Quotes of the Day:
“North Korea is a wild card among military (and nuclear-armed) powers given the unpredictable nature of its leader, Kim Jong-un. The regime has been relentless for some two decades in developing nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. From Kim’s perspective, Muammar Qaddafi gave up his nuclear weapons program and is dead, his regime gone; Saddam Hussein never got nuclear weapons and he is dead, his regime gone. Ukraine gave up 1,500 nuclear weapons in 1994 based on the pledge by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia (and separately, France) to guarantee its territorial integrity; it has since lost Crimea and the eastern part of its country. Kim is smart enough to understand these lessons.”
— Exercise of Power: American Failures, Successes, and a New Path Forward in the Post-Cold War World by Robert Michael Gates
https://a.co/9szEFiW
"To educate a man in mind and not in morals is to educate a menace to society."
- Theodore Roosevelt
"Be at war with your vices, at peace with your neighbors, and let every new year find you a better man."
- Benjamin Franklin
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 10
2. Russian state television DEFIES President Putin's propaganda edict and broadcasts criticism of the war in Ukraine
3. Iran Nuclear Talks Break Off Without a Deal
4. Ukraine Conflict Update - March 11, 2022 | SOF News
5. Why the US Won’t Give Patriot Interceptors to Ukraine
6. Testimony on the posture of United States Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea
7. Russian forces regroup near Kyiv after setbacks
8. Putin says Russia to use Middle East volunteer fighters
9. FDD | How Iran is Making Inroads in South America
10. Biden Congratulates President-Elect Yoon
11. The No-Fly Zone Delusion
12. Arming Ukraine Is Worth the Risk
13. Putin’s Nuclear Bluff
14. Why Strangling Russia’s Economy Could Backfire
15. Ukraine offers Taiwan a wake-up call, and lessons in resistance
16. U.S. Military Urges Biden to Place Commandos in Somalia as Militant Threat Worsens
17. Congress Clears $1.5 Trillion Spending Bill, Including Ukraine Aid
18. The Pentagon must pay for competition
19. ‘Putin is losing’ — but risks of a NATO-Russian war are growing
20. Ukraine Needs Ground-Based Air Defenses Way More Than MiGs. Here Are The Best Options
21. Putin's Plan B for Ukraine: A DMZ between East and West
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 10
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 10
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko
March 10, 4:00 pm EST
The likelihood is increasing that Ukrainian forces could fight to a standstill the Russian ground forces attempting to encircle and take Kyiv. Russian forces also appear to be largely stalemated around Kharkiv and distracted from efforts to seize that city. Russian advances in the south around Mykolayiv and toward Zaporizhya and in the east around Donetsk and Luhansk made little progress as well in the last 24 hours. Russia likely retains much greater combat power in the south and east and will probably renew more effective offensive operations in the coming days, but the effective reach and speed of such operations is questionable given the general performance of the Russian military to date. There are as yet no indications that the Russian military is reorganizing, reforming, learning lessons, or taking other measures that would lead to a sudden change in the pace or success of its operations, although the numerical disparities between Russia and Ukraine leave open the possibility that Moscow will be able to restore rapid mobility or effective urban warfare to the battlefield.
Russian forces around Kyiv did not attempt to renew offensive operations on a multi-battalion scale on March 10 following the failure of limited efforts on March 8-9. Ukrainian forces badly damaged a Russian armored column in the Brovary area east of Kyiv, likely further disrupting Russian efforts to set conditions for offensive operations on the east bank of the Dnipro. Ukrainian resistance all along the Russian lines of communication from eastern Kyiv to the Russian border near Sumy continues to disrupt Russian efforts to bring more combat power to bear near the capital. The episodic, limited, and largely unsuccessful Russian offensive operations around Kyiv increasingly support the Ukrainian General Staff’s repeated assessments that Russia lacks the combat power near the capital to launch successful offensive operations on a large scale.
Key Takeaways
- Russian operations around Kyiv remained largely stalled over the past 24 hours.
- Ukrainian forces badly damaged a Russian armored unit east of the capital, likely disrupting Russian efforts to encircle or assault the city from the east.
- Russian forces continue to struggle in efforts to seize Chernihiv city and to secure the long ground lines of communication from Sumy, which the Ukrainians still hold, to eastern Kyiv.
- A new Russian invasion from western Belarus, with or without Belarusian ground forces’ support, appears increasingly unlikely.
- Russian forces remain pinned down attempting to reduce Mariupol by siege and bombardment.
- Russian efforts to bypass Mykolayiv and establish a reliable ground line of communication across the Southern Bug River to the north of Mykolayiv remain stalled.
- Ukrainian air force and air defense operations continue to hinder Russian ground forces maneuver by likely limiting Russian close air support and exposing Russian mechanized forces to Ukrainian air and artillery attacks.
Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
- Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
- Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk Oblast;
- Supporting effort 2—Mariupol; and
- Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward.
Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis are aimed at encircling the city from the northwest, west, and east.
Russian forces did not make any substantial gains in the past 24 hours. The Ukrainian military reported it halted Russian advances “in all directions” and that Russian forces have reduced their offensive pace due to demoralization on March 10.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force and Ukrainian air defenses additionally remain operational. The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Ukrainian air defenses and fighters shot down four Russian Su-25 aircraft, two helicopters, and two cruise missiles on March 8-9.[2] Individual Russian attacks at roughly regiment size reported on March 8-9 may represent the maximum scale of offensive operations Russian forces can conduct on this axis at any one time. Russian forces will likely require a period longer than the previous operational pauses of 48-72 hours to sufficiently reinforce their forces to resume advances on Kyiv, if they are able to at all.
Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro
Russian forces did not make any substantial advances west of Kyiv on March 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at noon local time on March 10 that Russian forces occupy a ring of positions north and west of Kyiv running through Poliske, Kukhari, Borodyanka, Andriyivka, Motyzhyn, Horenychi, Bucha, and Demydiv.[3] Russian forces made slight advances in Motyzhyn and Bucha, two towns west of Kyiv, but Russian positions in Kyiv’s northwestern outskirts remained the same over the past 24 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff did not report any new details on the Russian elements that attempted to push south toward Fastiv from Byshiv since March 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 10:00 am local time on March 10 that Ukrainian forces continue to maintain their defensive lines around Kyiv.[4] The General Staff claimed Russian forces have not abandoned their efforts to encircle Kyiv from the west and southwest but predominantly regrouped and replaced combat losses over the last 24 hours.[5] Ukrainian forces repulsed Russian attacks on Vyshhorod (approximately 18 kilometers directly north of Kyiv along the west bank of the Dnipro River) and on Moshchun (roughly 20 kilometers northwest of Kyiv on the Irpin River) on March 10.[6]
The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported on March 10 that Russian saboteurs are wearing yellow armbands (an identifying marker of Ukrainian forces) as well as a yellow band on the leg to identify themselves to other Russian forces.[7] The General Staff additionally stated Russian saboteurs may have infiltrated Kyiv under the guise of evacuated residents of Kyiv’s suburbs.[8] ISW cannot independently confirm the possible successes of Russian efforts to infiltrate Kyiv.
The apparent failure of Russian forces’ attacks on March 8-9 after reconstituting and preparing during the operational pause and resupply efforts of the past several days supports the Ukrainian General Staff assessments that Russian forces have far less effective combat power around the capital than their numbers would suggest.[9]
Russian and/or Belarusian forces remain unlikely to attempt to open a new axis of advance into western Ukraine in the near future. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 10 that Ukrainian forces continue to cover the border with Belarus.[10] The Russian military is unlikely to be able to concentrate sufficient combat power to conduct any meaningful operation against western Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at midnight on March 9 that Belarus is supplying Russian forces with fuel and supplies and allowing Russian forces to use Belarusian bases but has not committed its own forces.[11]Russian aircraft additionally continue to operate from several Belarusian airbases.[12] Russia will likely continue to prioritize feeding individual replacements and reinforcing units to its ongoing main effort to encircle Kyiv, rather than attempting a new line of advance.
Subordinate supporting effort—Chernihiv axis
Russian forces unsuccessfully continued efforts to assault Chernihiv on March 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue to hold the city as of 6:00 am local time on March 10.[13] Ukrainian forces additionally claimed to destroy a Russian Iskander-M missile battalion near Chernihiv on March 10.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff previously reported on March 9 that elements of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 41st Combined Arms Army, and 90th Tank Division are attempting to renew the offensive toward Chernihiv and Kyiv from the north.[15]
Ukrainian forces likely successfully repelled Russian attacks on Brovary, an eastern suburb of Kyiv, on March 10. The Ukrainian GUR claimed Ukrainian forces killed Russian Colonel A. Zakharov, commander of the 6th Tank Regiment of the 90th Tank Division, in Brovary on March 10.[16] Several social media users additionally posted videos, later verified by CNN, of Russian losses in Brovary on March 9-10.[17]
Subordinate supporting effort—Sumy axis
Russian forces likely continued efforts to consolidate control of their lines of communication to eastern Kyiv along the Sumy axis in the past 24 hours as Ukrainian forces continue to contest them. Russian forces again unsuccessfully attacked Okhtyrka in Sumy Oblast throughout March 9-10.[18] Ukrainian forces did not report any counterattacks against Russian forces in Sumy Oblast in the past 24 hours but claimed that Ukrainian troops continued ”stabilization operations” and territorial defense outside the Kyiv and southeastern axes, likely referring to fighting in northeastern Ukraine.[19] This continued fighting likely indicates that the Russians are struggling to consolidate control over this long line of communication and that Ukrainian forces are actively contesting it.
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:
Russian forces continued to bombard Kharkiv on March 10 but have not renewed attempts to take the city through ground assault on a large scale.[20] Kharkiv Governor Oleh Sinegubov additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces recaptured the northern Kharkiv suburb of Dergachi from Russian forces on March 10—Ukrainian forces‘ third claimed counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast since February 24.[21]
Russian forces, likely from the Kharkiv axis, also continued operations to the southeast on March 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attempted to seize Izyum, Petrivske, and Hrushuvakha, three towns approximately 110 kilometers southeast of Kharkiv.[22] Russian forces advancing southeast from the Kharkiv axis likely seek to link up with Russian forces advancing west from Donbas but are unlikely to do so in the near future given that Russian forces have been trying and failing to take Izyum since at least March 8.[23]
Supporting Effort #1a—Luhansk Oblast:
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian and proxy forces continued attacks in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts on March 10, focused on the city of Kryvyi Rih.[24] The military situation in Donbas has not materially changed in the past 24 hours.
Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol:
Russian forces continue to encircle and bombard Mariupol. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue to successfully defend the city.[25] The Russian proxy Donetsk People’s Republic claimed that its forces took control of several neighborhoods near Mariupol—including Azovskiy, Naydenovka, Lyapino, Vinogradar, and the Azovstal metallurgical factory—on March 10.[26] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR)’s 1st Army Corps (the Ukrainian designation for the Russian-controlled military forces of the DNR) additionally reportedly deployed conscripted troops to Mariupol on March 10.[27]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 6:00 am local time on March 10 that Ukraine’s main efforts are focused on preventing the Russians from advancing in the “south-eastern direction”—likely referring to Russian attacks towards Zaporizhya—as well as Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff had not explicitly highlighted the southeast as an operational priority prior to March 10.
Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and west:
Russian forces continued assaults on the outskirts of Mykolayiv on March 10.[29] Ukrainian forces and social media reported ongoing fighting in Voznesensk, which is northwest of Mykolayiv and the furthest point of Russian advances west of the Dnipro River from Crimea.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff also stated that Russian forces are ”trying to gain a foothold” in settlements approximately 25 kilometers south and southeast of Mykolayiv on March 10, indicating that Russian forces are likely experiencing difficulty advancing northwest beyond the Inhul River.[31]
Russian forces continued to concentrate on the drive toward Mykolayiv and made little progress on other operations. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russia deployed a battalion tactical group of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (of the Baltic Fleet) to “the Crimean direction” on March 10, and previously reported increasing concentrations of Russian forces toward Mykolayiv on March 9.[32] The Ukrainian General Staff reported at midnight on March 9 that Russian forces continued attacks toward Zaporizhia but did not secure territorial gains.[33]
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces around Kyiv may undertake another operational pause to prepare for renewed efforts to encircle Kyiv from east and west and/or to seize the city center itself following their failures of the previous 48 hours;
- Russian troops may drive on Zaporizhya city itself within the next 48-72 hours, likely attempting to block it from the east and set conditions for subsequent operations after Russian forces besieging Mariupol take that city;
- Russian forces may attempt amphibious landings anywhere along the Black Sea Coast from Odesa to the mouth of the Southern Bug River in the next 24-48 hours.
[26] https://vz dot ru/news/2022/3/10/1147841.html.
2. Russian state television DEFIES President Putin's propaganda edict and broadcasts criticism of the war in Ukraine
This could be significant. Will it cause further crackdowns on the media or will Putin meltdown over this?
Russian state television DEFIES President Putin's propaganda edict and broadcasts criticism of the war in Ukraine - with guests describing the shambolic invasion as 'like Afghanistan, but even WORSE'
- Putin's war on freedom of expression in Russia appeared to be fraying at the edges on Thursday
- Guests on Kremlin-backed television defied Moscow and openly criticised the ongoing war in Ukraine
- Some said the invasion was worse than the Afghanistan operation in the 1980s which ended in failure
- Putin has intensified a crackdown on media and individuals who fail to hew to the Kremlin line on the war
PUBLISHED: 19:24 EST, 10 March 2022 | UPDATED: 05:44 EST, 11 March 2022
Daily Mail · by Jack Wright For Mailonline · March 11, 2022
Putin’s war on freedom of expression in Russia appeared to be fraying at the edges on Thursday after guests on Kremlin-backed TV defied Moscow and openly criticised the brutal conflict in Ukraine, calling the invasion ‘even worse than Afghanistan’.
Guests have refused to support the narrative pushed through by television hosts on Putin’s request that Russia has been conducting a ‘special operation’ to ‘demilitarise’ and ‘de-Nazify’ Ukraine – claims dismissed as baseless pretexts by Kyiv and her partners in the West.
One who appeared on one of Russia 1’s prime time talk show rebelled by referring to the USSR’s disastrous invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 which ended in withdrawal ten years later.
Historians argue that Moscow’s failure in that war, in which thousands of Red Army troops were killed, fuelled disillusionment among millions of people in the Soviet Union and ultimately helped to bring about the collapse of the ‘Evil Empire’ in 1991.
Putin’s ‘propagandist-in-chief’ Vladimir Soloviev, who has been sanctioned by the EU, was forced to interrupt Semyond Bagdasarov after the academic told him: ‘Do we need to get into another Afghanistan, but even worse?’. He said that in Ukraine ‘there are more people and they’re more advanced in their weapon handling’, before adding: ‘We don’t need that. Enough already.’
Speaking during a broadcast on Russia 1 earlier, Karen Shakhnazarov, a filmmaker and state pundit, said the conflict in Ukraine risked isolating Russia.
He told Mr Soloviyev: ‘I have a hard time imagining taking cities such as Kyiv. I can’t imagine how that would look.’ The filmmaker went on to demand an end to the war, declaring: ‘If this picture starts to transform into an absolute humanitarian disaster, even our close allies like China and India will be forced to distance themselves from us.
‘This public opinion, with which they’re saturating the entire world, can play out badly for us... Ending this operation will stabilise things within the country.’
A destroyed Russian tank is seen after battles on a main road near Brovary, north of Kyiv, March 10, 2022
Guests on Russian state television have called the Ukraine war 'even worse than Afghanistan' in the 1980s
Residents evacuate the city of Irpin, north of Kyiv, on March 10, 2022
Putin attends a videoconference meeting with Government members at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, March 10, 2022
Left, Semyond Bagdasarov. Right, Karen Shakhnazarov. Both appeared on Kremlin-backed TV and criticised the war
Putin has intensified a crackdown on media outlets and individuals who fail to hew to the Kremlin line on the war, blocking Facebook and Twitter and signing into law a bill that criminalises the intentional spreading of so-called ‘fake news’ in Russia.
Russians who criticise the war face being jailed for 15 years, while independent media in the country face threats of closure or large fines if they refer to the military campaign as an ‘invasion’.
The information war escalated on Thursday, with Moscow shifting its stance over the bombing of a hospital in the city of Mariupol with a mix of statements on Thursday that veered between aggressive denials and a call by the Kremlin to establish clear facts.
Volodymyr Zelensky said three people including a child had been killed in the bombing on Wednesday, and rejected Russian assertions there had been no patients there.
‘Like always, they lie confidently,’ said Zelensky, who has accused Moscow of waging genocide in the war it launched two weeks ago.
In the face of worldwide condemnation there were rare signs of inconsistency in the response from Russian officials, who since the start of Moscow’s invasion on February 24 have stuck tightly to the same narrative for what Russia calls its special military operation in Ukraine.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, asked for comment in the immediate aftermath, told Reuters on Wednesday: ‘Russian forces do not fire on civilian targets.’ On Thursday he said the Kremlin would look into the incident.
Other Russian officials took a more aggressive line, rejecting the hospital bombing as fake news. ‘This is information terrorism,’ foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said.
The Defence Ministry later denied having bombed the hospital, accusing Ukraine of staging the incident. It said Russian forces at the time had been respecting an agreement to hold fire to allow the evacuation of civilians.
‘Russian aviation carried out absolutely no strikes on ground targets in the area,’ spokesman Igor Konashenkov said. ‘The alleged air strike was completely a staged provocation... that can deceive the Western public but not an expert.’
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attacked what he called ‘pathetic shouting about so-called atrocities by the Russian armed forces’.
