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Quotes of the Day:
“We know they are lying.
They know they are lying.
They know that we know that they are lying.
We know that they know that we know that they know they are lying.
And still … They continue to lie.”
- Alexander Solzhenitsyn.
“Those who will not reason, are bigots, those who cannot, are fools, and those who dare not, are slaves.”
- Lord Byron
“Don’t just teach children to read. Teach them to question what they read. The value of an education is not the learning of many facts but the training of the mind to think.”
- George Carlin
1. Rules for Pentagon Use of Proxy Forces Shed Light on a Shadowy War Power
2. Zelensky Arrives in U.K. for Talks on Military Aid
3. Ukraine’s Zelensky visits Germany, turning a page on fragile ties
4. Joint Declaration by Ukraine and the French Republic
5. Wagner chief offered to give Russian troop locations to Ukraine, leak says
6. Soldiers under ‘enormous strain,’ warns Army’s top enlisted leader
7. Post-withdrawal, no “over-the-horizon” strikes in Afghanistan
8. Putin Can't Hide This: The Ukraine War Crushed the Russian Military
9. Germany Announces Its Biggest Military Aid Package Yet for Ukraine
10. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 14, 2023
11. Here comes Sky Warden, the crop duster that’s SOCOM’s newest armed overwatch aircraft
12. China sentences elderly US citizen to life in prison on spying charges
13. Zelensky Pledges to Oust Russia From All of Occupied Ukraine
14. Ukraine Hails ‘First Success’ of Advance Around Bakhmut
15. A massive new US embassy complex in a tiny Middle East nation is raising eyebrows
16. Special Operations News Update - May 15, 2023 | SOF News
17. It’s time to put Putin on the defensive
18. Opinion | In Vienna, the U.S.-China relationship shows signs of hope
19. China’s war chest: Beijing’s ‘great wall of steel’ faces obstacles to military supremacy
20. The Opponents of Marine Reform Have Lost, But Won’t Move On
21. EDCA: Illuminating the path to enhanced external defense (Philippines)
22. Philippines’ new military deal with US: Will it tilt power balance in South China Sea?
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1. Rules for Pentagon Use of Proxy Forces Shed Light on a Shadowy War Power
We need to keep in mind the wisdom of LTG Sam WIlson:
20. INTEGRITY, HONESTY, AND LOYALTY.
A. Need to take a moral bath.
B. Special Operations are very decentralized in execution and conducive to improprieties.
Improprieties, because of the political sensitivity of SO mission, cause long term mistrust within the command structure that take hard work and many years to overcome.
https://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2014/03/20-characteristics-of-special.html
No actions and certainly no policy can be kept secret forever (or for long) in a democracy. It is a fact of life so let's get over it and understand this fact.
We need to ask ourselves if the expediency of not conducting human rights vetting is worth the long term negative effects on the mission and on special operations? Do the ends really justify the means? And of course we need to understand what are the ends we are trying to achieve? Is it only the ability to capture /kill a high value target? Or are the ends bigger than that?
Is the argument really that the Chinese and Russians do not limit their operations because of human rights considerations that we should not either?
If the American narrative relies on the high standard of American values then we must consider that in all our actions.
In addition to human rights vetting I think we also need to vet the "proxy" forces (and I really do despise the use of proxy as potentially being too confused with mercenary) to ensure we have sufficient alignment of interests.
4. Assessment - must conduct continuous assessment to gain understanding - tactical, operational, and strategic. Assessments are key to developing strategy and campaign plans and anticipating potential conflict. Assessments allow you to challenge assumptions and determine if a rebalance of ways and means with the acceptable, durable, political arrangement is required. Understand the indigenous way of war and adapt to it. Do not force the US way of war upon indigenous forces if it is counter to their history, customs, traditions, and abilities.
5. Ensure US and indigenous interests are sufficiently aligned. If indigenous and US interests are not sufficiently aligned the mission will fail. If the US has stronger interest than the indigenous force we can create an “assistance paradox” - if indigenous forces believe the US mission is "no fail” and the US forces will not allow them to fail and therefore they do not need to try too hard. They may very well benefit from long term US aid and support which may be their objective for accepting support in the first place.
https://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2018/07/eight-points-of-special-warfare.html
Lastly, I think we need to spend more time focusing on the SOF imperatives rather than the SOF truths. In this case especially the second imperative. We should recognize the political implications of not conducting human rights vetting.
SOF Imperatives
- Understand the operational environment
- Recognize political implications
- Facilitate interagency activities
- Engage the threat discriminately
- Consider long-term effects
- Ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations
- Anticipate and control psychological effects
- Apply capabilities indirectly
- Develop multiple options
- Ensure long-term sustainment
- Provide sufficient intelligence
- Balance security and synchronization
Rules for Pentagon Use of Proxy Forces Shed Light on a Shadowy War Power
By Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt
Reporting from Washington
May 14, 2023
The New York Times · by Eric Schmitt · May 14, 2023
Newly disclosed documents include Special Operations forces directives for managing counterterrorism and irregular warfare surrogate fighters.
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The Pentagon keeps secret much about its proxy force operations.Credit...Julia Nikhinson for The New York Times
By Charlie Savage and
Reporting from Washington
May 14, 2023
U.S. Special Operations forces are not required to vet for past human rights violations by the foreign troops they arm and train as surrogates, newly disclosed documents show.
While the gap in rules governing vetting for a counterterrorism program have previously been reported based on anonymous sources, the documents provide official confirmation. Under the program, American commandos pay, train and equip foreign partner forces and then dispatch them on kill-or-capture operations.
The documents, including two sets of directives obtained by The New York Times through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit, also show a similar gap exists in another Pentagon surrogate force program for so-called irregular warfare. It is aimed at disrupting nation-state rivals via operations that fall short of full armed conflict — including sabotage, hacking and information campaigns like propaganda or clandestine efforts to shape morale.
While the Pentagon is more open about security cooperation in which it assists allies and partners in expanding their own capacities, it rarely discusses its use of surrogates, or the foreign troops with whom Special Operations forces work to pursue specific American objectives. The documents open a window on how the programs function and what rules govern them.
Proxy forces are an increasingly important part of American foreign policy. Over the past decade, the United States has increasingly relied on supporting or deputizing local partner forces in places like Niger and Somalia, moving away from deploying large numbers of American ground troops as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Even as that strategic shift is meant to reduce the risk of American casualties and blowback from being seen as occupiers, training and arming local forces creates other hazards.
The disclosures underscored a need for tighter rules on proxy forces, Representative Sara Jacobs, Democrat of California, argued. “We need to make sure that we are not training abusive units to become even more lethal and fueling the conflict and violence that we’re aiming to solve,” she said. “And that starts with universal human rights vetting.”
Last year, she and Senator Chris Van Hollen, Democrat of Maryland, sponsored an amendment to a defense bill to require human rights vetting of surrogate forces that passed the House but not the Senate. She said she planned to introduce a more comprehensive bill to tighten such rules.
A senior Defense Department official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive operations, said that all members of a proxy force were already subjected to extensive screening to ensure that they would not attack or spy on American forces. The official maintained that vetting was sufficient to weed out bad actors.
Lt. Col. Cesar Santiago-Santini, a Pentagon spokesman, said in a statement to The Times that the department had found “no verifiable gross violations of human rights” by participants of either proxy force program.
Katherine Yon Ebright, a counsel with the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University’s law school who has written critically about both programs, said that Pentagon officials have sent mixed signals about whether surrogate forces are vetted for past human rights violations, with current and former officials sometimes contradicting one another.
“It’s very helpful now to have these internal policies in hand that definitively show that human rights vetting is not required,” Ms. Ebright said. “It’s been frustrating, the more you know about this, because of those mixed messages and the opacity.”
The Pentagon keeps secret much about its proxy force operations.
In February, the Government Accountability Office completed a report titled “Special Operations: Overarching Guidance Needed to Oversee and Assess Use of Surrogate Forces to Combat Terrorism,” but everything about it beyond its title is classified. (The Times is seeking a declassification review under the Freedom of Information Act.)
The Pentagon also will not disclose a comprehensive list of partner forces and the countries in which they are operating. The Defense Department official said the list is classified primarily because of its sensitivity to partners, citing situations in which a foreign government has agreed but wants to keep its participation quiet for its own domestic political reasons.
The documents obtained by The Times include directives for two programs that are named for the laws that authorize them. The Section 127e program, commonly called “127 Echo,” can spend up to $100 million a year on counterterrorism proxies. The Section 1202 program is authorized to spend up to $15 million a year on surrogates for irregular warfare.
The rules lay out the process by which special operators propose developing a new partner force, which is ultimately up to the secretary of defense. The State Department’s chief of mission in the affected country — if there is one — must also concur, but the rules do not require consulting the secretary of state in Washington. The programs cannot be used for covert operations.
The laws creating the two programs do not provide free-standing operational authority, the documents say. They do not detail the scope and limits on whom the programs can target.
For the counterterrorism program, the proxy force must be used against an adversary deemed to be covered by the Authorization for Use of Military Force that Congress enacted after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the senior Defense Department official said. The executive branch has interpreted that law as a legal basis to wage an armed conflict against Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Somali militant group Al Shabab.
It is unclear whether the program has always been limited to groups covered by the force authorization. Reporting by The Intercept and Politico has suggested that the Pentagon may have used the program to support a force in Cameroon battling both an ISIS affiliate and Boko Haram, a group not deemed to be covered by the authorization. However, some Boko Haram members also have ISIS links.
The irregular warfare program has provided training to allied forces in countries that face a threat of invasion by larger neighbors, the senior Defense Department official said. The Washington Post has reported that an irregular warfare proxy program in Ukraine was terminated just before the Russian invasion, and that some officials want to restart it.
The directives also describe the vetting that allied partners must undergo before American taxpayers pay their salaries and put weapons and specialized military equipment, like night-vision goggles, in their hands.
Screening includes collecting people’s DNA; analyzing phone call logs, travel histories, social media posts, and social contacts; checking local and national records for derogatory information; and conducting security interviews. Leaders who will come into greater contact with American troops and learn more about their plans must also undergo behavioral health interviews and lie-detector tests.
But the purpose of this vetting is to detect counterintelligence risks and potential threats to American forces. The directive does not mention violations of human rights — such as rape, torture or extrajudicial killings.
The irregular warfare directive is less detailed about vetting. But it explicitly says, “The provision of support under Section 1202 is not contingent upon successful human rights vetting requirements as defined in” a statute with a rule known as the Leahy Law.
The Leahy Law, named after former Senator Patrick Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, bans security assistance to units of foreign militaries or other security forces that have a history of gross violations of human rights. (The law does not cover nonstate forces, like a tribal militia.)
Still, Colonel Santiago-Santini, the Pentagon spokesman, said in his statement that the department was “confident that our vetting system for Section 127e and 1202 programs would reveal any human rights concerns with potential recipients.”
At first, the Pentagon’s version of the Leahy Law applied only to training. But in 2014, Congress expanded it to providing equipment and other assistance. But in a memo that year signed by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and obtained by The Times separately from the information act lawsuit, the Pentagon declared that the Leahy Law did not apply to counterterrorism surrogates.
The memo said that enabling proxy forces to help Special Forces counterterrorism operations is “not assistance” to the foreigners. This purported distinction — that building up proxy forces so they can assist the United States in pursuing its objectives is legally different from assisting foreign partners in building up their own security abilities — is disputed.
A critic of that theory is Sarah Harrison, who worked as a Pentagon lawyer from 2017 to 2021 and is now at the International Crisis Group, where she has called for requiring human rights vetting of surrogate forces. She argued that the Pentagon’s narrow interpretation of the Leahy Law is “a dishonest reading of the plain text and intention of Congress.”
The New York Times · by Eric Schmitt · May 14, 2023
2. Zelensky Arrives in U.K. for Talks on Military Aid
Strong diplomatic push by Zelensky through Europe.
Zelensky Arrives in U.K. for Talks on Military Aid
The New York Times · by Mark Landler · May 15, 2023
Prime Minister Rishi Sunak of Britain and President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, at Chequers, the prime minister’s official country residence, near Ellesborough, England, on Monday.Credit...Pool photo by Carl Court
LONDON — Prime Minister Rishi Sunak of Britain pledged on Monday to provide a large package of missiles and attack drones to Ukraine, ahead of a meeting with President Volodymyr Zelensky, who over the weekend secured promises of billions of dollars in additional military aid from European allies.
Mr. Zelensky, who has been on a whirlwind tour of Europe to shore up support ahead of a counteroffensive against Russia, shared a hug with Mr. Sunak when he landed at the British leader’s country residence, Chequers, outside London, on Monday morning. The Ukrainian president described the meetings as “substantive negotiations” and referred to Mr. Sunak in a Tweet as “my friend Rishi.”
Welcome back, @ZelenskyyUa pic.twitter.com/ph57ZoUHpC
— Rishi Sunak (@RishiSunak) May 15, 2023
The State of the War
An armored Ukrainian vehicle on a road in Donetsk region, Ukraine, on Saturday.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
While the battle for Bakhmut, a mostly ruined city where tens of thousands of soldiers are believed to have died, continues to rage after Ukraine made some gains for the first time in months, world leaders are planning several efforts in the coming days to find new diplomatic avenues for ending the war.
Later this week, leaders from the Group of 7 nations — the United States, Japan, Canada, Britain, France, Germany and Italy, as well as the European Union — will be gathering in Hiroshima, Japan, for a weekend of meetings. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is on the agenda.
“Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is a challenge to the rule-based international order, and the G7 has responded in a united manner,” the group’s website says. “The G7 will continue to strongly promote sanctions against Russia and supports for Ukraine.”
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Smoke rising over the skyline from the scene of a Russian strike in Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, in October.Credit...Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times
A Chinese government envoy is scheduled to begin a trip on Monday that includes visits to Ukraine and Russia in an attempt to help negotiate an end to the war.
China had announced its intention to send the official, Li Hui — the government’s special representative for Eurasian affairs — after a phone call last month between its top leader, Xi Jinping, and Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky. Beijing had said that Mr. Li would “conduct in-depth communication with all parties” to try to reach a “political settlement.” His trip was confirmed last week by a government spokesman.
Beijing has been trying to position itself as a potential peace broker in the war, especially as Mr. Xi casts himself as a global statesman and China as an alternative to the United States for global leadership. In February, China issued what it described as a 12-point peace plan for Ukraine, though Western officials criticized it as lacking substance.
The film “Our House Is on Fire” follows Sofia, a young Ukrainian singer who is trying to make her way in Los Angeles but returns to Kyiv for her brother’s wedding.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times
This is one in an occasional series of dispatches about life amid the war in Ukraine.
KYIV, Ukraine — Alice Biletska knew that it would be challenging to film in Ukraine, where one is always under the threat of missile or drone strikes, but when she was deciding how to tell the story of a Ukrainian singer torn between her career in the United States and her family in a war-torn country, she and her co-producer saw little choice.
“There was never any question of where we would film,” Ms. Biletska said. “You have the soul of the people here. It’s very hard to fake that. Our Ukrainian crew all have their personal experiences of this war, and have gone through all of this, and everyone has a story.”
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On a dusty roadside on the outskirts of Dubai, Sohrab Fani is profiting from the West’s response to the war in Ukraine: his shop installs seat heaters into cars being re-exported to Russia.
Twelve thousand heating pads languished in his warehouse for years, he said, until Russia’s invasion and the resulting Western sanctions drove American, European and Japanese automakers out of the Russian market. Now, Russians import those cars via Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates — and because cars shipped to the Middle East tend to be made for warm climates, accessories shops like Mr. Fani’s are doing a brisk business outfitting them for winter weather.
“When the Russians came, I sold out,” Mr. Fani said, so he ordered several thousand more seat-heating pads. “In Russia, they have sanctions. Here, there is not. Here, there is business.”
The New York Times · by Mark Landler · May 15, 2023
3. Ukraine’s Zelensky visits Germany, turning a page on fragile ties
Ukraine’s Zelensky visits Germany, turning a page on fragile ties
The Washington Post · by Loveday Morris · May 14, 2023
BERLIN — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Germany on Sunday, as Berlin attempts to turn a new page in a relationship that has been damaged by friction over the course of Russia’s war on Ukraine.
The visit came a day after Germany announced a package of military aid for Ukraine totaling $2.95 billion, almost doubling its total commitment since Russia invaded in February 2022.
Before the new package of artillery and air defense systems, Berlin already was Ukraine’s third-biggest arms supplier behind the United States and Britain. But Zelensky has visited many other allies ahead of Germany, indicative of the difficulties in the two countries’ relationship.
He flew from Italy and was greeted in Berlin by Chancellor Olaf Scholz with military honors. “Already in Berlin. Weapons. Powerful package. Air defense. Reconstruction. EU. NATO. Security,” the Ukrainian president tweeted in the early hours of Sunday morning.
He then met German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, a politician who has been criticized for his previous cozy relations with Moscow. The session represented a thaw after Zelensky disinvited Steinmeier from a visit to Kyiv last year, setting off a diplomatic spat.
Zelensky is expected to travel to the western German city of Aachen to receive the International Charlemagne Prize for services to Europe.
In pledging the additional military aid, which comes as Ukraine readies a counteroffensive against Russian forces, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said Saturday that Germany “will provide all the help it can, as long as it takes.”
Scholz announced last year a “zeitenwende,” or turning point, in the country’s defense strategy after Russia attacked Ukraine. But Kyiv was frustrated by Germany’s perceived dithering in the first weeks of the fighting and subsequent foot-dragging on sending heavy weaponry.
Zelensky’s visit to Germany almost didn’t happen after details of his itinerary, including the hotel he had booked, were published by a Berlin newspaper, according to a Ukrainian official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal government deliberations.
“People were furious,” the official said, adding that it was the first time such explicit details had been made public so far in advance of a Zelensky visit abroad.
Berlin police have launched an investigation into how the information passed to the media. Chief Barbara Slowik described it as “unbearable” that “a single employee is damaging the reputation of the Berlin police in such a shameful way nationally and internationally.”
The Ukrainian official speculated as to whether more nefarious reasons were at play. “Was the intention to destroy this relationship?” the official said of the impact on German-Ukrainian ties. “It’s very fragile.”
The tension in the relationship — rooted in the two country’s differing views of the Russian threat — long predates the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine last year. In Ukraine, Germany is regularly blamed for laying Russia’s path for the war by ignoring Kyiv’s warnings that the Nord Stream pipelines threatened its security and also for coercing the government to accept the maligned Minsk agreements following Russia’s 2014 invasion and illegal annexation of Crimea.
For Ukraine, pragmatic considerations influence trips such as Zelensky’s, said Susan Stewart, an analyst at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
Ukraine’s performance on the battlefield has added impetus to the political debate over sending arms. The country is keen to shore up continued supplies of tanks from Europe, and Zelensky is also lobbying for fighter jets. Germany has so far ruled out sending jets.
“Germany continues to be an extremely important partner for Ukraine and one that Ukraine appreciates,” Stewart said. “It’s just that because of this sort of an initial hesitance and because of the previous positions toward Russia, there is this kind of lingering lack of complete trust or a sense that others are perhaps even more on Ukraine’s side.”
The Washington Post · by Loveday Morris · May 14, 2023
4. Joint Declaration by Ukraine and the French Republic
Excerpt:
In the coming weeks, France will train and equip several battalions with tens of armored vehicles and light tanks including AMX-10RC. Besides, France is focusing its effort in supporting Ukraine’s air defense capacities in order to defend its population against Russian strikes. In addition to its national contribution, the French Republic is actively involved in the measures of the European Union and NATO in the military assistance to Ukraine and in the training of Ukrainian soldiers.
Joint Declaration by Ukraine and the French Republic
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/spilna-deklaraciya-ukrayini-ta-francuzkoyi-respubliki-82897
15 May 2023 - 01:35
At their meeting in Paris on 14 May 2023, the Presidents of Ukraine and the French Republic issued the following declaration.
The Presidents of Ukraine and France reiterated their unequivocal condemnation of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine. Ukraine has shown remarkable determination in exercising its inherent right to self-defence against this unprovoked and unjustified attack. Russia must immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. France and Ukraine call specifically on Russia to withdraw from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), of which the irresponsible seizure and militarization by Russian armed forces is causing a grave threat.
France remains unwavering in its commitment to Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. France commends the determination and courage of the Ukrainian people and armed forces and acknowledges their significant contribution to the security of the European continent and beyond. France will continue its political, financial, humanitarian and military support to Ukraine for as long as it takes – individually and through international cooperation within the European Union, NATO, the United Nations and in other formats. By defending the security of the European continent, France, Ukraine and other partners are also safeguarding the rules-based international order.
The military support provided by France since the beginning of the war in order to allow Ukraine to defend itself continues, as new packages are being prepared, constantly taking into account the most urgent and immediate needs of Ukraine to strengthen its defence capabilities. France is aiming at providing full capacities in all areas. In the coming weeks, France will train and equip several battalions with tens of armored vehicles and light tanks including AMX-10RC. Besides, France is focusing its effort in supporting Ukraine’s air defense capacities in order to defend its population against Russian strikes. In addition to its national contribution, the French Republic is actively involved in the measures of the European Union and NATO in the military assistance to Ukraine and in the training of Ukrainian soldiers.
Beyond the military assistance, France has been providing Ukraine with civilian assistance, including financial, humanitarian and emergency support. In particular, France has sent to Ukraine two mobile DNA laboratories to strengthen Ukraine's capacity to prosecute war crimes. This assistance will continue to grow.
France supports Ukraine’s initiative for a just and sustainable peace based on Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Ukrainian Peace Formula includes a variety of important objectives, many of which France is already working on. France expresses its support to the Ukrainian Peace Formula and stands ready to cooperate with Ukraine to ensure as wide international participation as possible in a Global Peace Summit to be convened in the coming months on the basis of the Ukraine Peace Formula proposal and other possible good faith proposals.
Ukraine and France are determined to fight against impunity, and underline their firm commitment to bringing to justice those responsible for war crimes and other atrocity crimes committed in connection with Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. France is participating in ongoing international efforts, in cooperation with Ukraine, to ensure accountability through the establishment of an appropriate mechanism for prosecuting the crime of aggression. Broad international support is key in this regard, since it provides maximum international legitimacy while ensuring the prosecution of the political leadership. Therefore, while participating in the Core Group on achieving accountability for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, France encourages other countries to join and to build international support for the creation of an ad hoc tribunal. France welcomes the agreement on the new International Centre for Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (ICPA) in The Hague, and looks forward to its launch as soon as possible.
