Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:


"Geniuses are like thunderstorms: they go against the wind, terrify people, clear the air."
- Soren Kierkegaard

"The voice of the majority is no proof of justice."
-Friedrich Schiller

"Kindness is more important than wisdom, and the recognition of this is the beginning of wisdom.”
~Theodore Isaac Rubin



1. North Korea’s ‘first daughter’: Everything we know about Kim Ju Ae

2. Kim Jong-un’s daughter has emerged on the world stage – but what does it mean?

3. U.S., S. Korea and Japan will jointly deter N. Korean threat: Wendy Sherman

4. S. Korea, Japan seek ways to mend ties in bilateral talks

5. Why North Korea is denying its involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine

6. N. Korea unveils stamp featuring leader's daughter Ju-ae for 1st time

7. S. Korea and NATO hold 1st military staff talks

8. Interview, John Batchelor Show on north Korea

9. The State as a Transnational Criminal Organization: A North Korea Case Study

10. China's defense chief sends congratulatory message to N. Korea over army anniversary

11. [Column] Reform needed for North defector foundation

12. A glimmer of hope for North Korea in 2023

13. JCS chief calls for 'bold' punishment against potential enemy provocations

14. Korean independence fighter Ahn Jung-geun and unfinished Oriental Peace Theory




1. North Korea’s ‘first daughter’: Everything we know about Kim Ju Ae


Known knowns. Known unknowns. Unknown unknowns. 


I concur with the Ministry of Unification:

The first daughter’s high-profile appearances have fueled speculation that she is being groomed as Kim’s successor. Experts are divided on whether a woman could ever become the leader of such a male-dominated society.
Ryu, the former North Korean diplomat, said a female heir is “unimaginable” for the Kim dynasty because it would deviate from the patrilineal succession of three generations. South Korea’s Unification Ministry said this week that it is premature to conclude on the young girl’s potential leadership capacity but said “all possibilities are open” at this point.



North Korea’s ‘first daughter’: Everything we know about Kim Ju Ae

The Washington Post · by Min Joo Kim · February 14, 2023

SEOUL — North Korea’s “first daughter” suddenly seems to be everywhere. In November, she was out inspecting intercontinental ballistic missiles with her dad, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. This month, she’s appeared twice at celebrations for a major army anniversary.

The first daughter was further enshrined in the family personality cult Tuesday, when North Korea released eight postage stamps commemorating that November missile launch — five of them featuring the tweenager.

The prominence given to a child of the ruling family is a big change for North Korea. But then again, Kim Jong Un has broken out of the dictator mold set by his grandfather, North Korea founder Kim Il Sung, and his father, Kim Jong Il. Kim Il Sung didn’t introduce his son to the public until Kim Jong Il was in his mid-20s, then he spent a good quarter-century promoting the heir up the ranks.

Although Kim Jong Il announced his son as the third generation of Kims to lead North Korea in 2009, the successor’s visage wasn’t revealed to the North Korean public until September the following year. Kim Jong Un’s age — just 26 at the time — was going to be an issue in a society that adheres to the Confucian principles honoring elders (and patriarchy).

North Korea on Tuesday unveiled the designs of a new stamp featuring the daughter of leader Kim Jong-un, known as Ju-ae, for the first time https://t.co/j1uT1Gn5Iu pic.twitter.com/XekNm3YN6H
— Michelle Ye Hee Lee (@myhlee) February 14, 2023

The third Kim has had no such reservations. He’s taken his middle-school-aged daughter with him to important military events, fueling speculation that he was setting the stage for her to be the next generation’s leader.

Analysts say it is still too early to draw firm conclusions. But here’s what we know so far about the increasingly high-profile daughter of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

What’s her name?

Well, we don’t exactly know. Even when her face is splashed across North Korean state media outlets, they don’t publish the girl’s name. She has been referred to only as “beloved daughter” or “respected daughter” of Kim Jong Un.

But she is widely believed to be called Kim Ju Ae. The first source — and yes, it’s an unlikely one, but this is North Korea — is retired National Basketball Association star Dennis Rodman, who said he held Kim’s daughter during a visit to Pyongyang in 2013.

“I held their baby Ju-ae and spoke with Ms Ri [Sol-Ju, Kim’s wife] as well. He’s a good dad and has a beautiful family,” Rodman told the Guardian after the trip.

South Korean intelligence authorities have also identified the girl as Kim Ju Ae. The first syllable of her given name, Ju Ae, appears to come from her mother Ri Sol Ju, who uses the Chinese character for “main” or “primary.” The second syllable, Ae, is likely to come from the Chinese character for love, said Kwak Gil-seop, a former researcher at South Korea’s state-run Institute for National Security Strategy.

How old is she?

Er, we don’t know that either. But say she was 1 when Rodman held her in March 2013. That would make her 10 now, about to turn 11.

South Korean lawmaker Yoo Sang-bum, after being briefed by Seoul’s spy agency in November, said the girl was about 10 years old. Yoo cited the agency as saying that Ju Ae is “quite tall and big” for a girl that age.

Ju Ae is thought to be the second child of Kim Jong Un and Ri Sol Ju, according to South Korean intelligence officials. She is thought to have an older brother, born in 2010, and a younger sibling born in 2017, gender unknown. But as with many things about North Korea, this is just a best guess based on South Korean intelligence reports — which don’t always have a great relationship with fact — and analysts’ interpretation of Ri’s absences from the public eye.

If there is an older brother, that would raise the question: Where is he? As the oldest and as a boy, he should be the heir apparent according to Confucian hierarchies. But Kim Jong Il bucked that tradition when he anointed Kim Jong Un, his third son, as his successor.

Where does she go to school?

We don’t know that either. Kim Jong Un and his siblings had private tutors while living in Pyongyang, instead of going to school. But to give them an experience of “normal life,” Kim Jong Il sent his children to school in Switzerland for several years during their teens — all under false names. Kim Jong Un seems to be cutting off that option for his daughter by making her face known at such an early age.

Why her?

Described in state media as “the most beloved” child, Ju Ae appears to be very close to her father, with whom she held hands and shared the spotlight at major events.

“Kim Jong Un’s exceptional love for his daughter has long been famous among Pyongyang officials,” said Ryu Hyun-woo, North Korea’s former ambassador to Kuwait, who defected in 2019. He said the North Korean leader used to carry the daughter in his arms when she was young. Some of Kim’s aides posed for photos with the baby girl, according to Ryu, who said he saw such pictures.

When she made her first public appearance in November, Ju Ae was seen hand in hand with her father in front of North Korea’s largest ballistic missile. Dressed in a white jacket and red shoes, the daughter appeared to watch a missile as it was launched into the sky. She was also pictured shaking the hand of a uniformed soldier against a backdrop of applauding officials.

She has since been in the spotlight at events celebrating the country’s military, which has served as the mainstay of the Kim family’s dictatorial rule for decades.

This month, the daughter was seen at the center of the first family during an army banquet full of top military brass. Official photos of the event showed her in the middle, a place of honor usually reserved for the leader himself. Most recently, she was given a red-carpet welcome alongside her father at a massive parade in Pyongyang to mark an army anniversary.

Analysts say the daughter is strategically placed to promote the importance of military development for North Korea’s future generations.

How important is the family line here?

North Korea’s Kims have claimed their right to lead the country for more than 70 years now by saying they are the descendants of a sacred bloodline stemming from Mount Paektu, a mountain on the Chinese border that is of mythical importance to Koreans.

When Kim Jong Un was announced as the third-generation successor, North Korean officials “were filled with deep emotion as they realized he would carry forward the bloodline of Mount Paektu in its purest form,” according to the state media account. Earlier this month, when Ju Ae and the first family watched the parade from a balcony above Kim Il Sung Square, named after her great grandfather, troops marching through the square chanted: “Defend the Paektu bloodline with our lives!”

The parade also featured a cavalry regiment mounted on white horses, a propaganda symbol used to glorify the Kim family’s strength and authority. The narrator on state television referred to one of the horses as belonging to the first daughter. “With dazzling looks, the fine steed of Paektu heads the squadron, followed by the beloved daughter’s favorite horse as they lead the high-spirited parade,” the narrator said, describing the father and the daughter’s horses respectively.

So will she succeed her father?

The first daughter’s high-profile appearances have fueled speculation that she is being groomed as Kim’s successor. Experts are divided on whether a woman could ever become the leader of such a male-dominated society.

Ryu, the former North Korean diplomat, said a female heir is “unimaginable” for the Kim dynasty because it would deviate from the patrilineal succession of three generations. South Korea’s Unification Ministry said this week that it is premature to conclude on the young girl’s potential leadership capacity but said “all possibilities are open” at this point.

