Quotes of the Day:

"The path to freedom is not easy, but it is the only path worth walking." 

– Kim Koo

"I find the great thing in this world is not so much where we stand, as in what direction we are moving." 

– Olive Wendell Holmes, Sr.

"America has been called a melting pot, but it seems better to call it a mosaic, for in it each nation, people, or race which has come to its shores has been privileged to keep its individuality, contributing at the same time its share to the unified pattern of a new nation." 

– King Baudouin of Belgium

1. The Threat from Russia’s Unconventional Warfare Beyond Ukraine, 2022–24

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 19, 2024

3.. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 19, 2024

4. Why is Japan hosting a conference for Ukraine reconstruction when it's still at war? AP explains.

5. The Next Tripartite Pact? China, Russia, and North Korea’s New Team Is Not Built to Last

6. ASU launches MA in global security, with irregular warfare concentration

7. Special Operations News - February 20, 2024 | SOF News

8. The Strange Resurrection of the Two-State Solution

9. This military special ops unit is so classified, even its name is a secret — and getting into it is absolute hell

10. Propensity Through Permeability: A Culture Shift That Might Save the All-Volunteer Force

11. Russian spies are back—and more dangerous than ever

12. Two Years On: Russia's Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine and the Continuing Lessons for the Future of Irregular Warfare

13. The AI Deception: Navigating the Mirage of Political Deepfakes Ahead of 2024 Elections

14. US must not lose Taiwan, experts warn

15. Russia is rebuilding capacity to destabilize European countries, new UK report warns

16. Philippine troops clash with Muslim militants in a gunbattle that has left at least eight dead

17. How Many Sentinel Missiles Does the United States Need?

1. The Threat from Russia’s Unconventional Warfare Beyond Ukraine, 2022–24

Download the PDF of the 38 page report at this link: https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Unconventional-Weapons-final-web.pdf

Tp paraphrase and revise Sun Tzu: "Do not assume the enemy will not conduct unconventional warfare, defend yourself with an effective counter unconventional warfare strategy."

Congress told DOD to develop a counter-unconventional warfare strategy in section 1097 of the NDAA in 2016. As far as I know DOD never sufficeintly developed this strategy.

https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1735/text#toc-H57D78DE2C41D4347BF5202B774B80E94  

 SEC. 1097. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE.

(a) Strategy Required.—The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of other appropriate departments and agencies of the United States Government, develop a strategy for the Department of Defense to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include each of the following:

(1) An articulation of the activities that constitute unconventional warfare threats to the United States and allies.

(2) A clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense in providing indications and warning of, and protection against, acts of unconventional warfare.

(3) An analysis of the adequacy of current authorities and command structures necessary for countering unconventional warfare.

(4) An articulation of the goals and objectives of the Department of Defense with respect to countering unconventional warfare threats.

(5) An articulation of related or required interagency capabilities and whole-of-Government activities required by the Department of Defense to support a counter-unconventional warfare strategy.

(6) Recommendations for improving the counter-unconventional warfare capabilities, authorities, and command structures of the Department of Defense.

(7) Recommendations for improving interagency coordination and support mechanisms with respect to countering unconventional warfare threats.

(8) Recommendations for the establishment of joint doctrine to support counter-unconventional warfare capabilities within the Department of Defense.

(9) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

(c) Submittal To Congress.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees the strategy required by subsection (a). The strategy shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) Unconventional Warfare Defined.—In this section, the term “unconventional warfare” means activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.

The US Army Special Operations Command published a white paper on countering unconventional warfare in 2014. But as far as I know no other work has been done on this to satisfy the requirement 2016 NDAA.

Here is a link to the USASOC White Paper. https://www.soc.mil/Files/Counter-UnconventionalWarfareWP.pdf

If that one does not work you can download a copy of the white paper from this link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ngCc7hlbQ56cVi5KFSwjYhdjVBF38pHR/view?usp=sharing

The Threat from Russia’s Unconventional Warfare Beyond Ukraine, 2022–24

Dr Jack Watling , Oleksandr V Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds20 February 2024

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This report details Russia’s unconventional military activities outside Ukraine, including efforts to prepare for destabilisation in European countries, expeditionary operations in Africa to seize control of critical resources, and outreach to target audiences in the Middle East.

Western discourse about Russia’s way of war has oscillated between emphasising the conventional and unconventional threat.1 Up until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the emphasis was disproportionately on Russian unconventional warfare – the conduct of sabotage, subversion and destabilisation through undeclared Russian forces – carried out in the so-called ‘grey zone’. This has since shifted to the conventional threat that Russia poses to NATO. The problem with this is that Russia considers both conventional and unconventional military means to be tools of national power and applies them in combination. It is the conventional threat of escalation that deters retaliation against unconventional activity, thereby expanding the scope of what Russia can get away with. Conversely, it is the unconventional operations of the Russian special services that aim to set the conditions for the successful application of conventional military force.2 Both tool sets must be understood to appreciate the threat that Russia poses. Its unconventional efforts remain central to its theory of victory against Ukraine – and countering them is equally important.

This report’s primary conclusions are that Russia’s special services actively seek to expand their capacity in several areas that pose strategic threats to NATO members. First, the GRU is restructuring how it manages the recruitment and training of special forces troops and is rebuilding the support apparatus to be able to infiltrate them into European countries. Second, the GRU has taken the Wagner Group’s functions in house and is aggressively pursuing the expansion of its partnerships in Africa with the explicit intent to supplant Western partnerships. Third, the leader of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, is being used to build a broad network of influence among Chechen and Muslim populations in Europe and the Middle East, with the aim of contributing to the subversion of Western interests. These lines of effort should be countered.

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 19, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Russian actors conducted a cyber operation regarding Russia’s seizure of Avdiivka, likely aimed at generating panic in the Ukrainian information space and weakening Ukrainian morale.
• The tempo of Russian offensive operations near Avdiivka has reportedly dramatically slowed following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two more Russian fighter aircraft, a Su-34 and a Su-35S, in eastern Ukraine on the morning of February 19.
• The White House is reportedly considering the provision of long-range ATACMS missiles to Ukraine in the event that Congress passes security assistance for Ukraine.
• The Russian government eased the requirements for “compatriots” living abroad to apply to resettle in Russia.
• Emirati banks reportedly began to limit some transactions with Russian entities and close Russian citizens’ accounts in September 2023 due to the risk of Western secondary sanctions.
• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reiterated that Armenia does not support Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine against the backdrop of deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Donetsk City and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitri Medvedev claimed on February 19 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has recruited more than 53,000 military personnel since January 1, 2024.
• Russian authorities have reportedly returned Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine and Russia to relatives in Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 19, 2024

Feb 19, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 19, 2024

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

February 19, 2024, 7:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on February 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian actors conducted a cyber operation regarding Russia’s seizure of Avdiivka, likely aimed at generating panic in the Ukrainian information space and weakening Ukrainian morale. Ukraine’s State Special Communication Service reported on February 18 that Russian actors hacked well-known Ukrainian media outlets and posted fake information on their social media channels.[1] Ukrainian outlets Ukrainska Pravda, Apostrophe, Liga.net, and Telegraf reported on February 18 that their social media accounts were hacked and that hackers posted disinformation, specifically about the alleged widespread destruction of Ukrainian forces in Avdiivka.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) issued new claims about the Ukrainian withdrawal from Avdiivka on February 19 aimed at sowing resentment and distrust against the Ukrainian command, and other Russian sources amplified this information operation.[3]

The tempo of Russian offensive operations near Avdiivka has reportedly dramatically slowed following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Dmytro Lykhoviy reported on February 19 that the number of Russian attacks in the Avdiivka direction significantly decreased in the past day and that Russian forces are currently regrouping and conducting clearing operations in Avdiivka.[4] Lykhoviy noted that Russian shelling and aviation activity has also significantly decreased in the area.[5] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn to a new line of defense, which Ukrainian forces previously prepared in advance and fortified at “several levels.”[6] Russian forces will likely have to conduct an operational pause before resuming significant offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction or will have to transfer additional reinforcements from other sectors of the front to the area to prevent operations near Avdiivka from culminating. Russian forces have reserves available for such reinforcement in other sectors, but ISW has observed no indication that the Russian command is moving those reserves toward Avdiivka at this time. Lykhoviy and Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash, on the contrary, stated that the Russian command will likely transfer Russian forces accumulated around Avdiivka to other, unspecified areas of the frontline in the near future.[7] Yevlash stated that it will likely take Russian forces at least a week to transfer units from Avdiivka into battle in unspecified frontline areas.[8] ISW has not yet observed any indications of how Russian forces will choose to allocate their manpower currently deployed to the Avdiivka area.

Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two more Russian fighter aircraft, a Su-34 and a Su-35S, in eastern Ukraine on the morning of February 19.[9] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that the Russian aircraft were striking Ukrainian positions with glide bombs when Ukrainian air defenses destroyed the planes.[10] Ukrainian forces also shot down two Su-34s and one Su-35 over Donetsk Oblast on February 17 and another Su-34 in eastern Ukraine on February 18.[11] Russian forces appear to have temporarily established limited and localized air superiority during the final days of their offensive operation to seize Avdiivka, but Ukrainian air defenders appear to be challenging Russian air operations in eastern Ukraine once again.[12]

The White House is reportedly considering the provision of long-range ATACMS missiles to Ukraine in the event that Congress passes security assistance for Ukraine. NBC News reported on February 19 that two US officials stated that the White House is working to provide Ukraine with long-range ATACMS missiles in one of the first packages of military aid to Ukraine if Congress approves funding for further security assistance to Ukraine.[13] The US previously provided Ukraine with a limited number of a different type of ATACMS missile that have a shorter range.[14] Ukraine conducted successful ATACMS strikes in October 2023 but did not have enough supplies to sustain a strike campaign with ATACMS that could have presented operational challenges for Russian forces in Ukraine, particularly for Russian aviation operations and for the storage and supply of ammunition.[15] NBC News reported that the US officials also stated that the US has artillery systems and ammunition prepared for immediate transfer to Ukraine if Congress approves funding for US security assistance to Ukraine.[16] Ukrainian long-range strike capabilities allow Ukrainian forces to degrade Russian logistics at depth, and sufficient artillery systems and ammunition are crucial for effective Ukrainian counterbattery fire.

The Russian government eased the requirements for “compatriots” living abroad to apply to resettle in Russia. The Russian government announced on February 17 that it will no longer require "compatriots” abroad to prove their Russian-language proficiency when applying for resettlement in Russia if the individual is a Russian citizen permanently residing abroad; an individual who previously renounced Russian citizenship; an individual who was born or permanently resided in the Soviet Union and had Soviet citizenship; or an individual who has relatives who were born or permanently resided on territory formerly part of the Soviet Union or Russian Empire.[17] The Russian government stated that the changes in the requirements for resettlement in Russia follow a January 1, 2024, Russian presidential decree to “support compatriots from unfriendly countries.” The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that the Russkiy Mir — purposefully vaguely defined as including ethnic Russians, Russian language-speakers, and any territory and people formerly ruled by the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire — includes Ukrainians and that Russia’s invasions of Ukraine were allegedly in defense of “compatriots abroad” in Ukraine.[18] Russian President Vladimir Putin further expanded the definition of the Russian World in a speech in late November 2023 to include “those who consider themselves carriers of the Russian language, history, and culture regardless of their national or religious affiliation.”[19] Putin’s stated goals of “uniting” and maintaining control over the Russkiy Mir is part of Russia’s larger imperialist ambitions, and Russia may continue to enact measures in accordance with the purposefully broad Russian World framework to manufacture territorial claims against neighboring states, including NATO members.

Emirati banks reportedly began to limit some transactions with Russian entities and close Russian citizens’ accounts in September 2023 due to the risk of Western secondary sanctions. Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on February 19 that three businesspeople working in the UAE and a representative of the Russian “Delovaya Rossiya” organization stated that banks in the UAE are not accepting deposits from or making payments to Russian entities and are closing accounts of companies whose owners are Russian citizens for unclear reasons.[20] Vedomosti reported that one of the sources stated that the “purges” began in September 2023. A source close to the Russian Cabinet of Ministers reportedly stated that the Russian government is aware of the problem but considers it “not critical and solvable.” Vedomosti sources indicated that the problems with the banks can be solved, for example by using local connections and avoiding any connections with entities under Western sanctions. Bloomberg reported in November 2023 that Emirati banks increasingly faced US pressure and began to work to prevent sanctions evasion by rejecting Russian firms.[21] At least two state-owned Chinese banks reportedly ordered reviews of their business with Russian clients in January 2024 and will sever ties with sanctioned Russian entities and entities with ties to the Russian defense industry.[22] Turkish banks have also reportedly started to close Russian companies’ accounts.[23]

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reiterated that Armenia does not support Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine against the backdrop of deteriorating Russian–Armenian relations. Pashinyan stated on February 19 at the Munich Security Conference that “Armenia is not Russia’s ally in the matter of Ukraine.”[24] Pashinyan highlighted the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration that founded the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and recognized the territorial integrity of its 11 signatories, including Russia and Ukraine.[25] Kremlin officials and mouthpieces have increasingly promoted narratives about Russia’s alleged continued influence in Armenia and criticized Pashinyan’s policies.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian actors conducted a cyber operation regarding Russia’s seizure of Avdiivka, likely aimed at generating panic in the Ukrainian information space and weakening Ukrainian morale.
• The tempo of Russian offensive operations near Avdiivka has reportedly dramatically slowed following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two more Russian fighter aircraft, a Su-34 and a Su-35S, in eastern Ukraine on the morning of February 19.
• The White House is reportedly considering the provision of long-range ATACMS missiles to Ukraine in the event that Congress passes security assistance for Ukraine.
• The Russian government eased the requirements for “compatriots” living abroad to apply to resettle in Russia.
• Emirati banks reportedly began to limit some transactions with Russian entities and close Russian citizens’ accounts in September 2023 due to the risk of Western secondary sanctions.
• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reiterated that Armenia does not support Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine against the backdrop of deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Donetsk City and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitri Medvedev claimed on February 19 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has recruited more than 53,000 military personnel since January 1, 2024.
• Russian authorities have reportedly returned Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine and Russia to relatives in Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Rosgvardia has reportedly deployed additional elements to Belgorod Oblast. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on February 19 that Rosgvardia deployed elements of its 116th Special Purpose Brigade, namely units of the 901st Regiment, to Belgorod Oblast.[27] Mashovets stated on February 7 that elements of the 116th Special Purpose Brigade’s 900th and 902nd regiments redeployed to Belgorod Oblast from occupied Donetsk Oblast at the beginning of February.[28] Mashovets stated that Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Alexander Lapin and Rosgvardia Southern District Commander Igor Turchenyuk oversaw the Rosgvardia redeployment from occupied Donetsk Oblast to Belgorod Oblast.[29] Mashovets stated that elements of the 116th Special Purpose Brigade did not deploy to Belgorod Oblast’s international border with Ukraine and are operating north of Belgorod City along the E105 highway to Kursk City in the Syrtsevo-Yakovlevo-Stroitel-Dmitriyevka area.[30]

Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on February 19, but there were no confirmed changes to this area. Positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, southwest of Kupyansk near Tabaivka, west of Kreminna near Terny, and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[31] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated that Russian forces have intensified offensive operations near the Zherebets River and are transferring reinforcements to the area in an attempt to establish defensive positions near Terny and Torske (both west of Kreminna and on the east bank of the Zherebets River) and prepare for future offensive actions.[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional fighting near Bakhmut on February 19. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer near Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut).[33] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continued northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Pivdenne.[34] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash reported that Russian forces are conducting frontal assaults on Bohdanivka and are attacking the settlement’s flanks.[35] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut direction, and elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating near Bohdanivka.[36] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat “Kamerton” detachment are reportedly operating near Klishchiivka.[37]

Russian forces have likely seized all of Avdiivka as of February 19, though Russian forces may still be clearing portions of Avdiivka. Ukrainian units operating in the Avdiivka direction reported that all Ukrainian personnel withdrew from the Avdiivka Coke Plant on the far northwest side of Avdiivka, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces seized the plant.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Avdiivka near Stepove and Lastochkyne and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske and Pervomaiske.[39] One Russian milblogger claimed on February 18 that Russian forces seized Lastochkyne, but later withdrew those claims and noted that fighting continues near the settlement.[40] Russian and Ukrainian forces stated on February 19 that positional fighting continues near Novobakhmutivka (northwest of Avdiivka) and Sieverne (west of Avdiivka).[41] Elements of the Russian 41st Combined Arms Army (Central Military District), including its 55th, 35th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades, and the 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division) are operating near Avdiivka.[42] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People Republic [DNR] Army Corps) are operating near Pervomaiske, and elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR Army Corps) are operating near Nevelske.[43]

The Russian MoD published footage on February 18 suggesting that Russian forces were able to strike select small groups of withdrawing Ukrainian forces near Avdiivka, and reports from Ukrainian personnel operating near Avdiivka suggest that Russian forces were able to encircle isolated sub-tactical elements of Ukrainian units during the Ukrainian withdrawal from Avdiivka.[44] ISW has not observed indications that Russian forces were able to destroy or encircle a significant number of Ukrainian personnel during the Ukrainian withdrawal from Avdiivka. The Russian-provided footage and Ukrainian reports appear to explain the dissonance between Russian and Ukrainian characterizations of the Ukrainian withdrawal from Avdiivka in recent days.[45] Russian claims that the Ukrainian withdrawal was chaotic or that Russian forces had encircled Ukrainian troops likely exaggerated these small unit actions intentionally or unintentionally.

Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Marinka (west of Donetsk City) amid continued positional fighting west and southwest of Donetsk City on February 19. Geolocated footage published on February 17 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Marinka.[46] Russian and Ukrainian forces stated that positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[47] Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating near Heorhiivka.[48]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) and Prechystivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[49] Elements of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating north of Pryyutne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[50]

Russian forces recently advanced near Robotyne and continued intensified offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 19. Geolocated footage published on February 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the western outskirts of Robotyne.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed on February 18 and 19 that Russian forces advanced over a kilometer deep west of Verbove and up to two kilometers deep near Robotyne.[52] Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Russian forces reached the western and southern outskirts of Robotyne, with select milbloggers claiming that Russian forces entered the settlement and that fighting is ongoing in central Robotyne.[53] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian forces fighting in central Robotyne, and some Russian milbloggers disputed these Russian claims.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are trying to tactically separate Ukrainian forces deployed along the Robotyne-Verbove line.[55] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that Russian forces are attacking in small groups with limited armored vehicle support near Robotyne.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are intensifying indirect fire and air strikes near Kamianske (west of Robotyne) and made unspecified tactical gains in the area.[57] ISW has not yet observed confirmation of Russian advances in the area.[58] Positional fighting occurred near Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[59] Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly attacking near Verbove, and elements of the 291st, 70th, and 71st motorized rifle regiments (all of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly attacking near Robotyne.[60] Elements of the Russian 392nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized unit) are reportedly operating near Pyatykhatky (west of Robotyne), and elements of the 49th Special Airborne Brigade (a newly formed brigade reportedly subordinated to the 58th CAA) reportedly attacked near Kamianske.[61]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled at least 16 Russian assaults in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on February 19.[62] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces continue to conduct infantry assaults in east bank Kherson Oblast in an effort to conserve armored vehicles.[63]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Shahed-136/131 drones from Belgorod Oblast at targets in Kharkiv Oblast and that Ukrainian forces shot down all four drones.[64] Ukrainian officials also stated that Ukrainian forces shot down a Kh-59 missile near Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[65]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitri Medvedev claimed on February 19 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has recruited more than 53,000 military personnel since January 1, 2024.[66] Medvedev previously claimed the Russian military recruited 42,000 personnel between November 9 and December 1, 2023.[67] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on January 15 that Russia recruits about 30,000 personnel per month.[68]

Efforts to integrate former Wagner Group forces into Rosgvardia have reportedly halted. A Russian milblogger claimed that the creation of Rosgvardia’s 1st Volunteer Corps from the Wagner Group’s former 15th, 16th, and 17th Assault Detachments has not begun for unknown reasons.[69] The milblogger claimed that personnel who intended to make up the three units left for other unspecified volunteer units. The milblogger previously claimed that Rosgvardia tasked the 15th, 16th, and 17th Assault Detachments with recruiting volunteers after the Kremlin adopted a law allowing Rosgvardia to form its own volunteer formations in December 2023.[70]

Russia is nationalizing Western-owned factories in Russia, likely to further expand Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on February 19 transferring 100 percent of the shares of the Ulyanovsk Machine Tool Plant, which German company Gildemeister Beteiligungen GmbH (a subsidiary of the Japanese-German machine tool manufacturer DMG Mori) owns, to the temporary management of the Russian Federal Property Management Agency.[71] The Ulyanovsk Machine Tool Plant ceased operations in the spring of 2022 after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[72]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises and their European partners are producing ammunition for Ukrainian forces. Ukrainian Armor stated on February 19 that it delivered a shipment of “thousands” of 122 mm artillery shells that it produced in partnership with an unspecified Eastern European ammunition company to Ukrainian forces.[73]

Russia likely used its trade relations with Ecuador to prevent Ecuador from sending Soviet-era military equipment to Ukraine via the US. Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa announced in January that Ecuador was going to send $200 million worth of Soviet-era weapons to the US in exchange for modern weapons, but Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Gabriela Sommerfeld stated on February 19 that Ecuador would not send any military equipment to countries that are involved in international armed conflicts.[74] Russia partially lifted its ban on imports of Ecuadorian bananas, which Russia recently imposed allegedly for phytosanitary issues, on February 16.[75]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian authorities have reportedly returned 11 Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine and Russia to relatives in Ukraine. Kremlin-appointed Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova stated on February 19 that Russian authorities returned 11 Ukrainian children to Ukraine from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast; occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast; occupied Luhansk City; occupied Simferopol, Crimea; and Krasnoyarsk City.[76] Lvova-Belova stated that Qatari authorities mediated the children’s return.