Ukraine and France reiterate their support for the investigations of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, which are a step towards accountability, and have taken note of the court’s arrest warrants. France has provided additional support to the International Criminal Court in order to enhance its capacities in the framework of the war of Russia against Ukraine.
Ukraine and France agree on the need to increase collective pressure on Russia through further sanctions to weaken Russia’s ability to continue its illegal war of aggression. Furthermore, they agree on the need to strengthen efforts to ensure the effective implementation of sanctions and to prevent and counter circumvention in and by third countries.
Ukraine and France will continue to work together with others to develop mechanisms to provide compensation for losses, injuries and damages caused by the Russian aggression. To this end, the international register of damage, to be presented at the Reykjavik Summit of the Council of Europe on 16-17 May 2023, is an important milestone. Our efforts will continue to explore appropriate options for the financing of a compensation mechanism, including a sound legal basis for the use of frozen and immobilized Russian assets, to support Ukraine’s reconstruction and for the purposes of reparation.
Ukraine and France remain also determined to support countries suffering from the consequences of the Russian war, notably to reduce the consequences of the food crisis. In this regard, France emphasizes the importance of Ukraine’s consistent efforts to continue the Black Sea Grain Initiative and launch the Grain from Ukraine Humanitarian Program, aimed at enhancing global food security. Ukraine highly appreciates France’s support for the Grain from Ukraine Humanitarian Program and encourages further strengthening of the relevant support.
Ukraine welcomes the fact that France organized an international conference on December 13, which led to the establishment of the "Paris mechanism" for better coordination of emergency aid. France, together with international organizations and partners, is committed to participate in the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine after the war. Already now, it is important to lay the ground for an ambitious and long-term engagement that will create opportunities and enable the Ukrainian people to rebuild their country. Engaging all relevant partners, including private companies and internationally, with the aim of securing the financial support, investments and knowledge needed, is essential to ensure a prosperous future for Ukraine.
The future of Ukraine and its people lies within the European family. The European Union has already recognized the European perspective of Ukraine and granted Ukraine the status of candidate country. France strongly supports Ukraine in its reform efforts and in meeting before the end of 2023 the required conditions, looking forward to the European Commission’s report, with a view to start accession negotiations. Ukraine and France call on the EU to continue supporting the country in all fields. Regarding military support, they welcome the recent agreements aiming at delivering more ammunition and missiles to Ukraine, notably through the expansion of the European industrial base. Furthermore, Ukraine has a key role to play within the newly founded European Political Community and will work towards the success of the Chisinau Summit, together with France and Moldova.
In the NATO framework, France continues to focus on the immediate support to Ukraine. France continues its strong support to bolster Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself, and recalls that Ukraine has the right to choose its own security arrangements. France fully supports the NATO-Ukraine Commission as a venue to further increase and expand the ongoing cooperation to help fulfil Ukraine’s path towards the Euro-Atlantic family, consistent with the Bucharest Declaration. Ukraine and France look forward to addressing these issues at the NATO Summit in Vilnius in July 2023.
5. Wagner chief offered to give Russian troop locations to Ukraine, leak says
Now here is where the leak could provide some useful information for psychological operations. I hope we can exploit this (and get some benefit from that traitor the Discord Leaks)
Wagner chief offered to give Russian troop locations to Ukraine, leak says
THE DISCORD LEAKS | Yevgeniy Prigozhin said he would tell Ukraine’s military where to attack Russian troops if they pulled their own forces back from the beleaguered city of Bakhmut, where Wagner mercenaries were taking heavy losses
By Shane Harris and Isabelle Khurshudyan
May 14, 2023 at 7:23 p.m. EDT
The Washington Post · by Shane Harris · May 14, 2023
In late January, with his mercenary forces dying by the thousands in a fight for the ruined city of Bakhmut, Wagner Group owner Yevgeniy Prigozhin made Ukraine an extraordinary offer.
Prigozhin said that if Ukraine’s commanders withdrew their soldiers from the area around Bakhmut, he would give Kyiv information on Russian troop positions, which Ukraine could use to attack them. Prigozhin conveyed the proposal to his contacts in Ukraine’s military intelligence directorate, with whom he has maintained secret communications during the course of the war, according to previously unreported U.S. intelligence documents leaked on the group-chat platform Discord.
Prigozhin has publicly feuded with Russian military commanders, who he furiously claims have failed to equip and resupply his forces, which have provided vital support to Moscow’s war effort. But he is also an ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who might well regard Prigozhin’s offer to trade the lives of Wagner fighters for Russian soldiers as a treasonous betrayal.
The leaked document does not make clear which Russian troop positions Prigozhin offered to disclose.
The Discord Leaks
Dozens of highly classified documents have been leaked online, revealing sensitive information intended for senior military and intelligence leaders. In an exclusive investigation, The Post also reviewed scores of additional secret documents, most of which have not been made public.
Who leaked the documents? Jack Teixeira, a young member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, was charged in the investigation into leaks of hundreds of pages of classified military intelligence. The Post reported that the individual who leaked the information shared documents with a small circle of online friends on the Discord chat platform.
What do the leaked documents reveal about Ukraine? The documents reveal profound concerns about the war’s trajectory and Kyiv’s capacity to wage a successful offensive against Russian forces. According to a Defense Intelligence Agency assessment among the leaked documents, “Negotiations to end the conflict are unlikely during 2023.”
What else do they show? The files include summaries of human intelligence on high-level conversations between world leaders, as well as information about advanced satellite technology the United States uses to spy. They also include intelligence on both allies and adversaries, including Iran and North Korea, as well as Britain, Canada, South Korea and Israel.
What happens now? The leak has far-reaching implications for the United States and its allies. In addition to the Justice Department investigation, officials in several countries said they were assessing the damage from the leaks.
1/5
End of carousel
Two Ukrainian officials confirmed that Prigozhin has spoken several times to the Ukrainian intelligence directorate, known as HUR. One official said that Prigozhin extended the offer regarding Bakhmut more than once, but that Kyiv rejected it because officials don’t trust Prigozhin and thought his proposals could have been disingenuous.
A U.S. official also cautioned that there are similar doubts in Washington about Prigozhin’s intentions. The Ukrainian and U.S. officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information.
In an interview with The Washington Post this month, Zelensky would not confirm the contacts with Prigozhin. “This is a matter of [military] intelligence,” he said. The Ukrainian leader also objected to airing classified information publicly and said he believed that the leaks had benefited Russia.
But there is no debating Prigozhin’s bitter frustration with the grinding fight in Bakhmut. He has complained, publicly and privately, that the Russian defense ministry has not given his fighters the ammunition and other resources they need to succeed. Bakhmut, in eastern Ukraine, has seen some of the bloodiest fighting of the war. Over the past few months, in a grinding back and forth measured by city blocks, Ukrainian and Russian forces have taken steep casualties.
Prigozhin, who promised to take control of the city by May 9, in time for Russia’s Victory Day celebrations, has recently threatened publicly to pull his forces out of the fight.
Other leaked documents reveal Russian defense ministry officials privately wondering how to respond to Prigozhin’s criticism of the military’s performance and his demands for more resources, which they apparently conceded were not illegitimate grievances. The documents also speak to a power struggle between Prigozhin and top officials, including Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.
Against that tense backdrop, Prigohzin has carried on a secret relationship with Ukrainian intelligence that, in addition to phone calls, includes in-person meetings with HUR officers in an unspecified country in Africa, one document states. Wagner forces provide security to several governments on the continent.
The leaked U.S. intelligence shows Prigozhin bemoaning the heavy toll that fighting has taken on his own forces and urging Ukraine to strike harder against Russian troops.
According to one document, Prigozhin told a Ukrainian intelligence officer that the Russian military was struggling with ammunition supplies. He advised Ukrainian forces to push forward with an assault on the border of Crimea, which Russia has illegally annexed, while Russian troop morale was low. The report also referred to other intelligence noting that Prigozhin was aware of plummeting morale among Wagner forces and that some of his fighters had balked at orders to deploy in the Bakhmut area under heavy fire, for fear of suffering more casualties.
The Kremlin did not respond to a request for comment about Prigozhin’s communications with Ukraine.
In wartime, it is not unusual for opposing parties to maintain some form of communication. And the documents don’t reveal Prigozhin’s intention in talking to his erstwhile foes in Ukraine. In an interview, a Ukrainian official characterized the contacts in the spirit of “keeping your friends close and your enemies closer.”
The documents also suggest that Kyiv suspects, or may know, that the Kremlin is aware of Prigozhin’s communications with Ukrainian intelligence, if not his secret negotiations over Bakhmut.
One document, based on “sigint” — or intercepted communications — states that Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, Kyrolo Budanov, “expected the Russians to use details of Prigozhin’s secret talks with the HUR and his meetings with their officers in Africa to make him appear to be a Ukrainian agent.” It doesn’t specify whether Budanov suspects Moscow may already know that Prigozhin is talking to HUR officers.
When informed that U.S. intelligence documents revealed Prigozhin’s communications with Ukrainian intelligence, the mercenary commander appeared to make light of the situation. “Yes of course I can confirm this information, we have nothing to hide from the foreign special services. Budanov and I are still in Africa,” Prigohzin wrote on Sunday via his Telegram channel.
Budanov didn’t immediately respond to a question about Prigohzin’s offer to disclose Russian troop positions in exchange for a Ukrainian pullback in Bakhmut.
Mary Ilyushina contributed reporting from Riga, Latvia.
The Washington Post · by Shane Harris · May 14, 2023
6. Soldiers under ‘enormous strain,’ warns Army’s top enlisted leader
Soldiers under ‘enormous strain,’ warns Army’s top enlisted leader
armytimes.com · by James Clark · May 12, 2023
Even though America’s longest war has drawn to an end, soldiers continue to face a breakneck operational tempo, and for the time being, there seems to be little chance of respite as the Army is left short-handed amid a recruiting crisis.
“We have an enormous strain on soldiers,” Sergeant Major of the Army Michael Grinston said earlier this month. “We’re busier now than we ever have been.”
The Army’s top enlisted leader recently issued the dire warning at the Fires Symposium in Lawton, Oklahoma, calling current strains on personnel a “huge concern” for him, according to a release by the Association of the United States Army.
The high operations tempo, coupled with the shrinking size of the force, means that soldiers are being asked to do more with less.
For the second year in a row, the Army missed its target recruiting goal. According to AUSA, the Army’s projected strength for fiscal year 2024 is roughly 951,800 soldiers, counting active duty, Guard and Reserve. That total marks a 20% decrease from the service’s end strength in 2022.
Contrary to claims that the U.S. military has scaled back its operational tempo during what has been branded as peacetime — a claim that overlooks the risks shouldered by service members still serving in combat zones, like Iraq and Syria — American soldiers find themselves deploying regularly for missions abroad as well as at home.
There are advise and assist deployments in Iraq and Syria, some of which rely on detachments with unique capabilities, such as air artillery defense units. At home, the Army and National Guard have been called upon to serve as duct-tape fixes for everything from the COVID response to support at the U.S.-Mexico border.
“The link of everything we’ve done has been the Army,” Grinston said, according to the release. “Whether it’s COVID, hurricanes, forest fires, Russia, Ukraine, all the way to what we’re doing today. That’s why, again, I’m concerned about our optempo.”
The tempo may be grueling, but soldiers continue to meet the high expectations set before them, Grinston added.
“We’ve never said no,” Grinston said of the Army. “I’ve watched these soldiers, year after year, they’ve said, ‘Yes, I’ll go do that.’”
Then-U.S. Army Forces Command’s Command Sgt. Maj. Michael A. Grinston speaks to Soldiers of E Company, 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division at Ft. Campbell, May 22, 2018. (Sgt. Steven Lopez/Army)
Grinston’s remarks at the Fires Symposium come on the heels of another conversation in which he raised workload concerns of the average soldier. In April, Grinston told Military.com’s Steve Beynon “the average citizen doesn’t know how stressful this is on our families. I think it has been an incredible strain on our soldiers and our families.”
Ahead of a deployment overseas, soldiers must meet a series of requirements before even beginning pre-deployment training. Individual tasks may only take a day here or there, but they pile up. This period is followed by a month-long pre-deployment training evolution — often hosted at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, or the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana — that may be further augmented by unit-level exercises specific to select commands or career fields.
Atop the pre-deployment period, personnel must meet unit-level logistical requirements, individual preparations for necessary armor and gear, screenings, staffing and so on. Finally, when every task has been completed, the deployment and all the rigors and risks that come with it await.
Soldiers eventually return home and are afforded a breather, albeit brief, before doing it all over again. With manpower issues looming and a tempo that won’t slow, it remains to be seen whether this cadence is sustainable — not just for the Army, but for those who fill its ranks.
About James Clark
James is the editor of Army Times and a Marine Corps veteran.
7. Post-withdrawal, no “over-the-horizon” strikes in Afghanistan
I recall the adage about not making promises you cannot keep.
I know that air power advocates will not like this, but some over the horizon capabilities do require boots on the ground gathering human intelligence and support capabilities in proximity to the target areas.
Post-withdrawal, no “over-the-horizon” strikes in Afghanistan
militarytimes.com · by Meghann Myers · May 12, 2023
As the U.S. scrambled to get the last of its troops out of Afghanistan in late summer 2021, the Pentagon fielded endless questions about how it could prevent the country from becoming the terrorist training ground it had been before 9/11.
Biden administration officials touted robust “over-the-horizon” capabilities to both gather intelligence and strike terrorist groups to keep them in check. But some two years after the Biden administration announced the drawdown, the U.S. military hasn’t struck a single target in Afghanistan, and U.S. military leaders now concede they lack sufficient resources to do so.
In August 2021, then Pentagon spokesman John Kirby insisted the administration would “maintain robust over-the-horizon counter-terrorism capability, the kinds of capabilities that you’ve seen us use in just the last 24-36 hours,” as the U.S. prepared to evacuate the last of its troops. “We still have that capability. We will use that capability,” an assertion Kirby repeated again this year, as Biden National Security Council spokesman, and also repeated to Military Times by multiple military officials.
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But the military commander in charge of that region didn’t sound so confident, warning that terrorist groups inside Afghanistan may soon be ready to launch attacks abroad.
“Specifically, ISIS-Khorasan, Senator,” Army Gen. Erik Kurilla, head of U.S. Central Command, told lawmakers during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in March. “It is my commanders’ estimate that they can do an external operation against U.S. or Western interests abroad in under six months with little to no warning,” he said, with the caveat that he believes the U.S. homeland is still safe.
The CIA did target and kill al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in July 2022. And the Taliban killed the suspected mastermind behind the 2021 ISIS bombing of Kabul’ airport’s Abbey Gate, that left 13 U.S. troops and about 170 Afghans dead during the chaotic U.S. withdrawal.
But neither of those involved the U.S. military, calling into question whether that “over-the-horizon” capability is as robust as was claimed, or simply has been delegated to the CIA, therefore is outside the U.S. military’s purview.
Keeping tabs
Counterterrorism experts are dubious not only that the U.S. can properly surveil terrorist activity in Afghanistan, but that the national security apparatus is willing to devote adequate energy to containing it.
“The U.S. is essentially flying blind in Afghanistan, especially compared to the ability to understand what was going on in the 2000s, the 2010s and up through the withdrawal,” according to former Pentagon counterterrorism official Seth Jones, now at the Center for Strategic and National Studies.
During the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. had the benefit of not only surveillance aircraft and other technology in-country, but military, intelligence and State Department personnel on the ground maintaining Afghan and Pakistani human information networks, said Jones, who once worked as an adviser and plans officer for U.S. special operations forces in Afghanistan.
“Even then ... there were still huge intelligence gaps when we had 100,000 forces there, plus NATO forces, plus some cooperation with Pakistan,” Jones said in an interview.
What capability the U.S. does have is hamstrung by the short amount of time any surveillance equipment can spend gathering information over Afghanistan or launching a strike, as much of that dwell time over a target is spent actually getting there, flying roughly a thousand miles to Afghanistan from where U.S. forces are stationed at al-Udeid Air Base.
Jones said that means targeting a high-value asset like al-Zawahiri is possible as a one-off, but without more resources close to the adversary, “you’re going to be very limited in conducting any kind of sustained campaign against Islamic State-Khorasan, al-Qaida or other groups operating from Afghan soil. That is the reality.”
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Kurilla’s Senate Armed Services Committee comments have been repeated at numerous other hearings since then, including one in April with the House Homeland Security Committee. There, a former Trump administration ambassador-at-large for counterterrorism shared similar concerns about the viability of reining it terrorism from afar.
“To dismantle a terrorist group, what’s needed is a sustained campaign to eliminate its leadership, its infrastructure, its foot soldiers and so on,” Nathan Sales, now a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, told lawmakers. “It simply isn’t possible to defeat terrorists using an over-the-horizon strategy.”
In Somalia, for example, the U.S. canceled a rotational deployment that had been helping local forces beat back al-Shabaab, the largest and most well-funded wing of al-Qaida, in late 2020 on orders from President Donald Trump.
But 18 months later, the rotation was back on, as military leadership had complained that “commuting to work” was ineffective in that counterterror mission.
Sales believes that getting a handle on the Afghanistan situation will require not only more funding for CENTCOM counterterrorism operations, but a policy shift.
“If we want to make sure that terrorism remains relatively low on the hierarchy of threats, we have to keep mowing the grass,” in addition to countering China, and keeping an eye on a revanchist Russia that’s conducting a war of aggression on Ukraine, he said. “We have to keep a lid on the pot because God forbid there should be another catastrophic attack.”
More advanced drones that can spend more time in the air would be a start, but he said the U.S. should also looking into basing arrangements closer to Afghanistan, as it once had in Pakistan and Central Asia.
Jones echoed that sentiment, suggesting Pakistan, Central Asia or even U.S. naval ships deployed to the Indian Ocean as a more efficient launch point.
Fulfilling promises
Sales believes the “robust over-the-horizon” talk during summer 2021 was essentially lip service meant to ease the minds of the American public, as they watched 20 years of U.S. investment in Afghan security crumble on their television screens.
“The White House told us that ‘over-the-horizon’ would be capable of mitigating any terrorist threats in Afghanistan after the withdrawal,” Sales said. “One strike in 20 months is no one’s idea of threat mitigation.”
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Relying on the Taliban to take out U.S. adversaries like the Abbey Gate plotter is not a reliable strategy longterm, though it was discussed during Sales’ time in office by then-Taliban “peace” negotiator U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.
“The Taliban is not a trustworthy or reliable or capable counterterrorism partner,” Sales said. “We should not be outsourcing our responsibility, the government’s responsibility to protect Americans to a group that has the blood of countless Americans on its hands.”
Pentagon officials have pushed back on such criticism, pointing out that the most recent National Defense Strategy includes a counterterrorism plank, despite China taking center stage in terms of funding and attention.
During his March testimony, Kurilla described keeping tabs on terrorist activity within Afghanistan as “difficult but not impossible.”
“One of the things that we are trying to do is increase our intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,” he said. “We’re putting investment into long-duration, high-altitude, alternative airborne ISR that can go up for days and weeks.”
A Pentagon spokesman told Military Times, the Defense Department is confident they have what they need.
“DoD can monitor terrorist groups in Afghanistan and maintains capabilities to monitor potential threats and, if needed, to disrupt terrorist operations targeting the United States and our allies and partners,” Air Force Lt. Col. Phillip Ventura told Military Times.
That can include strikes, he added, but there are other options, “such as the facilitation of criminal prosecutions and the seizure or freezing of financial assets.”
A CENTCOM spokesman, Maj. John Moore, echoed that those two non-kinetic options, of arresting terrorist organizers and going after their finances, has helped disrupt their operations.
Despite that optimism, Sales has a warning.
“It’s a cliche, but it’s true,” Sales said. “Our enemies get a vote on whether they continue to fight and they’re voting ‘yes.’ "
About Meghann Myers
Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members.
8. Putin Can't Hide This: The Ukraine War Crushed the Russian Military
Putin Can't Hide This: The Ukraine War Crushed the Russian Military
The Russian military in Ukraine is increasingly unlikely to be able to mount successful operations as a combined ground force (CGF).
19fortyfive.com · by Peter Suciu · May 15, 2023
Russian Army Unlikely to be an Effective Fighting Force Thanks to Ukraine War – The Russian military in Ukraine is increasingly unlikely to be able to mount successful operations as a combined ground force (CGF). It is spread out along too great be an effective fighting force, while it is now made up of mostly “poorly trained” reservists that are reliant on “antiquated equipment.”
In addition, many units are below optimal strength, and as a result, the Kremlin is only able to carry out infantry-based operations.
The Russian Military: RIP in Ukraine?
The harsh assessment of the state of the Russian military in Ukraine came from the latest British Ministry of Defence (MoD) intelligence update, which was released on Sunday.
“On paper, the Russian Combined Grouping of Forces (CGF) in Ukraine is similarly organised to the invasion force of 446 days ago,” the MoD stated in a series of Tweets. Russia’s fighting force still consists of more than 200,000 personnel organized into around 70 combat regiments and brigades divided into five Groups of Forces – yet now struggles with “limited freedom to conduct air operations.”
A Difference a Year Makes
The most notable difference in Russia’s fighting force is in the caliber of its troops.
Whereas the Russian military that engaged in the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 consisted of professional soldiers largely equipped with modern vehicles – and was thus able to take part in complex “joint operations” – the force is “is mostly poorly trained mobilized reservists and increasingly reliant on antiquated equipment, with many of its units severely under-strength. It routinely only conducts very simple, infantry-based operations.”
The UK MoD’s evaluation of the state of the Russian Army mirrors what General Christopher G. Cavoli, commander of U.S. forces in Europe said at Sunday’s Lennart Meri Conference in Tallinn, Estonia.
However, Cavoli said it would be premature to suggest that the Russian military is a spent force.