He told reporters after meeting Ukraine’s foreign minister in Turkey that the hospital building had for days been under the control of ultra-radical Ukrainian forces who had emptied out the doctors and patients – the version rejected by Zelensky as a lie.
On Wednesday, the United States denied renewed Russian accusations that Washington was operating biowarfare labs in Ukraine, calling the claims ‘laughable’.
During a televised meeting with Kremlin officials on Thursday, Putin addressed the Western sanctions that have caused the ruble to crash and led many major companies to leave Russia.
Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko said today that Ukraine's capital city has been 'turned into a fortress' ahead of the Russian assault, with about 2 million people - half the residents of the metro area of the capital - having fled as Putin's troops draw ever closer
A child wait to be evacuated from the city of Irpin, north of Kyiv, on March 10, 202
Kyiv's northwest suburbs such as Irpin and Bucha have been enduring shellfire and bombardments for more than a week, prompting a mass evacuation effort (Ukrainian soldier hugs his wife evacuating Irpin, north of Kyiv)
A Russian armoured vehicle sits by the side of the road in Brovary, to the east of Kyiv, after being destroyed in an artillery and rocket ambush that caused heavy casualties
Ukrainian servicemen walk in front of a Russian tank that they captured after fighting, as Russia's attack on Ukraine continues, outside Brovary near Kyiv, Ukraine, March 10, 2022
Ukrainian servicemen drive off in a Russian tank they captured after fighting with Russian troops, as Russia's attack on Ukraine continues, outside Brovary, near Kyiv, Ukraine, March 10, 2022
‘The pressure of sanctions has always been there. Yes, of course, now it is complex and creates certain challenges, problems, difficulties for us. But just as we overcame these difficulties in the previous years, we will overcome them now. We must go through this period. The economy will certainly adapt to the new situation’, the Russian despot said.
The list of companies that have stopped operating in Russia grew Thursday, with German fashion brand Hugo Boss temporarily closing its stores and US-based hotel chains Hilton and Marriott closing their Moscow offices, though their Russian hotels are owned and operated by franchisees and will stay open.
The Walt Disney Company said that in addition to pausing film releases in Russia, as previously announced, it was also ‘taking steps to pause all other businesses’ there.
Goldman Sachs said it would close its operations in Russia entirely, making it the first major Wall Street bank to do so since Russia invaded Ukraine.
And JPMorgan Chase said it was ‘unwinding’ its Russian banking business.
Meanwhile, Twitter launched a privacy-protected version of its site to bypass surveillance and censorship after Russia restricted access to its service in the country.
Daily Mail · by Jack Wright For Mailonline · March 11, 2022
3. Iran Nuclear Talks Break Off Without a Deal
What a complex world. While Putin's War is taking place in Ukraine the Russians are making demands during the Iran negotiations.
Iran Nuclear Talks Break Off Without a Deal
Pause follows Russian demands for guarantees from the U.S. over sanctions
The Iran nuclear talks broke off Friday with no agreement, imperiling negotiations that were advancing toward a deal until Russia upended them with demands that would soften the West’s sanctions on Moscow over the Ukraine invasion.
The European Union coordinator of the talks, Josep Borrell, said Friday he would speak to the U.S., Iran and other negotiating teams “to overcome the current situation and to close the agreement.”
“A pause in #ViennaTalks is needed, due to external factors,” Mr. Borrell said on Twitter. “A final text is essentially ready and on the table.”
After weeks of round-the-clock negotiations in Vienna, the breakoff in talks significantly raises the prospect that efforts to revive the 2015 nuclear deal may fail. The U.S. quit the deal in 2018 and Iran has since then expanded its nuclear work significantly in response to reimposed American sanctions.
Western diplomats have been warning that while the U.S. and Iran had resolved most of their differences in the talks, Russia’s demands and the growing tensions over Ukraine could scupper the talks.
The talks in Vienna have focused on the steps the U.S. and Iran would take to return into compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal, which lifted most international sanctions on Iran in exchange for tight but temporary restrictions on Tehran’s nuclear work.
U.S. and European negotiators have been warning for weeks that the nuclear talks can’t be further prolonged because of advances in Iran’s nuclear work.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said last week that guarantees should ensure that if a deal is restored, Western sanctions on Russia over Ukraine “does not in any way damage our right to free and full trade, economic and investment cooperation and military-technical cooperation with the Islamic State.”
U.S. and European officials have dismissed Russia’s demands for sanctions guarantees, saying the issue of Ukraine-related sanctions is irrelevant to the Iranian nuclear deal.
An Iran deal would likely help bring down oil prices, which surged to nearly $140 a barrel and remain above $100 a barrel—historically high levels. High oil and gas prices have made it difficult for Western powers to impose one of its most powerful financial tools against Russia: sanctions on its massive energy industry.
Speaking after the pause in talks was announced, Russia’s chief negotiator at the talks, Mikhail Ulyanov, told reporters that he didn’t know how long the break in talks would be and that he doesn’t believe there is “any impasse.”
“The only thing which I want to tell you...the conclusion of the deal does not depend on Russia only,” he said.
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4. Ukraine Conflict Update - March 11, 2022 | SOF News
Ukraine Conflict Update - March 11, 2022 | SOF News
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO.
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Russian Campaign Update. The Russians have failed to reach the initial goal of quickly subduing Ukraine. Two weeks into Russia’s attempted conquest has yielded a quagmire that will require many more troops to get out of. The Russians are now bogged down in a war of attrition. The conflict has gone from a war of movement to one of urban conflict – with the Russians using siege tactics with their reliance on artillery and rocket assaults. The Center for European Policy Analysis provides an update on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. “Putin’s Invaders Stall”, CEPA, March 9, 2022.
Fight for the Skies. A constant theme in the world’s press about the Russian air force is how badly it has performed. There are many reasons advanced on why it has not been seen at strength in the Ukraine conflict. Thomas Newdick writes about the increasing questions about the competency and role of the Russian Aerospace Forces. “After an Abysmal Start, Here is How Russia’s Application of Airpower in Ukraine Could Evolve”, The Warzone, March 9, 2022. There has been a decrease in Russian air activity the past few days, most likely due to the Ukrainian air defenses. Kris Osborn writing in the Warrior Maven (Mar 3) asks “Why Can’t Russian Control the Sky?”. Ukrainian air activity has decreased as well.
Maritime Activities. A Russian ship that fired on a small Ukrainian coast guard garrison on Snake Island has been a target of Ukrainian shelling during an exchange of rockets recently on Monday. (New York Post, Mar 8, 2022). There are reports that amphibious ships off the coast of Odessa have returned to ports in nearby Crimea.
Ground Fight. As temperatures warm in the coming weeks the ground will begin to thaw out, in many instances turning into a muddy situation for those Russian vehicles attempting off road movement. The weather will continue to channelize Russian ground movement on roads.
And the Convoy? The Russian convoy (or groups of convoys) followed by the international press has made little progress over the past few weeks and has suffered from air attacks and ambushes. However, some reports indicate that it has dispersed, likely moving into the staging locations for a thrust into Kyiv. Maxar Technologies, a satellite imagery firm, says that parts of the convoy have ‘repositioned’ in forests, while other parts are now parked in roadways in residential areas. The convoy reportedly has reinforcements, supply, fuel, artillery, and food for the forward units of Russia.
Kyiv. The capital city of Ukraine is considered the primary objective of the Russians. The Capture of Kyiv would allow Russia to put in place its puppet government. Currently there are Russian forces to the west, northwest, and east of the city. The long Russian resupply column moving towards Kyiv has reportedly dispersed and the elements of the convoy are moving to frontline staging areas. Many national security observers anticipate a big push by the Russians for Kyiv in the next few days. More than half the city’s 4 million occupants have left the city.
Mariupol. Located on the Sea of Azov, the coastal city of Mariupol is under siege by the Russians. This city of 430,000 is situated along the coastal road network that would provide Russia with a land bridge between Russia and the Crimea. Some reports say the city is completely encircled by the Russians and it is under constant shelling. The humanitarian situation is dire. Humanitarian aid has not been able to reach the city for six days. Pictures posted by the news media and on social platforms show a lot of devastation in the city.
Kharkiv. The second largest city of Ukraine is Kharkiv located in the northeast of the country. The city continues to suffer from heavy Russian shelling; however the Ukrainians are putting up stiff resistance. An experimental nuclear reactor facility in Kharkiv was struck damaging the exterior of buildings and some laboratories.
Other Cities Under Attack. Located on the west bank of the Dnieper River close to the coast of the Black Sea, the city of Mykolayiv is a strategic objective for the Russians that is on the road to Odessa located further west along the coast of the Black Sea.
Graphic Assessments. The Institute for the Study of War provides a daily “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment” and graphic map of areas controlled or under the influence of Russian forces. Read the one for March 10. View a graphic map depicting Ukrainian and Russian troop disposition for March 10th by @JominiW (Twitter).
General Information
Exodus from Ukraine. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that as of Thursday (Mar 10), 2.3 million refugees have departed Ukraine. The western city of Lviv currently has 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). Other western cities are also hosting IDPs in the thousands. The U.S. Embassy in Ukraine issued a security alert entitled Ukraine Land Border Crossing Options (Mar 9, 2022). Many of the Ukrainians crossing the western border of Ukraine are arriving at the crossings on trains from the interior cities of Ukraine. An in-depth article describes the train operation in “On board the mobile command that’s keeping Ukraine’s trains running”, Business Insider, March 4, 2022.
Evacuation Routes. The ‘humanitarian corridors’ from Mariupol and Volnovakha remain completely blocked due to Russian fire. The Russians have proposed several evacuation routes that lead . . . to Russia.
Negotiations. Senior officials from the Russian and Ukrainian governments met in Antalya, Turkey on Thursday (Mar 10). No real progress was made. Russian demands include that Ukraine adopt a neutral status, recognition of Crimea as Russian, the entire Luhansk and Donetsk regions as independent, and the ‘demilitarization’ and ‘denazification’ of Ukraine.
Some Private Sector Help. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that so far, 20,000 volunteers from 52 different countries have signed up to serve in Ukraine in its International units. There are about 3,000 U.S. citizens who are taking that journey. A former Special Forces officer and ‘overseas contractor’, Mykel Hawke, is one of several individuals is interviewed about Americans ‘working’ in Ukraine. “Private military firms see demand in Ukraine war”, BBC News, March 9, 2022.
Cyber and Information Operations
Anti-Propaganda Text Messages. Anonymous groups have gone on the offensive against Russia . . . sending text messages to millions of phones, hijacking camera feeds, and interrupting web services. (HS Today, Mar 9, 2022).
Failure of Russian’s IO Machine. For decades the Russian information operations machine has been eating the lunch of the western nations. However, something has gone amiss. A few critical errors have brought down Russian’s complex and objectively brilliant war of influence in the west. Tom Southern informs us on this topic in “The Spectacular Collapse of Putin’s Disinformation Machinery”, Wired, March 10, 2022.
Cyber Escalation? While the world is worried about an escalation between NATO and Russia resulting in nuclear weapons, it should also consider the effects of an increase in offensive cyber activities. Moscow may very well consider responding to the West’s support to Ukraine with an increase in cyber attacks. Jason Healey explores this topic in “Preventing Cyber Escalation in Ukraine and After”, War on the Rocks, March 9, 2022.
Shortwave Radios. Using lower transmission frequencies, shortwave radio signals can travel thousands of miles. This means news outlet like BBC can broadcast from a safe distance into a conflict zone without needing physical infrastructure. Low frequency signals reach into buildings and basements better, even when the transmitters are from far away. Shortwave radio receivers are power efficient, you can run a short-wave capable radio on car batteries for days. And wind-up or solar-powered shortwave radio receivers are available as well. Read more in “Shortwave radio in Ukraine: why revisiting old-school technology makes sense in a war”, The Conversation, March 9, 2022.
World Response
Starstreaks to Ukraine? Britain has been providing Ukraine with a variety of weapons to include numerous Next Generation Light Anti-tank Weponss (NLAW). Now you can add the Starstreak anti-air missile to that list of weapons. The Starstreak is a high-velocity missile designed to provide air defense against helicopters, low-flying fixed wing, and UAVs out to a range of 4 miles. There are vehicle mounted and lightweight shoulder fired configurations of the weapon. The weapons are coming from the UK’s weapons stockpiles. “Britain mulls giving ‘Starstreak’ air defense weapons to Ukraine”, Defense News, March 9, 2022.
Air Defense Weapons for Ukraine? With the debacle over the Polish MiG-29s fading in the news there are now reports that the Pentagon may come up with an alternative plan that would assist the Ukrainians in contesting ownership of the skies. The Stinger, Starstreak, and other short-range anti-aircraft missiles are taking a toll on Russian aircraft. However, larger, more sophisticated air defense systems are needed that will get above the 10,000 foot level. “U.S., Allies Look at Sending Soviet-Designed Air-Defense Systems to Ukraine”, The Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2022. (subscription). The Pentagon has said that Patriot missile systems would not be sent to Ukraine.
U.S. Aid Grows. The White House asked for $6.4 billion on February 25th to assist Ukraine and East European nations. This past week the aid package seems to have grown to over $13 billion. The bill includes about $6.5 billion for DoD, nearly $4 billion for DoS, and almost $3 billion for USAID. “Biden’s Ukraine aid package is getting super-sized by Congress”, Defense News, March 9, 2022.
Sweden Spending More on Defense. If Putin thought that invading Ukraine would in some way weaken NATO then he miscalculated. NATO is stronger than ever and ‘neutral’ countries like Finland and Sweden are being pushed ever closer to NATO. In addition, they are upping how much they spend on defense. “Sweden to Raise Military Spending Over Ukraine War”, The Defense Post, March 10, 2022.
Commentary
Taking Out Putin. Many commentators have expressed the hope that Putin would be removed from office through a military coup, internal political forces, or other means. Sometimes mentioned are assassination attempts against Putin. A week ago Senator Lindsey Graham stated that the only way to end the conflict is to have Putin removed. There was a lot of moral outrage over his comments, but not a lot of discussion as to what actual effect Putin’s removal would have. Book author Brad Taylor examines this topic in “A Simple Primer on Counter-Leadership Targeting”, March 6, 2022.
Event Calendar
Thursday, March 10. The War to Destroy a State: Russia’s Invasion and Ukraine’s Response. Sergiy Kudelia, Associate Professor of Political Science, Baylor University, discusses the Russia Ukraine crises. This online event will be hosted by the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (ASIS) and is open to the public.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, defense, or the current conflict in Ukraine then we are interested.
Maps and Other Resources
Maps of Ukraine
Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.
Janes Equipment Profile – Ukraine Conflict. An 81-page PDF provides information on the military equipment of the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces. Covers naval, air, electronic warfare, C4ISR, communications, night vision, radar, and armored fighting vehicles, Ukraine Conflict Equipment Profile, February 28, 2022.
Arms Transfers to Ukraine. Forum on the Arms Trade.
UNHCR Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation
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Photo: A U.S. Air Force Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker provides fuel to an F15E Strike Eagle over Eastern Europe, Feb. 26, 2022. The 100th Aerial Refueling Wing assigned to Royal Air Force Mildenhall is currently operating missions out of Ramstein Air Base, Germany, providing 24-hour support to NATO allies and partners. (U.S. Air Force Airman 1st Class Edgar Grimaldo)
5 Why the US Won’t Give Patriot Interceptors to Ukraine
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Patriots take a lot more training than Stingers. They are much more complex. Also what is the likelihood of them being attacked in static locations or captured in what will eventually be a 360 degree battlespace? This is a capability we would have to have begun to develop years ago to be ready for this conflict. Patriot does not lend itself the old "lend lease" concept. It will take a long time to develop operational Patriot units manned by Ukrainians if we are even willing to turn over that technology. In addition, sustaining these systems is a challenge and I think we still require US contractors from Raytheon for some aspects of maintenance. How would we do that in Ukraine?
Why the US Won’t Give Patriot Interceptors to Ukraine
The Pentagon is still hunting “alternative options” to bolster Ukraine’s air defenses against Russia’s brutal strikes.
Pentagon officials will not send the advanced Patriot air-defense system to Ukraine, saying Thursday that U.S. forces would need to enter Ukraine to operate it, which is a non-starter for the Biden administration.
The decision comes one day after U.S. officials rejected a proposal from Poland to have the United States and NATO transfer Polish MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine.
“There's no discussion about putting a Patriot battery in Ukraine. In order to do that you have to put U.S. troops with it to operate it,” a senior defense official said Thursday. “It is not a system that the Ukrainians are familiar with and as we have made very clear, there will be no U.S. troops fighting in Ukraine.”
A Patriot missile battery usually has about 90 U.S. soldiers attached to it. Each system includes a phased array radar, a control station, and eight launchers, each of which can hold four missiles. Patriot “is the only operational air defense system that can shoot down attacking missiles,” according to the Army.
It would likely take months to train the Ukrainian military how to operate the system, according to people familiar with the technology.
“It takes a long time to be a Patriot operator,” said Thomas Karako, a missile defense expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, a think tank in Washington.
Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy has urged the West to send additional surface-to-air defenses. Russia has escalated a brutal assault on Ukrainian civilians and military targets that is relying heavily on long-range missiles and rockets, partly because of the local resistance and logistical failures their ground forces encountered.
As of Thursday, Russia had launched approximately 775 missiles into Ukraine, increasingly targeting civilians and devastating residential areas, according to U.S. officials.
“The Kremlin bombs schools, hospitals and maternity wards. Moscow does not protect anyone. She's the destroyer,” the Navy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine wrote on its official Facebook page. “They are not capable of fighting with our army, guard, territorial defense forces This is why the most vulnerable are attacked.”
“The Russian air defense units … operated by the Ukrainians, they're pretty capable systems,” Gen. Mark Kelly, the head of the U.S. Air Force’s Air Combat Command, said Wednesday at the McAleese and Associates Defense Programs conference in Washington.
