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Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners



Quotes of the Day:

"There is no such thing as paranoia. Your worst fears can come true at any moment." 
- Hunter S. Thompson

"Falsehood is so easy, truth so difficult."
- George Eliot

"Truth is ever to be found in simplicity."
- Isaac Newton



Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement | The White House

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 23 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. Russian diplomat quits over war in Ukraine
3. Did Biden just end US strategic ambiguity on Taiwan?
4. Analysis | Three theories on Biden’s repeated Taiwan gaffes
5. Russia’s Potemkin Army
6. Intelligence and War: Does Secrecy Still Matter?
7. Guam Needs Better Missile Defenses—Urgently
8. Protests in Iran Are Surging. The Biden Administration Can Help.
9. Who Is to Blame for the Collapse of Afghanistan’s Security Forces?
10. End the WHO’s Unhealthy Obsession With Israel
11. Missile Defense Agency Eyes Command Center for Guam
12. The Changing Character of Combined Arms
13. After 3 months, Russia still bogged down in Ukraine war
14. Ukraine's Zelenskiy says he would meet with Putin to end the war
15. Can a U.S.-China War Be Averted?
16. Republicans plot foreign intervention pullback
17. Duterte hits Putin: I kill criminals, not children, elders
18. Why does the U.S. need a Disinformation Governance Board?
19. Ukrainian intelligence chief: Putin survived assassination attempt 2 months ago
20. US an empire of coercion
21. Ukraine war has pushed Japanese away from war-renouncing stance, political analyst says
22. How to Make Biden’s Free World Strategy Work
23. How to Build Putin a Gilded Bridge Out of Ukraine
24. Defeating Putin Is the Only Route to Peace in Ukraine
25. Quad summit outlines wider Indo-Pacific ambitions



Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement | The White House
Conclusion:
Today, with a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, we once again emphasize the importance of fundamental values and principles, and commit to work tirelessly to deliver tangible results to the region. In doing so, we will regularize the Quad activities, including regular meetings by the Leaders and Foreign Ministers. We agree to hold our next in-person summit in 2023 hosted by Australia.


Topics:

Peace and Stability
COVID-19 and Global Health Security
Infrastructure
Climate
Cybersecurity
Critical & Emerging Technologies
Quad Fellowship
Space
Maritime Domain Awareness and HADR


Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement | The White House
whitehouse.gov · May 24, 2022
Today, we – Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, and President Joe Biden of the United States – convene in Tokyo to renew our steadfast commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient.
Just over one year ago, Leaders met for the first time. Today in Tokyo, we convene for our fourth meeting, and our second in person, to demonstrate, at a time of profound global challenge, that the Quad is a force for good, committed to bringing tangible benefits to the region. In our first year of cooperation, we established the Quad’s dedication to a positive and practical agenda; in our second year, we are committed to deliver on this promise, making the region more resilient for the 21st century.
With the COVID-19 pandemic still inflicting human and economic pain around the world, tendencies for unilateral actions among states and a tragic conflict raging in Ukraine, we are steadfast. We strongly support the principles of freedom, rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes without resorting to threat or use of force, any unilateral attempt to change the status quo, and freedom of navigation and overflight, all of which are essential to the peace, stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region and to the world. We will continue to act decisively together to advance these principles in the region and beyond. We reaffirm our resolve to uphold the international rules-based order where countries are free from all forms of military, economic and political coercion.

Peace and Stability
We discussed our respective responses to the conflict in Ukraine and the ongoing tragic humanitarian crisis, and assessed its implications for the Indo-Pacific. Quad Leaders reiterated our strong resolve to maintain the peace and stability in the region. We underscored unequivocally that the centerpiece of the international order is international law, including the UN Charter, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states. We also emphasized that all countries must seek peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law.
The Quad is committed to cooperation with partners in the region who share the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. We reaffirm our unwavering support for ASEAN unity and centrality and for the practical implementation of ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We welcome the EU’s Joint Communication on the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific which was announced in September 2021 and increased European engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. We will champion adherence to international law, particularly as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the maintenance of freedom of navigation and overflight, to meet challenges to the maritime rules-based order, including in the East and South China Seas. We strongly oppose any coercive, provocative or unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo and increase tensions in the area, such as the militarization of disputed features, the dangerous use of coast guard vessels and maritime militia, and efforts to disrupt other countries’ offshore resource exploitation activities.
Individually and collectively, we will further strengthen our cooperation with Pacific island countries, to enhance their economic well being, strengthen health infrastructure and environmental resilience, to improve their maritime security and sustain their fisheries, to provide sustainable infrastructure, to bolster educational opportunities, and to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change, which pose especially serious challenges for this region. We are committed to working together to address the needs of Pacific island partners. We reaffirmed our support for Pacific Islands Forum unity and for Pacific regional security frameworks.
Among ourselves and with our partners, we will deepen our cooperation in multilateral institutions, including at the United Nations, where reinforcing our shared priorities to reform and enhance the resilience of the multilateral system itself. Individually and together, we will respond to the challenges of our time, ensuring that the region remains inclusive, open, and governed by universal rules and norms.
We reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) and also reconfirm the necessity of immediate resolution of the issue of Japanese abductees. We also condemn North Korea’s destabilizing ballistic missile development and launches, including multiple intercontinental ballistic missile tests, in violation of UNSCRs, and call on the international community to fully implement these resolutions. We urge North Korea to abide by all of its obligations under the UNSCRs, refrain from provocations, and engage in substantive dialogue.
We remain deeply concerned by the crisis in Myanmar, which has caused grave humanitarian suffering and posed challenges to regional stability. We continue to call for the immediate end to violence in Myanmar, the release of all political detainees, including foreigners, engagement in constructive dialogue, humanitarian access, and the swift restoration of democracy. We reaffirm our support for ASEAN-led efforts to seek a solution in Myanmar and welcome the role of Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair. We further call for the urgent implementation of the ASEAN Five Point Consensus.
We condemn unequivocally terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations and reiterate that there can be no justification for acts of terror on any grounds whatsoever. We denounce the use of terrorist proxies and emphasize the importance of denying any logistical, financial or military support to terrorist groups which could be used to launch or plan terror attacks, including cross-border attacks. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorist attacks, including 26/11 Mumbai and Pathankot attacks. We also reaffirm UNSC Resolution 2593 (2021), which demands that Afghan territory must never again be used to threaten or attack any country or to shelter or train terrorists, or to plan or finance terrorist attacks. We emphasize the importance of upholding international standards on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism by all countries, consistent with FATF recommendations. We reaffirm that in our fight against global terrorism, we will take concerted action against all terrorist groups, including those individuals and entities designated pursuant to the UNSC Resolution 1267(1999).

COVID-19 and Global Health Security
For more than two years, the world has grappled with the devastating impacts of COVID-19 – on our communities, citizens, health workers and systems and economies. The Quad countries have led and will continue to lead global efforts for COVID-19 response, with a view to building better health security and strengthening health systems. We commit to adapt our collective approaches to get ahead of the virus with a focus on preparing for new variants, and getting vaccines, tests, treatments, and other medical products to those at highest risk.
To date, the Quad partners have collectively pledged approximately USD $ 5.2 billion to the COVAX AMC, approximately 40 percent of the total contributions from government donors. We are proud to have delivered over 670 million doses, including at least 265 million doses to Indo-Pacific. Noting significant expansion in the global supply of COVID-19 vaccines, we will continue to share safe, effective, affordable and quality-assured COVID-19 vaccines where and when they are needed.
We welcome the progress on the expansion of J&J vaccine production at the Biological E facility in India under the Quad Vaccine Partnership– sustainable manufacturing capacity will yield long-term benefit in the fight against COVID-19 and future pandemics. In this regard, we look forward to the grant of WHO’s EUL approvals regarding the aforementioned vaccines in India. We celebrate the donation by the Quad to Cambodia and Thailand of WHO approved Made in India vaccines, together with Quad members’ other vaccine related support, as an example of tangible achievement of our collaboration.
We will continue to address both the COVID-19 response and preparedness against future health threats. We will accelerate getting shots in arms through last mile support of which over 2 billion USD has been provided in more than 115 countries globally by our four countries, and will also address vaccine hesitancy through a Quad-convened event this week at the World Health Assembly. We will coordinate our efforts including through the “COVID-19 Prioritized Global Action Plan for Enhanced Engagement (GAP),” and COVAX Vaccine Delivery Partnership. We welcome the successful 2nd Global COVID-19 Summit co-hosted by the United States, and joined by the Quad members, which galvanized $3.2 billion in financial and policy commitments. We will strengthen support for economic and social revitalization in the Indo-Pacific region.
In the long term, we will strengthen the global health architecture and pandemic prevention, preparedness and response (PPR) to build better health security, including by enhancing finance and health coordination and bolstering on-going science and technology cooperation, such as through clinical trials and genomic surveillance. Building on existing Quad collaboration, we will enhance our capacity to improve early detection and monitor new and emerging pathogens with pandemic potential, and work to increase resilience to epidemics and pandemics. For the development of new vaccines to prevent and contain infectious diseases, Quad partners have collectively committed $524 million to the next phase of CEPI’s work, accounting for about 50 percent of the total public investors.
We commit, as members of the Group of Friends of UHC, to take global leadership to further strengthen and reform the global health architecture for enhancing PPR and promoting UHC in the lead up to the UN High Level Meeting on UHC to be held in 2023.

Infrastructure
We reaffirmed our shared commitment to deepen cooperation on infrastructure, which is critical to driving productivity and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. We also share a commitment to addressing debt issues, which have been exacerbated by the pandemic in many countries.
Quad partners bring decades of skills and experience together to catalyse infrastructure delivery to the region. We are committed to working closely with partners and the region to drive public and private investment to bridge gaps. To achieve this, Quad will seek to extend more than 50 billion USD of infrastructure assistance and investment in the Indo-Pacific, over the next five years.
We will work to strengthen capacities of the countries in need to cope with debt issues under the G20 Common Framework and by promoting debt sustainability and transparency in close collaboration with finance authorities of relevant countries, including through the “Quad Debt Management Resource Portal,” which consists of multiple bilateral and multilateral capacity building assistance.
We also welcome the meeting of the development finance institutions and agencies of the four countries in the margins of the Quad Leaders’ Meeting. We are working closely with experts, our region and each other to link our toolkits and expertise to better connect the Indo-Pacific.
We will further deepen collaboration and pursue complementary actions in identified areas, such as regional and digital connectivity, clean energy, and climate resilience including disaster resilience in energy related facilities that reflect the region’s priorities including ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, to contribute to sustainable and inclusive growth in the region.

Climate
Recognizing the urgent need to address climate change as emphasized in the latest IPCC reports, we will steadfastly implement the Paris Agreement and deliver on the outcomes of COP26, accelerating our efforts to raise global ambition, including reaching out to key stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region and supporting, strengthening, and enhancing climate actions by partners in the region including through mobilizing climate finance, both public and private, and facilitating the research, development, and deployment of innovative technology.
Today, we launch the “Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP)” with “mitigation” and “adaptation” as its two themes. Q-CHAMP includes ongoing activities under the Quad Climate Working Group on: green shipping and ports aiming for a shared green corridor framework building on each Quad country’s input; clean energy cooperation in clean hydrogen and methane emissions from the natural gas sector; strengthening clean energy supply chains, welcoming the contribution of the Sydney Energy Forum; climate information services for developing an engagement strategy with Pacific island countries; and disaster risk reduction, including disaster and climate resilient infrastructure such as the efforts through the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI). Its coverage includes new cooperation in clean fuel ammonia, CCUS/Carbon Recycling, cooperation and capacity building support to advance high integrity carbon markets under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, climate-smart agriculture, knowledge sharing on subnational climate actions, and ecosystem-based adaptation. To make Q-CHAMP tangible, we are committed to expanding our programs, in support of climate actions between our four countries as well as in the Indo-Pacific region. We recognize the immense challenges posed by climate change to the island nations of the Pacific.
We welcome the new Australian Government’s commitment to stronger action on climate change, including through passing legislation to achieve net zero by 2050 and lodging a new, ambitious Nationally Determined Contribution.

Cybersecurity
In an increasingly digital world with sophisticated cyber threats we recognize an urgent need to take a collective approach to enhancing cybersecurity. To deliver on the Quad Leaders’ vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, we commit to improving the defense of our nations’ critical infrastructure by sharing threat information, identifying and evaluating potential risks in supply chains for digitally enabled products and services, and aligning baseline software security standards for government procurement, leveraging our collective purchasing power to improve the broader software development ecosystem so that all users can benefit. The Quad partners will coordinate capacity building programs in the Indo-Pacific region under the Quad Cybersecurity Partnership, and will initiate the first-ever Quad Cybersecurity Day to help individual internet users across our nations, the Indo-Pacific region, and beyond to better protect themselves from cyber threats.
Critical & Emerging Technologies
The Quad remains focused on harnessing critical and emerging technologies to enhance the prosperity and security of the region. In the area of 5G and beyond 5G, while welcoming the Prague Proposals on Telecommunications Supplier Diversity, we will advance interoperability and security through the signature of a new Memorandum of Cooperation on 5G Supplier Diversification and Open RAN. We are also deepening our engagement with industry, including through Open RAN Track 1.5 events, and exploring ways to collaborate on the deployment of open and secure telecommunications technologies in the region.
We have mapped the Quad’s capacity and vulnerabilities in global semiconductor supply chains and have decided to better leverage our complementary strengths to realize a diverse and competitive market for semiconductors. The Common Statement of Principles on Critical Technology Supply Chains, launched on the occasion of this Summit, advances our cooperation on semiconductors and other critical technologies, providing a cooperative foundation for enhancing our resilience against various risks to the region. Our cooperation in the international standardization organizations, such as the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau of the International Telecommunication Union, has made great progress, and we expect to strengthen such cooperation through the new International Standards Cooperation Network (ISCN). This cooperation will help ensure technology development in the region is guided by our shared democratic values. We continue to strengthen our horizon scanning cooperation following our deepened discussions in biotechnology through our efforts on mapping and a corresponding Track 1.5 and a future focus on quantum technologies. We will convene a business and investment forum for networking with industry partners to expand capital for critical and emerging technologies.

Quad Fellowship
We recognize that people to people ties are the bedrock of the Quad and welcome the official launch of the Quad Fellowship, which is now open for application. The Quad Fellowship will bring 100 students from our countries to the United States each year to pursue graduate degrees in STEM fields, and is administered by Schmidt Futures. The first class of Quad Fellows will begin their studies in the third quarter of 2023, and we look forward to building together a talented cohort of next-generation STEM minds who will lead our countries in cutting-edge research and innovation.

Space
Space-related applications and technologies can also contribute to addressing common challenges such as climate change, disaster preparedness and response, and sustainable uses of oceans and marine resources. Each Quad partner will endeavor to improve public access to Earth observation satellite data and applications. We will work together to create an Earth observation-based monitoring and sustainable development framework. We will endeavor to share space-based civil Earth observation data, along with providing a “Quad Satellite Data Portal” that aggregates links to our respective national satellite data resources. We will work together to develop space applications, including in the area of Earth observations, and provide capacity building support to countries in the region, including with regards to partnering on using space capabilities to respond to extreme precipitation events. We will also consult on rules, norms, guidelines and principles for the sustainable use of space, and extend support to countries in the region through joint workshops including in relation to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities.

Maritime Domain Awareness and HADR
We welcome a new maritime domain awareness initiative, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), designed to work with regional partners to respond to humanitarian and natural disasters, and combat illegal fishing. IPMDA will support and work in consultation with Indo-Pacific nations and regional information fusion centers in the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands by providing technology and training to support enhanced, shared maritime domain awareness to promote stability and prosperity in our seas and oceans. IPMDA embodies what the Quad stands for: catalyzing our joint efforts towards concrete results that help to make the region more stable and prosperous.
Delivering on our commitment following our virtual meeting on 3 March 2022, we announce today the establishment of the “Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific”. This Partnership will further strengthen our collaboration to effectively respond to disasters in the region.

Closing
Today, with a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, we once again emphasize the importance of fundamental values and principles, and commit to work tirelessly to deliver tangible results to the region. In doing so, we will regularize the Quad activities, including regular meetings by the Leaders and Foreign Ministers. We agree to hold our next in-person summit in 2023 hosted by Australia.
###
whitehouse.gov · May 24, 2022


1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 23 (PUTIN'S WAR)

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 23
May 23, 2022 - Press ISW

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Mason Clark, and George Barros
May 23, 6:00 pm ET
Russian nationalist figures are increasingly criticizing the failures of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine and are calling for further mobilization that the Kremlin likely remains unwilling and unable to pursue in the short term. The All-Russian Officers Assembly, an independent pro-Russian veterans’ association that seeks to reform Russian military strategy, called for Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin to declare war on Ukraine and introduce partial mobilization in Russia on May 19.[1] The Assembly said that Russia’s “special military operation” failed to achieve its goals in three months, especially after the failed Siverskyi Donets River crossings. ISW previously assessed that the destruction of nearly an entire Russian battalion tactical group (BTG) during a failed river crossing on May 11 shocked Russian military observers and prompted them to question Russian competence.[2] The Assembly’s appeal called on Putin to recognize that Russian forces are no longer only “denazifying” Ukraine but are fighting a war for Russia’s historic territories and existence in the world order. The officers demanded that the Kremlin mobilize all regions bordering NATO countries (including Ukraine), form territorial defense squads, extend standard military service terms from one year to two, and form new supreme wartime administrations over Russia, the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR), and newly occupied Ukrainian settlements. The officers also demanded the death penalty for deserters.
The Assembly’s letter may be a leading indicator of elements of the Russian government and society setting informational conditions to declare partial mobilization. However, the Kremlin has so far declined to take this step likely due to concerns over domestic backlash and flaws in Russia’s mobilization systems.[3] The All-Russian Officers Assembly called on Putin to recognize the independence of the DNR and LNR three weeks prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, setting conditions for the Russian “special military operation.”[4] Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced on May 20 that Russia will form 12 new Western Military District units (of unspecified echelon) before the end of the year in response to NATO expansion.[5] Russian forces may intend to man these units with newly mobilized personnel, as it is unclear how else the Kremlin could generate the manpower for new units. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces are withdrawing old T-62 tanks from storage to form new BTGs.[6] Russia is likely continuing to exhaust its remaining combat-ready reserves to maintain the momentum of the Battle of Severodonetsk, rather than prioritizing preparations for new reinforcements. ISW previously assessed that Russian mobilization is unlikely to generate combat-ready force due to hasty training.[7]
More Russians supportive of the Kremlin and the Russian invasion of Ukraine are beginning to criticize the Kremlin openly. Russian milbloggers claimed that the Kremlin will not honor the Officers Assembly appeal, indicating an intensifying negative perception of the Russian leadership among Russians supportive of the war in Ukraine.[8] Kaliningrad Oblast Governor Anton Alikhanov publicly stated that the Russian war in Ukraine has disrupted transport routes and construction schedules in the region, a rare admission of the economic cost of the war from a Russian government official.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian military personnel are increasingly complaining about the ineffectiveness of offensive operations against Ukrainian troops.[10]
Unidentified assailants continued attacks against military recruitment offices in Russia on May 23, indicating growing discontent with conscription.[11] A Russian Telegram channel reported that an unknown attacker threw a Molotov cocktail at the military recruitment office in the Udmurtia region, which follows a May 19 incident wherein a Russian conscript shot at a recruitment office in Zheleznogorsk-Ilimsky (Irkutsk Oblast) with a pneumatic device.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff previously reported that 12 total attacks on recruitment offices have happened since the beginning of the war, with five happening in the past few weeks alone.[13] These attacks may represent growing domestic discontent with conscription and recruitment practices.
The UK Ministry of Defense reported that Russia has suffered a similar death toll within the first three months of the invasion of Ukraine as was experienced by the Soviet Union over the course of nine years in Afghanistan.[14] The British Ministry of Defense stated that a combination of poor low-level tactics, poor air defense, lack of operational flexibility, and poor command methods have resulted in repeated mistakes and failures, which are continuing to be evident in Donbas. The report noted that the Russian public is sensitive to high casualty numbers, and assessed that as casualties suffered in Ukraine grow and become harder to conceal, public dissatisfaction will increase.
Key Takeaways
  • Russian nationalist figures (including veterans and military commentators) are increasingly criticizing the failures of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine and are calling for further mobilization that the Kremlin likely remains unwilling and unable to pursue in the short term.
  • Russian forces around Izyum increased their tempo of air and artillery strikes and likely intend to attempt to resume stalled offensive operations in the coming days.
  • Russian operations to encircle Severodonetsk made minor gains in the past 24 hours, driving north through Zolote. Fighting is ongoing in Lyman (north of Severodonetsk) as Russian forces attempt to cut off Ukrainian supply lines
  • Russian forces will likely make further minor gains west of Popasna in the near future but are unlikely to be able to quickly seize Bakhmut.
  • The Ukrainian counteroffensive northeast of Kharkiv continues to threaten Russian positions and is forcing Russia to pull units from ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine to shore up their defensive positions near Vovchansk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate main effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
  • Supporting effort 1—Mariupol;
  • Supporting effort 2—Kharkiv City;
  • Supporting effort 3—Southern axis.
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces intensified air and artillery strikes southeast of Izyum on May 23 in preparation for intended resumed offensive operations towards Slovyansk. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that unspecified elements of Russia’s Western, Central, and Eastern Military Districts, along with the 11th Army Corps of the Baltic Fleet, are preparing to resume attacks toward Slovyansk.[15] Russian forces conducted artillery strikes and reconnoitered Ukrainian positions southeast of Izyum around Dibrove, Virnopillya, Bogorodichne, Husarivka, Chepil, Dolyna, Studenok, and Sviatorhirsk.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces attempted an unsuccessful ground assault on Dovhenke, about 20 km southeast of Izyum.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally stated that Russian forces are strengthening the police-administrative regime in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast, likely to consolidate control of Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that run south to Izyum against possible Ukrainian partisan actions.[18]

Russian forces continued ground assaults around Severodonetsk and made marginal gains to encircle the city on May 23.[19] Russian sources claimed that Russian troops cleared the settlement of Shchedryshcheve, directly northeast of Severodonetsk, and are fighting on the outskirts of the city.[20] Russian forces reportedly stormed Zolote and took control of the entry points to the city, which would allow them to push northward and complete the encirclement of Severodonetsk from the south.[21] The Ukrainian Defense Ministry reported that Russian forces are attempting to break through Ukrainian defenses around Popasna, specifically around Toshkivka, Komyshuvakha, Nyrkove, Vasylivka, Nova Kamyanka, and Myronivsky, in a likely attempt to push westward toward Bakhmut.[22] Ukrainian forces reportedly withdrew westward from Volodymyrivka to Soledar, indicating that Russian forces are advancing westward from Popasna, as opposed to prioritizing a northward push toward Severodonetsk.[23] Russian forces additionally made gains near the Donetsk-Luhansk administrative border and took control of Mironovsky, southeast of Bakhmut.[24] The capture of Mironovsky will enable further attempts to drive toward Bakhmut from both the south and west. However, Russian forces are unlikely to be able to capture Bakhmut quickly (if at all) based on their past performance in urban terrain in eastern Ukraine.
Russian forces intensified offensive operations around Lyman and Avdiivka and made gains on May 23. Unconfirmed reports suggest that Russian forces have launched an assault on the northern part of Lyman and have taken at least partial control of the city as of May 23.[25] Russian forces additionally intensified artillery strikes against Avdiivka and are likely taking advantage of their previous capture of Novoselivka in order to advance on Avdiivka and gain highway access toward Slovyansk.[26]

Supporting Effort #1—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
Russian defense officials stated that Russian and proxy forces continued to demine the Azovstal Steel Plant on May 23.[27] Russian military Telegram bloggers criticized a video of Russian servicemen reportedly carrying out ground assaults on Azovstal on May 22 and stated that they should have waited for the remaining Ukrainian forces to surrender.[28] Russian milbloggers said that Russian forces did not attempt further assaults on May 23, but suggested that Russian military commanders continue to disregard servicemen’s lives in favor of the total capture of the Azovstal plant. ISW cannot independently confirm the number of remaining Ukrainian defenders in Azovstal. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that Ukrainian defenders who already surrendered are awaiting trials in detention centers in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[29]
Russian national (as opposed to DNR proxy) occupation authorities continued to strengthen their bureaucratic control over Mariupol, signaling a shift away from administrative control by DNR forces. Mariupol Mayor’s Advisor Petro Andryushenko reported that “volunteers” from Russia are assisting filtration efforts and Chechen units are patrolling highways from Mariupol into the Ukrainian-controlled areas of Zaporizhia Oblast.[30]
Supporting Effort #2—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces focused on maintaining their positions north of Kharkiv City on May 23.[31] The Ukrainian Defense Ministry noted that unspecified elements of the Russian 6th and 41st Combined Arms Armies, Baltic Fleet, and (for the first time) the 1st and 2nd Army Corps are operating in the area to prevent Ukrainian troops from further advances.[32] The 1st and 2nd Army Corps are the armed forces of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, respectively. The redeployment of DNR and LNR troops away from their previous positions conducting frontal assaults in eastern Ukraine to northern Kharkiv to hold defensive lines against the Ukrainian counteroffensive indicates Russia’s prioritization of slowing the Ukrainian counteroffensive, at the cost of reinforcing Russian offensive operations in the east. A pro-Russian source reported that Russian forces are still fighting in Lytpsi and Rubizhne (in Kharkiv Oblast, not Luhansk Oblast), which is consistent with previous claims that Russian troops were able to regain some ground to the north of Kharkiv City.[33] Russian forces continued to shell Kharkiv City and its environs throughout May 23.[34]

Supporting Effort #3—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces continued to set conditions to establish permanent control and resume offensive operations in southern Ukraine on May 23. The Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian forces are accumulating troops in Vasylivka—approximately 80 km south of Zaporizhia City and east of the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in Enerhodar.[35] Russian forces likely seek to consolidate their control of the Zaporizhia NPP and mitigate the threat of Ukrainian counteroffensives in Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russia is deploying two additional S-400 anti-aircraft missile battalions to northwestern Crimea to reinforce air defenses against any possible Ukrainian counterattacks[36] The Ukrainian military also reported that Russian forces are fortifying their frontiers in Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts.[37]

Immediate items to watch
  • Russian forces are likely reinforcing their grouping north of Kharkiv City to prevent further advances of the Ukrainian counteroffensive toward the Russian border. Russan forces may commit elements of the 1st Tank Army to Northern Kharkiv in the near future.
  • The Russians will continue efforts to encircle Severodonetsk and Lysychansk at least from the south, possibly by focusing on cutting off the last highway connecting Severodonetsk-Lysychansk with the rest of Ukraine.
  • Russian forces in Mariupol will likely shift their focus to occupational control of the city as the siege of Azovstal has concluded.
  • Russian forces are likely preparing for Ukrainian counteroffensives and settling in for protracted operations in southern Ukraine.
[1] https://m-kalashnikov dot livejournal.com/4243623.html
[5] https://iz dot ru/1337432/2022-05-20/shoigu-zaiavil-o-sozdanii-12-voinskikh-chastei-na-zapade-rossii; https://www.rosbalt dot ru/russia/2022/05/20/1958736.html; https://lenta dot ru/news/2022/05/20/6714263/
[9] https://kaliningradfirst dot ru/317343
[13] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/19/u-rosiyi-za-ostannij-tyzhden-stalosya-5-pidpaliv-vijskkomativ/
[19] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/23/vorog-namagayetsya-vyjty-na-administratyvnyj-kordon-luganskoyi-oblasti-rechnyk-mou/; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2843; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2834; https:...
[22] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/23/protyvnyk-gotuyetsya-zastosuvaty-pidrozdily-drugogo-eshelonu-ta-rezervy-vklyuchno-iz-taktychnymy-raketnymy-kompleksamy-tochka-u/; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1528617382536699904; https://www....
[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/323137383332680; https:/... https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/23/na-harkivshhyni-vorog-namagayetsya-vidnovyty-vtrachene-polozhennya/
[32] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/23/na-harkivshhyni-vorog-namagayetsya-vidnovyty-vtrachene-polozhennya/

2. Russian diplomat quits over war in Ukraine

A lot of scathing comments. We should be concerned for his safety.