“The Russian military’s demise in Ukraine is something that has to be studied very closely,” the general said, per Newsweek. “It has not been even. It’s very easy to look and to think that the Russian military has collapsed, or is in dire trouble. But in fact, it’s been uneven.”
Russia’s ground forces have been significantly eroded, General Cavoli added, and further suggested that the Kremlin has run into several problems.
“They’ve lost a lot of people, they’ve lost a lot of equipment. On the other hand, they’ve also ingested a lot of people. And you know, the Russian army, the ground force, today is bigger than it was at the beginning of this conflict. So, it still exists,” Cavoli further warned.
Russian Losses Continue to Mount in Ukraine
The comments about the state of the Russian military came just a day after the Institute for the Study of War reported that Ukrainian forces liberated 16.85 square kilometers around the city of Bakhmut in the Donbas region.
It further noted that according to claims from Russian military bloggers, there had been limited successful Ukrainian counterattacks north of Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) degraded Russian forces’ ability to interdict near a significant ground line of communication (GLOC) for Ukrainian troops operating near the city.
Two Russian military commanders were killed in the recent fighting. Russia’s Ministry of Defense announced that Commander Vyacheslav Makarov of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade was wounded and died while being evacuated off the battlefield. In addition, Col. Yevgeny Brovko, deputy commander of the Army Corps for Military-Political Work died “heroically, suffering multiple shrapnel wounds,” Russian state media reported.
News of the deaths of the two officers follows reports on Saturday that the Russian Air Force also saw the loss of four aircraft, including an Su-34 fighter/bomber and an Su-35 air superiority fighter, as well as two Mi-8 transport helicopters.
Author Experience and Expertise
A Senior Editor for 19FortyFive, Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.
19fortyfive.com · by Peter Suciu · May 15, 2023
9. Germany Announces Its Biggest Military Aid Package Yet for Ukraine
Germany Announces Its Biggest Military Aid Package Yet for Ukraine
By Erika Solomon and Christopher F. Schuetze
Erika Solomon reported from Berlin, and Christopher F. Schuetze from London.
The New York Times · by Christopher F. Schuetze · May 15, 2023
The nearly $3 billion package is part of an effort by both sides to reset rocky relations, which have become increasingly important to maintaining European unity in backing the war.
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The 28th Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Army in an armored vehicle during an operation near Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine on Monday.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
By Erika Solomon and
Erika Solomon reported from Berlin, and Christopher F. Schuetze from London.
May 13, 2023
Germany on Saturday sent the strongest signal yet of its commitment to backing Ukraine in its battle against Russian occupiers, promising more tanks, armored vehicles and substantial air defense systems in its largest weapons package for Kyiv.
The arms package, totaling 2.7 billion euros, or about $2.95 billion, amounted to roughly as much as Germany’s total military aid to Ukraine since the war began in February 2022.
The move was part of a budding effort by Chancellor Olaf Scholz and President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine to draw a line under a year of rocky relations over Germany’s hesitancy to provide weapons and solidify a partnership that may prove increasingly critical to maintaining European unity in backing the war.
With elections looming in the United States next year, concern is growing in European capitals that President Biden will become less willing to showcase support for Ukraine, given the potential for Republicans to use the issue against him during the presidential campaign. Europe fears an even sharper drop in support for Ukraine should a Republican win the presidency next year.
The German announcement was one of the most forceful steps yet taken by Mr. Scholz to back his call last year for Germans to play a leading role in Europe’s security affairs — and to bolster their own forces — in the face of a newly perceived threat from Russia.
“We all wish for a speedy end to this terrible war waged by Russia against the Ukrainian people,” said Germany’s defense minister, Boris Pistorius, who has been even more outspoken than the chancellor on support for Ukraine. “Germany will provide all the help it can — as long as it takes.”
Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany at the European Parliament in France on Tuesday. Mr. Scholz called last year for Germany to overcome its reluctance to take a leading role in European security affairs.Credit...Jean-Francois Badias/Associated Press
Though the additional arms will no doubt be welcomed by Ukraine, it was not certain they would arrive in time for its much anticipated counteroffensive against Russian forces, which will be powered by new supplies of advanced Western equipment, including tanks and armored personnel carriers.
In recent days, as Kyiv’s forces made advances near Bakhmut, the eastern city that more than any other has come to stand for the mounting costs of the war, Russia’s pro-war bloggers interpreted the move as a signal that the Ukrainian push had begun.
But Mr. Zelensky told the BBC this week that Ukraine wanted more weaponry and ammunition to arrive before starting the offensive, even though NATO’s top military commander has said that nearly all of the combat vehicles promised by Ukraine’s Western allies have been delivered.
The German promise of new heavy weapons came the day before Mr. Zelensky was to be awarded the prestigious Charlemagne Prize, bestowed by the German city of Aachen to someone who has done the most to promote European unity.
Previous winners have included Winston Churchill, Pope Francis, Angela Merkel and Bill Clinton. The judges’ decision to award the prize to Mr. Zelensky and the people of Ukraine underscored both how the war in Ukraine has united Europeans and the irony that Ukraine is not a part of the European Union, despite Kyiv’s strong entreaties to join.
German news media were reporting that Mr. Zelensky, who was in Rome on Saturday meeting with Italian leaders including Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, would come to Germany to collect the prize, and he subsequently said on Twitter that he had arrived in Berlin.
President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine on Saturday in Rome. Mr. Zelensky is aiming to shore up Germany’s support for his country’s war effort.Credit...Angelo Carconi/EPA, via Shutterstock
The offer of the prize, and now the German arms package, presented perhaps the best chance yet for Mr. Zelensky and Mr. Scholz to reset relations that have been characterized by months of tensions, sniping and diplomatic missteps.
“It’s a very open moment right now,” said Ulrich Speck, an independent analyst who writes a foreign policy newsletter in Berlin. “I think a new dynamic is going to start. And so Zelensky wants to shore up Germany. He wants to repair this relationship, because he needs to be able to call up Scholz without the bad feelings we have seen in the past.”
Even before the war, Kyiv, like many Eastern European capitals, had long been frustrated with German eagerness to pursue economic ties with Russia — which they argued came at their expense. That was especially so in the case of the now suspended and sabotaged Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project, which bypassed Ukraine by running under the Baltic Sea.
German hesitation to break its post-World War II taboo about sending weapons to conflict zones and to act more forcefully as a leader on security matters aggravated tensions further.
In the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year, Germany pledged 5,000 helmets for Kyiv’s forces, instead of weapons, provoking the ire of allies and Ukrainians alike.
A few days after the invasion, Mr. Scholz sought to end that era of reluctance with a speech calling for a “Zeitenwende,” or “turning point,” for his nation. But in the months that followed, Germany did not follow through with robust action, repeatedly lagging on delivering weapons and provoking widespread criticism in Europe.
Tensions reached a low point over the stalled delivery of German-made Leopard 2 tanks. Mr. Scholz, wary of making any move that could be seen by Moscow as an escalation, declined to send the German-made tanks or to permit re-export licenses to Ukraine by other countries with the tanks in their supplies.
He insisted that Germany would not “go it alone” and would not relent without parallel moves by the United States, which has provided $37 billion in military aid and pledged to send some of its own tanks, clearing the way for Mr. Scholz to give a green light.
A German-made Leopard 2 tank during a media event at a military base in Poland in February.Credit...Maciek Nabrdalik for The New York Times
The package announced on Saturday — which includes 30 Leopard 1A5 main battle tanks, 20 armored infantry fighting vehicles, four IRIS-T SLM air defense systems, 100 armored fighting vehicles and 200 drones — may be the clearest sign yet of a German turnaround.
German lawmakers have also tried to change Ukraine’s perception that they are still more interested in relations with Russia, said Andrea Römmele, a political analyst at the Hertie School, a university in Berlin.
A prime example, she said, was a visit to Kyiv in March by Rolf Mützenich, the parliamentary leader for Mr. Scholz’s Social Democrats, a party that long seemed divided on its support for the war. “The face of the hesitant left wing of the S.P.D. also going to Kyiv — that was a very important gesture,” she said, referring to the party.
For Mr. Zelensky, there are mounting reasons to accept the olive branch.
“If I was a Ukrainian, I would be looking for some leadership in Europe for my cause,” said Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, a scholar at the German Marshall Fund in Berlin. “Zelensky sees the writing on the wall: It is going to be increasingly hard for Biden and the U.S. Congress to get the support that is needed.”
Ukraine is also watching warily as countries that declare neutrality in the war, particularly China and Brazil, offer themselves as mediators. In the absence of a Washington-led effort, Kyiv would have preferred to see Berlin or Paris drive negotiations, a Ukrainian official told The New York Times before the Zelensky visit.
A woman in front of her home that was destroyed by a Russian missile in Sloviansk, Ukraine, on Thursday.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
But a role for France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, is being regarded with caution by European allies and Ukraine after he made remarks that seemed to placate China during a recent visit to Beijing. They are also wary of his consistent calls for “strategic autonomy” from the United States and for Russia to be included in any European postwar security architecture.
That leaves Germany. Ukrainian and German officials privately said that Mr. Zelensky might be hoping to persuade Mr. Scholz to play a more influential role when it comes to European support for the war, or even in mediating a peace settlement.
That is something the chancellor has been reluctant to do.
The chancellery argues that its cautious and slow approach, which faced so much criticism from allies, is the very reason Berlin is technically in the best position of Kyiv’s main partners, and that it has allowed a divided German population to grow accustomed to the changing security architecture in Europe.
“As opposed to the United States, you don’t see a drop-off of support here,” Mr. Kleine-Brockhoff said. “But does that mean this country would be ready to increase as American support is weakening? That I’m very doubtful about.”
Victoria Kim contributed reporting from Seoul, and Shashank Bengali from Istanbul.
The New York Times · by Christopher F. Schuetze · May 15, 2023
10. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 14, 2023
Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2023
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 13 to 14.
- Increasingly regular series of Russian drone and missile strikes are likely a part of a new Russian air campaign in Ukraine aimed at degrading Ukrainian abilities to conduct counteroffensive offensive operations in the near term.
- Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking around Bakhmut on May 14.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is attempting to distract from recent Ukrainian successes near Bakhmut by praising Russian defensive efforts against the Ukrainian counterattacks.
- Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s newly formed “Club of Angry Patriots” is continuing efforts to expand its presence and influence public discourse.
- Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Kupyansk-Svatove line.
- Russian forces have not made additional confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut and continued limited offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
- Russian forces continued to fire on areas west of Hulyaipole in southern Ukraine.
- Russian forces continue efforts to replenish manpower losses using prisoners.
- Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to prepare for the September 2023 elections in occupied territories.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 14, 2023
May 14, 2023 - Press ISW
Download the PDF
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 14, 2023
Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan
May 14, 2023, 3pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12pm ET on May 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Important Note: ISW has reindexed its map layer for reported Ukrainian counteroffensives on May 12, 2023. We removed reported Ukrainian counteroffensive coded before May 1, 2023, in order to delineate more clearly new Ukrainian territorial gains from gains secured in previous Ukrainian counteroffensives. ISW retained a few reported Ukrainian counteroffensives polygons from before May 1, 2023, specifically on the Dnipro River Delta south of Kherson Oblast, to preserve context in that complex area of operations. May 1, 2023, is an arbitrary date and does not mark the beginning or end of any assessed Ukrainian or Russian effort. ISW has reindexed its map layers before and similarly removed old reported Ukrainian counteroffensives around Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts following the conclusion of the Battle of Kyiv in April 2022.
Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 13 to 14. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of drones of varying models at Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 25, including 18 Shahed 131/136s.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces launched 23 Shahed-136/131 drones in total.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Kalibr missiles from the Black Sea as well as an unspecified number of Kh-101/555/55 cruise missiles, and that Ukrainian forces shot down three Kh-101/555/55 missiles.[3] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Ternopil and Mykolaiv cities as well as Kharkiv City and Zolochiv in Kharkiv Oblast with S-300 missiles.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Khmelnytskyi City and Ukrainian military facilities and deployment areas near Ternopil and Petropavlivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[5]
Increasingly regular series of Russian drone and missile strikes are likely a part of a new Russian air campaign in Ukraine aimed at degrading Ukrainian abilities to conduct counteroffensive offensive operations in the near term. Russian forces have conducted at least 10 series of strikes throughout Ukraine, particularly in rear areas, since April 19.[6] Russian forces have used significantly fewer high precision missiles in these latest series of strikes in comparison to their failed campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure from the fall of 2022 through the winter of 2023. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely expended a significant proportion of their precision missiles in the previous air campaign, and the current Russian air campaign may be using far fewer of these missiles in an effort to conserve the limited remaining stocks.[7] Russian forces have instead relied heavily on launching large numbers of Iranian-made Shahed drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, although Ukrainian forces have been more effective in shooting down Russian precision systems than during the previous Russian air campaign.[8] The new Russian air campaign appears to be focused on Kyiv and alleged Ukrainian military industrial and logistics facilities in deep rear areas. The more limited air campaign has so far been more regular than the previous wider Russian campaign against critical infrastructure, and ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces may be attempting to conduct almost daily series of strikes to portray themselves as successfully constraining potential upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[9] The alleged targets and limited nature of this campaign indicates that Russian forces are immediately concerned with current Ukrainian capabilities to launch counteroffensive operations, although the diminished effectiveness of these strikes are likely not significantly constraining Ukrainian capabilities writ large.
Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking around Bakhmut on May 14. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces captured over 10 Russian positions on the northern and southern outskirts of Bakhmut over the course of the day on May 14.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops attacked towards Berkhivka, Klishchiivka, and Kurdiumivka and took up new unspecified positions near the settlements and additionally advanced towards Yahidne from the direction of Bohdanivka.[11] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Ukrainian forces did not conduct any attacks on the night of May 13 to 14, however.[12] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of new Ukrainian positions around Bakhmut. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty emphasized on May 14 that Ukraine’s main goal in Bakhmut is to destroy Russian concentration areas and encircle the city, not to conduct frontal assaults.[13] Cherevaty noted that Ukrainian forces have recently advanced up to 300m in some areas, and Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces are advancing in two directions in the suburbs of Bakhmut.[14]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is attempting to distract from recent Ukrainian successes near Bakhmut by praising Russian defensive efforts against the Ukrainian counterattacks. The Russian MoD praised the defensive efforts of the Russian 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) south of Ivanivske, 200th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) east of Bohdanivka, and the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (20th Guards Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) in an unspecified area on the Soledar-Bakhmut line.[15] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled all Ukrainian counterattacks and that the 4th Brigade Commander Colonel Vyacheslav Makarov and Deputy Commander for the likely 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps of Political-Military Work Colonel Yevgeny Brovko died while leading their respective defense efforts.[16] The Russian MoD noted that it presented combat medals and state awards to defending Russian personnel at their combat positions, and later posted footage of Russian military leadership presenting over 120 personnel with various awards, including “For Courage,” “For Military Distinction,” and “For Military Valor.”[17] The Russian MoD likely seeks to assuage information space criticism of the MoD’s failure to acknowledge Ukrainian battlefield successes in a timely manner without actually acknowledging the degree of these successes, which is consistent with recent Kremlin guidance to not downplay Ukrainian military successes.[18] The MoD also notably highlighted the efforts of its regular forces over those of irregular forces, including Wagner Group forces operating in Bakhmut. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin criticized reports on May 14 that Russian Airborne (VDV) forces are helping Wagner forces, instead claiming that VDV forces are failing to support Wagner’s offensive operations, defending captured positions, or recapturing positions recently lost to Ukrainian forces.[19]
Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s newly formed “Club of Angry Patriots” is continuing efforts to expand its presence and influence public discourse. The Club of Angry Patriots announced on May 14 that it is forming regional branches and called on experienced politicians, public opinion leaders, and heads of Russian organizations to participate.[20] The Club of Angry Patriots also stated that it will hold a news conference in Moscow on an unspecified date in June, during which it will address how Russia can win the war in Ukraine.[21]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 13 to 14.
- Increasingly regular series of Russian drone and missile strikes are likely a part of a new Russian air campaign in Ukraine aimed at degrading Ukrainian abilities to conduct counteroffensive offensive operations in the near term.
- Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking around Bakhmut on May 14.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is attempting to distract from recent Ukrainian successes near Bakhmut by praising Russian defensive efforts against the Ukrainian counterattacks.
- Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s newly formed “Club of Angry Patriots” is continuing efforts to expand its presence and influence public discourse.
- Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Kupyansk-Svatove line.
- Russian forces have not made additional confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut and continued limited offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
- Russian forces continued to fire on areas west of Hulyaipole in southern Ukraine.
- Russian forces continue efforts to replenish manpower losses using prisoners.
- Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to prepare for the September 2023 elections in occupied territories.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on May 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Masyutivka (12km northeast of Kupyansk), Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove), and on the eastern outskirts of Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove).[22] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces continue “sluggish” fighting between Novoselivske and Kuzemivka (13km northwest of Svatove), and that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) have established first lines of defense along the eastern side of the rail line near Novoselivske.[23] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces withdrew from Novoselivske on an unspecified date because the settlement is destroyed and not worth defending, and emphasized that Russian forces still control Kuzemivka.
Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report any Russian ground attacks near Kreminna on May 14. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, citing a Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz commander, denied reports that Ukrainian forces broke through Russian defensive lines near Kreminna but acknowledged that Ukrainian forces may be conducting sabotage and reconnaissance in the area.[24] ISW has not observed claims or confirmation of significant Ukrainian offensive activity near Kreminna.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces have not made additional confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut as of May 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations within Bakhmut itself; within 9km northwest of Bakhmut near Hryhorivka, Bohdanivka, and Khromove; and within 14km southwest of Bakhmut near Bila Hora and Predtechyne.[25] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on May 13 that Wagner fighters advanced up to 500m in Bakhmut and that Ukrainian forces currently control 1.78 square kilometers of the city.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[27]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front on May 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled numerous Russian assaults near Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[28] Russian Southern Grouping of Forces (Southern Military District) Spokesperson Vadim Astafyev claimed that Russian forces prevented Ukrainian forces from conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations near Marinka.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that there are ongoing battles near Novobakhmutivka (13km northeast of Avdiivka) and Kruta Balka (4km northeast of Avdiivka) but that the frontline remains unchanged along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front.[30]
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 14.[31] The Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (Eastern Military District) Spokesperson Alexander Gordeev claimed that Russian forces thwarted an attempted Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operation in an unspecified area of western Donetsk Oblast.[32]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued to fire on areas west of Hulyaipole in southern Ukraine on May 14.[33] Ukrainian Southern Forces Joint Press Center Head Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are trying to use sea missile carriers, kamikaze drones, and reconnaissance drones to distract Ukrainian air defenses.[34] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces struck Kizomys and Stanislav, Kherson Oblast with four guided aerial bombs and targeted the Chornobaivka and Tokarivka areas with four loitering munitions.[35] The Southern Operational Command also reported that Russian shelling damaged critical infrastructure in Ochakiv Hromada.[36] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov posted footage on May 13 of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) firing incendiary munitions at the Hulyaipole area.[37] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 14 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian ammunition depot near Mykolaiv City.[38]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian forces continue efforts to replenish manpower losses using prisoners. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 14 that 200 prisoners arrived at a training camp in Rohove, occupied Luhansk Oblast for a four-week military training course and that an additional 50 recruits will likely arrive by the end of May.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that 800 prisoners are training in Mozhnyakivka, Luhansk Oblast, and that 400 convicts are training with the Wagner Group in Novopetrivka, Zaporizhia Oblast.[40] Ongoing prison recruitment efforts are part of a wider campaign of crypto mobilization that avoids the need to conduct general mobilization, as ISW has previously assessed.[41]
Several Russian sources continue to claim that the Wagner Group is successfully continuing recruitment and maintaining a positive reputation despite its challenges in Bakhmut. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on May 14 that the number of those wishing to join Wagner is increasing because Wagner ensures that all of its soldiers are protected and cared for.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner has already successfully trained nearly 10,000 volunteers for ”people’s militias” in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts.[43] A Russian opposition source additionally amplified a video appeal posted by mobilized personnel from Ulyanovsk Oblast where they ask to be transferred from the Russian army to Wagner because they want to fight and not be ”abandoned like kittens” by their leadership.[44] Wagner’s information campaign to portray itself as an effective and empathetic force is at odds with ubiquitous reports of Wagner’s brutality towards its own.[45]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues measures to integrate the forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) into the Russian military. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on MAY 14 that the Russian MoD issued an order to an unspecified DNR brigade to replace its DNR military tickets with formal Russian tickets and to re-sign service contracts with the Russian armed forces for a two-year minimum.[46] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Russian MoD is threatening to send DNR forces who refuse to receive Russia military tickets or re-sign contracts with deployment to the most dangerous sectors of the front.[47]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to prepare for regional elections in occupied territories, which are set for September 2023. Chairman of the Russian Central Election Commission Ella Pamfilova met with Russian occupation authorities on May 14 to discuss preparations for the upcoming elections, including creating conditions for fair and safe voting for all residents of occupied territories.[48] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) head Denis Pushilin stated on May 14 that the Russian Central Election Commission has started preparing the electoral systems and that recruitment to form 615 precinct commissions is ongoing in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[49]
Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)
ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense reported on May 14 that Belarusian forces are continuing combat readiness checks and combat training.[50]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
11. Here comes Sky Warden, the crop duster that’s SOCOM’s newest armed overwatch aircraft
Here comes Sky Warden, the crop duster that’s SOCOM’s newest armed overwatch aircraft
U.S. special operations forces have a new eye in the sky to rely on.
BY JARED KELLER | PUBLISHED MAY 13, 2023 5:14 PM EDT
taskandpurpose.com · by Jared Keller · May 13, 2023
After years in the making, U.S. Special Operations Command’s dream of a fleet of brand new multi-role “armed overwatch” aircraft is about to become a reality.
Defense contractors L3Harris and Air Tractor, which won a $3 billion contract to produce the aircraft last August, have officially entered low-rate initial production of their single-engine turboprop AT-802U Sky Warden light attack aircraft for SOCOM, Flight Global reports.
Speaking at the Special Operations Forces Week conference in Tampa, Florida this week, SOCOM acquisition executive Jim Smith confirmed that production run, stating that the command was “very pleased with the progress,” per Flight Global’s reporting from the conference.
