Quotes of the Day:

"Fearful men control, intelligent men, analyze, but ise men listen with intent to understand."

– J. Mike Fields

"Know the rules well, so you can break them effectively."

– Dalai Lama XIV

"One of the most cowardly things ordinary people do is to shut their eyes to facts."

– C.S. Lewis

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 20, 2024

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 20, 2024

3. Ukraine Schools Roll Out Shooting Training for Students

4. U.S. Pushes Hostage-Release Plan Aimed at Ending Gaza War

5. How the U.S. Is Derailing China’s Influence in Africa

6. Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC)

7. Will the Houthis Target U.S. Troops in Djibouti Next?

8. Myanmar Conflict Unveils Complex Dynamics of China's Interests 

9. The Urgent Mission to Counter Military Extremism

10.Houthis Avoid Targeting Chinese and Russian Ships in Red Sea

11. The Navy relieved 16 commanding officers in 2023

12. Experts predict how a future Russian attack on NATO will unfold

13. Readout of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Meeting With "Five Eyes" Defense Policy Senior Officials

14. ‘We killed many … drones are our air force’: Myanmar’s rebels take on the junta from above

15. China is the world’s worst jailer of journalists, CPJ says

16. How Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea Upended Global Shipping

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 20, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin falsely claimed that Russia supports the “unconditional equality” and “sovereignty” of all states in a January 20 letter to the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, contradicting Russia’s official position on its war in Ukraine and its wider imperial ambitions.
• Russian Ambassador to Denmark Vladimir Barbin threatened Denmark, a founding member of NATO, on January 20 in response to a recent US-Danish agreement allowing US forces access to military bases in Denmark.
• Russian energy exports to China significantly increased in 2023 amid increasing Russian reliance on oil revenues to manage the fiscal burdens of the war in Ukraine.
• European Union (EU) Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton stated on January 20 that the EU will have the capacity to produce 1.3 to 1.4 million artillery shells by the end of 2024 and will ensure that it delivers the “majority” of the shells to Ukraine.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued positional engagements along the front.
• A Russian Storm-Z instructor claimed on January 16 that Rosgvardia personnel operating in occupied Ukraine have systematic issues with equipment and weapons storage.
• Occupation authorities continue preparations for the March 2024 Russian presidential election.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 20, 2024

Jan 20, 2024 -  ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 20, 2024

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 20, 2024, 4:15pm ET 

Click  here

Click  here

Click  hereISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on January 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: ISW has added a new section on Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) efforts to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to track the development of Ukraine’s DIB and the international support for Ukraine’s DIB efforts. ISW will be publishing its assessments in this section based on public announcements, media reporting, and official statements.

Russian President Vladimir Putin falsely claimed that Russia supports the “unconditional equality” and “sovereignty” of all states in a January 20 letter to the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, contradicting Russia’s official position on its war in Ukraine and its wider imperial ambitions. Putin claimed that Russia rejects “neocolonialist ambitions, double standards, as well as forceful pressure, dictatorship, and blackmail as a means of achieving foreign policy and foreign economic goals.”[1] Russian officials have routinely denied Ukraine’s sovereignty and refused to treat it as an equal. The Kremlin rejects Ukrainian statehood and nationhood by incorporating Ukraine into the ideological and geographic conception of the Russian World (Russkiy Mir), which includes any Russian speakers and ”carriers of Russian history and culture“ as “compatriots“ and includes all of the former territories of Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation.”[2] Russia uses the framework of “Russkiy Mir” to justify Russian imperialist expansion and the subjugation of independent, sovereign states and their peoples within a pseudo-cultural and historical context. Russian officials have routinely justified the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by claiming that Russia aims to protect its “compatriots” abroad, again rejecting Ukraine‘s sovereignty.[3] Russia also continues to trivialize the sovereignty of other post-Soviet countries and has been setting information conditions to escalate tensions in the Baltics and Moldova under the guise of protecting its “compatriots” abroad.[4] Russia has been in violation of its own commitments to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and “inviolability of borders” and its agreement to center relations with Ukraine on ”non-use of force or threat of force” and “non-interference in internal affairs” undertaken in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum since its initial invasion in 2014.[5] Putin's false claims that Russia respects “equality” and “sovereignty” are likely intended to cater to states that the Kremlin desires to pull into its wider sphere of influence, much as it initially intended to do with Ukraine before the initial 2014 invasion.

Russian Ambassador to Denmark Vladimir Barbin threatened Denmark, a founding member of NATO, on January 20 in response to a recent US-Danish agreement allowing US forces access to military bases in Denmark. Barbin claimed during an interview with Russian news outlet RIA Novosti that the December 2023 US-Danish agreement “creates new challenges” for Russia’s security in the Baltic Sea region and stated that Russia will determine the “necessary responses" to such actions.[6] The US and Denmark signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement on December 21, 2023, allowing the US to permanently station forces and equipment at military bases in Denmark.[7] Barbin called the agreement a “deliberate course towards further degradation of the military-political situation in the region under the slogans of containing and intimidating Russia.“[8] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger previously claimed that Finland is becoming a ”second Ukraine” in response to a similar US-Finnish agreement.[9] Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have recently threatened Finland, and the Kremlin’s threats against a founding member of NATO that shares no borders with Russia is a notable challenge to the wider alliance.[10] Russian threats made towards a founding member of NATO also undermine Russia’s longstanding information operation that its aggressive actions are in response to NATO expansion.[11]

Russian energy exports to China significantly increased in 2023 amid increasing Russian reliance on oil revenues to manage the fiscal burdens of the war in Ukraine. Kremlin newswire TASS amplified data from the Chinese General Customs Administration on January 20 that shows a 24 percent increase in Russian crude oil exports to China from 2022 to 2023 and a 23 percent increase in Russian exports of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG).[12] TASS noted that Russia became China’s largest oil supplier in 2023.[13] Increased Russian energy exports to Indo-Pacific states, primarily India and China, and widespread Russian efforts to skirt the G7 price cap on Russian crude oil and petroleum products allowed Russia to significantly increase oil revenues in 2023.[14]

European Union (EU) Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton stated on January 20 that the EU will have the capacity to produce 1.3 to 1.4 million artillery shells by the end of 2024 and will ensure that it delivers the “majority” of the shells to Ukraine.[15] Breton stated that the EU will be able to produce one million shells per year by March or April 2024 and intends to “significantly” increase its shell production capacity in 2025.[16] NATO announced on January 19 that it plans to announce a major unspecified investment in artillery ammunition on January 23.[17]

A poll conducted by independent analytical platform VoxUkraine found that 63 percent of Ukrainians who left the country because of Russia’s invasion had returned by July-August 2023.[18] The poll also found that 64 percent of respondents who have not yet returned to Ukraine do have plans to return and that 27 percent will return to Ukraine. At the same time, the war continues as long as there are suitable housing and employment opportunities.[19] As many as 6.2 million Ukrainians are living abroad due to the war, according to various international estimates.[20]

Russian forces conducted a limited series of strikes against Ukraine on January 20 amid continued Russian efforts to test and pressure Ukrainian air defenses. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched seven Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and three S-300 missiles from occupied Luhansk Oblast.[21] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted four of the drones and that the S-300 missiles struck Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast.[22] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that recent Russian strike series have attempted to overload Ukrainian air defenses and that Russian forces continue to launch drones and missiles in ways designed to avoid, penetrate, and degrade limited Ukrainian air defense capabilities.[23] Russian forces will likely continue to adapt missile and drone strike packages in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses and place pressure on Ukrainian air defense deployments.[24] Ihnat acknowledged that Ukrainian forces have concentrated a considerable amount of air defense near Kyiv to defend against regular Russian strikes and that it will be difficult for Ukrainian forces to disperse these systems as Russia’s strike campaign continues.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin falsely claimed that Russia supports the “unconditional equality” and “sovereignty” of all states in a January 20 letter to the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, contradicting Russia’s official position on its war in Ukraine and its wider imperial ambitions.
• Russian Ambassador to Denmark Vladimir Barbin threatened Denmark, a founding member of NATO, on January 20 in response to a recent US-Danish agreement allowing US forces access to military bases in Denmark.
• Russian energy exports to China significantly increased in 2023 amid increasing Russian reliance on oil revenues to manage the fiscal burdens of the war in Ukraine.
• European Union (EU) Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton stated on January 20 that the EU will have the capacity to produce 1.3 to 1.4 million artillery shells by the end of 2024 and will ensure that it delivers the “majority” of the shells to Ukraine.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued positional engagements along the front.
• A Russian Storm-Z instructor claimed on January 16 that Rosgvardia personnel operating in occupied Ukraine have systematic issues with equipment and weapons storage.
• Occupation authorities continue preparations for the March 2024 Russian presidential election.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on January 20. Geolocated imagery published on January 20 indicates that Russian forces captured Krokhmalne (20km northwest of Svatove), and Russian milbloggers earlier claimed that Ukrainian forces withdrew from positions near the settlement.[26] Geolocated footage published on January 20 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced east of Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[27] Additional geolocated footage published on January 18 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced just east of Zolotarivka (17km south of Kreminna).[28] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka; northwest of Svatove near Berestove; west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; southwest of Kreminna near Hryhorivka and the Serebryanske forest area; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka and Verkhnokamyanske.[29] Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District [WMD]) are reportedly attacking in the Kupyansk direction and elements of the 20th Combined Arms Army (WMD) are reportedly conducting assaults in the Lyman direction.[30]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on January 20 that Russian forces are conducting infantry-led assaults with armored vehicle support in the Lyman direction.[31] The spokesperson stated that a large number of Russian tanks, BMPs, and armored vehicles are moving in an unspecified area in the Lyman direction and that Russian forces are suffering significant armored vehicle losses in the area. The spokesperson stated that increased Russian attacks in the Lyman direction may be due to orders from Russian leadership to reach “specific boundaries” by a certain date, potentially in reference to the upcoming Russian presidential election in March. ISW has not yet observed footage of large columns of Russian vehicles operating in the Kupyansk or Lyman directions at the time of writing this report but will consider visual evidence of such columns and the consistent occurrence of mechanized Russian assaults as leading indicators that Russian forces have begun a larger offensive operation in the area. Notable Russian gains along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line would also likely be indicators of a larger Russian offensive effort in the area given the previous year of positional fighting along this sector of the front.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage posted on January 20 shows that Russian forces recently advanced in a small forest belt northwest of Klishchiivka (southwest of Bakhmut).[32] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported fighting northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured the rest of Bohdanivka, but later withdrew the claim and stated that Ukrainian forces still maintained control of some of the settlement.[34] ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of these Russian gains in Bohdanivka. Elements of the Russian 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division, Sever-V volunteer brigade, and 58th Spetsnaz Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps) reportedly continue operating in the Bakhmut area.[35]

Russian forces reportedly advanced on the southern outskirts of Avdiivka on January 20. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured a Ukrainian fortified area near the "Tsarska Okhota" restaurant (500 meters south of Avdiivka), broke through to Chernyshevskoho and Sportyva Streets, and are advancing north towards Avdiivka along Soborna Street.[36] Milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces captured the Skotovata dacha area on the southern outskirts of Avdiivka.[37] ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of these purported Russian gains in southern Avdiivka. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Stepove, Novobakhmutivka, and Novokalynove; west of Avdiivka near Sieverne and Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske.[38] Elements of the DNR's “Pyatnashka” international volunteer brigade and “Dikaya Divisiya” formation are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka direction.[39]

Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on January 20, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported fighting west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Marinka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka.[40] Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have been focusing on interdicting the O0532 Marinka-Vuhledar road.[41]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces made a marginal advance in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. Geolocated footage posted on January 20 shows limited Russian gains southeast of Urozhaine (10km south of Velyka Novosilka).[42] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting occurred south of Zolota Nyva (southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and Staromayorske.[43]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 20. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continued near Robotyne and east of Robotyne near Verbove.[44]

Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast as of January 20, but there were no changes to the frontline in this area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled 10 Russian assaults on the left bank.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that weather is constraining operations on the left bank, although Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed that Ukrainian forces recently resumed attempts to cross the Dnipro River after icy conditions on the river thawed.[46] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) assessed that Russian forces will likely continue to attempt to dislodge Ukrainian forces from positions near Krynky in the coming weeks despite growing manpower losses.[47]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated on January 19 that its observers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) noted that unspecified actors, likely Russian forces, mined the perimeter of the ZNPP between the facility’s internal and external fence, where IAEA observers had previously seen mines as of November 2023.[48] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated that there is nothing new about Russian forces mining the territory of the ZNPP and that Russian threats to the facility will remain as long as Russian forces occupy it.[49] Russian threats to the ZNPP occur amid Russia’s ongoing effort to compel the IAEA and the international community to normalize Russia’s occupation of the ZNPP.[50]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

A Russian Storm-Z instructor claimed on January 16 that Rosgvardia personnel operating in occupied Ukraine have systematic issues with equipment and weapons storage caused by inflexible regulatory documents. The instructor claimed that improper storage of military equipment and weapons led to a fire at a Rosgvardia checkpoint in southern Donetsk Oblast on January 15.[51] The instructor claimed that Rosgvardia requires its personnel to lock weapons and equipment on cables in storage facilities which prevented personnel from saving the equipment and weapons from the fire.[52] The instructor claimed that Rosgvardia personnel are strictly following documents that regulate the storage of weapons in this way and bemoaned the practice as constraining Rosgvardia’s ability to quickly respond to threats.[53] Russia appears to be continuing efforts to use newly formed Rosgvardia units to build out a military occupation force in Ukraine separate from frontline Russian units but appears to be facing systemic issues in doing so.[54]

