Quotes of the Day:

"It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. "

- Excerpt from a speech by Secretary of State George Marshall laying out his plan for U.S.-led economic recovery of Europe after World War II. The plan, which came to be known as the Marshall Plan, was signed and put into effect by President Harry S. Truman in 1948

"I do not like to state an opinion on a matter unless I know the precise facts." 

- Albert Einstein

If you make listening and observation your occupation, you will gain much more than you can by talk." 

- Robert Baden-Powell

1. Special Forces legend Billy Waugh passes away at 93

2. A Western Strategy for Ukraine: Part 4

3. Opinion | The Most Amazing — and Dangerous — Technology in the World

4. Antiwar Officer from Putin's Elite Security Team Defects

5. ‘Just in time’ F-35 supply chain too risky for next war, general says

6. Inside the shadowy anti-war groups trying to undermine Putin

7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 4, 2023

8. Japan changes aid rules; to fund defense projects of friendly nations

9. Russia is set to deploy more nuclear weapons in the Arctic

10. Retired women spies push for predecessor to get highest military medal

11. Custer’s Last Tweet: Avoiding a Digital Little Bighorn in the Fight for Hearts and Minds

12. With eye on China, Japan to offer military aid to like-minded countries

13. Dear Next Commandant: Why The Marines Matter

14. Explainer: Why is China so angry about Taiwan president meeting US Speaker McCarthy?

15. Ukraine's Zelenskiy arrives in Poland to deepen ties with key Western ally

16. US Sending Experimental Anti-Drone Weapons to Ukraine

​17. Apple’s Beck to lead Defense Innovation Unit at Pentagon

18. Why Neutrality Is Obsolete in the 21st Century

19. China is not only asserting itself geopolitically but openly questioning the U.S.’s central role on the world stage

20. Washington Post blasted over editorial that suggested cutting veterans' disability benefits

21. A call for all Americans to help stop veteran suicides

22. Disinformation may be one of Russia and China’s greatest weapons

23. The US Army moves to tweak its formations for future conflicts

24. Confronting the New Nuclear Peril

25. The United States Has Given Ukraine All The Heavy Trucks, Tankers And Recovery Vehicles the Ukrainians Need To Breach Russian Defenses

26. Unmanned ships deploying to SOUTHCOM, as Navy seeks to prove technology 'ready to scale'

27. Indo-Pacific focus to aid Thomas in info warfare post, Trussler says

. 

1. Special Forces legend Billy Waugh passes away at 93

The loss of a truly great American.

Special Forces legend Billy Waugh passes away at 93

Billy Waugh served from Korea to Vietnam to Afghanistan.

BY MAX HAUPTMAN | PUBLISHED APR 4, 2023 6:16 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Max Hauptman · April 4, 2023

William “Billy” Waugh, a famed Army Special Forces soldier and later CIA operative, passed away today, at the age of 93.

Born on December 1, 1929, in Bastrop, Texas, Waugh was drawn to the military at an early age. When he was just 15, he came across two Marines and was inspired to enlist immediately. Deciding to travel to California, where he believed the minimum enlistment age was 16, he was stopped by a police officer in New Mexico and returned to Texas. That abortive attempt would only delay an impressive career by a few years, though.

Joining the Army in 1948, Waugh attended Airborne School and in 1951 was sent to Korea with the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team. Waugh wrote in his 2004 autobiography “Hunting the Jackal” that he “learned what made men tick, and what combat was all about.”

After being deployed to Germany, Waugh transferred to Special Forces.

“Once I learned what these fine men – the fittest and most committed group I had ever seen – were to become, I knew it was the only place for me,” Waugh wrote.

He first deployed to Vietnam in 1961, and then again in 1965. In June of that year, helping lead a Special Forces team alongside South Vietnamese volunteer forces in a raid, Waugh was shot three times, in an engagement for which team leader then-Capt. Paris Davis was later awarded the Medal of Honor.

After recovering from his injuries, Waugh served several more years in Vietnam with Military Assistance Command Vietnam-Studies and Observation Group, an elite formation of special operations forces tasked with conducting some of the most dangerous and secretive missions in the country. Waugh himself participated in the first freefall High Altitude, Low Opening (HALO) combat jump in history, in 1971. Retiring in 1972 as a Sgt. Maj., Waugh earned the Silver Star, four Bronze Stars, eight Purple Hearts, four Army Commendation Ribbons, 14 Army Air Medals, and a Presidential Unit Citation.

Following a brief detour as a U.S. Postal Service employee, Waugh began working for the CIA in 1977, although it happened in an unusual way. Waugh was first recruited by a former CIA employee named Edwin Wilson to train special operations troops in Libya. Once in that country, though, Waugh was recruited by the actual CIA for intelligence work.

“I had a method — I would take photos for about three weeks of areas we’d never been into before, of all the countries around Sudan, Egypt, and all of the countries of Africa. I became very good with small cameras … I learned how to brief well, and I was excellent with maps. It became a pleasure to do the work. If you get killed, that’s just tough sh*t,” Waugh told Recoil Magazine about his intelligence work in 2022.

In this capacity, Waugh spent the 1980s and 1990s tracking down both Usama bin Laden and Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, known as “Carlos the Jackal.”

In 2001, Waugh was just a couple of months shy of 72 when he became one of the first CIA members to enter Afghanistan, working alongside special operations personnel hunting for bin Laden, who Waugh said he had been close enough “to have killed him with a rock,” a decade earlier.

Waugh spent his later years as a speaker and, generally, as a legend in the special operations community.

“Once you get used to that (a life of adventure), you’re not about to quit,” Waugh said in 2011. “How could you want to do anything else?”

The latest on Task & Purpose

• Mike Day, Navy SEAL who survived being shot 27 times in Iraq, dies
• Army pulls ‘Be All You Can Be’ commercials after Jonathan Majors’ arrest
• Marine infantry veteran with Nashville police helped take down active shooter
• Army identifies 9 soldiers killed in dual Black Hawk crashes
• How a team of scientists are exploring the remnants of a World War II battlefield at Guam

taskandpurpose.com · by Max Hauptman · April 4, 2023

2. A Western Strategy for Ukraine: Part 4

I searched for the first 3 parts but all I could find was Part 1 from last August (https://cepa.org/article/a-western-strategy-for-ukraine/)​

Excerpts:

These policies to extend NATO and the EU will deter future war, and make Europe stronger and safer. This alone is a good reason to pursue such policies.

But a further reason is the message to China. China needs to see that Russia’s war of aggression has failed to extinguish Ukrainian statehood, weakened Russia, unified the West, and closed pre-existing security gaps in Russia’s neighborhood. These outcomes would all tell China to avoid an ill-considered military campaign against Taiwan.

Looking ahead, the United States and EU must do more to strengthen their own joint leadership in a Western, economic, and law-based global order. With the possibility of a still-revanchist Russia, as well as a growing threat from China, further steps will be required to strengthen the transatlantic bond. NATO does this in the security sphere. In the economic sphere, a new Transatlantic Investment, Growth, and Resilience (TIGRE) Pact is needed to strengthen the collective Western economy and law-based international order.

A Western Strategy for Ukraine: Part 4

cepa.org · by Kurt Volker · March 28, 2023

Much has been said about post-war security guarantees for Ukraine. One idea is a massive armament program to make Ukraine a “porcupine” — too difficult to attack and swallow. This could be combined with a bilateral security guarantee from the United States — such as with Israel — or other individual NATO and non-NATO member states. One recent Foreign Affairs article proposed an alliance-led multinational stability force, including US boots on the ground.

All of these suggestions for security guarantees, however, have their own major problems. At root, they are all efforts to work around what is the most obvious conclusion: Ukraine should be a member of NATO.

At the end of the current phase of the war, Ukraine will have the largest, most experienced, and best-equipped Western military in Europe. Under any circumstances, Ukraine and the West will want to maintain this level of capability to deter future aggression. There is no reason why this de facto NATO membership should not become an actual treaty commitment. This would deter aggression even more effectively.

We have a track record with non-NATO security guarantees in Europe, and it is not a good one. In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Russia, the UK, France and the United States pledged to guarantee Ukraine’s security within its internationally recognized borders. But when Russia violated this agreement in 2014, the pledge meant nothing. In 2008, NATO said Ukraine and Georgia would one day become NATO members, but decided not to offer them a Membership Action Plan. In August 2008, Russia turned its so-called peacekeeping forces in Georgia into occupiers, and neither NATO nor the EU did anything to overturn this.

In the wake of Russia’s all-out 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Sweden and Finland — Europe’s most powerful neutral states — decided that they needed to join NATO to assure their security in the future. “Porcupine” status (which Finland could be said to possess) was not enough. How could anyone ask Ukraine to accept a security arrangement that Finland and Sweden both determined was inadequate?

As for a new multinational force in Ukraine, there is no reason to think it would have the structure, leadership, or unity of purpose to be effective. Nor would it win any greater acceptance from a Putinesque Russia than Ukrainian NATO membership itself. NATO is a known quantity, and we know from experience that Russia takes alliance security guarantees seriously.

NATO membership should not stop with Ukraine. NATO should encompass all the states currently stuck in Europe’s “grey zones.” Putin has demonstrated he is willing to attack non-NATO states and seize territory if he can. He did so in Georgia and Moldova even before attacking Ukraine. Serbia, with Russia’s direct support, seeks to do the same in the Balkans. Future security in Europe demands an end to grey zones.

From a purely domestic US political perspective, the arguments for Ukrainian NATO membership are even more persuasive.

To keep Russia out, there must be an ironclad US commitment to defend Ukraine. Yet to win Congressional support, America’s other NATO allies will have to share the burden. The only security guarantee that makes sense is the one we offer through NATO, with all other NATO allies equally committed.

On the economic side, the European Union (EU) has declared that Ukraine is a candidate for membership. Yet this is still perceived in Western Europe as a long-term, generic proposition, with no clear commitment or timeline. Advancing Ukraine’s EU accession process should be an immediate task for both Ukraine and the EU.

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As reconstruction assistance and foreign investment flow into Ukraine to rebuild the economy, the West should insist that Ukraine adopt the EU rulebook, the acquis, especially in the economy, energy, and rule of law sectors. This has to be done as swiftly as possible. Foreign investors are likely to require this, and the wartime situation in Ukraine provides ample justification for “shock therapy” economic and rule of law reforms.

The EU and US have their own reasons to support such an accelerated process: together, they are covering €3bn ($3.25bn) per month in assistance to Ukraine’s state budget. The sooner Ukraine’s economy starts growing robustly again, the greater Ukraine’s tax revenue will be, thus diminishing the amount of Western budgetary assistance required.

As with NATO, the European Union should accelerate accession talks for Moldova and Georgia. While both have significant work to do, it is vital to send a clear signal that these states will fully be a part of Europe, alongside Ukraine. Withholding candidate status for Georgia would only relegate it to the Russian sphere of influence: exactly the opposite of what the Georgian people want and what the West should support.

Russia must withdraw from the lands it has occupied beyond its borders. That will mean both Moldova and Georgia offering citizenship and zero-retribution policies to the population in occupied territories, provided they accept citizenship and agree to be part of those states in the future. Those populations will not accept such an offer today, but it is important they know the goodwill is there when Russia is ultimately defeated in Ukraine.

These policies to extend NATO and the EU will deter future war, and make Europe stronger and safer. This alone is a good reason to pursue such policies.

But a further reason is the message to China. China needs to see that Russia’s war of aggression has failed to extinguish Ukrainian statehood, weakened Russia, unified the West, and closed pre-existing security gaps in Russia’s neighborhood. These outcomes would all tell China to avoid an ill-considered military campaign against Taiwan.

Looking ahead, the United States and EU must do more to strengthen their own joint leadership in a Western, economic, and law-based global order. With the possibility of a still-revanchist Russia, as well as a growing threat from China, further steps will be required to strengthen the transatlantic bond. NATO does this in the security sphere. In the economic sphere, a new Transatlantic Investment, Growth, and Resilience (TIGRE) Pact is needed to strengthen the collective Western economy and law-based international order.

Ambassador Kurt Volker is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. A leading expert in US foreign and national security policy, he served as US Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations from 2017-2019, and as US Ambassador to NATO from 2008-2009.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Read More From Europe's Edge

CEPA's online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.

Read More

cepa.org · by Kurt Volker · March 28, 2023

3. Opinion | The Most Amazing — and Dangerous — Technology in the World

The hour long interview and entire transcript can be accessed at this link: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/04/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-chris-miller.html?smtyp=cur&smid=tw-nytopinion

Opinion | The Most Amazing — and Dangerous — Technology in the World

The New York Times · by ‘The Ezra Klein Show’ · April 4, 2023

transcript

0:00/57:49

-57:49

transcript

The Most Amazing — and Dangerous — Technology in the World

The historian Chris Miller explains how semiconductors touch every corner of modern life — and the geopolitics of manufacturing them.

Tuesday, April 4th, 2023

[MUSIC PLAYING]

ezra klein

I’m Ezra Klein. This is “The Ezra Klein Show.”

[MUSIC PLAYING]

So you may have noticed at the beginning of the year the two themes are really dominating the show — China and A.I. And obviously, that’s not an accident. I’m not going to try to rank order what matters most in the world, but these are two good contenders for the top five, at least. When I imagine the history books getting written of our era, it is very hard for me not to imagine these being dominant themes.

And these stories connect. They connect in obvious ways. There’s a geopolitics of who controls A.I., a race between the U.S. and China to get the strongest and earliest A.I. capabilities. But they also connect in another, more tangible way. They are both stories driven by semiconductors and who controls them.

In the same way that you couldn’t understand geopolitics in the 20th century without understanding oil and other forms of energy — where it was, and who had it, and who needed it, and what they would do to get it — you can’t understand the major stories of the 21st century without understanding semiconductors. Whoever controls semiconductors controls the future.

And it turns out, for reasons I didn’t really understand until I read Chris Miller’s book “Chip War,” that semiconductors really can be controlled. So “Chip War,” which is just amazingly timed, given how deep it is, is a history of semiconductors as a technology, as an industry, and then it traces the way they have and are shaping geopolitics. It was a “Financial Times” Business Book of the Year in 2022. And having read it now, definitely going to be on my year-end list of the most important books I read in 2023. And there’s a lot more in the book than I’m able to cover in the show. I really do recommend reading this one. But I do think this show is one of the more important we’re going to do — and important for understanding a lot of the other shows we’re going to do — because this is getting at a material reality that is easy to miss but is going to shape so many of the big stories we’re living through in the coming years. As always, my email: ezrakleinshow@nytimes.com.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

Chris Miller, welcome to the show.

chris miller

Thanks for having me.

ezra klein

What timing on this book, man. I assume — when did you actually start it? Because I honestly cannot imagine a better moment for it to have come out.

chris miller

Well, I started researching it around 2015, 2016, didn’t start writing until 2020, and finished writing early 2022 just as the chip shortage was reaching its peak.

ezra klein

So let’s talk a bit about why semiconductors end up mattering this much. You write that we rarely think about chips, yet they’ve created the modern world. Justify that for me.

chris miller

Well, today, people like you and me can’t live our lives without touching hundreds or thousands of chips just going about the course of our daily lives. We think of chips as being in smartphones or being in P.C.s, but today, they’re in almost any device with an on/off switch. So a new car will have a thousand chips inside of it, your refrigerator, your microwave, your dishwasher. All of our devices are full of chips that do computing and do sensing, increasingly do communication. And so the modern economy just can’t function without lots and lots of chips.

​(Continued at the link: ​ https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/04/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-chris-miller.html?smtyp=cur&smid=tw-nytopinion​)​

4. Antiwar Officer from Putin's Elite Security Team Defects

Excerpts:

When Putin was in Sochi, security officials would deliberately pretend he was leaving, bringing in a plane and sending off a motorcade, when he was in fact staying, Karakulov said.

“I think that this is an attempt to confuse, first, intelligence, and second, so that there are no assassination attempts,” he said.

Karakulov’s defection was a surprising turn for a family steeped in patriotic military tradition. Karakulov’s father is a former military man, and his brother is a local government official.

Karakulov said he couldn’t tell his parents about his disillusionment, because their minds had been molded by years of watching Russian state television. So he never told them he was leaving.

But he denies that he is unpatriotic and urged others to break their silence to stop the war.

“Patriotism is when you love your country,” he said. “In this case, our homeland needs to be saved because something crazy and terrible is happening.”

Antiwar Officer from Putin's Elite Security Team Defects

military.com · by 4 Apr 2023 Associated Press | By Erika Kinetz · April 4, 2023

LONDON — On Oct. 14, a Russian engineer named Gleb Karakulov boarded a flight from Kazakhstan to Turkey with his wife and daughter. He switched off his phone to shut out the crescendo of urgent, enraged messages, said goodbye to his life in Russia and tried to calm his fast-beating heart.

But this was no ordinary Russian defector. Karakulov was an officer in President Vladimir Putin’s secretive elite personal security service — one of the few Russians to flee and go public who have rank, as well as knowledge of intimate details of Putin’s life and potentially classified information.

Karakulov, who was responsible for secure communications, said moral opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and his fear of dying there drove him to speak out, despite the risks to himself and his family.

“Our president has become a war criminal,” he said. “It’s time to end this war and stop being silent.”

Karakulov’s account generally conforms with others that paint the Russian president as a once charismatic but increasingly isolated leader, who doesn’t use a cellphone or the internet and insists on access to Russian state television wherever he goes.

He also offered new details about how Putin’s paranoia appears to have deepened since his decision to invade Ukraine in February 2022. Putin now prefers to avoid airplanes and travel on a special armored train, he said, and he ordered a bunker at the Russian Embassy in Kazakhstan outfitted with a secure communications line in October — the first time Karakulov had ever fielded such a request.

A defection like Karakulov’s “has a very great level of interest,” said an official with a security background from a NATO country, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive political matters.

“That would be seen as a very serious blow to the president himself because he is extremely keen on his security, and his security is compromised,” he said.

The Kremlin did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

As an engineer in a field unit of the presidential communications department of the Federal Protective Service, or FSO, Karakulov was responsible for setting up secure communications for the Russian president and prime minister wherever they went. While he was not a confidant of Putin’s, Karakulov spent years in his service, observing him from unusually close quarters from 2009 through late 2022.

Karakulov, his wife and his child have gone underground, and it was impossible to speak with them directly due to security constraints.

The Dossier Center, a London-based investigative group funded by Russian opposition figure Mikhail Khodorkovsky, interviewed Karakulov multiple times and shared video and transcripts of more than six hours of those interviews with The Associated Press, as well as the Danish Broadcasting Corporation DR, Swedish Television SVT, and the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation NRK.

The Dossier Center confirmed the authenticity of Karakulov’s passport and FSO work identity card, and cross-checked details of his biography against Russian government records, leaked personal data and social media postings, all of which the AP reviewed.

The AP also independently confirmed Karakulov’s identity with three sources in the U.S. and Europe and corroborated his personal details, including passport numbers, date and place of birth, two registered addresses, and the names and ages of family members. AP was unable to verify all details of his defection.

AP also confirmed that Karakulov is listed as a wanted man in the Russian Interior Ministry’s public database of criminal suspects. The Interior Ministry initiated a criminal investigation against Karakulov on Oct. 26 for desertion during a time of military mobilization, according to documents obtained by the Dossier Center and seen by the AP.

The FSO is one of the most secretive branches of Russia’s security services.

“Even when they quit, they never talk, but they know a lot of details of the private life of the president and the prime minister,” said Katya Hakim, a senior researcher at the Dossier Center.

Karakulov moved as part of an advance team, often with enough specialized communications equipment to fill a KAMAZ truck. He said he has taken more than 180 trips with the Russian president, and contrary to widespread speculation, Putin appears to be in better shape than most people his age. Putin has only canceled a few trips due to illness, he said.

Unlike the prime minister, Putin does not require secure internet access on his trips, Karakulov said.

“I have never seen him with a mobile phone,” he said. “All the information he receives is only from people close to him. That is, he lives in a kind of information vacuum.”

Karakulov’s work brought him to luxury hotels for summits, beach resorts in Cuba, yachts — and aboard a special armored train outfitted for the Russian president.

Putin’s train looks like any other, painted gray with a red stripe to blend in with other railway carriages in Russia. Putin didn’t like the fact that airplanes can be tracked, preferring the stealth of a nondescript train car, Karakulov said.

