substances were not detected.
In November last year, the government proposed to return the body of a presumed North Korean woman found near the inter-Korean border in July. But the South cremated the body as the North did not respond to the South's offer.
Since 2010, the ministry has sent back a total of 23 bodies of North Koreans who were found in the South, most recently in November 2019.
This photo, taken Jan. 20, 2023, shows Lee Hyo-jung, deputy spokesperson at South Korea's unification ministry, speaking at a regular press briefing. (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · June 9, 2023
6. Navigating South Korea’s Plan for Preemption
Important analysis and discussion. I am not sure we should read too much into the emerging ROK Strategic Command. I also do not think it is necessary for the Kim regime to use the Strategic Command as justification for more nuclear weapons. They are going to build their arsenal whether there is a Strategic command or not. If asked another way – e.g., if the ROK stopped its development of its Strategic Command would the regime halt its nuclear weapons development? I think not.
Conclusion:
The U.S. government’s concerns about escalation on the Korean Peninsula are not new. However, these historic concerns have been reinforced by the Yoon administration’s rhetoric regarding preemption, along with North Korea’s nuclear advances and continued tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
South Korea’s Strategic Command is a hedging strategy, designed to ensure that the leadership in Seoul can act promptly during a crisis without interference from the United States. This approach is not necessarily due to a lack of trust in America’s extended nuclear deterrence. Instead, South Korea’s leadership appears to believe it cannot necessarily trust the United States to act quickly during a crisis. For one, U.S. attention and resources could be pulled elsewhere to another contingency. Moreover, given the simple fact that no matter how much deeper the alliance consults within the Nuclear Consultative Group, any possible decision to use nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula will be made in Washington by an American leader — current and future.
The constant talk of preemption, however, provides easy justification for North Korea to continually build more nuclear weapons. The result is that both sides may now be incentivized to adopt a “go-first” mentality during a crisis. As Ankit Panda rightly notes, this raises the possibility of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un adopting more dangerous command and control practices in a crisis, like delegating nuclear authority so North Korea’s weapons can be used even if he is incapacitated or killed.
The development of Strategic Command, although understandable, quickens the pace of the decades-old security dilemmas on the Korean Peninsula, narrows the most critical decision-making windows, and crowds out opportunities for diplomacy. The explicit mention of South Korea’s Strategic Command in the Washington Declaration may indicate the alliance is gearing up to navigate these dilemmas in a more mature manner. The urgency of the environment certainly requires it but also underscores just how fragile the current status quo is on the peninsula.
Navigating South Korea’s Plan for Preemption - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Clint Work · June 9, 2023
South Korea has invested in systems designed to preempt North Korean nuclear launch and attack missiles before they are launched and the leadership and command and control nodes that support Pyongyang’s weapons of mass destruction enterprise. This system is a network of interlinked offensive and defensive missiles and multidomain platforms and ultimately is undergirded by the assurance that South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has sought since winning election: A more robust nuclear guarantee from the United States.
The Biden administration has sought to manage South Korea’s interest in both nuclear weapons and preemption since taking office. And, in April, the two sides reached agreement on the first-ever standalone alliance document issued at the presidential level solely devoted to the U.S. extended deterrence commitment to South Korea. The Washington Declaration’s takeaway was the establishment of an alliance Nuclear Consultative Group, signaling a potentially unprecedented level of bilateral consultation surrounding U.S. nuclear policy and planning. However, the declaration’s mention of the Republic of Korea’s yet-to-be established Strategic Command, dubbed ROK STRATCOM for short, has received minimal attention. The Biden administration’s effort to link this command with Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command suggests that Washington is willing to offer more concrete assurances to Seoul but also wants to try and limit escalation in the event of a crisis.
South Korea’s Strategic Command aims to enhance the country’s nonnuclear strategic deterrence in different ways. First, it seeks to bolster deterrence by denial — to deter North Korea’s nuclear and unconventional threats by making them infeasible or unlikely to succeed. The goal is to undermine North Korean confidence that it can achieve its objectives through nuclear coercion. Second, Strategic Command would enhance deterrence by punishment by threatening to impose substantial costs up to and including decapitation strikes against North Korean leadership in the event of North Korean nuclear or weapons of mass destruction use against South Korea.
Become a Member
Even for the most focused Korea watchers, it was noteworthy that Korea’s Strategic Command was included in the declaration. So, what is this seemingly obscure command, and why was it included in a presidential-level alliance document? This command’s sudden prominence reflects several interconnected yet conflicting currents within the U.S.-Korean alliance. These include Seoul’s efforts to leverage advanced conventional means to achieve nonnuclear strategic deterrence; an alliance effort to build conventional-nuclear integration; and a sometimes contentious dance between U.S.-imposed constraints and South Korean hedging, grounded in the alliance’s history yet more urgent in the face of a rapidly advancing North Korean threat and shifting strategic environment.
Strategic Command and Nonnuclear Strategic Deterrence
One reason for limited coverage of Korea’s Strategic Command is that it does not exist. It is supposed to be established in 2024. It was first mentioned during South Korea’s 2022 presidential campaign as part of President Yoon’s defense and security platform. Since then, the Republic of Korea’s Strategic Command — as both concept and command structure — has mostly been covered in defense-related outlets and occasional South Korean media reports. Most prominently, the Yoon administration included several paragraphs on the command in the country’s 2022 Defense White Paper. Its first-ever mention in a bilateral alliance document was in the April 12 Joint Press Statement for the 22nd Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue. The Washington Declaration was the second.
Once this command is established, it will control South Korea’s 3K Defense System. The 3K Defense System consists of three platforms and concepts, each beginning with the letter “K”: Kill Chain platform, Korea Air and Missile Defense system, and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation plan. Under Strategic Command, the 3Ks would call upon a similar array of capabilities from across the South Korean military. These include the Army’s Strategic Missile Command’s Hyunmoo family of ballistic and cruise missiles, which would play a role in both the Kill Chain and Massive Punishment and Retaliation plans. In addition, the Air Force Air Defense Missile Command’s PAC-3s, F-35As, Global Hawk surveillance aircraft, and Cheongung II M-surface-to-air missiles would be included in each component of the 3K system. So, too, would the Navy’s 3,000-ton submarines with sub-launched ballistic missiles and KDX-III Aegis destroyer-based SM-2 missiles, as well as South Korea’s future military surveillance satellites, cyberwarfare and space-focused forces, and special forces units.