Sending additional Soviet-era S-300 interceptors owned by NATO allies to Ukraine is one of the options under consideration, the Wall Street Journal reported Thursday. Bulgaria and Slovakia possess S-300s, according to Military Periscope, a weapons database owned by Defense One parent GovExec.
“Lethality is the top priority for the Ukrainians right now,” said Josh Kirshner, a former State Department official now with Beacon Global Strategies. “But at the same time they need systems that they can learn to use quickly and are ready to ship. Clearly, they don’t have the personnel to spare for long training efforts or time to waste.”
Israel reportedly blocked the United States from giving Iron Dome missile interceptor systems to Ukraine out of fear upsetting Moscow. Iron Dome has been widely effective in shooting down thousands of rockets fired from Gaza, but Israel historically has balked at sharing the technology with other countries, including South Korea.
In the meantime, the Ukrainian military has successfully attacked Russian forces using Turkish TB2 drones.
“At this point, they need everything they can get,” Karako said.
Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said Wednesday that the U.S. was exploring other ways to better enable Ukraine to defend against the air assault, after rejecting a proposal by Poland to take its Soviet-era MiG-29s and get them into Ukrainian hands.
“Alternative options are working with other allies and partner nations around the world who may have additional air defense capabilities and systems at their disposal who might be willing to provide them to Ukraine,” Kirby said. “And so we're having discussions with many countries right now about some of those capabilities, surface-to-air missiles for instance, that the Ukrainians are more trained and more equipped [on].”
Russia warned earlier this week that any country that took part in transferring jets to Ukraine would be seen as party to the conflict, and Kirby said Wednesday that the U.S. intelligence community had assessed that a jet transfer would be “high risk” for escalating into a direct war between NATO and Russia, while not making an appreciable difference in the air war.
Some Republicans on the Senate Intelligence Committee on Thursday demanded to know the intelligence behind the Biden administration’s claims that providing Ukraine with more advanced weapons would cause Russia to escalate the war.
On Thursday, the Pentagon said that Ukrainian pilots “are not flying their fixed wing aircraft very much on a daily basis” because Russia has almost the entire country covered by its own surface-to-air missile defense systems.
6. Testimony on the posture of United States Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea
OPEN/CLOSED: To receive testimony on the posture of United States Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea
Date: Thursday, March 10, 2022
Time: 09:30 AM
Location: Dirksen SD-G50
7. Russian forces regroup near Kyiv after setbacks
Are they awaiting the arrival of the Syrian "urban experts?" Will the next offensive be even more scorched earth? Will they employ chemical weapons? What do we do if they do?
Russian forces regroup near Kyiv after setbacks
- Summary
- Companies
- Biden to call for an end of normal trade with Russia - source
- Satellite images show Russians redeploy north of Kyiv
- Britain says Russia could launch assault on Kyiv within days
- Putin cites "positive shifts" in talks
LVIV, Ukraine, March 11 (Reuters) - Russian forces bearing down on Kyiv are regrouping northwest of the Ukrainian capital, satellite pictures showed, in what Britain said could be preparation for an assault on the city within days.
Ukraine accused Russian forces of hitting a psychiatric hospital near its eastern town of Izyum on Friday, in what the regional governor called "a brutal attack on civilians". Emergency services said no one was hurt as the patients were already sheltering in the basement. read more
Reuters could not immediately verify the report and there was no immediate comment from Moscow.
Russia has been pounding Ukraine's cities while its main attack force north of Kyiv has been stalled on roads since the invasion's early days, having failed in what Western countries say was an initial plan for a lightning assault on the capital.
Images released by private U.S. satellite firm Maxar showed armoured units manoeuvring in and through towns close to an airport on Kyiv's northwest outskirts, site of intense fighting since Russia landed paratroops there in the first hours of the war.
Other elements had repositioned near the small settlement of Lubyanka just to the north, with towed artillery howitzers in firing positions, Maxar said.
"Russia is likely seeking to reset and re-posture its forces for renewed offensive activity in the coming days," Britain's Ministry of Defence said in an intelligence update. "This will probably include operations against the capital Kyiv."
The British update said Russian ground forces were still making only limited progress, hampered by persistent logistical issues and Ukrainian resistance.
Ukraine said Russian forces were regrouping after taking heavy losses. In its overnight statement on the battlefield situation, the Ukrainian general staff also said its forces had pushed Russians back to "unfavourable positions" in the Polyskiy district, an area near the Belarus border to the rear of the main Russian column heading towards Kyiv.
Oleh Synegubov, governor of the Kharkiv region, said 330 people had been at the psychiatric hospital when it was hit: "This is a war crime against civilians, genocide against the Ukrainian nation," he wrote on the Telegram messaging app.
The reported strike came less than two days after Russia bombed a maternity hospital in the besieged southern port of Mariupol, an attack Washington has called a war crime. Ukraine said pregnant women were among those hurt there; Russia said the hospital was no longer functioning and was occupied by Ukrainian fighters when it was hit.
For a seventh straight day, Russia announced plans to cease fire to let civilians leave Mariupol, site of Ukraine's worst humanitarian emergency, with hundreds of thousands of people trapped with no food, water, heat or power. All previous attempts to reach the city have failed with both sides accusing each other of failing to observe ceasefires.
Ukraine said it would try yet again to help people leave: "We hope it will work today," Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk said. read more
Moscow denies it has been targeting civilians in what it calls a "special operation" to disarm and "de-Nazify" Ukraine.
PUTIN SEES 'POSITIVE SHIFTS'
President Vladimir Putin has tried to project an air of calm in regular engagements since ordering the invasion on Feb. 24. In the latest, a meeting with Belarus leader Alexander Lukashenko, Putin said there were "certain positive shifts" in talks with Ukrainians. He gave no further details.
Earlier, at a meeting of his security council, Putin approved a proposal to recruit 16,000 fighters from the Middle East. read more
"If you see that there are these people who want of their own accord - not for money - to come to help the people living in Donbass, then we need to give them what they want and help them get to the conflict zone," Putin said.
The Kremlin threatened to shut down Facebook owner Meta Platforms (FB.O) in Russia on Friday, following a Reuters report that the company had issued guidelines temporarily easing a ban on calls for political violence to allow some Facebook or Instagram posts that encourage killing invading Russian troops.
According to internal emails sent to content moderators, the guidelines would even allow posts that call for the death of Putin or Lukashenko. read more
"We don't want to believe the Reuters report - it is just too difficult to believe," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters. "We hope it is not true because if it is true then it will mean that there will have to be the most decisive measures to end the activities of this company."
European Union leaders were holding a summit at France's Versailles Palace, expected to be dominated by calls for more action to punish Russia, assist Ukraine and cope with an influx of nearly 2.5 million refugees in just two weeks.
In the two weeks since the invasion, Western countries have swiftly moved to isolate Russia from world trade and the global financial system to an extent never before visited on such a large economy.
In the latest move, sources said U.S. President Joe Biden will ask the Group of Seven industrialised countries and the EU to strip Russia of normal trade rights, known as "most favoured nation status". That would allow hitting Russian goods with new tariffs. read more
While Russia's advance on Kyiv has been stalled and it has failed so far to capture any cities in northern or eastern Ukraine, it has made more substantial progress in the south. Moscow said on Friday its separatist allies in the southeast had captured the town of Volnovakha north of Mariupol.
On Friday, three air strikes in the central city of Dnipro killed at least one person, state emergency services said, adding that the strikes were near a kindergarten.
Ihor Polishshuk, the mayor of the city of Lutsk, said four pepole were killed and six wounded in an attack on an airfield there, a rare strike on a target deep in western Ukraine and far from the battlefields in the north, east and south.
Within Russia, the authorities have banned any reports that refer to the "special operation" as a war or invasion. Most of the remaining independent media outlets were shut last week. Thousands of people have been arrested for holding mostly small anti-war demonstrations. The main opposition figure, Alexei Navalny, issued a call from jail for mass protests on Sunday.
Reporting by Reuters bureaus Writing by Peter Graff Editing by Tomasz Janowski
8. Putin says Russia to use Middle East volunteer fighters
Volunteers? What does this say about the state of the Russian military? Is this believed to be a way to reduce the domestic political blowback in Russia? Let the Syrian and other Middle Eastern fighters die for mother Russia? Is this the quid pro quo for the countries that Russia has supported? Is it payback time?
Putin says Russia to use Middle East volunteer fighters
LONDON, March 11 (Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin gave the green light on Friday for up to 16,000 volunteers from the Middle East to be deployed alongside Russian-backed rebels to fight in Ukraine, doubling down an invasion that the West says has been losing momentum.
The move, just over two weeks since Putin ordered the invasion, allows Russia to deploy battle-hardened mercenaries from conflicts such as Syria without risking additional Russian military casualties. read more
At a meeting of Russia's Security Council, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said there were 16,000 volunteers in the Middle East who were ready to come to fight alongside Russian-backed forces in the breakaway Donbass region of eastern Ukraine.
"If you see that there are these people who want of their own accord, not for money, to come to help the people living in Donbass, then we need to give them what they want and help them get to the conflict zone," Putin said from the Kremlin.
Shoigu also proposed that Western-made Javelin and Stinger missiles that were captured by the Russian army in Ukraine should be handed over to Donbass forces, along other weaponry such as man-portable air-defense systems, known as MANPADS, and anti-tank rocket complexes.
"As to the delivery of arms, especially Western-made ones which have fallen into the hands of the Russian army - of course I support the possibility of giving these to the military units of the Lugansk and Donetsk people's republics," Putin said.
"Please do this," he told Shoigu. The exchange was shown on Russian state television.
Putin says the "special military operation" in Ukraine is essential to ensure Russia's security after the United States expanded NATO up to its borders and supported pro-Western leaders in Kyiv.
Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a meeting with government members via a video link in Moscow, Russia March 10, 2022. Sputnik/Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin via REUTERS
Ukraine says it is fighting for its existence while the United States, and its European and Asian allies have condemned the Russian invasion. China has called for calm.
Shoigu said the operation was all going to plan before requesting Putin's approal for the use of fighters from the Middle East.
U.S. intelligence chiefs told lawmakers on Thursday that Russia had been surprised by the strength of Ukrainian resistance, which had deprived the Kremlin of a quick victory it thought would have prevented the United States and NATO from providing meaningful military aid. read more
That was causing concern in Beijing, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns said.
"I do believe that the Chinese leadership, President Xi (Jinping) in particular, is unsettled," Burns said. "By what he's seen, partly because his own intelligence doesn't appear to have told him what was going to happen."
Shoigu said Western arms were flowing into Ukraine in an "absolutely uncontrolled" way and that the Russian military planned to strengthen its Western border after what he said was a build up of Western military units on Russia's border.
"The general staff is working on, and has almost finished, a plan to strengthen our Western borders, including, naturally, with new modern complexes," Shoigu said.
Putin said the question of how to react to moves by NATO countries need a separate discussion.
Reporting by Guy Faulconbridge; Editing by Tomasz Janowski
9. FDD | How Iran is Making Inroads in South America
Conclusion:
Regardless of whether Cantillo is elected, the Biden administration should begin paying more attention to Iranian influence operations in Latin America, including especially the ones run by Al Mustafa, and understand that Iran is now capable of fielding native politicians with a chance of getting elected. Washington has the power (though not always the will) to prevent Iranian officials from coming to the U.S. Barring an elected official from an allied country is a different story.
FDD | How Iran is Making Inroads in South America
Al Mustafa International University in Qom caters to converts in their native language. Some of them come home to run for office.
fdd.org · by Emanuele Ottolenghi Senior Fellow · March 10, 2022
Colombians will vote to elect a new parliament on Sunday, two months before they will choose a new president. That might not be a big story for most Americans, but it’s worth paying attention to because of what it says about Iran’s intentions in South America. This year, the mullahs have their own man on the legislative ballot.
Meet Marlon Cantillo Borrero, No. 82 on the Senate list for the Fuerza Ciudadana (or Citizen’s Force). Fuerza Ciudadana is a left-wing political party closely aligned with former Marxist guerrilla and left-wing presidential candidate Gustavo Petro. The nature of the Colombian Senate’s electoral system—a combination of pure proportionality and the right to choose individual candidates—means that if Cantillo musters enough personal support, he could become senator. Getting a senator elected in Colombia, possibly the U.S. closest ally in the region, would be a game changer.
Cantillo is a graduate of Iran’s Al Mustafa International University, a religious seminar based in Iran’s city of Qom that opened its doors in 2007 with the specific mission of proselytizing the non-Shiite, non-Muslim world and catering to converts in their native language. If Cantillo were elected, the Tehran regime would have a loyal advocate in Colombia’s next parliament.
Al Mustafa is one of Iran’s main vectors to export its revolutionary brand of Shiite Islam. Its key role in regime efforts to indoctrinate and radicalize its pupils, alongside its active training of Shi’a militias Iran deployed in Syria, earned it U.S. sanctions in December 2020.
Thanks to robust state funding ($80 million per year) since Al Mustafa launched its operations, it has trained tens of thousands of students, including numerous Latin Americans. Many students go beyond basic indoctrination and become ordained Shiite clerics. Iran’s goal: train a cadre of native speaker propagandists with a deep understanding of the culture in which they operate.
Upon returning home, Al Mustafa’s graduates support Iran’s main political goal in Latin America: to turn the Western Hemisphere into a hotbed of anti-Americanism and a forward operating base for Iran.
Exporting the Islamic revolution has been a key goal of the Iranian regime ever since it toppled the shah in 1979. Latin America became an early target because Iran’s clerical leadership viewed the region as a fertile ground for the spread of anti-American ideology. During the past four decades, Iran has patiently pursued the goal of spreading its message across the Western Hemisphere and leveraged the resulting support in pursuit of its political goals, with Al Mustafa leading the way.
To expand its influence, Iran has developed a missionary network built on mosques, cultural centers, educational institutions, media outlets, and publishing houses, which it has sustained with both itinerant and resident clerics either from Iran or trained in Iran. This network has run in parallel with official diplomatic relations managed through embassies and other bilateral contacts. It has thrived both in countries whose governments, like the Maduro regime in Venezuela, are allies of Iran, and in places like Colombia where the government is closely aligned with the United States.
It would not be the first time Iran has tried to get a protégé elected—a sign that this is a strategy, not happenstance. In 2009, the Al Mustafa network recruited and converted a Peruvian national, Edwar Quiroga Vargas, who at the time was a radical left-wing, Castro-Chavista activist in southern Peru. Quiroga traveled to Iran, converted, returned to his native Apurimac region, and in 2010 sought to run for office as regional president. He failed. Nevertheless, Quiroga, a virulent antisemite, remains active in Peru’s politics and has established an Islamic Center in his native Abancay, radicalizing numerous local youth in the process.
Cantillo is no more moderate in his views—his most admired leader, as his electoral profile states, is Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Yet he appears more disciplined than Quiroga—Cantillo has mostly expunged his social media of blatant references to his Iranian sympathies and his campaign has focused on domestic social issues. He can also count on a more sophisticated Iranian support infrastructure, which the Iranians patiently laid out in Colombia over decades, than his mercurial Peruvian counterpart. As a result, Colombians have barely noticed that Iran is trying to insert one of its proselytized, radical converts into their Senate.
Regardless of whether Cantillo is elected, the Biden administration should begin paying more attention to Iranian influence operations in Latin America, including especially the ones run by Al Mustafa, and understand that Iran is now capable of fielding native politicians with a chance of getting elected. Washington has the power (though not always the will) to prevent Iranian officials from coming to the U.S. Barring an elected official from an allied country is a different story.
Emanuele Ottolenghi is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington, D.C., non-partisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy. Follow him on Twitter @eottolenghi. FDD is a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Emanuele Ottolenghi Senior Fellow · March 10, 2022
10. Biden Congratulates President-Elect Yoon
Can we make the Quad a "Quint" in May?
Excerpt:
A meeting could take place as early as May in Seoul if Biden stops en route on a visit to Tokyo for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or "Quad" summit.
Biden Congratulates President-Elect Yoon
March 11, 2022 08:31
U.S. President Joe Biden on Thursday phoned president-elect Yoon Seok-youl to congratulate him on his election win.
The two "affirmed the strength of the U.S.-[South Korea] alliance, which is the linchpin for peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific," according to the White House.
Biden said he hoped to deepen cooperation in tackling global challenges, such as climate change and the pandemic and added that South Korea has played a core role in supporting Ukraine.
Yoon and Biden also pledged to work closely together in response to the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. According to a statement released by Yoon's People Power Party, Biden asked him to visit the White House after taking the office, and Yoon expressed hope to meet Biden at an early date.
President-elect Yoon Seok-youl speaks to U.S. President Joe Biden at his home in Seoul on Thursday. /Newsis
The call was originally scheduled for Friday, but they instead connected at 10:00 a.m. here on Thursday at Washington's request, just five hours after the National Assembly accepted the election result.
A meeting could take place as early as May in Seoul if Biden stops en route on a visit to Tokyo for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or "Quad" summit.
Meanwhile, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida also expressed hopes of working closely with Yoon to rebuild healthier ties between the two neighbors. According to Kyodo News on Thursday, Kishida said it is "fundamental" that promises between nations are kept to improve icy bilateral relations.
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
11. The No-Fly Zone Delusion
The war in Ukraine must be called Putin's War. I think this will be critical in the future when we reconcile with Russia after Putin is no longer in power. This war must be personalized as Putin's war much as WWII was Hitler's War so there can be reconiliation in the future.