“I understand that he’s simply afraid,” he said.

Putin began to use the train regularly in the run-up to the February 2022 invasion, Karakulov said. Even last year, Putin continued to insist on strict anti-COVID measures, and FSO employees took shifts in two-week quarantine so there would always be a pool of people cleared to travel with Putin on the train, he said.

Putin has set up identical offices in multiple locations, with matching details down to the desk and wall hangings, and official reports sometimes say he’s one place when he is actually in another, according to Karakulov and prior reporting by a Russian media outlet.

When Putin was in Sochi, security officials would deliberately pretend he was leaving, bringing in a plane and sending off a motorcade, when he was in fact staying, Karakulov said.

“I think that this is an attempt to confuse, first, intelligence, and second, so that there are no assassination attempts,” he said.

Karakulov’s defection was a surprising turn for a family steeped in patriotic military tradition. Karakulov’s father is a former military man, and his brother is a local government official.

Karakulov said he couldn’t tell his parents about his disillusionment, because their minds had been molded by years of watching Russian state television. So he never told them he was leaving.

But he denies that he is unpatriotic and urged others to break their silence to stop the war.

“Patriotism is when you love your country,” he said. “In this case, our homeland needs to be saved because something crazy and terrible is happening.”

___

Associated Press reporters Aamer Madhani in Washington, Jamey Keaton in Geneva and Joanna Kozlowska in London contributed to this report.

military.com · by 4 Apr 2023 Associated Press | By Erika Kinetz · April 4, 2023

5. ‘Just in time’ F-35 supply chain too risky for next war, general says

"Just in time" is not good for any military logistics.

‘Just in time’ F-35 supply chain too risky for next war, general says

Defense News · by Stephen Losey · April 3, 2023

NATIONAL HARBOR, Maryland — The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will need a more resilient supply chain to ensure the military can keep it flying in a future, highly contested war, the Air Force officer in charge of the program said Monday.

The F-35 program was set up with a “just in time” supply chain, where parts arrive right before they’re needed and little inventory is stockpiled, Lt. Gen. Michael Schmidt, the program executive officer, said during a panel discussion at the Navy League’s Sea Air Space conference being held this week in National Harbor, Maryland.

In the private sector, Schmidt said, that kind of efficient supply chain works well for keeping costs low. But in a future war involving highly contested environments, it could lead to disaster, he said.

“When you have that [just-in-time] mentality, a hiccup in the supply chain, whether it be a strike … or a quality issue, becomes your single point of failure,” Schmidt said. “We need to look at, what does ‘right’ look like in the future, to give us more resilience in a combat environment.”

Bridget Lauderdale, vice president and general manager of the F-35 program for the aircraft’s main manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, said the company has focused more on trying to forecast the demand cycle, so it can better predict when it will need parts.

“A lot of those materials take lead time to prepare, even when you do have funding and even when you have repair capacity,” Lauderdale said.

To create the resilient supply chain necessary to fly the F-35 in the future, Lauderdale said, the military services and the defense industry are going to need to work more closely together.

The F-35 enterprise’s sustainment network is “enormous,” Schmidt said, encompassing airplanes operating from 27 bases and 10 ships. Nine nations fly the F-35 operationally, and there are 17 countries in all taking part in the program.

Schmidt said the international nature of the F-35 program will provide opportunities for the U.S. and other partner nations to work together and more efficiently maintain their jets.

“In a few years, we’re going to be flying between 500 and 600 F-35s in Europe, and less than 100 of those are going to be U.S.” fighters, Schmidt said. “What a huge opportunity that is to leverage each other’s logistics and maintenance environments.”

At the same time, he said, the F-35 program needs to work on ensuring it can get the right parts and other materials to the right places, so those maintenance hubs can do the necessary work on the planes.

‘Huge win’

Schmidt acknowledged that the program was “a little bit late” in standing up depots to handle the sustainment capacity the F-35 will need, adding that as the Pentagon was negotiating with Lockheed on lots 15-17 last year, it opted to use some of the money to pay for more depot capacity, instead of buying an unspecified number of additional fighters.

“That’s a huge win,” he said. “I think once we can really figure out this global sustainment enterprise, to make sure that we can meet all the demands of all the countries … getting that right is a huge focus area of mine.”

The F-35 program, including the heavy maintenance depot at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma, has made great progress in fixing an engine shortage, which at one point was a “top degrader” dragging down readiness rates. Schmidt said. A little more than a year ago, 48 F-35s were without engines, he said. Last month, that number was down to one.

The commander of Tinker’s Oklahoma Air Logistics Complex told Defense News last year that the base had overhauled its processes, hired more workers and acquired new tools and equipment to repair more of the fighters’ F135 engines.

F-35 maintainers are also getting more data they can use to assess the health of the fighters’ engines, without having to go through the time-consuming effort of pulling the engines out of the plane to do a closer inspection.

“We’re seeing over a 50% increase in reliability in terms of engine-on-wing time,” Schmidt said. “I’m anxious to see how that really plays out over the life of the program.”

About Stephen Losey

Stephen Losey is the air warfare reporter for Defense News. He previously covered leadership and personnel issues at Air Force Times, and the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare at Military.com. He has traveled to the Middle East to cover U.S. Air Force operations.

6. Inside the shadowy anti-war groups trying to undermine Putin

Be careful what you wish for but also I would not get my hopes up.

That said, if Putin were to be deposed are we ready for what comes next? Have we wargames the fall of Putin?

Inside the shadowy anti-war groups trying to undermine Putin

Inside the shadowy anti-war groups trying to undermine Putin: How resistance activists work in the shadows to plot assassinations and sow chaos in Russia - despite Kremlin's bid to stamp out dissent

• Putin has a vice-like grip on power in Russia, brutally cracking down on dissent
• Yet there is no shortage of movements dedicated to destabilising the regime 
• MailOnline takes a look at some of the key figures fighting back against Putin 

By DAVID AVERRE

PUBLISHED: 16:51 BST, 3 April 2023 | UPDATED: 10:35 BST, 4 April 2023

Daily Mail · by David Averre · April 3, 2023

Vladimir Putin has garnered a reputation as a ruthless strongman and de-facto dictator over the course of his two-decade rule in Russia.

Not only did the warmongering Kremlin chief order Russian tanks across the border into Ukraine on February 24, 2022, but any hint of dissent at home is swiftly cracked down on.

Political rivals are imprisoned, die in mysterious circumstances or are even assassinated, street protesters are beaten and bundled out of sight by riot police, and any group exhibiting anti-Kremlin or anti-war sentiments are designated terrorist organisations or 'foreign agents'.

Yet there is no shortage of movements dedicated to destabilising Putin's regime.

Some groups employ guerrilla-style tactics to launch explosive attacks on Russian military sites or assassinate of pro-Putin figures.

Others harness the power of social media and clandestine broadcasting operations to offer a counter-narrative to the homogeneity of Russia's state-media channels.

And many Russians who have left their homeland are now fighting back against Putin from abroad - either by volunteering to fight on the side of the Ukrainians against their compatriots, or creating organisations to fundraise for Kyiv's war effort and inform the Russian public about Putin's corruption.

Here, MailOnline takes a look at some of the most influential individuals and groups risking persecution or even death to fight back against the Russian despot and his vice-like grip on power.

Vladimir Putin has garnered a reputation as a ruthless strongman over the course of his two-decade rule in Russia, but resistance groups are fighting fervently to bring down his regime

National Republican Army (NRA)

Among the most violent - and mysterious - anti-establishment movements in Russia is the National Republican Army.

Little is known about the group's size, participants or operational structure, and some have even dismissed its existence altogether.

The NRA rose to prominence in the weeks following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, amid a spate of arson attacks and sabotage of Russian army enlistment offices and ammunition depots.

As the war progressed, the NRA is believed to have expanded its operational scope to include assassinations of pro-Putin figures and hacking the IT systems of large Russian corporations.

NRA members claimed responsibility for the death of Darya Dugina - a pro-Putin journalist and political scientist - who was killed in a car bombing in August 2022.

Russian FSB security service claimed Dugina, the daughter of far-Right Russian nationalist philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, was killed by a Ukrainian saboteur, but the NRA allegedly dismissed this via de-facto spokesman Ilya Ponomarev.

A chemical plant explosion was one of several major fires to have rocked Russia

NRA members claimed responsibility for the death of Darya Dugina - a pro-Putin journalist and political scientist - who was killed in a car bombing in August 2022

Then in October, the NRA claimed it had executed a large-scale hack of Russian IT giant Technoserv, telling the Kyiv Post its members had stolen a trove of documents that one source said constituted a 'serious breach across large swathes of the Russian government'.

In its manifesto, the NRA said it would take up arms against the Russian government and individuals it sees as complicit in maintaining the corrupt regime.

Part of the statement reads: 'We, Russian activists, military and politicians, now partisans and fighters of the National Republican Army, outlaw warmongers, robbers and oppressors of the peoples of Russia!

'We declare President Putin a usurper of power and a war criminal who amended the Constitution, unleashed a fratricidal war between the Slavic peoples and sent Russian soldiers to certain and senseless death...

'Our goal is to stop the destruction of Russia and its neighbours, to stop the activities of a handful of Kremlin businessmen who have sucked on the wealth of our people and are committing crimes today inside and outside the country.

'We declare officials of the Government of the Russian Federation and regional administrations to be accomplices of the usurper – those who do not resign their powers will be destroyed by us.

'Long live Free Russia... Victory will be ours!'

Freedom of Russia legion and Russian Volunteer Corps

While many Russians continue to resist and subvert Putin's regime as part of underground schemes at home, others are taking the fight to Moscow in the open.

The Freedom of Russia legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps are volunteer battalions comprised primarily of Russian nationals who have taken up arms on the side of Kyiv following Putin's invasion.

Many of the volunteers are native Russians who were deployed as part of their nation's armed forces, only to realise their fight to 'de-Nazify' Ukraine was a mere pretence orchestrated by the Kremlin propaganda machine.

Others are Russians who fled to Ukraine and are willing to kill their countrymen in combat, believing it is the only way to bring an end to Putin's reign.

These volunteer battalions are fighting alongside Ukraine's armed forces and territorial defence groups, and are liable to suffer torture and summary executions if they are captured by their compatriots.

One volunteer told the Mail last year: 'I was shocked by the scale of corruption and injustice that was organised at the highest level [in Russia]. I started to look into the political and economic situation and realised that we need to fight this regime... The brainwashing has been going on for decades.

'It is a cancer on the world's body. Take any military conflict around the world – such as Syria or in African countries – and you can always find the Kremlin's hand.'

Scores of Russians have defected to Kyiv – including captured prisoners of war and even a senior official in one of Moscow's central financial institutions. Pictured, the Freedom of Russia legion in Ukraine's armed forces with a captured Russian tank

Anti-Corruption Foundation

Perhaps the most well-known resistance movement is the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), a non-profit group founded by the president's most vocal critic, Alexei Navalny.

The Foundation was launched in 2011 by Navalny, who at the time was building a political career and in 2013 campaigned to become the mayor of Moscow, losing out to Putin ally Sergei Sobyanin.

Like many of Putin's political dissenters he was subject to embezzlement charges widely believed to be manufactured to prevent him from mounting a challenge.

Navalny nonetheless launched a presidential campaign in 2018, but Moscow's courts blocked his candidacy due to the earlier embezzlement convictions - despite the European Court of Human Rights ruling the dissident had not received a fair trial.

Two years later, Navalny was poisoned with the Novichok nerve agent while aboard a flight - almost certainly at the behest of Putin - and almost died.

After undergoing weeks of treatment and rehabilitation in Berlin, the dissident returned to Russia and has been incarcerated ever since.

Amid the harrowing treatment of Navalny by Russian courts and prison authorities, his foundation has produced a torrent of anti-Kremlin content including investigations into Russian government corruption and the system of cronyism that underpins the reign of Putin and his billionaire oligarchs.

Documentaries produced by the FBK consistently rack up millions of views on YouTube and other social media networks.

Several members of Navalny's team, including chief investigative journalist Maria Pevchikh and lawyer Lyubov Sobol, continue to communicate on behalf of Navalny and produce anti-Kremlin content on a daily basis.

Navalny is pictured in a cage in a Russian courtroom following his arrest

Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, his wife Yulia, opposition politician Lyubov Sobol and other demonstrators march in memory of murdered Kremlin critic Boris Nemtsov in downtown Moscow in 2020

Lyubov Sobol, lawyer for the Anti-Corruption Foundation, is pictured in April 2021 wearing a t-shirt that reads 'where is the criminal investigation into the poisoning of Navalny?'

Rospartizan and February Morning

Rospartizan and February Morning are media organisations set up by the former Russian MP Ilya Ponomarev which seek to promote resistance activity against the Kremlin and provide an alternative to Russian state media.

Ponomarev was once a vice president of Russia's Yukos Oil Company, and represented the city of Novosibirsk in Siberia in Russia's parliament.

But he fell out of favour with the Kremlin when he was the only MP to oppose Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, and fled the country after he was put on trial for embezzlement - charges widely believed to have been politically motivated.

He has been a vocal opponent of Putin ever since, and launched Rospartizan and February Morning in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine.

Rospartizan is a news channel hosted via the Telegram messaging app, and functions as an aggregator for resistance activity in Russia, sharing and promoting acts of defiance such as attacks on military recruitment centres. It also acts as a de-facto news service for the NRA.

February Morning functions in tandem with Rospartizan as a news website and television channel with an anti-Putin and anti-war stance.

Ponomarev's willingness to incite violence against the Russian regime has led other anti-Putin bodies, including the Russian anti-war committee headed by exiled oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, to denounce his activities.

Former Russian MP Ilya Ponomarev during a broadcast on his February Morning anti-Kremlin television channel

Russian anti-war committee

The Russian anti-war committee is a network of prominent Russians from a variety of sectors who came together in the wake of Putin's invasion of Ukraine to help co-ordinate relief initiatives.

The group was founded by Mikhail Khodorkovsky - a former oil tycoon who fled Russia to London in 2013 after falling foul of Putin and being jailed for nearly a decade.

Other prominent members include chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov, former Russian prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov and economist Sergei Guriev, as well as several politicians, scientists, journalists and entrepreneurs.

The committee donates and supports a pair of major fundraising initiatives - one named Sunrise which organises the provision of humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and another named The Ark which provides financial and logistical support for Russian nationals who decided to flee the country.

A statement on the committee's website reads: 'It was not the Russians who started this war, but a mad dictator. But it is our civic duty to do everything we can to stop it.'

Unlike Ponomarev's organisations, the anti-war committee focuses exclusively on supporting humanitarian initiatives and non-violent action, though its media centre produces highly-critical articles of the Putin regime and celebrates acts of resistance, such as protests.

Khodorkovsky was one of the main figures who spoke out against Ponomarev when he shared details of the NRA's arson attacks.

He was also critical of Ponomarev's support of the resistance fighters who claimed to have orchestrated the car bombing of Dugina, arguing that she was an innocent civilian despite her work in support of Putin.

Daily Mail · by David Averre · April 3, 2023

7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 4, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2023

Key Takeaways 

• The Kremlin will likely attempt to coerce Belarus into further Union State integration when Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko meet in Moscow on April 5 and 6.
•  The Kremlin continues to attempt to employ nuclear threats to deter Western military aid provisions to Ukraine ahead of Ukraine’s planned counteroffensive.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s demonstrative response to the assassination of Russian milblogger Maxim Fomin indicates that Prigozhin likely believes that the attack was in part directed at himself.
• The Kremlin continues to attempt to (falsely) reassure the Russian public that the war in Ukraine will not have significant long-term economic consequences.
• The Kremlin is likely trying to shift more responsibility for growing Russian industry onto regional bodies to insulate itself from possible criticism about Russia’s deteriorating economic situation.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.
• Russian forces continue to prepare for a rumored pending Ukrainian counteroffensive in the southern direction.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that Russia’s ongoing spring conscription cycle is going according to plan, progressing as quickly as planned, and has completed initial military registration.
• Russian occupation officials denied Ukrainian reports that Russian occupation authorities are preparing evacuation plans from occupied regions of Ukraine.
• Belarusian state media claimed that the Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB) reportedly arrested two men under the suspicion of attempted terrorist attacks in Grodno.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 4, 2023

Apr 4, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 4, 2023

Riley Bailey, George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Angela Howard, and Mason Clark

April 4, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

The Kremlin will likely attempt to coerce Belarus into further Union State integration when Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko meet in Moscow on April 5 and 6. The Kremlin announced on April 4 that Putin and Lukashenko will meet for private bilateral discussions on April 5 and attend a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State in Moscow on April 6.[1] The Kremlin stated that the Union State Supreme State Council meeting will address the implementation of the Union State Treaty through 28 different Union State programs from 2021 to 2023 —likely the package of 28 integration roadmaps that Lukashenko ratified in November 2021.[2] The Kremlin stated that Russian and Belarusian officials also plan to agree on other unspecified “practical issues of further integration,” possibly in the area of intelligence sharing, as Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergey Naryshkin met with Lukashenko in Minsk and discussed Russian-Belarusian intelligence sharing on April 4.[3] The Kremlin may pressure Belarus for more integration concessions under the rubric of defending the Union State from claimed Western military and/or terrorist threats.[4]

The Kremlin continues to attempt to employ nuclear threats to deter Western military aid provisions to Ukraine ahead of Ukraine’s planned counteroffensive. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu justified Russia’s decision to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus by accusing NATO of intensifying combat training and reconnaissance activities near the Russian and Belarusian borders and accused the West of escalating the war in Ukraine by providing additional military aid to Ukraine on April 4.[5] Shoigu reinforced existing Russian nuclear threats by stating that Belarus has nuclear-capable attack aircraft and nuclear strike-capable Iskander-M systems.[6] Shoigu also stated that Belarusian missile forces began training in Russia to operate Iskander-M systems, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, on April 3.[7] Shoigu’s statements do not present any new information on Belarusian training and are likely part of an information operation. ISW previously reported that Belarusian servicemen were training with Iskander systems in Russia as of February 2023.[8] Shoigu’s reinvigorated nuclear blackmail rhetoric coincides with Finland joining NATO and a new US aid package to Ukraine.[9] ISW continues to assess that the risk of nuclear escalation remains extremely low and that Russian deployments of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus are highly unlikely to affect battlefield realities in Ukraine.[10] Russian-deployed nuclear weapons in Belarus additionally will almost certainly remain under the control of Russian personnel permanently deployed in Belarus.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s demonstrative response to the assassination of Russian milblogger Maxim Fomin (Vladlen Tatarsky) indicates Prigozhin likely believes that the attack was in part directed at himself. Prigozhin held an event on April 4 at the remnants of the restaurant where Fomin was killed by an improvised explosive device on April 2.[11] Prigozhin claimed that he arrived at the scene from the Bakhmut frontline as quickly as he could to commemorate Fomin. Prigozhin announced that he intends to expand “Kiber Front Z”—the Wagner-affiliated ultranationalist group that held Fomin’s fatal event—into a social movement that fights against external threats.[12] Prigozhin stated that the Wagner Group has been thwarting attempts by unnamed actors to eliminate the group since 2014.[13] Prigozhin also noted that he will offer financial compensation to the event’s attendees. Prigozhin’s publicly demonstrative response and vague accusations of a campaign against Wagner suggest that Prigozhin is likely attempting to indirectly frame the incident as an attack on him.[14] Prigozhin’s response also shows that he intends to continue to pursue a central position within the Russian pro-war ultranationalist community, despite the threat of violence and pushback.