Excerpt:

In contrast, Mr Bondarev said in his open letter he had "never been so ashamed of my country" as he was on 24 February, the day the invasion began.

Russian diplomat quits over war in Ukraine
BBC · by Menu
By Flora Drury
BBC
Published
18 hours ago
Image caption,
Boris Bondarev has released a scathing public statement after quitting in protest at the war
A Russian diplomat has quit his job in protest at the "bloody, witless" war "unleashed by Putin against Ukraine".
Boris Bondarev, whose LinkedIn says he worked at the Russian mission to the UN in Geneva, told the BBC he knew his decision to speak out may mean the Kremlin now considers him a traitor.
But he stood by his statement which described the war as "a crime against the Ukrainian people" and "the people of Russia".
Moscow has not yet commented.
Russia has cracked down on those who are critical of or veer from the official narrative surrounding the war, which it refers to only as "a special military operation".
In the letter posted on social media and shared with fellow diplomats, Mr Bondarev explained he had chosen to end his 20-year career in the service because he could no "longer share in this bloody, witless and absolutely needless ignominy".
"Those who conceived of this war want only one thing - to stay in power forever," he wrote.
"To achieve that, they are willing to sacrifice as many lives as it takes," he continued. "Thousands of Russians and Ukrainians have already died just for this."
The letter does not hold back over his former employer either, accusing Russia's Foreign Ministry of being more interested in "lies and hatred" than diplomacy.


As resignation letters go, this one was scathing.
Diplomat Boris Bondarev didn't hold back in his criticism of President Putin, Foreign Minister Lavrov and the Russian offensive in Ukraine.
"The aggressive war… the most serious crime… warmongering, lies and hatred…"
It's rare to hear such words from a Russian official. In the three months since Vladimir Putin launched what he's still calling his "special military operation" in Ukraine (what most of the world calls Russia's war) there have been few signs of open dissent in Russian state institutions.
Embarrassing for the Russian authorities? Absolutely. They like to make out that the state machine here is fully behind President Putin's decision to invade Ukraine.
But one resignation does not automatically mean that many more will follow. Mr Bondarev admitted to me that he's in the minority. He believes that, for now, most officials in the Russian Foreign Ministry back the official line and support the Kremlin's 'special operation.'

Speaking to the BBC, Mr Bondarev said he had "not seen any alternative" than to resign: "I don't think it will change a lot, frankly, but I think it may be one little brick into the bigger wall which would eventually be built. I hope so."
Mr Bondarev revealed that the invasion had initially been met by colleagues with "happiness, delight, euphoria" at the fact Russia had "taken some radical steps".
"Now they're less happy with that, because we're facing some problems, with the economy first of all," he told the BBC. "But I don't see that many of them would repent and change their views.
"They may become a little bit less radical, less aggressive quite a bit. But not peaceful.," he said.
In contrast, Mr Bondarev said in his open letter he had "never been so ashamed of my country" as he was on 24 February, the day the invasion began.
It is unclear if he is the first diplomat to resign from the mission, although no one else has spoken out publicly.
Mr Bondarev is under no illusions that Moscow will now see him as a traitor, but notes he hasn't "done anything illegal".
"I just resigned and spoke my mind," he said. "But I think I have to be concerned about my safety of course."

War in Ukraine: More coverage

BBC · by Menu


3. Did Biden just end US strategic ambiguity on Taiwan?

I ask rhetorically and knowing the answer from some, but what is really wrong with this statement? Why can't POTUS make this statement?

Excerpt:

In Tokyo, Biden drew parallels between Ukraine and Taiwan. “The idea that [Taiwan] can be taken by force, just taken by force, would just not be appropriate,” said Biden. “It would dislocate the entire region and be another action similar to what happened in Ukraine. So, it’s a burden that is even stronger.”

Did Biden just end US strategic ambiguity on Taiwan?
Quartz · by Tripti Lahiri
The White House played down what appeared to be a departure from longstanding US policy after president Joe Biden said today the US would militarily intervene in case of an attack on Taiwan by China.
A White House official later said Biden’s comments did not mark a change in policy, even though the US has long had a strategy of being deliberately vague about how it would respond in case of military aggression by China.
It’s not the first time the president’s staff steps in to clarify his statements about US commitments towards Taiwan. The same happened last year when the president made similar remarks in response to a question at a town hall in the US.
Speaking today from a venue far closer to China, standing alongside Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida in Tokyo, Biden was again decidedly unambiguous. “That’s the commitment we made,” he said, when asked if the US would get involved in case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
The comments came ahead of a meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, which includes Australia, India, Japan, and the US in a grouping meant to counter China.
“Strategic ambiguity” and Taiwan
For decades the US policy of strategic ambiguity was thought to be a way to balance both sides, given that good relations with both China and Taiwan were important for US interests.
China has claimed the democratically governed island as its own territory since the Communist Party emerged victorious from the Chinese civil war in 1949. By being vague as to what the US would do in the event of a Chinese attack, the goal was to deter Chinese aggression, yet also hold Taiwan’s pro-independence forces in check, and thus avoid riling Beijing.
Still, not everyone sees the policy as having been entirely unclear in case of an unprovoked attack on Taiwan. According to the Washington-based National Bureau of Asian Research think tank:
Strictly speaking, strategic ambiguity is not about whether the United States would intervene should either side upset the present status quo by initiating a cross-strait conflict, as is commonly assumed. Instead, it is about providing conditional clarity regarding the circumstances under which intervention by the United States would be appropriate. It creates a type of “dual deterrence” in which both sides are deterred from endangering the status quo by the possibility of U.S. intervention while at the same time being assured that the other side will not unilaterally seek to change the status quo. Thus, Taiwan is deterred from upsetting the status quo with the assurance that it will be supported only in the event of an unprovoked attack from the mainland.
Biden’s comments come as China’s rhetoric about “reunification” with Taiwan has been more aggressive in recent years, while Chinese incursions into Taiwan’s air monitoring area have also increased. But a shift to “strategic clarity,” notes one analyst, won’t necessarily determine what Beijing decides to do.
“The administration is under the false impression that if you make China more certain about the US commitment to defend Taiwan, that will change China’s calculus,” Oriana Skylar Mastro, a China expert at Stanford, told NPR last year.
Ukraine and Taiwan
On Feb. 24, Russia invaded Ukraine, a war that is still raging in the heart of Europe. In its earliest days, the Ukraine war appeared to offer a warning that Taiwan might well be largely reliant on its own ability to fight and resist. But since then, the US and Europe have imposed sweeping sanctions that have crippled Russia’s economy, while the US just approved a $40 billion emergency military and humanitarian aid package for Ukraine.
In Tokyo, Biden drew parallels between Ukraine and Taiwan. “The idea that [Taiwan] can be taken by force, just taken by force, would just not be appropriate,” said Biden. “It would dislocate the entire region and be another action similar to what happened in Ukraine. So, it’s a burden that is even stronger.”
Quartz · by Tripti Lahiri

4. Analysis | Three theories on Biden’s repeated Taiwan gaffes

Or just speaking truth to power: blunt talk recognizing reality.

The theories:

1. They’re gaffes.
2. There’s a new policy.
3. It’s the old policy, with a new spin.


Analysis | Three theories on Biden’s repeated Taiwan gaffes
Analysis by Adam Taylor
Reporter
May 24, 2022 at 12:01 a.m. EDT
The Washington Post · by Adam Taylor · May 24, 2022
When it comes to President Biden and Taiwan, a confusing pattern has developed. It repeated in Tokyo on Monday.
It goes like this: Biden is asked if the United States would respond militarily if China invaded Taiwan. The president responds, “yes.” The world freaks out, wondering if there has been a major change in policy. The White House says there has been no change and that everyone is freaking out over nothing.
Is it really nothing? Taiwan, a self-governing island that Beijing claims, is not recognized diplomatically by the United States but works closely with Washington. And so, for decades, the United States has maintained a careful policy of “strategic ambiguity” that allows the United States to be deliberately unclear on the question of Taiwan’s defense, even as it enjoys otherwise close relations including arms sales.
Yet, over the course of just nine months, Biden has said at least three times that the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of an invasion. Though administration officials have thrice walked back these statements, amid heightened tensions with Beijing, it’s reasonable to wonder if the ambiguity is starting to wear a little thin.
Here are three theories about what Biden’s remarks mean.
1. They’re gaffes.
One of the easiest explanations is that each time he spoke of defending Taiwan, Biden was misspeaking. It’d be an understandable mistake: Taiwan policy is complicated, shrouded in lingo that often only those who track the issue closely seem to understand. And Biden’s remarks about U.S. agreements with Taiwan often appear to be factually incorrect.
During his visit to Tokyo on Monday, for example, Biden was asked whether the United States would defend Taiwan militarily if China invaded. He responded directly: “Yes, that’s the commitment we made.” This directly echoes remarks he made in a town hall interview with CNN’s Anderson Cooper in October when he told the host that the United States had made a “commitment” to protecting Taiwan.
In an earlier interview with ABC News last August, Biden appeared to suggest that the United States had a commitment to protect Taiwan similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty that guarantees collective self-defense. “We made a sacred commitment to Article 5 that if in fact anyone were to invade or take action against our NATO allies, we would respond. Same with Japan, same with South Korea, same with — Taiwan. It’s not even comparable to talk about that,” Biden said in an interview, which took place during the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan.
But there is no formal requirement for the United States to protect Taiwan.
The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which set out provisions for unofficial but substantive relations with Taiwan, does not call for the United States to protect Taiwan in the case of a war. The treaty does not make any military commitment to defend Taiwan, instead stating specifically that “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities.”
A more informal understanding is also in place regarding Beijing’s “One China” policy. Here, the United States has acknowledged Beijing’s position that there is only one China but it has also said that Taiwan’s fate should not be decided by force. But Biden also made a confusing error in his remarks here, suggesting that the United States had “signed onto [the One China Policy] and all the attendant agreements made from there,” when the Shanghai Communique between Washington and Beijing only acknowledges the Chinese position.
2. There’s a new policy.
Biden would hardly be the first U.S. official to make a gaffe on Taiwan policy. He’s not even the only one of his administration to do so. But his comments have now been repeated enough that many do not buy that it’s just a mistake.
Some China-watchers say that, at this point, it’s best to just assume that Biden is signaling a new policy. Bill Bishop, author of the popular China-focused newsletter Sinocismtweeted Monday that strategic ambiguity looked “dead” and that it has become “obvious they are not gaffes” — particularly if you are China’s Xi Jinping.
“Strategic ambiguity is over. Strategic clarity is here. This is the third time Biden has said this. Good. China should welcome this. Washington is helping Beijing to not miscalculate,” Matthew Kroenig, a professor at Georgetown, wrote in his own tweet.
The key to this theory is to remember that Biden is president: If he says that the United States would protect Taiwan if China is invaded, you would assume that it would. And Taiwanese officials had been calling on Biden to do away with ambiguity: In an interview with the Today’s WorldView newsletter in 2020, Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to the United States called for “some degree of clarity” on the issue.
But the idea is undercut by the repeated denials that a new policy is in place from other administration officials. On Monday, a White House official told reporters that people were misinterpreting Biden’s comments and that he was simply reiterating the 1979 pledge made to support Taiwan with the military means for self-defense.
3. It’s the old policy, with a new spin.
Because of this, perhaps the most persuasive idea about Biden’s comments is that this is still “strategic ambiguity,” just with a new, harder spin.
It makes most sense particularly when you consider the context: Biden was speaking in Japan for the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, a new initiative of a dozen countries designed to be a bulwark against China. Notably, Taiwan has not been offered a place in the framework, despite a bipartisan majority of 52 senators writing to ask that it be a founding member.
The move to exclude Taiwan was widely interpreted as a nod to Beijing’s interests. But Biden’s comments about Taiwan could be interpreted as a warning. Biden said Monday that though he did not expect China to invade Taiwan, Beijing was “already flirting with danger.”
Lev Nachman, a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, wrote on Twitter that while Biden’s language was clumsy, it wasn’t a reversal of any policy. “Strategic ambiguity is about under what conditions the US would intervene in a war over Taiwan, not a flat out refusal to answer if it would intervene,” Nachman argued.
Other presidents have had their own views on how hard to push the idea of military support for Taiwan; both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations offered thinly veiled warnings to Beijing about invading Taiwan. But despite fierce anti-China rhetoric in public, President Donald Trump offered little firm support for Taiwan and is reported to have privately taken a dim view of U.S. support for Taiwan in the event of an invasion.
“If they invade, there isn’t a … thing we can do about it,” he reportedly told an unnamed Republican senator in 2019, according to a book published last year by my Washington Post colleague Josh Rogin.
If this is accurate, Biden’s comments could be an attempt to remind China that the threat of military intervention could be real. It’s still a policy built on ambiguity, just with a little more strategy to back it up.
The Washington Post · by Adam Taylor · May 24, 2022

5. Russia’s Potemkin Army

Excerpts:
Ukraine continues to inflict heavy costs on those military forces, including last month’s sinking of the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship. Moreover, Russia’s “primary armored vehicle manufacturer appears to have run out of parts to make and repair tanks,” reports Fortune, constrained as a result of international sanctions. This is but one illustration of the impact sanctions have imposed.
The Ukrainians have revealed that the Russian military many believed to be the second strongest in the world has serious limitations. It has proven to be a facade of gleaming new tanks and planes concealing all of the performance and command problems noted above, until they had to fight.
This ugly surprise will not go away as Ukraine increasingly begins to look like a quagmire, entrapping Vladimir Putin and his Potemkin army in a military and diplomatic swamp.

Russia’s Potemkin Army - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Richard H. Shultz · May 23, 2022
On the eve of war in Ukraine, US officials told Newsweek they believed Kyiv would fall within days of a Russian invasion, and the country’s resistance neutralized soon thereafter. They were so convinced of this outcome that they even offered to evacuate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Driving this assessment was the fact that prior to the war, much was made of Russia’s vaunted military power, particularly its hardware—all those new weapon systems added since 2008—and on the overwhelming size of the Russian forces.
For instance, nine days before the invasion, a piece by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies offered an in-depth assessment of Russia’s new tanks, planes, warships, missiles, and artillery, providing an ominous picture of what the Ukrainians would face if war came. The “New Look” modernization program was said to make Russia “a far more capable military power today than at any time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.”
As the war’s duration approaches three months, however, the Ukrainians have not only reversed the Russian military’s drive on Kyiv but, to the surprise of virtually everyone, forced it to withdraw from the entire northern part of the country. A subsequent attempt to narrow the Russian offensive to the east in order to encircle Ukrainian forces has likewise come to grief. Even overcoming the resistance of the small, beleaguered body of Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol took more than eighty days, required Russia to resort to appallingly destructive tactics, and can hardly be counted as the performance of a highly capable military force. Russian casualty numbers in these misadventures have been staggering. What’s more, Russia’s poor military performance has come at an extraordinary cost: only a month into the war, NATO estimated that up to forty thousand Russian troops had already been killed, wounded, or captured, or had gone missing.
These developments reveal that prewar analysis focused too narrowly on the Russian military’s new and modernized equipment, which was hiding ugly facts and conditions. An analysis of those realities, now on full display on Ukraine’s battlefields, provides a far better understanding of what analysts missed in their evaluation of the Russian army that invaded Ukraine. In effect, those gleaming new tanks and planes constitute a Potemkin army, an impressive facade designed to hide from Vladimir Putin the ugly truth that it was not ready for war.
While modern historians now contend that the story of Grigory Potemkin’s portable village deception of Catherine II is overblown, the way that the reality of Putin’s army was concealed from him—a reality on full display in Ukraine—constitutes a deliberate deception of gross negligence and deployment of an army unprepared for full-scale war.
Dismal Logistics and Vehicle Maintenance
General Omar Bradley famously (and perhaps apocryphally) said, “Amateurs talk strategy. Professionals talk logistics.” This truism seems lost on Putin’s army. One of the most notable shortfalls of the invading forces has been the sheer number of vehicles the Russians have abandoned since the start of the war.
The military analysis site Oryx, which tracks the material losses on both sides in Ukraine through open sources, reports that Russia has lost thousands of vehicles of all types, including more than six hundred tanks, and hundreds more armored vehicles of many types. Scores of those losses are due to the Ukrainian military’s use of Western-supplied weaponry, such as the American FGM-148 Javelin and the British NLAW.
But it’s not only Ukrainian firepower stopping Russian vehicles. Satellite images revealed a major problem Russia has faced since launching the invasion is a breakdown of its logistical supply system. Within a few weeks of the war, images were shared widely that showed undamaged but abandoned vehicles littering Ukrainian roads, making clear that the Russian military is suffering from major maintenance problems likely due to shortages of spare parts and fuel.
Russia’s logistics woes are not just limited to poor planning and organization causing massive traffic jams. Trent Telenko, a former staff specialist with the Department of Defense and US Army vehicle auditor, has noted that images of Russia’s trucks and other vehicles reveal signs of a serious neglect of maintenance. In particular, images showing ripped-up tires and leaking wheel hubs expose a massive lack of the routine maintenance required to keep vehicles running—vehicles that are the primary means for transporting tons of supplies like food, fuel, ammunition, and spare parts to the war zone.
The Russian military’s logistics support appears severely limited in its capability to sufficiently resupply its forces. A widespread lack of maintenance, combined with bad Ukrainian weather and muddy roads, drastically limits that capability. What accounts for these maintenance and spare parts deficits? Poor planning? Yes. The tyranny of distance? Yes. And then there is the corruption of the Russian military and defense sector. In 2020, Transparency International’s Government Defence Integrity Index designated Russia’s defense sector as “at high risk of corruption, owing to extremely limited external oversight of the policies, budgets, activities and acquisitions of defence institutions.” Corruption extends even to the tactical level—Russian soldiers have a history of selling their own fuel on the black market, and Russian soldiers in Belarus have reportedly tried to sell fuel to locals both before and during the war in Ukraine.
The effect of all of this has extended all the way down to the Meals, Ready-to-Eat (MRE) that Russian soldiers carried in their rucksacks into Ukraine. Many had expired in 2015, as captured Russian field rations in Ukraine show. The ration problem has reportedly gotten so bad that Russia has requested MREs from China.
Training and Experience Shortfalls
Another indicator that helps explain the Russian military’s poor performance so far in Ukraine is its training practices. This is especially relevant when it comes to combined arms operations. “So far, Russian forces have shown extremely poor coordination across the board, from basic logistics tasks, to coordination of airborne assaults with ground forces activity and arranging air defence cover for columns on the move,” Justin Bronk, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, wrote at the beginning of the conflict.
Despite the Russian military’s recent experience in Syria, its initial advances in Ukraine showed poor proficiency in these kinds of operations. The first assault on Hostomel’s airport, for instance, was done almost entirely by airborne infantry and helicopters, with no long-range indirect fire and hardly any support from fixed-wing aircraft.
As a result, Ukrainian defenders, with the aid of armored vehicles, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopter gunships, were able to rally, surround the Russians, shoot down some of the helicopters, and retake the airport for a short period of time—long enough to damage the runway and render it unusable even when Russian forces seized the airport a second time.
Had the Russians executed a combined arms attack that, in addition to the helicopter assault, included coordinated long-range missile strikes along with fixed-wing attack aircraft and suppression of enemy air defense operations, they could have successfully captured the airfield and destroyed any counterattacking forces, enabling Russian reinforcements to be flown in en masse just outside of Kyiv.
Subsequent fighting in the area saw Russian forces attempt to seize towns and cities with apparently no air support at times, reportedly leading to high casualties. One video posted by Ukraine’s intelligence service, for instance, shows the apparent aftermath of an ambush in Hostomel that wiped out an entire Russian platoon, including multiple armored vehicles.
A lack of rigorous training and relevant experience may explain the limited operations by the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), one of the war’s ongoing mysteries. Despite a large modernization program in the last decade that added about 350 new and modern aircraft to its inventory and a force of about 300 combat aircraft usually stationed near Ukraine, the VKS has not conducted the type of large operations that were critical to NATO or allied successes in the wars in KosovoKuwaitAfghanistanIraq, and Libya.
The VKS does fly over one hundred sorties a day, but a “good number” of those sorties “never leave Russian airspace or Belarusian airspace,” with Russian aircraft “not venturing very far or for very long into Ukrainian airspace,” according to a senior US defense official. Instead, the VKS has relied heavily on firing long-range standoff munitions launched from bombers and aircraft over Russia, Belarus, and the Black Sea, likely because Ukrainian air defenses cannot reach them there.
Though the VKS gained valuable experience in Syria, it usually only sent small formations on combat missions—often a lone fighter-bomber or two to four aircraft at one time. Even when different types of aircraft operated together, they generally only did so in pairs of two. Thus, the VKS does not have experience conducting operations with multiple types of aircraft flying together in formations of dozens of planes operating in a coordinated fashion to attack multiple targets.
Additionally, VKS pilots themselves receive less training than their Western counterparts, with the average Russian pilot conducting about 100–120 flying hours per year. By comparison, the average British and American fighter pilot logs around 180–240 flying hours per year. The type of training is also different, with US and British pilots utilizing advanced flight simulators, training in bad weather, and practicing attacks against live and simulated air and ground defenses within time constraints. “By contrast, most VKS frontline training sorties involve comparatively sterile environments, and simple tasks such as navigation flights, unguided weapon deliveries at open ranges, and target simulation flying in cooperation with the ground-based air-defence system,” according to Bronk.
The Paralysis of Centralized Leadership
The invasion has also brought new public scrutiny to the Russian military’s leadership structure, mainly because of the reported loss of so many general officers. According to Ukrainian officials, the death toll of Russian soldiers includes twelve general officers, a staggering number. A large number of lower-ranking senior officers have also reportedly been killed, including the deputy commander of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. The Russian government has not confirmed all of the reported deaths, but, if genuine, they would represent the highest attrition rate among senior officers for Russia since World War II.
There are a number of reasons for these casualty figures, such as the reported usage of mobile phones and unsecured radio channels enabling Ukrainian intelligence to locate and target the generals. But the main reason is because the Russian command-and-control structure is highly centralized and top-heavy, which means that Russia’s senior officers have to be close to the front line simply to command their troops. This in turn puts them at considerable risk of being successfully located and targeted, a process that the United States has helped facilitate by providing actionable intelligence about their whereabouts.
The US system, by comparison, is much less centralized. While senior officers strategize and make the overall plans that guide operations, it is the strong cadre of junior officers, aided by a highly professional corps of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) with years of training, military education, and experience, who actually carry out those orders on the ground.
And while those US junior officers and NCOs obey orders from their superiors, the concept of mission command empowers them to make decisions themselves when executing those orders on the ground, with the authority to adapt and improvise. This is especially important, as it ensures a seamless transition of command decision-making in the heat of battle.
The Russian military has no such similarly empowered junior officers and NCO corps. As a result, unit cohesion is more difficult to maintain. Everything from logistics issues, morale problems, and panic on the battlefield cannot be addressed locally, but must wait for guidance from the top.
The Ukrainian military, meanwhile, has been attempting to model its military on NATO and US standards, including building up its own NCO corps through engagement in programs like NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme.
More Ugly Surprises Await Putin
While the above facts explain why Russia’s military has failed to achieve its main objectives so far, the war has entered a new phase, with Russian attention shifting from a large-scale invasion across multiple fronts on Ukraine’s border to a face-saving effort focused more narrowly on Ukraine’s Donbas region.
The shift to a narrower front has brought about a regrouping and reorganizing of the Russian military’s capabilities, as well as lessening the strain on its logistics networks, to enable better performance. In addition, the VKS has shown signs of increased activity, and the state of Ukraine’s air defenses may be weaker as almost three months of action and attrition may have reduced the stockpile of surface-to-air munitions.
But this will not be enough to cause a reversal of fortune for Putin and his military.
Ukraine continues to inflict heavy costs on those military forces, including last month’s sinking of the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship. Moreover, Russia’s “primary armored vehicle manufacturer appears to have run out of parts to make and repair tanks,” reports Fortune, constrained as a result of international sanctions. This is but one illustration of the impact sanctions have imposed.
The Ukrainians have revealed that the Russian military many believed to be the second strongest in the world has serious limitations. It has proven to be a facade of gleaming new tanks and planes concealing all of the performance and command problems noted above, until they had to fight.
This ugly surprise will not go away as Ukraine increasingly begins to look like a quagmire, entrapping Vladimir Putin and his Potemkin army in a military and diplomatic swamp.
Richard Shultz is a professor and director of the International Security Studies Program at The Fletcher School, Tufts University.
Benjamin Brimelow is a research assistant in the International Security Studies Program at The Fletcher School, Tufts University.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: kremlin.ru, via Wikimedia Commons
mwi.usma.edu · by Richard H. Shultz · May 23, 2022