The Washington Post · by Min Joo Kim · February 14, 2023


2. Kim Jong-un’s daughter has emerged on the world stage – but what does it mean?


Kim Ju Ae is generating more press reporting than the suspected solid fuel ICBM shown at the February 8 parade.


Excerpts:

Ju-ae’s emergence is a “show of confidence” that everything is “fine and normal,” says Chun In-bum, a retired lieutenant general who once commanded South Korea’s special forces, adding that designating a successor now would only put that person in danger.
If his daughter was, indeed, the anointed one, she would not be spared the trials of trying to succeed as a woman in a “very chauvinistic society,” he added.
But introducing Ju-ae early could also give the patriarchy more time to get used to the idea of her reign, and, ultimately, the decision may be based on her character.
“The North Koreans do have a selection process. It’s not because you are the oldest or a boy or a girl [that you become ruler], but you have to have the temperament to rule their society,” says Lt-Gen Chun.
“In the end it’s like one of those soap operas where everybody is trying to stab everybody else. As a South Korean, I am worried about the instability that it might all cause on the Korean Peninsula.”
For now, the world is awaiting Kim’s next move – and whether Ju-ae will be by his side.





Kim Jong-un’s daughter has emerged on the world stage – but what does it mean?

Some believe the North Korean leader’s second-born child is being primed to eventually take over – here’s what we know about Kim Ju-ae

By

Nicola Smith,

 ASIA CORRESPONDENT

13 February 2023 • 5:00pm

The Telegraph · by Nicola Smith,

Amid the formidable firepower on display at North Korea’s massive military parade last week, an elegant white horse was spotted marching alongside the regime’s largest nuclear missiles and ranks of goose-stepping soldiers.

The symbolism of a white horse, typically the favoured Orlov Trotter, has long been ingrained in the mythology of the ruling Kim dynasty and deployed to project the personal strength and prowess of Kim Jong-un as “supreme leader”.

But this time, the propaganda did not focus on Kim’s own prestige, but on that of his young daughter. The horse, revealed state media on Monday, was the “most loved” of the leader’s “beloved” child.

It was a further hint of the rapid ascendancy of a young girl who some experts believe is being primed for leadership of the world’s most secretive state, cementing her legitimacy as a descendant of the ruling family’s self-proclaimed “royal” bloodline.


Believed to be his second child, Ju-ae, thought to be 10-years-old, grabbed global headlines in November after her first public appearance, sweetly holding hands with her father at a test launch of the new Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile, a weapon capable of striking the United States.

Since then, her public image has transformed from a ponytailed little girl in red shoes and a white puffer jacket to a poised and stately potential heir, frequently taking centre stage at the country’s most prestigious events.

At a glitzy banquet in Pyongyang’s Yanggakdo Hotel last week to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the army’s founding, Ju-ae walked along a red carpet with her parents to a standing ovation from military chiefs before sitting at the top table for a lavish meal.

Dressed in low heels, a short black skirt suit and modest white blouse, her clasped hair gave her gravitas beyond her years, resembling a miniature version of her stylish mother, Ri Sol-ju.

She reappeared for a fifth public outing the next night on a VIP balcony, confidently waving and smiling at the roaring crowds gathered in the city’s brightly-lit Kim Il Sung Square to witness a parade of monster missiles.

“The beginning of such a personality cult for Kim Ju-ae suggests that she has been de facto internally designated as the successor although she does not yet have an official status of a successor,” says Cheong Seong-chang, a senior analyst at the Sejong Institute in South Korea.

That lack of transparency, or even official confirmation of her name, has left experts to interpret every nuance of state media coverage.


Ju-ae, seen with Kim and his wife Ri Sol-ju at a banquet, is believed to be the couple’s second-born child Credit: KCNA via Reuters

Dr Cheong believes a choreographed photo at the banquet with Ju-ae at the centre, seated between her mother and father, and flanked by smiling generals, is “actively promoting” the child and “suggests that she will become the next supreme commander of the North Korean army in the future”.

If true, Ju-ae would be following in her father’s footsteps. He too, was chosen at a tender age for a lofty future role, despite not being first in line by birth for the family throne.

According to South Korea’s spy agency, Ju-ae likely has an older sibling aged about 13 and a younger one of six.

Very little is known about the children or their home life and Ju-ae’s name was only revealed by former NBA star Dennis Rodman, who claimed he met her as a baby during a visit to North Korea in 2013.

Her mother Ri Sol-ju, believed to be a 33-year-old former singer with the elite Unhasu Orchestra, is the Pyongyang-raised daughter of a professor and an obstetrician.

Known for her sharp fashion sense and fondness for Western clothes, she has become a style icon to North Korean women and a groundbreaking First Lady, accompanying her husband on state visits abroad.

Since the founding of North Korea in the aftermath of the Second World War, the reclusive state has been run by three generations of the Kim family, who claim the right to rule through their “Paektu bloodline,” named after a volcano considered sacred to Koreans. Under the current dictatorship, the rise of one of Kim’s offspring to power is all but pre-ordained.


Analysts suspect the displays of a happy family are all about bolstering Kim’s reputation Credit: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP

According to The Great Successor, a definitive biography of Kim Jong-un by Anna Fifield, a journalist with The Washington Post, his father Kim Jong Il recognised that he had the ruthless cunning needed to run the pariah state and favoured him as a young child over his older siblings to take on his mantle.

Kim grew up believing he was special. His eighth birthday was attended by high-ranking officials who “bowed and deferred” to him, reveals the book, although his status was not publicly known until the year before his father died.

Dr Edward Howell, a North Korea expert at Oxford University, notes that Ju-ae has already been honoured as the “respected” daughter – “a term usually reserved for leaders or their spouses” – but he says it is too early to conclude if she would take over the reins.

Analysts also suspect a propaganda strategy to curate Kim’s own public persona as a family man.

“There is historical precedent for North Korean leaders caring about their image. Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il sought to portray themselves as paternal and maternal leaders; caring for their people as a mother cares for her children, especially during times of crisis,” says Dr Howell.

Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Ewha University in Seoul, agrees. “The daughter’s public displays of affection suggest her appearances are more immediately about her father. Kim wants to be seen as a leader protecting his people rather than a rights-abusing, nuclear-armed dictator,” he says.

The perception of Kim as a loving father draws a jarring contrast with current developments, where his regime is ploughing the national budget into a weapons of mass destruction programme despite reports the country is on the brink of famine.

‘Everybody is trying to stab everybody’

Ju-ae’s emergence is a “show of confidence” that everything is “fine and normal,” says Chun In-bum, a retired lieutenant general who once commanded South Korea’s special forces, adding that designating a successor now would only put that person in danger.

If his daughter was, indeed, the anointed one, she would not be spared the trials of trying to succeed as a woman in a “very chauvinistic society,” he added.

But introducing Ju-ae early could also give the patriarchy more time to get used to the idea of her reign, and, ultimately, the decision may be based on her character.

“The North Koreans do have a selection process. It’s not because you are the oldest or a boy or a girl [that you become ruler], but you have to have the temperament to rule their society,” says Lt-Gen Chun.

“In the end it’s like one of those soap operas where everybody is trying to stab everybody else. As a South Korean, I am worried about the instability that it might all cause on the Korean Peninsula.”

For now, the world is awaiting Kim’s next move – and whether Ju-ae will be by his side.

The Telegraph · by Nicola Smith,



3. U.S., S. Korea and Japan will jointly deter N. Korean threat: Wendy Sherman


I know I am a broken record but this continued/sustained high tilateral engagement is important for the national security of all three nations.



(LEAD) U.S., S. Korea and Japan will jointly deter N. Korean threat: Wendy Sherman | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · February 14, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with additional remarks, more details, minor changes; ADDS photo)

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Feb. 13 (Yonhap) -- The United States, South Korea and Japan will work together to deter North Korea's nuclear and missile threats and to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman said Monday.

The U.S. diplomat also insisted that trilateral cooperation among the U.S. and its two allies is only getting stronger.

"The DPRK continued to threaten the ROK, Japan and its neighbors and the world with the launch of an unprecedented number of ballistic missiles last year," Sherman said, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"Standing united, our nations will deter the DPRK and urge it to give up its nuclear weapons program and abide by its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions," she said at a joint press conference with her South Korean counterpart, Cho Hyun-dong, and Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Takeo Mori.


South Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister Cho Hyun-dong (R), U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman (C) and Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Takeo Mori are seen holding a joint press conference at the U.S. state department in Washington on Feb. 13, 2023 following their trilateral talks at the department in this captured image. (Yonhap)

The three met here earlier in the day for their third trilateral talks since South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol took office in May 2022.