Kherson Oblast Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin stated on February 19 that Ukrainian authorities returned two families and a child from occupied Kherson Oblast to Ukrainian-controlled areas.[77]

Russian authorities continue to forcibly deport children and their parents from occupied Ukraine to Russia under vacation schemes. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik stated on February 19 that LNR authorities, the Russian “humanitarian” organization “We Don’t Abandon Our Own,” and the “We Are Together” Foundation organized a two-week trip to Sochi, Krasnodar Krai for children of deceased Russian military personnel.[78] Pasechnik stated that the children’s mothers and grandmothers will also participate in the trip to Sochi.

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to falsify voting results and voter turnout in occupied Ukraine in the March 16-17 Russian presidential election. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on February 19 that Russia deployed specially trained groups to occupied Ukraine to oversee falsifications and monitor the work of election commissions ahead of the Russian presidential election.[79] The GUR stated that these Russian groups will attempt to prepare civilians in occupied Ukraine to vote by March 10. The GUR reported that Russian occupation authorities are not requiring citizens to have a Russian passport in order to vote and are promoting an online voter system that allows residents in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts to vote online “without registration.” The GUR stated that Russian occupation officials are falsely claiming that 85 percent of voters in occupied Ukraine support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s candidacy. Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian occupation authorities are intensifying measures to falsify voter turnout.[80]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Nothing significant to report.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 19, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-19-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Yemen: The Houthi movement launched an anti-ship ballistic missile that struck and disabled the UK-owned, Belize-flagged Rubymar cargo ship in the Bab al Mandeb strait on February 18. This incident marks the first time that a crew has had to abandon ship after a Houthi attack since Houthi attacks began during this round of escalation on November 19.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces are constructing a road in the Gaza Strip to divide the northern Gaza Strip from the southern Strip and facilitate Israeli raids. An IDF battalion commander working on the road said that Israeli forces will use the road to protect the area and control the flow of Gazans from north to south.
• Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF reported that Israeli forces are finishing clearing operation in western Khan Younis.
• Negotiations: The Qatari prime minister said that a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas should not require a hostage deal.
• Palestinian Politics: Russia invited Palestinian factions, including Hamas and PIJ, to meet in Moscow on February 26 for an “inter-Palestinian meeting.” The Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh said that the PA will see if Hamas “is ready to reach an understanding.”
• Lebanon: The IAF conducted airstrikes that targeted two “Hezbollah military depots” near Sidon, Lebanon on February 19. This is the first time since October 7 Israel has conducted airstrikes in Sidon, which is roughly 30km north of the Litani River and 40km south of Beirut.

IRAN UPDATE, FEBRUARY 19, 2024

Feb 19, 2024 - ISW Press

Iran Update, February 19, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Amin Soltani, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Houthi movement launched an anti-ship ballistic missile that struck and disabled the UK-owned, Belize-flagged Rubymar cargo ship in the Bab al Mandeb strait on February 18.[1] The Rubymar’s Lebanon-based management company said that the vessel took on water after the missile struck the vessel’s engine room.[2] The Houthi military spokesperson claimed that the cargo vessel had completely sunk about 22 hours after the attack occurred.[3] Neither the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) nor CENTCOM has said that the Rubymar sunk. A warship operating under the auspices of Operation Prosperity Guardian and a commercial vessel responded to the attack.[4] The commercial vessel evacuated the Rubymar’s crew to Djibouti.[5] This incident marks the first time that a crew has had to abandon ship after a Houthi attack since Houthi attacks began during this round of escalation on November 19.[6] The Houthi military spokesperson falsely claimed that the Houthis “made sure that the ship’s crew exited safely.”[7]

The Houthi movement claimed two attacks targeting a US-owned, Greece-flagged vessel and a Marshall-Islands flagged vessel in the Gulf of Aden on February 19.[8] The Houthi military spokesperson claimed that the Houthis fired anti-ship missiles at the US-owned and Greece-flagged Sea Champion and the Marshall Islands-flagged Navis Fortuna. The spokesperson said that the ships were both “American.”[9] The UKMTO reported two explosions lightly damaged one vessel 100 NM east of Aden.[10] British maritime security firm Ambrey said that the Sea Champion was “involved“ in the two explosions.[11]

The Houthi movement claimed that it shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over Hudaydah on February 19.[12] The group posted a video showing Houthi surface-to-air missile hitting the drone.[13] The video also showed the drone’s wreckage. The Houthi military spokesperson did not specify what type of missile system the Houthis used to shoot down the drone. Two US officials told the New York Times that the Pentagon is investigating the cause of the drone “crash.”[14] An unspecified US official told Voice of America that the Houthis previously shot down a Reaper drone over Yemen in early November 2023.[15]

Local Houthi-affiliated media reported that US forces conducted a strike against an unspecified target in al Jabbana, Hudaydah Province. The Houthi movement spokesperson condemned US and UK strikes against Houthi targets near the time of the incident.[16] CENTCOM has not confirmed the airstrike.

Key Takeaways:

• Yemen: The Houthi movement launched an anti-ship ballistic missile that struck and disabled the UK-owned, Belize-flagged Rubymar cargo ship in the Bab al Mandeb strait on February 18. This incident marks the first time that a crew has had to abandon ship after a Houthi attack since Houthi attacks began during this round of escalation on November 19.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces are constructing a road in the Gaza Strip to divide the northern Gaza Strip from the southern Strip and facilitate Israeli raids. An IDF battalion commander working on the road said that Israeli forces will use the road to protect the area and control the flow of Gazans from north to south.
• Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF reported that Israeli forces are finishing clearing operation in western Khan Younis.
• Negotiations: The Qatari prime minister said that a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas should not require a hostage deal.
• Palestinian Politics: Russia invited Palestinian factions, including Hamas and PIJ, to meet in Moscow on February 26 for an “inter-Palestinian meeting.” The Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh said that the PA will see if Hamas “is ready to reach an understanding.”
• Lebanon: The IAF conducted airstrikes that targeted two “Hezbollah military depots” near Sidon, Lebanon on February 19. This is the first time since October 7 Israel has conducted airstrikes in Sidon, which is roughly 30km north of the Litani River and 40km south of Beirut.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces are constructing a road in the Gaza Strip to divide the northern Gaza Strip from the southern Strip and facilitate Israeli raids.[17] An Israeli journalist embedded with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to observe the IDF’s construction of the new road. An IDF battalion commander working on the road said that Israeli forces will use the road to protect the area and control the flow of Gazans from north to south. The journalist reported that “the IDF was preparing for a very long stay” near the road.[18] Palestinian fighters have been infiltrating the northern Gaza Strip since early January and attempting to reconstitute their military capabilities and rebuild a governance system there.[19] Hamas’ return to providing services in areas that Israeli forces previously cleared undermines Israeli efforts to destroy Hamas.

Palestinian militias attempted to disrupt Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip on February 19. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters fired rockets targeting Israeli forces in southern Gaza City, where the IDF are constructing the new dividing road.[20] Hamas and Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fighters conducted combined attacks using man-portable air defense systems to target Israeli drones and helicopters in southwestern Gaza City.[21] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas that has expressed close ties with Iran. Other Palestinian militias fired rockets targeting an IDF supply line and Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip.[22]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) identified and killed a Palestinian fighter in Gaza City after the fighter fired a rocket from the central Gaza Strip into Israel.[23]

The IDF reported that Israeli forces are finishing clearing operation in western Khan Younis.[24] Israeli forces “expanded” ground operations in western Khan Younis on January 22 and have engaged Palestinian militias there on a near-daily basis since.[25] Three IDF brigades are operating in western Khan Younis to target Hamas’ battalion in the area and destroy military infrastructure.[26] Israeli forces used a drone to identify a Palestinian militia cell approaching their position in western Khan Younis on February 19 and directed an airstrike to target the cell.[27]

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the current war, detonated an unspecified explosive device and fired a rocket-propelled grenade targeting Israeli armor near Nasser Hospital.[28] Hamas fighters returned from “areas of fighting” in western Khan Younis and reported that they targeted 15 Israeli soldiers inside a house.[29] These fighters’ inability to communicate with higher headquarters until returning to rear areas indicates that their commanders may be unable to transmit orders to fighters engaged with the IDF. Several other Palestinian militia groups experienced similar delays in reporting as Israeli forces advanced across the Gaza Strip.[30]

Russia invited Palestinian factions, including Hamas and PIJ, to meet in Moscow on February 26 for an “inter-Palestinian meeting.”[31] Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister and Special Representative for the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov told Russian media on February 18 that Russia invited Palestinian factions that are based in different countries, including Syria and Lebanon. Bogdanov did not provide any additional details about the purpose of the meeting.[32] The Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh said that the PA will see if Hamas “is ready to reach an understanding.“[33] A senior Hamas delegation last traveled to Moscow in late October 2023 to meet with Russian and Iranian officials.[34] Hamas praised Russia’s stance toward the Israel-Hamas war after the meeting.[35] Russia has framed itself as a possible mediator between Israel and Hamas.[36]

The Qatari prime minister said that a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas should not require a hostage deal.[37] Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al Thani said that some unspecified countries believe that a hostage deal must be a condition of a ceasefire deal. Thani spoke at the Munich Security Conference on February 17, emphasizing the need to end the war. One of Israel’s stated war objectives is to recover the Hamas-held hostages from the Gaza Strip. Israel-Hamas negotiations have largely stalled since Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declined to send an Israeli delegation to Cairo for follow-up talks on February 14. Netanyahu refused to send a new delegation because Hamas demanded that Israel release thousands of Palestinian prisoners as part of the hostage deal.[38]

Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks into southern Israel from the Gaza Strip on February 19.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters six times in the West Bank on February 19.[39] Unspecified Palestinian fighters threw an explosive device at a car northwest of Nablus that was operated by an Israeli civilian.[40] The attack injured one person.

Israeli Army Radio reported that violence in the West Bank increased 350% in 2023 compared to 2022.[41] The IDF recorded 608 shooting, stabbing, explosive, and vehicle ramming attacks in 2023 compared to 170 attacks in 2022.[42] Three hundred shooting attacks took place in 2023, which is the highest number of shootings recorded since the Second Intifada in the early 2000s. The report did not specify how many attacks occurred after October 7. Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other Palestinian militia groups have repeatedly called for violent attacks targeting Israeli security forces and Israeli settlers in the West Bank since October 7.[43]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 19.[44] Lebanese Hezbollah claimed three attacks targeting IDF positions along the Israel-Lebanon border.[45]

The IAF conducted airstrikes that targeted two “Hezbollah military depots” near Sidon, Lebanon on February 19.[46] This is the first time since October 7 Israel has conducted airstrikes in Sidon, which is roughly 30km north of the Litani River and 40km south of Beirut.[47] A Reuters journalist reported that the IDF has conducted airstrikes further north into Lebanon at a higher frequency in recent weeks.[48]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Houthi President Mahdi al Mashat issued a decree declaring the United States and the United Kingdom “enemy states of Yemen” on February 19 for their support of Israel.[49] The decree states that Houthi forces should confront the United States and United Kingdom. Houthi attacks have consistently targeted US and UK interests prior to the declaration, however. Most Houthi attack claims now allege that the attacks’ targets are US or UK shipping. The Houthis increased claims focusing on “US or UK shipping” after combined US-UK airstrikes began targeting Houthi positions in Yemen in early January. Houthi attacks prior to early January framed most attacks as targeting Israeli-associated assets. The Houthis fire missiles and drones targeting ships without ties to the United States, United Kingdom or Israel. The Houthis attacked a Marshall Islands-flagged cargo ship transporting corn from Brazil to Iran on February 12, for example.[50]

The European Council launched a Greek-led, defensive naval coalition to protect commercial vessels from Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The coalition, dubbed Operation Aspides, will be based out of Larissa, Greece and commanded by Greece. The EU mission will not take part in any military strikes and will only operate to provide “maritime situation awareness, accompany vessels, and protect them against attacks” at sea.[51]

Western media reported on February 19 that Iranian-backed Shia Afghan militias fighters expressed “anger and frustration” at the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)’s treatment of casualties within their ranks.[52] US airstrikes killed at least 12 fighters in the Fatemiyoun, an Iranian-backed Shia Afghan militia, in Syria on February 2. The New York Times reported that Fatemiyoun members and other unspecified Afghans were angered and frustrated because the IRGC was “silent” on the deaths of the Fatemiyoun fighters. Fatemiyoun members and other Afghans on pro-Fatemiyoun social media channels “questioned” the lack of IRGC acknowledgement of the Fatemiyoun casualties, with some suggesting that the IRGC Quds Forces discriminated against the Afghans. The IRGC ordinarily acknowledges or threatens to avenge the death of its own members. Local Iranian officials, clerics, and an unspecified IRGC representative attended some of the funeral ceremonies inside Iran for the Fatemiyoun fighters who were killed in Syria. Iran evacuated IRGC personnel from its military facilities in Syria but kept Fatemiyoun fighters stationed at those facilities ahead of the US strikes on February 2.[53]

The IDF Air Force said that it has conducted a series of strikes targeting Iranian, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Syrian targets inside Syria since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.[54] The IDF previously reported on February 3 that it had conducted a series of airstrikes targeting more than 50 Hezbollah and Hezbollah-affiliated targets in Syria since the start of the war.[55]

4. Why is Japan hosting a conference for Ukraine reconstruction when it's still at war? AP explains.

Anticipate, anticipate, anticipate.  

Some key points in this excerpt:

The conference is largely about reconstruction and investment in Ukraine that could put Japan ahead of the curve. It’s also about Japan’s national security. Kishida has repeatedly said “Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow.” Japan has staunchly opposed Russia’s invasion, viewing it as a one-sided change of the “status-quo” by force. It is concerned about China’s increasingly assertive military actions in the region.

Why is Japan hosting a conference for Ukraine reconstruction when it's still at war? AP explains.

AP · February 19, 2024

TOKYO (AP) — Japan is hosting a conference for Japanese and Ukrainian officials to discuss reconstruction of Ukraine just ahead of the two-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion, while the U.S. and other Western countries are still focusing on military aid for the battlefield. Hundreds of senior officials and executives are attending the Japan-Ukraine Conference for Promotion of Economic Growth and Reconstruction in Tokyo. AP explains the event, its purpose, who’s attending and the projects being discussed.

WHO’S ATTENDING?

The conference is co-organized by the Japanese and Ukrainian governments, Japan’s powerful business organization Keidanren, and the Japan External Trade Organization, or JETRO.

Ukraine’s Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal is heading his country’s delegation of more than 100 government and corporate officials. First Deputy Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko, Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko and Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Minister Ruslan Strilets also were to attend.

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is leading Japan’s side, joined by Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa, Keidanren chair Masakazu Tokura, among many others. About 100 officials from Japanese companies, the majority of them startups but from also leading companies like Kawasaki Heavy Industry, farming equipment makers Yanmar Holdings and Kubota Co., and telecoms company Rakuten Symphony also are attending.

WHY NOW?

Japan hopes the conference will help build support for Ukraine as the war drags on after two years, at a time when attention has been diverted to the situation in Gaza. Officials in Tokyo say the global community should unite in supporting Ukraine to show that using force against other countries will not be tolerated.

WHY IS JAPAN DOING THIS?

The conference is largely about reconstruction and investment in Ukraine that could put Japan ahead of the curve. It’s also about Japan’s national security. Kishida has repeatedly said “Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow.” Japan has staunchly opposed Russia’s invasion, viewing it as a one-sided change of the “status-quo” by force. It is concerned about China’s increasingly assertive military actions in the region.

Japan has earned a strong reputation for economic and development cooperation under its post-World War II pacifist policy that commits it to never using force against other nations. Tokyo has eased that restraint to build up a military deterrence against China, but its support for Ukraine has largely been for humanitarian assistance. It has limited its supplies of military equipment to non-lethal weapons.

Japan’s $12.1 billion contribution to Ukraine over the past two years is much smaller than the $111 billion that the United States and other Western nations have provided in weapons, equipment and humanitarian assistance.

The government hopes to facilitate private sector investment while minimizing risks of business operations in Ukraine.

Having risen from the ashes of devastation from World War II and from the damage caused by major earthquakes and other disasters, Japan believes it has a special role to play in aiding Ukraine’s rebuilding.

WHAT ARE SOME OF THE DEALS SIGNED?

Ukrain’s Shmyhal expressed high expectations for Japanese companies’ expertise in technology and Japan’s experience in postwar and disaster reconstruction. Ukraine’s reconstruction also will mean future investment and business opportunities for the startups, who were the majority of companies attending the conference.

The Japanese government has chosen seven target areas — including removal of mines and debris; improvement of humanitarian and living conditions; farming; biochemical manufacturing; digital and information industries; infrastructure for power generation and transportation and anti-corruption measures.

In all, 56 cooperation deals between Japanese and Ukrainian government agencies and companies were announced, and Kishida unveiled a plan to open a JETRO office in Kyiv.

A Tokyo-based bridge-builder, Komaihaltec, is to jointly develop small wind power generation facilities with Ukraine’s state gas operator. Sumitomo Corp. and Kawasaki Heavy Industries agreed on a joint study with the Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine on modernizing gas compressor stations. Rakuten Symphony and Ukrainian telecom Kyivstar plan to jointly rebuild digital infrastructure. One Japanese startup has developed radar-mounted landmine removal equipment and another helps optimize farming by analyzing soil components using satellite imagery.

WHAT’S IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE?

In the joint communique, Japan and Ukraine reaffirmed that sanctions against Russia are a “crucial and effective measure” to deter Russia’s military activities. They also confirmed their determination to prevent circumvention of sanctions.

Japan expressed its continued support of all phases of Ukraine’s reconstruction, from its initial emergency recovery to economic reconstruction and industrial development.

The two countries signed a tax convention and are to begin reviewing an investment treaty. Japan also announced the easing of visa requirements for Ukrainian citizens.

AP · February 19, 2024

5. The Next Tripartite Pact? China, Russia, and North Korea’s New Team Is Not Built to Last

I thought of the Bonaparte quote about "never interrupting your enemies when he is making a mistake."

But Dr Skyler Mastro rightly points out that we can "make the most of the regional dynamics that will hasten a divide."

Excerpts:

The good news, however, is that this trilateral alignment turned out poorly for all three countries during the Cold War—and, if the United States plays its cards right, it can fail this time around, too. Chinese and Soviet backing helped North Korea fight South Korea and its allies to a draw, leading to an armistice agreement in 1953, but subsequent decades of poverty and international pariah status can hardly be considered a victory for Pyongyang. As for Beijing and Moscow, cooperation soon gave way to the Sino-Soviet split and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Although today’s circumstances are different, familiar signs of unease are already visible among China, North Korea, and Russia—rifts the United States can exploit.

...

For now, coordination between North Korea and Russia makes it harder for the United States and its allies to compel either country to leave behind its revisionist, aggressive tendencies and assume a constructive role in the international community. But if their relationship sufficiently threatens China, Beijing may choose to distance itself from both Moscow and Pyongyang. It might even go so far as to try to push North Korea and Russia apart. The United States and its allies were not the primary reason for the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War, and they will not be the cause of the next Chinese-Russian rift—but they can make the most of the regional dynamics hastening a divide.

The Next Tripartite Pact?

China, Russia, and North Korea’s New Team Is Not Built to Last

By Oriana Skylar Mastro

February 19, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Upstart: How China Became a Great Power · February 19, 2024

North Korea has long been a source of instability, but a new development over the past year threatens to make things even worse: the country is teaming up with Russia. At a meeting in Pyongyang last July, North Korea’s defense minister, Kang Sun Nam, and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu, vowed to expand their countries’ military cooperation to “resolutely stand against” their “common enemy,” the United States. Then, at a September summit with President Vladimir Putin in Russia, the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un toasted the Kremlin’s “sacred struggle” against “a band of evil”—a reference to Western countries—and called Putin the “Korean people’s closest friend.”

The North Korean–Russian convergence goes beyond rhetoric. Russia has been propping up the Kim regime with food aid, along with fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, and equipment for ballistic missile production. There are signs that Russia is sharing its expertise, too. In July, North Korea conducted a test launch of a technologically sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missile, and in November, it managed to send its first military reconnaissance satellite into orbit after several failed attempts.

The transfer of critical supplies goes both ways. North Korea is sending Russia much-needed artillery shells to use in its war in Ukraine, with U.S. officials confirming in October that more than 1,000 containers of arms had arrived in Russia by ship and by train. Pyongyang’s equipment is hardly world-class—its shells have a 20 percent failure rate, whereas most advanced U.S. munitions have failure rates in the low single digits—but many of North Korea’s missiles are difficult for Ukraine to defend itself against because they are long-range, which allows Russian forces to fire from deep within their own territory, and low-tech, which helps them evade detection. North Korean military assistance could therefore be decisive in Russia’s campaign to halt Ukrainian troops’ progress. For Pyongyang, meanwhile, the arms transfer is an opportunity to test its wares in battle.

In addition to undermining U.S. and allied efforts to defend Ukraine, expanding North Korean–Russian cooperation threatens to destabilize the Korean Peninsula. On January 5, less than a week after reports emerged that Russia had launched its first North Korean–made ballistic missiles into Ukraine, North Korea fired hundreds of artillery rounds into the sea near its disputed border with South Korea. On January 14, North Korea conducted its first intermediate-range ballistic missile test of the year and formally announced that it no longer considered South Korea to be a “partner of reconciliation and reunification” but an enemy that had to be conquered—through nuclear war, if necessary.

As if this were not enough, China is playing a counterproductive role. Beijing’s security relationship with Russia has deepened: Russia has provided critical weapons and defense-industrial expertise to China, and the two countries are engaging in more frequent and sophisticated joint military exercises. Beijing, in effect, has sanctioned a larger Russian military role in Asia and provided the political cover and economic lifeline Putin needs to continue fighting in Ukraine. China has also shielded North Korea from international sanctions and pressure designed to force Kim to give up his nuclear weapons program. There is historical precedent for the three countries’ working together, too. During the Cold War, China, North Korea, and Russia were all committed to “opposing imperialism”—code for their anti-Western activities. Their cooperation facilitated conflict around the world, including in eastern Europe, on the Korean Peninsula, and across the Taiwan Strait.