The Kremlin continued efforts to (falsely) reassure the Russian public that the war in Ukraine will not have significant long-term economic consequences. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Tula Railway Engineering Plant and attempted to address workers’ economic concerns on April 4.[15] Putin later held a State Council Presidium meeting to discuss developing Russian industry in the face of sanctions pressure, during which he claimed that sanctions are having positive outcomes by forcing Russian firms to embrace import substitution, an argument the Kremlin has made sporadically since the 2014 annexation of Crimea.[16] Putin suggested in both meetings that Russian industry as a whole will be able to grow like the Russian agricultural sector did following the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014.[17] Putin has previously relied on the example of post-2014 Russian agricultural growth to assuage Russians of their economic anxieties but has yet to offer concrete proposals for how Russian industry would increase domestic production in a similar way.[18] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin will likely struggle to reassure Russians about their economic concerns while also setting informational conditions for a protracted war in Ukraine and mobilizing a wider portion of Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB).[19]

The Kremlin is likely trying to shift responsibility for expanding Russian industry onto regional bodies to insulate itself from possible criticism about Russia’s deteriorating economic situation. Putin emphasized the need for regionally based industrial development funds to assume a greater role in supporting Russian industry and stated that the Russian government should consider refinancing regional funds for these efforts, including from federal reserve funds.[20] Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov also attempted to reassure the Russian public on April 3 by stating that there will be no problems financing budget obligations and that reserves will cover falling oil and gas revenues for the federal budget.[21] Siluanov stated that Russian officials are unlikely to replenish reserves in the National Welfare Fund in 2023.[22] A growing Russian overreliance on funding through reserves could lead to further economic instability.

Key Takeaways 

• The Kremlin will likely attempt to coerce Belarus into further Union State integration when Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko meet in Moscow on April 5 and 6.
•  The Kremlin continues to attempt to employ nuclear threats to deter Western military aid provisions to Ukraine ahead of Ukraine’s planned counteroffensive.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s demonstrative response to the assassination of Russian milblogger Maxim Fomin indicates that Prigozhin likely believes that the attack was in part directed at himself.
• The Kremlin continues to attempt to (falsely) reassure the Russian public that the war in Ukraine will not have significant long-term economic consequences.
• The Kremlin is likely trying to shift more responsibility for growing Russian industry onto regional bodies to insulate itself from possible criticism about Russia’s deteriorating economic situation.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.
• Russian forces continue to prepare for a rumored pending Ukrainian counteroffensive in the southern direction.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that Russia’s ongoing spring conscription cycle is going according to plan, progressing as quickly as planned, and has completed initial military registration.
• Russian occupation officials denied Ukrainian reports that Russian occupation authorities are preparing evacuation plans from occupied regions of Ukraine.
• Belarusian state media claimed that the Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB) reportedly arrested two men under the suspicion of attempted terrorist attacks in Grodno.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on April 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Kreminna, Nevske (20km northwest of Kreminna), Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna), and Serebrianska forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[23] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 3 that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions near the Zhuravka gully (18km west of Kreminna) and that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) attacked Ukrainian positions near Kuzemivka (14km northwest of Svatove).[24] A milblogger claimed on April 4 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance near Nevske, Torske (14km west of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna). Geolocated footage published on April 4 indicated a limited Ukrainian advance northeast of Verkhnokamianske (18km south of Kreminna).[25] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian conventional and mobilized forces operating in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction are using more armored vehicles and act more cautiously in ground battles than Russian personnel in other sectors of the frontline.[26] Russian forces may be attempting to conserve forces in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction ahead of an anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within Bakhmut on April 4. Geolocated footage published on April 3 indicates that Russian forces likely advanced in southern Bakhmut closer to the Avangard stadium.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 4 that Wagner forces captured the Bakhmut-1 railway station, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[28] Russian sources claimed that Wagner forces completely cleared the territory of the AZOM industrial complex in northern Bakhmut, advanced in northwestern Bakhmut, and continued fighting in Bakhmut city center.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner fighters completely control central Bakhmut, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim, and it is unclear how the milblogger defines “central Bakhmut.”[30] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are gradually transferring personnel to the western part of Bakhmut from elsewhere in the city and that Wagner fighters are currently probing Ukrainian defenses in the city in search of the most favorable areas for future assaults.[31] A Ukrainian withdrawal to secondary lines of defense in the city and a Wagner focus on probing attacks would likely result in a temporary decrease in Russian forces’ operational tempo within Bakhmut.

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on April 4. Russian sources claimed that battles took place near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Khromove (2km west of Bakhmut), and Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut).[32] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces transitioned to positional defensive tactics near Orikhovo-Vasylivka in preparation for expected Ukrainian counterattacks.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that recent Ukrainian counterattacks to push Wagner fighters away from Ivanivske and the T0504 have been unsuccessful.[34] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults west of Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut) and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Orikhovo-Vasylikva, Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), and Ivanivske.[36] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Russian forces conducted 32 attacks in the Bakhmut area with 26 combat clashes in Bakhmut City and its surroundings.[37] Cherevaty also reported that Russian conventional forces are continuing to reinforce Wagner fighters in the Bakhmut area because of Wagner’s extensive losses, likely in an effort to maintain Russian forces’ current tempo of offensive operations in and around the city.[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline on April 4. Geolocated footage published on April 4 indicates that Russian forces made marginal gains west of Novobakhmutivka (13km northwest of Avdiivka).[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attempted to advance towards Avdiivka from the southwest and east and conducted assaults near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka) and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka) as well as within Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[40] Russian Southern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Ivan Bigma claimed that an unspecified motorized rifle unit of the Southern Grouping of Forces repelled a Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operation near Marinka.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Avdiivka itself, within 13km north of Avdiivka near Novokalynove and Krasnohorivka, and within 27km southwest of Avdiivka near Sieverne, Pervomaiske, and Marinka.[42]

Ukrainian forces likely conducted a counterattack northeast of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage published on April 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely recaptured positions northwest of Novoselivka (17km northeast of Avdiivka) and advanced close to the settlement.[43] It is unclear if Ukrainian forces still hold these positions or if Ukrainian forces conducted reconnaissance-in-force operations and subsequently left the area. A Russian milblogger claimed on April 3 that Ukrainian forces are preparing for counterattacks in the Avdiivka area after several unsuccessful counterattack attempts.[44]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on April 4. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces resumed assault operations near Mykilske (27km southwest of Donetsk City) in an attempt to bypass Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City) from the east.[45]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continue to prepare for a rumored upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive in the southern direction.[46] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 4 that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in the Kherson and Zaporizhia directions but rather continued to build up their defensive capabilities.[47] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated that Russian forces moved heavy equipment, infantry fighting vehicles, and ammunition from the rear in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast in the direction of Rozivka, Zaporizhia Oblast (45km northwest of Mariupol).[48] One Russian milblogger posted footage from an unspecified date and location allegedly showing Russian forces repelling a Ukrainian attack in the Zaporizhia direction.[49]

Russian forces struck Ukrainian infrastructure in Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts between April 3 and 4. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on April 4 that Ukrainian forces destroyed 14 of 17 Shahed-131 and -136 drones, 13 of which Ukrainian forces shot down over Odesa Oblast and one drone over Mykolaiv Oblast.[50] The Southern Operational Command stated that the drones caused a fire in an industrial facility in an unspecified location in Odesa Oblast.[51] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Shahed drones struck the military airfield in Shkilnyi Raion and Odesa Aircraft Repair Plant in Odesa City, though ISW cannot independently confirm these claims.[52] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on April 4 that Russian forces struck agricultural territory and industrial areas in the Kherson City and Beryslav, Kherson Oblast directions with guided bombs from Su-35 aircraft.[53] Russian forces conducted routine shelling along the southern axis on April 3 and 4.[54]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu stressed that Russia’s ongoing spring conscription cycle is going according to plan, progressing as quickly as planned, and has completed initial military registration on April 4.[55] Shoigu likely hoped to quash concerns that Russia‘s military lacks the administrative capacity to process, train, and account for the current class of approximately 147,000 conscripts after Russia‘s lackluster partial mobilization in September 2022. Shoigu framed the process as an example of Russian modernization successes, attributing alleged logistical ease to digitization and electronic recruitment. Shoigu claimed that 706,230 personnel arrived at Russian military registration and enlistment offices.[56] ISW maintains that spring conscription is extremely unlikely to increase Russian combat power in the short term due to intrinsic training requirements for conscripts and that Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to openly deploy conscripts for fear of political costs.[57]

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) stated on April 4 that Russia seeks to sponsor and develop alternative private military companies (PMCs) to replace the Wagner Group’s combat role.[58] The UK MoD Intelligence Service implied that Russian authorities desire to replace Wagner with a more-controllable alternative due to the feud between the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Wagner Group.[59] This supports ISW’s ongoing assessments on the declining influence of Wagner and Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.[60] Independent Russian news outlet Meduza reported on April 4 that the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service proposed mandating that members of the Public Monitoring Commission, which monitors prisoner’s rights, give 48 hours’ notice before visiting Russian detention centers.[61] This reduction of prison oversight may enable the expansion of Russian military recruitment efforts in prisons for Wagner or other groups.

The Russian “Alexander Nevsky” volunteer reconnaissance and assault brigade is continuing to form new volunteer battalions.[62] The Alexander Nevsky brigade reported that it formed three additional volunteer assault battalions named after Russian saints Daniil Moskovskyi, Dmitry Donskoy, and Alexander Peresvet. The Alexander Nevsky brigade also incorporated the “Borz” sabotage and reconnaissance detachment as a volunteer assault battalion.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials denied Ukrainian reports that they are preparing plans to evacuate from occupied regions of Ukraine. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported that Russian occupation authorities offered “voluntary evacuations” to Ukrainians living in occupied Skadovsk in Kherson Oblast to Crimea or Russia.[63] Kherson Oblast occupation administration Head Vladimir Saldo denied the Ukrainian report and claimed that Russian forces are discussing plans to seize the west (right) bank in Kherson Oblast.[64] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov denied claims that occupation officials in Berdyansk organized civilian evacuations and claimed that Russian forces reliably defend Berdyansk and occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[65] Russian occupation authorities rarely respond to Ukrainian claims about evacuations. Russian occupation officials’ denial of civilian evacuations far from the frontline could suggest doubt in Russian forces’ ability to hold occupied territory.

Russian occupation officials continue to coerce Ukrainians in Russian-occupied areas to receive Russian passports. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported that Russian occupation authorities on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River restricted movement and denied services to Ukrainian civilians who have not acquired Russian passports.[66] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that occupation officials in some areas of the Kakhovka Raion in Kherson Oblast have forbidden civilians from leaving their homes since April 2 and closed off public spaces such as hospitals and shopping centers during the day.[67]

Russian occupation authorities are attempting to integrate occupied Ukrainian territories through healthcare and education measures. Kherson Oblast occupation chairperson Andrey Alekseenko claimed that all residents of occupied Kherson Oblast can receive free medical care through Russian medical insurance available only through a Russian government-run online portal and government-run centers.[68] ISW previously reported on Russian occupation officials using healthcare access to assert control over civilians living in occupied areas.[69] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation Head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed that Azov State Pedagogical University in Berdyansk will accept students in bachelor’s, specialist, and master’s programs for free and issue Russian graduate diplomas.[70]

The Kremlin continues to shift responsibility for integrating occupied Ukrainian territory onto regional authorities. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration claimed that Krasnodar Krai Department of Consumer Issues representatives visited occupied Kherson Oblast, stated that the Department plans to expand trade turnover and investment in occupied Kherson Oblast, and drafted a list of potential companies and individuals who could work with entities in Kherson Oblast.[71] ISW previously reported on Kremlin efforts to promote programs between Russian regions and occupied Ukrainian territories in an attempt to promote socio-economic integration while shifting financial burdens away from the Kremlin.[72]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian state media claimed that the Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB) reportedly arrested two men accused of attempting terrorist attacks in Grodno on April 4.[73] The KGB claimed that the Ukrainian State Security Service (SBU) recruited two Russian and Belarusian men to conduct terrorist attacks against a military recruitment center, a military unit, two tank storage facilities, and Russia’s Consulate General in Grodno. KGB Chairman Ivan Tretel claimed that Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and the Czech Republic are preparing militants to intensify terrorist activity against Russia and Belarus in spring 2023, and claimed that Ukrainian special services are curating these attacks using Belarusian and Russian citizens.[74] These statements and arrests occurred ahead of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin scheduled for April 5 and April 6 and may be an effort to set information conditions for more Russian-Belarusian integration under the guise of combating terrorism.[75]

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the start of numerous readiness military exercises in Belarus on April 4. Lukashenko ordered Belarusian forces to begin combat readiness inspections focusing on the Belarusian military’s ability to operate in a changing environment and check conscripts’ readiness to staff brigades.[76] Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Commander Colonel Andrey Lukyanovich is overseeing joint staff exercises of Belarus’ Air Force and Air Defense Forces within the context of the joint Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Forces.[77] Artillery and missile elements of the Belarusian Northwestern Operational Command are conducting field exercises at the Osipovichi Training Ground in Mogilev Oblast.[78] Unspecified logistics elements of the Belarusian 120th Separate Mechanized Brigade deployed to an unspecified area after removing military equipment from storage.[79]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70863

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-october-20-%...

[3] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70863; https://t.me/readovkanews/56147; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/17441863

[4] https://t.me/ontnews/111432 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/04/v-kgb-belarusi-zayavili-chto-predotvratili-terakt-v-konsulstve-rf-v-grodno-ego-yakoby-planirovali-pod-rukovodstvom-ukrainskoy-razvedki

[5] https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-tematicheskom-selektornom-soveshchanii-04-04

[6] https://news.yahoo.com/belarus-receives-aircraft-iskander-missiles-09520...

[7] https://t.me/modmilby/25140; https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-tematicheskom-selektornom-soveshchanii-04-04

[8]https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[9] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/04/us/politics/us-ukraine-military-aid.h...

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[11] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/683

[12] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/684

[13] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/684

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[15] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70859

[16] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70860

[17] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70859 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70860

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031623 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70860

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[20] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70860

[21] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/17436751 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/56140

[22] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/5913221

[23]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09hgNePeV9U2SwNxExnP...

[24] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82118; https://t.me/rybar/45427

[25] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QESktRh0430 ; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1642967999236677636?s=20 ; https://t.me/k_2_54/79 ; https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1641848862896685078?s=20

[26] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU; https://suspilne dot media/434373-boi-za-bahmut-niderlandi-vidilili-novij-paket-dopomogi-rf-obstrilala-avdiivku-405-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/04/na-kupyansko-lymanskomu-napryamku-nashi-zahysnyky-znyshhyly-dva-tanky-t-72-dvi-bmp-i-sklad-boyeprypasiv-sergij-cherevatyj/ 

[27] https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1643229307978801156; https://twit...

[28] https://t.me/brussinf/5828 ; https://t.me/milchronicles/1734 ; https...

[29] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46536 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/20077; https...

[30] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82162; https://t.me/brussinf/5828  

[31] https://t.me/readovkanews/56155 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46536

[32] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46536 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/56155

[33] https://t.me/readovkanews/56155

[34] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46536

[35] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46536

[36]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nie7mQLn8DrFACGiivU...

[37] https://suspilne dot media/434373-boi-za-bahmut-niderlandi-vidilili-novij-paket-dopomogi-rf-obstrilala-avdiivku-405-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU

[38] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032523 ; https://suspilne dot media/434373-boi-za-bahmut-niderlandi-vidilili-novij-paket-dopomogi-rf-obstrilala-avdiivku-405-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU

[39] https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1643229321618771969; https://twit... https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1643170583922851840

[40] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46516 ;

[41] https://t.me/mod_russia/25360

[42]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09hgNePeV9U2SwNxExnP...

[43] https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1643229325032816640; https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1642429573617860608

[44] https://t.me/rybar/45427

[45] https://t.me/wargonzo/11754

[46] https://t.me/basurin_e/535; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/16416; https://t.m...

[47]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nie7mQLn8DrFACGiivU...

[48] https://t.me/andriyshTime/8282

[49] https://t.me/ok_spn/23798

[50]https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02zbD6t13e4d...

[51]https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02zbD6t13e4d...

[52]https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82141; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82145; http...

[53]https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02zbD6t13e4d...

[54]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nie7mQLn8DrFACGiivU...

[55] https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-tematicheskom-selektornom-soveshchanii-04-04

[56] https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-tematicheskom-selektornom-soveshchanii-04-04

[57] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[58] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1643123656275423237?s=20

[59] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1643123656275423237?s=20

[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[61] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/04/fsin-predlozhila-obyazat-chlenov-onk-preduprezhdat-o-poseschenii-izolyatorov-za-48-chasov-pravozaschitniki-nazvali-eto-nachalom-kontsa-nablyudatelnyh-komissiy; https://www.coe dot int/t/democracy/migration/russian-pmc_description_en.asp

[62] https://t.me/BTGR_NEVSKIY/185

[63]https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid02NoLtXh3XcYsvsaF1T3XQb...

[64] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/630

[65] https://t.me/vrogov/8553

[66]https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid02NoLtXh3XcYsvsaF1T3XQb...

[67]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09hgNePeV9U2SwNxExnP...

[68] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/8320

[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[70] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/932

[71] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/8329

[72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[73] https://t.me/ontnews/111432 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/04/v-kgb-belarusi-zayavili-chto-predotvratili-terakt-v-konsulstve-rf-v-grodno-ego-yakoby-planirovali-pod-rukovodstvom-ukrainskoy-razvedki

[74] https://t.me/readovkanews/56169

[75] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70863

[76] https://t.me/modmilby/25147 ; https://t.me/modmilby/25148; https://t....

[77] https://t.me/modmilby/25130

[78] https://t.me/modmilby/25155

[79] https://t.me/modmilby/25132

Tags

Ukraine Project

File Attachments: 

Bakhmut Battle Map Draft April 4,2023.png

Donetsk Battle Map Draft April 4,2023.png

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Kherson-Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft April 4,2023.png

Zaporizhia Battle Map Draft April 4, 2023.png

8. Japan changes aid rules; to fund defense projects of friendly nations

I think this is significant. Is the next step that Japan will contribute lethal aid?

Excerpts:

The aid will not be used to buy lethal weapons that recipient countries could use in conflicts with other nations in accordance with the three principles that govern arms exports, according to the statement.

The Philippines and Bangladesh are likely to be included as the first recipients of the aid, a government source involved in talks said to Reuters.

Japan is considering providing radars to the Philippines to help it monitor Chinese activity in the contested South China Sea, and also weighing Fiji and Malaysia as potential recipients of the aid, the Yomiuri newspaper reported on Monday.

In principle, only developing countries will be eligible to receive the aid given it will be provided as grants, according to the foreign ministry.

The decision to expand the scope of international aid to military-related projects follows Japan’s announcement in December of a military build up that will double defense spending within five years as it looks to counter China’s growing military might in Asia.

Japan changes aid rules; to fund defense projects of friendly nations

rappler.com · April 5, 2023

TOKYO, Japan – Japan on Wednesday, April 5, said it plans to offer friendly nations financial assistance to help them bolster their defenses, marking Tokyo’s first unambiguous departure from rules that forbid using international aid for military purposes.

Japan’s Overseas Security Assistance (OSA) will be operated separately from the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) programme that for decades has funded roads, dams and other civilian infrastructure projects, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno said at a regular news conference.

“By enhancing their security and deterrence capabilities, OSA aims to deepen our security cooperation with the countries, to create a desirable security environment for Japan,” a statement released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Wednesday said.

The aid will not be used to buy lethal weapons that recipient countries could use in conflicts with other nations in accordance with the three principles that govern arms exports, according to the statement.

The Philippines and Bangladesh are likely to be included as the first recipients of the aid, a government source involved in talks said to Reuters.

Japan is considering providing radars to the Philippines to help it monitor Chinese activity in the contested South China Sea, and also weighing Fiji and Malaysia as potential recipients of the aid, the Yomiuri newspaper reported on Monday.

In principle, only developing countries will be eligible to receive the aid given it will be provided as grants, according to the foreign ministry.

The decision to expand the scope of international aid to military-related projects follows Japan’s announcement in December of a military build up that will double defense spending within five years as it looks to counter China’s growing military might in Asia.

Following on from the overhaul of its military strategy, there is growing momentum over the easing of Japan’s arms export ban. The ruling coalition is looking to start working-level discussions in late April over loosening the current arms export restrictions, according to broadcaster TBS, in line with similar suggestions made in the new strategy.

Japan has also been ramping up its outreach to developing nations in an effort to counter China. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced a $75 billion investment across the Indo-Pacific in March as he seeks to forge stronger ties with countries in South and Southeast Asia. – Rappler.com

rappler.com · April 5, 2023

9. Russia is set to deploy more nuclear weapons in the Arctic

Russia is set to deploy more nuclear weapons in the Arctic

Russia is set to deploy more nuclear weapons in the Arctic after Finland joined NATO: Analysts say Putin will escalate tensions in an attempt to intimidate Europe and the West

• Finland officially joined NATO on Tuesday, infuriating Russian officials
• The Kremlin warned of 'countermeasures' that analysts warn could see Russia increasing its nuclear arsenal in the Arctic circle, to the east of Finland 

By CHRIS JEWERS FOR MAILONLINE

PUBLISHED: 09:35 BST, 5 April 2023 | UPDATED: 11:00 BST, 5 April 2023

Daily Mail · by Chris Jewers For Mailonline · April 5, 2023

Finland joining the NATO alliance could prompt Russia to increase its nuclear arsenal stationed in the Arctic circle, analysts have warned.