6. Intelligence and War: Does Secrecy Still Matter?
Conclusion:
Someday the war will be over — every war must end. Yet the peace will be tenuous because the conflict has deep roots. Ukrainians will worry that Russia seeks not a real peace but only a temporary pause to lick its wounds. For their part, Russians will worry that Ukraine is moving toward an ever-expanding NATO. Monitoring a fragile peace via intelligence will require clandestine collection and careful analysis. If the current conflict is a guide, open sources and public intelligence will be important, but they will not be enough.
Intelligence and War: Does Secrecy Still Matter? - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Joshua Rovner · May 23, 2022
The secret services were remarkably conspicuous before the war in Ukraine. American and British agencies issued blunt assessments about Russian intentions and policymakers used intelligence to rally support against Russian aggression. They also released specific details about suspected efforts to manufacture a pretext for war, using intelligence as a “prebuttal” to phony Russian claims. Public intelligence continued after the war began, with daily summaries and highprofile appearances by spy chiefs, who seem to have embraced the spotlight and abandoned the tradition of working in the shadows. The secret world doesn’t seem so secret anymore.
Open source intelligence has also played a large role in the public portrayal of the war, and in public debates about the best way forward. Commercial imagery provides regular views of the battlefield. Social media provides a platform for close-up views of military operations and wartime savagery. Open source analysts put these images and videos in context. A growing constellation of researchers from academia, think tanks, and private-sector intelligence firms offer detailed assessments of everything related to the war: tactics and strategy, resources and costs, adversaries and allies, winning and losing.
Most observers see value in these trends. They applaud leaders for making better use of public information, and for sharing their own secrets. The fact that intelligence agencies welcomed open sources into their assessments led to a clear victory before the war: Their warnings were right. The fact that policymakers used intelligence in public helped to build a strong and durable coalition against Russia. This was no small feat, given that some coalition members depend on Russian energy exports and therefore have a lot to lose. Intelligence sharing was essential to bringing them on board, and to keep them motivated.
The implications of the Ukraine experience seem clear. Public intelligence is an important tool in the hands of diplomats as well as generals. Intelligence works when intelligence agencies are open-minded about open sources. And there is no going back. Gone are the days when secrecy was the coin of the realm, and when a state’s possession of private information was the key to strategic success. “Historically, intelligence success often came in lockstep with secrecy,” a group of intelligence scholars recently wrote in these pages. “More than any other event in the last fifty years, the Russian invasion of Ukraine drives home the degree to which this is no longer true.” In a second article, the same authors argued that we are in the midst of a “global open source intelligence revolution.” Failure to embrace this revolution in the face of overwhelming evidence from the war risks poor performance from intelligence agencies before and during war. Stubbornly insisting on an outmoded version of spycraft, where secrets still reign supreme, risks disaster.
Perhaps. Technological advances have vastly increased the amount and quality of information available at our fingertips. Real-time data is abundant, making secrets seem unimportant and secrecy irrelevant. Yet there are reasons to believe that secrecy played an important role before and during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — and that it might prove vital to ending the war.
Open Questions about Open Sources
Russia assembled a large invasion force over several months before the war began in February. Its military movements were not hidden, yet there was little agreement about what they meant. Some were sure a large invasion was coming, while others expected a limited incursion. Some thought the whole thing an effort to force Western concessions, not a prelude to war. After all, such a war would be costly and counterproductive to Russian security interests. Maybe President Vladimir Putin was simply stirring the pot, keeping his rivals on edge without paying a heavy price, and making them look absurd by overreacting.
U.S. allies were also divided. As the above-mentioned authors point out, some remained doubtful throughout the winter. While the Americans and British were openly predicting an invasion, French and German officials apparently thought that Russia would choose a different path. NATO intelligence briefings reportedly helped to change their minds, but not until the eve of the war. France’s Chief of the Defense Staff Thierry Burkhard offered telling comments in March. “The Americans said that the Russians were going to attack,” he said. “Our services thought rather that the conquest of Ukraine would have a monstrous cost and that the Russians had other options.”
None of these were foolish beliefs. It was reasonable to argue that Russia would show restraint before the war, given the enormous costs and risks. Yet it was also reasonable to infer that war was coming, given the scale of Russia’s mobilization and Putin’s neuralgia about Ukraine. The point is that freely available information did not point to a single obvious conclusion. Analysts made opposite but plausible inferences from the same data. The facts were not self-interpreting.
What, then, caused the skeptical European officials to change their minds about Russian plans? What intelligence information did NATO officials share internally? Given that the general outlines of Russia’s mobilization were already known, it seems likely that the intelligence provided more detailed and compelling insights about Russian plans. The fact that U.S. spokesmen had knowledge of possible Russian prevarications suggests that the intelligence community had unusually good access to Russian communications, and not all of this made its way into the public sphere. Some combination of human and technical sources may have provided a window into Putin’s plans in ways that were far beyond open source imagery.
The authors of the War on the Rocks articles correctly note that intelligence is only important if policymakers are willing to hear it. In this case American leaders proved receptive to warnings about Russian military action, but it is unclear that public intelligence was the reason why. President Joe Biden was already cynical about Russian intentions, after all, having declared Putin a “killer” a year before the war. At best, public intelligence reinforced these preexisting views. A better test will come when it cuts against policymakers’ beliefs and expectations, but that was not the case here.
The Roots of Russian Misfortune
Although the outcome of the war is uncertain, Russian forces have suffered grievously over the last three months. Ukraine has killed and wounded thousands of invaders, according to various estimates, and has taken a chunk out of Russian armor, airpower, and naval forces. Russia’s campaign against Kyiv failed spectacularly, despite what appeared to be overwhelming material advantages. It has since made grinding gains in the south and east, though again at substantial cost. None of this reflects the kind of limited conflict that the Kremlin implied when it announced its “special military operation” in February.
What explains this failure? It is too soon to tell, of course, given the limits of news reporting from Moscow. Yet there are signs that the war has been a massive Russian intelligence debacle. Russia based its actions on terribly misguided assumptions about Ukraine’s will to persist, its defensive capabilities, and the likely international response. It may be that Russian intelligence fed these beliefs and encouraged policymakers’ aggressiveness. Reports of an intelligence purge suggest that Russian leaders are at least disappointed in their performance.
The authors of the War on the Rocks articles correctly note that we are still in early days, and there is much we don’t know about Russian decision-making. Yet their preliminary verdict about Russian intelligence is damning: “Increasingly detached and dissociated from the global open source intelligence revolution, Russia mounted its attack on Ukraine entirely unprepared to fight a war in the 21st-century intelligence environment.” Innovative Ukrainian leaders went looking for new technologies that they could use to exploit open sources and gain the upper hand against their larger rival. Russian leaders, by contrast, clung to an outmoded model of intelligence. Had they been wise to information that was freely available, and invested in new ways of processing it, they would have been more careful in the early stages of the war. Perhaps they would have chosen not to invade at all.
All of this might be true. The problem, however, is that Russian failure had a lot more to do with Putin than with military organization and doctrine. An authoritarian strongman, Putin is very effective at ruling at home but very poor at wielding power abroad. It is likely that the same tools that he uses to stay in charge of Russia work against the quality of intelligence-policy relations. His regime brooks little dissent: Political opponents often end up in prison or dead. This does not create an environment conducive to a healthy exchange with intelligence officials. Rather than being the bearer of bad news, they have obvious incentives to sugar-coat their conclusions and provide intelligence to please. Putin’s public humiliation of his intelligence chief before the war reinforced the message.
Under these circumstances, it is hard to imagine what Russian intelligence might have done to change the outcome. Russia’s quagmire is a result of Putin’s obsession with Ukraine, his strategic ineptitude, and his ruthlessness. There is no reason to believe that he would have accepted a more sober and cautious estimate before the war, even if his intelligence officials had invested more in open sources or other novel approaches.
A more interesting question is whether Putin’s ham-fisted approach had trickle-down effects on tactical intelligence. In one sense, Russian military organization reflects Putin’s authoritarian instincts. “The directives of the commander are presumed correct,” the authors write, “and the staff only determine the specific tactics of how to execute the order.” This does not leave much room for deliberation and implies that intelligence reports are secondary at best. Everything depends on the commander’s judgment. Problems for intelligence likely intensify after operations commence, because their mission is to help the commander succeed rather than trying to make honest assessments about results. Here, intelligence officers may ignore or downplay open sources that carry bad news. A more fulsome tactical intelligence effort would be more open-minded.
Yet the same problem can befall intelligence officers who rely mostly on secret sources. In the Vietnam War, for instance, a controversy erupted in the secret world over the estimate of the size and resilience of insurgent forces. The U.S. military was attempting to win a war of attrition, and some officers were confident that they were killing enemy personnel faster than they could be replaced. CIA analysts, however, drew different conclusions from prisoner interrogations and captured documents. A struggle ensued among military and intelligence officials — ultimately the White House intervened and forced the CIA to back down. Policymakers preferred the military’s more optimistic estimate, which supported the public case for the administration’s strategy in Vietnam.
The problem for the CIA was not its choice of sources or analytic methods. The problem was the domestic politics of the Vietnam War, which made the Johnson administration wary of pessimistic assessments. We know much less about the current state of play in Moscow, but it is safe to assume that Putin was allergic to prewar assessments about the strength and resiliency of Ukraine’s fighting forces. The problem for Russian intelligence is not about grasping a technological revolution, but about whether domestic politics encourage productive intelligence-policy relations.
Secrecy and Strategy
There is no denying that public intelligence has shaped the debate over the war in Ukraine. Commercial imagery of the prewar Russian military buildup drew attention to the looming conflict. The flood of first-hand accounts on social media after the invasion painted Russian forces as simultaneously immoral and incompetent. This inspired sympathy for Ukraine as well as hopes that it could withstand the onslaught. Broad international support for Kyiv created pressure to deliver huge amounts of military equipment, and NATO members followed through, despite Ukraine’s position outside the alliance. The war seems a case study in how the new information environment is affecting international politics, and why secrecy is becoming relatively less important.
Yet it is too soon to make this conclusion. Evidence from the war suggests some familiar challenges for intelligence agencies, which have long sought to balance what they steal against what they can learn in the open. At its best, intelligence provides the “library function” for the state, as Richard Betts put it, by combining public and private information into useful forms for decision makers. The current task is how to cope with the increasing volume of information from a wider variety of sources. Ukrainian officials note that they are receiving thousands of reports about Russian troop movements from citizens via a government app. Such information, when combined with information from other sources, may allow Ukrainian forces to respond quickly. Yet organizational problems loom just beneath the surface. Judging the veracity of tactical reports from civilians with iPhones and getting them to the right units at the right time is a complex bureaucratic task. Open source information has been useful to commanders in past wars, but only because they learned to distribute it effectively.
A related problem is sheer information overload. Intelligence agencies relish detailed information on all things having to do with the enemy, and they may feel confident that their own information systems are capable of filtering out erroneous reports. Yet recent experience has shown that even highly sophisticated military services struggle to deal with vast amounts of data from various sources. They are impelled to collect more information to cut through ambiguity, and yet they end up “shifting the fog of war” to their own information systems. Military intelligence has always wrestled with the tradeoff between exhaustive collection and efficient use of information. Ukrainian officials are enthusiastic about their new collection methods. Whether they remain so depends on their ability to manage this tradeoff.
And there are other signs of continuity. In past wars secret intelligence-sharing proved important for bringing allies together against common enemies, and keeping them together in the aftermath. Secret intelligence likely helped to forge the coalition against Russia, providing details that overcame the skepticism of key allies. The U.S. intelligence community provided strategic warning of Russian intentions, tactical warnings about timing and location of the invasion, and indicated the ways in which Russia planned to justify the war. Sharing these secrets helped to lay the groundwork for a united response.
There are also indications that clandestine work remains essential in wartime. The Biden administration has increasingly shared intelligence that has helped Ukrainian forces to target Russian ground forces and warships. Some reports suggest that they are using intelligence to target Russian generals, though U.S. officials deny that claim. U.S. intelligence may have also helped Ukrainian forces to anticipate Russian military movements and assess Russian morale, though this is only speculation.
Finally, it is worth asking whether secret intelligence has aided Ukraine’s cyber defense. U.S. Cyber Command, for instance, supported Ukraine with “hunt forward” missions before the war. In such missions, foreign partners request U.S. assistance in strengthening their network defenses, and they also coordinate on improving intelligence on malicious cyberspace actors. The hope is that this will enable action against foreign threats as close as possible to their point of origin. Preempting cyberspace threats requires very good visibility into the murky world of foreign intelligence agencies and their non-state proxies. Open source analyses can be useful, especially when seeking to attribute cyberspace operations after the fact, but there is no substitute for clandestine collection if the goal is to stop them in advance. The effort to gain intelligence on Russia in cyberspace may be a reason why Russian cyberspace operations have been inconsequential.
Secret intelligence services may prove especially important in war termination. Domestic actors in Ukraine and the United States may be averse to a settlement that includes anything that looks like a concession to Russian interests. Yet unless Ukraine is committed to total victory, with Russian forces ejected from the whole country along with promises from Russia to permanently honor the pre-2014 borders, then some concession will be required. This will prove politically difficult for Ukrainian leaders who have rallied their country against Russian aggression, and for Biden, who called Putin a war criminal.
Intelligence agencies might prove useful in opening subterranean diplomatic channels, removed from the political fray. Quiet talks might help to determine when peace might be possible, and under what terms. Secret outreach is essential because these conversations are so politically sensitive, and because overt peacemaking is currently on ice. Intelligence officials will be well-positioned to facilitate the effort because they are in the business of secrecy.
Someday the war will be over — every war must end. Yet the peace will be tenuous because the conflict has deep roots. Ukrainians will worry that Russia seeks not a real peace but only a temporary pause to lick its wounds. For their part, Russians will worry that Ukraine is moving toward an ever-expanding NATO. Monitoring a fragile peace via intelligence will require clandestine collection and careful analysis. If the current conflict is a guide, open sources and public intelligence will be important, but they will not be enough.
Joshua Rovner is an associate professor in the School of International Service at American University.
Image: NASA fires mapping
warontherocks.com · by Joshua Rovner · May 23, 2022



7. Guam Needs Better Missile Defenses—Urgently

Conclusion:

For too long, Washington has made peace with Pentagon programs that take forever to get started and then run years past their intended delivery date. Given the rapidly growing missile threat to Guam and the vital American national security interests there, Congress must demand better than business as usual when it comes to developing and fielding missile defenses for the island. Implementing these recommendations without delay can help ensure the United States has the missile defenses on Guam necessary to deter and defeat Chinese aggression.

Guam Needs Better Missile Defenses—Urgently
Here's a two-stage plan to harden this crucial island base against China's burgeoning missile arsenal.

By MARK MONTGOMERY, RIKI ELLISON and BRADLEY BOWMAN
MAY 23, 2022 12:56 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Mark Montgomery
The Defense Department of Defense has dithered as China builds ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles to attack Guam, America’s most important military base in the western Pacific. The good news is that the Pentagon is finally requesting nearly $1 billion for the island’s missile defense in the 2023 budget. But seeing it through on time will require assertive congressional oversight and action.
It is easy to see why Guam is an appealing target to China. The island hosts the U.S. Navy’s only submarine base in the western Pacific, one of the few facilities where submarines can reload weapons in theater. Guam is home to an enormous air base that hosted bombers, fighters, and support aircraft in World War II and the Vietnam War and would likely play a similar role in any contingency with China, including in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Guam is also home to 170,000 U.S. citizens who expect to be defended in a conflict.
China has spent 20 years developing its ability to threaten U.S. facilities inside the first and second Pacific island chains. (Guam sits astride the second chain.) This includes a large number of short-range ballistic missiles that can hit U.S. airfields in Japan, as well as a smaller number of anti-ship ballistic missiles that can threaten U.S. aircraft carriers and other warships. The Chinese have even developed the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile specifically to place Guam at risk. Complementing these ballistic missiles are ship-, submarine-, and bomber-launched cruise missiles that can strike with great precision from any direction. China is also aggressively pursuing hypersonic missile variants that could easily strike the island.
Meanwhile, the Pentagon has lost valuable time debating missile defense solutions and squabbling over the roles various commands, agencies, offices, and services should play. Too many defense leaders have permitted the perfect to be the enemy of the good. Beijing is sprinting, and Washington must now sprint faster.
For the past decade the United States has defended Guam with a land-based Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, system and costly patrols by Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense destroyers. This approach remains sufficient to ward off North Korean missiles but increasingly less so for dealing with Chinese missiles. Accordingly, the last three commanders of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, or INDOPACOM, have argued for more robust missile defenses on Guam. Congress, to its credit, has been asking for reports on the feasibility of such defenses since 2019.
So, what’s to be done? A good place to start is by understanding the four essential elements of effective missile-defense for Guam. They include: (1) radar that can spot any missile coming from any direction; (2) a weapons-control system that links the various radars and weapons on the island, at sea, and in the air or space; (3) enough launchers to intercept everything from ballistic missiles arriving from outer space to sea-skimming cruise missiles ; and (4) a command-and-control system that enables the safe and effective integration of fires and deconfliction of airspace.
Given the urgency of the threat from China, Congress should push the Pentagon to establish a Guam Defense System initial operational capability, or IOC, by 2024 and a full operational capability by 2027.
To achieve IOC by the end of 2024, the Missile Defense Agency will need to use proven, readily available technologies. The radar mission, for example, might be performed by distributed panels of an existing radar mounted on mobile, survivable towed vehicles instead of a building like Aegis Ashore in Poland and Romania. Thankfully, the department is already moving in this direction, reportedly selecting the SPY-7 radar for this task.
The primary launchers and interceptors should be a mix of existing Army Patriot and THAAD systems plus any newly developed mobile launchers that will be available by 2024. MDA should add a ground-based installation of the Navy’s proven Vertical Launch System, or VLS, which can launch SM-2, SM-3, SM-6, and Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles. VLS is a launcher capability available today with no additional development or testing required. To minimize construction delays and make the 2024 timeline, the Pentagon should build the Navy VLS on Guam with an above-ground installation (like with Aegis Ashore).
The Aegis, Patriot, and THAAD weapons control systems can already integrate and deconflict through existing LINK-16 systems. The Guam installation should resemble the one in Korea, which allows commanders to mix THAAD and Patriot radars and interceptors for a best-sensor, best-shooter capability. All these systems can provide regional and theater commanders with situational awareness through the Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications system.
Guam’s initial operational capability by 2024 should also include the deployment of additional Army Sentinel air defense radars; Lower Tier Air Missile Defense Sensors, when available; and Army short-range air defense systems such as the Indirect Fire Protection System Increment 2, when available. Finally, there should be ample use of decoys and deception systems to complicate counter-targeting.
The lion’s share of the $192 million in the 2022 budget and the $872 million in the proposed 2023 budget should be spent on procuring and integrating systems to meet the 2024 initial-operational capability goals.
To reach full capability by 2027, when at least some U.S. leaders expect a step up in Chinese aggression, MDA should add the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System; promising non-kinetic programs, such as directed-energy or high-power microwave systems; and any emerging hypersonic missile defense capabilities. Congress should demand that MDA expedite fielding plans for the Glide Phase Interceptor, and provide the necessary funding.
The capability by 2027 should also include the expansion of radars, missile launchers, fire-control networks, and deception systems that started with the IOC. There should be a significant resilience-and-redundancy effort, to include some below-ground construction, to protect against inevitable battle damage. The command-and-control system could even include offensive strike capabilities. As the United States develops strike systems that can attack targets from the second island chain, placing them under the Guam defense umbrella may be advantageous.
Doing all this will require a few things. First, other elements of the Defense Department should let the professionals do their jobs. MDA, the nation’s missile-defense architect, is the only defense organization that might be able to develop, test, and turn over an initial system in 2024 and a full system in 2027. No other organization in the Pentagon, the Joint Staff, or the military services is optimized for this work, and no other organization can develop, field, and integrate the necessary capabilities to make either date work.
Even MDA will need help. The defense secretary should restore the rapid acquisition authorities that the agency held from 2002 to 2019, including its status as a Component Acquisition Executive. This will allow MDA to develop systems—particularly ones to counter hypersonic weapons—without time-consuming secondary approvals or strict adherence to the Defense Department’s burdensome 5000-series acquisition regulations.
Second, INDOPACOM should be directed to establish the command-and-control solution. The missile defense of Guam is just one element in a complex war plan for a potential conflict with China, and the INDOPACOM commander needs to develop and assign a robust command-and-control network to manage the defense of Guam. The current command structure in Guam is geared toward facilities management and is not appropriate for conducting missile defense operations. There are a number of options available to the INDOPACOM commander, including making this command an element of a larger Joint Task Force China construct.
Third, the U.S. Army needs a cost-effective short-range air defense system to counter a potentially massive Chinese attack. While Patriot can shoot down some cruise missiles, it is also tasked as a counter-SRBM system, and its interceptors are expensive. After many years of challenges, Indirect Fire Protection System Increment 2 has been contracted to Dynetics, and the first units could be available by 2024. If that is successful, it could introduce a low-cost interceptor (basically a Sidewinder missile) with a proven Sentinel radar.
If the Army can’t field IFPC by 2024, perhaps U.S. allies and partners could contribute existing short-range fixed-site defense systems. Australia could contribute its new National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System air defense batteries to Guam as part of a “defensive deployment,” eliminating any political issues. Additionally, as risk reduction, the Pentagon could analyze shore-basing options for the Navy’s Rolling Air Frame Missile system. Both these systems can be queued by the larger radars to provide point defense of high-value targets.
Finally, experimental solutions should be examined as well. The Pentagon could consider procuring and deploying radar-equipped aerostats. The Israelis are using them for their high-altitude “look down” advantage. Alternatively, or as a complement, the Navy could provide shore-based E-2D “Advanced Hawkeye” early warning plane detachments. The E-2D’s sensors have proven their worth in detecting cruise missiles. Finally, the United States should continue to press for non-kinetic solutions developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency as well as with key tech-savvy allies such as Israel.
For too long, Washington has made peace with Pentagon programs that take forever to get started and then run years past their intended delivery date. Given the rapidly growing missile threat to Guam and the vital American national security interests there, Congress must demand better than business as usual when it comes to developing and fielding missile defenses for the island. Implementing these recommendations without delay can help ensure the United States has the missile defenses on Guam necessary to deter and defeat Chinese aggression.
defenseone.com · by Mark Montgomery

8. Protests in Iran Are Surging. The Biden Administration Can Help.

Resistance. What is the resistance potential? WHo has conducted a thorough assessment? All proposals should be tested against that assessment.

Excerpts:
While one challenging and obvious hole in the above idea pertains to the flow of hardware for satellite internet services, there is an instructive corollary: satellite television in Iran. Despite years of Basij paramilitary, vigilante, and law-enforcement force raids against people’s homes, the steady and available stream of cheap satellite TV hardware and demand by the Iranian people for this technology forced the regime to change its tactics. While smuggled hardware related to satellite internet services is likely to be confiscated early on, the satellite TV case demonstrates that continuity of effort is key in any contest of wills and attempt to penetrate the regime’s firewalls, be they physical or virtual.
More than a year into indirect nuclear talks with Iran , the Biden administration is struggling to show something for its own continuity of effort in looking at Iran as only a nuclear problem. Should Biden broaden the aperture and take stock of the evolution in street protests and the problems that persist inside Iran, he may find that it is still possible to align one’s head and one’s heart on matters of foreign policy in the Middle East. Here’s to hoping that the chants of Iranian protesters reach the president’s ears.