North Korea fired 69 ballistic missiles last year, marking a new record number of ballistic missile launched in a year. Its previous annual record was at 25.

"On North Korea, we shared the recognition that North Korea's intensified nuclear and missile activities, including ballistic missile launches with an unprecedented frequency in unprecedented manners, pose a clear and serious challenge to the international community," Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Mori said.

"Against these backdrops, coordination among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK is becoming increasingly important not only in dealing with North Korea but also in maintaining peace and stability of the region and in realizing the free and open Indo-Pacific," he added, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.

Cho said the three countries reaffirmed their efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

"We committed ourselves to respond to any North Korean provocation and work toward complete denuclearization of North Korea," Cho said of the trilateral vice foreign ministerial meeting.

"In response to this threat, (we will) strengthen robust ROK-U.S. combined defense posture, and at the same time enhance our trilateral security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan," added Cho.


South Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Cho Hyun-dong (R), U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman (C) and Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Takeo Mori are seen posing for a photo during their trilateral talks at the U.S. Department of State in Washington on Feb. 13, 2023 in this photo provided by the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Cho said the three countries have also expressed deep concerns over the human rights situation in North Korea, and committed to working together to raise international awareness on the issue.

"We urge North Korea to return to denuclearization talks," he told the press conference.

Sherman said the trilateral cooperation between the U.S. and its allies "remains strong and it is only getting stronger."

The U.S. official also stressed the importance of the trilateral cooperation in dealing with other regional issues, including "challenges posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC)."

"Today's dialogue reiterated our core message -- we will remain aligned with the ROK, Japan, other allies and partners worldwide to push back on the PRC behavior that challenges the rules based regional and international order," she said.

Cho noted the three agreed on the "urgent need to address common security challenges, "supply chain disruptions and energy crisis."

"We reaffirmed our shared commitment to strengthening strategic consultation amongst three countries, including the dialogue on economic security," he said.

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · February 14, 2023



4. S. Korea, Japan seek ways to mend ties in bilateral talks


I hope both countries remain committed to trying to improve ties between both.



(LEAD) S. Korea, Japan seek ways to mend ties in bilateral talks | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · February 14, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with reports of a press release on the outcome of the South Korea-Japan talks in last 5 paras)

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Feb. 13 (Yonhap) -- Vice foreign ministers of South Korea and Japan held rare bilateral talks in Washington on Monday, seeking to mend ties soured by the prolonged issue of Japan's wartime forced labor.

South Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Cho Hyun-dong said the sides will continue to hold discussions but that they have yet to reach any conclusion.

"We are still trying to find common ground," he told reporters when asked about his bilateral meeting with Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Takeo Mori.

The meeting comes after Seoul proposed establishing a public foundation through which Japanese companies can compensate Korean victims of Japan's wartime forced labor.


South Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister Cho Hyun-dong (R) and Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Takeo Mori pose for a photo during their bilateral meeting in Washington on Feb. 13, 2023, in this photo provided by the South Korean foreign ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

"I cannot comment on any specific issue at this point because it is a very sensitive issue not only to us but also to Japan," said Cho when asked if there has been any progress in the meeting with his Japanese counterpart, which lasted nearly two hours longer than it was originally scheduled.

"The fact the meeting lasted longer than scheduled is not a bad thing, but that our discussions lasted longer may also mean we were unable to reach a conclusion, so I believe we will need to continue our consultations," he added.

The South Korean diplomat earlier said the countries have narrowed their differences in some areas but not others.

The Cho-Mori talks followed a trilateral meeting, involving U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman.

In a joint press conference after the trilateral talks, the Japanese vice foreign minister said Japan "very much would like to cooperate with the ROK," referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.

He added Japan "would like to restore and further advance sound bilateral relations" based on what has been built since the normalization of diplomatic ties.

Cho said he and his Japanese counterpart also discussed Seoul's concerns over the potential release of radiation-contaminated water from Japan's Fukushima nuclear power plant in South Korean waters.

When asked if the countries have committed to future bilateral talks, Cho said no specific date has been set for a vice ministerial meeting but noted the possibility of a bilateral meeting between their foreign ministers at the Munich Security Conference, set to be held later in the week.

Cho and Mori also highlighted the importance of cooperation between the two countries, as well as trilateral cooperation with the United States, according to Seoul's foreign ministry.

"The vice ministers reaffirmed their joint objective of completely denuclearizing North Korea and the importance of close communication and cooperation between the two countries, as well as trilateral cooperation with the U.S.," it said in a press release.

They also agreed on the need to continue strengthening the countries' bilateral and trilateral cooperation with the U.S. in dealing with various regional and global issues, it added.

In addition, the vice ministers agreed to enhance their countries' cooperation with other like-minded countries, such as Australia and New Zealand that together with their countries form the so-called Asia-Pacific Partnership or AP4, according to the ministry.

"The vice ministers noted that the countries are continuing to accelerate close consultations between their diplomatic authorities for swift resolution of outstanding issues and normalization of relationship, and agreed to continue close consultations at various levels," it said.

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · February 14, 2023


5. Why North Korea is denying its involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine


Excerpts:

Importantly, Russia’s war is also causing collateral damage to North Korea’s own policy towards the United States. In the past, North Korea could simply switch from confrontation to engagement independent of other actors, but now its “power-for-power” policy cannot be detached from Russia’s war. North Korea likely understands that so long as it continues to ship military supplies to Russia, the chance of dialogue revival with the United States is low. This explains why Pyongyang has continually denied sending arms to Russia, and the country’s basic agreement with Russia forbids North Koreans from participating in the war, presumably to avoid being seen as supplying mercenaries. The last thing Pyongyang wants is for its troops to fight NATO troops on the front line and jeopardise any chance of negotiations with the United States. North Korea’s delay in deploying workers to eastern Ukraine out of concerns for their security shows how much it wants to avoid being trapped in a situation where its workers are directly involved in fighting.
However, like South Korea in its military relationship with the United States, North Korea cannot ignore Russia, one of its main backers. Moscow continues to serve as an alternative option for North Korea to limit Chinese leverage over the country’s political and economic isolation. And North Korea is increasingly counting on Russian assistance in the remote scenario that a war resumes with South Korea. In covertly sending military supplies to Russia in an attempt to avoid damaging relations with the United States, North Korea is simply hedging its bets, not looking for any major gains from the war in Ukraine.
North Korea’s support for Russia appears to be more a silver lining than a deliberate partnership. If this is the case, there is still hope that North Korea may not completely close its dialogue with the United States, despite its warlike rhetoric. An end to the war in Ukraine may somehow boost the chance of a North Korea–US détente.




Why North Korea is denying its involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine | Lowy Institute

KHANG VU

Pyongyang appears to be a reluctant participant

in Putin’s brutal offensive in Eastern Europe.

lowyinstitute.org · by Khang Vu

In a case of history repeating itself, the Korean War is set to be revived. Not on the Korean Peninsula but in Eastern Europe. Both North Korea and South Korea are currently contemplating sending military supplies to Russia and Ukraine respectively to assist in the ongoing war.

South Korea is under increasing pressure from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to supply arms to Ukraine after the country apparently agreed to export munitions to the United States, which would then find their way to Ukraine. South Korea’s longstanding policy is to not directly supply arms to a country that is actively at war.

Across the demilitarised zone, North Korea has allegedly been producing artillery shells for Russia in exchange for Russian oil, gas and flour. Satellite imagery appears to confirm such exchanges are taking place. An arms deal in the hundreds of millions of dollars with Russia would help boost the North Korean economy battered by the pandemic. Pyongyang is also recruiting personnel from its companies in Russia to work on reconstruction projects in eastern Ukraine.

As an international pariah, North Korea has almost nothing to lose, so why does it keep denying its involvement?

While it is not surprising that North Korea is sending military assistance to Russia, what is remarkable is its repeated denial of such activities. In November, North Korea’s military responded with a public statement to what it regarded as moves by the United States to “tarnish the image of the DPRK in the international arena by invoking the illegal ‘sanctions resolution’ of the UN Security Council against the DPRK”. In January, Pyongyang again warned Washington that “trying to tarnish the image of the DPRK by fabricating a non-existent thing is a grave provocation that can never be allowed and that cannot but trigger its reaction”. The denial is even more noteworthy considering Kim Yo-jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, publicly affirmed that North Korea would “always stand in the same trench, together with the army and the people of Russia”.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L) with Russian President Vladimir Putin during Russia-North Korea talks in Vladivostok, April 2019 (kremlin.ru)

As an international pariah, North Korea has almost nothing to lose, so why does it keep denying its involvement?