Russia continues to rely on covert schemes to acquire critical components from abroad to support Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). The US Department of Justice (DOJ) reported on January 18 that US authorities arrested an individual with US, Israeli, and Russian citizenship who the US DOJ accused of using a network of businesses in China and other countries to transfer hundreds of thousands of semiconductors to sanctioned businesses with ties to the Russian military and Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).[55]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Click here to read ISW’s new analysis on Ukrainian long-term efforts to develop a self-sufficient DIB with US and European support.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on January 20 that the Ukrainian MoD’s Internal Audit Service and the US Embassy in Ukraine’s Defense Cooperation Department conducted the first joint inspection of US-provided weapons in Ukraine.[56] The Ukrainian MoD reported that Ukrainian and US inspectors checked weapons’ serial numbers, technical conditions, and storage conditions, and stated that US representatives had ”no comments” during the joint inspection.[57] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Yuriy Dzhygir stated that Ukraine is providing partner countries access to storage locations and conducting systematic joint inspections to ”increase transparency and strengthen trust.”[58]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Occupation authorities continue preparations for the March 2024 Russian presidential election. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 20 that occupation authorities in occupied Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast are recruiting local pensioners to form a “council of veterans” to campaign for Russian President Vladimir Putin ahead of the presidential election.[59] Occupation officials will provide the pensioners with additional food and medicine in exchange for campaigning for Putin.[60] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian authorities have selected proxies in occupied Ukraine to collect signatures for Putin and ensure "100 percent voter turnout" and at least 90 percent of local votes for Putin.[61]

Russian officials continued efforts to highlight the economic potential of occupied areas of Ukraine, likely in part to attract Russians to move to occupied Ukraine. Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko presented an award on January 20 to Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) chairman Sergei Kozlev recognizing the LNR as one of the “best supporter[s] of local producers” during a ceremony honoring Russia’s “federal territories” at the Rossiya international forum and exhibit.[62] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky claimed that Russian authorities recognized occupied Primorsk and Berdyansk cities as “best projects to create a comfortable urban environment” in 2023.[63]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

A Russian ultranationalist milblogger continued to express fear that Russia is losing influence over Armenia amid deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger criticized Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s statements in support of creating a new Armenian constitution instead of reforming the existing constitution.[64] The milblogger claimed that Pashinyan may want to declare Armenia’s “neutral status” in a proposed new constitution, thereby removing Armenia from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and allowing Armenia to ally with “countries unfriendly to Russia.”[65]

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to promote Russia’s 2023 transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. Lukashenko stated on January 20 that Russia transferred nuclear weapons to Belarus with Iskander launch vehicles in 2023 and that he signed a decree on the “procedure for using nuclear weapons” that specifies that nuclear weapons may only be used by order of the president" (presumably by order of Russian President Vladimir Putin since Russia retains control over the weapons).[66] Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin announced on January 16 that Belarus’ new draft military doctrine accounts for the use of Russian tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Belarus for the first time.[67] ISW continues to assess that neither Russia nor Belarus seeks nuclear escalation and that Russian use of nuclear weapons remains unlikely.[68]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev stated on January 19 that Belarus continues to supply and repair weapons and military equipment that Russian forces use in Ukraine. Nayev also stated that the Belarusian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to produce new and recycle obsolete ammunition to transfer to Russian forces.[69]

Belarusian Ambassador to Russia Dmitry Krutoy, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk, and Union State Secretary of State Dmitry Mezentsev met on January 19 to discuss preparations for the next Supreme State Council of the Union State meeting and Russian-Belarusian trade and economic cooperation.[70]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 20, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-20-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in eastern Jabalia on January 20. A local Gazan activist also reported that an Israeli armor convoy reentered eastern Jabalia from the Gaza “envelope.”
• The IDF 7th Armored Brigade continued clearing operations in Khan Younis City on January 20.
• Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces three times across Nablus Governorate in the West Bank on January 19.
• Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel targeting Israeli military facilities.
• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a missile attack targeting US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, on January 20.
• The IRGC announced on January 20 that Israel killed five IRGC “advisors” in an airstrike on Al Mazzah, Damascus, Syria
• US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces conducted two separate preemptive airstrikes on January 19 and 20 targeting anti-ship missiles that the Houthis had prepared to launch from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen towards the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 20, 2024

Jan 20, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, January 20, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on January 20 and 21, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume on Monday, January 22, 2024.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in eastern Jabalia on January 20. A local Gazan activist also reported that an Israeli armor convoy reentered eastern Jabalia from the Gaza “envelope.”
• The IDF 7th Armored Brigade continued clearing operations in Khan Younis City on January 20.
• Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces three times across Nablus Governorate in the West Bank on January 19.
• Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel targeting Israeli military facilities.
• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a missile attack targeting US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, on January 20.
• The IRGC announced on January 20 that Israel killed five IRGC “advisors” in an airstrike on Al Mazzah, Damascus, Syria
• US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces conducted two separate preemptive airstrikes on January 19 and 20 targeting anti-ship missiles that the Houthis had prepared to launch from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen towards the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in eastern Jabalia on January 20. The al Qassem brigades fired small arms and Yasin-105 rockets at Israeli forces in the al Jaabari area of eastern Jabalia.[1] A local Gazan activist also reported that an Israeli armor convoy reentered eastern Jabalia from the Gaza “envelope.”[2] The Gaza Envelope describes populated areas in southern Israel that are within seven kilometers of the Israel-Gaza border. Commercially available satellite imagery also shows fresh tank tracks east of Jabalia, corroborating this report.

The al Quds Brigades, the military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, fired small arms at Israeli forces advancing in Bureij and Maghazi in the Gaza Strip’s Central Governorate.[3]

The IDF 7th Armored Brigade continued clearing operations in Khan Younis City on January 20.[4] Israeli forces raided a militia compound, destroyed six rocket launchers, and found a tunnel shaft in the surrounding area.

Palestinian fighters conducted multiple mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in Khan Younis. The al Quds Brigades fighters mortared an Israeli combat outpost in southern Khan Younis and an Israeli position at Rumaydah, east of Khan Younis City.[5] The al Qassem Brigades mortared Israeli forces advancing in the northern and southern areas of Khan Younis.[6]

The Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigade—the militant wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine —claimed one rocket attack targeting unspecified targets in Israel.[7]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces three times across Nablus Governorate in the West Bank on January 19.[8]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel targeting Israeli military facilities.[9]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a missile attack targeting US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, on January 20.[10] A US official told Reuters that “multiple theater ballistic missiles” hit the airbase, causing several minor injuries to US personnel and “severe injuries” to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) members.[11]

The IRGC announced on January 20 that Israel killed five IRGC “advisors” in an airstrike on Al Mazzah, Damascus, Syria.[12] Among the killed individuals were Brigadier General Sadegh Omid Zadeh, the IRGC Quds Force’s intelligence deputy in Syria, and Omid Zadeh’s deputy, Haj Gholam.[13] A June 2023 Washington Post article citing leaked documents, which CTP-ISW has not reviewed, reported that Omid Zadeh worked with Iranian proxies in Syria, such as LH, to develop EFPs to target US forces.[14] The Washington Post reported, citing the leaked documents, that Omid Zadeh was responsible for “identifying US Humvee and Cougar armored vehicles in Syria” as EFP targets.

Iranian officials vowed retaliation against Israel for the killing of the five IRGC officers. Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani stated that Iran reserves the right to respond to Israel’s “organized terrorism” at an “appropriate time and place.”[15] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf similarly stated that Israel will face a “harsh punishment” for killing the IRGC officers.[16]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces conducted two separate preemptive airstrikes on January 19 and 20 targeting anti-ship missiles that the Houthis had prepared to launch from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen towards the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.[17] CENTCOM conducted the self-defense strikes after determining that the anti-ship missiles presented an "imminent threat” to merchant vessels and US Navy ships.

3. Ukraine Schools Roll Out Shooting Training for Students

Ukrainian resistance and resilience.

But imagine this concept: Every school child gets to pilot their own drone for reconnaissance and attack.

Ukraine Schools Roll Out Shooting Training for Students

The war has upended Ukraine's education system, forcing classes online as fighting destroys school facilities and officials introduce war-time curricula, including firing drills and drone piloting.

by AFP | January 21, 2024, 9:08 am

kyivpost.com · January 21, 2024

The war has upended Ukraine's education system, forcing classes online as fighting destroys school facilities and officials introduce war-time curricula, including firing drills and drone piloting.

by AFP | January 21, 2024, 9:08 am

Photo:adm.lviv.ua

Schools in western Ukraine are rolling out rifle and pistol shooting practice using interactive software, a regional official said Thursday, signalling how Russia's nearly two-year invasion has impacted school life.

The war has upended Ukraine's education system, forcing classes online as fighting destroys school facilities and officials introduce war-time curricula, including firing drills and drone piloting.

"Prykarpattia high school students will learn shooting on safe interactive systems at Defence of Ukraine classes," Governor Svitlana Onyshchuk of the western Ivano-Frankivsk region said on social media.

She said the trainings would be introduced in three dozen schools in the western region, which has enjoyed relative calm during 23 months of fighting further east.

"These systems are mobile and consist of: multimedia equipment, software and samples of weapons," she said on social media.

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She said the training was part of a broader effort to "improve skills related to military and patriotic education".

Kyiv says the fighting against Russian forces has left nearly 3,500 education facilities damaged and 365 completely destroyed.

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kyivpost.com · January 21, 2024

4. U.S. Pushes Hostage-Release Plan Aimed at Ending Gaza War

Hostage release is an important humanitarian effort. Unfortunately their release is unlikely to achieve any significant strategic effects save for possible relief of some domestic criticism and that their release can contribute to the narrative that Hamas is a brutal terrorist organization.

U.S. Pushes Hostage-Release Plan Aimed at Ending Gaza War

The talks are at an early stage, and large gaps remain between Israel and Hamas on the details

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-pushes-hostage-release-plan-aimed-at-ending-gaza-war-d48b27e1?mod=hp_lead_pos2

By Summer SaidFollow

Jan. 21, 2024 7:06 am ET

DUBAI—The U.S., Egypt and Qatar are pushing Israel and Hamas to join a phased diplomatic process that would start with a release of hostages and, eventually, lead to a withdrawal of Israeli forces and an end to the war in Gaza, diplomats involved in mediating the talks said.

Neither side in the conflict has agreed to the terms of the new proposal—which includes steps at odds with the stated positions of Israel and Hamas. Taher Al-Nono, a media adviser to Hamas, said there was no real progress, and Israeli officials didn’t respond to a request for comment.

But people briefed on the talks said Israel and Hamas at least were again willing to engage in discussions after weeks of stalled talks following the end of the last cease-fire on Nov. 30. Negotiations were set to continue in Cairo in coming days, the people said.

The two parties’ “willingness to discuss the framework was a positive step. Mediators are now working to bridge the gap,” one of the people briefed on the talks said.

The new proposal, backed by Washington, Cairo and Doha, represents a new approach to defusing the conflict—aiming to make the release of Israeli hostages kidnapped by Hamas part of a comprehensive deal that could lead to an end to hostilities.

In November, a pause in fighting lasted a week and was accompanied by an exchange of 100 Israeli hostages in Gaza for more than 300 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel.

And Israeli negotiators have continued to push for a two-week halt to fighting to allow for hostage-prisoner exchanges and have been reluctant to discuss plans that envision a permanent cease-fire, Egyptian officials said.

A Red Cross bus carried Palestinians released from Israeli jails in November. PHOTO: FADEL SENNA/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Israeli hostages arrived at an army base in southern Israel after being freed. PHOTO: MENAHEM KAHANA/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Hamas, on the other hand, is seeking to gain maximum advantage from the captives it holds, and only wants to trade them for thousands of Palestinian prisoners and a permanent cease-fire. Gaza leader Yahya Sinwar believes that the Israelis will prioritize hostages over the battlefield and that Hamas needs to hold out as long as possible to exhaust Israel and keep international pressure on it, the officials said. Sinwar is willing to release hostages but wants a longer cease-fire and better terms than last time, the officials said.

Hamas took more than 200 hostages in a surprise attack on Israel on Oct. 7 that Israel says also left about 1,200 people dead. Some of those killed were tortured and raped. Israeli officials have said the attack profoundly changed Israeli society and have vowed to destroy Hamas and kill its leaders.

The U.S., Egypt and Qatar see another hostage deal as the key to bringing a prolonged halt to the fighting. Egyptian officials say that while Israeli leaders publicly take an uncompromising stance, there are divisions within the Israeli cabinet, with some calling for prioritization of hostages.

In a rare interview with Israeli television, Gadi Eisenkot, a former general who is now a nonvoting member of Israel’s war cabinet, said: “We should say bravely that it is impossible to return the hostages alive in the near future without an agreement.” 

Other senior Israeli leaders disagree, saying that only continued military pressure on Hamas will compel the group to return captives.

An artillery shell is fired from southern Israel toward the Gaza Strip. PHOTO: JACK GUEZ/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

On Tuesday in Cairo, Israeli negotiators offered another counterproposal on hostages that didn’t include a path to ending the war, Egyptian officials said. They said Egypt’s top negotiator, its intelligence chief, Abbas Kamel, accused Israel’s team of not being serious about the talks.

Meanwhile, Hamas has told Egyptian and Qatari officials that the previous, short-term hostage deal was unsatisfactory, with less aid than promised reaching Gaza and many of its freed prisoners getting arrested again later. 

A Qatari official said the Gulf state “continues to communicate with all parties with the objective of mediating an immediate end to the bloodshed, protecting the lives of innocent civilians, securing the release of hostages, and facilitating the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza.”

The mediators have proposed a 90-day plan that would first pause fighting for an unspecified number of days for Hamas to first release all Israeli civilian hostages, while Israel would release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, withdraw forces from Gaza’s towns and cities, allow freedom of movement in the strip, end drone surveillance and double the amount of aid going into the enclave, according to the plan. 

In the second phase, Hamas would free female Israeli soldiers and turn over bodies while Israel would release more Palestinian prisoners. A third phase would involve the release of Israeli soldiers and fighting-age men Hamas considers soldiers, according to Egyptian officials, while Israel would redeploy some of its forces outside the current borders of the Gaza Strip.

The Nuseirat refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. PHOTO: ADEL HANA/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Displaced Palestinians at the Rafah camp attempt to contact relatives. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Israel says it has destroyed more than half of Hamas’s fighting battalions and largely cleared the strip’s largest city, Gaza City, and its surroundings of militants. But its forces are now fighting in Khan Younis, a densely packed city in the enclave’s south, and looking ahead to clashes in the border town of Rafah, where more than 1.3 million civilians have sought refuge. 