The Nordic country officially joined the world's biggest military alliance on Tuesday, becoming its 31st member in a historic realignment of Europe's defences spurred by Vladimir Putin's illegal invasion of Ukraine, infuriating Russian officials.

Helsinki's strategic shift, which ended decades of military non-alignment, has doubled the length of the US-led alliance's land border with Russia and drew an angry warning of 'countermeasures' from the Kremlin.

While Moscow did not specify what these measures could be, Russia's defence chief said on Tuesday that Belarusian warplanes had been upgraded to carry Russian nuclear warheads, while Putin has said he plans to station tactical nuclear weapons in the neighbouring country.

Analysts have also warned Moscow's hawkish leaders will view Finland's NATO ascension as a threat to the Kola Peninsula, where Russian military bases house the world's largest concentration of nuclear weapons.

Finland joining the NATO alliance could prompt Russia to increase its nuclear arsenal stationed in the Arctic circle, analysts have warned. Pictured: Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with workers as he visits the Tulazheldormash plant, a Russian leading machine-building enterprise, in Tula on April 4

The Nordic country officially joined the world's biggest military alliance on Tuesday, becoming its 31st member in a historic realignment of Europe's defences spurred by Vladimir Putin's illegal invasion of Ukraine. Pictured: The Finnish flag is raised outside NATO HQ on Tuesday

Finland's border with Russia stretches 833 miles from the Baltic Sea at its southern-most point to a tripoint where the Russian, Finnish and Norwegian borders meet some 65 miles south of the Barents Sea.

To the east, sits the Kola Peninsula, which is home to the city of Murmansk, where Russia hosts its northern fleet. This includes nuclear-capable submarines.

In October 2022, Norwegian reports said Russia had deployed bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons to Kola Peninsula. Satellite images later appeared to confirm an increase in the bombers stationed in the region.

Russia also carried out tests of all three legs of its nuclear triad in the Arctic.

Writing for security website War on the Rocks, Heli Hautala, a Finnish diplomat, and Nicholas Lokker, of the Center for a New American Security think-tank, warned that with Finland in NATO, Russia will view their northwestern flank as being vulnerable.

'Nuclear weapons will assume greater prominence in Russian strategy until the country can reconstitute its forces,' which for now have been diverted to Russia's war efforts in Ukraine, the analysts write.

'As Russia attempts to meet the apparent increased threat in northern Europe while its army remains tied down elsewhere, it is likely to double down on aggressive nuclear signalling in the region,' the pair add in their analysis.

'Any new NATO infrastructure in Sweden and Finland — such as upgraded airfields, intelligence facilities or, most critically, nuclear weapons — will only intensify Russia's aggressive posture.'

Hautala and Lokker said 'Russia's northwestern flank becomes more vulnerable' with Finland, and possibly Sweden, joining NATO, noting that 'the Kola Peninsula is particularly relevant to Russia’s threat perception'.

They described the region as being of 'central importance' to Russia's national security.

In addition to expanding closer to the Kola Peninsula, NATO's borders are now closer to Russia's second largest city of St. Petersburg, they write.

The expansion could also be perceived as a threat to Russian naval exercises in the Baltic Sea as well as its Kaliningrad exclave - that will soon be surrounded by NATO member states, the pair note.

Joining NATO is significant both symbolically and strategically. From a military point of view, it would allow NATO to reinforce the Baltic states (NATO members Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) from the north in the case of a Russian invasion.

With Norway and Finland both in NATO and Sweden looking to join, it also protects other European nations from any Russian incursions from the North.

On the symbolic significance, Hautala and Lokker highlight an interview given by Finnish president Sauli Niinistö in 2022, who recalled a warning he was given by Vladimir Putin himself in 2016.

'When we look across the border now, we see a Finn on the other side,' Niinistö said Putin told him at the time. 'If Finland joins NATO, we will see an enemy.'

Pictured: A nuclear missile test is carried out on the Kola Peninsula (file image)

In October 2022, Norwegian reports said that Russia had also deployed bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons to Kola Peninsula. Satellite images (pictured) later appeared to confirm an increase in the bombers stationed in the region

Russia's Kola Peninsula is home to the city of Murmansk, where Russia hosts its northern fleet. This includes nuclear-capable submarines (pictured, file photo)

Pictured: A map showing how NATO has expanded since it was founded in 1949

Finland's foreign minister formally sealed Helsinki's membership by depositing the accession papers before the Finnish flag was raised between those of France and Estonia to the singing of a choir outside NATO's gleaming Brussels headquarters.

'Finland now has the strongest friends and allies in the world,' NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg said.

Putin, he said, had 'wanted to slam NATO's door shut. Today we show the world that he failed, that aggression and intimidation do not work'.

Joining NATO puts Finland under the alliance's Article Five, the collective defence pledge that an attack on one member 'shall be considered an attack against them all'. This was the guarantee Finnish leaders decided they needed as they watched Putin's devastating assault on Ukraine.

'NATO membership strengthens our international position and room for manoeuvre,' Finland's President Sauli Niinisto said.

US President Joe Biden said the alliance was strengthened by its newest member and promised to 'defend every inch of NATO territory'.

But Moscow erupted in fury at the move, which takes its frontier with NATO member states to 1,550 miles, branding it an 'assault' on Russia's security and national interests. 'This forces us to take countermeasures... in tactical and strategic terms,' Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said.

Invaded by its giant neighbour, the Soviet Union, in 1939, Finland stayed out of NATO throughout the Cold War.

Now its membership brings a potent military into the alliance with a wartime strength of 280,000 and one of Europe's largest artillery arsenals.

Senior NATO military commander Admiral Rob Bauer told AFP that Finland had so far not requested its new allies station troops on its soil.

NATO officials say the war in Ukraine has sapped Moscow's forces, but the alliance is monitoring how Russia responds to gauge its future steps.

Turkey and Hungary, attempting to gain leverage over allies in separate political battles, had delayed Finland's bid to come under the NATO umbrella - and Stockholm's progress remains blocked.

Pictured: A Russian fighter jet from the country's Northern Fleet's naval aviation group takes off in the Kola Peninsula (file photo)

But last week, the Turkish parliament voted to clear Finland's final hurdle.

Completing the ratification in well under a year still makes this the fastest membership process in the alliance's recent history.

NATO was created as a counterweight to the Soviet Union at the onset of the Cold War era that began immediately after the Allies defeated Nazi Germany.

Finland's arrival nevertheless remains a bittersweet moment for the alliance as the hope had been for Sweden to come on board at the same time.

Helsinki's first act as a new member was to back Stockholm's bid.

Budapest and Ankara remain the holdouts after belatedly agreeing to wave through Helsinki's bid.

Sweden has upset Hungary's leader Viktor Orban - one of Putin's closest allies in Europe - by expressing alarm over the rule of law in Hungary.

It has also angered Turkey by refusing to extradite dozens of suspects that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan links to a failed 2016 coup attempt and the decades-long Kurdish independence struggle.

The United States and other NATO members led the calls for Sweden to join as soon as Finland's flag was fluttering in the cold Brussels breeze.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said he believed both countries would take part in a NATO summit in Vilnius this summer as new members.

Ukraine is also pushing for eventual NATO membership, but Western diplomats say that remains a distant prospect.

'There is no better strategic solution to ensuring strategic security in the Euro-Atlantic region than the membership of Ukraine in the alliance,' Ukraine's Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said.

Stoltenberg said Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was invited to NATO's Vilnius summit in July.

The focus for the alliance remains on bolstering Kyiv's capacities to win the war, while moving it towards NATO membership only over the longer term.

Finland's ascension came as Zelensky and his wife arrived in Poland Wednesday for a state visit that is meant as a gesture of thanks to the neighboring nation for its crucial support in Ukraine's defence against Russia's invasion.

The visit is a rare foray for Zelensky out of Ukraine since Russia unleased the war in February 2022.

A plaque along with Finland's flag is seen at a roundtable discussion during a joining ceremony at the NATO foreign ministers' meeting at the Alliance's headquarters in Brussels, April 4

While it follows visits to the US, Britain, France and Belgium, it stands out from the others because it was announced in advance without the secrecy of past visits.

It is also unusual that the president is joined by the first lady, Olena Zelenska. Marcin Przydacz, the head of Polish President Andrzej Duda's foreign policy office, described it as Zelenskyy's first visit of this kind since the war began.

The visit shines a light on Poland's rising international role in a new security order that is emerging after Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

Poland is modernising its military with orders of tanks and other equipment from U.S. and South Korean producers, while the United States has also beefed up its military presence in Poland.

Daily Mail · by Chris Jewers For Mailonline · April 5, 2023

10. Retired women spies push for predecessor to get highest military medal

Virginia Hall is a real hero and deserving of this recognition.

Video at the link: https://scrippsnews.com/amp/stories/retired-female-spies-want-predecessor-to-get-highest-medal/

Retired female spies want predecessor to get highest medal (VIDEO)

scrippsnews.com · by Sasha Ingber

Retired women spies push for predecessor to get highest military medal

Why don't Americans know who Virginia Hall is?

By | April 3, 2023

She made for an unlikely spy — an American woman behind German lines in France in the 1940s. But Maryland native Virginia Hall proved so good at intelligence the Nazis gave her nicknames.

"She was referred to by Klaus Barbie, who was one of the evilest, the meanest Nazis there were, as 'the limping b**ch,'" says Ellen McCarthy, the former Assistant Secretary of State for the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Hall only became a spy after losing part of her leg in a hunting accident. She had wanted to be a diplomat, but the State Department used the disability to deny her that career path. With a prosthetic limb she named Cuthbert, she went on to sabotage German operations in advance of the D-Day Invasion.

Brad Catling, Hall’s great nephew, says he found an old postcard she wrote buried in a box. "And she writes, ‘And so the catastrophe has come. I can't begin to express the horror I feel at the useless slaughter being embarked upon, caused by the usual enemies of the civilized world. Everything here is quiet. I am staying.’"

Catling says Hall hid fake passports in that hollow leg while spying for the British Special Operations Executive, and then the Americans with the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor to the CIA. Researchers say she posed as a journalist and later a milkmaid, getting her teeth filed down to pass as an older woman.

"I met her when I was 16, and she arrived still in her spy uniform, which was puffy clothes to make her look fat. And they were lumpy. And [she had] old white hair because she was supposed to look like an old woman. And I was not impressed," Lorna Catling, Hall’s niece, says. She would learn later in life about Hall's bravery and accomplishments.

Her life reads like a novel: In France, Hall stayed for a time in a nunnery, recruited people in the woods, and gathered intelligence from unusual sources — farmers, manufacturers, and a woman in a brothel. To avoid German capture, she trekked 50 miles over the Pyrenees mountains, with her wood and aluminum leg. Then she did something exposed spies never do: She went back. Hall organized, armed and trained 1,500 French resistance fighters for sabotage and ambush missions. When the war was over, she returned once more to find her agents petitioning the U.S. government for their restitution.

Why don't Americans know who Virginia Hall is?

"The intelligence community hasn't told its story very well," says Sue Gordon, Former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. "And part of the reason is that's our story, that we don't shine a light on ourselves because that anonymity allows us to act."

Since 2021, Gordon and McCarthy have been working with other retired female spies to get Hall the highest military award in the country: the Medal of Honor. They are also working with Hall’s family and the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Sen. Mark Warner. Last summer, Sen. Warner sent a letter to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, asking him to upgrade a Distinguished Service Cross Hall received. Secretary Austin declined.

"I'm not going to lie," says McCarthy. "I was very disappointed. You know, we had worked very hard on this. And it just seems so clear to me."

The Defense Department said Hall was ineligible because she was a civilian. But declassified intelligence shows Hall received combat credit for an operation in France. Now, they’re trying again — with a Department of Army historian.

"Virginia Hall couldn't have operated in the military, the Office of Strategic Services was a pseudo-military organization within the Department of Defense. It was aligned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, a Department of Army element," says McCarthy. "If we can get the historian from the Department of Army to draw that line, that she was operating in a military capacity, maybe that will be another data point that will compel the secretary to maybe reconsider his decision."

Hall had shied away from recognition and said little about her time in France. But Brad Catling says, "If 'Aunt Dindy' were to be awarded the Medal of Honor, our goal would be for it to be seen by as many people as possible."

Her family and these retired spies say Hall wouldn't care about the medal. But it isn’t just about her. The medal is a way to show that “conspicuous gallantry,” a criterion for the award, takes many forms.

"Our history was not made by people who looked all the same. They were not all West Point Civil War generals, or descendants of those, who were making a difference in the security of our nation," says Gordon. She and McCarthy say the U.S. needs more Virginia Halls for the problems the country is facing.

They don’t plan to give up. "Maybe it's also an opportunity to really look at the whole Medal of Honor process,” McCarthy says. “Do those requirements still apply today?"

scrippsnews.com · by Sasha Ingber

11. Custer’s Last Tweet: Avoiding a Digital Little Bighorn in the Fight for Hearts and Minds

Graphics and images at the link: https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/custers-last-tweet-avoiding-a-digital-little-bighorn-in-the-fight-for-hearts-and-minds/

​Excerpts:

Ultimately, the best way to fight influence operations is by setting normative conditions for the truth to flourish and thrive. Towards that end, the national security apparatus should avoid prioritizing threats based on a perceived level of sophistication or tradecraft but rather through a holistic and diversified portfolio that addresses the spectrum of tactics, techniques, and procedures our adversaries employ. Just as any artillery operator understands “low-tech still kills,” so too must information warfare professionals avoid disproportionately emphasizing biased ideas of sophistication over substantive and coherent evaluation strategies. Rather than simply condemn the Chinese behaviors, they should be treated no different than Russian threats and considered for asset freezes, criminal indictments, and even offensive cyber actions. Ultimately, the only viable path to avoiding Custer’s Last Tweet is one whereby information warfare professionals evaluate effectiveness solely on the basis of whether or not it accomplishes an adversary’s goals. In order to do so, however, they must first know their adversary and their goals.

2000 years before Custer’s final battle, Sun Tzu asserted in The Art of War, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.” Obviously Custer should have considered this timeless piece of wisdom before Little Bighorn, as should Quintilius Varus before marching into the Teutoberg or Charles d’Albret at Agincourt. But they are also words that should be appreciated in whole new contexts that none of those leaders could have imagined. Understanding the mind and goals of an adversary is as important in the digital information environment as it is in any other domain of warfare. Different goals and contexts necessarily require different tactics. Not everyone is following the same playbook, Russian or otherwise. Why would they? They are all fighting different battles.​

Custer’s Last Tweet: Avoiding a Digital Little Bighorn in the Fight for Hearts and Minds - Irregular Warfare Initiative

Jayson Warren, Darren Linvill, and Patrick Warren

irregularwarfare.org · by Jayson Warren, Darren Linvill, Patrick Warren · April 5, 2023

Jayson Warren, Darren Linvill, and Patrick Warren

On the afternoon of June 25, 1876, Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer led five companies of the Seventh Cavalry into the valley of the Little Bighorn River, intent on pacifying the Lakota and Sioux encamped there. A veteran of previous campaigns against the Plains Natives, Custer believed he knew the mind of his opponent; he even wrote as much two years earlier in his memoir, My Life on the Plains. He was confident, but, unfortunately for the Seventh Cavalry, overly so. By that evening Custer and hundreds of others would be dead.

In lore, simple hubris is given as the reason for Custer’s defeat, and the same is said about other infamous military losses—from the Romans in Teutoburg Forest to the French at Agincourt. Pointing the finger at pride to rationalize failure may shape a good morality tale or serve to create a useful scapegoat (as Emperor Augustus is said to have declared after hearing of the disaster at Teutoburg Forest, “Quintilius Varus, give me back my legions!”), but seldom does it give actionable insight. The fundamental contributing factor to Custer’s predicament is that he did not understand his opponent as well as he thought he did. The afternoon Custer rode into the valley of the Little Bighorn he was outnumbered, outgunned, and unaware of the disposition of his enemy. More fundamentally, he did not understand or appreciate his opponents’ goals or motivations. Custer thought he was fighting the same battle he had fought before and therefore followed an old plan of battle—one he had literally written the book on. But on that day his experience only ensured he was defeated before firing a single shot.

In our current understanding of digital information warfare, we may be making the same fundamental error that Custer made a century and a half ago. But we can apply lessons from Little Bighorn to twenty-first century conflict where “hearts, minds and opinion are, perhaps, more important than kinetic force projection.” A common principle applies to both kinetic warfare and information warfare: understanding one’s adversary must be step one.

The Russian Playbook Problem

While the US military’s bias towards conflict can intellectually impede its ability to conduct operations in the information environment, framing informational conflict with the doctrinal lexicon of physical warfare (e.g., center of gravity, campaigns, objectives, command and control) can assist in avoiding the pitfalls of the past. This is particularly important at a time when adversary nations are turning their focus from the means of war (i.e., solely armed violence) to the objectives of war. After all, in the same way that Clausewitz contends that war is “a continuation of policy by other means” (i.e, wars are fought for political ends) so too does Thomas Rid find linkages between informational conflict and “political warfare.” Consequently, it is paramount to first understand why a country is engaging in informational conflict (for example, the fear, honor, and interest of Thucydides) before attempting to either evaluate the efficacy of their operations or plan appropriate countermeasures.

Understanding a nation’s goals for a campaign gives insight into their tactics, in both kinetic and information warfare. Since 2016 there has been a natural focus on Russia and Russian tactics when discussing digital information operations, with research examining Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) activities dominating the nascent body of academic literature on state-backed social-media trolls. When campaigns from other nations are exposed, the media and policy community suggest those states have used the “Russian playbook.” Russia is not only the standard-bearer by which all digital influence operations are measured, but increasingly the assumed model for what effective disinformation looks like.

But focusing on past Russian tactics is increasingly ill-advised because the arena of information warfare is becoming increasingly crowded and with each new actor comes the possibility of new tradecraft. As a result, the US national security community needs to broaden its understanding of what “effective” digital information operations might look like. Whether it is foreign efforts to sabotage trust in scientific researchers and institutions; Venezuelan manipulation of public sentiment to boost positive perceptions of Russia’s Sputnik-V COVID-19 vaccine; Moscow’s nefarious use of fake fact-checking during the ongoing invasion of Ukraine; China’s covering up of its genocide of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang; or autocratic regimes fortifying domestic control at home, state-sponsored information operations have a wide range of goals. Online disinformation is not one size fits all. Which tactics may be appropriate depends on the goals the actor wants to achieve, and, in turn, different tactics require different measures to evaluate success or failure.

The Russian IRA’s campaign to target the 2016 election (which likely continued through 2018 and 2020) has generally been judged a success. The campaign’s goal was to divide America along ideological lines and to spread doubt and distrust in democratic institutions. Russia’s goals required reaching real users. To do this they created social media accounts which were artisanal in nature, accounts that purported to be part of specific ideological groups. Some of their most successful accounts, for instance, purported to be Black American women and part of the Black Lives Matter movement. It was necessary for the IRA to build accounts that appeared and acted in every way genuine. The IRA studied and understood the communities it engaged with and was able to seamlessly integrate itself into a group. IRA accounts engaged with genuine users, gained followers over time, and used those followers to pull supposedly like-minded individuals to believe information they were likely already inclined to believe. The success of the IRA campaign can be (and has been) measured by a variety of metrics related to these goals, including organic followers, organic shares, appearances in media, and the successful amplification of targeted narratives in the public conversations. By every measure the IRA was excellent at what it did.

Figure 1. Controlling the Xinjiang Narrative Via Hashtag Flooding

The Little Red Playbook

If we examine some digital information operations known to originate from the Chinese state by these same measures, we might conclude that what China has done is not nearly so effective. Social media accounts attributed to China and working to influence the West often appear sloppy or superficial. Seldom do they create accounts with robust persona able to stand up to scrutiny. They often appear fake at a glance. The names and profile pictures regularly have mismatched genders, the handles are a string of algorithmically generated numbers and letters, and the English (or French, or Korean, etc.) is obviously translated by a computer. Chinese campaigns typically, therefore, acquire virtually no organic followers and have minimal audience engagement. Measured by the Russian yardstick, China has failed dramatically.