One possibility may be that North Korea, like the South, was reluctantly dragged into the Russian quagmire in Ukraine. The war has proven an extra burden in an already tumultuous geopolitical environment. North Korea is busy coping with a long list of problems: a contracting economy, the unpredictable trajectory of the pandemic, and escalating tensions with the United States and South Korea. And as a country that usually consumes a great deal of Washington’s bandwidth, the war in Ukraine has exhausted what energy the United States has left in dealing with the hermit state.

North Korea has recently exploited its position as a nuclear-armed actor by flexing its missile-testing muscles while the United States is distracted by events in Ukraine, but in contrast to past provocations, its recent moratorium-breaking tests do not attract as much US attention.

Moscow continues to serve as an alternative option for North Korea to limit Chinese leverage over the country’s political and economic isolation.

Importantly, Russia’s war is also causing collateral damage to North Korea’s own policy towards the United States. In the past, North Korea could simply switch from confrontation to engagement independent of other actors, but now its “power-for-power” policy cannot be detached from Russia’s war. North Korea likely understands that so long as it continues to ship military supplies to Russia, the chance of dialogue revival with the United States is low. This explains why Pyongyang has continually denied sending arms to Russia, and the country’s basic agreement with Russia forbids North Koreans from participating in the war, presumably to avoid being seen as supplying mercenaries. The last thing Pyongyang wants is for its troops to fight NATO troops on the front line and jeopardise any chance of negotiations with the United States. North Korea’s delay in deploying workers to eastern Ukraine out of concerns for their security shows how much it wants to avoid being trapped in a situation where its workers are directly involved in fighting.

However, like South Korea in its military relationship with the United States, North Korea cannot ignore Russia, one of its main backers. Moscow continues to serve as an alternative option for North Korea to limit Chinese leverage over the country’s political and economic isolation. And North Korea is increasingly counting on Russian assistance in the remote scenario that a war resumes with South Korea. In covertly sending military supplies to Russia in an attempt to avoid damaging relations with the United States, North Korea is simply hedging its bets, not looking for any major gains from the war in Ukraine.

North Korea’s support for Russia appears to be more a silver lining than a deliberate partnership. If this is the case, there is still hope that North Korea may not completely close its dialogue with the United States, despite its warlike rhetoric. An end to the war in Ukraine may somehow boost the chance of a North Korea–US détente.

lowyinstitute.org · by Khang Vu


6. N. Korea unveils stamp featuring leader's daughter Ju-ae for 1st time


I guess now we can say she is really important to the regime.



​Stamp image at the link:​ https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230214004700325?section=news

N. Korea unveils stamp featuring leader's daughter Ju-ae for 1st time | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · February 14, 2023

SEOUL, Feb. 14 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Tuesday unveiled the designs of a new stamp featuring the daughter of the North's leader Kim Jong-un, known as Ju-ae, for the first time.

The stamp designs uploaded on the website of the North's Korea Stamp Corp. show photos of the North's leader and his daughter attending the test-firing of a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in November last year.

It marked the first time that the North has released stamp designs featuring Ju-ae, Kim Jong-un's apparent second child, since she was first exposed to the public last year.

Of eight stamps, five designs contained Ju-ae's public appearance, including her walking with the North's leader hand in hand in front of a missile on a mobile launcher and taking a photo with troops.

The stamps will be issued Friday, according to the website.

Ju-ae, believed to be around 10 years old, attended a military parade last week to mark the 75th founding anniversary of the North's army, fueling speculation she may be groomed as Kim's successor.

The North's state media has recently begun calling her Kim's "respected" daughter from the "beloved" or "the most beloved" one, in a possible indication of an elevation in her profile.

Observers said it is too early to judge that she has been anointed as the successor, but the North appears to be displaying her legitimacy as a descendant of the "Paektu bloodline" of the Kim dynasty.


This image, captured from the website of the North's Korea Stamp Corp. on Feb. 14, 2023, shows the design of a new stamp featuring North Korean leader Kim Jong-un taking a photo with his daughter Ju-ae to mark the firing of a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile in November last year. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · February 14, 2023


7. S. Korea and NATO hold 1st military staff talks


The South Korea - NATO relationship continues to develop.




S. Korea and NATO hold 1st military staff talks | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · February 14, 2023

SEOUL, Feb. 14 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held their first military staff talks in Seoul this week, officials said Tuesday, in a sign of growing security cooperation between the two sides.

Maj. Gen. Kim Su-kwang, a senior official at the directorate of strategic planning at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and Lt. Gen. Francesco Diella of the Italian Army, director of NATO's cooperative security division, led the two-day session that began Monday, according to the JCS.

The meeting was launched as the two sides have agreed on the need for such regular talks during their high-level talks in 2021 and last year.

During this week's meeting, the two sides discussed cooperation procedures, shared strategic security concepts and assessed progress in bilateral cooperation, the JCS said, touting "meaningful" progress from the gathering.

In a regular press briefing, JCS spokesperson Col. Lee Sung-jun said the meeting did not touch on the issue of sending weapons support to Ukraine in its war with Russia.

The two sides plan to hold their next session in Belgium next year.

Later in the day, the NATO delegation plans to visit the inter-Korean border truce village of Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone, separating the two Koreas, in order to enhance their understanding of the security situation of the peninsula and encourage troops stationed there, the JCS added.

"This visit was very meaningful as it laid the foundation for military cooperation between South Korea and NATO," Diella was quoted as saying by the JCS.

South Korea has recently strengthened its ties with the transatlantic alliance as demonstrated in the opening of its diplomatic mission to NATO in Brussels last November.


Maj. Gen. Kim Su-kwang (C), head of the directorate of strategic planning at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and Lt. Gen. Francesco Diella (5th from L), director of NATO's cooperative security division, take a group photo as they take part in military staff talks between the two sides on Feb. 13, 2023, in this photo provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · February 14, 2023


8. Interview, John Batchelor Show on north Korea





Two part interview. I discuss the recent paper from Mathew Ha and me and more about north Korea.


1/2: #ROK: #DPRK: #PRC: The strengthening ICBM threat from Pyongyang & What Is to be done? David Maxwell, FDD


https://audioboom.com/posts/8246902-1-2-rok-dprk-prc-the-strengthening-icbm-threat-from-pyongyang-what-is-to-be-done-david


1/2: #ROK: #DPRK: #PRC: The strengthening ICBM threat from Pyongyang & What Is to be done? David Maxwell, FDD

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/02/09/north-korea-political-warfare-strategy/


2/2: #ROK: #DPRK: #PRC: The strengthening ICBM threat from Pyongyang & What Is to be done? David Maxwell, FDD

https://audioboom.com/posts/8246903-2-2-rok-dprk-prc-the-strengthening-icbm-threat-from-pyongyang-what-is-to-be-done-david


2/2: #ROK: #DPRK: #PRC: The strengthening ICBM threat from Pyongyang & What Is to be done? David Maxwell, FDD

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/02/09/north-korea-political-warfare-strate




9. The State as a Transnational Criminal Organization: A North Korea Case Study


The mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime.


Transnational organized crime (TOC) – state-­­operated TOC (SOTOC)


Citations (35) at the link: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3285265/


Conclusion:

North Korea serves as the most prominent example of organized crime that is truly organized and run by a state itself. Many of the tools for analyzing and combating organized crime may not apply to this SOTOC. This presents a challenge unique from those posed by governments that are simply corrupt, complicit in, or unable to respond to organized crime. However, the recommendations offered in this article can be utilized for other states connected to TOC at a variety of levels: i.e., Venezuela, Suriname, and Russia. For those states with lower levels of government involvement, these approaches can be combined with more traditional counters to further improve overall effectiveness. The United States, along with other governments and organizations, must focus more on the demand side of the networks, while continuing to strategically engage with other key international partners and tactically engage with more traditional forms of countertrafficking like interdiction and sanctions. While such a holistic approach to countertrafficking is not a new concept, the proportional effort on each part must be different due to the unique dynamics of SOTOC. This will be a challenge for the national security apparatus, but particularly when considering the support these activities provide to programs like the DPRK’s nuclear weapons development, it must be done correctly to promote global stability.