Also on the table: the formation of an international fund for the reconstruction of Gaza, and safety guarantees for Hamas political leaders, Egyptian officials said. 

The plan then envisions talks for a permanent cease-fire, normalization of relations between Israel and Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and the relaunching a process to create a Palestinian state, Egyptian officials said.

Gulf countries have ruled out funding a reconstruction of Gaza—as the Israelis have called for—without a clear and irreversible path to a Palestinian state. 

A particular hindrance in the talks, said Egyptian officials, has been Hamas’s internal rifts. 

Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader in Gaza, greeting supporters in 2021. PHOTO: AHMED DEEB FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Hamas’s political leader in Doha, Ismail Haniyeh. PHOTO: IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY/ZUMA PRESS

On one side is Sinwar, an architect of the Oct. 7 attacks who is believed to be hiding deep in Gaza’s underground tunnel network with at least some of the hostages. Sinwar has told mediators that Hamas has essentially won the war, the officials said, despite heavy military losses, and at least 25,000 Palestinians have been killed in Israel’s offensive, mostly women and children—a Palestinian health ministry figure that doesn’t distinguish between civilians and militants.

The death and destruction has sparked criticism of Israel’s conduct of the war from Arab and other governments and protesters in the West. South Africa’s government filed a claim of genocide against Israel in the International Court of Justice. Israel has vehemently denied the allegation.

On the other side is Hamas’s political leadership outside of Gaza. Based in Doha, these officials have led the talks with Qatar and Egypt, are vying to keep Hamas relevant after the war ends and have indicated a willingness to demilitarize in Gaza—something Sinwar vehemently opposes, the Egyptian officials said. 

Israel opposes a role for Hamas in any future Gaza government and has also expressed opposition to suggestions that the secular Palestinian Authority, which rules the West Bank, should run the strip, as the U.S. envisions. 

Sinwar and Hamas’s political leader in Doha, Ismail Haniyeh, haven’t communicated directly in almost a month, the officials said. That has made progress on a deal difficult, they said.

An Israeli army vehicle driving along the border with the Gaza Strip. PHOTO: JACK GUEZ/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Stephen Kalin, David S. Cloud and Abeer Ayyoub contributed to this article.

Write to Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com

5. How the U.S. Is Derailing China’s Influence in Africa

As an aside, how many of our diplomats, military Foreign Area Officers, and other government and military officials working in Africa (and other regions outside of Asia) are sufficiently versed in Chinese strategy let alone Mandarin?

How the U.S. Is Derailing China’s Influence in Africa

A U.S.-backed railway project is helping to challenge Beijing’s dominance in an unlikely country

https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/angola-africa-china-us-railroad-f0e23523?mod=hp_lead_pos8

By Michael M. PhillipsFollow

Jan. 21, 2024 12:01 am ET

LUENA, Angola—In 2012, a Chinese state company finished building the train station in this central Angolan town and installed an illuminated computer-controlled board to show departure times and ticket prices. Then the contractors decamped for China and, according to Angolan railway employees, neglected to tell anyone the computer password.

So for more than a decade, the departure board has stubbornly displayed 2012 train times and 2012 ticket prices.

“Over the years we’ve told clients that the information is wrong, so they’ve stopped paying attention to it,” said ticket-collector Cahilo Yilinga during the 200-mile run from Luena to Luau, a border town where the tracks cross a trestle bridge and disappear into long grass in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

China’s missteps along the vital rail corridor have helped create a surprise opening for the U.S., which finds itself suddenly challenging Beijing’s commercial dominance in the unlikeliest of places: Angola, a southern African country once solidly embedded in the Communist bloc and the continent’s largest recipient of Chinese infrastructure loans.

In 2022, Angola rejected a Chinese bid to re-rehabilitate and operate freight service along the Lobito Corridor line. Instead it granted a 30-year concession to a U.S.-backed European consortium that promises to carry millions of tons of green-energy minerals such as copper, manganese and cobalt from Congo to Angola’s Atlantic coast.

The U.S. government is planning to lend $250 million and its prestige to make sure the $1.7 billion Lobito Corridor project succeeds.

“They’ve done a salvo over the bows of the Chinese,” said Alex Vines, director of the Africa program at Chatham House, a British think tank.

Broom vendors peddle their wares during a stop on the Benguela Railway train to Luau. PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

A broken Chinese-made station monitoring system in Lobito. PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

For the past decade, the U.S. has watched as China’s Belt and Road infrastructure campaign expanded Beijing’s influence across resource-rich Africa. It has seen Russia gain ground, too, as Kremlin-tied Wagner mercenaries provided military support to African governments—and then extracted gold, diamonds and other materials in those countries. 

The Biden administration has made improved commercial ties with Africa a foreign-policy priority. The railway win, along with several other recent Western business coups, shows the U.S. and its allies can hold their own in the elbowing for economic position and political sway in Africa, according to American officials.

The U.S. Export-Import Bank is lending Angola $900 million to buy American equipment for solar-energy projects expected to supply power to a half-million homes. In September, the bank approved a $363 million loan guarantee to help New Jersey-based Acrow Corp. of America sell steel bridges to the Angolan government.

Last month, Texas-based railway consortium All-American Rail Group signed a memorandum of understanding with the Angolan government to explore upgrades to a parallel train route to Congo running across northern Angola. The Angolan Transport Ministry put the potential investment linked to the project, which would be more focused on agricultural trade, at $4.5 billion.

“What I ask Angolans is to give me the opportunity to present the U.S. model, to give me the opportunity to be at the table and to compete,” said Tulinabo Mushingi, the U.S. ambassador in Luanda, Angola’s capital. “I know that our model will be appealing to the Angolans at the end of the day. I know that they will choose us.”

Shoddy Chinese work and Angolan maintenance along the 800-mile railroad connecting Angola’s Atlantic Ocean port of Lobito to mineral-rich Congo have left stations run down, safety systems on the blink, computer servers dark, phone lines disconnected and trains prone to tipping off the rails, according to Benguela Railway, the state train company, and other industry officials.

After losing out on the new Lobito Corridor concession to the U.S.-backed Swiss-Portuguese-Belgian consortium, Citic, the company that led the Chinese bid, walked away from a separate Angolan government concession to operate Lobito’s container port.

“When we competed for this tender with Citic, they were very convinced they would win,” said Julien Rolland, a senior executive at Trafigura, a commodity-trading giant based in Switzerland and Singapore and partner in the winning consortium. “When they lost, they got pissed off so they said they were dropping out of the port.”

Citic didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Benguela Railway personnel look at a shipment of copper panels from the Democratic Republic of Congo in Luau. PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Trafigura and 

Mota-Engil Group, a Portuguese construction firm with roots in Angola, each owns 49.5% of the winning partnership, called the Lobito Atlantic Railway. Belgian rail operator Vecturis owns the remaining 1%.The Biden administration quickly jumped on board after the consortium approached it during the bidding process. The International Development Finance Corp., a U.S. government agency, is conducting a due-diligence review of the project, and is expected to approve the quarter-billion-dollar loan to Lobito Atlantic Railway for new freight cars and other costs.

Another Chinese state company, China Communications Construction Corp., owns about 30% of publicly traded Mota-Engil, a situation that hasn’t deterred the U.S.

“This first-of-its-kind project is the biggest U.S. rail investment in Africa ever—one that’s going to create jobs and connect markets for generations to come,” President Biden said at a November Oval Office meeting with Angolan President João Lourenço.

The U.S. credits Lourenço for the rapid warming of relations between the two countries, which once faced off across Cold War parapets.

Angola won independence from Portugal in 1975 and quickly descended into an intractable civil war among competing factions. Russia and Cuba backed the left-wing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, led by José Eduardo dos Santos. The U.S. and apartheid South Africa supported rebel Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, Unita.

The U.S. dropped Unita after the MPLA won elections in 1992. Savimbi’s forces fought on until reaching a peace deal upon his death in 2002.

A student studies next to a MiG monument in Luena’s central park. PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Colonial-era buildings in Lobito. PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Dos Santos ended his 38-year rule in 2017, leaving Angola with a reputation as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, according to Transparency International, the nonpartisan corruption monitor. 

He also left behind huge debts, much of it to China. Angola’s government spends more than 60% of its revenue paying off debts, according to the International Monetary Fund. 

Lourenço, Dos Santos’s former defense minister, succeeded him and embarked on an anticorruption drive. Despite lingering evidence of the country’s hard-left past—visitors leaving Luanda’s international airport on October Revolution Ave. soon intersect Ho Chi Minh Ave.—Lourenço has initiated a sharp tilt toward the West.

Angola’s Kalashnikov-toting military is negotiating a deal to buy American weapons, including aircraft and tanks, according to U.S. officials. U.S. Africa Command picked Angola as the site of last year’s American-hosted gathering of top African intelligence officers. U.S. and Angolan officials swap reports about goings-on in such hot spots as Congo and northern Mozambique, according to a senior U.S. intelligence official.

This summer, the Pentagon sent more than a dozen newly promoted U.S. brigadier generals to visit Angola to prepare them for their duties.

Several senior U.S. officials, including Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, have turned up in Angola recently. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is scheduled to visit this week. It was a political coup for Lourenço to secure a White House visit. Biden even hinted he might take a trip to Angola.

Angolan President João Lourenço and President Biden in the Oval Office in November. PHOTO: YURI GRIPAS/PRESS POOL

American oil companies such as Chevron and Exxon Mobil have been very active for decades in Africa, and continued to work in Angola’s oil-rich Cabinda enclave even as civil war raged.

The U.S., however, still has a lot of catching up to do. Many American firms view Africa as politically and economically risky.

“Africa has been left aside from the agenda of the big corporations in America,” said Ricardo D’Abreu, Angola’s transportation minister. “And why is that? I wouldn’t put all the responsibility on the American side. We need to do our own part as well.”

The U.S. is at a natural disadvantage against China. Beijing can draw on a host of state banks to finance projects led by government-controlled construction companies. Washington can only cajole and provide incentives to get U.S. firms to look at Africa, according to Assis Malaquias, academic dean of the Pentagon-funded Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

Angola is by far the largest African recipient of Chinese infrastructure loans, borrowing $42.6 billion in 254 loans for mining, power, transport and other projects between 2000 and 2020, according to researchers at Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center.  

But China has recently reined in its lending in Africa. And some Chinese-built projects already have a whiff of white elephant.

For instance, Luau’s $80 million Chinese-built airport, inaugurated in 2015, receives no commercial flights, and today the airport sits locked, with an empty restaurant, control tower, check-in desks and baggage claim. A yellow-and-black-checked Follow Me escort car sits on the tarmac, driverless and unfollowed. Locals say government or military aircraft land a few times a month at most.

D’Abreu, the transportation minister, didn’t respond to questions about the Luau airport.

The Aviation Industry Corp. of China is building a $3 billion-plus airport outside of Luanda, with a hotel, road and light-rail connections to the city and capacity for 15 million passengers a year. Luanda’s current airport has a capacity of two million passengers annually, according to government media.

Sections of the Benguela Railway, which dates to 1902, were destroyed during the long civil war. Rusted freight cars, derailed during the fighting, still litter the side of the track bed.

China Railway 20 Bureau, or CR20, a unit of China Railway Construction Corp., secured a contract to lay new tracks, build 68 stations, and install computerized safety and communications systems along the Lobito-Luau route. The project, begun in 2006, was supposed to be completed in 2007, according to a contemporaneous U.S. Embassy cable released by WikiLeaks. Instead, it took another decade for CR20 to finish the work, a delay Chinese officials blamed in part on the constant danger from leftover land mines littering construction sites.

China Railway 20 Bureau handed over the Benguela Railway to Angola in a ceremony in Lobito in 2019. PHOTO: XINHUA/ZUMA PRESS

Trains on the Lobito-Luau line, Chinese and South African cars pulled by U.S.-made General Electric locomotives, chug through grassy savannah and low woodlands so thick that sometimes branches scrape the passing carriages. Vendors wait on station platforms, handing papaya, electric-orange mushrooms, handmade brooms and skewers of fried insect larvae to passengers who bargain through open windows.

In the control room of each station is a train-tracking console, with diagrams of the sidings and lights that are supposed to indicate the locations of trains and the status of the safety signals. “It broke after the Chinese left in 2012,” said Alves Livela, controller at Luena station.

Now station managers run along the tracks with green, yellow and red signal flags to guide trains to the platforms.

Rail sections are joined by plates, not welded together, making them susceptible to warping, according to train engineers, who say there are about 10 derailments a year. Lobito Atlantic Railway officials say construction faults have been aggravated by poor Angolan maintenance, which wasn’t part of the CR20 contract.

CR20 officials didn’t respond to written questions. The chargé d’affaires at the Chinese embassy in Luanda declined interview requests and didn’t respond to written questions.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry said that Chinese-built infrastructure laid the foundation for Angola’s economic development and postwar reconstruction. “Angola-China cooperation is mutually beneficial and win-win, and major projects have been successfully implemented continuously, witnessing and promoting the friendship between the two countries,” it said.

The ministry didn’t address specific questions about the quality of Chinese work along the Lobito Corridor rail line, or Angola’s decision to pick a Western consortium over Chinese state companies.

D’Abreu, the Angolan transport minister, said CR20 fulfilled the contract’s legal requirements.

A flooded locomotive repair bay in Lobito. PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Passengers board the Benguela Railway on its run to Luau. PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Lobito Atlantic Railway predicts it will triple freight traffic to 1.5 million tons annually by year five of the concession and five million tons by year 20. The consortium expects much of that business will come from transporting sulfur to Congo for use in the mines, and copper, cobalt and manganese out of Congo to meet growing global demand for clean-energy technologies. The consortium will also run the separate minerals terminal in Lobito.

Benguela Railway, the state company, will continue to operate passenger service on tracks shared with Lobito Atlantic Railway.

The Western consortium will cover an estimated $1.6 billion in renovation and equipment costs and recoup its investment from freight revenue, according to Manuel Mota, deputy chief executive of Mota-Engil. The Angolan government receives $100 million upfront plus a stream of royalties, which Mota expects to reach $2 billion on $10 billion in revenue over the life of the concession.