The good news, however, is that this trilateral alignment turned out poorly for all three countries during the Cold War—and, if the United States plays its cards right, it can fail this time around, too. Chinese and Soviet backing helped North Korea fight South Korea and its allies to a draw, leading to an armistice agreement in 1953, but subsequent decades of poverty and international pariah status can hardly be considered a victory for Pyongyang. As for Beijing and Moscow, cooperation soon gave way to the Sino-Soviet split and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Although today’s circumstances are different, familiar signs of unease are already visible among China, North Korea, and Russia—rifts the United States can exploit.

AN UNSTABLE TRIANGLE

China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union’s falling out over the course of the 1950s is instructive. The decade began with the two larger powers, China and the Soviet Union, committed to each other’s security and to supporting other communist countries, including North Korea. In 1950, Beijing and Moscow signed an alliance agreement vowing mutual defense in the event of an attack and pledging to coordinate their activities against the West. Both supported Kim Il Sung, the founding father of North Korea and the grandfather of Kim Jong Un, in his bid to attack South Korea the same year. When China sent its own forces into the brutal fighting on the Korean Peninsula, the Soviet Union backed the Chinese effort with military aid and expertise.

But this cooperation was not to last. After the death of the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1953, his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, introduced political reforms and pursued “peaceful coexistence” with the United States. The Soviet Union’s pivot threatened to undermine the Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s domestic project, which emulated Stalin’s harsh governance. Meanwhile, Chinese attacks on Taiwanese-controlled islands, China’s 1962 border war with India, and the Great Leap Forward—Beijing’s disastrous economic and social program of that period—elicited contempt in Moscow. Mao’s personal jabs at the Soviet leadership did not help matters, either. By 1960, the Soviet Union had canceled 12 aid agreements and roughly 200 science and technology projects in China.

Back then, as now, Beijing and Moscow were revisionist great powers with limited willingness to advance the other’s ambitions. Both expected more from a partnership than mere protection. Beijing sought financial assistance for its defense-industrial base and political support to lend legitimacy to the regime. Moscow wanted to lead an ever-expanding communist bloc and to secure China’s help in undermining the United States’ position in Asia. Although the two sides shared many of the same interests, their priorities differed. And they would clash over tactics, especially when it came to dealing with third parties. Beijing and Moscow disagreed, for instance, about how to respond to Polish and Hungarian resistance against Soviet control in 1956: Mao even warned that China would support Poland if the Soviet Union dispatched troops to quell the unrest.

The North Korean–Russian relationship undermines China’s influence.

Chinese and Soviet leaders weighed the benefits and risks of teaming up. Great powers can use alliances to strengthen their militaries and enhance their deterrence, but forming a partnership can also provoke a potential adversary or draw one of the great powers, against its wishes, into its ally’s disputes. During the 1950s, for example, Soviet leaders grew concerned that China’s dispute with Taiwan would undermine their plans to discuss détente with the United States.

Similar stresses could now be opening fissures between China and its partners. Closer cooperation between North Korea and Russia has highlighted a fundamental tension in Russia’s relationship with China: unlike Pyongyang, Beijing has been unwilling to aid Moscow’s war effort directly. Russia’s requests for military equipment and aid from China have gone unanswered. (Russian officials have claimed that China secretly agreed to provide lethal weapons, but U.S. assessments have found no evidence that this is true.) Beijing’s official stance on the war in Ukraine is to remain neutral. It has called for de-escalation, reiterated its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons, and affirmed the sovereignty of all nations. None of China’s statements have contained explicit rebukes of Russia, but they have not expressed full-throated support, either. The fact that Russia had to turn to North Korea for aid shows how little material assistance Moscow is receiving from Beijing. In the immediate term, Russia has no choice but to take what help it can get, but eventually the discovery that its “no limits” partnership with China does, in fact, have limits may force a reckoning with the risks of relying on Beijing.

For China’s part, the North Korean–Russian relationship undermines Beijing’s influence on the Korean Peninsula. With no indication of having consulted China, Russia opted to ignore United Nations trade sanctions (which both China and Russia had signed onto) and sell North Korea the advanced military technology its leaders have long desired. Now that Russia is willing to provide benefits that China will not, Pyongyang is turning closer to Moscow, and Beijing has lost significant leverage. To be sure, China is still North Korea’s largest trading partner. And even when North Korea was almost wholly dependent on China, Kim sometimes felt free to dismiss Chinese leaders’ preferences. But Russian support gives Pyongyang a stronger hand to take action that could impede Beijing’s regional and global ambitions. For example, Beijing will not want North Korea—or Russia, for that matter—to jeopardize its attempts to unify Taiwan with mainland China. But a crisis on the Korean Peninsula could spoil China’s plans by driving the United States and its allies toward deeper defense integration, just as the North’s 1950 invasion of the South pushed the United States to rethink its security interests in the region and sign a defense pact with Taiwan in 1954.

Beijing is clearly concerned that Moscow and Pyongyang’s actions will do China more harm than good.

The most damning consequence of North Korea’s military cooperation with Russia may be that it is damaging China’s broader diplomatic and security environment. An emboldened North Korea and an aggressive Russia do nothing to improve China’s image or help it compete with the United States. Nothing unites U.S. allies more than shared concerns about North Korean or Russian belligerence. And as a partner of both countries, China is expected to use its own political capital to solve the problems they cause. At a December summit with EU leaders in Beijing, for example, Chinese officials wanted to focus on long-term plans for bilateral relations and caution against a European “de-risking” strategy that threatens China’s technological ambitions and economic interests. But the European delegation instead opened the talks by urging China to leverage its economic influence over Russia “to put an end to the Russian aggression against Ukraine.”

China has long regarded a trilateral alliance among Japan, South Korea, and the United States as a critical threat to its security, even seeking guarantees from Seoul and Tokyo that they would not enter such a pact. Part of the case Beijing is making to reassure both capitals is that China is prepared to serve as the “stabilizer” of Northeast Asia—a message it repeated in a meeting with Japanese and South Korean officials after North Korea launched its spy satellite in November. At the same meeting, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin urged Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to encourage North Korea to halt its provocations and pursue denuclearization. But China’s commitment to playing “a constructive role” could amount to little if North Korea, bolstered by Russia, does not respond to Beijing’s overtures. At a certain point, even if other countries in the region do not see China as complicit in North Korea’s bellicose actions, Japan, South Korea, and the United States are bound to make defense decisions that will be unwelcome in Beijing.

China, recognizing the danger of being grouped with North Korea and Russia, has tried to publicly distance itself from the two countries. In late January, Liu Pengyu, the spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, told Voice of America that he was “unaware” that North Korea and Russia were cooperating on military matters. China has also denied playing any role in the two countries’ recent collaboration. In line with that claim, when Moscow suggested that North Korea join Chinese-Russian naval drills in September, Beijing did not respond. The official Chinese media has also downplayed the idea of a trilateral alliance among China, North Korea, and Russia. In China’s telling, such a partnership is “concocted” by Western media to justify closer military cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States and generate a Cold War mindset by framing regional politics in terms of two opposing blocs. Beijing still sees real, if limited, benefits from its relationships with North Korea and Russia, but it is clearly concerned that Moscow and Pyongyang’s actions will do China more harm than good.

LET THE CHIPS FALL

The United States and its allies can encourage fissures in the emerging autocratic bloc, but they must proceed with caution. Erecting obstacles is the wrong approach. Taking a page from history, Washington should recognize that China, North Korea, and Russia will sabotage their triangular alignment all on their own. During the Korean War, for instance, Soviet air support for Chinese forces was not forthcoming despite promises from Moscow, and in the 1960s, the Soviet Union reneged on commitments to lend its nuclear expertise to China. Moscow’s continued reluctance to support Beijing, let alone extend security assistance, in times of crisis was a major contributor to the Sino-Soviet split.

Recently, the war in Ukraine provided a perfect opportunity for China to disappoint its partner by refusing to fully back Russia’s military campaign. But the Biden administration squandered that opportunity by threatening China with “consequences” should it assist the Russian war effort and by adding Chinese companies that it asserted were supporting the Russian military to a trade blacklist. Even without these warnings, Beijing would have been unlikely to provide significant aid. Now, however, Beijing can contain the damage to its relationship with Moscow by blaming the United States for China’s failure to help a friend. If Washington had left the issue alone or confined its threats to private channels, China and Russia’s disagreement might have snowballed into an even larger rift.

The best way for the United States to counter the Chinese-Russian alignment is by using it to rally U.S. allies and partners. Shared perceptions of a threat create a fertile environment for deepening alliances and breaking ground on new areas of defense cooperation. Such a mindset has already allowed Japan and South Korea to look past their historic animosities and work together more closely than ever before. Each country decided to reinstate the other’s preferred trade partner status last spring, and in December they resumed high-level economic talks after an eight-year hiatus. U.S. allies in Europe that were previously reluctant to push back against Beijing may also change their minds as they come to see China and Russia as a unified threat—perhaps enough to persuade them to help the United States deter Chinese aggression in Asia. China has been reluctant to support Russia’s military and political goals in Europe in part because Beijing values its economic relationships with European countries. If those countries join the United States in taking a harder line on China, Beijing may conclude that an association with Russia and its disruptive tactics comes with too a high a cost.

For now, coordination between North Korea and Russia makes it harder for the United States and its allies to compel either country to leave behind its revisionist, aggressive tendencies and assume a constructive role in the international community. But if their relationship sufficiently threatens China, Beijing may choose to distance itself from both Moscow and Pyongyang. It might even go so far as to try to push North Korea and Russia apart. The United States and its allies were not the primary reason for the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War, and they will not be the cause of the next Chinese-Russian rift—but they can make the most of the regional dynamics hastening a divide.

• ORIANA SKYLAR MASTRO is a Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University and the author of the forthcoming book Upstart: How China Became a Great Power.

Foreign Affairs · by Upstart: How China Became a Great Power · February 19, 2024

6. ASU launches MA in global security, with irregular warfare concentration

Arizona State University is one of the most innovative universities I have encountered particularly in the national security space (where I have personally observed it) but the leadership of its president really drives innovation across all disciplines.

ASU launches MA in global security, with irregular warfare concentration | ASU News

news.asu.edu

In response to the evolving landscape of global security challenges, Arizona State University is launching a groundbreaking Master of Arts in global security, with a concentration in irregular warfare.

This unique program, offered by the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, is designed to equip students with the knowledge and skills needed to navigate complex irregular warfare scenarios in today's geopolitical environment.

The MA in global security (irregular warfare), which will be available starting fall 2024, is the first of its kind in a civilian, accredited academic university. It addresses the growing recognition among security experts that irregular warfare will be a prominent component of future conflicts, particularly in the context of great power competition.

The fully online program, offered through ASU Online, is tailored to meet the educational needs of security practitioners, including military personnel, diplomats, intelligence analysts and policymakers.

"The concentration allows students to focus their studies within the context of global security on issues that are central to contemporary irregular warfare,” said Jeff Kubiak, School of Politics and Global Studies professor of practice who is spearheading the program. “Our curriculum covers a wide range of topics, including narrative conflict, urbanization, military adaptation and innovation, and the theory of irregular warfare and special operations.”

The program's online delivery format ensures accessibility to students based in the U.S. and internationally, fostering collaboration and learning across cultural and national borders. With esteemed faculty members such as Peter Bergen, Jan Gleiman, Candace Rondeaux, David Kilcullen, Isaiah Wilson, Thomas Just, Alicia Ellis and Ajit Maan, students will benefit from the insights of global thought leaders, seasoned scholars and skilled practitioners.

Two of the key courses in the MA in global security (irregular warfare) are:

1. GSC 570: Irregular Warfare (three credits) — Examines how states employ measures short of war to gain strategic advantage while avoiding the costs and risks of major armed conflict, including the variety of irregular warfare approaches to competitive statecraft. Explores irregular warfare campaigns and the implementation of competitive strategies to determine why they succeed or fail.
2. GSC 572: Proxy Warfare, Strategic Thinking, History, and Operational Arts (three credits) — Proxy warfare has become a prominent feature of modern conflicts, posing unique challenges to traditional military strategies. This course examines the historical roots, strategic implications and operational dynamics of proxy warfare. Students will analyze case studies and engage in strategic simulations to develop critical thinking and decision-making skills essential for navigating proxy conflicts in the contemporary global security landscape.

Graduates of the MA in global security (irregular warfare) will be well positioned for a variety of career paths, including roles in conflict zone reconstruction, security policy analysis, global security intelligence and military advancement.

Interested applicants are encouraged to visit the degree page for more information and to apply.

For media inquiries or further information, please contact Alicia Ellis at alicia.ellis@asu.edu.

National security SDG 04 Quality Education Graduate student Law, journalism and politics Online School of Politics and Global Studies Academics ASU Online Military The College of Liberal Arts and Sciences

7. Special Operations News - February 20, 2024 | SOF News

Special Operations News - February 20, 2024 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · February 20, 2024

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: East Coast-based Naval Special Warfare Operators use a Submarine Exploration (SUEX) diver propulsion vehicle during a sustainment exercise in Virginia Beach, Va. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Trey Hutcheson, Jan. 7, 2024)

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SOF News

Questions on the Osprey. AFSOC is eager to get their fleet of CV-22s back in the air but want to ensure it is safe for its crews. In November 2023 a special operations Osprey crash off the coast of Japan’s Yakushima Island resulted in the death of eight crewmen. An investigation is ongoing. (Military.com, 13 Feb 2024) (Editorial Note: One retired SF colonel commented: “Do the troops have a desire to fly IN the CV-22?”) Read more in “Is the V-22 Osprey Headed to the Scrap Yard?”, National Interest, February 16, 2024; and in “US Navy’s Six-Decade-Old Greyhounds to fill Grounded V-22 Osprey’s Role”, The Defense Post, February 14, 2024.

Women in SOF. An interesting article takes a look at the history (and outcome) of the effort to integrate women into special operations forces. “A Reconsideration of Women’s Role in Special Operations: Critical Questions, Mooted a Decade After the Fact”, Small Wars Journal, February 19, 2024.

Change of SEAL Mission. Naval Special Warfare sailors are pivoting away from being a counterterrorism force to supporting the combatant commands. Training is now more focused on the maritime environment. “The Navy SEAL Mission is Shifting from Raids to Supporting the Service”, Military.com, February 14, 2024.

USS Canley Commissioned. An Expeditionary Sea Base ship (ESB) was recently commissioned (DOD, 16 Feb 2024) on February 17, 2024, in Coronado, California. It will support a variety of mission to include the staging of Special Operations Forces (SOF). It has a four-spot flight deck, mission deck, and hangar. The ship is named in honor of a U.S. Marine, Gunnery Sergeant John Canley (DVIDS, 17 Feb 2024), who won the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions during the Battle of Hue City, Vietnam in 1968. Watch a video about the ESB ship that describes the mission and layout of the ship. In the video, the captain of the ship describes the ESB as a “large command and control platform for sea basing Marines and special forces.” “USS John L. Canley (ESB 6) Virtual Tour”, DVIDS, February 10, 2024. See also “Explore the Floating Navy SEAL Base: A Closer Look at the US Warship Resembling a Tanker”, Texas Breaking News, February 12, 2024.

MoH – Zabitosky. The U.S. Department of Defense published a story about a U.S. Army Special Forces soldier who was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during a 1968 helicopter crash in the Vietnam War. His recon team was tasked with monitoring the Ho Chi Minh Trail on February 19, 1968, in the midst of the Tet Offensive. Read more in “Medal of Honor Monday: Army Master Sgt. Fred W. Zabitosky”, DOD News, February 19, 2024.

“The Unit”. The New York Post has published an article entitled “This military special ops unit is so classified, even its name is a secret – and getting into it is absolute hell.” February 19, 2024.

NSW Force Multiplier. Rear Adm. Keith Davids recent participated in and provided some commentary at the AFCEA-USNI West 2024 Conference held in February 2024 in San Diego. “Naval Special Warfare a Force Multiplier for Fleet, Prioritizing Reintegration with Joint Force”, Seapower Magazine, February 15, 2024.

1st SFG(A) Training in Taiwan. The United States and Taiwan appear to be having a more robust relationship over the past year or more. Members of the 1st Special Forces Group are reported to be working on two bases of the 101st Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion – a Taiwanese special operations force. “US Army Special Forces Train Taiwan Troops Near China’s Coast”, Newsweek, February 8, 2024.

Nine Honored at Fort Liberty. Some prominent members of the special operations and airborne community were recently honored at the Iron Mike Conference Center on Fort Liberty. (CityView, 17 Feb 2024)

26th MEU (SOC). The 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) is conducting cold weather bilateral training with the 32nd Marine Brigade in Volos, Greece at the Mount Olympus Mountain Training Center. (DVIDS, 19 Feb 2024)

Cigars Honoring the SEALs. A cigar line honoring the Navy SEALs and their families has been created by a New Hampshire-based smoke shop. “United Cigars To Release New Smokes Honoring Navy SEALs”, Cigar Aficionado, February 14, 2024.

Special Forces Scholarship Fund. The Special Forces Scholarship Fund has now become a part of the Green Beret Foundation (GBF). Read a press release dated February 9, 2024, by the GBF.

5th SFG(A) Memorial. Over 800 Special Forces men were lost during the Vietnam War. There is a plan underway to build a memorial on Gabriel Field, Fort Campbell, Kentucky close to the headquarters of the 5th Special Forces Group. Members of the Special Forces Association and Special Operations Association are involved in the project and the fundraiser to make the memorial a reality.

https://specialoperations.org/soa/5th-group-vietnam-memorial/

International SOF

Royal Marines New CRC. A new CRC is replacing the troop-carrying and fire support variants of the Offshore Raiding Craft (ORC). The new craft is multi-purpose and more supportive of the Commando Force. “Royal Marines Receive New Commando Raiding Craft”, Forces.net, February 14, 2024.

Paddy Mayne and the SAS. A member of the Special Air Service executed some of the most daring raids against enemy strongholds during World War II. (War History Online, 13 Feb 2024)

UKSF Blocks Afghans from Triples. Afghan fighters of CF 333 and ATF 444 have been stymied in their attempt to resettle in the UK under the Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy (ARAP) scheme. Recent reports from multiple media sources (Express, Arab News, AOAV, Independent, Guardian) indicate that the roadblock may be because the applications did not receive approval from UK Special Forces. “Special Forces blocked UK resettlement applications from elite Afghan troops”, BBC, February 19, 2024.

SOF History

Burma. On February 24, 1944, Merrill’s Marauders began a campaign in northern Burma. The mission of the 5307th Composite Unit (provisional) was to disrupt Japanese supply and communications lines.

Corregidor. On February 16, 1945, members of the 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team (PRCT) dropped onto Corregidor in an effort to recapture the island from the Japanese. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Corregidor_(1945)

Desert Storm. On February 23, 1991, SOFDA 525 was inserted by helicopter at night and moved to a hide site to conduct a recon mission deep behind enemy lines in Iraq. On the next morning, the 24th, this 5th SFG(A) team would find itself fighting for survival against an overwhelming enemy force.

https://sof.news/history/sfoda-525/

MARSOC. On February 24, 2006, the Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) was officially activated at Camp Lejeune, N.C.

Robin Moore. On February 21, 2008, Robin Moore, the author of The Green Berets, died. He attended the Special Forces Qualification Course and would later deploy to South Vietnam where he spent time with the 5th Special Forces Group.

Conflict in Israel and Gaza

Situation Update. The IDF says that Hamas’ Khan Younis (map) Brigade is defeated. Next big target is Rafah. The humanitarian situation and civilian casualties are the foremost concern in the international community.

Civilian Casualties. Israel is taking a lot of heat over the number of civilian casualties suffered by Palestinians in Gaza. The numbers often quoted in news media usually comes from Hamas government sources – so the claims are unverifiable and likely inflated. John Spencer, Chairman of the Urban Warfare Studies Program at the Modern War Institute at West Point, argues that Israel has taken more steps to avoid harming civilians than any other military in history. Read more in “Urban warfare expert says Israeli military taking unprecedented steps to protect Gaza civilians”, by Ruth Marks Eglash, Fox News, February 17, 2024. (sign in required)

City of Rafah. One of the last remaining strongholds for Hamas fighters and a location where many Israeli and foreign hostages are held could be the next target of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). Complicating an offensive in Rafah (map, NSI) is the fact that over a million Palestinians are sheltering in the city and surrounding areas after being displace from the homes. The international community is calling for an immediate ceasefire; but Hamas refuses to release the remaining hostages (over 100) and Israel won’t stop until Hamas is defeated and the hostages are released. There are reports that the IDF will begin an offensive in Rafah by the start of Ramadan (March 10?) if the remaining hostages are not released.

Hospital Raid by IDF. Israeli forces entered the Nassar Medical Complex in Khan Younis (map) in a “precise and limited” raid in attempt to recover the remains of hostages taken by Hamas. Thousands of displaced persons had taken refuge in the hospital. (Associated Press, 15 Feb 2024)

References:

Ukraine Conflict

Fall of Avdiivka. After many months of fierce resistance by Ukrainian forces it appears that Ukraine has withdrawn from the small city of Avdiivka (Google Maps). Shortages of supplies, ammunition, and artillery rounds, and manpower have contributed to the difficulties that Ukrainian forces have had in continuing to defend the city. Without the departure from the city, Ukrainian troops would have been cut off and encircled by Russian troops. The victory came at a high cost for Russia. (Business Insider, 18 Feb 2024) A detailed account of the Battle for Avdiivka can be read here on Wikipedia.

IG Report on Ukraine. The Special Inspector General report to the U.S. Congress was recently put online. It covers the period from October 1, 2023, to December 31, 2023. The publication has an executive summary, mission update, operational update, info on security assistance, diplomacy, development, and humanitarian assistance. “Operation Atlantic Resolve“, DoS, February 2024, PDF, 158 pages.