Protests in Iran Are Surging. The Biden Administration Can Help.
U.S. policy can no longer afford to be limited to seeking a new nuclear deal.
May 23
thedispatch.com · by Behnam Ben Taleblu
(Photo by Iranian Leader press office/Handout/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images.)
Chants of “Death to the dictator!” are once again crescendoing in street protests across Iran.
Early this May, the ultra-hardline government of President Ebrahim Raisi cut subsidies for flour and wheat pursuant to a greenlight in March by the Iranian parliament to slash select price controls. Days later, the government hiked prices on other staples such as dairy, poultry, and cooking oil. The decision sent prices soaring by a reported 300 percent and immediately sparked unrest, as some in Iran had anticipated. Although the month of May saw various other demonstrations—such as by teachers and bus drivers—the protests triggered by food price spikes have begun to spread across the country, with a reported six dead and a growing number arrested.
Despite attempts by Iranian leaders to downplay protests, more turbulence is expected. As such, the quickly changing facts on the ground in Iran mean that U.S. policy can no longer afford to be limited to the number and type of centrifuges installed, nor Tehran’s stockpile of enriched uranium. Various economic, social, and political forces have brought about these protests and are slated to sustain future ones. Turning a blind eye to each driver and continuing to see Iran policy through the sole prism of nuclear nonproliferation ensures that Washington will perennially be caught off-guard by the next iteration of protests, as well as their results.
At least six distinct factors, all likely to persist, are driving the current round of protests. First, and perhaps the most proximate, is the effect that the war in Ukraine has had on the back of pandemic-induced supply chain disruptions and inflation rates, which led to a global food crisis. Iran’s minister of agriculture, who is one of the few unsanctioned ministers in President Raisi’s cabinet, drew attention to the war in Ukraine as the driver of the price spike, while officials at the State Trading Company of Iran noted that much of Iran’s subsidized wheat was being smuggled out of the country. Despite Tehran’s efforts to be self-sufficient in the production of wheat, in the Iranian calendar year 1400 (March 2021 to March 2022), it imported more than 7 million tons of wheat. Iran is also highly dependent on imports from both Russia and Ukraine for cooking oil, with a reported 90 percent of Iranian cooking oil coming from abroad.
Second, Iran continues to face a worsening multi-year drought in already hard-hit areas. In fact, the current iteration of street protests began in the country’s impoverished but oil-rich southwest, an area previously hurt by severe drought because of abysmal water management by central authorities. Protests over water that began in this region last summer swept large portions of the country, culminating in broader anti-regime protests in the nation’s capital last July. Combining drought with the havoc inflation is currently wreaking on the purchasing power of the Iranian rial means that protests are not likely to be contained to one region, as is already being witnessed.
Third, Iran suffers from long-term economic mismanagement and corruption that have been exacerbated by the macroeconomic impact of the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy, which relied heavily on economic and financial sanctions. Specifically, Iranians have had to deal with consistent two-digit inflation and massive currency depreciation for the last five years. On January 1, 2017, one U.S dollar was worth approximately 39,300 rials at the free-market exchange rate. On May 17, 2022, one U.S. dollar was worth 302,500 rials. In other words, one U.S. dollar is 7.7 times more expensive (relative to the free-market value of the Iranian rial) than it was five years ago.
Fourth, compounding this sense of a looming crisis is relative uncertainty over the fate of the nuclear deal and the prospect of sanctions relief, two unresolved matters that continue to inject huge risks and ambiguity into the economy, as well as drive suboptimal fixes to economic issues like inflation. The fact that the Islamic Republic remains the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism and the challenge of conducting proper due-diligence in Iran notwithstanding, an incomplete, short-lived, or increasingly politically tenuous nuclear deal is unlikely to assuage sanctions violations concerns for foreign firms, skewing the risk-reward ratio of doing business in or with Iran. Similarly, on the Iranian side of the ledger, uncertainty makes planning—be it for already marginalized private sector firms or large government-controlled entities in Iran—very difficult for anything beyond the short-term.
The politics of the nuclear deal may even be informing the Raisi government’s decision to press for subsidy cuts, as Raisi himself was a critic of the 2015 accord and has been looking to improve Iran’s economic situation in ways that go beyond deal re-entry. Both Raisi and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stressed earlier this year that the country’s economy should not be dependent on the prospect of sanctions relief in a deal with the West. Should the regime withstand the protests and make more economic cuts, its position at the negotiating table could harden and embolden Tehran to look at other non-deal options for its nuclear program.
Fifth, like more fuel to the fire, is the very presence of figures like Raisi—dubbed the “butcher” of Tehran for his role in a 1988 death commission that oversaw the execution of thousands of political prisoners—on the national stage. While he won the Islamic Republic’s tightly managed attempt to further constrict political space, Raisi’s “election” last summer was widely boycotted, marking the lowest ever recorded electoral turnout in the Islamic Republic’s history, which followed a similarly low turnout in parliamentary elections from February 2020. Domestically, the boycott can best be understood as the result of a troika of forces: strong distaste for Raisi given his past, a public rebuke of the regime that tried to use a scripted electoral contest to feign legitimacy abroad, as well as a death-knell in the domestic reform movement and so-called “moderate” wing of the political elite—whose continued calls for electoral participation fell on the deaf ears of a populace frustrated with the entire political system.
What support Raisi lacked from the street he sought to cement with the state for his uncompromising social and political stances. Since his first and failed presidential bid in 2017, analysts in Washington had posited that Raisi was being groomed as a potential ultra-hardline successor to Khamenei, who recently turned 83.
But as confidence begot overconfidence, in the face of these challenges the Raisi government took to initiating a politically and economically tenuous comprehensive subsidy reform endeavor, something his limited support base termed “economic surgery.” The policy targets the officially subsidized dollar rate that the Central Bank of Iran previously gave importers to buy basic goods and sell below the market price nationally.
As a result of Raisi’s new policy, importers must instead buy their dollars and sell their goods at a much higher rate in the NIMA market, a part of Iran’s multi-tiered exchange rate system and the exchange platform for importers and exporters. By way of example, the subsidized exchange rate for one U.S. dollar is 42,000 rials, while the price of a U.S. dollar on NIMA is now more than 250,000 rials, representing an almost six-fold increase. Meanwhile, as we mentioned above, the price of a single U.S. dollar in the black-market or free-market economy is now higher than 300,000 rials. When Raisi began his so-called economic surgery with the price of flour, bread prices surged and render families hungry. While Iran’s supreme leader ran cover for the move, not all of Iran’s principalists fell in line. For example, Raisi was castigated by traditional conservative outlets that called for his resignation, noting that “Bread, even during the Imposed [Iran-Iraq] War, did not become expensive.” With subsidy reform set to increase inflationary pressures in an economy already struggling, Raisi’s economic policy looks exactly like what would happen if a butcher was asked to stand in for a surgeon.
The sixth and final reason to expect more turbulence is the most important: attitudes and preferences of the Iranian people as reflected in changing patterns of national protest. Specifically, those of the urban and rural poor—which have formed the backbone of recent (2017—present) protests—and were the first and hardest hit by Raisi’s economic policies and previous shocks. The country’s deteriorating economic conditions have led to a significant increase in the number of Iranians living below the poverty line. According to official figures, currently 30 percent of the population lives below the absolute poverty line. Regime insiders and experts estimate that 60 to 70 percent of Iranians are below the relative poverty line. Coupled with a mountain of unfulfilled promises, as more and more Iranians have fallen into poverty, they have less hope in a solution to their plight coming from the regime and its factions, and are more willing to protest the Islamic Republic in its entirety. This sentiment is best expressed by a popular protest chant against regime elites of all stripes that goes, “Reformists, principalists, the jig is up!”
By twist of fate, the founding fathers of the Islamic Republic had hoped this class of more traditionally minded Iranians—dubbed the “oppressed” or Mostazafin and who made the revolution possible—would sustain and defend the Islamic Republic through bonds of faith and communal identity rather than concern over their socio-economic situation. As Iran’s first supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, is reported to have said about the 1979 revolution, “People did not make a revolution for the price of watermelon. … They did it for Islam.”
The ayatollah could not have been more wrong, and not just about economics.
When reviewing various iterations of national protest since 2017, a new pattern of anti-regime uprisings emerges when compared to past protests such as those seen 1999 and 2009. This shift is visible across a series of factors, including protester geography and demography, slogans chanted, relative cohesion, and even levels of state violence against citizens. The most important lesson for Washington audiences to take away from these demonstrations is that the Iranian population has continued to risk life and limb on the street for wholesale change away from the Islamic Republic rather than settle for the promise of incremental change through the ballot-box and preserve the Islamic Republic.
Given their lack of attachment to any political faction in the system, these newer protests are leaderless and less cohesive. And while political in nature, they are touched-off by seemingly non-political issues and events, be they socialenvironmentalsecurity, or increasingly, economic to demonstrate popular dissatisfaction with the regime. Seldom has the Western or international press been able to understand this. One rare exception was a recent headline from ABC News on the current iteration of protests which read, “Bloody protests in Iran are not just about food prices.”
But why exactly would a protest triggered by economic matters end up being political in practice? As one Iranian dissenter speaking to France 24 recently put it:
“There were lots of anti-Khamenei slogans simply because he’s the one responsible for our situation. His politics over the past 30 years have brought us here—useless uranium enrichment, interfering in internal affairs of neighbouring countries, stupid enmity with Israel, the list is long … They are imposing famine on us for their stupid opposition to the USA, while they all are corrupt and living a luxurious life, buying luxury condos in Canada or Turkey.”
In the winter of 2017, for instance, Iranians poured out into the streets protesting the high price of eggs. Protests continued into 2018, creating varied and sporadic demonstrations against the regime even into the summer. In the winter of 2019, Iranians again hit the streets to protest high gas prices. Within days, each set of protests became a referendum on the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic rather than merely the price of eggs or gas, an assessment seemingly shared by the regime based on the ferocity of its response against protesters at each juncture.
In 2017, Iranian authorities blocked various social media platforms to prevent Iranians from communicating with one another and sharing their stories with the outside world. In 2019, as protests metastasized across the nation, authorities escalated by enacting a national internet blackout for nearly a week and killed a reported 1,500 protesters, making the 2019 uprising the bloodiest since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Now with food prices triggering protests, distinctly political chants heard in various iterations of national uprisings from 2017 to 2021 are being recycled by the Iranian people, sharpening the divide that already exists between state and society. Thus far, there have been temporary interruptions in internet services, as reported by NetBlocks. But should protests continue, another blackout and more direct violence against Iranian protesters is likely.
This brings us to the question of U.S. policy. For years, the U.S. has been exceptionally cautious in its approach both to protests inside Iran as well as to countering the Islamic Republic. This has especially been the case in the nuclear era (2002—present). Perhaps most famously, Barack Obama’s administration failed to offer support to the 2009 protests known as the Green Movement, settling instead for belated and tepid rhetorical encouragement simply because he sought engagement with the clerical regime to facilitate a nuclear deal that ended up enriching the Iranian people’s oppressors. In 2009, protesters in Tehran had even taken to chanting, “Obama, Obama, are you with us, or with them?”
Prudence and caution are a must in foreign policy. But so too is a proper understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of one’s adversary. While options like aggressive containment or rollback can and should be applied to the Islamic Republic drawing on lessons from the Reagan-era playbook against the Soviet Union—and there has been no shortage of ink spilled on this issue in Washington over the years—policymakers should make no mistake, the Islamic Republic is no Soviet Union. Despite similar patterns of foreign aggression, domestic repression, and a precarious internal climate compounded by a failing economy, the Islamic Republic is smaller, weaker, and less globally integrated than the Soviet Union. It also does not—at least not now—possess nuclear weapons. As much as it wants to be an alternative to U.S. power and ideology on the world stage, it simply is not. In this regard, settling for less and constantly pulling punches against the Islamic Republic makes little strategic sense. That is especially the case given that sustained anti-regime protests can create a domestic vector for pressure against Tehran that can aid U.S. policy. And if supported and stewarded wisely, could one day lead to a wholesale change in the U.S.- Iran relationship.
For its part, the Trump administration took it upon itself to course correct from the Obama years. This led to the breaking of several taboos related to the embrace of unilateral economic sanctions and the busting of myths pertaining to American support for popular protests, something Trump did early and often. But beyond vociferous support, sanctions that could crater the economy, and designations that would name and shame rights violators, the Trump administration ran into implementation challenges related to its maximum pressure policy. Namely, how best to provide maximum support for Iranian protesters who were increasingly subject to arrest, torture, internet outages of varied duration and scope, and of course, the use of cold-blooded and lethal force.
At the height of protests in 2019, the authors warned that there would be more waves of demonstrations and strikes in Iran. Washington couldn’t then, and still cannot now, afford to be caught flat-footed in the fight against the Islamic Republic and in support of the Iranian people. To that effect, we recommended the development of a protest policy playbook of sorts, some of which, when looking at U.S. policy in the open-source, appears to have been implemented by the previous administration. One example are localized designations, meaning targeted sanctions against security forces and their commanders engaged in, or other officials supportive of, crackdowns against Iranian protestors active in the same exact jurisdiction witnessing protests. This could be, and seemingly was, complemented with sanctions against additional regime elites and security organs for a pincer effect. Other elements from that playbook, such as telecommunications support and satellite internet provision, still have not been implemented and would stand to meaningfully alter the balance between the street and the state in Iran.
While the Biden administration promised to put human rights at the center of its foreign policy, its track record on holding human rights abusers to account and standing with the Iranian people has been at best, lackluster. The current crisis offers the administration an inflection point to ponder what went wrong, an opportunity to act on the sole profession of support for the Iranian people it offered amid the current crisis, and perhaps most importantly, time to align means and ends on a broader Iran policy.
Here’s exactly how.
First, the administration should understand that its quest for a nuclear agreement centered on the 2015 accord known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is fundamentally at odds with its professed support for the Iranian people. In a nutshell, sanctions relief to the Islamic Republic—including to its terror-underwriting organs—that flows from this nuclear deal would end-up lessening the political and economic burden on those who would engage in or call for cracking down on Iranian demonstrators. Free from the specter of foreign threats related to its nuclear program, the regime would have more resources, manpower, and attention to spend on threats it perceives internally in any post-deal scenario.
Moreover, Iran’s nuclear advances under the Biden administration make such an agreement increasingly ineffectual as a tool of counterproliferation. But even if no deal is achieved, Washington’s perceived eagerness for an accord has led to the handicapping of other tools that could have been helpful to Iranians protesting last summer as well as now. With more than a year of unenforced sanctions, Iranian officials have generated enough illicit revenue to spend where and how they please, and not on bread or subsidized wheat for their people.
Citing a troika of Iranian nuclear advances, regional malign activities by Iran-backed proxies, as well as repression of Iranian protesters by security forces, the administration should announce a formal end to the current round of nuclear negotiations in Vienna as well as a termination of its policy to resurrect the JCPOA. Unless Washington frees itself from the current self-defeating cycle of nuclear diplomacy, supporting Iranian protesters will join a laundry list of items— a meaningful Syria policy, pressure against Hezbollah narcotraffickers in Latin America, and sanctions on Iran-backed terrorists in Yemen among them—that were all sacrificed on the altar of a nuclear deal with Tehran.
Second, the administration should more aggressively embrace the bully pulpit against the Islamic Republic in general, but specifically on the human rights file by naming and shaming rights violators and memorializing protest anniversaries. Even as the Trump administration prepared to restore some of the toughest economic sanctions on Iran, it continued to vocally support Iranian protesters. As Iranians took to the streets in 2018, they chanted for the first time, “Our enemy is right here, they lie when they say it's America.”
Accordingly, late and lukewarm responses from the State Department are likely to have a demoralizing effect on protesters and perhaps even be interpreted by the regime as a measure of American trepidation and thus pave the way for a greater cycle of repression. A coherent, clear, and consistent message of support from the highest levels, such as from the president, vice president, secretary of state, national security adviser, or various press secretaries is likely to go a long way. Complementing these messages, U.S. officials ought to consider virtual meetings with prominent protestors or relatives of deceased protestors to put the spotlight on their struggle. These messages and meetings should be shared on U.S. government affiliated outlets and social media channels, which at present, stand to have significant room for improvement. As Iranians were taking to the streets earlier this May, the main U.S. government Persian-language Instagram account was posting about spin classes. This is an own-goal and was rightly chastised by Iranian—American organizations and activists.
A corollary to embracing the bully pulpit is stepping up the aforementioned targeted designations campaign as per the protest policy playbook idea. Using videos circulating on social media about protests in specific towns and provinces, the U.S. government can collate protest data by town, province, and region, and move to sanction any local law-enforcement, semi-official vigilante group, Basij paramilitary, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leadership structures in each region. The same can be applied to the judicial and political apparatus in each province in the aftermath of a protest.
Third, Washington should embrace changes seen in its risk tolerance to use non-kinetic tools like sanctions in the Russia context and transpose them to Iran, where supporting the Iranian people also tugs at the same moral and strategic nexus as supporting the Ukrainian people. In this regard, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered a series of asset forfeiture actions and sanctions by Washington against Russian oligarchs and their families across a host of jurisdictions. The point of such actions was presumably to increase the costs—both figurative and literal—of being part of the Kremlin’s elite. Washington should study the legal and political feasibility of using a combination of exposures, asset freezes, visa prohibitions, and other prohibitions against the interests of regime officials, security organs, and business elite from the Islamic Republic to potentially include those of their families who reside in Western countries. In addition to signaling another way to hold regime elites accountable, it would send a clear message to autocrats and kleptocrats alike that America will not be a safe haven for funds pilfered from other nations.
Fourth, things that may not have seemed possible just a few years ago appear quite possible today. As Washington moved to tighten sanctions on Iranian oil throughout the Trump administration, the Islamic Republic looked for ways to continue to illicitly export oil to generate revenue from buyers like China as well as to support its few state partners like the Assad regime in Syria or the Maduro regime in Venezuela. These actions meant Iranian tanker activities ran afoul of U.S. sanctions and their extraterritorial reach, leading to tense but also creative moments on the high seas that resulted in things like the temporary seizure of a tanker by British Marines and authorities in Gibraltar in 2019.
While Washington has had a mixed record of success in enforcing sanctions against Iranian oil tankers, the U.S. has been able to seize Iranian oil cargos in violation of sanctions under both the Trump and Biden administrations as well as sell this oil. In fact, families of victims of terrorism have previously called upon the U.S. to seize and sell Iranian oil that is sold or transferred in violation of U.S. sanctions in order to adjudicate outstanding terrorism judgements against the Islamic Republic. But there is no reason why, should normative, legal, and strategic concerns be sufficiently assuaged, that should oil sanctions be vigorously enforced and more seizures and sales of illicitly exported Iranian oil occur, Washington could not channel those proceeds towards some form of freedom or strike fund that might be able to covertly support Iranian laborers who go on strike, much like U.S. trade unions did with the Solidarity movement in Poland during the Cold War.
Fifth and last, but certainly not least, as protesters continue to turn out despite being met with force, it is imperative that the Iranian people have internet access to both communicate and organize with one another domestically, as well as to be able to share videos and stories of their struggles. In the absence of independent political parties and a free press, Iranians have been relegated to using internet-based platforms and social media through anti-filtering applications to voice discontent. Keenly aware of this dynamic, the Islamic Republic has allocated significant time, attention, and resources to developing capabilities to surgically cut internet access at local levels while reportedly working with China on creating a national intranet to fully cut off the country from the outside world.
It is in this space where the most amount of creativity is needed, and not just by the Biden administration, but by big-tech entrepreneurs willing to engage in myriad public-private partnerships that amplify the full breadth of U.S. government capabilities. One potential solution to bypass Iran’s internet clampdown and support Iranian protestors is satellite internet service. Elon Musk’s Starlink has developed a commercially viable alternative already being used in Ukraine, which may be able to offer Iranians internet beyond the reach of the regime’s censorship. While the application of this technology is not at a one-to-one between Ukraine and Iran, its proven functionality means that creative tech minds and those engaged in covert action on behalf of the U.S. government should be talking to one another. Accordingly, the Biden administration should task all relevant national security bodies with ways to address this problem and facilitate conversations to plug the logistical, legal, technical, security, and other pitfalls such an idea is likely to have while playing into the creativity Iranians have shown in the past to get around other bans imposed on them.
While one challenging and obvious hole in the above idea pertains to the flow of hardware for satellite internet services, there is an instructive corollary: satellite television in Iran. Despite years of Basij paramilitary, vigilante, and law-enforcement force raids against people’s homes, the steady and available stream of cheap satellite TV hardware and demand by the Iranian people for this technology forced the regime to change its tactics. While smuggled hardware related to satellite internet services is likely to be confiscated early on, the satellite TV case demonstrates that continuity of effort is key in any contest of wills and attempt to penetrate the regime’s firewalls, be they physical or virtual.
More than a year into indirect nuclear talks with Iran , the Biden administration is struggling to show something for its own continuity of effort in looking at Iran as only a nuclear problem. Should Biden broaden the aperture and take stock of the evolution in street protests and the problems that persist inside Iran, he may find that it is still possible to align one’s head and one’s heart on matters of foreign policy in the Middle East. Here’s to hoping that the chants of Iranian protesters reach the president’s ears.
Behnam Ben Taleblu is a senior fellow at Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior adviser. Both contribute to FDD’s Iran Program and Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP), among other projects. The views expressed are their own.
thedispatch.com · by Behnam Ben Taleblu


9. Who Is to Blame for the Collapse of Afghanistan’s Security Forces?

Conclusion:
The answer to “who is to blame” for what happened with Afghanistan’s security forces is complex. Framing six factors as equally important avoids oversimplifying that complexity and is more likely to enable the type of accountability we really need: not just of presidents, but of critical leaders and institutions at all levels. As the special inspector general concludes, “Unless the U.S. government understands and accounts for what went wrong, why it went wrong, and how it went wrong in Afghanistan, it will likely repeat the same mistakes in the next conflict.” On that at least, the special inspector general is absolutely correct.

Who Is to Blame for the Collapse of Afghanistan’s Security Forces? - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Jonathan Schroden · May 24, 2022
The Taliban’s takeover of Kabul on Aug. 15 of last year cemented the complete collapse of Afghanistan’s security forces, which the United States and its partners built over twenty years at a cost of nearly $90 billion. Last week, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction placed primary blame for that collapse on the shoulders of the United States, saying that the “single most important factor” behind it “was the U.S. decision to withdraw military forces and contractors from Afghanistan through signing the U.S.-Taliban agreement in February 2020 under [President Donald Trump], followed by President [Joe] Biden’s withdrawal announcement in April 2021.”
This finding aligns with views espoused by some U.S. military leaders, such as the former commander of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Frank McKenzie. He similarly traced the collapse of Afghanistan’s security forces to the signing of the U.S.-Taliban agreement. But this runs squarely against statements by Biden, who placed the blame on Afghan security forces themselves, saying, “We gave them every chance to determine their own future. What we could not provide them was the will to fight for that future.”
Who is really, or mostly, to blame? Is it Trump? Biden? U.S. military leaders? Afghanistan’s security forces? Or, as some Afghans have alleged, was it mostly the fault of Afghanistan’s former President Ashraf Ghani? Contrary to the special inspector general’s conclusion, I contend that the answer to all of these questions is “yes.” And only by acknowledging the responsibility of all these actors (and more) can we properly learn and heal by holding them accountable.
Factors of Collapse
The special inspector general’s report was requested by Congress and directed to address two issues regarding the failure of Afghanistan’s security forces: What factors contributed directly to their collapse last fall, and what factors led to that collapse over the course of the past 20 years? Regarding the former, the special inspector general identified the U.S. withdrawal as the primary factor, mainly because it caused devastating degradations in Afghan security forces’ morale and led many Afghans to conclude that the United States was abandoning Afghanistan — or worse, that Washington had negotiated a deal to hand the country over to the Taliban. But the special inspector general identified five other factors that also played critical roles in the collapse.
The first of these was the marked reduction of U.S. support to Afghan security forces in the wake of the U.S.-Taliban agreement. In support of this factor, the special inspector general points to the post-agreement decline in airstrikes conducted by the United States in support of Afghan forces. In total, the United States conducted about 800 airstrikes in the 10 months of 2020 following the agreement, compared to over 8,000 strikes in the 14 months that preceded it. In addition to the decline in the total number of strikes, the special inspector general points to changes in U.S. rules of engagement that accompanied the agreement and enabled the Taliban to attack Afghan positions more easily. As described by Afghan Gen. Sami Sadat, “Taliban fighters had to be actively shooting within 150 meters of a checkpoint in order for U.S. aircraft to engage. If Taliban forces were 300 meters away, or stopped shooting when U.S. aircraft arrived, [Afghan security forces] were on their own.”
The second factor was that the United States never built Afghanistan’s security forces to be self-sustaining. The special inspector general points out that the United States and its allies built these forces largely in their own image, conferring upon them sophisticated equipment such as Black Hawk helicopters and C-130 transport planes, and complicated systems for maintenance, logistics, and personnel management that were mostly run by contractors. These dependencies were most notable for the Afghan Air Force, but they extended to the other military and security forces as well. The special inspector general noted additional dependencies for the Afghan Commandos, widely regarded as the most capable force that Afghanistan had: reliance on U.S. advisors for planning, personnel and unit management, and combat enablers such as intelligence. While Afghan forces had been doing the bulk of the fighting for years before the U.S. withdrawal, the United States had been performing nearly all of the behind-the-scenes management and support of those forces.
The third factor was Ghani’s frequent rotation of Afghan security force leaders and his marginalization of competent U.S.-trained officers in favor of loyalists who frequently lacked knowledge of the security sector. According to a former Afghan general and a security minister, Ghani became increasingly paranoid after the U.S.-Taliban agreement that the United States would push him from power. Accordingly, he increasingly viewed the cadre of U.S.-trained Afghan generals as a potential coup source and sought to limit their influence relative to others that he deemed more loyal to himself.
Fourth, the special inspector general pointed to the failure of the Afghan government to develop a national security plan for the era after the U.S. withdrawal. The reasons for this stemmed in part from Ghani’s marginalization of competent security leaders and in part from his and other Afghan leaders’ persistent belief that Biden would buck the terms of the U.S.-Taliban agreement and not fulfill its obligation to withdraw. Not until July 26, 2021 did Ghani announce a plan to defend the country from the Taliban onslaught. Even then, the plan called for stabilization of the situation over the next six months, which was dangerously out of touch with the pace of Taliban advance across the country.
The last major factor that the special inspector general identified was the effectiveness of the Taliban’s military campaign, which “isolated — both physically and psychologically — [Afghan] forces and undermined their willingness to fight.” The decrease in American airstrikes following the U.S.-Taliban agreement and small size of the Afghan Air Force, combined with the U.S.-imposed requirement for Afghan security forces to stop conducting military offensives and adopt an “active defense” posture, granted the Taliban considerable freedom of movement and ability to mass forces. The Taliban used this ability to isolate and overrun Afghan security force positions. The Taliban would then advertise these victories via social media, in support of psychological operations designed to pressure or entice Afghan security forces into surrendering. As the number and sharing of these advertised victories expanded, the Taliban increasingly reached out to local Afghan security force leaders with a combination of incentives for surrender (e.g., amnesty, money) and threats for not doing so (e.g., against their families). This pressure, combined with the lack of strategy, guidance, logistics, and air support from Kabul led many local commanders to take the Taliban’s offer. Once this dynamic started, it snowballed quickly.
These six factors were identified by the special inspector general as being the most critical to the final collapse of Afghanistan’s security forces. But the speed of their collapse strongly suggests that they were built on a precariously shaky foundation. Looking back at the previous 20 years, the special inspector general identified an additional nine factors that contributed over time to the collapse. These included strategic shortfalls (e.g., struggles to balance a desire to “get after the enemy” and “transition the mission” with developing sustainable Afghan security forces, giving Afghans ownership of military strategies), bureaucratic problems (e.g., no single country being in charge, not taking a long-term view of the problem, persistent frequent rotations of personnel), and cultural issues (e.g., not prioritizing the advisory mission, constantly doing things for Afghans because Americans could do them better, Afghan political corruption). As the special inspector general states, “These nine factors were intertwined and worked together to create inefficiencies in the U.S. government’s approach, resulting in [security forces] dependent upon long-term international support.” It is also worth noting that these factors were called out repeatedly by the special inspector general, the Government Accountability Office, the intelligence communityanalysts, and the media over the course of those 20 years.
Reviewing the Review
Given the complexity of the issues associated with the collapse of Afghanistan’s security forces, the special inspector general deserves significant credit for teasing out a set of critical factors that came together to generate that collapse. The analysts behind the report also deserve our thanks for uncovering fascinating new details, such as the ways in which the Taliban exploited changes to American rules of engagement in the wake of the U.S.-Taliban agreement. Overall, the six “end game” factors and the nine preceding ones identified by the special inspector general paint a comprehensive and damning picture of the activities of American, coalition, and Afghan political and military leaders. The institutional — and sometimes personal — failings of actors on those sides of the conflict are in sharp contrast to the organizational, political, and military effectiveness of the Taliban.
Yet, for all the strengths of the report, its overall framing is analytically unjustified and risks undermining the learning and change that should accrue from it. The report’s opening statement that the primary factor for the collapse was the agreement and decision, respectively, of Trump and Biden to withdraw generated predictable headlines. The argument behind it appears to be a relatively simple one: Had the United States decided to stay in Afghanistan and continue supporting the Afghan security forces as it had for years, those forces would not have collapsed. The simplicity of this argument renders it logically appealing, but easily picked apart.
For starters, it fails to consider the details of the alternative universe in which the United States made choices to stay. For example, if Trump had refused to withdraw, presumably Washington and the Taliban would have never reached an agreement and the war would still be on, much as it was in 2020. But as I have discussed elsewhere, the Afghan security forces had been slowly failing as an institution for years and the Afghan government had been steadily losing ground to the Taliban. Between November 2017 and November 2019, for example, the government lost control of 38 percent of Afghanistan’s districts. To conclude that staying the course would have prevented the eventual collapse of Afghanistan’s security forces requires providing an argument that these trends would have somehow turned around — an argument that seems implausible unless one further assumes the injection of additional U.S. resources or institutional and cultural changes, which renders the argument even more implausible.
Perhaps more analytically, though, a similar line of logic could be used to argue the primary importance of any of the other factors that the special inspector general identified. As one example, had the Taliban fought an incompetent campaign instead of a brilliant one, Afghan security forces may have prevailed even after the United States withdrew its forces. Thus, perhaps the Taliban’s highly effective political-military campaign was the most important factor. As another, if Ghani had accepted the likelihood of U.S. withdrawal, engaged in appropriate strategic planning, empowered competent military leaders, and shown courage in the face of Taliban aggression, perhaps the Afghan security forces would have rallied to the cause of their national defense, like what we’ve observed with President Volodymyr Zelensky’s efforts in Ukraine. Thus, perhaps Ghani’s poor choices and cowardly behavior was the most important factor.
These arguments can be picked apart, too, which leads back to a different conclusion than that drawn by the special inspector general: There is no “single most important” factor behind the collapse of Afghanistan’s security forces. All six factors that the special inspector general identified are critically important to the story of what occurred, as are all nine of the supporting factors that contributed over time. As I have stated in my own analysis of lessons from the collapse, the failure of Afghanistan’s forces had many fathers, spanning the political and military leaders of the United States, its coalition partners, Afghanistan, and the Taliban.
Why It Matters
I was asked in a recent Lawfare podcast why the report is important and why its framing matters. I responded that it is important for two reasons, learning and healing — both of which hinge on accountability. And its framing can either enable or hinder that accountability.
First, to truly learn from the American experience in Afghanistan not only requires identifying what happened, how it happened, and why — it also requires identifying who made critical decisions along the way and what information, processes, and institutional cultures and biases led to them. In short, it requires accountability for those decisions. This need not be in the form of personal shaming of specific leaders, as I still believe that the vast majority of actors in Afghanistan were doing their best under the conditions and constraints in which they acted, but rather in the form of identified and implemented changes to the organization, cultures, and processes of U.S. and other institutions that generated these outcomes.
Second, for those involved in the Afghan war to truly heal and move on with their lives, they must also see accountability. These people have made sacrifices that range from lost time with loved ones, to scars and wounds that may never heal, to the loss of their own lives or those they loved. Accountability of, and substantial changes to, critical institutions that might prevent similar sacrifices from having to be made under similar conditions in the future are the least we owe these people to help them heal.
This report — and others that will follow, such as those from the Afghanistan War Commission — have the ability to drive that accountability. But to do that effectively, their framing is critical. The special inspector general and his team deserve credit for the work that went into this report. But its identification of the U.S. withdrawal decision as the “single most important factor” behind the Afghan security forces’ collapse enables the blame for that disaster to be placed singularly on Trump and Biden instead of forcing us to grapple with the more complicated reality that a whole web of people and institutions were responsible.
The answer to “who is to blame” for what happened with Afghanistan’s security forces is complex. Framing six factors as equally important avoids oversimplifying that complexity and is more likely to enable the type of accountability we really need: not just of presidents, but of critical leaders and institutions at all levels. As the special inspector general concludes, “Unless the U.S. government understands and accounts for what went wrong, why it went wrong, and how it went wrong in Afghanistan, it will likely repeat the same mistakes in the next conflict.” On that at least, the special inspector general is absolutely correct.
[wotr_member_button
Jonathan Schroden, Ph.D., directs the Countering Threats and Challenges Program at the CNA Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research and analysis organization based in Arlington, Virginia. He is also an adjunct scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point. The views expressed here are his and do not necessarily represent those of CNA, the Departments of the Navy or Army, or the Department of Defense. You can find him on Twitter at @jjschroden.
warontherocks.com · by Jonathan Schroden · May 24, 2022



10. End the WHO’s Unhealthy Obsession With Israel

Excerpts:
Analytical deficiencies aside, the report’s main flaw is that it holds Israel to a double standard by making it the only country subject to an annual resolution and report. This double standard is a prime example of the Jew-hatred codified in the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s working definition of anti-Semitism.
When the Biden administration announced it would resume funding for the WHO last year, it promised to pursue reforms of the agency. But the administration’s engagement-only strategy hasn’t curtailed the WHO’s anti-Semitism. The State Department should oppose the Israel-specific agenda item at the upcoming World Health Assembly and work to eliminate it at the next Executive Board. This will not only ensure Israel’s fair treatment but allow the WHO to address the world’s true health problems.


End the WHO’s Unhealthy Obsession With Israel
Eliminating the World Health Organization’s double standard will not only ensure Israel’s fair treatment but allow the WHO to address the world’s true health problems.

by David May
The National Interest · by David May · May 21, 2022
The World Health Organization’s (WHO) annual World Health Assembly (WHA) will kick off later this month in Geneva. The WHA will put Israel under the microscope—just like it did last year and the year before that. The purpose, of course, is not to praise Israel’s early success with Covid-19 vaccinations, the fact that almost half of its new doctors are Arab or Druze Israelis, or that Israel trained Gazan medical professionals to deal with the coronavirus. The purpose is to damage Israel’s reputation. This year, the assembly should finally put aside this double standard and just focus on public health.
The WHA began its annual tradition of singling out Israel in 1968, at the first meeting after the Six-Day War. The assembly called on the WHO director-general to report on individuals displaced by the war. Since then, the WHO’s Executive Board has submitted agendas annually ensuring resolutions and reports on the matter. Amid a global pandemic, this agenda item consumed a full day of last year’s eight-day conference.
The agenda item’s current formulation, “Health conditions in the occupied Palestinian territory, including east Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan,” decidedly omits Palestinians in Syrian-held territory, Lebanon, Jordan, and elsewhere from its purview. Only those Palestinians whose suffering can be attributed to Israel are included.
The mandate’s inclusion of the Golan Heights forced the WHO to note in its 2021 report that individuals in that territory have “full access to universal health care.” This stands in stark contrast to Syrians suffering through a decade-long civil war and the hospital-bombing Bashar al-Assad regime.