Today, trucks carrying copper panels from Congo need a month or more to reach ports in Durban, South Africa, or Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, having run a gantlet of hijackers and bad roads, said Trafigura’s Rolland. The consortium says that once Lobito Atlantic Railway is fully up and running and the tracks on the Congolese side of the line have been cleaned up, minerals from Congo’s copper belt will reach Africa’s Atlantic coast in just eight days.

In October, the U.S. signed a deal with Angola, Zambia, the European Union and international finance agencies to study the feasibility of running new rail lines from Angola into Zambia’s copper-mining regions. “We want this rail to be built within five years,” said Helaina Matza, who heads the State Department’s infrastructure initiative.

An idle conveyor on the mineral loading pier in Lobito. PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Ultimately the Biden administration envisions the corridor reaching Tanzania on Africa’s Indian Ocean coast.

In their dealings with African counterparts, U.S. diplomats stress that, unlike during the Cold War, Washington no longer expects African countries to choose sides in a global power competition. 

Yet the U.S. isn’t shy about declaring the Lobito Corridor project a victory. “This is a game-changing regional investment,” said Biden in September.

For its part, Angola is loath to pick a public fight with China, its longtime ally and creditor. “We are committed to maintaining that strategic relationship,” said D’Abreu, the transport minister. “But still we have our own interests.”

Write to Michael M. Phillips at Michael.Phillips@wsj.com

6. Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC)

I was unfamiliar with this organization but I am very happy to learn of it. Having an intelligence focus on this problem is very important. But the question is, what organization is using the intelligence analysis and designing not only counters to the threats but also taking proactive approaches to defeat the malign actors' information strategies?

Everyone seems to embrace the foundational Special Forces concept of "by, with, and through."

Excerpts:

FMIC is organized around three lines of effort: Analytic Integration, Mission Management, and Partner Engagement. FMIC works closely with the National Intelligence Council, the National Intelligence Management Council, and our partners across the Intelligence Community.

...

FMIC’s partner engagement unit works by, with, and through partners, such as the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to promote awareness of the FMI threat. Efforts include downgrading or declassifying intelligence as appropriate, furthering efforts to develop solutions to difficult and systemic problems, and helping strengthen resiliency efforts.

https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-who-we-are/organization/340-about/organization/foreign-malign-influence-center

Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC) 

Organization

FMIC is organized around three lines of effort: Analytic Integration, Mission Management, and Partner Engagement. FMIC works closely with the National Intelligence Council, the National Intelligence Management Council, and our partners across the Intelligence Community.

Analytic Integration

FMIC’s analytic integration focuses on advancing strategic analysis on the FMI problem set, producing assessments of the global threat and U.S. response and warnings, identifying gaps in production, establishing common standards, and providing indications and warning.

Mission Management

FMIC’s mission management unit focuses on defining the FMI mission space, integrating with existing ODNI intelligence management functions, supporting robust collection, monitoring programmatic investments, and developing capabilities.

Partner Engagement

FMIC’s partner engagement unit works by, with, and through partners, such as the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to promote awareness of the FMI threat. Efforts include downgrading or declassifying intelligence as appropriate, furthering efforts to develop solutions to difficult and systemic problems, and helping strengthen resiliency efforts.

Foreign malign influence poses a significant threat to democracy and U.S. interests. The Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC) is charged with strengthening Intelligence Community (IC) efforts to counter the enduring threat posed by hostile foreign actors seeking to influence the U.S. Government, state and local governments, or public opinion and behaviors through overt or covert means. This can include efforts to expose foreign operations to influence U.S. public opinion, interfere in elections within the United States, or steer policy and regulatory decisions in favor of a foreign actor.

FMIC serves as the primary U.S. Government organization for integrating intelligence analysis and reporting pertaining to foreign malign influence, including election security. It utilizes expertise from all elements of the IC, including departments and agencies elements with diplomatic and law enforcement functions. FMIC is committed to protecting our democratic processes and institutions from foreign influence and interference. In particular, election security is a top priority for the IC.

History

The Foreign Malign Influence Center was activated on September 23, 2022. Chartered by Congress and established by the DNI, FMIC serves as the primary U.S. Government organization for analyzing and integrating all intelligence and other reporting possessed or acquired pertaining to foreign malign influence, including election security.

FMIC is the successor organization to the ODNI Election Threats Executive, which was established in 2019 to serve as the DNI’s principal advisor on election threats and related security matters. Election security remains a key mission of the FMIC, and the Director remains dual-hatted as the Election Threats Executive, serving as the coordinating authority for the IC on election security and reporting directly to the DNI.

Mission

To counter enduring threats to democracy and U.S. national interests from foreign malign influence actors by integrating analysis, managing the intelligence mission, nurturing partnerships, and providing indications and warning of foreign malign influence.

Vision

FMIC protects U.S. citizens from hostile foreign influence, safeguards democratic institutions, and defends U.S. interests.

Values

Trust. Transparency. Partnership.

Motto

Exposing deception in defense of liberty.

Jeffrey K. Wichman

Jeffrey K. Wichman serves as the acting Director of the Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC) and the ODNI’s Election Threats Executive (ETE). In these roles, Jeffrey leads the Intelligence Community’s ongoing efforts to identify and assess foreign influence and interference in U.S. elections – a task that remains paramount amidst the other challenges facing the United States.

Jeffrey joined ODNI with more than 30 years of experience at CIA, where he most recently served as Chief of Analysis for the Counterintelligence Mission Center. He also served as Deputy Chief of Analysis and Chief of Analysis in the Center for Cyber Intelligence and held other analytic roles focusing on weapons and counterproliferation and counterterrorism. In addition, Jeffrey oversaw leadership and management training at CIA’s Sherman Kent School, where all CIA analysts hone their analytic tradecraft.

Jeffrey earned an M.S. in National Security Strategy from the National War College in June 2010 and B.A. degrees in Political Science and History from the University of Iowa in 1988.

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7. Will the Houthis Target U.S. Troops in Djibouti Next?

Will the Houthis Target U.S. Troops in Djibouti Next?

Despite the U.S. naval base in the country, Djibouti's support for Palestine will likely protect them from Houthi attacks. 

The National Interest · by Emily Milliken · January 20, 2024

The world is left wondering how the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen will respond to a series of devastating strikes on the group’s military assets.

On January 11, the United States and the United Kingdom launched over 100 precision-guided missiles at Houthi targets in Yemen in response to weeks of Houthi attacks on civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The strikes targeted more than sixty sites, including military bases in Sanaa and Taiz, a naval base in Hodeidah, and military sites in Hajjah. At least five Houthi fighters were killed in the operation. Over the next week, the United States and its partners conducted four more strikes on Houthi offensive capabilities.

While the attacks were meant to degrade the rebel group’s capabilities and act as a deterrent to future attacks, the Houthis have shown that they are still capable of conducting maritime attacks. In reality, the strikes will likely continue to embolden the Houthis and their other Iran-backed allies to ramp up their attacks against the United States, Israel, and their allies in the short term.

Shortly after the strike on the radar site, Houthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdulsalam said that the U.S. attack would not deter the group from targeting Israel-linked vessels. Another Houthi official claimed during a television interview with a Hezbollah-linked outlet that the group had developed a target list that included American bases in the region. Such a list could include U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, or Syria.

And in true Houthi fashion, the threats were accompanied by a flurry of propaganda. For instance, the group released imagery showing its troops training on a Soviet-era T-80 tank, a Soviet-era Zu-23-2 autocannon, and an Iranian-made AM-50 Sayyad anti-material rifle. They also released videos of Houthi fighters practicing an October 7-style raid on a mock Israeli village, where they shot at posters of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and simulated kidnapping Jewish men dressed in ultra-Orthodox garb.

One obvious but little-discussed target might be the U.S. naval expeditionary base Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. While the base has received little attention from Iranian proxies in the past, it is one of the most significant targets in the region and is located just a short eighty miles across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait from Yemen. The site, which acts as the primary base of operations for the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in the Horn of Africa and hosts approximately 4,000 troops from the United States and allied countries, has been used for operations against the Houthis for years. The group could also target the nearby Chabelley Airport, where the military has operated Predator and Reaper drones since moving them from Lemonnier in 2013.

With the Houthis claiming that they possess a liquid propellant missile with a range as extensive as 1,200 miles, a critical U.S. base less than 100 miles away seems to be an easy target. And even more concerning, the base is not built to defend against or withstand drone or missile attacks that the Houthis would likely be planning.

But Washington appears to be aware that the Houthis could target Lemonnier in short order. During an interview with BBC, Djibouti’s prime minister Abdul-Qadir Kamil Muhammad said that the United States was allowed to deploy Patriot air defense systems to Camp Lemonnier to protect against Yemeni attack, signaling that the United States is trying to protect its sole permanent base in Africa.

However, if anything keeps Djibouti safe from Houthi attacks, it would be the country’s voracious support for Palestine since October 7 and long before the assault. In the BBC interview, Muhammad also confirmed that Djibouti would not allow the United States to deploy missile launchers in the country or use it as a base for operations against the Houthis as it considers the group’s maritime attacks “legitimate relief for the Palestinians.”

Moreover, Djibouti announced that it was reluctant to participate in the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian maritime coalition to combat the Houthis and was even one of the five countries that called on the International Criminal Court (ICC) in November to investigate Israeli war crimes in Palestinian territories.

Emily Milliken is the Senior Vice President and Lead Analyst at Askari Associates, LLC.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

The National Interest · by Emily Milliken · January 20, 2024

8. Myanmar Conflict Unveils Complex Dynamics of China's Interests 

Excerpts:

"The bigger interest here is China's energy security, because you have the single source of piped natural gas to China, in the form of the Chinese-Myanmar pipeline project, which is now supplying gas to four Chinese provinces in the southwest and contributes significantly to Yunnan's gross domestic product," he said.

"This is another reason why China is pushing the brotherhood alliance to disengage with broader revolutionary activity and to deal with the Myanmar military."

EAST ASIA

Myanmar Conflict Unveils Complex Dynamics of China's Interests 

https://www.voanews.com/amp/myanmar-conflict-unveils-complex-dynamics-of-china-s-interests-/7448050.html?utm

January 20, 2024 8:02 AM

• Ingyin Naing

FILE - Members of an ethnic armed forces group known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance check an armored vehicle the group allegedly seized from Myanmar's army outpost on a hill in Hsenwi township in Shan state, Nov. 24, 2023.

WASHINGTON — 

The rapid breakdown of a Beijing-mediated cease-fire in northern Myanmar has exposed the limits of Chinese influence in the region, even as it seeks to turn recent military gains by a rebel alliance to its advantage.

The "Haigeng agreement," announced January 12, was less than a day old when witnesses reported widespread gunfire in northern Shan state, bordering China.

The rebel Three Brotherhood Alliance — comprising the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army or MNDAA, the Arakan Army and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army — released a statement the day after the talks, accusing the military of launching attacks at multiple locations.

The largest took place near Kyaukme, a small but bustling town along the Mandalay-Lashio Road in a mountainous area near China's southwestern border. The area has long been a trade route between the two countries and has seen significant infrastructure investment by China in recent years.

A humanitarian assistance worker in Kyaukme, speaking anonymously for security reasons, told VOA this week that he could hear the hourslong gunbattle the morning after the cease-fire. "It was a shootout in Kyaukme," he said. "Civilians started fleeing for safety as the attacks were coming from both sides of town."

An updated statement from the alliance nearly a week later described continuing attacks by the Myanmar military, including 16 airstrikes on villages in northern Shan state. Witnesses on the ground have confirmed the use of airstrikes to VOA by phone.

The alliance statement blamed the military for the failure of the cease-fire, which grew out of the third attempt at dialogue since December, largely with China as mediator.

"From the day the 'Haigeng agreement' was reached until today, our side has been in compliance," the statement read. "We have been patient and showed restraint by not engaging in battle. Otherwise, we would have already implemented operational targets and city-occupation battles that had been planned before the cease-fire."

The reports of cease-fire violations belied remarks made earlier by junta spokesperson Major General Zaw Min Tun.

"We have plans to further discuss and strengthen the cease-fire agreement," he said immediately after last week's announcement. "We will engage in further discussions between Myanmar and China to reopen border trade zones."

VOA has been unable to reach the junta spokesperson's office for a response to the alliance statement. As of Friday, there had been no official statement from the junta regarding the latest developments.

FILE - In this May 25, 2012, photo, a truck transports logs with markings showing they came from across the border in Myanmar, in Ruili, Yunnan province, China.

China's interest in trade routes

According to Than Soe Naing, a China-Myanmar expert and former member of the Communist Party of Burma, Beijing's primary interest in peace talks lies in its desire to reopen trade routes between Myanmar and China's Yunnan state.

"The Chinese perspective suggests that dealing with cities on the trade route between China and inland cities like Mandalay, such as the town of Lashio, with a similar approach as the one taken with the Laukkai matter, could potentially open up the trade route," Naing said. However, he added, "whether the military junta will accept such intervention is doubtful. If Lashio is filled with military forces, there will certainly be fierce battles."

Laukkai, a border town that is infamous for gambling, prostitution and cybercrime, was captured by the Three Brotherhood Alliance on January 5 as part of a successful offensive begun in October and known as the "1027" operation. The alliance established a special regional self-government in the town this week.

"China would also encourage this kind of development in Lashio," Naing suggested. Lashio is the largest town in northern Shan state and lies at what was once the end of the "Burma road," a historically significant thoroughfare connecting Lashio to southeast China's Yunnan state. It is also the site of a large military base, which is thought to be one of the alliance's next targets.

"The main reason [the Three Brotherhood Alliance] agreed to the cease-fire was their hope to come to some sort of compromise on Lashio's capture," Naing said. "A forceful occupation of Lashio would lead to extensive fighting and turmoil in the region; a military withdrawal would avoid that."

Jason Tower, the country director for the Myanmar program at the U.S. Institute of Peace, told VOA he believed China was looking for a compromise in which the junta would concede some territory in the north while the alliance would roll back some of its war aims.