Brave Chopper Pilots Who Resupplied Mariupol. When Russia invaded Ukraine (SOF News) in February 2022, one of its principal targets was the coastal city of Mariupol on the Sea of Azov. However, the defenders held on for months despite overwhelming odds. The resistance by these fighters most likely stalled the Russian assault on Kiev and provided time for the Ukrainian defense forces to reconstitute and reorganize. The 36th Separate Marine Brigade and Azov Battalion fought a heroic defense of the city but were ultimately reduced to defending a small, four-mile in area industrial complex located on the shore of the Sea of Azov. Resupply of ammunition and the evacuation of wounded was difficult as the city was surrounded. But a handful of brave helicopter pilots provided a lifeline that prolonged the resistance in Mariupol. “The Untold Story of the Ukrainian Helicopter Rescue Missions During the Mariupol Siege”, Time, February 15, 2024.

Frontline Evacuation. Read a story of how medics tend to patients picked from the trenches and the journey to a hospital – the race to save a life. “The quiet intimacy of a desperate frontline evacuation”, The Counteroffensive, February 15, 2024.

More News Snippets. A Russian helicopter pilot who defected to Ukraine with his Mi8 aircraft (for $1 million) has been confirmed dead (Kyiv Post Twitter) in Spain by the Ukrainian Maine Intelligence Directorate (HUR). He was shot multiple times in what appears to be an assassination. The U.S. Defense Department says that without U.S. funding, Ukraine’s defense will likely collapse. (DOD, 16 Feb 2024)

Battle of Irpin River. In the early days of the war, late February 2022, Russia forces were stopped short of Kyiv. One of the key factors was stopping the Russian advance on the capital from the north and northwest. Read more about this in “The Battle of Irpin River”, The British Army Review, Spring 2024, 54 pages.

Reality Check. Martin Stanton, a retired Army officer, provides his appraisal of the likely outcome of the Ukraine conflict – a negotiated peace. “The Ukraine War at Two: Time for Some Reality”, Small Wars Journal, February 14, 2024. See also “Does the West’s Ukraine policy need a reality check?”, Brookings Institute, February 15, 2024. And there is this as well “A Frozen War in Ukraine Would Be a Victory for Russia”, by Paul Poast, World Politics Review, February 16, 2024.

• References:
• Interactive Map. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine by the Insitute for the Study of War and Critical Threats. On storymaps.arcgis.com See also https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/maps.html
• U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, Congressional Research Service, CRSIF12040, periodically updated, PDF, 3 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12040
• Ukraine Conflict, National Security Info. https://www.national-security.info/ukraine-conflict.html

Commentary and Reports

Air Power and IW. The Irregular Warfare Initiative has a new program called Project Air Power that will explore and advocate for the totality of air, aviation, and space power in the unconventional, hybrid, and gray-zone environments. The director is a retired USAF Air Commando, Richard D. Newton, PhD. Read more in “Air and Space Power in the Gray Zone”, Irregular Warfare Initiative, February 2, 2024.

IW Masters. Sal Artiaga provides details the strategic thoughts and successes of Mao Zedong, T.E. Lawrence, Michael Collins, and Vo Nguyen Giap. “The Legacy of Irregular Warfare Masters”, Irregular Warfare Center, January 31, 2024.

Report – The Conceptualization of Irregular Warfare in the Indo-Pacific Region, by Dr. Sandor Fabian and Gabrielle Kennedy, Irregular Warfare Center, February 13, 2024, PDF, 21 pages. Abstract or PDF.

National Security

Report – FARA Program Cancelled? The U.S. Army is seeking to cancel the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft program in its FY2025 budget request. The program is part of an effort to improve existing rotorcraft and replace the AH-64 Apache and OH-58 Kiowa helicopters. Read more in Army Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) Program Proposed Cancellation: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS IF12592, February 16, 2024, PDF, 3 pages.

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12592

Dropping Munitions from Drones. The increased drone activity in the Middle East and Ukraine is changing up modern warfare. The U.S. Army is trying to stay up with the times. “The 82nd Airborne is dropping munitions from drones”, Task & Purpose, February 15, 2024.

Conexs, Pallets, and Rucksacks. Anyone who has deployed has taking part in loading a Conex, pallet, and personal gear into rucksacks, duffel bags, kit bags, and team boxes. One of the never-ending questions is what to pack and what to leave in the supply room. The Army has come around to the idea that ‘leaner is better’ and more efficient. “Lighten the load: The Army’s plan to save time by shedding excess gear”, Army Times, February 13, 2024.

Border Security. The Texas government is looking at opening a base along the Rio Grande River at some point in the future. This 80-acre base camp for National Guard troops could house as many as 2,300 troops and will provide improved living conditions for those maintaining border security. (Task & Purpose, 17 Feb 2024)

SECDEF Out of Hospital. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin was released from Walter Reed National Military Hospital Medical Center on Tuesday, February 13, 2024. He was held for two nights for “supportive care and close monitoring” in the critical care unit of the Hospital. “Austin Released From Hospital Today”, DOD News, February 13, 2024. DOD announced that he returned to work at the Pentagon on Thursday, February 15, 2024.

Strategic Competition

China and IW. Sal Artiaga writes about the contrasting approaches of two world powers – China and the United States – towards irregular warfare. He says that the U.S. is playing Chess while China is playing Go. “Contrasting Chinese and American Approaches to Irregular Warfare”, Irregular Warfare Center, February 12, 2024.

China’s Gray Zone Operations. “The latest wave of gray zone operations initiated by Beijing will heighten tension in the region and increase other countries’ concerns about China’s aggressive posture. Gray-zone operations involve using irregular tactics without resorting to open combat.” “Analysts: China Challenges Taiwan’s Sovereignty Through Gray Zone Operations”, by William Yang, Voice of America, February 19, 2024.

U.S. Engagement in SE Asia. Derek Grossman, a senior defense analyst at RAND, takes a hard look at the limited success that the Biden administration has had in countering the influence of China in southeast Asia. With some countries – Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia – there have been some achievements. But other countries like Laos and Cambodia seem to be neglected. “The Good and the Bad for Biden in Southeast Asia”, RAND Blog, February 8, 2024.

Russia’s New Space Capability. The U.S. security establishment and politicians in D.C. a buzzing about a new space weapon (Associated Press, 15 Feb 2024) that may be part of Russia’s arsenal in the future; many characterizing it as a “serious national security threat”. At risk could be GPS and communications networks that depend on satellites. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (Arms Control Association) prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons in space. The White House has publicly confirmed that Russia has an anti-satellite capability that is not yet operational.

Death of Navalny. A well-known dissident and Putin critic, Alexei Navalny (age 47), is reported to have died on while in a Russian penal colony in the Arctic region of Siberia. He had survived two poisonings – with Russian intelligence agents as the suspected perpetrators. He was imprisoned in 2021. Even while imprisoned he continued his criticism of Putin to include the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. “Alexey Navalny dead in a Russian penal colony, prison service says”, CBS News, February 16, 2024. See also commentary by Ambassador Daniel Fried in “Navalny’s Death and the Kremlin”, Just Security, February 16, 2024.

Afghanistan

UN Meeting on Afghanistan in Doha. On February 18-19, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres will convene a meeting on Afghanistan in Doha to discuss the ongoing humanitarian and human rights crises and the recent report on a way forward by U.N. Special Coordinator for Afghanistan Feridun Sinirlioğlu. A host of representatives from various international organizations and U.N. member states will attend. Read some news reports about the conference.

• “What to Expect from the Doha Conference on Afghanistan”, by Kate Bateman and Andrew Watkins, United States Institute of Peace, February 15, 2024.
• “The UN Doha Meeting: Sustain Aid and Confront Unyielding Taliban Rule”, by Nader Nadery, Asia Dispatches, Wilson Center, February 15, 2024.
• “The Contest for a Special Envoy: Will the meeting in Doha yield a shift in the world’s engagement with the Emirate?”, by Roxanna Shapour, Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), February 17, 2024.

SOF News Book Shop

View our selection of books about special operations forces at the SOF News Book Shop.

Middle East

U.S. Strike Kills Afghans in Middle East. Afghan refugees who joined the Fatemiyoun Brigade have died in strikes by the United States in Syria. The Afghans join the expeditionary unit to escape crushing poverty and to battle for Shiite Islam. The brigade is estimated to be about 20,000 strong and operates under the command of Iran’s Quds Forces. “U.S. Strike Killed Afghans Recruited to Fight for Iran”, The New York Times, February 19, 2024. (subscription)

Report – Iraq: Attacks and U.S. Strikes Reopen Discussion of U.S. Military Presence, Congressional Research Service, CRS IN12309, updated February 16, 2024, PDF, 4 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12309

IG Report on Operation Inherent Resolve. The US Department of State’s Office of Inspector General has published its quarterly report to Congress for Operation Inherent Resolve. The publication, posted online in February 2024 is 114 pages long (PDF). Major sections cover the security situation, mission update, activities of CJTF-OIR, CSOJTF-L, ISIS, talks on transitioning the U.S. presence in Iraq, the “new operating paradigm”, U.S. policy goals, IG oversight activities, and the security partners in the region (Iraqi, Kurdish, and Syrian) to include the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS) which is advised by the Special Operations Advisory Group. Russia and Turkey get a mention as well.

Yemen. The situation in the seas around Yemen has not improved. There are unconfirmed news reports that the Houthis have shot down a MQ-9 Reaper. In addition, the Houthis are using unmanned underwater vessels (UUV) (USNI News, 19 Feb 2024) and unmanned surface vessels (USV). On February 18, 2024, an anti-ship ballistic missile struck a UK-owned bulk carrier. The crew was evacuated and transported to a nearby port. Some news reports say the Houthis are now using underwater drones.

Podcasts and Videos

Podcast – Analyzing Emerging IW Trends. LTG (ret) David Barno and Dr. Nora Bensahel analyze the emerging trends in the character of Irregular Warfare as seen in the ongoing conflicts in both Ukraine and Gaza. The Trident, U.S. Naval College, February 15, 2024, 1 hour. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/the-trident/2/

Podcast – Three Missions in Panjwai District. A Special Forces NCO tells of his time in a dangerous district in southern Afghanistan that was littered with IEDs. Ryan Hendrickson shares his stories on The Spear Podcast, Modern War Institute at West Point, February 14, 2024.

Podcast – Flashpoints in the US-China Relationship. This podcast is focused on the book entitled Facing China: The Prospect for War and Peace, which examines various flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific that could result in military conflict. Bonnie Glaser and Jean-Pierre Cabestan are featured in this 22-minute episode presented by the German Marshall Fund. (20 Feb 2024)

Video – 5th SFG(A) Tactical Skills Assessment. Soldiers from across all battalions of 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) teamed up and conducted a three-day tactical skills assessment Jan. 31 – Feb. 1, 2024, at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The assessment included day and night marksmanship, stress shoots, tactical combat casualty care, timed rucks, and land navigation. (U.S. Army video by Staff Sgt. Gregory T. Summers, 5th SFG(A) Public Affairs) (DVIDS, 7 Feb 2024, 1 minute)

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April 24-25, 2024

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May 6-10, 2024

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June 24-25, 2024

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Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups

sof.news · by SOF News · February 20, 2024

8. The Strange Resurrection of the Two-State Solution

Conclusion:

Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians are ready to make the deep compromises that genuine coexistence would require; indeed, they are far less ready to do so than they were at the end of the Clinton administration, when they failed to close the deal. But the massive costs of refusing to compromise have become much clearer in recent months, and will become clearer still in the years to come. Over time, majorities in both societies may recognize that the only way to secure the future for their children is to separate out of respect rather than engage out of hatred. That realization could be accelerated by responsible, courageous leadership on both sides—should it ever emerge. In the meantime, the process can start with an international commitment to an Arab state of Palestine living alongside a Jewish state of Israel in peace and security—a promise articulated by the United States, endorsed by the Arab states and the international community, and given credibility by a concerted effort to generate a more stable order in Gaza and the West Bank. In the end, the parties to the conflict and the rest of the world may then come to see that decades of destruction, denialism, and deceit did not kill the two-state solution—but only made it stronger.

The Strange Resurrection of the Two-State Solution

How an Unimaginable War Could Bring About the Only Imaginable Peace

By Martin Indyk

March/April 2024

Published on February 20, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Master of the Game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy · February 20, 2024

For years, the vision of an Israeli state and a Palestinian state existing side by side in peace and security has been derided as hopelessly naive—or worse, as a dangerous illusion. After decades of U.S.-led diplomacy failed to achieve that outcome, it seemed to many observers that the dream had died; all that was left to do was bury it. But it turns out that reports of the death of the two-state solution were greatly exaggerated.

In the wake of the monstrous attack Hamas launched on Israel on October 7 and the grievous war that Israel has waged on the Gaza Strip ever since, the allegedly dead two-state solution has been resurrected. U.S. President Joe Biden and his top national security officials have repeatedly and publicly reaffirmed their belief that it represents the only way to create lasting peace among the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the Arab countries of the Middle East. And the United States is hardly alone: the call for a return to the two-state paradigm has been echoed by leaders across the Arab world, the countries of the EU, middle powers such as Australia and Canada, and even Washington’s main rival, China.

The reason for this revival is not complicated. There are, after all, only a few possible alternatives to the two-state solution. There is Hamas’s solution, which is the destruction of Israel. There is the Israeli ultra-right’s

solution, which is the Israeli annexation of the West Bank, the dismantling of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and the deportation of Palestinians to other countries. There is the “conflict management” approach pursued for the last decade or so by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which aimed to maintain the status quo indefinitely—and the world has seen how that worked out. And there is the idea of a binational state in which Jews would become a minority, thus ending Israel’s status as a Jewish state. None of those alternatives would resolve the conflict—at least not without causing even greater calamities. And so if the conflict is to be resolved peacefully, the two-state solution is the only idea left standing.

All that was true before October 7. But a lack of leadership, trust, and interest on both sides—and the repeated failure of American efforts to change those realities—made it impossible to conceive of a credible pathway to a two-state solution. And doing so now has become even more difficult. The Israelis and the Palestinians are angrier and more fearful than at any time since the outbreak of the second intifada in October 2000; the two sides seem less likely than ever to achieve the mutual trust that a two-state solution would require. Meanwhile, in an age of great-power competition abroad and political polarization at home, and after decades of failed diplomatic and military interventions in the Middle East, Washington enjoys far less influence and credibility in the region than it did in the 1990s, when, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the U.S.-led eviction of the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s army from Kuwait, the United States kick-started the process that eventually led to the Oslo accords. And yet, as a result of the war in Gaza, the United States finds itself with a stronger need for a credible process that can eventually lead to an agreement, and stronger leverage to transform the resurrection of the two-state solution from a talking point to a reality. Doing so, however, will take a significant commitment of time and political capital. Biden will have to play an active role in shaping the decisions of a reluctant Israeli ally, an ineffective Palestinian partner, and an impatient international community. And because what he will be pushing for is an incremental approach that would achieve peace only over a lengthy period, the two-state solution needs to be enshrined now as the ultimate objective in a U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council resolution.

THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD

The two-state solution dates back to at least 1937, when a British commission suggested a partition of the British mandate territory then known as Palestine into two states. Ten years later, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 181, which proposed two states for two peoples: one Arab, one Jewish. Although the resolution’s recommended territorial partition left neither side satisfied, the Jews accepted it—but the Palestinians, encouraged by their Arab state sponsors, rejected it. The ensuing war led to the founding of the state of Israel; millions of Palestinians, meanwhile, became refugees, and their national aspirations languished.

The idea of a Palestinian state lay mostly dormant for decades as Israel and its Arab neighbors became preoccupied with their own conflict, one result of which was the Israeli occupation and settlement of Gaza and the West Bank after the 1967 Six-Day War, which placed millions of Palestinians under direct Israeli control but without the rights accorded to Israeli citizens. Eventually, however, terrorist attacks launched by the Palestine Liberation Organization and an uprising of the Palestinian people against Israeli occupation in the 1980s forced Israel to come to terms with the fact that the situation had become untenable. In 1993, Israel and the PLO signed the American-brokered Oslo accords, recognizing each other and laying the groundwork for a phased, incremental process intended to eventually lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The two-state solution’s moment appeared to have arrived.

By the end of the Clinton administration, the Oslo process had generated a detailed outline of what the two-state solution would look like: a Palestinian state in 97 percent of the West Bank and all of Gaza, with mutually agreed swaps of territory that would compensate the Palestinian state for the three percent of West Bank land that Israel would annex, which at that time contained some 80 percent of all the Jewish settlers on Palestinian lands. The Palestinians would have their capital in East Jerusalem, where predominantly Arab suburbs would come under Palestinian sovereignty and predominantly Jewish suburbs under Israeli sovereignty. The two countries would share control of Jerusalem’s so-called Holy Basin, the site of the most important shrines of the three Abrahamic faiths.

But a final agreement on those terms never materialized. As a member of the Clinton administration’s negotiating team at the time, I came to see that neither side was ready to compromise on the highly emotional question of who would control Jerusalem or on the issue of “the right of return” of Palestinian refugees, which was deeply threatening to the Israelis. In the end, the edifice of peace that so many had labored so hard to construct was consumed in a paroxysm of violence as the Palestinians launched another, more intense uprising and the Israelis expanded their occupation of the West Bank. The ensuing conflict lasted for five years, claiming thousands of lives on both sides and destroying all hopes for reconciliation.

Every subsequent American president has sought to revive the two-state solution, but none of their initiatives proved capable of overcoming the mistrust generated by the Palestinian return to violence and the Israeli settlers’ determination to annex the West Bank. The Israelis became frustrated by the Palestinian leadership’s unwillingness to respond to what they regarded as generous offers for Palestinian statehood, and the Palestinians never believed that the offers were genuine or that Israel would deliver if they dared compromise on their claims. Leaders on both sides preferred to blame each other rather than find a way to lead their people out of the miserable morass that the failed peace process had created.

STATE OF DENIAL

By the time Biden became U.S. president in 2021, the world had given up on the two-state solution. Netanyahu, who had dominated his country’s politics for the preceding 15 years, had persuaded the Israelis that they had no Palestinian partner for peace and therefore did not need to address the challenge of what to do with the three million Palestinians in the West Bank and the two million in Gaza whom they effectively controlled. Netanyahu sought instead to “manage” the conflict by kneecapping the PA (Israel’s putative partner in the peace process) and taking steps to make it easier for Hamas, which shared his antipathy to the two-state solution, to consolidate its rule in Gaza. At the same time, he gave free rein to the settler movement in the West Bank to make it impossible for a contiguous part of a Palestinian state to ever emerge there.

The Palestinians also lost faith in the two-state solution. Some turned back to armed struggle, while others began to gravitate to the idea of a binational state in which Palestinians would enjoy equal rights with Jews. Hamas’s version of a “one-state solution,” which would do away with Israel altogether, also gained greater traction in the West Bank, where the group’s popularity began to eclipse the geriatric and corrupt leadership of Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the PA.

For years, American diplomats had warned that this status quo was unsustainable and that another Palestinian uprising would soon emerge. But it turned out that the Palestinians had no stomach for another intifada and preferred to sit on their land as best they could and wait the Israelis out. This suited the Biden administration. It was determined to deprioritize the Middle East as it addressed more pressing strategic challenges in Asia and Europe. What it wanted in the Middle East was calm. So whenever the Israeli-Palestinian conflict threatened to flare up, particularly over provocative settler activities, American diplomats would swoop in to reduce the tensions, with support from Egypt and Jordan, which had a common interest in avoiding an explosion.

For his part, Biden paid lip service to the two-state solution but didn’t seem to believe in it. He kept in place policies favorable to the settlers that had been introduced by his predecessor, Donald Trump, such as the labeling of products from West Bank settlements as “made in Israel.” Biden also failed to make good on his campaign promise to reopen the U.S. consulate for Palestinians in Jerusalem. (The consulate had been absorbed into the U.S. embassy when Trump moved it to Jerusalem.)

Biden paid lip service to the two-state solution but didn’t seem to believe in it.

Meanwhile, the Arab states had decided to all but abandon the Palestinian cause. They had come to see Israel as a natural ally in countering the Iranian-led “axis of resistance” that had taken root across the Arab world. This new strategic calculation found expression in the Abraham Accords, negotiated by the Trump administration, in which Bahrain, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) each fully normalized relations with Israel without insisting that Israel do anything that might make the establishment of a Palestinian state more likely.

Biden sought to broaden this Israeli–Sunni Arab compact by seeking normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer and the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites. From a U.S. point of view, there was a compelling strategic logic to normalization: Israel and Saudi Arabia could serve as the anchors for a U.S. “offshore balancing” role that would stabilize the region while freeing up American attention and resources to deal with an assertive China and an aggressive Russia.

Biden found a willing partner in Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, widely known as MBS, who had embarked on an ambitious effort to modernize his country and diversify its economy. Fearing he would be unable to defend the fruits of that investment with Saudi Arabia’s limited military capabilities, he sought a formal defense treaty with the United States, as well as the right to maintain an independent nuclear fuel cycle and to buy advanced U.S. arms, using the prospect of normalization with Israel to make such an agreement palatable to the heavily pro-Israel U.S. Senate. MBS cared little for the Palestinians and was not willing to condition his deal on progress toward a two-state solution. The Biden administration, however, feared that bypassing the Palestinians completely could lead to a Palestinian uprising, especially because, in 2022, Netanyahu had formed a coalition government with ultranationalist and ultrareligious parties who were bent on annexing the West Bank and toppling the PA. The administration also assessed that it could not secure the necessary Democratic votes in the Senate for a defense treaty with the unpopular Saudis without a substantial Palestinian component in the package. Since the Saudis needed some political cover for their deal with Israel, they were amenable to Biden’s proposal for significant constraints on West Bank settlement activity, the transfer of additional West Bank territory to Palestinian control, and the resumption of Saudi aid to the PA.

By early October 2023, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States were on the brink of a regional realignment. Netanyahu had not yet accepted the Palestinian component of the deal, and his coalition’s opposition to any settlement concessions made it unclear how much of the proposed agreement would survive—as did MBS’s general diffidence. Still, had a breakthrough taken place, the Palestinians would likely have been sidelined yet again, and Netanyahu’s ultra-right government would have gained greater confidence in pursuing its annexation strategy. But then it all came crashing down.