These weapons — and supporting infrastructure —are designed for preemptive and retaliatory strikes, along with air and missile defense systems to defend against preemptive or retaliatory North Korean missile strikes. Strategic Command will not be a force provider. Rather, it will fall under South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff and will command and control all South Korea’s strategic weapons, implement the 3K Defense System, and set related military policy and plans. At present, it is unclear how or to what extent Strategic Command would come under the Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command. This is the controlling element of the joint forces on the peninsula and is headed by a U.S. general, with a South Korean officer serving as the deputy.
There are voices in South Korea’s political and military establishment who want to keep Strategic Command independent of the United States. An independent air and missile command would, in theory, allow for South Korea to act quickly — and independently — of the United States. This would be advantageous if South Korean officials were concerned that the United State might try and prevent South Korea from preempting attack, over concerns that any such attack could escalate to North Korean nuclear strikes on the U.S. homeland.
Currently, all 3K Defense System assets are individually managed by the South Korean Army, Air Force, and Navy. South Korea’s Strategic Command would, in theory, greatly enhance jointness and the more efficient command and operation of those assets by combining those divided strategic assets under one single unit. The organization will be commanded by a three-star general or admiral, with the various military services rotating the leadership among them. Strategic Command is intended to bolster deterrence by enhancing jointness and increasing the military’s operational efficiency. The idea would be to create a seamless system and project that seamlessness toward North Korea to limit its ability to exploit gaps in South Korea’s defense.
This concept did not come out of nowhere. It has grown directly out of Seoul’s concerted effort to build up its advanced conventional capabilities and a nonnuclear strategic deterrent and defense system to counter a rapidly evolving North Korean nuclear, missile, and weapons of mass destruction threat. The 3K Defense System originated in early 2013 at the tail end of President Lee Myung Bak’s rule and was dubbed the three axis system. It was further developed under Lee’s conservative successor President Park Geun Hye. In 2019, the progressive administration of President Moon Jae In changed the name to the “system to respond to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction,” the Kill Chain to the Strategic Target Strike, and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation plan to Overwhelming Response.
The name change was mostly cosmetic. However, it aligned with Moon’s policy of inter-Korean reconciliation and engagement and his liberal government’s policy of engagement with North Korea to reduce tensions. The new names were meant to reduce the sense of hostility of the previous ones. Regardless, the basic makeup of the system remained the same, and the Moon administration — more so than its conservative predecessors — took steps to upgrade the system’s advanced capabilities.
The first K — the Kill Chain — is a preemptive strike system against Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile facilities. On paper, the Kill Chain concept consists of a range of capabilities, including deep strike missiles and radar-evading fighters. It is to be activated in the event Seoul is faced with a credible threat of an imminent North Korean nuclear launch. The system is geared toward finding, fixing, targeting, and engaging various North Korean targets before they can be launched.
The second K — Korea Air and Missile Defense system — is meant to provide multi-tiered, layered defense of critical facilities and population centers by intercepting air, missile, and artillery threats. The air and missile defense system will eventually consist of long- and medium-range surface-to-air missile defense systems; low-altitude missile defense systems; and U.S. missile defense systems forward deployed in South Korea.
The third K — Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation plan — assumes that a North Korean nuclear or unconventional attack has already occurred. If this were to occur, South Korea would retaliate with short- and longer-range precision missiles, advanced strike aircraft, and potentially the infiltration of special operations forces. The targets would be a combination of countervalue, counterforce, and leadership decapitation strikes.
Under Strategic Command, each of the 3Ks will be linked in thinking and for warfighting purposes. Depending on the course of events, pace of escalation, and North Korean actions, each component of the system could operate simultaneously. Although each component of the 3K paradigm has a distinct purpose, they would be utilized in a synchronized fashion under Strategic Command to deter and, if need be, defend and counterattack against North Korea’s nuclear, missile, and unconventional threats.
Conventional-Nuclear Integration Alongside Constraints and Hedging
South Korea does not currently possess all the necessary capabilities for Strategic Command and the 3K Defense System. Seoul also still depends on the United States for key intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities for the military’s effective operation. These challenges likely spurred greater effort within the alliance, driven by Washington, to tighten conventional-nuclear integration between U.S. and South Korean forces.
South Korea plans to develop or acquire more surveillance satellites and ground-to-ground guided weapons for the Kill Chain; more ballistic missile early warning systems, an L-SAM interceptor system, and a low-altitude missile defense system for the Korea Air and Missile Defense system; and secure more 230-mm multiple launch rocket systems and possibly more U.S.-manufactured ATACMS, upgrade its C-130H transport aircraft, and develop and produce more ballistic missile and land-attack cruise missiles for the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation plan. But all this hardware requires resources and time to develop, and it must be integrated into existing organizational force structures and operating concepts.
South Korea faces another related challenge: North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat continues to advance rapidly. As a result, South Korea’s weapons development may not keep up with evolving threats. Seoul and Pyongyang also appear on the precipice of an arms race, which could further destabilize the peninsula. An additional challenge centers on how effectively such advanced conventional capabilities can be incorporated into the existing software components of the military — in other words, whether the military possesses the necessary organizational, conceptual, and doctrinal innovation and jointness to utilize these advanced capabilities as advertised. Although this challenge was voiced during the beginnings of this current 3K system a decade ago, there still remain outstanding concerns about interservice rivalries and varying doctrinal and technological preferences within the South Korean military.
The Yoon administration is cognizant of the need for South Korea’s military to be more closely integrated and to operate more jointly. A key objective of establishing Strategic Command, according to President Yoon, is “to strengthen the jointness of the three branches of the armed forces and combine and effectively operate the fighting capabilities spread across the services.” The 2022 Republic of Korea Defense White Paper, too, stresses it will be established in stages. The first was in January when South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff expanded its nuclear and weapons of mass destruction response center to the Directorate of Countering Nuclear and WMD. The second stage will involve launching the command while establishing operational plans and command and control capabilities, and evaluating and verifying operational capabilities. The command will continue to evolve, the white paper notes, based on changes in the North Korean threat, strategic environment, and South Korea’s own military capabilities.
Seoul’s capability advancements over the last 15 years alongside North Korea’s own steadily advancing nuclear and missile capabilities — and more offensive nuclear doctrine — has provided South Korea with both the means and incentive to realistically envision standing up and operating the new command. Nevertheless, the various challenges above have reinforced the U.S. desire to integrate these capabilities within the alliance.
