Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Either you deal with what is the reality, or can be sure the reality is going to deal with you."

– Aldous Huxley

"I learned this, at least by my experiment: that if you advance confidently in the direction of your dreams, and endeavor to live the life which you have imagined, you will meet with a success unexpected in common hours. You will put some things behind, you will pass an invisible boundary; new, universal and more liberal laws will begin to establish themselves around and within you; or the old laws will be expanded, and interpreted in your favor in a more liberal sense, and you will live with the license of a higher order of beings. In proportion as you simplify your life, the laws of the universe will appear less complex, and solitude will not be solitude, nor poverty poverty, nor weakness weakness. If you have built castles in the air, your work need not be lost, that is what they should be. Now put foundations under them."

– Henry David Thoreau

"The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty, and the American people, just now, are much in want of one."

– Abraham Lincoln

1. Kim Jong-un rejects unification out of fear of South Korea

2. ＜Investigation Inside N. Korea＞ A shocking situation...How are the neglected elderly faring? (1) Poverty-stricken elderly people live off begging and wander the streets Fewer elderly people seen in public than before

3. Russia’s veto on North Korea sanctions watchdog sparks international criticism

4. Don’t Count Samsung Out in the AI Memory Stakes

5. N. Korea reaffirms plan to launch multiple spy satellites this year

6. S. Korea detects no signs of preparations in N. Korea for military parade

7. Police probe 2 military doctors for writing collective action guidelines

8. Outgoing U.S. 8th Army commander receives state medal for contribution to alliance

9. Defense Ministry launches AI research center

10. Why preparation for COVID-29 is imperative

11. Kim Jong Un building new university to train officials to support family’s rule

12. The New Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

1. Kim Jong-un rejects unification out of fear of South Korea

I like the comment that it is hard to argue with any of the theories as to why Kim is doing this. But I do agree with Lee Min-bok and his comments in this excerpt below. The biggest threat to Kim Jong Un is South Korea - not its military but the example of South Korea and the idea (and ideals) of South Korea.

Excerpts:

That said, what stands out for me is that the factor driving the dissolution of the Fatherland Front and the other changes this year is the growing influence of South Korea, not just in the world, but within North Korea itself.

In many ways, North Korea hardly changes from one decade to the next. But the recent influx of information into the country has emerged as the Achilles’ heel of Kim’s regime.

Lee Min-bok, who heads an activist group in the South that sends information into the North using balloons, believes that, while the South Koreans do not have a strategic plan to achieve “reunification by absorption,” they are in fact absorbing North Korea by stealth.

“This process is invisible,” he said. “The way the South’s culture has taken root even in the stony ground of North Korea is evidence of this.”

Lee noted that the official name for the South, the Republic of Korea, was never uttered when he lived in North Korea, but now even Kim is using it as he strives to convince his people that it is a foreign country. He is doing this because South Korea has replaced the United States in his assessment as the North’s greatest enemy.

Kim Jong-un rejects unification out of fear of South Korea

Kim Heung-Kwang

April 1, 2024

https://www.nkinsider.org/2024/04/01/kim-jong-un-rejects-unification-out-of-fear-of-south-korea/

Kim Jong-un at the 7th Enlarged Meeting of 8th Central Military Commission of WPK on Aug 9, 2023. Image | Rodong Sinmun

Like a wizard, Kim Jong-un waved his magic wand on March 23 and an entire organization vanished. The Democratic Front for the Reunification of Korea, a party body commonly known as the Fatherland Front, that had been around for almost 80 years, was no more.

The front’s dissolution was the latest in a series of vanishing tricks in the wake of Kim’s announcement on December 30 that there was no more point in pursuing reunification with South Korea.

Government departments have gone. References to unification went from subway station names, websites, and publications. The map of the peninsula in weather forecasts now only shows North Korea. Even the national anthem has been changed. “The beautiful country of 3,000 ri,” a reference to the length of the peninsula, has become “The beautiful country of this world.”

The weather forecast on North Korea’s state-run Korean Central Television on Jan 16 (right) showed an accentuated image of North Korea on a map to make a point. Until the previous day, Jan 15 (left), North Korea had not distinguished South Korea on the map.Gone are organizations like the Committee for Implementing the June 15 Joint Declaration, the North Headquarters of the Pan-national Alliance for Korean Reunification, and the Consultative Council for National Reconciliation.

Now the Fatherland Front has followed them into the trash can.

The front was formed in 1946, before the formal creation of the two separate states, as a coalition of 72 political parties and social organizations from both sides. Notably, it brought together the South Korean National Democratic Front, an umbrella body of 40 leftist groups led by the Communist Party of Korea, and the North Korean National Democratic Front, which had 13 groups and was led by the Workers’ Party of Korea.

Despite this history, the front has been something of an empty vessel since the establishment in 1961 of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF), as the governmental organization handling the real business of inter-Korean relations and unification-related matters. The front’s main role has been peace offensives, such as dialogue between political parties and social organizations in the two Koreas.

The decision on March 23 to dissolve it came in a meeting in which representatives of its 24 member parties and social organizations accused South Korea of pursuing ”regime collapse” and “unification by absorption.” This latter term refers to the German and Vietnamese forms of national unification by which one side completely takes over the other. The members declared that, as Seoul was not a good faith partner, there was no longer any need for the front to exist. They unanimously agreed to dismantle it.

Kim is now moving to revise the constitution. If carried out, this will formally eradicate the founding mission of the Kim dynasty to achieve reunification.

What are we to make of this?

International experts are offering several interpretations. Some view it as Kim’s acceptance that reunification on the North’s terms is no longer possible. Others see it as a strategic repositioning rather than a true abandonment of reunification. Others argue that it’s a tactical move to push the obstacle of South Korea aside and extract concessions from the United States. Given that the change is an implicit rejection of his father and grandfather, some say he is seeking to distinguish his own rule from theirs.

It is hard to thoroughly argue against these theories. Each has some merit. As most analysts agree, it will take time before the smoke clears and Kim’s intentions become apparent.

That said, what stands out for me is that the factor driving the dissolution of the Fatherland Front and the other changes this year is the growing influence of South Korea, not just in the world, but within North Korea itself.