LAST PLAN STANDING

At first glance, it may be hard to see why what happened next would help resurrect the two-state solution. It is difficult to express in words the trauma that all Israelis suffered on October 7: the complete failure of the vaunted military and intelligence capabilities of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to protect Israeli citizens; the horrific atrocities committed by Hamas fighters that left some 1,200 Israelis dead and nearly 250 captives in Gaza; the ongoing hostage saga that suffuses every Israeli home with grief and concern; the displacement of border communities in southern and northern Israel. In this context, not surprisingly, Israelis of all stripes have no interest in contemplating reconciliation with their Palestinian neighbors. Before October 7, most Israelis were already convinced that they had no Palestinian partner for peace; today, they have every reason to believe that they were right. And the way that Hamas’s popularity has increased in the West Bank since the war started has only reinforced this assessment. According to polling conducted in November and December by the Palestinian researcher Khalil Shikaki, 75 percent of West Bank Palestinians support Hamas’s continued rule in Gaza, compared with 38 percent of Gazans. The Israelis point to the refusal by the Palestinians—including Abbas—to condemn Hamas’s atrocities, the outright denial on the part of many Arabs that anything of the sort took place, and the newly anti-Semitic dimension of the international support for the Palestinian cause and conclude that the Palestinians want to kill them, not make peace with them.

Most Palestinians have understandably reached a similar conclusion with regard to the Israelis: the assault on Gaza has killed more than 25,000 Palestinians (including more than 5,000 children), destroyed more than 60 percent of the homes in the territory, and displaced nearly all of its 2.2 million residents. On the West Bank, anger over the war is compounded by the systematic violence of Israeli settlers who have assaulted Palestinians, driven some from their homes, and prevented others from harvesting their olives and grazing their sheep. At least some Palestinians, potentially a majority, do not reject the idea of an independent Palestinian state as an eventual solution that could end the Israeli occupation and allow them to live a life of dignity and freedom. (Notably, that remains the official position of the PA, whereas the official position of the Netanyahu government is to adamantly oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state.) But few Palestinians believe that the Israelis will allow them to build a viable state free of military occupation.

For all these reasons, there is a complete disconnection between renewed international calls for a two-state solution and the fears and desires currently shaping Israeli and Palestinian society. Many have argued that the best the United States can do in these circumstances is to try to bring the fighting to an end as soon as possible and then focus on rebuilding the shattered lives of the Israelis and the Palestinians, putting the issue of an ultimate resolution of the conflict aside for the time being until passions cool, new leadership emerges, and circumstances become more conducive to the contemplation of what now seem like far-fetched ideas of peace and reconciliation.

Yet taking a short-term, pragmatic approach has its own dangers: that, after all, is what Washington did after the four rounds of fighting between Hamas and Israel that broke out between 2008 and 2021—and look what that produced. After this round, moreover, Israel will not simply withdraw and leave Hamas in control, as it did in the past. Netanyahu is already speaking about a long-term Israeli security presence in Gaza. This is a recipe for disaster. If Israel remains stuck in Gaza, it will be fighting off a Hamas-led insurgency—just as it fought off an insurgency led by Hezbollah and other groups for 18 years when it was stuck in southern Lebanon after invading in 1982. There is no credible way to bring the war in Gaza to an end without trying to fashion a new, more stable order there. But that cannot be done without also establishing a credible path to a two-state solution. The Sunni Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, are insisting on that as a condition for their support for the revitalization of the PA and the reconstruction of Gaza, as is the rest of the international community. The PA would need to be able to point to that goal in order to legitimize any role it played in controlling Gaza. And the Biden administration must be able to include the goal of two states as part of the Israeli-Saudi agreement it is still eager to broker.

An Israeli tank near Gaza, February 2024

Amir Cohen / Reuters

The first step would be for the Palestinians to establish a credible governing authority in Gaza to fill the vacuum left by the eradication of Hamas rule. This is the opportunity for the PA to expand its writ and unite the divided Palestinian polity. But with its credibility already at a low point, the PA cannot afford to be seen as Israel’s subcontractor, maintaining order for the sake of Israel’s security interests. Fortunately, Netanyahu’s opposition to the PA taking control in Gaza seems to have backfired, serving only to legitimize the idea in the minds of many Palestinians.

But in its current state, the PA is in no position to take responsibility for governing and policing Gaza. As Biden has put it, the PA must be “revitalized.” It needs a new prime minister, a new set of competent technocrats who are not corrupt, a trained security force for Gaza, and reformed institutions that no longer incite against Israel or reward prisoners and “martyrs” for terrorist acts against the Israelis. The United States and the Sunni Arab states, including Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, are already engaged in detailed discussions with the PA about all these steps and seem satisfied that the PA is willing to undertake them. But it will require the active cooperation and support of the Netanyahu government, which adamantly opposes a PA role in Gaza and has so far refused to make any decisions about the “day after” there.

Once the revitalization process got underway, it would probably take around a year to train and deploy PA security and civilian cadres in Gaza. During this period, Israel would likely undertake some military activity against residual Hamas forces. In the meantime, an interim governing body would need to run the territory. That entity would need to be legitimized by a UN Security Council resolution and would oversee the gradual assumption of responsibility by the PA. It would control a peacekeeping force tasked with maintaining order. To prevent friction with the IDF, the force would need to be led by a U.S. general. But there would be no need for American boots on the ground: troops could come from other countries friendly to Israel that have deep experience in peacekeeping operations and would be acceptable to the Palestinians, including Australia, Canada, India, and South Korea. Sunni Arab states should be invited to participate in the force, although it is unlikely that they would want to take responsibility for policing the Palestinians.

But even without contributing troops, the Sunni Arab states would have a critical role to play. Egypt has a considerable interest in securing the stability that would allow millions of Gazans to move away from the Egyptian border, where they pose a continual threat of flooding into Egypt. Egyptian intelligence has good ground knowledge of Gaza, and the Egyptian army can help prevent the smuggling of arms into Gaza from the Sinai Peninsula—although it failed to do so before October 7. Jordan has less influence in Gaza than Egypt does, but the Jordanians have ably trained Palestinian security forces in the West Bank and could do the same for PA forces in Gaza. The oil-rich Gulf Arab states have the necessary resources to rebuild Gaza and fund the revitalization of the PA. But none of them will be suckered into footing the bill unless they can tell their own people that doing so will lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and the eventual emergence of a Palestinian state—which would prevent another round of war that would leave them holding the bag again.

A FRIEND IN NEED

There are, of course, two major obstacles to such a plan, and they are the main combatants in the war. Although its control of northern Gaza is now in doubt, Hamas still maintains its underground strongholds in the southern cities of Khan Younis and Rafah. As of this writing, it still holds around 130 hostages whom it intends to use as bargaining chips; the longer the fighting drags on, the more domestic pressure will build on Netanyahu to agree to a semipermanent cease-fire in exchange for the rest of the hostages, potentially leaving a good part of Hamas’s infrastructure and control mechanisms in place. Washington can try to convince the IDF to shift to a more targeted approach that will produce fewer casualties. But for any postwar order to take shape, Hamas’s command-and-control system must be broken—and that outcome is far from guaranteed.

On the other side, the survival of Netanyahu’s government coalition with ultra-right and ultrareligious parties depends on the rejection of the two-state solution and any return of the PA to Gaza. Although speculation is rife in Israel that Netanyahu will be hounded out of office soon and new elections will bring a moderate, centrist coalition to power, his survival skills are unmatched; he should never be counted out.

Nevertheless, Biden retains considerable leverage over Netanyahu. The IDF is now heavily dependent on military resupply from the United States as it contemplates having to fight a two-front war against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Israel has expended massive amounts of materiel in its campaign in Gaza, requiring two emergency efforts by the Biden administration to expedite resupply by bypassing congressional oversight, much to the chagrin of some of the Senate Democrats whom Biden will need to support an Israeli-Saudi deal. Even if Israel opts for a more targeted campaign in Gaza, it will have to restock its arsenal and be prepared for a resource-intensive war with Hezbollah. Holding up resupplies is something that Biden is reluctant to do because he does not want to look as if he is undermining Israel’s security. But in a standoff with Netanyahu, Biden could drag his feet on certain decisions by tying things up in bureaucratic procedures or asking for congressional reviews. That might lead the IDF to press Netanyahu to give in. Pressure might also come from the decorated military men who serve in his emergency war cabinet: the retired generals Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, who lead the main opposition party, and Yoav Gallant, the defense minister.

This dynamic has already begun to play out. Even though it has taken a Herculean effort, the Biden administration has succeeded in convincing the IDF to reshape its strategy and tactics—limiting the scope of its operations against Hamas and restraining it from taking on Hezbollah—and has persuaded it to allow increasing amounts of humanitarian aid into Gaza, including opening the Israeli port of Ashdod to supplies. Gallant has even publicly stated his support for the PA to assume a role in Gaza, directly contradicting the prime minister.

In some ways, the United States has become Israel’s first line of defense.

In the long run, the IDF will remain heavily dependent on military support from the United States to rebuild its deterrent power, which took a blow on October 7. This new dependence is best illustrated by the need for the United States to deploy two carrier battle groups to the eastern Mediterranean and a nuclear-powered submarine to the region to deter Iran and Hezbollah from joining the fray at the outset of the war. Before October 7, Israel’s military capabilities alone had served as a sufficient deterrent, and the United States was able to deploy its major forces elsewhere. But according to reporting by Israel’s Channel 12, in January, when U.S. officials decided it was time to withdraw one of the carrier battle groups, the IDF asked them to keep it in place.

This heavy tactical and strategic dependence on the United States is a new phenomenon. Washington has long served as Israel’s second line of defense. But the deployment of the U.S. carrier battle groups signaled that in some ways, the United States has become Israel’s first line of defense. Israel is no longer able to “defend itself by itself,” as Netanyahu was fond of bragging before October 7. He may do his best to ignore this new reality, but the IDF cannot afford to do so.

Meanwhile, Israel is weathering a tsunami of international criticism as its indiscriminate use of force in the early stages of the war, when it was reacting out of rage rather than calculation, caused massive civilian casualties. The United States alone has stood in the breach, repeatedly protecting Israel from international censure and defending its right to continue prosecuting the war against Hamas despite the almost universal demands for a cease-fire. This serves American interests, too, since Hamas’s destruction is a prerequisite for establishing a more peaceful order in Gaza. But Israel is just one American abstention away from UN Security Council resolutions that could invoke sanctions. Like its newly acute military dependence on Washington, this political isolation makes Israel vulnerable to U.S. leverage.

Until now, Netanyahu seemed determined to resist the influence of his only real friend in the international community, using outright public rejections of the two-state solution to shore up his coalition and gain credit with his base for standing up to the United States. But Biden has a number of other sources of leverage beyond potentially dragging his feet on military resupply or letting it be known that he is considering an abstention on a UN resolution critical of Israel. Netanyahu is dependent on the international community to finance the rehabilitation of Gaza. Israel is in no position to pay the $50 billion or so that will be needed to repair the damage its military campaign has wrought. And yet if Netanyahu does not reach an understanding with Biden on a credible pathway to a two-state solution, Israel will be left holding the bag. The oil- and gas-rich Arab states have repeatedly made it clear that they will not pay for Gaza’s reconstruction without a firm commitment to a Palestinian state. And leaving Gaza in ruins will ensure that Hamas returns to power there, in charge of an otherwise failed state on Israel’s borders. He may not recognize it yet, but Netanyahu has no choice but to find a way to accommodate this demand.

Finally, Biden can influence the public debate in Israel by going over Netanyahu’s head to address the Israeli people. They deeply appreciate that he was there for them in their darkest moments after the October 7 attack. His visit to Israel comforted the country when Netanyahu could not. Ever since, Israelis have watched as the president of the United States has defended them, fought for the return of the Israeli hostages, rushed military supplies to the IDF, and vetoed UN resolutions critical of Israel. By contrast, Netanyahu’s standing with the Israeli public was already at a historic low before October 7 because of the divisiveness of the self-serving campaign he had been mounting to reduce the powers of the judiciary. If an election were held today, he would be routed. According to recent opinion polls, over 70 percent of Israelis want him to resign. Meanwhile, over 80 percent of Israelis approve of U.S. leadership in the wake of the war and prefer Biden to Trump by 14 points—the first time in decades that Israelis have preferred the Democratic candidate for U.S. president to the Republican.

WHAT BIDEN MUST DO

If Biden found himself in a showdown with Netanyahu, a speech to the Israeli people could give the American president the edge. The best time to deliver it would be after the United States helped broker another hostages-for-prisoners swap, for which the Israeli public would be profoundly grateful. The point would not be to sell the two-state solution to the Israelis, who are not yet ready to hear that pitch. Rather, the idea would be to offer an avuncular explanation of what the United States is trying to do to ensure a stable “day after” in Gaza that would prevent a repeat of October 7 and also provide a pathway, over time, to end the broader conflict. Biden would explain that he does not want to see his beloved Israel condemned to never-ending war, with each generation sending its children off to fight in the streets of Gaza and the refugee camps of the West Bank. He would offer an alternative that would instead hold out the hope of an enduring peace—as long as Israel’s government followed his lead. He would need to counter Netanyahu’s claim that Israel has to maintain overall security control in the West Bank and Gaza by emphasizing alternative U.S.-supervised security arrangements, including the demilitarization of the Palestinian state, which would reconcile Israeli security needs with Palestinian sovereignty—and keep Israelis safer than would a permanent military occupation.

Caving in to Biden would go against all of Netanyahu’s political instincts. The only way Netanyahu can reliably stay in power now is by maintaining his coalition with the ultranationalists, who adamantly oppose the revitalization of the PA and the two-state solution. If he gave in, he would run the considerable risk of losing power. Normally, when he is backed into the corner, Netanyahu dances: giving in a little to the United States while reassuring his hard-liners that his concessions are not serious. On the issue of Israeli settlements in particular, he has gotten away with that maneuver for 15 years.

But the jig is up. Netanyahu cannot credibly claim to support a two-state solution. He did so before, in 2009, but it has since become obvious that he was lying, as he now boasts of having prevented the emergence of a Palestinian state. But even if Netanyahu maintains his opposition to that outcome, cooperation with a U.S. postwar plan for Gaza would commit him to actions, such as allowing the PA to operate in Gaza and restricting settlement activity in the West Bank, that would constitute a credible pathway to a two-state solution—and would thus doom his fragile coalition and likely end his career.

Biden in Tel Aviv, October 2023

Evelyn Hockstein / Reuters

Biden would clearly prefer to avoid a face-off with Netanyahu, but it seems inevitable. As the president contemplates how to get Netanyahu’s attention, he needs to find a way to change Netanyahu’s calculus—or, if Netanyahu continues to balk, to help win Israeli public support for Biden’s preferred “day after” approach.

Saudi Arabia can lend a significant hand in this effort. Before October 7, Biden thought he was on the cusp of a strategic breakthrough on Israeli-Saudi peace. That opportunity still exists, the Gaza war notwithstanding. MBS is not about to let his ambitious trillion-dollar plan for the development of his country be buried by Hamas. Nor is he happy at the boost that the war has given to Iran and its partners in the “axis of resistance,” which threatens Saudi Arabia as much as Israel. Because the deal he had negotiated with Biden serves the vital interests of his kingdom, he is still interested in forging ahead when things quiet down. But normalization with Israel is now highly unpopular in Saudi Arabia, where public opinion, as elsewhere in the Arab world, has turned even more fiercely against Israel. The only way MBS can square this circle is to insist on the very thing he was indifferent to before October 7: a credible pathway toward a two-state solution.

Biden should make clear the choice facing Israelis. They can continue on the road to a forever war with the Palestinians, or they can embrace the U.S. “day after” plan—and be rewarded with peace with Saudi Arabia and better relations with the broader Arab and Muslim worlds. Netanyahu has already publicly rejected these terms. But he did so after the deal was offered in private. Biden should try again—but this time, he should pitch the deal directly to the Israeli public in a way that would shift its attention from the trauma of October 7.

Biden would clearly prefer to avoid a face-off with Netanyahu, but it seems inevitable.

After the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat captured Israelis’ imaginations with a surprise visit to Jerusalem. MBS is unlikely to be as adventurous, but he might be persuaded to join Biden in appealing directly to the Israeli public via an interview with a respected Israeli TV journalist. Working together, Biden and MBS could use the Saudi offer of peace to enhance a message of hope. They could point to the Saudi and Sunni Arab role in promoting PA rule in Gaza and the two-state solution as ways of ensuring that the Palestinians will do their part. Biden would need to add, in nonthreatening terms, that such a breakthrough would serve the vital strategic interests of the United States, as well as bring peace with Saudi Arabia to Israel. He would need to convey that he therefore thinks it’s reasonable to expect Israel to cooperate—and that he would not understand if its government refused to do so.

Biden will face a less acute but similar problem when it comes to persuading the Palestinians and Arab leaders, who have little reason to trust his commitment to a Palestinian state—especially since they know there is a chance that Biden will not be in the White House come 2025. Winning them over will not be easy. Some have suggested that the United States should recognize the Palestinian state now, with its borders negotiated later. But a grand gesture of that sort would put the cart before the horse: the PA must first embark on building credible, accountable, transparent institutions, demonstrating that it is a trustworthy “state in the making,” before it is rewarded with recognition.

There is, however, another way to demonstrate American and international commitment to the two-state solution. The basis for every negotiation among Israel, its Arab neighbors, and the Palestinians is UN Security Council Resolution 242, which was passed and accepted by Israel and the Arab states following the Six-Day War in 1967. (In 1998, the PLO also accepted it as the basis for the negotiations that led to the Oslo accords.) Resolution 242 is silent, however, on the Palestinian issue, except for a passing reference to the need for a just settlement of the refugee issue. It makes no mention of any of the other final-status issues, although it does make an explicit reference to “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” and the need for Israeli withdrawal from territories (although not “the territories”) it occupied in the 1967 war.

A new resolution that updated Resolution 242 could enshrine the U.S. and international community’s commitment to the two-state solution in international law. It would invoke UN General Assembly Resolution 181 in calling for two states for two peoples based on mutual recognition of the Jewish state of Israel and the Arab state of Palestine. It could also call on both sides to avoid unilateral actions that would impede the achievement of the two-state solution, including settlement activity, incitement, and terrorism. And it could call for direct negotiations between the parties “at the appropriate time” to resolve all final-status issues and end the conflict and all claims arising from it. If such a resolution were introduced by the United States, endorsed by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, and passed unanimously, Israel and the PLO would have little choice but to accept it, just as they accepted Resolution 242.

THE TIME HAS COME

Wars often don’t end until both sides have exhausted themselves and become convinced that they are better off coexisting with their enemies than pursuing a futile effort to destroy them. The Israelis and the Palestinians are a long way from that point. But maybe, after the fighting in Gaza ends and the passions cool, they will begin to think again about how to get there. There are already some reasons for hope. Consider, for example, the fact that Israel’s Arab citizens have so far refused Hamas’s call to rise up. There has been relatively little communal violence in Israel’s mixed Arab-Jewish cities since October 7, and one of the most prominent leaders of the Arab-Israeli community, the politician and Knesset member Mansour Abbas (no relation to the Palestinian prime minister), has given courageous voice to the goal of coexistence. “All of us, Arab and Jewish citizens, must take pains to cooperate in order to maintain peace and calm,” he wrote in The Times of Israel in late October. “We will strengthen the fabric of relations, increasing understanding and tolerance, to overcome this crisis peacefully.” Nor have the Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem turned to popular violence (as opposed to isolated terrorist incidents), despite the provocations and predations of extremist settlers; the 150,000 or so Palestinians who live in the West Bank but worked in Israel proper before October 7 may understandably burn with a sense of humiliation, but they would rather return to their jobs than see their children fighting with Israeli soldiers at checkpoints.

Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians are ready to make the deep compromises that genuine coexistence would require; indeed, they are far less ready to do so than they were at the end of the Clinton administration, when they failed to close the deal. But the massive costs of refusing to compromise have become much clearer in recent months, and will become clearer still in the years to come. Over time, majorities in both societies may recognize that the only way to secure the future for their children is to separate out of respect rather than engage out of hatred. That realization could be accelerated by responsible, courageous leadership on both sides—should it ever emerge. In the meantime, the process can start with an international commitment to an Arab state of Palestine living alongside a Jewish state of Israel in peace and security—a promise articulated by the United States, endorsed by the Arab states and the international community, and given credibility by a concerted effort to generate a more stable order in Gaza and the West Bank. In the end, the parties to the conflict and the rest of the world may then come to see that decades of destruction, denialism, and deceit did not kill the two-state solution—but only made it stronger.

• MARTIN INDYK is Lowy Distinguished Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He worked closely with Arab, Israeli, and Palestinian leaders in a number of senior roles during the Clinton and Obama administrations, including U.S. Ambassador to Israel and U.S. Special Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations. He is the author of Master of the Game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy.

Foreign Affairs · by Master of the Game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy · February 20, 2024

9. This military special ops unit is so classified, even its name is a secret — and getting into it is absolute hell

Was this book cleared by DOD? I am sure members of this organization know who the author is despite the use of a pseudonym. Should he be charged if this book was not cleared? Seems like the author likely violated his non-disclosure agreement if it was not cleared.

This military special ops unit is so classified, even its name is a secret — and getting into it is absolute hell

New York Post · February 19, 2024

We’ve all heard of the Navy SEALs and the Green Berets, but there’s an elite team within the US military that’s so secretive, even its name is classified. It’s referred to simply as “the Unit” or “the Activity,” and the VA has no record of its members. Adam Gamal, a pseudonymous author, writes about his time as part of the highly classified group in his new book “The Unit: My Life Fighting Terrorists as One of America’s Most Secret Military Operatives” (St. Martin’s Press, Feb. 20). Gamal, a Muslim American who fled Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood as a young boy, enlisted in the US Army in 1994, compelled to serve the country that had given him freedom. He initially hesitated to join the special forces — though his language skills were needed, and his dark complexion and 5-foot-1 stature would make him an asset who could easily blend-in abroad. But, after 9/11, he wanted to do whatever he could to fight al-Qaeda.