After all, this command and the 3K Defense System would be activated at the height of the North Korean nuclear or unconventional weapons threat; at the very moment when the highest authority in South Korea would have to make the decision whether to fire missiles at a nuclear-armed neighbor. It likely would operate in a crisis environment in which some form of aggression had already occurred. The alliance, in fact, may already be at war, albeit still a conventional one. While one of the ultimate purposes of Strategic Command would be to reestablish deterrence within such a conflict — to prevent further escalation up to the nuclear level — it raises understandable concerns on the U.S. side about crisis instability and escalation. Depending on how the ROK operates it, it could spur the very nuclear escalation it is ostensibly meant to deter.
The Washington Declaration’s language around tightening links between South Korean conventional and U.S. nuclear capabilities reflects this persistent U.S. concern. Directly following mention of the Nuclear Consultative Group, the declaration notes the “Alliance will work to enable joint execution and planning for [South Korean] conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency and improve combined exercises and training activities on the application of nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.” Although the language incorporates Seoul’s demand for greater transparency about U.S. nuclear policy and planning, it demonstrates, too, Washington’s desire to tie as tightly as possible South Korea’s advanced conventional capabilities and its Strategic Command within the Combined Forces Command, the alliance’s bilateral warfighting command structure.
The declaration continues: “President Yoon affirmed that the ROK will apply the full range of its capabilities to the Alliance’s combined defense posture. This includes working in lockstep with the United States to closely connect the capabilities and planning activities of the new Strategic Command and the U.S.-Korean Combined Forces Command. Such activities will include a new table-top exercise conducted with U.S. Strategic Command.” The declaration’s language leaves very little doubt that Washington aims to limit just how independent a platform South Korea’s Strategic Command will be moving forward, especially given rumors that South Korean officials are contemplating keeping it outside of the Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command. It is also consistent with the longstanding dynamic between U.S.-imposed constraints and South Korean hedging.
Conclusion
The U.S. government’s concerns about escalation on the Korean Peninsula are not new. However, these historic concerns have been reinforced by the Yoon administration’s rhetoric regarding preemption, along with North Korea’s nuclear advances and continued tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
South Korea’s Strategic Command is a hedging strategy, designed to ensure that the leadership in Seoul can act promptly during a crisis without interference from the United States. This approach is not necessarily due to a lack of trust in America’s extended nuclear deterrence. Instead, South Korea’s leadership appears to believe it cannot necessarily trust the United States to act quickly during a crisis. For one, U.S. attention and resources could be pulled elsewhere to another contingency. Moreover, given the simple fact that no matter how much deeper the alliance consults within the Nuclear Consultative Group, any possible decision to use nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula will be made in Washington by an American leader — current and future.
The constant talk of preemption, however, provides easy justification for North Korea to continually build more nuclear weapons. The result is that both sides may now be incentivized to adopt a “go-first” mentality during a crisis. As Ankit Panda rightly notes, this raises the possibility of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un adopting more dangerous command and control practices in a crisis, like delegating nuclear authority so North Korea’s weapons can be used even if he is incapacitated or killed.
The development of Strategic Command, although understandable, quickens the pace of the decades-old security dilemmas on the Korean Peninsula, narrows the most critical decision-making windows, and crowds out opportunities for diplomacy. The explicit mention of South Korea’s Strategic Command in the Washington Declaration may indicate the alliance is gearing up to navigate these dilemmas in a more mature manner. The urgency of the environment certainly requires it but also underscores just how fragile the current status quo is on the peninsula.
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Dr. Clint Work is a Fellow and Director of Academic Affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). He focuses on the Korean Peninsula, U.S.-Korean relations, East Asia, and U.S. foreign policy.
Image: Department of Defense
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Clint Work · June 9, 2023
7. A chain of North Korean defections is anticipated
Froma. man who is probably receiving information from the NIS, from brokers of escapes, from former colleagues in the north as well as escapees as noted in the article. If there is a wave of escapes, how will Kim Jong Un react? Will a chain of escapes create momentum and result in some kind of sustained exodus? How will north Korea, China, and South Korea react?
A chain of North Korean defections is anticipated
donga.com
Posted June. 09, 2023 08:27,
Updated June. 09, 2023 08:27
A chain of North Korean defections is anticipated. June. 09, 2023 08:27. 9dragon@donga.com,yea@donga.com.
People Power Party lawmaker Thae Yong-ho alleged that he had met two North Korean Trade Representative staff who defected to South Korea in Seoul sometime between January to May this year. “They were declared missing in action, and now they are living in South Korea under a new name,” Thae said. It was reported that families of a staff of the North Korean Trade Representatives, who were staying in Vladivostok, Russia, have been lately missing. Thae’s allegation indicates that there are more cases involving North Koreans working abroad having recently defected to South Korea that the regime has not reported.
In a telephone interview with The Dong-A Ilbo on Thursday, Thae said he has recently met two North Korean defectors, who were well-off in North Korea, working abroad at North Korean embassies in a trade-related sector. While the North Korean authority only revealed two cases of defections of North Korean diplomats, including former North Korean Acting Ambassador to Italy Cho Sung-gil in 2017 and former North Korean Acting Ambassador to Kuwait Ryu Hyun-woo in 2019, Thae explained that more than two people working at North Korean embassies abroad have recently defected to South Korea. “They are not career diplomats. They used to be the staffs of the overseas branch of the Office of Trade Representative,” Thae explained.
A chain of defections by North Korean laborers working abroad, who have been unable to return to North Korea because of the COVID-19 pandemic, is likely to continue. “Workers and diplomats who have been living abroad for an extended period are the first to be returned to North Korea when the borders reopen,” one official of the regime reportedly has said. “Many of them are reluctant to return for various reasons, such as their children's education or fear of punishment.” On top of it, the country's grain belt is expected to yield only two-thirds of the harvest of the year before, which will exacerbate food shortages, and this would drive up defections of North Koreans working abroad.
한국어
donga.com
8. China reaches out to Korean Assembly to counterweigh Yoon's bet on US
Imitation – the sincerest form of flattery - trying to be like Yoon? Is the PRC recognizing the importance of working with democratic institutions? Or is this PRC political warfare and another line of effort to undermine the ROK government. Look for subversive funding of political opposition parties to create chaos.