In many ways, North Korea hardly changes from one decade to the next. But the recent influx of information into the country has emerged as the Achilles’ heel of Kim’s regime.

Lee Min-bok, who heads an activist group in the South that sends information into the North using balloons, believes that, while the South Koreans do not have a strategic plan to achieve “reunification by absorption,” they are in fact absorbing North Korea by stealth.

“This process is invisible,” he said. “The way the South’s culture has taken root even in the stony ground of North Korea is evidence of this.”

Lee noted that the official name for the South, the Republic of Korea, was never uttered when he lived in North Korea, but now even Kim is using it as he strives to convince his people that it is a foreign country. He is doing this because South Korea has replaced the United States in his assessment as the North’s greatest enemy.

“Previously everything was devoted to the cause of reunification, but now this has been abandoned in the face of an apparently impending absorption by the South. The fact that they have designated the South as their number one enemy shows how keenly they feel this threat,” he said.

It is my conviction that the rationale for the recent change of direction is fear of South Korea’s invisible takeover of North Korean hearts and minds.

The claims about South Korea’s bad faith and aggressive intent which are used to justify the new posture do not stand up to fact-checking. Most inter-Korean efforts have been initiated by South Korea. Three of its presidents have visited Pyongyang, where they adopted declarations and agreements regarding peace and reunification. The idea that this all masks an aggressive intent is a fantasy at best and hypocrisy at worst, a case of North Korea seeing itself in the South Korean mirror.

That is not to say North Korea does not fear South Korea. It does. North Korea’s regime is always afraid. Its actions towards the outside, as well as towards its own, are all driven by fear. And this is what lies behind its new posture. We see it manifest in the dismantling of the Fatherland Front and all the other changes.

Kim Heung-Kwang

Heung-kwang is the representative of NK Intellectual Solidarity, an NGO based in Seoul, South Korea. Previously, he served as the chairman of the quarterly magazine North Korean Village, chairman of the board of directors of Samheung North Korean Defector Children’s School, and a policy advisory member of the Ministry of National Defense in South Korea. Before defecting to South Korea in 2004, he was a professor at the Hamheung Communist College in North Korea. He graduated from North Korea’s Kim Chaek University of Technology and received his doctorate from South Korea’s Hansae University Graduate School.

nkinsider.org ·

This is the so-called socialist workers paradise. There are few places in the world that are ruled by such an evil regime. The Korean people in the north are now more able to compare life in the north with the example of the South. And that is a threat to the regime.

＜Investigation Inside N. Korea＞ A shocking situation...How are the neglected elderly faring? (1) Poverty-stricken elderly people live off begging and wander the streets Fewer elderly people seen in public than before

asiapress.org

(FILE PHOTO) An elderly woman picks ears of corn in a field after the harvest. Photograph by Sim Wui-chon in rural Sariwon, North Hwanghae Province, October 2008. (ASIAPRESS)

As we have reported on North Korea from inside the country, the lives of North Korea's vulnerable classes have always been of interest to ASIAPRESS. In-depth interviews we recently conducted with two women living in Yanggang Province revealed the shocking circumstances faced by the elderly in North Korea. The interviews of the two female reporting partners provide an opportunity to shed light on the miserable lives of the elderly, who – following the outbreak of the COVID pandemic – have been neglected by the state and abandoned by their families. (KANG Ji-won / JEON Sung-jun)

◆ Picking ears of corn and surviving as homeless on the streets

From late February to mid-March, we spoke with two people (“A” and “B”) who live in central Hyesan to get detailed information about conditions that elderly North Koreans have faced over the years. While there was some overlap in their answers, these overlapping areas have not been deleted to ensure the context of their narratives remain clear. Although the interviews are limited to the areas where the reporting partners live, ASIAPRESS believes that the information is not necessarily specific to Yanggang Province. This is because the information overlaps with many reports from reporting partners in North Pyongan Province and North Hamgyong Province that ASIAPRESS received in 2023 and 2024.

(FILE PHOTO) An elderly man peddles grass collected from the mountains to sell as fuel for fires. Photographed in Pyongsong, South Pyongan Province, in 2013. (ASIAPRESS)

Q1. How are the lives of the elderly around where you live in 2024?

“A”: During COVID in 2022, many elderly people died. They (typically) aren’t able to get enough food, so by the time they become 65, they fall sick. Elderly people who can earn a little money by going out and picking ears of corn, work at a (market) stall, stand on guard duty, or babysit other people's children are fine. If they can’t do those things, they’re just considered “sick” and they suffer from malnutrition. They seem to typically die within a month.

“B”: Except for cadres or those who have a little money, the elderly are treated as trouble in households where it is difficult to make a living. In such households, the elderly are almost akin to dead people. If they have good-hearted children, they can eat, but if they don't, they have to earn their own food, so they go around and beg for food, babysit, collect compost, (go out to the fields) to pick ears of corn, or dig rat holes (this refers to digging up rat holes in corn fields to collect the corn stored by rats).

If they can’t do even that, they end up becoming homeless wanderers. On March 10, ASIAPRESS surveyed one market in Wuiyon and found there were 12 homeless children and elderly people. Four of the homeless were elderly.

◆ “Elderly people died almost everyday due to COVID”

Q2. It’s been mentioned that many elderly people have died during the COVID period. What kind of situations did elderly people face during this period?

“A”: If they didn't eat properly and just got (COVID), they died. In April 2022, there were five to seven old people in front of the apartment chatting with each other, but after July and September, there were only one or two people who came out to sit and chat. That shows that a large number of elderly people died.

“B”: Every day (the bodies) were taken out. Since April 2022, there have been so many deaths that there were people waiting in the apartment to cremate the dead. They would send the (dead) old people away (to be cremated) in nice clothes and, after the bodies arrived at the crematorium, people would steal the clothes. That’s why families would guard the bodies.

(FILE PHOTO) A woman lives with her son, who is a teacher, but says there's no rations, so she sells cigarettes on the streets all day. The police often come to crack down on such commercial activities, according to her. Photograph by Sim Wui-chon in Haeju, Hwanghae Province, September 2008. (ASIAPRESS)

◆ North Korea’s collapsed free medical care system; the number of elderly on the streets has fallen dramatically

Q3. Are there any special medical benefits offered to elderly people to maintain their health?