SOCOM’s Armed Overwatch program calls for a total fleet of 75 aircraft, and the command has been eyeing its own fleet of light-attack aircraft since at least 2017, as our colleagues at The War Zone previously reported.
The aircraft is intended to provide U.S. special operations forces with “crewed deployable, affordable, and sustainable aircraft systems capable of executing Close Air Support (CAS), precision strike, and armed [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] requirements in austere and permissive environments for use in irregular warfare operations,” according to the command’s fiscal year 2024 budget request.
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Billed as the largest single-engine turboprop aircraft in the world, the original Air Tractor AT-802 aircraft on which the Sky Warden is based first flew in the 1990s as a crop duster. Its rugged airframe and relatively large payload capacity made it ideal for counter-narcotics missions in South America that required aircraft to operate on unimproved airstrips and dirt roads.
“Years of coca crop eradication missions in South America resulted in the development of lightweight composite ballistic armor for the AT-802U cockpit ‘bathtub’ and engine compartment,” notes Air Tractor.
The Sky Warden variant that SOCOM is procuring has a payload capacity of 8,000 pounds with ballistic armor, according to Air Tractor. The aircraft can loiter on station for six hours with a 200 nautical mile combat radius, per L3Harris, and features 10 external hardpoints: eight wing hard points for 600-pound bombs, and two centerline hard points for 1,000-pound bombs. The innermost wing station is “optimized” for firearms from .50 caliber to 20mm.
Designated the OA-1K, the adoption of the Sky Warden is intended to replace its small fleet of U-28A Draco ISR aircraft in SOCOM’s inventory, Air Force officials previously announced.
The long-term goal of the program, apart from finally fielding a light attack aircraft, but to eliminate the “stack” of multiple single-role specialized ISR and close air support aircraft that are often called in to support U.S. special operations forces in austere environments, Air Force Special Operations Command chief Lt. Gen. James C. Slife previously told Congress last April.
“You’ll typically have single-role specialized platforms — AC-130s, A-10s, MQ-9s, U-28s — you have a stack of airplanes over an objective, each platform providing a niche capability to the force on the ground,” Slife said at the time. “That averages, in terms of cost per flying hour, over $150,000 an hour […] to generate kind of the typical stack for that.”
“The idea of the Armed Overwatch platform is [that] it’s a modular capability and so you can outfit the aircraft with a robust suite of sensors that will exceed what is available with most dedicated ISR platform,” he continued.“For what we envision the enduring counter-[violent extremist organization] mission looking like, we think it’s a prudent investment.”
While the low-rate initial production decision is a big step forward for the Sky Warden, the aircraft isn’t necessarily ready for prime-time just yet: Speaking at the SOF Week conference in Tampa, SOCOM’s Smith stated that the command had decided to delay full-rate production of the aircraft by three months to address new training and system requirements, Flight Global reports.
“This will be the first tail dragger aircraft in the Air Force inventory in many years,” Smith said, referencing the configuration of the Sky Warden’s landing gear compared to other Air Force aircraft. “We want to make sure we’ve added time in the schedule for our operators, our pilots to work with the technology.”
The latest on Task & Purpose
taskandpurpose.com · by Jared Keller · May 13, 2023
12. China sentences elderly US citizen to life in prison on spying charges
Excerpts:
Chinese authorities and state media have not previously disclosed any information on Leung’s detention or the court process that led to his conviction. In China, cases involving state security are usually handled behind closed doors.
The US Embassy in Beijing said Monday it was aware of reports of Leung’s sentencing.
“The Department of State has no greater priority than the safety and security of US citizens overseas. Due to privacy considerations, we have no further comment,” a spokesperson for the US Embassy said in a statement to CNN.
The sentencing of Leung comes at a time when relations between Beijing and Washington are at their lowest point in half a century amid intensifying rivalry over trade, technology, geopolitics and military supremacy.
It also comes as American and Chinese officials are resuming high-level engagements since a dispute over a suspected Chinese spy balloon shattered efforts to mend ties earlier this year.
China sentences elderly US citizen to life in prison on spying charges | CNN
CNN · by Nectar Gan · May 15, 2023
Hong Kong CNN —
A 78-year-old American citizen has been sentenced to life in prison by a Chinese court on spying charges.
John Shing-Wan Leung, who is also a Hong Kong permanent resident, was convicted of espionage and given a life sentence Monday by the Intermediate People’s Court in the eastern city of Suzhou, according to a statement on the court’s social media account.
Leung was detained on April 15, 2021 by state security authorities in Suzhou, Jiangsu province, according to the brief statement, which did not provide details on his charges.
The court also confiscated personal property worth 500,000 yuan ($71,797), the statement added.
Chinese authorities and state media have not previously disclosed any information on Leung’s detention or the court process that led to his conviction. In China, cases involving state security are usually handled behind closed doors.
The US Embassy in Beijing said Monday it was aware of reports of Leung’s sentencing.
“The Department of State has no greater priority than the safety and security of US citizens overseas. Due to privacy considerations, we have no further comment,” a spokesperson for the US Embassy said in a statement to CNN.
The sentencing of Leung comes at a time when relations between Beijing and Washington are at their lowest point in half a century amid intensifying rivalry over trade, technology, geopolitics and military supremacy.
It also comes as American and Chinese officials are resuming high-level engagements since a dispute over a suspected Chinese spy balloon shattered efforts to mend ties earlier this year.
Leung is among a growing number of foreign nationals to have been ensnared in China’s widening crackdown on espionage under leader Xi Jinping.
A comic strip poster warning of foreign spies is displayed at a subway station in Beijing on April 22, 2016
Kyodo/AP/File
China has widened its already sweeping counter-espionage law. Experts say foreign businesses should be worried
In March, Chinese authorities detained a Japanese employee of Astellas Pharma in Beijing on suspected espionage – the 17th Japanese national to have been detained in China since the counter-espionage law was introduced in 2014.
In another high-profile case, two Canadians – former diplomat Michael Kovrig and businessman Michael Spavor – were detained by China for nearly three years.
Their arrest on espionage charges in late 2018 came shortly after Canada arrested Chinese businesswoman and Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou on a US warrant related to the company’s business dealings in Iran.
Beijing repeatedly denied that their cases were a political retaliation, but the two men were nonetheless released on the same day Meng was allowed by Canada to return to China.
Last month, China passed a wide-ranging amendment to its already sweeping counter-espionage law, which will take effect from July 1.
The new legislation expanded the definition of espionage from covering state secrets and intelligence to any “documents, data, materials or items related to national security and interests,” and to include cyberattacks against state organs or critical information infrastructure.
CNN’s Beijing bureau contributed to this report
CNN · by Nectar Gan · May 15, 2023
13. Zelensky Pledges to Oust Russia From All of Occupied Ukraine
I think President Zelensky is channeling his inner Churchill:
You ask, What is our policy? I will say; 'It is to wage war, by sea, land and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us: to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark lamentable catalogue of human crime. That is our policy.' You ask, What is our aim? I can answer with one word: Victory-victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be; for without victory there is no survival.
Winston Churchill
Zelensky Pledges to Oust Russia From All of Occupied Ukraine
During trip to Berlin, Ukrainian president says Germany is now Ukraine’s No. 2 military backer
By Bojan PancevskiFollow
Updated May 14, 2023 7:32 pm ET
https://www.wsj.com/articles/zelenskys-berlin-trip-heralds-thaw-in-relationship-with-germany-ecfe5038
BERLIN—Ukraine’s president vowed to reclaim his entire country while on his first visit to Germany since Russia attacked Ukraine last year, a trip that signaled that the tense relations between Kyiv and its biggest military and financial backer in Europe are thawing.
Speaking alongside German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, President Volodymyr Zelensky said Ukraine wouldn’t attack Russian territory but seek to recapture all occupied areas, including Crimea, the peninsula that Moscow annexed in 2014. He said that goal would be possible by the end of the year.
“We are preparing a counteroffensive to de-occupy areas of Ukraine, according to our constitution and within our legitimate borders that are internationally recognized,” Mr. Zelensky said.
Mr. Scholz said that Germany would support Ukraine in its efforts.
“Peace in Europe and all over the world is endangered by the idea that a larger country can simply attack and conquer parts of a smaller country,” Mr. Scholz said.
Mr. Zelensky flew on Sunday evening to Paris where he had dinner with French President Emmanuel Macron, according to the French president’s office. The two leaders discussed France’s support to Ukraine, and the Ukrainian peace proposal to end Russia’s invasion, French officials said. France pledged to send several dozen armored vehicles and light tanks to Ukraine within the next few weeks, the officials said.
The sanguine comments about Kyiv’s military goals come ahead of an expected offensive by Ukraine that Western officials have said should lead to talks between Kyiv and Moscow, even if it fails to retake all of the occupied territory.
While the West is beginning to contemplate a future settlement, China is dispatching special representative Li Hui to Ukraine and Russia, as well as Poland, France and Germany this week, in Beijing’s most concrete step yet to insert itself into diplomacy aimed at ending the war.
Berlin is currently the largest military and financial backer of Ukraine after the U.S., Mr. Zelensky and Mr. Scholz said in Berlin, providing more than 17 billion euros—equivalent to about $18.5 billion—in bilateral aid, on top of financing through multilateral organizations such as the European Union. Germany is also training Ukrainian troops and hosts one of the largest Ukrainian refugee communities abroad.
Mr. Zelensky thanked German taxpayers for supporting Ukraine and for sheltering the more than one million Ukrainian refugees who have fled to Germany since the war started.
“Germany’s aid is saving lives…The people of Ukraine will always be grateful to the people of Germany for providing a chance for peace through your leadership,” Mr. Zelensky told Mr. Scholz.
“Heartfelt thanks go to the German people for your help, for every Ukrainian life saved.”
Recent polls show German voters broadly support aiding Ukraine, and both Mr. Scholz and German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who also welcomed Mr. Zelensky, are vocal backers of Kyiv. But both also hail from a party that for decades advocated close economic ties between Germany and Russia.
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Ukraine and Russia have been engaged in grueling fighting for months over the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut. WSJ explains how the city turned into the bloodiest and one of the longest battles of the Ukraine war. Photo illustration: Adam Adada
These ties—Germany’s decadeslong dependence on Russian energy supplies, in particular—caused mistrust between Berlin and Kyiv in the early months of the war. Ukraine initially criticized Germany for its lack of military support while Berlin politicians privately doubted Kyiv would withstand the Russian offensive for more than a few weeks.
Tensions culminated when Mr. Zelensky disinvited Mr. Steinmeier from a visit to Kyiv in April last year, triggering a backlash in German media. The spat caused Mr. Scholz to cancel plans to visit Ukraine’s capital.
Both have since made the trip. In a further gesture, Mr. Scholz replaced his pacifist defense minister in January and chose a vocal Kyiv supporter. Boris Pistorius, who has called for a military victory of Ukraine, has since gained plaudits in Kyiv for accelerating Germany’s military support for Ukraine.
The two countries have been working closely together on weapon procurement—Berlin has delivered dozens of main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, state-of-the-art air defenses and heavy artillery. Kyiv and Berlin are cooperating on establishing a tribunal that could try Russia’s top leaders, including President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, for war crimes.
Chancellor Olaf Scholz, with President Volodymyr Zelensky, said Germany would support Kyiv in its counteroffensive efforts. PHOTO: JESCO DENZEL/BUNDESREGIERUNG/GETTY IMAGES
Germany, the largest economy in Europe, could become even more central to Ukraine’s defense posture, both in the coming months and after the war.
German armaments firms are being contracted to deliver long-term supplies of materiel for Ukraine. Defense group Rheinmetall said last week that it wants to build a factory for armored vehicles, artillery and ammunition in Ukraine as part of a joint venture with Kyiv.
Diehl Defence, another weapons manufacturer, is now expanding capacities to supply Kyiv with the sophisticated Iris-T SLM air-defense system, with funding from the German government. Two of the systems, which Ukrainian officials said have a nearly 100% hit rate, have been delivered, and two will be supplied by early next year, while several more are set to be delivered at a yet undisclosed date. Berlin has yet to purchase the system for its own armed forces, in part because of its high cost.
From Berlin, Mr. Zelensky and his German hosts traveled to Aachen, where Mr. Zelensky will be awarded the International Charlemagne Prize for service to European unity, whose past recipients include former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Macron and Pope Francis.
The president of the European Commission, the EU’s executive, Ursula von der Leyen and Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki will also attend.
Yet despite the display of friendship, Kyiv and Berlin remain divided on a key issue concerning Ukraine’s future: its bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as insurance against future Russian aggression.
The George W. Bush administration first put Ukrainian membership on NATO’s agenda in 2008. Ms. Merkel vetoed the bid at the time with France’s support. As a result, NATO extended a noncommittal invitation to Ukraine but didn’t kick off the process of accession.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion last year, the alliance and such key members as the U.S. and the U.K. have all called for Ukraine to join. Germany, however, remains opposed, according to several Western officials.
German officials argue that admitting a country at war with a nuclear power that occupies its territory would greatly escalate the risk of a confrontation between Russia and NATO.
NATO diplomats and officials are now working on a solution that would signal that Ukraine could join in the future and offer immediate assistance short of membership. The offer will be presented at the July NATO summit in Lithuania, according to people familiar with the talks.
Noemie Bisserbe in Paris contributed to this article.
Write to Bojan Pancevski at bojan.pancevski@wsj.com
14. Ukraine Hails ‘First Success’ of Advance Around Bakhmut
Ukraine Hails ‘First Success’ of Advance Around Bakhmut
kyivpost.com
Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrsky, stressed the latest developments were only a ‘partial success’ and the operation continues.
by Kyiv Post | May 15, 2023, 10:53 am |
Photo:Ukrinform
A top Ukrainian commander has hailed the “first success” of the operation to retake ground in the Bakhmut sector, saying the last few days “have shown that we can move forward and destroy the enemy even in such extremely difficult conditions.”
Speaking on Monday morning, the Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrsky, said: “The advance of our troops in the Bakhmut direction is the first success of the offensive in the course of the operation to defend Bakhmut.
“We are fighting with fewer resources than the enemy. At the same time, we manage to destroy its plans, all thanks to our soldiers who are fighting the aggressor, overcoming the highest limit of human capabilities.”
On Sunday evening, Ukraine said it had captured more than ten Russian positions on the outskirts of the frontline city, but Syrsky stressed this was only a "partial success,” adding: “That is how it should be perceived. The operation to defend Bakhmut continues.
“All decisions necessary for defense have been made. My commanders and I have worked out all possible scenarios directly on the battlefield.”
Ukrainian troops have made advances in the Bakhmut area several days in a row, despite the continuing, challenging conditions.
"Things are difficult in Bakhmut and the surrounding area. It is tough. Against all odds, our troops managed to advance for several days. Thanks to the superpowers and professionalism of our military," Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar said.
According to Maliar, the Russians' goal [the capture of Bakhmut] remains unchanged.
"They are moving their air assault units to the outskirts of Bakhmut. Heavy fighting continues. The defense of Bakhmut continues," she added.
Elsewhere, the head of the Wagner mercenary group offered to reveal the positions of Russian troops to the Ukrainian government, according to a new report.
The Washington Post, citing leaked documents, said that in January Yevgeny Prigozhin had offered the information in exchange for Ukraine withdrawing its soldiers from the besieged city of Bakhmut.
Prigozhin’s Wagner mercenary group has been leading the assault for the city for months now and has suffered huge casualties in the process.
15. A massive new US embassy complex in a tiny Middle East nation is raising eyebrows
Check out the photo at the link. Gives new meaning to "fortress on a hill."
https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/12/middleeast/massive-us-embassy-middle-east-mime-intl
I wonder if someone is anticipating making this the Middle Eastern central outpost for diplomatic and intelligence operations. What better plan than to build a "little America" in some other country so Americans never have to leave the protection of the compound.
Any diplomatic facility built from 2001 on and overseen by the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) will be first and foremost a "fort" built to withstand any likely attack. I am sure they perceive their mission as "no fail;" they will give little heed to diplomatic activities or supporting any kind of American narrative other than the US is deathly afraid of terrorist attacks and fears everyone. (note sarcasm).
A massive new US embassy complex in a tiny Middle East nation is raising eyebrows | CNN
CNN · by Nadeen Ebrahim · May 12, 2023
Editor’s Note: A version of this story appears in CNN’s Meanwhile in the Middle East newsletter, a three-times-a-week look inside the region’s biggest stories. Sign up here.
CNN —
A massive new US embassy complex in Lebanon is causing controversy for its sheer size and opulence in a country where nearly 80% of the population is under the poverty line.
Located some 13 kilometers (about 8 miles) from the center of Beirut and built on the site of the current embassy, the US’ new compound in Lebanon looks like a city of its own.
Sprawling over a 43-acre site, the complex in the Beirut suburb of Awkar is almost two-and-a-half times the size of the land the White House sits on and more than 21 soccer fields.
Many Lebanese on Twitter questioned why the US needs such a large embassy in their capital. Lebanon is smaller than Connecticut and has a population of just six million. Few American tourists go to the country as the State Department has placed it on the third highest travel advisory level, but it does have a sizeable population of Lebanese American residents.
“Did the US move to Lebanon??” tweeted Sandy, a social media activist.
“Maybe you’ll have enough room to work on all those pending visa applications,” tweeted Abed A. Ayoub, national executive director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, responding to the grandiosity of the new complex.
A father and son browse fish at a stall illuminated by a light powered by a private electricity generator at the fish market, in Beirut, Lebanon, on Wednesday, Sept. 8, 2021. Egypt agreed to supply natural-gas to Lebanon through Jordan and Syria as the Arab states seek to help end power shortages in their crisis-ridden neighbor.
Francesca Volpi/Bloomberg/Getty Images
Lebanon's soul has been eviscerated by its financial crisis. Not even the children want to play
Computer-generated images published by the embassy show an ultra-modern compound, hosting multi-story buildings with high glass windows, recreational areas, and a swimming pool surrounded by greenery and views of the Lebanese capital. The compound includes a chancery, representational and staff housing, facilities for the community and associated support facilities, according to the project’s website.
From the pandemic to the 2020 Beirut blast, Lebanon has been assailed by a number of crises that have left its economy in ruins. Many Lebanese are unable to afford basic commodities, including food, medicine and electricity.
“Let them eat concrete,” another user tweeted.
Plans for the embassy complex were announced in 2015 and it is reported to have cost $1 billion.
Its construction is overseen by the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), which supervised the building of a number of other US embassies around the world.
The US embassy in Lebanon did not respond to CNN’s request for comment.
The US has had a turbulent history with Lebanon. It is the home of Iran-backed Hezbollah, the most powerful group in the country, but has nonetheless enjoyed friendly relations with the US.
Last month marked 40 years since the 1983 bombing of the American embassy in Beirut, which killed 63 people, including 52 Lebanese and embassy employees. In October that year, a bomb struck barracks in Beirut housing American and French peacekeepers, killing 299 people.
This story has been updated to clarify that the existing embassy is being extended
CNN · by Nadeen Ebrahim · May 12, 2023
16. Special Operations News Update - May 15, 2023 | SOF News
Special Operations News Update - May 15, 2023 | SOF News
sof.news · by SOF News · May 15, 2023
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.
Photo / Image: An Airman assigned to the 1st Special Operations Squadron oversees the aerial refueling of a CV-22 Osprey from an MC-130J Commando II during a training mission as part of Freedom Shield 23 over the Sea of Japan.
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SOF News
New CO for SEAL Training Center. A planned change of command occurred earlier than usual at the training center for SEAL candidates. This was related to the death of a SEAL trainee last year. “SEAL Training Center Gets New CO Early as Navy Continues Inquire Following 2022 Trainee Death”, USNI News, May 2, 2023.
Delta’s ‘Jump Haters Club’. If you are in Delta Force then you freefall. But not all ‘operators’ enjoy falling through the sky without a canopy deployed above their head. George Hand explains, with some humor, in “Delta Force Jump Haters Club: Not All Operators Like Skydiving”, SANDBOXX, May 3, 2023.
PSD is now the RSAR. Acronyms are everything for the military . . . and this is especially true when describing weapons. So the Personal Defense Weapon (PSD) is now being called by U.S. Special Operations Command as the Reduced Signature Assault Rifle (RSAR). It appears that there is an order in for 800 of the weapons. “Upgraded Assault Rifles in Store for Commandos”, by Scott R. Gourley, National Defense Magazine, May 3, 2023.
AC-130 Gunship Laser Weapon Update. The Airborne High Energy Laser (AHEL) system planned for the Ghostrider is probably going to run into some implementation delays. The aircraft are undergoing modifications that will require a new round of integration work and testing. “AC-130 Gunship Laser Weapon Program’s Future Is Looking Blurry”, The War Zone, May 11, 2023.
SOF and Proxy Forces. Newly disclosed documents obtained by the NYTs through the FOIA include special operations forces directives for managing counterterrorism and irregular warfare surrogate fighters. SOF are not required to vet for past human rights violations by the foreign troops they arm and train as surrogates through the “127 Echo” and “1202” programs. “Rules for Pentagon Use of Proxy Forces Shed Light ona Shadowy War Power”, The New York Times, May 14, 2023. (subscription)
AFSOC Establishes New Directorate. The Air Force Special Operations Command established the Air Commando Development Directorate (A7) which will provide policy, oversight, and guidance to support AFSOC’s collective training. It will also lead the command’s pivot to a Mission Command culture. The Air Commando Development Center will be located at Hurlburt Field. “AFSOC establishes new directorate: A7 Air Commando Development”, DVIDS, May 12, 2023.
AFSOC’s Use of Highways as a Runway. An MC-130J Commando II from the 15th Special Operations Squadron recently used a highway during an exercise. Prior to the landing Airmen parachuted from the MC-130J to secure the highway runway for the aircraft. The event was part of Exercise Agile Chariot. A MQ-9 Reaper, two A-10s, and two MH-6M Little Bird helicopters were also in play. (Business Insider, May 4, 2023).
Emerald Warrior 23 and AFSOC. A recently held exercise at Hurlburt Field, Homestead Air Force Base, and Puerto Rico provided realistic and relevant training that integrated full spectrum special operations in a complex environment. The exercise included a Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) and Special Operations Task Unit (SOTU) at distant locations. “Emerald Warrior 23 hones Mission Command in environment of competition”, AFSOC, May 12, 2023.