Excerpts:
The war in Ukraine is the agonizing outcome of Putin’s outrageous response to two errors on NATO’s part. The first of these was the alliance’s declaration, in 2008, that Ukraine and Georgia would one day join it. (In Ukraine’s case, a scheme for the country’s Finlandization would have been better, exchanging its neutrality in relations between Moscow and the West for the country’s independence and internal democracy.) Once the goal of NATO membership was declared, however, the second mistake was not accomplishing it right away and thus immediately establishing NATO’s deterrent guarantee. Given Putin’s view of NATO enlargement as a threat to Russia, this period of ambiguity created an incentive—and an opportunity—for him to carry out a preventive war.
The resulting tragedy is heartbreaking. But trying to cope with it by belatedly entering the war directly—desperately endorsing a no-fly zone with no assurance it would not lead to a bigger disaster—would only compound the tragedy. NATO should help Ukraine, but its assistance must remain below the established threshold for escalation. That would include more or less what the alliance has already been doing: where possible, providing relief for civilian refugees and weapons, ammunition, food, and logistical support to Ukraine’s military.
The urge to help Ukraine is laudable. But the only things worse than watching the country’s slow-motion defeat would be to promise direct military intervention and then fail to follow through or, worse, to up the ante and turn what is now clearly a new cold war into a hot war—one that could produce destruction and casualties in the wider world on a scale that would make even the devastation of the current war in Ukraine seem insignificant.
The No-Fly Zone Delusion
In Ukraine, Good Intentions Can’t Redeem a Bad Idea
March 10, 2022
Faced with a brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine, many Americans and Europeans are pushing for their governments to provide as much military support as possible to Kyiv. One idea that a number of prominent observers and commentators have seized on is the establishment of a no-fly zone—that is, using force (or the threat of force) to keep Russian aircraft out of some segment of the airspace above Ukraine, in order to prevent Russian air strikes on Ukrainian military forces and civilians in the area. Creating such a zone would involve a combination of day-to-day intelligence collection, observations from the ground, rotating aerial patrols with large numbers of planes and pilots—and, crucially, the threat to physically prevent adversary aircraft from entering the designated airspace.
Proposals for a no-fly zone are inspired by the concept's application by U.S. and NATO forces in Iraq after the Persian Gulf War, in Bosnia in the mid-1990s, and in Libya during its civil war in 2011. Notably, those cases did not involve imposing an exclusion zone on a major power; instead, they featured a mighty great power, the United States, dictating demands to weak local adversaries that were in no position to contest them. There are no examples of something called a “no-fly zone” being imposed on a major power outside the context of battles for air superiority in regular warfare.
The idea of establishing a no-fly zone reflects a humane urge to relieve Ukrainian suffering and to "do something" in the face of Russian aggression. But doing so would risk stumbling into a far worse tragedy. This applies even to a limited no-fly zone of the kind floated earlier this week by more than two dozen experts and former officials—an idea that may sound reasonable but is in fact profoundly reckless.
RISKY BUSINESS
The idea of a limited no-fly zone aims primarily to protect corridors through which civilians can escape, safe from Russian air strikes. But in the first couple of weeks of war, at least, Russian air operations have not been the main problem. Artillery and missiles fired from the ground have done far more damage than Russian bombers, and a no-fly zone would have little effect on such attacks.
And even if one accepts the premise that restricting Russia’s access to Ukrainian airspace would make a significant difference, proposals for a no-fly zone for Ukraine still suffer from one of two crucial mistakes: either they assume a best-case result in which the Russians simply cooperate with the demand, or they accept a significant risk of provoking a war directly between NATO and Russia.
It is possible that Russia would be prudent and simply accept a demand to stand down from operations in and around corridors set aside for the evacuation of civilians. But that is hardly probable: after all, Moscow has already gambled on a war that it claims was motivated in the first place by a threat from NATO, the war’s earliest phase has produced embarrassing results for the Russian military, and Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to do anything that might look like a retreat in the face of a NATO ultimatum.
Establishing a no-fly zone risks stumbling into a far worse tragedy.
If the Russians did not accede to a no-fly zone, NATO would have to decide whether to enforce it, which would mean being ready to shoot down Russian planes—and firing the first shots, at that. Make no mistake: whether or not air combat to enforce the zone would remain limited to Ukrainian airspace, it would amount to initiating war between NATO and Russia. And even limited conflict would be epochal: it would be the first direct war between major powers since 1945.
Of course, the United States and its allies are already involved in combat against Russian forces, but only indirectly, by providing weapons and supplies to Ukraine. Such involvement, however, remains below a threshold for escalation that has been tacitly established by past experience. For example, the Soviets supplied the North Koreans and the Chinese in their war against Americans in Korea in the 1950s, and again supplied the Vietnamese communists against Americans in the 1960s. For its part, the United States supplied the mujahideen fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. In these cases, the Russians and the Americans were angered by the toll such assistance took but refrained from retaliating with force against the suppliers, lest the small wars metastasize into huge ones. It is true that U.S. and Soviet pilots engaged each other directly in some aerial combat during the Korean War. But both sides kept this strictly secret until many years later, precisely to restrain political pressures to expand the war. In today’s world of technologically promiscuous communication and abundant open-source intelligence, there is no way aerial combat over Ukraine would remain secret.
Additionally, the outbreak of a great-power war is not the only risk posed by declaring a no-fly zone. Consider what might happen if the Russians refused to accept the no-fly zone and, in the face of Moscow’s intransigence, NATO backed down and decided to not enforce it, after all—precisely to avoid a wider war. The declaration of a no-fly zone would be exposed as a pathetic bluff—little more than a no-fly request. Although the importance of credibility is often exaggerated and too often used as an excuse for mistaken military commitments, in this case the damage to NATO’s credibility would be tremendous. Such a move would not just reveal the emptiness of posturing to help Ukraine but would also highlight and intensify doubts about whether the alliance would make good on its foundational promise of collective defense, especially when it comes to weaker, newer members, such as the highly vulnerable Baltic states.
A BIG MISTAKE
The war in Ukraine is the agonizing outcome of Putin’s outrageous response to two errors on NATO’s part. The first of these was the alliance’s declaration, in 2008, that Ukraine and Georgia would one day join it. (In Ukraine’s case, a scheme for the country’s Finlandization would have been better, exchanging its neutrality in relations between Moscow and the West for the country’s independence and internal democracy.) Once the goal of NATO membership was declared, however, the second mistake was not accomplishing it right away and thus immediately establishing NATO’s deterrent guarantee. Given Putin’s view of NATO enlargement as a threat to Russia, this period of ambiguity created an incentive—and an opportunity—for him to carry out a preventive war.
The resulting tragedy is heartbreaking. But trying to cope with it by belatedly entering the war directly—desperately endorsing a no-fly zone with no assurance it would not lead to a bigger disaster—would only compound the tragedy. NATO should help Ukraine, but its assistance must remain below the established threshold for escalation. That would include more or less what the alliance has already been doing: where possible, providing relief for civilian refugees and weapons, ammunition, food, and logistical support to Ukraine’s military.
The urge to help Ukraine is laudable. But the only things worse than watching the country’s slow-motion defeat would be to promise direct military intervention and then fail to follow through or, worse, to up the ante and turn what is now clearly a new cold war into a hot war—one that could produce destruction and casualties in the wider world on a scale that would make even the devastation of the current war in Ukraine seem insignificant.
12. Arming Ukraine Is Worth the Risk
Conclusion:
Such aid alone is unlikely to be decisive in swaying the war in Ukraine’s favor, and it will incur an inherent risk of escalation. But it represents a way to give Ukraine a fighting chance while limiting the risk of a direct confrontation between the United States and Russia.
Arming Ukraine Is Worth the Risk
The West Can Raise the Cost of Russian Aggression
March 11, 2022
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has spurred a tidal wave of arms transfers from the West to the besieged country. The United States alone has committed $1 billion worth of arms to Ukraine this year. More than 20 other countries have promised, sent, or assisted in moving arms and equipment to Ukraine. Some of these commitments have entailed head-spinning reversals of longtime policies: just days after Putin’s initial attack on Ukraine, for instance, Germany flipped from prohibiting the transfer of German-made weapons to the country to delivering 1,000 anti-tank weapons and 500 antiaircraft missiles of its own to help Ukraine defend itself.
The West’s transfer of military resources and aid to Ukraine, a non-NATO country, raises important questions regarding the risk of an escalation with Moscow. These weapons, sent by the United States and its allies, are intended to kill Russians. How can Western countries continue to provide Ukraine with arms and materiel without provoking retaliation from Putin? How severe could that retaliation be? And will the West’s material support really make much of a difference in Ukraine’s bid to fend off the Russian invasion? Other debates regarding the provision of military resources to Ukraine—for instance, Washington’s rejection of a Polish offer to send fighter jets to Ukraine via a U.S. base in Germany—indicate enduring fears within the NATO alliance that too forward an intervention in the conflict will lead to direct confrontation with Russia. Are these fears justified?
The West’s strategy of transferring resources to Ukraine is nothing new: arms from third parties are extremely common in modern warfare. An escalation of the conflict is always possible, but arms transfers do not usually enmesh the suppliers in war. In part this is because arms transfers alone are rarely decisive in war. Nor can they ensure a decisive victory for Ukraine against Russia now. They can certainly help, and without them the Ukrainian military is unlikely to be able to supply itself for a long war. But Russia’s superior capabilities should enable Putin to steamroll Ukrainian forces, if Moscow can overcome the logistical, command, and tactical problems that have bedeviled its invasion so far. If Russia can figure out how to bring its advantages properly to bear, it could eventually occupy enough territory to force the Ukrainians into insurgency. A better outcome for Ukraine will require either the continued ineptitude of the Russian army or a Western intervention that assumes a level of risk that NATO is unwilling to tolerate. What arms transfers can do is to bridge these two options, representing a way for the United States and its allies to contribute to Ukraine’s defense, raise the cost of Russian aggression without engaging Russia directly, and give Ukraine a chance of fending off Russian forces without exceeding NATO’s risk tolerance.
Putin’s invasion raises the security stakes for everyone—Ukrainians, Westerners, and Russians alike. There is no longer a zero-risk policy available, if there ever was. For now, arms transfers may be the least dangerous of a dangerous list of options.
BELOW THE THRESHOLD FOR RETALIATION
For Americans, the most familiar example of arming an ally is the United States’ support of the United Kingdom in the early years of World War II. Through lend-lease programs that allowed Washington to provide its allies with war materials while avoiding direct involvement in the conflict, the United States transferred over $12 billion worth of armaments to an active belligerent with whom it had no treaty alliance. This practice is nearly ubiquitous in modern warfare: there have been over 900 individual acts of security assistance involving weapons transfers, training, or other military aid from third parties to combatants in wars since 1945.
The establishment of external sanctuaries—in which guerillas set up base camps and logistics hubs in neighboring countries—is also common, occurring in perhaps two-thirds of all civil wars since 1945. This tactic can trigger retaliation against the sanctuary countries that harbor cross-border attackers: Israel, for instance, invaded Lebanon in 1982 to put an end to attacks launched by the Palestine Liberation Organization against Israel from Lebanese soil. Rwanda invaded the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1996 to stop Hutu attacks launched from there. The United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to destroy al Qaeda sanctuaries.
How can Western countries arm Ukraine without provoking retaliation from Putin?
Most retaliation, when it does happen, is against such guerilla or terrorist havens rather than mere weapons suppliers. Germany did not attack the United States to halt the lend-lease programs that were supplying its enemies in the early years of World War II. The United States did not attack Iran over its weapon transfers to the Shiite militias that fought U.S. troops in Iraq between 2003 and 2008. The Soviet Union did not attack Pakistan to halt the flow of U.S. weapons to the anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
This distinction between the types of aid provided and the degree of retaliation they incur is not surprising. The whole point of arming others rather than waging war directly is to limit the risk of intervention by keeping the provocation below the threshold for retaliation. Supplying weapons hurts the target, but usually not enough to defeat the target outright. The weapons supplier is often a strong power that might defeat the target outright if dragged into the war directly. The target therefore faces a choice: retaliate against the supplying power and risk a wider war that it may well lose, or muddle through against a strengthened enemy and hope to win in the end. Most targets choose to muddle through rather than retaliate.
This historical pattern does not mean that arming others is without risk. Escalation is not always intentional. Miscalculation is common—if not universal—in war, and even a single mistake can trigger an escalatory spiral. And unfortunately for the United States and its allies, thresholds for retaliation are in the eye of the beholder, not the weapons supplier. Putin, not U.S. President Joe Biden or German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, will decide whether the billions of dollars of arms given to Ukraine warrant an attack on the suppliers. As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine itself shows, external perceptions of Putin and his goals can be clouded by a host of cultural differences and perceptual biases. Arming the Ukrainian military is lower risk than attacking Russians directly—but it is not risk free.
WORTH THE RISK
Is the risk of an escalation with Russia, a nuclear power, worth coming to the defense of Ukraine? What can arming Ukraine accomplish, beyond meeting calls to counter a massive affront to decency?
The transfer of weapons to Ukraine can, in fact, accomplish three important goals. First, it gives Ukraine a chance to exploit Russian errors and further stall Moscow’s offensive, if Russia’s military performance continues to be as poor as it has been so far. Russia’s military proficiency in Ukraine to date has been shockingly poor. Modern warfare is extremely complex, and thus far Russia has shown no evidence that it can cope with this complexity to exploit its tremendous material and manpower advantages. But even if Russia continues to stumble, Ukraine will need help to force Russia into a stalemate. Modern warfare consumes resources at a ferocious rate. The U.S. Army VII Corps in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, for instance, expended 9,000 tons of ammunition and 2.4 million gallons of fuel every day—and Ukraine’s army is bigger than that corps. If Ukraine continues to expend munitions and fuel at the current rate, it will soon exhaust its prewar stockpile, and it will be in constant need of further supplies.
Putin’s invasion raises the security stakes for everyone.
Second, if Russia adapts and improves its performance, it will likely topple the existing regime in Kyiv no matter how much support Ukraine receives—but weapons transfers can make the Russian invasion more expensive, perhaps intolerably so. A cheap Russian success in Ukraine could look to Putin like his fourth successful military adventure in a row, after his invasion of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and Russian intervention in Syria in 2015. If so, deterring Putin from targeting other neighboring countries such as Poland or the Baltic states could prove much harder. The more lethal the Ukrainian defense, the more likely the West can deter Putin from further military aggression.
Third, if Kyiv does fall and the Ukrainian military is driven from the field, arms transfers will still prove useful: they can facilitate an insurgency to contest Russian dominance of the country and give Ukrainians a chance to oust the occupying power and restore self-government. Most of the arms now being sent are exactly the kinds of weapons needed for such an insurgency: ammunition and handheld or shoulder-fired anti-tank and antiaircraft systems. If the Russian army overruns all of Ukraine, it will surely try to seal Ukrainian borders to prevent further arms shipments from reaching anti-Russian insurgents. It is notoriously difficult to seal long borders, and parts of Ukraine’s border runs through the Carpathian Mountains and dense forests near Poland that could prove impossible for Russia to secure completely. Nonetheless, the more munitions the United States and others can send to Ukraine now, the less effective Russian border security will be at starving a future insurgency of arms. Arms transfers now are an investment in an anti-Russian resistance later, even if Russia does crush Ukraine’s regular army.
Such aid alone is unlikely to be decisive in swaying the war in Ukraine’s favor, and it will incur an inherent risk of escalation. But it represents a way to give Ukraine a fighting chance while limiting the risk of a direct confrontation between the United States and Russia.
13. Putin’s Nuclear Bluff
Putni's nuclear bluff is making us self-deter.
Excerpts:
But low risk is not the same as no risk, and many Western analysts believe that the Kremlin is more willing to use nuclear weapons than it publicly suggests. The country has an arsenal of roughly 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons: smaller, lower-yield warheads that nonetheless approach or exceed the blast power of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These weapons seem to have little purpose in a purely responsive doctrine and appear designed for wartime use.
Instead of mere protection, these analysts—including in the United States government—believe Russian nuclear doctrine calls for a more aggressive tactic that they term, alternately, “escalating to de-escalate” and “escalating to win.” They believe that if Russia is faced with the prospect of losing a conventional war, it would detonate a nuclear weapon in order to demonstrate resolve and force adversaries to back down.
This is unlikely to be Moscow’s actual nuclear strategy. Instead, if Russia uses nuclear weapons to signal resolve, it will be because it indeed sees an existential threat—not to win a smaller conventional conflict which it would otherwise lose. It is difficult to imagine such a threat coming from Ukraine itself. But Russian nuclear use would become far more plausible if Moscow feels that direct NATO military involvement is inevitable. The Kremlin believes that in a war between NATO and Russia, the West would inevitably target Russian leadership and preemptively strike its nuclear capabilities. This, of course, would meet all the criteria in Russia’s nuclear use doctrine, perhaps leading Moscow to launch the first bomb.
Conclusion:
Such caution and concessions may not bring emotional satisfaction; there is certainly a visceral appeal to proposals that would have NATO forces directly help Ukraine. But these would dramatically heighten the risk that the war becomes a wider, potentially nuclear conflict. Western leaders should therefore reject them out of hand. Literally nothing else could be more dangerous.
Putin’s Nuclear Bluff
How the West Can Make Sure Russia’s Threats Stay Hollow
March 11, 2022
Few if any wars have been launched with as much nuclear posturing as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. One week before beginning its offensive, Moscow conducted previously planned exercises of its nuclear launch systems. A few days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin falsely accused Ukraine of building nuclear weapons. When starting the invasion, Putin warned that any outside country standing in Russia’s way would face “consequences such as they have never seen in their history”—a thinly disguised nuclear threat. Almost as soon as the fighting began, Russia’s military attacked and seized Ukrainian nuclear facilities while falsely claiming that Kyiv wants to build dirty bombs. And as Russian forces began to meet stiff resistance, Putin announced that Russia’s deterrence forces—which include its nuclear weapons—were shifting to “a special regime of combat duty.” It then ran another set of (possibly routine but still notable) launch drills.