“A”: They received healthcare just like everyone else. (The government) doesn’t do anything extra (for the elderly). If you're sick, you have to buy medicine. Getting hospitalized is out of the question, so you just suffer at home. The most common drug available is opium. Even if you get sick, the only people who go to the doctor are those who have power or money. Ordinary people rarely go to the hospital.

There’s an old man in my neighborhood who hasn't been properly diagnosed (by a doctor), so he doesn't know what he has. He’s using opium as a painkiller to get through the day, and I think he's going to die soon.

“B”: They rarely go to the hospital. Money is a problem and medicine is a problem. So, they just get sick and die. No old person can survive a month of illness because of malnutrition. Around me, there are very few old people over 70. There are a lot fewer elderly people on the streets as well.

*During the COVID pandemic, North Korea essentially abandoned its system of free medical care for its citizens. Hospitals now require people to pay to obtain medication. The sale of medicines by private individuals is now a focus of intense crackdowns by the government. That being said, reports suggest that hospitals use medicine they have to treat emergency cases where patients need immediate surgery.

According to Statistics Korea in December 2023, the estimated life expectancy for North Koreans is 71.9 years for men and 78.3 years for women. (To be continued in the next installment)

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

asiapress.org

3. Russia’s veto on North Korea sanctions watchdog sparks international criticism

Excerpts:

Bruce Bennett, senior fellow at an American think tank RAND Institute, shares a similar view.

“After all, Russia and China are regularly violating the U.N. Security Council sanctions against North Korea,” said Bennett.

“Russia in particular is doing this because of its needs for military equipment in its conflict with Ukraine. As long as the U.N. panel of experts is operating, the panel will report on such violations, and Russia does not like being embarrassed by that reporting.

“So if the U.N. panel of experts is no longer watching Russian and Chinese violations, those violations will likely increase and become more serious.”

He notes that the alternative for the U.S. and its allies is forming a new panel to take over from the U.N. experts, focusing on reporting violations of sanctions by Russia and China.

“Such a panel will not have the international clout and prestige of a U.N. panel. Still, hopefully the United States decides to take such actions.”

Russia’s veto on North Korea sanctions watchdog sparks international criticism

The move also shows Moscow fears exposure of its own U.N. sanction violations, say experts.

By Taejun Kang for RFA

2024.04.01

Taipei, Taiwan

rfa.org

Russia faced widespread criticism following its use of veto power to effectively terminate official United Nations monitoring of sanctions on North Korea amid investigations into alleged arms transfers between Moscow and Pyongyang.

The Russian veto at the U.N. Security Council on Thursday blocked the renewal of the panel of experts tasked with probing violations of sanctions related to North Korea’s prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile programs, which was imposed nearly 20 years ago.

For a resolution of the renewal to pass, it must receive the support of at least nine of the 15 members of the Security Council, with no veto from any of the five permanent members – the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom and France.

China abstained from Thursday’s vote, while the remaining 13 U.N. Security Council members voted in favor.

The panel, which consists of eight experts drawn from the permanent members of the Security Council, is tasked with assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee to investigate alleged violations of sanctions by North Korea, and has issued in-depth reports twice a year on the sanctions violations.

The Security Council has extended the panel’s mandate for one year each March by passing a resolution. Its mandate expires at the end of April.

Members of the United Nations Security Council meet on the day of a vote on a Gaza resolution at U.N. headquarters in New York City, U.S., March 25, 2024. (Andrew Kelly/Reuters)

Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said on Friday that its veto was in line with its interests.

“It is clear to us that the U.N. Security Council can no longer use old templates in relation to the problems of the Korean Peninsula,” said Zakharova.

The move follows accusations from the U.S., South Korea and others that Pyongyang is supplying Moscow with weapons to use in its war in Ukraine – a claim that both countries have denied.

But the panel’s report, released in March, detailed, with photographs, Russia’s arms dealings with North Korea in violation of sanctions. It also added that the panel was investigating reports of the arms transfers.

The Russian move met with international criticism with South Korea’s foreign ministry on Friday slamming the move as an “irresponsible decision.”

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, writing on social media after the veto, described the move as “a guilty plea,” while Yoshimasa Hayashi, Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan, said the move was “regrettable” since it “disrespected” the U.N.

Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said Russia’s actions have “cynically undermined” international peace and security.

Russian, Chinese agenda

During negotiations on the draft text on Thursday, Russia and China unsuccessfully pushed for it to include a requirement that the sanctions regime be renewed annually. Over the past few years, both nations have advocated for a relaxation of these sanctions.

Russia’s U.N. ambassador, Vassily Nebenzia, told the council before the vote that Western countries were trying to “strangle” North Korea and that sanctions were losing their “relevance” and becoming “detached from reality” in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the country.

He accused the panel of experts of “increasingly being reduced to playing into the hands of Western approaches, reprinting biased information and analyzing newspaper headlines and poor quality photos”. Therefore, he said, it was “essentially conceding its inability to come up with sober assessments of the status of the sanctions regime”.

Anthony Ruggiero, the White House NSC Director for North Korea, said that Russia and China were worried the panel would continue to expose the truth: Beijing and Moscow are violating U.N sanctions on North Korea.

Bruce Bennett, senior fellow at an American think tank RAND Institute, shares a similar view.

“After all, Russia and China are regularly violating the U.N. Security Council sanctions against North Korea,” said Bennett.

“Russia in particular is doing this because of its needs for military equipment in its conflict with Ukraine. As long as the U.N. panel of experts is operating, the panel will report on such violations, and Russia does not like being embarrassed by that reporting.

“So if the U.N. panel of experts is no longer watching Russian and Chinese violations, those violations will likely increase and become more serious.”

He notes that the alternative for the U.S. and its allies is forming a new panel to take over from the U.N. experts, focusing on reporting violations of sanctions by Russia and China.

“Such a panel will not have the international clout and prestige of a U.N. panel. Still, hopefully the United States decides to take such actions.”