SERE School Myths. Steve Balestrieri exposes some of the myths associated with the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. “Breaking Down the SERE School Myths: How Accurate Are They?”, SANDBOXX, May 12, 2023.
Less Iron Man, More 007. USSOCOm is shifting its focus to creating hyper-enabled operators with omniscience-like capabilities. It will be using artificial intelligence (AI) and instant translators to counter high-tech adversaries like China and Russia. This change reflects SOCOM’s changing expectations about where its operators will be and what roles they will play. “Tomorrow’s Special Operator? Less Iron Man, More 007”, Defense One, May 9, 2023.
EW Loitoring Systems at SOF Week 2023. U.S. Special Operations Command is prioritising loitering technologies to support counter-violent extremist organizations (C-VEO) operations and strategic competition. Some of these loitering platforms could feature electronic warfare (EW) payloads. “USSOCOM eyes loitering systems for EW, other functions”, Janes, May 15, 2023.
Mk16 SCAR-L. In the mid-2002s the United Special Operations Command was searching for a replacement for the M4 carbine. The command came up with two solutions: the SCAR-L and SCAR-H. But only one was adopted. “Why the Mk16 SCAR-L failed with Special Forces”, We Are the Mighty, May 12, 2023.
International SOF
CCM Vessels Going to Norway. Two Combatant Craft Medium vessesl are being built for Norway; work that is expected to be completed in 2025. “US Builder ReconCraft to Produce Special Forces Boats for Norway”, MarineLink, May 12, 2023.
Wagner Group in Africa. The Russian paramilitary group is expanding its efforts in Africa. One of its efforts is to displace the U.S., France, and other countries efforts in assisting African nations in their fight against jihadist groups. However, the Wagner Group effect is a light one – it has provided limited commitmetns in counterterrorism missions and its impact on the African jihadist landscape is less powerful than some have anticipated. “Russia, Wanger, and the Future of Counterterrorism in Africa”, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, May 15, 2023.
SOF History
OSS and the Colt M1903. During World War II the Office of Strategic Services used a variety of weapons in the field. It didn’t have an ‘official pistol’ but a favorite was the M1903 Pocket Hammerless made by Colt. It was easily carried in coat pockets. “This is Why the Colt M1903 Was the Pistol of Choice of the OSS”, by Travis Pike, SANDBOXX, May 4, 2023.
History of Covert Ops. A brief history of the world of elite secret units called upon for dangerous and difficult missions is provided in this article. “In the shadows: The art and history of covert ops”, We Are the Mighty, May 9, 2023.
Legendary Cockleshell Heroes. Read about the men who took part in Operation Frankton in December 1941 when British commandos paddle over 60 miles for several days in canoes to reach their targets. Of the ten Marines who participated, only two survived. They were members of the newly formed Special Boat Service (SBS) whose mission was to infiltrate the German-controlled port of St. Nazaire, France and destroy enemy ships. “The daring operation of the legendary Cockleshell heroes”, We Are the Mighty, May 11, 2023.
Ukraine Conflict
Abrams Tank Training. Ukrainian forces will begin training at the Grafenwoehr Army base in Germany within two to three weeks. The training, expected to last about 10 weeks, will be completed about the same time that the 31 Abrams tank being supplied to Ukraine will be ready. The tanks and crews will likely be in Ukraine by the fall. “US Abrams tanks for training Ukrainian forces arrive in Germany early”, Marine Corps Times, May 12, 2023.
Russia’s Elite Units – Heavy Losses. Russia’s clandestine Spetsnaz forces have been put to use alongside the infantry, suffering massive numbers of dead and wounded. “Russia’s command units gutted by Ukraine war, U.S. leak shows”, The Washington Post, April 14, 2023. (subscription)
Russia Denied a Victory in Bakhmut. Many national security observers forcasted a victory for Russia in the small industrial city of Bakhumt in Eastern Ukraine by ‘Victory Day’. After massive casualties on both sides the Russians failed to take the city by the May 9th celebration. this was due to a fierce defense by the Ukrainians and aggressive offensive moves around the outskirts of the city. However, the battle for the city is not over; the Russians keep pouring in more fresh troops. “How Ukrainian forces denied Russia victory in Bakhmut by Victory Day”, The Washington Post, May 12, 2023. (subscription)
U.S. Provides Air Defense Systems. The U.S. will provide Ukraine with a $1.2 billion package to bolster the country’s air defenses and sustain its artillery needs. More 155mm artillery rounds are headed to that country. (DoD, May 9, 2023).
Ukraine SOF. The special operations forces of Ukraine once learned advanced tactics from US and UK experts. Now, with combat experience, Ukrainians are teaching their SOF counterparts a thing or two. “Ukrainain Special Operations Forces (UASOF) – They’re Coming for You”, Kyiv Post, May 13, 2023.
Lessons from Ukraine. At the recent SOF Week 2023 held last week in Tampa, Florida, General Bryan Fenton talked about lessons learned from Ukraine. One was that the U.S. should “be there early”. In 2014 when Russia invaded Ukraine and seized parts of the eastern portion of the country and Crimea the U.S. sent in advisors and trainers to assist the Ukraine military. This helped set the stage for preparing Ukraine for the February 2022 Russian invasion. “Gotta be there early: America special ops lessons from Ukraine”, Breaking Defense, May 9, 2023.
UK Storm Shadow Missiles. The United Kingdom is sending long-range missiles to Ukraine to help that nation fight the Russian invasion. The cruise missiles have a range of over 155 miles (250 km) and are fired from aircraft; allowing Ukrainian pilots to launch them further away from the frontlines. “UK confirms supply of Storm Shadow long-range missiles in Ukraine”, BBC News, May 11, 2023.
Sudan Conflict and Evac of Foreign Nationals
Update on the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), ceasefire, humanitarian crisis, and evacuation of foreign nationals.
https://www.national-security.info/country/sudan/sudan-neo.html
UK Finishes Flight Evacs. The final United Kingdom flight from Sudan took place on May 4, 2023. The UK had been flying British citizens as well as other foreign nationals to Cyprus. “Final UK evacuation flights leave Port Sudan, Foreign Office says”, Forces.net, May 4, 2023.
Hard Borders to Cross. As the fighting continues in Sudan huge amounts of civilians are fleeing to neighboring countries. It is a dangerous journey to the border but the struggle isn’t over once arriving. “Hard Borders and little aid: How civilians are escaping Sudan’s conflict”, The New Humanitarian, May 1, 2023. See also “A ticket to anywhere: Stories of grief and relief on a bus out of Khartoum”, The New Humanitarian, May 2, 2023.
Sudan and Missed Opportunity. The U.S. Navy responded to the Sudan evacuation by moving three ships to the Red Sea. One of them became involved in the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Port Sudan to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. However, these ships were not suited for this type of operation . . . and the Navy does not have enough of the ones needed for a presence in most areas of the globe. Read more in “Evacuating Sudan: An amphibious gap and missed opportunity”, by Adm. James G. Foggi (ret.), Defense News, May 3, 2023. See also “US Marines abdicating a rescue role to China”, Asis Times, May 6, 2023.
Commentary
Putin, Xi, and a Declining America. The three most important leaders in the world are maneuvering to position their nation in a favorable strategic position (diplomatically, economically, and militarily). One is on the path to succeed. One is utterly failing according to Lela Gilbert and Lt. Gen. (Ret.) William Boykin. “Xi and Putin Raise Global Stakes While Biden Touts Reelection”, The Washington Stand, May 2, 2023.
SOF and the ‘Irregular’ Cold War. Paul Burton, a retired Special Forces Colonel writes about irregular warfare and the new Cold War of strategic competition. “This is Not Your Father’s Cold War – It’s Irregular”, Small Wars Journal, May 5, 2023.
SOF and Lawyers. Dan Pace, a freshly retired Special Forces officer, provides his thoughts on the SF CONOP process and the legal system that reviews them. “Too Many Lawyers – Why Legalism is Undermining Ethical Conduct in the SOF Community”, Real Clear Defense, May 10, 2023.
National Security
Border Crisis. At the request of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense will provide an additional 1,500 military personnel to supplement U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) efforts on the U.S. Southwest border. The 3-month deployment will provide support in ground-based detection and monitoring, date entry, and warehouse support until the CBP can fill those needs through contracted support. The increase of troops is related to an anticipated jump in border crossers over the next several weeks (Title 42). (DoD News, May 2, 2023).
DoD Releases NDSTS. The Department of Defense released the National Defense Science and Technology Strategy which articulates the science and technology priorities, goals, and investments of the DoD and makes recommendations on the future of the defense research and engineering enterprise. It identifies three lines of effort; focus on the Joint Mission, created and field capabilities at speed and scale, and ensure the foundations for research and development. It also will continue to emphasize the 14 Critical Technology Areas detailed in the DoD CTO’s Strategic Vision. “DoD Releases National Defense Science and Technology Strategy”, DoD News, May 9, 2023.
Philippines and Bilateral Defense Guidelines. On May 3, 2023, the U.S and Philippines formalized its alliance cooperation with new ‘guidelines’. Read about it in a Fact Sheet (PDF, 2 pages) published by the DoD.
Arrow Security & Training, LLC is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. AST offers a wide range of training and instruction courses and programs to include language and cultural services, training, role playing, and software and simulation. https://arrowsecuritytraining.com/
Great Power Competition
Russia in the Arctic. Elizabeth Buchanan provides commentary on the major geopolitical ramifications stemming from overlapping international seabed claims for the North Pole. Russia has been using international law and legal processes to buttress its claims on the Arctic region. And it has gained ground in this effort. However, Russia also has some ‘muscle’ in the region. It operates 40-plus icebreakers while the U.S. can only claim two Arctic-capable icebreakers. Its military capabilities in the Arctic could over-match that of the U.S. So what it can’t achieve through negotiations and legal proceedings (think about Ukraine) it very well might attain through more forceful means. “Russia’s Gains in the Great Arctic Race”, War on the Rocks, May 4, 2023.
Geopolitical Interests of Russia in the Arctic. The high north is essential for Russia for military and economic reasons. Its Northern Fleet, with nuclear-capable subs, is located in the Arctic. A significant portion of its natural gas and oil production takes place there. The Northern Sea Rout is becoming increasingly relevant as a connection to Asian markets. Minna Alander, as research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, provides the details. “High North, High Tension: The End of Artic Illusions”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 11, 2023.
Asia
SF Network in Taiwan? The United States is making preparations for Ukraine-style military operations in the Pacific. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) conducted drills simulating operations on Taiwan. These were part of an annual exercise known as CAPEX held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Some in Congress have highlighted the role the U.S. Special Forces has had in assisting Ukraine in the fight against the Russians. They believe the same can be done for Taiwan. “Building a US Special Forces ‘Stealth Network’ on Taiwan”, The Diplomat, May 3, 2023.
ROK and Japan: History vs. Common Interests. A new reality is setting in with ties between two Asian nations. Common strategic interests are submerging the issues of history that have long divided them. Clearly this is good for U.S. interests in the region in light of the current strategic environment with the People’s Republic of China. But there is more work to be done in the future to solidify the relationship. “The Rising Tide of Japan-South Korea Relations”, Lawfare Blog, May 12, 2023.
Middle East
SF Fight With Russian Mercenaries in Syria. In 2018, a small group of Green Berets were in a fierce battle with over 500 Russian mercenaries. At the end of the fight hundreds of Russians were dead and ten Russian tanks destroyed. “Special Forces Soldiers Reveal First Details of Battle With Russian Mercenaries in Syria”, The War Horse, May 11, 2023.
Upcoming Events
May 16-18, 2023. Fort Bragg, NC and via Zoom
Geostrategic Symposium 2023
USASOC
May 20, 2023. Hoquiam, WA
MG Bargewell Memorial
https://eldonbargewell.org/events/
May 22-26, 2023. Indianapolis, Indiana
Special Forces Association Convention
May 31, 2023. Ijamsville, MD
6th Annual Golf Tournament
Three Rangers Foundation
June 21-22, 2023
Warrior East
ADS
August 5, 2023. Perdido Key, Florida
Deep Dive 2023 Combat Diver Reunion
CDF
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, or defense then we are interested.
Books, Pubs, and Reports
CRS – Finland in NATO. On April 4, 2023, Finland acceded to NATO, enlarging the alliance to 31 members. Sweden’s accession has been delayed by Turkey. Read more in “NATO: Finland Joins as Sweden’s Accession Faces Delay”, Congressional Research Service, April 7, 2023.
CRS – Wagner Group in Africa. The Russian private military company (PMC) has expanded its presence in Africa over the past six years. Wagner provides security services in several African countries and its affiliates are involved in mining and commercial activities. Read more in “Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, April 26, 2023.
Podcasts, Videos, and Movies
Video – SOF Week 2023: GSOF reflects on a successful first SOF Week. Stuart Bradin, President and CEO of the Global SOF Foundation, looks back over the past four days of SOF Week and outlines plans for next year’s event. Shephard Media, YouTube, May 15, 2023.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dbtasc5-qB0
Video – SOF Week 2023: Acquistion Executive USSOCOM Interview. Jim Smith, Acquisition Executive – U.S. Special Operations Command, outlines his priorities and requirements during SOF Week 2023. Shephard Media, YouTube, May 10, 2023.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b4ypWHiDPwM
Video – SOF Week 2023: PEO Rotary Wing Interview. Geoffrey Downer, Program Executive officer for USSOCOM’s RW program talks about current priorities and challenges. Shephard Media, YouTube, May 10, 2023.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMjEJJHFzUI&t=1s
Video – NSW: Mission Success Demands a High Performance Team. A great recruiting video by Naval Special Warfare Command, NSW Facebook, May 3, 2023, one minute.
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=561125599502598
Podcast – The Cyber-SOF-Space Triad. Lieutenant General Jonathan P. Braga, commanding general of US Army Special Operations Command, and P.W. Singer, an author and national security ‘futurist’, explore the range of future threats that Army special operations forces will encounter, discuss how to harness the power of innovation to enable them to meet these threats, and recommend ways to optimize these uniquely trained and equipped soldiers and units for the future of irregular warfare. Irregular Warfare Podcast, Modern War Institute at West Point, May 5, 2023, 54 minutes.
https://mwi.usma.edu/irregular-warfare-podcast-the-cyber-sof-space-triad/
Podcast – Security Force Assistance: Building Armies (Afghanistan Lessons). MG Donn Hill, the Commander of Security Force Assistance Command, talks about what the U.S. Army learned about SFA, building balanced and sustainable foreign security forces, and operationalizing the lessons learned from Afghanistan. He also talks about the mission of the Army’s Security Force Assistance Brigades or SFABs. War Room, U.S. Army War College, May 5, 2023.
https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/podcasts/afg-lsn-1/
Podcasts Channels
SOFCAST. United States Special Operations Command
https://linktr.ee/sofcast
The Pinelander. Blacksmith Publishing
https://www.thepinelander.com/
The Indigenous Approach. 1st Special Forces Command
https://open.spotify.com/show/3n3I7g9LSmd143GYCy7pPA
Irregular Warfare Podcast. Modern War Institute at West Point
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385
SOF News is not a ‘money making’ enterprise; but we do have administrative, operating, and publishing expenses. Individuals and businesses provide the funds to defray these expenses. Their contributions are deeply appreciated. Learn how you can support SOF News.
sof.news · by SOF News · May 15, 2023
17. It’s time to put Putin on the defensive
May 12, 2023 | The Telegraph
It’s time to put Putin on the defensive
Moscow continues to spread toxic disinformation to cripple the West. Much more can be done to do the same to Russia
Ivana Stradner
Research Fellow
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/05/12/its-time-to-put-putin-on-the-defensive/
Britain always has been, is now, and will be our eternal enemy,” Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev declared, promising the UK’s imminent collapse “into the abyss of the sea from a wave triggered by a cutting-edge Russian weapons system.” Even as Russia’s military struggles in Ukraine, Moscow still has a powerful weapon – information – which it is currently deploying in full force against London.
For weeks now, Russia has accused the UK of endangering Ukrainian civilians by supplying Kyiv with armor-piercing shells containing depleted uranium. This claim is false: according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, “[n]o human cancer of any type has even been seen as a result of exposure to … depleted uranium.” In fact, Russia also uses ammunition containing depleted uranium.
But that hasn’t stopped Moscow from churning out disinformation. The Kremlin has even tried to paint the depleted-uranium shells as a form of nuclear escalation. Vladimir Putin threatened that “Russia will be forced to respond accordingly, given that the West collectively is already beginning to use weapons with a nuclear component.” Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu claimed the UK’s decision puts Russia and the West closer to a “nuclear collision.”
These tricks are nothing new. Russia has used the same disinformation playbook for decades. In fact, Moscow also falsely accused Nato of endangering civilians with weapons containing depleted uranium during the alliance’s 1999 intervention in Yugoslavia. After the UK announced its plan to send the shells to Ukraine last March, Zakharova called it a repeat of the “Yugoslavia scenario.”
These baseless allegations resemble Russia’s global disinformation campaign accusing the United States of developing biological weapons. Moscow has alleged that Washington runs covert facilities in Ukraine and other former Soviet countries. Russia has likewise claimed that the U.S. intentionally spread Covid and engineered monkeypox.
Russia wields disinformation to weaken the UK and other Western democracies from within while damaging their reputations on the world stage. Moscow amplifies its disinformation through social media platforms and state-run Russian media outlets such as RT and Sputnik. These outlets operate not only in the West but also in the global south, especially Africa and Latin American, where they are often popular sources of news.
London, along with Washington and other Western capitals, has quickly refuted Moscow’s claims: last year, during a UN Security Council briefing on Ukraine and Biological Weapons, UK Ambassador Barbara Woodward emphasised that Russia “has repeatedly spread disinformation, including wild claims involving dirty bombs, chemical weapons, and offensive biological research.”
That’s a step in the right direction. But now the UK should put Moscow on the defensive.
For starters, London should reveal the truth about Russia’s own bioweapons programmes. Russian sources have provided plenty of material to work with. For example, in 1999, Kenneth Alibek, the first deputy director of the Soviet Union’s bioweapons initiative, told the Nonproliferation Review that Moscow developed “the most efficient, sophisticated, and powerful offensive [biological weapons] programme in the world.” This programme remains alive and well in Russia today, in violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. The UK should ensure everyone hears this truth, perhaps by inviting Mr. Alibek to talk about the Kremlin’s bioweapons program.
UK media, too, could pitch in. A documentary on the Soviet and Russian biological weapons programmes could raise mass awareness about this issue. Similar projects have proven their effectiveness in the past. For example, the 2019 HBO mini-series on the Soviet Union’s 1986 Chernobyl so annoyed the Kremlin that Moscow banned the series and state news channels attempted to discredit it.
Speaking of nuclear disasters, the UK should continue to remind the world that Russia is threatening to cause Chernobyl 2.0 through its reckless occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, or ZNPP. Ever since Russian troops seised ZNPP last year, concerns have mounted about a possible meltdown. This past weekend, Russian troops began to evacuate locals who worked at and lived near the plant. In a statement, International Atomic Energy Agency director Rafael Mariano warned of “the very real nuclear safety and security risks facing the plant.”
As it combats the Kremlin’s lies, the UK should harness a powerful tool: humour. Dry statements by government officials will not appeal to ordinary people. But witty memes will. London should establish a program to devise creative content to debunk Russian disinformation and spread the word about Moscow’s malfeasance.
Russia is using information as a weapon against the United Kingdom and its allies. Now it’s time for London to use the truth to fight back.
Ivana Stradner is a Research Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. You can hear her interview on Russian propaganda on the Telegraph’s daily podcast ‘Ukraine: The Latest’ here.
18. Opinion | In Vienna, the U.S.-China relationship shows signs of hope
I won't get my hopes up because hope is not a course of action.
Opinion | In Vienna, the U.S.-China relationship shows signs of hope
The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · May 14, 2023
As the United States and China veered toward confrontation in recent years, both sides gave lip service to the idea that they seek cooperation on issues of mutual interest. Little came from that rhetoric until last week in Vienna, when top Chinese and U.S. officials actually seemed to be creating a framework for constructive engagement.
After the two days of intense meetings Wednesday and Thursday between national security adviser Jake Sullivan and top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi, the two nations used identical language to describe the meetings: candid, substantive, constructive. For diplomats, that amounts to a rave review.
Talking about resets in foreign policy is always risky, and that’s especially true with Washington and Beijing. These two superpowers might be “destined for war,” as Harvard professor Graham Allison warned in a book with that title. What they’ve lacked, in their increasingly combative relationship, has been common ground. But some shared space seems to have emerged during the long, detailed discussions between Sullivan and Wang.
The U.S. and Chinese officials are said to have talked for hours about how to resolve the war in Ukraine short of a catastrophe that would be harmful for both countries. They discussed how each side perceives and misunderstands the other’s global ambitions. They spoke in detail about the supremely contentious issue of Taiwan.
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The frank discussion in Vienna was important because both sides have been running hard in the opposite direction in recent years. The Biden administration has concentrated on rebuilding U.S. military alliances and partnerships but has had little constructive engagement with Beijing. China has proclaimed a “no limits” partnership with Russia and has fostered an alliance of the aggrieved but, in the process, has rebuffed the superpower that matters most to its future.
What was different in Vienna? From accounts that have emerged, it was partly a matter of chemistry. Sullivan and Wang are both confident enough to talk off script. Over nearly a dozen hours of discussion, they threw schedules aside. They have the confidence of their bosses, Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping, to engage in detailed discussion about sensitive issues. They appear to have found a language for superpower discussion, like what once existed between the United States and both Russia and China but has been lost.
Sullivan and Wang are said to have discussed the Ukraine war at length. China insists it won’t abandon Russia, its longtime partner. China seems to understand that this conflict won’t be resolved on the battlefield but through diplomacy. As Ukraine prepares a counteroffensive that could push back the Russian invasion, China fears a cascading series of Russian losses could destabilize President Vladimir Putin.
