Quotes of the Day:

“A ruling intelligentsia, whether in Europe, Asia or Africa, treats the masses as raw material to be experimented on, processed, and wasted at will.”

– Eric Hoffer, The Temper of Our Time

"The genius of the United States is not best or most in its executives or legislatures, nor in its ambassadors or authors or colleges, or churches, or parlors, nor even in its newspapers or inventors, but always most in the common people." 

– Walt Whitman

"If you ever need a helping hand, it's at the end of your arm. As you get older, you must remember you have a second hand. The first one is to help yourself, the second one is to help others." 

– Audrey Hepburn

1. RETIRED GEN. GORDON SULLIVAN DIES

2. High-end sex ring in Boston and D.C. areas was 'honeypot' scheme by Russia, China, South Korea or even Israel - to ensnare US officials, intelligence experts believe

3. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 3, 2024

4. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 3, 2024

5. US, allies promise larger military response if Red Sea attacks persist

6. Pompeo claims Biden administration has ‘accelerated the rate of decay’ in US deterrence

7. Deadly blast in Iran looks like 'a terrorist attack,' possibly ISIS -senior US official

8. Iran vows revenge after biggest attack since 1979 revolution

9. Taiwan reports China sent 4 suspected spy balloons over the island

10. Russia Moves Forward With Plans to Buy Iranian Ballistic Missiles

11. A Better Cyber Service

12. Learning from Failure: Afghanistan as a Microcosm for Strategic Competition

13. Can the Palestinian Authority Govern Gaza?

14. Defending the Year of Democracy

15. China to play starring role in coming US election chaos

16. Add it to the list: Three more considerations for AUKUS

17. Cut Off the Head of the Snake in the Red Sea | Opinion

18. Hit the Houthis — and Iran — Where It Counts

19. Dealing With the Unprecedented Military Threats Facing the United States

20. A restless Gen Z is reshaping the Chinese Dream

21. Overcoming data analytics inertia in defense to win future wars

22. Voter Beware: Unveiling China's AI Propaganda in the 2024 American Elections

1. RETIRED GEN. GORDON SULLIVAN DIES

​Rest in Peace, General.

I will never forget graduation speech at SAMS at Leavenworth in 1996 after he retired as the CSA. The year before he was the speaker for our CGSC graduation class and gave a speech that you would expect from a CSA. But in retirement he gave a speech based on spending his retirement with his grandchildren and he used Dr. Seuss analogies to talk about strategy. It was at once a very funny speech but also showed his brilliance in that he could take Dr. Seuss and apply it so effectively to critical thinking. His is one of the few graduation speeches we all remember.

https://www.ausa.org/news/retired-gen-gordon-sullivan-dies

RETIRED GEN. GORDON SULLIVAN DIES

Photo by: AUSA

Tue, 01/02/2024 - 17:06

Retired Gen. Gordon Sullivan, the 32nd Army chief of staff and former president and CEO of the Association of the U.S. Army, died Jan. 2. He was 86.

“Gen. Gordon Sullivan was a true American hero and an Army legend. He was an inspirational leader of integrity and compassion who served his beloved Army and country selflessly for decades,” said retired Gen. Bob Brown, AUSA president and CEO. “As the 32nd chief of staff of the Army, he led the service through critical times with strength and a clear vision, ensuring soldiers and their families had the best training and resources.”

But Sullivan didn’t stop serving after he retired from the Army. “After his uniformed service, Gen. Sullivan led AUSA for 18 years, where he continued to serve soldiers and America’s Army by advocating for them and supporting them,” Brown said. “So many of us are so incredibly proud to have served with him in the Army and at AUSA. He was an amazing person, and we will all deeply miss his wit, leadership and wisdom. Our thoughts and prayers are with his family during this difficult time.”

A native of Boston who grew up in nearby Quincy, Massachusetts, Sullivan graduated from Norwich University and was commissioned a second lieutenant of armor in 1959. During his Army career, Sullivan served two combat tours in Vietnam and in the United States, Korea and Germany. He commanded the Army’s 1st Infantry Division, was assistant commandant of the Armor School and deputy commandant of the Command and General Staff College. He later was deputy Army chief of staff for operations and plans, G-3, and Army vice chief of staff before becoming the Army chief of staff in 1991.

During his tenure as the Army’s top general, Sullivan oversaw the downsizing of the Army by 600,000 soldiers. He did it while attempting to maintain morale and a sense of purpose while also seeing the Army deploy on unexpected contingencies to Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and the Balkans, and also in response to Hurricane Andrew, then the most destructive hurricane in U.S. history.

He is credited with keeping the Army trained and ready and opening the door to information-age technologies. He also always kept his focus on taking care of soldiers.

“I believe the essential nature of the Army has remained constant since the beginning,” Sullivan said in 2016. “It is the soldier. The soldier is the weapon. He or she is the answer. They are the ones who adapt on the battlefield. Ultimately, success will rest on the shoulders of the men and women who had the courage to serve. I believe that.”

In his book, Hope is Not a Method, which he co-authored with Michael Harper, Sullivan chronicles the enormous challenges he faced in transforming the post-Cold War Army.

Sullivan retired from the Army in July 1995 after more than 36 years of service.

In 1998, Sullivan joined AUSA as the association’s 18th president, overseeing the association’s transformation into a dynamic, member-based organization that represents soldiers and families and connects America’s Army with the nation it serves.

He would lead the educational nonprofit for 18 years, stepping down in 2016. Later that year, he received the Gen. George Catlett Marshall Medal, AUSA’s highest award, for his lifetime of selfless service to the Army and the nation.

“I’ve been proud for 18 ½ years to lead a professional organization dedicated to supporting the Army and all of its parts,” Sullivan said when he stepped down from leading AUSA. “We have an essential mission of the public voice for the Army, including its soldiers, veterans and retirees, their families, the Army’s civilian workforce and industry partners.”

His time at AUSA was an extension of his Army service, Sullivan said. “I saw my work here as a continuation of my 36 years in the Army, building leaders, supporting the troops, facing whatever challenges the world creates,” he said.

Sullivan continued to serve by leading the board of the Army Historical Foundation. During his time as chairman, he led the capital campaign to build the National Museum of the United States Army at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The first and only museum to tell the complete history of the U.S. Army and its soldiers, the museum opened in November 2020.

In 2021, Sullivan and 17 other military leaders were honored by their shared hometown of Quincy. Already known as the “City of Presidents” for being the birthplace of John Adams and his son, John Quincy Adams, Quincy also has the distinction of being the hometown of several senior military leaders.

The new bridge and park, called Generals Bridge and Park, features three 7-foot bronze statues of Sullivan, former Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville and former Joint Chiefs Chairman Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford.

During the dedication ceremony, Sullivan said he is motivated by his steadfast dedication to service members.

“If you stick your hand up in the air at some recruiting station and say, ‘Send me, send me,’ you are my hero,” Sullivan said at the time. “There's nothing like being in a uniform and serving the United States of America. I have told many people, if I could do it again, I would. And I am not kidding.”

2. High-end sex ring in Boston and D.C. areas was 'honeypot' scheme by Russia, China, South Korea or even Israel - to ensnare US officials, intelligence experts believe

Excerpts:

But the mystery is which country was behind the scheme. Russia, China, Korea itself, or even Israel are al seen as possibly being behind the scheme.

'Having the Koreans out front could have been a false flag to give China or another country plausible deniability if the plot unraveled,' a one-time CIA senior operations officer told DailyMail.com in an exclusive interview.

The brothels were raided in November and prosecutors said they were looking to charge 28 people in Massachusetts alone.

EXCLUSIVEHigh-end sex ring in Boston and D.C. areas was 'honeypot' scheme by Russia, China, South Korea or even Israel - to ensnare US officials, intelligence experts believe

• Investigators believe a network of high-end brothels operating in the Boston and D.C. areas was a honey trap to ensnare politicians and government officials 
• But whether the plot was intended to aid Russia, China, South Korea – or even Israel – remains to be determined 
• Clients, believed to include members of Congress, military officers, and national security contractors, have not yet been unmasked and charged 

By KEN SILVERSTEIN, IN FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA, FOR DAILYMAIL.COM

PUBLISHED: 10:03 EST, 3 January 2024 | UPDATED: 11:08 EST, 3 January 2024

Daily Mail · by Ken Silverstein, In Fairfax, Virginia, For Dailymail.Com · January 3, 2024

Intelligence experts are becoming increasingly convinced that six high end brothels in the suburbs of Boston and Washington, D.C. were set up by a foreign nation as an espionage 'honeytrap'.

They believe the brothels – allegedly masterminded by a 41-year-old South Korean woman – targeted politicians, high ranking government officials and defense contractors.

But the mystery is which country was behind the scheme. Russia, China, Korea itself, or even Israel are al seen as possibly being behind the scheme.

'Having the Koreans out front could have been a false flag to give China or another country plausible deniability if the plot unraveled,' a one-time CIA senior operations officer told DailyMail.com in an exclusive interview.

The brothels were raided in November and prosecutors said they were looking to charge 28 people in Massachusetts alone.

The lingerie and bikini clad 'models' advertised on the brothel's website included, Yoko and Tiffany who were offered as a 'duo' for photographers looking for a modeling twosome

In their affidavit, investigators identified six 'target locations' where the brothels were based, four in the Boston area - referred to as 'Target Locations 4-7'. Three of those were units in a Cambridge apartment complex and one in a unit in Watertown. Two apartment units on New St in Cambridge were also named as previous brothel locations

The two brothels in Virginia (referred to in the affidavit as 'Target Locations 8 and 9') were situated in Unit 245 at the Avalon Mosaic in the quiet suburban town of Fairfax and Unit 649 of the nearby Hanover Tysons

Joshua Levy, the Acting U.S. Attorney for the state said his office will seek 'accountability for the buyers who fuel the commercial sex industry'.

There was no evident motive to establish two cathouses in the greater Washington area, sources noted emphatically. None of the three defendants live anywhere near the capital and sex workers were flown in from Los Angeles or Las Vegas.

Han Lee, the alleged mastermind, Junmyung Lee, 30, and James Lee, 68 – all South Korean-born U.S. nationals – were charged in November with running the sex ring. The three Lees are not related.

Han and Junmyung both live in the Boston area so the locations of four of the brothels there made sense. James lives in Torrance, a suburb of Los Angeles.

Members of Congress, military officers, and national security contractors who 'possessed security clearances' were among the steady customers at the 'high-end brothels' run by the ring, prosecutors say.

The ring's clients, who paid rates of up to $600 an hour, included corporate executives, professors, lawyers, and scientists.

To entice customers, the Lees allegedly set up websites whose purported purpose was helping photographers find nude female models looking for work. Investigators believe the ring had made more than $1 million by the time it was busted.

The lingerie and bikini clad 'models' went by names such as Sexy Schu, Venus, Tina, YokoDDD and Tiffany.

The last two were offered as a 'duo' for photographers looking for a modeling twosome.

None of the clients have been identified or charged so far, but they could soon be unmasked after federal prosecutors last month announced they are seeking criminal charges.

The probe into 'their involvement in prostitution is active and ongoing,' Department of Homeland Security Special Agent Zachary Mitlitsky said in a court affidavit.

A spokeswoman for the US Attorney's Office in Boston, which is prosecuting the case, cited the same reason in declining to comment on questions about the prostitution ring, including whether the suspects had ties to foreign intelligence.

Experts interviewed by DailyMail.com suspect the brothel scheme was a honeypot.

The twin locations where ring operators selected to set up shop is the first clue, a number of them said.

As the country's political headquarters, Washington presents a target-rich environment for spies.

In the affidavit, investigators identified six 'target locations' where the brothels were based, four in the Boston area ('Target Locations 4-7') and two in Virginia ('Target locations 8 and 9).

The high-end brothel network kept detailed records of its customers along with millions in cash and other damning items in bulk. Clientele included 'hundreds' of elected officials, tech, pharmaceutical executives, lawyers, professors and military officers, though federal prosecutors did not identify any of them

One of the sites seen here, which was aimed at the Massachusetts area, asked customers to not 'knock on the door'

One of the women advertised by the brothel was identified as Tina on the website

Extramarital affairs and sexual promiscuity and deviance are other helpful vulnerabilities, which is why honeypots are a time-honored practice of intelligence agencies.

Two of the brothels operated from units in luxury apartment buildings in the Virginia suburbs outside the capital, which are each about a 15-minute drive from the White House, Congress, Pentagon and CIA.

The surrounding area is packed with national security giants such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing and General Dynamics.

Boston, where the other four brothels operated, is a haven for defense contractors as well.

It's also home to top-tier universities such as Harvard and MIT that train government and military officials, and produce reports for the Pentagon and CIA.

The ring didn't have anyone based near D.C. as far as can be determined. Suspects had to fly in and out of town with a rotating cast of sex workers, set them up at the Virginia apartments and deal with routine business matters.

The Washington operations would have significantly increased costs, created logistical headaches, and greatly heightened risks.

From a practical standpoint, it would have been easier to simply open two more brothels in Boston – unless the primary goal of the ring's operators wasn't maximizing profits but intelligence gathering.

'The most valuable information in Washington and Boston are government secrets,' a former foreign spy who is well acquainted with honeypots told DailyMail.com.

'If you open a prostitution business that caters to wealthy clients in those cities, you'll get a lot of people walking through the doors that have access to them.'

Former CIA Special Agent Nic McKinley, who now leads Deliver Fund, a nonprofit that works with law enforcement to combat human trafficking, echoed the point.

'If this had been a pure cash play, massage parlors are easier to set up, have lower overhead costs and print money,' he said.

Driver's licenses of one of the three suspects, James Lee. According to the affidavit, investigators found three driver's licenses were submitted in support of rental applications for brothels in Massachusetts and Virginia – which are all believed to be James Lee using two different aliases

'But they wouldn't have pulled in affluent customers from government and national security circles.'

The first step for any intelligence agency looking to recruit a foreign asset is preparing a targeting analysis to pinpoint top prospects.

Those that make the final cut must have access to the desired information and a history that suggests they would betray their country if the proper incentive were offered.

Spy agencies deem financial stress, greed, marital problems and feeling underappreciated at work to be exploitable vulnerabilities.

Extramarital affairs and sexual promiscuity and deviance are other helpful vulnerabilities, which is why honeypots are a time-honored practice of intelligence agencies.

The brothels in Virginia were situated in Unit 245 at the Avalon Mosaic in the quiet suburban town of Fairfax and Unit 649 of the nearby Hanover Tysons.

The two units had large bedrooms and comfortably furnished living room areas where clients could unwind over drinks with their companions afterwards.

In this relaxing atmosphere, a government official might feel the urge to impress an attractive young woman by dropping names of prominent colleagues and holding forth about his important responsibilities at work.

Aspiring clients had to submit a membership application before they could book an appointment.

Required documentation included government-issued ID, phone and email contacts, employer information and credit card records, according to court records.

Bizarrely, numerous political, military and business officials provided it all without blinking an eye and proceeded to have sex in an apartment that for all they knew was outfitted with equipment to record video and audio footage.

'Finding idiots like this would be pure gold for an intelligence service running a honeypot,' said the retired foreign spy.

A retired CIA senior operations officer was equally flabbergasted.

'This is at the level of a Nigerian prince scam,' she said.

Ring operators would have taken precautions to ensure a prospective client wasn't actually an undercover cop, but the level of vetting of brothel members suggests the proprietors may have built a client base heavily laden with government insiders by design, not chance.

The affidavit also shows a text message sent from a phone related to the operation in Massachusetts which includes a 'menu'

The details of the investigation included pictures of meticulous client records with names and dates - which have exposed tons of professionals in elite industries for paying upwards of $600 per hour for sexual encounters with predominately Asian women

That's exactly the way honeypots are intended to work, the retired foreign operative asserted.

'The goal is to create a chain reaction,' he said. 'Draw people from your narrow group of targets, provide them with great service and wait for them to invite friends and colleagues from the same circles.'

None of the three suspects have known prior criminal records. The biggest mark against any of them is that James Lee received more than $500,000 in potentially fraudulent Covid relief funds.

Their clean records are especially surprising because prosecutors allege at least some of the sex workers were trafficked, which would mean an organized crime group almost certainly played a role.

It's simple nowadays for spy services – and relative amateurs as well – to obtain compromising material on targets by hacking their phones or stealing it from client databases of online companies that sell illicit or seedy sex, said a former CIA counterintelligence officer.

He cited reports from earlier this year that revealed a conservative Catholic group in Colorado spent millions of dollars to buy mobile tracking data in order to out priests using gay hookup apps.

But most of the sources said the brothel scheme's risk-reward ratio wouldn't deter a foreign service from trying to pull it off, but encourage it.

'Paying for sex may reveal a character flaw, but you have to know a lot more to assess if a target is corruptible,' said a retired senior CIA officer who served in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

'You're not going to find what you need by scrolling through a list of names you stole from hookers.com.'

In a well-executed honeypot, the women who serve as the bait build personal relationships with the marks, tease out information that helps assess their weaknesses and test what they're willing to do.

According to an affidavit, three units at this apartment building in Cambridge, Massachusetts, were used as brothel locations, among others in the area

In a similar fashion, the group are also said to have operated a unit inside this apartment building in Watertown, Massachusetts

In Virginia were situated Unit 649 of the nearby Hanover Tysons (pictured) was among the apartments used as brothel locations

Unit 245 at the Avalon Mosaic in the quiet suburban town of Fairfax was counted as a brothel location. The two units at both properties had large bedrooms and comfortably furnished living room areas where clients could unwind over drinks with their companions afterwards

'The girls start by asking for a small favor that's at the edge of the target's comfort zone and try to keep expanding the zone and turn small favors into big favors,' said the ex-CIA officer.

A honeypot aims to obtain compromising information, but weaponizing it is rare because it's counterproductive to the primary goal: recruiting agents that have access to state secrets.

'It's easy to get blackmailable information into public, but that creates a public scandal,' explained the source.

'Your target loses his job, his life is destroyed and so is his value.'

Furthermore, a recruitment target might be threatened with blackmail in an emergency – signs he was preparing to go to the FBI, for example – but it's rarely used to compel cooperation.

'Persuasion works better than threats,' said John Sipher, a 28-year veteran of the CIA's National Clandestine Service. 'Targets who need to be coerced will turn on you the first chance they get.'

Not enough information is available to know for sure whether a foreign intelligence service was behind the brothel operation, but based on what's been disclosed so far it's likely, said Sipher.

'You've got high level officials with access to secrets who may have been filmed having sex with a prostitute, and are at high risk of manipulation or coercion.'

'The FBI would be criminally negligent if it hasn't already opened a counterintelligence investigation.'

Archived web pages reveal the high-end bordello network maintained a roster of slender Asian 'companions' - with names like Jade, Barbie, Bing Bing, Venus and Sexy Schu

Before clients could book a slot, first-time visitors were greeted with a verification page asking for personal data including their name, phone number and employer

Christine Fang, (right) known as 'Fang Fang' ,cost Democrat Rep. Eric Swallwell his place on the Intelligence sub-committee while Maria Butina was jailed after being labeled a 'Kremlin-trained seductress'

Only a few overseas spy agencies have the capacity to pull off a sophisticated honeypot and would risk running in on US soil, so the list of suspects is a short one.

The consensus view of the sources interviewed by DailyMail.com. was that if it was a honeypot, the foreign service that drew it up arranged to have an organized crime group with existing financial stakes in the sex industry manage and staff it to cover its tracks.

Many of those involved, from the three indicted Koreans to the sex workers themselves, were likely unaware of the espionage component, the experts said.

Russia is an obvious candidate as the KGB frequently ran honeytraps during the Cold War and the FSB, its post-Soviet Union successor agency, is known to as well.

In 2018, Maria Butina, a red-headed Russian grad student at American University in Washington, was charged with infiltrating the Republican Party and conservative groups to encourage them to promote Russian interests.

Her alleged tactics included seducing NRA operative Paul Erickson and Overstock.com CEO and GOP donor Patrick Byrne, who later helped finance former President Donald Trump's effort to overturn the results of the 2020 election.

In 2019, Butina, who the US government labeled a 'Kremlin-trained seductress,' was deported to Russia after six months in prison for serving as an unregistered foreign agent for Moscow.

Friendly foreign services are also on the suspect list, including the Israeli Mossad, another prolific historic user of honeypots. In 2010, Rabbi Ari Shvat decreed that seducing an enemy for national security purposes was a blessing and that 'an unmarried operative should be preferred in 'honey trap' cases'.

'But if there was no other choice her husband should divorce her and remarry her after the fact,' Shvat said.

Israel also isn't shy about targeting CIA officers.

A former deputy station chief in the Middle East said that he once boarded a flight from the US to Israel and a gorgeous Israeli had the seat next to his.

'She had all the same interests I did ,' he recounted. 'We talked for almost the entire flight and when we arrived she said she'd love to get together; I told her I appreciated her interest but it probably wasn't a good idea given her likely employer.'

French intelligence, which excels at corporate espionage, and the Egyptian service, which befriended Senator Bob Menendez and his wife in a case still pending, were also named as outlier suspects, but most sources pointed a finger at China or South Korea.

The FBI rates the danger posed by Beijing's influence operations to be so serious that it established a special unit dedicated to countering the threat in 2019.

In January of this year, Congressman Eric Swalwell lost his seat on the House Intelligence Committee due to reports that he developed a warm friendship with alleged Chinese intelligence operative Christine Fang in the mid-2010s.

Better known as 'Fang Fang,' the voluptuous suspected spy forged bonds with several national and local elected officials, including two Midwestern mayors she seduced. Fang Fang fled the US in 2015.

Other sources believe the nationality of the three suspects is an indicator South Korea's National Intelligence Services was involved.

The country's vast political and commercial stakes in Washington give it a strong motive to seek to influence American government policies.

South Korea has a lot more to lose than China if it was exposed for running an influence operation in the US, but it wouldn't be the first time.

In 1966, South Korean lobbyist Tongsun Park launched the exclusive George Town Club in Washington.

A decade later, it emerged that Park was operating the club in cahoots with Seoul's spy service.

Park was indicted for bribing three members of congress but was granted immunity in exchange for testifying at the trials of the elected officials, none who were convicted.

If the feds eventually conclude a foreign intelligence service was the hidden hand behind the brothels, the public may never know, according to one retired operations officer's opinion.

The former officer explained that if a john clicked on one of the websites to book an appointment, he could have unwittingly downloaded a tool that allowed the adversary to swipe information from the device they used.

'Should that be the case, the Pentagon and CIA would likely make the case that publicly disclosing what was stolen could jeopardize national security. I'd hate to see government officials get off for that reason, but that might be the right call.'