Many analysts and observers have been frightened by Putin’s actions, and for good reason. Whenever the leader of a nuclear-armed state signals a readiness to use nuclear weapons, it is worth taking seriously. That is especially true when the threats come from a man who controls the world’s largest nuclear stockpile and who is simultaneously conducting an unprovoked, full-scale military invasion of a neighboring country. Putin is powerful, belligerent, and evidently unconcerned about casualties.
But although the Kremlin has shown a willingness to kill civilians and wreak havoc, using nuclear weapons would deviate from Russia’s own nuclear doctrine. The country does not need them to defeat Kyiv, and even if it did, detonating weapons of mass destruction would provoke international retaliation, including, quite possibly, direct military involvement from NATO. This risks both massive conventional war and further nuclear escalation—an outcome that Putin does not want. Rather than seriously considering strikes, Putin is more likely using the specter of nuclear escalation as cover for increasingly brutal tactics on the ground and to pressure Kyiv into surrendering. He may also hope that by threatening attacks, he can scare NATO away from increasing its involvement in the conflict or even get the West to make Ukraine submit.
So far, this strategy has failed; Kyiv and its backers have held firm. But they have wisely avoided escalatory language and steps of their own. They should continue to do so, because although the risk of nuclear escalation may be low, it is real. Russia has a diverse arsenal of nuclear weapons, large and small, and both Russian and Western nuclear thinkers have discussed nuclear use as a way of demonstrating resolve and pressuring adversaries. The risk of nuclear war would grow particularly acute if NATO forces become more directly involved in the invasion, because from Russia’s perspective, a war with NATO would threaten its sovereignty and existence.
Western powers should keep assisting Ukraine with the aim of convincing Moscow to reverse course and reach a negotiated settlement with Kyiv, one that guarantees Ukraine’s security. But as Western states debate new weapon provisions and ways of engagement, they must be aware of the dangers and avoid mission creep. If NATO offers Ukraine increasingly direct help, the organization risks finding itself in a war against Russia despite every intention of avoiding it.
TALK IS CHEAP
It is not easy to divine the meaning of Putin’s nuclear declarations. To keep the West on edge, the Russian president has been deliberately ambiguous, and despite the menacing tone, his statements are not explicitly or uniquely about nuclear weapons. As Russia defines them, its “deterrent forces” include its nuclear arsenal, but also its conventional long-range strike systems, some of which are already being used in Ukraine. Although it has not been used before, Putin’s phrase “a special regime of combat duty” does not appear to signal a serious change in Russia’s nuclear posture. When Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu explained the details of the order, he said it entailed staffing up Russia’s nuclear strategic force command centers—all of which were already well staffed. The phrase, in other words, had little real meaning.
If Russia were to detonate nuclear weapons as part of the invasion, it would run counter to the state’s official doctrine and Vladimir Putin’s stated nuclear plans. In “Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence,” the government stated that it will not use nuclear weapons unless the “very existence” of the Russian state is threatened or if Russia’s nuclear deterrent capacity—that is, its nuclear forces and command and control—is at risk of being struck. Putin has set a slightly different bar, indicating in spoken remarks that Russia would use nuclear weapons if under missile attack. But either way, even dramatic losses in Ukraine would fall short of meeting these thresholds.
Using nuclear weapons would serve no military purpose besides shock and horror.
Doctrines, of course, are subject to interpretation, and Putin and his advisers may view the serious sanctions levied against Russia and a bogged-down invasion as threats to the country’s existence, particularly as the costs build. Putin may also equate the Russian state with his own leadership, something that defeat in Ukraine and Western sanctions could threaten. And Putin has plenty of personal incentives to avoid losing office. Leading Western politicians are calling for Russian officials—including the president—to be overthrown and charged with war crimes in The Hague, and the International Criminal Court has opened an investigation into Russia’s conduct.
But right now, Putin faces no serious threats to his power, and Russia is not losing on the battlefield. Despite substantial Ukrainian resistance, the Russian military continues its slow advance on Ukraine’s major cities. It retains tremendous conventional combat power, which it can use to destroy both military and civilian targets. As the conflict currently stands, the use of nuclear weapons would serve no military purpose besides shock and horror, which Russia has other ways to inflict. This means that the current nuclear posturing is almost certainly meant to deter direct Western involvement in the fight—including to defend Ukraine’s airspace by enforcing a no-fly zone—or to compel Kyiv into making concessions at the negotiating table.
If Russia were facing defeat, a nuclear strike could force Ukraine to concede. But it is unlikely that this would ultimately protect Russia or help Putin and his allies stay in power. Instead, the radioactive fallout from the attack would spread for hundreds of miles, if not more, including to Russia itself and NATO countries. The former could risk Putin’s domestic position; mass poisoning one’s population is generally not a recipe for political success. The latter, meanwhile, may well be seen as an assault on NATO, triggering its conventional involvement in the conflict, the very thing Russia wants to deter. (The Russian government is aware it would lose a war with NATO.)
STEERING CLEAR
But low risk is not the same as no risk, and many Western analysts believe that the Kremlin is more willing to use nuclear weapons than it publicly suggests. The country has an arsenal of roughly 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons: smaller, lower-yield warheads that nonetheless approach or exceed the blast power of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These weapons seem to have little purpose in a purely responsive doctrine and appear designed for wartime use.
Instead of mere protection, these analysts—including in the United States government—believe Russian nuclear doctrine calls for a more aggressive tactic that they term, alternately, “escalating to de-escalate” and “escalating to win.” They believe that if Russia is faced with the prospect of losing a conventional war, it would detonate a nuclear weapon in order to demonstrate resolve and force adversaries to back down.
This is unlikely to be Moscow’s actual nuclear strategy. Instead, if Russia uses nuclear weapons to signal resolve, it will be because it indeed sees an existential threat—not to win a smaller conventional conflict which it would otherwise lose. It is difficult to imagine such a threat coming from Ukraine itself. But Russian nuclear use would become far more plausible if Moscow feels that direct NATO military involvement is inevitable. The Kremlin believes that in a war between NATO and Russia, the West would inevitably target Russian leadership and preemptively strike its nuclear capabilities. This, of course, would meet all the criteria in Russia’s nuclear use doctrine, perhaps leading Moscow to launch the first bomb.
The West must be careful in how it handles the ongoing invasion.
In the event of such a conflict, the West could try to persuade the Kremlin that it had limited aims. But doing so would be extraordinarily difficult through the fog of war. Even in the absence of active conflict between the alliance and Moscow, Putin sees NATO with tremendous hostility. He has condemned the organization for arming Ukraine, compared the West’s financial sanctions to an “act of war,” and declared that he would consider any country that lets Ukrainian planes land on its territory “a party to the conflict.” These statements, like his general nuclear threats, are designed to deter, but they also reflect his genuine views. Combined with Russia’s nuclear doctrine and the Kremlin’s hostile posture, these statements underscore the importance of avoiding a direct conflict between NATO and Russia.
That means the West must be careful in how it handles the ongoing invasion. Member states should continue to supply Ukraine as it defends itself, but NATO should not institute a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine, which would entail using Western airpower or the threat thereof to stop Russian aircraft from flying in Ukrainian airspace, potentially bringing NATO and Russian forces into direct military combat. They should slow plans to supply equipment such as fighter jets, which could require the use of their own airfields. They should promise to ease old and new sanctions if Russia de-escalates and withdraws its forces.
Such caution and concessions may not bring emotional satisfaction; there is certainly a visceral appeal to proposals that would have NATO forces directly help Ukraine. But these would dramatically heighten the risk that the war becomes a wider, potentially nuclear conflict. Western leaders should therefore reject them out of hand. Literally nothing else could be more dangerous.
14. Why Strangling Russia’s Economy Could Backfire
Who wants another north Korea? :-)
Excerpts:
Russians are not the only ones who are unprepared for what is about to happen. The Western countries that have imposed these sanctions have not fully thought through their likely consequences. Measures that make life miserable for ordinary Russians might have the opposite of their intended effect: they might rally the public behind Putin. Over the last 20 years, the Russian leader has built a powerful propaganda machine—one that has been working overtime since the Ukrainian invasion began. Right now, about half of Russians support the war. (Among them, initially, was my mother-in-law. She has a university degree but believed Putin’s claim that Ukraine and NATO had attacked Russia and that Russia was just defending itself. It took some time for my wife to convince her that Putin had attacked Ukraine and not the other way around.)
...
The United States and its allies should therefore rethink their sanctions strategy. Instead of making enemies of the Russian people by strangling the Russian economy, Western countries should make allies of them in a more targeted attempt to squeeze Russia’s leaders. Washington and Brussels should relax some of their most sweeping punitive measures, such as those that prevent ordinary Russians from accessing their own money, obtaining basic necessities, and traveling to Western countries. Instead, they should target only Russian oligarchs and high-ranking officials, confiscating their assets abroad and closing borders to them and their family members. The United States and Europe have done this to an extent, but they should go much further, sanctioning all senior government officials and employees of state-owned companies as well as their families. If it continues to target all Russians with crippling sanctions, the West will impoverish and immiserate Russia—and possibly bolster Putin.
Why Strangling Russia’s Economy Could Backfire
Harsh Sanctions Could Make the Country a Bigger, Badder North Korea
By Maxim Mironov
March 11, 2022
After Russian President Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea in 2014, the United States and its allies imposed a raft of relatively mild sanctions on Russia. These measures sent the ruble tumbling and dented Russian GDP growth, but the Kremlin’s propagandists downplayed the damage and, over time, the economy stabilized. So when Western countries announced a much tougher suite of sanctions in response to Putin’s latest assault on Ukraine, many Russians shrugged, convinced that their economy could withstand any level of Western sanctions.
They couldn’t be more wrong. The punitive measures that the United States and its allies have put in place since the invasion began could be catastrophic for ordinary Russians, as could the steps that many Western companies have taken to sever their ties to Russia and pull their businesses from the country. But the vast majority of Russians, even educated ones, have little idea of what is coming. Shortages of basic goods, mass unemployment, and even travel restrictions intended to stem the flight of human capital could soon become facts of life. If Western countries continue to tighten the economic screws on the Russian economy as a whole, instead of targeting specific figures in the regime with more tailored sanctions, they will risk turning Russia into something like a larger, more unstable, and more dangerous North Korea.
SOLD OUT
In a matter of days after Putin’s invasion, the West has largely reversed three decades’ worth of economic integration with Russia. Washington and its allies have barred Russia’s central bank from transacting in dollars, effectively frozen most of its foreign currency reserves, and slapped punishing sanctions on Russia’s most important financial institutions. They have removed seven Russian banks from SWIFT, the interbank messaging system that serves as the backbone of the global financial system, and restricted transactions with many major Russian state-owned enterprises. And on March 8, less than two weeks after the invasion began, U.S. President Joe Biden announced a ban on all Russian oil and natural gas imports to the United States.
As a result of these and other measures, Russians will soon face shortages of basic products—not just luxury goods such as iPhones and iPads, the import of which is now banned, but also more ordinary goods and commodities such as clothes, cars, household appliances, and food. IKEA and H&M have announced that they are withdrawing from the Russian market. Toyota, Honda, Mercedes-Benz, and Volkswagen have stopped exporting vehicles to Russia and closed their local production plants. And McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, and other Western food companies have suspended business in Russia. Russia imports almost 40 percent of the seeds that sustain its agricultural industry—and almost 90 percent of the seeds used to grow certain staples, such as potatoes. Russian farmers will find alternatives over the long run, but in the short term, many basic food products will disappear from Russian shelves and the prices for them will skyrocket.
Russia is highly dependent on international trade. But even companies that still wish to transact with Russia will soon have trouble moving goods to and from the country. Maersk, one of the world’s largest shipping container operators, has announced that it will halt shipments to Russia. Even if another company is willing to make up the shortfall, likely at exorbitant prices, it is unclear how Russian firms could pay for its services. The country’s export earnings will fall significantly because consumers in the West are refusing to buy Russian goods. Gazprom, the country’s main exporter of gas, is now unable to raise money in the United States, making it unclear how the company will receive foreign exchange earnings because it must use a significant portion of its revenue to repay its debts. And even non-sanctioned Russian oil companies are struggling to find buyers for their oil.
Western sanctions risk turning Russia into something like a larger, more unstable, and more dangerous North Korea.
Russia’s central bank has $650 billion in foreign exchange reserves, but Washington and Brussels have already frozen more than half of those funds. The Kremlin also has reserves in gold, but it is unclear how it could make use of these stockpiles. Few foreign banks will want to buy them from Russia’s central bank for fear of triggering sanctions and incurring huge fines. Russia has built up its domestic manufacturing base in recent years. But Russian factories that produce cars, airplanes, and household appliances all use imported components. As a result, entire industries could shut down in the coming months, precipitating not just shortages of goods but mass unemployment, a collapse of the tax base, and an inability to pay salaries to state employees. Already, Russia’s largest automobile producer has had to temporarily halt production because of shortages of imported components.
Even air travel will grind to a halt in Russia. Almost all Russian commercial aircraft are imported, and EU and U.S. sanctions now bar Western companies from supplying spare parts. Huge numbers of airplanes will have to be decommissioned as a result. Even the Internet as Russians know it will be shut down. The Kremlin has blocked access to Facebook and Twitter. It has threatened to shut down YouTube and could decide to block informational websites such as Wikipedia. In short, Russia will soon be one of the most isolated countries on earth.
It is not just what Moscow is trying to keep out that should scare Russians; it is what Moscow is trying to keep in. Everyone who can get out of the country will do so. In recent days, I have received messages from friends and strangers alike seeking advice on how to emigrate. The government understands this, which is why it has introduced a raft of measures designed to retain skilled information and technology professionals, including a three-year tax holiday and heavily subsidized mortgages and loans. But such measures won’t work. Skilled professionals are already racing for the exits. Soon, therefore, the Russian government will probably introduce exit visas for certain categories of workers or close the country altogether. Those who are nostalgic for the Soviet Union will finally learn what it was really like.
FROM ENEMIES TO ALLIES
Russians are not the only ones who are unprepared for what is about to happen. The Western countries that have imposed these sanctions have not fully thought through their likely consequences. Measures that make life miserable for ordinary Russians might have the opposite of their intended effect: they might rally the public behind Putin. Over the last 20 years, the Russian leader has built a powerful propaganda machine—one that has been working overtime since the Ukrainian invasion began. Right now, about half of Russians support the war. (Among them, initially, was my mother-in-law. She has a university degree but believed Putin’s claim that Ukraine and NATO had attacked Russia and that Russia was just defending itself. It took some time for my wife to convince her that Putin had attacked Ukraine and not the other way around.)
Last week, Putin signed a new law that makes publishing “fake news” punishable by 15 years in prison. Needless to say, all factual reporting on the war in Ukraine is considered fake news. Even the word “war” is prohibited; Russians must call the conflict in Ukraine a “special military operation.” With fewer alternative sources of information to compete with, the Kremlin’s propagandists will grow even more powerful. Many Russians will come to believe that Russia is fighting a holy war against the West and NATO, and that Western sanctions are designed to make ordinary Russians suffer. They will believe, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov put it last week, that sanctions are a “tax on independence.”
The United States and its allies should therefore rethink their sanctions strategy. Instead of making enemies of the Russian people by strangling the Russian economy, Western countries should make allies of them in a more targeted attempt to squeeze Russia’s leaders. Washington and Brussels should relax some of their most sweeping punitive measures, such as those that prevent ordinary Russians from accessing their own money, obtaining basic necessities, and traveling to Western countries. Instead, they should target only Russian oligarchs and high-ranking officials, confiscating their assets abroad and closing borders to them and their family members. The United States and Europe have done this to an extent, but they should go much further, sanctioning all senior government officials and employees of state-owned companies as well as their families. If it continues to target all Russians with crippling sanctions, the West will impoverish and immiserate Russia—and possibly bolster Putin.
15. Ukraine offers Taiwan a wake-up call, and lessons in resistance
An important lesson. And Taiwan needs to learn to use its Special forces effectively. Rather than investing in commando capabilities they need to focus on mobilizing, organization, training, advising, assisting, and leading resistance forces on Taiwan. We need to support Taiwan with a Taiwanese unique resistance operating concept (ROC). We need a ROC for the ROC.
Ukraine offers Taiwan a wake-up call, and lessons in resistance - Breaking Defense
“The lesson every Taiwanese is learning from what we are seeing in Ukraine is that we have to defend ourselves, no one else will fight for our democracy like we can,” said Kolas Yotaka, spokeswoman for Taiwan’s presidential office.
ROC Marine Corps infantry units of 99th Regiment conducted an urban warfare drill in Kaohsiung’s Tsoying Naval Base on August 27, 2013 in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. (Photo by Ashley Pon/Getty Images)
TAIPEI: While Europe’s sense of security has been shaken by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the war has also reverberated in Taiwan, which has been facing the threat of a Chinese invasion for more than seven decades.
The Ukrainian resistance has surprised and inspired many here, but a new sense of concern and urgency is also palpable. Under president Tsai Ing-wen, who took office in 2016, Taiwan’s military has ordered billions of dollars of weapons from the United States, but there has been little public discussion of how to prepare, should China attempt to invade and occupy Taiwan.
Like Ukraine, Taiwan is a thriving democracy threatened by a giant revanchist neighbor. It also does not have any mutual defense treaty with the US or other countries in its region. Ukraine’s efforts to resist Russia are changing the national conversation here, with more people contemplating how to resist a Chinese attack without direct help from the US or Japan.
