Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:


"Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication." 
- Leonardo da Vinci

"The best way to keep a prisoner from escaping is to make sure he never knows he's in prison."
- Fyodor Dostoevsky

"I have come to believe that a great teacher is a great artist and that there are as few as there are any other great artists. Teaching might even be the greatest of the arts since the medium is the human mind and spirit."
- John Steinbeck, “On Teaching”



1. United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission Special Investigation of the 26 December 2022

2. UNC says both Koreas breached armistice by flying drones in each other's territory

3. Blinken looks forward to any opportunity to engage with S. Korean FM: State Dept.

4. Secretary Austin to highlight U.S. commitment to S. Korea during upcoming trip to Seoul: Pentagon

5. N. Korea likely to continue provocations, threats in 2023: U.S. intelligence official

6. North Korea Mines New Revenue Sources in Its Trade With China

7. Chinese companies keep exporting nuclear and missile items to N. Korea

8. North Korea’s Chungju Spy Ring in South Korea Exposed

9. Hyesan authorities crack down hard on Chinese cell phone users, including money transfer brokers

10. South Korea’s Economic Security Dilemma

11. S. Korea to support civilian aid to North in hopes of talks

12. Seoul to work with Hanoi to pursue peace on Korean peninsula

13. Unification Ministry seeks to disclose more N. Korean information to public

14. South Korea’s unions cry ‘red scare’ amid North Korea spy claims

15. Report to Congress on North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs

16. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs (CRS Report)

17. America’s Allies Should Consider Going Nuclear

18. No food, a shared blanket and public executions: Growing up in North Korea



1. United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission Special Investigation of the 26 December 2022


Of course this will cause friction. There will be those in Korea who will attack the UNC (again).


I think it is correct to cite north Korea for its incursion into SOuth korea.


Second, it is correct to note that South Korea had every right to engage the aircraft that penetrated its air space.


Third, it is correct to cite South Korea for violating the armistice by simply sending South Korean UAS/drones into north Korean airspace.


People in South Korea, to include the Yoon administration will likely be upset with this but in my assessment the sending of South Korea drones/UAS was not an act of self defense but was simply a tit-for-tat retaliation. Although I must defer to experts, I think if South Korea had instead conducted an operation against the north Korean drone base to destroy it to prevent further hostile action it would have been considered a justified response in self defense to defend South Korea from future attacks or hostile action.


But this should be viewed in a positive light.


First, the UNC Military Armistice Commission is doing its job objectively. It is calling balls and strikes in accordance with the Armistice aAgreement which it is charged to enforce.


Second, its action contributes to countering the perception that it is a puppet of the US or the South.


Most importantly, the US and the ROK must accept its findings because this is an action by an organization that is upholding the rules based international order. Both the ROK and the US claim it is in their national interest to uphold the international rules based order.


This actually gives the ROK and theUS the moral high ground. This should be emphasized and exploited. South Korea should simply accept the criticism and move forward. It should not protest in any way. If it does it will only embarrass itself, keep it in the news longer than it should be, and open itself up to continued criticism.


It should offer a one line response and then shut up: "The ROK government acknowledges the findings of the UNC Military Armistice Commission investigation."



PRESS RELEASE | Jan. 26, 2023

United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission Special Investigation of the 26 December 2022 Incident 2022년 12월 26일 사건 관련 유엔군사령부 군사정전위원회 특별조사

unc.mil

USAG HUMPHREYS, Republic of Korea, – Starting 26 December 2022, the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission conducted a special investigation of the airspace incursions that took place in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This investigation has been observed by members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to ensure fair practices and adherence to the terms of the Armistice. UNC offers the following findings:

험프리스 미 육군 기지, 대한민국 – 남북 양측에서 발생한 영공 침범 사건에 대해 유엔군사령부 군사정전위원회가 2022년 12월 26일부터 특별조사를 진행하였습니다. 이번 조사는 조사의 공정성과 정전협정 규정 준수를 위해 중립국감독위원회의 참관 하에 진행되었으며, 유엔군사령부의 조사 결과는 다음과 같습니다.

  • The Special Investigation Team (SIT) was able to determine that the Korean People’s Army side committed a violation of the Armistice when multiple North-side unmanned aerial systems (UAS) entered ROK-controlled airspace.

특별조사반은 다수의 북한군 무인기가 대한민국 영공을 침범한 행위가 북한군 측의 정전협정 위반임을 확인하였습니다.

  • The SIT was able to determine that the ROK military’s attempts to neutralize the DPRK aircraft in ROK-controlled airspace was in compliance with the Armistice Rules of Engagement and consistent with the Armistice.

조사반은 대한민국 영공을 침범한 북 무인기에 대한 한국군의 무력화 시도는 정전교전규칙에 따른 것이며 정전협정과도 부합함을 확인하였습니다.

  • Finally, the SIT was able to determine that the employment of ROK military UAS across the Demilitarized Zone and into DPRK-controlled airspace constitutes a violation of the Armistice.
  • 마지막으로, 한국군 무인기가 비무장지대를 통과하여 북측 영공에 진입한 것은 정전협정 위반이라는 점을 확인하였습니다.

United Nations Command reaffirms that adherence to the terms of Armistice is essential for mitigating the risk of both accidental and deliberate incidents through prevention of escalation, and for preserving a cessation of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. UNC will continue to work closely with ROK partners towards those ends.

유엔군사령부는 긴장을 미연에 방지하여 우발적 혹은 고의적 사건의 발생 위험을 완화하고 한반도에서 적대행위의 중지 상태를 유지하기 위해서는 정전협정 규정의 준수가 필수적이라는 점을 재확인합니다. 유엔군사령부는 이를 위해 한국의 파트너 기관들과 계속해서 긴밀히 협력할 것입니다.


###

unc.mil


2. UNC says both Koreas breached armistice by flying drones in each other's territory




(2nd LD) UNC says both Koreas breached armistice by flying drones in each other's territory | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 장동우 · January 26, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with Seoul foreign ministry's reaction in para 11-12)

SEOUL, Jan. 26 (Yonhap) -- The U.S.-led U.N. Command (UNC) announced Thursday both South and North Korea violated the armistice by sending drones into each other's territory last month.

The UNC released the outcome of a probe by its special investigation team (SIT) into the North's Dec. 26 drone infiltrations, which led the South to send its drones north of the inter-Korean border in a "corresponding" counteraction.

"The SIT was able to determine that the Korean People's Army side committed a violation of the armistice when multiple North-side unmanned aerial systems (UAS) entered ROK-controlled airspace," the UNC said in a press release. It referred to the North Korean military by its official name. ROK stands for the South's official name, the Republic of Korea.

The command also said the employment of the South Korean military's UAS across the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas and into the North Korea-controlled airspace constituted an armistice breach.

The UNC stressed adherence to the terms of the armistice is "essential" for mitigating the risk of both accidental and deliberate incidents, and for preserving a cessation of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.

"UNC will continue to work closely with ROK partners towards those ends," it said.

The disclosure of the investigation outcome came amid concerns it could risk friction with the Seoul government.

The South's defense ministry defended its sending of the drones into the North's territory as the exercise of its right to "self-defense," stressing the right is not restricted by the armistice.

"The South Korean military's operation of drones north of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) is a self-defense measure against North Korea's drone breach and is not restricted by the armistice," the ministry said in a statement.

The UNC is an enforcer of the armistice that effectively ended the Korean War in 1953.

The South Korean foreign ministry is also reportedly considering asking the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to review whether the North's drone breach violated the organization's international convention.

"We condemn the illegal invasion of our airspace by North Korean drones as a clear act of provocation and are reviewing various responses," a ministry official told reporters.

Youtube

https://youtu.be/NT667oJ9klY


This undated file photo shows a North Korean drone that was found in Inje County, Gangwon Province, in 2017. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 장동우 · January 26, 2023



3. Blinken looks forward to any opportunity to engage with S. Korean FM: State Dept.



Blinken looks forward to any opportunity to engage with S. Korean FM: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · January 27, 2023

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Jan. 26 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken would welcome any future opportunity to engage with his South Korean counterpart, a state department spokesperson said Thursday.

Vedant Patel, principal deputy spokesperson for the state department, however, said he had nothing to announce when asked about a possible meeting between Blinken and South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin in Washington.

"The secretary has had the opportunity to engage with the foreign minister on a number of occasions in bilateral settings and multilateral settings, and we, of course, would look forward to any future opportunity to do that as well," the spokesperson told a daily press briefing.

"But I don't have any specifics to offer," he added.

Diplomatic sources in Seoul earlier said the top South Korean diplomat was seeking to visit Washington before Blinken takes his planned trip to China on Feb. 5-6.

State department officials, including press secretary Ned Price, have said North Korea will be a key topic of talks between Blinken and his Chinese counterpart.


Vedant Patel, principal deputy spokesperson for the U.S. state department, is seen answering questions during a daily press briefing at the department in Washington on Jan. 26, 2023 in this captured image. (Yonhap)

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · January 27, 2023


4. Secretary Austin to highlight U.S. commitment to S. Korea during upcoming trip to Seoul: Pentagon




Secretary Austin to highlight U.S. commitment to S. Korea during upcoming trip to Seoul: Pentagon | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · January 27, 2023

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Jan. 26 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin will underscore the U.S.' commitment to the security of South Korea during his upcoming trip to Seoul, a Pentagon spokesperson said Thursday.

Sabrina Singh, principal deputy spokesperson for the defense department, also noted the U.S. defense chief looks forward to meeting with his South Korean counterparts, but said she had nothing to offer when asked if Austin will also be meeting with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol.

"I think you will see the secretary certainly highlight our commitment to the region," she told a daily press briefing, adding, "Our commitment to South Korea remains rock solid."


Sabrina Singh, principal deputy spokesperson for the Department of Defense, is seen taking questions during a daily press briefing at the Pentagon in Washington on Jan. 26, 2023 in this captured image. (Yonhap)

Austin is scheduled to depart Sunday, according to Singh, on the trip that the defense department earlier said will include a visit to the Philippines.

His trip to Seoul, first of its kind since May 2022, follows an unprecedented number of ballistic missiles fired by North Korea.

Pyongyang launched over 90 missiles in 2022 alone, including 69 ballistic missiles that mark the largest number of ballistic missile fired by North Korea in a single year.

An official from South Korea's presidential office earlier said the office was making arrangements for a meeting between Yoon and Austin.

"I don't have anything to read out about a meeting now, but when we are ready to release more details on the trip, we are certainly happy to get them to you," the spokesperson said when asked about a possible meeting between Yoon and Austin.

When asked about a recent weapons deal between North Korea and Russia's Wagner mercenary group, Singh insisted the deal demonstrated Russia's isolation.

"We have seen the Wagner Group try and procure and be successful (in) procuring weapons from North Korea. I think that shows further isolation, that Russia is depleting its stocks pretty quickly," she said.

"And again, when you are turning to a country like North Korea, Iran, these are countries that are already isolated from an incredible alliance built around support for Ukraine, and so I will just leave at that," she added.

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · January 27, 2023


5. N. Korea likely to continue provocations, threats in 2023: U.S. intelligence official


The National Intelligence Officer for Korea, Sydney Seiler, recognizes the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime, understands its strategy, and here is exposing it and attacking it. Exposing the regime's strategy is important to inoculate the people of South korea and the US and the international community so that Kim will be unable to achieve the effects see seeks. more government officials in the ROK and US need to follow his lead.


N. Korea likely to continue provocations, threats in 2023: U.S. intelligence official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · January 27, 2023

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Jan. 26 (Yonhap) -- North Korea is well expected to continue making provocations and nuclear threats this year following its unprecedented number of missile tests in 2022 as it seeks to leverage its military capabilities diplomatically, a U.S. intelligence official insisted Thursday.

Sydney Seiler, top intelligence official for North Korea at the National Intelligence Council, also noted that Pyongyang will likely conduct its much anticipated nuclear test if and when it sees the need to.

"So when you look at where we are today, it obviously makes sense to look at what's transpired the past year," Seiler said in a webinar hosted by the Center for Strategic and Intelligence Studies, a think tank based in Washington.

North Korea fired over 90 missiles in 2022, including 69 ballistic missiles that marked the largest number ballistic missiles fired in a single year. The North's previous annual record of ballistic missile launches was 25.


Sydney Seiler, national intelligence officer for North Korea at the National Intelligence Council, is seen speaking at a webinar hosted by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies on Jan. 26, 2023 in this captured image. (Yonhap)

"Bottom line up front, (20)22 should not have surprised us as we have looked at the evolution of the North Korean nuclear threat, in terms of capabilities and intent, and how North Korea is intending to leverage its nuclear capabilities in the diplomatic realm," said Seiler.