Daily Mail · by Ken Silverstein, In Fairfax, Virginia, For Dailymail.Com · January 3, 2024

3. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 3, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Russia and Ukraine conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 3 in what was the largest POW exchange of the war to date and the first official POW exchange since August 2023.
• Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on January 3 that Ukraine plans to increase its defense industrial base (DIB) output six-fold in 2024.
• Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba announced on January 3 that the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) will hold an emergency meeting in response to Russia’s recent mass air strikes against Ukraine.
• NATO member states continue initiatives to support Ukrainian operations in the air domain.
• Kremlin-affiliated mouthpieces may be setting information conditions to blame the West for a potential future conflict in the Arctic.
• Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev characterized Russia as Kazakhstan’s “main partner and ally” in an interview published on January 3 despite recent efforts to distance Kazakhstan from Russia.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City as positional engagements continued along the entire line of contact.
• The Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion stated on January 3 that the unit will continue to operate subordinated to Rosgvardia and will not be impacted by the Russian military’s reported dissolution of the “Kaskad” operational combat tactical formation of the DNR’s Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD).
• Russian authorities continue efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia using infrastructure projects and social outreach programs.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 3, 2024

Jan 3, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 3, 2024

Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 3, 2024, 5:45pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on January 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia and Ukraine conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 3 in what was the largest POW exchange of the war to date and the first official POW exchange since August 2023. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that over 200 Ukrainian soldiers and civilians returned to Ukraine from Russian captivity, including personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, National Guard, Navy, and State Border Guard Service.[1] Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights Dmytro Lubinets later clarified that 230 Ukrainian personnel returned to Ukraine in the 49th POW exchange since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[2] Lubinets and Zelensky noted that many of the Ukrainian POWs fought and were captured on Snake Island and in Mariupol, suggesting that these soldiers had been in Russian captivity for nearly two years.[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), in turn, stated that 248 Russian military personnel returned to Russia as part of the exchange, and notably thanked the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for its role in mediating the exchange.[4] Russian sources disagreed on the exact number of Ukrainians returned in the exchange, with some claiming that it was 173 and others claiming that it was "up to 230."[5] Russian milbloggers generally praised the Russian MoD for securing the return of a greater ratio of Russian POWs to Ukrainian POWs, which Russian sources claimed was long overdue following a deeply unpopular POW exchange in September 2022 that swapped 215 Ukrainian POWs, including captured leaders of the Azov Regiment whom Russia had initially pledged to imprison at least until the end of the war, for 55 Russian POWs and political prisoners including Putin’s personal friend, pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvechuk.[6]

The timing of Russia's apparent willingness to participate in the largest POW exchange since the beginning of the war, and the first exchange in nearly five months, is noteworthy. Representative of the Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War Petro Yatsenko stated on November 17, 2023, that Russia implemented a freeze on POW exchanges over summer 2023 for an unspecified reason.[7] As ISW has recently reported, there have been several incidents over the past few weeks of Russian forces using Ukrainian POWs in apparent violations of the Geneva Convention on POWs, including using a battalion of former Ukrainian POWs in active combat, using Ukrainian POWs as human shields, and summarily executing surrendered Ukrainian POWs who were clearly hors de combat.[8] The Russian leadership may have chosen to engage in such a large POW exchange at this time to undermine reports of Russian abuses of Ukrainian POWs and posture Russia as interested in operating within the bounds of international law and norms. ISW has frequently assessed that senior Russian officials are often very invested in portraying Russia as adhering to humanitarian and other legal guidelines, and the timing of this POW exchange may be part of this wider informational effort.[9]

Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on January 3 that Ukraine plans to increase its defense industrial base (DIB) output six-fold in 2024.[10] Shmyhal reiterated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s December 27 statement that Ukraine’s DIB production capacity tripled in 2023 compared to 2022 and highlighted the importance of additional drones, shells, ammunition, and armored vehicles for Ukrainian forces.[11] Shmyhal stated that the Ukrainian government has allocated more than 760 billion hryvnia (roughly $20 billion) for payments to military personnel and more than 265 billion hryvnia (roughly $7 billion) for the purchase, production, and repair of weapons in 2024.[12] Shmyhal also advocated for the reported Western plan to use frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s future reconstruction.[13] Shmyhal’s comments come after several days of large-scale Russian strikes that reportedly primarily targeted Ukrainian DIB facilities and military infrastructure.[14] ISW previously assessed that reported Russian strikes against Ukrainian industrial facilities likely aim to prevent Ukraine from developing key capacities to sustain operations for a longer war effort.[15]

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba announced on January 3 that the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) will hold an emergency meeting in response to Russia’s recent mass air strikes against Ukraine.[16] Kuleba called the upcoming meeting a “sign of Euro-Atlantic unity in the face of Russian terror” and noted that strengthening Ukraine’s air defense will be one of the meeting’s key topics.[17] The NUC met for the first time on November 29, 2023, to discuss the roadmap to full Ukrainian interoperability with NATO and steps to increase weapons and ammunition production.[18]

NATO member states continue initiatives to support Ukrainian operations in the air domain. Norwegian Defense Minister Bjørn Arild Gram announced on January 3 that Norway is providing two F-16 fighter jets and 10 instructors to train Ukrainian military personnel in Denmark.[19] Gram stated that Ukraine’s partners will work “day and night” to establish a lasting and modern Ukrainian air force.[20] NATO also announced in a statement on January 3 that NATO’s Support and Procurement Agency will support a coalition of member states, including Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, and Spain to purchase up to 1,000 Patriot missiles to strengthen the member states’ air defenses, additionally noting that NATO partners have previously supplied Ukraine with Patriot systems.[21] It is unclear if Ukraine will receive any of the 1,000 Patriot missiles, or on what timeline. The $5.5 billion contract will support the establishment of a Patriot missile production facility in Germany, increasing the available supply of Patriot missiles and replenishing member states’ stockpiles.[22] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi stated on January 2 that Western-provided Patriot systems enabled Ukrainian forces to down a record number of 10 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles during Russian strikes overnight on January 1-2 and during the day on January 2.[23]

Kremlin-affiliated mouthpieces may be setting information conditions to blame the West for a potential future conflict in the Arctic. A prominent Russian milblogger, whom the Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) have recently rewarded for service to the Russian Armed Forces and whose channel has recently fixated on the Arctic region, amplified a post wherein another milblogger responded to comments from the Danish Foreign Ministry about how Denmark’s chairmanship of the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) will focus on Arctic security after reports from the Danish Defense Intelligence Service and NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept listed Russian activity in the region as a possible cause of future regional instability.[24] The milblogger claimed that despite Danish statements about Denmark’s hopes to keep the Arctic a region of low tension, Denmark views Russia as the main threat in the Arctic, suggesting that the milblogger views Denmark’s response to Russian actions in the Arctic as unnecessary and inconsistent with other Danish signaling. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on December 21, 2023, that Russia deployed forces to the Arctic not as a demonstration of military force but to ensure Russian economic development in the region, whereas Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have increasingly blamed Western countries for preparing Arctic countries for a confrontation against Russia and claimed that Russia has been forced into responding by reforming the Leningrad Military District (LMD) in Russian's northwest to counter supposed threats from Finland and other NATO states.[25] Recent Kremlin and MoD statements and the Russian MoD-affiliated milblogger’s post may be part of Kremlin efforts to set information conditions for Russia to blame Denmark and other Western Arctic countries for any future conflicts with Russia in the Arctic. These narratives are in line with Putin’s declaration on January 2 that the West is Russia‘s “enemy” and his further implication that the war in Ukraine is an existential war for Russia against the West.[26]

Efforts driven by Kremlin mouthpieces to set such information conditions may be permeating the larger Russian information space. Another prominent Russian milblogger, who has previously amplified Kremlin narratives about Russia's maximalist goals of imperial reconquest in Ukraine, amplified a post claiming that the next regional “flare up” will be the Baltics and Nordic countries.[27] The post vaguely claimed that an unspecified actor, possibly the West, is preparing the Baltic and Nordic peoples for a confrontation with Russia and that the Baltic and Nordic countries have lacked sovereignty for a long time - echoing Kremlin narratives about how states that are not great powers - like Ukraine - do not have full sovereignty.[28] These informational lines are disturbingly similar to the justifications the Kremlin used to invade Ukraine in 2022 and to continue the invasion. There are no indications that Russia will seek conflict with NATO in the very near future, but Moscow began running similar information operations in Ukraine many years before Russian invasions in 2014 and 2022.

Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev characterized Russia as Kazakhstan’s “main partner and ally” in an interview published on January 3 despite recent efforts to distance Kazakhstan from Russia. Tokayev emphasized the strength of current Russian-Kazakh relations and Russia’s position on the world stage, claiming that “no problem in the world can be solved” without Russia’s participation.[29] Tokayev’s statement comes after Kazakhstan took over chairmanship of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on January 1.[30] Tokayev has recently sought to balance maintaining friendly relations with Russia against allowing Kazakhstan to fall too far under Russian influence, likely reflecting an increase in tension that Russia’s war in Ukraine has caused. Russia previously deployed airborne (VDV) elements to Kazakhstan as CSTO peacekeeping forces to help quell domestic anti-government protests in January 2022, but Tokayev reportedly refused to help Putin quell the Wagner PMC’s June 2023 rebellion.[31] Tokayev also refused to recognize Russia's claimed independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s republics (DNR and LNR) following the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and subsequently refused to recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of the DNR, LNR, and Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in September 2022.[32]  Russian society has also recently intensified violence towards, and disenfranchisement of, Central Asia migrant communities living in Russia, including Kazakh migrants. This has likely become a growing point of neuralgia in Russia's relationship with its Central Asian neighbors, especially as Russia has massively mobilized Central Asian migrants to fight in Ukraine. A Kazakh court recently sentenced a Kazakh citizen for mercenarism for fighting with the Wagner Group in Ukraine, suggesting that Kazakh authorities feel discomfort around the idea of their citizens affiliating with Russia militarily.[33] Despite these evident frictions, Tokayev recently emphasized the extent of friendly Russian-Kazakh relations at the 19th Russian-Kazakh Regional Cooperation Forum in Ankara, Turkey on November 9, 2023, also likely to maintain strong ties with Russia while remaining relatively independent.[34]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia and Ukraine conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 3 in what was the largest POW exchange of the war to date and the first official POW exchange since August 2023.
• Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on January 3 that Ukraine plans to increase its defense industrial base (DIB) output six-fold in 2024.
• Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba announced on January 3 that the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) will hold an emergency meeting in response to Russia’s recent mass air strikes against Ukraine.
• NATO member states continue initiatives to support Ukrainian operations in the air domain.
• Kremlin-affiliated mouthpieces may be setting information conditions to blame the West for a potential future conflict in the Arctic.
• Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev characterized Russia as Kazakhstan’s “main partner and ally” in an interview published on January 3 despite recent efforts to distance Kazakhstan from Russia.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City as positional engagements continued along the entire line of contact.
• The Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion stated on January 3 that the unit will continue to operate subordinated to Rosgvardia and will not be impacted by the Russian military’s reported dissolution of the “Kaskad” operational combat tactical formation of the DNR’s Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD).
• Russian authorities continue efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia using infrastructure projects and social outreach programs.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.   

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on January 3, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Positional fighting continued northeast and east of Kupyansk near Synkivka, Lake Lyman, and Petropavlivka and west and southwest of Kreminna near Terny and the Serebryanske forest area.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that one of their subscribers is deployed near Synkivka and reported to the milblogger that Ukrainian artillery fire and drone strikes are inhibiting Russian advances near Synkivka more significantly than Ukrainian mine fields.[36] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Russian forces are regrouping and conducting glide bomb strikes in the Lyman direction.[37]

Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that Russian forces conducted a missile strike that destroyed a school in the Osnovianskyi urban raion in Kharkiv City on the night of January 2.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Bakhmut on January 3, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area.[39] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces resumed attacks on the northeastern and eastern flanks of Vesele (about 18km northeast of Bakhmut) and posted a map claiming that Russian forces advanced in these areas.[40] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of these Russian advances near Vesele.

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance northwest of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage posted on January 2 shows that Russian forces, likely elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, advanced north of the O0506 Bakhmut-Khromove road between Bohdanivka and Khromove.[41] Several milbloggers also claimed on January 3 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Bakhmut in forest areas along the O0506.[42] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi noted that intense fighting is ongoing near Bohdanivka and that Russian forces are trying to advance towards Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut).[43] Milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Kurdyumivka, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian gains in this area.[44] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported positional engagements northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka and Khromove, west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske, and southwest of Bakhmut near Kurdyumivka, Klishchiivka, and Andriivka.[45] Elements of the Russian 98th and 106th VDV Divisions and of the Northern Fleet reportedly continue to operate in the Bakhmut direction.[46]

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance southwest of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage posted on January 3 shows that Russian forces made a marginal gain on the northwestern bank of the Izmaylovsky Pond on the outskirts of Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka).[47] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces crossed the railway line northeast of Stepove (just northwest of Avdiivka) and advanced up to 500 meters from the "Toshmash" dacha area in the direction of Berdychi.[48] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces achieved tactical success near Berdychi.[49] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these purported Russian gains in the Stepove-Berdychi area, however. Positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka, Stepove, and Berdychi; on the northwestern and southeastern outskirts of Avdiivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske and Pervomaiske.[50] Elements of the Donetsk People's Republic 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR Army Corps) and Russian Spetsnaz continue to operate in the Avdiivka area.[51]

Russian forces recently made confirmed gains during a ground attack southwest of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage posted on January 3 shows the aftermath of a Russian assault southeast of Pobieda (about 10km southwest of Donetsk City) and indicates that Russian forces made a number of marginal advances on the southeastern outskirts of Pobieda.[52] A milblogger also claimed that Russian forces made a marginal gain towards Heorhiivka (just west of Marinka), but ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[53] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City.[54]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on January 3, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported positional fighting southwest of Velyka Novovsilka near Pryyutne and west of Staromayorske.[55] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on the composition of Russian air defense units covering Zaporizhia Oblast, including: the 38th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (Eastern Military District [EMD]), the 8th Air Defense Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD), the 71st Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (35th CAA, EMD), the 67th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), the 140th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (29th CAA, EMD), the 35th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), the 1171st Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division [MRD], 5th CAA, EMD), and anti-aircraft missile batteries of the 19th and 58th MRDs (58th CAA).[56]

Ukrainian forces reportedly made marginal advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional fighting in the area on January 3, though ISW has not observed any confirmed changes. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced east of Robotyne near Verbove.[57] Positional fighting continued near Robotyne and to the east and south of Robotyne near Verbove, Novoprokopivka, and Novofedorivka.[58]

Positional engagements continued on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on January 3, but there were no confirmed territorial advances in the area. Russian and Ukrainian forces continued meeting engagements near Krynky.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the area have a numerical advantage in personnel but that Ukrainian forces are compensating with electronic warfare (EW) and drone strikes.[60] Mashovets stated that the Russian command is reorganizing tactical elements of the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces to correct combat command and control problems among the various tactical units operating near Krynky and concluded that these units will likely be subordinated to a unified tactical command, possibly collocated with the headquarters for the Russian 104th Airborne Division near Krynky.[61] Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 26th Motorized Rifle Regiment (70th MRD, 18th CAA, SMD) are operating southwest of Krynky; assault groups of the 337th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) retreated to the west of Krynky; elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Brigade (40th Army Corps, 18th CAA, SMD) are moving from the Krynky area southwest to the Pishchanivka-Pidstepne area; and elements of the 328th and 337th VDV regiments (104th VDV Division) are operating within Krynky.[62]

Russian sources accused Ukrainian forces of conducting a Storm Shadow strike against occupied Crimea on January 2, but claimed that Russian forces intercepted all the missiles. Sevastopol occupation head Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed that Russian forces intercepted a missile over Cape Fiolent (southern Sevastopol), and footage shows columns of smoke over the bay.[63] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian 31st Air Force and Air Defense Division identified up to six targets, including missiles that fell near or that were approaching Sevastopol without hitting the intended Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) targets.[64] Mashovets stated that Russia has begun constant sorties of A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft due to the threat of Ukrainian strikes against Russian military infrastructure in Crimea, including BSF assets.[65]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion stated on January 3 that the unit will continue to operate subordinated to Rosgvardia and that the unit’s service will not be impacted by the Russian military’s reported dissolution of the “Kaskad” operational combat tactical formation of the DNR’s Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD).[66] The “Vostok” Battalion stated that some of its elements hold several positions on the front, including frontline positions in the Avdiivka industrial zone southeast of Avdiivka, while other elements are participating in law enforcement tasks in an unspecified location, likely in the Russian-occupied rear.[67] The “Vostok” Battalion stated that Rosgvardia is preparing the unit to go on an offensive in order to perform its “assigned role" and noted that the unit is taking steps to preserve its combat potential.[68] “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky announced the unit’s future intention to operate under Rosgvardia in March 2023.[69] A Russian milblogger later claimed on December 30, 2023, that Khodakovsky "hijacked" Kaskad’s entire 5th Battalion and subordinated it to an unspecified Rosgvardia formation that does not participate in active combat.[70] Another Russian milblogger claimed that some Kaskad fighters framed Kaskad’s reported dissolution as a transfer to other units in BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) or Rosgvardia.[71] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military’s dissolution of “Kaskad” is likely in support of its efforts to formalize control over Russian irregular forces.[72]  

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russia’s ruling United Russia party is intensifying recruitment efforts for the “Hispaniola” private military company (PMC).[73] The GUR reported that the Hispaniola PMC, formerly the 1st “Hispaniola” Fan Volunteer Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade, receives funding from United Russia and is composed of “football hooligan” sports fans and extremists.[74] The “Hispaniola” Brigade announced new recruitment efforts in Moscow and a new training base in Tambov Oblast on November 28, 2023.[75] BBC’s Russia service reported on November 20, 2023, that the “Hispaniola” Brigade is subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-controlled Redut PMC.[76]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)  

Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec stated on January 3 that its subsidiary, High Precision Systems, is completing tests on a new version of the Pantsir-SM-SV missile system that will be installed on a new tracked chassis and will be maneuverable through snowy and off-road conditions.[77] Rostec claimed that the modification will increase Russian air defense capabilities at low altitudes and in near-rear areas.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian authorities continue efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia using infrastructure projects and social outreach programs. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration amplified a post stating that the Russian Adygea Republic built a multifunctional center in occupied Kherson Oblast.[78] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky claimed that 12,340 businesses registered with the occupation administration in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast in 2023, revenues from the budget of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast injected about nine billion rubles into the Russian federal budget, and investors from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast signed agreements worth more than 100 billion rubles at various Russian and international exhibits and forums.[79] The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Militia posted footage of members of the LNR branch of the Russian Young Army Cadets National Movement (Yunarmiya) giving New Year’s gifts to local children in occupied Popasna, Luhansk Oblast, on behalf of Gazprom Inform, a subsidiary of Russian-state owned energy company Gazprom.[80]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian state news outlet Belta reported on January 3 that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko relieved Major General Viktor Lisovsky from the post of deputy chief of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Staff.[81]

Russian Ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov stated on December 31, 2023, that Russia and Belarus would approve a new package of Union State integration roadmap measures for 2024-2026 at an unspecified time “in the near future.”[82]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

4. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 3, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-3-2024

Key Takeaways:

1. Palestinian militias continued to try to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods of Gaza City on January 3. Palestinian militias are attacking Israeli forces behind the Israeli forward line of advance in Gaza City.
2. Hamas, PIJ, and other Palestinian groups condemned the killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri.
3. Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah signaled on January 3 that LH will not immediately escalate against Israel for Israel’s “surgical strike” killing Hamas deputy political bureau chairman Saleh Arouri in Beirut.
4. Senior Iranian and Axis of Resistance leaders condemned Israel’s killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri.
5. Unspecified fighters conducted a terrorist attack near Qassem Soleimani’s burial site in Kerman on the fourth anniversary of Soleimani’s death. Bloomberg News reported that the United States initially believes that the Islamic State or a related group was responsible for the attack.
6. The Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles at the Malta-flagged commercial vessel CMA CGM TAGE in the Red Sea. US CENTCOM reported that this was the 24th Houthi attack on maritime shipping in the Red Sea since November 19. 
7. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba warned that Iraqi militias will conduct an “unprecedented escalation” to expel US forces from Iraq if the Iraqi federal government orders US forces to withdraw from Iraq and the United States does not comply with its request.

IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 3, 2024

Jan 3, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, January 3, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. Palestinian militias continued to try to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods of Gaza City on January 3. Palestinian militias are attacking Israeli forces behind the Israeli forward line of advance in Gaza City.
2. Hamas, PIJ, and other Palestinian groups condemned the killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri.
3. Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah signaled on January 3 that LH will not immediately escalate against Israel for Israel’s “surgical strike” killing Hamas deputy political bureau chairman Saleh Arouri in Beirut.
4. Senior Iranian and Axis of Resistance leaders condemned Israel’s killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri.
5. Unspecified fighters conducted a terrorist attack near Qassem Soleimani’s burial site in Kerman on the fourth anniversary of Soleimani’s death. Bloomberg News reported that the United States initially believes that the Islamic State or a related group was responsible for the attack.
6. The Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles at the Malta-flagged commercial vessel CMA CGM TAGE in the Red Sea. US CENTCOM reported that this was the 24th Houthi attack on maritime shipping in the Red Sea since November 19. 
7. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba warned that Iraqi militias will conduct an “unprecedented escalation” to expel US forces from Iraq if the Iraqi federal government orders US forces to withdraw from Iraq and the United States does not comply with its request.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias continued to try to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods of Gaza City on January 3. Israeli forces in the neighborhoods coordinated with artillery and ground forces to direct a drone strike targeting Palestinian fighters surveilling them with drones.[1] Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, conducted three attacks targeting Israeli forces and vehicles in Daraj and Tuffah.[2] The group claimed that it detonated a Shawaz explosively formed penetrator (EFP) and anti-tank rocket at an Israeli bulldozer and tank east of Tuffah.[3]

Palestinian militias are attacking Israeli forces behind the Israeli forward line of advance in Gaza City. The National Resistance Brigades—the militant wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—claimed that its fighters conducted an “elaborate ambush” targeting Israeli ground forces on the outskirts of al Shati refugee camp.[4] The National Resistance Brigades said that its fighters detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Israeli ground forces. The National Resistance Brigades fighters then fired unspecified munitions at the Israeli force.[5] The group also claimed to have shot down an Israeli tactical reconnaissance drone in a separate incident and published pictures of drone pieces.[6] CTP-ISW cannot verify the militia’s claim and the IDF has not commented on the incident. The al Qassem Brigades claimed that it seized an Israeli drone south of Zaytoun neighborhood in the southern Gaza Strip on January 3.[7] The militia fired anti-tank rockets at Israeli armor in Sheikh Ijlin neighborhood, where Israeli forces have not reported on clearing operations since mid-November.[8]

The al Qassem Brigades claimed three combined attacks targeting the IDF in the Gaza Strip with other Palestinian militias on January 3. The al Qassem Brigades have coordinated several attacks in the Gaza Strip with other militias throughout the war.[9]

The al Qassem Brigades and Mujahideen Brigades—the militant wing of the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement—claimed that it fired a surface-to-air missile at an Israeli helicopter in Khan Younis.[10] Neither group provided evidence to corroborate the claim. The Mujahideen Brigades have cooperated with the al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—prior to the Israel-Hamas War.[11]

The al Qassem Brigades and Mujahideen Brigades claimed to shoot down an Israeli Hermes drone with a surface-to-air missile east of Gaza City.[12] Neither group provided evidence to corroborate the claim.

The al Qassem Brigades and al Quds Brigades published footage of their fighters firing mortars together at Israeli vehicles and soldiers in Khan Younis.[13] Hamas and PIJ have coordinated their operations against Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip throughout the Israel-Hamas war.

Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 3. The IDF said that Israeli forces continued “intense fighting” in Khan Younis on January 3.[14] The Israeli Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting a PIJ weapons manufacturing facility in Khan Younis.[15] Israeli ground forces directed another airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters who attempted to attach IEDs to an Israeli tank.[16] The al Qassem Brigades targeted Israeli tanks and bulldozers with anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and mortared Israeli soldiers operating in Khan Younis.[17] The al Quds Brigades detonated an EFP targeting an Israeli tank as Israeli forces advanced northeast of Khan Younis.[18]

Other Palestinian militias are also attempting to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis. The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the militant wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—fired an RPG at Israeli forces in central Khan Younis City.[19] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—mortared a group of Israeli soldiers in Khan Younis City.[20]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Khuzaa southeast of Khan Younis on January 3. An IDF brigade combat team uncovered a tunnel shaft in a school and clashed with Palestinian fighters who attempted to attach IEDs to Israeli vehicles in Khuzaa.[21] Israeli infantry, armor, and engineers raided Palestinian militia infrastructure in the area. The al Qassem Brigades detonated two anti-personnel devices targeting seven Israeli infantrymen operating east of Khuzaa.[22]

Hamas, PIJ, and other Palestinian groups condemned the killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri. Israeli forces conducted a “surgical strike” targeting senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri in southern Beirut on January 2.[23] Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh delivered a speech on January 3 condemning Arouri’s death as a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and an “expansion” of Israeli attacks on the group.[24] The al Qassem Brigades published a statement on January 3 that honored Arouri and the other militia leaders who died in the explosion.[25] PIJ Secretary General Ziad al Nakhalah mourned Arouri, calling him a leader who contributed to the Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[26] The Palestinian National and Islamic Forces—a coalition of major factions in Palestine—commemorated Arouri’s death and called for “revolutionary action” in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel.[27]

Palestinian militias did not claim any indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip on January 3.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces in nine locations across the West Bank.[28] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted nine attacks against military and civilian targets in the West Bank.[29] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades Tulkarm Battalion detonated improvised explosive devices targeting Israeli forces conducting counterterrorism operations in the Nour Shams refugee camp.[30] The IDF ordered an airstrike targeting the fighters who detonated the explosives.[31]

Palestinian shopkeepers closed storefronts in protest of Saleh al Arouri’s death in seven locations across the West Bank on January 3.[32] Palestinian media posted flyers on January 2 calling for supporters to strike and hold demonstrations.[33]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah signaled on January 3 that LH will not immediately escalate against Israel for Israel’s “surgical strike” killing Hamas deputy political bureau chairman Saleh Arouri in Beirut.[34] Nasrallah blamed Israel for Arouri’s death, describing it as a “dangerous crime that will see response and punishment.” Nasrallah’s speech was in commemoration of the anniversary of the death of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and his top Iraqi lieutenant, Abu Mahdi al Muhandis.[35] Nasrallah said that Israel has not deterred LH and that LH is ready to act against Israel ”without limits” if the country wages war on Lebanon.[36] He added that war with LH would be ”very costly” and a ”regret” for Israel with ”no ceiling” and ”no rules”.[37] Nasrallah’s choice to not immediately signal an escalation is notable, given that LH and Hamas threatened in August 2023 that Israeli strikes targeting Palestinian leadership in Lebanon would spur a regional war.[38] Nasrallah said that he will give another speech detailing LH operations in southern Lebanon on January 5.[39]

LH doubled the number of its cross-border attacks into Israel on January 3. This is notable in the context of Nasrallah’s speech and the Israeli strike that targeted Arouri. LH claimed 13 attacks on Israeli forces and military positions on January 3, compared to an average of six attacks per day during the previous week.[40] LH’s attack claims highlighted their use of anti-tank missiles and heavy-payload Burkan rockets.[41] This is notable given that recent LH attack claims have rarely specifically described the types of weapon systems used in LH attacks.[42]

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi discussed Israel’s military readiness during a trip to northern Israel on January 3. Halevi met with the IDF commander of Northern Command and unit commanders along the Lebanese border. Halevi said the IDF is at the “peak” of its readiness in northern Israel but that his focus is currently fighting Hamas.[43] He also said October 7 was an ”opportunity” for Israel to change the situation in a ”very significant way” in the south, north, and in the region. He added that Israel needs to give a very strong response to the October 7 attack.[44]  Halevi also discussed plans for Israel to deploy more forces along the Israel-Gaza Strip and Lebanese borders over at least the next year.[45]

Iran and Axis of Resistance—

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Unspecified fighters conducted a terrorist attack near Qassem Soleimani’s burial site in Kerman on the fourth anniversary of Soleimani’s death on January 3.[46] The unspecified fighters remotely detonated two improvised explosive devices within twenty minutes of each other. Iranian media has not confirmed the size or type of explosive device. Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi stated that the first explosion occurred at 1500 local time and the second more deadly explosion occurred at 1520.[47] The first explosion occurred within 700 meters of Soleimani’s burial site, and the second explosion occurred within one kilometer of Soleimani’s burial site. Iranian media reported that the two explosions killed 103 people and injured an additional 188.[48] Iranian media emphasized that no IRGC officials were in attendance or injured.[49] The attack killed three Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers.[50]

Bloomberg News reported that the United States initially believes that the Islamic State or a related group was responsible for the attack.[51]  The State Department spokesperson said that the United States does not believe Israel was to blame. The Afghan branch of the Islamic State likely conducted two separate smaller-scale terror attacks in Shiraz, 591 kilometers from Kerman, in October 2022 and August 2023.[52]   CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) maintained ground lines of communication between Iran and Afghanistan.[53]

Iranian officials, including the Security Deputy of Kerman, called the explosion a terrorist attack.[54] The Iranian Interior Minister said that the terrorist attack was a ”continuation of conspiracies” carried out by Iran’s enemies.[55] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei expressed his condolences to the victims of the terror attack.[56] Khamenei stated that the attack was carried out by the ”evil and criminal enemies” of Iran. Khamenei promised a hard response to the attack.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders and politicians expressed their condolences over the terrorist attack in Kerman on January 3.  Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai condemned the attack in separate statements.[57] Khazali claimed that Israel seeks to drag the region into a “comprehensive and open war” to conceal its “defeats” in the Israel-Hamas war.

Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting US positions in Syria on January 3. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a one-way drone attack targeting US forces at al Omar oil field.[58] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a separate one-way drone attack targeting US forces at the al Tanf garrison.[59]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei praised Palestinians in the Gaza Strip for resisting Israel during a speech to religious eulogists on January 3.[60] Khamenei further condemned the United States for its support of Israel’s “malice and dirty goals.”

Senior Iranian and Axis of Resistance leaders condemned Israel’s killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri. Israeli forces conducted a “surgical strike” targeting Arouri in southern Beirut on January 2.[61] Iranian political officials–including President Ebrahim Raisi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf–said that the assassination was a sign of Israel’s weakness and a violation of Lebanese territory.[62]

Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani warned that the decision would “backfire.”[63] The IRGC published a statement warning that Arouri’s death will inspire further Palestinian resistance against Israel.[64]

The Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada General Secretariat compared Israel’s killing of Arouri to the US killing of Qassem Soleimani and his top Iraqi lieutenant, Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, in January 2020.[65] It claimed on January 2 that the Arouri strike violated Lebanese sovereignty just as the US strike targeting Soleimani in January 2020 violated Iraqi sovereignty.[66] Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militias frequently cite alleged US “violations of Iraqi sovereignty” to try to pressure the Iraqi federal government to expel US forces. The United States has a legitimate right to self-defense as it operates in Iraq to fight ISIS at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government.[67]

Kataib Hezbollah emphasized the US role in Israel’s “dangerous escalations” in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria and renewed its pledge to “defeat” the United States and Israel in a statement honoring Arouri on January 2.[68] Kataib Hezbollah and its partners, not the United States, escalated in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq initiated attacks on US forces after the start of the Israel-Hamas War with attacks in Iraq on October 18 and in Syria on October 19.[69] The United States did not respond with force in Syria until October 26, after an Iranian-backed drone landed in a US barracks in Erbil, and in Iraq until November 21.[70] Lebanese Hezbollah began attacking Israel from southern Lebanon immediately after the October 7 attacks. 

Popular Mobilization Forces Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh warned on January 2 that the “murderous criminals” who killed Arouri will pay for their actions.[71]

Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri emphasized on January 3 his organization’s solidarity with Palestinian and Lebanese “jihadist movements.”[72]

Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Secretary General Akram al Kaabi warned that Iraqi militias will conduct an “unprecedented escalation” to expel US forces from Iraq if the Iraqi federal government orders US forces to withdraw from Iraq and the United States does not comply with its request.[73] Kaabi made this statement on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the US killing of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al Muhandis. Iranian military leaders have previously vowed to expel US forces from the Middle East as part of their revenge for Soleimani’s death.[74] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have been trying to pressure the Iraqi federal government to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, particularly in recent weeks. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced on December 28, 2023, that his administration will begin procedures to remove International Coalition forces from Iraq.[75] CTP-ISW assessed that Sudani likely made this announcement due to pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[76] 

Iraqi Design Alliance member Amer al Fayez stated that members of the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties—agreed to replace all current provincial governors in a meeting on January 2.[77] The Design Alliance won 12 out of 23 seats in Basra Province in the recent provincial council elections. Current Basra Governor Asaad al Eidani leads the Design Alliance.[78] Eidani became governor of Basra in 2017.[79] Iraqi media reported on December 27 that members of the Shia Coordination Framework are trying to deprive Eidani’s party of their majority in the Basra provincial council.[80] Fayez criticized the framework’s agreement to remove current provincial governors, describing it as “undemocratic” and a “political decision.”[81] Fayez added that there is “no justification for replacing the successful governors [who were] elected by the people of the governorate.”

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani has demonstrated in recent months that provincial councils do not retain the exclusive authority to appoint and remove provincial governors. Sudani appointed Abdul Qadir al Dakhil as the acting governor of Ninewa following former Ninewa Governor Najm al Jabouri’s resignation in November 2023.[82] Sudani additionally tried to remove the provincial governors of Anbar, Babil, Dhi Qar, and Ninewa in April 2023.[83] CTP-ISW assessed at the time that Sudani was attempting to sideline political opposition, especially Sunnis.[84] Some of the governors he sought to remove supported former Parliament Speaker Mohammed al Halbousi.[85]

The Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Malta-flagged commercial vessel CMA CGM TAGE while it transited the Red Sea. US CENTCOM reported that this was the 24th Houthi attack on maritime shipping in the Red Sea since November 19.[86] CMA CGM stated that the vessel was headed to Egypt. The Houthi movement claimed that the vessel was bound for Israel.[87] The Houthi movement continues to claim that it only targets vessels in the Red Sea that are owned by Israelis or vessels bound for Israel.[88] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted ships with no connection to Israel. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that this Houthi campaign is part of a wider regional escalation by Iran and its so-called Axis of Resistance which is intended to support Iranian strategic objectives in the region.[89]

The United States and 11 partner countries warned the Houthi movement against further attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea in a joint statement on January 3.[90] The statement warned that the Houthis would face unspecified consequences if the Houthi movement does not cease its attacks on shipping in the Red Sea.[91] The Houthi military spokesperson threatened on January 3 that the Houthis would retaliate against any attack by the United States.[92] The US statement also called for the Houthis to release unlawfully detained vessels and crews. The Houthis continue to hold the commercial vessel Galaxy Leader, which the Houthis seized on November 19.[93]

5. US, allies promise larger military response if Red Sea attacks persist

Sigh.... have there been enough attacks to justify a decisive response? Does our lack of repsonse weaken deterrence?

US, allies promise larger military response if Red Sea attacks persist

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · January 3, 2024

Leaders from the United States and 12 other partner nations warned of the possibility of escalating military action against Houthi fighters if their attacks against commercial vessels in the Red Sea continue, calling the assaults “illegal, unacceptable, and profoundly destabilizing.”

In a statement released by the White House on Wednesday, the group said the Houthi attacks against civilian vessels in the region have “no lawful justification” and must be stopped immediately. On Sunday, U.S. forces sank three Houthi boats in the Red Sea following an attack on a merchant ship there.

“Let our message now be clear: We call for the immediate end of these illegal attacks and release of unlawfully detained vessels and crews,” the statement said. “The Houthis will bear the responsibility of the consequences should they continue to threaten lives, the global economy, and free flow of commerce in the region’s critical waterways.”

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USS Carney sailors awarded for battling Houthi attacks in Red Sea

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During a White House briefing on Tuesday, National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby said that the growing U.S. military presence sent to the Red Sea — which includes an aircraft carrier strike group centered around the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower — now totals more than 4,000 sailors and Marines and more than 130 aircraft.

“As the president has made clear, the United States does not seek conflict with any nation or actor in the Middle East, nor do we want to see the war between Israel and Hamas widen in the region,” Kirby said. “But neither will we shrink from the task of defending ourselves, our interests, our partners, or the free flow of international commerce.”

A senior administration official said that since Nov. 19, Houthi fighters have attacked commercial ships in the Red Sea at least 23 times. On Dec. 30, U.S. forces shot down two anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting a Singapore-flagged ship, an attack which the official called “unprecedented” in its use of munitions and technical sophistication.

The official also confirmed that U.S. naval personnel have come under fire from Houthi militants during the Americans’ work in the region, with no injuries so far. U.S. forces sunk three Houthi ships, killing the small boat crews, on Dec. 31 in response to one such attack.

Houthi leaders have said publicly their goal in the attacks is to target vessels bound for Israel as a way to help Palestinians under siege in Gaza. But U.S. officials said the attacks have gone far beyond that and endangered countless other ships and individuals.

According to the White House, nearly 15 percent of global seaborne trade passes through the Red Sea, including 8 percent of global grain trade and 12 percent of seaborne-traded oil. Kirby acknowledged during the briefing that many companies are now opting to sail south around Africa rather than attempt a transit of the Red Sea because of the violence.

“You’re adding weeks and weeks onto voyages and untold expenses have to be applied in order to do that,” Kirby said. “Plus, that’s a dangerous journey. So, obviously, there’s a concern about the impact on global commerce.”

The multinational group signing the joint statement included Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom.

About Leo Shane III

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

6. Pompeo claims Biden administration has ‘accelerated the rate of decay’ in US deterrence

As Sir Lawrnece Freedman says, "deterrence works, until it doesn't."

Pompeo claims Biden administration has ‘accelerated the rate of decay’ in US deterrence 

BY TARA SUTER - 01/03/24 3:37 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4387553-pompeo-claims-biden-administration-has-accelerated-the-rate-in-decay-of-us-deterrence/?utm

Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Wednesday that President Biden has “accelerated the rate of decay” of U.S. deterrence.

“President Biden has allowed such [an] accelerated rate of decay of our deterrence that we had built up in the four years that President Trump and I were serving, has really done the American people a disservice, and it is dangerous.” Pompeo said Tuesday in an interview on Fox News​.

“It’s dangerous not only for the Israelis, and for folks in the Middle East, but it’s dangerous for folks here in the United States of America as well,” Pompeo continued. “A wide-open southern border, and a North Korean leader, a Chinese leader, a Russian leader who don’t think that the United States will stand up and defend its most sacred values, is a place that is a very dangerous country here at home as well.”

A senior Hamas official was reportedly killed in a strike Tuesday in Lebanon’s capital city, putting Israel on high alert should the conflict in the region widen.

According to local news channels, Israel carried out a bombing that killed Saleh al-Arouri, the deputy chief of the political bureau for the Palestinian militant group in Beirut. The Hamas official is the highest-ranked member killed in the ongoing war between Israel and the group in Gaza.

There’s also the question of how the Israeli bombing in an area where Iran-backed Hezbollah is strong could affect current fighting along the Lebanese-Israeli border. 

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah had promised retaliation in the past for all forms of Israeli targeting of allied militant leaders in his country, The Associated Press reported, but Nasrallah has seemed reluctant thus far to escalate the fighting.

7. Deadly blast in Iran looks like 'a terrorist attack,' possibly ISIS -senior US official

Who will control this narrative?

Deadly blast in Iran looks like 'a terrorist attack,' possibly ISIS -senior US official

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/deadly-blast-iran-looks-like-a-terrorist-attack-possibly-isis-senior-us-official-2024-01-03/?utm

Reuters

January 3, 20245:18 PM ESTUpdated 14 hours ago

[1/2]People gather at the scene of explosions during a ceremony held to mark the death of late Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, in Kerman, Iran, January 3, 2024. WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS Acquire Licensing Rights

WASHINGTON, Jan 3 (Reuters) - Two explosions that killed nearly 100 people and wounded scores at a ceremony in Iran on Wednesday looked like a "terrorist attack" of the kind ISIS has been responsible for in the past, a senior Biden administration official said on Wednesday.

The official, speaking to reporters, said "it does look like a terrorist attack, the type of thing we've seen ISIS do in the past, and as far as we are aware that is kind of, I think, our going assumption at the moment."

The ceremony was to commemorate commander Qassem Soleimani who was killed by a U.S. drone in 2020 ordered by then-President Donald Trump. No one claimed responsibility for the blasts.

Reporting By Steve Holland, Jonathan Landay and Eric Beech; editing by Jonathan Oatis and Sonali Paul

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

8. Iran vows revenge after biggest attack since 1979 revolution

Iran vows revenge after biggest attack since 1979 revolution

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-vows-revenge-after-biggest-attack-since-1979-revolution-2024-01-04/?utm

By Parisa Hafezi and Elwely Elwelly

January 4, 20245:39 AM ESTUpdated an hour ago

[1/3]People gather at the scene of explosions during a ceremony held to mark the death of late Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, in Kerman, Iran, January 3, 2024. WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS Acquire Licensing Rights

Summary

• Wednesday's attack was bloodiest bombing since 1979U.S. suspects Islamic State militants were behind itIranian leaders vow to avenge the attack

DUBAI, Jan 4 (Reuters) - Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards and First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber vowed revenge on Thursday for explosions that killed nearly 100 people at a ceremony to commemorate top commander Qassem Soleimani, who was killed by a U.S. drone in 2020 in Iraq.

"A very strong retaliation will be handed to them on the hands of the soldiers of Soleimani," Mokhber told reporters at a hospital were some of the wounded were receiving treatment for the bloodiest attack since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

No one claimed responsibility for the blasts. A senior official in U.S. President Joe Biden's administration said the blasts appeared to represent "a terrorist attack" of the type carried out in the past by Islamic State militants.

In a statement, Iran's powerful Guards described Wednesday's attack as a cowardly act "aimed at creating insecurity and seeking revenge against the nation's deep love and devotion to the Islamic Republic".

The powerful Guards also said the attack "strengthens the resolve to decisively and justly punish the perpetrators.”

The Guards commander in the southeastern city of Kerman denied state media reports of a shooting in Kerman on Thursday.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi condemned the "heinous and inhumane crime", and Iran's top authority, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, vowed revenge for the twin bombings.

Iran's Red Crescent rescuers tended to wounded people at the ceremony, where hundreds of Iranians had gathered to mark the anniversary of Soleimani's killing. Some Iranian news agencies said the number of wounded was much higher.

EARLIER ATTACKS

Tehran often accuses its arch enemies, Israel and the United States, of backing anti-Iran militant groups.

In 2022, the Sunni Muslim militant group Islamic State claimed responsibility for a deadly attack on a Shi'ite shrine in Iran which killed 15 people.

Earlier attacks claimed by the group include twin bombings in 2017 which targeted Iran's parliament and the tomb of the Islamic Republic's founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

Baluchi militants and ethnic Arab separatists have also staged attacks in Iran.

The U.S. assassination of Soleimani in a Jan. 3, 2020, drone attack at Baghdad airport, and Tehran's retaliation - by attacking two Iraqi military bases that house U.S. troops - brought the United States and Iran close to full-blown conflict.

As chief commander of the elite Quds force, the overseas arm of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Soleimani ran clandestine operations abroad and was a key figure in Iran's longstanding campaign to drive U.S. forces from the Middle East.

Tensions between Iran and Israel, along with its ally the United States, have reached a new high over Israel's war on Iran-backed Hamas militants in Gaza in retaliation for their Oct. 7 rampage through southern Israel.

Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi militia have attacked ships they say have links to Israel in the entrance to the Red Sea, one of the world's busiest shipping lanes.

U.S. forces have come under attack from Iran-backed militants in Iraq and Syria over Washington's backing of Israel and have carried out their own retaliatory air strikes.

Writing by Michael Georgy and Parisa Hafezi, Editing by Timothy Heritage

9. Taiwan reports China sent 4 suspected spy balloons over the island

Taiwan reports China sent 4 suspected spy balloons over the island

militarytimes.com · by The Associated Press · January 3, 2024

TAIPEI, Taiwan — Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said that China sent four balloons over the island, three of which passed near a key air force base.

The reported incursions on Tuesday come as China has been upping its threat to use force to annex the self-governing republic.

Taiwan is holding elections for its president and legislature on Jan. 13, and China has used its military, diplomatic and economic power to influence voters to back candidates favoring unification between the sides. Despite that, the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party is leading in most polls, reaffirming the electorate’s backing for the status of de-facto independence from mainland China.

China regularly sends navy ships and warplanes to waters and airspace close to Taiwan, and its use of balloons to collect intelligence could be a new stage in its campaign of intimidation against the island.

The Defense Ministry said three of the balloons passed from east to west, close to the Ching-Chuan-Kang air base, home to much of the Taiwanese air wings dedicated to defending the island against China’s military threat. The fourth passed north of the port of Keelung, which services Taiwan’s crucial trade relations with Japan, a treaty partner with the U.S.

A Chinese balloon shot down by the U.S. after transferring North America last February was equipped to detect and collect intelligence signals as part of a huge, military-linked aerial surveillance program that targeted more than 40 countries, the Biden administration said, citing imagery from American U-2 spy planes.

A fleet of balloons operates under the direction of the People’s Liberation Army, the military wing of China’s ruling Communist Party, and is used specifically for spying, outfitted with high-tech equipment designed to gather sensitive information from targets across the globe, the U.S. said. Similar balloons have sailed over five continents, it said.

10. Russia Moves Forward With Plans to Buy Iranian Ballistic Missiles

And in some real irony the missiles Iran may be selling could be based on designs and assistance from north Korea which developed their own weapons based on designs from Russian/Former USSR systems. But I will leave that to the missile and proliferation experts to assess.

Russia Moves Forward With Plans to Buy Iranian Ballistic Missiles

Moscow in recent weeks has also begun receiving ballistic missiles from North Korea

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-moves-forward-with-plans-to-buy-iranian-ballistic-missiles-cf3560e4?mod=hp_lead_pos5&utm

By Michael R. Gordon

Follow

, Gordon Lubold

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 and Benoit Faucon

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Jan. 4, 2024 5:30 am ET

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, in the military cap, viewed Iranian munitions on display in Tehran in September. PHOTO: RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESS/SHUTTERSTOCK

Russia is planning to buy short-range ballistic missiles from Iran, a step that would enhance Moscow’s ability to target Ukraine’s infrastructure at a critical moment in the conflict, U.S. officials said.

Moscow’s plans have provoked deep concern within the Biden administration and come as support wanes in Congress for continued U.S. military assistance for Ukraine. Lawmakers have yet to pass a bill that would provide additional funding for Ukraine.

“The United States is concerned that Russian negotiations to acquire close-range ballistic missiles from Iran are actively advancing,” one of the U.S. officials said. “We assess that Russia intends to purchase missile systems from Iran.”

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Iran-backed groups form a land bridge across the Middle East and connect in an alliance that Tehran calls the “Axis of Resistance.” Here’s what to know about the alliance that includes Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Photo Illustration: Eve Hartley

Delivery of the Iranian missiles could happen as soon as this spring if the purchase proceeds, but U.S. officials don’t believe the deal has been completed.

The Iranian missiles would add to Moscow’s recent acquisitions. Russia has already begun to receive ballistic-missile launchers and several dozen ballistic missiles from North Korea, the officials said.

U.S. officials said that Moscow’s desire to acquire Iranian missiles was evident in mid-December when a Russia delegation visited an Iranian training area to observe ballistic missiles and related equipment displayed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force, including its short-range Ababil missile.

That visit, which hasn’t previously been disclosed and marks a further step toward acquiring Iranian missiles, followed a September trip by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to the headquarters of the IRGC Aerospace Force in Tehran. During that visit, Shoigu observed a display of the Ababil and other missile systems, U.S. officials said. He also met Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri, the chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, and boasted that Russian-Iranian relations were reaching a new level.

An Iranian missile being test-fired in 2010, according to the Iranian Defense Ministry. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Engulfed in a grinding war of attrition and facing international sanctions, Russia has also turned to North Korea to supplement its efforts to produce arms at home. Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un held a summit at a spaceport in Russia’s far east in September and pledged greater cooperation on economic and security issues.

In the past several weeks, North Korea has begun to ship a range of weaponry to Russia, including, for the first time, short-range ballistic missiles to eastern Russia, according to several officials familiar with the transaction. The weaponry includes previously reported stocks of artillery, officials said.

Military analysts say that Moscow’s acquisition of the Iranian and North Korean missiles could provide an important boost for Russia as it is stepping up its attacks and trying to overwhelm Ukraine’s antimissile defenses.

“The strikes that Russia has executed in recent days demonstrate the importance to the Russians of having a large supply of ballistic missiles,” said Frederick Kagan, director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington think tank.