China reaches out to Korean Assembly to counterweigh Yoon's bet on US
The Korea Times · June 9, 2023
Chinese Ambassador to Korea Xing Haiming, left, gestures during his meeting with main opposition Democratic Party of Korea Chairman Lee Jae-myung at the former's residence in Seongbuk District, Seoul, Thursday. Joint Press Corps
Gov't summons Chinese envoy over inflammatory remarks
By Nam Hyun-woo
China is advancing its diplomatic outreach to Korea's National Assembly, particularly opposition party members, seeking to gain leverage in Korean politics against the Yoon Suk Yeol administration's U.S.-leaning foreign policy.
In response, Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Xing Haiming, the Chinese ambassador to Korea, on Friday, over remarks he made during a meeting with main opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) Chairman, Lee Jae-myung, on Thursday, which the ministry described as "irrational and provocative."
A day earlier, Xing had a dinner meeting with the main opposition leader at the ambassador's residence in Seoul.
During the meeting, Xing said, "The current China-Korea relations are facing a slew of difficulties, and honestly, the responsibility for these problems does not lie with China."
He continued, "The Taiwan issue is a core part of China's key interests and is closely related to the fundamental of China-Korea relations. We hope that the Korean side will honor its commitments and respect China's core concerns regarding the Taiwan issue … With the U.S. exercising full-fledged pressure on China, some people are placing their bet that the U.S. will prevail and China will defeat. This is a wrong bet … They will regret their decision in the future."
Xing also noted that he is paying attention to Seoul's recent increases in trade deficits with China, attributing the deficits to "attempts to decouple from China."
The ambassador's comments referred to the Korean president's policy of strengthening Seoul's relations with Washington to their highest level, while building a framework for closer cooperation between Korea, Japan and the U.S.
In doing so, Yoon has echoed U.S. views on issues that China finds sensitive, namely the contentious geopolitical issue of Taiwan. Yoon has said that he is against any "attempt to change the status quo by force" referring to Beijing's stance on the self-governing island state.
"Beijing had been thinking that Korea was a weak link of U.S. strategy to encircle China, and it now sees the necessity to slow down Seoul's prompt leaning toward Washington," said Lee Dong-gyu, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
"Ambassador Xing's comments during his meeting with the opposition party leader were seen as a subtle warning, and it seems that Beijing is seeking to use Korea's domestic politics to build up opinions desirable for China."
In response, Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a release that it summoned Xing on Friday, and First Vice Minister Chang Ho-jin warned the envoy that his "criticism against the Korean government's policy with wrong facts and unacceptable rhetoric goes against the diplomatic custom, and constitutes an interference of domestic affairs."
Chang also noted that the remarks dashed the both governments' desire to improve the bilateral relations under the principle of mutual respect and irresponsibly inflicted misunderstanding between the two countries.
"Chang warned that Xing should not deviate from the duty of a diplomatic envoy, and that all results will be his responsibility," the release read.
The meeting, which was requested by Xing, was seen as an indirect expression of China's complaints against the ruling bloc, because the ambassador had the dinner with the opposition party chairman before meeting the ruling party leader Kim Gi-hyeon.
According to the ruling People Power Party (PPP), the Chinese embassy in Seoul contacted the party on June 6 to request a meeting between Kim and Xing, far later than the meeting between Lee and Xing was arranged.
Kim told reporters on Thursday that "we (he and Xing) are friends so we can always meet," but showed an angry response on Friday, slamming Xing's comments during the dinner was "clearly an interference in internal affairs and a serious breach of diplomatic protocol."
Korea's Director of National Security Cho Tae-yong said in a forum on Friday that "we will build a healthy Korea-China relations that befits our enhanced national status, through confident diplomacy," adding that "mutual respect is the basis of country-to-country relations."
On the contrary, DPK Chairman Lee said on Friday that he had discussions with Xing in order to "explore ideas to revive the strained Seoul-Beijing economic cooperation and revitalize China-bound trade."
"With exports standing as the backbone of our economic growth, it is almost impossible to rebound from economic slowdown while excluding its largest trade partner," DPK's Lee said.
Director of National Security Cho Tae-yong delivers a speech during a forum at the Four Seasons hotel in Jongno District, Seoul, Friday. YonhapPark Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University, said Xing's recent moves can be interpreted as Beijing's strategy to build up positive political sentiment toward China in the Korean politics.
"Though the speaker was Ambassador Xing, it should be seen as Beijing's direct order," Park said.
"So far, Beijing has showed its complaints about Korea's strengthening relations with the U.S. and Japan by responding to Seoul's certain actions such as President Yoon's remarks (through indirect means), but now China is delivering its messages straight to Korean counterparts. From this point, Seoul should monitor whether Xing will make omnidirectional moves to secure China's political room in the domestic political scene."
Asan's Lee also said Xing's outreach to Korean politics is an attempt to find leverage that China can use for its interests.
"Beijing seeks to speak about economic issues with opposition politicians to highlight that Seoul is not gaining economic profits from China due to the Yoon administration," Lee said. "If the current situation of the opposition's controlling of National Assembly continues (in next year's general election) and public sentiment turns against the Yoon government, Seoul's foreign policy may also be changed, and China may seek opportunities in that."
The Korea Times · June 9, 2023
9. S. Korea may see rise in NK defectors as Pyongyang mulls reopening borders
I don't think they will open the border the way some might think. I suppose the journalists have not seen this Reuters report on how the north has reinforced border security.
I recommend reading this report from Reuters and looking at the interactive graphics of the reinforced border. https://www.reuters.com/graphics/NORTHKOREA-BORDER/byvrlwjreve/index.html
S. Korea may see rise in NK defectors as Pyongyang mulls reopening borders
The Korea Times · June 9, 2023
People watch the North Korean side as they visit to celebrate the New Year at Imjingak Pavilion in Paju, near the border with North Korea, Jan. 1, 2022. AP-Yonhap
By Lee Hyo-jin
South Korea could experience a significant increase in defectors from North Korea in the coming months, according to analysts, as the reclusive regime is considering whether to reopen its borders following three years of closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which might pave the way for more defections.
Given North Korea's critical food crisis, diplomats and high-ranking officials who were abroad for overseas assignments prior to the pandemic may attempt to seek refuge in South Korea instead of returning home, the experts viewed.
Rep. Tae Yong-ho of the ruling People Power Party (PPP), who served as North Korea's deputy ambassador to Britain before defecting to South Korea in 2016, said on Thursday that there are growing signs of North Korean diplomats looking to defect to the South.
"There have been rumors circulating among North Korean overseas missions that due to the pandemic, some families have been separated, with husbands in Pyongyang and wives and children abroad, creating a North Korean version of 'separated families,'" the defector-turned-lawmaker wrote on Facebook.