“The lesson every Taiwanese is learning from what we are seeing in Ukraine is that we have to defend ourselves, no one else will fight for our democracy like we can,” said Kolas Yotaka, spokeswoman for Taiwan’s presidential office. “We have never stopped preparing for a contingency, and our only principle in this process has always been self-defense, never to attack.”
Until recently, President Tsai has appeared reluctant to discuss how Taiwanese citizens can help defend their country. In the first days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, she described comparisons between Ukraine and Taiwan as “cognitive warfare” aimed at damaging Taiwanese morale. But the tone from the government has shifted as the Ukraine conflict drags on, and there are signs that Taiwanese society as a whole is feeling less restrained in talking about preparing for war.
Shortly after a think tank funded by the Ministry of National Defense publicly noted the vital role that Ukrainian reservists played in resisting the Russian invasion, the ministry doubled the period for reservist training from one week to two weeks — a small but significant step. The ministry also mooted including women veterans in reservist training for the first time. Despite a public that is not accustomed to thinking about the nuts and bolts of self-defense, there has been little public pushback to either move.
“The Ukraine situation is an opportunity to motivate and mobilize a population and legislature that has historically underestimated the risk and underinvested in Taiwan’s own security,” said Ivan Kanapathy, a CSBA Senior Fellow who previously served as the NSC Deputy Senior Director for Asia and a US military attaché in Taipei.
“With the PLA [People’s Liberation Army]’s significant and capable counter-intervention capabilities, the Taiwanese people must understand that a US-led coalition can only come to their aid if Taiwan can hold out for an extended period of time, regardless of a security commitment,” Kanapathy added. Both the US and Japanese governments have said in the past year that they see Taiwan’s security as a national security issue in their respective countries.
With municipal and county elections this November that will serve as a gauge of Tsai’s popularity with Taiwanese voters, the cautious but not necessarily risk-averse president — think of her congratulatory call to then-president-elect Donald Trump — may have a window to raise public awareness of the threat posed by China. There is also an opportunity to move towards a more nimble, asymmetric approach to defense, rather than focusing on fighters, tanks and other big-ticket items.
Much of Taiwan’s current strategic focus is on trying to gain or maintain local air superiority, and as a result the country has focused heavily on high-end capabilities to keep its airspace under control. But rather than tanks and fighters being the backbone of Ukraine’s stiff resistance, it has been anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry, along with well-trained reservists and a mobilized general public that have made the difference.
From a military standpoint, shifting to a more mobile and nimble approach similar to what Ukraine has would seem to make sense. And Taiwan’s lack of land borders to bring in materiel during a conflict means that now is the time to decide on how to shift, and then to stockpile in anticipation of a blockade.
“The lowest hanging fruit would be to rapidly divest from military capabilities that have little to no value to Taiwan’s defense in order to free up force structure and other resources for vital missions,” Kanapathy said.
“For example, airborne, amphibious assault/landing, and close air support are not useful mission sets for Taiwan’s armed forces in any real-world scenario. China can bring many more platforms to the Taiwan fight than Russia brought to the Ukraine fight, which will require significantly more lethal ordnance on survivable platforms.”
Kanapathy recommended CDCMs to target ships, TOWs and Javelins to target landing craft, and Stingers to target aircraft in order to prevent Chinese forces from gaining lodgment. He also said Taiwan should work closely with US and allied UUV technology companies to modernize its inventory of sea mines, he added. “Gaining the ability to program, pilot and arm, and disarm self-propelled sea mines would provide Taiwan’s leadership with significant flexibility in its decision making.”
Of course, China is also looking at Ukraine for lessons learned. Ultimately, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and his planners may well conclude that quickly delivering a fait accompli through a shock-and-awe-style bombardment — alongside cyber, space and information operations by PLA Strategic Support Force — would be the most likely way to avoid getting bogged down as Russia has.
Given the density of Taiwan, that would likely mean mass civilian casualties and a major rebuilding effort for Beijing, but that may be a trade off the PLA is willing to make for a quick conflict, especially given that it would likely be a bonanza for state-owned engineering and construction companies.
Any resistance effort in the face of such bombardment would have to come from mobilizing the population, which is another major lesson from Ukraine.
A poll published in December by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy found that more than 70% of respondents were willing to fight China if it attacked without provocation. The opportunities for Taiwanese outside of the military who seek to defend their country are negligible at the moment, but that is slowly changing.
At a Forward Alliance event, Taiwanese civilians practice first-aid techniques. (Forward Alliance)
A small but growing number of non-profits in Taiwan are pushing for greater civil preparedness. One of those, Forward Alliance, has focused on first-aid training for civilians. Enoch Wu, who heads the organization and is also the Taipei chair for Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party, said Ukraine’s resilience has been a lesson in the value of citizens being both willing and able to help each other.
“The best way to deter military conflict is to demonstrate a credible national will to resist, by combining military readiness with civil preparedness,” Wu said. “We are working to unify efforts across society, getting first responders like the fire agency and the police force, civic organizations, and the general public, to work together on a regular basis. It is a bad idea to practice mobilization and collaboration for the first time during a crisis.”
A former special forces soldier, Wu concurred with Kanapathy on the importance of shifting away from easy targets such as jets and tanks and instead focusing on taking the fight to the enemy near the nation’s shores and within its airspace, as well as prioritizing the stockpiling of munitions.
“We need to allocate a larger share of our defense budget to survivable weapons that can disrupt PLA’s operations and threaten their invading forces,” Wu said. “The more dispersed and mobile, the easier to operate, the more likely our weapons will be useful during conflict.”
16. U.S. Military Urges Biden to Place Commandos in Somalia as Militant Threat Worsens
It takes sustained engagement if you are going to employ a "through, with, and by" campaign to moderate these types of threats (because they can never be eliminated).
This is irregular warfare as Congress described it in the 2017 NDAA: Irregular Warfare is conducted “in support of predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals participating in competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict.”
U.S. Military Urges Biden to Place Commandos in Somalia as Militant Threat Worsens
Trump administration pulled out Americans who had been training Somali forces in the fight against al Qaeda affiliate
WSJ · by Michael M. Phillips
“Since U.S. forces have come out of Somalia last January, we assess there is an uptick in al-Shabaab activities,” said a senior U.S. intelligence official, adding that “there has been no pressure on al-Shabaab at this point and they have freedom of movement.”
The military is asking Mr. Biden to deploy troops now stationed in Djibouti and Kenya back to Somalia. Senior officers argue that local soldiers fight more effectively when consistently side-by-side with experienced U.S. special-operators, even if the Americans avoid ground combat and limit their role to training and air support. Commanders also say frequent movement in and out of Somalia itself carries unnecessary risks for U.S. troops.
Mr. Biden hasn’t announced his decision. “As a matter of policy we do not comment on potential troop deployments,” a National Security Council spokeswoman said.
But there is a growing sense the military will get many, if not all, of the troops it is seeking. “I believe we will be given permission in the near term to be able to have a more persistent presence in Somalia,” said a senior military official.
There is a growing sense among the military that they will get many, if not all, of the troops they are seeking back in Somalia.
Photo: Tech. Sgt. Nick Kibbey/U.S. Air Force
Mr. Trump dismayed many military commanders when he issued the withdrawal order in the final weeks of his term, amid his wider effort to wind down conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the time, the Pentagon scrambled to reassure nervous African governments and allies that the U.S. was “not withdrawing or disengaging from Africa.”
The incoming Biden administration immediately put the decision under review as part of a larger reassessment of U.S. forces abroad, while allowing American troops to visit Somalia periodically to train the local commando unit, the Danab, or Lightning.
At the same time, Mr. Biden has sharply reduced the number of U.S. drone strikes against al-Shabaab fighters, which, due to the risk of civilian casualties, sometimes stir up public opposition in Somalia.
Mr. Trump conducted 203 airstrikes during his four-year term, including two the day before he left office, according to data from U.S. Africa Command. During Mr. Biden’s first 13 months as president, the military has carried out five airstrikes, most recently last month when Somali troops requested assistance to repel an al-Shabaab attack.
U.S. officials say it has proven more difficult to coordinate air attacks on al-Shabaab without having troops on the ground in Somalia.
The N.S.C. spokeswoman said the Biden administration takes a “holistic” approach to Somalia, where pressing issues run from drought-induced hunger and militant violence to regional schisms, political infighting and clan rivalries. Such an approach involves synchronized strategies from the Pentagon, State Department and Agency for International Development, officials say.
Top U.S. officers have been wary about exerting public pressure on the White House to back their request to move troops back into Somalia. But in recent months, they have become increasingly outspoken about their sense that al-Shabaab fighters are gaining ground while American troops commute to the battlefield.
“The threat of al-Shabaab is growing,” Gen. Stephen Townsend, commander of U.S. forces in Africa, told Voice of America in January. “And if increased pressure is not applied to al-Shabaab, I’m concerned that there’s going to be a significant al-Shabaab attack.”
Al-Shabaab killed 67 people in a Nairobi, Kenya, shopping mall in 2013. Two years later, the militants killed almost 150 at Kenya’s Garissa University, near the Somalia border, searching out Christians to target among the students. And in 2017, the group allegedly detonated a truck bomb that left nearly 600 dead in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital.
In 2019, the group declared American civilians to be legitimate targets. U.S. officials say the militants present a potent threat to American interests in East Africa.
In 2020, al-Shabaab killed one U.S. soldier and two American civilian contractors at a military base in Manda Bay, Kenya, near the Somalia border. U.S. troops were there to train Kenyan soldiers serving in a large African Union force deployed to Somalia since 2007.
The U.S. military on Thursday released its findings from its investigation into that attack. That report concluded that a number of U.S. military failings, including insufficient planning for potential threats and poor leadership, and roughly 40 attackers that were “determined, disciplined and well resourced” led to the attack.
“If there continues to be no pressure on [al-Shabaab], the concern would be that they would become a threat to the homeland,” the intelligence official said.
The aftermath of a deadly attack on police in the outskirts of Mogadishu, Somalia in February.
Photo: Farah Abdi Warsameh/Associated Press
In addition to carrying out ambushes, planting roadside booby-traps, detonating bombs in cities, assassinating officials and taking over villages, al-Shabaab extorts revenue from ports and other businesses, taking in an estimated $130 million a year. The group spends some of that wealth on weapons and transfers a portion to al Qaeda global leaders in Pakistan and Syria, according to U.S. officials.
Mohamed Mubarak, an independent political analyst, said Somali government officials were alarmed when Mr. Trump pulled out U.S. special operators.
“They put al-Shabaab on the defensive—it was going well,” Mr. Mubarak said. “Nobody expected the operation would end without warning.” The Danab, Somalia’s U.S.-trained special-operations unit, has been the only force keeping the militants in check, he said.
Somali government spokesmen didn’t return calls and messages seeking comment on the prospect of the Americans returning on an enduring basis.
Uncertainty over the U.S. position in Somalia mirrors growing questions about Western policy in other volatile areas of Africa.
Al Qaeda and Islamic State-aligned extremists have intensified attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in the Sahel, the semiarid band just south of the Sahara. Military coups in Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso, however, have driven a wedge between Western militaries and some former allies in the region.
France announced last month it is pulling thousands of troops out of Mali, but will likely shift them to neighboring countries. The U.S. has suspended plans to station a Green Beret team in Burkina Faso to train local commandos.
—Nancy A. Youssef contributed to this article.
WSJ · by Michael M. Phillips
17. Congress Clears $1.5 Trillion Spending Bill, Including Ukraine Aid
Congress Clears $1.5 Trillion Spending Bill, Including Ukraine Aid
President Biden is expected to sign the measure, the first major spending bill since he took office.
Senator Chuck Schumer, the Democratic leader, called the legislation “the strongest, boldest and most significant government funding package we’ve seen in a very long time.”Credit...Tom Brenner for The New York Times
By
March 10, 2022, 10:19 p.m. ET
The Senate approved the 2,700-page measure by a vote of 68 to 31 less than two days after it was finalized and pushed through the House, a rapid timetable that reflected strong bipartisan support for assisting Ukraine and a sense of urgency to avert a government shutdown within days. The bill, which funds the government through September, includes generous spending on domestic programs long prioritized by Democrats and military investments championed by Republicans.
Mr. Biden was expected to quickly sign the measure, which marked the first time since he took office and Democrats won unified control of Congress that they have been able to enact a spending bill that reflects their priorities, including investing in climate resilience, public assistance programs and unlocking aid for projects contained in the $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure law.
In remarks on the Senate floor, Senator Chuck Schumer of New York, the majority leader, called it “the strongest, boldest and most significant government funding package we’ve seen in a very long time.”
But to clear the way for passage, Democrats had to drop some priorities, most notably a White House request for more pandemic aid. Republicans objected to spending any new federal money on the coronavirus response, prompting Democrats first to whittle down the size of that package, and then to claw back funding from existing aid programs, including money for state governments, to pay for it.
But that strategy infuriated rank-and-file Democrats and governors in both parties, who balked at yanking promised state assistance, and leaders were forced to strip the aid from the package. They vowed to try again to pass it in the coming days, but Republican support was unclear, leaving in doubt the fate of the administration’s new pandemic plan.
Republicans claimed credit for prodding Democrats to accept a $42 billion increase in military spending, bringing the total this year to $782 billion.
The negotiations, said Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the minority leader, “put us Republicans in the surreal position of having to push a commander in chief’s party into giving his own commanders the funding they need.”
“But over many Democrats’ objections, Republicans made sure this deal gets the job done for our armed forces,” he said.
Democrats hailed the $46 billion increase they secured for domestic programs, calling the $730 billion total the largest investment in four years.
“This bill invests in future prosperity, in our health, and reduces everyday costs for millions of Americans, such as child care, a college education, and heating and cooling costs,” said Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who leads the Appropriations Committee.
The last-minute scuffles reflected the arduous negotiations over the package, which dragged out more than five months past the Oct. 1 start of the fiscal year that it is supposed to fund. To secure Republican support, Democrats agreed to go above the administration’s request for Pentagon spending and maintain a series of longstanding restrictions on federal money that they had hoped to remove, including the Hyde Amendment, which bans federal funding for most abortions.
The package provides $145 billion to invest in new aircraft, ships and other vehicles, including 13 new Navy vessels, a dozen F/A-18 Super Hornets and 85 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. It also provides a 2.7 percent pay raise for all 2.1 million uniformed service members as well as the approximately 750,000 civilian employees in the Defense Department.
Even without the emergency aid package, Democrats secured additional funds for pandemic preparedness. That includes $745 million, an increase of $148 million, for the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, and $845 million, an increase of $140 million, for the Strategic National Stockpile, an emergency medical reserve intended to guard against infectious disease and bioterrorism threats.
Democrats also won increases for maternal and child health programs, tribal programs, public education and programs addressing mental health crises.
And Congress agreed to direct millions of dollars toward its own employees and support of the Capitol complex. The U.S. Capitol Police will receive $602.5 million, an increase of $87 million, to help expand its ranks after the Jan. 6 riot, while House congressional offices will see their budgets expand 21 percent, the largest increase since 1996, to try to stem the drain of institutional knowledge and prevent staff from seeking better pay off Capitol Hill.
Because the package is one of the few must-pass bills remaining in the legislative session, lawmakers seized on the opportunity to attach an array of additional priorities. Most notably, the bill includes a reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, a law aimed at preventing domestic violence, stalking and sexual assault that lapsed in 2019. Mr. Biden helped craft the law as a senator in 1994, and a bipartisan group of senators had recently unveiled a deal on an expanded version.
The legislation also includes $1 billion in funding for Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system, which had been held up in the Senate because of objections from Senator Rand Paul, Republican of Kentucky. And it would close a loophole to ensure that makers of flavored e-cigarettes can no longer sidestep the Food and Drug Administration’s ability to regulate products derived from tobacco.
To push the package through the Senate, lawmakers had to navigate a series of objections from conservative Republicans, who complained that they had little time to examine the legislation and pushed to prioritize the emergency aid to Ukraine.
“It’s hard to express my anger and frustration,” said Senator Rick Scott, Republican of Florida, as Democrats blocked his effort to pass the emergency aid for Ukraine without the $1.5 trillion to fund the government. “What in the hell are we doing here?”
Like other budget hawks, Mr. Scott also derided the return of earmarks, which allowed lawmakers in both parties to direct money toward projects in their states or districts. But lawmakers rejected an amendment, offered by Senator Mike Braun, Republican of Indiana, that would have stripped those projects, now rebranded with stricter guardrails, from the package.
“That’s what this is about — politics,” said Senator Jon Tester, Democrat of Montana, defending the package. He warned that Mr. Scott was risking a shutdown by seeking to change the spending measure.
“You can be unhappy with the” legislation, he added, “but the fact of the matter is, it has been negotiated over the last year by Democrats and Republicans.”
Before passing the sprawling measure, lawmakers also voted down additional Republican amendments, including a measure to prevent funding from going toward coronavirus vaccine mandates and an amendment providing disaster relief for Louisiana for recovery for hurricane damage.
Senator Brian Schatz, Democrat of Hawaii, instead called for a separate disaster aid bill to be passed in the future. Any changes to the spending package would have forced another House vote and risked a government shutdown.
Catie Edmondson contributed reporting.
18. The Pentagon must pay for competition
The Pentagon must pay for competition
A recent Pentagon report called for more arms manufacturers to bolster competition in the shipbuilding-, aerospace- and defense-industrial base. Citing examples of the reduction of suppliers over the past 20 years for major weapons categories, the report laments the drop in tactical missile suppliers from 13 to just three; fixed-wing aircraft falling from eight companies to three; and satellites tumbling from eight contractors to four.
Given the sorry state of industry, it is all the more surprising that there’s one glaring omission from the solution set: buying more equipment.