Russia has been looking for ways to overcome Ukrainian air defenses by increasing the number of missiles launched, and adjusting the types of weapons it is using, according to Kagan. “Having enough ballistic missiles in their arsenal is a very important part of that,” he added.

Russia has already acquired a large number of drones from Iran to attack Ukraine. Moscow and Tehran have also been building a new factory in Russia that could make thousands of drones for the conflict, U.S. officials have said.

Russia’s outreach to Iran and North Korea represents a shift from its posture in past years when it cooperated with the U.S. and other Western powers in trying to limit the two nations’ capabilities.

An apartment building in Kharkiv, Ukraine, damaged by a Russian drone strike last month. PHOTO: STRINGER/REUTERS

The U.S. fears that Russia’s growing cooperation with Tehran will not only help Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine but also strengthen Iran’s military capabilities in the Middle East and potentially provide revenue to bolster its economy, which has been battered by Western sanctions. In November, U.S. officials said that Russia has been helping Tehran develop its satellite collection capabilities and has also been offering “unprecedented defense cooperation” on missiles, military electronics and air defense.

A U.N. Security Council resolution adopted soon after the 2015 Iran nuclear deal banned Tehran from exporting or importing some types of missiles and drones, as well as military technology that can be used to produce and operate missiles, without the approval of the council.

But that restriction formally expired in October, raising concerns among some Western officials that Tehran may now seek to turn to military sales to Russia and other nations.

With the expiration of the U.N. ban, the U.S. imposed sanctions intended to discourage Iran’s missile trade and issued a statement with 47 other nations vowing to block Iran’s sale of ballistic missiles and related technology. But Russia’s Foreign Ministry has said the U.N. restrictions on buying missile technology from Iran or providing it to Tehran no longer need to be followed.

A Kremlin handout showing Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at a summit in Russia in September where they pledged greater cooperation on economic and security issues. PHOTO: ARTYOM GEODAKYAN/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia was a more cooperative partner with Washington. It joined the U.S., European nations and China in negotiating the 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran. It also supported tough sanctions in the U.N. Security Council on North Korea through 2017 in response to Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile activities.

“Russia was basically supportive of getting North Korea to accept all kinds of restrictions,” said Robert Einhorn, a former senior State Department official, referring to the bygone era of cooperation.

Moscow’s latest actions reflect a shift in its strategic orientation, according to Einhorn. “Its foreign policy is largely based on undermining U.S. interests,” he said.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com, Gordon Lubold at gordon.lubold@wsj.com and Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com

11. A Better Cyber Service

I think the US Cyber Service has merit. I hope we consider it.

Excerpts:

A further step would be the creation of a uniformed U.S. Cyber Service, modeled more closely on the Health Service Commissioned Officer Corps than on military services. The new Cyber Academy proposed in the first step could provide undergraduate and graduate degrees in the computer sciences, cyber operations, cyber policy, and cyber law with the goal of commissioning uniformed cyber professionals who can specialize in government, military, and private-sector security applications in support of national security objectives. Such a service, emphasizing cyber professionalism over military professionalism, would further enable direct commissioning of cyber professionals to the highest echelons of leadership, much as the Surgeon General will not often rise through the ranks of the uniformed service. 

As with the Health Service Commissioned Officer Corps, who readily fill critical positions in agencies throughout the federal government, and Coast Guard officers who readily fill critical positions and bring key authorities to joint military commands, Cyber Service personnel could be empowered to bring key expertise and authorities to U.S. military operations and commands as cyber professionals with military expertise, rather than service-trained military professionals with cyber expertise.

This path forward would allow for the growth of cyber professionals within the U.S. government and the building of public-private partnerships, all without limiting future changes to the mission and character of the service or other new services. Just as the Coast Guard has changed what federal department it belonged to over time, the Cyber Service could similarly transfer as needed. Or should policymakers determine that a military service is still necessary, transitioning the Cyber Service to the Defense Department or standing up a wholly new service would still be possible. And for the immediate military needs of today, a greater emphasis on Cyber Command is preferrable to the creation of Cyber Force. Ultimately, cyber is too big, too dynamic, and too important to be constrained in a military service.

A Better Cyber Service - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Michael Kreuzer · January 4, 2024

2024 will mark the fifth year of America’s newest military service, the Space Force. Its success has led to increased calls for a new service for the Department of Defense’s fifth recognized domain of warfare, cyberspace. These calls have grown so loud as to have reached the point where current U.S. Senate proposals for the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act include a provision that will task the Department of Defense to study the possibility of an independent cyber force.

Despite these calls, many significant challenges and obstacles exist. Though cyberspace is recognized by the department as a domain of warfare, it is unambiguously different in character from the physical domains of warfare that define existing services. And although from legal and budgetary standpoints the standup of Space Force has to date been relatively smooth, significant questions remain about the focus and culture of the fledgling service. Taken together, these issues give serious pause to a new Cyber Force as an independent military service. The churn of developing a new service combined with the lack of a sufficiently independent operating environment and unique set of capabilities and operating constructs may hinder cyber military capabilities, rather than enhance them, at a critical juncture in great-power competition.

Become a Member

To get serious about the future of cyber and national security, policymakers should look outside the Defense Department box to establish an effective U.S. Cyber Service. Rather than looking to the physical warfighting domains as an example, they should look instead to the functional domains of weather, medicine, and law enforcement. These are examples of non-military services that can integrate with military operations when needed while also partnering with the public sector in a non-militarized role for ongoing operations both foreign and domestic.

The Benefits and Drawbacks of a Cyber Force

The reasons for the increased calls for a cyber service are clear. Four of the five current military services are tied to the four physical domains of warfare, and the fifth specializes in one trans-domain region within the department of one of those domains. In this context, decaling a new domain of warfare implies the need for an independent service for that domain.

What’s more, recent conflicts have proven the growing vital importance of cyber operations to modern warfare. Cyber is increasingly the backbone of all advanced weapons system, and in the future cyber connections and even weapons may well be in the quiver of every soldier’s arsenal. To a large degree, fifth-generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35 are more integrated supercomputers that can fly than cyber-augmented aircraft. As David Barno and Nora Bensahel noted in a previous article, “[n]o military service today can function without reliable, resilient cyber capabilities for everything from command and control, to intelligence analysis, to the routine functioning of every weapon system from tanks and ships to aircraft and satellites.”

Yet it is these very attributes that have made the declaration of cyberspace a domain of warfare alongside the four physical domains highly problematic, even dangerous, from a defense policy standpoint. The Space Force, like the Air Force before it, came into existence because the physical requirements of the unique domain required wholly separate equipment and operating constructs to enable human beings to fight and operate within those domains. The Air Force evolved toward independence because the Army was culturally unwilling to prioritize procurement of long-range aircraft. It also resisted the development of “airminded” officers to implement a system of war based on strikes deep into enemy territory rather than in direct support of ground maneuver forces. Similarly, calls for Space Force independence occurred because the Air Force was perceived as paying lip service to space launch and developing constructs of defense in orbital space, while instead being culturally biased towards air dominance.

Cyber operations are not distinct from the physical domains and do not require distinct procurement or operating constructs. They are instead a new layer or medium of weapons and vulnerabilities that need to be prioritized and integrated within the existing domains, rather than bureaucratically separated. Like other emerging weapons systems from missiles to drones to special operations forces, they would benefit from greater awareness and emphasis within the existing services.

Cyber as a medium for military operations, vulnerabilities, and power projection poses further problems for U.S. military policy as it, by its nature, eliminates the foreign/domestic divide and thus poses significant obstacles to U.S. laws and norms of military employment. The 2014 Sony Pictures hack illustrates this problem best, when an American mass media conglomerate, with a subsidiary in Japan, had its overseas servers hacked over a period of months, with information from the hack released to coerce the company not to release a movie to Americans. The dubious questions surrounding national sovereignty, proprietary ownership, private sector network security, and lack of a brute force element demonstrates the inherently whole-of-government, public-private sector cooperation necessary to thwart this type of threat.

Finally, as with the Space Force versus Space Command confusion, a second case where a unified combatant command heavily overlaps with an individual service will potentially undermine the cyber mission due to bureaucratic infighting. As a domain defined by operating constructs and not unique physical constraints, the unified combatant command model with quasi-service authorities, much like U.S. Special Operations Command, is better suited to the military challenges of cyber integration than a distinct service.

What’s more, the reaction of Google employees to the Air Force’s Project Maven demonstrated the cultural tensions between the military and technology sector, and the authority to direct commission cyber professionals to senior military ranks raises questions about the profession of arms relative to technical expertise. Tech company CEOs may undoubtedly be subject-matter experts and proven leaders in the private sector, but direct commissioning such individuals to senior military ranks remains a bridge too far for the military services.

For all these reasons, embracing a purely military framing for this challenge and addressing it only in the “warfighting domain” will artificially restricts thinking and harm, rather than help. U.S. policymakers and allies should instead think differently about the relationship of cyber operations to governments and national sovereignty.

Alternative Models

Naming “cyberspace” a warfighting domain, as the U.S. Department of Defense did in 2010, has led many analysts to the natural conclusion that a military cyber service is the logical next step in the progression of cyber operations. This framing, however, omits alternative models beyond the Department of Defense that are better suited for the unique demands of cyber. Beyond the five Department of Defense uniformed services, the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Commissioned Officer Corps, and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy provide valuable alternatives to the uniformed service models that can shape a non-Department of Defense Cyber Service.

The U.S. Coast Guard, as part of the Department of Homeland Security, is the most obvious alternative model. Officially a maritime security, search and rescue, and law enforcement service, the Coast Guard both maintains a global military presence, in partnership with the U.S. Navy, and a domestic law enforcement and humanitarian role overseeing activities in U.S. territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone. The Coast Guard has in its history been assigned to the Department of Treasury, Transportation, and now Homeland Security. Due to its broad law enforcement mission it is explicitly exempted from the restrictions of other uniformed military services imposed by the Posse Comitatus acts. These unique authorities readily make the Coast Guard a critical force-multiplier for military operations, notably in the Indo-Pacific Command and in the Global War on Terrorism.

At the same time, the Coast Guard’s status as a military service may pose normative challenges when it comes to domestic cyber needs. The Department of Health and Human Services’ Public Health Service Commissioned Corps and Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Commissioned Officer Corps provide models of non-military, profession-centric uniformed services for critical public missions. These services are comprised of 6,000 and 330 officers, respectively, who are driven by the public-service applications of their core professions.

The Public Health Service Commissioned Corps’ mission is to protect, promote, and advance the health and safety of the United States, accomplished rapid reaction to public health needs, leadership in public health practices, and advancement of public health science. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Commissioned Officer Corps’ mission is to develop a coordinated approach to oceanographic and atmospheric research in order to provide critical environmental intelligence to the nation both in times of war and peace. The public health service is relatively high visibility to most Americans owing to the leadership of the Surgeon General and crisis response to events from Ebola to COVID-19. But the professional reputation of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration can also be seen in it being one of the few U.S. entities able to regularly overfly Cuba in pursuit of vital public information. Its officers are generally professionals focused on engineering, earth and marine sciences, and other related disciplines. Due to their expertise and dual-professional nature, most serve in the field grade officer ranks (usually lieutenant commander).

A final uniformed option, without a formal uniformed service, is the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and the Merchant Marine fleet. The Merchant Marine is comprised of civilian mariners and both civilian and federally-owned merchant vessels, managed jointly by the U.S. government and private sector. Its purpose is primarily commerce and transportation of goods in U.S. territorial waters during peacetime, while in wartime it can be called up as an auxiliary to the Navy. Governed today under the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration, the Merchant Marine Academy seeks to educate leaders inspired to serve the national security, marine transportation, and economic needs of the United States. Those graduates do so in a variety of functions, from active-duty military officers to Coast Guard-licensed mariners while on reserve status.

Building a Better Cyber Service

These examples, alongside many non-uniformed agencies where these officers are employed, illustrate that there are many potential models for a future cyber service. Further, the history and evolution of these entities demonstrate a gradual but determined path that U.S. cyber professionals can embark on rapidly, without precluding alternative agencies in the future.

To start, a U.S. Cyber Academy and reserve officer training program modeled on the Merchant Marine Academy, the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, and the military’s Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program can be implemented almost immediately. This in turn will promote a core of public sector-oriented cyber professionals similar to the Public Health Service’s Ready Reserve Corps and the Merchant Marine, potentially administered under the Department of Commerce. This model can lay a more solid foundation for developing cyber professionalism integrated across the government, operating in cooperation with critical allies and private-sector partners, and unconstrained by the potential stigma of military operations.

A further step would be the creation of a uniformed U.S. Cyber Service, modeled more closely on the Health Service Commissioned Officer Corps than on military services. The new Cyber Academy proposed in the first step could provide undergraduate and graduate degrees in the computer sciences, cyber operations, cyber policy, and cyber law with the goal of commissioning uniformed cyber professionals who can specialize in government, military, and private-sector security applications in support of national security objectives. Such a service, emphasizing cyber professionalism over military professionalism, would further enable direct commissioning of cyber professionals to the highest echelons of leadership, much as the Surgeon General will not often rise through the ranks of the uniformed service.

As with the Health Service Commissioned Officer Corps, who readily fill critical positions in agencies throughout the federal government, and Coast Guard officers who readily fill critical positions and bring key authorities to joint military commands, Cyber Service personnel could be empowered to bring key expertise and authorities to U.S. military operations and commands as cyber professionals with military expertise, rather than service-trained military professionals with cyber expertise.

This path forward would allow for the growth of cyber professionals within the U.S. government and the building of public-private partnerships, all without limiting future changes to the mission and character of the service or other new services. Just as the Coast Guard has changed what federal department it belonged to over time, the Cyber Service could similarly transfer as needed. Or should policymakers determine that a military service is still necessary, transitioning the Cyber Service to the Defense Department or standing up a wholly new service would still be possible. And for the immediate military needs of today, a greater emphasis on Cyber Command is preferrable to the creation of Cyber Force. Ultimately, cyber is too big, too dynamic, and too important to be constrained in a military service.

Become a Member

Col. (s) Michael P. Kreuzer is the Director of Emerging Technology Programs at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College. A career Air Force intelligence officer, he holds a Ph.D. in International Security from Princeton University. All views expressed herein are his own and do not represent the views of the U.S. government or Department of Defense.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Michael Kreuzer · January 4, 2024

12. Learning from Failure: Afghanistan as a Microcosm for Strategic Competition

Conclusion:

Afghanistan and its lessons matter because the U.S. military ultimately lost several thousand lives, expended trillions of dollars, and failed to achieve its primary strategic objectives by not understanding and conducting layered multi-polar competition and conflict. The U.S. military has been quick to rush away from Afghanistan and to claim that strategic competition is very different than its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. This article questions that basic assumption and highlights several critical parallels to consider. Similar to the Cold War, strategic competition is playing out across irregular warfare environments around the globe.

However, while Afghanistan offers a microcosm of strategic competition and the U.S. military should adapt from its mistakes, it must also not rush to apply lessons particular to Afghanistan in other unique contexts. Adapting lessons from Afghanistan to competition with China, Russia, and Iran requires careful application. The U.S. military can begin careful application through producing power frameworks for specific theaters of operation with realistic political-military objectives, employing hybrid methods to support those objectives, and adapting its manpower and deployment models to wage political warfare. Failure to adapt risks the same consequences as faced in Afghanistan and worse. Where the U.S. faces embarrassment, sunk costs, continued threats from transregional terrorism, and degraded credibility from Afghanistan, future failures in Ukraine, Central and Eastern Africa, the South China Sea, and elsewhere could result in conflict escalation, global economic crisis, or total warfare. While the U.S. military is not the lead for strategic competition, it will continue to lead where the operational environment is destabilized and requires security capabilities not available elsewhere, namely irregular warfare environments that blur peace and war. Overwhelmingly the most prevalent form of warfare since at least 1945, irregular political warfare with strategic competitors will continue to force U.S. military intervention around the globe. The U.S. military, therefore, must learn and adapt to avoid future catastrophe.

Learning from Failure: Afghanistan as a Microcosm for Strategic Competition - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Paul Bailey · January 4, 2024

Why should the U.S. military and political leadership care about Afghanistan? Isn’t Afghanistan a story about sunk costs whose lessons only apply to counter terrorism or counter insurgency? Absolutely not. Rather, the U.S. military must understand its failures in Afghanistan to succeed in strategic competition. Failure to learn and adapt could end in similar disaster with greater strategic consequences.

In 2020, the world watched as the U.S. military scrambled to the exits while the Afghan government and military imploded, leaving the country in shambles. Credible analysis calls the war in Afghanistan an unmitigated strategic failure that demands accountability. Conveniently, the U.S. leadership have plenty to distract from failure in Afghanistan due to crisis in Israel, conflict in Ukraine, potential war over Taiwan, and the dominance of strategic competition with China, Russia, and Iran, not to mention the ever-simmering crisis with North Korea. The U.S. military has now shifted priorities to strategic competition and confronting and deterring the “pacing” threat. Unfortunately, the ghost of Afghanistan will not go away that easily. Not only will Afghanistan continue to matter due to residual terrorist safe havens, but strategic competition also harkens back to the Cold War where competition played out over irregular conflicts in Afghanistan, El Salvador, Vietnam, and elsewhere. Strategic competition, in fact, possesses numerous parallels with the multi-decade U.S. conflict in Afghanistan. This article posits that Afghanistan represents a microcosm for strategic competition and that the U.S. military’s success in this competition requires learning from failure in Afghanistan. Most centrally, the U.S. military failed to effectively wage a political warfare campaign in Afghanistan. To better enable future success, the military needs to apply analysis-based political warfare frameworks, employ hybrid methods to support political-military objectives, and adapt legacy manpower and deployment models. Left unlearned, military leaders and practitioners will continue to repeat similar mistakes across ongoing irregular battlefields in strategic competition.

U.S. Failure to Compete in Afghanistan

The U.S military principally failed in Afghanistan by not adequately addressing the centrality of layered multi-polar political competition and conflict. Rather than waging a political warfare campaign, the U.S. military basically approached Afghanistan through traditional battlefield combat. This approach defaulted to U.S. unilateral combat operations to find, fix, and finish enemy forces, often whom the U.S. forces could not meaningfully differentiate between the Taliban, Haqqani network, al Qaeda, a local warlord, or local militia. Short-term rotational unit deployments, typically with limited or no prior experience in their area of operations, incentivized a focus on combat operations and de-incentivized understanding the power landscape. When the U.S. military engaged local and regional powerbrokers, short term deployments and lack of contextual knowledge and misemployment of hybrid warfare often destabilized the economic landscape or enabled local Afghani local, regional, or national powerbrokers to extort and manipulate the U.S. military thereby neutralizing the desired effect and design of U.S. programs. The military’s rotational deployment model proved particularly debilitating as it systematically rotated units and leaders in an ad hoc manner, effectively neutralizing continuity of relationships, understanding, or operational approaches. Ultimately, the U.S. military failed to employ an appropriate tactical and operational political warfare approach in Afghanistan and proved ineffective in engaging in tactical and operational competition while leveraging combat capability to support competitive objectives.

The U.S. war in Afghanistan offers a microcosm of current strategic competition due to multi-polar competition and conflict occurring simultaneously across the local, regional, and global theaters. In Afghanistan, the U.S. political and military leadership violated Clausewitz’s first principle of war through not recognizing the type of war it encountered. While the U.S. military viewed the conflict through a bipolar lens of al Qaeda unified with the Taliban against the U.S. and unified resistance partners, reality shows a “kaleidoscopic” spectrum of complex actors. Locally, these actors often included isolated village elders, connected through tribal and ethic ties but dissociated from a centralized Kabul state structure. At the regional level, competition occurred across Pakistan, India, Iran, the U.S., Russia, China, and others, while globally al Qaeda, the U.S., China, Iran, UN, UK and others engaged in complex confrontation over Afghanistan and its future. This multipolar competition and conflict occurred simultaneously, creating complex adaptation with cascading subsequent effects locally, regionally, and globally. The U.S. military proved largely incapable of understanding or addressing the challenge. Just as troubling, many units naively applied doctrinal counterinsurgency methods generically or with little analysis of why or how to apply the methods. Finally, many military tactical and operational leaders did not practically consider a political warfare campaign part of their job or at least did not effectively implement an effective campaign. Instead, the military preferred to advocate for U.S. Department of State responsibility while pursuing attritional combat operations themselves. Unfortunately, little to no Department of State presence existed outside of Kabul, nor did a recognizable approach exist to connect or federate governance across Afghanistan. The result proved telling both analytically and experientially for those who served across Afghanistan: the U.S. led by its military failed to effectively compete, substituting temporary and clumsy combat power instead of sustainable Afghan political power. In the end, the Taliban prevailed as the remaining sustainable Afghan political power.

Afghanistan, a Microcosm of Strategic Competition for Power

The U.S. conflict in Afghanistan reveals at least five critical parallels to global strategic competition with Russia, China, and Iran including multi-polarity, multi-layered conflict, ambiguous objectives, hybrid warfare methods, and indecisive combat. The conflict in Afghanistan and ongoing strategic competition both include multi-polar competition among a wide range of actors. As noted, in Afghanistan, the U.S. military faced a plethora of political and military actors and adversaries, including al Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistan, Iran, local warlords, the government of Afghanistan, China, India, and others. Similarly, the U.S. faces a multi-polar strategic adversarial environment including China, Russia, Iran, North Korea as well as a diverse array of non-state actors and proxies such as Wagner Group, Transregional Criminal Organizations, and local and global terrorist organizations.

The U.S. faces multiple layers of competition and conflict in complex-adaptive multi-polar environments in Afghanistan and global competition. In Afghanistan, the U.S. military encountered complex village, or local, level competition and conflict with “accidental guerillas,” local tribal elders, ethno-centric warlords, and insurgent networks. Simultaneously, it encountered regional competition and conflict with the Taliban, Iran, Pakistan, and India. Globally, the U.S. military faced global conflict and competition with al Qaeda, ISIS, China, Iran, and Russia. Together, this created a complex-adaptive multi-polar and layered competitive environment. Similarly, the U.S. currently faces complex-adaptive multi-layered competition and conflict with its strategic competitors locally, regionally, and globally. In Iraq and Syria, it simultaneously faces Russian and Iranian threat network alignment all the while confronting ISIS and operating in politically competitive environments between Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish government and non-governmental factions. In the Philippines, the U.S. military simultaneously faces ISIS affiliates and PRC encroachment and coercion in Philippine territorial waters. In Europe, the U.S. confronts Russian incursions into Ukraine through supplying money, weapons, and equipment to Ukrainians battling Russian regular and irregular forces at the local, regional, and international levels. Modern information technology has only served to increase the complex interaction between these local, regional, and global layers.

Multi-polarity across all layers of competition and conflict in Afghanistan and strategic competition have produced ambiguous strategic political objectives. In Afghanistan, this complex-dynamic environment confounded U.S. political objectives. What began as retaliation for the attacks on September 11th to destroy al Qaeda and neutralize terrorist safe havens morphed into democratic nation building and expanding the rights of individual Afghans. Later, when decisive success proved elusive, objectives focused on strengthening the Afghan security forces, neutralizing remaining terrorist networks, and looking for an exit strategy. Finally, the U.S. accepted withdrawal as the metric of success at the expense of earlier objectives. Throughout the conflict, the U.S. faithfully followed a centralized government model and political strategy regardless of realities on the ground at the village, district, provincial, national, or regional levels.