He also claimed that some diplomats who served in Europe and South Asian nations during the pandemic have gone "penniless" after becoming stranded in Beijing as the Kim Jong-un regime kept its borders shut, blocking their return.
"Our government must take special attention to ensure the safe defection and travel of North Korean residents to the South, the number of which are set to increase in the foreseeable future. This would include diplomatic negotiations with countries where they are staying, as well as the active engagement with overseas intelligence networks," he said.
A recent incident brought the matter into focus when two family members of a North Korean official surnamed Park living in Vladivostok, Russia, were reported missing earlier this week in what is viewed as an attempted defection. Russian authorities have issued missing persons alerts for Kim Kum-sun, 43, and her 15-year-old son Park Kwon-ju.
According to Radio Free Asia, the older Park is a trade representative who was dispatched to earn foreign currency for the North Korean government by owning two restaurants in the Russian Far Eastern city. However, his wife Kim became the restaurants' acting manager on behalf of her husband after he was summoned to Pyongyang in 2019.
South Korea's unification ministry, foreign ministry and National Intelligence Service have yet to share any information regarding the missing family.
Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University, said Kim and Park may have contacted the South Korean consulate in Vladivostok seeking to defect to Seoul.
The professor expected South Korea to see a growing number of North Korean defectors in the coming months, not only from Pyongyang but also from China and Russia, as the North Korean government slowly prepares to reopen its borders.
"We may see the number (of defectors) return gradually to pre-pandemic levels," he said.
The COVID-19 pandemic led to a sharp decline in the number of North Korean defectors to South Korea due to strict border controls. The number, which was tallied at around 1,000 in 2019, dipped to 229 in 2020, 63 in 2021 and 67 last year.
"The ongoing food crisis, though it wouldn't be as severe as the Arduous March in the 1990s, may prompt defections of a lot of North Koreans, including diplomats and overseas workers," Park said.
The Korea Times · June 9, 2023
10. There’s history behind S Korea’s nuclear desire
Well of course there is. And it is only natural that a country that is a shrimp among whales would want to have a nuclear deterrent.
There’s history behind S Korea’s nuclear desire
Will Biden’s promise of more South Korean say in the use of US weapons head off further nuclear proliferation?
asiatimes.com · by Urban C. Lehner · June 9, 2023
If you’re American and, like most Americans, you don’t pay much attention to South Korean politics, you may have been surprised by the announcement Joe Biden and South Korea’s Yoon Suk Yeol made when Yoon visited Washington in April.
The two presidents issued a “Washington Declaration” that gives South Korea a say in any US use of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and commits the South Koreans not to develop their own nukes.
It’s fair to say most Americans were unaware that the South Koreans were thinking about getting the bomb. But they were – and, although Yoon signed, it’s by no means certain that the declaration has extinguished those thoughts.
Republic of Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol holds an acoustic guitar signed by Don McClean with US President Joe Biden at the White House on April 26, 2023. Yoon, a karaoke fan, sang McClean’s “American Pie.” It was during that visit that the two signed the Washington Declaration. Photo: Yonhap
South Korea is a solid US ally, a free-market democracy that both hosts 28,000 American troops on its soil and has sent its own troops to fight alongside the US in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. It paid 90% of the US$10.8 billion to build up the base south of Seoul used by US troops.
South Korea is an important country for US farmers and ranchers. It’s the number 6 overseas market for US ag products, having bought $9.34 billion worth in 2022. Whereas many countries only import commodities from the US, the South Koreans’ biggest purchase, to the tune of $2.7 billion, was a value-added product, beef.
According to Pew Research Center, 89% of South Koreans have a favorable view of the United States, the most in Asia and second worldwide only to Poland. Think about that: The South Korean public views the US favorably but prefers not to rely on the US nuclear umbrella.
Despite the strong ties, the south Korean president was talking earlier this year about developing nukes. Polls showed 71% of South Koreans in favor.
It’s not hard to guess why. The unimpressive US withdrawal from Afghanistan couldn’t have inspired confidence in South Korea. There’s also concern that a re-elected Donald Trump might resume his push to withdraw US troops from South Korea.
And with North Korea having missiles capable of reaching the continental US, South Koreans naturally wonder: Would the US put San Francisco at risk to save Seoul?
US reliability was also in question the last time South Korea contemplated developing nukes. That was during the 1970s, when the US was pulling out of South Vietnam and Cambodia.
President Gerald R Ford and South Korean ‘President for Life’ Park Chung-hee at the arrival ceremony for Ford in Seoul on November 22, 1974. Before the stone-faced Ford’s visit, US intelligence had been learning about South Korea’s secret nuclear program. Photo courtesy of Gerald R Ford Library
Seoul backed off when Washington said South Korea could have either a US alliance or nuclear weapons but not both. Seoul chose the alliance.
Back then, South Korea was a poor developing country ruled by a dictator. Today it’s a developed country that elects its rulers. For some South Koreans, having nuclear weapons is about national prestige as much as security. Their starving, backward cousins to the north have nukes. Why shouldn’t they?
Perhaps as important as worries about US reliability is the increasing seriousness of the threat. North Korea is clearly not going to be talked out of its nukes. The US has all but stopped trying.
What about MAD?
Would it really be such a bad thing if South Korea developed its own nuclear weapons? It would clearly be a blow to nuclear nonproliferation, a policy supported by every president for the last seven decades, including Trump.
Although that policy hasn’t stopped proliferation, it has limited it. In the early 1960s, President John F Kennedy predicted that by 1975, 10 to 20 countries would have nuclear weapons. The world only got to nine recently, when North Korea got the bomb.
A devil’s advocate might say, “Let mutually assured destruction work its magic.” India and Pakistan defied the nuclear nonproliferation consensus and neither has used nukes against the other. Might not a South Korean bomb actually lessen the risk of nuclear catastrophe by deterring North Korea?
North Korea has nuclear weapons and long-range missiles and 71% of South Koreans want their country to have them, too. Map: Wikimedia Commons
Non-proliferation advocates have a ready answer. The greater the number of countries that have nuclear weapons, the greater the chances of a nuclear catastrophe owing to accident or miscalculation or the increased risk of terrorists getting nukes.
President Biden has stressed that the US umbrella provides deterrence, vowing that any North Korean nuclear attack on the US or its allies would “result in the end” of the regime in Pyongyang.
By offering South Korea more say in the use of US weapons, the Biden administration hopes to prevent yet another country from going nuclear. Graham Allison, a noted Harvard expert, calls the Washington Declaration a “big deal.”