The State as a Transnational Criminal Organization: A North Korea Case Study

  • Published Feb. 6, 2023
  • By Maj Brian Hill, USAF

Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Air University Press -- 


airuniversity.af.edu · February 6, 2023

Abstract

Throughout history, many states have tolerated, sponsored, or even partnered with transnational criminal organizations, but the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) stands out as a nation where the government itself is the criminal organization, directly conducting drug trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, and other criminal enterprises. These activities have direct destabilizing effects and contribute to the DPRK’s ability to circumvent sanctions and fund its illicit nuclear weapons program. Moreover, this condition of the state as the criminal organization poses a unique challenge to the international community, requiring a different approach for analyzing and combating the problem. This article explores this phenomenon with a brief historical review of state involvement in transnational crime, then brings together multiple previous analyses to provide a more comprehensive examination of the DPRK as a distinctive case study. It concludes by offering recommendations for further examination and action to counter this destabilizing force that undermines economies and strains national and international security structures.

***

What happens when a state not only allows, sponsors, or partners with transnational criminal organizations (TCO) but is the transnational criminal organization? How does one deal with an international crime boss who also serves as the head of state for the world’s most isolated nation?

Transnational organized crime (TOC) is a destabilizing force that undermines economies and strains national and international security structures. Hostile states are increasingly turning to TOC as an asymmetric tool of power, presenting a key threat to US national security. This trend of state-­­operated TOC (SOTOC) will continue to increase in conjunction with global connectivity and as less powerful or economically viable states continue seeing benefit in using criminal activity as a balance against more powerful states. Though it is a form of TOC, SOTOC presents unique challenges that can neither be analyzed nor addressed the same way as traditional TOC. One of the most salient modern examples of this phenomenon is North Korea, a nation whose state apparatus is directly involved in trafficking, counterfeiting, and cybercrimes.

This article examines why policy makers and researchers must view SOTOC, its analysis, and its potential solutions differently than either traditional TOC or a hostile government. First this article defines several key terms and scopes the discussion of SOTOC. Then it briefly discusses the historical and modern context of SOTOC. This section will focus on North Korea as a prominent example of modern SOTOC, a state that actively operates trafficking, counterfeiting, and cybercrime enterprises. Finally, the piece concludes with a discussion of why the United States and its allies must analyze and address this problem differently than the TOC conducted by independent TCOs and provide suggestions for doing so both for the DPRK and beyond.

Defining State-­­Operated Transnational Organized Crime

There are several academic definitions of transnational organized crime, but for the purposes of this discussion we will utilize one similar to the US Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime definition, with some simplifications. TOC will be considered criminal activity, conducted by an organization, that crosses national boundaries and is motivated by some form of material profit. A transnational criminal organization will be defined as a nonstate organization that conducts TOC. SOTOC refers to TOC that is directly operated and sanctioned by a state as part of its official policy. Thus, this article does not focus on states that are simply permissive or complicit in the commission of organized crime by nonstate actors but rather ones in which the state is the primary driver of the criminal activity itself. Further, the article does not address the concept of a state as an exploitative entity toward its own population as described by sociologist Charles Tilly,

 nor will it address genocide and other crimes against humanity as described in the 1945 Charter of London, which guided the Nuremberg Trials and the United Nation’s guiding documents for the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and, later, Rwanda, and which discuss the state as an organized criminal actor in the context of genocide. This human-­­rights–focused definition of the state as an organized crime actor has become more common in recent decades and features a growing field of scholarship. These additional definitions are valid, but this article foregoes these discussions and focuses on organized crime in a more traditional context involving profit-­­motivated entities.To properly scope this discussion, there are essentially four levels of state involvement in criminal activities. The first is passive complicity, wherein a state turns a blind eye toward the activity due to corruption, fear, or simply an inability to act. The second is encouragement, where the state sees some form of value to itself in the activity but is not willing to provide overt support. The third is state-­­supported or state-­­sponsored, in which the state provides financial, material, or other forms of support to the criminal activity. Finally, there is state-­­operated, which is criminal activity directed by the state and conducted through groups that report to the state, either directly or through indirect methods meant to obfuscate state involvement. This fourth category sits at the extreme end of the concept of the criminalized state put forward by journalist and national security consultant Douglas Farah and is how this article will define SOTOC.

 However, it should also be noted that the line between the third and fourth levels is often blurry, particularly since governments typically try to obfuscate their involvement in criminal activity.States’ Involvement in Transnational Organized Crime

SOTOC is not a new phenomenon. Letters of marque for privateers date back centuries and constitute a concerted effort by states to leverage criminal elements against their enemies.

 The state was not merely endorsing these criminal activities. Rather, the state was actively directing them, falling squarely into the SOTOC category. Similarly, France actively engaged in opium smuggling to support its colonization of Indochina. Smuggling of illicit goods, particularly arms, remains the most widely reported form of SOTOC. The Iran-­­Contra Affair is a particularly notable example, wherein the US executive branch violated domestic and international laws to provide weapons to Iran and funding and weapons to the Contra insurgency in Nicaragua. Today, state-­­operated cybercrime is becoming increasingly ubiquitous and includes influence operations, espionage, sabotage, and profit-­­motivated cybercrime such as extortion via ransomware.All these forms of SOTOC have similar motivations as any other asymmetric means of conflict. States that are willing to leverage all instruments of power through creative means can overcome a conventionally more powerful opponent.

 States that are militarily weaker in a conventional sense sometimes turn to state-­sponsored or state-­­operated terrorism to provide an offsetting capability. Similarly, states can leverage TOC to offset disadvantages in the security and economic realms. Also like terrorism, this can be done via proxy or with varying levels of state support and state direction, and this phenomenon is observed in several South American countries, most notably Venezuela and Suriname.The DPRK: A Unique Criminal Enterprise

However, the single most extreme example of a state actively operating as a TCO is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In fact, the DPRK may be more actively engaged in criminal activity than any other nation, and Paul Rexton Kan, Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. and Robert M. Collins characterize North Korea as particularly unique among states that leverage TOC.

 By comparison, while the Chinese government may turn a blind eye toward some counterfeiting activity that occurs within its borders and narcotics traffickers partner with some South American governments, the DPRK’s government takes an even more active role in these activities, directs their execution, and can even be credited with the initial establishment of its criminal enterprises. This state-­­controlled crime purportedly occurs across a wide portfolio that includes drug manufacturing and trafficking; weapons trafficking; counterfeiting of goods, pharmaceuticals, and money; endangered species trafficking; insurance fraud; and human trafficking, though some are more clearly linked to the regime than others.Reports of the DPRK’s drug production and trafficking are fairly extensive prior to 2003, with large shipments of methamphetamine and heroin seized and linked directly to the DPRK over the preceding three decades. Since 2003, however, there have been no direct links established between the DPRK and drug shipments. This may be a direct result of the seizure of drugs on the DPRK-­flagged vessel Pong Su that occurred that year, after which the DPRK government may have reduced its drug activity to avoid further sanctions and scrutiny. However, it may also be a result of partnerships with Chinese criminal organizations that may now be facilitating the movement of drugs, adding an additional layer of obfuscation and making it more difficult to link the drugs to the DPRK.

 Additionally, the overall shift toward horizontal integration among narcotics traffickers seen around the world may have influenced a change in how the DPRK conducts its own trafficking operations, shifting it from a purely state-­­owned enterprise to a state-­­sanctioned one.There is similar ambiguity in counterfeit pharmaceuticals, a field where both China and the DPRK have been implicated as sources for the products with the actual point of origin remaining unclear.

 However, if the counterfeit pharmaceuticals were sourced from the DPRK, the advanced pharmaceuticals industry in the DPRK and its direct ties to the government imply significant involvement by the government in their production. In addition to counterfeit pharmaceuticals, the DPRK is likely also involved in the production and distribution of counterfeit cigarettes, with some sources indicating the DPRK is one of the largest producers of counterfeit cigarettes in the world. Probably the most prominent field of counterfeiting in which the DPRK has been implicated is US currency. The United States previously accused it of manufacturing US $100 “supernotes,” though other sources state the evidence for this is tenuous. Nevertheless, there have been numerous counterfeiting incidents tied to the DPRK and indications that even as far back as the 1950s the DPRK was counterfeiting South Korean currency. Additional reports suggest links between the DPRK regime and both human and endangered species trafficking, though the degree to which the regime itself is involved in these is unclear.Finally, the DPRK is heavily involved in cybercrime. This is not unusual for many states, with nations committing cyberattacks on infrastructure and conducting intrusion into government and commercial networks for the purpose of military, industrial, political, and economic espionage. The DPRK has been implicated in such operations as well but also leverages crime in cyberspace for the more classic criminal purpose of profit. A cyber robbery in which USD 100 million out of an attempted USD 1 billion was stolen from the Bangladesh Bank via the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was linked to the DPRK.