"I think what [China] ultimately hopes for is that the military will pull back from some of these territories, and to make the case as to why the brotherhood should stop its movement to eradicate military dictatorship and instead focus on working with the military to stabilize the situation, especially for Chinese projects," Tower said this week.

"I think where things are interesting is that the military does not want to give up control and give up a strong presence in the north of Shan state and wants to try to retain some of the positions that it still has."

China has invested in several infrastructure projects in the area, such as the Upper Yeywa hydroelectric dam on the Shweli River, which has remained uncompleted since before an earlier military government ceded power to a civilian government in 2015. The current junta restarted the project.

China playing both sides

"The Chinese side is both helping the brotherhood to make some advances toward more narrow political objectives, but also helping the military by putting pressure on the brotherhood at the same time," Tower said.

"China presently is, at least in the northern part of the country, favoring the brotherhood to take over control of territories in the immediate border area," he continued.

"However, it's also putting a lot of pressure on the brotherhood to do business with the military … and to limit its involvement in broader revolutionary activity, pushing the brotherhood to limit its dealings" with a shadow government comprising members of Aung San Suu Kyi's ousted democratic administration and associated military forces.

The Chinese are still doing business with the military, Tower said, citing as an example a deep-water port project in Rakhine state known as the Kyaukphyu project. These are "things that a more responsible Myanmar government would not sign on to," he said. "The Myanmar military is useful to China for doing those sorts of things."

Hla Kyaw Zaw, a Burma-China scholar based in China, told VOA that Beijing's policy generally "is to be open to all sides."

"In the case of Sudan, for example, the Chinese government has good relations with both sides of the conflict. They were able to convince both sides to cease fighting so it could evacuate its embassy staff.

"They deal with various groups in every country. In the case of Myanmar, China is mainly dealing with the military junta that is currently in power, just as it is also dealing with the ethnic armed groups to serve its own purposes."

From cybercrime crackdown to energy security

China also hopes that by stabilizing the border region it can more effectively pursue its fight against cybercrime, which is prevalent in the Kokang region and mostly targets Chinese citizens. With the success of the "1027" operation in the region, Beijing sees an opportunity to work with the Three Brotherhood Alliance to go after the scam artists.

"I think the Chinese side is satisfied enough" with control of the region by the alliance, China-Myanmar expert Than Soe Naing said in an interview. "China aims to reopen trading posts and has expressed contentment with the North Shan region being in the hands of the MNDAA," one of the three alliance members.

Naing added that China "recognizes the fact that cybercriminal gangs have been protected by the Burmese military, making it harder for China to stop these gangs from targeting victims in China." The Myanmar military claims to have been working with the Chinese government "to eradicate online fraud," according to its spokesperson, Major General Zaw Min Tun.

Tower said that China's interest in the region "is certainly much bigger than just cracking down on criminal activity."

"The bigger interest here is China's energy security, because you have the single source of piped natural gas to China, in the form of the Chinese-Myanmar pipeline project, which is now supplying gas to four Chinese provinces in the southwest and contributes significantly to Yunnan's gross domestic product," he said.

"This is another reason why China is pushing the brotherhood alliance to disengage with broader revolutionary activity and to deal with the Myanmar military."

9. The Urgent Mission to Counter Military Extremism

Excerpts:

Additionally, veterans may be particularly vulnerable to radicalization given their personal lives, especially if substance abuse, chronic unemployment or mental health issues – including post-traumatic stress disorder – are involved. The military also often fails to provide sufficient counseling to persons leaving the services who may not have successfully transitioned from the battlefield to civilian life. As one U.S. Army veteran who was recruited into the KKK explained in a 2023 interview with WBUR, “When a soldier's mission is taken away from him and he's left without a mission, he'll create one.”

The embrace of extremist political views justifying the use of violence should not be viewed only as a threat to the American public but also as a serious threat to veterans themselves. In recent years, as the issue of veteran suicides has garnered more attention, important programs have been put in place to prevent these deaths. A memo released by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in September, for instance, outlined a series of measures to reduce suicides, including “Foster a Supportive Environment” and “Address Stigma and Other Barriers to Care.” Moreover, the report noted that “these lines of effort are in line with the Secretary's Taking Care of Our People initiative and emphasize the Department's commitment to the well-being of the Total Force.” Elsewhere, nongovernmental organizations and veterans groups actively engage with veterans to ameliorate this problem.

These initiatives should also be replicated to combat extremism among veterans. More healthy and productive pathways for transitioning veterans will not only promote “the well-being of the Total Force” by reducing suicides, but also by countering efforts to radicalize and recruit former service personnel.

For the insider already indoctrinated into extremism, a stand-down, or indeed additional mandated training, will not be helpful. The already-avowed extremist has longer-term aims and will continue to blend unseen into the ranks. Another reason that the 2021 stand-down proved so unpopular was that many service personnel felt tainted by being associated with ideologies that were not theirs and, moreover, believed that their service to the country was not being respected.

Greater efforts to screen bad recruits in the first place is thus critically important. At the same time, far more needs to be done to strengthen veterans’ services in order to ensure that the unique situation of those who have served are sufficiently cared for, including a smooth transition back into civilian life.

The Biden administration, accordingly, has inadvertently made a serious miscalculation in its efforts to counter extremism in the military. In focusing their efforts on stand-downs that are dismissed as diversity measures to satisfy a particular constituency, the administration has allowed critics to let this be written off as another issue in America’s ongoing culture wars.

Instead, this problem should be regarded as a grave and pressing threat both to the military itself and to veterans. Longer-term efforts to strengthen screening and improve veteran quality of life will likely prove more effective in keeping both the military and the American public safe from extremism.

The Urgent Mission to Counter Military Extremism

Service personnel and veterans who quietly hold views hostile to the U.S. government clearly pose both a grave security risk and endanger the nation as a whole.

By Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware

|

Jan. 19, 2024, at 11:45 a.m.

https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2024-01-19/the-urgent-mission-to-counter-military-extremism?utm

A spate of recent incidents has focused renewed attention on the longstanding and increasing efforts of violent far-right extremists to recruit and radicalize serving and retired members of the United States military. The Jan. 6 assault on the U.S. Capitol highlighted this issue, with the arrests of over 100 active duty personnel, reservists, National Guard members and veterans. In our new book “God, Guns, and Sedition: Far-Right Terrorism in America,” we find that the military-extremism nexus dates back as far as the Civil War, when the Ku Klux Klan was founded by defeated veterans of the Confederacy.

A variety of analyses focusing on issues of extremism within the military have often exaggerated the threat to the public – drawing caricatures of trained killers targeting fellow Americans, as Timothy McVeigh so devastatingly displayed in the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. The military’s generally more conservative ethos, coupled with the diminishing percentage of citizens who have served in our armed forces and therefore understand its unique culture firsthand, supposedly make serving military personnel and veterans more susceptible to radicalization than the general public, analysts often insist.

Accordingly, many of the counter-measures they advocate focus on addressing this dangerous culture within the military itself – initiatives which the Biden administration has itself adopted. For instance, a military-wide stand-down – implemented to various degrees by commanders – was ordered within weeks of President Biden’s inauguration, aimed at explaining why extremism is incompatible with service in the U.S. military. However well-intentioned, the day of service-wide education, discussion and introspection was criticized as placating the administration’s own base by mandating extensive diversity trainings. The same sentiments account for why these efforts are also unpopular with America’s service personnel.

Perhaps most importantly, it remains unclear whether this training is achieving the goals and objectives defined by the Pentagon’s senior leadership when there is limited evidence that political extremism starting in the military is actually all that widespread, much less, pervasive.

The solution must be holistic: We must address extremists entering the military and veterans exiting it, rather than simply focusing on cultural issues inside the institution itself.

​In focusing on military culture, the Defense Department is ignoring a more serious internal threat: the deliberate infiltration of the U.S. military by individuals intent on acquiring the wherewithal to plot future attacks, leak classified information, pilfer weapons stockpiles and even target their service brethren.

In a growing trend, white supremacist and neo-Nazi militants have volunteered for military service explicitly to abet the seditious intentions of the violent extremist movements whose ideologies they embrace.

Precisely this strategy was chosen by 1996 Atlanta Olympics bomber Eric Rudolph, a veteran of the famed 101st Airborne division, whose memoir recalled, “The plan was to acquire knowledge about weapons and small unit tactics – get as much training in as short an amount of time as possible – and then get out. When the real war came, I’d be ready.”

A similar testimony was offered by one former member of the Atomwaffen Division, a neo-Nazi terrorist group founded in Florida, who said of his group’s efforts to infiltrate the military that “these people join the military specially to get training” and “to get access to equipment.”

The danger was further highlighted in June of 2020, when a private serving with the 173rd Airborne Brigade was arrested for leaking classified information to the white supremacist satanic cult Order of the Nine Angles, hoping to facilitate an al-Qaida attack on his own unit during a deployment to Turkey. The Department of Justice called him “the enemy within.”

A similar issue arose last spring, when a Massachusetts Air National Guardsman leaked classified documents about the war in Ukraine on social media site Discord, which is often used for gaming. Although his motive is still unknown, this lowly airman railed against government overreach at Waco and Ruby Ridge, two defining moments from the early 1990s for America’s anti-government, violent far-right. He was also reportedly seen on camera firing weapons and shouting racial and antisemitic epithets, per The Washington Post. He also claimed that the white supremacist shooting targeting a Buffalo supermarket in May of 2022 was a so-called false flag operation – that the government had known in advance, but allowed it to proceed in order to obtain increased funding for law enforcement.

Accordingly, the source of one of the most serious leaks of classified information in recent memory appears to have drank deeply from the well of a variety of conspiracy theories that have previously resulted in violence. The fact that vital and classified U.S. government secrets had been entrusted to an individual who was actively peddling violent hate online is deeply alarming.

A study of insider crime published in 1990 and written by one of us concluded that successful breaches or information leaks most often depended less on detailed planning or expert execution than on the exploitation of existing security flaws. Indeed, most of these crimes did not require sophisticated planning; they were carried out against targets of opportunity. Even those facilities that were heavily secured had their security compromised simply through the use of routine access to exploit situations where security was lax – as appears to be the case here.

Even 30 years ago, this report found that “insider criminals may be among the most difficult and dangerous adversaries to defend against.” In addition, the report noted, “Insiders can accomplish great damage acting either alone, in cooperation with fellow insiders, or in league with outsiders.” The report was written before the social media era, in which the immediacy of access to digital information and in turn to the public makes such breaches even simpler.

Service personnel who quietly hold views hostile to the U.S. government clearly pose both a grave security risk and endanger the institution as a whole.

Despite this vulnerability, an even more serious development afflicts American veterans. Throughout the country’s history, former service members have played leading roles in standing up a variety of far-right extremist organizations – including the KKK, Aryan Nations and Oath Keepers – and thereafter sustaining their existence. Veterans, particularly those with combat experience, are often sought by extremist groups across the ideological spectrum, not only for their expertise with weapons, but also for their knowledge of logistics, communications, insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Additionally, veterans may be particularly vulnerable to radicalization given their personal lives, especially if substance abuse, chronic unemployment or mental health issues – including post-traumatic stress disorder – are involved. The military also often fails to provide sufficient counseling to persons leaving the services who may not have successfully transitioned from the battlefield to civilian life. As one U.S. Army veteran who was recruited into the KKK explained in a 2023 interview with WBUR, “When a soldier's mission is taken away from him and he's left without a mission, he'll create one.”

The embrace of extremist political views justifying the use of violence should not be viewed only as a threat to the American public but also as a serious threat to veterans themselves. In recent years, as the issue of veteran suicides has garnered more attention, important programs have been put in place to prevent these deaths. A memo released by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in September, for instance, outlined a series of measures to reduce suicides, including “Foster a Supportive Environment” and “Address Stigma and Other Barriers to Care.” Moreover, the report noted that “these lines of effort are in line with the Secretary's Taking Care of Our People initiative and emphasize the Department's commitment to the well-being of the Total Force.” Elsewhere, nongovernmental organizations and veterans groups actively engage with veterans to ameliorate this problem.

These initiatives should also be replicated to combat extremism among veterans. More healthy and productive pathways for transitioning veterans will not only promote “the well-being of the Total Force” by reducing suicides, but also by countering efforts to radicalize and recruit former service personnel.

For the insider already indoctrinated into extremism, a stand-down, or indeed additional mandated training, will not be helpful. The already-avowed extremist has longer-term aims and will continue to blend unseen into the ranks. Another reason that the 2021 stand-down proved so unpopular was that many service personnel felt tainted by being associated with ideologies that were not theirs and, moreover, believed that their service to the country was not being respected.

Greater efforts to screen bad recruits in the first place is thus critically important. At the same time, far more needs to be done to strengthen veterans’ services in order to ensure that the unique situation of those who have served are sufficiently cared for, including a smooth transition back into civilian life.

The Biden administration, accordingly, has inadvertently made a serious miscalculation in its efforts to counter extremism in the military. In focusing their efforts on stand-downs that are dismissed as diversity measures to satisfy a particular constituency, the administration has allowed critics to let this be written off as another issue in America’s ongoing culture wars.

Instead, this problem should be regarded as a grave and pressing threat both to the military itself and to veterans. Longer-term efforts to strengthen screening and improve veteran quality of life will likely prove more effective in keeping both the military and the American public safe from extremism.

10. Houthis Avoid Targeting Chinese and Russian Ships in Red Sea

Speaking of deterrence. Who has a better concept of deterrence? Actions (or non-actions by the Houthis) speak louder than words. 

I think our lack of serious and decisive action in response to attacks and threats has diminished our ability to deter. We cannot simply make statements and threats in response to enemy action. For deterrence to be sustained our words must be backed by actions periodically and we must never make empty threats.

In short, if we want to depend on deterrence we must take decisive action to re- instill fear in the hearts of our enemies (or strategic competitors if we want to use the euphemism) in order to have a credible concept of deterrence.