Whether it’s a big enough deal to head off further nuclear proliferation remains to be seen.
This article, originally published on June 2 by the latter news organization and now republished by Asia Times with permission, is © Copyright 2023 DTN/The Progressive Farmer. All rights reserved. Follow Urban Lehner on Twitter: @urbanize
asiatimes.com · by Urban C. Lehner · June 9, 2023
11. China ties will be on equal footing: Yoon’s adviser
ROK officials "on message" with the new NSS.
China ties will be on equal footing: Yoon’s adviser
koreaherald.com · by Choi Si-young · June 9, 2023
Published : Jun 9, 2023 - 16:24 Updated : Jun 9, 2023 - 18:01
National security adviser Cho Tae-yong delivers a keynote speech at a forum in Seoul on Friday. (Yonhap)
South Korea will manage relations with China to foster a “healthy relationship,” President Yoon Suk Yeol’s national security adviser said, suggesting Seoul would not give in to Beijing’s demands as easily as the previous administration.
Cho Tae-yong said the Yoon administration is seeking to advance Korea’s global status with a “principled approach and reciprocity,” meaning Beijing would have to reciprocate what it asks Seoul to do.
China has been trying to reel Korea in since May 2022, when Yoon took power pledging to forge closer ties with the US, Seoul’s biggest ally. China’s top envoy in Korea said “betting on the US prevailing” in its fight against China is a “lapse in judgment,” at a meeting Thursday with Korea’s main opposition party leader.
“China isn’t to blame for strained Seoul-Beijing relations,” Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Xing Haiming said in what many saw as the strongest rhetoric by Beijing so far over Seoul’s push to get closer with Washington as it aims to fight off growing nuclear threats from North Korea.
Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs are the single biggest challenge which requires Seoul’s immediate action, Cho said, noting the isolated country’s nuclear buildup has been at the expense of sacrificing its own people. Food shortages are a fact of life for North Koreans as leader Kim Jong-un uses every resource on arming his regime while refusing to return to nuclear talks with the US.
“The so-called satellite launch could have given every North Korean food enough to live for up to 10 months,” Cho said, referring to last week’s failed attempt by the North to test what many believed was a ballistic missile. International sanctions on the regime ban such launches.
South Korea’s ever-expanding alliance with the US is key to peace and prosperity in the region, Cho added.
By Choi Si-young (siyoungchoi@heraldcorp.com)
12. Kim Yo Jong: The most powerful woman in North Korea
The evil sister who is the bad cop of the regime.
Kim Yo Jong: The most powerful woman in North Korea
wftv.com · by Niamh Cavanagh, Yahoo News · June 8, 2023
The 35-year-old Kim Yo Jong has increasingly become the face of North Korea's secretive and combative regime. The younger sister to dictator Kim Jong Un led the state delegation at the Winter Olympics in South Korea. She met then-President Donald Trump in 2018. She has made major announcements on the world stage, including last week's launch of a spy satellite, prompting the United Nations Security Council to hold an emergency meeting.
Her title is officially “deputy department director of the Publicity and Information Department,” but there has long been speculation that she is being set up for a bigger role.
When rumors about Kim Jong Un's health began in 2020, she was cited as a likely successor.
Whoever rules North Korea wields enormous power given the authoritarian kingdom’s nuclear weapons and constant threats to use them against the U.S. and its allies. But what is known about Kim Yo Jong?
Yahoo News spoke to two experts: Sung-Yoon Lee, author of "The Sister: North Korea's Kim Yo Jong, the Most Dangerous Woman in the World," and Edward Howell, a lecturer in politics and international relations at the University of Oxford, about the princess and her rise through the ranks of North Korean politics.
Who is Kim Yo Jong?
Howell: She’s the younger sister of Kim Jong Un and the youngest child of the former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. What we know is that she was born and raised in North Korea but also studied abroad in Switzerland, together with her brothers, under a pseudonym.
What do we know about her political career?
Howell: What’s interesting about Yo Jong is that she has risen through the ranks as a member of the junior elite in the Workers’ Party of Korea. She worked for the National Defense Commission — the most important institution for national defense. She was then appointed to the Publicity and Information Department in 2014 — one of the main departments of the party and one that sets the stage for what happens to the kingdom in the future. Over time, she gets promoted to different departments within the party, and in 2021, she was promoted to the State Affairs Commission, which is the most important body of state power over North Korea.
Why has Kim Jong Un chosen her?
Howell: I think she’s useful [to the party] because she reinforces North Korea’s messaging that South Korea and the United States are fundamentally hostile actors, the idea that the outside world will never fundamentally be nice to North Korea, and that North Korea must act accordingly. She has been seen as a sort of unifier among factions within the military and the party.
How significant is it that a woman is in the high ranks of the North Korean regime?
Lee: The rise of a “Nuclear Despotess” is an entirely new phenomenon. North Korea is such a male-dominated, chauvinistic country despite claiming to be a communist system that guarantees gender equality. This sudden rise of a female leader, a sort of a co-crime boss of the family, is in itself an interesting phenomenon. In the past, we’ve seen the royal family, for example, the younger sister of other kids play an important role, but not nearly as important or visible a role as that played by Yo Jong over the past five or six years.
What do the high-ranking officials think about her?
Lee: Senior political figures avert their gaze whenever she makes an appearance. They don’t want to be noticed by her because she is such an oddity as a young, powerful person and sister of the supreme leader. There have been reports of her issuing random orders of execution of officials who get on her nerves. It’s hard to corroborate these reports, but they have come from many different regions inside the nation.
With all of her recent public appearances, is she being primed as Kim Jong Un’s successor?
Lee: A lot of North Korean defectors take the view that there could never be a female leader and they may be right. But I humbly disagree, because I would argue that the North Korean dynasty’s supposedly sacred hereditary bloodline supersedes chauvinistic cultural considerations.
wftv.com · by Niamh Cavanagh, Yahoo News · June 8, 2023
13. 'Dollarization' of North Korean economy, once vital, now potential threat to Kim's rule
This is why Kim used COVID as an excuse for its draconian population and resources control measures. One of the measures has been the attempt to control and eliminate the use of foreign currency.
The dollar is a threat to the regime. One of my friends who is an expert on Northeast Asia economies recommends we flood north Korea with dollars - get them to the people to use in the markets.