 UN reporting indicates North Korean hackers directly stole USD 50 million in cryptocurrency in 2020, which was likely funneled into its nuclear weapons program. Other reports from April 2022 link the DPRK to a USD 615 million cryptocurrency theft. All reports consolidated suggest the DPRK has stolen billions in cryptocurrency.The DPRK’s driving motivation is clear: economically, the regime is extremely weak from a conventional sense. A combination of international sanctions and its own reclusiveness and insistence on self-­­reliance combine to keep the DPRK’s economy closed off from much of the world. Pyongyang has taken some steps to change this and engages in limited trade, with China as its primary partner, but runs at a steep deficit and does not generate enough income to support a robust economy. North Korea’s internal economy also remains weak and continues to decline according to estimates by the Bank of Korea in South Korea.

 States that are militarily weak on the conventional side often turn to asymmetric activities like state-­­sponsored terrorism. Similarly, the DPRK has turned to transnational criminal activity to bolster its funding, with the primary concern from analysts being that these additional funds are funneled into its nuclear weapons program. Thus, this goes beyond the typical construct of corrupt government officials profiting from criminal activity. Rather, the state apparatus itself is the TCO.Combating SOTOC: Beyond Traditional Countermeasures

This poses unique challenges when determining how to combat this form of organized crime. Distinguished fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Moisés Naím proposes several key activities for combating TOC, including reducing corruption, leveraging nongovernmental organizations (NGO), enhancing tracking technology, and partnering with other nations to present global solutions.

 Some tactics, like improving cybersecurity and cutting off the supply of counterfeit currency while improving detection and removal of that which is already in circulation are fairly straightforward at addressing cybercrime and monetary counterfeiting, respectively. Unfortunately, many of the other counter-­­TOC strategies become much more difficult or entirely ineffective when confronted with SOTOC.Attempting to reduce corruption in the host nation is a key tactic in combating TCOs but is entirely moot in the context of the state acting as the TCO. Corrupt officials are not the problem, since the state apparatus as a whole is conducting these operations. Therefore, such a tactic would be like trying to combat a drug trafficking cartel by reducing corruption in the cartel, a tactic unlikely to have any effect other than, possibly, making the organization even more capable. Partnering with other nations to present global solutions is still possible and will likely have an effect. US-­­led sanctions regimes have made it harder for some nations to conduct illicit activities, and as more nations buy into these regimes, the measures become more effective. Financial targeting like the US Department of the Treasury’s crackdowns on banks and front companies used by the DPRK in the mid-2000s were also effective in curbing the DPRK’s SOTOC.

 While these partnerships should still be pursued with the DPRK’s trading partners, particularly China, one cannot expect these measures to have the same effect as other counter-­­TOC partnerships. For example, while many nations coordinated to counter cocaine trafficking by Pablo Escobar’s cartel, the participation of the Colombian government was necessary to actually bring it down. Without the host nation’s cooperation, the effects of global coordination will be limited, and one cannot expect the DPRK to take actions against itself. Leveraging NGOs also becomes more difficult for the same reason. Generally speaking, an NGO operates with the permission of the host government. The DPRK is already very restrictive in allowing NGOs access. NGOs seeking to combat the criminal activities of the DPRK cannot expect to be allowed entry into North Korea unless they conducted their counter-­­TOC activity clandestinely—a dangerous proposition. The one exception to this limitation could be NGOs operating in cyberspace, which would not require physical access to the DPRK. However, these organizations’ reach would also be limited due to the DPRK’s severely restricted access to the global internet.This leaves few options for combating SOTOC like that seen in the DPRK. A traditional, supply-­­side–focused strategy is difficult at best when there is minimal or no access to the source country. Certainly, interdiction and confiscation outside the DPRK’s borders can be tactically successful in reducing the supply and should still be used. Military interdiction in international waters remains a useful tactical tool. Further, along the supply chain, law enforcement cooperation and exchanges between willing nations, including the establishment of multinational and interagency fusion centers, should be used to increase interdiction capacity in ports and territorial waters while also standardizing enforcement to prevent weak seams that can be exploited. This could include a more stringent version of the Container Security Initiative enacted by key destinations for DPRK shipping that increases scrutiny on those shipments. Establishing the necessary agreements for this cooperative enforcement will also require engagement in the diplomatic realm.

However, focusing on the supply side rarely leads to strategic success.

 In that sense, combating the DPRK’s SOTOC presents an opportunity. With such limited options to combat the supply side, anyone seeking to do so is forced into focusing on the demand side of the criminal activity. Strategies like reducing demand for methamphetamines and heroine in DPRK-­­targeted markets or promoting consumer resistance to purchasing counterfeit products could have desired effects. For counterfeit goods, an aggressive, multilateral information campaign should be used in the primary markets for DPRK’s counterfeits. Strategic messaging that emphasizes negative cuing along with promoting relationship marketing by the companies whose products are being counterfeited have shown positive results. For narcotics trafficking, the United States must partner with key markets for DPRK narcotics—including China, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand—to help enact effective demand-­­reduction policies, including treatment programs and education. These and similar tactics have been proposed academically and utilized to limited extents by the United States and other governments in their general counter-­­TOC strategies. However, these methods must have a higher share of the overall strategy to counter the DPRK and other sources of SOTOC, if only because there is no other option.The United States also has options in the cyber realm to directly counter state-­­operated cybercrime and to leverage cybertools to monitor and track other SOTOC activity. In the case of the DPRK, the United States should work to strengthen the international cybersecurity regime by promoting multilateral cybersecurity partnerships. A global regime like the 2001 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime will be hard to achieve in the near term, with key nations like China not having signed even that long-­­standing Convention, but more limited partnerships to specifically monitor DPRK cyberactivities could be achievable if scoped properly. The United States should conduct diplomatic engagement to explore this possibility, focusing on technically capable nations that have already been the victim of DPRK cyberactivities, while offering cybersecurity assistance to less-­capable nations concerned with DPRK cyberactivities.

Finally, the area where the United States and other nations may have the most room to effectively operate is in financial targeting. The DPRK remains under strict sanctions that limit its ability to interact with global financial markets, and the United States and others have successfully frozen assets or countered financial transfers related to DPRK organized crime. However, the DPRK has a variety of sophisticated means to evade these restrictions. The regime’s money-­­laundering activities allow it to take full advantage of its other criminal activities and countering them could significantly reduce the effectiveness of Pyongyang’s criminal enterprises. The DPRK has not only leveraged foreign banks with relatively low capabilities to counter money laundering but has also used large American banks like JPMorgan Chase and the Bank of New York Mellon, which have better capabilities against illicit transfers and present a greater opportunity for the United States to take action.

 Pyongyang has also leveraged the burgeoning cryptocurrency market and its low level of global regulations to rapidly move money.The United States, particularly the Department of the Treasury, must continue its current trajectory of strengthening its ability to counter DPRK money laundering. This is important but insufficient by itself. The interconnectedness of the international financial system necessitates a broader approach involving global partners, particularly those with weaker anti–money-­­laundering capabilities or policies. The best way to do this is through what Fordham University’s Seongjun Park calls “upward regulatory harmonization.”

 This policy seeks to incrementally improve anti–money-­­laundering capabilities among developing nations via an incentive structure, similar to some of those used to reduce carbon emissions. This appears to be more effective than a punitive approach. This will likely not be a fast or complete solution, particularly since the largest regional economy, China, is hesitant to do anything that would destabilize the DPRK. Nevertheless, even partial gains in this space would be beneficial for countering DPRK SOTOC.Conclusion

North Korea serves as the most prominent example of organized crime that is truly organized and run by a state itself. Many of the tools for analyzing and combating organized crime may not apply to this SOTOC. This presents a challenge unique from those posed by governments that are simply corrupt, complicit in, or unable to respond to organized crime. However, the recommendations offered in this article can be utilized for other states connected to TOC at a variety of levels: i.e., Venezuela, Suriname, and Russia. For those states with lower levels of government involvement, these approaches can be combined with more traditional counters to further improve overall effectiveness. The United States, along with other governments and organizations, must focus more on the demand side of the networks, while continuing to strategically engage with other key international partners and tactically engage with more traditional forms of countertrafficking like interdiction and sanctions. While such a holistic approach to countertrafficking is not a new concept, the proportional effort on each part must be different due to the unique dynamics of SOTOC. This will be a challenge for the national security apparatus, but particularly when considering the support these activities provide to programs like the DPRK’s nuclear weapons development, it must be done correctly to promote global stability.