Houthis Avoid Targeting Chinese and Russian Ships in Red Sea

Red Sea Attacks Continue

Overt Operator

January 20, 2024

overtoperator.com · by Overt Operator

Photo by Venti Views on Unsplash

In an interview with Russian outlet Izvestia, Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a senior official of the Iranian-backed Houthi terrorist group, stated that ships from China and Russia will have safe passage through the Red Sea. He emphasized that this assurance only applies to vessels that are not connected with Israel, as reported by Agence France-Presse on Friday, January 19.

The Houthis, who have expressed solidarity with Palestinians amidst Israel's conflict with Hamas militants in Gaza, have carried out over 30 attacks in the Red Sea. These attacks have prompted shipping firms to avoid the affected shipping lanes, leading major companies to reroute their vessels on longer and more expensive routes around Africa. The Red Sea route is a crucial link for maritime traffic, accounting for approximately 15 percent of global shipping.

The most recent incident involved the launch of two anti-ship ballistic missiles by Houthi rebels towards a U.S.-owned ship in the Gulf of Aden, according to a statement by the U.S. Central Command on Thursday. Fortunately, the missiles landed in the water near the ship, named the M/V Chem Ranger, causing no injuries or damage. The tanker ship, flagged under the Marshall Islands and operated by a Greek company, was the target of the attack.

Yemen's Houthi rebels claimed responsibility for the attack, boasting of "direct hits" in a statement shared on social media. In response, U.S. forces conducted additional strikes against targets within Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen on Thursday. These actions reflect growing concerns that the Israel-Hamas conflict may escalate into a broader war across the Middle East.

The statement from al-Bukhaiti offers a glimmer of hope for Chinese and Russian vessels seeking to navigate the Red Sea. However, the condition that ships must not be connected with Israel raises questions about the potential impact on international shipping and trade. As tensions in the region continue to rise, the safety and security of maritime routes remain a significant concern for global trade partners.

The situation in the Red Sea underscores the complex dynamics at play in the Middle East, where geopolitical rivalries intertwine with longstanding conflicts. As the international community closely monitors developments in the region, the diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions and ensure the safety of all vessels passing through the Red Sea will be critical in maintaining stability and preserving global trade routes.

overtoperator.com · by Overt Operator

11. The Navy relieved 16 commanding officers in 2023

The Navy relieved 16 commanding officers in 2023

"The term ‘loss of confidence’ has real meaning in the Navy."

BY JEFF SCHOGOL | PUBLISHED JAN 18, 2024 5:37 PM EST

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · January 18, 2024

Once again, the Navy demonstrated in 2023 that it will not hesitate to fire commanding officers when it feels they have not lived up to the service’s standards.

In 2023, the Navy relieved a total of 16 commanding officers of command: 14 were fired “due to a loss of confidence” in their ability to command, and two were relieved for medical issues unrelated to their performance, according to the Navy, which did not release the two officers’ names due to privacy concerns.

Of the 14 commanding officers who were fired: Eight were in charge of ships, five were in shore billets, and one led a squadron of Navy E/A-18G Growlers.

In addition to those commanding officers, the destroyer USS John Finn’s executive officer was also relieved of his position last year.

That may sound like an awful lot of senior leaders getting sacked in just one year, but it’s par for the course for the Navy, which holds commanding officers rigidly accountable for their performance as well as the conduct of the sailors and Marines whom they lead.

“Navy commanding officers are held to high standards of personal and professional conduct,” a Navy spokesperson told Task & Purpose. “They are expected to uphold the highest standards of responsibility, reliability, and leadership, and the Navy holds them accountable when they fall short of those standards. Adherence to our Navy core values of honor, courage, and commitment by our Sailors and Marines is central to the Department of the Navy’s ability to meet its global mission.”

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The following commanding officers were fired in 2023:

• Cmdr. Alexa Jenkins
• Capt. Michael D. Nordeen
• Cmdr. Jared Samuelson
• Cmdr. Angela Gonzales
• Cmdr. Jeffrey Applebaugh
• Cmdr.Ronald Kolpak
• Cmdr. Kenji Igawa
• Capt. Paul Choate
• Cmdr. Michael Lyle
• Capt. Danielle DeFant
• Cmdr. Steven J. Green
• Capt. James Harney
• Cmdr. Adam K. Pendleton
• Cmdr. William Coulter

For the most part, the Navy does not publicly release the exact reason why commanding officers are fired, preferring just to say they were relieved due to a “loss of confidence” in their ability to command.

One rare exception was when the Navy announced in November 2022 that Cmdr. Cassidi Reese, commanding officer of Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 31, had been relieved after being arrested for drunken driving.

At least one other skipper, Capt. Geoffry Patterson, was relieved soon after being arrested for DUI, but the Navy did not note that arrest in the official release on Patterson..

According to a retired Navy captain, the service generally fires commanding officers for three reasons: Bad personal judgment, violation of a law, or poor professional performance, Navy Capt. Brent Sadler, the senior fellow for naval warfare and advanced technology at the Heritage Foundation, told Task & Purpose.

But in at least one case, a Navy officer lost his job pending an investigation, and was later cleared of the most serious allegations against him. Retired Rear Adm. Jeffrey Harley, former president of the Naval War College, said that accusations that he offered free hugs and played Twister in his office stemmed from a misunderstanding of his sense of humor.

“Bottom line, these officers should be made aware of whistleblower options and encouraged to tell their stories if their firing is for questionable reasons,” Sadler told Task & Purpose. “I suspect there are more Admiral Harley experiences out there, but that officers are too ashamed or unable to afford legal counsel to fight their case.”

By Navy standards, 2023 was average in terms of the number of commanders relieved, said retired Navy Capt. Jerry Hendrix, a strategist and senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute a think tank based in Indianapolis.

Hendrix said that there have been some years in which the Navy has received more than 20 commanding officers.

“The term ‘loss of confidence’ has real meaning in the Navy,” Hendrix told Task & Purpose, adding that the question remains why the other services do not relieve as many commanding officers as the Navy does.

“Is it because their COs [commanding officers] at the O-5 and O-6 level are just clean as fresh snow or do they operate under a different ethical and operational standard?” Hendrix said. “I don’t know the answer to be honest, but I have always been comfortable with our current standards.”

Still, there is one famous example of a Navy officer whose career survived a serious mistake. In 1908, then-Ensign Chester Nimitz commanded the destroyer USS Decatur when it ran aground.

Although he was found guilty at court-martial of neglect of duty and issued a letter of reprimand, Nimitz went on to become an admiral, and he led the Pacific Fleet during World War II. From 1945 to 1947, he served as chief of naval operations.

Times have changed since then, said Hendrix, who added that it is extremely unlikely that an ensign would command any type of vessel these days.

“To be clear, operating a $2 billion, 9500-ton destroyer as a commander is a lot different than operating a 1,400-ton destroyer as a junior officer à la Chester Nimitz,” Hendrix said.

The latest on Task & Purpose

• Navy will name a new ship for the ‘human tugboat,’ a forgotten WWII hero
• Soldiers now must pay out of pocket to store cars and belongings while deployed
• Inside a new technology for Marine marksmanship training
• Apple TV+ releases the opening title sequence for Masters of the Air
• Meet the skateboarding Green Beret shredding the civilian-military gap

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · January 18, 2024

12. Experts predict how a future Russian attack on NATO will unfold

Extensive graphics and photos at the link: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-12983961/Long-range-missiles-strike-civilian-targets-Europe-Baltic-states-invaded-AI-controlled-tanks-rule-battlefield-NATO-warns-Russian-attack-20-years-terrifying-prediction-unfold.html

Experts predict how a future Russian attack on NATO will unfold

Long-range missiles strike civilian targets across Europe. Baltic states are invaded. AI-controlled tanks rule the battlefield. As NATO warns of Russian attack in 20 years, a terrifying prediction of how it will unfold

• European governments are ramping up military readiness in preparation for potential conflict with Russia

By DAVID AVERRE and RACHAEL BUNYAN  and CHRIS JEWERS

PUBLISHED: 08:35 EST, 20 January 2024 | UPDATED: 21:01 EST, 20 January 2024

Daily Mail · by David Averre · January 20, 2024

The year 2024 is off to an alarming start.

Almost two full years into Russia's invasion of Ukraine and with the Middle East teetering on the brink of disaster following Hamas' October 7th attacks on Israel, the threat of a wider war looms large on the horizon.

Prime ministers, defence secretaries and military chiefs have claimed that the threat of a major conflict is greater now than at any other time since the Cuban Missile Crisis.

European governments one after the other have issued grave warnings to their citizens to start preparing for a fight.

And now, NATO countries are gearing up for one of their largest-ever drills, with 90,000 troops from all corners of the continent and the United States set to embark upon Herculean war games - a last-ditch effort to display their military might before Vladimir Putin and any other potential threats.

All of this comes as Admiral Rob Bauer, the chairman of NATO's Military Committee, urged governments and civilians alike to prepare for a 'wholesale change' in their lives, predicting a large-scale armed conflict in the next 20 years.

Retired Brigadier General Kevin Ryan told MailOnline: 'In 2024, Russia's defence spending will grow to $140 billion - a third of the national budget.

'These changes do not make sense if they are aimed solely at the current adversary – Ukraine – a country one-third the population of Russia and barely holding its own.

'The changes only make sense if Russia is preparing for a war against a major foe, like NATO.'

Now, with the help of a team of former military chiefs and security experts, MailOnline examines how a Russian assault of Europe could unfold before 2044.

U.S. Soldiers assigned to the 1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division participate in the distinguished-visitors day as part of Griffin Shock 23 held at Bemowo Piskie, Poland, in May 2023

Russian T-72B3 tanks fire at Ukrainian fortified positions in Ukraine in undated footage

A Leopard 2 tank is seen in action during a visit of German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius at the Bundeswehr tank battalion 203 at the Field Marshal Rommel Barracks in Augustdorf, Germany

Former commanding General Ben Hodges, United States Army Europe, spoke to MailOnline about the potential for a future NATO conflict with Russia

NATO is planning to mobilise 90,000 troops in its largest military manoeuvre since the Cold War in a bid to deter Vladimir Putin

Phase One: Cyber warfare and missile strikes

The technological capabilities harboured by bad actors around the world are growing exponentially.

Cyber attacks are now a near-daily occurrence, with governments, intelligence services and even private companies or militias jockeying for superiority.

Although this new norm is almost accepted as a form of competition and espionage, experts warned that the next major international conflict is likely to begin with a massive cyber attack.

'Cyber attacks have real battlefield applications - the Russians used these in the prelude to the invasion to Ukraine to take down the Viasat communications network, among other things,' RUSI associate fellow and defence analyst Sam Cranny-Evans said.

But technological advancement in the coming years means Russia's capacity to employ cyber warfare to sew chaos in NATO's ranks could be orders of magnitude greater when the time comes to attack.

Gen. Hodges said: 'I can imagine that the Russians, if they had already made the terrible decision to invade, would have taken steps to create massive cyber disruption of our infrastructure. They could leverage cyber attacks to create labour problems at the seaports or to disrupt logistics and supply chains.'

Cranny-Evans added: 'There's even the possibility of some kind of conflict in space, with satellites being used to attack each other or jamming conducted against satellites - which has already been done on a lower level in Ukraine.'

Disinformation campaigns, propaganda drives and other forms of non-violent pressure will also be unleashed to stir up unrest in countries Russia wants to bring under its sphere of influence.

But although cyber warfare undoubtedly has the potential to destabilise NATO's military efficacy, undermine its industrial capabilities and stoke discontent, nothing will replace what Cranny-Evans described as 'conventional kinetic operations on the ground, in the air and at sea'.

This would likely take the form of a brutal missile attack, designed to cripple key military assets and infrastructure targets in Eastern Europe and beyond, setting the stage for the deployment of troops.

'A major lesson of the current fight in Ukraine is that the increase in cyber and electronic warfare has not lessened the brutality of war. Any war between Russia and NATO will be characterised by immense destruction and death as each side tries to break the will of the other with escalating attacks,' Brig. Gen. Ryan said.

'Russia will not be bashful about using hundreds of long-range precision missiles against civilian targets all over Europe,' Gen. Hodges warned.

'They've done it against Ukraine and clearly they have no concerns about repercussions for these war crimes that happen every day. So, if they've made the decision to attack NATO, they'll be launching missiles and long-range drones at all the main seaports and airports and transportation hubs, as well as major military headquarters, airfields, that sort of thing.

'That's why I emphasise so often the importance of us having adequate air and missile defence across Europe - we do not have that right now.'

Cranny-Evans concurred that NATO nations must commit to enhancing air defence capabilities - including early warning systems - and coordinating with neighbours to ensure the network can operate cohesively.

Russia warns the West by releasing chilling new footage showing the launch of an 'unstoppable' Zircon [Tsirkon] nuclear-capable Mach 9 hypersonic missile from the Admiral Gorshkov frigate

The conflict would likely begin with a brutal missile attack, designed to cripple key military assets and infrastructure targets in Eastern Europe and beyond

A Ukrainian serviceman attends an anti-sabotage mock drills at the border with Belarus, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Chernihiv region, Ukraine

Ukrainian servicemen dressed in Russian uniforms attend anti-sabotage mock drills at the border with Belarus, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Chernihiv region

Phase Two: Invasion - by land, sea and air

If Russia did make the 'mistake' of attacking NATO in 20 years, Gen. Hodges predicts the Kremlin would launch assaults via land, sea and air in a bid to 'break' the military alliance.

Gen. Hodges said Russia will have learned from the mistakes made in Ukraine and managed to replenish their military arsenal and made significant technological advancements with the help of Iran and China.

In one scenario, Gen. Hodges said Moscow could use this renewed military strength to first attack the narrow strip of land known as Suwalki Gap, sandwiched between Poland, Lithuania and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.

Even a small attack on this weak point - the only land border between mainland Europe and the Baltic States - could cause huge problems for NATO.

Gen. Hodges said if Putin or his successor was successful in blocking the Suwalki Gap, they would use that strip of land and Belarus as a launchpad for the second phase of their offensive.

This second phase would involve sending thousands of Russian soldiers, AI-controlled tanks and special forces, to attack one of the Baltic states on NATO's eastern flank - most likely either Lithuania, Poland or Estonia.

Though thousands of NATO troops, including UK soldiers, are currently deployed to the Baltics, they are only intended as a 'tripwire' force. Their role is to hold up any invading force until the main NATO army can arrive.