“I felt that I had a moral obligation to make sure these guys didn’t do any more damage — either to my fellow Americans or to the religion that also feels like home to me,” he writes in the book, which is co-authored by Kelly Kennedy. But, joining the Unit first required undergoing a long, grueling selection process that was was excruciating both physically and mentally. Gamal, who has been awarded the Purple Heart, the Bronze Star Medal and the Legion of Merit, shares his experience in this excerpt.

As soon as they handcuffed us and pulled bags over our heads, I started to hear explosions all around me, as if we’d sud­denly found ourselves in a war zone.

From underneath my bag, I began to hear voices all around me: “I quit.”

I’d been walking for days, and I smelled sour. Things didn’t get better after they removed the bags from our heads. They asked me a bunch of questions, including about a message I’d received from a guy at a bar on the shady side of town.

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“I don’t know,” I said. Whack!

They hit me so hard I was sure I was going to pass out. And then they hit me again. This was real. This was not a joke. They hit the women, too. One interrogator stood at least six feet, five inches tall and weighed a good 250 pounds. He had a monster beard, like some kind of militant religious terrorist — or a biker­ — and a bald head.

“Please don’t smack me,” I said, as I stood eyeball-to-belly but­ton with the biggest guy I had ever seen in my life. “If you smack me again, you’re going to kill me. So don’t.”

Adam Gamal (pictured with his dad) fled Egypt as a boy to escape the Muslim Brotherhood. Photo courtesy of the author

He didn’t smile.

This was not a war zone.

For days, we had walked. Twenty miles. Thirty miles. Fifty miles. In the desert. In the city. In the woods. We never knew what our days would look like. One MRE to last a day. If we were in the city, eleven dollars to last a day. They dropped us in the worst places: Sand in every direction with no landmarks. The rough parts of town. At one point, I looked so bad, a woman thought I was homeless.

“Hey, I saw you walking around yesterday,” she said.

Isthispartofit? I thought. Isthisatest?

Gamal was initially hesitant to join a special ops team, but 9/11 changed his mind. Getty Images

I had become paranoid about everything, sure that someone would try to trip me up.

I had been wearing the same clothes for days. I hadn’t shaved in a week. She tried to give me money.

“I can’t take it,” I told her. She insisted. “No, no,” I explained. “I’m not homeless.”

As it turned out, she had nothing to do with it. She was just kind.

They told us to pack a bag, and when we arrived, we gave it to our evaluators. They then decided what we would wear that first day. Our first day of walking? They gave one of the women a pair of high heels she had packed in her bag. She walked at least twenty miles that day. I am sure she was in pain, but my god, she was f—ing tough.

Flyers such as this one targeted Gamal when he was a young soldier. courtesy of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)

Most of us would not make it through selection. And many of us would not make it through training. By the end of it, I had injured myself enough that I needed cortisone shots. There was no skin on the bottom of my feet.

Was it physical? Yes.

But mostly, it was a mindf—.

Adam Gamal is a pseudonym. The author’s true identity is a secret. courtesy of the author.

‘Leave your ego at the door.’

“Leave your ego at the door,” they told us on the first day. Those who didn’t failed.

I went in feeling like I was special: Not only had I joined the Army as a non-English-speaking immigrant but I was usually the shortest guy in the group. Well, always. But despite that, I had excelled in training, physical fitness, rank, and education.

But it’s like when you go from high school, where you’re the best football player at your school, and move on to college, where all the best football players from all the high schools are and you’re no longer the best.

Two special operatives display the American flag after a successful mission in Africa. Photo courtesy of the author

We had a guy who grew up between Brazil and Argentina, a guy whose dad had kidnapped him and taken him to Lebanon and then Libya, a guy who grew up fishing in Alaska, a guy whose family came from Ukraine. One woman was a world-class swim­mer. There was a guy who ended up mayor for one day of his hometown in a foreign country after a coup and who then had to flee for his life.

Another guy, Jacob, had been shot in the face. While the bullet missed his brain, it took out his eye. His party trick? Popping out his glass eye.

The frightening unknown.

We didn’t know how long it would last.

The Special Forces guys — the Green Berets — also go through selection, but it wasn’t the same as ours. They knew, going in, exactly what they would encounter during their twenty-one days.

A flock of H-6M Little Bird helicopters took out a terrorist using information gathered by Gamal and his team. Photo courtesy of author

They knew that if they could just suck it up for three weeks, they were golden. They also knew, every day, exactly what they would be doing: Today, I’m going to do this task. I’ll need this much food and water. And tonight, I’m going to sleep in this particular spot after a twenty-mile road march. They knew that they would spend much of their time at Camp Mackall in North Carolina.

It may not seem like a big deal, but just that sense of a be­ginning, a middle, and an end gives you an edge: I only have to do this for another two hours/six miles/three days. Your first question-anybody’s first question-will always be, “For how long?” We didn’t have that. We didn’t even know how long selec­tion would last. Six weeks? Eight weeks? They wanted to know if we were willing to take the risk, as well as if we could muscle through that daily unknown.

Special ops collect intelligence in a secret location in Africa. Photo courtesy of the author

Fears revealed.

We found out during selection if we had any crazy phobias: we jumped from heights; we spent time in the water; we slept in the woods by ourselves.

“If you see a bear, don’t try to fight it,” they told us, and then they sent us out into the woods for days and days (and nights) for a land-nav course.

In the middle of f—ing nowhere in West By-God Virginia, we did a lot of land nav without GPS. They gave us maps and told us where to go, and then we found our spots and camped out. If you grew up in the country, this may seem like no big deal. But I didn’t grow up near anything that looked like a forest.

Special ops forces prepare to go on a mission in western Iraq. CJSOTF-AP

I definitely never saw a bear in Egypt.

Bears are faster than you think. They can run after you.

A brutal wakeup.

One night, we stayed, as a group, at a hotel. All of a sudden, a bunch of guys stormed our room and arrested us.

Okay.Whatthef—?

An old lady in the next room saw all of it, and it freaked her out pretty hard. We’re probably lucky we didn’t end up a meme for police brutality.

Green Beret special ops prepare for a nighttime free fall jump. 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division

They weren’t pretending. They smacked the f– out of me. We had a guy, I’ll call him Mike, with us who was extraor­dinarily smart, to the point that he overengineered everything and was incapable of working with other people because he was smarter than everybody else. Hilarious, though, and I liked him. He and I were in the same room for one interrogation — picture a gym or an old-school barracks with an open shower area. I swear I could smell sweaty socks, bleach, and Speed Stick.

The interrogator asked me a question. “I don’t know,” I said.

Smack!

They told us not to talk too much.

The interrogator asked Mike a question. Mike told the interrogator this long-ass story.

Adam Gamal stands in front of Saddam Hussein’s “Victory Arch.” Photo courtesy of author

“Mike,” the interrogator said, “you talk too much.”

But he couldn’t stop. And every time he talked more, the interrogator smacked him again. Smacked him hard. Extremely hard.

Whoa, I thought. This is real.

The unexpected ending.

All through it, they kept us walking. I had no skin left on the bottom of my feet. I had landed sideways fast-roping out of a Blackhawk and twisted my ankle the wrong way. My knee still ached from slipping on the black ice — the doctor had told me not to run on it for six months. And I was exhausted. I hadn’t been able to eat enough to keep any weight on my body, and I could feel it breaking down.

I was so f—ing thirsty.

Gamal kept a copy of the newspaper from the day Osama bin Laden was killed. Courtesy of the author.

ShouldIquit?

I couldn’t even move. Couldn’t move my feet.

A member of the cadre in a car rolled up next to me.

Sh-t.

I knew I was done. I knew he had come to tell me I had failed.

Gamal has been awarded the Purple Heart, the Bronze Star Medal and the Legion of Merit. Courtesy of the author.

I got in the car.

But he didn’t say anything.

Sh-t. He’s taking me somewhere else to make me walk some more. Should I tell himI can’t walk anymore?

He handed me a bag.

“Eat this,” he said. “We’re going home.”

It was the best burger I’ve ever eaten.

From The Unit: My Life Fighting Terrorists as One of Americas Most Secret Military Operatives by Adam Gamal with Kelly Kennedy. Copyright © 2024 by the author and reprinted by permission of St. Martin’s Press.

New York Post · February 19, 2024

10. Propensity Through Permeability: A Culture Shift That Might Save the All-Volunteer Force

Excerpts:

Embracing permeability would be a culture shock for the US military, but a necessary one for the security challenges that may lie ahead. The armed forces will always need some lifers, but both societal changes and strategic geography indicate that full-time, career service members should be in the minority. The Ukraine War is providing a reminder that major wars are seldom short. Talk of sinking the entire People’s Liberation Army Navy in seventy-two hours is as farcical as Vladimir Putin’s army packing their dress uniforms for a supposed stroll into Kyiv two years ago. A major war will be fought and won by a mobilized nation, not by the small active duty force that begins hostilities. America’s providential geography, with the United States thousands of miles from potential enemies and ringed by oceans and friendly neighbors, only underscores this truth.

Permeability is not a short-term panacea for the US military’s recruiting woes. It will probably take a generation to thoroughly conceive, instill, and disseminate a new ethos of American military service, with the organizational culture and institutions to match. The scale of the solution will be commensurate with the scale of the problem. The alternative, the evidence suggests, is a shrinking force, bleeding both talent and mass, increasingly inadequate to the security challenges of the twenty-first century.

Propensity Through Permeability: A Culture Shift That Might Save the All-Volunteer Force - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Gil Barndollar · February 20, 2024

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The all-volunteer force is in the throes of what is widely and rightly termed a “recruiting crisis,” having now missed its annual intake goal by tens of thousands of recruits for the second year in a row. Dig a little deeper and the picture gets even darker. The Air Force’s pilot shortage continues to worsen. The Army Reserve has been forced to put active duty officers in command of some of its battalions, because there are insufficient Reserve officers who want the once-coveted position of commander. The Army National Guard narrowly missed its recruiting goals this past year—but 2022 was catastrophic, with only one state (New York) meeting its Army Guard recruiting goal and thirty-one states falling short by more than 40 percent.

The worst may be yet to come. Just like American higher education, the US military faces an impending demographic cliff, a “baby bust” that resulted from the Great Recession (and another from the COVID-19 pandemic, which will be felt in in the 2030s). The number of American eighteen-year-olds is set to peak next year at 9.4 million, before dropping to about eight million by 2029. The pool of traditional military recruits is about to dramatically shrink.

The pervasive politicization of almost all aspects of America life has left the military beset by ideologues on both ends of the political spectrum, with those on the hard right attacking a “woke military” led by social radicals, while those on the hard left dismiss the US military as a tool of oligarchy and oppression. American society is still digesting the effects of twenty years of post-9/11 wars, the global financial crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic, but none of these major and compounding disruptions are likely to be boons to military recruiting.

The recruiting crisis took years to reach fruition; quick fixes will not reverse it. Throwing money at the problem, America’s first answer to all things national security since 1947, has reached the point of diminishing returns. Lowering standards—though already in progress— is not a viable path for a force that must be able to overcome both the physical and technological demands of major conventional warfare. And better advertising, though welcome, won’t save the Army.

There are two primary drivers of the recruiting crisis and the retention struggle to which it is inextricably linked: a shrinking pool of potential service members and the incompatibility of the traditional model of full-time military service with modern American life.

The all-volunteer force’s economic and social model appears archaic to young Americans. Cradle-to-grave employment, the active duty military’s model (albeit with enormous incentives to retire too early), is a thing of the past for most US workers. A 2016 Gallup report found that 21 percent of millennials polled changed jobs that year—triple the number of workers from other generations. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, millennial and Generation Z workers are particularly apt to sacrifice pay and promotion for flexibility, stability, and work-life balance. The all-volunteer force, by contrast, punishes families with frequent moves—a rigid model that also makes meaningful careers for military spouses all but impossible. The pandemic has made the gap between civilian and military life larger and more unattractive.

The most salient number for the all-volunteer force’s survival is not the percentage of young Americans who are eligible to serve, as grim as that number is, but the percentage of Americans who would even consider enlisting—those the US military describes as “propensed to serve.” That number, at just 9 percent, is the lowest it’s been since the worst days of the Iraq War. The cratering propensity to serve is a direct, if delayed, consequence of the all-volunteer force itself.

The end of the draft in 1973 eventually yielded a US military of unparalleled proficiency and professionalism. But these gains came at a grave cost: the creation of a widening chasm between the American people and their military. Civil-military relations experts, and many other Americans, rightly worry about the impact of this divide on basic questions of American national security and foreign policy. But by sequestering the military from civilian life, the all-volunteer force may also have sown the seeds of its own destruction.

After fifty years of an opt-in, all-recruited force, most young Americans have an extremely limited understanding of their country’s military. Millennials, an understandably risk-averse cohort after growing up amid a global financial crisis and post-9/11 terrorist threat inflation, are prone to dramatically overrate the dangers of military service. Understanding of military lifestyles is equally blinkered. Forty-nine percent of Gen Zers in a 2022 poll thought that American soldiers received no personal time and no vacation days.

The people with the best understanding of the challenges and rewards of military service are military families. The children of service members and veterans are far more propensed to serve, to the point that the US military has become a family business. In 2019, nearly 80 percent of Army recruits reported having a family member who served. For more than 30 percent, it was a parent. This nascent military caste is another unhealthy and unsustainable outcome of the all-volunteer force, but it points to a potential solution: lowering barriers between the US military and American society in order to expose more Americans to their military, ensuring better understanding of the force and far broader interest in military service.

The method, in military manpower terms, is permeability: breaking down bureaucratic walls between the military’s active and reserve components and between the military and civilian sectors. Permeability would enable nontraditional military careers, in which American citizens might move, with minimal possible friction, between active service, reserve service, and fully civilian status, as their lives and the national security situation dictate.

Permeability enhances both talent acquisition and talent management, by offering more responsibility and pay to recruits with critical skills, while also better incentivizing some of these key contributors to maintain at least a vestigial relationship with the military, making them far more ready to serve again in the event of a national crisis.

By maintaining that vestigial relationship, and with it, far more information about once and future service members than the Individual Ready Reserve and Selective Service currently provide, the military will be better prepared to effectively mobilize in the event of a true national security emergency. The US military needs both talent and mass. But a military must be built with the worst-case scenario in mind: high-intensity, high-casualty, major warfare.

The services, and Congress, have taken some steps toward increasing permeability in the US military. The 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) contained several provisions that could foster a more fluid and capable military force. It authorized career intermissions, later entry for commissioned officers, promotion flexibility, and, most importantly, lateral entry from the civilian sector at up to O-6 rank. None of these reforms have been fully implemented, but together they offer a glimpse of a very different future force.

The United States can also look to allies and partners for examples of permeability at work. Finland, NATO’s newest member, defends itself with a tiny active-duty military and enormous reserves in which most men serve for decades (Finnish women can and do volunteer to serve). Neighboring Sweden has restored gender-neutral selective conscription and returned to a Cold War–era, whole-of-society concept of “total defense.” In Israel, many if not most of the elite strike pilots of the Israeli Air Force are reservists. The current American way is not the only way.

Embracing permeability would be a culture shock for the US military, but a necessary one for the security challenges that may lie ahead. The armed forces will always need some lifers, but both societal changes and strategic geography indicate that full-time, career service members should be in the minority. The Ukraine War is providing a reminder that major wars are seldom short. Talk of sinking the entire People’s Liberation Army Navy in seventy-two hours is as farcical as Vladimir Putin’s army packing their dress uniforms for a supposed stroll into Kyiv two years ago. A major war will be fought and won by a mobilized nation, not by the small active duty force that begins hostilities. America’s providential geography, with the United States thousands of miles from potential enemies and ringed by oceans and friendly neighbors, only underscores this truth.

Permeability is not a short-term panacea for the US military’s recruiting woes. It will probably take a generation to thoroughly conceive, instill, and disseminate a new ethos of American military service, with the organizational culture and institutions to match. The scale of the solution will be commensurate with the scale of the problem. The alternative, the evidence suggests, is a shrinking force, bleeding both talent and mass, increasingly inadequate to the security challenges of the twenty-first century.

Gil Barndollar is a US Marine Corps veteran, serving National Guardsman, and a Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor veterans fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Spc. Francis De Leon, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Gil Barndollar · February 20, 2024

11. Russian spies are back—and more dangerous than ever

This is a fairly detailed overview of the Russian intelligence services.

The byline for this article is Muncih. I am sure the Russians had a large presence of intelligence personnel there for the recent security conference

Russian spies are back—and more dangerous than ever

The Kremlin’s intelligence agencies have learned from their mistakes over the past two years

Feb 20th 2024|munich

The Economist

IT IS UNUSUAL for spymasters to taunt their rivals openly. But last month Bill Burns, the director of the CIA, could not resist observing that the war in Ukraine had been a boon for his agency. “The undercurrent of disaffection [among Russians] is creating a once-in-a-generation recruiting opportunity for the CIA,” he wrote in Foreign Affairs. “We’re not letting it go to waste.” The remark might well have touched a nerve in Russia’s “special services”, as the country describes its intelligence agencies. Russian spies botched preparations for the war and were then expelled from Europe en masse. But evidence gathered by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a think-tank in London, and published exclusively by The Economist today, shows that they are learning from their errors, adjusting their tradecraft and embarking on a new phase of political warfare against the West.

The past few years were torrid for Russian spies. In 2020 operatives from the FSB, Russia’s security service, botched the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, the recently deceased opposition activist. He mocked them for spreading Novichok on his underwear. Then the FSB gave the Kremlin a rosy view of how the war would go, exaggerating Ukraine’s internal weaknesses. It failed to prevent Western agencies from stealing and publicising Russia’s plans to invade Ukraine. And it was unwilling or unable to halt a brief mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner mercenary group, last year. The SVR, Russia’s foreign intelligence agency, saw its presence in Europe eviscerated, with some 600 officers expelled from embassies across the continent. At least eight “illegals”—intelligence officers operating without diplomatic cover, often posing as non-Russians—were exposed.

The study by RUSI, written by Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, a pair of the organisation’s analysts, and Oleksandr Danylyuk, a former adviser to both Ukraine’s defence minister and foreign intelligence chief, draws on documents “obtained from the Russian special services” and on interviews with “relevant official bodies”—presumably intelligence agencies—in Ukraine and Europe. In late 2022, the study says, Russia realised that it needed more honest reporting from its agencies. It put Sergei Kiriyenko, the Kremlin’s deputy chief of staff, in charge of “committees of special influence”. These co-ordinate operations against the West and then measure their effect.

That personnel change appears to have produced more coherent propaganda campaigns. In Moldova, for instance, a once-scattershot disinformation effort against the country’s bid for European Union membership grew more consistent and focused last year. It tied the accession bid to the president personally, all the while blaming her for Moldova’s economic woes. Campaigns aimed at undermining European support for Ukraine have also picked up. In January German experts published details of bots spreading hundreds of thousands of German-language posts a day from a network of 50,000 accounts over a single month on X (Twitter as was). On February 12th France exposed a large network of Russian sites spreading disinformation in France, Germany and Poland.

Meanwhile the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency, has also been re-evaluating its tradecraft. In recent years its Unit 29155—which had attempted to assassinate Sergei Skripal, a former GRU officer, in Salisbury, Britain in 2018—saw many of its personnel, activities and facilities exposed by Bellingcat. The investigative group draws on publicly available information and leaked Russian databases for its exposés.

The GRU concluded that its personnel were leaving too many digital breadcrumbs, in particular by carrying their mobile phones to and from sensitive sites associated with Russian intelligence. It also realised that the expulsion of Russian intelligence officers in Europe had made it harder to mount operations and control agents abroad—one reason why the invasion of Ukraine went awry.

The result was wholesale reform, which began in 2020 but sped up after the war began. General Andrei Averyanov, the head of Unit 29155, was, despite his litany of cock-ups, promoted to deputy head of the GRU and established a new “Service for Special Activities”. Unit 29155’s personnel—once exemplified by Alexander Mishkin and Anatoly Chepiga, Mr Skripal’s hapless poisoners, who insisted that they had travelled to Salisbury to see its cathedral’s famous spire—no longer carry their personal or work phones to its facility, using landlines instead. Training is done in a variety of safe houses rather than onsite. Whereas half of personnel once came from the Spetsnaz, Russia’s special forces, most new recruits no longer have military experience, making it harder for Western security services to identify them through old photographs or leaked databases.

A separate branch of the Service for Special Activities, Unit 54654, is designed to build a network of illegals operating under what Russia calls “full legalisation”—the ability to pass muster even under close scrutiny from a foreign spy agency. It recruits contractors through front companies, keeping their names and details out of government records, and embeds its officers in ministries unrelated to defence or in private companies. The GRU has also targeted foreign students studying at Russian universities, paying stipends to students from the Balkans, Africa and elsewhere in the developing world.

For another example of how Russian spies have turned disaster into opportunity, consider the case of the Wagner Group, a series of front companies overseen by Mr Prigozhin. Wagner initially served as a deniable arm of Russian influence, providing muscle and firepower to local autocrats in Syria, Libya and other African countries. In June 2023 Mr Prigozhin, angered by the mismanagement of the war by Russia’s defence minister and army chief, marched on Moscow. The mutiny was halted; two months later Mr Prigozhin was killed when his plane exploded midair.

Russia’s special services quickly divided Mr Prigozhin’s sprawling military-criminal enterprise among themselves. The FSB would keep domestic businesses, and the SVR the media arms, such as the troll farms which interfered in America’s presidential election in 2016. The GRU got the foreign military bits, split into a Volunteer Corps for Ukraine and an Expeditionary Corps, managed by General Averyanov, for the rest of the world. The latter missed its target of recruiting 20,000 troops by the end of last year, says RUSI, though its strength is “steadily rising”. There have been hiccups: Mr Prigozhin’s son, who mystifyingly remains alive and at liberty, offered Wagner troops to the Rosgvardia, Russia’s national guard, prompting a bidding war between the guard and the GRU, according to the authors.