Yet, buried deep in the document is the admission that “opportunities for new programs can be limited.” You don’t say?
Another gem states that “consolidation in the U.S. defense industry historically increases under budget reduction pressures.” Huh, really?
Given these truisms, the solutions the Pentagon proposes do not align with the full scope of the problem. All the flexible contracting authorities in the world won’t be enough to solve the simple economies of scale necessity.
And it’s not as if there is no need.
The U.S. military is deep in the “Terrible ’20s” — a decade where the bulk of conventional and nuclear systems need to be updated after decades of use, technological advancements have made systems irrelevant, and general wear and tear has occurred from war.
Currently, the military is facing a massive spending spike to pay for modernization bills across the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps that have been ignored, deferred or inadequately considered. This modernization crunch is the result of decades of defense investment decisions — including delayed equipment recapitalizations from the end of the Cold War, the dominance of short-term spending priorities during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the legacy of the 2011 Budget Control Act, and competing federal spending priorities.
Turns out, you can buy your way out of some problems. Competition is one of them.
But the track record is dismal for both the Pentagon and Capitol Hill. Take the Navy proposing in 2005 and again last year what is essentially a “one shipyard” acquisition strategy for destroyers. Buying just one of these ships (or buying more and down-selecting to one builder) is a “winner take all” approach between the two yards building destroyers that would permanently put one shipbuilder out of business.
Both times, Congress had to save the Navy from itself.
The most recent defense policy bill calls the Navy’s plan troubling for violating the current destroyer contract and delaying higher ship counts “during a period of increasing demand, particularly in countering threats from China and Russia.”
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A federal spending package would give the Navy a significant boost in funding for ships and aircraft, after lawmakers were largely underwhelmed by the service's budget request last spring.
Another time, however, it was Congress that rejected competition in deciding to not pay for an alternative engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in fiscal 2010. Members accepted this short-term “out” to President Barack Obama’s massive defense cuts, even though it would mean only one type of engine available for a plane that will constitute 90% of all U.S. fighter jets in 2035.
Then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said at the time: “We feel strongly there is not a need for the second engine.” Feelings aren’t facts, as the saying goes.
The Joint Strike Fighter is a single-engine plane. At the time of congressional debate, there were warnings that if something went wrong with the engine, it could lead to a systemwide grounding of every aircraft until the problem was identified and fixed — unless there was an alternative available.
Fast forward a decade, and the Joint Strike Fighter fleet has been repeatedly grounded for engine troubles. These fleetwide standdowns could have been easily avoided had the modest investment been made to continue the F136 program, which at the time of cancelation was already 70% complete — a sunk cost and wasted taxpayer money.
Higher and more efficient production rates for military fleets and inventories helps to restore economies of scale and cut unit production costs. In a separate report, the Pentagon’s cost analysis office admits as much, stating: “Any decision to change the quantity of a good or service estimated will affect its total cost, whether due to government effects (e.g., budget limitations), contractor effects (e.g., capacity limitations), or any other cause.”
The Defense Department calls competition “vital” in its latest report for “improved cost, schedule, and performance for the products and services needed to support national defense.” But the procurement dollars must flow first. The military must start buying in bulk again and pay a little extra up front for that competition, which ultimately keeps costs down later.
19. ‘Putin is losing’ — but risks of a NATO-Russian war are growing
Putin is losing "Putin's War."
Conclusion:
The bottom line is that there may be some trade that isn’t significant in this environment that could give him a face-saver out of this. But it’s very hard to see any other kind of exit for him that is good for Russia or good for him.
‘Putin is losing’ — but risks of a NATO-Russian war are growing
A former top CIA official sees no good end for Vladimir Putin — but no clear paths to ending the war in Ukraine.
Tom Nagorski, Global Editor,
and John McLaughlin, Special Contributor
As the war in Ukraine reached its two-week mark, Grid spoke with former CIA leader and Grid Special Contributor John McLaughlin about the state of the war, the NATO efforts to arm the Ukrainian resistance and why he believes Russian President Vladimir Putin is losing the fight.
He also spoke about the risks of a “collision” between NATO and Russian forces, and why a “Srebrenica moment” in the war might draw NATO into more direct engagement. We are in “the wild blue yonder,” McLaughlin said. “There is no rule book for this.”
This interview originally took place as a Twitter Spaces conversation and has been edited for length and clarity.
Grid: On the first day of the war, you said you were very concerned about circumstances that might bring NATO and the U.S. into some direct combat or, as you said, “collision.” What were you worried about then? And are you more worried or less worried now?
John McLaughlin: At the time, I was thinking of at least four different situations in which NATO and the Russians could come into some direct contact.
Maybe the most obvious one is the possibility of miscalculation or accident, you know, with NATO aircraft and NATO ships in the general vicinity, in the Black Sea and in the NATO areas adjacent to Ukraine. The possibility of an accident of some sort is always there.
The second thing — and the concern about this has only grown — is that Putin, in some kind of desperation, might do a little minor provocation in some NATO country. I think the candidates would mostly be the Baltics — Estonia or Latvia, where there are large Russian-speaking populations, particularly in the northeast corner of Estonia. And once he did that, we would be in Article Five territory [requiring a NATO response].
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Then third: The distinction is rapidly disappearing between what we’re doing and what an insurgency would be. Because we are clearly funneling weapons, sophisticated weapons to Ukraine. But if the situation goes to one where Putin has been able somehow to occupy Ukraine, there would be an insurgency against Russian occupation, and presumably, we would support it and presumably with support from some adjacent territory, and that means from NATO countries. And some hotheaded Russian commander in hot pursuit, after insurgents had blown up, say, a bunch of Russian soldiers, could easily stray across the border. And bingo, we would be in direct contact.
And of course, Putin has more or less said that anyone doing that in his eyes becomes a combatant.
And then finally, the really far-out one is the idea that at some point he might start a cyber war. And while we have escalation dominance in sanctions — that is to say we can control how far it’s going to go — when it’s cyber, we don’t have the practice and the experience and the precedent to know, where does it stop? When does it become an act of war? When have we engaged in the cyber-equivalent of what we used to call in the nuclear world “mutual assured destruction”? Would that be taking down our electrical grids? We’re way out in the wild blue yonder there.
Grid: Well, this whole conflict has us in the wild blue yonder, in a lot of ways.
JM: That’s a very important point, I think. On so many of these things, we’re in new territory. You know, we haven’t had anything comparable to this experience since the Cuban missile crisis.
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Grid: Let me let me pin down one thing, which I don’t think you mentioned. A no-fly zone, which is put on the table every morning by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and others in Ukraine, and even by those who seem to know that it’s unlikely for the moment. Can you talk a little bit about why a no-fly zone has been — at least to this moment — very clearly off the table for NATO?
JM: Well, I think everyone understands that if you had NATO pilots flying in a no-fly zone, obviously the potential would be there for American pilots or NATO pilots engaging Russian pilots. And the idea of U.S.-Russian aerial combat, against a backdrop of two nuclear-armed superpowers who can destroy the world, is something that I think everyone justifiably would like to avoid.
As far as Putin’s claim that this would be an act of war by NATO, and he would consider it as such — and meanwhile, he says he’s increased the readiness of his nuclear forces — at some point, we are going to have to address this. And this is where we’re in new territory. We don’t have a rule book to turn to. And I doubt that there is a plan on the shelf in the Pentagon for how to deal with exactly this situation.
I was thinking today, I’m sitting here in my office and up on my shelf is a large foot-long fragment of a 107-millimeter rocket that almost hit me in Vietnam when I was there in the Army. And those rockets came from the Soviet Union. And they were inflicted on American forces in a war we were fighting. And no one at the time said, ‘That means we’re at war with the Soviet Union,’ and no one at that time said, ‘This means we could go nuclear.’ No one said that seriously, in any event. So we can’t treat his remark in a trivial way — anyone talking about nuclear weapons, we have to take that seriously. But I guess what I’m saying is we’re already far down this road. We’re providing them with sophisticated weapons.
Now, having said that, this is not an easy thing to do. No-fly zones are not easy to do. We have done them in Bosnia, Libya and in Iraq back long before the recent war, but back after the 1991 war to protect Iraqi civilians from Saddam Hussein. But in all those cases, we were not going against a superpower. We were going against air forces that were outdated and not very capable. So we had air superiority.
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Grid: And in all those cases, fair to say that the strategic imperative that drove the U.S. and NATO to impose no-fly zones was probably not as compelling as the imperative now. And the only difference is that it’s a nuclear power that is on the other side of things.
JM: I think that’s right. In those other cases, the strategic imperative was actually not as great.
The question in my mind is, how do you take the nuclear issue off the table? Or how do you neutralize it or diminish its importance in the circumstances?
I would say it’s a situation that would require direct communication with Putin or his representatives, and with the Russian military through channels that we have for deconfliction, in which you would have to have a very serious conversation about the two of us taking the nuclear issue off the table, acknowledging we are in a conflict, and that it’s in no one’s interest to begin engaging nuclear weapons. Now, that’s heroic diplomacy I’m talking about, and what are the chances of a rational conversation succeeding in a situation like this? Probably small. But that’s one way you can go.
Another way you can go is to think of this as a deterrence situation. In other words, we both understand the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction. So while I think it would be a mistake for us to reciprocate what he has done — that is to say, we’re going to put our nuclear forces on a higher state of readiness, because that does escalate — just to remind the Russians that we do have a deterrent capability here. And essentially, you’re calling their bluff.
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But let me be clear, I’m not saying that as a recommendation, or I’m not saying it as something we would do lightly. You really have to go back to the Cuban missile crisis, which was a nail-biter from hour to hour, in order to have anything roughly analogous to this.
So our government now needs to be thinking this through, and we need to be keeping all channels open to Russia. Because clearly, Putin is losing this thing. And he must have a desperate feeling about it at this point.
Grid: I want to follow up on that — that Putin is losing. Almost every hour, you can read accounts — and I’m not talking about misinformation, I’m talking about reliable information — that paint a picture that Putin is “losing this thing.” But then you can also just make the general point that the Russians have an awful lot more firepower to throw at this. And you start to feel, well, the Ukrainians are holding on valiantly, but that’s not going to last. So say a bit more about that phrase you used. What gives you that impression?
JM: The reason I say he’s losing is it’s been my observation in war — the one I was in and the ones I’ve analyzed — is that nothing really trumps will to fight. Yes, if you have no weapons, you are going to be crushed. But if you have some sophisticated weapons, and you have a force that has the will to fight, that trumps almost everything else in the sense that people will risk their lives and fight on bravely against the odds. And the Ukrainians have that if we can keep supplying them with sophisticated weapons, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft weapons and small arms.
They are fighting extraordinarily well. On the other side, I don’t think there is much will to fight. Putin has now acknowledged it’s a conscript army. We’re talking about people who have been sent there. And this is a Russian practice. They did this in the Cuban missile crisis — those people going to Cuba had no idea why they were going. They sent conscripts there with no idea of what they were getting into.
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And on the home front, yes, if you stop a man on the street in Russia today, chances are that, you know, 7 out of 10 or more will deny that anything bad is happening in Ukraine. But it is going to get through to the Russians what’s going on there. You can’t really wall off 150 million people in today’s information environment. And so I sense that concern and unease will grow inside Russia.
And the fight on the ground in Ukraine will be extremely tough for the Russians. I mean, take individual things like going into urban combat in Kyiv. So what will they do if they can get in there? Will they bring tanks in? If the Ukrainians are well-armed, they’re going to take those tanks out. And the Russian infantry conscripts without a lot of motivation to fight are going to be wandering around in a city of 3 million people getting picked off in what has already turned into a guerrilla war. So yes, ultimately, if the Russians are willing to stay long enough, and fight hard enough, and throw enough at it, they can prevail in a raw military sense. But the attrition of their morale, and their people, and their will is occurring daily, I think.
Let’s say they persist in that. What are they left with? They’re left with a ruined country of people who will hate them for the rest of their lives and who will fight a guerrilla war. All of the elements are there for an insurgency.
So I just think [the Russians] have gotten themselves into a situation that they’re going to deeply regret. And Putin, my personal opinion is in the end, he will deeply regret it because he’s just made himself an international pariah for the rest of his life.
Grid: You have used a phrase — “a Srebrenica moment.” Our audience probably knows, but this refers to a horrific incident, a war crime committed by the Bosnian Serbs nearly three decades ago in that conflict. Others have invoked what the Russians themselves did in Chechnya and the leveling of Grozny. This week in Mariupol, in eastern Ukraine, a Russian airstrike hit a maternity hospital. At what point does the very logical, practical argument that you cannot send warplanes up change? Do you think there are going to be moments that are so visceral that it will change that conversation?
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JM: It’s certainly easy to imagine that. The reason I say “Srebrenica moment” is for the reason you mentioned. Prior to Srebrenica, President Clinton didn’t want to send NATO forces into Bosnia. But when 7,000 Muslim men and boys were killed in one day in one spot, Srebrenica, that tipped the balance. So can something like that happened in Ukraine? It’s not hard to imagine. Certainly a maternity ward is in the zone of that horror. But there are reports that you know, the Russians are thinking about attacking Odessa. And more or less leveling Odessa. It’s one of the really beautiful cities of the Black Sea. And it’s a treasure.
And something on that scale or something in Kyiv, another beautiful city, if they were to level major parts of Kyiv, with massive civilian casualties. Again, we’re in unknown territory, and who can predict anything about reactions, but already the frustration and tension is building among NATO countries, and the world. In fact, the world’s reaction to this can be summarized in one sentence. That sentence is: We don’t do this anymore.
So yes, it’s not hard to imagine something that would overcome these very logical and reasonable reactions. Who wants two superpowers with nuclear weapons to be engaging each other? No one wants that. But could it change the risk versus benefit calculus in a way? I don’t know. It certainly would stoke the frustration on our side, in ways that would be, I think, unpredictable in terms of the outcome.
Grid: Let’s talk for a moment about what has been sent in to Ukraine. On the scale of, “it’s symbolic and makes the West feel better” versus “it actually is making a difference on the battlefield” — where would you rate what you’ve seen about weapons going in?
JM: The material that’s gone in is very significant. We have always thought two or three times about whether to send in anti-aircraft missiles like Stingers. Stingers aren’t going to be effective against highflying combat jet aircraft, but they are very effective against low-flying aircraft and helicopters. And the anti-tank weapons are very effective and would make tanks extremely vulnerable if they brought them into cities. So these are not feel-good weapons, these are serious weapons of war. And the Ukrainians are using them brilliantly.
Grid: You’ve reflected a little bit on how the Russian leader must be feeling about all of this. But what about influencing the man to scale down in any way or to negotiate. We were interested in the Israeli prime minister’s visit, which went on for quite some time at the Kremlin recently. Is there any glimmer of hope you see for a way out that involves talking to Putin himself?
JM: Well, these visits by people like Naftali Bennett, the Israeli prime minister, and by [French President Emmanuel] Macron, and any others who can go in and see him are very important. Because if they are able to tell him what’s going on, they’re able to say, and I assume they would: Do you understand what’s going on in Ukraine? And do you understand how the world is reacting?
Is there a way out? Well, you know, I think his exits have been closing here. Ironically, it is his firm control of the media in Russia that may offer him the best way out. Again, heroic diplomacy is called for here. If we could find some trade space where he could be given some inconsequential concession. I don’t know what it would be, leave that to the genius diplomats, but not something that sacrifices basic principles, something that he could then use his media to spin up into a meringue of victory and portray as having a mission accomplished, and we’ve protected our brethren and gotten rid of whatever the problem was there. That’s one way out for him.
There is one other factor in all of this, and that is China. It’s pretty obvious from their public statements that they’re not 100 percent comfortable with this. If you think about the model that China and Russia have sought to project to the world, as an alternative to the model that we have created and spread after World War II, a model global order, this isn’t a great advertisement for their model. So I would not give up on seeking China to use its influence with Putin. None of this would be done publicly. You know, this is one of those times where a lot of stuff has to go on behind the scenes that we may never know about or not know about until much later.
The bottom line is that there may be some trade that isn’t significant in this environment that could give him a face-saver out of this. But it’s very hard to see any other kind of exit for him that is good for Russia or good for him.
20. Ukraine Needs Ground-Based Air Defenses Way More Than MiGs. Here Are The Best Options
No US systems on this list.
Ukraine Needs Ground-Based Air Defenses Way More Than MiGs. Here Are The Best Options
Rushing highly mobile and familiar air defense systems to Ukraine is the key to keeping Russian aircraft at bay and under threat.
BY TYLER ROGOWAY AND THOMAS NEWDICK MARCH 10, 2022
thedrive.com · by Tyler Rogoway and Thomas Newdick · March 10, 2022
Ukraine MOD
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When it comes to helping Ukraine continue to keep Russia from gaining air superiority over its skies — a miraculous achievement thus far in the conflict that is now in its third week — all the focus has been on providing the embattled country with a couple of dozen decades-old MiG-29 Fulcrums. This has been an unfortunate distraction. What Ukraine really needs more than anything else are ground-based air defense systems — surface-to-air missiles, or SAMs — especially the kind with medium or greater altitude engagement capabilities that are optimized for high mobility. And not just any SAM systems that fulfill the requirements, but Soviet-era systems that the Ukrainian military is fully trained on employing in combat and supporting in the field.
While providing additional fighters for Ukraine's air arm, which remains under great pressure from Russia's war machine, is one potential facet of bolstering its air defenses, it is far from the most important or convenient one. Fighters are the least of the Russian military's counter-air worries at the moment. The presence of medium to higher-tier SAM threats keeps Russia's combat aircraft from operating at medium altitudes or above, in effect pressing them right into the shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile (man-portable air defense systems or MANPADS) engagement envelope, which is roughly defined as anything under 15,000 feet. Thousands of MANPADS of different types have flooded into Ukraine and have been dispersed among troops across the country — and more are on the way. They have been brutally effective so far, but without the threat presented by more capable air defense systems, the opportunities to engage the enemy at lower altitudes will decline. In other words, the presence of one enables the other.