The WHO’s 2021 report on Israel, like ones before it, made no mention of Hamas’ deleterious effects on Palestinian health care. During the 2014 war, Hamas operated out of Gaza’s Shifa hospital, turning its doctors into human shields. While Gaza was in a Covid-19 lockdown in August 2020, Hamas launched numerous incendiary devices at Israel, thereby increasing Israel’s restrictive measures on the coastal enclave. Hamas has a long history of abusing medical travel permits to Israel to conduct terrorist attacks. And Hamas diverts Palestinian funds that could have provided for healthcare to instead provide for deadly weapons. None of this made the cut.
The report then qualified its sparse criticism of the Palestinian Authority (PA). The WHO report clarified that the PA severed ties with Israel in May 2020 “in the context of the further annexation of large parts of the West Bank announced by Israel,” but failed to mention that the annexation never occurred. The termination of ties undoubtedly hindered the collaborative healthcare efforts necessary to fight a pandemic.
Instead, the report blamed “chronic occupation” for much of the Palestinians’ health woes. Barriers to movement and limits on imports can be obstacles for Palestinian health care. But this framing, like starting a movie in the middle, does not explain how the problem began or how it can be solved. The report made no effort to understand why, after hundreds of terrorist attacks, Israel erected a security barrier and established checkpoints. Or why, in the face of thousands of rockets, Israel limits the import of dual-use items into Gaza. Asserting that the “chronic occupation” is the source of the problem ultimately serves Palestinian propaganda, not Palestinian health.
In another section, the WHO report blamed settler wastewater dumping for its deleterious impact on health conditions in the West Bank but made no mention of Palestinian wastewater dumping. According to a 2018 World Bank report, more than 85 percent of Palestinian wastewater in the West Bank goes untreated. Palestinian health suffers regardless of the culprit, but the WHO singled out Israeli transgressions.
The report also repeated the claim that Israel fails to meet its obligations to vaccinate Palestinians. Following Israel’s world-leading national vaccination campaign, some activists politicized the disparity between Israeli and Palestinian vaccination rates. The WHO report cited the (incorrect article of the) Fourth Geneva Convention to argue that Israel is obligated to vaccinate Palestinians. The Geneva Conventions are explicitly for the “protection of civilian persons in time of war,” and most articles, including the one in question, stop applying a year after the “general close of military operations.” In any case, international legal expert Eugene Kontorovich notes, the Oslo Accords specifically assign the PA the responsibility for vaccinating Palestinians and supersede the obligations contained in the Geneva Accords.
Analytical deficiencies aside, the report’s main flaw is that it holds Israel to a double standard by making it the only country subject to an annual resolution and report. This double standard is a prime example of the Jew-hatred codified in the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s working definition of anti-Semitism.
When the Biden administration announced it would resume funding for the WHO last year, it promised to pursue reforms of the agency. But the administration’s engagement-only strategy hasn’t curtailed the WHO’s anti-Semitism. The State Department should oppose the Israel-specific agenda item at the upcoming World Health Assembly and work to eliminate it at the next Executive Board. This will not only ensure Israel’s fair treatment but allow the WHO to address the world’s true health problems.
David May is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow him on Twitter @DavidSamuelMay. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
Image: Reuters.
The National Interest · by David May · May 21, 2022


11. Missile Defense Agency Eyes Command Center for Guam


Missile Defense Agency Eyes Command Center for Guam
Integrating current and future sensor data is key to protecting Guam from future missile threats.
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
The “hardest” challenge the Missile Defense Agency will face in protecting Guam from missile threats will be integrating multiple data streams into a single, coherent picture for commanders, the agency’s commander said Monday. To address that challenge, the agency hopes to build an integrated missile defense command and control center on the island, which would give military leaders better control over the variety of missile defense tools at their disposal, Vice Adm. Jon Hill said.
Guam is expected to play a critical role in the U.S. military’s future efforts to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan, and would be among the first targets of Chinese long-range missile strikes in the event of armed conflict. Over the years, the U.S. military and MDA in particular have added missile defense capabilities in the region—land-based defenses on Guam itself, such as the land-based Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system and soon the Patriot missile battery, as well as ship-based interceptors. paired with a variety of radar and other sensors.
But as CSIS senior fellow Tom Karako pointed out in a discussion Monday with Hill, that’s a lot of different types of information to integrate and respond to across multiple services. Building a missile defense command center on the island would allow Indo-Pacific Command to respond more quickly.
“If you look at the most important thing on Guam, it is going to be that command center,” Hill said. “We are going to build it in advance. And I'm going to have [Indo-PACOM Commander Adm. John Aquilino] and his team in there walking and kicking consoles, making sure we have the chairs in the right place…What I want to do and what my team wants to do for Indo-PACOM is to have what we've all talked about for years, a single integrated air picture.”
That picture also must be flexible enough to contain new types of sensor data and new types of missile interceptors, such as future ones for highly-maneuverable hypersonic weapons, he said.
The new class of highly-maneuverable hypersonics are sometimes described as “invincible,” but developing new interceptors that can effectively take them out is a big part of MDA’s future. The agency requested $130 million for the Hypersonic & Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor and Space-based Kill Assessment in its most recent budget request.
But Hill said the Defense Department is still trying to solve some hard physics and engineering problems before it can determine what hypersonic missile defense will look like.
Much of it depends on the effects of incredibly high temperatures on sensitive, missile-finding technology in the nose of the interceptor missile, a portion of the interceptor sometimes called the seeker. That seeker is going to experience a wide range of conditions as it plows through the atmosphere into space, and then comes back down to “near space” where it can effectively intercept the incoming missile.
“There's concerns about seeker, the seeker window materials. We have concerns about propulsion and divert and the attitude control system because it's a different environment,” Hill said. Future hypersonic interceptors will “have to operate in space; that's one environment, operate in the atmosphere; that's a different environment. And that glide environment that’s 50 to 70 kilometers up, that is a different environment. And we're going against a different kind of threat that's in a maneuver state.”
Understanding how physics will affect seeker electronics across those different altitudes will drive future investment, he said.
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker



12. The Changing Character of Combined Arms

Excerpts:
The military learns by playing war. Experimental units and campaigns of learning are old traditions in the military profession that could be revolutionized by incorporating data science and the scientific method. In both the lead-up to World War II and the aftermath of the Cold War, the U.S. Army used the Louisiana Maneuvers to explore new tactical and operational force designs. Combining experimentation and wargaming, the Army used the Howze Board to accelerate air mobility and air cavalry in the 1960s and the high-technology testbed in the 1980s to explore lighter, more mobile infantry formations. The Marines employed experiments and experimental units in both Sea Dragon efforts in the 1990s, a tradition that continues today.
While efforts like Project Convergence and Force Design 2030 replicate the best of these traditions, they can transcend the trap of pseudo-science by showing their homework and subjecting themselves to rigorous hypothesis testing. The foundation is there. The data just needs to be captured, structured, and independently tested to validate the predictions. The process will need to be transparent so that it can be replicated — the gold standard in modern science.


The Changing Character of Combined Arms - War on the Rocks
BENJAMIN JENSEN AND MATTHEW STROHMEYER
warontherocks.com · by Benjamin Jensen · May 23, 2022
Debates are raging the about tanks and how well individual services, like the U.S. Marine Corps, are responding to the requirements of great power competitionRetired generals question the utility of lighter expeditionary forces reliant on missiles while younger officers and thinkers are more open to experimentation and debate based on insights from conflicts like Ukraine and contingencies beyond the Indo-Pacific. In the U.S. Army, the multi-domain task force ushers in a new era which will be increasingly dominated by long-range precision fires combined with electronic attack and cyber operations. Disagreements center on whether the U.S. Army should focus on converging effects at the tactical level (close combat) or at the operational level, penetrating and disintegrating layered enemy anti-access/area-denial systems. The U.S. Air Force envisions a future where the air component develops the doctrine, training, and technology necessary to accomplish operational maneuver — untethered from large, static basing.
These debates produce an unappreciated competitive advantage: a healthy marketplace of ideas in the profession of arms. What the dialogue to date lacks is a broader conceptualization of how the character of combined arms is changing in what is best described as the new missile age. The ability of tactical units — from squads to individual fighter aircraft — to conduct precision strikes across the depth of the battlefield, all captured and circulated on social media, changes how we think about tempo, decision-making, and combined arms. Below we describe some of the larger trends changing combined arms and what it means for military innovation and adaption going forward. We seek to develop a framework for further debate and defense planning biased toward experimentation and testing that moves away from idol worship built around legacy platforms and ideas.
The Nature of Combined Arms
Just like war, there is an enduring nature and changing character to combined arms. Combined arms involve combining capabilities in a simultaneous manner to prevail. Traditionally, this combination involved indirect and direct fire to support ground maneuver and closing with the enemy. For Stephen Biddle, the essence of combined arms is captured in the concept of force employment. Warfighting is less about mass and more about maneuver, using tempo and targeting to put the enemy on the horns of a dilemma that reduces cohesion. Seen another way, combined arms is about the combination of effects: fire and maneuver, direct and indirect approaches across domains, orthodox and unorthodox ways and means. Combined arms reduce the decision space of the adversary. The more effects a force brings to bear in time and space, the more likely the enemy system is to collapse.
The concept is tactical but finds resonance in 19th and 20th century operational maneuver. The Prussian military elite dreamed of universal principles and schemes of maneuver based on the 216 BCE Battle of Cannae. The concept of fire cauldrons, or kesselschalt, was a key component of offensive planning. As artillery grew more powerful and shifted from direct to indirect fire assets and aircraft entered the fight, these concepts transitioned to modern mechanized warfare and blazed a trail of destruction. Arguably this art of battle (i.e., tactics) struggled to bridge operational art and campaigning to achieve true strategic objectives. Yet it has enduring value and serves as a template for combat to this day.
Offsets and Decisions: The Emerging Character of Combined Arms
Military organizations are complex entities that reflect a mix of political, social, and technological factors limiting how a group — be it a state or armed movement — mobilizes people and resources to produce combat formations. Political institutions alter military doctrine. Cultural and social structures shape tactics. Advances in technology change this process and modify how nations generate and apply combat power. In modern military thinking, offsets provide an example.
Offset strategies propose using technological superiority (qualitative advantage) to overcome conventional military mass (i.e., quantitative advantage): The better beats the many. The first offset, or what Bernard Brody called “the missile age,” saw thinking about both the balance of power and strategy change as a result of nuclear weapons and advances in long-range strike. The advent of thermonuclear weapons set off a cascading series of debates about riskescalation, and second-strike capabilities. The U.S. Army experimented with new approaches to combined arms on a nuclear battlefield as well as increasing conventional forces to provide more flexible response options. New technology, filtered through images of future war linked to military tradition and pop-culture imagination, changed the character of combined arms.
An offset strategy assumes governments can mobilize resources and drive the innovation process relative to a great-power competition, combining a mix of national labs and federal funding with private-sector initiatives and rapid experimentation to produce new combat formations. This line of thinking defined the second offset, in which groups like the Office of Net Assessment and the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency built the concepts and capabilities to realize what Soviet theorists called a military-technical revolution. Taking advantage of the information revolution and advances in digital technology, precision conventional strike could produce effects equivalent to counter-force nuclear weapons, creating what are today called strategic non-nuclear weapons. The third offset added advances in robotics (i.e., autonomous systems) and AI/machine learning to enhance precision strikes, creating a new competitive strategy on display in concepts ranging from expeditionary advanced base operations that seek to hold the Chinese navy at bay to multi-domain tasks forces and mosaic kill-webs.
Over the last generation, this offset logic has led to the proliferation of precision-strike capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels — blurring the levels of war and increasing the lethality of conventional forces. It stands to reason that as technological trends lower the cost of precision-strike networks — to include in tactical formations — the character of combined arms starts to change.
It is not just lethality that is changing war, but the ripple effects of network society. As globalization and digital technologies create new social and political forms, information and cyber operations become central political contests, including those involving arms and violence. It is not enough to destroy a Russian tank. You have to upload a video as well to mobilize public opinion and galvanize will. The proliferation of precision strike in a connected world alters battlefield geometry and creates a new character to combined arms: What can be seen can be hit, and what can be hit can be destroyed. What can be uploaded can mobilize people and resources.
When it becomes easy to kill what you can see, the challenge of combined arms rests in decision architecture and using scalable, Uber-like mechanisms to synchronize fires and effects across the compressed levels of war. In contrast to mass, firepower, or linear maneuver-based warfare of the past, the defining characteristic of modern war is decision. The blurring of political, informational, and military spheres not only increases the complexity of the operating environment, but also produces a a level of data that tends to overwhelm decision makers. This challenge is compounded by the shrinking of operational battlespace with non-nuclear missiles that can traverse thousands of miles, multiple combatant commands, and a dizzying array of competing command authorities. While tactical engagement, massing fires, and effective sustainment remain the foundation of effective warfighting, an ability to cut through the complexity and make effective decisions faster than an adversary is the new high ground. Tempo is becoming more about the relative speed of judgment than action. Much of this advantage is gained through effectively processing what can amount to petabytes of data — a task impossible for a single human and difficult for large staffs. The dominant force in future conflict will likely apply AI/ML to aggregate data, parse trends, identify patterns, and pass the results to humans to apply context and make decisions, all while monitoring how battlefield effects change social media themes and messages.
In the U.S. military, the engineering and capabilities required to adapt to the changing character of combined arms exist (just look at Project Convergence), but the mental models, doctrine, and tactics lag behind. U.S. military dominance on display during the 1991 Gulf War ushered in a decade of military cognitive stagnation. The U.S. Air Force figured, why fix what didn’t seem broken? The Army and the Marine Corps laid out bold visions but struggled to adapt due to contingency operations and diminished budgets. Despite noble efforts to transform the entire defense enterprise after 2000, the next decade focused on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, distracting military thinkers from considering the changing character of combined arms. Efforts to imagine future war found it difficult to escape the gravity of old service programs and key platforms.
While the U.S. military fought across both the Middle East and the bureaucratic battles in the beltway, Russia and China gathered their notes from 1991 and designed a future fire-centric force that could hold U.S. power projection at risk. By the mid-2010s, U.S. military thinkers began to wake up to the reality of a new missile age but responded to the threat with paradigms of the past. To the prospect of more missiles, they called for more maneuver-championing legacy platforms like tactical aircraft and tanks.
The threat of complex, constant missile attack is only one part of the new operational environment. The blurring of traditional battlefield lines through the reemergence of gray-zone competition and global connectivity reinforces the shift in the dominant characteristic of war from maneuver to decision. A more tactically maneuverable army or air component certainly gains some advantage, but that same force in a modern salvo exchange, facing hundreds of low-cost munitions, will likely fare as well as dexterous Prince Oberyn against massive Gregor Clegane. Gray zones and salvo exchanges are the new coins of the realm, not mass tank or air-to-air battles.
Combined arms in the new missile age should seek machine-enabled decision advantage — sensing, deciding, and acting within an adversary’s decision cycle. The sheer complexity will require algorithmic judgment, using AI and especially machine learning to help prioritize which aircraft and missiles to engage given logistical considerations like ammunition stockpiles, the probability of future battles, and shifting political limitations associated with escalation risk. While the nature of combining effects will not change, the character will increasingly stress synchronization and optimization over mass and maneuver. Combined arms will become less about memorized battle drills and human intuition and more a function of augmented consciousness. Machines will offload cognitive tasks from humans to free up space for improvisation and creativity within the bounds of the mission. It will increasingly involve mosaic kill-webs that can be tailored and scaled — and this will produce an urgent need to rethink how we educate and train military professionals for future war.
The Road Ahead: Hypothesis-Testing through Experimentation
In moments of transition like this, the best course of action is to engage in what Carl von Clausewitz called critical analysis. Clausewitz differentiated chronological history — common still in many operational and official histories used in professional military education — from causal explanations of events that facilitate evaluating ends, ways, and means. Criticism starts by identifying equivocal facts — embracing rather than wishing away uncertainty and competing perspectives — and tracing “effects back to their cause” to form testable hypotheses. For Clausewitz, the process helped professional officers hone judgment through analyzing historical military campaigns as counterfactuals. In modern strategic analysis, this process translates into embracing social science methods and continuous experimentation to identify and evaluate new ways and means for combining effects.
While change is constant, the future is unknown. The military professional can see the outline of the future but struggles to find the optimal investments to combine effects at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Too often, the methods used to determine a way ahead — from wargaming to defense scenarios — tend to lack robust samples and risk overgeneralizing from narrow cases that may not reflect how war is changing. Just as international relations for years abused 1914 as a crucial case to hypothesize the causes of war, the national security community runs countless wargames that often wish away politics and logistics and, worst of all, lack enough iterations to draw even bounded conclusions. They propose to generate ideas, not evaluate hypotheses.
The services struggle to conduct force-design experiments in a manner that allows them to compare findings from across wargames and field exercises in a meaningful analytical manner. Take the U.S. Marine Corps: While the service used an iterated series of wargames on the road to Force Design 2030, the use of non-disclosure agreements limited the ability of a larger community to debate the merits of the findings or run competing experiments that falsified the design. The net result? What Karl Popper called pseudo-science and an increasingly emotional as opposed to rational debate. The marines are not alone. The national security community is littered with unfalsifiable anecdotes that cost the taxpayer billions of dollars.
The way out of this trap is to inject new life into old traditions: wargaming and experimentation. Wargaming is as old as the military profession and can be adapted to generate and test new ideas rather than exclusively generate understanding. Building an infrastructure to capture data from wargames at the echelon of command and run randomized control trials could accelerate adapting to the changing character of combined arms. Beyond testing ideas, the captured data could also be used to refine AI applications likely required to synchronize effects on multidomain battlefields in the future.
The military learns by playing war. Experimental units and campaigns of learning are old traditions in the military profession that could be revolutionized by incorporating data science and the scientific method. In both the lead-up to World War II and the aftermath of the Cold War, the U.S. Army used the Louisiana Maneuvers to explore new tactical and operational force designs. Combining experimentation and wargaming, the Army used the Howze Board to accelerate air mobility and air cavalry in the 1960s and the high-technology testbed in the 1980s to explore lighter, more mobile infantry formations. The Marines employed experiments and experimental units in both Sea Dragon efforts in the 1990s, a tradition that continues today.
While efforts like Project Convergence and Force Design 2030 replicate the best of these traditions, they can transcend the trap of pseudo-science by showing their homework and subjecting themselves to rigorous hypothesis testing. The foundation is there. The data just needs to be captured, structured, and independently tested to validate the predictions. The process will need to be transparent so that it can be replicated — the gold standard in modern science.
Benjamin Jensen, Ph.D. is a professor of strategic studies at the School of Advanced Warfighting, Marine Corps University, and a senior fellow for future war, gaming, and strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is also a reserve officer in the U.S. Army.
Col. Matthew Strohmeyer is a U.S. Air Force officer and a military fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The views expressed are their own and do not reflect the views or policies of Marine Corps University, the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.
warontherocks.com · by Benjamin Jensen · May 23, 2022



13. After 3 months, Russia still bogged down in Ukraine war

3 months, But how long can Putins sustain his war?


After 3 months, Russia still bogged down in Ukraine war
AP · by The Associated Press · May 24, 2022
When Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, it had hoped to overtake the country in a blitz lasting only days or a few weeks. Many Western analysts thought so, too.
As the conflict marked its third month Tuesday, however, Moscow appears to be bogged down in what increasingly looks like a war of attrition, with no end in sight and few successes on the battlefield.
There was no quick victory for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s powerful forces, no rout that would allow the Kremlin to control most of Ukraine and establish a puppet government.
Instead, Russian troops got bogged down on the outskirts of Kyiv and other big cities amid stiff Ukrainian defenses. Convoys of Russian armor seemed stalled on long stretches of highway. Troops ran out of supplies and gasoline, becoming easy targets from land and air.
A little over a month into the invasion, Russia effectively acknowledged the failure of its blitz and pulled troops back from areas near Kyiv, declaring a shift of focus to the eastern industrial region of the Donbas, where Moscow-backed separatists have been fighting Ukrainian forces since 2014.
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To be sure, Russia has seized significant chunks of territory around the Crimean Peninsula that Moscow annexed eight years ago. It also has managed to cut Ukraine off completely from the Sea of Azov, finally securing full control over the key port of Mariupol after a siege that prevented some of its troops from fighting elsewhere while they battled diehard Ukrainian forces.
But the offensive in the east seems to have bogged down as well, as Western arms flow into Ukraine to bolster its outgunned army.
Each day, Russian artillery and warplanes relentlessly pound Ukrainian positions in the Donbas, trying to break through defenses built up during the separatist conflict.
They have made only incremental gains, clearly reflecting both Russia’s insufficient troop numbers and the Ukrainian resistance. In one recent episode, Russians lost hundreds of personnel and dozens of combat vehicles while trying to cross a river to build a bridgehead.
“The Russians are still well behind where we believe they wanted to be when they started this revitalized effort in the eastern part of the country,” Pentagon press secretary John Kirby said Friday, describing the Donbas fighting as very dynamic, with small towns and villages changing hands every day.
Elsewhere in Ukraine, Russian forces have methodically targeted Western weapons shipments, ammunition and fuel depots, and critical infrastructure in the hope of weakening Kyiv’s military capability and economic potential.
But in their struggle to gain ground, Russian forces have also relentlessly shelled cities and laid siege to some of them. In just the latest example of the war’s toll, 200 bodies were found in a collapsed building in Mariupol, Ukrainian authorities said Tuesday.
The Kremlin appears to still harbor a more ambitious goal of cutting off Ukraine from the Black Sea coast all the way to the Romanian border, a move that would also allow Moscow to build a land corridor to Moldova’s separatist region of Transnistria, where Russian troops are stationed.
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But Moscow seems to know that this objective is not currently achievable with the limited forces it has.
“I think they’re just increasingly realizing that they can’t necessarily do all of it, certainly not at one go,” said Justin Crump, a former British tank commander who heads Sibylline, a strategic advisory firm.
Moscow’s losses have forced it to rely increasingly on hastily patched-together units in the Donbas that could only make small gains, he said.
“It’s a constant downshifting of gear toward smaller objectives that Russia can actually achieve,” Crump said. “And I think on the biggest scale, they’ve actually downsized their strategy better to match their their ability on the ground.”
Two top Russian officials appeared to acknowledge Tuesday that Moscow’s advance has been slower than expected. Secretary of Russia’s Security Council Nikolai Patrushev said the government “is not chasing deadlines,” while Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said the pace was deliberate to allow civilians to flee, even though forces have repeatedly hit civilian targets.
Many in Ukraine and the West thought Putin would pour resources into the Donbas to score a decisive triumph by Victory Day on May 9, when Moscow celebrates its defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. Russia has falsely called the war a campaign to “denazify” Ukraine — a country with a democratically elected Jewish president who wants closer ties with the West.
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Rather than a massive campaign in the east, however, the Kremlin opted for a series of tactical mini-offensives there, aimed at steadily gaining ground to try to encircle Ukrainian forces.
“The Russian leadership is urging the military command to show at least some gains, and it has nothing else to do but to keep sending more troops into the carnage,” said Mykola Sunhurovskyi, a military expert at the Kyiv-based Razumkov Center think-tank.
Many in the West expected Putin to declare a broad mobilization to fill up the Russian ranks. British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace warned that Putin might time an announcement to Victory Day.
But it never happened, and Russia has continued to rely on a limited force that was clearly insufficient against Ukrainian defenses.
A massive mobilization would likely foment broad discontent in Russia, fuel antiwar sentiment and carry massive political risks. Authorities opted for more limited options, with lawmakers drafting a bill to waive the current age limit of 40 for those willing to sign up for the military.
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The lack of resources was underlined last week by an abrupt Russian withdrawal from areas near Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city that has been bombarded since the start of the war. Some of those forces apparently were redeployed to the Donbas, but it wasn’t enough to tip the scales on the battlefield.
“They really had to thin out the troops they had around Kharkiv, simply because they’re trying to hold to too much of a line with too few troops,” said Phillips O’Brien, professor of strategic studies at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland.
The Donbas fighting has increasingly morphed into artillery duels, and “it might go on for quite a long time without much movement in the lines,” he said.
“So it will be a more of a positional battle at that point, O’Brien added, with success going to whoever “can take the pounding.”
Ukraine, meanwhile, continues to get a steady flow of Western weapons, including U.S. howitzers and drones, tanks from Poland and other heavy gear that is immediately sent into combat.
“Ukraine’s plan is simple and obvious — wear down the Russian forces in the nearest months as much as possible, win time for receiving Western weapons and training how to use them, and then launch a counteroffensive in the southeast,” said Sunhurovskyi, the Kyiv-based military expert.
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He said Ukraine hopes to receive even more powerful Western weapons, such as U.S. HIMARS multiple rocket launchers, anti-ship missiles and more potent air defense weapons.
The eastern deadlock has angered hard-liners in Russia, who warned that Moscow can’t win if it doesn’t conduct a massive mobilization and concentrate all of its resources in a decisive attack.
Igor Strelkov, a former security officer who led the separatists in the Donbas in 2014, denounced what he described as the Kremlin’s indecision, saying it could pave the way for defeat.
“For Russia, the strategic deadlock is deepening,” he said.
Ukrainian authorities, meanwhile, are increasingly emboldened by the slow pace of the Russian offensive and growing Western support.
While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reaffirmed last week that pushing the Russians back to their pre-invasion positions would represent a victory, some of his aides declared even more ambitious goals.
Adviser Mykhailo Podolyak said Ukraine isn’t interested in a cease-fire “until Russia is ready to fully liberate occupied territories,” a bold statement that appears to reflect hopes for reclaiming the Donbas and Crimea.
Russia, meanwhile, apparently aims to bleed Ukraine by methodically striking fuel supplies and infrastructure while making grinding military gains in the east. The Kremlin may also hope that Western interest in the conflict will eventually fade.
“Their final hope is that we will lose interest completely in the conflict in Ukraine by the summer,” Crump said. “They’re calculating the Western audiences will lose interest in the same way as Afghanistan last year. Russia thinks that time is working in its favor.”
___
Danica Kirka in London, Lolita C. Baldor in Washington and Yuras Karmanau in Lviv, Ukraine, contributed.
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Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine
AP · by The Associated Press · May 24, 2022


14. Ukraine's Zelenskiy says he would meet with Putin to end the war


Excerpts:
Russian and Ukrainian negotiators have held sporadic talks since Russian forces poured into Ukraine at the end of February, but both sides say the talks have stalled.
Zelenskiy told Ukrainian television last week that it was impossible to halt the war without some sort of diplomacy involved.
In his remarks to the audience in Davos, Zelenskiy also said that war came at a huge human price for Ukrainians. The country's forces, he said, were making gains, notably near the second city of Kharkiv, but "the bloodiest situation remains in Donbas, where we are losing too many people".
He added that any notion of recovering by force the Crimea peninsula, seized and annexed by Russia in 2014, would cause hundreds of thousands of casualties.

Ukraine's Zelenskiy says he would meet with Putin to end the war
Reuters · by Reuters
May 23 (Reuters) - Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Monday that President Vladimir Putin was the only Russian official he was willing to meet with to discuss how to end the war.
Zelenskiy, addressing by video link an audience at the World Economic Forum in Davos, also said that arranging any talks with Russia was becoming more difficult in light of what he said was evidence of Russian actions against civilians under occupation.
Russia denies targeting civilians in what it calls a "special operation" to degrade Ukraine's military capabilities.

"The president of the Russian Federation decides it all," said Zelenskiy through an interpreter. "If we are talking about ending this war without him personally, that decision cannot be taken."
Zelenskiy said the discovery of mass killings in areas occupied by Russian troops earlier in the war, particularly outside Kyiv, made it more difficult to arrange talks and he would rule out any discussions with other officials.
Founder and Executive chairman Klaus Schwab addresses the delegates with the Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy displayed on a screen in the background during the opening ceremony of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland May 23, 2022. REUTERS/Arnd Wiegmann
"I cannot accept any kind of meeting with anyone coming from the Russian Federation but the president," he said. "And only in the case when there is one issue on the (table): stopping the war. There are no other grounds for any other kind of meeting."
Russian and Ukrainian negotiators have held sporadic talks since Russian forces poured into Ukraine at the end of February, but both sides say the talks have stalled.
Zelenskiy told Ukrainian television last week that it was impossible to halt the war without some sort of diplomacy involved.
In his remarks to the audience in Davos, Zelenskiy also said that war came at a huge human price for Ukrainians. The country's forces, he said, were making gains, notably near the second city of Kharkiv, but "the bloodiest situation remains in Donbas, where we are losing too many people".
He added that any notion of recovering by force the Crimea peninsula, seized and annexed by Russia in 2014, would cause hundreds of thousands of casualties.