And Gen. Hodges says that after Putin had attacked a nation on NATO's eastern flank, Russia would wait to see how the military alliance would respond.

'If we hesitated, that failure to live up to our obligations under Article 5 to protect member states... it would break the alliance. It would be a staggering blow to NATO if we didn't live up to what we said we were going to do,' Gen. Hodges said.

And if NATO did hesitate, Putin would not stop, Gen. Hodges predicts.

Within days of launching his ground invasion and aerial assault on NATO's eastern flank, Putin would deploy his Russian Navy for a vital mission: taking control of the northern Arctic route. 'If they cut us off from that, it would be devastating,' Gen. Hodges says.

'This isn't about Russia trying to take over all of NATO. That's not what their objective would be in 20 years. It would be about breaking NATO as an alliance by invading the eastern flank and gaining critical places - like the Arctic - that would benefit them.'

The distance from a northwestern European port to the Far East along the Northeast Sea Route is almost 40% shorter than the traditional route via the Suez Canal. Other sea routes are becoming more accessible for more of the year

FILE PHOTO: China's aircraft carrier Liaoning takes part in a military drill of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy in the western Pacific Ocean

Image shows Russia's new nuclear submarine during a flag-rising ceremony led by Vladimir Putin at the Arctic port of Severodvinsk on December 11, 2023

With the polar ice cap melting due to climate change, new shipping routes are becoming all the more accessible.

'Russia will want to dominate that northern route, it would make it much quicker for them to sail over the top of the world and benefit Moscow economically,' Gen. Hodges said.

'With their long-range weapons, they would be able to dominate what goes in and out of the North Atlantic from the Arctic,' he added.

Russia already lays claim to ownership and control over the majority of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the most accessible Arctic shipping path which could become a new thoroughfare for international trade.

The route runs along Russia's Arctic coast and therefore falls within Russia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), allowing the country to assume control of shipping activities, navigation and resource exploitation, as per Article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Amid torrid relations with the West, the NSR offers Putin a way to ship its natural resources and other exports to China, India and other buyers in the East with no interference from the US or Europe.

And from high in the Arctic Circle, Russia's Northern Fleet can launch attacks on Scandinavian ports, or traverse Arctic waters to bear down on the UK via the North Sea.

Moscow could deploy submarines or submersibles to cut vital fibre optic undersea cables, dealing unprecedented damage and disruption to Western infrastructure, logistics and communications amid an escalation in future conflict.

Russia's allies could join the fight

As Gen. Hodges so plainly declared to MailOnline: 'This war would not happen in a vacuum.'

With the chasm between East and West growing ever deeper, it is unlikely a Russian attack on NATO would unfold without other major powers piling into the fight.

In recent years Russia has been forging closer ties with other powers, each of whom has their own deep-rooted grievances with what they see as a hegemonic world order led by the US and its Western allies.

Iran, for example, represents a grave threat in the Middle East, with a fearsome military and the resources to develop nuclear weapons - something Gen. Hodges said would likely happen in years to come.

The Islamic Republic also backs a smattering of other heavily armed groups throughout the region, including Hamas, Hezbollah and Yemen's Houthi rebels, as well as forces in Iraq and Syria that have authored drone attacks on US bases in the region in recent weeks.

These forces constitute a so-called 'Axis of Resistance' representing a geopolitical and military alliance to counter threats from the West and regional rivals.

Tehran is well on its way to orchestrating a wide-ranging strategic partnership treaty with Vladimir Putin - for whom it is already producing drones to bombard Ukrainian cities - that would see military, economic and diplomatic engagement soar to unprecedented levels.

Just like Russia, Iran has long faced a battery of Western economic sanctions and is strongly opposed to Western influence and intervention in the Middle East.

It is also developing much closer links with other nations in the East and Global South through various international forums as it aims to minimise the impact of Western punishment.

In the event of a Russian attack on NATO, it is highly possible that Iran could enter the fray on the side of the Kremlin.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi shake hands during their meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia

The Islamic Republic also leads a smattering of other heavily armed groups throughout the region, including Hamas, Hezbollah and Yemen's Houthi rebels, as well as forces in Iraq and Syria that have authored drone attacks on US bases in the region in recent weeks

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) troops fire a missile

This photo provided by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), shows its soldiers taking part in military exercises

Members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) force attend a rally marking the annual Quds Day, or Jerusalem Day, on the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadan in Tehran, Iran April 14, 2023

China represents another threat - though perhaps not directly to Europe.

While China enjoys cheap energy imports from Russia and supports its wider goal of destabilising the Western-led international order, it is also heavily reliant on trade with the West, particularly the US.

Their military cooperation does not yet resemble that of Moscow and Tehran, and Beijing, intent on consolidating its status as a true world superpower, is wary of Russian attempts to cultivate influence throughout the Eurasia and Global South.

With this in mind, it's less likely Beijing would wade into a European theatre to back up Russia in a conflict with NATO forces.

But a scenario in which the Chinese Communist Party seizes such an opportunity to launch an invasion of Taiwan in an effort to bring the sovereign, self-governed island back under control - while NATO is focused on the threat from Moscow - is certainly a plausible one.

And given Beijing's desire to consolidate access to the vast resources of the Arctic and secure shipping routes out of the bounds of Western control, it's feasible that China could lend support to the Kremlin as it wages war with Europe.

'I don't think there's any love for Russia in China. China is not terribly interested in keeping Russia afloat,' Gen. Hodges said.

'But they they will not want any disruption to their cheap gas and they will want to be able to use that Northern Sea Route which Russia would control in the case of this conflict scenario.'

North Korea's near total isolation from the world stage means it is less likely to be dragged into a major conflict, and the threat of war is a tool used since the very creation of the country by Kim Jong Un's grandfather Kim Il Sung to maintain the dynasty's grip on power.

But the regime has already agreed to supplement Moscow with munitions for its ongoing war in Ukraine at a time when Western relations with its historic allies – China and Russia – are at new lows.

A RUSI analysis of North Korea's provision of munitions to Russia warned: 'The impact will be felt much further than the battlefield in Ukraine. The sale of such quantities of munitions will fill the coffers of the cash-strapped regime in Pyongyang.

RAND Corporation adjunct international defence researcher Bruce Bennett said: 'North Korea may seek other assistance from Russia in return for its support, including the provision of missile and other advanced military technologies.'

As this military alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang develops further, there is a chance that North Korea 'could use nuclear weapons coercively' to place greater strain on Western alliances with Asian partners like Japan and South Korea, or 'directly threaten the United States with nuclear weapon use'.

FILE PHOTO: Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping

Chinese troops from the People's Liberation Army are seen patrolling with the Chinese flag on an exercise

China's President Xi Jinping believes Taiwan is a renegade province that must be brought under Beijing's control

A Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile is launched during what North Korea says is a drill at an unknown location December 18, 2023

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un views a missile launcher before the launch of a Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile during what North Korea says is a drill at an unknown location December 18, 2023

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un

How can we avoid all-out war?

Putin has long held the belief that the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s was a catastrophe, and while it is not clear what the goals of a Russian attack on NATO would be, analysts expect his first targets to be the former Soviet states.

The Kremlin's rhetoric towards the Baltic states and other Eastern European nations - places that once bowed to the Kremlin but now largely subscribe to Western values and institutions - has become increasingly hostile since the February 2022 invasion of its neighbour.

With Moscow's forces already facing fierce resistance in Ukraine, defence analysts do not believe the Kremlin would have the strength to consolidate large swathes of European countries into the Russian Federation in the event of a future conflict.

But Russia has clearly and consistently condemned what it perceives as an expansion of NATO and the alliance's desire to threaten the Kremlin's sphere of influence.

It therefore may not be long before the eastern bloc is back in its sights - if not to conquer, at least to disrupt and destabilise with the goal of undermining NATO's alliance.

A victory for Moscow might see the overthrow of pro-Western governments who have willingly and democratically joined the European Union and NATO, supplanting them with Russian puppets or parties more inclined to align with the Kremlin, thereby breaking up the alliance.

So how can the West stop this from happening?

According to experts, deterrence is the key.

This requires NATO and its member states to have a military that is not only ready to repel any invading Russian force, but strong enough to outmatch Moscow's armies to the point that the Kremlin will be unwilling to launch an attack in the first place.

'Deterrence is both having the military capability and signalling to your foe your willingness to use that capability - and your resolve to see it through to the end,' Sam Cranny-Evans says.

'What we're seeing in Europe with this large-scale drill of 90,000 personnel in May, with Operation Steadfast Defender, is a part of that signalling element.

'It's a demonstration to Russia that Europe and NATO have this ability to mobilise this large force and put it into the field and test its ability to fight a major war.

'This is a cooperative effort to avert a war or prevent an enemy thinking that their war aims could be easily achieved.'

Gen. Hodges said: 'The Russians would have to believe that [NATO] has the capability and are willing to use that capability to defeat them or make it so painful for them that they choose not to act.'

FILE PHOTO: Army soldier figurines are displayed in front of the NATO logo and Russian flag colours background in this illustration taken, February 13, 2022

Brig. Gen. Ryan said: 'Getting ready could be enough to avert a wider war. Not getting ready could invite one.'

And Gen. Hodges added: 'The Russians would have to believe that [NATO] has the capability and is willing to use that capability to defeat them or make it so painful for them that they choose not to act.'

He stressed that all-out war would only happen if Russia sensed that NATO wasn't prepared or unified.

He said: 'The Russians only respect strength. If they sense any weakness then they will continue to move forward.

'If they did it, it would be because they made the assessment that we were not ready or unified inside the alliance or that we did not have adequate ammunition or the ability to move fast enough.

He added: 'If the civilian leadership doesn't think there's a threat, they won't be able to move quickly enough. Our leaders should talk to us like adults.

'It doesn't mean you're a scaremongerer, it means you're taking precaution, which is exactly what we should be doing.'

Deterrence also includes the threat of a nuclear conflict, according to some analysts.

Alexander Lord, Lead Europe-Eurasia Analyst at global risk analysis firm Sibylline, said: 'Nuclear deterrence remains the bedrock of strategies to prevent a full-scale Russia-NATO war.'

However, he stressed that 'the proliferation of hybrid warfare, grey zone destabilisation and the return of high-intensity war to the European continent means that conventional deterrence must play a larger role in preventing such a war between Russia and NATO.

'This means Europe and the wider West need to invest for the future, and large-scale military drills such as Steadfast Defender, the largest NATO exercises since the Cold War, are designed to illustrate this conventional capability and willingness to defend allies, and therefore deter further Russian aggression,' he concluded.

If NATO can present a fearsome, effective and cohesive military threat, perhaps it can discourage Putin - or his successor - from further violence and prevent the spectre of all-out war from descending over Europe once more.

But deterrence is not an eternal solution, and must be followed up by concerted efforts to re-establish continual communication and positive diplomatic relations with Moscow.

Among many things, former US president Theodore Roosevelt is remembered for his popularisation of 'Big Stick Diplomacy' - the idea that cultivating a strong military power, and willingness to display it, is essential for safeguarding national interests and discouraging would-be foes from carrying out nefarious intentions.

But there is a second element to the proverb that inspired his coining of the concept. If one is to carry a big stick, one should also 'speak softly'.

A big stick might change someone's behaviour - but it can't beat them into understanding.

Daily Mail · by David Averre · January 20, 2024

13. Readout of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Meeting With "Five Eyes" Defense Policy Senior Officials

Readout of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Meeting With "Five Eyes" Defense Policy Senior Officials

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3651283/readout-of-principal-deputy-assistant-secretary-of-defense-for-indo-pacific-sec/

Jan. 21, 2024 |   

DOD spokesperson Lt. Col. Martin Meiners provided the following readout:

U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Jedidiah P. Royal; Australian Deputy Secretary of Defence Strategy, Policy, and Industry Hugh Jeffrey; Canadian Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) Peter Hammerschmidt, United Kingdom Director for International Security Policy Nick Gurr; and New Zealand Ministry of Defence Deputy Secretary Policy & Planning Richard Schmidt convened a meeting of senior defense policy officials in Singapore today. 

The senior officials exchanged views on strengthening regional security and upholding the rules-based international order, including the importance of air and maritime operational safety across the Indo-Pacific region. They also reaffirmed the importance of continuing to work together to enhance the collective resilience of the partners, as well as resilience across the broader Indo-Pacific region.

​14. ‘We killed many … drones are our air force’: Myanmar’s rebels take on the junta from above

Excerpts:

But with drones opening up a new frontier of warfare for Myanmar’s rebel armies, Sabu, 49, a commander in the CNA’s drones department, was among those who felt a renewed confidence in their chances of defeating the junta.

“We were bad at using them initially and missed most of the targets in the first year,” he said.

However, the dedicated training was now paying off, he said, and several of their recent successful ground offensives against the junta had been preceded by pre-dawn drone strikes. “Drones are our air force,” said Sabu. “We will win this war with them.”

‘We killed many … drones are our air force’: Myanmar’s rebels take on the junta from above

The Guardian · by Aakash Hassan · January 20, 2024

As the drones flew silently over western Myanmar’s Chin hills, the junta did not know what was about to hit them. Their operators were hidden a few hundred metres away in the dense forest. As the images on their screens indicated the drone fleet was hovering exactly above the target – a key military base in the town of Lailenpi – they hit the button on their controllers and bombs began to fall.

“We had precise hits,” said Noah, 20, one of the specialist drone fighters in the Chin National Army (CNA), one of the ethnic rebel groups who have been fighting Myanmar’s military for almost three years. “It took them by surprise. We killed many, including the second-in-command of the base.”

After three days of fighting, the rebels hoisted their tricolour flag over the base and shouted slogans of victory.

In the bloody war between the military junta, who toppled the democratically elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi and seized control in a coup in February 2021, and the rebel groups who have been fighting to restore democracy since, a significant shift has been taking place.

The junta has now lost control of more than 50% of the country, and in Chin state, which borders India, the CNA rebel forces say they have managed to capture back 70% of the province, including five key military bases.