Much of the research and policy community has made just this judgment. It has been suggested that Chinese digital information operations targeting the West are “more simplistic,” “more primitive,” or “still improving” relative to Russian efforts. Researchers have argued that China has not done the psychological and ethnographic research needed to create convincing Western social media personas. Looking for explanations for this pattern of many thousands of social media accounts attributed to China with little organic reach, it has been suggested that the real goal of Chinese disinformation is not about engagement, but rather to “demonstrate to superiors total commitment by generating high levels of activity (in this case, hitting targets for post counts), while actual efficacy or impact may be secondary.” These arguments assume China’s goals are best accomplished using tactics found in the “Russian playbook” and are grounded in the theory that China’s efforts should involve engagement with real users. They also assume that the adversary in this case is unsophisticated, which was perhaps another of Custer’s mistakes.

There is ample evidence that, at least in many cases, organic engagement may in fact be detrimental to China’s digital operation goals. In just one recent example occurring in the run up to the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, thousands of social media accounts attributed to China began posting the hashtag #GenocideGames, a hashtag used by activists to link the Olympic games to Chinese atrocities committed against the Uyghur Muslim minority in Northwest China. These accounts did not try to engage in conversation or make the hashtag artificially trend so that more users would see it. Far from it. They engaged in what is often called “hashtag flooding,” posting in volume to dilute the use of the hashtag, to ensure that genuine users have a more difficult time using it to engage in real dialogue. Users trying to use the #GenocideGames hashtag for its original purpose were more likely to find meaningless content posted by Chinese trolls and less likely to find content critical of the Chinese state. Russian-style engagement would, in fact, hamper the goal of flooding out narratives critical of China in this way.

Figure 2. Spoofed Twitter Accounts to Minimize Problematic Expatriate Followership/Accessibility

The Chinese have applied the flooding technique to many different targets, in many different languages, across a large variety of platforms. The targets have included hashtags used by critics (#XinjiangCotton, #Accelerationism, #Safeguard) and the names or handles of critics, especially expatriate Chinese critics (#LiMengYan, #GuoWengui, #邱家军), and the names of disputed or troublesome territories (#HK, #taiwan, #Xinjiang). The flooding has occurred in (at least) Chinese, English, French, Korean, and Japanese, and has occurred across hundreds of international websites and social-media platforms. It included tens of thousands of posts, from thousands of profiles, across many months. In addition to flooding hashtags, they also flood identities—creating hundreds of spoof accounts mirroring individuals critical of China. When successful, flooding obscures all organic conversations. Searching for flooded narratives and targets is difficult because content is dominated by the flood and any new organic messages on targeted topics quickly get pushed down the feed, making organic discourse very costly and inefficient.

Moreover, hordes of spoof accounts make posts from any real account difficult to identify, effectively obscuring valid or legitimate messages from potential readers. The second order effect is to dissuade organic participants from contributing to the targeted conversations. The stifling of narratives and organic online discourse has real consequences and measurable impacts—shutting down content on topics targeted by a motivated political actor is one way to stifle dissent. Therefore, using the “Russian playbook” as the standard bearer and relying on the metrics used to measure Russian online influence campaigns is not helpful because the right measures to determine the impact of Chinese online influence campaigns are not numbers of retweets or likes. Instead, with Chinese efforts, focus should be on the harder problem of measuring the shortfall in organic content or views of that content and what that means for political discourse.

Figure 3. Example PRC “Low Quality” Social Media Profiles

Don’t Judge a Playbook by its Cover

China is not the only actor with designs in the information space that diverge from the “Russian playbook.” A recent (and ongoing) review of 113 foreign and domestic online influence efforts documents 28 distinct influence actors operating over the past decade. Among these campaigns, they identify six broad classes of political goals: discredit, hinder, polarize, spread, support, and influence. They also identify five specific tactics (bot, troll, hashtag flooding, information stealing, fake social media profile) and one catchall for “other strategy.” One could quibble about these particular categories, but they do demonstrate a substantial and important heterogeneity across these campaigns. As one would expect from adversaries matching their strategies to their goals, the tactics and aims correlate, and both vary by attacking country and over time.

Ultimately, the best way to fight influence operations is by setting normative conditions for the truth to flourish and thrive. Towards that end, the national security apparatus should avoid prioritizing threats based on a perceived level of sophistication or tradecraft but rather through a holistic and diversified portfolio that addresses the spectrum of tactics, techniques, and procedures our adversaries employ. Just as any artillery operator understands “low-tech still kills,” so too must information warfare professionals avoid disproportionately emphasizing biased ideas of sophistication over substantive and coherent evaluation strategies. Rather than simply condemn the Chinese behaviors, they should be treated no different than Russian threats and considered for asset freezes, criminal indictments, and even offensive cyber actions. Ultimately, the only viable path to avoiding Custer’s Last Tweet is one whereby information warfare professionals evaluate effectiveness solely on the basis of whether or not it accomplishes an adversary’s goals. In order to do so, however, they must first know their adversary and their goals.

2000 years before Custer’s final battle, Sun Tzu asserted in The Art of War, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.” Obviously Custer should have considered this timeless piece of wisdom before Little Bighorn, as should Quintilius Varus before marching into the Teutoberg or Charles d’Albret at Agincourt. But they are also words that should be appreciated in whole new contexts that none of those leaders could have imagined. Understanding the mind and goals of an adversary is as important in the digital information environment as it is in any other domain of warfare. Different goals and contexts necessarily require different tactics. Not everyone is following the same playbook, Russian or otherwise. Why would they? They are all fighting different battles.

Jayson Warren is an active-duty major and PhD student at Clemson University. In addition to his doctoral studies, he serves as an assistant researcher in the Clemson Media Forensics Hub.

Darren Linvill is an associate professor in the department of Communication at Clemson University and lead researcher in the Clemson University Media Forensics Hub. His research explores state-sponsored disinformation and information operations, particularly as employed on social media.

Patrick Warren is an associate professor in the John E. Walker Department of Economics and a lead researcher at the Clemson University Media Forensics Hub. He has a PhD from MIT in economics and studies media, politics, and the economics of organizations.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Photo: US Air Force

irregularwarfare.org · by Jayson Warren, Darren Linvill, Patrick Warren · April 5, 2023

12. With eye on China, Japan to offer military aid to like-minded countries

Some more detail on Japan's major policy change.  

Is it all about China?  Will Japan eventually become a full partner in the Arsenal of Democracy?

With eye on China, Japan to offer military aid to like-minded countries

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/04/05/national/japan-official-security-assistance-aid-china/?tpcc=dnu&pnespid=pOuBlZZQ7bTM9667qkL2tuBO5x0NsCZ3mhcwGEk2qxyVVBB4oLlCPGeZV4T2WlnEeA7Qumk

• BY GABRIEL DOMINGUEZ
• STAFF WRITER

Japan on Wednesday unveiled guidelines for a new program to strengthen the militaries of like-minded countries by providing “official security assistance” — a move that breaks with its previous policy of avoiding the use of development aid for military purposes other than disaster relief.

First announced in last December’s revised National Security Strategy (NSS), the new OSA framework will initially provide equipment, supplies and infrastructure development assistance to partner countries in the form of grants, rather than loans, in a bid to reinforce what Tokyo describes as the region’s “comprehensive defense architecture.”

Foreign Ministry officials say the Philippines will be one of the first beneficiaries of OSA, with Malaysia, Bangladesh and Fiji also among those being considered.

The purpose of the initiative is to “contribute to the creation of a desirable security environment for Japan,” while maintaining Japan’s “basic principles as a peaceful nation,” the ministry said in a statement.

A final Cabinet decision on the policy is expected in May, officials said.

OSA: Beyond traditional aid

OSA, which will be implemented jointly by the National Security Secretariat and the Foreign and Defense Ministries, is being presented as an expansion of Japan’s official development assistance (ODA) — one of the world’s largest foreign aid programs — to cover projects “for the benefit of armed forces and other related organizations.”

The new framework was revealed as Tokyo moves away from a strict nonmilitary approach to its ties with neighbors and as it looks to realize its vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

The government said the OSA program will focus on improving the capabilities of regional militaries to conduct surveillance of territorial waters and airspace, U.N. peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance as well as disaster response activities.

Philippine defense chief Carlito Galvez Jr. and Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada (left) at the beginning of a bilateral meeting at the Defense Ministry in Tokyo in February | POOL / VIA REUTERS

The gear and materials are to be provided within the scope of Japan’s so-called three principles on defense transfers laid out in 2014 that effectively ban the export of potentially lethal equipment.

The initiative will be an additional tool for Japan to strengthen relations with these nations beyond the scope of traditional ODA. While that has included the provision of maritime law enforcement equipment, the new OSA framework will aim to enhance partners’ defense capabilities to counter regional security challenges, including those posed by China, Russia and North Korea.

Russia’s war on Ukraine — and fears that China could take a page from that conflict and invade Taiwan — have provided an impetus for the drastic shift in Japan’s defense and security policies.

According to its fiscal 2023 budget, the government has set aside ¥2 billion ($15 million) for OSA. Funding will be separate from the ¥570.9 billion in economic and social development assistance that Tokyo provides to developing countries.

While this year’s modest OSA budget appears largely symbolic, especially compared with the ODA funds, experts say the decision to launch the program is significant, as it marks another step in Japan’s march toward a more robust and proactive defense posture that could ultimately allow it more leeway in defense transfers.

Tokyo has traditionally exercised self-restraint on arms exports and defense technology transfers.

But over the last 15 years, the country’s security posture has been gradually changing, as shown in the three principles, an ODA expansion to cover maritime law enforcement equipment and — more importantly — the revisions to Japan’s national security documents, said Simon Chelton, director at the International Security Industry Council of Japan.

“These steps point to Tokyo’s growing recognition that defense exports can have a positive role in regional security relations,” he said.

Bolstering national power

The strategic use of development assistance also highlights Tokyo’s deployment of the “full spectrum of state capabilities” to improve regional security, said Robert Ward, the Japan Chair at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, noting that this is what the NSS calls “comprehensive national power — the combination of diplomatic, defense, economic, technological and intelligence capabilities.”

Little information has been released about the type of military equipment to be provided or the facilities to be built under the program, with the Foreign Ministry suggesting this will be determined on a case-by-case basis.

But ministry officials said Wednesday it will mainly include small patrol ships, drones and radar and communication systems, including for satellites.

Tokyo stressed that recipient countries will be required “to ensure the appropriate management of materials, equipment and infrastructure” provided.

Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy warships and fighter jets take part in a military display in the South China Sea in April 2018. | REUTERS

This could mean that selected countries would have to pay for the lifetime support of the gear and infrastructure, a move that could help Japan’s struggling defense industry broaden its customer base.

“Any equipment transferred in this way would require long-term support solutions and this would be expected to involve Japanese manufacturers of the equipment as well as their suppliers,” Chelton said.

Potential partners

Tokyo said the selection of countries will be based on a number of factors, including an assessment of the security needs of Japan and the region and the “appropriateness and transparency” of any transfer.

The Philippines, which is rapidly forging closer defense ties with Tokyo and considering a trilateral security pact with Japan and the United States, has already received warning-and-control radar systems as well as multirole vessels and maritime surveillance aircraft from Japan under the ODA expansion for maritime law enforcement equipment.

Located relatively close to Taiwan and sitting astride key maritime trade routes, the Philippines is considered crucial to regional security amid concerns that a crisis akin to the invasion of Ukraine could envelop the area.

The consideration of Fiji as a recipient reflects Tokyo’s concerns about growing Chinese influence in and around the Pacific islands, while broadening relations with Dhaka — already an important ODA recipient — “makes strategic sense for Japan,” according to Ward. Aid to Malaysia may focus on tackling threats to shipping in the Strait of Malacca.

“Many of these countries have close ties to China, but they are also critical for maritime security, which is why they are at the core of Japan’s FOIP vision,” said Sebastian Maslow, a Japan security expert and lecturer at Sendai Shirayuri Women's College.

Plans to expand the program?

While the OSA might not be a revolutionary shift given that Japan has provided maritime law equipment to its neighbors under the ODA framework, the program is likely meant to open the door for the type of defense cooperation that other major countries routinely carry out.

Tokyo’s first steps will probably be incremental, meant to provide the foundation for expansion.

In February, Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada said Tokyo is weighing a substantial revision to its three principles, calling the transfer of equipment an “important policy tool” for Japan.

At the same time, Hamada implied defense transfers might go beyond the region, saying that it would also allow Japan to “provide assistance to countries like Ukraine, which are being subjected to aggression in violation of international law.”

Staff writer Gabriele Ninivaggi contributed to this report.

13. Dear Next Commandant: Why The Marines Matter

Conclusion:

The coming decade is likely to test the joint force’s preparedness for war and its ability to respond as the operational environment requires. Through Force Design 2030, the Marine Corps has signaled its commitment to preparing for the future. Now what remains is ensuring that the Marine Corps can execute on all it has promised. Marine Corps concepts for addressing future challenges currently rely on unfunded capabilities that may not be realized in time for a large-scale conflict. Creation of a new operational concept that is fundamentally dependent on these capabilities being funded outside of the Marine Corps could potentially be dangerous. All of the Marine Corps’ efforts to divest to reinvest may be for naught if they are not supported by a joint concept and defense strategy that ensures they can get to the fight. Right now, it is not clear whether the joint force is both aware of the Marine Corps’ remaining dependencies and prepared to foot the bill to fulfill them.

Your predecessor’s planning guidance, issued in 2019, committed to resourcing a campaign of learning that takes a structured approach to collaborating with partners, applies sophisticated modeling and simulation methods and tools, and seeks out thoughtful answers to the hard questions being asked. The Marine Corps should continue to prioritize future analysis, wargaming, and experimentation with the rest of the joint force. Other services are currently looking at many of the same problems, and collaborating on the development of capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures could not only yield significant savings for the Marine Corps but also create a more viable future operating environment. Sharing some of the unclassified results of past experimentation could also help to craft a cohesive message that would contribute to a stronger, more capable force.

You have the opportunity to reshape the narrative and more effectively convey the Marine Corps’ message to the critical audience who will pay for it: Congress and, to a large extent, the Navy. If the joint force and its funders understand the full extent of the Marine Corps’ capabilities, they will be more willing to support them and more likely to benefit from them.

Best of luck to you, next commandant.

Why The Marines Matter - War on the Rocks

JOSLYN FLEMING, KATHERINE GUTHRIE, AND COLIN SMITH

warontherocks.com · by Joslyn Fleming · April 5, 2023

Dear Next Commandant:

Congratulations on your appointment as the 39th commandant of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps’ radical redefinition over the last four years under your predecessor’s guidance sought to prepare the service for the future with an even more capable and well-postured force, armed with new weapon systems and operating concepts that will provide the capabilities and resources required to survive and thrive inside contested spaces. But the work is far from complete. We believe the Marine Corps can do a better job of articulating how its contributions to the joint force are more significant than its dependencies. Your predecessor shared in his 2022 Force Design 2030 annual update that he, too, believed it is essential to communicate the details of his vision more effectively.

As the next commandant, you will have the opportunity to improve the narrative by clearly identifying and communicating how the service’s current and future operational objectives contribute to the challenges of today’s ever-changing national security environment. We believe that the process ought to start with identifying areas where the Marine Corps adds unique capabilities and expanded capacity to the joint force while interrogating some of the favorable assumptions underlying these capabilities. By embracing this effort, you can bolster the Marine Corps’ narrative and build understanding with decision-makers in the Pentagon, at the White House, and on Capitol Hill.

Become a Member

We believe that the Marine Corps is correct in emphasizing its ability to be a stand-in force via the expeditionary advanced base operations concept. However, to do this right, the Marine Corps still needs support from the joint force and a refinement of its own capabilities to execute a realistic sustainment concept, maintain a command-and-control architecture capable of enabling the kill-chain in denied and degraded environments, and assure mobility and counter-mobility throughout the theater. And while your predecessor consistently acknowledged these challenges, we believe that more can be done. To garner the support required to meet these dependencies and shortfalls, the service needs to do a better job of convincing Congress and the other armed services that the capabilities that the Marine Corps plans to bring to the fight are worth their investment, now and in the future.

Transformation Worthy of Investment

With finite resources available, decision-makers in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill are faced with the daunting task of deciding how to best deter U.S. adversaries with a fixed budget. The last two National Defense Strategies reoriented the joint force back to great-power competition, with particular attention to China. The Marine Corps has spent the last several years rapidly developing and executing a modernization plan to meet the demands associated with pacing against China’s rapid and increasing military modernization and employment efforts. The capabilities that the Marine Corps pursued to execute its updated concepts are starting to be fielded, most notably the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment.

Modernizing, however, has come at a cost. Commandant David H. Berger, understanding that no additional resources from Congress would be forthcoming, has pursued an aggressive path of “divest to invest.” The Marine Corps’ investments over the past four years have signaled that it is no longer in the business of being a second land army. However, as the Marine Corps continues to emphasize how the capabilities that it has chosen to pursue are a force multiplier in competition, the service could also explicitly state what missions it will no longer train for. This could include identifying capabilities that may be outsourced to other services, similar to how the Marine Corps relies on the Navy for medical support. With potential defense budget cuts on the horizon, the Marines Corps, as the smallest service, needs to ensure that its value is fully understood, and that savings from divestments don’t turn into justifications for cuts. While senior defense leaders have testified in support of these capabilities, the capabilities that allow the Corps to be ready in every time and place are still under-resourced. Without funding from congress, the Marine Corps is relying on verbal commitments that may be subject to change depending on the current environment.

The Marine Corps should continue to highlight where its ability to provide a forward posture and rapid response capability is unique to the joint force. The Marine Corps’ Marine Expeditionary Units remain in high demand with combatant commanders. Despite the alarmism of Force Design 2030 detractors, Marine Corps leadership has no intention of foreclosing this sort of capability. However, the Marine Corps should continue to assess new ways in which to deploy the expeditionary unit and related capabilities that combatant commanders want, such as cyber, space, and electronic warfare. While the Marine Corps has begun to do this, we believe it should go further, specifically in assessing how high demand for capabilities can be met even if future goals on amphibious shipping may fall short. We believe it is time to assess whether the current composition of these expeditionary units needs to change, particularly as China begins deploying its own similar formations across the Indian Ocean region.

For example, split amphibious-ready groups have become the rule rather than the exception, and this disaggregation can be leveraged to provide afloat expeditionary advanced base operations capabilities. Further analysis can help to identify whether the Marine Corps continues to build Marine Expeditionary Units to fit the ships that the United States has or builds new classes of ships to fit what the Marine Expeditionary Unit could be.

Identifying and messaging where the Marine Corps provides the joint force with expanded options to meet high-demand missions will also be important. Fires and sensor capabilities currently in development, and tested by the Marine Littoral Regiment, can provide the joint force commander with expanded capacity and portfolio diversification. The Marine Corps’ ability to extend sensing forward and complement a dearth of sensors across a vast area of operations provides unique capabilities to fires missions common across the services. However, more could be done to ensure appropriate in-depth layering of these capabilities and interoperability among the services that will allow for complementary employment in the future. To help assess the overall value of their contribution, the Marine Corps could articulate where it provides both unique capabilities and portfolio diversification in those areas common to the joint force.

Refinement To Do It Right

Certain aspects of expeditionary advanced base operations provide demonstrate how the Marine Corps provides warfighting capabilities that are deployed in unique ways — but only when done right. The Marine Corps has already rightfully identified that logistics and command and control present significant challenges to expeditionary advanced base operations execution, but supportive logistics and command-and-control concepts have yet to materialize. To address these key areas of concern, rigorous testing that assumes unfavorable conditions, such as reduced access and basing, could help the Marine Corps to further refine its requirements. Experiences in recent exercises and wargames have shown the Marine Corps’ tendency to assume favorable sustainment, uninterrupted communications, and assured access conditions, but experimenting under different constraints could be helpful. Marines operating in forward locations may need to limit their communications with higher and adjacent units so as to not be detected by enemy sensors, and the Marine Corps could benefit from incorporating these long periods of radio silence into their training. This could also include risk-informed decision-making under stressful potential future scenarios.