Reporting by Ronald Popeski, Editing by Rosalba O'Brien
Reuters · by Reuters

15. Can a U.S.-China War Be Averted?


Excerpts:
It will nonetheless be a tall order for Beijing and Washington to accommodate each other with self-imposed constraints on their respective regional and international behavior. And it sounds illogical that they would agree to allow each other to focus on building their respective capabilities for their own long-term competition. But as Rudd persuasively observes, “that is the essential point.” Both sides would recognize that “managed competition” serves their interests because the only alternative is unmanaged competition—“with the loss of all strategic guardrails and the growing risk of crisis, conflict, or war.” The positive incentives for both sides also include the opportunity to reduce bilateral tensions, enhance cooperation in areas where it ultimately will be necessary, and allow the rivalry “to unfold relatively peacefully” rather than continue to escalate and become more hostile.
Rudd’s bottom line is exactly right: “In the world of ideas, systems, and governance, may the best team win.” And the “liberal-democratic-capitalist world” should feel at least as confident as China apparently does. The two biggest dangers for the United States are that America will lose its confidence, or that either side will assume that “winning” necessarily requires vanquishing the other.

Can a U.S.-China War Be Averted?
The two biggest dangers for the United States are that America will lose its confidence, or that either side will assume that “winning” necessarily requires vanquishing the other.
The National Interest · by Paul Heer · May 23, 2022
There is no dearth of commentators with ideas about, and proposals for dealing with, the downward spiral in U.S.-China relations. But former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd offers a unique perspective that merits considered attention. A genuine scholar of China who also has broad, deep, and close ties in both Beijing and Washington—without being either Chinese or American—is rare indeed. This allows him to speak frankly to both sides, which he does in The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China.
The purpose of the book, according to Rudd, is to “provide a joint road map to help these two great nations to navigate a common pathway to the future” and thus avert what Rudd correctly sees as a drift toward conflict. He is also correct in his diagnosis that “the worldviews now dominant in China and the United States are pushing the two countries toward war.” Rudd’s prescription is what he calls “managed strategic competition,” in which Beijing and Washington would pursue mutual understandings and rules of the road that allow them to keep their inevitable strategic rivalry within limits, while maximizing opportunities for cooperation where it obviously serves the interests of both countries.
Rudd fully acknowledges that this will be very difficult because of the “mutual non-comprehension” and “near-complete erosion of trust” between the United States and China. He also recognizes the domestic political constraints that will make it risky for leaders on either side to advocate restraint or anything that looks like accommodation or appeasement. But Rudd observes that the alternatives—including the current trajectory—only risk catastrophe.
One of the central themes of the book is the need for Beijing and Washington to overcome the cognitive trap in which they have put themselves by their failure to pursue mutual understanding or strategic empathy. This has facilitated both sides’ misattribution or exaggeration of each other’s ambitions and intentions. What is needed instead is a better appreciation by each side of how the other perceives and thinks about the world. “At a minimum,” Rudd states, “policy makers need to make a genuine attempt, free of ideological bias or self-delusion, to understand the prevailing ‘perception environment’ in each other’s capitals,” and to incorporate this into their strategic approach to the relationship.

Rudd is especially frank in issuing this call to Washington, partly because he was writing “for a mainly American audience.” He essentially says that the Chinese view of the United States is probably more accurate than the U.S. view of China: “While China’s understanding of modern America may be imperfect, it is more disciplined and sophisticated than what we find today among Washington’s political elites in their understanding of what actually makes China tick.” Rudd’s readiness as a foreigner to speak bluntly to his American friends and associates is similarly reflected in his characterization of U.S. policy toward China as having been “driven in recent years by a destabilizing mix of ill-considered strategic panic and domestic political opportunism.” As a result, “the policy appetite and political space for a more rational American approach [to China] remains limited.” This is harsh criticism, but not misplaced.
But Rudd directs no less attention and criticism toward China. Indeed, half of the book is an in-depth explication of “Xi Jinping’s worldview,” structured as “ten concentric circles of interest” (which Rudd compares to American psychologist Abraham Maslow’s classic “hierarchy of needs”). These begin with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) top priority of remaining in power and in control, and radiate out to encompass the CCP’s internal pursuit of economic and social stability, border security, and territorial integrity; and its external pursuit of regional and global influence, leverage, and security. The recurring theme that is most relevant to U.S.-China relations is Beijing’s view that it is contending with Washington on virtually all of China’s needs and priorities. This is because Chinese leaders see American contempt for the CCP, and what they interpret at Washington’s goal of regime change in Beijing, as the greatest threat to China’s internal stability. Similarly, they see (what they interpret as) a U.S. policy of containing China regionally and obstructing its power and influence globally as China’s primary external challenge. Rudd comprehensively outlines Xi’s strategy for confronting this perceived threat, which focuses on reinforcing the CCP’s domestic authority at home, while pursuing more activist and assertive policies abroad to score points against the United States and maximize China’s global position and clout.
Two key elements of Rudd’s discussion of Xi’s worldview and ambitions raise questions that are ripe for debate. The first is his focus on Xi personally, which is ambivalent or at least inconclusive on the extent to which Chinese foreign policy is a reflection of Xi’s own influence and preferences, or of drivers that transcend his leadership and predate his tenure. Rudd asserts that Xi “changed the course of China’s strategic relationship with the United States forever” when “back in 2014 ... he changed China’s grand strategy from an essentially defensive posture to a more activist policy seeking to advance Chinese interests and values across the region and the world.” But Beijing’s more activist and assertive posture was already in train under Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, who five years earlier had essentially announced Beijing’s retreat from Deng Xiaoping’s longstanding guidance for China to “hide its capabilities and bide its time.” Indeed, China scholar Rush Doshi—now working in Biden’s National Security Council—wrote last year that attributing China’s recent assertiveness to Xi’s personality is “a mistaken notion that ignores the longstanding party consensus in which China’s behavior is actually rooted.”
Rudd appears to acknowledge this when he observes that the “current state of the US-China relationship is the product of a long, complex, and contested history,” and that “in many respects, what Xi has done is intensify and accelerate priorities that have long been part of the party’s strategy.” On the other hand, Rudd asserts that Xi has “changed China’s world view” by “reinvigorating the party’s Marxist-Leninist foundations,” “turbo-charging” Chinese nationalism, and “sharpening ... the country’s national ambitions.” But these all build on earlier trends and characteristics of the CCP and its agenda. Rudd asserts that Xi “has seen the return of the party to the epicenter” of Chinese policymaking; made it “clear that the CCP has no intention of ever transforming China into a more liberal democratic state”; and revealed a determination to “establish a Chinese sphere of influence across the Eastern Hemisphere, and dilute—and eventually remove—America’s military presence from the wider region.” The CCP, however, arguably has never left the epicenter of Chinese policymaking or revealed any interest in liberal democracy; and Beijing’s pursuit of a regional sphere of influence at Washington’s expense has been apparent for decades. Xi no doubt is a bolder and more decisive leader than his immediate predecessors, and he has put a strong personal imprint on Beijing’s international behavior. It is nonetheless important to recognize that his world view and strategic priorities are in large measure inherited and reflect a longstanding consensus with the Chinese leadership. They have also been driven in part by changes in the external environment, including actions by the United States and other countries, that have unfolded before and since Xi took the helm.
Rudd does address one key strategic issue over which Xi’s personal proclivities could have a decisive impact: Taiwan. In Rudd’s analysis, “it seems increasingly likely that Xi will want to try to secure Taiwan during his political lifetime.” Specifically, Rudd speculates that Xi might want Beijing to have the military capability to seize Taiwan “as early as the late 2020s should he choose,” or least to have “sufficient military edge against the United States” to prompt a political settlement with Taipei. This is certainly conceivable, but it constitutes neither the establishment of a deadline for unification with Taiwan nor a decision to attack when the requisite military capability is achieved.
The second element of Rudd’s discussion of China’s strategic ambitions that invites debate is his characterization of Beijing’s long-term global objective. He is on solid ground when he asserts that “China’s global strategy is to increase its economic, foreign, and security policy influence across all regions,” and to do so in part by taking advantage of “the relative decline in American power” and “American complacency and lack of attention to the importance of its traditional friends and partners around the world.” It is also increasingly evident that Beijing seeks “a dilution of American power and the increase of its own” in the global order. Going further, China clearly is “challenging the political legitimacy and policy effectiveness of the Western liberal-democratic model” and seeking “a future order that is more accommodating of authoritarian political systems” and “much more conducive to [China’s] political, ideological, and economic interests.”
But Beijing’s end game becomes fuzzier when Rudd cites Xi’s goal of “rewriting the global rules-based order” and efforts “to change the nature of the order itself.” Rudd acknowledges that “it is less clear how much China actually wants to change things [and] at what pace,” and he doubts that Beijing has “a detailed blueprint of what a China-led international system would finally look like.” What he does not address is the core question of whether Beijing is approaching its competition with the United States as a zero-sum or winner-take-all game: whether China, as is widely claimed, aspires to supplant the United States as the leading global power and secure a Sino-centric world order. Many policy analysts and scholars think so, but on the basis of little conclusive evidence. Doshi argues that Beijing seeks to “displace” the U.S.-led order, but it is not entirely clear whether that means “replace.”
Rudd is also somewhat equivocal on this core issue. He observes correctly that China is working to “expand [its] influence across the existing institutions of global governance” and has taken the lead in establishing new institutions (like the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank) in which “China, not the United States, is the central organizing power.” He also notes that, in the crucial science and technology sector, Beijing is pursuing “long-term Chinese global influence and, if possible, dominance.” Perhaps most importantly, he notes that Xi sees “a new unfolding ideological struggle underway between state socialism and democratic capitalism, which China is determined to win.” At the same time, Rudd asserts that “at its heart, Beijing’s call is for a multipolar world” rather than a unipolar one. Most of the available evidence supports this assessment. This suggests that Beijing is focused more on maximizing its position and relative power and influence globally, rather than judging that it can and must become the global hegemon. Rudd is correct that Beijing has been promoting its development model and the “accumulated wisdom that China has to share from its experience.” But he omits Xi’s insistence that China will not impose its model on other countries or oblige them to copy it. In short, Beijing seeks to legitimize its governing model, but not to rule the world the way it does at home.
Rudd judges that the trend lines currently are in favor of China strengthening its position relative to the United States, but this is largely because he sees Beijing as having its act together better than Washington does. Indeed, he asserts that “America and the much of the collective West appear to have lost confidence in themselves, their mission, and their future.” It is for this reason that Rudd focuses on the need for the United States to demonstrate the “political resolve and strategic acumen” that will be necessary to meet the strategic challenge from China by rebuilding America’s economic and military power and reinvigorating its partnerships abroad. And Washington will only have the time, attention, and resources to focus on this self-restoration if it is able to avert conflict with China—which is where Rudd’s “managed strategic competition” comes in. Fortunately, he notes that Beijing has the same need and desire to focus on domestic priorities because China—like the United States—“does not at this stage welcome the adversarial strategic environment in which it finds itself.”
Rudd is not pollyannish about what “managed strategic competition” might yield. Indeed, he is downright dismissive of any potential for the revival of “strategic engagement” or “win-win cooperation” because “there has already been too much water under the bridge for that.” This, however, might be unduly pessimistic. Neither Beijing nor Washington should rule out the possibility of restoring a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship. There is in fact some overlap between Rudd’s proposal and Beijing’s advocacy a decade ago of a “new type of great power relations”—the substance of which is still inherent in China’s bilateral diplomacy and wish list. At the very least, it is premature or unnecessary at this stage to exclude the possibility of more positive outcomes.
It will nonetheless be a tall order for Beijing and Washington to accommodate each other with self-imposed constraints on their respective regional and international behavior. And it sounds illogical that they would agree to allow each other to focus on building their respective capabilities for their own long-term competition. But as Rudd persuasively observes, “that is the essential point.” Both sides would recognize that “managed competition” serves their interests because the only alternative is unmanaged competition—“with the loss of all strategic guardrails and the growing risk of crisis, conflict, or war.” The positive incentives for both sides also include the opportunity to reduce bilateral tensions, enhance cooperation in areas where it ultimately will be necessary, and allow the rivalry “to unfold relatively peacefully” rather than continue to escalate and become more hostile.
Rudd’s bottom line is exactly right: “In the world of ideas, systems, and governance, may the best team win.” And the “liberal-democratic-capitalist world” should feel at least as confident as China apparently does. The two biggest dangers for the United States are that America will lose its confidence, or that either side will assume that “winning” necessarily requires vanquishing the other.
Paul Heer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. He served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia from 2007 to 2015. He is the author of Mr. X and the Pacific: George F. Kennan and American Policy in East Asia (Cornell University Press, 2018).


16. Republicans plot foreign intervention pullback

No longer the party of national security.

Foreign intervention is a loaded term.  This faction wants to pull back forward presence, end alliances, and return the US to isolationism.


Republicans plot foreign intervention pullback
Axios · by Lachlan Markay · May 23, 2022
Republican lawmakers — following former President Trump's lead — are working with a wide range of conservative groups to pull back American support for Ukraine, the Middle East and Europe, officials tell us.
Why it matters: With the GOP poised to retake control of the House and perhaps the Senate next year, this contingent could grow substantially. Trump is backing candidates who've explicitly broken with Republican foreign policy orthodoxy.
Driving the news: Eleven Senate GOP "no" votes on a $40 billion Ukraine aid package last week was the clearest sign the new coalition's influence is expanding.
  • Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), who led the Senate opposition, huddled in his office with several of the coalition's key players before the House voted on the measure earlier this month.
  • They included representatives from the Koch political network, Cato Institute, populist-oriented group American Moment and the American Conservative magazine, according to a person who attended.
  • "Promoting a realist foreign policy agenda has always been a priority of Dr. Paul’s, which is why he has been holding meetings with interested groups and fellow members for years and will continue to do so in the future," a Paul spokesperson told Axios.
Why it matters: They discussed messaging and strategy on Ukraine but also U.S. foreign policy more generally.
  • The source described the atmosphere as upbeat, with Paul seeing the Ukraine vote as a catalyst for self-described "realist" elements in the party seeking to pull the U.S. back from deeper military involvement in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere.
  • It comes as the Biden administration escalates U.S. involvement in Somalia, a move that members of the new GOP coalition anticipate fighting.
Republican leadership has sought to downplay the influence of this new bloc of members pushing "restraint" in foreign policy, describing it as a marginal faction that still represents a small minority.
  • Its backers in Congress and in groups forming an outside policy infrastructure say they're more aligned with core Republican voters and donors, and, crucially, with Trump, a singular force in the party.
What they're saying: "We're going to come out on the back end of this — probably in a period of months, but certainly by 2024 — with a strong conservative and libertarian consensus about a more restrained, but still very robust, American foreign policy," said Kevin Roberts, who late last year took over as president of the conservative Heritage Foundation.
  • Objections to the Ukraine bill fell into three categories: strategic differences over America's policy role in world affairs, procedural objections to the bill's speedy passage through Congress and concerns the money could be better put to use domestically.
  • "Every Congressman had their own public reason for voting no, but I don’t think you would have seen this expanded coalition if it wasn’t for a genuine reassessment of American foreign policy happening in the Republican conference," one operative involved in the effort told Axios.
How we got here: Momentum for more restrained foreign posture grew out of the Trump administration — and is being sustained with systemic efforts.
Policy: Heritage is consciously shifting gears on foreign policy, with an eye toward less military involvement in Europe and more attention on China in particular, Roberts told Axios in an interview.
  • That aligns it with Koch's Stand Together and Concerned Veterans for America, and to a degree with more libertarian groups such as Cato and FreedomWorks.
  • Roberts said Heritage's rank and file donors have generally come down firmly on the restraint side of the foreign policy fight.
  • Newer organizations are also adding voices to that coalition. Former Trump budget director Russ Vought, a Heritage alum, was highly active in the Ukraine aid fight via his new organization, the Center for Renewing America.
Media: Tucker Carlson is considered the voice of the so-called realist right, and his top-rated Fox News primetime show routinely questions U.S. aid for Ukraine and foreign military entanglements more generally.
  • Former Trump strategist Steve Bannon is also an influential voice in the space.
  • The American Conservative's presence at the Paul meeting underscored its continued influence among those segments of the right. A newer publication, Compact, has also added an influential voice on the populist right.
Personnel: American Moment, founded in 2020, works to staff congressional offices — and potentially a future Republican administration — with more populist-oriented staffers.
  • The group organized a conference in March, dubbed Up From Chaos, that people in that camp described as a watershed moment for the coalition.
Fundraising: Tech mogul Peter Thiel is bankrolling political efforts for more populist candidates.
  • His highest-profile beneficiary, Republican Senate nominee J.D. Vance in Ohio, is a leading GOP critic of Ukraine aid efforts. Another Thiel-backed Senate candidate to watch is Republican Blake Masters in Arizona.
  • Sources also identified venture capitalist David Sacks as a key voice in the donor community. He gave the keynote speech at American Moment's conference in March.
Between the lines: In the context of Ukraine, this movement is skeptical of — or simply opposed to — greater U.S. commitments as the country battles a Russian invasion.
  • Members of the bloc say the Senate vote and its House companion's 57 Republican nays show its position is gaining steam. They point in particular to no votes from Sen. Roger Marshall (R-Kan.) and from Republican Study Committee chair Rep. Jim Banks, (R-Ind.), seen as a contender for House leadership.
  • In an emailed statement, Marshall cited the Biden administration's lack of strategic clarity. A Banks spokesperson referred Axios to a radio interview in which he said that $40 billion should instead go towards addressing domestic issues such as inflation and immigration.
What to watch: The new coalition's influence will soon be put to the test when the Senate votes on Finland's and Sweden's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
  • The measure is unlikely to draw nearly as much opposition as the Ukraine aid bill.
  • Heritage continues to support NATO expansion, and the America First Policy Institute, a nonprofit run by Trump alumni, has also backed the move by Finland and Sweden. Meanwhile, Vought's group, the Center for Renewing America, opposes the move.
The bottom line: The coalition nonetheless sees momentum. Dan Caldwell, vice president of foreign policy for Koch network group Stand Together, tells Axios, "I am expecting to see most of these groups heavily involved in future debates over NATO expansion, increasing America’s military presence in Europe, and ending our endless wars in Iraq, Syria and Somalia.
  • "We might not agree on every individual issue, but I think we all share a sense that the foreign policy that was dominant on the right prior to Trump was not making America safer and was becoming increasingly unpopular with the GOP base.”
Axios · by Lachlan Markay · May 23, 2022



17. Duterte hits Putin: I kill criminals, not children, elders


I wonder if his statements will be admissible in a criminal trial if he is ever tried for extrajudicial killings.

Duterte hits Putin: I kill criminals, not children, elders
AP · by JIM GOMEZ · May 24, 2022
MANILA, Philippines (AP) — Outgoing Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte sharply criticized Russian leader Vladimir Putin for the killings of innocent civilians in Ukraine, saying while the two of them have been tagged as killers, “I kill criminals, I don’t kill children and the elderly.”
Duterte, who openly calls Putin an idol and a friend, voiced his rebuke for the first time over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in remarks aired Tuesday where he blamed the three-month old war for the spike in global oil prices that has battered many countries, including the Philippines.
While stressing he was not condemning the Russian president, Duterte disagreed with Putin’s labeling of the invasion as a “special military operation,” and said it was really a full-scale war waged against “a sovereign nation.”
“Many say that Putin and I are both killers. I’ve long told you Filipinos that I really kill. But I kill criminals, I don’t kill children and the elderly,” Duterte said in a televised weekly meeting with key Cabinet officials. “We’re in two different worlds.”
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Duterte, who steps down on June 30 when his turbulent six-year term ends, has presided over a brutal anti-drugs crackdown that has left more than 6,000 mostly petty suspects dead. Human rights groups have cited a much higher casualty and say innocent people, including children, have been killed in the campaign that Duterte vows to continue up to his last day in office.
The unprecedentedly massive drug campaign killings have sparked an investigation by the International Criminal Court as a possible crime against humanity. Duterte has said he expects to face more lawsuits arising from the drug deaths when his presidency ends.
Duterte and his police officials have denied sanctioning extrajudicial killings in the campaign against illegal drugs but has openly threatened drug suspects with death and made an unsuccessful attempt to reimpose the death penalty in the largest Roman Catholic nation in Asia to deter drug dealers and other criminals.
When he took office in 2016, he reached out to Russia and China for trade and investment and to expand military cooperation while often criticizing the security policies of Washington, Manila’s longtime treaty ally.
He visited Russia twice in 2017 and 2019 to meet Putin but cut short his first visit after Islamic State group-aligned militants laid siege on the southern Philippine city of Marawi while he was away with his defense secretary and military chief of staff.
More than a week after Russian forces laid siege on Ukraine, the Philippines voted in favor of a U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning the Russian invasion. The Philippines appealed for the protection of civilians and public infrastructure in Ukraine, although Duterte held back from strongly criticizing Putin and said he would remain neutral in a conflict that could potentially lead to the use of nuclear weapons and spark WWIII.
Addressing Putin “as a friend” and the Russian Embassy in Manila, Duterte urged them to stop bombing and firing artillery rounds on residential areas and allow innocent civilians to safely evacuate before launching a bombardment.
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“You are in control of everything. Anyway, you really started the ruckus there so control your soldiers strictly. They are on a rampage,” Duterte said.
Duterte said he was concerned about the stability of his country’s oil supply as the war in Ukraine continues to rage and spark global instability.
“I’m on the way out and I don’t know how to solve the problem,” Duterte said. “You have to solve the war between Ukraine and Russia before we can talk of even returning to normalcy.”
AP · by JIM GOMEZ · May 24, 2022

18.  Why does the U.S. need a Disinformation Governance Board?

A lot is going on in this OpEd which is obviously critical of the apparently now dead board, the left, and Ms. Jankowicz and her views.

Why does the U.S. need a Disinformation Governance Board?
Download
Opinion 20:59, 23-May-2022
Why does the U.S. need a Disinformation Governance Board?
Updated 07:57, 24-May-2022
Keith Lamb

CFP
Editor's note: Keith Lamb is a University of Oxford graduate with a Master of Science in Contemporary Chinese Studies. His primary research interests are China's international relations and "socialism with Chinese characteristics." The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) attempt to create the Orwellian-sounding Disinformation Governance Board (DGB), whose stated goal is to "coordinate countering misinformation related to homeland security," is now on "pause." Ironically, the DHS claims this pause is due to a right-wing disinformation campaign which in turn led to the head of the embryonic board Nina Jankowicz resigning due to an online smear campaign.
According to the Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab, the abuse Jankowicz has faced follows a pattern typical of right-wing campaigns. Firstly, a person is identified as a villain; secondly, harassment is done through reputational harm; and thirdly, criticism remains un-contextualized.
However, this type of campaign is widespread when it comes to how U.S. citizens get their information. For example, I've argued that no matter what one's views are regarding the situation in Ukraine, analyzing it through the psychoanalytical lens, which reduces the entirety of Russia's actions to the "madness" of a single man, distorts the complexity of international relations and truth itself.
If Jankowicz is a moral actor then her stepping down from the DGB perhaps represents a "light-bulb moment." This is because her previous work history suggests that she must be well versed in state disinformation.
For example, she served at the National Democratic Institute funded by the National Endowment for Democracy which sponsors psychological operations previously carried out by the CIA. Then her work at StopFake.org, charged with countering disinformation, is also intriguing. This is because far from being independent it was founded by the U.S. government. According to The Nation, since 2018, it has been "aggressively whitewashing" neo-Nazi groups in Ukraine with track records of violence and war crimes.
Of course, it could be that Jankowicz, despite being in the belly of the disinformation beast, believes in her cause and, in turn, trusts wholeheartedly in "left-wing" disinformation. For example, according to the Washington Examiner, she defended the Hunter Biden laptop scandal as Russian disinformation. She also pushed the Russiagate story used to defame former President Donald Trump which, according to the Justice Department, has been denounced as a fraud concocted within the Democratic Party.
The White House in Washington, D.C., U.S. /CFP
The White House in Washington, D.C., U.S. /CFP
Many have pointed out that the DGB will have a hard time getting the go-ahead because the U.S. First Amendment, which protects freedom of speech, is ingrained within the American psyche. Under the U.S. system, with its "marketplace of ideas," media consumers choose what is right and wrong with a full spectrum of information make the "right decisions."
However, if even Jankowicz, an "expert on disinformation" is legitimately disinformed then this belief is a fallacy. If it was true, then U.S. citizens, those who labor, would be to blame for all sorts of U.S. calamities both at home and abroad. I for one will not stoop to blaming the ordinary citizen for millions of deaths due to illegal U.S. wars and neither will I blame them, the victims, for rotting U.S. infrastructure or homelessness.
Consequently, there isn't a marketplace of ideas, which produces the best results, but a monopoly of ideas which constrains thinking. This is evidenced in concentrated media ownership which, due to political funding, is captured by the oligarchy.
In addition, the narrow range of views that have been served up to the American citizen as diversity is tragic. For example, Jankowicz sees herself as "on the left" fighting right-wing and foreign disinformation. However, when it comes to international policy there is bipartisan support for U.S.-led wars whose foundation is disinformation.
With a docile media, even the terminology used for democratic struggle has been subverted. For example, “Left” is traditionally used on the side of labor against capital. However, it has now been perverted to represent an individualist culture war where "we fight amongst ourselves" while "they look on." In turn, this culture war diverts the energy of adroit thinkers from real mass emancipatory struggles into debates on personal pronouns and unfortunately, these “adroit” thinkers blindly accept the new constructed definitions of left and right.
All the while, Joe Biden's Democratic Party claims to be the party that represents the disinformed definition of "the left," while in the "monopoly of ideas" the truth of the working man is drowned out in the din and madness of mass media misinformation.
Indeed, the Democrats just like the Republicans represent capital. With this in mind, why would the Democrats need a Disinformation Governance Board to counter the right? Simply put, even within capital there are factions.
Trump, though a capitalist, was never enamored with transnational elements within his class that have taken hold of the U.S. and other Western states. By calling out their "fake news" he was clearly a thorn in their hegemonic side.
Thus, with the mid-term elections looming, the noose representing the "monopoly place of ideas" needs to be tightened even further to protect U.S. citizens from "another right-wing Russian disinformation campaign" which might, once again, "pervert the democratic outcome." This is why the DGB was needed.
(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com. Follow @thouse_opinions on Twitter to discover the latest commentaries in the CGTN Opinion Section.)




19. Ukrainian intelligence chief: Putin survived assassination attempt 2 months ago

Hmmm.. RUMINT? A strategic influence effort? I have not seen any credible reporting on this.

Ukrainian intelligence chief: Putin survived assassination attempt 2 months ago
aol.com · by AOL Staff
LONDON — The head of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin survived an assassination attempt two months ago.
Speaking to the Ukrainian news outlet Pravda Ukraine, Maj. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov said there was an “unsuccessful” attempt against the Kremlin leader’s life at the start of Russia’s brutal invasion of its neighbor.
“Putin was assassinated,” Budanov told the news outlet. “He was even attacked in the line of, as they say, representatives of the Caucasus not so long ago. This is nonpublic information. Absolutely unsuccessful attempt, but it really took place. … It was about two months ago.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin. (Mikhail Metzel, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)
Pravda said the full interview with the intelligence chief would air on Tuesday.
In an interview for the 2017 documentary series “The Putin Interviews” with director Oliver Stone, it was said that the Kremlin leader had escaped at least five assassination attempts.
Earlier this month, Budanov told Sky News he was “optimistic” about Russia’s defeat, suggesting that the loss would lead to Putin's removal from power by the end of the year.
“It will eventually lead to the change of leadership of the Russian Federation,” he said. “This process has already been launched.” When asked if a “coup” was underway, he told Sky News: “Yes. … They are moving in this way, and it is impossible to stop it.”