"So we move through this pattern of announcing capabilities as possible parading capabilities, demonstrating them, fielding, developing the doctrine and training them so that, you know, gradually the deterrent becomes more real, more established and more threatening and more valuable to the North diplomatically," he added.

Seiler noted the North will seek to continue building on its nuclear leverage this year with more provocations and threats directed toward South Korea and the Yoon Suk Yeol administration.

"I would imagine it will be accompanied by a full choreography of doom and gloom for the Republic of Korea (ROK), the inevitability of the failure of the Yoon administration's so-called hardline policy, and, you know, again the futility of any efforts to try to denuclearize North Korea," he said, referring to South Korea by its official name.

"These are the types of events that, not surprisingly, we look forward to in the coming year," added the U.S. intelligence official.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un called for an "exponential" growth of the country's nuclear arsenal at a key meeting of the ruling Workers' Party held late last year.


North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attends the second-day session of the sixth enlarged meeting of the eighth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in Pyongyang on Dec. 27, 2022, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Seiler emphasized the importance of enhancing joint military capabilities of South Korea and the U.S., saying, "When the ROK and the United States enhance their deterrence, it is a bitter disappointment for North Korea who had thought they were achieving some degree of, again, dominance, or, you know, they have rectified some perceived vulnerabilities in the balance of power and then suddenly they erode as these capabilities come online."

"The good news is, for now North Korea is understanding of the overwhelming strength of the US-ROK alliance. It is fully aware of our commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea," he added.

North Korea has not proceeded with a seventh nuclear test although it had been widely anticipated since early last year that they would do so.

"They haven't launched because Kim doesn't see a need to launch," said Seiler.

"When you look at the calculation of the development need, the demonstration need, the diplomatic need and the domestic need ... you want to use it in a way that's diplomatically advantageous," he added. "If the goal is to portray a constantly improving, inevitably, exponentially growing nuclear threat, it (a test) is not so critical."

Youtube

https://youtu.be/EKTfGsAudUE

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · January 27, 2023


6. North Korea Mines New Revenue Sources in Its Trade With China


Excerpts:


Prior to the pandemic, North Korea began to adapt to a series of U.N. sanctions put in place from 2016 and 2017 in response to its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests. The sanctions regime prohibited virtually all of North Korea’s leading export items. By 2018, the implementation of those sanctions had largely eliminated the export of sanctioned items to China, while exports of non-sanctioned items began to grow.
...
It will bear watching in 2023, but exports of watch movements may be in permanent decline. After peaking at $49.2 million in 2019, they have declined each year of the pandemic and were only worth $1.8 million last year.
With trade between North Korea and China beginning to pick up, there are some exports that stand out.
With strict border control measures in place during the pandemic, North Korea increased electrical exports from the hydroelectric plants it runs with China along their mutual border. These exports were specifically carved out of U.N. sanctions in Resolution 2375 and began increasing as sanctions were implemented. They have grown significantly during the pandemic. In 2019, electrical exports to China were worth $11.4 million. By 2022, they had grown to $20.4 million (517 million kWh). Prior to the U.N. sanctions, North Korea had not exported more than $8.4 million worth of electricity.

North Korea Mines New Revenue Sources in Its Trade With China

The latest data shows Pyongyang is continuing to adapt to U.N. sanctions, while trade is beginning to rebound from pandemic lows.

thediplomat.com · by Troy Stangarone · January 26, 2023

Advertisement

North Korea has spent much of the pandemic financing its weapons programs and imports with stolen cryptocurrency. However, with trade between North Korea and China expanding in 2022, there are also signs that Pyongyang is looking to grow potential legitimate revenue streams.

While still below pre-pandemic levels, North Korea’s trade with China began to rebound last year. Exports were up just over 130 percent from 2021 levels to $134.4 million, though that’s still only about 60 percent of their pre-pandemic levels. Imports from China were up a more robust 247 percent, reaching $893.6 million, but still well below the $2.6 billion North Korea imported in 2019.

Prior to the pandemic, North Korea began to adapt to a series of U.N. sanctions put in place from 2016 and 2017 in response to its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests. The sanctions regime prohibited virtually all of North Korea’s leading export items. By 2018, the implementation of those sanctions had largely eliminated the export of sanctioned items to China, while exports of non-sanctioned items began to grow.

Chief among those were assembled watch movements (the engine of a watch). Prior to 2017, North Korea had not exported any watch movements, but by 2018 they were its top export to China. Other non-sanctioned items that grew pre-pandemic include molybdenum, tungsten, ferrosilicon, wigs, and fake eyelashes.

As with much of North Korea’s trade, exports of many of these items declined significantly or came to a halt during the pandemic. Exports of wigs and false eyelashes fell from $31 million in 2019 to slightly less than $375,000 by 2021, while exports of molybdenum came to a complete halt that same year. One export that broke this trend to a degree was ferrosilicon, which declined by 65.6 percent in 2020 but had recovered to near pre-pandemic levels in 2021.

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

It will bear watching in 2023, but exports of watch movements may be in permanent decline. After peaking at $49.2 million in 2019, they have declined each year of the pandemic and were only worth $1.8 million last year.

With trade between North Korea and China beginning to pick up, there are some exports that stand out.

With strict border control measures in place during the pandemic, North Korea increased electrical exports from the hydroelectric plants it runs with China along their mutual border. These exports were specifically carved out of U.N. sanctions in Resolution 2375 and began increasing as sanctions were implemented. They have grown significantly during the pandemic. In 2019, electrical exports to China were worth $11.4 million. By 2022, they had grown to $20.4 million (517 million kWh). Prior to the U.N. sanctions, North Korea had not exported more than $8.4 million worth of electricity.


Exports of tungsten and molybdenum are also well above their pre-pandemic levels. In 2022, North Korea exported $31 million in tungsten and $13.7 million in molybdenum to China. The previous high for tungsten was $18.5 million in 2018, while it was $9.3 million for molybdenum in 2008. Interestingly, China’s imports of tungsten from North Korea last year account for slightly less than 50 percent of China’s total imports of tungsten.

Exports of silk are another item of interest. Previously, they had not been a significant source of trade with China, but in 2022 they were North Korea’s fourth largest export item. Exports of raw silk amounted to $9.2 million last year and exports of silk waste reached $3.5 million. Prior to the pandemic, North Korea had not exported even $1 million of either product since 2013.

Carbides, or compounds of metal and carbon, are another area to watch. Prior to last year, North Korean exports of carbides to China had fluctuated and never exceeded a little less than $2 million. Last year, they jumped to $4.4 million.

All of these export items represent relatively small revenue streams, especially compared to the $163 million North Korea exported in seafood prior to sanctions – let alone the revenue generated by now-banned exports of coal or textiles. However, the significant growth in exports of tungsten and molybdenum stand out at a time when North Korea’s overall exports remain depressed, as does the potential emergence of silk and carbides as new export items. These items won’t replace the revenue generated by North Korea’s sanctioned items, but they may signal Pyongyang’s continued attempt to adapt to sanctions to find new sources of revenue.

CONTRIBUTING AUTHOR

Troy Stangarone

Troy Stangarone is Senior Director and Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI).

VIEW PROFILE

thediplomat.com · by Troy Stangarone · January 26, 2023


7. Chinese companies keep exporting nuclear and missile items to N. Korea


Excerpts:


The report comes amidst growing voices calling for a tougher response to China's support of sanctions evasion by North Korea following Republicans’ winning control of the U.S. House.


Meanwhile, former White House National Security Adviser John Bolton wrote in an article for the Washington Post on Wednesday to urge Secretary of State Tony Blinken, who will visit China on the 5th and 6th of next month, to put stronger pressure on China, which is turning a blind eye to North Korea's nuclear development. Bolton said, “The US has long tolerated China neglecting its responsibility to contain North Korea’s security threats. This meeting will be a good opportunity to change that.”


“The United States has realized, albeit belatedly, that China was not against North Korea’s nuclear ambitions," he argued. "The assumption that China, just like the U.S., is concerned about the North Korean nuclear threat has ruined its nuclear policy. This is (China's) counter-intelligence operation."

Chinese companies keep exporting nuclear and missile items to N. Korea

donga.com

Posted January. 27, 2023 07:39,

Updated January. 27, 2023 07:39

Chinese companies keep exporting nuclear and missile items to N. Korea. January. 27, 2023 07:39. weappon@donga.com.

The U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) has pointed out that Chinese companies and individuals continue to export items that could be used in nuclear and missile development to North Korea and Iran.


In a report titled “China’s Nuclear and Missile Proliferation,” published on Monday (local time), CRS said, “Although the Chinese government appears to have stopped direct intervention in the transfer of nuclear and missile-related items, Chinese companies and individuals continue to export these items, especially to North Korea and Iran.”


Citing a State Department announcement in 2019, the report said, “Chinese companies have continued to supply items that fall under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Pakistan. The U.S. has asked China to stop these trading activities after it has found them, but most of them have not been addressed.”


The CRS also wrote, "The U.S. is also concerned about the provision of support by Chinese companies for (nuclear, missile) proliferation activities such as illicit finance and money laundering.” “Chinese financial companies set up paper companies to act as agents for North Korean financial institutions, evading sanctions to finance the North’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs,” the report said. Previously, the Joe Biden administration sanctioned five Chinese companies that supported financial transactions on behalf of the Scientific and Educational Film Studio of Korea (SEK), which was subject to sanctions in December last year for financing North Korea’s nuclear and missile development and illegally sending workers abroad.


The report comes amidst growing voices calling for a tougher response to China's support of sanctions evasion by North Korea following Republicans’ winning control of the U.S. House.


Meanwhile, former White House National Security Adviser John Bolton wrote in an article for the Washington Post on Wednesday to urge Secretary of State Tony Blinken, who will visit China on the 5th and 6th of next month, to put stronger pressure on China, which is turning a blind eye to North Korea's nuclear development. Bolton said, “The US has long tolerated China neglecting its responsibility to contain North Korea’s security threats. This meeting will be a good opportunity to change that.”


“The United States has realized, albeit belatedly, that China was not against North Korea’s nuclear ambitions," he argued. "The assumption that China, just like the U.S., is concerned about the North Korean nuclear threat has ruined its nuclear policy. This is (China's) counter-intelligence operation."

한국어

donga.com


8. North Korea’s Chungju Spy Ring in South Korea Exposed


A stunning conclusion:


It appears that North Korea has had a relatively permissive environment in South Korea for creating secret extensions of the Workers’ Party of Korea to conduct subversive operations against South Korea. As the investigations continue, more will be revealed about how extensive these networks of underground organizations are and what other activities they have performed under the direction of North Korea.




To provide further background on north Korean espionage activities this might be useful:


Jihyun (Amanda) Won, “The Theory and Practice of North Korean Espionage,” The Intelligencer: The Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies, Winter/Spring 2020, page 9-17.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Pegm2W2KOnt_WYkqyqT6gN7DRLvEa7h0/view?usp=sharing



North Korea’s Chungju Spy Ring in South Korea Exposed


https://eastasiaresearch.org/2023/01/26/north-koreas-chungju-spy-ring-in-south-korea-exposed/

2023-1-26, Tara O

North Korea has continuously conducted intelligence and subversive operations against the Republic of Korea since its inception and even prior. Through its Cultural Exchange Bureau, the communist party based in Pyongyang has recruited Spies from South Korea over the years, instructing them to create subversive underground organizations and implement North Korea-directed tasks. While the current investigations focus on the recently uncovered “HGH” and “The People’s Vanguard for Independent Unification” organizations, this essay focuses on the Chungju Spy Ring exposed in 2021. It also highlights the situation of the previous administration of Moon Jae-in in blocking and slowing down the investigations of North Korea’s spy operations.

Chungju Spy Ring / Chungbuk Comrades’ Association for Independent Unification

In September 2021, a secret branch of the Korean Workers’ Party (North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un is the Chairman of the KWP) located in South Korea was exposed and 3 of its members were charged with violating the National Security Law. The underground organization is called Jaju Tongil Chungbuk Dongjihoi (자주통일 충북동지회) (Chungbuk Comrades Association for Independent Unification). (Chungbuk is a short form of the name of North Chungcheong Province.) It is also referred to as “Chungju Spy Ring” (청주간첩단), because it was based in Chungju (청주) City in North Chungcheong Province. The Chungju Spy Ring also took funds and orders from Ri Gwang-jin (리광진) of North Korea’s espionage organization, known as the Cultural Exchange Bureau. The underground party, Chungbuk Comrades’ Association for Independent Unification, was created to fulfill North Korea’s goal to overthrow the South Korean system on the orders of North Korea.