Installation and Logistics 2030 recognizes the pressing need for a logistics enterprise capable of supporting stand-in forces in a future fight. Current challenges include equipping strategies that do not support future operating needs, an overreliance on just-in-time logistics that is tested in future operating scenarios, and a logistics concept of employment that is not resourced or organized to support operational needs in the future operating environment. Some of these logistics challenges could be addressed by restructuring existing Marine Corps capabilities, like its pre-positioned stocks. Updating the legacy employment of these capabilities to better match the needs of the future force in theater has the potential to mitigate some sustainment vulnerabilities. The “divest to invest” plan has allowed the Marine Corps to invest in new capabilities, but these have overwhelmingly focused on warfighting capabilities without similar investment in modernization of support capabilities. Giving investment in the Future Vertical Lift initiative and ship-to-shore connectors higher priority — perhaps at the expense of other warfighting capabilities — would help to reconcile intra-theater lift and protection concerns. With the divestment of certain capabilities, ground mobility and counter-mobility should be tested to ensure that the future force can get into and out of the fight.

Conclusion

The coming decade is likely to test the joint force’s preparedness for war and its ability to respond as the operational environment requires. Through Force Design 2030, the Marine Corps has signaled its commitment to preparing for the future. Now what remains is ensuring that the Marine Corps can execute on all it has promised. Marine Corps concepts for addressing future challenges currently rely on unfunded capabilities that may not be realized in time for a large-scale conflict. Creation of a new operational concept that is fundamentally dependent on these capabilities being funded outside of the Marine Corps could potentially be dangerous. All of the Marine Corps’ efforts to divest to reinvest may be for naught if they are not supported by a joint concept and defense strategy that ensures they can get to the fight. Right now, it is not clear whether the joint force is both aware of the Marine Corps’ remaining dependencies and prepared to foot the bill to fulfill them.

Your predecessor’s planning guidance, issued in 2019, committed to resourcing a campaign of learning that takes a structured approach to collaborating with partners, applies sophisticated modeling and simulation methods and tools, and seeks out thoughtful answers to the hard questions being asked. The Marine Corps should continue to prioritize future analysis, wargaming, and experimentation with the rest of the joint force. Other services are currently looking at many of the same problems, and collaborating on the development of capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures could not only yield significant savings for the Marine Corps but also create a more viable future operating environment. Sharing some of the unclassified results of past experimentation could also help to craft a cohesive message that would contribute to a stronger, more capable force.

You have the opportunity to reshape the narrative and more effectively convey the Marine Corps’ message to the critical audience who will pay for it: Congress and, to a large extent, the Navy. If the joint force and its funders understand the full extent of the Marine Corps’ capabilities, they will be more willing to support them and more likely to benefit from them.

Best of luck to you, next commandant.

Become a Member

Joslyn Fleming is a defense policy researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserves.

Katherine Guthrie is an operations researcher at RAND and a major in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserves.

Colin Smith is a senior international/defense researcher at RAND and a retired Marine Corps officer of 28+ years.

Views expressed are the authors’ own and do not represent the views of the Marine Corps or Department of Defense.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Joslyn Fleming · April 5, 2023

14. Explainer: Why is China so angry about Taiwan president meeting US Speaker McCarthy?

Explainer: Why is China so angry about Taiwan president meeting US Speaker McCarthy?

Reuters · by Reuters

TAIPEI, April 5 (Reuters) - U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy will host a meeting in California on Wednesday with Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen, part of a sensitive U.S. stopover that has drawn Chinese threats of retaliation.

Here are the key issues in Taiwan-U.S., China-U.S. and Taiwan-China relations, why China is so angry about the meeting and what it might do to express its anger:

WHY IS CHINA SO ANGRY?

Taiwan is a deeply emotive issue for China's ruling Communist Party, and for Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The People's Republic of China has claimed Taiwan as its territory since the defeated Republic of China government fled to the island in 1949 after losing a civil war with Mao Zedong's communists.

China has repeatedly called on U.S. officials not to engage with Taiwanese leaders, viewing it as support for Taiwan's desire to be viewed as separate from China.

China has never renounced the use of force to bring democratically governed Taiwan under its control, and in 2005 passed a law giving Beijing the legal basis for military action against Taiwan if it secedes or seems about to.

HOW WILL CHINA REACT TO THE MEETING?

China staged war games around Taiwan last August after then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei, and has threatened unspecified retaliation if the McCarthy meeting goes ahead.

While Taiwanese and U.S. officials have said in the run-up to the McCarthy-Tsai meeting they have not seen any unusual activity from China's military, Taiwan is also on alert for any further Chinese drills.

Taiwanese and U.S. officials have also said that by staging the meeting outside of Taiwan it may help tone down China's reaction.

Over the past three years or so, China's air force has flown almost daily into the skies near Taiwan, in which Taiwan calls "grey zone" warfare designed to test and wear out its forces. While China's air force has never flown into Taiwan's territorial airspace, it fired missiles high over the island after Pelosi's visit.

WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAIWAN AND THE UNITED STATES?

In 1979, the United States severed official relations with the government in Taipei and instead recognised the government in Beijing. A Taiwan-U.S. defence treaty was terminated at the same time.

Post-1979, the U.S. relationship with Taiwan has been governed by the Taiwan Relations Act, which gives a legal basis to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself, but does not mandate that the United States come to Taiwan's aid if attacked.

While the United States has long followed a policy of "strategic ambiguity" on whether it would intervene militarily to protect Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, U.S. President Joe Biden has said he would be willing to use force to defend Taiwan.

The United States continues to be Taiwan's most important international source of weapons, and Taiwan's contested status is a constant source of friction between Beijing and Washington.

WHAT IS TAIWAN'S POSITION AND DIPLOMATIC STATUS?

Taiwan's government says that as the People's Republic of China has never ruled the island it has no right to claim sovereignty over it or speak for or represent it on the world stage, and that only Taiwan's people can decide their future.

Taiwan's official name continues to be the Republic of China, though these days the government often stylises it as the Republic of China (Taiwan). Only 13 countries now formally recognise Taiwan after Honduras ended ties last month.

Taiwan's government says that as the Republic of China is a sovereign country and it has a right to state-to-state ties.

WHAT ARE RELATIONS LIKE BETWEEN TAIPEI AND BEIJING?

In one word - bad.

China views Tsai as a separatist and has rebuffed repeated calls from her for talks. Tsai says she wants peace but that her government will defend Taiwan if it is attacked.

She says the Republic of China and People's Republic of China are "not subordinate" to each other. Beijing says Tsai must accept that both China and Taiwan are part of "one China".

Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Lincoln Feast.

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

​

15. Ukraine's Zelenskiy arrives in Poland to deepen ties with key Western ally

Ukraine's Zelenskiy arrives in Poland to deepen ties with key Western ally

Reuters · by Pawel Florkiewicz

WARSAW, April 5 (Reuters) - Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy arrived in neighbouring Poland on Wednesday, a Polish presidential aide said, for an official visit to a close ally that has galvanised Western military and political support for Kyiv.

The visit to Poland, which has taken in more than a million Ukrainian refugees over the past 13 months of war, comes as Ukraine plans to conduct a counter-offensive in the coming weeks or months to recapture land in its east and south from Russia.

Zelenskiy will meet President Andrzej Duda and Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki on the trip, and speak to Ukrainian refugees and Polish members of the public as well as business leaders who could be involved in rebuilding Ukraine.

"I can say that President Zelenskiy has crossed the Polish border," presidential aide Marcin Przydacz told private broadcaster TVN24 on Wednesday.

In televised comments on Tuesday, Przydacz had said the visit "should be taken as a sign of trust and of thanking Poland and Poles".

As well as welcoming refugees, the NATO member has played an important role in persuading other Western powers to supply battle tanks and other weaponry to Ukraine.

Military deliveries have been vital for Ukraine to fend off and fight back Russian forces that poured over the Ukrainian border in February 2022. Swathes of Ukraine remain occupied in the south and the east.

Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov said on Tuesday that Kyiv was grateful to Poland for clearing the way for deliveries of MiG fighter jets.

Ukraine officials have also pressed for F-16 jet fighters to boost Kyiv's ability to hit Russian missile units with U.S.-made rockets but Przydacz said Poland would not decide any time soon on whether to send any.

"F-16s are protecting Poland's skies." he said. "There are absolutely no such decisions at this stage."

Polish officials had also said talks would focus on developments on Ukrainian front lines, international support and economic cooperation.

Ukraine's presidential office, which avoids mentioning Zelenskiy's travel plans in advance for security reasons, did not outline anything about the trip or what it would focus on.

The Polish public overwhelming supports Ukrainians in their war with Russia. An Ipsos poll said 82% of Poles think NATO and European Union countries should back Ukraine until it wins.

Nonetheless, Zelenskiy's visit takes place amid mounting anger in rural Poland over the impact of imports of Ukrainian grain, which have pushed down prices in several states in the EU's eastern wing -- something the Polish prime minister had said would come under discussion.

Tariffs on Ukrainian agricultural imports may need to be reintroduced if an influx of products pushing down prices in European Union markets cannot be halted by other means, the premiers of five eastern states said in a letter published on Friday to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

Reporting by Pavel Polityuk in Kyiv and Alan Charlish and Pawel Florkiewicz in Warsaw; writing by Tom Balmforth and Michael Kahn; editing by Mark Heinrich, Lincoln Feast, Philippa Fletcher

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Pawel Florkiewicz

​16. US Sending Experimental Anti-Drone Weapons to Ukraine

The Ukraine battlefield is a proving ground.

US Sending Experimental Anti-Drone Weapons to Ukraine

SAIC is among contenders for a crash Army effort to help the country down Iranian-made drones.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

The U.S. is sending anti-drone missiles as part of an experimental platform to help Ukraine down the Iranian-built drones that have devastated its energy infrastructure, according to representatives of government contracting company SAIC.

On Tuesday, the U.S. announced a large package of military aid to Ukraine focused on air defense, including what it called “10 mobile c-UAS laser-guided rocket systems.”

That follows a January competition held by the U.S. Army, which was seeking a system to fight off Shahed-136 suicide drones. SAIC, which participated in the competition, anticipates sending ten of the weapons to Ukraine, a company representative told Defense One on the sidelines of the Association of the U.S. Army’s Global Force Symposium last week.

Russia has used Shahed-136s to attack not just Ukrainian military forces, but also enough civilian infrastructure to cause blackouts across the besieged country. Ukraine has downed many of the Iranian-made drones, which cost about $20,000 apiece, but sometimes is forced to use $500,000 air-defense missiles to do so.

The Army and one other competitor in the test, Invariant Systems, did not confirm that the test was to provide systems to Ukraine, but confirmed other details that support SAIC’s statements.

Contracting documents provided by the Army indicate that the test objective was to destroy Class Three drones—that is, aircraft that weigh more than 55 pounds. The Shahed-136 weighs about 440 pounds.

Other details in the contracting document also conform to information provided by SAIC. For instance, the documents say a winning design should be ready to ship to partner nations within 30 to 90 days of a contract award—roughly the amount of time between the January test and the April news that the systems were being sent to Ukraine.

The contract also says the systems might be funded with Title 22 authorities, which are used to fund security assistance to Ukraine.

In the January test, SAIC used BAE’s APKWS laser-guided rockets, which achieved a 100-percent hit rate, the company representative said.

And at less than $30,000 apiece, the rockets are cheaper than Ukraine’s larger air-defense missiles, said Greg Fortier, the vice president of SAIC’s Army Business Unit.

The system also includes a M240 machine-gun mount and an electronic warfare system that can take control of a commercial drone, including any DJI-brand system not operating with advanced encryption, said Jeremy Davidson, an SAIC systems engineer. DJI drones are frequently used by both sides in Ukraine.

Fortier said their system acquired the drone at over six miles away and struck it at three miles, much farther than the Army’s 1.2-mile requirement.

Fortier said SAIC and Invariant had the best results in the test.

Invariant CEO David Anderson said he had not learned if his system was part of the Defense Department’s announced shipment.

The U.S. has primarily sent existing technology, said Samuel Bendett of the Center for Naval Analysis. It was unclear whether the U.S. had ever sent a weapon that was created from scratch for use specifically in Ukraine.

Other anti-aircraft assistance in the $2.5 billion aid package announced today included munitions for the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, or NASAMS; anti-drone 30mm gun trucks; three air-surveillance radars; and 30mm and 23mm anti-aircraft ammunition. The aid is a mix of equipment drawdowns and procurement, according to a U.S. senior defense official.

The defense official said that the 30mm gun trucks and the laser-guided rocket systems were for shooting down Shahed drones.

“We want to help Ukraine advance and hold this position in what we expect will be a Ukrainian counter offensive,” the official said.

One Ukrainian official indicated that such a counter-offensive would come in spring.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

​17. Apple’s Beck to lead Defense Innovation Unit at Pentagon

Make the iPhone the personal communications device for all military personnel. Adapt it for battlefield use.​ (I say that with some sarcasm but we must be able to make communication devices as simple and effective as the iPhone.)

Apple’s Beck to lead Defense Innovation Unit at Pentagon

c4isrnet.com · by Courtney Albon · April 4, 2023

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon named Apple Inc. Vice President Doug Beck to lead its innovation hub, the Defense Innovation Unit, elevating the role to report directly to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

“As DIU Director, Mr. Beck will oversee efforts to accelerate the Department’s adoption of commercial technology throughout the military and also serve as a senior advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on technology innovation, competition, and strategic impact,” the Pentagon said in an April 4 statement.

Beck, who is Apple’s vice president of worldwide education, health and government, joined the company in 2009 and leads its businesses in Northeast Asia and the Americas. He served in the Navy for nearly 26 years and led a joint reserve unit in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Beck also oversaw a DIU joint reserve component from 2015 to 2019.

In a memo accompanying the announcement of Beck’s appointment, Austin revealed the DIU director will no longer report to the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering but will instead answer directly to him.

“The DIU director shall serve as a leader inside the Department to catalyze engagement with and investment into private sector communities where commercial technology can be adapted and applied to meet our warfighters’ requirements,” Austin said.

The memo notes that the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering will “use all available resources to support DIU’s mission,” including providing human resources and administrative support.

Members of the Massachusetts National Guard's Command Team receive a demonstration on the use of commercial quadcopters from the Defense Innovation Unit during Operation Patriot Crucible in August 2019. (Sgt. 1st Class Jamie Gaitan)

DIU has been without a director since last September, when former leader Mike Brown stepped down. At the time, he cited frustration with a lack of support for the organization from Defense Department leadership.

According to the memo, Austin wants Beck to provide him with an assessment of DIU’s ability to meet its objectives within 90 days and an action plan for filling any gaps identified in that review.

“DIU’s mission is to accelerate the adoption of commercial technology at speed and scale, and these changes will further enable it to effectively execute this critical mission,” Austin said.

About Courtney Albon

Courtney Albon is C4ISRNET’s space and emerging technology reporter. She has covered the U.S. military since 2012, with a focus on the Air Force and Space Force. She has reported on some of the Defense Department’s most significant acquisition, budget and policy challenges.

​

18. Why Neutrality Is Obsolete in the 21st Century

Excerpts:

It’s an open secret that Austria and Ireland are de facto NATO militaries—they have adopted NATO standards for operational concepts, doctrines, procedures, and munitions. But maintaining interoperability with NATO partners will become increasingly more challenging as sensitive data will not be shared with non-alliance members. In addition, Europe’s neutrals would not be permitted to participate in large-scale military exercises focused on multi-domain operations in a high-intensity war. Multi-domain operations, after all, is an advanced version of combined arms operations, which require constant training and practice. In other words, future combined arms training would be extremely difficult for Austria and Ireland.

Finally, their status will prevent Europe’s neutrals from pooling and sharing military capabilities at the operational level, where it matters most in a military crisis. Within NATO, there are already discussions about various countries specializing in different capabilities to save cost. One country might provide offensive cyber capabilities, another could provide advanced electronic warfare capabilities, and a third could specialize in air defense. Neutral countries would be left out of these arrangements—and would need to invest in capabilities across all domains to mount a tenable defense. That is an unlikely proposition. At the very least, Austria would have to triple its defense spending—to 3 percent of GDP—for decades to come.

From both diplomatic and military perspectives, the Austrian, Irish, and Maltese governments’ case for maintaining neutrality is weak—unlike Switzerland’s, since the Swiss maintain an effective military. For the former countries, neutrality could endanger their military security should the United States or NATO not intervene in times of crisis.

Naturally, this security free-riding is breeding resentment among non-neutrals, most of which spend a significantly higher share of GDP on defense or have plans to do so. Austria, Ireland, and Malta expect others to fight on their behalf, while they are unwilling to do the same for their neighbors. For Europe’s last neutrals, it’s time for a genuine, open-minded discussion about the diplomatic and military utility of neutrality in the 21st century.

Why Neutrality Is Obsolete in the 21st Century

As Finland joins NATO, a few European holdouts cling to nonalignment.

By Franz-Stefan Gady, a senior fellow for cyber power and future conflict at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Foreign Policy · by Franz-Stefan Gady · April 4, 2023

The Italian diplomat Niccolò Machiavelli had his doubts about the wisdom of a state remaining neutral, as it usually risks alienating both sides in a conflict. “He who conquers does not want doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial,” he wrote in his 16th-century strategy manual, The Prince. “And he who loses will not harbor you because you did not willingly, sword in hand, court his fate.”

The Italian diplomat Niccolò Machiavelli had his doubts about the wisdom of a state remaining neutral, as it usually risks alienating both sides in a conflict. “He who conquers does not want doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial,” he wrote in his 16th-century strategy manual, The Prince. “And he who loses will not harbor you because you did not willingly, sword in hand, court his fate.”

Following Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, two formerly neutral European states—Finland and Sweden—have heeded Machiavelli’s advice. Today, Finland joins NATO as its newest member, and neighboring Sweden will soon follow. Europe’s four remaining traditional neutrals—Austria, Ireland, Malta, and Switzerland—are sticking to their neutrality for now. Ireland, which has de facto disarmed, claims to be militarily neutral if not politically so; but the country is slated to train Ukrainian soldiers and has been cozying up to NATO since the outbreak of the war. Austria and Malta likewise insist they are militarily neutral but not “not neutral on values.” Switzerland is the most uncompromising of the bunch, remaining both politically and militarily neutral, going as far as refusing to grant other countries permission to re-export Swiss-made weapons to Ukraine. To Kyiv, the Swiss government’s stance goes beyond neutrality by actively undermining Ukrainian defense capabilities, Ukraine Ministry of Internal Affairs advisor Anton Gerashchenko tweeted. Critics argue that neutrality, like pacifism, leaves the victim of aggression to its fate.

Yet out of Europe’s four remaining neutrals, it is only Switzerland that maintains relatively robust conventional defenses capable of fielding a credible military deterrent against a potential aggressor. Even though they are not part of NATO, Austria, Ireland, and Malta have de facto outsourced their territorial defense and security to the alliance, with the implicit expectation that it will come to their aid when needed. This enabled each of the three to spend less than 1 percent of GDP on their armed forces before Russia’s attempt to conquer Ukraine. Although the three countries have announced defense spending increases, these will not be enough to boost military capabilities and readiness to a level where they would be able defend against another nation-state in a high-intensity conflict any time soon.

How long can these neutrality doctrines survive in the 21st century without becoming a security risk for the states practicing them? Maintaining neutrality will become more difficult for two main reasons. First, the existence of European neutrals is much less useful to non-neutrals today than it was during the Cold War, when it served the purposes of both East and West. Not only will great powers be less inclined to respect neutrality in the future, but the European Union, too, will increasingly find its neutral members an obstacle as the bloc tries to develop a common security and defense policy. Second, at the military level, 21st-century warfare increasingly requires highly integrated, sophisticated, and interoperable capabilities in all domains that small, neutral powers simply cannot afford on their own.