The secret to their recent victories, they say, is a new fleet of drones, and an army of rebel soldiers – most of whom were once ordinary civilians – who have spent over a year training to operate them. “Drones have been key to our success,” said Ram Kulh Cung, the CNA’s assistant general secretary. “The attacks, like those at Lailenpi, have been carried out after months of planning and training.”

During a recent visit to Camp Victoria, the central headquarters of the CNA in Chin state, they showed the Observer the vast fleet of thousands of commercial and agricultural drones – otherwise known as an unmanned aerial vehicles – they had imported, mostly from China but also from western countries such as the United States, to hit the junta-controlled territory in targeted attacks.

Since the military, known as the Tatmadaw, took power, they have overseen a brutal nationwide crackdown. Its soldiers have been accused of arbitrary arrests, torture, mass killings, rapes and abuses that, according to Human Rights Watch, amount to crimes against humanity. More than 4,000 civilians have been reported to have been killed in the conflict since the coup.

Beauty Zailenpar (21), a rebel fighter with Chin National Army, getting ready for her posting. Photograph: Aakash Hassan/The Observer

Until recently, the military have had the heavy advantage of a highly technical air force which has been used to carry out hundreds of deadly airstrikes, often targeting areas of resistance, which have killed thousands.

Yet the fleet of fighter jets is costly for the junta to maintain and operate, and increasingly proving no match for the drones being cheaply and expertly utilised by the rebel armies against the military-controlled areas.

Junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun conceded that they had been facing heavy assaults and the insurgents had been using drones to drop hundreds of bombs on military posts.

Indian army officials said that most of the border posts on the Myanmar side had been either overrun by rebels or are under threat. In the last two months, more than 400 Myanmar army soldiers have fled across the border to the Indian state of Mizoram, following rebel attacks.

So successful has the drones technology been in rebel warfare that the junta has also started using commercial drones to carry out attacks but has lacked the necessary training to use them as efficiently as the rebel fighters.

“The use of drones has created a tectonic shift in Myanmar’s battlefield,” said Angshuman Choudhury, an associate fellow at Delhi-based thinktank Centre for Policy Research. “They have not completely closed the tactical asymmetry between the military and resistance forces, but have diminished it significantly.”

Junta rank and file are being watched discreetly, and could be attacked from the air anytime, anywhere – something that was absolutely unthinkable before the coup

Angshuman Choudhury, military analyst

He said the drones have created a “sense of fear among the junta rank-and-file that they are being watched discreetly, and could be attacked from the air anytime, anywhere – something that was absolutely unthinkable before the coup.”

The CNA is now one of the rebel armies that has a dedicated drones department, established over a year ago, whose footsoldiers have learned to operate the technology mostly through months of operational practice and tutorials on YouTube.

“The drone department consists of skilled young fighters – some who were engineering students and some who have gained knowledge of drones as a hobby,” said Ram Kulh Cung, the CNA secretary. “The department also relies hugely on the internet to upgrade the skills and train more people.”

The technology, said Cung, was “turning the tables” but added: “Procuring weapons and drones is not easy for us. There is nothing easy in war.”

Commanders said that most of the military equipment was coming in via the borders with China and Thailand rather than through India which had been keeping a tight control on any kind of weapons inflow.

A squad of Myanmar rebels works to ready a drone for an attack on a nearby military base. Photograph: AFP/Getty Images

CNA leadership also attributed the recent successes of the resistance forces to a greater alliance and increased coordination between the different armed ethnic minority groups fighting the junta across Myanmar, who in the past had not always worked harmoniously due to differing priorities and infighting.

In late October, three insurgent groups – known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance – launched “Operation 1027”, to take on junta troops in Shan state near Myanmar’s border with China. Furthering the nationwide momentum behind the assault, other rebel groups, including the Arakan Army and CNA, supported the operation from their own regions. Ultimately, several towns and more than 100 military outputs were taken from the junta in the offensive.

Last week, in what many took as a sign of the growing weakness of the junta, the military and an alliance of rebel groups announced a China-mediated ceasefire along Myanmar’s border with China. However, the CNA was not party to it, and commanders told the Observer they would not be abiding by it in Chin state.

At Camp Victoria headquarters, every morning hundreds of newly recruited cadets – who get just a few months training before being sent to the frontlines – take part in a parade. Yet even as morale was high following the recent spate of victories, the nearby cemetery also revealed how this battle is still not an easy one. More than two dozen young fighters killed in the recent operations had been laid to rest, their tombstones engraved with lines of valour honouring their actions in battle.

A group of rebel fighters from Chin National Army (CNA) in the Chin province of Myanmar. Photograph: Aakash Hassan/The Observer

But with drones opening up a new frontier of warfare for Myanmar’s rebel armies, Sabu, 49, a commander in the CNA’s drones department, was among those who felt a renewed confidence in their chances of defeating the junta.

“We were bad at using them initially and missed most of the targets in the first year,” he said.

However, the dedicated training was now paying off, he said, and several of their recent successful ground offensives against the junta had been preceded by pre-dawn drone strikes. “Drones are our air force,” said Sabu. “We will win this war with them.”

The Guardian · by Aakash Hassan · January 20, 2024

15. China is the world’s worst jailer of journalists, CPJ says

Why is it only RFA and VOA calling out China on these issues? Yes other media organizations do but RFA and VOA are consistent on this issue.

China is the world’s worst jailer of journalists, CPJ says

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/journalists-01192024171213.html

Uyghurs make up almost half of the journalists jailed by China

By Eugene Whong for RFA

2024.01.19

Washington

Jewher Ilham, daughter of Ilham Tohti, holds a portrait of her father during the award ceremony for his 2019 European Parliament's Sakharov human rights prize in Strasbourg, France, Dec. 18, 2019.

 Frederick Florin/AFP

China is the worst jailer of journalists in the world, a report by a New York-based watchdog said, and nearly half of the journalists behind bars in the country are Uyghurs who reported on the persecution of the mostly Muslim group in Xinjiang.

In its 2023 prison census, conducted on Dec. 1, the Committee to Protect Journalists, or CPJ, found that there was a spike in arrested journalists, with 320 believed to be behind bars – close to a record high.

More than half of those jailed journalists were charged with false news, anti-state or terrorism charges in retaliation for their coverage, the group’s research found.

China led all countries, with 44 journalists in prison, accounting for 32% of the worldwide total. Following closely behind was Myanmar, with 43. Vietnam was fifth on the list with 19, ahead of Iran and just behind Russia.

Hong Kong media mogul and pro-democracy activist Jimmy Lai, is escorted by Correctional Services officers to a Hong Kong court appearance, Dec. 12, 2020. (Kin Cheung/AP)

“China has long ranked as one of the world’s worst jailers of journalists,” the report said. “Censorship makes the exact number of journalists jailed there notoriously difficult to determine, but Beijing’s media crackdown has widened in recent years, with 2021 marking the first time journalists from Hong Kong were in jail at the time of CPJ’s census.” 

In addition to Hong Kong, Xinjiang was another chief area of concern, according to the report. Of the 44 imprisoned journalists in China, 19 are Uyghurs.

Among them is Ilham Tohti, a professor who was also the founder of the news website Uighurbiz. Tohti was arrested almost exactly 10 years ago, and later sentenced to life in prison on charges of separatism.

Another is Qurban Mamut, the former editor-in-chief of the popular Uyghur journal Xinjiang Civilization. Mamut went missing in November 2017 and RFA learned in 2022 that he was sentenced to 15 years in prison for “political crimes.”

Media gather outside the offices of Stand News in Hong Kong on December 29, 2021, after police raided the office of the local media outlet and arrested six current and former staff. (Daniel Suen/AFP)

“Chinese authorities are also ramping up the use of anti-state charges to hold journalists, with three out of the five new China cases in CPJ’s 2023 database consisting of journalists accused of espionage, inciting separatism, or subverting state power,” the report said. 

“Many journalists charged are ethnic Uighurs from Xinjiang, where Beijing has been accused of crimes against humanity for its mass detentions and harsh repression of the region’s mostly Muslim ethnic groups,” it said.

‘Silencing minority voices’

The disproportionate number of jailed Uyghur journalists mirrors the situation in Xinjiang, Beh Lih Yi, the CPJ’s Asia program coordinator told RFA Uyghur.

“Nearly half of the journalists behind bars in China in 2023 were Uighur journalists. They have been targeted under vague charges such as inciting separatism or being ‘two-faced,’ a loose term Chinese authorities often use to punish those they see as publicly supporting government policy but secretly opposing it,” said Yi. 

“The media repression highlights the Chinese government's harsh attempt to silence minority voices and independent reporting – even as Beijing repeatedly rejected claims of widespread human rights abuses in Xinjiang,” she said.

A giant screen in Beijing shows Chinese President Xi Jinping visiting Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region July 15, 2022. (Tingshu Wang/Reuters)

She said that long-term sentences for Uyghur journalists were “outrageous and cruel,” and called on the Chinese government to release all its imprisoned journalists and allow all journalists to freely report in Xinjiang.

The report proves the importance of the work of Uyghur journalists, Zubayra Shamseden of the Washington-based Uyghur Human Rights Project said.

“It is clear from the imprisonment of Uyghur journalists that China doesn’t want the international community to know anything about Uyghurs,” said Shamseden. “Uyghur journalists report on Uyghur issues. They are the voices of the Uyghur people in the world. By imprisoning Uyghur journalists, China is attempting to crush the voices of Uyghurs.”

The report also noted that Israel saw a huge spike of journalist jailings last year, with all those known to be behind bars on the date of the census having been arrested in the West Bank.

Additional reporting by Mamatjan Juma. Edited by Malcolm Foster.

16. How Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea Upended Global Shipping

Please go to the link to view the graphics. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/01/20/world/middleeast/houthi-red-sea-shipping.html

How Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea Upended Global Shipping - The New York Times

By Agnes Chang, Pablo Robles and Keith Bradsher Jan. 21, 2024

nytimes.com · by Keith Bradsher · January 21, 2024

Note: To show the changing paths of ships that regularly traverse the Red Sea, 3,461 cargo vessels recorded at entrances to the Red Sea in the last three months are shown. Shipping routes before the attacks show ship positions from Nov. 1, 2023 to Nov. 15, and positions from Jan. 1, 2024 to Jan. 15 are shown after the attacks.

Source: Spire Global

It is an extraordinary detour: Hundreds of ships are avoiding the Suez Canal and sailing an extra 4,000 miles around Africa, burning fuel, inflating costs and adding 10 days of travel or more in each direction.

They are avoiding one of the world’s most important shipping routes, the Red Sea, where for months the Iranian-backed Houthi militia has attacked ships with drones and missiles from positions in Yemen.

The Houthis have said they are seeking to disrupt shipping links with Israel to force Israel to end its military campaign in Gaza. But ships connected to more than a dozen countries have been targeted, and a Houthi spokesman said this week that they consider “all American and British ships” to be enemy targets.

The turmoil has been sweeping. About 150 ships passed through the Suez Canal, which lies at the northwest end of the Red Sea, during the first two weeks of this January. That was down from over 400 at the same time last year, according to Marine Traffic, a maritime data platform. Those detours, and the Houthi attacks, have persisted despite airstrikes by the United States and its allies against the Houthis.

Note: Attacks involving commercial vessels are attacks where at least one commercial ship is struck or targeted usually with drones or missiles. Data as of Jan. 20.

Source: United States Central Command

Shipping companies have tripled the prices they charge to take a container from Asia to Europe, partly to cover the extra cost of sailing around Africa. Shipowners that still use the Red Sea, mainly tanker owners, face rising insurance premiums.

Container rates have not yet risen as much as they did during the coronavirus pandemic. But retailers like Ikea have warned that avoiding the Suez Canal could delay the arrival of merchandise at stores. Some car factories in Europe have had to briefly suspend operations while they wait for parts from Asia.

Source: Freightos Data

This could worsen inflation. JPMorgan Chase estimated on Thursday that worldwide consumer prices for goods would climb an extra 0.7 percent in the first half of this year if shipping disruptions continue.

Here’s what the diversion from the Red Sea looked like for a single ship, the Maersk Hong Kong. The Singapore-flagged container ship set out from Singapore to Slovenia on Nov. 15. It reached Port Said in Egypt merely 12 days later, having passed through the Red Sea and Suez Canal.

On the way back to Singapore, it arrived at Port Said again on Dec. 17. But with the Houthis then ramping up attacks, it then made a U-turn and traveled around Africa instead, only arriving back to Singapore this Friday, after a full month of sailing.

Note: Data is from November 1, 2023 through January 19, 2024.

Source: Spire Global

The Red Sea and Suez Canal have become increasingly important in the past two years not just for ships that take goods between Asia and Europe, but also for oil and liquified natural gas cargos.

European countries tried to stop buying fuel from Russia after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. So Russia sharply increased the oil it ships through the Suez Canal, much of it to India, while Europe stepped up natural gas purchases from the Middle East, also through the Suez Canal. About 12 percent of the oil carried worldwide by tankers passes through the Red Sea, and almost as much of the world’s liquefied natural gas, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Source: World Bank

Note: Ship traffic density maps are based on vessel positions reported between January 2015 and February 2021 processed by the International Monetary Fund’s World Seaborne Trade monitoring system.

The Houthis have said that they are seeking to disrupt shipping links with Israel as an attempt to force Israel to end its campaign in Gaza. But ships connected to more than a dozen countries have been targeted, many of them not traveling to or from Israeli ports.

While no deaths or injuries have been confirmed from these attacks, some vessels have been damaged. A car carrier, the Galaxy Leader, was hijacked in November and taken to Yemen. Its 25-member crew of mostly Filipinos has been detained there.

The U.S. Navy has shot down many drones and missiles before they could reach their targets, preventing serious damage of commercial vessels. But it is costly for America and its allies to intercept cheap drones and inexpensive missiles with advanced fighter jets and other military hardware.

The stance of China, a maritime powerhouse, remains a major question in the Red Sea. Beijing has avoided criticizing the Houthis and has not participated in military actions against them. The Houthi attacks have delayed China’s annual surge in exports before its factories are idled next month for the Lunar New Year.

nytimes.com · by Keith Bradsher · January 21, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com