Cultural Exchange Bureau

The Cultural Exchange Bureau (문화교류국) is an espionage organization of the United Front Department (통일전선부) of the Workers’ Party of Korea (NoDongDang, 노동당) that conducts anti-ROK (Republic of Korea) intelligence and subversion operations. The Cultural Exchange Bureau recruits members of South Korean civic and labor organizations, political parties, religious clergy, and other sectors to form an underground party, an extension of the Korean Workers’ Party, in South Korea. These organizations collect state secrets and other information and conduct propaganda and subversive activities against South Korea’s national interests and its system for the North Korean regime. The Cultural Exchange Bureau began as two separate organizations—the Ministry of Culture (문화부) and the Ministry of Liaison (연락부) in the 1940s. They merged to form the Ministry of Cultural Liaison (문화연락부). Subsequently, it has changed names multiple times: the Ministry of Liaison (연락부), the Ministry of Social and Cultural Affairs (사회문화부), the Ministry of External Liaison (대외연락부), the 225th Bureau (225국), and now the Cultural Exchange Bureau.

North Korea’s Orders to Form an Underground Organization in South Korea

On May 21, 2017, a South Korean man in his mid-50s met with North Korea’s Cultural Exchange Bureau agent in Beijing, China, and received instructions to “form North Korea’s vanguard underground organization in North Chungcheong Province” in South Korea.

The man returned to South Korea and held preliminary meetings with other members as the “Independent Unification Chungbuk Regional Party of the Workers’ Party of Korea.” This name was to change later. 

The Creed

At the meetings they discussed its creed and regulations. Their creed #1 describes their organization as a “secret organization of vanguard warriors to struggle in the forefront of the movement to reform South Korean society into a Korean People’s Democracy,” like the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It also states, “Thoroughly reject all reactionary and opportunistic ideological tendencies, including pro-U.S. and pro-Japan tendencies.” Thus, it views the alliance with the U.S. as “reactionary,” when most Korean citizens value the ROK-U.S. alliance. It shows the Chungbuk Regional Party’s anti-U.S. and anti-Japan nature in its efforts to turn the ROK, a liberal democracy into a “people’s democracy,” which is another word for “socialist society,” in this case, run by the Kim Family Regime in North Korea.

Loyalty Pledges to Kim Jong-un

They also pledged their loyalty to Kim Jong-un by writing their pledges in blood:

Mr. A: “Our Brilliant Leader!! Long Live!” (영명한 우리 원수님!! 만수무강 하시라!)

Ms. B: “The Great Leader’s Supreme Leadership, Chungbuk [Association] to Risk Life to Guard, Risk Life to Accomplish” (위대한 원수님의 영도 충북 결사옹위 결사관철)

Ms. C: “With the (revered) Leader until the End of My Life” (생명이 다하는 순간까지 원수님과 함께)

Mr. Sohn: “Live as a loyal warrior of the (revered) Leader!” (원수님의 충직한 전사로 살자!)

Organizational Tasks

The Chungbuk Comrades’ Association for Independent Unification was assigned various tasks, such as “using the ruling party’s connections,” “recruiting former cadres of the KCTU,” “ideological indoctrination of local youth,” “ideological indoctrination of childcare teachers,” and “organizing nurses in the Chungbuk region.”

The adviser, Mr. A, was in charge of the ideological indoctrination of the underground party members, “waking up” (의식화) the workers of the labor union and irregular workers in North Chungcheong Province to the communist party ideology, and working with the former cadres of Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), which has over 1 million members, to develop the local labor movement according to Kim Jong-un’s intent. 

Mr. Sohn, who was the director of the Organization Bureau of KCTU, was the chairman of the Chungbuk Comrades’ Association for Independent Unification. He was in charge of taking control of the labor unions in major companies in South Korea as well as raising awareness of the youth in North Chungcheong Province toward their political ideology. Sohn also ran for National Assembly as an independent candidate in Daejeon in the general election on April 13, 2016. Sohn was the only 1 of four, who did not get arrested, because the judge rejected his arrest warrant.

Ms. B, a former secretary-general of the Democratic Women’s Union (민주여성노조), one of the labor unions under KCTU, was the vice chair of the Chungbuk Comrades Association. Given her studies in Early Childhood Education, Ms. B was put in charge of raising the ideological awareness of daycare teachers in North Chungcheong Province and recruiting them. In November 2013, she was an executive committee member of candidate Ahn Cheol-su’s policy network “Tomorrow” and in the 2014 elections, she ran for a local city council. As such, she was also tasked with “using the connections with the members of the Democratic Party of Korea’s (Deobureo Minju Party) branch in North Chungcheong Province as well as the Provincial Assembly.”

Mr. A’s wife, Ms. C, a nurse, was the liaison with North Korea, and was in charge of organizing and recruiting nurses in North Chungcheong Province.

Per North Korea’s orders, these members of the underground spy ring reported their organizational details, including their positions and duties to the Cultural Exchange Bureau in August 2017.

The organization’s name change—delete reference to the Workers’ Party of Korea

The Chungbuk Comrades’ Association for Independent Unification is actually an underground party, a branch of the Korean Workers’ Party. Initially, the name of the organization was Chosun NodongDang Jaju Tongil Chunbguk JiyukDang (조선노동당 자주통일 충북지역당) (Chungbuk Regional Party of the Korean Workers’ Party for Independent Unification) in 2017 when it was formed. It was changed to Jaju Tongil Chungbuk Dongji-hoi (자주통일 충북동지회) (Chungbuk Comrades’ Association for Independent Unification) after North Korea directed that “under no circumstances should the expression ‘Workers’ Party of Korea’ be used” to prevent association with North Korea. North Korea wanted to hide the fact that they conduct subversive activities in South Korea, and that they have branches of the Korean Workers’ Party in South Korea.

North Korea’s anti-ROK, anti-U.S. orders

From June 2017 until May 2021 (charged in September 2021), 84 encrypted file directives and reports were exchanged between the Chungbuk Spy Ring and North Korea. The documents reveal North Korea’s instructions, including opposing the introduction of F-35A to the ROK Air Force, creating a receptive atmosphere for Kim Jong-un’s reciprocal visit (after Moon Jae-in’s visit to North Korea), the DMZ Peace and Human Chain (평화인간띠) movement, struggle against conservative party, propaganda activities to recruit/gain support from the public for the Cho Kuk scandals, and the spread of anti-U.S. sentiment. The Cultural Exchange Bureau repeated the above-themed orders repeatedly. Indeed, some of those orders were implemented, including anti-F-35 demonstrations. The anti-F-35 poster below shows that it is sponsored by various organizations, including the “Chungwon Residents Countermeasures Committee to Oppose F-35A Introduction,” “DMZ Peace Human Chain Movement’s North Chungcheng Province Headquarters,” and “Labor Counseling Center.”

“Chungju a War Base for F-35A; Oppose introducing F-35A Stealth Aircraft”

North Korea’s orders intensified in September 2018, after the 3rd South-North summit in Pyongyang and the signing of the lopsided South-North Military Agreement of 19 September 2018. North Korea repeatedly issued orders to the Chungbuk Comrade Association, including the following:

2019-3-12: (soon after the failed U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi on February 27-28, 2019) “Regarding Trump’s low-life scoundrels’ highway robber-like nature and shamelessness, organize activities to expand anti-U.S. and anti-Trump sentiment.”

2019-6-22: “At the next general election [in April 2020], drive the Liberty Korea Party (LKP) [which became the United Future Party, which became the People Power Party] to a crushing defeat and bury Hwang Kyo-ahn [LKP leader] politically by blaming him.”

2019-10-20: “The current situation (Cho Kuk’s resignation from Justice Minister) [the Cho Kuk scandal] is the conservatives’ deliberate scheme to return to power by challenging the prosecution reform with the aim of usurping political power.”

2019-12-15: “Develop the struggle against the introduction of F-35A stealth fighters to Chungju Air Base into one that subjects the military warmongers to social condemnation.”

2020-2-10: “Regarding the discussions on Park Geun-hye’s release from prison, organize activities that expand an atmosphere of anti-conservative struggle in the entire society.”

2020-2-25: “Minimize the effect of the newly created United Future Party [now People Power Party] and making it incoherent are requirements for the progressive, democratic, reform faction to retake power in the [April 2020] general election.”

2021-4-19: (Regarding the failure to retake the mayorship of Seoul and Busan in the By-election in 2021 by the Democratic Party of Korea and other parties on the left) “Implement a sly method of struggle to turn the entire public sentiment against the conservatives.”

In 2019, 5 months before the April 2020 elections, the members received $20,000 from a North Korean agent in Shenyang, China.

The North Korea’s orders show its intent on interfering in South Korean elections and politics, manipulating public opinion, and organizing anti-U.S. movements.

Security Measures

On May 27, 2021, the NIS search Ms. B’s residence and seized 84 reports and directives, an unprecedented quantity, contained in USBs wrapped in four layers (aluminum foil, a zip lock bag, yellow envelop, white envelope), then hidden inside blankets. They used book codes, a form of covert communications, which has long been used by the Cultural Exchange Bureau, since the 1950s, but instead of using short wave radio to broadcast the book codes, it used steganography. Office 225 (which is now known as the Cultural Exchange Bureau) and its spies in South Korea used steganography in the past for the Wangjaesan (왕재산) spy case discovered in 2011 and the Ilsimhoe (일심회) spy case uncovered in 2006 as well.

The spy ring members abided strictly by the security procedures of the Cultural Exchange Bureau, which include buying used computers and equipment to avoid real name registration or traces of purchase, replacing computers every 3 years, replacing wireless modems, SIM cards, and contact emails every 6 months, securing encryption programs, using slang to note important details, and completely deleting the slang notes. They refer to North Korea as “the company,” and Kim Jong-un as “the chairman of the company”

Chungbuk Comrade Association members make a statement supporting candidate Moon Jae-in as a special advisor, May 2017

The members of the Chungbuk Comrades Association also served as special advisors to candidate Moon Jae-in during the 2017 presidential election. In May 2017, they invited labor union officials, former and current, and journalists and held a press conference supporting Moon Jae-in for president.

Three members of the Chungbuk Comrade Association were arrested in August 2021, but all three were released within 10 months.

Investigation Squashed

Key officials in the Moon administration blocked the investigation and prosecution of the incident. When counterintelligence officials reported that the investigation should be expanded with search and seizures, high-ranking officials simply went on leave to avoid approving the investigation.  If the approving officials did not approve the investigation, despite being aware of the evidence of clear violations of the National Security Law, it would fall under the charge of dereliction of duty (직무유기), and if the approving official directly instructs them not to conduct an investigation, the approving official would be accused of abuse of authority (직권남용). (21:12) Taking a leave of absence provided an excuse to not deal with the issue.

Within 6 months starting April 2018, there were two summits between Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un. In addition, the U.S.-North Korea summit occurred on June 12, 2018 in Singapore, the day before the nation-wide local elections in South Korea on June 13, 2018. Suh Hoon (서훈) and Chung Ui-yong (정의용) repeatedly shuttled back and forth between Seoul and Washington, DC to promote the summit, emphasizing that North Korea had the will to denuclearize the “Korean Peninsula,” a misleading statement, since it means exactly the opposite, e.g., not denuclearizing North Korea. The key word was “Korean Peninsula,” which includes the U.S. nuclear umbrella for South Korea, and from North Korea’s perspective, denuclearization of the “Korean Peninsula” means no U.S. extended deterrence for South Korea.

While the investigation was on hold, the Chungbuk Comrade Association members communicated with North Korea 35 times, and traveled back and forth between Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Angkor Wat, Cambodia, and Hanoi, Vietnam, to contact or receive orders from North Korean agents. They also organized anti-government and anti-U.S. demonstrations. In 2019, the spy ring received $20,000 from North Korean agents in Shenyang, China. The counterintelligence officials at NIS had to continue to wait, while also continuing to gather evidence.

Suh Hoon

Suh Hoon

Suh HoonSuh Hoon (서훈), then director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) appointed by Moon Jae-in (NIS Director from June 1, 2017 – July 2, 2020) did not approve further investigations, although the NIS obtained evidence related to the allegations in early 2018. As the NIS’s counterintelligence officials reported that the investigation should be broadened as evidence of alleged espionage was accumulating, their superiors did not approve it, instead telling them to gather more evidence and to watch for the South-North situation. The Moon-appointed NIS director Suh said that South-North relations are improving, but if the espionage case breaks out, it will have an adverse effect, so put it on hold. In effect, Suh Hoon abused his authority to stop the investigations and further legal actions against subversive groups in South Korea that were taking orders from North Korea.