China has proposed a peace plan for Ukraine and is sending a special envoy this week to Kyiv, Moscow and other key capitals. U.S. officials expect that China’s role won’t be as a mediator but a check on Russia’s actions. If Xi decides it’s time for this war to end, Putin has few alternatives. That’s why the Kremlin is said to have viewed last week’s Sino-American engagement with dread.
In the background of the Vienna discussions were two ruthlessly pragmatic questions for China. These issues form the context for a new stage in the relationship in which, as China’s foreign ministry spokesman put it, “China-U.S. relations should not be a zero-sum game where one side outcompetes or thrives at the expense of the other.”
The first baseline issue might be described as the “inevitability” question. Is the United States in inevitable decline while China is moving toward inevitable ascendancy? Xi’s policies have been premised on both outcomes, but the past several years have raised questions in Beijing. The U.S. economy and social framework have shown surprising resilience, and its technology remains supreme.
China might have imagined that it was dominant in artificial intelligence, for example, until the explosive impact of GPT-4. China, meanwhile, has faced economic and political head winds. Its global dominance is far from certain.
The Chinese leadership appears to be debating, behind the scenes, this question of America’s staying power. U.S. officials noted a blog post this month by Fu Ying, a prominent Chinese former diplomat, questioning in veiled terms whether one country should question another’s power. The post was removed from the website of the university where she teaches, and U.S. officials say they believe Fu was reprimanded. What’s evident is that the issue is being debated.
A second essential question for China is whether prolongation of the Ukraine war is in Beijing’s interest. Some Chinese officials are said to have argued that a long war is good for China, because the United States is bogged down in the conflict and Russia’s ties to China are reinforced. But there’s apparently a growing counterargument that the war strengthens America’s alliances in Europe and Asia and creates long-term trouble for China. U.S. officials say they believe the latter argument is gaining force in Beijing.
For the Biden administration, the fundamental question has been whether it is in America’s interest to accept China’s growing global role and work with Chinese leaders to accomplish mutual goals. Sino-American engagement had been focused on “soft” issues such as health, food and climate change. But Biden encouraged Sullivan to engage on core security issues such as Ukraine.
The U.S. message in Vienna is said to have been an emphatic “yes” on engagement. Sullivan praised Wang’s mediation of the bitter rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example, explaining that the United States could not have played a similar role because of its mutual antipathy with Iran but welcoming China’s effort to de-escalate conflict in the region.
Biden’s opening to China has been motivated by one simple idea: The United States doesn’t want to start a new Cold War. Biden took too long to implement this insight, bowing to the new conventional wisdom in Washington that the more strident the confrontation with China, the better. But he seems to have found his voice.
A few green sprouts don’t guarantee blossoms in spring, let alone a ripe summer. But based on Chinese and American accounts, what happened last week in Vienna was the beginning of a process of regular, direct engagement that will benefit both sides.
The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · May 14, 2023
19. China’s war chest: Beijing’s ‘great wall of steel’ faces obstacles to military supremacy
Is every Chinese defense concept related to a "great wall?" Great wall of steel, great wall at sea, great wall of cyber, etc?
And that begs the question, do "great walls" work?
China’s war chest: Beijing’s ‘great wall of steel’ faces obstacles to military supremacy
Amy Hawkins senior China correspondent
@amyhawk_
Sun 14 May 2023 19.01 EDT
The Guardian · by Amy Hawkins · May 14, 2023
Taiwan’s foreign minister says he is preparing for conflict with China. In an interview last month, Joseph Wu said that “we are taking the Chinese military threat very seriously” and named 2027 as the year to be concerned about.
As relations between China and the US spiral ever lower, many analysts are increasingly worried that a conflict could be on the horizon and that the relationship between Taiwan and the US will be an important factor in influencing if and when China attempts to annex the self-governing island.
After years of isolation, Xi’s China looks to dominate world stage
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The CIA believes that China’s leader, Xi Jinping, has told the military to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. At China’s annual parliamentary meetings in March, Xi said he would build China’s military into a “great wall of steel”, but stressed the need for a “peaceful development of cross-strait relations”.
Quick Guide
China already has the world’s largest armed forces, with about 2 million active personnel. Its navy is also the world’s biggest, with an estimated 355 active vessels compared with the US’s 296. In 2021, Vice Adm Kay-Achim Schonbach, then the commander of Germany’s navy, said China was expanding its navy by the equivalent of France’s entire navy every four years.
An invasion of Taiwan would probably rely on a naval encirclement of the island, so China’s maritime capabilities will be of particular importance to those trying to glean how capable the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is of achieving its aim.
On 7 April the Pentagon announced a $1.7bn deal with Boeing for 400 anti-ship Harpoon missiles. The buyer is reportedly Taiwan, although this has not been officially confirmed.
Part of China’s push to modernise its armed forces has been a strategy of pursuing “military-civil fusion”, with the aim of developing the PLA into a “world-class military”. The government encourages private businesses to support the development of military technology, in everything from AI to nuclear technology to drones.
This strategy is evident in China’s shipbuilding industry. The China Shipbuilding Group Corporation accounts for a fifth of global ship production and also produces vessels for China’s navy. Such a high level of integration is “relatively uncommon”, according to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a thinktank.
China defence spending
It also hampers the ability of outside countries to understand or limit China’s military development.
“With little transparency and differentiation between military and civilian operations, it is impossible to determine the extent to which foreign ship orders may be helping to lower the costs” of the PLA’s naval modernisation, CSIS notes.
The PLA navy has also used civilian ferries to conduct military exercises. This hampers the ability of US and Taiwanese intelligence to detect abnormal activity.
Another trend of the past decade has been China’s efforts to become self-sufficient in advanced technology, particularly arms manufacturing. After concerted efforts over a number of years to advance its technological capabilities, China now produces more than 90% of its weaponry domestically, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a thinktank.
The ‘peace disease’
Although the Taiwan Strait would be the first obstacle, it would not be the last. The PLA would not be able to conquer Taiwan from the shoreline alone. More than 90% of Taiwan’s population lives in cities and both China and Taiwan have been bracing themselves for the possibility of a drawn-out urban conflict. In a report last year, the Institute for the Study of War noted that the PLA “has been increasing its study, training and preparation for future urban warfare”.
“We can expect those efforts to redouble and start to incorporate lessons from Russian experiences [in Ukraine],” says Elsa Kania, one of the report’s authors.
PLA soldiers in a parade marking the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 2019. Photograph: China News Service/Visual China Group/Getty Images
The final part of the puzzle for the PLA is its people. Although it boasts the world’s largest armed forces, its soldiers have virtually no combat experience. The last time the PLA fought a war was when China invaded Vietnam in 1979. In 2017 Xi said that what he thought about “most” was whether the army would be able to mobilise when needed.
Earlier this month, the government revised its conscription laws to allow retired service people to re-enlist. The new amendments include specific wartime provisions, including measures to quickly boost troop numbers.
Blake Herzinger, a former US navy intelligence officer who is now a fellow at the United States Studies Centre, notes that “there aren’t many militaries in the world with a lot of combat experience”, aside from Ukraine and Russia.
“The US has fought two bloody insurgencies over 20 years. But the total casualties for the US in those two wars would likely be a week’s casualties” in a conflict over Taiwan.
More important, says Herzinger, are cultural problems in the PLA, such as corruption and a rigid command structure.
In 2018, an editorial in the People’s Liberation Army Daily, the PLA’s official newspaper, said the armed forces were infected by a “peace disease”, namely corruption.
Chinese leaders are well aware of these challenges, and have been focusing on improving the quality of their troops and becoming more self-sufficient with weaponry. Nothing about an assault on Taiwan would be simple. But, says Herzinger, “it’s rare, in history, for a navy or military to build out and modernise so rapidly without a real reason for doing so”.
The Guardian · by Amy Hawkins · May 14, 2023
20. The Opponents of Marine Reform Have Lost, But Won’t Move On
Ouch! This conclusion hurts:
It appears the only people now listening to the opponents of Force Design 2030 are the opponents themselves. They fought the fight for public opinion, but they have clearly failed to sway it. It’s far past time for them to cede the field and let today’s marines and those who will come after them continue their proud tradition of adapting to new challenges, thereby ensuring that the future Corps will continue to win the nation’s battles.
The Opponents of Marine Reform Have Lost, But Won’t Move On - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Robert Work · May 15, 2023
The Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030, written under the direction of the 38th commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. David Berger, has been the target of much criticism since its release in 2020. In this article, former Undersecretary of the Navy and Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work addresses these criticisms and defends the document’s vision for the future of the Corps. Ultimately, he argues that it’s time for the self-proclaimed Chowderites, who have fought without success to oppose the commandant’s vision, to cede the field.
In the military, as in most public organizations, new leaders need to take stock. They are obligated to determine the state of the institution and its preparedness to execute its current missions, particularly during times of rapid technological change. Leaders must also assess whether the organization is ready to account for evident or anticipated changes in the foreseeable future. If they judge that the institution is not prepared for current or future challenges, then it is incumbent upon them to make the changes deemed necessary to make it so.
As he assumed the role of 38th commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. David Berger, the sitting commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, conducted just such an assessment. Upon completion, he concluded, “Significant change is required to ensure we are aligned with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and [Defense Planning Guidance] and prepared to meet the demands of the Naval Fleet in executing current and emerging operational naval concepts.” This was a difficult judgment to make for a decorated leader of a service as fiercely proud of its martial prowess as the Marine Corps. I understand this intimately, having served as a Marine artillery officer for 27 years. But Berger was convinced by the evidence that change was required, and he was intent on doing something about it. The “doing something about it” came in the form of Force Design 2030, which is both a case for change and a vision and a plan for a modernized Marine Corps that is ready to take on future challenges.
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Berger’s plans were not met with universal acclaim. Indeed, the opponents of the commandant’s vision would give the Energizer Bunny a run for its money. They have lobbied on Capitol Hill and fired off a spate of opinion pieces with machine-gun rapidity in various periodicals that come off as if they were generated by ChatGPT. They describe Berger’s plans in the most heated of terms, depicting them as both destructive and possibly illegal. They’ve implied that Congress has failed over the last few budget cycles to provide proper oversight of the merits of the programs and budgets they have approved. Their stated objective is to get Congress to stop Berger from pursuing his plan until it holds hearings, presumably to discredit his reforms and then chart a path into the future that better suits their preferences. These dissenters have thus far failed to convince Congress of the merits of their case, but that has not discouraged them from continuing to disparage the commandant’s plans publicly and often. They just keep going … and going … and going.
Berger’s opponents refer to themselves as “Chowder II,” a reference to the original “Chowder Society” formed in 1946 to fight efforts to limit the post-war role of the U.S. Marine Corps — if not eliminate it entirely. The original Chowder Society was fighting against external attacks on the Marine Corps that were being made by the U.S. Army, Defense Department leadership, and the Truman administration. President Harry Truman infamously wrote, “For your information the Marine Corps is the Navy’s police force and as long as I am President that is what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin’s.” Needless to say, Truman’s vision for the Marine Corps did not win the day.
While there is no meaningful effort to eliminate the Marine Corps today or to diminish its standing in the joint force, questions about its future role have been unfolding in public for several years. In fact, this questioning started within the Marine Corps itself, particularly under Commandant Gen. Robert Neller, Berger’s immediate predecessor. Indeed, Neller concluded, “The Marine Corps is not organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment.” Berger agreed with this assessment, which helped to frame his Force Design 2030 plans. These plans have now proceeded to the point that they are having a real impact. As just one example, in January 2023, the U.S. secretary of defense and U.S. secretary of state, in a “2+2” meeting with their Japanese counterparts, specifically featured one of the service’s new Force Design 2030 capabilities — the Marine littoral regiment. Having this emerging capability at the center of the discussion with one of America’s most important treaty allies was only possible because the sitting commandant had concluded that the Marine Corps needed to make changes if it were to prevail on future battlefields. Yet, today’s Chowderites are unhappy with these changes, so much so that they have deemed Berger an enemy of the Corps who must be defamed and stopped at all costs.
The Chowderites proclaim that their group has grown from a small number of retired senior marines to “hundreds of former and retired Marines of all ranks.” No one knows for sure what the true numbers are because the Chowderites refuse to reveal their members. Indeed, many of their early articles were pseudonymous and published in the Marine Corps Gazette. My best guess is that Chowder II probably numbers fewer than 30 dedicated members.
Make no mistake. Having been a deputy secretary of defense in two administrations, I can confidently say that these public attacks on a commandant’s plans by retired general officers are highly troubling, raising serious concerns about civil-military relations and the role of retired general and flag officers in the development of defense programs. As will be described, these officers are, in essence, urging the commandant to ignore strategic guidance from the president and the secretary of defense. Moreover, requiring sitting service chiefs to gain the “permission” of retired senior leaders for their visions and plans would set a terrible precedent and lay a substantial burden on all future chiefs — and not just Marine commandants.
This would be problem enough if the complaints and criticisms of the retired officers had merit. However, the Chowder II arguments are, in general, flimsily constructed assertions based on opinions, straw-man arguments, incorrect data, and misunderstandings or misrepresentations of the commandant’s intent and plans.
An example of these arguments came in a recent article written by retired Marine general officers John J. Sheehan and James Amos. Together, they trod the same ground previously plowed by several other retired senior marines — which is to say they make the same arguments that Congress has considered and rejected after more than 400 meetings and briefings. Indeed, a case can be made that the arguments have had the opposite effect to that intended: They have spurred full-throated congressional and combatant commander support for Force Design 2030 and increased funding for the Marine Corps to accelerate its implementation.
Chowder II has articulated numerous complaints about the vision laid out in Force Design 2030 and its associated implementation decisions. Sheehan and Amos consolidate these complaints into five key categories of concerns “that pose an unnecessary risk to national security, the role of the Marine Corps in national defense, the readiness of Marine forces for global contingencies, and those intangibles that define Marines.” According to the Chowderites, these represent high crimes and misdemeanors that should be considered and impeached. However, when critically examined, their concerns fail to make a convincing argument that Berger’s vision and plans should be blocked.
I assess them here.
Employing One Method, in One Place, and on the Defense? Hardly
When outlining his case for change, Berger identifies three unmistakable trends that are changing the competitive landscape in military affairs and should be accounted for. The first is the rise of the precision-strike regime, which sees battlefields that are largely — although not completely — transparent and swept by short-, medium- and long-range guided munitions with “near zero miss” accuracy. These circumstances have changed and are continuing to change the character of war. They have given rise to theater-wide anti-access and area denial networks designed first to deter any U.S. power-projection operation or, failing that, to defeat it. Both China and Russia have built their own such networks, and Iran is trying to follow suit, albeit on a far lesser scale. All cover the maritime approaches into their respective theaters and regions. This threatens the typical ways in which the United States has projected power, particularly large-scale amphibious assault operations. The late Sen. John McCain-led Senate Armed Services Committee, among many others, called into question such amphibious assault operations just prior to Berger becoming commandant.
The second imperative for change devolves from the first. The rise of continental based anti-access and area denial networks undoubtedly increases the risk and costs of any U.S. response to Chinese or Russian aggression against U.S. allies and partners. As a result, Berger believes that both China and Russia are using the degree of deterrence they have achieved to pursue their malign interests through so-called “gray zone” actions, “hybrid warfare,” proxy warfare, and related “salami-slicing” strategies. All these strategies “are designed to avoid obvious counters by the United States and its allies” by presenting American leaders with what Michael O’Hanlon calls the “Senkaku Paradox”:
Faits accompli on matters of such insignificance, in areas at the margins of our current ability to project and logistically support significant forces, that we perceive a lethal response as simply “not worth it.”
Basing large forces forward to combat these strategies and tactics below the level of armed conflict would be prohibitively expensive and diplomatically difficult. Moreover, large forward-based forces would be at risk of devastating preemptive or first strikes from the overhanging anti-access and area denial networks, should either country decide to resort to overt military action.
Small, agile, “light footprint,” and difficult-to-target maritime forces tailored to confront specific Chinese or Russian malign activities in their regions — like those envisioned by Berger in Force Design 2030 — appear to make great sense militarily, economically, and diplomatically. Indeed, Japanese leaders see these types of forces as “key to expanded Pacific security cooperation.” Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the most senior U.S. and Japanese defense and diplomatic leaders view these types of forces as essential for optimizing the “posture of the U.S. forces in Japan, with enhanced Japanese Self Defense Force capabilities and posture in areas including the Southwestern islands.” The senior leaders also stated that these capabilities “would substantially strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities.”
As Berger sees it, the “principal [places] where these first two trends are playing out today are in maritime theaters.” The third impetus for change is thus the need to pursue better integration with the Navy, spurred by the imperative for maritime campaigning.
This is hardly a novel idea. Ever since the Marine Corps started planning to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan, every commandant has called for the service to return to its “maritime roots.” Amos, although now an avowed opponent of Force Design 2030, had this to say in a posture report to the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee of Defense in 2014 when he was commandant:
Naval forces control the seas and use that control to project power ashore. The fiscal and security challenges we face demand a seamless and fully integrated Navy-Marine Corps team. Achieving our shared vision of the future naval force requires strong cooperation. Now more than ever, the Navy-Marine team must integrate our capabilities to effectively protect our nation’s interests.
Integrated naval campaigning is especially important when it comes to responding to potential Chinese aggression. However, the Chowderites believe that Force Design 2030 has a “myopic” focus on China and should instead have focused on all the other potential global contingencies at which the Marine force-in-readiness has long excelled. Berger rightly rejects this criticism. The 2022 National Security Strategy describes China as “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.” For its part, the 2022 National Military Strategy states, “The most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security is the [People’s Republic of China’s] coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences.” Both refer to China as the “pacing threat” — the priority focus of U.S. strategic and defense planning. In essence, then, the Chowderites are urging the commandant to ignore this definitive civilian guidance and instead concentrate on being an all-around force-in-readiness (more on this point later).
Berger cannot be true to his oath and ignore strategic guidance. If he were to ignore it, he would justifiably face being replaced. After having considered that guidance, the commandant concluded that assembling a large amphibious force within the range rings of the Chinese anti-access and area denial network will not be possible. Two decades of wargaming and campaign analysis support his judgment. Instead, he envisions a Marine Corps operating in close support of the Navy’s new distributed maritime operations concept with smaller, distributed, and low-signature “stand-in forces.”
The idea is this: Properly executed, stand-in forces persisting close to China within contested spaces can gain and maintain a capability to rapidly strike targets while denying a coherent picture of the fleet to adversaries. Marine forces extend the fleet’s ability to sense and make sense of the environment while becoming an unavoidable obstacle to enemy actions. It does this as an inside force, disintegrating an adversary’s system from the inside out and providing opportunities for the fleet to exploit.
To make this concept a reality, Berger directed three regiments already based in the Western Pacific — two infantry and one artillery — to be reconfigured as Marine littoral regiments, optimized as stand-in forces. These new formations would be the eyes of the fleet commander and the entire joint force, fighting a reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance battle to give U.S. and allied forces an advantage in sensing, sense-making, and targeting. These so-called “risk-worthy” forces could be inserted long before actual combat operations, working with allies to unmask and confront Chinese malign activities throughout the Western Pacific, as they are doing today. They would thus already be in a position to contest any Chinese overt aggression, and likely be the “first to fight.” In a war with China, stand-in forces would help to transform the entire first island chain into a garotte around the neck of China’s military.
When performing the stand-in force role, these littoral regiments would conduct distributed operations using widely dispersed smaller units, just as the U.S. Navy plans to fight at sea. Opponents of Force Design 2030 believe that these small forces would be too widely separated to provide mutual support and therefore would be vulnerable to defeat in detail. This is a valid concern, but one greatly mitigated by the other U.S. military services, as well as America’s allies and partners.
Moreover, risk should be balanced against the advantages afforded by distributed operations in the precision-strike regime, as explained by a Royal United Services Institute report about preliminary lessons in conventional warfighting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine:
Survivability is often afforded by being sufficiently dispersed to become an uneconomical target, by moving quickly enough to disrupt the enemy’s kill chain and thereby evade engagement, or by entering hardened structures. … Forces should prioritise concentrating effects while only concentrating mass under favourable conditions – with an ability to offer mutual support beyond line of sight – and should give precedence to mobility as a critical component of their survivability.
In addition to claiming that Force Design 2030 has a myopic focus on China, the Chowderites charge that the Marine Corps that it envisions would be employed only as stand-in forces — the “one method” they refer to. When doing so, they purposely fail to note four important things. First, stand-in forces are theater agnostic. They work as effectively in Europe’s confined waters as they do in the Western Pacific. Second, only two of seven Marine infantry regiments will be reconfigured as Marine littoral regiments. The other five will retain their “traditional” infantry-heavy structure, which is optimized for sustained operation ashore. Third, the group also fails to acknowledge that stand-in forces are just one manifestation of a new organizational design that is optimized to support distributed operations down to the lowest tactical level. Finally, they purposely ignore the results of experiments that suggest that the new Marine littoral regiment may outmatch a traditional infantry regiment.
Distributed operations are the true secret sauce behind Force Design 2030 that account for a largely transparent battlefield and the constant threat of intense, long-range guided weapon attacks. While most militaries see the infantry company (units of approximately 150–200 warriors) as the lowest fighting echelon capable of coordinating combined arms, Berger wants to push combined-arms capabilities, including small uncrewed aircraft and loitering precision munitions, to the squad level (13–15 warriors). As he puts it, “success will be defined in terms of finding the smallest, lowest signature options that yield the maximum operational utility.” This move is part of a redesigned infantry battalion organization that incorporates many of the advancements suggested by the Close Combat Lethality Task Force established by then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis.
Curiously, the Chowderites argue that these advancements will make the Marine Corps less adept at close combat. This is an opinion unsupported by facts. The truth of the matter is that the adaptations suggested in Force Design 2030 promise to make Marine infantry battalions — which will remain the heart of the service’s combat formations — more lethal than they are today. These changes include providing companies, platoons, and squads with their own intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities; resilient network communications systems; and precision fires. These new capabilities will be equally effective for both defensive and offensive operations.