Edited by Mike Firn and Elaine Chan.

rfa.org

4. Don’t Count Samsung Out in the AI Memory Stakes

Don’t Count Samsung Out in the AI Memory Stakes

SK Hynix and Micron have gained on the market leader, but Samsung’s financial and tech capacity are being brought to bear

https://www.wsj.com/tech/dont-count-samsung-out-in-the-ai-memory-stakes-5d06cd76?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

By Jacky Wong

April 1, 2024 6:00 am ET

The AI boom could boost Samsung’s memory chip business. PHOTO: SEONGJOON CHO/BLOOMBERG NEWS

South Korean technology giant

Samsung Electronics 005930 -0.49%decrease; red down pointing triangle has fallen behind in the artificial-intelligence race—at least in the first heat.It would be foolish to count it out, though. Recent signs indicate it might be narrowing the technological gap with rivals

SK Hynix 000660 1.37%increase; green up pointing triangle and Micron MU -1.05%decrease; red down pointing triangle in high-performance AI memory chips. Even if it takes longer than expected to catch up, a tighter overall memory market thanks to the AI boom could still be a significant tailwind for Samsung.Nvidia’s AI chips have been selling like hot cakes since the rise of generative AI apps such as ChatGPT. Memory-chip makers have, in turn, sold out their high-performance products to Nvidia and others. High-bandwidth memory, or HBM, offers enhanced data-processing speed, which is crucial for AI number crunching.

Korea’s SK Hynix has taken an early lead in HBM. It is virtually the only supplier to Nvidia for the latest-generation memory chip, called HBM3. Samsung only started mass-producing HBM3 in the second half of last year. It does produce earlier generations of HBM chips used by some slower AI chips, rather than the most cutting-edge ones made by Nvidia.

And now SK Hynix has started mass producing its next-generation chips, called HBM3E. SK’s smaller rival Micron, which essentially skipped the previous generation, is doing the same. Both companies said they have already sold out their full HBM production volume this year and are already filling orders for next year.

Even so, Samsung is working hard to catch up. The company expects to mass-produce next-generation HBM chips in the first half of this year. That would leave it about a fiscal quarter rather than a full year—as with the previous generation of HBM chips—behind the competition.

Moreover, on March 19, Nvidia Chief Executive Jensen Huang said the company is in the process of testing Samsung’s next-generation HBM chips, according to Japan’s Nikkei. An interesting aside: Huang wrote “Jensen Approved” along with his signature on Samsung’s HBM3E product display at Nvidia’s AI conference this March.

Switching From Apple to Samsung? Here’s What You Can Expect.

(LEAD) N. Korea reaffirms plan to launch multiple spy satellites this year | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 1, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS unification ministry's response in last two paras)

SEOUL, April 1 (Yonhap) -- North Korea vowed Monday to push for space development and reaffirmed its plan to launch multiple reconnaissance satellites this year after putting its first spy satellite into orbit in November.

Following the launch of the Malligyong-1 last year after two failed attempts in May and August, respectively, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced during a year-end meeting the country plans to place three more spy satellites into orbit this year.

"The successful launch of the reconnaissance satellite Malligyong-1 last year has brought about substantial progress in national defense capabilities and several launches are expected for this year as well," Pak Kyong-su, vice director of the North's National Aerospace Technology Administration, was quoted as saying by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The remark came after a South Korean military source said last week that the North has set up a screen to prevent outsiders from observing its Tongchang-ri satellite launch site, a possible indication that preparations are under way for a satellite launch.

Emphasizing the growing importance of space development, Pak said North Korea has been making efforts to use satellites for various purposes, such as agriculture, land management and disaster prevention.

Pak made the remarks on the anniversary of the establishment of the North's space development agency on April 1, the KCNA said.

South Korea's unification ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs said the government is closely cooperating with the United States to monitor key North Korean facilities for any signs of such launches.

"Regardless of the purposes North Korea claims, any North Korean satellite using ballistic missile technology is a clear violation of U.N. security council resolutions," ministry spokesperson Koo Byung-sam told a regular press briefing Monday.

This Nov. 22, 2023, file photo carried by the Korean Central News Agency shows the North Korean military spy satellite Malligyong-1. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 1, 2024

6. S. Korea detects no signs of preparations in N. Korea for military parade

Oh no. We love a parade. How are we going to know what new weapons Kim wants to show us?

But the nKPA is breathing a sigh of relief. The troops probably do not have enough energy (food) to conduct the month of rehearsal they usually do before a major parade.

S. Korea detects no signs of preparations in N. Korea for military parade | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · April 1, 2024

SEOUL, April 1 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean military said Monday it has not detected any imminent signs of preparations for a military parade in North Korea ahead of two major holidays in the communist country.

Col. Lee Sung-joon, the spokesperson for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made the remark after Voice of America reported Saturday the North may be preparing for a military parade near an airport in Pyongyang, based on commercial satellite imagery.

"Signs of North Korea's preparation for a military parade have not yet been verified," Lee said during a regular press briefing.

Although Pyongyang usually marks every fifth or 10th anniversary with large events, Lee said this year is not one of the commemorative years that are likely to have major events.

North Korea's two major holidays in April are the birthday of the country's founder Kim Il-sung, the late grandfather of leader Kim Jong-un, on April 15 and the founding anniversary of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army on April 25.

The JCS said it has been closely monitoring North Korea's preparation for a second launch of a military satellite at its Tongchang-ri launch site in its northwestern tip.

"There are no imminent signs of (North Korea's) spy satellite launch at its Tonchang-ri launch site. South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities have been closely coordinating to monitor and track North Korea's military activities," Lee said.

The North successfully placed its first spy satellite into orbit and vowed to launch three more this year. South Korea also put its military reconnaissance satellite into orbit in December and plans to launch a second one in early April.

This Nov. 22, 2023, still taken from video footage carried by the Korean Central Television shows the North Korean military spy satellite Malligyong-1. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · April 1, 2024

7. Police probe 2 military doctors for writing collective action guidelines

Collective action to improve conditions is one thing, but this doctor's call is obviously completely irresponsible and she should be properly sanctioned. Deleting medical data would be people's lives at risk.

Excerpt:

That is a separate case from a doctor now under police investigation on suspicion of writing a post on Medistaff, an online community of doctors and medical students, to urge trainee doctors to delete medical data before collectively resigning from their hospitals, they said.