   3 defectors sent to North Korea / Fire Control Radar targeted at Japan’s patrol aircraft (December 2018)

In December 2018, the Moon administration sent back 3 defectors against their will to North Korea. How they were “captured” is shocking. They were found by Japan in the Sea of Japan / East Sea near the joint fishing area between Japan and South Korea.   It was at this time when the South Korean Naval Warship Gwangweto the Great appeared suddenly along with a South Korean Coast Guard ship Sambongho 5001 and intercepted the defector boat and forced it into South Korean waters. The small boat had 4 defectors, with one who died from a gunshot wound received as he escaped North Korea.

The wooden boat part of the story was overshadowed by another major incident at the same time.  The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force’s P-1 pilots, who were flying over the same area to observe the situation regarding the wooden boat, were threatened by the ROK Navy warship targeting its fire control radar at their aircraft. Such an act is so hostile that, it can be interpreted as an act of war. Certainly, this incident was serious and the news headlines focused on this issue. The only mention regarding the small boat was Moon Jae-in administration’s claim that Gwangweto was searching for the North Korean fishing boat as part of “rescue operations,” but the story about the wooden boat and those onboard quickly disappeared. The Moon administration risked this dangerous international incident to capture the defectors on a small boat, but why? Apparently, Kim Yo-jong, Kim Jongun’s sister, called the Blue House through the North-South hotline, and Chung Ui-yong (National Security Advisor), Suh Hoon (then NIS Director), and others made the decision to send the ROK Naval ship to the area to capture the defector boat, and subsequently send the defectors back to North Korea. (54:47) They were returned to North Korea in 3 days, indicating there was no investigations.

   Sent 2 defectors to North Korea (November 2019)

Suh Hoon also stopped other investigations. After the NIS, Suh Hoon moved to the Blue House to become the Director of the National Security Office from July 3, 2020 – May 9, 2022.  After the Moon administration ended, the NIS filed charges against Suh Hoon for prematurely stopping an investigation into the case of the two fishermen who defected from North Korea, but were forcibly sent back to North Korea by the Moon administration on November 7, 2019. The decision to send them back occurred only 2 days after the 2 fishermen defectors arrived, which was on November 4, 2019. On November 5, 2019, Moon Jae-in sent a personal letter to Kim Jong-un, inviting him to the ROK-ASEAN Special Summit to be held in Busan on November 27, 2019, along with a request to hand over the 2 fishermen defectors and their fishing boat to North Korea, and the next day, North Korea approved sending the defectors and the boat back. The defector community in South Korea believe that the two defectors were sent back as a “concession” or “gift” to Kim Jong-un to entice him to visit South Korea. 

   No effort to rescue ROK citizen Lee Dae-jun at sea, framed him (September 2020)

Suh Hoon was also investigated in December 2022 for framing Lee Dae-jun, the Ministry of Maritime and Fisheries official shot dead and burnt by North Korea on September 22, 2020 during the Moon administration, as a traitor who defected to North Korea. Although South Korean citizens were horrified that the government took no action to protect a South Korean citizen, Moon’s priority was making the “end of war declaration” speech, which mimicked North Korea’s position, at the UN through video conference in the early hours of September 23, 2020. During September 23-24, 2020, intelligence and reports were deleted from the NIS and the Ministry of National Defense, and Suh Hoon was charged for ordering the deletion.

Soon after stating he has no intention of evading the investigations by the prosecutors, Suh Hoon quickly left Korea for the U.S. in June 2022 on a tourist visa, which allowed him to remain in the U.S. for up to 6 months. Suh Hoon eventually returned to Korea and was arrested on December 3, 2022. Moon Jae-in posted comments of support for Suh Hoon on social media. Moon referred to Suh Hoon as the “best North Korea expert and negotiator, who had participated in all the negotiations with North Korea by the Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in governments” and lamented that “such an asset is destroyed.” Suh Hoon played a key role in stopping and slowing investigations, which helped North Korea.

Park Sun-won

Park Sun-won

It appears Park Sun-won (박선원), then #2 man at the NIS, and also considered the real power at the NIS during the Moon administration, was a key obstacle to the investigation of North Korean espionage during the administration. (22:12) During his student days, Park Sun-won was a key cadre of the underground Jusapa (KimIlSungism/KimJongIlism) organization, SamMinTooWi (삼민투위), which was anti-U.S. (21:50) SamMinToo is an abbreviation for the 3 “Min” Struggle:  Minjok Tongil, Minju Jangchui, Minjoong Haebang (Minjok Unification, Democracy Attainment, Liberation of the Masses). 

(Note: Minjok means people of the same tribe or ethnicity, and often is translated as “nation” or “national,” but for most Koreans, it indicates the “Korean people.” When the Korean Workers’ Party or its sympathizers use the term “minjok,” it means “Kim Il-sung minjok,” which is not all Korean people, but those who accept KimIlSungism. It is confusing on purpose as part of Terminology Confusion Tactics.  Translating Minjok Tongil as “National Unification” loses that meaning, thus it is translated here as “Minjok Unification”—unified Korea controlled by those who adhere to KimIlSungism, thus a unified totalitarian Korea, not one that is based on liberal democracy and market economy.)

Park Sun-won was the chairman of SamMinTooWi (3 Min Struggle Committee), which occupied the U.S. Embassy’s Cultural Center by force in the 1980s, demanding that the U.S. apologize for the events in May 1980 during the Gwangju Uprising, a baseless accusation. He also defended North Korea by denying North Korea sank the ROK Navy ship Cheonan, instead blaming the ROK government. During the administrations of Rho Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in, Park Sun-won played a key role in planning and implementing pro-North Korea policies. (22:39) He often clashed with those who were pro-ROK-U.S. alliance during the Rho Moo-hyun administration. During the Moon administration, Park Sun-won, was the director of NIS’ Planning and Coordination Office (기획조정실장), which controls the budget, until March 26, 2021, when Moon Jae-in appointed him to be the First Deputy Director (제1차장), the #2 position at the NIS.

Park Ji-won

The “Chungbuk Comrade Association for Independent Unification” espionage case was finally approved for investigation under Park Ji-won (박지원), Suh Hoon’s successor, but even that required brave lower-ranking officials at the NIS, who risked their careers, to convince Park Ji-won. According to Huh Hyun-jun (허현준), former Blue House official in the Park Geun-hye administration, the officials in charge of the North Korea spy case directly went to Pak Ji-won, gave him the investigation data, and asked him to approve investigating the case as soon as possible in a quite intense manner. (23:50) They said if the case is not investigated, it will become quite burdensome for the Moon administration later, and that Park could face criminal prosecution for dereliction of duty or abuse of authority. Thus, reluctant Park Ji-won was impelled to allow the investigation and the spy case became known to the public. 

Lacking will to investigate spy cases under Moon Jae-in

According to Dr. Yoo Dong-ryul, the director of the Korea Institute for Liberal Democracy, from early 2011- 2017 (prior to Moon Jae-in administration), there were 26 spy cases investigated (about 4 per year). During 2018-2020 (under Moon Jae-in), only 3 people (the Chungbuk Comrade Association) were investigated, as described above. As for military and defense-related spy cases, during 2011-2016, then-Defense Security Command (DSC) arrested 48 violators of the National Security Law, and sent them for military or civilian prosecution, as appropriate. Under Moon Jae-in, the DSC was abolished, and the renamed Defense Security Support Command (DSSC), with its key function of counterintelligence taken away. DSSC made no spy arrests. With the current Yoon Suk-yeol administration, DSSC has become Defense Counterintelligence Command (DCC) (국군방첩사령부).

Moon Jae-in, who called for abolishing the National Intelligence Service (NIS), significantly reduced the NIS’ counterintelligence capability related to North Korea in the name of reform. He crushed the morale of the NIS by, among others, paying tribute to a communist spy—Shin Young-bok (신영복)—by erecting a large rock engraved with Shin’s calligraphy at the entrance of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in June 2021. It was removed soon after Moon’s presidency ended. Moon publicly stated that Shin Young-bok was the ideologist whom Moon admired the most, and displayed Shin’s calligraphy at the PyongChang Winter Olympics Reception on February 10, 2018.

Shin Young-bok was crucial to the formation of the subversive operations of the Unification Revolutionary Party (URP, 통일혁명당), an underground organization created by the order of the Korean Workers’ Party (Controlled by North Korea). The URP maintained that South Korea is a colony of the U.S. and that the Korean people by themselves should expel their colonial master, the U.S., and overthrow the South Korean government through armed revolution in order to establish socialism. Uncovered in 1968 by the South Korean government, the Unification Revolutionary Party case was the most significant espionage case in the 1960s.

Under former president Moon Jae-In, his political party forced through a law that takes away NIS’s authority to investigate North Korean spy cases, and transfers that authority to the police, which lacks the capacity and capability that NIS has. The transfer is to take effect on January 1, 2024.

The Prosecutor General in the Moon administration

The Moon administration continued to interfere in the investigations once the Chungju Spy case was sent to the prosecutors. The Chungju District prosecutors arrested 3 of the 4 Chungju Spy Ring members (the judge rejected the arrest warrant for the fourth one), and was taking affidavits from dozens of labor and civil society activists in North Chungcheong Province. They requested additional prosecutors from the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office [headed by Kim O-soo (김오수)] in August 2021, but the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office rejected the Chungju prosecutor’s request. 

What about the Court? Suspects Released

All three suspects were released. On March 15, 2022, one member of the Chungju Spy Ring was released from the Chungju Women’s Prison due to the expiration of her detention period. The other two were released on bail, despite the prosecutors’ opposition, as the judges granted the spy suspects’ bail requests on May 10, 2022. As mentioned earlier, the 4th suspect’s arrest warrant was rejected from onset by a judge.

The court hearing was on April 26, 2022, but the trial has come to a standstill. In May 2022, the spy suspects changed their lawyers to the Minbyun lawyers, who have been delaying the trial by various methods. Minbyun lawyers are infamous for supporting the interests of North Korea in legal battles, for example in demanding the ROK government return 12 defectors, who worked at a North Korean restaurant in Ningpo, China. The Minbyun lawyers also tried to cajole the defectors into going back to North Korea on numerous occasions. In a similar fashion, Minbyun lawyers have defended North Korean spy suspects and pro-North Korea activists for decades.

After their release, the suspects continued to communicate with spy suspects in other ongoing investigations which will be discussed in an upcoming article. At least one member of the Chungbuk Comrade Association communicated with KCTU cadre, who are currently under investigation for meeting North Korean agents in 3rd countries and establishing separate underground organizations at the direction of the Cultural Exchange Bureau. 

These suspects are the Director of the Organization Department at the KCTU and the vice chairman of the Korean Metal Workers’ Union (전국금속노동조합) of the KCTU. They are two of four KCTU current and former cadres, who came under investigation in January 2023.

It appears that North Korea has had a relatively permissive environment in South Korea for creating secret extensions of the Workers’ Party of Korea to conduct subversive operations against South Korea. As the investigations continue, more will be revealed about how extensive these networks of underground organizations are and what other activities they have performed under the direction of North Korea.

9. Hyesan authorities crack down hard on Chinese cell phone users, including money transfer brokers



This will have a significant impact on markets and smuggling. It will have an impact on escapee families trying to get other family members out of Korea as well as escapees who are sending money back to families to help them survive while they remain in north Korea.


Hyesan authorities crack down hard on Chinese cell phone users, including money transfer brokers

“Recently, the amount of money that defectors send back to their families [in North Korea] has gone down, so money transfer brokers are not making much money,” a source told Daily NK

By Lee Chae Un - 2023.01.27 9:00am

dailynk.com

FILE PHOTO: A border patrol checkpoint in Pungso County, Yanggang Province, can be seen in this photo, which was taken in February 2019. (Daily NK)

Hyesan authorities have been arresting around one person per day amid a recent crackdown on illegal Chinese cell phone users, a source in Yanggang Province told Daily NK on Jan. 18.

Since December, the Yanggang Province branch of the Ministry of State Security has been jamming telecommunications signals in Hyesan, making it impossible for local residents to use their Chinese cell phones.

Daily NK reported in late December that Yanggang residents who depend on money transfers for their livelihoods were baffled when the Yanggang Province branch of the MSS began jamming telecommunications in mid-December.

Starting on Jan. 10, however, a rumor began circulating in Hyesan that there was good reception for Chinese cellphones in certain parts of the city’s outskirts. Chinese cell phone users such as money transfer brokers who heard the rumor began visiting these areas to make international calls.

“The ministry’s radio wave detection bureau has just been broadcasting jamming signals in particular areas, so there are other places where phones still get reception,” the source said. “Under these conditions, money transfer brokers who need to contact the outside world are flocking to places where they can receive phone signals.”

However, the Hyesan branch of the MSS is taking advantage of this situation by ferreting out Chinese cell phone users in places they are gathering.