Similarly, the U.S. faces political ambiguity in global competition with China, Russia, and Iran. While at the global level, U.S. political objectives may appear relatively simple, at the regional and local levels, multi-polar and layered competition creates complexity and muddles political objectives. For example, competition with the PRC in the Western Pacific balances U.S. national security objectives with regional allies and partners such as Australia, Japan, and others while meshing those interests with local allies and partners in the Philippines, Indonesia, India, and elsewhere. The meshing of complex global, regional, and local interests produces ambiguity and sometimes conflicting objectives. Local interests to prevent escalation, conflict, and backlash within Russia’s and China’s spheres of influence exacerbate political ambiguity and prevent clarity, which can conflict with a local country’s political interests. The result has produced complexity unparalleled since at least the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Cold War. On its face, the United States is employing a simple strategy, Integrated deterrence, “a framework for working across warfighting domains, theaters, and the spectrum of conflict, in collaboration with all instruments of national power, as well as with U.S. allies and our partners.” A closer examination reveals, however, much greater ambiguity. While objectives with close allies such as the U.K., Australia, and Japan are clear, an attentive look at partnership with balancers such as India, Indonesia, Iraq, Germany, and others illuminate oft-time precarious political objectives where U.S. approaches to ensuring advantage are tailored considerably due to the unique actors and equities at stake. Ultimately, conflict in Afghanistan and strategic competition both reveal ambiguous political objectives due to the diverse range of actors and layers of complexity at local, regional, and global levels. The battlefield for this competition for power, resources, and influence extends globally, including less considered countries such as Papa New Guinea, Georgia, Finland, the Philippines, as well as the obvious flashpoints in Ukraine, Syria, and Taiwan. Like Afghanistan, the complexity has defied simple political objectives, instead requiring tailored goals with the various countries involved.

Multi-polarity, complex layers, and political ambiguity have perpetuated hybrid warfare and indecisive combat in both Afghanistan and strategic competition. While the United States began its war in Afghanistan to retaliate against al Qaeda and deny future terrorist safe havens, it quickly expanded its objectives to revolutionary democratic state building. It did so at the national, regional, and international levels while the local and district levels of government remained virtually divorced from centralized control or support from Kabul. Tactically, while combat remained pervasive, the U.S. military turned to hybrid methods based on counter insurgency doctrine. These methods included tactical level leadership engagements to influence local leaders, often using carrots of economic assistance through humanitarian related projects such as wells, schools, and other work programs designed to encourage cooperation from the local populace. All the while, military operations, often with a pro forma Afghan face, executed essentially U.S. military led combat operations to find, fix, and destroy insurgent networks. Although pervasive, combat in Afghanistan proved indecisive, although likely producing one of the highest friendly to enemy force killed ratios in history. It ultimately, however, never eradicated the enemy nor enabled the political and military strategy set by U.S. leadership.

As outlined by authors Seth Jones in “Three Dangerous Men” and David Kilcullen in “The Dragons and the Snakes,” strategic competitors have predominately employed indirect hybrid warfare and competitive methods to confront the United States. China has led with the most indirect method, using a “win without fighting” methodology epitomizing “Unrestricted Warfare” through hybrid legal, psychological, media, and economic means. Russia has proven more militarily aggressive, through cyber enabled psychological operations, proxy and direct military assistance in Syria and Africa, and direct conflict in Ukraine. Iran, meanwhile, maintains a robust proxy threat network throughout the Middle East and the world to contest U.S. and allied interests while bolstering its own global position. In strategic competition, where the aim is to sustain advantage while preventing direct conflict, direct combat will continue to serve a key but likely supporting and indirect role. The U.S. security assistance to Ukraine, Taiwan, the Philippines, Poland, Finland, and others represents the primary way that combat assistance will occur. This should not surprise, since the same trend occurred in the Cold War where direct combat occurred through proxies and surrogates in Afghanistan, Vietnam, Korea, El Salvador, and elsewhere. Furthermore, where direct combat is employed by the U.S., it will most likely occur in stabilizing a local country such as Iraq to deter greater influence from Iran or supporting Ukraine to prevent Russian dominance and future aggression.

How to Adapt:

The U.S. military needs to adapt from its failures in Afghanistan in three primary ways to better support and conduct strategic competition with China, Russia, and Iran. First, the U.S. military should focus campaigning on power-based warfare. A plethora of articles have debated what irregular warfare is, how to define it, and how to wage it. Most centrally, however, irregular warfare is closely linked to political warfare – the struggle and competition for power where combat operations are one of many hybrid methods to reach U.S. objectives. Authors David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks potentially provide the most effective definition of irregular warfare that captures its political essence;

“Irregular warfare is a coercive struggle that erodes or builds legitimacy for the purpose of political power. It blends disparate lines of effort to create an integrated attack on societies and their political institutions. It weaponizes frames and narratives to affect credibility and resolve, and it exploits societal vulnerabilities to fuel political change. As such, states engaged in, or confronted with, irregular warfare must bring all elements of power to bear under their national political leadership.”

This definition links closely to analysis of political warfare.

“Political warfare consists of the intentional use of one or more of the implements of power—diplomatic/political, information/cyber, military/intelligence, and economic—to affect the political composition or decision making in a state [or non-state group].”

The U.S. military should develop a historical and current framework of the power landscape globally and when deploying to a regional and local area of operation. This landscape should consist of a network analysis of relative power and must extend past the central government and out to the edges where governance is often localized and disconnected. From that landscape, the military can integrate appropriate U.S. government agencies and local and central power brokers to craft realistic and minimally acceptable political strategies aligned to U.S. objectives. Second, in support of that engagement framework, the U.S. military should pursue a hybrid warfare approach that mixes and matches methods to reach its objectives whether bolstering governmental resilience or a resistance group. In destabilized areas, U.S. forces may use combat operations or advise and assist a local partner in combat operations. Environments like Afghanistan or similar destabilized areas like Somalia, Ukraine, and others require combat operations to reach U.S. and allied objectives. These combat operations, however, must closely link to and support the political framework and integrate economic, legal, influence, and other methods to overarching theater and strategic objectives. Third and finally, the U.S. military must break outdated industrial, manpower, and deployment models to design its force to wage irregular strategic competition. Arguably its most important adaptation and most difficult to implement given organizational impediments, the military’s manpower model and short-term deployment cycles create incentives that degrade application of the first two recommendations. The manpower model incentives short-term thinking and focus on superficial issues rather than developing the deep critical thinking, analysis, and adaptive approaches required to succeed. In Afghanistan, this flaw is best captured by General McChrystal when he asked:

“What would you do differently if you had to stay until we won?”

“The answer was to get the right people into the fight, keep them there long enough to develop an understanding of the environment, and hold them accountable for progress, but that was not something the military was interested in doing. Instead, we stuck with a policy that rotated leaders through the country like tourists.”

Success in irregular warfare and strategic competition requires tailoring manpower and deployment models to understand and solve the challenges inherent in complex adaptive threat environments.

Conclusion

Afghanistan and its lessons matter because the U.S. military ultimately lost several thousand lives, expended trillions of dollars, and failed to achieve its primary strategic objectives by not understanding and conducting layered multi-polar competition and conflict. The U.S. military has been quick to rush away from Afghanistan and to claim that strategic competition is very different than its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. This article questions that basic assumption and highlights several critical parallels to consider. Similar to the Cold War, strategic competition is playing out across irregular warfare environments around the globe.

However, while Afghanistan offers a microcosm of strategic competition and the U.S. military should adapt from its mistakes, it must also not rush to apply lessons particular to Afghanistan in other unique contexts. Adapting lessons from Afghanistan to competition with China, Russia, and Iran requires careful application. The U.S. military can begin careful application through producing power frameworks for specific theaters of operation with realistic political-military objectives, employing hybrid methods to support those objectives, and adapting its manpower and deployment models to wage political warfare. Failure to adapt risks the same consequences as faced in Afghanistan and worse. Where the U.S. faces embarrassment, sunk costs, continued threats from transregional terrorism, and degraded credibility from Afghanistan, future failures in Ukraine, Central and Eastern Africa, the South China Sea, and elsewhere could result in conflict escalation, global economic crisis, or total warfare. While the U.S. military is not the lead for strategic competition, it will continue to lead where the operational environment is destabilized and requires security capabilities not available elsewhere, namely irregular warfare environments that blur peace and war. Overwhelmingly the most prevalent form of warfare since at least 1945, irregular political warfare with strategic competitors will continue to force U.S. military intervention around the globe. The U.S. military, therefore, must learn and adapt to avoid future catastrophe.

Paul Bailey is an active-duty U.S. Marine with more than 16 years of conventional and special operations experience across the Middle East and Western Pacific. In 2023, he was selected as a Non-Resident Fellow for the Irregular Warfare Initiative.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Main image: U.S. Air Force loadmasters and pilots assigned to the 816th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron, load passengers aboard a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III in support of the Afghanistan evacuation at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), Afghanistan, Aug. 24, 2021 (Master Sgt. Donald R. Allen via U.S. Air Force).

13. Can the Palestinian Authority Govern Gaza?

I am reminded of these quotes:

If you concentrate exclusively on victory, while no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.

--B.H. Liddel-Hart

If in taking a native den one thinks chiefly of the market that he will establish there on the morrow, one does not take it in the ordinary way.

--Lyautey: The Colonial Role of the Army,

Revue Des Deux Mondes, 15 February 1900

Conclusion:

Thinking about the PA’s role in governing Gaza may seem premature as the fighting still rages. One lesson from Afghanistan, Iraq, and other conflicts, however, is that removing a hostile regime is often the easy task. Far harder is building a new government that can provide for its people and ensure long-term peace. If Israel and its partners avoid the hard decisions about governance until after the fighting stops, by then it may be too late.

Can the Palestinian Authority Govern Gaza?

How to Revitalize the PA for Postwar Rule

By Daniel Byman

January 4, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Daniel Byman · January 4, 2024

At some point, the explosions and gunfire will stop, and the war in the Gaza Strip will end. Someone must then govern Gaza, but the options are poor. Hamas certainly will not be left in charge, since Israelis vow they will never allow the group to rebuild its military capacity and again threaten Israel. Israel could decide to take over the strip itself, but it has little desire to rule over two million hostile Palestinians who would undoubtedly wage a low-level insurgency while Israel’s tottering international legitimacy declines further. Others have proposed an international force composed mostly of troops from Arab states, but the potential Arab participants have declared that a nonstarter.

The best bet, and the preferred approach of the Biden administration, is for the Palestinian Authority to take the helm. Rule by the PA—the governmental body that currently controls parts of the West Bank and that ran Gaza before 2007—is better than a lasting Israeli occupation, chaos, or other options, since the PA favors peace with Israel and has the support of much of the international community. But it is hardly without problems. Because of its corruption, poor track record of governing with the West Bank, and perceived complicity with Israel, the organization lacks legitimacy among Palestinians. In the West Bank, it is increasingly losing the ability to suppress Hamas and stop violence without significant help from Israel. And then there is the problem of the current Israeli government’s lack of enthusiasm for the group: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that expecting the PA to solve Gaza’s problems is “a pipe dream.”

For lasting stability and better governance in postwar Gaza, Israel, the United States, and the world need to bolster the PA and otherwise strengthen moderate Palestinians—a process that should begin now but will take at least several years to complete. In the short term, the PA and its backers should identify plausible technocrats who can help run Gaza in the name of the PA but who enjoy more credibility than the group’s leaders in the West Bank. Meanwhile, the United States should work with Arab countries to train thousands of PA security forces, an effort the Biden administration is already beginning. In the medium term, the governments in the West and Arab world that fund the PA should use their leverage to encourage the PA’s current generation of sclerotic leaders to retire and push for a new generation of vibrant leaders to replace them.

One of the biggest challenges will be persuading Israeli leaders to support a role for the PA in Gaza, since many, including Netanyahu, portray the PA as untrustworthy or even supportive of terrorism. This task is doubly difficult given that the PA’s success in Gaza hinges on whether Israel will build up the group’s credibility in the West Bank by rolling back settlements, stopping violent settlers from attacking their Palestinian neighbors, and providing greater respect for Palestinian autonomy in everyday life. The Israeli government was moving backward on all these issues before October 7, and any perceived concessions to the Palestinians are now more politically difficult. But despite these real problems, Gaza must be governed, and the PA is the least-bad choice for the job.

WEAKNESS IN POWER

The PA has ruled the West Bank since the end of the second intifada in 2005, and it has a track record there of corruption and weakness. The PA’s security forces are particularly problematic. They include a multifaceted array of competing organizations, each with its own specific responsibilities. For example, the Palestinian National Security Forces patrol the border and provide internal security, while the Preventive Security Force is an internal intelligence and security agency that focuses on countering espionage, monitoring political activity, and preventing internal dissent. These forces work with Israel to crush Hamas in the West Bank, and they are often brutal in suppressing legitimate Palestinian dissent.

For years, the PA has worked closely with Israeli intelligence and the Israeli military, keeping a lid on violence in the West Bank. The PA, however, is becoming weaker and weaker. In July 2023, Israeli military forces raided the refugee camp in the city of Jenin, claiming that the PA was unable was unable to arrest militants there, even when Israel provided it with precise information. Violence on the West Bank was soaring before October 7, and in the months since, more and more Palestinians are turning to local militias for security rather than relying on PA security forces.

On paper, the PA has some presence in Gaza. As a Carnegie Endowment report notes, before October 7, the PA spent a third of its budget in the strip. It paid the salaries of almost 40,000 Palestinian civil servants in Gaza—including 19,000 police officers who had not been working for well over a decade, having been fired by Hamas when it took over in 2007—and paid Israel for water and electricity there. The PA also has a shadow cabinet that claims authority over the economy, education, and security in Gaza.

In the West Bank, the PA is losing the ability to stop violence without help from Israel.

Yet the writ of these officials is nonexistent, and the police officer payments are simply a form of patronage, with Hamas exercising full control over lives of Palestinians in Gaza before October 7. Israelis rightly ask a question: If the PA cannot provide security in the West Bank, where it is strongest, how could it provide security in Gaza, where it is weak?

Israelis also fault the PA for radicalizing Palestinians. They note that PA-produced textbooks glorify anti-Israel violence and otherwise create fertile ground for militancy. PA-run parks and public buildings bear the names of militants who have killed Israelis. Mahmoud Abbas, the PA’s leader since 2005, has given money to the families of jailed Palestinians or those who have died fighting Israel.

But the argument that the PA is radical often rings hollow. Abbas himself has embraced peace negotiations, and the PA security forces in the West Bank have proved willing partners for Israel. The Netanyahu government, in contrast, has actively allowed the flow of aid from Qatar and other sources to the far more radical Hamas, part of a deliberate strategy of keeping Palestinians divided and thus creating an excuse to avoid peace negotiations with the PA. In the West Bank, Israel expanded settlements and declined to punish settlers who launched pogroms against their Palestinian neighbors. This policy demonstrated to Palestinians both the futility of negotiating with the Netanyahu government and the inability of the PA to provide basic security. Unilateral Israeli raids against suspected terrorists deepened this perception and created a vicious circle: the weaker the PA was perceived, the more Israel acted on its own, which in turn further undermined the PA’s credibility.

The PA’s security forces are often brutal in suppressing legitimate Palestinian dissent.

Abbas himself does not seem fit to lead the PA, and Netanyahu’s accusations of moral cowardice have validity (although the Israeli prime minister himself is hardly a profile in courage). Abbas is an 88-year-old chain smoker, and under his leadership, independent Palestinian courts and civil society groups have withered. Not surprisingly, the mix of corruption, incompetence, and weakness have led many Palestinians to look on Abbas with scorn. In its October 7 attack, Hamas demonstrated its commitment to fighting Israel in contrast to a dithering PA. According to a December poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, a staggering 90 percent of Palestinians want Abbas to resign. In part to offset this weakness, the Biden administration has pushed the PA leaders to expand their ranks and include new faces.

Finally, Israeli politics make it difficult for the PA to play a role in Gaza. Since the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, Israelis have been skeptical of anything that smacks of a concession to Palestinians, and the October 7 attacks have almost certainly enhanced this concern. Since the attacks, Israel has barred the 150,000 or so Palestinians who live in the West Bank and work in Israel from returning to their jobs, worsening the already difficult economic situation in the territory. Israel has also blocked payment of the salaries of PA officials in Gaza. All this shows the PA cannot deliver for its own people, making it difficult for it to make the case that it can effectively play a far bigger role for Palestinians in Gaza in the face of Israeli pressure.

Already, Netanyahu and his allies have tried to undermine their political opponents and counter U.S. pressure to give the PA a major role in Gaza by claiming that allowing the organization to take charge would be tantamount to putting a new batch of terrorists in power in the strip. “I will not allow the entry into Gaza of those who educate for terrorism, support terrorism, and finance terrorism,” Netanyahu vowed in December. Itamar Ben-Gvir, Netanyahu’s far-right minister of national security, has even declared that the PA “is not an alternative to Hamas, it is an ally of Hamas, and that it is how it should be treated, both now and after the war.”

THE LEAST-BAD OPTION

To state the obvious, the primary objective of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza is to ensure that Hamas does not return to power there—ever. If Israel simply departs Gaza after leaving it in ruins, Hamas will resume its control there. Its leadership is still mostly intact, and it has thousands of fighters at its disposal. It has also ruled the strip for almost 20 years, and even before that, it had deep educational, religious, and social welfare networks there. Deeply enmeshed in Gaza, it will be difficult to extirpate.

One option is simply for Israel to become an occupying power in Gaza. Understandably, Israel has no desire to expand its rule over another two million Palestinians, most of whom have long hated Israel, celebrated the October 7 attacks, and now loathe the country even more for its bloody and destructive war in Gaza. Israel would face a low-level insurgency, adding to the casualties it has suffered and the considerable damage to its international reputation it has endured. Not surprisingly, Netanyahu has asserted that becoming a long-term occupier is not a goal.

Israel might also put a government composed of unaffiliated technocrats with experience in international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund in charge of Gaza. In theory, this government would be less corrupt and more efficient than the current PA leadership, focusing on providing services, establishing law and order, and otherwise building institutions to replace those established by Hamas. In practice, however, the technocrats by themselves lack a power base: both the PA nomenklatura and Hamas would oppose their rule. Israel would be forced to provide security, and the technocrats would quickly be seen as a façade for Israeli rule, further damaging their legitimacy. Technocrats are necessary, but they cannot rule without support.

Palestinians inspecting damage from an Israeli strike in Rafah, Gaza Strip, January 2024

Ibraheem Abu Mustafa / Reuters

Another alternative is simply chaos, with a Gazan version of Somalia on Israel’s border. Various clan leaders, municipal figures, and other local power brokers would come to the fore, at times cooperating and at times fighting each other. Israel would back or suppress a given leader based on his willingness to keep Hamas down and otherwise stop anti-Israel violence. Gazans, of course, would continue to suffer as constant low-level fighting would endure.

Some observers have also broached the idea of an international force, perhaps composed in part of troops from Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, or other Arab states that have friendly relations with Israel and are hostile to Hamas. But these countries have little appetite for getting involved in Gaza. Although their rulers oppose Hamas, their people do not, and the countries do not want to be seen as Israel’s partner in oppressing the Palestinians. Ayman Safadi, Jordan’s foreign minister, left little doubt about Arab interest: “Let me be very clear, there will be no Arab troops going to Gaza. None. We’re not going to be seen as the enemy.”

Indeed, to avoid the appearance of abetting an Israeli occupation, Arab states are likely to demand a greater role for the PA if they are to contribute to Gaza’s reconstruction. Saudi Arabia, for its part, will want Israel to make concessions to the PA so it can show that it is not abandoning the Palestinians—a far more politically salient issue than it was before October 7—if it is to proceed with normalizing relations with Israel.

A PLAN FOR GAZA

Every answer to the Gaza governance question is unsatisfying. But in the words of one Israeli security official who spoke to me on the condition of anonymity in December, “It’s obvious to all that the PA will be back in Gaza, except for the people in the Israeli government.” Several steps can be taken now to make the task more feasible, especially several years out.

First, a much more massive program of recruiting and training PA security forces needed to begin yesterday. The Biden administration is considering plans to reactivate what is left of the deactivated but still present-on-paper PA security forces in Gaza, perhaps retraining around 1,000 of them as the nucleus of a larger future force. Some proposals also envision U.S. support for the training of an additional 5,000 PA security forces in Jordan in counterterrorism. But far more officers will be needed.

Second, Israel, the United States, and interested European and Arab countries need to identify Palestinian technocrats from outside the PA who could play a limited role in governing Gaza when the fighting stops, or at least diminishes. These technocrats could help provide basic services, set up a new education system, and build institutions such as courts and local governments. But these leaders will have to nominally be associated with the PA as part of the process of bringing new, uncorrupted figures into the PA—and to ensure that the PA does not use its power to undermine them.

Arab states are likely to demand a greater role for the PA if they are to contribute to Gaza’s reconstruction.

Third, to succeed in Gaza, the PA needs more credibility, and that requires delivering progress for Palestinians in the West Bank. The fates of Gaza and the West Bank are tied together: it would be humiliating for the PA in the West Bank if it played no security role in a postwar Gaza, and it will be necessary for the PA to succeed in the West Bank if it is to succeed in Gaza. The 150,000 Palestinians in the West Bank who work in Israel but who have been barred from entering after October 7 need to be allowed to return to their jobs, albeit with careful security screening, in order to preserve a modicum of economic stability in the West Bank. Whenever possible, Israeli security forces must partner with PA security forces when fighting Hamas or other terrorists in the West Bank, making it clear publicly that the PA is in the lead. Israel also needs to stop expanding settlements and crack down hard on settler violence, both of which are political impossibilities given the current Israeli governing coalition.

Finally, greater PA credibility will also require a leadership change, a prospect U.S. officials are indirectly referring to as a “revitalized” PA. Younger leaders with more nationalist credibility are needed. Abbas is too damaged, both in Israel and among Palestinians, to expand the role of the PA in Gaza. Neither is he respected in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries that might aid the Palestinians. These countries should use their diplomatic and financial muscle to push Abbas and other PA leaders to bring a new generation into senior PA ranks.

Thinking about the PA’s role in governing Gaza may seem premature as the fighting still rages. One lesson from Afghanistan, Iraq, and other conflicts, however, is that removing a hostile regime is often the easy task. Far harder is building a new government that can provide for its people and ensure long-term peace. If Israel and its partners avoid the hard decisions about governance until after the fighting stops, by then it may be too late.

• DANIEL BYMAN is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Foreign Affairs · by Daniel Byman · January 4, 2024

14. Defending the Year of Democracy

Perhaps the top national security issue for like minded democracies around the world and the rules based international order.

Conclusion:

This year will be a milestone for democracy. The challenges will be extreme in both scope and complexity, and the threats to electoral processes will be supercharged. This is the moment for democracy’s defenders to redouble their efforts in defense of electoral integrity and enable creative, nimble opportunities for collaboration. It is still possible to ensure that 2024 sees democracy strengthened, not weakened. This year must be remembered not only for the scale of its elections but also for the speed and scale of democracy’s defense.

Defending the Year of Democracy

What It Will Take to Defend 2024’s 80-Plus Elections From Hostile Actors

By Kat Duffy and Katie Harbath

January 4, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Kat Duffy and Katie Harbath · January 4, 2024

This year, over 80 national elections are scheduled to take place, directly affecting an estimated 4.2 billion people—52 percent of the globe’s population—in the largest election cycle the world will see until 2048. In addition to the U.S. presidential election, voters will go to the polls in the European Union, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and dozens of other countries. Collectively, the stakes are high. The candidates that win will have a chance to shape not only domestic policy but also global issues including artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and Internet governance.

This year’s elections are important for reasons that go beyond their scale. They will be subject to a perfect storm of heightened threats and weakened defenses. Commercial decisions made by technology companies, the reach of global digital platforms, the complexity of the environments in which these platforms operate, the rise of generative AI tools, the growth of foreign influence operations, and the emergence of partisan domestic investigations in the United States have converged to supercharge threats to elections worldwide.

Each election will, of course, be affected by local issues, the cultural context, and the main parties’ policies. But each will also be challenged by global threats to electoral integrity and, by extension, democracy. Governments, companies, and civil society groups must invest to mitigate the risks to democracy and track the emergence of new and dangerous electoral threats. If they get to work now, then 2024 may be remembered as the year when democracy rallied.