Police probe 2 military doctors for writing collective action guidelines | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Cheong-mo · April 1, 2024

SEOUL, April 1 (Yonhap) -- Police are investigating two military doctors suspected of having written guidelines for collective actions by trainee doctors and spread them on social media, a top police official said Monday.

Woo Jong-soo, chief of the National Office of Investigation (NOI), said that two people who wrote collective action guidelines for junior doctors on social media have been identified through a search and seizure, and both were confirmed to be military doctors.

The probe began after the health ministry filed a complaint with police over the controversial posts shared in doctors' online chat rooms and Facebook, according to NOI officials.

That is a separate case from a doctor now under police investigation on suspicion of writing a post on Medistaff, an online community of doctors and medical students, to urge trainee doctors to delete medical data before collectively resigning from their hospitals, they said.

Woo also said police are investigating a student on leave from a medical school, in addition to a doctor, on charges of leaking a list of public health doctors who did not participate in the ongoing mass walkout by medical residents and interns.

The health ministry asked police on March 12 to investigate the leak of internal documents, which contained a list of public health doctors and their working places.

Over 90 percent of the country's 13,000 trainee doctors went on strike in late February to protest the government's plan to sharply increase the medical school admissions. Police have since been conducting extensive investigations into alleged illegalities related to their strike.

A notice displayed on a TV monitor at a hospital in the southeastern city of Daegu on March 25, 2024, says treatment is delayed due to the absence of trainee doctors. (Yonhap)

ycm@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Cheong-mo · April 1, 2024

8. Outgoing U.S. 8th Army commander receives state medal for contribution to alliance

Congratulations, General, for the honor of this award and your new Korean name.

A job well done.

Outgoing U.S. 8th Army commander receives state medal for contribution to alliance | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 1, 2024

SEOUL, April 1 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean government conferred a state medal on Lt. Gen. Willard M. Burleson, the outgoing commander of the U.S. 8th Army based in the country, Monday for his contributions to strengthening the bilateral alliance.

Defense Minister Shin Won-sik awarded Burleson the Gukseon Medal, the second-highest class in the Order of National Security Merit, on behalf of the government in a ceremony at the defense ministry's headquarters in central Seoul, his office said.

Burleson, who took the post in October 2020, is set to leave office Friday.

"Since he took command of the U.S. 8th Army, Burleson made many efforts to enhance the combined defense posture under close coordination between South Korea and the United States amid the COVID-19 pandemic and advancing North Korean nuclear and missile threats," the ministry said in a release.

The ministry noted the allies' combined exercises during Burleson's term, including their regular major joint exercises last year and this year, held at the largest scale ever, contributed to improving the two sides' interoperability.

Shin requested Burleson's efforts to develop the bilateral alliance even after his retirement, and the U.S. general vowed to continue to support such efforts, according to the ministry.

Lt. Gen. Christopher C. LaNeve, the former commander of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, is set to succeed Burleson, who is set to retire in May after 36 years of military service.

Last Friday, the Association of Korea-U.S.A. Friendship Alliance also gifted Burleson an honorary Korean name -- Bae Il-woo -- in recognition of his service in the country.

Defense Minister Shin Won-sik (L) holds talks with U.S. 8th Army Commander Lt. Gen. Willard M. Burleson III (R) after conferring a state medal on the U.S. general at the defense ministry's headquarters in central Seoul on April 1, 2024, in this photo provided by Shin's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 1, 2024

9. Defense Ministry launches AI research center

Monday

April 1, 2024

dictionary + A - A

Published: 01 Apr. 2024, 18:27

Updated: 01 Apr. 2024, 18:56

Defense Ministry launches AI research center

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-04-01/national/defense/Defense-Ministry-launches-AI-research-center-/2015731

Defense Minister Shin Won-sik, left, is briefed on artificial intelligence-based manned-unmanned teaming systems at the Agency for Defense Development in Daejeon, on Jan. 12. [YONHAP]

The Defense Ministry on Monday established a research center aimed at overseeing artificial intelligence (AI) development in the defense sector as part of efforts to introduce advanced technologies to the military.

A founding ceremony for the Defense AI Center took place at the state-run Agency for Defense Development in Daejeon, attended by Defense Minister Shin Won-sik and Science Minister Lee Jong-ho, according to Shin's office.

The research center came as part of South Korea's Defense Innovation 4.0 initiative, which aims to make the military slimmer yet smarter based on artificial intelligence and other cutting-edge technologies.

The center, made up of some 110 civilian and military personnel, will focus on developing technologies related to AI-based manned-unmanned teaming systems and battlefield situational awareness, as well as applying AI technologies in the civilian sector to the military, the ministry said.

Shin and Lee also signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between their ministries to bolster cooperation in key technology sectors that are essential in future battlefields, such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, space and cyberspace, the ministry said.

Under the MOU, the two sides will push for research and development to foster cooperation between the private sector and the military and utilize civilian and military infrastructure to verify research by universities and state-run institutes, according to the ministry.

Yonhap

10. Why preparation for COVID-29 is imperative

An interesting OpEd tying a NETFLIX drama, to the Korean doctors' strike, to preparing for pandemics.

Why preparation for COVID-29 is imperative

donga.com

Posted April. 01, 2024 07:43,

Updated April. 01, 2024 07:43

Why preparation for COVID-29 is imperative. April. 01, 2024 07:43. .

In Netflix's science fiction show, 'The Three-Body Problem,' a civilization exists with three suns. Due to their unpredictable orbital cycles, a stable era, where the climate is moderate, alternates irregularly with a chaotic era akin to hell. During chaotic eras, planet-wide firestorms occur when all three suns may rise simultaneously. If all three suns are distant, the planet enters an ice age. The only way to survive the harshness of chaotic eras is to prepare during stable periods.

Pandemics are akin to chaotic eras. You never know when they will strike, and they can always be destructive. It's too late to prepare once one begins. And, most importantly, they always return.

It will soon mark one year since the end of the global COVID-19 pandemic. Currently, we find ourselves in a stable era. However, the looming threat of another pandemic persists, one potentially more severe than its predecessor. Pathogens might target vulnerable populations, including infants, children, and the elderly, or evolve to attack vital organs such as the brain. Considering these alarming possibilities, I am compelled to question whether we are adequately preparing for the next pandemic.