'Dollarization' of North Korean economy, once vital, now potential threat to Kim's rule
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM · June 9, 2023
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — Before fleeing North Korea in 2014, Jeon Jae-hyun kept U.S. dollars as a store of value and used Chinese yuan to make everyday purchases at markets, restaurants and other places. He used the domestic currency, the won, only occasionally.
“There were not many places to use the won, and we actually had little faith in our currency,” Jeon said during a recent interview in Seoul. “Even the quality of North Korean bills was awful as they often ripped when we put them in our pockets.”
North Korea has tolerated the widespread use of more stable foreign currencies like U.S. dollars and Chinese yuan since a bungled revaluation of the won in 2009 triggered runaway inflation and public unrest.
The so-called “dollarization” helped ease inflation and stabilize exchange rates, enabling leader Kim Jong Un to establish a stable hold on power after he inherited that role in late 2011. But the trend poses a potential threat to Kim as it has undermined his government’s control over money supply and monetary policies.
The isolation of the pandemic badly hurt the North’s economy but still gave Kim a chance to solidify social controls by restricting market activities and limiting influence from capitalist, democratic South Korea. Now, observers say Kim is trying to roll back use of the dollar and yuan to tighten his grip on power as the North grapples with pandemic-related hardships, longstanding U.N. sanctions and tensions with the U.S.
“He has no other choice but to strengthen the command economy as he’s been locked in confrontations with the U.S. while maintaining a border shutdown,” said Lim Eul-chul, a professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul. “The current direction of the North’s economy is controlling markets in a stronger manner so there are still limits in demands for dollars.”
It’s unclear what Kim would do, since banning use of dollars and yuan could backfire by just confusing and angering the public, experts say. North Koreans are likely resisting attempts by authorities to take their foreign currency given the low level of public trust in the government’s economic policies, said Choi Ji-young, an analyst at Seoul’s state-funded Korea Institute for National Unification.
The shift to using dollars and yuan came amid economic turmoil and a famine in the 1990s that crumbled the state rationing system, prompting the emergence of capitalist-style markets.
The 2009 revaluation of the won led to even wider use of foreign currencies. To try to reassert control over nascent markets, authorities limited the amount of old bills that citizens could exchange with new North Korean won, wiping out much of their household savings. Realizing the local currency was unreliable, many began storing their savings in dollars and yuan.
Jeon, a former official from the northern North Korean city of Hyesan, had two boxes of North Korean won notes totaling 2 million won at his house in 2009, about what it would cost then to buy 60-80 smuggled, second-hand Japanese TVs. Most of that money became worthless since the authorities only allowed residents to exchange up to 200,000 won (about $60-70 at the time) per household in old bills for new money.
“My money was all gone. I was extremely frustrated and embarrassed but couldn’t do anything in protest,” Jeon said. “I saw many people crying and heard others fled to South Korea.”
The yuan has since become the most-used and preferred currency for savings in areas near the North’s border with China. The dollar has emerged as the most saved currency and the second most-used currency after the won in southern regions, according to surveys of defectors.
Jeon said he used the yuan to buy clothes, rice and other daily necessities, eat out or pay bribes to bosses. Most of his savings were stored in yuan and dollar bills. He kept a small amount of North Korean won for occasions like donating money to village campaigns to support military units.
Paek H.O, who defected from the northeastern North Korean town of Musan in 2018, said she used the yuan to buy expensive goods and the won for cheap items such as sodas, vegetables and bread sold at markets. About 50 professional money changers operated in Musan, she said.
“Using foreign currency is officially illegal but few ran into troubles or got arrested for using it,” said Paek, 47. She asked that her first name be identified using initials, citing worries for the safety of relatives in North Korea.
There are two exchange rates for the won -– an artificially high one set by the government and another set by the market that experts say more clearly reflects actual economic conditions in the country.
The won had stabilized at around 8,000 per dollar since 2012-2013 but suddenly sharply strengthened in 2020 when North Korea sealed its borders to guard against COVID-19. According to North Korea monitoring groups, the won was trading on the street at about 6,700-7,000 per dollar in late 2020; 4,600-7,200 in 2021; and 5,200-7,500 in the first half of 2022. Later in 2022 it dropped back to about 8,000 won per dollar.
The won’s value soared during the pandemic likely because demand for dollars and yuan fell due to the border closures and tighter controls on use of foreign currency. Such controls appear to have been enforced inconsistently though a lack of information from the secretive North makes it virtually impossible to get clear details.
Jeon said his relatives in Hyesan told him in phone calls that they weren’t allowed to use foreign currency in 2021 but could last year. Paek said her sisters in Musan told her last year that they were using the yuan.
Kang Mi-Jin, a defector who runs a company analyzing North Korea’s economy, said people in nearly 20 regions across North Korea voluntarily stopped using foreign currency in 2021 during a campaign against “anti-socialist elements” due to worries about possible punishment. Citing her contacts inside North Korea, Kang said the North Koreans also held onto foreign currency as a safe haven.
The return of exchange rates to pre-pandemic levels likely reflects revived demand for foreign currency amid speculation North Korea might soon lift its COVID-19 restrictions. But many experts say less foreign currency is in circulation and the government is likely intervening to control exchange rates in markets.
“Dollarization can’t be a long-term government policy as it’s like relinquishing sovereignty over monetary policy, though it’s still true that it helped the North’s economy stabilize and grow for the (earlier) years of Kim Jong Un’s rule,” said Lim Soo-ho, an analyst at the Institute for National Security Strategy, a think tank run by South Korea’s spy agency.
He said Kim’s government is likely “very carefully” examining whether to fully reopen the borders since an abrupt, full-fledged resumption of imports would push the value of the dollar against the won sharply higher, making imported goods more expensive.
Son Kwang Soo, an analyst at the Seoul-based KB Research in Seoul, said the North may be trying to keep the exchange rate in a narrow band of around 8,000 won per dollar.
Defectors say an attempt to end use of dollars and yuan would likely just cause chaos.
“Kim Jong Un will eventually leave ‘dollarization’ as it used to be. If he bans the use of foreign currency by ordinary citizens, the country’s monetary circulation would be disrupted,” Kang said. “My contacts in North Korea told me it’s even hard to find some North Korean bills now.”
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM · June 9, 2023
14. Captain takes over Naval Forces Korea with his promotion held up over abortion policy
I have to bite my tongue to not say something disparaging about an elected official and damage to national security.