DISTRACTED WATCHMEN

Elections take place within local contexts, in local languages, and in accordance with local norms. But the information underpinning them increasingly comes from global digital platforms such as Facebook, Google, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok, WhatsApp, and YouTube. Voters rely on these commercial platforms to communicate and receive information about electoral processes, issues, and candidates. As a result, the platforms exert a powerful sway over elections. In a recent survey by Ipsos, 87 percent of respondents across 16 countries with elections in 2024 expressed concern that disinformation and fake news could impact the results, with social media cited as the leading source of disinformation, followed by messaging apps. Although voters use these social media platforms, they are generally unable to influence the platforms’ decisions or priorities. Platforms are not obliged to fight information manipulation, protect information integrity, or monitor electoral environments equitably across the communities in which they operate. Nor are they focused on doing so.

Instead, the largest U.S. technology companies are increasingly distracted. Facing declining profits, higher compliance costs, pressure to invest in AI, and increased scrutiny from governments around the world, leading companies such as Google and Meta have shifted resources away from their trust and safety teams, which mitigate electoral threats. X (formerly known as Twitter) has gone even further, implementing massive cuts and introducing erratic policy changes that have increased the amount of hate speech and disinformation on the platform. Some platforms have begun, however, to prepare for this year’s elections. Meta, for example, has announced that it will apply certain safeguards, as will Google, both globally and in the United States. Both companies are also seeking to maximize the use of generative AI-based tools for content moderation, which may offer improvements to the speed and scale of information monitoring.

Newer platforms—such as Discord, TikTok, Twitch, and others—are beginning to formulate election-related policies and mitigation strategies, but they lack experience of operating during elections. Telegram, which is an established global platform, takes a lax approach to combating disinformation and extremism, while U.S.-centric platforms including Gab, Rumble, and Truth Social have adopted a hands-off strategy that promulgates extremism, bigotry, and conspiracy theories. Some even welcome Russian propagandists banned from other platforms. WhatsApp and other popular encrypted messaging platforms present their own unique challenges when it comes to reducing misuse because of the encrypted nature of the content being shared.

Leading companies such as Google and Meta have shifted resources away from their trust and safety teams.

Tech platforms have neither the resources nor the resolve to properly monitor and address problematic content. Every digital platform has a different process for reporting disinformation, hate speech, or harassment—as well as a varying capacity to respond to those threats. Companies will invariably be confronted with difficult tradeoffs, especially when their employees’ personal safety is at stake. At the same time, revenue constraints, technological limitations, and political prioritization will result in a vast gap between resources aimed at supporting U.S. electoral integrity and those focused on other countries’ elections. The result will be that most nations will be neglected.

Tech companies’ difficulties have been compounded by the growing incoherence of the laws and regulations that they are subject to. In the United States, legislators in 34 states have introduced over 100 bills since 2022 to regulate how social media platforms handle users’ posts. Challenges to laws passed in Florida, Texas, Utah, and other states are currently progressing through the courts. By the summer, the Supreme Court will have announced decisions in multiple cases impacting the ways in which social media companies and the U.S. government can communicate to discuss electoral threats and the degree of autonomy that companies should have to make decisions regarding the content they show users. At the same time, Europe is implementing its Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act, a landmark regulatory move against large platforms that seeks to protect EU users’ rights. Countries such as India, Indonesia, and the United Kingdom have introduced their own regulations that are likely to result in increased content removal requests and demands for user data. Other countries are considering laws specific to their own elections, all of which will require focus from the companies operating there.

In some instances, these laws reflect the increasingly authoritarian impulses of democratic governments, and their desire to control information, especially around elections. This dynamic may particularly apply in India, the world’s largest democracy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has consistently refused to show support for independent journalism, and his government has passed regulations that allow it to control what content online platforms leave up or take down. The result has been that more speech from opposition groups is being removed. In Mexico, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador and his party, Morena, have attempted to reduce the power of the electoral commission and have criticized journalists and the judiciary. According to Freedom House, the country remains hostile to journalists, and the threat of violence is high. These risks will only grow in the lead up to elections.

A PERFECT STORM

Another threat to electoral integrity is the continued proliferation of powerful, publicly available generative AI tools. The expertise required to create and disseminate fake text, imagery, audio clips, and video recordings across multiple languages will continue to plummet, without any commensurate increase in the public’s ability to identify, investigate, or debunk this media. Indeed, events in 2023 demonstrated how easy it will be to generate confusion. In Slovakia, for example, 48 hours before the parliamentary elections, an AI-manipulated audio recording circulated in which the leader of the liberal Progressive Slovakia party discussed how to rig the election. The audio clip was released during a news blackout on political coverage, limiting the media’s capacity to cover the story or debunk it. A similar campaign was seen in Bangladesh, which is holding a hotly contested election on January 7. There, AI-generated news clips have been transmitted that falsely accuse U.S. officials of interfering with the election. The tools powering this misinformation cost as little as $24 a month, and fakes have also emerged in Poland, Sudan, and the United Kingdom, demonstrating the growing nature of the threat.

The greatest danger of generative AI tools on online platforms is not their capacity to generate absolute belief in fake information, however. It is that they have the capacity to generate overall distrust. If everything can be faked, nothing may be true. Media coverage to date has focused on the use of AI to target political parties or officials, but it is likelier that the most significant target this year will be trust in the electoral process itself. For those seeking to sow skepticism and confusion, there are abundant opportunities.

Hostile actors are positioned to take advantage of these opportunities. In August 2023, Meta announced its “biggest single takedown” of a Chinese influence campaign that targeted countries including Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The campaign, which used thousands of accounts across numerous platforms, sought to bolster China and discredit the country’s critics. Beijing has also been active elsewhere, particularly in its attempts to affect the outcome of the Taiwanese election in January. Officials in Taipei have warned that China has “very diverse” ways of interfering in the election, including increasing military pressure and spreading fake news. Indeed, Beijing sought to do the same in 2019, and all countries can expect to be subject to some foreign interference efforts. As a recent Microsoft report noted, “Cyber operations are expanding globally, with increased activity in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. . . . Nation state actors are more frequently employing [information operations] alongside cyber operations to spread favored propaganda narratives. These aim to manipulate national and global opinion to undermine democratic institutions within perceived adversary nations—most dangerously in the contexts of armed conflicts and national elections.”

Since 2016, attempts to influence elections via online platforms have been met by a coalition of companies, external researchers, and governments working to analyze and understand electoral information dynamics. But those efforts are now under attack in the United States. Congressional investigations into these partnerships have been led by politically motivated lawmakers who are convinced that these collaborations are aimed at censuring conservatives’ speech. The pending Supreme Court decision in Murthy v. Missouri, which is due by summer, could result in the U.S. government being the only government in the world that is not at liberty to contact American social media platforms regarding electoral threats at home or abroad.

If everything can be faked, nothing may be true.

Meanwhile, lawsuits have been initiated by campaigning groups, including Stephen Miller’s America First Legal, to intimidate academics and nonprofits, which has caused research institutions to pull back on their work and delay building new programs for 2024. This has reduced research efforts and collaborative contingency planning at the exact moment that they are most needed. The academics and civil society organizations that are under attack are leaders in analyzing electoral dynamics in underresourced and underexamined countries, training independent researchers, and connecting them to global platforms that might not otherwise invest in those environments. Although many of these institutions are committed to continuing their work, the chilling effect has been significant and is spreading across the globe. Non-partisan U.S. NGOs focused on global electoral integrity have also been caught up in the mix, losing precious resources and focus to legal inquiries, and pulling back on work that might attract partisan attacks.

This chilling effect is particularly dangerous for U.S. elections—not just in major federal and state races but also at the local level. With eleven months to go before the 2024 presidential election, the FBI and the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the primary U.S. government agency tasked with ensuring cybersecurity and digital protection for domestic elections, lack legal clarity regarding their ability to engage with major social media platforms to discuss electoral security or information. Public comments by Meta indicate that the company’s communication with U.S. government counterparts on electoral security stopped in July 2023, the same month a federal district court in Louisiana issued a sweeping initial injunction in Murthy. Meanwhile, the Department of Homeland Security has warned of the increased likelihood that China, Iran, and Russia will use generative AI to target the U.S. elections. Microsoft has said the same, pointing to the current manipulation of social media platforms by the Chinese government.

The United States is not the only nation that is absorbed by domestic issues. Many leading democracies that are holding elections in 2024, including the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union, maintain an active diplomatic or development presence that supports the safety and integrity of international elections. This may include offering electoral monitoring support, technological infrastructure, transparent electoral processes or local civil society initiatives. In an election year, governments understandably turn their attention inward. Focus on foreign affairs is divided, and diplomatic relationships can stall as a potential leadership transition grows nearer. Given the stakes of this year’s electoral cycle, and the complexity of threats facing it, governments committed to supporting free and fair elections globally have a unique role to play in redoubling support for the collaboration and flexibility that will be necessary to protect democratic processes.

DEMOCRACY’S HOUR OF NEED

Despite the magnitude of the challenge, there is much that can still be done to protect this year’s elections. First, philanthropies and foreign assistance providers must immediately increase their investments in existing mechanisms to support information monitoring, fact checking, and digital forensics. In countries where there is limited capacity to track emerging electoral threats, this funding will be particularly important. The analyses from each election must then be shared and used as case studies for identifying new electoral threats and dynamics across digital platforms. The January elections in Bangladesh and Taiwan will not only be important in their own right: they will also be among the first to reveal what shape electoral threats will take during the rest of the year.

Second, governments and organizations focused on supporting democracy must ensure that they engage and mobilize local and regional civil society leaders. The resulting coalition must include educators, academics, community organizers, health providers, and representatives of marginalized communities who may operate outside of networks focused on civil and political rights, technology, or the rule of law. These individuals will bring crucial expertise to contextualizing how information dynamics are evolving in local contexts, especially with regard to issues that are of concern to voters, and may, consequently, be at high risk of exploitation. Too often these civic leaders operate at a remove from networks and partnerships focused on supporting democratic norms, as well as diplomats, researchers, and journalists striving to increase understanding of local developments. Their participation will be vital. Governments and civil society organizations must also increase pressure on technology companies to be more transparent about their electoral monitoring and response resources. This information will be crucial to identifying gaps in coverage that could be bridged by noncorporate investments.

Third, research must urgently begin to improve the understanding of how generative AI tools can impact the flow of information and to produce recommendations to mitigate their negative effects. A wealth of new philanthropic initiatives focused on AI, including a new $200 million fund created by ten organizations including the Ford Foundation, Packard and others, must be harnessed for this purpose. These efforts cannot center solely on developed nations and majority languages. Rather, they must span all communities and countries that are holding elections this year.

Fourth, innovative public-private partnerships must be developed to help voters become discerning consumers of information. They must be assisted in identifying sources of authoritative information, such as election officials, and taught about the tools available to understand if an image or video has been generated by AI or been used misleadingly. Voters should also be warned ahead of time about the types of narratives that they might hear. During the 2022 U.S. midterm elections, efforts such as these to pre-bunk problematic narratives were found to reduce the impact of misinformation. These efforts will help voters better understand who to trust when events and information about elections are evolving quickly.

This year will be a milestone for democracy. The challenges will be extreme in both scope and complexity, and the threats to electoral processes will be supercharged. This is the moment for democracy’s defenders to redouble their efforts in defense of electoral integrity and enable creative, nimble opportunities for collaboration. It is still possible to ensure that 2024 sees democracy strengthened, not weakened. This year must be remembered not only for the scale of its elections but also for the speed and scale of democracy’s defense.

• KAT DUFFY is Senior Fellow for Digital and Cyberspace Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.
• KATIE HARBATH is the Global Affairs Officer at Duco Experts.

Foreign Affairs · by Kat Duffy and Katie Harbath · January 4, 2024

15. China to play starring role in coming US election chaos

Can our divided nation unite against the common threat to our nation?

China to play starring role in coming US election chaos

Biden and Trump both under political pressure to get tough on China in what will be a rough and raucous presidential race

asiatimes.com · by William Pesek · January 4, 2024

TOKYO — In the closing weeks of 2023, US Republicans ratcheted up demands that President Joe Biden keep a hard line on China.

Biden, of course, is way ahead of the party that his predecessor Donald Trump hopes to lead to victory in November. Since January 2021, Biden has limited Beijing’s access to technology vital to raising its economic and security game with surgical and relentless precision.

Yet the renewed focus on China is a stark reminder of the central role Asia will play in upcoming US elections — and not in a good way.

Just about the only thing on which Biden’s Democratic Party and Republicans loyal to Trump agree is blaming China, and Asia more generally, for America’s economic challenges.

This will make the region the geopolitical piñata of choice for liberals, conservatives and the dwindling ranks of moderates in Washington this year.

All this poses big economic uncertainties, says David Kelly, global strategist at JP Morgan Asset Management. His “base case forecast” for the US in 2024 is “2% growth, 0 recessions, 2% inflation and 4% unemployment.”

However, Kelly says, “It should be recognized that there are many potential risks to this outlook.”

Along with the US election, Kelly adds that among “many potential risks to this outlook” is the “lagged consequences of higher interest rates and very significant geopolitical tension. Any of these issues, or something else entirely, has the potential to trigger recession in a slow-growing US economy.”

That something else could be political blood sport ahead of the November 5 election.

It doesn’t require much imagination to see Trump running with his Republican party’s new “axis of evil” narrative, expanded from a previous Iran, Iraq and North Korea grouping to include China and Russia, to threaten everything from trade sanctions to military action to even canceling US debt axis members hold.

Trump has said he would “enact aggressive new restrictions on Chinese ownership” of a broad range of US assets, bar Americans broadly from investing in China and phase in a complete ban on imports of key categories of Chinese-made goods like electronics, steel and pharmaceuticals.

“We will impose stiff penalties on China and all other nations as they abuse us,” Trump declared at a recent campaign rally. He has also recently vowed to impose “a bold series of reforms to completely eliminate dependence on China in all critical areas.”

Trump is threatening more trade sanctions on China. Image: YouTube

In May 2016, then-presidential candidate Trump shook global debt markets when he told CNBC: “I would borrow, knowing that if the economy crashed, you could make a deal. And if the economy was good, it was good. So, therefore, you can’t lose.”

Trump’s team scrambled to do cleanup, insisting that Trump wasn’t considering defaulting on the debt undergirding the reserve currency. But in May 2020, the Washington Post detailed how Trump’s inner circle wanted to use Treasury securities as a pressure point in the China trade war.

China is the globe’s second-biggest holder of US Treasury securities after Japan. Critics point out that Biden crossed a financial red line himself by freezing some of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves over Moscow’s Ukraine invasion, the so-called “weaponization” of the dollar.

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But in a second term, which would begin in January 2025, Team Trump is already laying out how unhinged his next administration might be. This could include an executive branch power grab that neuters Congress’ responsibility over America’s purse strings.

A Trump 2.0 administration would also be sure to turn Biden’s efforts to curtail China’s access to US technology including high-end semiconductors up to 11. Trump also might seek to settle scores with industries that pushed back on his first-term policies.

“Under a new Trump presidency, sectors like traditional energy may benefit from shifts in tax and regulatory burdens, while big tech could face heightened scrutiny,” economists at Union Bancaire Privée argue in a note to clients.

Biden, too, might ratchet up the anti-China atmospherics to revive his dismal poll numbers and to neutralize attacks against his son, Hunter Biden.

Republicans are hellbent on proving their allegations that, in addition to business dealings in Ukraine, Biden’s family engaged in influence-peddling and shady transactions involving Chinese companies. Beginning in February 2023, the US House Oversight Committee held a series of hearings concerning Hunter Biden.

This theory has Republicans conducting an official impeachment inquiry. Pundits in Washington reckon President Biden’s best defense against this China profiteering chatter is going even harder at President Xi Jinping’s Communist Party.

Doing so would dash any hopes for a Sino-US detente following Biden’s much-ballyhooed San Francisco summit with Xi in November, their first meeting in a year. Relations nosedived after the US shot down an alleged Chinese spy balloon in February.

Amid high tensions over Taiwan and China cozying up to Russia, Biden and Xi pledged to renew military-to-military communications.

As Biden put it, the priority is “open, clear, direct communications” to avoid “vital miscalculations on either side” that might lead to accidents. At the time, Xi declared his commitment to “stable, healthy and sustainable” ties with Washington.

The Taiwan issue might move to center stage as the island holds presidential and parliamentary elections on January 13, democratic contests that are testing Beijing’s patience for talk of independence.

“US-China ties remain fundamentally competitive and stabilizing efforts will continue to be vulnerable to both foreseeable and unforeseeable stresses in the year ahead, including presidential election politics in Taiwan and the US,” notes Rick Waters, an analyst at the Eurasia Group.

Increased trade friction is arguably the last thing China wants. In 2023, foreign direct investment in China cratered for the first time in decades. Some of the negativity reflects fears of intensifying scrutiny of foreign firms and investors’ ability to trust audits and so basic due diligence.

A clerk counts renminbi banknotes at a bank in Huaibei city in east China’s Anhui province. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP

The outflows have Xi and Premier Li Qiang redoubling private-sector reform efforts. Yet as 2024 begins, and Beijing telegraphs a fresh crackdown on China’s virtual economy, overseas funds don’t quite know what to think about the trajectory of Asia’s top economic power.

This goes for Washington, too. Biden has argued that no world leader would relish swapping places with Xi. China’s leader, after all, confronts a slowing economy, a deepening property crisis, record youth unemployment and hard decisions on Taiwan. What’s more, Biden wonders if these conflicting pressures might make Xi’s party more dangerous.

Others see the potential for more aggressive economic policy. “Keep a lookout on China for potentially more generous fiscal and monetary policy stimulus measures that may stoke positive animal spirits in the short to medium term for China and Hong Kong stock markets,” says Kelvin Wong, analyst at OANDA.

That becomes harder if China is cast in an even bigger bogeyman role ahead of the November elections. Here, Asian exchange rates are sure to play their own starring role. And this means Japan, too.

In 2023, the yen was the worst-performing currency among the 10 rich nations for a third consecutive year, down 9%.

In November, Biden’s Treasury Department concluded that no major trading partners were manipulating currency rates. That was despite China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam finding their way onto the Treasury’s watchlist.

The failure by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to slam China’s currency regime ran afoul of many Republicans. Of course, one could argue that given China’s troubles, a weaker yuan is wholly consistent with economic fundamentals. Perhaps Yellen worried about the optics of hitting China without singling out US ally Japan.

Yet here, too, all bets might be off if Biden seeks to buttress his anti-China bona fides. Especially as Trump, the presumptive favorite for Republican nominee, pivots toward taking on Biden’s record on Asia more directly.

This could be Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s worst nightmare. Kishida was Shinzo Abe’s foreign minister when the late Japanese leader kowtowed to Trump. In November 2016, Abe was the first world leader to race to Trump Tower in New York for an audience with the US president-elect.

Abe got zero in return, not even a pass for Japan as Trump slapped prohibitive tariffs on steel and other vital commodities. The asymmetry in their “bromance” hurt Abe politically. It rankled the Tokyo establishment that the mercurial US leader basically had three pals in global leadership circles: Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong Un and Abe. Talk about a bad look.

Kishida has indeed courted Biden, supporting Washington’s hard line on China and Russia and offering aid to Ukraine, including visiting Kiev to meet with President Volodymyr Zelensky.

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The specter of a Biden loss in November has Kishida’s team hedging its bets to some extent. Hence Kishida taking time out of a busy schedule in April to meet with a visiting Ron DeSantis, the Florida governor angling to out-Trump Trump.

Kishida and Biden in a Covid era embrace. Image: Twitter Screengrab

Yet after seeing the chaos of his first term – and how it emboldened Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions – the Tokyo establishment has little interest in a Trump 2.0 White House.

Both Biden and the Republicans should be careful not to overplay their hands, however. In 2023, the US national debt topped US$34 trillion for the first time.

That dubious milestone came 51 days after Moody’s Investors Service threatened to yank away Washington’s last AAA credit rating and just weeks ahead of deadlines for Congress to agree to new federal funding plans.

Whatever the result, “US elections could result in a more fiscally expansionary outcome, another potential catalyst for higher bond yields,” say analysts at Goldman Sachs.

Analysts at UBP add that “unchecked fiscal spending, as well as increasing deficits further, could trigger a resurgence of inflation, challenging the Fed’s control over the economy.”

Economists at Bank of America note that “one option Congress will face at the end of 2025 is a decision on the Trump tax cuts. If Congress is serious about correcting the increasingly concerning trajectory of debt-to-gross domestic product, it would not extend the Trump tax cuts.”

While this “wouldn’t be enough fiscal adjustment to correct the current trajectory,” BofA says, “it will likely be the first real test of Congress’ resolve around the increasingly unsustainable fiscal path.”

All this is coming to a head amid growing doubts about the US dollar. It might not take much to provoke Xi’s men in Beijing to pull the plug on their US Treasury holdings.

If markets got wind of China selling large blocks of the $860 billion of Washington’s debt it holds, chaos would follow. Even news that Tokyo is refusing to add to its $1.1 trillion of Treasuries could devastate markets.

However the next 306 days play out, Asia is sure to be dragged more and more into the most raucous US election in memory, crucially and worryingly at a moment of maximum anxiety for the global economy.

Follow William Pesek on X, formerly Twitter, at @WilliamPesek

asiatimes.com · by William Pesek · January 4, 2024

16. Add it to the list: Three more considerations for AUKUS

​Why is AUKUS only about technology, industry, and submarines? There is so much more potential.

Add it to the list: Three more considerations for AUKUS

Defense News · by John Ferrari and Charles Rahr · January 3, 2024

Saying AUKUS is big and ambitious is an understatement. It’s as AEI’s Bill Greenwalt has called it, “a generational opportunity.” Spanning nuclear-powered submarines to advanced capabilities in eight technology areas as varied as undersea capabilities and quantum technologies, AUKUS is one large endeavor. Indeed, there’s been plenty of commentary on actions that the three nations can take to make this “too big to fail” endeavor from failing. But amid the details of reform, it’s important to remember that in order to get AUKUS’ big and ambitious items right, we need to get the smaller items right, too, including military-to-military and industry-to-industry communications.

The three nations have been fighting alongside each other for decades, dating back to the 1940s. Yet today, we still experience difficulties at the most tactical level to communicate with each other. We live in an era where any individual in the world can go on their mobile device, type a message, have it translated into any language and send it nearly instantly to a recipient anywhere in the world. And yet when it comes to our military command and control, we have not yet solved this form of communication, boding ill for military-to-military collaboration within AUKUS.

This is an all the more pressing problem to fix because in warfighting today, as is the case in our daily lives, the connected Internet of Things is driving the revolution in productivity and effectiveness. If AUKUS does nothing other than seamlessly knit together existing weapon systems across the three nations, it will be a huge success.

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Opinion

Japan, South Korea and the US should mirror AUKUS for destroyers

But before breaking a celebratory bottle of champagne across the bow, obstacles must be addressed.

By Cmdr. Douglas Robb

The other issue is at the same time simpler and yet much more complex: Our industrial partners cannot easily talk to each other. Putting up the most formidable walls between the industrial bases of all three AUKUS nations is the United States’ rules codified in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations regime, or ITAR, which threatens to derail defense collaboration. Australia is now making its own attempt to reform its defense export controls, but that effort looks to be a replication of all the bad parts of ITAR, as Bill Greenwalt has also noted.

Reform in this area is extremely important because U.S. and Australian engineers cannot easily share information, thereby destroying the fruits to be gained from cooperation.

So besides current reform efforts included in the recently passed National Defense Authorization Act, what’s there to do to ensure that defense cooperation, both on the industrial and military levels, can actually happen within AUKUS?

First, AUKUS’ participating defense industries should be treated the same. In other words, a company working on a hypersonic project in the U.K., Australia or the U.S. should have the same opportunity to supply the AUKUS nations with that technology as they would in their home country. That will help drive competition between the countries’ industries in a non-protectionist manner, and hopefully lower costs and barriers to access for the technology areas covered by AUKUS’ second pillar.