Proponents of neutrality argue that as long as neutral states remain useful to larger powers or alliances, they have little to fear. And it’s true that neutral powers have historically been useful as military buffer states or diplomatic go-betweens. A good example is Austria during the Cold War: For the Soviet Union, a neutral Austria was useful because it cut the land bridge between NATO allies Italy and West Germany. A weak Austria also offered the Soviets a potential route for a rapid flanking attack on NATO forces in southern Germany. Similarly for NATO, Austria’s status as a buffer state gave the alliance the option of a forward defense on Austrian territory; the Austrian military, which saw itself as a secret NATO ally throughout the Cold War, would presumably have joined NATO’s forces. Austria’s official Cold War neutrality was very profitable for Vienna, which turned itself into a diplomatic hub by enticing international organizations—including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OPEC, and various United Nations bodies—to establish their headquarters there.

However, the end of the Cold War also ended Austria’s utility as a buffer state. Russia’s attacks on Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 show that staying out of alliances, as Ukraine did, offers no protection from a revisionist great power. What’s more, the idea that neutral powers can be successful conveyors and mediators between hostile powers is generally not borne out by history. Neutrality is no precondition to facilitating a post-war settlement; one of the most successful cases of peace brokering in European history was the Congress of Vienna, where the hosting Austrian Empire was clearly on the side of the Napoleonic Wars’ victors. Similarly, the United States’ and France’s intervention in the Balkan Wars did not keep them from supervising negotiations to end these conflicts at Dayton, Ohio, in 1995 and Rambouillet, France, in 1999. Nor is a neutral state necessarily a better location for multilateral diplomacy; the United Nations’ headquarters in New York are at least as important a diplomacy hub as the organization’s offices in Vienna and Geneva. The latter cities are good diplomatic hubs not because of their neutral status, but because they have easily accessible airports, plenty of five-star hotels, and excellent conference infrastructure.

Today, Austrian, Irish, and Maltese neutrality contributes to the EU remaining a weak player in security and defense. There are of course many other reasons why the EU is unlikely to become a European alternative to (or complement of) NATO, including: “the absence of a common European threat perception, a lack of financial resources, a shortage of creative policy proposals, successive U.S. governments poised to blockade the EU’s ambitions, and member states unwilling to delegate power over defense to the supranational level.” But neutral members contribute to this weakness, not least because the so-called Irish clause of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty effectively gives countries such as Austria and Ireland an opt-out when it comes to providing military support to a fellow EU member state under attack. Some EU members’ neutrality can also be readily exploited by countries such as Russia to drive wedges between members of the bloc via influence campaigns. Neutrality also leads to fissures in military support for Ukraine: Austria, Ireland, and Malta have abstained from decisions to arm Ukraine under the European Peace Facility financing instrument. This is weakening the EU’s response to Russia’s invasion.

Military neutrality also makes less and less practical sense when one considers the future character of warfare. Western armed forces are adopting a doctrine of multi-domain operations, which require the coordinated use of military capabilities in multiple domains such as air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace—and the ability of allied countries to do so jointly, smoothly, and quickly. The fuel for these highly complex military operations is intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other types of data collection using multiple sources such as satellites, uncrewed aerial vehicles, and cyberspace operations that feed into command, control, and communications to create a sophisticated picture of the battlespace or overall strategic environment. Given the relatively limited capabilities of European militaries, sharing data and technologies across allied militaries will be key to future military effectiveness. The militaries of neutral countries would be largely cut out of these arrangements. Classification issues and a general lack of trust make it difficult for NATO members to share sensitive real-time tactical data with Austria or Ireland in a military crisis. Even short of crisis, neutrality already makes it difficult for some NATO member states to share data with these countries on a permanent basis—for example, on cyber threats.

It’s an open secret that Austria and Ireland are de facto NATO militaries—they have adopted NATO standards for operational concepts, doctrines, procedures, and munitions. But maintaining interoperability with NATO partners will become increasingly more challenging as sensitive data will not be shared with non-alliance members. In addition, Europe’s neutrals would not be permitted to participate in large-scale military exercises focused on multi-domain operations in a high-intensity war. Multi-domain operations, after all, is an advanced version of combined arms operations, which require constant training and practice. In other words, future combined arms training would be extremely difficult for Austria and Ireland.

Finally, their status will prevent Europe’s neutrals from pooling and sharing military capabilities at the operational level, where it matters most in a military crisis. Within NATO, there are already discussions about various countries specializing in different capabilities to save cost. One country might provide offensive cyber capabilities, another could provide advanced electronic warfare capabilities, and a third could specialize in air defense. Neutral countries would be left out of these arrangements—and would need to invest in capabilities across all domains to mount a tenable defense. That is an unlikely proposition. At the very least, Austria would have to triple its defense spending—to 3 percent of GDP—for decades to come.

From both diplomatic and military perspectives, the Austrian, Irish, and Maltese governments’ case for maintaining neutrality is weak—unlike Switzerland’s, since the Swiss maintain an effective military. For the former countries, neutrality could endanger their military security should the United States or NATO not intervene in times of crisis.

Naturally, this security free-riding is breeding resentment among non-neutrals, most of which spend a significantly higher share of GDP on defense or have plans to do so. Austria, Ireland, and Malta expect others to fight on their behalf, while they are unwilling to do the same for their neighbors. For Europe’s last neutrals, it’s time for a genuine, open-minded discussion about the diplomatic and military utility of neutrality in the 21st century.

Foreign Policy · by Franz-Stefan Gady · April 4, 2023

19. China is not only asserting itself geopolitically but openly questioning the U.S.’s central role on the world stage

This Is why we cannot make Beijing the central geographic focus for competition. We have to be able to compete globally.

Excerpts:

“Why isn’t it China’s time to lead? Why is it assumed we live in a U.S. world?” asked 27-year-old Alan Ma, a graduate student in politics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University.

Other areas are reaching heightened levels of tension. China’s military said last month it drove out an American destroyer ship that had “illegally” entered the South China Sea. And the CEO of Chinese-owned video sensation TikTok appeared before U.S. lawmakers in hopes of preventing an American ban on the app over national-security concerns.

But China’s rise, however rapid, must be put in a realistic context, experts said.

“I don’t think that we can say China has entered a new period as a global power until it has deployed large troop contingents overseas on its own,” said UC San Diego’s Shih.

China is not only asserting itself geopolitically but openly questioning the U.S.’s central role on the world stage

Published: April 4, 2023 at 11:54 a.m. ET

By Tanner Brown

Beijing’s new assertiveness comes against a backdrop of three years of so-called zero-COVID restrictions that saw the country close itself off from the world

marketwatch.com · by Tanner Brown

Days later, Beijing announced it had brokered a deal that will see Persian Gulf rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran normalize relations, a shocking diplomatic coup in an area long dominated by the United States. Xi was reportedly personally involved in the negotiations.

“This landmark agreement has the potential to transform the Middle East by realigning its major powers,” the journal Foreign Affairs declared, adding that the gambit is “weaving the region into China’s global ambitions. For Beijing, the announcement was a great leap forward in its rivalry with Washington.”

But the biggest news came two weeks ago, when Xi flew to Moscow and met with Vladimir Putin, just days after the International Criminal Court in the Hague issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president on charges of war crimes in Russia’s year-old invasion of Ukraine.

“ ‘China has seen a space where it is hard for the West to really block off — heading into issues [that the Western powers] feel are too intractable or too toxic to touch and trying to demonstrate that there might be a different way to mediate or involve yourself in these problems.’ ”

— Kerry Brown, King’s College London

“There are changes coming that haven’t happened in 100 years,” Xi told Putin as the self-described “dear friends” concluded their talks. “When we are together, we are driving these changes.”

China’s assertiveness comes after three years of COVID restrictions that saw the country close off from the world in an attempt to tame the virus, a policy that was suddenly scrapped in December.

“It has sunk in that China needs friends. It has ended up too isolated, and that has cut across the narrative of the Xi third term, which was due to be somewhat more sunny,” Kerry Brown, director of the Lau China Institute at King’s College London, told MarketWatch.

Others agreed. “China certainly is exiting a period of diplomatic isolation during the height of COVID,” said Victor Shih, the Ho Miu Lam chair in China and Pacific relations at the University of California, San Diego, and an expert on Chinese elite politics.

That exit has been swift, with Beijing taking concrete steps toward a belief that previously had been mostly rhetoric — that the U.S.-led global system is not the only path.

“China has seen a space where it is hard for the West to really block off — heading into issues [that the Western powers] feel are too intractable or too toxic to touch and trying to demonstrate that there might be a different way to mediate or involve yourself in these problems,” Brown said.

Those sentiments are increasingly pervasive across China, particularly in government, academia and media.

“The U.S., which is accustomed to enjoying the spotlight, is now puzzled for it never thought that one day China would be more popular than it,” state tabloid Global Times said in a front-page story last Thursday.

Wang Yong, director of the Center for International Political Economy and the Center for American Studies at Peking University, told MarketWatch, “The rise of China as a great power is facing an increasingly complicated situation, mainly because U.S. elites judge China as the foremost strategic and systemic threat, and attack China’s development.”

Wang highlighted concerns over Washington’s policy toward self-ruled Taiwan, which Beijing claims as a renegade province.

In fact, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen is stopping over in the U.S. this week after visits to the island’s few remaining allies in Central America. Beijing has threatened for weeks against her being welcomed by any high-level American officials.

Those threats turned to ire on Monday, when Republican House Speaker Kevin McCarthy said he would meet with Tsai on Wednesday in California. China said this could lead to “serious confrontation” and that Beijing would “resolutely fight back” — without giving specifics.

“ ‘Why is it assumed we live in a U.S. world?’ ”

— Alan Ma, graduate student, Tsinghua University.

“Gradually deviating from the past promise of ‘one China,’ promoting Taiwan independence and using Taiwan to contain China’s development — these could trigger a China-U.S. war,” Peking University’s Wang said from Beijing.

Average citizens including younger people expressed frustration with U.S. policy.

Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, arrives on Thursday at her hotel in New York.

AP/John Minchillo

“Why isn’t it China’s time to lead? Why is it assumed we live in a U.S. world?” asked 27-year-old Alan Ma, a graduate student in politics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University.

Other areas are reaching heightened levels of tension. China’s military said last month it drove out an American destroyer ship that had “illegally” entered the South China Sea. And the CEO of Chinese-owned video sensation TikTok appeared before U.S. lawmakers in hopes of preventing an American ban on the app over national-security concerns.

But China’s rise, however rapid, must be put in a realistic context, experts said.

“I don’t think that we can say China has entered a new period as a global power until it has deployed large troop contingents overseas on its own,” said UC San Diego’s Shih.

Tanner Brown covers China for MarketWatch and Barron’s.

marketwatch.com · by Tanner Brown

20. Washington Post blasted over editorial that suggested cutting veterans' disability benefits

Excerpts:

“If the Editorial Board is so worried about moral responsibility, maybe they should pick up a weapon and stand a post,” Gallucci wrote.

Comedian and veterans advocate Jon Stewart told Task & Purpose that he disagreed with how the editorial characterized the process by which veterans are awarded disability benefits.

“The insinuation of fraud or abuse or ‘generosity’ is misleading and misplaced, Stewart said.

Lindsay Church, co-founder and executive director of Minority Veterans of America, said that since the editorial was published, they have spoken to several veterans who are frustrated and concerned that their disability benefits may be taken away.

“That’s a really scary possibility, especially for people who are living on the edge with 30% disability and worry that their disability is going to get cut,” Church told Task & Purpose. “Thirty percent may not seem like a lot to some people, but to some folks that’s what they get by with.”

Washington Post blasted over editorial that suggested cutting veterans' disability benefits

“If the Editorial Board is so worried about moral responsibility, maybe they should pick up a weapon and stand a post.”

BY JEFF SCHOGOL | PUBLISHED APR 4, 2023 4:41 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · April 4, 2023

Veterans groups are venting their frustration over a Washington Post editorial that calls on Congress to more closely scrutinize veterans’ disability benefits claims as a way to cut costs.

The April 3 editorial suggests that one reason the Department of Veterans Affairs’ budget has rocketed from $45 billion in 2001 to more than $300 billion in 2023 is that the post-9/11 wars have higher disability rates when compared with all veterans due to “improved battlefield medicine and a broader understanding of the array of service-connected injuries and disabilities.”

In other words, many veterans who were wounded in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere suffer from lifelong injuries and other ailments that would have killed them in previous wars.

Noticeably absent from the editorial was any mention of how 20 years of war — the longest period of sustained conflict in U.S. history — may have contributed to the increase in the number of disabled veterans.

But the real problem, according to the editorial, is that the VA has not significantly revised its disability ratings system since 1945, when most veterans worked jobs that required physical labor, whereas most jobs in today’s information and service economy require a different set of skills.

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Noting that “disability payments based on those ratings go to veterans tax-free and continue, with some exceptions, for the entirety of a veteran’s life,” the editorial argues that Congress needs to modernize the disability ratings system. It also cites a December 2022 report from the Congressional Budget Office — which has also been widely criticized by veterans — that suggested phasing out veterans’ disability benefits as they earn higher salaries.

“The Congressional Budget Office estimates limiting payments for veterans who earn more than $170,000 a year would save $253 billion over the next decade,” the editorial says. “Congress could alternatively tax the benefits, or some portion of them, particularly for new recipients with high incomes.”

Prosthetist Edward Sliwinski constructs a custom leg socket for a U.S. military veteran amputee at the Veterans Administration (VA), hospital on January 29, 2014 in Manhattan, New York City. (John Moore/Getty Images)

That report caused a storm when it was shared on social media two weeks ago. When VA Secretary Denis McDonough was asked about the CBO’s proposal on disability benefits on March 23, he told reporters bluntly: “We think it’s a bad idea, and we’re not going to do it. You have my commitment that we won’t do it.”

The editorial concedes that none of the changes it recommends would be easy, “But the moral responsibility Americans have to those who fought for the country is of diminished value if it does not align with the fiscal responsibility Americans have to keep their financial house safe and sound.”

Task & Purpose sent the Washington Post several questions about the editorial, including whether the editorial board feels that it is too easy for veterans to receive disability benefits and if the board disagrees with McDonough’s appraisal of the CBO’s idea on disability benefits.

A spokesman for the newspaper said that all the questions were answered in the editorial itself and declined to comment further.

When asked to respond to the argument made by the Washington Post’s editorial, VA spokesman Terrence Hayes said no cuts to veterans’ disability benefits are being considered.

“Disability benefits are what veterans have earned for their service and sacrifices on behalf of our nation,” Hayes told Task & Purpose on Tuesday. “As Secretary McDonough said during his last press conference, ‘we think that [this is] a bad idea, and we’re not going to do it. You have my commitment that we won’t do it.’ On our watch, veterans will always get the benefits that they deserve.”

The Washington Post’s editorial has not gone over well with many veterans’ groups. Ryan Gallucci, executive director of the Veterans of Foreign Wars issued a blistering statement on Tuesday saying the VFW was shocked to see the Washington Post endorse “a recycled compilation of anti-veteran talking points against which the VFW has fought for years.”

A veteran who lost both of his legs, left arm and hearing while serving in Iraq shows the tattoo he got in memory of a friend killed in Iraq, at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C. on July 30, 2008. (David S. Holloway/Getty Images)

“It is laughable that the employees of one of the richest individuals in the world have the audacity to suggest disabled veterans should be the persons responsible for balancing the federal budget — instead of their wealthy billionaire benefactors who notoriously skirt their tax liabilities,” Gallucci wrote in the statement.

Gallucci also wrote that the VFW would have been happy to talk to the editorial board about why veterans have deserved their disability benefits, but the newspaper did not reach out to the group before the editorial was published. Moreover, he argued that money spent on disabled veterans’ benefits is the cost of defending the Washington Post’s right to free speech.

“If the Editorial Board is so worried about moral responsibility, maybe they should pick up a weapon and stand a post,” Gallucci wrote.

Comedian and veterans advocate Jon Stewart told Task & Purpose that he disagreed with how the editorial characterized the process by which veterans are awarded disability benefits.

“The insinuation of fraud or abuse or ‘generosity’ is misleading and misplaced, Stewart said.

Lindsay Church, co-founder and executive director of Minority Veterans of America, said that since the editorial was published, they have spoken to several veterans who are frustrated and concerned that their disability benefits may be taken away.

“That’s a really scary possibility, especially for people who are living on the edge with 30% disability and worry that their disability is going to get cut,” Church told Task & Purpose. “Thirty percent may not seem like a lot to some people, but to some folks that’s what they get by with.”

A wounded veteran at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C. on Jan. 7, 2005. (David S. Holloway/Getty Images)

Disability benefits recognize that veterans will have to deal with their injuries for the rest of their lives and that they might not live to reach retirement age, said Church, a Navy veteran.

Church is 100% disabled due to a botched surgery that they underwent while in the Navy. They have been unable to sue the Navy for medical malpractice due to the Feres Doctrine, which prevented service members from filing lawsuits against the Defense Department over any injuries or deaths that occurred as a result of their service. Even though troops have been able to file some malpractice claims against the military in recent years, few have been approved.

“While I can work right now, I’m also missing 36 inches of rib, have a spinal cord stimulator in my chest, and I’m staring down the barrel of a tenth surgery that will disrupt everything about my working abilities,” Church said. “I know many other 100% service-connected disabled veterans that experience the same tumultuousness about whether or not their disability is going to impact their day-to-day working relationship.”

Kaitlynne Yancy of Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America said that she believes it is unfair to make wounded veterans bear the fiscal responsibility for balancing the government’s budget

The U.S. government should not look at curtailing or testing veterans’ disability benefits for the sake of reining in spending, especially since many veterans continue to deal with lifelong physical and mental injuries, said Yancy, IAVA’s associate director for government affairs.

“We promised that we would take care of our veterans, and that also included disability benefits,” Yancy told Task & Purpose. “Our veterans earned these benefits by serving. Many of them will never have the bodies that they had when they joined the military.”

Still, some veterans said they do agree with part of the editorial’s premise, namely that it is time to reform the disability rating system.

American Veterans Disabled For Life Memorial on April 11, 2015 in Washington, D.C. (Raymond Boyd/Getty Images)

Concerned Veterans for America, a conservative veterans group, has called for modernizing the VA’s benefits and services programs that date back to the 1940s, said John Byrnes, the group’s deputy director.

“Congress should apply the independent assessment commission model to examine the VA’s practices while measuring outcomes and effectiveness, studying the long-term impact on veterans, and ultimately driving innovative reform options,” Byrnes told Task & Purpose.

Former Marine Corps Maj. Kyleanne Hunter, who deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan as an attack helicopter pilot, said she believes it would be good for the U.S. government to take a new look at disability benefits because the types of injuries and ailments that troops suffer from have evolved over time.

Historically, there has also been a wide range of ethnic, racial, and gender disparity in how disability benefits are awarded, in part due to long-standing assumptions of which veterans have seen combat, Hunter told Task & Purpose.

While Hunter supports reforms to the disability compensation system, she also thinks the entire U.S. government needs to look at all the costs involved in sending service members to war, not just how much money it is providing to disabled veterans.

“If we’re going to say that we need to cut back on the types of benefits that we’re giving, well maybe we need to cut back on putting people in the position that they’re going to be injured to begin with,” Hunter told Task & Purpose.

Hunter said she receives VA disability benefits for injuries she sustained as a pilot, and since Congress passed the PACT Act, she has also applied for benefits due to her exposure to toxins from burn pits, which her oncologist believes created a tumor in her left eye that had to be removed.

Entertainer and activist Jon Stewart speaks at a press conference on the PACT Act to benefit burn pit victims on Capitol Hill, Tuesday, March 29, 2022, in Washington, D.C. (AP Photo/Mariam Zuhaib)

One issue she had with the Washington Post editorial was that she got the sense that it was arguing it is too easy for veterans to receive disability benefits, she said.

“I will say that it is not,” Hunter said. “It is not an easy process to go through, as someone who is in the midst of working through it again. It is not a simple process. It’s not like they just throw benefits out there, like ‘You get benefits’ and ‘You get benefits.’”

According to Mary Kaszynski, director of government relations at VoteVets, a liberal veterans group, The Washington Post’s editorial board has shown that it does not have a firm grasp of the process by which veterans receive disability benefits.

“I think there is a little bit of a mistaken belief or misperception that these are just handouts that are given to veterans the day they transition from military to civilian life,” Kaszynski told Task & Purpose. “That’s not at all the way the system works.”

Kaszynski described the editorial board’s argument as “disgraceful,” adding that the U.S. government should provide the VA with more funding to reduce wait times rather than treating the VA as a “wasteland of fraud and abuse.”