Captain takes over Naval Forces Korea with his promotion held up over abortion policy
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · June 8, 2023
Capt. Neil Koprowski takes command of Naval Forces Korea during a change-of-command ceremony at Naval Fleet Headquarters in Busan, South Korea, Thursday, June 8, 2023. (David Choi/Stars and Stripes)
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BUSAN, South Korea — A Navy captain whose promotion to rear admiral is blocked in the Senate became the Navy’s representative to South Korea during a ceremony here Thursday.
Capt. Neil Koprowski relieved Rear Adm. Mark Schafer at South Korea’s Naval Fleet Headquarters. Koprowski’s promotion to rear admiral is one of about 200 held up by Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Ala., who pledged to block the Pentagon's nominations until Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin changes the military's policy on abortions for service members and their families.
Tuberville is using a procedural tactic to slow the Senate votes on promotions until Austin reverses a policy that provides time off and travel expenses for service members and their dependents who travel to obtain an abortion.
Koprowski previously served as branch head for the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations’ programming division in Washington, D.C. Prior to that, he commanded the amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge.
Koprowski said he felt welcomed to South Korea during Thursday’s ceremony in Busan.
“I’ve been impressed by the energy and professionalism of our team …,” he said. “This only strengthens my belief in our great alliance.”
Schafer, a Navy SEAL, is headed to Qatar for his next assignment as commander of Special Operations Joint Task Force-Central.
Rear Adm. Mark Schafer bids farewell to Naval Forces Korea during a change-of-command ceremony at Naval Fleet Headquarters in Busan, South Korea, Thursday, June 8, 2023. (David Choi/Stars and Stripes)
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Speaking to Stars and Stripes prior to the ceremony, Schafer said he had looked forward to leading U.S. sailors and Marines in South Korea after serving in the special operations community for years.
Since “the first day that I showed up” in September 2021, working with South Korea’s navy “definitely delivered on my expectations,” he said.
“One thing I was excited about was that after a lot of time working with a lot of partners in the U.S. Central Command’s special operations environment: coming out here and working with an ally that we’ve served with for more than 70 years,” Schafer added.
Schafer’s tenure coincided with the resumption of large-scale joint military drills between the United States and South Korea.
Joint drills like the Ssangyong Exercise in April were paused in 2018 as former Presidents Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in negotiated for the denuclearization of North Korea. Those drills were downscaled two years later as COVID-19 cases began to spread through the military’s ranks.
Restarting that training “really came easy” and the two navies were eager to start working again, Schafer said. He added that the navies aspired to be operationally interchangeable, or able to “seamlessly sail in [each other’s] formations.”
“That culture of training never ends,” he said. “For each individual exercise, we look for opportunities to be pleased with incremental progress but never satisfied we’ve got it just right.”
Schafer, a native of New Hartford, N.Y., graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1994. He served with SEAL Teams 2 and 4, as well as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group.
In a farewell speech to roughly 250 people, Schafer thanked his wife, Anne, as well as the sailors who served under his command.
“I’m grateful every day to join the hard-working sailors who strive to be smart like a learning organization would be, but also tough like the resilient team that we need to be,” Schafer said in his speech. “Anne and I have loved every minute of serving with you.”
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · June 8, 2023
15. North Korea punishes ‘anti-socialist’ behavior with forced farm labor
I am surprised to not see reports of the regime using slogans of "Work will set you Free."
North Korea punishes ‘anti-socialist’ behavior with forced farm labor
Minor offenses result in a 5-day stint pulling weeds or planting rice.
By Ahn Changkyu for RFA Korean
2023.06.08
rfa.org
North Korea is punishing people who engage in minor “anti-socialist behaviors” like dying their hair, wearing unapproved styles of clothing and brewing moonshine, by sending them to work on rural farms to atone, residents in the country told Radio Free Asia.
“Anti-socialist behavior” is the vague term North Korea’s government uses to describe activities deemed to be South Korean, foreign or capitalist cultural practices.
In 2020 the country passed the Rejection of Reactionary Thought and Culture Act, which laid out punishments for specific anti-socialist acts, including multi-year prison sentences for watching South Korean media.
But some offenses are not as serious as others, and violators caught in recent crackdowns in the northeastern city of Chongjin can expect to receive a relatively mild sentence of only five days working on the farm, a resident there told RFA’s Korean Service on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
“[They’re] cracking down on making or selling clothes in the market that are not our style,” the resident said, using the Korean term “uri,” which literally means “our” but refers to concepts that have originated in or are ubiquitously accepted as part of Korean culture.
Clothing and hairstyles
He said that tight clothes, clothing that reveals the shoulder and clothing with foreign letters on them were all anti-socialist.
“Socialist Patriotic Youth League patrols are also cracking down on young men and women who dye their hair yellow or brown, grow their hair long and wear jeans or tight-fitting clothes in public,” the resident said.
“Recently, the authorities have instructed barbers and hairdressers not to dye customers' hair brown or do strange hairstyles, such as clipping only the side of the hair and leaving the front and back,” he said. “This kind of hair is a priority for crackdown on the street.”
The source said that using foreign currency is also grounds for punishment.
“If they catch you, they will take you to the countryside in a car,” he said. “You will be planting rice or weeding for the next five days.”
The resident said that when people are caught and sent to work, it is not only they who suffer.
“At our factory, two young men and one woman are not coming to work because they have been mobilized for planting rice after they were caught on the street wearing clothes and hairstyles that are not our style,” he said.
‘Ruthlessly’
Every morning when the factory holds a meeting, the officials advise them not to get caught in the crackdown because the factory requires them to be at their posts, the resident said.
“This crackdown is proceeding ruthlessly. It’s different than usual,” he said. “It’s strange that this kind of punishment coincides with the rice planting and weeding season,” he said.
Authorities in Chongjin are raiding the city’s Kangdok neighborhood on a weekly basis, hoping to catch people making moonshine in their homes, another resident of the city told RFA on condition of anonymity to speak freely.
Kangdok became a haven for a home-brewed alcoholic drink called nongtaegi during the 1994-1998 North Korean famine, which followed after the country’s economy collapsed.
The people of Kangdok needed to make a living somehow and began producing nongtaegi in large quantities and selling it all over Chongjin’s surrounding North Hamgyong province.
“Some people are lucky enough to avoid the crackdowns, but there are also some who get caught red-handed while making alcohol,” the second resident said. “Their brewing machines and corn kernels they prepared to make the alcohol were confiscated.”
Moonshine is a slightly more serious offense, so the illicit brewers were sent to the farms for 10 days, he said.
Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.
rfa.org
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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