A Marine Corps designed from the ground up and organized, manned, trained, and equipped for distributed operations is a military service that is designed for combat in the precision-strike regime in “any clime and place” — on any battlefield, in any theater, against any opponent. Moreover, stand-in forces operations are just one form of naval campaigning that the Marine Corps, as described in Force Design 2030, is “capable of rather than designed exclusively for.” Imagine a Corps that can emulate what the Ukrainian army did to the Russian army during the first phase of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation,” but amplified by an order of magnitude or more. It will likely be one of the apex predators in the mature precision-strike regime.
As such, the Chowderites’ charges that Berger’s reforms are myopically focused on one enemy (China), in one geographical region (the Western Pacific), employing one method (stand-in forces), and with a defensive orientation all ring hollow.
No More Global Response? Not So Fast
This is one of the most frequently cited objections by the opponents of Force Design 2030. It is closely related to the charge that the new design has a “myopic” focus on China. Chowderites claim that the evidence is “overwhelming” that “the Marine Corps is clearly less capable to serve as a global response force and a force-in-readiness … and can no longer claim [its] traditional role as the Nation’s premier 9-1-1 force.”
The wording used by Sheehan and Amos is important because it reveals the true motivations of Chowder II: They want to turn back time to 1952.
The original 1946 Chowder Society helped to cement the Marine Corps’ role in the Department of Defense. The subsequent National Security Act of 1947 protected the Marine Corps as an independent service in the Department of the Navy. Later, in 1952, after comparing the sub-par performance of the U.S. Army at the start of the Korean War, combined with the subsequent stirring combat performance of the Marine Corps at the Pusan Perimeter, Inchon, and the Chosin Reservoir, a subcommittee in the 82nd Congress wrote that the Marine Corps “has fully demonstrated the vital need for the existence of a strong force in readiness. … The nation’s shock troops must be the most ready when the nation is generally least ready.”
The subcommittee went on to say that the force-in-readiness should be a “balanced force … for a naval campaign and, at the same time, a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large-scale war.” Marines, and especially the Chowderites, fiercely embrace this vision, which helps explain why they think of themselves as America’s global 9-1-1 response force.
Chowder II wants Berger to retain the force design of the 1952 force-in-readiness role — one that is optimized for amphibious assault and expeditionary combat operations ashore. It believes that any force design that is not aligned with this role is a threat to U.S. national security. Although executive branch agencies often seek to comply with language found in committee and subcommittee reports, their language is not legally binding in the same manner as statutory text. The full weight of law is found in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which provides the legal basis for the roles, missions, and organization of the U.S. Department of Defense and each of the armed services. Title 10 directs that the Marine Corps shall include no fewer than three combat divisions and three air wings, “and be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet.” Nothing in Force Design 2030 ignores these Title 10 mandates.
Furthermore, Berger continues to tout the Marine Corps’ role as an expeditionary force-in-readiness at every opportunity. As he noted:
The Marine Corps will be trained and equipped as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness. … In crisis prevention and crisis response, The Fleet Marine Force — acting as an extension of the Fleet — will be first on the scene, first to help, first to contain a brewing crisis, and first to fight if required to do so.
A Devastating Reduction of Operational Capabilities? Only in 1952 Dreams
Chowder II might concede that Berger is saying all the right words. But they will likely quickly add that the “devastating reductions” associated with Force Design 2030 prove that the future Marine Corps will not be organized or equipped for the global response mission. To make their case that such reductions will take place, the Chowderites rely heavily on percentage decrements of legacy capabilities. Some advice: View these numbers skeptically because they are generally off the mark.
For example, the Chowderites claim that Force Design 2030 will result in a 21 percent loss in Marine infantry battalions. This is not correct.
The total number of infantry battalions will drop from 24 to 21, a reduction of 12.5 percent, not 21. Recall, however, that Title 10 calls for a Marine Corps of no fewer than three divisions and three air wings. Chowder II appears to interpret this to mean a force-in-readiness Marine Corps should always have no fewer than three “full strength” divisions, with nine regiments and 27 battalions. A drop from 27 to 21 battalions is a 22 percent cut, close to the 21 percent that the Chowderites cite. But that dog won’t hunt. Due to budgetary constraints, the Marine Corps has not had a force structure of this configuration since the 1990s, and since then the service has aligned its force design within these congressionally established limits. The 2018 and 2019 Marine Corps had already been cut by one regiment to eight, and by three infantry battalions down to 24 (reductions that were approved by many of the current opponents when they were in charge). Force Design 2030 further cuts the number of Marine infantry regiments by one, from eight to seven. That cut regiment’s three organic infantry battalions go with it, resulting in the number of battalions falling from 24 to 21.
One might also get close to a 21 percent decrease if considering manning cuts to the infantry battalions. Legacy battalions had 896 personnel. The Force Design 2030 battalions will have somewhere between 800 and 835 Marines (and another 66 Navy personnel). This results in a manning cut ranging from 7 to 22 percent, the final number depending on the results of experimentation.
Critically, and a point often overlooked by the critics, even a reduced battalion of 800 to 835 marines will be the largest infantry battalion in the world. Moreover, Force Design 2030 calls for 100 percent manning of the 21 infantry battalions. Over the past several decades, infantry battalion manning has been substantially lower, often 90 percent or below. As a result, the individual manning of keys billets, such as squad leader, were filled by a rank lower than that defined by the table of organization — for example, with a corporal rather than a sergeant. Force Design 2030 will see a higher degree of seasoned leadership and readiness in the infantry battalions than ever before.
Even a cut of three battalions upsets the opponents, who apparently believe any reductions to a “full-strength” three-division Marine Corps force structure are unacceptable. Yet, Berger lives in the real world of defense requirements and budget allocations. Force Design 2030 starts from an approved 2018–2019 force structure of 24 battalions. An analysis of joint war plans revealed that 21 battalions satisfy all currently assessed naval and joint requirements. It therefore makes sense to divest the three “excess” battalions to invest in new combat capabilities that are more appropriate for distributed operations and integrated naval campaigning in the mature precision-strike regime. And, as discussed, the opponents of Berger’s force design fail to mention that the 21 remaining battalions promise to be more capable than legacy battalions.
One of the main objects of criticism is Berger’s decision to direct the Marine Corps to rid itself of all its tanks. But the Chowderites doth protest too much. Some of this group’s members appear to have been ambivalent about tanks, before they came out against cutting them. For example, during the confirmation hearing for Gen. Charles Krulak’s successor as commandant, Sen. John Warner (himself a former undersecretary of the Navy) noted:
General Krulak recently made the comment that he would eliminate the tank fleet found in the Marine Corps today if he could. He went on to suggest that heavy armor has limited relevance for future defense challenges and the operation and support costs for a heavy force seriously impact limited defense dollars.
In the Marine Corps, tanks have most often performed the role of “mobile protected firepower” in support of infantry in a close fight, especially in urban combat. In the 1990s, the Marine Corps total force included two active and one reserve tank battalions, each with 56 tanks (although the reserve battalion typically had fewer than 56). In addition, each of the three maritime prepositioning force squadrons carried a battalion’s worth of tanks. More tanks were stored in caves in Norway to support Marine force operating on NATO’s northern flank. Importantly, however, none of these prepositioned stocks included the marines to operate and maintain the tanks, according to Gen. Eric Smith, assistant commandant of the Marine Corps.
In total, then, by 2019, with access to a protected port to offload tanks from a maritime prepositioning force squadron, the total force Marine Corps could employ at best three tank battalions, each with 56 tanks. To support this force of 168 tanks, the Marine Corps needed to procure and maintain obstacle-breaching and bridging equipment, substantial numbers of refuelers, tank retrievers, and other heavy engineering capabilities. Moreover, when they were in charge and making force structure decisions, the Chowderites never upgraded Marine tanks. If Berger were to do so now, such as installing active protective systems and other upgrades, an up-armored M1A2 tank would weigh 80 tons — too heavy for either the current landing craft air cushioned or new ship-to-shore connector to carry. Berger deemed the opportunity cost to maintain and operate this heavy equipment in support of such a small number of tanks to be too high. In addition, he knew he could count on getting tank support from the Army if needed, as the Marine Corps did in Operation Desert Storm and more recently in Operation Iraqi Freedom, including when 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment served as 1st Marine Division’s main effort in Fallujah in 2004.
Regardless of these historical truths, Force Design 2030 opponents now believe a force-in-readiness should be entirely self-contained and not dependent on any other service. If experimentation suggests that the ground combat element would benefit from organic mobile protected firepower, the Marine Corps has the option to procure the Army’s new Mobile Protected Firepower system — a light tank — should future analysis or experience call for this capability.
The truth of the matter is that M1 Abrams tanks that weigh 70 tons or more, along with all the heavy equipment needed to support them, represent an incredible logistics burden for a fighting organization that counts on fleetness and mobility for its combat effectiveness and survival. The burden is especially acute for Marine forces coming from the sea. Nowhere is this more evident than in the premier Marine Corps crisis response organization — the Marine expeditionary unit. A combined-arms capable, Marine air-ground task force built around an infantry battalion landing team ground combat element, with supporting aviation and logistics combat elements, the Marine expeditionary unit is typically embarked on a three-ship Amphibious Readiness Group where space is especially tight. This lack of space helps to explain why marines often decide not to embark tanks with the Marine expeditionary units, despite having the available inventory to do so. Indeed, prior to Berger’s divestment decision, the service — when led by many of the Chowderites — deployed a Marine expeditionary unit out of Japan for decades without tanks, including twice into combat situations: Once was in support of Desert Fox in Kuwait in 1999 and the other time was to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2004. Importantly, the 2004 deployment saw the Marine expeditionary unit’s ground combat element, Battalion Landing Team 1/3, serving as one of the primary clearing units in the Second Battle of Fallujah, where it had a U.S. Army infantry task force, reinforced with a tank company, fighting on its flank. The Chowderites fully supported multiple decisions over the decades to deploy annually one of the service’s “crown jewel” sea-based, Marine air-ground task forces without tanks. It is curious, then, that they now believe that tanks are an absolute must for a Marine formation to be considered as a self-contained, combined-arms-capable, force-in-readiness.
Berger’s opponents also decry a 67 percent loss of direct support cannon artillery. It is again difficult to duplicate their stated number. Initial Force Design 2030 plans announced a divestment of 16 155 mm towed artillery cannon batteries, from 21 to 5, a 76 percent decrease. Berger subsequently clarified his plans, cutting 22 batteries from a total force of 29 active and reserve batteries, a 75 percent decrease. Whatever the final percentage is, if this were the whole story, it would certainly raise questions about the sufficiency of Force Design 2030’s indirect fire support. But the opponents fail to mention that these were not zero-sum cuts. Although he reduced towed cannon artillery batteries, Berger added longer-range rocket and missile batteries, increasing their number from seven to 20, with the majority capable of attacking ships at sea. In other words, he traded shorter-range fires for longer-range precision fires. In sum, Force Design 2030 reduces the number of Marine Corps firing batteries in the total force from 39 to 33 (a 15 percent reduction) to get an indirect fires capability that is far more suited to a distributed-operations-capable Corps. It is also much better able to support integrated naval campaigning operations in the mature precision-strike regime: It is more mobile, has longer range, and is more accurate.
Moreover, the seven residual cannon batteries “are sufficient to satisfy traditional requirements of a Marine Expeditionary Force engaged in sustained operations ashore.” As discussed, the Force Design 2030 Marine Corps will retain five “traditional” infantry regiments (in addition to two reconfigured as Marine littoral regiments). In expeditionary combat operations, each infantry regiment would have a 155 mm towed howitzer battalion in direct support, each with three cannon batteries. However, Force Design 2030 batteries will have eight guns versus the six in the legacy Marine Corps. This equates to one more battery worth of cannons by 2019 standards. Indeed, the Force Design 2030 Marine Corps will be able to field a Marine expeditionary force nearly identical to the ones it used to fight Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, less the Marine tank battalions. This is why Berger confidently states that the redesigned Marine Corps will be every bit as capable in sustained operations ashore as the legacy Corps.
The Force Design 2030 Marine Corps will continue to organize itself into tailorable Marine air-ground task forces, each with an organic air combat element, including both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. The Chowderites claim that Force Design 2030 cuts about 30 percent of the aircraft from the legacy force. No one outside their group knows where this number comes from. The Force Design 2030 Marine Corps will have 18 fighter attack squadrons, the same as in the legacy Corps. True, Force Design 2030 reduces the number of aircraft assigned to each fighter attack squadron from 16 to 10, which is likely the cause of the opponents’ concerns. But this is simply an asset management decision. The Marines still intend to procure their long-established acquisition objective of 420 F-35s. In other words, under these reforms, the Marine Corps will have access to the same overall number of strike fighters as before, but with more assigned as training and attrition aircraft. This design is more sustainable in terms of pilots, training, flying hours, and maintenance costs.
Berger’s initial plan was to reduce the number of tiltrotor (i.e., MV-22), heavy lift, and light attack helicopter squadrons by three, three, and two squadrons, respectively. These cuts were made possible by the reduction of infantry battalions requiring aviation support by three. In other words, the slightly smaller Force Design 2030 Marine Corps will have the same relative level of aviation support as the legacy force, except in the case of unmanned aerial vehicle squadrons, which will see a 100 percent increase from three to six squadrons, and aerial refueling squadrons, which will move from three to four squadrons. Moreover, the commandant subsequently decided to “buy back” two MV-22 squadrons based on input from the operating forces.
The final tally: The legacy aviation combat element had 56 squadrons of all types. Force Design 2030 will have 54.
Of course, these numbers obscure a critically important fact: Force Design 2030 embraces the ongoing democratization of airpower due to the maturation and proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles of different sizes. In the Force Design 2030 Marine Corps, infantry squads, platoons, companies, and battalions will have their own “aerial reconnaissance squadrons” and “close air support” embedded in their formations. As such, instead of cutting aircraft by 30 percent, Force Design 2030 would actually increase the number of aircraft in the Marine Corps manyfold.
The Chowderites are also upset about the reduction in the number of amphibious ships and maritime prepositioning force ships, and large cuts in land-based prepositioning. As a result, the Marine Corps “would find it challenging to get to the fight and sustain itself successfully in a conflict in Korea, Iran, or Europe.” This would be true if we were just counting ships. And if costs were irrelevant. And if pressures on the Navy’s shipbuilding accounts did not exist. But blaming Force Design 2030 for these circumstances is disingenuous. As the opponents well know, the number of amphibious ships and maritime and land-based prepositioning sets are Department of Defense programmatic decisions based on strategic priorities and the requirements of the national defense strategy and its associated war plans. Indeed, debates over the appropriate size of the future amphibious fleet continue between the Defense Department and Congress, the Defense Department and the Department of the Navy, and the Navy and the Marine Corps. It is not yet clear where these debates will land. In any case, this is more of an analytical beef with the Department of Defense than with Force Design 2030 itself.
Moreover, on Berger’s watch, the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act set the minimum size of the amphibious fleet at 31 ships and mandated that the commandant of the Marine Corps now legally sets the requirement for amphibious shipping.
Finally, with the divestiture of all tanks and the purported drastic reduction in direct support cannon artillery, Chowder II asserts that the Force Design 2030 Marine Corps will have great difficulty employing combined arms in the future. To make their case, the opponents define combined arms as “the employment of infantry, artillery, armor, engineers, close air support and all with needed logistics in a way that places an enemy on the ‘horns of a dilemma.’” But this definition deviates from the Marine Corps’ own doctrine, which describes combined arms as “the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another.” This more open-ended definition does not mandate that combined-arms operations include armor or cannon artillery to place an enemy on the horns of a dilemma. That is a self-serving Chowderite mandate.
Chowder II is so worked up over their false assertion that the Force Design 2030 is incapable of conducting combined-arms operations that they claim it “comes dangerously close” to violating the law. Recall that Title 10 stipulates that the Marine Corps be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms. So, the Chowderite logic goes something like this: Because Force Design 2030 offers no tanks and less cannon artillery, the Marine Corps will no longer be capable of employing combined arms. They continue: If the plan does not allow for a force capable of employing combined arms, it is ignoring the law.
This is pure sophistry.
With the introduction of ubiquitous guided munitions, unmanned vehicles of all types, and cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, the fact is that the character of combined arms is changing. Fortunately, Berger’s predecessors recognized these realities, creating the Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command in 2009, when Amos was serving as assistant commandant. The command has grown under every commandant since, suggesting that senior leaders expect cyber capabilities to make powerful contributions to future combined-arms operations. And, as the Royal United Services Institute explains, “To enable kill chains at the speed of relevance, [electronic warfare] for attack, protection and direction finding is a critical element of modern combined arms operations.” In the Force Design 2030 Marine Corps, talented commanders will employ both traditional and new arms in novel ways to complicate enemy actions and reactions.
To recap, the evidence provided by the Chowderites for the “devastating” reduction of operational capabilities for global response is weak. It is based off dated visions of warfare. Their criticisms fail to take into account strategic guidance, geography, or technology. Every reduction in legacy capabilities is generally matched by an addition of new capabilities such as long-range fires, unmanned systems, and resilient command-and-control networks. These capabilities aim to make the Force Design 2030 Marine Corps more capable and lethal than the legacy Corps.
Too Much Risk Today? Depends on Your Point of View
The concern that these changes will put marines at greater risk is closely tied to Berger’s decision to cut some legacy capabilities now to free up the resources to buy the things the Force Design 2030 Marine Corps will need in the future, such as long-range precision fires, unmanned systems, resilient command and control, air and missile defense, and advanced technologies like AI. The opponents object to this “divest to invest” policy, writing, “The unnecessary and unwise reductions in needed force structure and equipment were not made to make the Marine Corps more combat-ready. They were made to self-fund unproven, experimental capabilities that will not be fully operational until 2030 or beyond.”
First off, the unproven, experimental capabilities that the opponents are apparently referring to are the Marine littoral regiment, which is organized for stand-in operations, and the redesigned infantry battalion. It is true that new combat organizations are unproven until they are tested in combat. But that is a red herring. It didn’t stop Germany from forming Panzer units prior to World War II. Or, for that matter, the Marines from reorganizing the Corps for amphibious assault operations — even after the disaster at Gallipoli. Many of the new capabilities now being adopted by the Marine Corps — such as long-range precision fires and unmanned aerial systems — have been thoroughly tested and proven, several in battlefield conditions in Ukraine. Others, such as the technologies being incorporated in the redesigned infantry battalions, are now being put through their paces. None of them require technological leaps.
Second, the “divest to invest” strategy is Department of Defense policy, even if it’s not stated exactly in these terms. For his part, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin talks in terms of “divestiture of capabilities no longer needed as the National Defense Strategy changes.” Chinese leader Xi Jinping has directed the People’s Liberation Army to be ready to seize Taiwan by 2027. As Adm. John Aquilino, the commander of Indo-Pacific Command, recently said, “Everything needs to go faster. … Everyone needs a sense of urgency, because that’s what it’s going to take to prevent a conflict.” Shedding legacy capabilities that are no longer as effective as they once were to pay for new, more advanced capabilities is a good way to jumpstart change at scale and rapidly. Here’s the running scorecard: Berger has thus far ordered the divestment of $17 billion in legacy Marine capabilities. The Defense Department allowed him to apply $15 billion toward his preferred capabilities (the remaining $2 billion went to pay “corporate bills” assessed by the Defense Department). There was no way that Berger could expect the Defense Department to divert $15 billion toward the Marine Corps, and no way to procure the capabilities he deemed necessary by 2030, unless the Marine Corps found a way to “help itself.” So, Berger boldly did the smart thing and pulled the trigger. He accepted some near-term risk, to accelerate the acquisition of more relevant capabilities and thus reduced mid- to long-term risk. The National Military Strategy of 2022 encourages such an approach.
Every single sitting service chief is following the same divest to invest approach to a greater or lesser degree. And, if any of the Chowderites were sitting in Berger’s seat, they likely would, too. If they didn’t, they would lose out in the annual development of the defense program overseen by the secretary of defense. Indeed, to demonstrate its approval of Force Design 2030 and Berger’s approach, and to encourage other service chiefs to follow his lead, the Defense Department recently increased its planned future resource spending on the Corps to push forward the fielding of aspects of Berger’s plan from 2030 to 2027.
The difference in approaches favored by each camp is a reflection of their own views on risk. The Chowderites repeatedly say that the risks associated with Berger’s plans are too high. For example, they point out that by divesting capabilities today to procure capabilities needed for tomorrow, he is creating a period of risk where the Marine Corps will have divested useful combat capabilities before the new capabilities are available. They also argue that the decisions made to date weaken the Corps’ ability to perform its traditional force-in-readiness role, thereby risking U.S. national security. For his part, Berger (and the secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) believes these risks are far outweighed by the risk of doing nothing. As the precision-strike regime continues to mature and China becomes more aggressive, Berger has concluded that the Marine Corps must reinvigorate the service’s commitment to its Title 10 responsibilities. That it must try to shape its future before the next war, even if that future cannot be perfectly known. The opponents of Force Design 2030 implicitly are arguing that doing nothing is far better than doing anything.
Finally, given that Force Design 2030 debate has been going on, and on, and on, for four years, the argument over divest to invest is moot. The divestments have been approved by the Department of Defense and Congress and have been made. All that remains is to invest the additional resources that Congress has provided to grow new capabilities and capacity.
Broken Process? Only If It Isn’t Yours
If it sometimes appears that the supporters and critics of Force Design 2030 are talking past each other, it is because they often are. The opponents talk in terms of combat development while the supporters talk in terms of force design. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication-1, Warfighting outlines the Marine Corps’ philosophy of warfighting. Neither combat development nor force design are defined in this document.
Instead, in the chapter entitled, “Preparing for War,” it uses the term “force planning” to describe activities “associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities.” It explains that all these activities are concept based and describes how Marine Corps forces “will operate and perform certain key functions … and provide the basis for identifying required capabilities and implementing coordinated programs to develop those capabilities.”
The Chowderites prefer to think in terms of a force (i.e., combat) development process that was championed by many of the opponents of Force Design 2030 when they were on active duty. According to the Marine Corps combat development and integration directorate in Quantico, Virginia, force development activities “plan, design, and implement the translation of strategic priorities into manned, trained and equipped Marine Corps organizations able to provide capabilities to Unified Combatant Commanders.” In other words, it is generally about procuring the systems and organizing the units best suited for the Marine Corps’ view of future warfare. The Chowderites believe that this should be a slow deliberate process, notionally about four years long, divided into five phases: a learning campaign, a Marine Corps capabilities-based assessment, programming, budgeting, and execution.