Let's start with our vaccine response strategy. In May last year, the government declared the end of the COVID-19 pandemic and announced its goal to "develop a messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) vaccine within 100 days of an outbreak." The mRNA vaccine was a "game changer" because it was quickly developed and highly effective in preventing deaths. Korea could not develop one independently and had lost the advance purchase competition, so the president had to call pharmaceutical companies and request the vaccines.

But the government and the National Assembly's response has been backward. The National mRNA Vaccine Development Project, which has spent 32.7 billion won over the past two years, will end its activities this June due to the complete budget cut for the project's second phase. During the budget review process, the government questioned why they should support the project now that COVID-19 is over. On the other hand, Japan successfully developed its own mRNA vaccine last year after investing 1 trillion won. How will we respond to the next pandemic? Beg Japan?

The next crucial step is to enhance the legislative framework supporting disease prevention and control measures like social distancing. In the previous pandemic, we prioritized societal protection over the rights of self-employed individuals and students, yet they weren't consulted in decision-making processes nor compensated for their sacrifices. In the face of a new pandemic, social distancing remains indispensable until a vaccine becomes available. Initiating cost-effective mitigation strategies is paramount, yet there's a lack of analysis regarding the impact of measures such as business hour restrictions and school closures on case reduction.

The last concern is hospital beds. During the previous pandemic, 'available hospital beds' and 'healthcare capacity' were synonymous. The government was supposed to have 1,700 negative pressure room beds ready for emergency mobilization by the end of 2022 in preparation for the next pandemic, but the plan was delayed by two years to the end of this year. This delay aimed to ensure the availability of quality beds with critical care capabilities. A slight delay is acceptable. However, we must remember that the 'emergency beds' won't be practical unless we address the current healthcare reimbursement structure, which prioritizes more funding for doctors treating mild and minor illnesses over severe and urgent cases.

From this perspective, the ongoing battle between the medical community and the government over medical school admission slots seems like a luxury. There is a mountain of challenges that need to be addressed head-on. We don't know when this stable era, which is meant to prepare for the next wave, will end. Even as we speak, viruses are lurking somewhere on the planet, waiting to spark the next pandemic, and we've forgotten the lessons of the past too quickly and too easily.

한국어

donga.com

11. Kim Jong Un building new university to train officials to support family’s rule

We often describe the Korean people in the north as an educated workforce. But we need to understand that the priority for education focuses on learning the regime's history and ideology. Ideology is the priority subject of study.

I would normally question an article like this on April Fools' Day becauses this would make no sense in almost any other country in the world. However, this is north Korea and this is reality. Then again, perhaps north Korea is just a bad April Fool's joke on all of us.

Kim Jong Un building new university to train officials to support family’s rule

North Korean leader tours cadre training school amid push to reform institution central to regime survival

https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/kim-jong-un-building-new-university-to-train-officials-to-support-familys-rule/

Colin Zwirko April 1, 2024

Kim Jong Un inspecting the new WPK Central Cadres Training School construction site on an unspecified date | Image: KCTV (March 31, 2024)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un recently inspected a sprawling new campus for the Central Cadres Training School of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), according to state media on Sunday, a visit that appears aimed at ensuring future officials’ loyalty to his family’s rule.

Construction is reportedly set to finish in time for a large opening ceremony “in mid-May” coinciding with the school’s 78th founding anniversary.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that classrooms, offices, gyms and other amenities for students cover 13.3 hectares (32 acres) of floorspace, making it one of the largest universities in the country.

NK News analysis of state media photos and satellite imagery shows the campus was built rapidly in under a year — KCNA said builders “worked 24/7” — on the grounds of an elite airbase in eastern Pyongyang that was demolished just ahead of the start of construction in March 2023.

KCNA reported that Kim “personally chose the site of construction” and guided the process in order to turn the school “into a top-notch university.”

The new university will serve to “train the reserve cadres of the Party and thoroughly arm them with the revolutionary idea of Kim Jong Un and the Party-building line in the new era.”

The institution’s revival comes after Kim disbanded its leadership due to corruption in 2020.

Kim smokes a cigarette next to top political and military officials inside a lecture hall | Image: KCTV (March 31, 2024)

This map shows the new and existing locations of the Central Cadres Training School as well as other key landmarks in central Pyongyang | Image: Google Earth/Airbus (April 16, 2023), edited by NK News

SUCCESSION AND ‘PURE LOYALTY’

Sunday’s report on Kim’s visit to the new location’s construction site was brief, but a lengthy state media report on his high-profile visit to the school’s former location in Oct. 2022 offers clues about the importance of the project.

When touring the new campus last week, Kim reportedly said its construction “is an issue related to the long-term development of our Party for training the successors to the WPK and furthermore an important issue linked to the succession of the revolution.”

This likely refers to a priority on ensuring his own successor’s spot at the helm of the party and country.

Kim made the issue of hereditary succession a major focus of his “historic commemorative lecture” delivered during his 2022 visit, just one month before publicly revealing his daughter for the first time. Many experts believe the DPRK leader has already chosen the young girl, thought to be named Kim Ju Ae, as his successor.

Kim spoke at length in the speech about improving the party’s power and control over society during his first 10 years in power.

These efforts to strengthen party structures will prevent the “confusion” that can arise when there is succession in the “leadership of a socialist ruling party,” he said.

The DPRK ruler added that maintaining a “monolithic ideology and leadership” requires active measures, stating that improving party cadre education will help avoid a situation in which his own “exploits are distorted and destroyed” as after leaders died in other socialist countries.

All party members must be made to “cherish faith [in the party] and maintain pure loyalty.”

Widespread problems of “abuses of power, bureaucratism, irregularities and corruption” were plaguing the party, he added, leading him to “declare a war to wipe out” these problems.

This was a reference to his Feb. 2020 decision to “disband the party committee of the Party cadre training base, which was involved in the practices of corruption and irregularities.”

As a result, the school was subsequently reorganized and renamed from the Kim Il Sung Higher Party School (김일성고급당학교) to the current Central Cadres Training School of the WPK (조선로동당 중앙간부학교). It was called the Central Party School (중앙당학교) when it was established on June 1, 1946.