Kyrylo Budanov, Ukraine’s military intelligence chief. (uscc.org.ua)
According to Sky News, Budanov doubled down after it was suggested that he was spreading propaganda. “It’s my job, it’s my work — if not me, who will know this?” he said.
He added that since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, Russian forces’ military tactics have not changed, despite their shift in focus to eastern Ukraine.
“The breaking point will be in the second part of August,” he said. “Most of the active combat actions will have finished by the end of this year. As a result, we will renew Ukrainian power in all our territories that we have lost, including Donbas and the Crimea.”
Sky News noted that Budanov’s earlier prediction that Russia would invade this year — at a time when other officials were skeptical — had been correct.
_____
How are Ukrainian forces taking out so many Russian tanks? Use this embed to learn about some of the weapons systems the U.S. is sending to the Ukrainian army.
aol.com · by AOL Staff

20. US an empire of coercion

And article like this might justify for some the need for a Disinformation Governance Board.

From the China Daily.



US an empire of coercion
chinadaily.com.cn · by 单学英
An American flag flies outside of the US Capitol dome in Washington, US, Jan 15, 2020. [Photo/Agencies]
From Rome to Great Britain, every empire has assimilated the conquered with language, institutions and ideas, often by coercion, so that the conquered would be easier to rule over, and the empire's power and interest are maximized.
Similar is the tale of the United States of America. When the US found European gunboats blockading Venezuela's port in 1902, it couldn't sit idly by anymore, so it decided to exercise "international police power" in the Western Hemisphere and intervene in other country's internal affairs (Roosevelt Corollary 1904).
US policing whole world
Hegemony is not easy to manage. So for those who were too stubborn to accept its rule — Cuba, Iran, Syria, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Venezuela, and most recently, Russia — the US has resorted to harsh coercion including economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, or more directly, missiles, drones and marines. The tools of coercion may have varied, but Washington's goal has been consistent — inducing a major change in the target's political system so as to wipe out its strategic, diplomatic and economic ambitions. In this way, problems are solved once and for all and the "American Empire" is cemented.
In the past seven decades, the US has fought major wars in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Unhappy with the price and outcome of military options, sanction has become Washington's favorite tool of coercion. During former US president Barack Obama's first term, the US sanctioned on average 500 entities every year. During previous president Donald Trump's term, that number doubled.
Incumbent President Joe Biden has inherited this coercive diplomacy faithfully, and sanctioned Myanmar, Nicaragua and Russia during his first months in office.
Two months into the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the US has imposed more than 800 sanctions on Russia. Sanctions have officially become Washington's go-to option apart from military actions, and the Americans seem to be confident that they can coerce a major country into submission with the US' hegemonic power in the global economy and financial system.
It is even more remarkable that the Americans are using coercion to reinforce coercion. The US has made it clear that those who follow its sanctions are loyal friends, and those that attempt to judge the situation based on its merits are not "standing on the right side of history" and will be greeted with "severe consequences".
The actual efficacy of US coercion is a topic of debate, but its damage effects have been keenly felt by ordinary people in those countries targeted by the US. For instance, US embargo has cost Cuba roughly $130 billion (about one and a half times Cuba's annual GDP) in economic value over the past six decades, and studies have shown that the embargo "contributes to increasing health threats and the decline of some health indicators". As for US sanctions on Iran, they have led to a 42 percent annual inflation there, and more than one-third of Iranians are living below "the basic minimum of subsistence".
Despite the human and economic tolls, the term coercion wasn't considered negative in the US' dictionary. For a while, it was proudly branded as "an alternative to war", as we read about the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 in the many pages of study by Alexander George, who was among the first to put "coercive diplomacy" into theocratic framework in the early 1990s.
Until China came along.
From the Trump administration to the Biden administration, Washington's politicians have been using the term "coercion" to describe those moves by China that they don't like. China downgrading its diplomatic ties with Lithuania: coercion. China arresting Canadian spies: coercion. China protesting against the deployment of US high-tech weapons in the Republic of Korea: coercion.
Apparently, "coercion" has become a convenient word for US propaganda. The more China is associated with negative terms, the easier it is to garner support for the US' hostile China policy.
A truly independent and responsible observer would examine the nature of a state's actions, instead of going by just how they have been labeled.
There are essential differences between how the American and Chinese people do things. For one thing, Beijing's actions are defensive and proportional while the US' are offensive and coercive. Beijing downgraded its diplomatic relations with Lithuania in 2021, because the latter violated the one-China principle by allowing Taiwan to open a de facto embassy in Vilnius. Beijing's move was labeled by Washington and its allies as an act of "coercion".
Yet no matter how individual politicians try to present it, the meaning of the one-China principle is self-evident, and it has been written into UN resolutions, and the declarations between China and other countries while establishing diplomatic ties. In response to a violation of a legally-binding international agreement and in an effort to defend its territorial integrity, China's decision to downgrade diplomatic relations with Lithuania is highly proportional and legitimate.
Sanctions US' powerful weapon to coerce others

In 2018, the US recalled its top diplomats from the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama, and threatened to downgrade its diplomatic relations with those countries. Guess what? It also had something to do with Taiwan. Washington was angry that the three Central American countries had decided to establish diplomatic ties with Beijing, thereby cutting off their "official" relations with Taiwan. Which country those Central American countries choose to befriend is within the scope of their sovereignty and has nothing to do with the US.
Besides, establishing diplomatic ties with the only legitimate government of China endorsed by the UN and the overwhelming majority of countries should not be a move that calls for interference by the "big boss".
Yet Washington was so desperate to change the behavior of the three Central American countries that it even issued a threat to cut off assistance to them. Reducing development aid in retaliation to a sovereign decision — this has been a classic demonstration of asymmetrical reaction or, to use a simpler term, bullying.
Also, China takes actions within the confines of international agreement and institutions, while the US applies its domestic laws selectively all around the world regardless of legality.
Moreover, Australia has been crying out "Chinese coercion", because some in Canberra felt that the drop in its exports to China has something to do with its political statements regarding the tracing of COVID-19 origins and China's human rights. Here, the validity of such imagination is not to be examined, but how China did what it did is all on paper.
For Australian barley, wine sugar and other products, China conducted anti-dumping investigations and took actions according to World Trade Organization rules. Australia reacted by also utilizing WTO tools. Any party can take their grievances to an impartial arbitrator governed by international agreement. Isn't that the essence of how we run this anarchic world in a modern way?
But if a country somehow crosses the US, the consequences would be dire and there is no place to appeal except in US courts. The overwhelming majority of US sanctions have been authorized by domestic laws, which means US Congress has more sway in running global affairs than the UN, an institution with collective mandates of 193 sovereign states.
Every year since 1992, the UN General Assembly has voted overwhelmingly to pass a resolution demanding the US lift its illegal embargo on Cuba. Yet the embargo is yet to be fully lifted. This is a classic demonstration of the US' arbitrary enforcement of law or, in plain terms, bossiness.
I will leave it to the readers to decide which country uses coercion? And which is a bully?
The author is Beijing-based international observer.
The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
If you have a specific expertise, or would like to share your thought about our stories, then send us your writings at opinion@chinadaily.com.cn, and comment@chinadaily.com.cn.
chinadaily.com.cn · by 单学英


21. Ukraine war has pushed Japanese away from war-renouncing stance, political analyst says


More second and third order effects from Putin's War.

But this is also problematic for the Japan-US alliance:
There are also questions about U.S. reliability under President Joe Biden over the long term, Matsumura said.
"Trump made a great investment in defense. While he was not very skillful in managing alliances," the professor pointed out. "Biden is exactly the opposite. [Under Biden], nominally, the U.S. defense budget is increasing but considering inflation, it is shrinking."



Ukraine war has pushed Japanese away from war-renouncing stance, political analyst says
KEY POINTS
  • After the Russian aggression, if the Japanese government under Prime Minister Fumio Kishida were to work toward increasing the military budget, the majority of the Japanese public is now getting ready to accept that, an expert said.

  • He said there were questions about U.S. reliability under President Joe Biden over the long term because the U.S. defense budget is shrinking in real terms.
CNBC · by Ravi Buddhavarapu · May 24, 2022
The public mood in Japan is changing from being strongly pacifist to becoming more open to arming its military after the ongoing war in Ukraine, where Ukrainian tanks are here seen shortly before an attack in the Lugansk region in February.
Anatolii Stepanov | AFP | Getty Images
The public mood in Japan is changing, and people are now less opposed to Japan arming its self-defense forces after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a Japanese analyst told CNBC on Monday.
Japan is allowed to engage in military combat only if it's attacked first, according to Article 9 of the country's pacifist constitution, which was drawn up after the Second World War.
"After the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the public mood is changing. And if the Japanese government under Prime Minister Kishida were to work toward a more realistic stance and increase the military budget, the majority of the Japanese public is now getting ready to accept that," Masahiro Matsumura, professor at St. Andrew's University in Osaka told CNBC's "Squawk Box Asia."
"If not already, then it may take maybe six months to one year to change public opinion dramatically," said the professor of international politics, adding that public sentiment on the matter will be affected by the progress of the war in Ukraine.
However, a survey released by Kyodo News in early May, showed that the sentiment on amending Article 9 has remained unchanged from a year ago, despite growing concerns over regional security.
VIDEO2:3602:36
Professor discusses Biden's trip to Japan and South Korea relations
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February, there have been calls by members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and others to revise the law. Despite that, 48% disagreed to the revisions, while 50% said it was necessary — numbers similar to those from a year ago, the report said.
In a similar poll conducted last year, 51% were in favor of an amendment while 45% were against it.
U.S. reliability is a 'major concern'
There are also questions about U.S. reliability under President Joe Biden over the long term, Matsumura said.
"Trump made a great investment in defense. While he was not very skillful in managing alliances," the professor pointed out. "Biden is exactly the opposite. [Under Biden], nominally, the U.S. defense budget is increasing but considering inflation, it is shrinking."
Traditionally, the U.S. position has been to talk softly with a big stick but now it does not have "sufficient investment" in defense, Matsumura said. "Now, the U.S. is speaking tough without the big stick. That's the problem."
Biden is in Japan to meet leaders of the four-nation Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a security grouping which includes the United States, Japan, India and Australia.
On the Quad meeting being hosted by Japan, Matsumura said it will be necessary to "calibrate expectations" around the summit.
"Quad is just a security alliance without a military component. It is not a military alliance. So we get what we get," he said, adding that the Quad was a "soft check" on Chinese belligerence.
CNBC · by Ravi Buddhavarapu · May 24, 2022


22. How to Make Biden’s Free World Strategy Work

Excerpts:
A free-world strategy also has awkward implications for estranged autocratic partners. After all, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates do engage in transnational repression, weaponize surveillance technologies, and coerce their neighbors. Both have pulled closer to Russia and China, in part for economic reasons, in part because of a declining U.S. interest in Persian Gulf security, and in part because strongmen have an ideological affinity for other strongmen. Both countries still have long-standing, extensive ties to the United States, with whom they share an interest in containing Iran; their relationships with Washington are valuable enough that they won’t crumble overnight. But one possible upshot of a more starkly divided world is that the most important Gulf monarchies could end up on the other side.
Even if a green revolution eventually turns Riyadh and Abu Dhabi into has-beens—a big “if”—in the medium term this could lead to nasty strategic consequences in a region that still matters very much. For the time being, then, a free-world strategy can’t liberate the United States from ongoing engagement, and perhaps ticklish compromises, with key autocracies that have a foot in both camps.
Finally, Biden should answer a question he has avoided so far: How does this end? A free-world strategy doesn’t require a goal of regime change, although Biden’s ad-libbed comments about Putin haven’t clarified the issue. Democracies can moderate tensions with hostile autocracies, as détente showed during the Cold War. But if this is really a contest between countries with fundamentally different worldviews based on fundamentally different domestic orders, then such a détente will, once again, be temporary. The United States spent decades trying to draw Moscow and Beijing into the international system; now it must strengthen the free world around them, and reduce their ability to do harm, until their internal politics shift or their power fades. A free-world strategy can eventually produce a happy ending. But “eventually” may be a very long time.

How to Make Biden’s Free World Strategy Work
It’s Not as Simple as Pitting Democracy Against Autocracy
May 24, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Hal Brands · May 24, 2022
Crises illuminate the contours of world affairs, and the war in Ukraine has had a clarifying effect on the Biden administration’s approach to the world. Since taking office, U.S. President Joe Biden has argued that the struggle between democracy and autocracy is the defining clash of our time, even as critics and some members of his administration haven’t always agreed. For Biden, at least, the Russian invasion and the world’s response to it has proved that he was right all along.
In his State of Union address in early March, Biden described the war in Ukraine as a battle between freedom and tyranny. In Warsaw a few weeks later, in another speech replete with Cold War echoes, the president announced that Washington would lead the free world to victory in a great struggle “between democracy and autocracy, between liberty and repression, between a rules-based order and one governed by brute force.”
Biden has good reason to be hitting these themes hard. The Russian invasion has shown how deeply the struggle to shape global order is rooted in opposing conceptions of domestic order. It has clarified and intensified the struggle between advanced democracies and Eurasian autocracies. And it has given Biden’s foreign policy, which seemed headed for frustration if not outright failure just a few months ago, a new lease on life. Yet critics of the democracy-autocracy thesis aren’t wrong to argue that the world isn’t quite so simple. Winning this contest of systems will require crafting a strategy that takes these complexities into account.
Biden must first specify what Washington opposes—not the existence of autocracy but that combination of tyranny, power, and hostility that so threatens the United States and the international order it has built. He must then flesh out his concept of the “free world,” a familiar term that can be more flexible than it sounds. Finally, his administration must address four key problems that this framing implies. A free-world strategy can help Washington prevent this century from becoming an age of autocratic advantage—but it raises pointed questions about who’s in, who’s out, and how to navigate a world that is increasingly divided and stubbornly interdependent at the same time.
SECOND CHANCES
Biden’s foreign policy has unfolded in three stages. The first six months of the administration showcased bold ideas and big plans. Biden came into office stressing the ideological roots of great-power rivalry and the need to strengthen the cohesion and resilience of the democratic world. His administration soothed alliances that had been strained during the Trump era; it cultivated democratic cooperation on issues from semiconductor supply chains to stability in the western Pacific. Biden focused NATO and the Group of 7 on the China challenge; he raised the ambitions and expanded the activities of the Quad, a group that comprises Australia, India, Japan, and the United States; he pursued new schemes, such as the AUKUS security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, that connected democratic allies in creative ways. “America is back,” Biden claimed: a confident superpower was reasserting principled international leadership.

Then the next six months got very ugly. The ill-managed U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan delivered the citizens of that country to a brutal tyranny. Biden’s China agenda stagnated in the absence of any compelling trade policy for the Indo-Pacific; his “Asia first” approach foundered amid worsening tensions with Iran and Russia. The major democracy-themed initiative—the Summit for Democracy—was a glitchy, underwhelming Zoom meeting. Meanwhile, much of Biden’s domestic agenda—meant to build a “situation of strength” at home through ambitious reform—stalled in Congress while galloping inflation created domestic weakness instead.
Stage three initially looked even worse. By early 2022, U.S. officials were warning that Russian President Vladimir Putin would soon invade Ukraine and that he could easily conquer most of the country. In the run-up to the conflict, Washington adeptly revealed Russia’s plans through the rapid dissemination of sensitive intelligence. Yet it nonetheless struggled to deter Putin or secure transatlantic agreement on a punishing sanctions package, in part because of residual European skepticism that the assault would indeed occur. The administration was confronting the possibility that a frontline democratic state would be destroyed by an imperialist autocracy, creating cascading global insecurity and a pervasive sense that the dictators were on the march.
Yet Ukrainian resistance, Russian blunders, timely American support, and surprising European unity have saved that country—and with it, Biden’s foreign policy. Shocked by the brazenness of the attack, a transregional coalition of democracies slapped harsh sanctions on Putin. The United States and European allies turned the tables on Moscow, providing money, guns, and intelligence that helped Ukraine defend itself and take a terrible toll on the invaders. The world’s premier alliance of democracies, NATO, is strengthening its military capabilities and preparing to take on new members; countries in the Indo-Pacific are moving faster, if not fast enough, to meet the parallel challenge from China. Putin’s invasion produced greater unity and urgency among the advanced democracies than at any time in decades. It also has largely, but not wholly, vindicated Biden’s democracy-versus-autocracy framing.
A WORLD (MOSTLY) DIVIDED
The war in Ukraine has certainly confirmed that regime type is a crucial driver of international behavior. Russia’s policies flow from a witch’s brew of history, geopolitics, personality, and ideology, but autocracy and aggression undoubtedly go together in Putin’s regime. A democratic Russia would not feel so threatened by a democratic, Western-facing Ukraine. A consolidated, modern democracy would not systematically commit war crimes as an act of policy, seize and annex a neighbor’s territory, and lie, shamelessly and continuously, to its population and the world.
The war has also reminded us, therefore, how profoundly the world would change if it were run by revisionist autocracies. Yes, the hypocrisies of the liberal international order are legion; dictators have no monopoly on deception and coercion. Yet in a system that was not led by Washington or another democratic superpower, the aggressive, flagrantly acquisitive action Putin has taken in Ukraine, and that Beijing has taken in the South China Sea, would be far more common. Great-power predation—economic, diplomatic, military—would be the norm the world endures rather than the exception it has the luxury of criticizing. The type of global order a great power pursues is the outward projection of its political order at home.
The war, then, has both highlighted and deepened the fundamental global cleavage today—the clash between advanced democracies that are committed to the existing international order and the Eurasian autocracies trying to overturn it. Regional aggression is starting to elicit global democratic responses. The coalition that has sanctioned Russia includes not just the United States and Europe but also Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—just as European powers are asserting their interest in preventing China from dominating the western Pacific.
At the same time, the world’s two great autocracies are joining hands. A war that began weeks after Russia and China touted a relationship with “no limits” will surely produce an even tighter axis, since neither country, having alienated much of the democratic world, has anywhere else to go for now. And that, in turn, will further encourage democracies at both ends of Eurasia and beyond to cooperate in confronting an emerging illiberal coalition. Biden may say that Washington wishes to avoid a world of opposing blocs, but that is precisely the thrust of global events and U.S. policy.

Critics of the democracy-autocracy thesis aren’t wrong to argue that the world isn’t quite so simple.
Yet the “clash of systems” model doesn’t explain everything. If most advanced democracies have rallied, many developing democracies have not. India and Brazil have adopted a position of neutrality. Countries in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia have sought a middle ground. There are always specific reasons, such as India’s dependence on Russian arms or Brazil’s reliance on Russian fertilizer. Yet this new nonaligned movement is a reminder that many of the United States’ democratic brethren are choosing not to choose.
Moreover, the Biden administration is rediscovering its reliance on nondemocracies. Perhaps one day a green energy revolution will make the petrostates irrelevant, but for now Washington needs Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies to offset the energy shock the war has caused. Containing Russia and China will require the cooperation of countries—including Singapore, Turkey, and Vietnam—that are governed in illiberal ways. The United States isn’t opposed to all autocracies, and not all democracies are fully on its side.
Finally, the war in Ukraine has shown the perils of interdependence with hostile regimes—but that interdependence isn’t going away. The advanced democracies can brutalize Russia economically, but they can’t—at a tolerable cost—totally sever it from the world. They can’t, and shouldn’t, come anywhere close to a complete decoupling from China. Freedom-versus-tyranny rhetoric brings to mind a global landscape fully split in two. But we live in a world where two increasingly hostile camps cannot fully escape each other’s economic and technological embrace.
THE PYRAMID
If Biden intends to pursue a free-world strategy, his first task is to clarify what, exactly, the United States opposes. The answer is not autocracy per se, given that Washington must work with some illiberal regimes to check others. What the United States opposes is the marriage of tyranny, power, and hostility: those authoritarian regimes that have the intent and the ability to fundamentally challenge the existing international system, by exporting the violence and illiberalism they practice at home to the world.
This behavior can take the form of outright territorial aggression, whether blatant or subtle; it can involve economic and political coercion meant to distort the foreign policies and domestic politics of other nations. It can involve meddling and subversion that impairs the functioning of democratic societies, transnational repression that can chill basic liberties globally, or efforts to weaponize new technologies in ways that could drastically shift the balance of power or the balance of freedom and oppression. Different behaviors will, of course, merit different responses. But it is this combination of autocracy, capability, and aggressive conduct that the free world must organize itself to meet.
Which means that Biden must also better articulate the coalition he aims to rally. The free world is a Cold War–era concept making a comeback. The original phrase, though, was more malleable than we often remember. It included liberal democracies, friendly authoritarians, and states of various shades in between. Today, the free world is best thought of as a three-tiered coalition.
The United States will need different rhetoric for different audiences.
The first tier features the United States’ democratic treaty allies—the (mostly) liberal democracies that make up the Anglosphere, the transatlantic community, and the strongest links in the chain of U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific. This group features deep, institutionalized cooperation based on shared values as well as shared interests; it constitutes the core of any coalition to resist aggression, maintain democratic technological dominance, and otherwise thwart the autocratic challenge. And although U.S. alliances are organized regionally or bilaterally, they create preponderant global strength: including the United States, this group commands a majority of world GDP and military spending. The key, then, will be not simply enhancing capabilities and collaboration within existing alliances but also forging greater connections across them, as AUKUS has done.

The second tier includes democratic partners. These countries are often imperfectly or inconsistently aligned with the United States. They are far from wholly comfortable with American power. Yet they would surely be far less comfortable still in a world where expansionist autocracies had the advantage, so they will lend critical assistance on select matters.
India may be hesitant to break with Russia, but it is already a vital part of the geopolitical and technological balancing effort vis-à-vis China. Indonesia will increasingly cooperate with Washington on security issues, even as it maintains close commercial ties to Beijing. Ukraine and Taiwan are non-allies that constitute geopolitical bulwarks in crucial regions. Biden’s goal should be to further develop institutions and arrangements, such as the Quad or various tech alliances, that enhance the overall power of the free world by thickening the connective tissue between its first and second tiers.
The third tier consists of comparatively benign autocracies—illiberal countries that still support an international system led by a democratic superpower. Admittedly, efforts to draw distinctions between good and bad dictators have a sordid lineage. But certain autocracies do depend on an open, U.S.-led global economy; occupy strategic geography that leaves them vulnerable to Beijing or Moscow and thus dependent on Washington; or are otherwise deeply wired into the existing system. These countries, such as Vietnam and Singapore, will work with the United States on a transactional basis, to thwart more extreme forms of autocratic aggression. But their dealings with democracies will be more attenuated when it comes to human rights, the future of the Internet, and other governance issues.
ROCKY ROAD TO … WHERE?
A free-world strategy can thus be principled without being absolutist or self-defeating. It offers a plausible rationale for working with some autocrats against others. And it packs a strategic punch: a free-world coalition can allow the United States and its friends to marshal a decisive superiority on critical issues. Nonetheless, challenges abound.
The first involves managing interdependence in a fragmenting world. The goal here should be not to fully unwind those ties but to ensure that the terms of interdependence favor the free world. This will require selective decoupling—denying Chinese firms access to investment and high-tech inputs, for instance, or increasing Europe’s freedom of action by weaning it off Russian energy supplies. More important will be increasing the commercial, financial, and technological cohesion of the free world, to accelerate its growth and innovation and decrease its vulnerability to autocratic coercion. This is urgent: China is racing to reduce its susceptibility to international economic pressure, in recognition that the terms of interdependence may determine the balance of leverage in a crisis.
A separate challenge is engaging ambivalent, democratic partners, countries that cooperate with Washington on concrete issues but don’t particularly like the free-world model. The United States will need different rhetoric for different audiences: self-determination and freedom of geopolitical choice may sell better than democracy-versus-tyranny in Africa or Southeast Asia. Washington should carefully prioritize what it needs from these partners, whose choice of 5G telecommunications provider may be more important than their position on Ukraine. Yet Biden must also exploit opportunities the war has provided.
India’s strategy of using Russian arms to protect itself against China is now bankrupt: if Moscow is crippled by conflict and sanctions, and ever more dependent on Beijing, then it can’t or won’t provide Delhi with the military equipment it might need in a crisis. By helping India reduce its reliance on Russian military gear, the United States and other democratic countries can also reduce India’s incentives for hedging over time.
A free-world strategy can be principled without being absolutist or self-defeating.
A free-world strategy also has awkward implications for estranged autocratic partners. After all, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates do engage in transnational repression, weaponize surveillance technologies, and coerce their neighbors. Both have pulled closer to Russia and China, in part for economic reasons, in part because of a declining U.S. interest in Persian Gulf security, and in part because strongmen have an ideological affinity for other strongmen. Both countries still have long-standing, extensive ties to the United States, with whom they share an interest in containing Iran; their relationships with Washington are valuable enough that they won’t crumble overnight. But one possible upshot of a more starkly divided world is that the most important Gulf monarchies could end up on the other side.

Even if a green revolution eventually turns Riyadh and Abu Dhabi into has-beens—a big “if”—in the medium term this could lead to nasty strategic consequences in a region that still matters very much. For the time being, then, a free-world strategy can’t liberate the United States from ongoing engagement, and perhaps ticklish compromises, with key autocracies that have a foot in both camps.
Finally, Biden should answer a question he has avoided so far: How does this end? A free-world strategy doesn’t require a goal of regime change, although Biden’s ad-libbed comments about Putin haven’t clarified the issue. Democracies can moderate tensions with hostile autocracies, as détente showed during the Cold War. But if this is really a contest between countries with fundamentally different worldviews based on fundamentally different domestic orders, then such a détente will, once again, be temporary. The United States spent decades trying to draw Moscow and Beijing into the international system; now it must strengthen the free world around them, and reduce their ability to do harm, until their internal politics shift or their power fades. A free-world strategy can eventually produce a happy ending. But “eventually” may be a very long time.

Foreign Affairs · by Hal Brands · May 24, 2022


23. How to Build Putin a Gilded Bridge Out of Ukraine


Conclusion:
If Ukraine ultimately emerges as a stable democracy, rebuilt with billions of dollars in foreign funds and frozen Russian assets, bonded together by narratives of a great patriotic war, then the country will stand as a living testament to Putin’s recklessness. Ukraine will be a beacon of freedom, and its heroic resistance may dissuade other countries from acts of aggression. And memories of a failed war in Russia could spur doubts about the Kremlin’s judgment that, in time, undermine Putin’s regime—just as Afghanistan helped bring down the Soviet system.
How to Build Putin a Gilded Bridge Out of Ukraine
The Lessons of the Soviet Retreat from Afghanistan
May 24, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Dominic Tierney · May 24, 2022
On February 15, 1989, Soviet General Boris Gromov walked across the Friendship Bridge from Afghanistan into the Soviet Union, where he was greeted by Soviet television cameras and given a bouquet of red carnations. After a decade-long war in Afghanistan, Gromov was officially the last Soviet soldier to leave the country. Moscow used his choreographed walk to signal that the mission had been successful and to highlight its orderly departure, one that stood in stark contrast to the final days of the Vietnam War, when Americans desperately clambered onto helicopters to escape Saigon.
But it was a charade. Gromov had spent the previous night at a hotel in the Soviet Union and traveled to Afghanistan only to stage the exit. In the end, the theatrics fooled hardly anyone, including within the Soviet Union itself. The country’s war in Afghanistan was supposed to be rapid: Moscow had planned to quickly install a new regime more friendly to its interests and then depart. Instead, the long intervention provoked a brutal counterinsurgency campaign that led to 14,000 official Soviet fatalities (the true figure is probably much higher). Moscow did install a new government in Kabul, but it was deeply unstable.
Ultimately, this failure discredited the entire Soviet system and encouraged domestic reforms that helped collapse the state. The war helped drive a wedge between the Soviet military and the people, spurring anti-military and anti-draft protests in Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and elsewhere. In 1992, Edward Shevardnadze, the former Soviet minister of foreign affairs and a key architect of perestroika and glasnost, described the decision to leave Afghanistan as “the first and most difficult step” in the reform process. “Everything else flowed from that.”
Thirty-three years after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, Russia finds itself in another destructive and unwinnable conflict. It is now clear that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s original objective in Ukraine—overthrowing the country’s government and replacing it with a pliant proxy regime—is unattainable. Ukraine will continue to exist as an independent state, and it will be more pro-Western than ever. Rather than weakening NATO, Russia’s war has reinvigorated the alliance while isolating its own economy. Tens of thousands of Russian soldiers have already been slain and injured in the invasion, which is becoming a grinding war of attrition.
Ukraine, however, is also suffering from the war, as thousands of its residents are killed while its economy collapses. Other parts of the world are struggling with the ripple effects of the conflict, including influxes of refugees and grain shortages. The ongoing catastrophe has led some Western commentators to call for a negotiated solution to the war that could grant Putin significant material concessions in exchange for a Russian withdrawal, such as expanded and formalized Russian control of the Donbas region—offering Moscow what the military theorist Sun Tzu called a “golden bridge” out of the conflict. Critics, meanwhile, decry any talk of an off-ramp for Putin as an act of appeasement and a reward for Russia’s brutal atrocities that will only embolden the autocrat to engage in further aggression. As they see it, there is no substitute for a total Ukrainian victory.