“Plainclothes state security agents have been working with neighborhood watch units to conduct stakeouts on the street and in various places to crack down on Chinese cell phone users,” the source said. “The neighborhood watch units stake out neighborhoods and tell state security agents when non-residents enter the area and which houses they go into. Biding their time, state security agents then storm into the houses.”

Unaware of the MSS stakeouts, people who go to the houses of family members and acquaintances to make international calls are like rats in a trap when the agents suddenly rush in.

“Recently, the amount of money that defectors send back to their families [in North Korea] has gone down, so money transfer brokers are not making much money,” the source said. “Unable to contact the outside world due to poor phone reception, the brokers are impatient they will miss out on business opportunities. That’s why they are so careless with regard to the MSS stakeouts.”

On Jan. 14, a broker brought the family of a defector to the home of an acquaintance who lives in an area with cell phone reception. After coming to the house, the entire group was caught by state security agents who had been on stakeout nearby.

Within five minutes of their arrival, agents had followed the group inside, questioned them about where they came from and why they were there, and even conducted body searches. In the end, all the money the group had was confiscated and they were taken to the MSS headquarters.

“The Hyesan branch of the MSS has been using this technique to crack down on users of Chinese cellphones. Family members of defectors, phone brokers, and money transfer brokers have been getting arrested and taken to the MSS at a rate of around one person every day. On the other hand, agents are making money and obtaining good results leading up to the Lunar New Year, so they are implementing the crackdown with enthusiasm,” the source said.

Translated by Nick Seltzer. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com




10. South Korea’s Economic Security Dilemma


Conclusion:

Seoul now has to choose between geography and trade, which prioritizes Beijing as the main partner, and defense and security cooperation, which calls for closer strategic alignment with Washington. Since Seoul normalized its relations with Beijing in the early 1990s, increased trade with China and defense relations with the United States did not contradict each other. However, in light of threats emanating from North Korea and the intensifying Sino-U.S. competition over advanced technologies, Seoul is seeking closer alignment with Washington. That said, economic considerations remain an important factor in Seoul’s strategic calculations while deciding its foreign and domestic policy engagements, making it much more difficult to exercise strategic autonomy.
Yoon offered a potential solution to this problem at the WEF, where he called for “the global economic order’s return to the free trade system based on universal norms.” However, he also emphasized a qualifying condition: “We will align and cooperate with mutually trusted countries in full compliance with the universal rules to secure the global supply chain’s stability.” Contradictions in defining “universal norms,” rules, and fairness will pose a test for China-South Korea relations – and South Korea-U.S. relations for that matter.
Amidst this complexity, Seoul will find it difficult to balance its interests going forward. It remains to be seen whether Seoul can avoid participating in bloc formation – and if not, how would it ensure its strengthening alliance with Washington in the tech and defense sectors will not influence its economic relations with China going forward.


South Korea’s Economic Security Dilemma

As China-U.S. competition securitizes more and more economic transactions, Seoul’s old balancing act between the rivals is becoming trickier to sustain.

By Moksh Suri and Abhishek Sharma

January 25, 2023

thediplomat.com · by Moksh Suri · January 25, 2023

Advertisement

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, during his special address to the World Economic Forum (WEF), stated that the “Republic of Korea, which boasts the world’s top-notch production technologies and manufacturing capabilities in semiconductor, rechargeable batteries, steelmaking, and biotechnology, will be a key partner in the global supply chain.” That declaration furthers Yoon’s vision of South Korea as a “global pivotal state” and supplements Seoul’s recently released Indo-Pacific Strategy, which is premised on three principles: inclusiveness, trust, and reciprocity.

The intensification of China-U.S. strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific is diminishing space for cooperation and increasing the risk of confrontation between the two powers. As this competition intensifies, states are increasingly finding their autonomy constrained. Fragmentation of supply chains, trade protectionism, and the securitization of emerging technologies, among other issues, are the primary causes of this polarization. South Korea, one of the key powers of the Indo-Pacific, is caught up in this strategic rivalry and has been forced to rethink its earlier posture of strategic ambiguity. Seoul’s cautious policy of strategic ambiguity, manifested in a way that carefully navigates between Washington and Beijing, is now proving to be futile, and geopolitical tensions are incrementally pushing Seoul toward closer strategic alignment with Washington.

The contest between economic prosperity and security considerations in Seoul’s strategic outlook was a matter of concern even during the Park Geun-hye administration (2013-2017) and became quite prominent during Moon Jae-in presidency (2017-2022), when relations with China turned sour because of the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. But with advanced and critical technologies being a new strategic disruptor in Seoul’s relations with the United States and China, the emerging reality will make it difficult for Seoul to have a policy of strategic clarity in its foreign and trade policy.

What was earlier confined to geopolitical contestation is now getting entangled with geoeconomics. Since critical technologies have emerged as a strong link between geopolitics and geoeconomics, resilient supply chains, trusted sources, and access to rare earth materials are becoming more vital factors in shaping Seoul’s long-term strategic outlook. Therefore, Seoul’s Indo-Pacific strategy also seems to be an endeavor to provide the leadership enough space to pursue selective cooperation with Beijing to avoid an overly adversarial relationship, while also prioritizing closer alignment vis-à-vis Washington.

“The rivalry for technological hegemony and the weakening of the multilateral trade system has led to the weakening of the global supply chains,” Yoon stated during his speech at the WEF, acknowledging the changing nature of strategic alignment, which is premised on international norms, rule of law, trust, and supply chain resilience. As states increasingly adopt measures to securitize the technology sector, information and communications technology, artificial intelligence, 5G, and 6G are seen as strategic assets that must be protected from infiltration by foreign adversaries.

This trend of securitizing strategic assets is not limited to the United States but is proliferating in South Korea, fueled by the technology sector’s linkage with national security considerations. Now reliabilitytrust, and resilience are national security matters, and not just aspirational values.

South Korea has also tried to realign its strategy and posture vis-à-vis emerging technologies. We can observe an incremental shift from ambiguity to alignment in Seoul’s outlook on critical emerging technologies. This shifting posture can be traced through the South Korea-U.S. joint statements during the Moon and Yoon administration: Under Yoon, the emphasis has been put on working “to prevent the use of advanced technologies to undermine our national and economic security,” moving a step ahead from just “cooperation” during Moon’s administration.

Advertisement

Other key developments that make a case for Seoul’s closer strategic alignment with Washington are South Korea’s semiconductor companies relocation of some investment to the United States; Seoul’s intention to join the strategic CHIP 4 initiative; and South Korea’s participation in the Indo-Pacific Economic Forum (IPEF) and the Washington-led minerals security partnership.

Similarly, Seoul’s Indo-Pacific Strategy has a separate chapter for strengthening cooperation in critical domains of science and technology, which emphasizes “engaging in collaborative networks with the U.S. while expanding technology cooperation with Europe, Canada and Australia.”

For critical and advanced technologies, Seoul also seeks active participation with the Quad. Seoul’s Indo-Pacific strategy has also indicated its desire to gradually expand avenues of cooperation with the Quad. Meanwhile, China is conspicuously absent as a strategic partner.

Beijing perceived Seoul to be taking a more non-aligned posture on the emerging Sino-U.S. technological competition under Moon. However, the U.S. has upped the ante since then – and increased Beijing’s sense of urgency. China has now clearly expressed its opposition to the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Chinese media outlets even warned Seoul that it should “independently formulate its own semiconductor industrial strategies,” adding that “whether South Korean chipmakers will expand or lose market share in China now depends on South Korea’s industrial policy for its semiconductor sector.”

South Korean trade is heavily dependent on China, its largest trading partner, with semiconductor exports reaching around $42 billion per year. The frictions may also have implications for China-South Korea FTA negotiations in the service and investment sector, raising the risks for Seoul.

Economic Considerations and Supply Chain Resilience

A closer alignment with the U.S. in the technology domain will not necessarily translate into closer cooperation in trade and commerce. Even if this were to happen, it would either demand structural changes in the way Seoul perceives its relations with Beijing or a likely scenario where Seoul profits from new markets, which might offset the trade costs from dependency on China.

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

Thus far, South Korea has maintained a balanced trade relationship with China and has benefited from outsourcing manufacturing. With Seoul’s decreasing population, any chances of taking further economic risks would find no unanimous support in either conservative or progressive parties. The need for a bipartisan consensus domestically on how to deal with China vis-à-vis trade persists.

Even as South Korean companies are moving out of China, this does not have to imply decoupling or full alignment with Washington. While Seoul clearly has concerns, such as in supply chain resilience, there is an understanding between Beijing and Seoul on working to resolve these issues bilaterally.

Another factor that creates suspicion in Seoul is the lack of political certainty in the United States and the rise of economic nationalism and trade protectionism. Donald Trump’s presidency (2017-2021), and his prioritization of domestic manufacturing, was symbolic of this changing political environment. President Joe Biden has further continued this legacy with the passage of the IRA, showing that the trend of polarization is still intact. With the 2024 U.S. presidential elections approaching, Seoul will be cautious in taking any drastic steps against Beijing.

Advertisement

However, the question will be how China perceives Seoul’s changing posture. Till now, Beijing has reacted neutrally to Seoul’s growing profile in the region, as China saw the shift as not directed toward itself. So far, Beijing does not see Seoul as joining the “anti-China bloc,” but that could change. Yoon also recognizes this trend, saying in Davos that “cooperation between countries in the realms of security, economy, and advanced technologies has been increasingly regarded as a package deal, giving rise to the trend of bloc-forming among countries.”

Yoon also acknowledged that the “boundaries between security, economic, and cutting-edge scientific technologies are blurring,” putting high-tech exporters like South Korea in a bind.

Defense and Security Considerations: Spoiler in China-South Korea Relations?

Beijing also feels uneasy about the deployment of U.S. regional missile defense systems such as THAAD in South Korea, which undermines China’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. While Beijing has conveyed its concerns directly to Seoul in the past, it also resorted to the use of economic coercion to be more assertive in its approach. As the Yoon administration pursues a policy of strengthening military cooperation within the alliance, it could cause frictions with China.

Seoul and Beijing’s contrasting approaches to responding to nuclear threats from Pyongyang is another point of contention. Earlier, South Korea-U.S. defense cooperation and joint military exercises directed toward North Korea were one factor that irked Beijing, which saw these developments as indirectly targeting China by building Seoul’s defensive capabilities. Those concerns were settled with an agreement on the “Three Nos,” which committed South Korea not to deploy additional THAAD batteries, join a U.S. missile defense network, or sign onto a trilateral military alliance with the U.S. and Japan.

Thus, renewed support in South Korea for the continued deployment of THAAD missiles and calls for building a nuclear arsenal would further strain bilateral relations and will likely impact trade. Based on past precedent, security developments in the Korean Peninsula will overflow into China-South Korea economic relations, and the perception that Seoul seeks to isolate Beijing by restricting exports of critical technologies will further fuel misunderstandings.

Conclusion

Seoul now has to choose between geography and trade, which prioritizes Beijing as the main partner, and defense and security cooperation, which calls for closer strategic alignment with Washington. Since Seoul normalized its relations with Beijing in the early 1990s, increased trade with China and defense relations with the United States did not contradict each other. However, in light of threats emanating from North Korea and the intensifying Sino-U.S. competition over advanced technologies, Seoul is seeking closer alignment with Washington. That said, economic considerations remain an important factor in Seoul’s strategic calculations while deciding its foreign and domestic policy engagements, making it much more difficult to exercise strategic autonomy.

Yoon offered a potential solution to this problem at the WEF, where he called for “the global economic order’s return to the free trade system based on universal norms.” However, he also emphasized a qualifying condition: “We will align and cooperate with mutually trusted countries in full compliance with the universal rules to secure the global supply chain’s stability.” Contradictions in defining “universal norms,” rules, and fairness will pose a test for China-South Korea relations – and South Korea-U.S. relations for that matter.

Amidst this complexity, Seoul will find it difficult to balance its interests going forward. It remains to be seen whether Seoul can avoid participating in bloc formation – and if not, how would it ensure its strengthening alliance with Washington in the tech and defense sectors will not influence its economic relations with China going forward.

GUEST AUTHOR

Moksh Suri

Moksh Suri is a research trainee at the European Army Interoperability Centre in Brussels. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations from Leiden University. 