The net result of this consolidation is a revitalised Russian threat in Africa. Shortly after Mr Prigozhin’s death General Averyanov visited various African capitals to offer what RUSI describes as a “regime survival package”. In theory the proposals involve the GRU providing local elites with military muscle and propaganda against local rivals. In Mali, they observe, the GRU-created Lengo Songo radio station is one of the most popular in the country. In return Russia would get economic concessions, such as lithium mines and gold refineries, and so leverage over enemies, perhaps including the ability to sever France from uranium mines in Niger (France needs uranium for its nuclear power stations). Mr Prigozhin is dead; his malevolent influence lives on.

Mission possible

Russian intelligence, though bruised, is firmly back on its feet after its recent humiliations. In recent weeks the Insider, a Riga-based investigative website, has published a series of stories documenting Russian espionage and influence across Europe. They include details of how a GRU officer in Brussels continues to provide European equipment to Russian arms-makers, and the revelation that a top aide in the Bundestag and a Latvian member of the European Parliament were both Russian agents, the latter for perhaps more than 20 years.

“It’s not as bad for them as we think it is,” says Andrei Soldatov, an investigative journalist, who reckons that the Russian services are “back with a vengeance” and increasingly inventive. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, and once a (mediocre) KGB officer, is “trying to restore the glory of Stalin’s formidable secret service”, explains Mr Soldatov. He points to a case in April 2023 when Artem Uss, a Russian businessman arrested in Milan on suspicion of smuggling American military technology to Russia, was spirited back to Russia with the help of a Serbian criminal gang—a common intermediary for the Russian services.

In the past, says Mr Soldatov, the FSB, SVR and GRU had a clearer division of labour. No longer. All three agencies have been particularly active in recruiting among the flood of exiles who left Russia after the war. It is easy to hide agents in a large group and simple to threaten those with family still in Russia. Germany is of particular concern, given that the many Russians who have moved there could make up a recruiting pool for Russian spy bodies. The flood of new arrivals is thanks in part to Baltic countries having grown more hostile to Russian emigres.

Moreover, Russian cyber-activity goes from strength to strength. In December America and Britain issued public warnings over “Star Blizzard”, an elite FSB hacking group which has been targeting NATO countries for years. The following month Microsoft said that “Cosy Bear”, a group linked to the SVR, had penetrated email accounts belonging to some of the company’s most senior executives. That came on top of a sophisticated GRU cyber-attack against Ukraine’s power grid, causing a power outage apparently co-ordinated with Russian missile strikes in the same city.

The renewal of Russia’s intelligence apparatus comes at a crucial moment in east-west competition. An annual report by Norway’s intelligence service, published on February 12th, warned that, in Ukraine, Russia was “seizing the initiative and gaining the upper hand militarily”. Estonia’s equivalent report, released a day later, said that the Kremlin was “anticipating a possible conflict with NATO within the next decade”.

The priority for Russian spies is to prepare for that conflict not just by stealing secrets, but by widening cracks within NATO, undermining support for Ukraine in America and Europe and eroding Western influence in the global south. By contrast there has been precious little Russian sabotage against Ukraine-bound supplies in Europe. One reason for that is the Kremlin’s fear of escalation. Another is that the Russians cannot do everything, everywhere all at once.

In the meantime, spies will continue to battle against their peers. In their report, Estonia’s foreign intelligence services published the identities of Russians working on behalf of the country’s intelligence services. “For those who prefer not to find their names and images alongside those of FSB or other Russian intelligence officers in our publications, potentially affecting their associations with the West, we extend an invitation to get in touch,” noted the Estonian spooks. “We are confident that mutually advantageous arrangements can be negotiated!”

The Economist

12. Two Years On: Russia's Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine and the Continuing Lessons for the Future of Irregular Warfare

Conclusion:

Finally, the conflict holds broader implications for the strategic competition between the United States and China. The international response to Russia’s actions provides insights into potential reactions to aggressive moves by China in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly concerning Taiwan. The conflict underscores the importance of a multifaceted approach to security, which includes not only military capabilities but also tools to counter hybrid and cyber threats. This necessitates closer cooperation among the United States, its allies, and partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific to develop and adopt irregular approaches that address the evolving nature of global security challenges. The situation demonstrates the interconnectedness of global conflicts and the ever-evolving importance of irregular warfare in shaping the relevant environments and influencing their populations.

Two Years On: Russia's Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine and the Continuing Lessons for the Future of Irregular Warfare - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Doug Livermore · February 20, 2024

Introduction – Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine in Context

Russia’s escalating war against Ukraine, especially the past two years since the full-scale invasion in 2022, has highlighted several critical lessons regarding irregular warfare and its broader implications for global security and stability. While irregular warfare is widely understood to reference approaches to conflicts that emphasize subterfuge and using proxies, the US Department of Defense recently redefined “irregular warfare” in Joint Publication 1 Volume 1 (Joint Warfighting) as “A form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities.” Far from comprising the minority of struggles across history, “irregular warfare” is ironically far more prevalent than “traditional warfare” in the study of past, current, and future conflicts.

First and foremost, the conflict in Ukraine underscores the importance of hybrid warfare strategies, which blend conventional military operations with irregular warfare approaches such as cyber-attacks, misinformation campaigns, and economic coercion. This approach has been particularly evident in Europe, where Russia’s use of cyber warfare and disinformation has aimed to destabilize political systems and sow discord among NATO allies. The European response, emphasizing the need for more robust cyber defenses and counter-disinformation strategies, reflects a key lesson in addressing the multifaceted nature of modern conflicts​​​​.

In Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, the invasion’s repercussions have primarily manifested in economic and humanitarian domains, illustrating the global reach of contemporary warfare’s consequences. The disruption of agricultural exports from Ukraine and Russia, vital for global food security, has particularly affected countries in the Middle East and Africa, where reliance on wheat and other staples from the conflict zone is high. This situation has underscored the necessity for nations to diversify their sources of essential commodities and enhance resilience against external shocks. ​​​​In Southeast Asia, the conflict has demonstrated the vulnerability of global supply chains to geopolitical tensions, particularly in critical sectors such as semiconductors and agriculture. Additionally, the economic sanctions against Russia have illustrated the double-edged nature of such measures, affecting not only the targeted nation but also countries with economic ties to it, highlighting the interconnectedness of the global economy​​.

These lessons from the Russian invasion of Ukraine emphasize the need for a holistic understanding of modern warfare, which transcends traditional military engagements, including cyber, economic, and informational dimensions generally understood as the realm of “strategic competition.” They also highlight the importance of preparedness, resilience, and international security cooperation in navigating the complexities of contemporary global conflicts, considerations that influence the evolution of irregular warfare approaches.

The Ukrainian War in a European Irregular Warfare Context

Starting with the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, Russia has pursued its objectives in Ukraine through a range of military options that include not just conventional force deployment but also support for pro-Russian rebels, cyber operations, and other irregular activities within Ukraine and the broader region​​. Prepositioning its forces under the deception of joint military exercises, Russia launched its full invasion in February of 2022. Only through valiant Ukrainian defensive actions were the Russians halted outside Kyiv in March, and the country was saved from rapid capitulation. In the intervening years since Russia’s initial invasion in 2014, the US and other allies worked extensively with the Ukrainian military and civil authorities to greatly increase the resistance potential of the populace. These efforts to assure our Ukrainian partners through this irregular warfare approach proved critical in blunting Russia’s invasion.

For its purposes, Ukraine has engaged in irregular warfare approaches to counter Russia’s invasion. Within the occupied territories of Kherson, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Crimea, Ukrainian special operations forces have directed a sustained partisan resistance to Russian occupation. Information operations directed at beleaguered Russian soldiers have also resulted in tens of thousands of surrenders. Further afield, sabotage operations against critical Russian infrastructure are regularly attributed to or claimed by Ukrainian intelligence or military services or both. The extent to which Ukraine has applied irregular warfare approaches to combat the Russian invasion is a direct reflection of the support provided by the US and its allies. Additionally, Ukraine’s successes and failures directly inform how all of Europe is revising its approach to irregular warfare.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the widespread engagement in irregular warfare have had far-reaching consequences for the security, political, and humanitarian landscape of Europe. The invasion has also had profound humanitarian impacts, contributing to Europe’s largest refugee crisis since World War II. Repeatedly, Russia has sought to “weaponize” the flow of migrants from Central and South Asia to pressure European countries to reduce aid to Ukraine. Both sides engage in proxy warfare, rely on clandestine sabotage operations, and employ information operations to advance their objectives. The conflict underscores the complex interplay of historical grievances, geopolitical ambitions, and modern military strategies shaping contemporary international relations. As the region most directly influenced by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we are seeing in Europe the most profound and rapid evolution of irregular warfare approaches.

The Ukraine War’s African Impacts

As Russia has become increasingly isolated from Western countries, it has turned to the developing world for allies. Before COVID-19, many African countries were among the fastest growing in the world, but the pandemic reversed decades of progress, with the Human Development Index dropping for the first time in nearly three decades. The war in Ukraine has further disrupted Africa’s recovery, particularly affecting critical imports like wheat, fertilizers, and steel for countries like Kenya, Cameroon, and Ghana. The war has also strained government revenues in African countries, reducing trade and taxation income while increasing public indebtedness. Imported inflation has hit several African countries, with notable increases in costs such as transportation and food prices.

Against this backdrop, Russia has helped instigate coups and sought closer relations with authoritarian regimes across Africa, often pairing these efforts with extensive disinformation and influence campaigns to undermine Western relations with the continent. Russia has been particularly active in seeking influence in Africa, employing tactics such as political interference and spreading disinformation. A significant tool in Russia’s approach is the Wagner Group and other private military companies active in several African countries. Russian mercenaries have played significant roles in the recent coups in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, and Sudan. This irregular warfare approach of leveraging proxies also aligns with Russia’s broader strategy of positioning itself as an alternative to Western powers in Africa. Russian mercenary operations often include gaining access to valuable resources like gold in return for their military services, extending Russia’s political influence in the region. Interestingly, there are increasing reports of alleged Ukrainian attacks against Russian mercenaries and their surrogates, indicating a growing and chaotic irregular competition across Africa.

Additionally, Russia’s narratives concerning its invasion of Ukraine have found resonance in Africa through social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, TikTok, and YouTube. These narratives often exploit existing tensions and grievances in the region, with a focus on anti-Western sentiment and historical issues such as colonialism. The spread of such narratives aims to sway African countries to support Russia’s actions and secure Russia’s influence, especially as the country faces international isolation from the United States and Europe. This approach has been successful in some African countries, where Russia’s popularity stems from its role during the era of decolonization and its non-colonial history in Africa compared to Western powers. In many ways, this Russian approach to Africa is a reapplication of the irregular warfare approaches used by the Soviet Union to build a competing bloc against the West during the Cold War.

The Middle Eastern Conflict as an Extension of the War in Ukraine

In the face of crushing sanctions on its defense industries from its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has significantly deepened its cooperation with Iran, receiving hundreds of one-way attack drones (and now the means to produce licensed versions) and potentially long-range attack missiles. At the same time, Russia continues to militarily back the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad while providing diplomatic support to Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas, both of which are effectively Iranian proxies. Since Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006, Russia has increasingly provided diplomatic support as well as millions of dollars through a Moscow-based cryptocurrency exchange. The Hamas terrorist attack in October 2023 instigated the massive Israeli counterattack against Gaza that has already drawn in the United States, United Kingdom, and several other Western powers. Escalating violence has distracted Western attention from and support for Ukraine at a critical juncture, interrupting aid and creating conditions more conducive to Russian gains. For instance, in November 2023, reports emerged that artillery shells desperately needed in and initially intended for Ukraine were diverted to support the Israeli campaign in Gaza. As part of its global irregular warfare campaign, Russia is looking to facilitate battlefield successes in Ukraine by supporting Iranian proxies in the Middle East.

In the Red Sea, Ansar Allah, a Houthi-majority group long supported as a proxy of Iran, has initiated a series of attacks targeting ships it claimed were linked to Israel, as well as indiscriminate targeting of other ships. These attacks have raised concerns about the impact on global trade, particularly the flow of oil and grain, as the Red Sea is a crucial maritime trade artery. The navies of the United States, United Kingdom, and other Western allies have undertaken an increasingly aggressive campaign to intercept these attacks and now strike at their sources in Yemen. Ansar Allah’s actions are seen as part of a broader proxy conflict between the United States and Iran, with the Houthis demanding a ceasefire in Gaza and an end to Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip as conditions to end their attacks in the Red Sea​​​​. The longer this situation escalates in Yemen, the better for Russia, as Western attention, aid, and military might continue to be stretched further and further away from the battlefields in Ukraine.

The Iranian proxy attacks on American-led coalition forces in Syria, Iraq, and Jordan can be linked to the Russian invasion of Ukraine through the lens of shifting global alliances and the intensification of proxy conflicts. The Russian invasion has heightened tensions between major powers, leading to a realignment of geopolitical interests. As the greatest strategic beneficiary of a West distracted from Ukraine, Russia has lent its considerable support to Iran and, by extension, to its proxies. American counter attacks against Iranian-backed surrogates in Iraq have drastically increased pressure on the government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani to expel the United States and end a decades-long partnership, a stated strategic objective of Iran. By intensifying proxy attacks against American interests, both Iran and Russia aim to further their objectives while capitalizing on the current global realignment.

The rapidly escalating situation in the Middle East contributes to the complexity of international relations, where conflicts in one region can have ripple effects on other regions’ stability and security. The complex nature of these conflicts and their potential links to a broader irregular warfare campaign, including the Russian invasion of Ukraine, illustrate the multifaceted and interconnected challenges in the region. These situations involve a mix of state and non-state actors, proxy warfare, and impacts on international relations and global trade, all contributing to the overall instability and security concerns in the Middle East and beyond.

The Impact of Russia’s Ukraine Experience in Deterring China

The outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has several implications for China’s ambitions regarding Taiwan, especially in the realm of irregular warfare. The resistance and resilience demonstrated by Ukraine against a larger, more powerful adversary have been a crucial lesson for the international community, including China. This resistance has involved not just conventional military tactics but also elements of irregular warfare such as cyber defense, information operations, and the mobilization of civilian resources. The effectiveness of these tactics in Ukraine may lead China to reassess the challenges it would face in any potential action against Taiwan, especially considering the likelihood of Taiwanese resistance employing similar irregular warfare strategies​​​​​​.

Another aspect of the conflict in Ukraine that could impact China’s calculations is the international response, particularly the unity and resolve shown by Western allies in supporting Ukraine. This response has included not only military aid but also economic sanctions and diplomatic efforts, demonstrating the potential consequences for nations that undertake aggressive military actions. For China, this could serve as a cautionary tale about the potential diplomatic isolation and economic repercussions it might face if it were to take military action against Taiwan.

People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Admiral Dong Jun, China’s newly appointed defense minister, just pledged China’s unwavering support for Russia in its ongoing military activities against Ukraine. As Beijing has long asserted its rights to neighboring Taiwan, a Russian success in Ukraine would be an unmistakable message to China that it may pursue its territorial ambitions regardless of international opposition. Absent a Russian victory, the world’s strong and unified response may thus act as a deterrent, encouraging China to consider non-military irregular means of achieving its goals or to pursue a more cautious approach in its dealings with Taiwan​​​​.

Furthermore, the conflict in Ukraine has highlighted the importance of irregular warfare in modern conflicts, where military actions are combined with non-military tactics like cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, and economic coercion. Russia has effectively used these aspects of irregular warfare in Ukraine, tools that China intends to employ against Taiwan. The Taiwanese government has learnt from Ukraine’s experience, and is heavily focused on strengthening its capabilities to counter these irregular warfare approaches. This includes bolstering cyber defenses, countering disinformation, and preparing for blockades or economic coercion scenarios.

Conclusion – Putting It All Together

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has significant implications for irregular warfare across multiple regions, including Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the broader strategic competition between the United States and China. In Europe, the conflict has led to a reevaluation of defense strategies focusing on countering irregular forms of warfare, such as cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, and hybrid threats. This has necessitated a shift in NATO’s approach to security, emphasizing the importance of resilience against irregular warfare tactics. The conflict has also highlighted the need for closer cooperation among European nations to effectively respond to these evolving security challenges​​​​​​, responses that will increasingly require irregular warfare approaches.

In Africa and the Middle East, the invasion has underscored the global reach of modern irregular warfare tactics, particularly in the form of information warfare and political manipulation. Russia’s use of disinformation campaigns and political influence to shape perspectives in Africa and the Middle East reflects a broader pattern of irregular warfare. These tactics aim to sway support toward Russia while undermining Western influence, illustrating the importance of countering disinformation and influence operations to maintain regional stability. Escalating violence by proxies of Iran, which the war has made a close ally of Russia, threatens to distract the West from supporting Ukraine to the Kremlin’s benefit. In recent days, both Russia and China went to the United Nations to condemn US and British precision strikes against Iranian proxies engaged in indiscriminate terrorist attacks against commercial shipping off Yemen’s coast. The situation in these regions highlights the need for comprehensive strategies that address the multifaceted nature of modern conflicts, including the role of information operations as a component of irregular warfare​​​​​​​​.

Finally, the conflict holds broader implications for the strategic competition between the United States and China. The international response to Russia’s actions provides insights into potential reactions to aggressive moves by China in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly concerning Taiwan. The conflict underscores the importance of a multifaceted approach to security, which includes not only military capabilities but also tools to counter hybrid and cyber threats. This necessitates closer cooperation among the United States, its allies, and partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific to develop and adopt irregular approaches that address the evolving nature of global security challenges. The situation demonstrates the interconnectedness of global conflicts and the ever-evolving importance of irregular warfare in shaping the relevant environments and influencing their populations.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US Government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.

Doug Livermore is the vice president of operations at The Hoplite Group, a global threat analysis company providing bespoke support to government and commercial clients. Doug also continues his military service as the Deputy Commander for Special Operations Detachment – Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. In addition to his role as the Director of Communications for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Doug is the National Director of External Communications for the Special Forces Association, National Secretary for the Special Operations Association of America, Secretary of the Corioli Institute, and serves on the Board of Directors for No One Left Behind.

13. The AI Deception: Navigating the Mirage of Political Deepfakes Ahead of 2024 Elections

Excerpt:

In conclusion, the integration of AI in political advertising is a double-edged sword. While it offers new avenues for engaging with voters, it also opens up dangerous possibilities for electoral manipulation and misinformation. The passage of bills like the one in Wisconsin is a step in the right direction, but a global effort is required to safeguard the sanctity of elections. As we navigate this new terrain, the need for transparency, regulation, and vigilance has never been more critical to preserving trust and integrity in democratic processes.

The AI Deception: Navigating the Mirage of Political Deepfakes Ahead of 2024 Elections

bnnbreaking.com · by Mahnoor Jehangir

Mahnoor Jehangir

20 Feb 2024 10:14 EST

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New Update

The AI Deception: Navigating the Mirage of Political Deepfakes Ahead of 2024 Elections

In a world increasingly shaped by artificial intelligence (AI), the political sphere is undergoing a transformation that is both revolutionary and deeply concerning. As we edge closer to the 2024 elections, the emergence of AI-generated political advertisements, voices, and videos has set the stage for a new era of electoral deceit. From Wisconsin's legislative chambers to the digital battlegrounds of Indonesia and the United States, the fight for transparency in political advertising is more crucial than ever.

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The Frontlines of AI in Political Warfare

The use of AI-generated deepfakes in political campaigns is not just a hypothetical scenario; it's a reality that's unfolding across the globe. Instances of AI being used to deceive voters have surfaced in countries like Indonesia, India, Slovakia, and Pakistan, painting a grim picture of democracy under siege. In the United States, Wisconsin has taken a pioneering step by passing a bill that mandates disclaimers for AI-generated content in political ads. This legislative effort underscores the urgency of establishing guardrails against the misuse of AI in the electoral process.

The Challenge of Regulating AI

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Regulating AI-generated content in political ads presents a complex challenge. Determining what modifications are acceptable and tackling the menace of deepfakes are at the forefront of this battle. Deepfake technology, with its ability to create convincing fake audio messages and videos, poses a significant threat to the integrity of elections. The rapid advancement and accessibility of generative AI technologies have made it easier than ever to spread misinformation and manipulate electoral outcomes, raising alarms about the potential impact on democracy.

Combating AI-Driven Electoral Interference

As AI-generated disinformation campaigns threaten to influence election results in up to 50 countries, the call for effective countermeasures grows louder. Large technology companies have signed a pact to prevent AI tools from disrupting elections, but the lack of comprehensive regulations remains a gaping vulnerability. AI experts advocate for old-school verification methods, such as reverse image searching and metadata analysis, to identify and combat fake content. However, these measures alone may not suffice in the face of sophisticated AI technologies designed to deceive and manipulate on an unprecedented scale.

In conclusion, the integration of AI in political advertising is a double-edged sword. While it offers new avenues for engaging with voters, it also opens up dangerous possibilities for electoral manipulation and misinformation. The passage of bills like the one in Wisconsin is a step in the right direction, but a global effort is required to safeguard the sanctity of elections. As we navigate this new terrain, the need for transparency, regulation, and vigilance has never been more critical to preserving trust and integrity in democratic processes.

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bnnbreaking.com · by Mahnoor Jehangir

​14. US must not lose Taiwan, experts warn

I am curious as to why people do not write that we must not "lose" the Republic of Korea too.

Sun, Feb 18, 2024 page1

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2024/02/18/2003813705

US must not lose Taiwan, experts warn

‘A DISASTER’: A successful Chinese attack on Taiwan would undermine the credibility of US security guarantees and could result in a global depression, three experts wrote

• By Jonathan Chin / Staff writer
• 
  
•  
•  
• A Chinese takeover of Taiwan would be a geopolitical catastrophe for the US and its allies, one that would overshadow almost all others over the next decade, US policy experts said.
• Andrew Erickson, a professor of strategy in the US Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute; Gabriel Collins, a fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy; and former US deputy national security adviser Matthew Pottinger issued the warning in an article published on Tuesday in Foreign Affairs.
• Bejing’s invasion or annexation of Taiwan “would be a disaster of utmost importance to the United States, and I am convinced that time is of the essence,” they quoted US general Douglas MacArthur as writing in a secret memorandum dated June 1950, saying that now, his “words ring truer than ever.”
• 
  

People walk past a banner depicting a soldier waving a flag at the Ministry of National Defense in Taipei on Dec. 26, 2022.