Second, as part of that push to lower the barriers between industries, Congress should consider enshrining a “Buy AUKUS” provision in future legislation. That would move beyond harmful “Buy America” provisions, which favor the purchase of American-made and -sourced defense articles over those from foreign countries, and focus on buying defense articles from within the AUKUS partnership. That could in turn help revitalize the defense-industrial bases of all three nations and enable second sourcing and “friendshoring” of our defense supply chains.

Third, AUKUS will simply not work, and industry collaboration won’t work either, absent sustained funding from Congress. We need sustained funding for a whole host of AUKUS projects, especially for those undertaken by our submarine-industrial base or for attempts to make our current weapons interoperable.

As Mackenzie Eaglen has rightly argued: “The President and Congress must go beyond one-off supplemental measures and provide our Navy with robust and stable budgetary investments for the critical years to come.” How much money to appropriate is up to Congress, but it should surely go beyond the $3.4 billion requested by the administration in its October 2023 supplemental request and likely track the figure put out in the yet-to-be-publicly-released Pentagon study on the submarine-industrial base.

Absent sustained funding, industry simply will not invest in producing the 100,000 new hires (and facilities) that the Navy estimates the submarine-industrial base needs over the next decade.

In the end, though, there’s a near-endless list of policy prescriptions to help make AUKUS a success — and there’s more that should be added to the list. Without focusing on the smaller and solvable items first, AUKUS and its promise of submarines and emerging technologies may just fizzle out.

Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. John Ferrari is a senior nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute think tank. Ferrari previously served as a director of program analysis and evaluation for the Army. Charles Rahr is a research assistant at AEI.

17. Cut Off the Head of the Snake in the Red Sea | Opinion

I am all for killing snakes and taking their heads off. But I fear the snake in the Middle East is really a hydra. But that means we have to go after multiple targets and take a holistic approach.

​And I concur that there are times for lethality. And this is one.

Excerpt:

It’s time to showcase that lethality and live up to our global mission, and to what our president promised in Jeddah just over a year ago. We certainly have the capability to know from where the Houthis are firing their missiles and the launch points for their drones. Let’s remind the world who we are: a country that leads, and one that respects the values and integrity demanded in the global world order.

Cut Off the Head of the Snake in the Red Sea | Opinion

Published 01/03/24 07:00 AM ET

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Tom Jurkowsky

themessenger.com · January 3, 2024

The U.S. Navy’s action this past weekend in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden against Yemen’s Houthi terrorists was a welcome sign that reflects highly on our Navy’s capabilities. However, as well executed as they were, these actions were defensive. It’s time to unleash the offensive capabilities of our forces and cut the head off the Houthi snake that is causing serious problems to stability in the region — by striking their launch points.

On Sunday, naval units fired on Houthi terrorists after four boats attacked a container ship in the Red Sea and terrorists tried to board the ship; on Saturday, a Navy destroyer shot down two anti-ship ballistic missiles that were fired at the same vessel. The ship reported being hit by the missile, but there were no reported injuries to the crew.

Since mid-November, there have been nearly 25 attacks on international shipping. Sunday’s response by the U.S. was the first time the Navy has killed Houthi fighters since the attacks started.

Our Navy, and allied navies operating in the region, have done a magnificent job of interdicting the Houthi attacks, but we must ensure the harassment ends. Sooner or later, a weapon launched by the Iran-backed Houthis will make its way through and cause great harm. Waiting for that to happen is not the correct strategy.

The attacks on shipping are occurring in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Bab el Mandeb — three waterways that are a gateway to or from the Suez Canal. About 12% of global trade passes through these waters, approximately $1 trillion in goods annually. The waters are also an important passage for oil, with more than 1 million barrels of crude oil passing through each day.

Because of the Houthi attacks, several global shipping companies have diverted their ships away from the Red Sea. For ships going to Asia or Europe, the alternative route via the Cape of Good Hope around Africa adds 10 to 14 days to the journey, adding costs to fuel and personnel that will be passed on to consumers.

To help resolve the situation, the U.S. has formed a coalition to protect freedom of navigation for all countries and bolster regional security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The coalition is drawn from the Combined Maritime Forces, the world’s largest multinational naval partnership, composed of 39 countries and led by the commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet based in Bahrain. But only 20 nations agreed to participate in the coalition’s Operation Prosperity Guardian, and only about half of those countries have allowed their names to be released. Three allies — Spain, Italy and France — chose not to come under the Fifth Fleet command.

Rather than waiting for something catastrophic to occur, it’s time to strike the dragon and restore safe commerce in the region.

Interestingly, in July 2022, President Biden met with the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. At this summit, the president reaffirmed our commitment to the security and territorial defense of U.S. partners and recognized the region’s important role as a trade and technology crossroads. In his remarks, Biden discussed deterrence, saying the U.S. will not allow foreign or regional powers to jeopardize freedom of navigation through Middle East waterways, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el Mandeb.

Now the U.S. must back up those words with action. The Houthis do not appear to be deterred by the naval units’ defensive posture.

China reportedly has been asked to intercede, by asking Iran to pressure its Houthi proxies to stop the attacks on commercial shipping. Those discussions, if they have occurred, have not proven fruitful.

It wasn’t that long ago that the U.S. Navy commanded respect for its global dominance on the seas. We could be relied upon to handle threats, and if we asked for allies to join a coalition to protect shipping and commerce, none would have hesitated. But today, we are in a defensive mode, shooting down $2,000 drones with $2 million missiles.

Yemen's Houthi followers carrying their rifles chant slogans as they visit the tomb of Saleh al-Samad, the former Houthi-founded Supreme Political Council's president, on January 01, 2024 in Sana'a, Yemen.Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images

Perhaps some would argue this is the way we operate in a “new world order.” Yet the mission of the Navy has not changed. As Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro recently wrote, we have been a maritime nation since our country’s founding: “To maintain our nation’s unrestricted access to sea and guarantee the free flow of maritime commerce for ourselves, our allies and our international partners, our nation requires a capable, agile and lethal Navy and Marine Corps.”

It’s time to showcase that lethality and live up to our global mission, and to what our president promised in Jeddah just over a year ago. We certainly have the capability to know from where the Houthis are firing their missiles and the launch points for their drones. Let’s remind the world who we are: a country that leads, and one that respects the values and integrity demanded in the global world order.

Tom Jurkowsky is a retired Navy rear admiral who served on active duty for 31 years. He is the author of “The Secret Sauce for Organizational Success: Communications and Leadership on the Same Page.” He is a board member of the nonprofit Military Officers Association of America. The opinions expressed are his own.

themessenger.com · January 3, 2024

18. Hit the Houthis — and Iran — Where It Counts

Hopefully the Administration will listen to the Admiral.

Hit the Houthis — and Iran — Where It Counts

Guarding Red Sea traffic isn’t doing the job, so the US must plan for military strikes on land.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-01-03/us-can-strike-houthi-and-iranian-targets-to-protect-red-sea-shipping?sref=hhjZtX76

January 3, 2024 at 1:03 PM EST

By James Stavridis

James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired US Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

A series of brazen attacks in the Red Sea and North Arabian Sea by Yemen’s Houthi rebels against merchant shipping and US Navy warships have roiled global shipping lanes. More than 15% of the world’s trade passes through these vast waters, and many of the major shipping companies — Maersk, MSC, Evergreen — have put voyages through them on pause.

These Houthi pirates are trained, equipped, organized and directed by Iran. Unlike the Somali pirates of a decade ago, with their rusty AK-47s, flip-flops and small speedboats, these Houthis have modern helicopters, SEAL-like armament and skills, ground-based missiles, and are clearly operating with significant intelligence support in finding and fixing their targets.

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The mullahs’ latest provocation is to send a warship, the destroyer Alborz, through the Bab el Mandeb Strait and into the Red Sea, ostensibly to protect the Houthis from US defensive military action.

The US has increased the number of warships operating in the region, putting a carrier strike group and a half dozen guided-missile destroyers and cruisers on alert. But given the enormous space of the Red Sea alone, roughly the size of California, that force is not sufficient to thwart the threat. Over the past weeks, since Israel has ramped its counterattack into Gaza, the Houthis have fired scores of drones and cruise and ballistic missiles (some directly at US warships) and attacked more than 30 merchant ships.

Clearly, the Houthis and their masters in Tehran are not getting the cease-and-desist message from Washington. What are the logical next steps that can create deterrence — without leading to a regional war with Iran?

Certainly, strengthening the defensive side of the equation can help. The new Operation Prosperity Guardian is a US-led coalition to defend shipping lanes, with a dozen nations so far joining — albeit not two vital allies: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Using those warships, under the direction of the US Fifth Fleet headquartered in Bahrain, to manage protected convoys through the Red Sea would add to the deterrent effect against the Houthi.

Yet increased defense alone is probably not going to carry the day. The Pentagon needs to provide President Joe Biden with a set of options that use combat power to deter the Houthis and their sponsors in Tehran.

First, US rules of engagement need to be modified to permit offensive action against verified Houthi targets at sea. Last weekend, US helicopters correctly engaged and destroyed several Houthi speedboats, killing crewmembers. This kind of hunt-and-strike activity should continue, and is fully justified under international law permitting preemptive attacks on threats associated with a pirate operation.

A good second step would be strikes ashore at known Houthi infrastructure. These could include fuel depots, ammunition depots, repair facilities, floating and fixed docks, airfields and helicopter maintenance facilities — again, all legitimate targets given their use in piracy. The US needs to stop just defending against the figurative arrows — firing million-dollar cruise missiles at cheap drones is a losing long-term proposition — and stop the archers ashore.

Third, if the Houthis do not cease their operations after proportional attacks against their maritime assets, we may need to up the ante by striking more broadly at their military capability. In their civil war, they have built up considerable combat power to use against the government of Yemen and its Saudi and Emirati allies. Thus there are plenty of ripe Houthi military targets ashore: fuel and ammunition depots, ground-assault vehicles, training facilities, command-and-control nodes. Striking them would do real damage to Houthi efforts to overthrow the Yemeni government. This would likely be done with ship-fired Tomahawk cruise missiles, which have a range of 1,500 miles and pinpoint accuracy.

A fourth, and highly controversial, level of escalation would be to attack Iranian assets directly. This would need to be done with careful justification based on hard, provable intelligence of links between Tehran and the Houthis. Open-source reporting suggests that is eminently available.

Before striking Iranian targets, the US and its partners would need to publicly and privately inform the Iranians that the cease-and-desist order to the Houthis applies to their military support as well — and that unless the attacks stop, significant strikes would be forthcoming.

Any campaign against Iran would need to be a carefully calibrated series of escalating attacks, with built-in pauses allowing Tehran to stop the Houthi piracy. Initial targets could be selected to minimize loss of life, perhaps striking command-and-control facilities on offshore platforms in the Gulf and North Arabian Sea.

A next level of strike could be against ships used to ferry weapons to the Houthis, perhaps while the vessels were in port. US cyberattacks on Iranian military communications are also a possibility.

If the Iranians remained uncompliant, the next series of strikes could be directed against their naval capabilities on land, possibly ammunition depots, repair facilities, and dockyards. At the far end of the spectrum would be direct attacks on Iranian warships – proportional to the attacks being conducted by the Houthis on our Navy vessels. Iran’s naval defenses are hardly the equal of our own.

This fourth level of a campaign would bring serious danger of escalation: a widening of the war in Gaza into a regional conflict and potentially dragging the US back into a high level of combat in the Middle East. It is not a step to be taken lightly.

But in the late 1980s, after Iran mined the Strait of Hormuz and a US frigate struck a mine and nearly sank, the Navy destroyed much of the Iranian naval combat power in Operation Praying Mantis. Iran got the message. Perhaps it is time to send it again.

Stavridis is also vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group. He is on the boards of Fortinet, NFP, Ankura Consulting Group and Neuberger Berman, and has advised Shield Capital, a firm that invests in the cybersecurity sector.

​

19. Dealing With the Unprecedented Military Threats Facing the United States

Conclusion:

The Biden Administration is maintaining the fantasy that our national security can be advanced by a new nuclear arms control agreements with Russia. Its latest arms control proposal was rejected almost immediately by the Putin regime. As the recent report of the United States Strategic Posture Commission recognized: 1) “…there is no prospect of a meaningful arms control Treaty being negotiated with Russia in the foreseeable future…”; 2) “Over the past 20 years, Russia has either violated or has failed to comply with nearly every major arms control treaty or agreement to which the United States is or was a party.”; and 3) “…given Russia’s history of noncompliance and illegal treaty suspensions, and China’s continued intransigence on arms control dialogue, the United States cannot develop its strategic posture based on the assumption that arms control agreements are imminent or will always be in force.”

The Biden Administration’s efforts to prevent the destruction of Hamas (in the name of humanitarian concern about civilian casualties) is a strong indicator of the approach it would take in responding to a Russian attack on NATO. In a war against Russia or China or worse both, collateral damage cannot be the primary concern or the United States and the West will lose. Russia has the potential to win a war against NATO if NATO fights the same type of war it is forcing Ukraine to fight against Russia by prohibiting attacks on Russian territory with the weapons being provided. Russian nuclear escalation has to be deterred by firepower.

The Biden Administration’s no-win approach will likely result in a high casualty war of attrition. As Socor has pointed out, “Inadequate and inconsistent supplies of arms and munitions predetermined the stalling of Ukraine’s counteroffensive.” Under the Biden Administration’s likely approach, NATO also loses the advantage of the Soviet-style Russian command system. The centralized decision-making in Moscow is poorly suited to deal effectively with a fluid battlefield because it lacks tactical flexibility. Moreover, Russia could still win if it escalates to nuclear weapons in light of the West’s unilateral elimination of most of its tactical nuclear weapons. The Biden Administration’s fear of nuclear war is matched only by its aversion to the idea that nuclear escalation must be deterred by nuclear firepower.

Dealing With the Unprecedented Military Threats Facing the United States

By Mark B. Schneider

January 04, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/01/03/dealing_with_the_unprecedented_military_threats_facing_the_united_states_1002655.html?mc_cid=f7010f156a&mc_eid=70bf478f36

Former Secretary of Defense and former Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates recently observed in the pages of Foreign Affairs that, “The United States now confronts graver threats to its security than it has in decades, perhaps ever. Never before has it faced four allied antagonists at the same time-Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran-whose collective nuclear arsenal could within a few years be nearly double the size of its own. Not since the Korean War has the United States had to contend with powerful military rivals in both Europe and Asia. And no one alive can remember a time when an adversary had as much economic, scientific, technological, and military power as China does today.” Worse yet, he accurately noted that there was a great deal of similarity between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin with regard to their imperialist agenda and in their conviction that the United States was in decline. Even more significant is that both Xi and Putin have “…already made major miscalculations at home and abroad and seem likely to make even bigger ones in the future,” and these could result in “catastrophic consequences for themselves-and for the United States.”

According to Gates, “The problem…is that at the very moment that events demand a strong and coherent response from the United States, the country cannot provide one. Its fractured political leadership-Republican and Democratic, in the White House and in Congress-has failed to convince enough Americans that developments in China and Russia matter. Political leaders have failed to explain how the threats posed by these countries are interconnected. They have failed to articulate a long-term strategy to ensure that the United States, and democratic values more broadly, will prevail.”

Secretary Gates is hardly an alarmist. Indeed, he has historically played down the Russian threat, and he is ironically at least partially responsible for the situation he so well describes. Gates served as Secretary of Defense in both the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations. During the Bush Administration he attacked “…Next-War-itis—the propensity of much of the defense establishment to be in favor of what might be needed in a future conflict.” This is very much the mentality that resulted in the current crisis situation that Gates accurately assesses. The U.S. military power and the industrial base that supports it has been reduced to the point that the United States has difficulty in supplying a single medium-sized war in Ukraine. Unless the United States takes action, the shortage of munitions problem could continue to deteriorate.

Congressman Mike Gallaher (R.-Wis) has recently pointed out that in a conflict with China the United States would run out of long-range precision missiles and bombs in less than a week. The situation is probably a little better with regard to Russia because of its expenditure of weapons in its war against Ukraine and the poor performance of its long-range strike missiles. In a simultaneous conflict with Russia and China, a threat that the United States Strategic Commission detailed, the situation would be even more dire. In light of the fact that a high percentage of U.S. fighters and bombers are pre-stealth, a large number of long-range precision strike missiles is critically important.

The United States is even short of short-range precision munitions. In the war against ISIS, “…the Air Force was using up Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) so quickly that they were being loaded onto combat aircraft in the Middle East a scant 24 hours after being crated up and shipped from Boeing’s St. Louis factory.” In FY2021, bomb production was about cut in half. Reportedly, by mid-2023, “America’s arsenal is running dangerously low.” The empty arsenal problem also applies to much of NATO. This is the result of decades of inadequate defense spending.

The situation the United States faces regarding the Russian and Chinese nuclear threat is likely even worse than what Secretary Gates has outlined. Some of Gates’ assumptions such as Russian compliance with the New START Treaty are clearly more than a best case scenario in light of the reports indicating Russian treaty violations and the lack of New START Treaty on-site inspections for almost four years. Secretary Gates’ assessment that the combined Russian and Chinese nuclear threat could “be nearly double the size of its [the United States] own” is likely to be a substantial underestimation of what the Chinese and the Russians may actually have. Indeed, in 2020, noted Russian journalist Pavel Felgenhauer wrote that, “Indeed, taking into account non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, which no one has ever verifiably counted, Russia may have more (maybe twice as many overall) than all the other official or unofficial nuclear powers taken together.”

When he was Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates certainly supported the nuclear Triad and took action to remedy the catastrophic decline in Air Force nuclear weapons proficiency. This included the firing of the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff over issues involving Air Force nuclear weapons security. Still, Secretary Gates did a poor job of defending Defense Department interests during the New START Treaty negotiations. This included the dramatic decline in the substance of the limitations and verification regime in the New START Treaty compared to the original START Treaty. Moreover, his 2010 Nuclear Posture Review was based upon unrealistic optimistic assumptions concerning the threats the United States faces and the nature of the world. The U.S. nuclear modernization program during Gates’ tenure as Secretary of Defense did not include either a new ICBM or a new bomber. Indeed, in 2009, Secretary Gates cancelled the Next Generation Bomber program claiming that its capabilities were too expensive and unnecessary. He also ended production of the F-22 at a fraction of the number that the Air Force said was required. During Gates’ tenure as Secretary of Defense (and both before and after) Army procurement focused upon low-intensity conflict. This began under George W. Bush with the conversion of many Army heavy brigades to “medium” Striker brigades which are inadequate to fight heavy enemy units equipped with tanks. Indeed, the Striker proved vulnerable even in the low-intensity Iraq conflict. For more than two decades there was no modernization of Army heavy tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. In 2023, Army strength was lower than at any other time since 1940.

Secretary Gates notes that, “Xi has directed the Chinese military to be ready by 2027 to successfully invade Taiwan.” In 2023, reportedly, “Chinese President Xi Jinping bluntly told President Joe Biden during their recent summit in San Francisco that Beijing will reunify Taiwan with mainland China but that the timing has not yet been decided, according to three current and former U.S. officials.” Gates certainly takes the threat seriously; however, he is too optimistic about the current situation. According to Gates, “The U.S. military has been healthily funded in recent years, and modernization programs are underway in all three legs of the nuclear triad-intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers, and submarines.” His claim about the “healthy funding” of the U.S. military in the last several years is not credible. In light of the multiple threats, current defense funding is clearly inadequate. The Biden Administration attempted to cut defense spending compared to that planned by the Trump Administration before the world changed as a result of the Russian December 2021 ultimatum to NATO which sought to get NATO to acquiesce to Russian domination of the states of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The two are very closely connected.

The Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, which cut some nuclear weapons programs, did not fully take into account the new security situation that was created by the blatant Russian aggression unleashed by President Putin in his 2022 invasion of Ukraine and Putin’s intent to restore Soviet imperial dominance. The Biden Administration’s proposed FY2023 defense budget involved Army troop cuts, substantial cuts in aircraft production, erosion of Air Force readiness and ship construction. The first two Biden Administration proposed defense budgets contained a very large reduction in the already inadequate production level of U.S. precision conventional munitions. Inadequate precision conventional weapons procurement is continued in the Biden administration’s proposed FY2024 budget. The funding situation with regard to the rest of NATO is considerably worse. This is a significant part of the security problem faced by the United States.

The purchasing power of the U.S. defense budget has been negatively affected by the Biden Administration’s inflationary policies. For the last four years the Army budget has grown less than inflation. This is very important because the focus of the Army on low-intensity conflict for the last two decades has reduced its combat capability in high-intensity conflict. While the Congress after the Russian invasion of Ukraine blocked most but not all of the Biden Administration’s cuts, the programmatic effort is still less than what was planned by the Trump Administration before the current threat had been made obvious by Putin’s aggression not to mention Chinese preparation for a war in the Far East in the near future.

According to Secretary Gates, “The Pentagon is buying new combat aircraft (F-35s, modernized F-15s, and a new, sixth-generation fighter.” This assessment is much too optimistic. The 72 F-35 and F-15EX fighters that the Biden Administration proposes the Air Force buy in its FY2024 budget proposal is barely enough to prevent further aging of an already very old force. Moreover, the size of the fighter force will continue to fall. In its first budget proposal, the Biden Administration proposed cutting F-35 production to only 33 aircraft a year, almost a 50% cut in the Trump Administration’s projected level. (The Trump program had slightly reduced the average age of U.S. fighters to 29.1 years in 2021.) The Biden Administration’s FY2024 budget proposal calls for a F-35 production until the late 2020s at a rate of only 48 aircraft per year. This is of particular concern in light of the Chinese deployment of large numbers of the J-20 stealth fighter. Additionally, the Chinese are developing upgrades for it. The sixth generation fighter (NGAD) that Gates mentioned is almost a decade away. For the air dominance mission, the upgraded F-15 is a questionable program. While a great historic fighter, the F-15 is pre-stealth and has lost much of the dominance it had during the Cold War. According to a recent Heritage Foundation study, “Air Force readiness and capacity levels are at all-time lows.” (Emphasis in the original).

Current Navy procurement of the F-35 is so limited that it will take a decade to provide nine operational carriers with a single small squadron of F-35s.[1] Most of the aircraft will continue to be 4.5 generation F-18s.[2] The Marine Corp will be flying very old F-18s until 2030. The Navy dropped out of the JASSM long-range cruise missile program from 2004 to 2021; hence, its inventory is still quite small. The main focus of the Marine Corp aircraft program is not long-range strike but rather close air support.

Among the conclusions reached by the bipartisan United States Strategic Commission concerning United States conventional military requirements are the following critical points:

• “…. U.S. and allied conventional military advantages in Asia are decreasing at the same time the potential for two simultaneous theater conflicts is increasing.”
• “The speed and scale of success of U.S. forces in meeting that aggression in one theater may greatly influence the chances of conflict, or success in conflict, in the other theater.”
• “…Russian conventional forces, while inferior to fully mobilized NATO forces, will continue to have a space/time advantage against NATO states on Russia’s periphery, potentially enabling them to occupy such states’ territory in a fait accompli before NATO forces can fully mobilize in their defense, thus presenting an existential threat to territorial sovereignty of Allies and partners.”
• “…Russia’s use of large-scale conventional military force against Ukraine demonstrates a propensity to take risk and tolerate significant loss. The outcome of the war in Ukraine could influence future calculations – and indeed miscalculations – about the risks and benefits of aggression.”
• “The Commission heard significant concerns from regional Combatant Commanders regarding the capabilities and positioning of their conventional forces. In short, shifting to a necessary two-war construct requires increases in the size, type, and posture of U.S. and allied conventional forces. In the absence of such increases, the United States will likely have to increase its reliance on its nuclear deterrent.”
• “The United States [needs to] prioritize funding and accelerate long-range non-nuclear precision strike programs to meet the operational need and in greater quantities than currently planned.”
• “The United States urgently [needs to] deploy a more resilient space architecture and adopt a strategy that includes both offensive and defensive elements to ensure U.S. access to and operations in space.”
• “By the 2030s China’s conventional military build-up could turn the conventional military balance in Asia against the U.S. and its Allies.”
• “The United States and its Allies [need to] take steps to ensure they are at the cutting edge of emerging technologies – such as big data analytics, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence (AI) – to avoid strategic surprise and potentially enhance the U.S. strategic posture.”
• “[The United States needs to make] Strategic investments in research, development, test and engineering of advanced sensor architectures, interceptors, cruise and hypersonic missile defenses, and area or point defenses are urgently needed.”
• “The United States [needs to] develop and field homeland IAMD [Integrated Air and Missile Defense] that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China, and determine the capabilities needed to stay ahead of the North Korean threat.”
• “U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) needs improved warning and defensive capabilities to protect critical U.S. infrastructure from conventional or nuclear attack from air- and sea-launched cruise missiles—systems that ground-based interceptors (GBIs) are not designed to counter.”