GUEST AUTHOR

Abhishek Sharma

Abhishek Sharma is a Ph.D. Candidate in Korean Studies at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi, where his research focuses on the intersection between New Emerging Technologies and the Geopolitics of East Asia. He is a Non-Resident Kelly fellow at Pacific Forum. 

thediplomat.com · by Moksh Suri · January 25, 2023


11. S. Korea to support civilian aid to North in hopes of talks



Aid to the suffering Korean people in the north is the right thing to do. However, we should be under no illusion that it will somwhoe motivate Kim to come to the table for talks. Kim continues to prioritize nuclear and missile development over the welfare of the Korean people. Its latest policy direction calls for an exponential increase in nuclear weapons and there is no mention of relief and food aid for the Korean people. Kim is not moved negotiate by humanitarian aid and according to some of my escapee friends says that any aid that is not diverted to the regime leite and the military is used to benefit Kim Jong Un's legitimacy = meaning that the Propaganda and Agitation Department spins such aid as a gift from Kim Jong Un. Many of my escapee friends say that despite the horrendous suffering of the Korean people the international community should not provide aid because of how Kim exploits it by diverting it and propagandizing it.


Buried lede:


The “New Future Initiative on Unification” will be released by the end of the year after an opinion-gathering process, the ministry said in a statement.


​Some of the bumper stickers for the new initiative: "Onward toward unification," ​ "Unification On," "UniOn"

S. Korea to support civilian aid to North in hopes of talks

AP · by KIM TONG-HYUNG · January 27, 2023

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — South Korea’s government said Friday it will promote civilian efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to North Korea in hopes of softening a diplomatic freeze deepened by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s growing nuclear ambitions.

South Korean Unification Minister Kwon Youngse didn’t specify the type of aid he sees as conceivable or whether it was realistic to expect those exchanges to induce meaningful diplomatic breakthroughs.

North Korea has suspended virtually all cooperation with rival South Korea since the collapse of its nuclear negotiations with the United States in 2019 over disagreements in exchanging the release of U.S.-led sanctions and steps to cut back its nuclear weapons and missiles program.

Kim further ramped up tensions in 2022, test-firing more than 70 missiles, including potentially nuclear-capable weapons of various ranges targeting South Korea and the continental United States.

ADVERTISEMENT

Kim punctuated his testing activity with provocative statements that North Korea would preemptively use its nukes in crisis situations against South Korea or the U.S., as the allies revived their large-scale military exercises — which had been downsized in recent years — to counter the North’s growing threat.

Politics

RNC Chair McDaniel fights for reelection in leadership feud

5 women, immense power: Can they keep US from fiscal brink?

Trump impeachment leader Schiff joins California Senate race

SUPREME COURT NOTEBOOK: Warren is 5th justice with Navy ship

While ignoring South Korean calls for talks, the North has ridiculed President Yoon Suk Yeol’s offer for economic benefits in exchange for denuclearization steps, accusing Seoul of recycling “foolish” proposals Pyongyang already rejected.

Kwon’s news conference Friday was to address reporters on the ministry’s policy plans for 2023. But the dearth of new ideas for reviving dialogue underscored how rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula have sidelined a ministry dedicated to improving relations with the North and promoting an eventual peaceful unification.

Although South Korea’s current priority is to maintain a strengthened defense posture against the North in conjunction with its alliance with the United States, it’s also critical to make consistent efforts to revive an atmosphere for dialogue, Kwon said.

“To reopen a path for dialogue amid tightly strained South-North relations and to build trust between the South and North, even if it’s little by little, we will support the efforts of civilian organizations to resume contact with North Korea and also try to broaden contact through international organizations,” said Kwon.

ADVERTISEMENT

Kwon said that South Korea has not made any new offers for inter-Korean government talks after North Korea ignored repeated calls for meetings in 2022.

The South had proposed talks in May to set up Southern provisions of vaccines and other COVID-19 supplies after the North acknowledged an outbreak. The North was unresponsive again in September, when the South called for a meeting to arrange reunions of families separated since the 1950-53 Korean War ahead of that month’s Chuseok holidays, the Korean Thanksgiving.

The reunions of those families, as well as the issue of bringing back South Korean civilians who remain detained by the North, would be prioritized if talks between the Koreas do resume, Kwon said.

ADVERTISEMENT

Kwon said the ministry also plans to update South Korea’s long-term vision for an eventual unification with North Korea to reflect recent changes in global geopolitics and help maintain the South Korean public’s support for a future combined statehood, which weakened in recent years amid the North’s nuclear push.

The “New Future Initiative on Unification” will be released by the end of the year after an opinion-gathering process, the ministry said in a statement.

The ministry said it will also publicize annual reports on North Korea’s human rights record starting in March to raise awareness on the issue.

During an interview with The Associated Press this month, Yoon reiterated his plans to provide economic assistance to North Korea if it shows sincere commitment toward abandoning its nuclear weapons program.

Yoon said he isn’t demanding North Korea to completely denuclearize upfront, but appeared to set a high bar for talks, citing inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency as an example of the steps the North should take in order to receive economic benefits.

AP · by KIM TONG-HYUNG · January 27, 2023




12. Seoul to work with Hanoi to pursue peace on Korean peninsula



I have been amazed at the amount of international support there is for unification. I have spoken with a relatively large number of people from the region who are supportive of Korean unification. 


Seoul to work with Hanoi to pursue peace on Korean peninsula

The Korea Times · January 27, 2023

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, center, waves as he departs Dong Dang railway station in Dong Dang, a Vietnamese border town, in this March 2, 2019, file photo. The Ministry of Unification said Friday that it will begin various projects this year with Vietnam's authorities to renew peace efforts for the Korean Peninsula. AP-Yonhap


Ministry of Unification plans projects with Vietnam, key partner of both Koreas


By Jung Min-ho

After more than three years of no progress on the issue of peace for the Korean Peninsula, Seoul is now exploring ways to renew efforts in the country where it came to a sudden halt ― Vietnam.


In an effort to create something meaningful after the fruitless 2019 summit between Washington and Pyongyang in Hanoi, the Ministry of Unification will begin various projects this year with the authorities in Vietnam, such as building up an archive of how the Southeast Asian nation became an economic success story through its radical reforms.


According to a written plan Unification Minister Kwon Young-se submitted to President Yoon Suk Yeol on Friday, the ministry also seeks to set up a joint advisory group with Vietnam and strengthen ties with experts and scholars in that country.


Speaking to reporters the previous day, a high-ranking official at the ministry said authorities in Vietnam agreed to cooperate for the noteworthy cause and meet their South Korean counterparts to discuss possible joint projects.

"As we have learned lessons from German reunification over the past 30 years, North Korea took their lessons from Vietnam's example. We need to study what they study to learn what the North has learned so as to better comprehend its views," the official said.


Unification Minister Kwon Young-se speaks during a press conference at the government complex in Seoul, Friday, following his presentation to President Yoon Suk Yeol. Yonhap


Citing Vietnam's decision to introduce "Doi Moi," the economic reforms initiated in 1986 to create a "socialist-oriented market economy," the official also mentioned the possibility that North Korea might consider emulating the same path eventually.


In fact, Vietnam has much know-how to share with North Korea. It fought a war with the U.S. for 20 years before its reunification in 1975 and suffered from harsh economic sanctions (for occupying Cambodia) by many countries afterward. However, since adopting a strategy of integrating itself into the world's free-market economic system, Vietnam has become richer and more stable. In the process, it also restored relations with the U.S. while maintaining friendly ties with North Korea and a one-party system.


There were signs that North Korea was willing to learn from its "communist comrade" state. In 2018, North Korea's then-Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho visited Vietnam to study its reforms. It was also reported that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's delegation informed Vietnam's government that he was interested in visiting a Samsung factory in the country ahead of his summit with then-U.S. President Donald Trump.


Yoon asked the ministry to stay optimistic and be prepared for the possibility of Korea's unification, which many now believe is improbable.


"The opportunity for unification could come suddenly and it would be achievable only if we were prepared," Yoon said.


A man reads a copy of the Rodong Sinmun, North Korea's official newspaper, on a bus in Pyongyang, North Korea, in this Jan. 11, 2021, file photo. The Ministry of Unification plans to give the public better access to North Korean media. AFP-Yonhap


South Korean public to get better access to one of North Korea's official newspapers


In another major project for 2023, the unification ministry said it plans to give the public better access to North Korean media.


The ministry will launch a pilot project to make Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of Pyongyang's Central Committee of the Workers' Party, more accessible to people here.


Reading the papers or watching TV content from the North is legally permissible ― but only in government-designated places. Few know where they are located and it is difficult to get up-to-date information. Therefore, most of those interested in understanding North Korea get such content from overseas-based websites or by using a VPN, which could be considered unlawful under the National Security Law.


Speaking to The Korea Times, a ministry official said the government ultimately aims to give the public online access to Rodong Sinmun and other North Korean media content. But doing so would take longer than a year, given many legal issues and concerns.


However, he said, lifting the decades-old ban on public access to such content would lead to a positive change in North Korea, as the informed and educated readers of the South could pressure North Korean reporters when they make or report illogical or foolish "facts."




The Korea Times · January 27, 2023


13. Unification Ministry seeks to disclose more N. Korean information to public


Excellent. Release all information about north Korea. It will not have a negative influence in the South. Most people will not be swayed by the north's propaganda. At first people will be interested in the novelty, they they will become bored with it, and then they will mock it.


But most importantly, allowing unfettered access to information from the north provides the ROK the moral high ground for its own information operations to get information to the Korean people in the north.


I met a military officer from Korea who attended my lecture on the DPRK and the Gray Zone because he said he needed to learn more about north Korea. He said he was never exposed to any significant information about the north while he was in school up through college.


Unification Ministry seeks to disclose more N. Korean information to public

koreaherald.com · by Park Jun-hee · January 27, 2023

The Ministry of Unification aims to disclose more information on North Korea to the general public in 2023, it said Friday during a New Year’s policy briefing to President Yoon Suk Yeol.

The ministry said it would focus on improving accessibility and convenience by releasing more North Korean newspapers and broadcasts to the public.

It added that it would operate a pilot program by publishing information from Rodong Sinmun, an organ of the ruling Workers’ Party and the regime’s main newspaper, with the help of related ministries.

The ministry also hopes to launch a North Korean information center, dubbed the “mecca of North Korean information,” in Goyang, Gyeonggi Province, in September. It plans to open its doors to the public after completing the construction in the latter half of 2025.

In Unification Minister Kwon Young-se's briefing to President Yoon, Kwon said he would take “preparing for a unified future” and “implementing proper inter-Korean relations” as the main directions for this year’s agenda.

The ministry will also seek to raise public awareness in South Korea on the realities of the North through presentations by lecturers and North Korean defectors. Some 164,000 people attended 1,126 unification-related education sessions organized by the ministry last year.

It also aims to devise programs to inform those living abroad about the North Korean regime.

On restoring relations with the North, the ministry was not optimistic about the prospects for a breakthrough in inter-Korean dialogue that would thaw frozen ties. Should any discussion resume, it will discuss issues such as family reunions and human rights violations, it said.

“Although inter-Korean relations are expected to be in limbo like last year, the Unification Ministry will try to pave the way toward a denuclearized, peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula,” Kwon said.



By Park Jun-hee (junheee@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Park Jun-hee · January 27, 2023



14. South Korea’s unions cry ‘red scare’ amid North Korea spy claims


It is not a "red scare." This is real.  north Korea is conducting active subversion of the South on multiple levels and lines of effort. This is just one.


South Korea’s unions cry ‘red scare’ amid North Korea spy claims

South Korea’s spy agency has accused members of the country’s largest union of illegally contacting North Korean agents.

Al Jazeera English · by Steven Borowiec

Seoul, South Korea – For the past six years, Kim Joo-hwan has worked as what in South Korea is known as a “substitute driver”.

He drives people home in their car when they cannot themselves because they have been drinking.

Using Kakao Mobility, a branch of one of South Korea’s biggest tech companies, customers can request a sober driver to meet them and safely take them and their car home, saving on the cost of parking overnight and the hassle of having to retrieve their car the next day.

Like a growing number of gig workers that rely on platform-based services such as Kakao, Kim has been involved in organising better working conditions and pay.

Last year, he helped establish a union to negotiate with Kakao management for better conditions, such as drivers being paid for the time they spend going to meet a client.

But now Kim feels he is watching his government, led by conservative President Yoon Seok-yeol, resort to an old tactic he remembers from his days as a young worker in the 1980s: tarring unionists as communists working on behalf of North Korea.

This month, South Korea’s spy agency raided the offices of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), a leading left-wing umbrella group that represents workers across several industries, on allegations that union officials had illegal contact with North Korean agents.

Local media have reported that the National Intelligence Service (NIS) suspects that a number of KTCU officials met with North Korean spies in China, Cambodia and Vietnam.

The KCTU condemned the raids as an effort to suppress the labour movement, promising to “struggle against the violence of the Yoon Suk-yeol regime”.

“This current government is seeking to divide workers, to expand the differences between different kinds of workers,” Kim told Al Jazeera.

“They know that if workers come together, they can cause big losses for companies,” he added.