Major Hill is an intelligence officer in the United States Air Force. He has worked in a broad range of fields, including counterterrorism, partner-­­nation engagement, nuclear proliferation, political-­­military analysis, and denial and deception. He holds a bachelor’s degree in mathematics and a master’s degree in intelligence studies and is pursuing a master’s degree in international security with the University of Arizona.

airuniversity.af.edu · February 6, 2023



10. China's defense chief sends congratulatory message to N. Korea over army anniversary



PRC-DPRK alliance remains closer than lips and teeth? (At least on important anniversaries).



China's defense chief sends congratulatory message to N. Korea over army anniversary | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · February 14, 2023

SEOUL, Feb. 14 (Yonhap) -- China's defense minister has sent a congratulatory message to his North Korean counterpart on the occasion of the North's 75th founding anniversary of its armed forces last week, Pyongyang's state media said Tuesday.

In the letter to North Korean Defense Minister Kang Sun-nam, China's defense chief Wei Fenghe pledged efforts to promote the ties of the two nations' armies and defend regional peace, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The message said the two countries' traditional friendly relationship will be "everlasting" and military ties between Beijing and Pyongyang, an integral part of the bilateral relations, have been solidly developing.

Wei expressed a "willingness to enhance friendly relations between the armies of the two nations and promote peace and stability in the region," the KCNA said.

North Korea has been deepening its ties with China, the North's traditional ally and economic benefactor, amid global sanctions on its nuclear and missile programs and stalled denuclearization talks with the United States.

In August last year, then North Korean Defense Minister Ri Yong-gil sent a congratulatory message to Wei to mark the 95th founding anniversary of China's People's Liberation Army.


This image, captured from footage of North Korea's Korean Central Television on Feb. 9, 2023, shows the North holding a military parade at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang the previous day to mark the 75th founding anniversary of its armed forces. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · February 14, 2023



​11. [Column] Reform needed for North defector foundation


South Korea must do better caring for escapees.  


Tuesday

February 14, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

[Column] Reform needed for North defector foundation

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/02/14/opinion/columns/North-Korea-defectors-South-Korea/20230214202040112.html




Lee Ae-ran

The author is a former standing representative of the North Korean Human Rights Union.


Han Seong-ok and her son, who defected from North Korea by risking their lives to escape from deadly poverty, starved to death in South Korea. When their bodies were found two months after their deaths in July 2019, it shocked our society. Is it understandable that a person starved to death in a country that produces over 10-trillion-won ($7.9-billion) worth of food trash each year? At the sad news about their deaths, 30,000 North Korean defectors in the South were heartbroken. In frustration, they even staged hunger strikes for months at Gwanghwamun Square in central Seoul.


After bones of a North Korean defector woman who had lived alone in a public rental apartment were found in October last year, defectors were deeply saddened by the news again. As the period of social isolation during the Covid-19 pandemic grew protracted, more and more defectors were isolated further from our society and died.



What is the fundamental cause of the defectors’ repeated failures to settle into our society? I believe the reason can be found by analyzing the process of my settlement in the South. I escaped from the North in 1997 and entered the South the following year. I have lived as a citizen of South Korea for 25 years. When I came to South Korea, there were less than 1,000 defectors here.


After the Asian financial crisis hit South Korea in 1997, massive layoffs took place and it was impossible to find a job. Sitting in an empty apartment alone, I realized that if I die here alone, no one would ever know when and why I had died. My body was shaking with the feeling of loneliness.


North Korea is a regime whose priority is the organization over individuals. It is a totalitarian state where all individuals live under the control of organizations. In the North, an individual must join an organization whether he or she wants to or not.


In contrast, no organizational participation is mandatory here as freedom of individuals is guaranteed. No one compels anyone. You only have to pick and choose according to your own needs. In order for someone to call others, information and trust must be offered. But to North Korean defectors, information, trust and credit are the things they lack the most. This is why North Korean defectors are living in very barren soil in South Korean society.


Many talk about the success stories of some displaced North Koreans who came to the South before and during the 1950-53 Korean War. But the social environments and positions of North Korean defectors and displaced people are very different. Because the displaced North Koreans came to the South en masse, they could create a community here. As their social and economic conditions were similar, their organizations also were similar. As many of them were neighbors or relatives in North Korea, their social, economic and cultural environments were quite different from those defectors.


Defectors had lived in a country where their freedom to relocate and travel was completely banned. They defected to South Korea sporadically over decades instead of coming to the South en masse at the same time. As they do not know one another, they have to confront a structural limit that they cannot trust each other.


Most of the defectors were used to a passive and compulsory organizational life rather than an autonomous organizational life. They largely lack the active and autonomous organizational skills to live in a liberal democracy, market economy and an individualistic society. As they lived in the South, they realized that the most important thing is trust.


A series of defectors’ failures to settle in South Korea — such as deaths by starvation, suicide, lonely death and return to the North — resulted from their failure to build a community here where they can build trust in one another. For the defectors to settle here successfully, they must be able to communicate with South Korean society through a community of their own. An autonomous and self-sustainable community of defectors, by defectors and for defectors — not a community of defectors built by the government and for the government — is desperately needed.


The Korea Hana Foundation — set up to help defectors settle here but now being operated in a closed and bureaucratic manner and abused by politicians — should be reformed. We want a structural reform so that defectors can play a role in building a healthy community for all rather than remaining as a group of isolated and maladjusted people. Defectors must realize that the success of their community — not their individual successes — will help them make a bigger success and work together to create a harmonious community here. 

 

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.



12. A glimmer of hope for North Korea in 2023


Unfortunately for the Korean people living in the north there is little hope as long as the Kim family regime rules the north.


A glimmer of hope for North Korea in 2023

Resumption of trade with China and Russia expected to provide isolated and Covid-hit nation a much-needed lifeline


asiatimes.com · by Jamie Reilly · February 13, 2023

For the people of North Korea, 2022 was another difficult year. But as 2023 dawns, glimmers of hope are emerging as the country’s foreign trade with China and Russia begins to resume.

Food security remains the greatest challenge facing the North Korean people. The UN’s World Food Program estimates that 10.7 million people — over 40% of the population — are undernourished.

In March 2022, the UN’s Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) warned that “the most vulnerable segments of the population may be facing hunger and starvation.”


But all aid from the World Food Program ceased by April 2021, while bilateral aid from South Korea has collapsed. Aside from an unknown amount of Chinese aid, North Korea neither requested nor received humanitarian assistance in 2022.

While reliable information has been limited due to Covid-19-related restrictions imposed by the DPRK, scholarly analysis suggests that food insecurity in 2022 may have been the worst since the famine experienced during the 1990s, sparking calls for sanction adjustments for humanitarian purposes.

A central reason for this food insecurity is the DPRK’s strict Covid-19-related restrictions on human mobility. North Korea’s Covid-19 policy first began to shift on May 12, 2022, when the Politburo admitted that “a break was made on the emergency epidemic prevention front.”

By late May, reports of lockdownsmass testing and temporary quarantine sites were emerging from across North Korea. State media reported over 2.65 million cases of “fever” across the country. In July, the government declared a “maximum” national emergency while locking down the city of Kaesong.

Undated photo from North Korea shows rail wagons being disinfected as a Covid preventative measure. Image: KCNA

On August 10, 2022, North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un declared “victory” against Covid-19. In September, vaccinations finally began in particularly hard-hit regions, presumably using Chinese vaccines. By early November, a second round of vaccinations was underway, apparently focussing on the border region with China.


These regions have been hit particularly hard by border closures and domestic lockdowns, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, widespread summer flooding and ongoing multilateral sanctions.

Foreign trade in 2020 dropped to US$8.6 billion, an annual decline of 73.4%, and fell again in 2021 to $7.1 billion, the lowest level on record. Most crucially, exports to China over the first half of 2022 fell a further 75% year-on-year to just $27 million, while imports from China dropped 67% to $380 million.

With a near-collapse of access to foreign currency, the North Korean government adopted various measures designed to extract foreign currency while enhancing state control over markets. Such measures included collecting fees and taxes in foreign currency, encouraging the use of foreign currency in state-run stores and increasing the fees charged to market sellers.

Only in late September 2022 did freight train services from the Chinese border city of Dandong to North Korea’s Sinuiju resume.

Initially, North Korea mostly imported industrial goods, but Chinese customs data shows that imports of medicine and rice in October jumped to their highest levels since 2020. Bilateral trade reached $125.7 million in November 2022, dominated by medicines and food.


By late December 2022, news sources suggested plans to return DPRK laborers to Russia, while reports emerged of North Korean firms planning to resume their contract manufacturing and cross-border trade with China. Such measures would enable the DPRK to secure valuable foreign currency while still limiting incoming travel.

An increase in military confrontation also limited the potential for a resumption of humanitarian assistance, as North Korea conducted over 90 cruise and ballistic missile tests in 2022.