The story of how the Soviet Union left Afghanistan suggests that both pathways are possible—the West can craft a negotiated settlement and give Ukraine a decisive win. In the late 1980s, the United States agreed to let Moscow have face-saving concessions to get Soviet troops out of Afghanistan. But these were deliberately hollow and did little to mask what was a clear defeat. Today, the West and Ukraine can offer Moscow superficial gains as an incentive to withdraw while working to entrench the image of Russian failure and weaken Putin’s political position. The West should, in other words, build Putin not a golden bridge but a gilded bridge: a path out of the war that is attractive enough for Kremlin to end the fighting but in time comes to be seen as cheap and tawdry. The result might not be the climatic win that hawks envision: Ukrainian soldiers may not chase bedraggled Russian troops out of the Donbas. But it will nonetheless be a substantive victory for Kyiv.
THE STORY OF SUCCESS
Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion, every party in the conflict has tried to shape perceptions about who is winning and losing. As Kyiv resisted Russian advances, Ukraine and its Western allies have crafted a narrative of Ukraine as a plucky and surprisingly triumphant underdog. U.S. President Joe Biden recently said that “the battle of Kyiv was a historic victory for the Ukrainians” and “a victory for freedom.” Meanwhile, Moscow has claimed that the war is going according to plan and highlighted the supposed valor of its forces in the Donbas. After meeting with Putin in April, Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer said that the Russian leader “believes he is winning the war.”
It’s easy to see why both sides are aggressively promoting their storylines. Narratives of victory and defeat—whether true or false—can affect soldiers’ morale and public backing for war, shape battlefield outcomes, and determine the fate of leaders. In the coming years, it will be far easier to sustain NATO’s newfound cohesion if the alliance is seen as having succeeded in Ukraine. The political careers of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and perhaps some Western leaders may be tied to perceptions of whether Ukraine wins or loses. Crucially, Putin’s future may hinge on the outcome of his war, which is his biggest and riskiest political decision. In 1962, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was widely seen as the loser in the Cuban missile crisis. Partially as a result, he was toppled from power two years later.
The most obvious Western strategy might then be to single-mindedly focus on portraying Russia as the loser in Ukraine. But this approach risks needlessly prolonging the war. Putin cannot tolerate humiliation, and his overarching aim—more than capturing Ukrainian territory or even toppling the regime in Kyiv—is to restore a sense of Russian glory and pride and preserve his personal brand as a winner. He is not the first leader to fight with this motivation; great powers often prosecute wars to avoid the appearance of losing. In 1965, for example, a U.S. government memo said the United States fought in Vietnam “70%—to avoid a humiliating US defeat.” The West may therefore need a more dexterous approach to end the war.

The Kremlin’s failed war in Afghanistan imposed massive costs on a struggling empire.
History shows that it’s possible to craft peace terms that allow powerful countries to end failing wars with a modicum of dignity, but nevertheless in clear defeat. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is perhaps the foremost example. The 1988 Geneva Accords created a timetable for Soviet withdrawal in which the signatories and guarantors agreed to let Afghanistan’s communist regime stay in power—so there was, as one Soviet official put it, a “decent interval” between Moscow’s departure and the final collapse in Kabul. This enabled Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to claim that Soviet troops had succeeded in their mission to stabilize Afghanistan and produce national “reconciliation.” Widespread international involvement in the accords also allowed Moscow to emphasize the role of the United Nations in its exit strategy and cast the Soviet departure as an attempt to renew the international organization. The Red Army then left in good order: the withdrawal took only nine months and ended ahead of schedule. Soviet officials made it look like they were in control.
They weren’t. The Afghan regime temporarily survived, but it was clear to everyone that it wouldn’t stay in power forever. (The government in Kabul eventually collapsed in 1992.) The United States, one of the guarantors of the accords, conceded little of substance and retained the right to arm the Afghan rebels. Hardliners in Washington, who wanted to see Moscow indefinitely bogged down in Afghanistan, opposed even a face-saving agreement. But they were ultimately defeated by U.S. “dealers,” who were willing to offer symbolic concessions to get Moscow out and knew that the war would still be widely seen as a Soviet debacle. Their assessment proved correct. There was no peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. Thousands of Soviet troops had died for nothing. In 1988, Gorbachev bluntly told the Politburo that the Soviet Union had “lost in Afghanistan.”

The Kremlin’s failed war imposed massive material and psychological costs on a struggling empire. The campaign undermined morale and cohesion in the Soviet military—the country’s most important institution. Soviet troops had entered Afghanistan as supposedly worthy successors to the World War II generation, only to play, as one soldier put it, “the role of the Germans.” Veterans (the Afgantsy) grew embittered by the lack of postwar care they received and their neglect in official media, and they organized to spread narratives about how brutal the war really was. The defeat also undermined the Soviet system more broadly. In Moscow, the war discredited the use of force as a tool to hold the Soviet bloc together, and outside Moscow, the campaign showed that the Soviet Army was beatable and emboldened non-Russian republics to pursue independence. As the political economist Rafael Reuveny and political scientist Aseem Prakash wrote, Afghanistan was “one of the key causes” of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
THE ILLUSION OF VICTORY
Afghanistan and Ukraine are, of course, different wars, and they are taking place in different political contexts. Gorbachev was a reformer who sought to improve relations with the West and liberalize his country. Putin is almost the complete opposite: a revanchist authoritarian determined to concentrate power and remake the world through force.
But there are important parallels. In both cases, a sclerotic and overconfident Kremlin invaded a neighbor, fought a war that officially did not exist (the Afghan invasion was named the “Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan”), faced a resolute adversary backed by Western arms, and had to improvise a larger and costlier campaign than expected. Eventually, in the 1980s, the Soviet Union was forced to negotiate. As the casualties and other costs in Ukraine rise, Putin may also have to come to the table. Meanwhile, unless the Russian military completely collapses, Kyiv will need to concede some of its maximal goals—Moscow’s withdrawal from Crimea and the Donbas and massive Russian reparations—if it wants the war to end.
The terms of peace in Ukraine will, of course, primarily be up to Kyiv. But the West should also think about how it can help craft an agreement that will facilitate Putin’s exit while ensuring both a real and perceived Ukrainian win. This means distinguishing between meaningful and superficial concessions while considering how gains and losses could shape future narratives of victory and defeat. Western leaders cannot, for instance, pressure Ukraine to cede its territorial integrity and the right to strong armed forces, nor should it deprive the country of a road to membership in the European Union. But the West can encourage Kyiv to acquiesce on symbolic issues that will create a gilded bridge to get Russia out.

As the casualties and other costs in Ukraine rise, Putin may have to come to the table.
NATO, for example, has no plans to admit Ukraine, and so Kyiv could pledge to shelve its aspirations to join the alliance—something it has suggested it is open to doing. This would allow Putin to declare that he has, in some sense, stopped NATO (even as the alliance likely expands elsewhere). Similarly, Kyiv could “demilitarize” by promising not to host foreign bases, which it already has no intention of accommodating. Moscow has made far-fetched claims that it launched its special military operation to prevent an attack on Russia from Ukraine, and Kyiv may agree to mutual security guarantees to prevent attacks on both Ukraine and Russia as part of a broader deal.
The Russian president has declared that his invasion was necessary to stop Ukraine from committing a “genocide” against its Russian-speaking residents. In response, Ukraine could enact new measures that safeguard the rights of Russian speakers or other minorities. This shouldn’t be hard for Kyiv. Most Russian-speaking Ukrainians back the Ukrainian war effort, and such measures would be consistent with the European Union’s commitment to protecting minorities—and therefore worthwhile if Ukraine wants to join the institution. International actors such as the European Union, as well as non-Western powers like China, could play an important role in making a Ukrainian settlement palatable to Moscow. Historically, the Kremlin has been more willing to make deals when they are crafted in forums that highlight Russia’s great-power status, such as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which helped stabilize European security, or the 1988 Geneva Accords.
The West might consider a peace deal that leaves Russian proxies in charge of parts of the Donbas while preserving the right of Western states to continue supplying Kyiv with weapons, much as the United States allowed the communist regime in Afghanistan to temporarily stay in charge even after the Soviets withdrew. The Ukrainian government may eventually retake all or part of its eastern territories. But like in Afghanistan, this will come after a decent interval, allowing Moscow to blame local separatists for defeat.

The West doesn’t need to humiliate Russians to achieve its aims.

Even light concessions to Putin may be tough to swallow, given the brutality of Russia’s war. Building a gilded bridge in Ukraine may lack the emotional satisfaction of trying to rout Russian troops, much as letting the Soviet Union calmly walk away from Afghanistan did not appeal to hardliners in the United States. But humiliating Russia is likely to backfire. Nations that feel disrespected often choose aggression to redress an emotional loss. The punitive Treaty of Versailles, for example, fueled the rise of Adolf Hitler. Ukraine should avoid shaming the Russian nation for the sake of it, such as by marching Russian prisoners before cameras or burning the Russian flag. It should allow Russian troops to leave Ukraine in good order as part of a peace deal. The defeat should be seen as a failure of Putin and his system rather than the Russian people at large.
The West, after all, doesn’t need to humiliate Russians to achieve its aims. Symbolic concessions will not stop the war from being widely seen as a defeat for Putin—including within Russia itself. Putin controls the Russian media, and he will declare victory no matter what happens. But Russians cannot forever be blinded to the stark costs of the invasion, and they will slowly come to realize that they have lost thousands of soldiers for no real gains. Russians will feel the massive economic damage wrought by global isolation, and they will be aware that the war pushed Finland and Sweden to join NATO. Indeed, there are already signs of mistrust within Russia about official narratives. After Ukraine sank the Russia Black Sea flagship Moskva, Moscow claimed that no Russians (or at most one) had died. The parents of missing sailors nonetheless expressed anger and grief.
If Ukraine ultimately emerges as a stable democracy, rebuilt with billions of dollars in foreign funds and frozen Russian assets, bonded together by narratives of a great patriotic war, then the country will stand as a living testament to Putin’s recklessness. Ukraine will be a beacon of freedom, and its heroic resistance may dissuade other countries from acts of aggression. And memories of a failed war in Russia could spur doubts about the Kremlin’s judgment that, in time, undermine Putin’s regime—just as Afghanistan helped bring down the Soviet system.
Foreign Affairs · by Dominic Tierney · May 24, 2022

24. Defeating Putin Is the Only Route to Peace in Ukraine

Conclusion:

Military loss could create a real opening for national self-examination or for a major change, as it so often has done in Russia’s past. Only failure can persuade the Russians themselves to question the sense and purpose of a colonial ideology that has repeatedly impoverished and ruined their own economy and society, as well as those of their neighbors, for decades. Yet another frozen conflict, yet another temporary holding pattern, yet another face-saving compromise will not end the pattern of Russian aggression or bring permanent peace.
Defeating Putin Is the Only Route to Peace in Ukraine
Offering the Russian president a face-saving compromise will only enable future aggression.
The Atlantic · by Anne Applebaum · May 23, 2022
The expression off-ramp has a pleasing physicality, evoking a thing that can be constructed out of concrete and steel. But at the moment, anyone talking about an off-ramp in Ukraine—and many people are doing so, in governments, on radio stations, in a million private arguments—is using the term metaphorically, referring to a deal that could persuade Vladimir Putin to halt his invasion. Some believe that such an off-ramp could easily be built if only diplomats were willing to make the effort, or if only the White House weren’t so bellicose. It’s a nice idea. Unfortunately the assumptions that underlie that belief are wrong.
The first assumption is that Russia’s president wants to end the war, that he needs an off-ramp, and that he is actually searching for a way to save face and to avoid, in French President Emmanuel Macron’s words, further “humiliation.” It is true that Putin’s army has performed badly, that Russian troops unexpectedly retreated from northern Ukraine, and that they have, at least temporarily, given up the idea of destroying the Ukrainian state. They suffered far greater casualties than anyone expected, lost impressive quantities of equipment, and demonstrated more logistical incompetence than most experts thought possible. But they have now regrouped in eastern and southern Ukraine, where their goals remain audacious: They seek to wear down Ukrainian troops, wear out Ukraine’s international partners, and exhaust the Ukrainian economy, which may already have contracted by as much as half.
Buoyed by oil and gas revenues, the Russian economy is experiencing a much less severe recession than Ukraine. Unconcerned by public opinion, the Russian army seems not to care how many of its soldiers die. For all of those reasons, Putin may well believe that a long-term war of attrition is his to win, not just in southern and eastern Ukraine but eventually in Kyiv and beyond. Certainly that’s what Kremlin propagandists are still telling the Russian people. On state television, the Russian army is triumphant, Russian soldiers are protecting civilians, and only Ukrainians commit atrocities. With a few minor exceptions, no one has prepared the Russian public to expect anything except total victory.
The second assumption made by those advocating off-ramps is that Russia, even if it were to begin negotiating, would stick to the agreements it signed. Even an ordinary cease-fire has to involve concessions on both sides, and anything more substantive would require a longer list of pledges and promises. But brazen dishonesty is now a normal part of Russian foreign policy as well as domestic propaganda. In the run-up to the war, senior Russian officials repeatedly denied that they intended to invade Ukraine, Russian state television mocked the Western warnings of invasion as “hysterical,” and Putin personally promised the French president that no war was coming. None of that was true. No future promises made by the Russian state, so long as it is controlled by Putin, can be believed either.
Nor does Russia seem to be interested in adhering to multiple treaties it is theoretically obligated to follow, among them the Geneva Convention and the United Nations’ Genocide Convention. Russian troops’ behavior in this war demonstrates that there is no international agreement that Putin can be counted on to respect. Regardless of what he might promise during peace negotiations, Western officials would have to assume that any Ukrainian populations handed over to Russia would be subject to arrests, terror, mass theft, and rape on an unprecedented scale; that Ukrainian cities would be incorporated into Russia against the will of the public; and that, as in 2014, when Russian proxies in the Donbas agreed to a truce, any cease-fire would be temporary, lasting only as long as it would take for the Russian army to regroup, rearm, and start again. Putin has made clear that destroying Ukraine is, for him, an essential, even existential, goal. Where is the evidence that he has abandoned it?
The third assumption is that this Ukrainian government, or any Ukrainian government, is politically able to swap territory for peace. To do so would be to reward Russia for invading, and to accept that Russia has the right to kidnap leaders, murder civilians, rape women, and deport anybody it chooses from Ukrainian territory. What Ukrainian president or prime minister can agree to that deal and expect to stay in office? Russian cruelty also means that any territory that is temporarily ceded will, sooner or later, become the source of an insurgency, because no Ukrainian population can promise to endure that kind of torture indefinitely. Already, guerrillas in the city of Melitopol, occupied since the first days of the war, claim to have killed several Russian officers and carried out acts of sabotage. An underground is emerging in occupied Kherson and will appear in other places too. To concede territory for a deal now will simply set up another conflict later on. The end of one kind of violence will lead to other kinds of violence.
This does not mean that the war can or should go on forever, or that diplomacy has no place at all. Nor does it mean that Americans and Europeans should be blind to the real challenges that a long conflict will pose to Ukraine. The Western coalition backing Kyiv could certainly fray; the wave of adrenaline that has so far propelled the Ukrainian army and leadership could crash. Ukraine’s economy could grow worse, making the fight much harder or even impossible to sustain.
But even so, off-ramp remains the wrong metaphor and the wrong goal. The West should not aim to offer Putin an off-ramp; our goal, our endgame, should be defeat. In fact, the only solution that offers some hope of long-term stability in Europe is rapid defeat, or even, to borrow Macron’s phrase, humiliation. In truth, the Russian president not only has to stop fighting the war; he has to conclude that the war was a terrible mistake, one that can never be repeated. More to the point, the people around him—leaders of the army, the security services, the business community—have to conclude exactly the same thing. The Russian public must eventually come to agree too.
Defeat could take several forms. It might be military: The White House should now increase not just the level but the speed of its assistance to Ukraine; it should provide the long-range weapons needed to take back occupied territory and perhaps also assistance with quicker distribution of those weapons. Defeat could be economic, taking the form of a temporary gas-and-oil embargo that finally cuts Russia off from the source of its income, lasting at least until the war ends. Defeat could involve the creation of a new security architecture, one based on new kinds of security guarantees for Ukraine, or even some type of NATO membership for Ukraine. Whatever form that takes, it has to be substantially different from the 1994 Budapest memorandum, in which Ukraine was offered security “assurances” that meant nothing at all.
Defeat could also include broader sanctions, not just on a few select billionaires but on the entire Russian political class. The Anti-Corruption Foundation led by the jailed Russian dissident Alexei Navalny has drawn up a list of 6,000 “bribe-takers and warmongers”—that is, politicians and bureaucrats who have enabled the war and the regime. The European Parliament has already called for sanctions on that group. If others follow, maybe some in the ruling elite will finally be persuaded to start looking for new jobs, or at least start talking about how to make changes.
Although saying so is considered undiplomatic, the American administration clearly knows that the defeat, sidelining, or removal of Putin is the only outcome that offers any long-term stability in Ukraine and the rest of Europe. “Putin,” said Joe Biden in March, “cannot remain in power.” In April, Lloyd Austin said that he hoped “to see Russia weakened to the degree it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.” Both of these statements by the American president and his defense secretary were treated as gaffes or as policy mistakes—thoughtless remarks that might irritate the Russians. In truth, they were half-articulated acknowledgments of an ugly reality that no one wants to confront: Any cease-fire that allows Putin to experience any kind of victory will be inherently unstable, because it will encourage him to try again. Victory in Crimea did not satisfy the Kremlin. Victory in Kherson will not satisfy the Kremlin either.
I understand those who fear that, confronted with an impending loss, Putin will seek to use chemical or nuclear weapons; I worried the same at the start of the war. But the retreats from Kyiv and Kharkiv indicate that Putin is not irrational after all. He understands perfectly well that NATO is a defensive alliance, because he has accepted the Swedish and Finnish applications without quibbling. His generals make calculations and weigh costs. They were perfectly capable of understanding that the price of Russia’s early advances was too high. The price of using tactical nuclear weapons would be far higher: They would achieve no military impact but would destroy all of Russia’s remaining relationships with India, China, and the rest of the world. There is no indication right now that the nuclear threats so frequently mentioned by Russian propagandists, going back many years, are real.
By contrast, a true defeat could force the reckoning that should have happened in the 1990s, the moment when the Soviet Union broke up but Russia retained all of the trappings and baubles of the Soviet empire—its UN seat, embassies, diplomatic service—at the expense of the other ex-Soviet republics. The year 1991 was the moment when Russians should have realized the folly of Moscow’s imperial overreach, when they should have figured out why so many of their neighbors hate and fear them. But the Russian public learned no such lesson. Within a decade, Putin, brimming with grievances, had convinced many of them that the West and the rest of the world owed them something, and that further conquests were justified.
Military loss could create a real opening for national self-examination or for a major change, as it so often has done in Russia’s past. Only failure can persuade the Russians themselves to question the sense and purpose of a colonial ideology that has repeatedly impoverished and ruined their own economy and society, as well as those of their neighbors, for decades. Yet another frozen conflict, yet another temporary holding pattern, yet another face-saving compromise will not end the pattern of Russian aggression or bring permanent peace.
The Atlantic · by Anne Applebaum · May 23, 2022

25. Quad summit outlines wider Indo-Pacific ambitions

Excerpts:

And the Quad may soon get another member – a development that would require a name change for the grouping. New South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, who was elected last month, has announced that he wishes to join Quad working groups – a preliminary to applying for membership.

New Zealand and Vietnam are also potential new members. According to one expert, two related but opposed dynamics are driving this hurricane of paper signing: A rising China and a wobbling America.

“More than anything else, it is China’s behavior – in the South China Sea, in contested regions with South Korea and Japan – that has caused states in the region to rethink their security and that means working with their main partner, the US, but also looking at other options and partners,” said Roberston.

“But US behaviors under Donald Trump also gave everyone a scare – so the entire region is, I guess, concerned about the future.”


Quad summit outlines wider Indo-Pacific ambitions
Quad grouping is still big on talk and short on action but its outreach to potential new members speaks volumes to China

asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · May 24, 2022
SEOUL – The leaders of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, met today in Tokyo, the second formal meeting of the US-led grouping that ultimately seeks to counter China’s rise and influence.
There were photo ops a-plenty as Australia’s newly minted Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and US President Joe Biden took part in a four-way meeting and a series of bilaterals on the sidelines.
The meeting follows hot on the heels of a shock statement Biden – on the first Asia tour of his presidency – made in a press conference yesterday (May 23) when he announced that the US was committed to the defense of Taiwan. That unscripted comment was quickly walked back by White House handlers, but nevertheless stormed across global headlines.

And Biden – who has twice previously made similarly punchy statements on the defense of Taiwan – was in no mood to defuse his remarks today. “The policy has not changed at all,” he said today according to news reports from Tokyo. “I stated that when I made my statement yesterday.
The Taiwan confusion and brouhaha – or, if you prefer, the masterly practice of strategic ambiguity – somewhat overshadowed the launch, also yesterday, of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, or IPEF. All Quad members are founding members of the new IPEF, America’s nascent strategy to reassert a sustainable regional presence.
Both groups put Washington back into the center of the kind of regional, multilateral partnerships that Biden’s predecessor Donald Trump had downplayed to regional alarm.
The Quad was originally birthed in 2004, but did little until recently. It was reborn into its present format in 2017 – a time when China was looking both more assertive and more powerful. Today’s summit was the Quad’s second, following a 2021 meeting.
Despite the considerable power of the Quad’s four members, they are seeking wider security relationships in the region and beyond. One reason for this is because the Quad is a long way from being – or ever becoming – anything like an “Asian NATO.”
US President Joe Biden is seeking to put America back into the center of regional affairs following the dislocation of the Trump years. Here, he attends a press conference at the Akasaka Palace in Tokyo, May 23, 2022. Photo: Pool / Handout
In a joint statement, the Quad made a “steadfast commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient.”
“We strongly support the principles of freedom, rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes without resorting to threat or use of force, any unilateral attempt to change the status quo, and freedom of navigation and overflight,” the statement continued.
It also spoke to Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centrality, welcomed a European role in the region and vowed to strengthen cooperation with Pacific Islands – seen as the latest front in China’s regional influence expansion.
That the group is China-facing is no secret – as the statement’s language made clear. “We will champion adherence to international law, particularly as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the maintenance of freedom of navigation and overflight, to meet challenges to the maritime rules-based order, including in the East and South China Seas.”
The latter point speaks to concerns about maritime territories whose ownerships are disputed with China. Beyond security, the Quad was also looking at infrastructure investment – an area China is massively invested in across the region and the world.

The Quad, “…will seek to extend more than US$50 billion of infrastructure assistance and investment in the Indo-Pacific, over the next five years.” On the finance front, “We will work to strengthen capacities of the countries in need to cope with debt issues” which would be done by “promoting debt sustainability and transparency in close collaboration with finance authorities of relevant countries” and through the “Quad Debt Management Resource Portal.”
With some countries accusing Chinese fishing fleets of being hybrid naval assets, the Quad raised a fishing protection initiative. “We welcome a new maritime domain awareness initiative, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), designed to work with regional partners to respond to humanitarian and natural disasters, and combat illegal fishing,” the statement read.
There were also statements on Covid recovery, climate change and space. What is lacking is firm commitments and actual timelines. But that is reflective of the nature of the Quad.
For all flashbulbs exploding over Biden’s presence in Tokyo, both the IPEC and Quad are still more talk than action.
The IPEF is essentially a dialog grouping that seeks to set rules: it does not offer group members access to the US market or aim to cut tariffs the way free-trade pacts such as the Beijing-led RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) or the Tokyo-led CPTPP (Comprehensive Agreement for a Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership) do.

Likewise, the Quad is more of a security-focused dialog partnership than a military alliance. It lacks the commitments that underwrite organizations linked by multinational defense treaties such as NATO. It also lacks enforcement mechanisms.
“It is not an alliance, it is a dialog mechanism that aims to get partners discussing major security issues in the region,” Jeffrey Robertson an associate professor of diplomacy at Seoul’s Yonsei University told Asia Times.
“Any security alliance is a major step, but you need dialog and understanding between partners, so somewhere down the track, it could go in that direction but at this stage it is about getting partners on the same page,” he said.
When it comes to occupying the strategic page, India is the odd man out.
Though it faces Chinese strategic competition in both the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean it has not, unlike the other partners, condemned or sanctioned Russia over the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. Traditionally non-aligned, New Delhi is deeply reliant upon Moscow for weapons, though some indigenization moves are underway in the local armaments industry.
“China is the factor that pushed us toward the Quad,” Lakhvinder Singh, an academic specializing in peace and security studies at the Asia Institute in Seoul, told Asia Times. “I think Modi is putting on a brave face, because New Delhi is a divided house – divided between pro-US and pro-Russia factions. It is unable to take a final position and this is problematic.”
While Biden and Kishida look closely aligned on China, there are questions hanging over Australia’s Albanese, who just defeated Scott Morrison in a general election.
Morrison oversaw an unprecedented trade spat that divided Australia and China but multiple players suggest that while the outgoing premier used that animosity for domestic political gain, Canberra will remain on-side on points of principle.
“The new Labor government will be much more diplomatic in working with China – the previous was more rhetoric, more bullhorn,” said Robertson. “Australia always works very closely with Washington and Japan, but the previous government’s talk on China was more focused on domestic politics and that is not a good recipe for foreign policy.”
An Indian army soldier in a bilateral exercise involving the armies of India and the United States. Photo: Staff Sgt. Crista Yazzie / US Army, Pacific Public Affairs
Quad members Australia and Japan both enjoy separate mutual defense treaties with the United States. But in January this year, the two signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), allowing closer military cooperation including in terms of deploying personnel and equipment to each other, while also upgrading interoperability.
Both capitals are also looking beyond the region. In September 2021, in a surprise announcement, Canberra joined London and Washington to announce the AUKUS agreement, a defense arrangement centered around supplying Canberra with nuclear submarines.
Separately last month, Tokyo and London announced that they were commencing negotiations on an RAA, likely modeled on the Canberra-Tokyo deal. The Boris Johnson government in the UK seeks to pivot east, and last year sailed its new aircraft carrier battlegroup through the region to mixed responses: Distaste from China, a subdued welcome from ASEAN and applause from Japan and the US.
Japan has also been busily signing deals with Southeast Asian countries, a key influence battleground with China, which is heavily invested in the region but also engaged in territorial disputes with multiple ASEAN members.
In May, Bangkok and Tokyo agreed to a deal that would enable the transfer of Japanese defense equipment to Thailand and allow Japanese investment in the country’s arms sector.
Japan had previously signed similar deals with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. All these nations apart from Thailand have maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea.
While Japan may be seeking to expand the size and scope of its local arms industry, it is upping its defense posture in a gradualist but increasingly assertive manner. In recent years, it has conducted joint drills in waters far beyond its own littoral, including off of India, the Philippines and Singapore.
And the Quad may soon get another member – a development that would require a name change for the grouping. New South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, who was elected last month, has announced that he wishes to join Quad working groups – a preliminary to applying for membership.
Yoon Seok-youl is looking toward joining the Quad. Photo: Facebook
New Zealand and Vietnam are also potential new members. According to one expert, two related but opposed dynamics are driving this hurricane of paper signing: A rising China and a wobbling America.
“More than anything else, it is China’s behavior – in the South China Sea, in contested regions with South Korea and Japan – that has caused states in the region to rethink their security and that means working with their main partner, the US, but also looking at other options and partners,” said Roberston.
“But US behaviors under Donald Trump also gave everyone a scare – so the entire region is, I guess, concerned about the future.”
asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · May 24, 2022






V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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