Under South Korean law, citizens are prohibited from contact with North Korean people or organisations unless they receive government permission.

The country’s controversial National Security Law bans a range of activities, including expressions of sympathy with or support for North Korea, which fought a bloody war with South Korea from 1950 to 1953. The conflict ended in a stalemate that remains unresolved to this day.

Critics have long argued that the law is vaguely worded and can be easily misused by South Korean prosecutors and intelligence agents to muzzle left-wing critics.

The military strongmen Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, who ruled South Korea during the rapid industrialisation of the 1970s and 1980s, routinely cited the threat from North Korea as a pretext to suspend civil and political rights.

South Korean former President Park Chung-hee (centre) cited the threat from North Korea to suspend civil and political rights [File: AP]

More recently, conservative presidents, including Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, who ruled from 2008 to 2017, employed similar rhetoric to curtail speech and activism deemed pro-North Korean.

Yoon, a former chief prosecutor who had no political experience before entering office last May, has accused the labour movement of being a hotbed of corruption, singling out unions as one of three sources of “evil” holding back the country’s development.

To workers like Kim, the recent raids by the NIS, whose director is appointed by the president, feel like the latest iteration of a well-worn tactic.

“Even if there were individual members who actually had contact or relationships with the North Korean government, treating the entire union as an espionage organisation should be avoided,” Park Kyung-sin, a law professor at Korea University, told Al Jazeera.

“So far, some right-wing politicians are doing that and I hope that it does not actually affect the work of the Yoon administration,” Park said.

South Korea’s labour movement has long been known for the distinctly left-wing tenor of its activism.

Large organisations such as the KCTU and the Korea Metal Workers’ Union often hold rallies espousing customarily left-wing causes, including opposition to joint military exercises by South Korea and the United States, which fought against North Korea in the Korean War.

The unions object to the exercises on the grounds they serve only to antagonise North Korea and can increase the risk of a war breaking out on the Korean Peninsula, while arguing that South Korea should instead be seeking dialogue with Pyongyang.

In 2012, the KCTU voted to end its affiliation with the Unified Progressive Party (UPP), a minor left-wing party, amid controversy over the pro-North Korea views of some of its members.

Critics of the KCTU argue that, as a union, it should concern itself only with workplace matters, such as wage negotiations and advocating for workers who have grievances with their employers.

South Korea’s pro-business media have also called union members selfish for carrying out collective actions over the past year, at a time when the country has been struggling to reboot a sluggish economy after the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic.

“At a time of economic crisis, instead of sharing hardship, unions are carrying out an extreme struggle to fulfil members’ demands,” the right-leaning Donga Ilbo newspaper said in a recent editorial.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has accused the country’s trade union movement of being a significant source of corruption [Daewoung Kim/Reuters]

Unions have argued that the Yoon administration is attempting to scapegoat them and draw attention away from its own mistakes. The KCTU pointed out that the raids on its offices came shortly after Yoon had caused controversy while on a visit to the United Arab Emirates.

During a meeting with South Korean soldiers stationed in the country, Yoon said the UAE has an “enemy” in Iran, which is analogous to South Korea’s antagonistic relationship with North Korea. Iran accused Yoon of interfering in Iran-UAE relations and summoned the South Korean ambassador in Tehran to protest Yoon’s off-the-cuff comment.

It was not Yoon’s first flub while on an official trip overseas. While in New York last year, Yoon was caught on camera appearing to use foul language to refer to US politicians after he had a brief encounter with President Joe Biden.

The South Korean presidential office denied that Yoon had used any profane language, claiming that a local broadcaster misreported his words.

Kim, the gig worker, is now working to organise workers to lobby politicians for changes in the country’s labour law that would require companies to recognise contract workers as employees, and prevent companies from holding workers legally responsible for losses incurred during strikes.

“Myself and other platform workers are saying that we can’t live under this system anymore,” Kim said. “We have no choice but to struggle for something better.”

Al Jazeera English · by Steven Borowiec

15. Report to Congress on North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs




Report to Congress on North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs - USNI News

news.usni.org · January 26, 2023

The following is the Jan. 23, 2023 Congressional Research Service In Focus report, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs.

From the report

Overview

North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapons and missile programs despite UN Security Council sanctions and high-level diplomatic efforts. Recent ballistic missile tests and military parades suggest that North Korea is continuing to build a nuclear warfighting capability designed to evade regional ballistic missile defenses. Such an approach likely reinforces a deterrence and coercive diplomacy strategy—lending more credibility as it demonstrates capability—but it also raises questions about crisis stability and escalation control. Congress may choose to examine U.S. policy in light of these advances.

According to the U.S. intelligence community’s 2022 annual threat assessment, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un views nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as “the ultimate guarantor of his totalitarian and autocratic rule of North Korea and believes that over time he will gain international acceptance as a nuclear power.”

United States policy as well as United Nations resolutions call on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons. In a September 9, 2022, speech to North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim Jong Un rejected denuclearization talks and vowed the country would continue developing its “nuclear power.” The Assembly adopted a new law that reportedly expands the conditions under which North Korea would use nuclear weapons to include possible first use in situations that threaten the regime’s survival. The Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review said, “Any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime.”

Nuclear Testing

North Korea has tested a nuclear explosive device six times since 2006. Each test produced underground blasts progressively higher in magnitude and estimated yield. North Korea conducted its most recent test on September 3, 2017. A North Korean press release stated it had tested a hydrogen bomb (or two-stage thermonuclear warhead) that it was perfecting for delivery on an intercontinental ballistic missile.

In April 2018, North Korea announced that it had achieved its goals, would no longer conduct nuclear tests, and would close down its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. It dynamited the entrances to two test tunnels in May 2018 prior to the first Trump-Kim summit. In an October 2018 meeting with then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Kim Jong-un “invited inspectors to visit the [test site] to confirm that it has been irreversibly dismantled,” but this did not occur. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports say North Korea began restoring test tunnels in March 2022.

Nuclear Material Production

North Korea reportedly continues to produce fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for weapons. North Korea restarted its plutonium production facilities after it withdrew from a nuclear agreement in 2009, and is operating centrifuge uranium enrichment plants at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and possibly at Kangson. A March 2022 IAEA report says that there were no indications of operations at its Radiochemical Laboratory (reprocessing) plant since its last reprocessing campaign from February to July 2021. The IAEA notes ongoing operation of the Yongbyon Experimental Light Water 5MW(e) Reactor since July 2021. Spent fuel from that reactor is reprocessed at the Radiochemical Laboratory to extract plutonium for weapons. In September 2022, the IAEA reported ongoing uranium mining, milling, and concentration activities at Pyongsan. Fissile material production in large part determines the number and type of nuclear warheads a country is able to build.

Nuclear Warheads

Outside experts estimate that North Korea has produced enough fissile material for between 20 to 60 warheads. A 2021 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report says that North Korea “retains a stockpile of nuclear weapons.” Another goal of a nuclear weapons program is to lower the size and weight of a nuclear warhead for deployment on missiles. A July 2017 DIA assessment and some outside observers asserted North Korea had achieved the level of miniaturization required to fit a nuclear device on weapons ranging from short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Kim Jong-un in January 2021 said that the country was able to “miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical ones.”

Missile Development

North Korea conducted an unprecedented 63 ballistic missile test launches in 2022 according to U.S. government officials. U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions prohibit North Korea’s development of the means of delivering conventional and nuclear payloads, in addition to the nuclear weapons themselves. UNSC resolutions specifically ban “all ballistic missile tests” by North Korea. A ballistic missile is a projectile powered by a rocket engine until it reaches the apogee of its trajectory, at which point it falls back to earth using earth’s gravity. Ballistic missiles can deliver nuclear and large conventional payloads at high speed and over great distances. They are categorized as short-range, medium-range, or long-range (intercontinental) based on the distance from the launch site to the target.

Download the document here.

Related

news.usni.org · January 26, 2023




16. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs (CRS Report)


Download the 3 page document here: https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23587420/if10472.pdf


Updated January 23, 2023 

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs


Overview 


North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapons and missile programs despite UN Security Council sanctions and high-level diplomatic efforts. Recent ballistic missile tests and military parades suggest that North Korea is continuing to build a nuclear warfighting capability designed to evade regional ballistic missile defenses. Such an approach likely reinforces a deterrence and coercive diplomacy strategy—lending more credibility as it demonstrates capability—but it also raises questions about crisis stability and escalation control. Congress may choose to examine U.S. policy in light of these advances.


According to the U.S. intelligence community’s 2022 annual threat assessment, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un views nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as “the ultimate guarantor of his totalitarian and autocratic rule of North Korea and believes that over time he will gain international acceptance as a nuclear power.” 





17. America’s Allies Should Consider Going Nuclear


Kim Kong Un must be saying my strategy is working. I am driving a wedge in the ROK/US alliance. I have people talking about US withdrawal and especially an end of extended deterrence which will give me the upper hand on the peninsula to allow my continued political warfare to work and prepare for the ultimate use of force to achieve my objective to dominate the peninsula under the guerrilla dynasty and gulag state.


That said, I absolutely support DOug's right to express his views. Public discourse is good and important and strengthens our policies and strategy.


I just wish we would talk more about Kim Jong Un's strategy and how he exploits the friction caused by these issues. By exposing Kim's strategy and intent we reduce the effects.


America’s Allies Should Consider Going Nuclear - 

spectator.org · by Doug Bandow · January 27, 2023

Taiwan sits barely 100 miles off China’s coast and is increasingly vulnerable to attack by Beijing. America’s ambiguous, uncertain promise to defend the island will become increasingly difficult to back with military force. Imagine China attempting to defend Cuba from the United States. Taipei and America would be far more secure if the former possessed its own nuclear deterrent.

Much the same has been noted for Ukraine, which abandoned its Soviet hand-me-down nukes in 1994. In return, through the Budapest Memorandum, Kyiv received promises by the guaranteeing powers, including Moscow, to go to the United Nations if Ukraine was attacked. Which deterred no one. Although Kyiv did not possess the operational codes for its nuclear inheritance, the Ukrainian heirs might have eventually found a way to put the component parts to effective use. It is unlikely that Russia would have attacked a nuclear-armed Kyiv.

Paying to defend European states that in turn invest in generous social benefits for their peoples is a bizarre form of international wealth redistribution.

With North Korea’s relentless nuclear buildup and China’s evident intention to turn the U.S.–Russian nuclear duo into a threesome, South Korea and Japan are growing increasingly uncomfortable relying on Washington through “extended deterrence,” by which American officials promise to trade Los Angeles and New York for Seoul and Tokyo. Hence South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s dramatic expression of interest in acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent a half century after Seoul abandoned its nuclear program only under extreme pressure from the Nixon administration.

The American Spectator’s Francis P. Sempa attributes Yoon’s interest in nukes, as well as similar political currents in Japan, to the Biden administration’s failings. The latter are many, of course, but allies’ diminishing faith in America’s willingness to commit nuclear suicide over less-than-vital interests goes far deeper than the follies of one president. (Indeed, though President Joe Biden’s exit from Afghanistan was botched, staying would have been a far greater blow to American credibility, wasting even more lives and money in trying to implant democracy in Central Asia.)

The fundamental problem is that extended deterrence itself looks increasingly dubious. Observed Foreign Policy’s Stephen M. Walt:

[C]onvincing people you might use nuclear weapons to defend an ally isn’t easy. One might imagine a U.S. president using nuclear weapons to retaliate against a direct attack on U.S. territory or to deter the extremely unlikely prospect of a conventional invasion that threatened U.S. independence. This is the one thing nuclear weapons are good for: deterring existential threats to their possessors’ independence or autonomy.… Because the balance of resolve favors the defender, even much weaker nuclear powers can deter enemies from attacking them directly. If you don’t find this argument persuasive, remember the U.S. attacked non-nuclear Iraq in 2003 and non-nuclear Libya in 2011, but it leaves nuclear-armed North Korea alone.

Promises to defend allies, which almost by definition matter less than the homeland, always will be less convincing. After all, America could survive, however uneasily, in a world without them. Indeed, during the Cold War, military commanders said they would recommend against using tactical nukes in Europe, since the consequences would be so grievous — including the potential for escalation.

Former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara offered a sobering analysis four decades ago. He contended that once nukes started flying, full-scale nuclear war could scarcely be avoided:

Such an expectation requires the assumption that even though the initial strikes would have inflicted large-scale casualties and damage to both sides, one or the other—feeling disadvantaged—would give in. But under such circumstances, leaders on both sides would be under unimaginable pressure to avenge their losses and secure the interests being challenged. And each would fear that the opponent might launch a larger attack at any moment. Moreover, they would both be operating with only partial information because of the disruption to communications caused by the chaos on the battlefield (to say nothing of possible strikes against communications facilities). Under such conditions, it is highly likely that rather than surrender, each side would launch a larger attack, hoping that this step would bring the action to a halt by causing the opponent to capitulate.