• Photo: Ann Wang, Reuters
• Taiwan proper is strategically valuable, as it “anchors Japan’s defense and denies China a springboard from which it could threaten US allies in the western Pacific,” they wrote.
• Beyond the unchanging influence of geography, developments since MacArthur’s era have made Taiwan more important to global security and prosperity than ever before, they said.
• Taiwan’s transition to a full democracy on China’s doorstep further increases its significance, because its “subjugation to Beijing’s totalitarianism would hinder democratic aspirations across the region, including in China itself,” they said.
• Taiwan has become a microchip powerhouse, making it indispensable to the global economy, and a conflict could easily result in a global depression, they said.
• Although there is a wide network of US allies across the Indo-Pacific region, the countries are reliant on Washington for their security, they said.
• A successful Chinese attack on Taiwan would undermine the credibility of US security guarantees, triggering a race for nuclear weapons in the region, they said.
• Whether “one cares about the future of democracy in Asia or prefers to ponder only the cold math of realpolitik, Taiwan’s fate matters,” they said.
• If Taiwan’s democratic “system were extinguished, Beijing would have erased the world’s first liberal democracy whose founders include many people of Chinese heritage — and, with it, living proof that there is a workable, appealing alternative to Beijing’s totalitarianism,” they said.
• Citing the Economist Intelligence Unit, they said Taiwan is ranked the world’s eighth-most fully democratic polity, ahead of every country in Asia, the UK and the US.
• Taiwan is also deemed one of the world’s economically equitable societies, despite being among its richest, having overtaken Japan in per capita GDP last year, they added.
• Taiwan’s “strong democracy” forms a sharp contrast to China’s political system, where 1.4 billion people sharing many traditions and cultural traditions are subjugated under Beijing’s totalitarian regime, they said.
• “Officials in Beijing have long tried to caricature Taiwan as slavishly imitating Western forms of governance,” they said. “But it is actually the Chinese Communist Party that is doing so by clinging to its Marxist-Leninist system, a discredited political model imported from Europe.”
• “The loss of Taiwan as a democratic alternative would end the experiment with popular, multiparty self-governance by a society with significant Chinese heritage, with bad tidings for the possibility of democracy in China and far beyond,” they said.
• Citing former US president Dwight Eisenhower, they said the fall of Taiwan would trigger a “dangerous chain reaction” by threatening the security of Japan, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam and severely harming vital US interests.
• “Taiwan’s annexation in the face of US inaction or ineffective action would present US allies in Asia and Europe with a nightmare they have never faced before: Washington proving unable to protect a polity that is an ally in all but name,” they said.
• Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) pressure on Taiwan is no less significant a test of US resolve than the one posed by Joseph Stalin’s blockade of West Berlin in 1948, they said.
• “The stakes are equally stark today with Taiwan — and there is no time left to waste,” they said.

15. Russia is rebuilding capacity to destabilize European countries, new UK report warns

To complement the first entry in today's national security news and commentary (the report on Russian UW) here is a briefing I developed in 2014 on why we should focu1s on unconventional warfare and countering unconventional warfare.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/15tonpfUJQ-eaQeAqG6z65v823tuZ9Pbj/view?usp=sharing

Russia is rebuilding capacity to destabilize European countries, new UK report warns

The Washington Post · by Danica Kirka | AP · February 20, 2024

LONDON — Russia is rebuilding its capacity to destabilize European countries and extend its influence in the Middle East and Africa, posing a strategic threat to NATO as its members focus on the war in Ukraine, a U.K.-based think tank said Tuesday.

In a sweeping report, researchers at the Royal United Services Institute argue that Western nations need to do more to counter Moscow’s use of unconventional warfare if they are to succeed in turning back Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

“As the war in Ukraine protracts, Russia has an interest in creating crises further afield,’’ authors Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds wrote, citing the Balkans as a region that is ripe for mischief.

“Russia also has an active interest in destabilizing Ukraine’s partners, and with a slew of elections forthcoming across Europe there is a wide range of opportunities to exacerbate polarization,’’ the authors said.

The 35-page report by the think tank, founded in 1831, was released only days before the second anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

While Russian efforts to destabilize countries such as Moldova failed due to security lapses and the mass expulsion of Kremlin operatives, the Russian military is now strengthening its ability to launch unconventional attacks, the report says.

Using documents obtained from Russian secret services and interviews with official bodies in Ukraine and some European states, the report weaves a narrative of Russia’s efforts to extend its influence beyond the present conflict in Ukraine.

The threat “extends beyond Ukraine and the active collaboration of those states that are being targeted,” it said and urged for “sustained vigilance” over a range of issues.

Russia has also been expanding ties with African and Middle Eastern states, displacing Western interests in those regions. This new “Russian colonialism” seeks to create what the authors call an “Entente Roscolonial’’ — a group of states that “actively seek to assist Russia, while also becoming increasingly subordinate to Russian influence,’’ according to the report.

The “entente” posed a serious threat to Western interests because of a “strong and bitter sense” that the U.S. and NATO act differently in Ukraine than they do in places like Gaza and Tigray, the region of northern Ethiopia that has been devastated by conflict, the report said.

“Similarly, the apparent contrast in Western language and rhetoric between how it described the destruction of Aleppo or Mariupol, and how it has excused Israeli operations in Gaza, leave many on the continent perceiving a gap between Western rhetoric about values and the values practiced by those who have, for so long, imposed constraints on the policies of African states to enforce values-based norms.’’

The new colonialism, the report said, was intertwined with the formation of the Wagner Group, a nominally private company that provided mercenaries for wars in Africa, the Middle East and Ukraine, giving the Russian government plausible deniability about its role in these conflicts.

Following the death of the Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, these units have been brought more directly under the control of the Russian military. This new Expeditionary Corps is now offering a “regime survival package” to authoritarian governments in countries like Mali and the Central African Republic.

The Washington Post · by Danica Kirka | AP · February 20, 202​

16. Philippine troops clash with Muslim militants in a gunbattle that has left at least eight dead

Philippine troops clash with Muslim militants in a gunbattle that has left at least eight dead

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · February 19, 2024

CAGAYAN DE ORO, Philippines (AP) — Philippine troops clashed with Muslim militants in a gunbattle that left at least six soldiers and two rebels dead in a fog-shrouded hinterland in the south, military officials said Monday.

Military chief Gen. Romeo Brawner Jr. said four other soldiers were wounded in the army offensive Sunday against fighters of the Dawlah Islamiyah, a small armed group aligned with the Islamic State group, near Munai town in Lanao del Norte province.

Troops were hunting a still-unknown number of militants, who withdrew from the scene of the battle, military officials said. Brawner vowed to get justice for the slain and wounded soldiers.

“I assure their families and every Filipino that justice will be meted and all efforts will be exhausted in pursuit of the enemy,” Brawner said in a statement where he expressed condolences to the families of the soldiers.

“Our troops are motivated to finish the job and accomplish our mission of defeating local terrorist groups once and for all,” he said.

The military has killed 18 fighters of the Dawlah Islamiyah, reportedly including its leader, in a series of military offensives after the group was blamed for a Dec. 3 bombing that left four people dead and 50 others wounded while attending a Catholic Mass at the Mindanao State University in southern Marawi city.

The Dawlah Islamiyah is among a few armed groups still waging a separatist uprising in the southern Philippines, homeland of minority Muslims in the largely Catholic nation.

The largest armed separatist group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, signed a 2014 peace pact with the government that eased decades of sporadic fighting. The military is separately fighting a decades-old communist insurgency, which has been weakened by battle setbacks, infighting and surrenders.

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · February 19, 2024

​17. How Many Sentinel Missiles Does the United States Need?

Conclusion:

The Air Force is going to spend more than $48 billion to modernize 76 B-52 bombers so that they can continue to fly combat missions for another 35 years. This is just to point out that the argument over the Sentinel program — like many of the Defense Department’s major defense acquisition projects — is not just about the money. Nuclear modernization enjoys bipartisan support and is not going away. If the Sentinel program was cancelled, the money would move to maintaining the Minuteman missiles and putting strategic bombers on alert. Few, if any, in Congress will view a Nunn-McCurdy breach as the signal to kill the Sentinel program, especially as it will be fielded in less than 10 years’ time. No one likes the idea of nuclear warfare, but at the same time, the argument against modernizing the U.S. nuclear stockpile is dangerously naïve. The Sentinel will eventually be fielded and the United States will maintain a degree of strategic stability against China’s and Russia’s nuclear arsenals.

It is, however, important to have this discussion about “how many nukes are enough” with the American public, in as much as they need to understand the need for this mission. The Cold War ended decades ago. We do not have civil defense shelters anymore and we worry about natural disasters more than a nuclear attack when the emergency broadcast signal goes off. But because nuclear weapons still exist, we need to discuss and develop concepts that reduce the possibility that they are used. That will include a certain number of land-based missiles within a strategic triad. Academics and political analysts are always debating as to what America’s nuclear posture ought to be, but it comes back to the military acquisition professionals who take direction from the White House and turn that into a capability that can be trusted to meet the most important mission of the Defense Department.

How Many Sentinel Missiles Does the United States Need? - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Al Mauroni · February 20, 2024

The U.S. Air Force deployed its first Minuteman missile in 1962. There’s no getting around this basic point, that America’s intercontinental ballistic missile fleet is a Cold War relic. At the height of the Cold War, there were more than 1,000 silos dotting the western United States. The latest iteration, the Minuteman III, was first deployed in 1970. Over the last 40 years, the Air Force has spent billions on replacing guidance systems, rocket motors, and power systems, in addition to patching up aging launch facilities and maintaining an outdated command and control system. Critics decry the land-based leg of the nuclear triad as having a “hair trigger” that threatens the world and would like to see the entire system disestablished. And recent events give this argument some justification.

The Air Force intends to replace the Minuteman III with the LGM-35 Sentinel missile. The Sentinel missile is getting increased scrutiny lately due to critical cost and schedule slips. Originally estimated in 2020 to cost $95.3 billion over its 10-year development, it now may cost upwards of $125 billion and slip past its expected initial deployment date of 2030. As a result, the average procurement cost per missile will rise to $162 million from an initial $118 million. This triggered a legal process known as the “Nunn-McCurdy breach” in which the Air Force must now justify the continuance of its program and develop a new cost and schedule estimate that is acceptable to Congress.

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While this review will not necessarily result in the elimination of the program, one might question why the Air Force requires 400 missiles armed with nuclear warheads today. While the Cold War is over, the continued presence of nuclear threats to the United States demands a response. The combination of bilateral arms control agreements, deterrence theory, and presidential direction, along with bipartisan congressional approval, has resulted in the decision to retain 400 land-based missile silos for the purpose of strategic stability between nuclear-weapon states.

The U.S. Nuclear Posture Has Changed

There is a lot of baggage associated with the U.S. nuclear stockpile other than the fact that its delivery systems and warheads date back to the Cold War, when there were understandable concerns about a global nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and United States. There have been five Nuclear Posture Reviews since 1990, and every administration — three Democratic, two Republican — has reaffirmed their view that the United States needs a “strategic triad” of land-based ballistic missiles, strategic bombers armed with gravity bombs or cruise missiles, and ballistic missile submarines. Part of this rationale has been the desire to counter Russia’s and China’s continued modernization and growth of their strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The debate over the continued need for land-based ballistic missiles focuses on whether these two states in particular are in fact deterred from using nuclear weapons against the United States because of these missiles and, if so, whether continuing to upgrade Minuteman III missiles would be a more prudent approach to maintaining that deterrent.

It’s difficult to dispassionately talk about the need for nuclear weapons in the context of 21st-century conflict. Nuclear weapons are simultaneously seen as political tools of national strategy, as tools of deterrence against aggressive neighbors, and as military warfighting tools. Scholars and military analysts have debated deterrence theory for literally decades without agreeing as to what extent other nations’ political leaders can be deterred or compelled to act because of threats of nuclear weapons use. It is true both that there have been no catastrophic uses of nuclear weapons since 1945 and that reducing the world’s number of nuclear weapons is seen as increasingly important. As Colin Gray remarked in his book Modern Strategy, “Categorization of nuclear weapons … as thoroughly as ‘Bad Things’ … provides some emotional and intellectual satisfaction, but inhibits understanding.”

Because a great deal of nuclear-related issues (weapon locations, warhead yields, accuracy, targeting plans) are classified, it further inhibits the public’s ability to understand why particular nuclear weapons are needed as opposed to other options. Instead, the U.S. military relies on rote phrases such as “ICBMs are the most responsive leg of the Triad” as opposed to the submarines being the most survivable leg and strategic bombers being the most flexible leg. The process by which land-based missile crews would receive orders and launch the missiles relies on an extensive and complex architecture of command, control, and communications that is secure, redundant, and survivable. Missiles will only be launched if the president authorizes the action, and never launched if that person does not. While this requires the highest level of standards and diligence, the Air Force’s nuclear enterprise has on occasion been rocked by scandalsthat cause some to question its relevance today.

The requirements for a land-based leg of the triad remain largely the same as 60 years ago — to complicate the decision by a Soviet (now Russian) government to use nuclear weapons against the homeland by making it too difficult for a nuclear first strike to succeed. While the Cold War ended in 1990, nuclear weapons still exist in China and Russia for the same reason that the United States has them. Because nuclear-tipped missiles can destroy a city in 30 minutes after launch, they present the highest existential threat to a major power. The rationale for retaining land-based missiles is largely that other nuclear weapon states have not given up theirs, and verification of a complete ban on nuclear weaponswould be politically challenging. While nuclear deterrence theory and rationales for the triad can be mysterious, we can try to understand how the Air Force has developed the numbers for the Sentinel program.

Arms Control Constraints

While people like to refer to land-based missiles as Cold War relics, the decision process for developing and employing nuclear weapons was very different back then. The Air Force’s Strategic Air Command enjoyed a period of significant growth between 1945 and 1960, while the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile increased from three to over 25,000 in that same period. The Air Force leadership had a certain amount of freedom to identify what it thought was required to counter the threat of Russian nuclear weapons. Fred Kaplan notes in his book The Bomb that the Air Force wanted 2,300 Minuteman missiles in 1961, but Defense Secretary Robert McNamara would only go for 1,000. Of those, over half had multiple warheads, resulting in a total of 2,100 deployed nuclear warheads on land-based missiles.

As the Soviet nuclear arsenal quickly grew larger than U.S. numbers, American political leaders recognized the need to stop this escalation. Arms control agreements were directly aimed at reducing how many missiles were deployed and what they carried. The first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), signed in 1972, restricted the number of land-based missile silos and ballistic missile submarines to existing levels. For the United States, this meant 1,054 land-based and 656 submarine-launched missiles. SALT II capped all strategic forces to a total of 2,250 nuclear delivery launchers, of which only 1,320 could have multiple warheads, but it was not ratified by the U.S. Senate due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980.

The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was signed in 1991 and called for a reduction on overall nuclear warheads to 5,000, with half of those to be deployed on ballistic missiles. Both the United States and Russia would be limited to 850 land-based missiles, while also reducing the numbers of operational strategic bombers and submarines. This caused the closure of Minuteman missile fields at Ellsworth Air Force Base, Whitman Air Force Base, and Grand Forks Air Force Base, as well as the Peacekeeper missile field at F.E. Warren Air Force Base. The New START treaty, signed in 2010, further reduced the total nuclear warheads to 1,550. This resulted in the Air Force removing 50 Minutemen IIIs out of silos at F.E. Warren, leaving a total number of 400 deployed missiles. The Air Force is keeping the 50 empty silos “warm” so as to have the option to refill them if national guidance changes.

Defense Acquisition Is Largely Unchanged

The Defense Department treats the research and development of nuclear weapon systems largely the same way as it does any other weapon system, using the same acquisition guidelines and cost controls, but there are a few significant differences. First, the president sets the guidance for how nuclear forces are to be employed. The Air Force and Navy can only recommend how they would like to organize, train, and equip their nuclear forces. In addition, the Defense Department has to rely on the Energy Department to design and produce the warheads that are mounted on military delivery systems, and a high-level Nuclear Weapons Council meets to review military requirements and oversee the modernization program. But every year, the Air Force’s nuclear community has to fight for and justify its requirements against the service’s many other conventional programs that are being developed.

Past Air Force leaders complained about a 20-year “procurement holiday” in which the Defense Department deferred its nuclear modernization and the Air Force budget prioritized fighters, bombers, and tankers. This in part led to significant delays in replacing the Minuteman III, in addition to modernizing the B-52 engines and replacing the helicopters that monitor the missile fields. Congress funded the current nuclear modernization program that President Barack Obama proposed in 2010. This advanced the Air Force’s nuclear modernization portfolio to being something more than just one of the many Air Force acquisition priorities. Air Force Global Strike Command stood up an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Modernization Directorate to develop its military requirements for the Sentinel. All of the Air Force’s nuclear programs are centrally managed by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center and the Program Executive Office for Strategic Systems, with a Program Executive Office for Intercontinental Missiles being stood up.

The Air Force’s planned acquisition is 659 Sentinel missiles, to include 400 for the silos at Minot, Malmstrom, and F.E. Warren, and the remainder for replacements and test flights (three per year) to last through 2075. The acquisition program also will replace, not modernize, the launch control centers, many of which may be leaking toxic chemicals, and hardening the intricate web of communication systems against cyber intrusions that could reduce their reliability. The number of missiles could be higher or it could be lower, but at this point in time it will not be zero. The Air Force will execute whatever the president and Congress wants the number to be.

The Air Force Global Strike Command’s modernization chief noted, “Not to be flippant, but show me a program that doesn’t have higher costs at the end than what were initially projected.” One can argue as to whether military acquisition offices are lowballing their initial program cost estimates or just optimistically presenting a best-case scenario, but there is nothing particularly unusual about how this acquisition program is being conducted. The prime objective is to meet the 2030 deadline to deploy the first batch of Sentinel missiles, and that might mean spending more money to overcome unexpected challenges that arise between now and then. The congressional delegations with missile bases in their districts will heartily welcome the execution of defense funds to modernize this capability.

Is There a Right Number?

There is no “right answer” for the number of required land-based silos to meet U.S. national security goals. As these weapons are political tools of power, it is up to the president, with advice from staff, to determine the desired nuclear employment strategy. There have been numerous studies on a “dyad” nuclear posture, and usually the land-based missile is the system that is proposed to be eliminated. Usually the rationale is either “it will save on costs and we still have bombers” or “we can’t afford an error that will end up launching all our missiles.” Neither argument has been particularly persuasive. As many calls as there have been to eliminate land-based missiles, there have been equal numbers of calls to retain them as a distinct capability that enhances global stability.

Congress usually eschews eliminating defense systems, no matter how old or vulnerable they might be in a modern context. Could the United States manage with fewer land-based missiles than today’s numbers? It depends on the context. Certainly the number has gone down from 1,054 silos in the 1960s to 400 silos today, and there is always the possibility that a new technology — hypersonic cruise missiles or road-mobile missiles or fractional orbital bombardment systems — could be adopted in their place. Some will still advocate for not proceeding with the Sentinel and continuing to pursue life extension programs for the Minuteman III, even as authorized funds pour into the Air Force’s coffers to develop the new missile. However, the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review suggests that any alternative to the Sentinel that extends the Minuteman III — which was never intended to last past 10 years, let alone 50 — “would increase risk and cost.”

There are calls to increase the importance of land-based missiles, notably in the 2023 report from the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. While the report does not call for additional missiles, it does suggest that the United States consider putting multiple warheads on the Sentinel and fielding missiles in “a road mobile configuration.” There are no specific numbers in its recommendations. Much of the commission’s concern arose from a worst-case scenario of China and Russia simultaneously attacking the United States, and that a future U.S. nuclear stockpile needs to keep pace with the growing number of Chinese and Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles. This is a ridiculous argument for multiple reasons. First of all, strategic deterrence does not rely on a math equation. Second, it’s not as if U.S. land-based missiles have to take out all of the Chinese and Russian silos on their own. How land-based missiles factor into nuclear employment plans is too complex and dependent on multiple factors to outline here.

Conclusion

The Air Force is going to spend more than $48 billion to modernize 76 B-52 bombers so that they can continue to fly combat missions for another 35 years. This is just to point out that the argument over the Sentinel program — like many of the Defense Department’s major defense acquisition projects — is not just about the money. Nuclear modernization enjoys bipartisan support and is not going away. If the Sentinel program was cancelled, the money would move to maintaining the Minuteman missiles and putting strategic bombers on alert. Few, if any, in Congress will view a Nunn-McCurdy breach as the signal to kill the Sentinel program, especially as it will be fielded in less than 10 years’ time. No one likes the idea of nuclear warfare, but at the same time, the argument against modernizing the U.S. nuclear stockpile is dangerously naïve. The Sentinel will eventually be fielded and the United States will maintain a degree of strategic stability against China’s and Russia’s nuclear arsenals.

It is, however, important to have this discussion about “how many nukes are enough” with the American public, in as much as they need to understand the need for this mission. The Cold War ended decades ago. We do not have civil defense shelters anymore and we worry about natural disasters more than a nuclear attack when the emergency broadcast signal goes off. But because nuclear weapons still exist, we need to discuss and develop concepts that reduce the possibility that they are used. That will include a certain number of land-based missiles within a strategic triad. Academics and political analysts are always debating as to what America’s nuclear posture ought to be, but it comes back to the military acquisition professionals who take direction from the White House and turn that into a capability that can be trusted to meet the most important mission of the Defense Department.

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Al Mauroni is the director of the U.S. Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies and author of the book BIOCRISIS: Defining Biological Threats in US Policy. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Al Mauroni · February 20, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com