This high-resolution image taken on March 1 this year shows the sprawling new campus covering the entire compound of the former airbase | Image: Planet Labs, edited by NK News

BETTER CAMPUS, MORE MEMBERS, MORE POWER

Though Kim didn’t directly mention plans to build a new campus in 2022, he said “increasing the Party membership and the management of its ranks” were top priorities, pointing to a need for more classroom space and additional education programs at a larger campus.

“The most difficult problem in strengthening our Party and implementing its fighting program at present is the shortage of cadres who are ready to carry it out,” Kim reportedly declared.

It’s still unclear why Kim chose to raze the airbase — which was only built in 2015 — to make room for the new campus, but it could be due to a desire to give the institution a nice spot in a prestigious area next to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, where the country’s former leaders lie in state.

It could also be to maintain a spot on the Taedong River amid a lack of undeveloped riverside land, as the school’s current location is on the banks next to the Juche Tower and across from Kim Il Sung Square.

KCNA on Sunday said plans for the new school have been in the works since the Jan. 2021 party congress and that plans were discussed at party plenums in Feb. and Dec. 2021, Dec. 2022 and Dec. 2023.

According to Kim’s 2022 speech, the next generation of party members should be exposed to modern teaching methods, including the use of “VR technology and augmented reality technology.”

He also said during his undated visit to the new campus in recent days that students would enjoy modern “educational conditions and environment,” as Kim likely sees improving their living and study conditions as key to helping transform them into “genuine revolutionaries” and true believers in party ideology.

It is unclear what will happen to the school’s current campus, but it could shift to focus more on training teachers for the new campus after Kim said in 2022 that the school “should improve the quality” of teachers.

Edited by Alannah Hill

12. The New Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

Conclusion:

These strategic conflicts and a new world order pose a complex challenge to Seoul’s policy toward Pyongyang. It doesn’t seem likely that the South Korean government can find a breakthrough on North Korea in the near future. Under these circumstances, South Korea’s policy toward North Korea needs to be more sophisticated, while paying close heed to US-China relations.

The New Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

Bellicose actions and strident rhetoric coming out of North Korea over the past year have heightened fears that the Korean Peninsula is entering a more dangerous period. Some experts have even argued that Pyongyang is preparing for war. To be sure, things seem to be heating up. But the causes are tied to a range of issues, including the US-China rivalry, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and continuing US neglect of engagement with North Korea. A new Cold War is settling over the Korean Peninsula and new policy adjustments are required, writes Jihwan Hwang.

globalasia.org

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The New Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

By Jihwan Hwang

NORTH KOREA presents a grave threat to peace and stability not only on the Korean Peninsula but also to the rest of Asia and the world. That threat is not new, but it has recently become more aggressive. Notably, Pyongyang test-fired numerous ballistic missiles in 2023 and launched a military reconnaissance satellite in November to strengthen deterrence against the US-South Korea alliance. The satellite launch was an effort to make a new breakthrough in military intelligence against the US, an area where North Korea has been far behind. Just as Pyongyang has pursued a “balance of terror” by acquiring nuclear weapons, it is now pursuing a “balance of intelligence” through reconnaissance satellites. The successful satellite launch in November, after two failures last year, seems to have been helped by Moscow, as was mentioned at the Russia-North Korea summit in September. Pyongyang has thus sought to strengthen deterrence and pressure on Washington while engaging in various forms of military cooperation with Moscow.

The current North Korean threat is an extension of the “heads-on breakthrough” strategy that it declared at the end of 2019. It maintained this hardline stance at the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021, setting out targets for hypersonic missiles, super-large nuclear bombs, multiple warhead nuclear weapons technology, nuclear submarines, submarine-launched nuclear weapons and military reconnaissance satellites.

In addition, North Korea enacted the Nuclear Weapons Policy Law in September 2022, which stipulates five conditions for nuclear first-use and a pre-determined operational plan for legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons, thereby escalating the potential for a nuclear crisis. In this vein, North Korea revised its constitution in September 2023 to make its nuclear policy more explicit. In this way, North Korea has continuously stepped up its offensive against the US and South Korea.

Finally, North Korea has sought to change the nature of inter-Korean relations. In the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party held on Dec. 30, Kim Jong Un declared that inter-Korean relations and unification policies should be revised, defining inter-Korean relations as involving “two hostile nations at war,” instead of pressing for unification as in the past. In furtherance of this aim, Kim said that North Korea should take measures to reorganize the institutions dealing with South Korean affairs, including the United Front Department.

Is the US-South Korea Response Sufficient?

The concerns surrounding this situation lie not only with North Korea but also with the US. US President Joe Biden’s administration has not demonstrated any new or proactive policy toward North Korea. In fact, his approach looks a lot like President Barack Obama’s “strategic patience” in which the US would watch North Korea carefully and respond to aggressive moves with policy adjustments. The Biden administration is unlikely to adopt a new North Korea policy if Pyongyang does not change its behavior. After reviewing its North Korea policy in 2021, the administration agreed to come up with a coordinated strategy with South Korea on how to deal with the North. It described the policy as “calibrated and practical,” which it says differs from President Donald Trump’s grandstanding summit diplomacy and Obama’s strategic patience.

However, Biden’s government has lacked details on a specific agenda or the conditions under which negotiations could take place. It is still unclear how calibrated and practical the approach is. Another difficulty is that there is no room for the Biden administration to deal with the North Korean issue after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the war between Hamas and Israel. For its part, North Korea, of course, is not being cooperative and is unlikely to engage with the US, either. As a result, the stalemate on the Korean Peninsula is likely to continue, and it will be very difficult to resolve any time soon.

In response to growing threats from North Korea, the US and South Korea have strengthened their deterrence capabilities. President Yoon Suk Yeol and Biden announced the Washington Declaration at their summit in April 2023, detailing the reinforcement of US extended deterrence toward South Korea. Washington pledged to “make every effort to consult with the ROK on any possible nuclear weapons employment on the Korean Peninsula.” The highlight of the Washington Declaration was the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), which is intended to provide a venue to discuss nuclear and strategic planning, and manage the threat to the nonproliferation regime posed by North Korea. The NCG can be regarded as a reinforced effort at extended deterrence worthy of the 70-year US-South Korea alliance. Moreover, Biden reaffirmed that US extended deterrence is backed by the full range of US capabilities, including nuclear. The enhanced extended deterrence approach of the Washington Declaration should provide significant assistance in countering North Korea’s nuclear threat.