Maybe that wouldn’t happen. Maybe responsible leaders would see the looming abyss and halt in time. Maybe. However, that is not the most likely reaction. What risks are Americans prepared to take? The result would not be “just” the deaths of hundreds of thousands or millions of Americans. It could be the destruction of America as we know it.


For what should we accept such risks? European countries that, after 70 years of NATO membership and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, still believe their security is America’s responsibility? Japan, which, had it spent a measly 2 percent of gross domestic product on its military over the last decade, would possess a navy strong enough to protect the homeland, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and surrounding waters? South Korea, well able to defend itself, possessing 50 times the economic strength and twice the population of the North? And Taiwan, which has lagged badly in its own defense efforts, preferring to rely on Washington?

The situation will become infinitely more dangerous when North Korea perfects its nuclear deterrent. Estimates of Pyongyang’s current nuclear arsenal are inexact, but the North Koreans likely possess sufficient fissile material for 45–55 weapons. Alas, that’s just today. Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un recently announced plans for an “exponential increase” in the North’s nuclear arsenal. The Asan Institute for Policy Studies and RAND Corporation have warned that North Korea could possess between 151 and 242 weapons by 2027, making Pyongyang a dangerous secondary nuclear power, well capable of destroying America. Equally disturbing, noted Asan/RAND, is that the North likely will possess “several dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and hundreds of theater missiles for delivering the nuclear weapons.”

Kim is not suicidal and won’t launch a first strike on the U.S. However, he could respond to Washington’s entry into a Korean War II by threatening to strike the American homeland. Imagine a reprise of Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s 1950 march toward the Yalu River, met this time not by China’s entry but by the use of tactical nukes backed by a threat to destroy cities across the U.S.

This illustrates the potential high cost of extended deterrence. Washington officials endlessly repeat the claim that allies are a force multiplier. In theory that could be the case, but not when supposed friends act as shameless international leeches, long-term defense dependents that treat the military as a form of international welfare. Paying to defend European states that in turn invest in generous social benefits for their peoples is a bizarre form of international wealth redistribution.

Add to that the much-increased risk of nuclear war and the bargain looks a lot worse. China, North Korea, and Russia are all malign powers. None, however, is suicidal. All have developed and expanded nuclear arsenals to deter America. Thankfully, none of Washington’s disputes with them are worth nuclear war. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the trio would go to war with the U.S. — other than over one of America’s many defense dependents. The simplest step to improve this nation’s security might be to end extended deterrence.

Despite the hopes of abolitionists, nuclear weapons are not going to disappear. Pandora’s box has been opened, and there is no way to press nuclear knowledge, along with the weapons, back into it. The best Washington can do is restrict their use to the defense of America. And step out of the way if friendly democratic powers in Asia or Europe decide to develop their own.

Ultimately, the problem is the profoundly messy world, not the addled Biden administration.

READ MORE:

Our Indo-Pacific Allies Signal That They Don’t Trust the Biden Administration’s Extended Deterrent

The GOP House Is Finally Coming for China

China Once Again Attempts to Fool America

Wargame Says US Would Beat China — But at Huge Cost

spectator.org · by Doug Bandow · January 27, 2023




18. No food, a shared blanket and public executions: Growing up in North Korea


Video and photos at the link. https://nypost.com/2023/01/26/no-food-and-public-executions-one-womans-life-in-north-korea/?utm_source=flipboard&utm_medium=syndicated&utm_campaign=partnerfeed


I strongly recommend her recent book.


No food, a shared blanket and public executions: Growing up in North Korea

New York Post · by Gavin Newsham · January 26, 2023

More On: north korea

Mike Pompeo joked to Kim Jong Un that he was ‘still trying to kill’ him during 2018 meeting, memoir reveals

Kim Jong-un’s daughter may determine North Korea’s fate

Book makes stunning claim that Trump mulled nuking North Korea in 2017, blaming another country

This week’s critical moment for Biden to act on China’s threat

Time wasn’t on Park Seong-il’s side. Weak, malnourished, and recovering from his third heart attack, he had just witnessed his brother die in his arms — and now the famine ravaging Kim Il-Sung’s North Korea seemed set to claim him, too.

His wife, Ro-Eun sook, was being chased by creditors and had disappeared completely while his son was wanted by the military for desertion. If one of them got caught or arrested, then they all would suffer the same fate.

Seong-il begged Jiyhun, his daughter and his full-time caregiver, to escape — even though it meant leaving him behind.

“There was silence,” writes Jihyun Park in “The Hard Road Out: One Woman’s Escape From North Korea” (Harper North). “An unbearable silence that no one dared to break for a long time.” Prior to leaving, Jihyun Park wrote her father a letter, which she remembers, verbatim, to this day: “Dearest Father, whom I have loved more than anything in this world, I have to leave you.”

In her memoir, Jihyun Park recounts a harrowing escape from North Korea — one of the most secretive and oppressive regimes in the world.

ANL/Shutterstock

Park was born in Chonjin on North Korea’s east coast.

Getty Images

In the book, Park tells the story of her attempts to flee one of the most secretive and oppressive regimes in the world, not once, but twice.

Jihyun Park was born on July 30, 1968, in Chonjin, a city on North Korea’s east coast. Like most of her countrymen, she was born into extreme poverty. She lived with her family in a tiny two-room apartment, measuring just 170 square feet, with just one blanket to share and a single light bulb used sparingly. “You had to be careful: light bulbs were rare, a gift of Kim Il-sung, and not available to everyone,” she recalls.

At school, they would have daily classes about the life of the country’s leader — the “Beloved Father” — and sing songs in his praise. Children were not permitted to celebrate their birthdays, because “only the birthday of Kim Il-sung, on April 15, is celebrated.”

Kim Il-sung was the leader of North Korea until 1994.

Getty Images

After lessons, Park was a member of the Corps of Young Pioneers and made to swear allegiance to Kim Il-sung (“‘Down with the Americans, destroyers of Korea!’ was the refrain”).

Then, when she returned home, she would play ‘Kill The Americans” with her younger brother, Jeong-ho, and when it snowed, they made American snowmen before pouring hot water over them, laughing as they melted. “We were the exalted heroes of the glorious fight,” writes Park.

Occasionally, the children were taken from school to watch public executions.

In the 1990s, North Korea was devastated by a famine that saw rationing, blackouts, and no running water — and up to 3 million deaths.

Associated Press

Occasionally, the children were taken from school to watch public executions.

Alamy Stock Photo

“It occurred to me that anyone could be executed: that it could be me,” she writes. “Back at home, our parents didn’t speak either, even though they had just returned from watching the same spectacle. My mother served dinner as usual, and then we all went to bed.

“We never spoke of what we had just seen.”

While her childhood was all any North Korean child had known, adulthood brought unimaginable hardship. In the 1990s, North Korea was devastated by a famine — state propaganda called it the “Arduous March” — that saw rationing, blackouts and no running water — and up to 3 million deaths.

While families in power thrived, the majority of the North Korean population lived in severe poverty.

Getty Images

As people died in the street, the military was called in to execute those people caught stealing food. Park, now a teacher, would also find one of her pupils, a 13-year-old boy called Lee Seung-Chul, dead against a wall in the local market. He is “the little barefoot boy who still haunts me to this day,” she writes.

Another victim was Park’s uncle. “If anyone asked, we told them that my uncle died of measles, that he had caught the childhood disease in later life,” writes Park. “One does not die of hunger in a socialist country.”

Park never saw her again.

Today, Jihyun Park lives in Bury, a small, industrial town near Manchester in the northwest of England.

Alamy Stock Photo

As her father’s health deteriorated, Park gave up her job as a teacher to look after him — but with neither food nor money, the future was bleak. “The idea of abandoning the children broke my heart, but the idea of having to beg food was even worse,” she writes.

And all the time, Park blamed the West for her situation. “No matter how hard I tried to resist it, I’d been brainwashed,” she now reflects.

By 1997, Park was left to look after her father on her own. Her mother had borrowed money, but unable to repay the loans, the debt collectors had started removing furniture and kitchen equipment from their home. In a bid to escape, she fled to China, telling Park she was going to visit a cousin and make some money.

Kim Jong Un is North Korea’s current leader.

REUTERS

On February 18, 1997, Jihyun Park left North Korea and headed through the mountains and across the border to China. Assured by a middleman that there would be well-paid work when she arrived, she was instead taken to the northern Chinese province of Heilongjiang and sold into a forced marriage for 5,000 yuan (around US $700).

Her new husband, Seong-ho Kim, was a 46-year-old farmer, a Chinese of North Korean descent. He was also an alcoholic and a gambler. He set her to work in the fields, paying her only rice and forbidding her from talking to the other North Korean women who lived in the village.

Work, housekeeping, and sex were all he wanted from her and, in the summer of 1998, she became pregnant. But as the baby would have no civil status and would be another mouth they could ill afford to feed, Park was ordered to have an abortion.

Instead, Park hid her pregnancy by wearing ever looser clothing.

Kim Il-sung is shown here greeting citizens — meanwhile, millions of people died of starvation.

Getty Images

On 20 April, 1999, Park gave birth to a son. “It was a boy and I named him Chul. The name means iron: strong as iron to face this pitiless world,” she writes. “He was my child of hope, and from then on my only reason for living.”

Her husband suggested selling the baby to pay off his gambling debts. With no money, a young child, and a husband in name only, life had become intolerable for Jihyun Park.

But on April 21, 2004, it became even worse. At 10 pm, she was taken from her home by 10 Chinese policemen. A neighbor had informed the authorities about her illegal status in the country, and now she would be deported back to North Korea by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

She had a choice. She could leave 5-year-old Chul in China and risk never seeing him again — or take him with her and, in all likelihood, leave him to starve to death while she spent the rest of her life in prison. She left him with Seong-ho. “I have never in my life felt such despair,” she writes.

Following two weeks in a high-security prison on Tumen near the Chinese-North Korean border, Park was moved to a labor camp in her birthplace, Chongjin. Each day began at 4:30 am and ended at 11 pm with Park dragging a plough full of fertilizer across the dry fields all day in her bare feet.

At school, children would have daily classes about the life of the country’s leader — the “Beloved Father” (Kim Il-sung, depicted here) — and sing songs in his praise.

Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images

In 2004, though, a cut on her foot became infected and, soon, gangrenous. “Over time my leg became darker and darker, until it was almost black,” she recalls. “The guards told me I was going to die soon.”

A prisoner that couldn’t work was worthless, and Park was thrown out onto the streets to die. Hungry and homeless, she sought refuge at a local orphanage where the boss helped her to recover. “He applied a white powder to my leg every day,” she says. “To this day, I don’t know what the powder was, but it worked nonetheless.”

Her recovery was the boost Park needed to find her son, Chul. With the help of another trafficker, she waded across the Tumen river and through the mountains into China, tracking her son down to her husband’s parents’ home.

On March 18, 2005, she was finally reunited with her son, “kidnapping” him with the intention of joining a group of other defectors and heading across the Gobi Desert to the Mongolian capital of Ulaanbaatar, where they would seek asylum at the South Korean embassy.

They didn’t make it.

“If anyone asked, we told them that my uncle died of measles, that he had caught the childhood disease in later life,” writes Park. “One does not die of hunger in a socialist country.”

AP

Pursued by police and unable to carry Chul, Park was assisted by one of the group, Kwang-hyun Joo, who threw her son over his shoulder and helped them to safety. Together they would spend three days in the Gobi Desert before the freezing conditions made them turn back.

They would settle in Beijing, lying low for a while — Park’s excellent Chinese allowed them to easily blend in — before applying for refugee status at the UN embassy. Their status was granted in 2007, and they began to plan a new life together.

Today, 14 years after she left Beijing to seek asylum in the United Kingdom, Jihyun Park, 54, lives in Bury, a small, industrial town near Manchester in the north-west of England. She married Kwang, the man who saved her, and lives with him and their two sons (including Chul, who is studying accounting at university in London) and a daughter.

When she arrived there in 2008, Park couldn’t speak any English — but in 2021, she stood in a local election to be a town counselor, the first person of North Korean descent to stand for political office in the UK. She works with fellow North Korean defectors, earning an award from Amnesty International in 2020.

To this day, Park has no idea what became of her mother or her brother.

And while she assumes her father died soon after she left North Korea, she has never known exactly what happened to him. It’s as she says in the final line of her letter to him: “If I never see you again, you know that I will never forgive myself.”

New York Post · by Gavin Newsham · January 26, 2023







De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Company Name | Website
Facebook  Twitter  Pinterest  
basicImage