This didn’t work for Berger. He keenly felt the urgency demanded by the secretary of defense and didn’t have the time to conduct a years-long analysis before making a move. He therefore made his initial decisions based on the wargaming, analysis, and concept development that had been conducted during the last years of Neller’s tour as commandant — activities he himself had led while at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. He freely admitted at the time that some of his initial decisions needed to be validated. He therefore announced a campaign of learning based on subsequent wargaming and experimentation to refine his initial decisions and make new ones based on new information. This approach “laid out a plan for modernizing the force, inspiring ownership and action throughout the service.”
The crux of the Chowderites’ argument is that Berger’s capabilities-based assessment was flawed, making all subsequent decisions — what to divest, what to invest in, how to reorganize units — suspect. The group falsely contends that Berger’s capabilities-based assessment was made in secret and was informed by faulty wargames, opaque analysis, and untested concepts such as stand-in forces. The move toward Force Design 2030 should therefore be slowed down and revisited. But such an approach presumes that the pace of the unipolar era in which the critics served is ongoing — an era in which no rising or assertive competitors existed.
The Chowderites often point to the development of the revolutionary MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft as proof of the superiority of “their” combat development process over Force Design 2030’s force design process for integrated naval campaigning and operations in the precision-strike regime. Their attitude is reflected in an article written by another opponent of Force Design 2030, Owen West, entitled, “Are the Marines Inventing the Edsel or the Mustang?” He compares the “secret” development of the Marine littoral regiment to the failed introduction of the Ford Edsel, which was developed in relative secrecy outside Ford’s normal product development process. It was this process that produced the Mustang — a spectacular corporate success.
The analogy of the Edsel loses much in translation, as Ford also decided to build the GT40 that defeated Ferrari at Le Mans in a “secret effort” away from the typical Ford process. Moreover, the Edsel example not only misses the point entirely; it’s the wrong analogy. Berger is trying to make sure the Marine Corps avoids the fate of Kodak, which at one time dominated the film photography market. Unfortunately for Kodak, its leaders could not bring themselves to shift the company’s operating model to that of digital photography — a technology that it invented. As a result, it was replaced as the market leader in photography and ultimately declared bankruptcy. As one analysis of Kodak’s subsequent failure concluded, “Kodak failed to realize that its strategy which was effective at one point was now depriving itself of success” [emphasis added].
Moreover, the opponents of Force Design 2030 fail to mention that the first MV-22 flew in 1989, but it did not achieve initial operational capability until 2007 — nearly 20 years later. This timeline is simply not tenable today in a dynamic competitive environment characterized by rapid change. In addition, the combat development process lauded by Force Design 2030 opponents resulted in the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, a 79,000-pound amphibious assault vehicle designed carry a squad of marines over the water at 25 miles per hour. The unit cost of this dream machine was 15 times that of its predecessor. The Marine Corps was forced to reduce the number of Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles it had planned to procure by nearly 50 percent due to the unit cost rising to over $22 million. Soon thereafter, the secretary of defense ordered the cancellation of this “exquisite” combat system — a polite way to refer to this costly Edsel and the $3 billion plus wasted on its development. For full disclosure, I was undersecretary of the Navy at the time, and I argued for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle’s cancellation while developing alternative concepts of operation and potential vehicle variants that would effectively meet the Corps’ needs and budget.
In any event, debating the proper process to transform the Marine Corps is an inside baseball argument. In the end, Berger is in no way bound by any process connected with manning, organizing, and equipping the Corps, except those dictated by the secretary of the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Moreover, he would undoubtedly argue that any force development process should properly follow force design, which outlines the vision of what the future force must be able to do. Chowder II supports a force design optimized for amphibious assault operations and sustained combat operations ashore. Berger sees that force design as dated and ill-suited for the emerging competitive environment. As he wrote, “As good as we are today, we need to be even better tomorrow to maintain our warfighting overmatch. … Future force development requires a wider range of force options and capabilities.” This is exactly the type of judgment he was selected by the president and confirmed by the Senate to make.
It would be against civilian guidance and common sense not to urgently prepare for a possible war with China, which entails ensuring that the most robust deterrent posture can be attained in the relevant timeframe. Thus, Berger’s campaign of learning is necessarily happening simultaneously with the four subsequent phases: capabilities-based assessment, programming, budgeting, and execution. The Chowderites prefer a years-long serial process. Berger’s approach reflects his thinking that the Marine Corps cannot spend time getting everything perfectly right before making changes toward his objective force. The competitive environment is simply changing too rapidly. The Marine Corps should begin to transform now or risk failing to provide the deterrent effects needed by the combatant commander or being ill-prepared if war breaks out. Of course, this approach requires that Berger be willing to modify some of his own initial decisions as new analysis, experimentation, and wargaming provide additional information. He has demonstrated that he is ready to do just that. As discussed, Berger initially planned to divest three MV-22 squadrons. But input from the Fleet Marine Forces convinced him to change his mind and divest only one.
Undermine What It Means to Be a Marine? You Gotta Be Kidding Me
The final concern laid out by Sheehan and Amos is that the changes brought about by Force Design 2030 will erode the customs, traditions, and ethos of the Marine Corps.
This is the Chowderites’ ultimate straw-man argument, designed to anger current and retired marines who are justifiably proud of their service and to undermine Berger. It is also a bunch of hokum. All marines in the Force Design 2030 Corps will continue to go to boot camp. They all will continue to earn the title “Marine” after enduring and completing the Crucible. They will get better weapons and capabilities than any marines before them. They will be led by more senior, seasoned marines. And they will get better training than that afforded to the Marine Corps when the Chowderites were on active duty. They will continue to strive to be the first to fight in any clime and place.
Time to Cede the Field
The Chowder II Society is made up of some of the most famous and capable marines of the last several generations. They care deeply about the service. Even if one finds their tactics distasteful and arguments weak, no one can question their love and concern for the Marine Corps. But there comes a time in every debate when, having said everything you have to say, you should concede that no one is listening to or buying your line of reasoning.
And that is where Chowder II finds itself today.
Congress is not listening. It is supporting Berger’s efforts in both national authorization and appropriations acts, as well as with bipartisan letters for the record.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense is not listening. The secretary is backing the changes being submitted by Berger in the defense program. Indeed, he provided additional budget resources to speed Force Design 2030 along.
And, although it is impossible to know for sure, there is little evidence that marines in the force are listening. Instead, they appear to believe that the Force Design 2030’s Marine air-ground task forces will be stronger and more lethal than the past, and that the enhanced tool-set they are getting will be more relevant to the future challenges they may face in Asia and beyond. They are not interested in endless reminisces of past fights in Korea or Hue City. They are looking at new threats, geography, and emerging technologies with a critical eye to ensure that they remain a potent force in readiness. As one 30-year infantry gunner recently wrote: “I have some candid advice to senior leaders lambasting the Marine Corps’ reforms: Look in the trenches. The character of war has changed. We will either adapt or perish.” And when it comes to adapting, today’s marines know a good plan when they see one.
It appears the only people now listening to the opponents of Force Design 2030 are the opponents themselves. They fought the fight for public opinion, but they have clearly failed to sway it. It’s far past time for them to cede the field and let today’s marines and those who will come after them continue their proud tradition of adapting to new challenges, thereby ensuring that the future Corps will continue to win the nation’s battles.
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Robert Work spent 27 years on active duty in the Marine Corps as an artillery officer. He was the undersecretary of the Navy in the first Obama administration and the deputy secretary of defense from 2014 to 2018, serving alongside three different secretaries across two administrations.
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Robert Work · May 15, 2023
21. EDCA: Illuminating the path to enhanced external defense (Philippines)
Some common sense recommendations from Lt Gen de los Santos.
Excerpt:
It is evident that the challenges and opportunities faced by the Philippines in the realm of defense and security require a proactive and strategic approach. The EDCA offers a temporary relief to existing and future threats, while emphasizing the importance of self-reliance and credible partnerships with the United States and other allied nations. As we navigate the evolving landscape of technology and geopolitical dynamics, it is crucial to embrace innovation, foster unity, and build upon the invaluable experiences gained through joint military exercises and partnerships. Together, with a clear vision and steadfast commitment, we can forge a path towards a more secure and resilient future for the Philippines.
EDCA: Illuminating the path to enhanced external defense
mb.com.ph · by Manila Bulletin
BARRACKS AND STRATEGY
By Lt. Gen. Jaime S. de los Santos, AFP (Ret)
The Philippines has come into focus due to the increasing tension in the Taiwan Straits, leading to the establishment of new EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement) sites in the Cagayan Valley Region. Recent news reports indicate that the US is allocating an additional $100 million for these new EDCA sites, which include air and naval bases in Cagayan province and the 5th Infantry Division in Isabela. The 5th Infantry Division serves as a prime example of an Army command that has been actively involved in counter-insurgency operations for approximately 50 years. Having personally commanded the Division, I can vouch for the courage and bravery demonstrated by its officers and soldiers. It has produced generals and Medal of Valor awardee. The soldiers' mindset and competence were cultivated and developed through their encounters with the local communist (CPP-NPA) threat, which was their primary concern. Their engagements mainly involved smaller to medium-sized combat operations against guerilla forces, who utilized unconventional warfare tactics.
Can the effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations contribute positively to the AFP as it gradually takes on a new role of external defense? What are the areas that need to be developed and pursued to establish a defense capability? The President has indicated in some of his statements that the AFP should now prioritize external defense. He specifically stated, "It is difficult to imagine that the Philippines can avoid a conflict involving Taiwan." The President's remarks imply a shift in priority towards the AFP's existing mission. The AFP needs to be ready to respond decisively to any external threats that challenge the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This marks a period of change and innovation for the AFP as it seeks to make this new role meaningful and relevant.
To embark on this new paradigm shift, there is a need to develop new infrastructure facilities, defense assets, and resources that align with modern technology in weaponry, armaments, communication, and logistical support. EDCA has been seen as a step towards strengthening our defense capabilities against external threats, essentially involving the modernization of our armed forces. We have developed a culture of reliance on support from the United States. The readiness of a military force is not solely determined by its inventory of warfighting equipment but also by its military mindset and psychological preparedness, which hold equal importance.
To initiate a paradigm shift, it is crucial to break free from the entrenched military values that have been shaped over years of counter-insurgency operations. Instead, new values should be cultivated to align with a fresh political and military order. In the book "Hope is Not a Method" by Gen. Gordon Sullivan, former US Army Chief of Staff, it is emphasized that assuming new roles cannot be solely reliant on hope. The Philippines cannot continuously rely on the United States. Prolonged dependence will hinder our initiative, ingenuity, and limit our ability to develop necessary options and approaches for operational readiness.
Can EDCA make a significant impact? We shouldn't expect miracles, but it does offer temporary relief for existing and impending threats. It is a preferable alternative to have US forces as partners, with the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) serving as an added incentive. This arrangement provides a sense of security and enhances our credibility. Alongside the opportunity for our troops to gain valuable experience through joint military exercises and other partnership programs, the following areas of concern should be prioritized to leverage meaningful change:
1. Craft a mission statement that is effectively communicated throughout the command structure, emphasizing self-reliance and strengthened partnerships with the US and other allied nations, grounded in mutual respect and cooperation.
2. Implement organizational changes in Command, Control, and Communication that align with EDCA and the operational concepts of allied forces, aiming for interoperability.
3. Foster the development of doctrines, education, and training programs to achieve uniformity, unity of effort, and synergy across the military forces.
4. Recognize that leadership is the key factor in facilitating the transition. As technology evolves, mindsets also need to adapt. Responsive leadership characterized by focus, mental resilience, flexibility, dynamism, and creativity is crucial in this changing landscape.
It is evident that the challenges and opportunities faced by the Philippines in the realm of defense and security require a proactive and strategic approach. The EDCA offers a temporary relief to existing and future threats, while emphasizing the importance of self-reliance and credible partnerships with the United States and other allied nations. As we navigate the evolving landscape of technology and geopolitical dynamics, it is crucial to embrace innovation, foster unity, and build upon the invaluable experiences gained through joint military exercises and partnerships. Together, with a clear vision and steadfast commitment, we can forge a path towards a more secure and resilient future for the Philippines.
(Gen. de los Santos served with distinction as a military professional, 42nd Commanding Gen. Philippine Army, 1st Force Commander, UN Multi-National Peacekeeping Force in East Timor, former member, UP Board of Regents and Professorial Lecturer II (part-time), UP-Diliman.)
mb.com.ph · by Manila Bulletin
22. Philippines’ new military deal with US: Will it tilt power balance in South China Sea?
Philippines’ new military deal with US: Will it tilt power balance in South China Sea?
Filipino fishermen welcome the increased presence of US troops. Others, such as a provincial governor and a woman pressured into sex work in her youth, worry that it could invite trouble. The programme Insight examines what is at stake.
Neo Chai Chin
Daniel Heng
14 May 2023 06:00AM
(Updated: 14 May 2023 08:06AM)
channelnewsasia.com
OLONGAPO, Philippines: Alma Bulawan lives in what was once the Philippines’ “sin city”, a place shaped by decades of the United States’ military presence. She opposes a larger US military footprint in her country but knows she belongs to the minority.
“If you ask people on the street, they’re glad the Americans are returning. It means business,” she said. “Only a few, like us, oppose it.”
The city of Olongapo is not far from the US’ former naval base in Subic, which American troops withdrew from in 1992.
The US’ military presence in the Philippines is now set for its largest expansion since then, after both countries announced in February that the number of bases the US could operate out of will increase from five to nine.
There are five bases the United States can operate out of currently.
Last month, the locations of the four new bases under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) were announced. Three are on Luzon island, close to Taiwan, and one is in Palawan province, adjacent to the South China Sea.
The expansion comes as Washington steps up its Indo-Pacific influence to counter Beijing.
The most serious flashpoint in the region is Taiwan, which China regards as a breakaway province to be reunified with the mainland and which the US is required, under the Taiwan Relations Act, to provide with arms for its defence.
Beijing’s claims to much of the South China Sea, a major trade route, are also a source of conflict with some Southeast Asian nations whose fishermen have been outmuscled and intimidated by larger Chinese vessels.
The programme Insight examines whether the US and Philippines’ new deal will even out the power imbalance in the South China Sea or drag Filipinos into a superpower rivalry.
‘RAINING MONEY’, BUT CHILDREN WERE ABANDONED
Olongapo residents, more than most, have seen both the shiny and dark sides of American military presence.
Before the troop withdrawal, the city’s seedy bars and nightclubs were making a windfall from off-duty Americans. “It was like raining money,” said present-day pub owner Joel Merza. But there would be riots when they got drunk, added Bulawan.
Forty years ago, Bulawan found work in a bar there. And like the many other young women working in bars, she found herself pressured into sex work.
She got pregnant at the age of 24 and gave birth in 1987 to an Amerasian son. The term refers to children of local women fathered by American soldiers, and these children were stigmatised owing to their illegitimate status.
From the archives: Filipinas seeking support for their Amerasian children.
“There are many Amerasians who were abandoned,” said Bulawan, who went on to become president of Buklod Centre, a non-profit organisation that helps to change the situation of women in sex work.
“The men would tell (the women), ‘You’re a prostitute, you’re working in a bar. How (can) I (be sure) that’s my child?’”
There are an estimated 50,000 to 250,000 Amerasians in the Philippines, and many grew up in poverty. Despite this, “the view of the community is still that the Americans helped us a lot”, Bulawan said.
When it leased and controlled the Subic naval base — the last of six bases to be returned to the Philippine government — the US provided economic, military and housing assistance to the Philippines.
In the financial year that ended in September 1991, the Philippines received US$408 million (S$546 million) in connection with the bases, and the Subic base had pumped more than US$344 million a year into the Philippine economy, the New York Times reported.
Elsewhere in Zambales province, on the west coast of Luzon, fishermen like Corterio “Boyet” Meer welcome a bigger American presence.
Filipino fisherman Corterio “Boyet” Meer calls the Americans “allies”.
Meer has been fishing for 39 years but has gone only twice to Scarborough Shoal, even though fish are “really abundant” there.
The disputed reef in the South China Sea is within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone but effectively under Chinese control.
“I don’t go there any more because we’ve been prohibited. … There are Chinese guards at Scarborough,” he said. “We’d get scared because they have guns. That’s why we’d rather just go home.”
Although the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague has rejected most of Beijing’s claims to the South China Sea in a case brought by the Philippines, small-scale Southeast Asian fishermen still find their right to fish under threat.
Philippine and Chinese coastguard ships sail close by each other in disputed waters.
With greater US access to his country’s bases and facilities, “we have protection from those who want to occupy the Philippines”, said fisherman Jeremias Mesia.
“At the very least, (China) will be more careful in the way it treats us,” said Jay Batongbacal, the director of the Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea at the University of the Philippines.
“China is controlling almost the whole region. Our own fisher folk can’t even fish in our own waters because China prevents them from doing so.
“Because of that, we have no choice but to strengthen our security alliance with the US so we can protect our own interests.”
CHINA NOT THE ENEMY?
In northern Luzon’s Cagayan province, however, Governor Manuel Mamba begs to differ. China is “not an enemy”, he said. “We have intermarriages with them. We have good relations with the Chinese.”
Cagayan Governor Manuel Mamba.
During disasters and the COVID-19 pandemic, China rendered help by giving rice, he cited as an example.
Cagayan is home to two of the four new sites the US military can access: Camilo Osias naval base and Cagayan North International Airport, or Lal-lo airport. Mamba worries that this will “invite more enemies” and drive away Chinese investors.
His priority is to reopen Cagayan’s Aparri port for it to be a gateway to Northeast Asia. He sees China as the “biggest market” for his province’s agricultural, fishery and livestock products.
“I’d rather trust this neighbour than somebody who’s far, far away,” he said.
“What I’m saying is, most of the people do not discuss EDCA on the streets here. What the people discuss here is how they’d be able to fill their stomachs every day.”
People of Cagayan, in its provincial capital Tuguegarao City.
The rehabilitation of the Aparri port would require dredging the sea floor to allow bigger ships to dock. Part of the Cagayan River Restoration Project, this also aims to mitigate flooding.
In 2020, news outlet The Philippine Star reported that two companies, Riverfront Construction Incorporated and Great River North Consortium, had been accredited for the project and would foot its cost. But controversy has erupted since.
Environmentalists, fishery representatives and Aparri’s mayor have claimed the dredging is a cover for black sand mining, and there is concern that the black sand is being shipped to China, news site Rappler reported in 2021. Extensive extraction of the resource elsewhere in the Philippines has caused coastlines to recede.
In response, Mamba challenged the critics to prove their allegations.
Dredging near the Aparri port.
Like him, International Peace Bureau co-president Corazon Fabros disagrees with the “Western narrative that the enemy is China”.
“Who gains in (the) billions of dollars when there’s war? The one who (would make) a killing (from) a situation of war is the US,” she said.
“They sell the arms, they sell all these fighter jets and everything, including what the soldiers will wear.”
Analysts noted, however, that former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte’s pivoting towards China did not ultimately benefit his country’s strategic interests — “particularly in the West Philippine Sea”, cited Aries Arugay, a visiting fellow at Singapore’s ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
Because Chinese incursions … not only continued but … intensified, despite the gesture of cordiality being extended by the Duterte administration.”
During much of his term from 2016 to last year, Duterte distanced himself from the US. He even threatened to suspend defence pacts including the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the annual Balikatan joint military exercise.
In the final months of his presidency, however, the Philippines and the US held their largest joint military exercise in seven years.
WATCH: Philippines welcomes more US troops at home — Will it be worth it? (47:27)
NOT A ZERO-SUM GAME
Under the current president, Ferdinand Marcos Junior, ties have grown warmer, and he was welcomed to the White House this month by US President Joe Biden.
But Marcos Jr has not turned his back on China, which he visited in January and returned from with US$22.8 billion in investment pledges.
Maximising the benefits from both superpowers will be a “balancing act”, said Batongbacal. “They have an offer, but that always comes at a price.”
There is always apprehension that each time the Philippines “gets closer to the US”, there would be a “corresponding deterioration” in China-Philippine relations, said Arugay.
The two countries’ leaders and their wives posing at the welcome ceremony by Chinese President Xi Jinping for Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Junior’s visit in January.
But other Southeast Asian countries have shown it is possible to manage relationships with both superpowers, he added. “So Philippine foreign policy and strategic policy should be clear that there’s no zero-sum game here.”
When it comes to the EDCA, first signed in 2014, the Philippines has also struck some sort of balance.
It fulfilled its constitutional requirement that bars foreign troops from having a permanent presence in the country, by allowing for the rotation of American forces stationed at its bases.
And it skirted the “very unpopular” notion of having foreign bases in the country, as the sites and facilities remain under Philippine control, Arugay noted.
Fabros’ opposition to the VFA and to the presence of foreign forces in her country stems from the fact that US troops are given “a lot of privileges”, like where they are detained if convicted of a crime and being allowed to remain in US custody while judicial procedures are ongoing.
In 2005, US Marine Lance Corporal Daniel Smith was accused of raping a Filipina and was allowed to be detained at the US embassy while his case was under appeal. Eventually, he was acquitted.
In 2014, another Marine, Lance Corporal Joseph Scott Pemberton, killed a transgender woman. He was pardoned by Duterte in 2020 after serving less than six years of his sentence in an air-conditioned cell at a Philippine military base.
These cases show the “asymmetrical relationship” between the Philippines and the US and can stir negative sentiments, adding to the “historical trauma”, said Arugay.
But Batongbacal reckoned that with smartphones and social media, such incidents “won’t happen easily any more”.
Protestors calling for US Marine Lance Corporal Joseph Scott Pemberton to be surrendered to Philippine correctional authorities.
Technology has occasioned a bittersweet ending in one case at least: Last year, Bulawan’s son, Edmark, saw his father for the first time after she used DNA testing to track him down.
“I’m happy for him now, for his future, because we found his father,” she said.
Watch this episode of Insight here. The programme airs on Thursdays at 9pm.
channelnewsasia.com
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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