The Biden Administration has repeatedly stated it has taken no action to enhance U.S. nuclear deterrence during the current Ukraine crisis. This is in stark contrast with Vladimir Putin who in December 2023 said that, “…Given the changing nature of military threats and the emergence of new military and political risks, the role of the nuclear triad, which ensures the balance of power, the strategic balance of power in the world, has significantly increased.” As a result, the United States is in a serious crisis with a non-crisis nuclear deterrent posture. The U.S nuclear deterrent will continue to age and decline in effectiveness until the 2030s, and even then improvements will be very gradual. If Xi invades Taiwan in 2027, even by Biden Administration estimates, China would have increased its “operational” nuclear warheads about 40% to 700. The 700 warhead estimate will likely understate the growth of Chinese nuclear warhead numbers.

According to former Assistant Secretary of Defense and senior National Security Council official Frank Miller, there is no sense of urgency in the U.S. strategic nuclear modernization program. While China is massively expanding its nuclear forces and Russia says it has modernized 95 percent of its strategic nuclear force, the comparable United States number is zero since 1998. By 2027, the existing U.S. nuclear modernization program will not have deployed a single new nuclear delivery vehicle. Thus, during this period, the U.S. nuclear deterrent will continue to age. As the Heritage Foundation has observed, “Age degrades reliability by increasing the potential for systems to break down or fail to respond correctly.” Except for a small number of B-21 bombers, all of the U.S. strategic modernization program will not even start until after 2030. Furthermore, the new Sentinel ICBMs, the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines and the B-21 bombers are already behind schedule. The only improvement between now and 2027 will be the introduction of the B61 Mod 12 and 13 bombs which are nothing more than nuclear Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) versions of 1960 vintage bombs. They will give the B-2 bombers a very tiny standoff capability compared to the previous gravity bombs. The Air Force does not regard the JDAM as adequate against advanced air defenses and is developing a conventional “…successor to the JDAM that would have longer range, reduced signature, and greater maneuvering capability to avoid terminal air defenses…” The United States Strategic Posture Commission report concluded, “Russian modernization and expansion of its air and missile defense capabilities beyond the Moscow region will pose a growing threat not only to the efficacy of U.S. nuclear forces but to conventional forces as well.”

As Secretary Gates indicates, a national consensus that dealing with the current threat is certainly important. In December 2023, President Putin even declared that his war against Ukraine would ensure Russia’s “global sovereignty.” What is at stake is much broader than the future of Ukraine. As Russia expert Vladimir Socor has pointed out, “Most Western governments, nevertheless, remain unwilling to recognize that Russia is also at war with them in Ukraine. With Ukraine as the central arena, Russia conducts a wider, hybrid war against the West in multiple theaters to revise the international system.” Putin now denies any intent to attack NATO. Yet the Putin regime said the same thing for months prior to its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, his Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov even denies that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is an “invasion.”

However, another trillion dollar U.S. defeat like President Biden’s Afghanistan fiasco will not prevent a NATO conflict with Russia. Noted China expert Gordon G. Chang has quite reasonably linked the message sent by President Biden’s “precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021” to “A series of catastrophes [that] continue to this day.” These include the stronger Russia-China alliance, their support of insurgencies in Africa, the Russian war against Ukraine and the current crisis in the Middle East. Played out in Europe, the consequences would be much more serious. The Biden Administration’s no-win approach to conflict is: 1) determining our assistance policy toward Ukraine, 2) lengthening the war, 3) increasing the cost of assistance by the United States and the NATO nations, and 4) making the conflict more deadly. Chang notes that, “With China and Russia fully supporting disruptive elements, it is no wonder that the world has passed from a period of general calm to one of constant turbulence.” He compared these developments with the period leading up to the Second World War.

The Biden Administration’s weak policy toward nuclear deterrence is one of the biggest problems the United States faces in dealing with the combined Russian and Chinse nuclear threat. In June 2023, White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said, “…the United States does not need to increase our nuclear forces to outnumber the combined total of our competitors in order to successfully deter them. We’ve been there. We’ve learned that lesson.” There appears to be a rejection of the nuclear deterrence policy every U.S. administration has pursued for decades (i.e., a rejection of “second to none.”)

The Biden Administration is maintaining the fantasy that our national security can be advanced by a new nuclear arms control agreements with Russia. Its latest arms control proposal was rejected almost immediately by the Putin regime. As the recent report of the United States Strategic Posture Commission recognized: 1) “…there is no prospect of a meaningful arms control Treaty being negotiated with Russia in the foreseeable future…”; 2) “Over the past 20 years, Russia has either violated or has failed to comply with nearly every major arms control treaty or agreement to which the United States is or was a party.”; and 3) “…given Russia’s history of noncompliance and illegal treaty suspensions, and China’s continued intransigence on arms control dialogue, the United States cannot develop its strategic posture based on the assumption that arms control agreements are imminent or will always be in force.”

The Biden Administration’s efforts to prevent the destruction of Hamas (in the name of humanitarian concern about civilian casualties) is a strong indicator of the approach it would take in responding to a Russian attack on NATO. In a war against Russia or China or worse both, collateral damage cannot be the primary concern or the United States and the West will lose. Russia has the potential to win a war against NATO if NATO fights the same type of war it is forcing Ukraine to fight against Russia by prohibiting attacks on Russian territory with the weapons being provided. Russian nuclear escalation has to be deterred by firepower.

The Biden Administration’s no-win approach will likely result in a high casualty war of attrition. As Socor has pointed out, “Inadequate and inconsistent supplies of arms and munitions predetermined the stalling of Ukraine’s counteroffensive.” Under the Biden Administration’s likely approach, NATO also loses the advantage of the Soviet-style Russian command system. The centralized decision-making in Moscow is poorly suited to deal effectively with a fluid battlefield because it lacks tactical flexibility. Moreover, Russia could still win if it escalates to nuclear weapons in light of the West’s unilateral elimination of most of its tactical nuclear weapons. The Biden Administration’s fear of nuclear war is matched only by its aversion to the idea that nuclear escalation must be deterred by nuclear firepower.

Dr. Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served as Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commission. He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.

Notes:

[1] David Axe, “Navy Air,” Guide to the US Navy 2023, Warships International Fleet Review, 2023, p. 46.

[2] Ibid.

20. A restless Gen Z is reshaping the Chinese Dream

I look forward to comments from China hands. If this is an accurate analysis how do we exploit it (if it is exploitable)?

I wonder if the same "revolution" is taking place in most of Gen Z outside China as well. It seems like some Gne Z Amwericans have similar thoughts about the American dream.

Excerpts:

More than one in five people between the ages of 16 and 24 are jobless in China, according to official data from August 2022. The government has not released youth unemployment figures since then.

With China's boom years behind them, millions of young people are confronting a future they did not prepare for - and how they respond will shape the fate of the world's second-largest economy.

A revolution is taking place in the minds of the country's Generation Z, according to anthropologist Xiang Biao, an Oxford University professor who spends a lot of time speaking to young people in China.

"The entire life of young people has been shaped by the idea that if you study hard then at the end of your hard work there will be a job and a highly-paid, decent life waiting for you. And now they find out that this promise is no longer working."

Opportunities have shrunk in a slowing, highly-indebted economy that was hit hard by sudden and total Covid lockdowns. And under Beijing's unyielding grip, China is now an uncertain place to do business for both hungry entrepreneurs and foreign investors.

A restless Gen Z is reshaping the Chinese Dream

BBC

By Laura BickerChina Correspondent, BBC News

Wang Xiqing/ BBC

Joy Zhang is among millions of Chinese graduates, fresh out of university, who are struggling to find jobs

"I've had one, two, three, four... five jobs in the last few months," says Joy Zhang, a 23-year-old graduate.

She counts them on her fingers as she walks through a line of stalls at a local food market in Chengdu, a city in south-west China's Sichuan province.

"The fact is there are lots of jobs, the problem is whether you are willing to lower your expectations," she adds, before turning to negotiate a price for snow pea shoots.

Joy's experience is not unusual in today's China, where there are more graduates than employers that need them. Out of her class of 32, only around a third have found full-time jobs since graduating in the summer.

More than one in five people between the ages of 16 and 24 are jobless in China, according to official data from August 2022. The government has not released youth unemployment figures since then.

With China's boom years behind them, millions of young people are confronting a future they did not prepare for - and how they respond will shape the fate of the world's second-largest economy.

A revolution is taking place in the minds of the country's Generation Z, according to anthropologist Xiang Biao, an Oxford University professor who spends a lot of time speaking to young people in China.

"The entire life of young people has been shaped by the idea that if you study hard then at the end of your hard work there will be a job and a highly-paid, decent life waiting for you. And now they find out that this promise is no longer working."

Opportunities have shrunk in a slowing, highly-indebted economy that was hit hard by sudden and total Covid lockdowns. And under Beijing's unyielding grip, China is now an uncertain place to do business for both hungry entrepreneurs and foreign investors.

Old dreams and new

That was evident at a recent jobs fair in Beijing. Smooth-talking recruiters were mostly offering low-skilled jobs, such as assistants to sell insurance or medical equipment.

"I think the difficulties are just temporary. People with real capabilities will find jobs," insisted a 25-year-old masters graduate who along with his partner had just moved back from Germany. "The world's future is in China," he said.

Recent graduate Tianyu, who studied software engineering, seemed less sure of that. He said that although his skills were "hotly sought after", there were too many graduates with a similar resume. "So it's not easy to find a job."

Wang Xiqing/ BBC

Low-paying jobs dominated a recent jobs fair in Beijing, disappointing many graduates

Some of his friends are aiming for a government career given the glum prospects in the private sector. A record three million-plus Chinese sat for the civil service exam in November.

But Tianyu says: "Many are looking for jobs. Not many found jobs." And those that did get lucky are working in unrelated fields.

That's what Joy did too - undeterred, she took the jobs she could find. She begged a tour company to take her on as a guide for the panda park in Chengdu over the summer, she sold hot drinks and she interned at a kindergarten.

"These jobs don't have good prospects for your future," Joy says. "They offer low salaries and you are easily replaceable. That's why most people would rather stay at home."

She has now accepted a position selling educational material. It's not her dream job, but she sees it as a way of gaining experience.

Her parents, however, are worried. Joy comes from a small village in the hills, some 400km (248mi) away. She is the first in her family to make it to university. Her father was so proud he held a banquet in her honour with more than 30 tables of guests.

"My parents expect me to have a better life and better job and income than their generation as I graduated from college," she says.

"They expect that after they supported my education, I could at least have a job... [but] I will insist on going down my own path at my own pace."

She stops to buy some hotcakes filled with thick brown sugarcane while pointing out a butcher making spicy Sichuan sausage. It's delicious but "too fatty" for her, she giggles.

Wang Xiqing/ BBC

Joy - the first in her family to go to university - now calls Chengdu home

She's come to love this vibrant city during her years at university. She wants to go further and one day travel to Australia and learn English.

The job market may be difficult, but Joy believes life for her is still easier than it was for her parents, when China was much poorer and dreams were far more distant.

"I think this generation is lucky and blessed," she says.

"There is lots of time and a lot of chances for us to achieve our goals. We can think deeper about what we really want. Compared to the last generation, we don't care that much about earning money. We think more about what we can do to achieve our dreams."

'Roll up your sleeves'

This is what Prof Xiang calls a "re-scripting of the Chinese dream". The pandemic has been one of the catalysts of Gen Z's new Chinese dream, he says.

"Young people felt a sense of vulnerability... [that] their life could be changed, crashed by powerful forces. It makes them rethink the entire paradigm of how Chinese society is organised and how Chinese collective life is organised."

Even during China's strict pandemic lockdowns, young people were encouraged to go to college. And they've gone in large numbers - with a record 11.6 million students graduating in 2023 alone.

Their frustration has inspired viral memes, cynical humour and even unconventional choices. Some posted alternative graduation pictures of themselves throwing their dissertations in the bin. The nickname "lying flat" was coined for those opting out of the rat race and finding ways to exist away from the competition of modern life.

Many have stopped searching for work altogether, instead heading home to be a "full-time child". Some document their life on social media as they earn small sums of money doing chores for their parents or looking after younger people in the family.

The BBC spoke to a one young woman who did not want to be identified who had returned home to live with her parents in rural China. She said she had time to read books, talk to her family and she was cherishing a different life to a city career. She added that she knew it was not forever - but said she was content for now.

Getty Images

Students line up to sit for the civil service exam in Beijing

"This is not only about a shortage of jobs or opportunities or income, rather there is a collapse of the dream which has pushed them to work so hard," Prof Xiang says. "That not only brings disappointment, but it also breeds disillusionment."

Beijing may be worried that this crisis could fester, that social discontent will rise and a disillusioned youth will pose a threat to the Communist Party's rule.

It has happened before. In 2022, protests against the government's stringent "zero-Covid" policies sprung up across the country - the most direct challenge to the Party in decades. And in 1989, frustration over unemployment and inflation provided the initial spark for what turned into historic and massive protests in Tiananmen Square.

So far, there is no sign of that.

"The very important reason for this is the transfer of intergenerational wealth," Prof Xiang says. "The family-based social support system is still there. Their parents benefited from China's reforms and have sufficient savings and real estate assets. But now the value of that is going down."

But Beijing is not taking chances. President Xi Jinping has urged young people to "eat bitterness", a Chinese term for enduring hardship.

The Party has urged graduates to stop thinking they are above manual jobs, asking them to "roll up their sleeves" and take up blue-collar work.

Hope vs despair

That's a temporary solution for 23-year-old sales and marketing graduate Zheng Guling.

She sniggers at her boyfriend who teases her as she lines up her shot at a snooker hall in Qinhuangdao, just a few hours' drive from Beijing. They met at university. They are both anxious about finding work. Guling is thinking of taking a role dealing with customers at a credit card firm.

"When I went to the job fairs, I found that most companies are only recruiting sales people. There are very few companies and very few suitable positions," she says.

Guling is one of six children from a small town in southern China. She was mostly taught online for four years. She has never been in a classroom with her classmates. She worries that this has deprived her of much-needed skills.

Lan Pan/BBC

Guling wants to start her own shop selling rice noodle rolls

Both Guling and Joy are "rolling up their sleeves" and finding their own way. Of course this is not the case for all, Prof Xiang says. Plenty of young Chinese do feel a deep sense of failure at not being able to get a job.

But he believes that their despair too will spur a shift. He says this is a "very powerful generation" with the potential to change China.

"The Chinese narrative needs to be rewritten. It can no longer be about prosperity, growth and national strength," he says. "Young people are the driving force for such a re-scripting of the Chinese dream."

In his New Year's Eve address, Mr Xi said that China had withstood the "test of winds and rains" and declared his "full confidence in the future".

But the big question is whether his nationalist Chinese Dream matches that of a disenchanted, restless generation that is not sure of what to expect from their future.

Huddled in a teashop overlooking the frozen sea, Guling's face lights up as she describes her ultimate dream: She wants to be her own boss.

She hopes to earn enough money to open a breakfast shop in her hometown selling Cantonese rice noodle rolls. "This will offer me more freedom," she says. "Then I can do what I like instead of just carrying on working for other people."

As she munches on the tea-shop snacks of mooncakes, chestnuts and dried mango, she explains that she wants more than a provincial life.

"My parents have never left their home province. They run in very small circles. They just want a stable life. But we want to see more things. See the outside world, and think about what we really dream of."

21. Overcoming data analytics inertia in defense to win future wars

Overcoming data analytics inertia in defense to win future wars

c4isrnet.com · by David Roddenberry, Jr. · January 2, 2024

Where will tomorrow’s wars be won?

The answer to that question is very different now than it would have been only ten years ago, because the battlespace has expanded into new arenas so quickly – perhaps most notably into the digital realm.

Whether fighting on traditional fronts (land, sea, and air), in cyberspace, or in space itself, victory hinges on our ability to make accurate, lightning-fast decisions based on massive volumes of data generated by sensors, machines, drones, and other digital systems – in addition to the sources of intelligence that have informed defense-related decisions for decades.

Analytics inertia

Ultimately, winning is about having the knowledge and insight to make smarter decisions faster than our opponents. But as quickly as defense organizations may want to move, a myriad of well explored and publicly discussed factors, like large bureaucracies, outdated acquisition processes, antiquated policies, and so on, hinder institutional transformation on the scale and at the rate needed to adapt to the increasingly digital environment.

Meanwhile, today’s opponents are fierce, nimble, digitally enabled and unencumbered by the deliberative, process-oriented environment in which mature defense organizations operate.

Core to unlocking digital capabilities is the application of advanced analytics already in use throughout the business world. But too often, “analytics inertia” is restraining progress and breaking free requires understanding why it exists at all.

Here are a few reasons and insights on how to gain momentum.

Vendor lock-in

Defense organizations must preserve the flexibility to acquire the best software without fear of becoming locked into a solution that may be unsuitable in the future, as technology and missions change. If a technology partner isn’t delivering desired results, or if the mission and priorities change, they must be replaceable.

Many defense leaders holding the responsibility to obtain mission-critical software – those “close” to mission success for the organization, like analytics solutions supporting intelligence and targeting in operationally focused organizations – are often reluctant to contract with commercial providers for fear the software may become too central to mission success and the company may gain disproportionate leverage in the relationship over time. Instead, their default mode is to build software capabilities themselves – with the help of large consulting organizations, working with internal technology experts and other stakeholders.

While this approach can be time- and resource-intensive, it effectively bypasses “vendor lock-in.” But in a sense, the locked-in relationship has just shifted to a reliance on perpetual services costs as the software is built internally from scratch, iterated to meet requirements and then maintained by a platoon of developers.

This is the best-case scenario, because many such endeavors never evolve beyond the “perpetual iteration phase” – where entities focused on delivering services are content to remain, for obvious reasons.

The history of defense contracts is littered with examples of this type of dysfunctional relationship, making it too easy for defense leaders to overlook the fundamental shift that has occurred among commercial software providers over the last decade or so. Following their own run-ins with vendor lock-in, the business community changed their own software requirements for commercial vendors – requiring these solutions be more easily replaced.

Today, this has become a key selling point for software providers, which has made their solutions more modular than ever before based on an acknowledgement that true commercial software is “built to be replaced.” This has fundamentally changed the vendor/buyer relationship – making it easier for defense organizations to benefit from the ready-to-implement capabilities of the world’s leading technology solutions.

Analytics at scale

Whether using data for intelligence purposes, supply chain management, or any number of highly sensitive, mission-critical initiatives, defense organizations traffic in data at an exponential scale. As a result, there is a widespread belief throughout defense organizations that the only way to manage these sprawling data volumes is to build solutions that are up to the task.

It is true that many commercial data management and analytics solutions are unable to handle military-grade data volumes. It is also a fact that a growing, elite class of commercial solutions are proving ready for the challenge – being used in business environments that operate at a scale comparable to defense applications. Nestle, for example, moves approximately 1 billion SKUs in their system in a 24-hour period.

The company must not only track these movements in real-time, but also requires highly sensitive forecasting capabilities for determining how to replenish these SKUs, as well as all the raw materials required to support their production, all over the world. There are many global technology companies dealing with similar grand-scale data on a daily basis. Many of these commercially available capabilities can be repurposed to fit defense requirements, giving defense leaders a solution that has real world “street cred” through analog commercial use cases with a 70% or greater viability the first day deployed into a defense technical environment.

Replaceability

Imagine a scenario in which a defense organization has entered into a contract with an analytics solution provider that fits the “replaceability” requirement, and then decides to replace them. New systems, processes, and capabilities are successfully implemented with a new provider…but the data is another story. The previous provider used a proprietary data format that requires extensive, time-consuming translation efforts in order to reconstitute it in a workable format. This is the painful reality facing too many defense leaders – and it is entirely avoidable.

Defense leaders in charge of analytics software purchasing decisions can apply one simple criteria to avoid difficult software transitions in the future: If the solution relies on a proprietary data format, disqualify it. Instead, focus on solutions that ensure an organization’s data will be returned in a standard, non-proprietary format it can use forever.

Where will tomorrow’s wars be won? They will be won in conference rooms, board rooms, and laboratories around our country. They will be won wherever risk tolerant leaders engage to push existing inertia a little off trajectory. Ultimately these future wars will be won at the intersection of data, speed and trust.

David Roddenberry, Jr. is Defense and Intelligence Industry Advisor at SAS, a supplier of data analytics software and services.

​22. Voter Beware: Unveiling China's AI Propaganda in the 2024 American Elections

Voter Beware: Unveiling China's AI Propaganda in the 2024 American Elections

sofrep.com · by Brandon Webb · January 2, 2024

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Be advised: What you see and what is real are not necessarily the same thing.

In the swirling vortex of the digital age, where the lines between reality and fabrication blur with the ease of a click, the Chinese government has launched its latest salvo in the global battle for influence: the “Global AI Governance Initiative.”- RAND Report

This grand proclamation, draped in the seductive garb of diplomatic language, claims a noble stance against the use of AI in spreading disinformation and meddling in the affairs of sovereign nations. On the surface, it’s a pledge that should soothe the furrowed brows of those fearing the tidal wave of online falsehoods. But here’s the rub, the blue falcon reality beneath the shiny veneer: China is bullshitting everyone. And if you believe that I’ve got a self-storage unit for sale in Hong Kong full of Bitcoin for sale cheap.

Reports, including those from tech giant Microsoft, have peeled back the curtain to reveal a theater of digital warfare already in motion. Chinese actors, not content with the slow burn of traditional propaganda, have embraced generative AI, producing distorted images and AI-generated avatars to disseminate their narrative, their version of the “truth.”

Generative AI, the latest weapon in the arsenal of Chinese propagandists, isn’t just coming — it’s already here as seen with Chat GPT, turbocharging their efforts to mold the global conversation.

Picture this: a network of “intelligent agents,” fake accounts powered by AI, indistinguishable from real humans, flooding your feeds, your forums, and your digital life with messages crafted to push China’s agenda. This isn’t some dystopian novel plot; it’s the reality of today, a reality where Xi, backed by the might of the Chinese military, is designing systems to deceive you, to guide your opinion without you ever knowing.

TikTok anyone?

Influence operations. US national security officials are concerned that TikTok could try to shape US public opinion by strategically suppressing or promoting certain videos. One official called the app a “Trojan horse” through which China could manipulate American thought. -Bloomberg

The Department of Defense and American Spy agencies, along with those who’ve been navigating these murky waters, aren’t fooled by Beijing’s lies. But lies, especially the blatant ones, offer a bizarre opportunity in the high-stakes poker game of international diplomacy.

The real battle that will unfold in the American 2024 elections is the war for your mind. It’s being fought not just in diplomatic backrooms but in the very device in your hand, the screen before your eyes.

As we careen towards the election season, American voters, you’re not just choosing a president; you’re on the frontline of a new type of warfare. The digital battlefield is vast, and the soldiers are invisible, algorithms and avatars seeking to influence, to manipulate, to control. The stakes? Your very perception of reality, your beliefs, your decisions.

So, as you navigate this treacherous terrain, be vigilant, be skeptical, and question more.

The future belongs to those who can discern the truth in an age of manufactured realities. And in this new world, your mind is the most valuable territory.

Beware, be aware, and be ready.

This election isn’t just about America; it’s about the very essence of what you believe to be true.

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About Brandon Webb View All Posts

sofrep.com · by Brandon Webb · January 2, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com