Highly unpredictable ground-mobile SAMs complicate the tactical threat picture even more for Russia. They are far more survivable than their less agile, largely static counterparts. They can appear out of virtually nowhere and then disappear before traditional counterattacks are possible. Leveraging radar guidance, they are also effective in any weather, day or night.
It has become abundantly clear in recent days that these more robust air defense assets remain a major issue for Russia, which you can read all about in this recent feature of ours. Regardless, according to the U.K. Ministry of Defense, a significant reduction in Russian air activity in recent days is likely due to this reason.
UK MOD
When it comes to fighters over SAMs, the U.S. government appears to have come to a similar conclusion. Speaking yesterday, John Kirby, the U.S. military’s top spokesperson, said that instead of the MiG-29s, the Ukrainian forces would benefit more from additional deliveries of ground-based air defense systems. While the Fulcrum became a signature weapon for the Ukrainian side early on in the conflict, and a rallying point for the country’s population, Kirby is right that transferring more of these jets would not necessarily have made the most sense from a military or a risk of escalation perspective. After all, while the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has made big claims about the aerial kills achieved by its fighters, the country’s ground-based air defense systems have certainly played a far bigger role in depriving Russia of air superiority — a surprise for many analysts, who had expected Russian aerial dominance to quickly show through. They have also limited Russia's ability to supply close air support to its own troops, giving Ukraine an additional advantage.
The U.S. decision is not one made on the fly either. A specialized team was sent to Ukraine in the months leading up to the war to closely evaluate the country's air defense capabilities and its projected needs should an invasion occur. In other words, the U.S. has an intimate and up-to-date knowledge of how best to help Ukraine keep Russia's airpower at bay.
What's even stranger is that somehow, as part of the MiG transfer drama, some in the media and on Capitol Hill reimagined the utility of the decades-old MiG-29 variants in question. While these aircraft do have an austere ground attack capability, somehow they have morphed into being a pivotal air-to-ground platform capable of unilaterally wiping out massive columns of Russian heavy armor that sit under their own anti-air umbrella. This is pure fantasy that has been created by people who have no idea what the MiG-29's capabilities actually are and think it is just an analog to a late-block F-16. And even then, their understanding of what an F-16 is actually capable of would also have to be of Hollywood action film level and outright divorced from reality. So no, a MiG-29 armed with a couple of rocket pods or a few dumb bombs is not going to repulse Russia's northern advance to Kyiv. And any mission of that sort has a high probability of being a one-way trip, regardless.
AP
Ukrainian MiG-29 taxiing.
Even in the air-to-air realm, the truth is the generation of MiG-29 in being discussed is at a great disadvantage against its Russian counterparts, especially as Russia learns and adapts to its own failings and further integrates A-50 radar planes and other force-multiplier capabilities into its counter-air battle plans. This era of MiG-29 is also largely airfield and ground radar dependent, some of which remain operational despite Russia's opening blows, but for how long remains a real question.
So, while ground-based air defenses are not as nearly as sexy of a topic as high-performance fighters flown by seemingly supernatural Ukrainian pilots, they are far more relevant to the pressing tactical realities facing the country today.
Once again, the major sticking point here is that Ukraine needs systems it can operate, employ successfully, and maintain in the field immediately, not western designs that will take months or even years to train on, field, and create a logistical train in a war zone to support. Hopefully, the U.S. government and its partners have learned from their abysmal mistakes in furnishing the Afghan Army with advanced western equipment it couldn't sustain on its own even after years of trying and will go another route with Ukraine.
With all this in mind, any additional and familiar air defense systems that could be supplied to Ukraine quickly so that they can continue to sustain and even broaden their successful anti-air campaign would likely have a significant effect on the course of the fighting and on the long-term fate of the country in general. The following rundown provides details of the SAM systems above the threshold of MANPADS that are currently used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and which would, therefore, be prime candidates to enhance their anti-air capacity in the ongoing air war.
The best candidates:
S-300P
On paper, some of the most capable surface-to-air missiles in the Ukrainian inventory, at least before the outbreak of the war, is the S-300P (SA-10 Grumble), one of the earlier iterations of the Soviet-designed S-300 family of long-range SAM systems.
The earliest examples of this system that the Ukrainian military has operated are S-300PT variants, which first entered service in the late 1970s and use trailer-mounted erector launchers, radars, and command posts. Ukraine's armed forces have also fielded S-300PS systems, which were first introduced in the mid-1980s and integrated the various components onto 8x8 MAZ-7910 truck chassis for much-improved mobility.
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense
A trailer-based launcher associated with one of Ukraine's S-300PT systems during a firing exercise in the Kherson region, in 2018.
It’s unclear how many examples of either of those systems were still in service or in storage in Ukraine before the outbreak of the current conflict, although previous assessments indicate that 250 launchers have remained in inventory.
The current organizational structure of Ukraine's S-300 units is also unknown, but a typical S-300PS battery may include three transporter erector launchers (TELs), two of which are also capable of acting as transloaders to be able to help reload each other, along with two other vehicles, one carrying a 5N63 or 30N6 Flap Lid phased array engagement radar and another configured as a mobile command post. As many as eight firing batteries, combined with other command and control nodes and radars, such as the 36D6 Tin Shield surveillance radar, comprise a single complete S-300PS system.
Though the S-300PS system can fire various different kinds of interceptors, the 5V55R missile, which features semi-active radar homing terminal guidance, is the main type available to Ukraine and has a stated maximum range of 56 miles and can hit targets at high altitudes.
VoidWanderer/Wikimedia Commons
Ukrainian transporter-erector-launchers associated with the S-300PS system.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense claims that a least some of its S-300PS systems are still operational. For instance, they reportedly contributed to the destruction of four Russian Su-25 attack aircraft and two helicopters, as well as two cruise missiles during the night of March 8/9. Some elements of these systems may have been destroyed by Russian forces, as well.
There are a number of potential sources of additional S-300s within NATO that might be available for transfer to Ukraine. Bulgaria has one complete S-300PMU system, while Slovakia inherited a single battery after the breakup of Czechoslovakia. Greece has 12 S-300PMU-1 systems, an improved version of the S-300PMU that, among other things, features an updated 30N6E radar and has the ability to fire 48N6 interceptors. The 48N6, variants of which have stated maximum ranges between 90 and 160 miles, uses a so-called track-via-missile (TVM) guidance system that blends radio command guidance with semi-active radar homing in the terminal phase of flight.
Experience with the original S-300P series could make it easier for the Ukrainian military to train personnel to operate examples of the S-300PMU. It’s not immediately clear how much additional instruction might be required for them to be able to use the PMU-1.
S-300V1
While the S-300PS was developed for the Soviet Union's Air Defense Forces, the S-300V1 (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant) is a related system that was instead tailored for use by Soviet ground forces, being carried on tracked transport-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicles, for improved cross-country mobility. Two primary types of missiles are provided as armament: the 9M83 (SA-12A Gladiator) with a maximum engagement range of around 47 miles and the 9M82 (SA-12B Giant) that can engage targets out to 62 miles. No NATO militaries use the S-300V family of systems, ruling out the possibility of transferring additional such weapons to Ukraine, which was thought to operate only a few examples of the SA-12A version prior to the Russian invasion.
VoidWanderer/Wikimedia Commons
The SA-12a Gladiator configuration of the S-300V1, with four 9M83 missiles.
S-125
The S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa) is a medium-altitude surface-to-air system that uses command-guided interceptors, the first version of which entered Soviet service in the early 1960s. The S-125 system evolved over time with the addition of new interceptors with improved capabilities and updated radars. In general, complete Pechora systems includes some number of truck-mounted or static launchers, along with an array of radars, including P-15 Flat Face/Squad Eye-series target acquisition types, SNR-125 "Low Blow" fire control models, and PRV-11 "Side Nets" for determinate the height at which targets are operating.
It's not clear how many Ukrainian S-125 systems were still in service when Russia's invasion began, but its examples utilize static launchers and therefore are not highly mobile. The country had previously retired its S-125s, but domestic companies continued to develop upgrades and provide support for the system, even testing an improved missile in 2018. Ukrainian troops were observed training with an S-125 system as recently as in 2020.
Buk-M1
The 9K37M1 Buk-M1 is an improved variant of the original 9K37 (SA-11 Gadfly) mobile medium-range SAM system developed toward the end of the Soviet era. Each of the tracked TEL vehicles carried four ready-to-fire missiles, as well as the fire control radar. The maximum engagement range of the missile is 22 miles. Apparently heavily utilized in the conflict so far by both Russian and Ukrainian forces, Ukraine entered the war with a reported 72 examples of the system available. Although not fielded by any NATO nations, the Buk system was previously operated by Finland, which has passed military materiel to Ukraine already. The Finnish examples have been in storage for some time now, but are reportedly still kept ready for possible wartime use.
VoidWanderer/Wikimedia Commons
Ukrainian 9K37M1 Buk-M1.
The Buk's high mobility and independence of operation, as well as its ability to hit targets operating as high as 45,000 feet, make it among the most well-suited options to help Ukraine keep Russia from gaining air superiority over the country. It's also worth noting that a Russian SA-11 is what took down Malaysian Airlines flight 17 back in 2014.
9K330 Tor
The 9K330 Tor (SA-15 Gauntlet) is a highly mobile tracked short-range air defense system (SHORADS) that was originally developed as a replacement for the widely used wheeled 9K33 Osa. The system is in limited use with the Ukrainian Ground Forces, which had six of them active as of 2018 when they appeared in the Ukrainian Military Independence Day Parade, having been refurbished after several years out of service. Within NATO, Greece is the only operator of the Tor, with a reported 25 examples. As it stands, another potential option for Ukraine to increase its inventory of Tor systems might even be through the capture of Russian examples, several of which have been noted either abandoned or in Ukrainian hands.
VoidWanderer/Wikimedia Commons
A Ukrainian 9K330 Tor after its return to service in 2018.
A captured Russian 9K330 Tor towed by a Ukrainian civilian tractor:
Tor is a shorter-range air defense system that can hit targets up to around 20,000 feet. Its self-contained and highly-mobile nature makes it effective at shoot-and-scoot-like aerial ambushes.
9K33 Osa
The Cold War-era 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko) is a SHORADS based on a fully amphibious six-wheeled BAZ-5937 transport vehicle. A variety of 9M33 series missiles are available for the Osa, the original variant having a range of 7.5 miles and all of which use radio command guidance. The number of these systems available to Ukraine prior to the start of hostilities is unclear, although various reports state that the particular version in use is the Osa-AKM, or SA-8B Gecko Mod-1, with 9M33M3 missiles with a maximum range of 9.3 miles and maximum altitude to of 40,000 feet. The Osa-AKM carries six missiles in box-type containers, rather than the four exposed missiles found on the original system.
Despite its age, the Osa remains effective and is in use with Bulgaria, Greece, Poland, and Romania. These nations could all potentially be willing to give up their Osa systems, especially if inventories were back-filled with more modern SHORADS systems.
Віталій/Wikimedia Commons
Ukrainian 9K33 Osa-AKM systems on parade in Kyiv.
Shorter-range systems that could still be useful:
9K35 Strela-10
The tracked 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher) was introduced in the 1970s as the successor to the wheeled 9K31 Strela-1 and fulfills the same low-level air defense role, also using a variant of the same missile used in the widespread Strela MANPADS. Unlike the Strela-1, the Strela-10 uses a more mobile, tracked MT-LB chassis. A variety of infrared-guided missiles, including the 9M37 and 9M333 families, are available and can engage targets out to a range of 3.1 miles. Prior to the start of the latest hostilities, Ukraine was thought to have at least 75 examples of the Strela-10 in service. The Strela-10 is also fairly widespread in NATO service, with examples still fielded by Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and North Macedonia, while there may still be stocks of retired systems held by both Poland and Slovakia.
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense
A Ukrainian 9K35 Strela-10.
9K31 Strela-1
The original highly mobile low-level air defense system fielded by the Soviet Union and provided to many of its allies was the 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin), mounted on a variant of the BRDM-2 wheeled amphibious light armored vehicle and armed with two pairs of ready-to-fire infrared-guided 9M31 missiles, which have a range of around 2.6 miles. Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, and Romania are the NATO nations that still possess stocks of Strela-1 systems thought to be in frontline use, and other NATO members in Eastern Europe may still have stocks of retired Strela-1s.
Toca/wikicommons
A Croatian Strela-1.
2K22 Tunguska
The 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 Grison) has been seen fairly frequently in the Ukrainian conflict, albeit mainly in Russian hands. Ukraine reportedly has around 70 of the tracked self-propelled systems, which combine 9M311 series surface-to-air missiles with twin 30mm cannons. There are no NATO operators of the system. Beyond Ukraine, Russia and Belarus are the only European countries with these systems in service, so restocking the Ukrainian Tunguska inventory looks unlikely.
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense
Ukrainian 2K22 Tunguska systems.
These systems represent the most capable ground-based air defense assets available to the Ukrainian Armed Forces ahead of the Russian invasion, supplemented by much larger numbers of MANPADS, as well as anti-aircraft artillery.
Of course, the S-300V1 and the Tunguska are not part of the NATO inventories, so the transfer of additional examples to Ukraine may be more challenging. At the same time, however, NATO has many air defense systems that are not part of the Ukrainian inventory or have since been withdrawn from use by Ukraine. While these could potentially be reintroduced to service, hurdles may still exist in the form of finding qualified operators and maintaining them over time.
It's also worth noting that the United States does have limited stocks of pretty much all of these systems it has acquired via various means under foreign materiel exploitation (FME) programs. Today, operational versions of the S300, Tor, and other systems are used in training against allied forces during major exercises like Red Flag and for other training and developmental evolutions. In other words, the U.S. could potentially rush some of these systems to Ukraine from its own very limited stocks, but doing so would degrade a critical training capability and the Pentagon isn't always up to discussing its FME programs or capabilities. The same can be said for MiG-29s in the U.S. Department of Defense's hands, as we discussed in detail in this recent report.
Also, the question of missile availability for these systems is also relevant. While the U.S. possesses the systems themselves, they do not fire missiles in training, so stocks of actual SAMs for them are likely small if not non-existent. Still, even helping with extra parts to keep them supported in the field could be worthwhile. It's also worth noting that Ukraine itself has been a huge contributor to U.S. FME efforts, sending radars, jets, and other capabilities to the United States for study and training.
Regardless, the big question now is how fast the U.S. and its allies can gather up relevant systems and get them into Ukraine. This is a far simpler task than dealing with the MiG-29s, but the clock is ticking. With every day that goes by that this doesn't happen, Russia has more time to adapt to Ukraine's diminished capabilities and work to degrade them further. But hopefully with the fighter jet drama laid to rest, getting SAM systems that have commonality with those already in Ukrainian hands can become an objective all of NATO can focus on before it is too late.
Contact the author: tyler@thedrive.com and thomas@thedrive.com
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thedrive.com · by Tyler Rogoway and Thomas Newdick · March 10, 2022
21. Putin's Plan B for Ukraine: A DMZ between East and West
Say no to DMZs. No more DMZs. DMZs are not demilitarized. This is one of the biggest oxymorons in international affairs.
MARCH 10, 2022
Illustrated | Getty Images, iStock
After several rounds of peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, Russia has begun to state explicitly (via foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova) that its war aims do not include overthrowing the elected government of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky or occupying the country.
Welcome to Vladimir Putin's Plan B.
When Russia's invasion of Ukraine began two weeks ago, overthrowing its government and installing a Russian-friendly puppet regime was very much the goal. But Putin's Plan A hasn't worked out as hoped. The Ukrainian military has fought back harder than anticipated. Zelensky has become a hero admired across the country and throughout the democratic world. And Russia's military has suffered severe setbacks. Add in economic sanctions imposed by Western governments (and boycotts by a long list of companies) that are far harsher than Putin, or really anyone, expected, and we're left with something approaching a debacle for the Russian autocrat.
Of course Putin can't just end his Ukrainian misadventure, slinking back across the border empty-handed. He needs to be able to point to some alteration in the pre-invasion status quo to justify Russia's enormous loss of blood and treasure, and to protect himself against a palace coup.
That's how we get to Plan B, which my colleague Grayson Quay summarized in a recent column: Ukraine would "formally cede Crimea to Russia, recognize the independence of the Russian-backed separatist republics in eastern Ukraine, and amend the Ukrainian constitution to forbid membership in international blocs like NATO and the European Union." Then there's Wednesday's clarification that Zelensky's government would get to remain in power.
This would turn Ukraine into a neutral zone between NATO and Russia. That would be a significant break from the way things worked during Cold War 1.0, when lines of separation between west and east were sharp and clear. Back then, you were either on one side of the Iron Curtain or the other — West Germany or East Germany, Paris or Prague. We can already see that stark division returning to borders today, only somewhat further east: between the Baltic states and northern Russia, between Poland and Belarus. If Putin had gotten his way in Ukraine, with a puppet regime installed in Kyiv, the dividing line would have been pushed to Ukraine's western border with Moldova and the NATO states of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania.
But that now looks beyond Putin's grasp. Hence the fallback of turning Ukraine into an 800-mile-wide DMZ between west and east.
Whether Putin will demand literal or only figurative demilitarization remains to be seen, as does Zelensky's willingness to accept whatever the Kremlin ultimately demands. Even more significant is the question of whether the U.S. and NATO will accept it. (Hard lines can be easier to defend than blurred ones.)
We may receive answers sooner than any of us expected.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