The problem, however, lies in the fact that US extended deterrence is not enough to eliminate the possibility of an unexpected and inadvertent crisis caused by Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons. In particular, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Policy Law increases the risk of serious damage to stability on the Korean Peninsula. The extended deterrence measures by the US-South Korea alliance are insufficient to reduce the potential of such a crisis. Some argue that North Korea is now seeking a change in its nuclear doctrine, which up to now was similar to the “assured retaliation” strategy based on deterrence and retaliation. It declares that nuclear weapons may be used for retaliation in cases where there is a possibility of a military attack by the US-South Korea alliance.

North Korea assumed previously that it would employ punitive deterrence, responding with nuclear retaliation to a US-South Korea military attack, while pursuing nuclear deterrence with enhanced nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. However, North Korea’s new nuclear doctrine appears to have become more aggressive with the Nuclear Weapons Policy Law, which is similar to an “asymmetric escalation” strategy. It aims to preemptively deter potential attacks from adversary nations through threats of nuclear first-use. This doctrine is inherently risky because it exacerbates the potential for a nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. If a military crisis escalates for any reason, North Korea would likely heighten its alert level, potentially increasing the chance of an inadvertent nuclear clash. The current US-South Korea approach of stepping up extended deterrence may be helpful in enhancing the ability to deter North Korea’s intended provocations, but it does not eliminate the possibility of an inadvertent and accidental clash.

Russia, China and the New Cold War

North Korea’s relations with Russia and China present another challenge for the Korean Peninsula. An important aspect of Pyongyang’s confrontational stance toward South Korea comes from its improving relations with Moscow and Beijing. North Korea has actively supported China amid various US-China conflicts and has strongly defended Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, North Korea has even provided military equipment including ammunition, artillery shells, missiles and other goods to Russia. North Korea has argued that the root cause of the Ukraine crisis lies in the hegemonic strategy of the US and the West and that Russia’s demands are reasonable and just. It argues that the US and NATO have moved eastward and threatened Russia, causing the current crisis. It says that no matter how strong sanctions, threats or intimidation are against Russia, Moscow will not waver from its commitment to its own national security and self-interest.

Kim Jong Un has also made efforts to strengthen relations with China. He once noted that through five rounds of North Korea-China summits, his Workers’ Party has deepened strategic communications and mutual understanding between the two sides, thereby providing a firm guarantee for further strengthening the bilateral relationship. In fact, there are strategic and political considerations behind the Chinese position because Beijing has geostrategic national interests involving the Korean Peninsula. Although Beijing seems to perceive Pyongyang as more of a burden than it was previously, it still sees the strategic importance of North Korea in East Asia. North Korea has not only acted as a buffer zone on the Korean Peninsula, it has also been strategically important with regard to US-China relations. For this reason, Beijing does not want the Kim regime to be destabilized for any reason, preferring the status quo on the peninsula. There are also huge concerns about the potential for waves of North Korean defectors and refugees to surge into China if the North Korean regime were to collapse. The prospect of millions of North Koreans fleeing into Chinese territory would inevitably lead to serious political, economic and social instability in the northeastern provinces of China.

Pyongyang is now seeking a new security environment on the Korean Peninsula while strengthening its awareness of a new Cold War order. In his address to the Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim stated that “as the structure of international relations changed into a new Cold War structure, it has become more complex and that is the major characteristic of the change in the current international situation.” Of course, Kim’s perception of the new world order reflects the US-China strategic rivalry and the changed international situation since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He seems to believe that changes in the world order will also change the security environment on the Korean Peninsula in favor of North Korea. As a US-led unipolar world changes into a multipolar world, the power structure surrounding the Korean Peninsula will change significantly. North Korea is determined to respond to this changed international environment in a very proactive way.

The problem is that as new Cold War tension intensifies, the North Korean issue can no longer be seen from a post-Cold War framework. If the regional order around the Korean Peninsula is placed in a new Cold War rivalry with the US, Japan and South Korea on one side, and China, Russia and North Korea on the other side, North Korea may no longer be seen as an isolated nation. It is even now strongly dependent on and supported by Russia and China, but neither Russia nor China perceive North Korea as they did before nor are they seen by Pyongyang as always-reliable patrons. However, Russia and China will keep taking advantage of North Korean issues strategically in their dealings with the US. North Korea understands this position well and will seek to maneuver for its own strategic advantage.

South Korea’s Strategic Dilemma

The biggest challenge in facing North Korean threats is to establish a strategic position amid the deepening conflicts among the great powers. There are some concerns that the Russian invasion of Ukraine and US-China rivalry downplay the importance of the Korean Peninsula because they likely move the focus of the US more toward Europe than the Indo-Pacific. However, the Korean Peninsula is still a core region of US-China strategic rivalry, so the North Korean issue is most likely to be affected by changes in the regional order.

Over the past several years, the US and China have competed for global hegemony through the Indo-Pacific strategy for the US and the Belt and Road Initiative for China. This has had a considerable impact on the design and implementation of North Korea policies. Following the division of the Korean Peninsula, the North Korea policy environment has continually changed over the course of three eras — the Cold War, the US unipolar system, and the new Cold War situation. Amid intensifying US-China and US-Russia tensions, South Korea is likely to be put in a strategic dilemma. Under the current situation, Beijing and Moscow are more likely to respond with hostility. As a result, South Korea’s policy options will be severely constrained. This is because the security environment on the Korean Peninsula has been moving away from the unipolar order led by the US that began with the end of the Cold War. Inter-Korean relations in the future are more likely to show similar patterns to those affected by the US-Soviet balance during the Cold War. This means that it may become more difficult for the South Korean government to lead its North Korea policy in the midst of strategic rivalry between the US and China.

These strategic conflicts and a new world order pose a complex challenge to Seoul’s policy toward Pyongyang. It doesn’t seem likely that the South Korean government can find a breakthrough on North Korea in the near future. Under these circumstances, South Korea’s policy toward North Korea needs to be more sophisticated, while paying close heed to US-China relations.

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Jihwan Hwang is a Professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Seoul.
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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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