While Kim Jong Un has repeatedly signaled his determination to continue pursuing nuclear weapons, Pyongyang has so far abstained from conducting its long-expected seventh nuclear test, perhaps due to Chinese objections.

Kim Jong Un and his daughter watch the test firing of an ICMB. Image: Screengrab / KCNA

But North Korea’s missile program and military assertiveness have had a negative effect on its relationship with South Korea, which had previously been a major source of humanitarian assistance for the North.

The election of new South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol in May 2022 was part of the escalatory cycle. Yoon resumed large-scale joint military exercises with the United States and has adopted an explicit tit-for-tat strategy in response to the DPRK’s provocations.


In early January 2023, Yoon even expressed concern over the United States’ deterrence efforts, suggesting that Seoul should be included in nuclear weapons “planning, information sharing, exercises and training”, a suggestion that Washington quickly dismissed.

Meanwhile, worrying signs continue to emerge from North Korea. Most recently, with the arrival of North Korea’s spring farming season, it appears that chemical fertilizer is in short supply at this crucial moment in the planting cycle.

With Pyongyang continuing its nuclear weapons program, a hard-line president in Seoul, the ongoing war in Ukraine and intensifying US-China strategic competition, prospects look dim for a resumption of humanitarian assistance to North Korea.

Without sanctions relief or major humanitarian assistance, the best hope for improved livelihoods in North Korea rests with a resumption of border trade with China, accompanied by a return to market-favorable measures at home.

The end of China’s “zero-Covid” measures offers some hope amid the dark clouds that continue to hang over the Korean Peninsula.

Jamie Reilly is Associate Professor of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney.

This article, republished with permission, was first published by East Asia Forum, which is based out of the Crawford School of Public Policy within the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University.

asiatimes.com · by Jamie Reilly · February 13, 2023



13. JCS chief calls for 'bold' punishment against potential enemy provocations


Excerpt:


"In a contingency, troops should obliterate the enemy's will to conduct additional provocations through a bold response without any indecision," he was quoted as saying.


JCS chief calls for 'bold' punishment against potential enemy provocations

The Korea Times · February 14, 2023

This Dec. 16, 2022 file photo, released, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), shows JCS Chairman Gen. Kim Seung-kyum visiting an Army border observation post. Newsis


South Korea's top military officer called on front-line troops Tuesday to carry out a "bold" punishment against potential enemy provocations, his office said, as Seoul is striving to sharpen its deterrence against evolving North Korean nuclear and missile threats.


Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Gen. Kim Seung-kyum made the call as he visited the Army's 2nd Corps for discussions on "concrete action plans to achieve a victory in a potential fight against an enemy," according to the JCS.


"(Kim) instructed troops to build a 'decisive combat posture' for each enemy provocation type, and carry out a punishment in a bold manner on the ground should an enemy provoke," the JCS said in a press release.


Kim also visited a border unit of the 15th Infantry Division to inspect its readiness.

There, he warned that the "enemy would provoke in a situation that the South can hardly predict."


"In a contingency, troops should obliterate the enemy's will to conduct additional provocations through a bold response without any indecision," he was quoted as saying. (Yonhap)



The Korea Times · February 14, 2023



14. Korean independence fighter Ahn Jung-geun and unfinished Oriental Peace Theory



​An interesting historical perspective.



Korean independence fighter Ahn Jung-geun and unfinished Oriental Peace Theory

The Korea Times · February 14, 2023

By Doh See-hwan


Feb. 14 was the 113th anniversary of Ahn Jung-geun's death sentence handed down by imperial Japan because of patriotic deeds committed in Harbin, China. As is well known, Ahn shouted "Corea Ura" (long live Korea) three times after shooting Hirobumi Ito, who was inspecting the honor guard at Harbin Station in China on Oct. 26, 1909. Ahn's patriotic deed played a crucial role in reviving the stagnant anti-Japanese movement as well as informing the world about the Japanese invasion of Korea.


Ahn, who was later arrested, wrote "The History of Ahn Eung-chil" from Dec. 13, 1909, to March 15, 1910, and then began writing the theory of peace in the East. However, following the death sentence by imperial Japan on Feb. 14, 1910, and being executed at the age of 30 on March 26, 1910, the Oriental Peace Theory was left unfinished.


Regarding Ahn's patriotic deed in Harbin, the media and leaders of China ― a country also victimized by Japanese invasion ― expressed homage. In an editorial on Nov. 7, 1909, the Shanghai Minyu daily pointed out that "Korea is not ruined because there is such a person in Korea. If there was such a person in China, there would not have been China like today."


Sun Wen, China's national father, commemorated it as "a feat that will shine in the millennium," and Zhou En-lai, the first prime minister, commemorated it as "the anti-Japanese struggle of the people of both countries after the Sino-Japanese War originated from the great deed of Ahn." Chen Duxiu, the first leader of the Communist Party of China, said, "The great and resolute Korean independence movement opened a new era in the history of world revolution by establishing an accurate idea as the will of the people, not military force."


In addition, Ahn's Oriental Peace Theory, which Japanese imperialists left incomplete, is that the three countries ― Korea, China, and Japan ― can maintain independence and achieve Eastern peace by defending themselves from the invasion of Western imperialism through mutual aid. It clarifies the essence of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity rationalizing the Invasive Attributes and further suggests the ideal of the Northeast Asian Peace Community.


Ahn's plan is regarded as a basic idea of the European Union, which is referred to as a new legal order in international law today, such as the establishment of a permanent East Asian Peace Conference between Korea, China and Japan related to politics, economy and military in Northeast Asia, the establishment of a joint bank, and the creation of a joint peace army.


Ahn's Oriental Peace Theory is revered in the Japanese thought world today in comparison with the German philosopher Kant's theory of Perpetual Peace. Eiji Makino, a professor at Hosei University in Japan who is a former chairman of the Kant Association of Japan, suggests the following things in common: first, outstanding insight into human society and, a cold and strict sense of reality; second, stern criticism of colonialism and colonial rule; third, fostering moral human beings for peace realization; fourth, the impossibility of realizing peace through force; and fifth, the providence of God as the foundation of peace theory.

Toshichi Chiba, a Japanese military police guard, was impressed by Ahn's propaganda for Korean independence and Oriental peace.


However, as Japan's invasion of national sovereignty continued through the 1905 Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905 and the 1907 Korea-Japan Treaty, Ahn's independence movement shifted from educational enlightenment and national debt redemption movement to an anti-Japanese armed struggle. Ahn organized the anti-Japanese soldiers titled Donguihoe in 1908, defeated the Japanese army and released Japanese prisoners based on international law and Catholic philanthropy, but was defeated by Japanese attack.


In October 1909, Ahn, while reorganizing the righteous army with the members of the Danji Alliance, punished Ito, the main culprit of the invasion of Korea and the destroyer of Oriental peace, who entered his righteous army area for the invasion of Manchuria. Regarding this, the Japanese claim that Ito resigned from the resident-general of Korea, and Ahn did not have the qualification of belligerency.

However, it is revealed that Ito was visiting for the purpose of advancing to the continent as the chairman of the Privy Council and that Ahn was a lieutenant general of the righteous army under the Hague Land Warfare Regulations in 1907 after the dissolution of the Korean army by Japanese imperialists.


On Oct. 8, 1895, Miura Goro, who murdered Empress Myeongseong, the mother of Korea, was acquitted and released, while Japan sentenced Ahn to murder by applying the Japanese Criminal Law on the basis of "Japan's Equal Protection of Korean subjects," Article 1 of the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905, which is absolutely invalid due to coercion with the national representative under international law.


If so, it remains to be questioned what would have happened if Ahn had not been executed in a normal trial. However, it is possible to reasonably infer from the fact that the poet of "the Wide Plain," whose name was Lee Yuk-sa (264), the prisoner number obtained through independence activities, died in prison at the age of 40 after 17 imprisonments and torture by Japanese imperialists.


Moreover, it should not be forgotten that behind the calling to protect Korean independence and Oriental peace through the sacrifice of Ahn himself, a pacifist, was the prayer and love of the mother, Jo Maria. This is because the image of the mother, Jo Maria, who sent the last shroud to Ahn, alludes to the image of the Virgin Mary in front of a dying Jesus Christ, who was completely obedient to the salvation of mankind.


In conclusion, keeping the last will of Ahn Jung-geun will be the task of our calling today. "When I go to heaven, I will strive for the independence of my country."

Dr. Doh See-hwan is a senior research fellow at the Northeast Asian History Foundation.



The Korea Times · February 14, 2023



De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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