“Veterans benefits should not be on the table in any form,” Kaszynski said. “Even considering that is a betrayal of the promise that we made to these folks when they signed up to defend our country and to make enormous sacrifices on behalf of our country.”

The latest on Task & Purpose

• Mike Day, Navy SEAL who survived being shot 27 times in Iraq, dies
• Army pulls ‘Be All You Can Be’ commercials after Jonathan Majors’ arrest
• Marine infantry veteran with Nashville police helped take down active shooter
• Army identifies 9 soldiers killed in dual Black Hawk crashes

How a team of scientists are exploring the remnants of a World War II battlefield at Guam

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · April 4, 2023

21. A call for all Americans to help stop veteran suicides

Another great American lost to the tragedy of war.

In addition to the sound advice offered, perhaps we should ask the Washington Post not to write about taking away veterans' disability benefits.

Excerpt:

I did not know Day personally, but I worked with a few of his former teammates while serving with the Naval Special Warfare Command at the same time he was deployed to Fallujah. In communicating our shared grief over this soul taken too soon, we have realized that more can be done to combat the crisis of veteran suicides. Every American can play a part in preventing another death like his and in honoring his memory of helping those who have served this country. Here’s how:

A call for all Americans to help stop veteran suicides

BY REAR ADMIRAL TIM GALLAUDET, PH.D., U.S. NAVY (RET), OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 04/04/23 3:30 PM ET

The Hill · April 4, 2023

Many Americans were shocked and saddened to learn last week of the unfortunate passing of Navy SEAL veteran Douglas “Mike” Day. In 2007, senior chief petty officer Day was shot 27 times at close range while leading a counterterrorism raid in Fallujah, Iraq. Demonstrating unimaginable courage, he was the first to enter a 12-foot by 12-foot room and withstood a withering assault from four terrorists, endured a grenade blast, which briefly knocked him unconscious, and then eliminated each assailant with a pistol after his rifle was shot away from his grip. Even more remarkable, he rescued six women and children in the structure afterward before exiting the scene and boarding a medical evacuation helicopter under his own power. This stunning act of bravery earned Day a Silver Star — the nation’s second-highest award for valor.

It took Day nearly two years to physically recover from his wounds, which he described in his deeply moving memoir “Perfectly Wounded.” After retiring from the Navy in 2010, he continued along a path of service by acting as a case manager and care advocate for other injured service members.

Like so many veterans, Day was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), terrible and invisible wounds that even he — a wounded warrior’s warrior — was challenged by.

I did not know Day personally, but I worked with a few of his former teammates while serving with the Naval Special Warfare Command at the same time he was deployed to Fallujah. In communicating our shared grief over this soul taken too soon, we have realized that more can be done to combat the crisis of veteran suicides. Every American can play a part in preventing another death like his and in honoring his memory of helping those who have served this country. Here’s how:

1. Check in on the veterans in your life. If you have a veteran in your social circle or family, look for the warning signs — verbally or behaviorally — that precede most suicides. Many individuals who are suicidal may only show warning signs to those closest to them. Even then, without understanding them, they can be tragically overlooked.
2. Have the courage to speak up about suicide. Once you observe the warning signs, it is essential to act, either directly or through a trusted intermediary. There is a widespread stigma associated with suicide, and as a result, many people are afraid to speak about it. Talking about suicide not only reduces the stigma, but also allows individuals to seek help, rethink their opinions and share their story with others.
3. Support a veterans assistance organization. There are hundreds of organizations in the U.S. working to prevent veteran suicides. For instance, when I led the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), we partnered with the nonprofit Force Blue, whose purpose is to help special forces veterans cope with PTS through efforts that support NOAA’s ocean conservation mission. Whether by volunteering, advocacy or donations, there are many ways to make a difference through a support group that best fits you.
4. Call on Congress to do more to support our veterans. While the Veterans Administration has made great progress by establishing the Staff Sergeant Parker Gordon Fox Suicide Prevention Grant Program, some reports indicate that veteran suicide rates may be as high as 24 per day. That tragic statistic is why we must seize every opportunity, such as encouraging Congress to pass the Don Young Veterans Advancing Conservation Act, which seeks to improve veteran mental health by training and deploying them to restore the health of America’s oceans, coasts and Great Lakes.

Disinformation may be one of Russia and China’s greatest weapons Budowsky: Why Trump indictments are a recurring GOP nightmare

When speaking on a podcast about his seven years of work with the United States Special Operations Command Care Coalition, Day gave a glimpse of his humility and spirit when he half-joked, “I was a better social worker than SEAL.” While his former teammates beg to differ, he acknowledged that his advocacy for hundreds of special operations service members with the organization had a healing effect on his own mental and physical injuries. Let us all help stop veteran suicides by following the example of this American hero and a lasting legacy for his honorable service, both on the battlefield and at the home front.

Rear Admiral (ret.) Tim Gallaudet, Ph.D., is the vice chairman of the Board of Directors for Force Blue. He is a former acting and deputy administrator of NOAA, acting under secretary and assistant secretary of commerce, as well as a former oceanographer in the Navy.

The Hill · by Alexander Bolton · April 4, 2023

22. Disinformation may be one of Russia and China’s greatest weapons

Excerpts:

Russia’s use of malign influence has not dissipated. In its 2023 Annual Threat Assessment, the U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that, “Efforts by Russia, China and other countries to promote authoritarianism and spread disinformation is helping fuel a larger competition between democratic and authoritarian forms of government.” Regarding Russia’s use of disinformation, the assessment states, “Russia presents one of the most serious foreign influence threats to the United States because it uses its intelligence services, proxies and wide-ranging influence tools to try to divide Western alliances and increase its sway around the world.”

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a primary example of the implementation of the country’s strategy of using disinformation and malign influence as a weapon against Ukraine and its allies, including the U.S. Shortly after the war began, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his government began to spread false rumors that Ukraine, working with the U.S., had labs that were developing biological weapons. The Chinese government amplified these false claims. U.S. government officials refuted these false accusations, but they still spread internationally. As recently as their March 2023 summit in Moscow, Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping continued to spread the rumor that the U.S. was conducting biological activity.

Disinformation may be one of Russia and China’s greatest weapons

BY WILLIAM DANVERS, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 04/05/23 7:00 AM ET

The Hill ·  · April 5, 2023

The United States has just completed its second Summit on Democracy. A warning from the State Department reinforces the reality that democracy is under threat globally and that public distrust is one reason for the threat. This distrust has various components, including concern about economic and political stability, but it is also driven and amplified by autocratic governments’ use of malign influence as a weapon against democracy.

Russia, in particular, uses disinformation and malign influence as part of its offensive national security strategy. In 2013, Russia’s military chief of general staff, General Valery Gerasimov, emphasized its importance in an essay he wrote, “The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.” The government of the Soviet Union used what they called active measures — the strategy for the spreading of disinformation — for decades against the United States and the West.

Russia’s use of malign influence has not dissipated. In its 2023 Annual Threat Assessment, the U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that, “Efforts by Russia, China and other countries to promote authoritarianism and spread disinformation is helping fuel a larger competition between democratic and authoritarian forms of government.” Regarding Russia’s use of disinformation, the assessment states, “Russia presents one of the most serious foreign influence threats to the United States because it uses its intelligence services, proxies and wide-ranging influence tools to try to divide Western alliances and increase its sway around the world.”

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a primary example of the implementation of the country’s strategy of using disinformation and malign influence as a weapon against Ukraine and its allies, including the U.S. Shortly after the war began, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his government began to spread false rumors that Ukraine, working with the U.S., had labs that were developing biological weapons. The Chinese government amplified these false claims. U.S. government officials refuted these false accusations, but they still spread internationally. As recently as their March 2023 summit in Moscow, Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping continued to spread the rumor that the U.S. was conducting biological activity.

The use of propaganda about Ukraine and America’s alleged biological weapons activities is part of Russia’s active-measures campaign to gain support for its illegal invasion of Ukraine. The State Department’s Global Engagement Center, which leads U.S. government efforts to counter international disinformation, wrote in its report, “The Kremlin’s Never-Ending Attempt to Spread Disinformation about Biological Weapons,” that the Russian government has established a “parliamentary commission on the investigation of U.S. biological laboratories in Ukraine … [that is] a key Kremlin platform for spreading disinformation,” adding that commission allegations “have become increasingly sensational and have drifted into the realm of science fiction.”

Unfortunately, Russia’s disinformation efforts are not confined to alleged biological weapons activity. Putin has developed a comprehensive strategy to justify his attack on Ukraine. Another Global Engagement Center report, “Disinformation Roulette: The Kremlin’s Year of Lies to Justify an Unjustifiable War,” describes five tropes Putin uses to justify his war: “1) Russia was encircled by NATO before the February 2022 invasion; 2) Ukraine is committing genocide in the Donbas; 3) the Ukrainian government needs ‘denazification and demilitarization’; 4) restoration of traditional values requires ‘desatanization’ of Ukraine; and 5) Russia must fight in Ukraine to defend its sovereignty against the West.”

The Russian disinformation/malign influence attempts in Ukraine — and more broadly — are a national security threat. In a 2021 Foreign Affairs article, “A World Without Trust,” Stanford University scholar Jacquelyn Schneider wrote, “In trying to analogize the cyber threat to the world of physical warfare, policymakers missed the far more insidious danger that cyber operations pose: how they erode the trust people place in markets, governments, and even national power.”

While it may be difficult to measure the direct impact of a malign foreign influence campaign, it is clear that the spreading of false information and rumors by state and nonstate actors do have an effect. A Washington Post editorial points out that polls taken in Germany, regarding whether the U.S. and Ukraine were involved with the production of biological weapons, indicate that this disinformation has traction. The pollsters expressed concern that “anti-democratic actors use disinformation campaigns not only to convince, but also to sow doubt among the population.”

China also uses disinformation as part of its national security strategy. Much like Russia, it uses malign foreign influence to further its national security goals and political interests. David Salvo, deputy director of the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Democracy, points out that “the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s assessment demonstrates that China has almost certainly been learning from Russia’s playbook to interfere in democracies beyond its borders.”

Budowsky: Why Trump indictments are a recurring GOP nightmare Trump’s criminal court proceedings must be televised

Russian disinformation attacks on Ukraine are part of its effort to win the war. But it is also integral to a larger strategy to undermine democracy and trust in the West. That China is stepping up its disinformation efforts, and working with Russia, should heighten our concern over the weaponization of information. This is a line of attack against the U.S. and its interests in Ukraine and globally. Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, asked during a recent committee hearing on democracy, “How can democratic nations, like our own, better respond to autocrats like Putin and Xi who have been meeting and marshaling their forces across the globe?”

One important way to respond to Menendez’s call to action is to support U.S. government programs and efforts by the Intelligence Community, State Department and other U.S. government agencies that combat efforts by autocrats to undermine democracy. They play an essential role in defending democracy by combatting what the Washington Post refers to as the “venom” of disinformation and malign foreign influence.

William Danvers, a former deputy secretary general of the OECD, has been an adjunct professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School and worked on national security issues for the Clinton and Obama administrations.

The Hill · by Alexander Bolton · April 5, 2023

23. The US Army moves to tweak its formations for future conflicts

The US Army moves to tweak its formations for future conflicts

Defense News · by Jen Judson · April 4, 2023

WASHINGTON — The U.S Army plans to spend roughly the next two years finalizing key decisions on what its future formational design will look like in the 2040s, the service’s four-star general in charge of modernization and requirements said at the Association of the U.S. Army’s Global Force Symposium last week.

“2040 seems like a long way away,” Gen. James Rainey, Army Futures Command boss, said in a March 29 speech, “but I believe we have about an 18 to 24 month window that we need to pursue with a sense of urgency to figure out what’s going to be different, what’s the operating environment going to look like; not to get it right, but to make sure we don’t get it really wrong and to be in a better position than whoever we’re fighting.”

AFC “has a responsibility to find that deep future operating environment, and we need to start iterating on the concept. We hope to be in the draft concept business by this fall, probably,” he said.

The command was established in 2018 to help the service focus on modernizing the force. Taking over the command last fall, Rainey is its second commander.

Working with Training and Doctrine Command, AFC will need to figure out how the Army will fight in the future – specifically a 2040 benchmark – and then design fighting formations that can support that, Rainey told Defense News in an exclusive interview at the show.

The Army is well on its way to fielding over 30 weapon systems and other capabilities in 2030 that will enable the service to fight across all domains against adversaries able to deny access to key terrain, Rainey said.

“We’re going to buy vehicles, systems, weapons, radios, but we need to transform our formations as a formation,” he said in his speech. “We buy things, but we fight formations, so everything we do material-wise needs to be ‘how does this fit into a formation?’ And we’ll make better decisions, candidly. And most importantly, we’ll put better-capable formations on the battlefield.”

There are still a variety of questions that need to be answered as the service builds its future force, and many of these need to be considered quickly. “Let me talk about the sense of urgency to 2040,” Rainey said in his speech. “When I say 2040, I’m talking about a fully fielded Army of 2040. To do that we will have to be in full-up aggressive fielding mode by about 2035.”

If capability needs to be fielded by 2035 to build the force of 2040, “they probably need to be prototyping, in low-rate production, something like that, in that space by 2031,” Rainey said.

Right now the Army is working on a five-year defense-spending plan that covers fiscal 2025 through 2029, he pointed out.

Concepts that are drafted over this time will need to be “rigorously, aggressively” verified through experimentation, according to Rainey. The Army’s Project Convergence “campaign of learning” effort is one of those places for experimentation, but the service will experiment persistently through other means like theater-located exercises to better craft concepts.

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Army sets sights on 2024 for next Project Convergence

The timeframe is later than usual; the Army has typically held the event in late fall.

Science and technology priorities will also need to be set and finalized by the Army secretary and chief, Rainey said. “I think by this fall, we need to start getting more clarity” but will likely not work on funding plans until the next couple of five-year budget planning cycles, he noted.

The Army plans to complete an initial concept within the next six months, according to Rainey, so that TRADOC Centers of Excellence and AFC Capabilities Development and Integration Directorates in partnership with U.S. Army Forces Command can develop new individual warfighting function concepts like fires, intelligence and maneuver starting in FY24.

Rainey has landed on a few ways he knows formations will need to change and what they will need to have.

“We have a lot of light formations in the Army,” he said. “I believe that we need to increase the lethality and survivability of our light formations.”

Giving this capability to the lighter formations will also help the Army lighten its logistics tail of heavy formations, something that will be necessary in contested environments in the future, he said.

Formations must also have appropriate human-machine integration, Rainey said. “This is the game changer.” The challenge right now, he said, is that much of what is being done is aspirational, like replacing a tank with a robot tank.

“I’m all for that, and we should be working on it, but that’s kind of blinding us to what’s absolutely doable now,” Rainey stressed, such as offloading work like menial tasks, riskier tasks from soldiers and giving those to machines.

And lastly, Rainey said, formations need to have redundancy and reliability in a contested environment. “You can’t have single points of failure,” he said, and “we need to engineer out complexity.”

Rainey stressed in his interview with Defense News that while AFC is looking toward 2040 and some of that might require minor adjustments to weapons development plans or procurement decisions, “the success of our modernization is based on us being consistent, so we don’t want to lose the focus.”

Gen. Mike Murray, AFC’s first commander, who preceded Rainey, “did a great job of getting the requirements documents very close to right” and there is no plan “to move the goalposts,” he said.

About Jen Judson

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

24.  Confronting the New Nuclear Peril

​

Although north Korea is referenced in the introduction, it is not clear who north Korea could (or even would) participate in such a structure.

Excerpts:

Given that a nuclear accident, an act of sabotage, or a terrible miscalculation would surely have global implications, any country with nuclear weapons should conduct its own internal review of fail-safe protocols. When these reviews are completed, declassified portions could be shared with other nuclear powers. The five acknowledged nuclear weapons states in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, along with the United States—could share their declassified reviews in the context of the P5 Process, the forum that brings together those countries to discuss their NPT obligations. Other nuclear-armed powers, such as India and Pakistan, may find it in their security interests to follow suit.

Every nuclear power has a vital interest in preventing a mistake from turning into a disaster.

The United States can also encourage international cooperation as part of its own nuclear fail-safe review. For example, it could call on other nuclear states to work with the U.S. government to establish cyber-nuclear “rules of the road”—steps that governments should take to help define norms to protect their nuclear arsenals from cyberattacks. And it could seek to establish clear redlines, including cyberattacks on vital nuclear infrastructure such as early warning and command and control systems. The U.S. review should also call for the creation of a joint center of nuclear-armed states—and perhaps NATO member states, too—for the exchange of data from early warning systems and for notifications of missile launches. Such a step could provide a crucial guardrail to prevent a mistaken nuclear response.

Current geopolitical tensions must not stand in the way of such dialogue. Since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has made reckless statements about its readiness to use nuclear weapons, and many Western powers are understandably reluctant to maintain communication with Moscow. But the Russian government, no less than any other nuclear-armed state, has a crucial interest in the safety and security of its own arsenal and the arsenals of the other nuclear powers. Moscow and Washington have discussed the issue in the past: during the Cold War, of course, but also as recently as June 2021, when Russia and the United States established a bilateral strategic stability dialogue, in which both sides committed to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures. Although the prospect of Russia taking action in coordination with the United States and other nuclear-armed states may now seem remote, it is still possible to envision Russia contributing to global nuclear risk reduction by engaging in a serious fail-safe review of its own nuclear weapons. The same could reasonably be expected of Beijing. In parallel with dialogue among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, internal fail-safe reviews could also lead to proposals for bilateral and multilateral risk reduction measures by nuclear weapons states.

Confronting the New Nuclear Peril

How a Global Fail-Safe Can Prevent Catastrophe

By Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn

April 5, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn · April 5, 2023

In late March, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia intends to return short-range tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, underlining yet again the terrifying prospect of the use of such weapons in the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, North Korea is pursuing an accelerated program of missile tests, including of intercontinental ballistic missiles that can strike the United States. China appears committed to a significant expansion of its nuclear weapons program. And the future of nuclear arms control looks bleak, following Russia’s announcement earlier this year that it was suspending implementation of certain obligations under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the United States.

In view of these alarming developments, finding new approaches to preventing nuclear weapons use has never been more urgent. The available avenues for reducing the nuclear threat, strategies that have been built since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, continue to close. It is hard to imagine that any new treaty on nuclear arms can be negotiated between the United States and Russia and ratified by the U.S. Senate, when trust between Washington and Moscow is at zero and dialogue is frozen. Unrestricted nuclear competition between Washington and Moscow will now overlap not only with China’s expanding nuclear arsenal, and growing threats from North Korea and Iran, but also with efforts by India and Pakistan to advance their nuclear capabilities and even with some U.S. allies considering whether to acquire their own nuclear weapons. The warning bells are deafening.

And yet one effective form of global threat reduction is both feasible and doable: preventing the unauthorized or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. The United States has already begun this effort internally—a crucial step in itself—with the hope that other nuclear weapons states will follow suit. There is a growing danger that nuclear weapons could be used based on faulty judgment, false warnings of attack, or other miscalculation. Aided by rapid shifts in technology, U.S. adversaries, including nonstate actors, could use cyberattacks to disrupt the command and control of nuclear weapons and early warning systems—the systems that can start the clock on a possible nuclear response leaving governments only minutes to decide whether to proceed.

If the world is going to survive a new era of nuclear competition, every nuclear-armed country must strengthen its defenses against cyberthreats and the possibility of rogue, accidental, or mistaken use of a nuclear weapon. Fortunately, they can do so even in the absence of bilateral or multilateral treaties, by advancing a global nuclear fail-safe—a system of self-imposed safeguards taken by each member of the nuclear weapons club. The responsibility that accompanies nuclear weapons capability should compel such states to actively focus on avoiding a nuclear catastrophe.

PROTECTING THE AMERICAN ARSENAL

The concept of nuclear fail-safe dates back to the 1950s, when it was focused on nuclear-armed bomber delivery systems. In later decades, it was applied more broadly to ballistic missiles. But it has been 30 years since the United States made its last comprehensive review of nuclear fail-safe. The commission appointed in 1990 by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and chaired by the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick recommended more than 50 specific steps to prevent accidental, mistaken, or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon. Since then, a number of factors have combined to heighten the risk of a nuclear blunder: faster and more powerful delivery systems, the rise of cyberthreats, the increasing dependence of launch systems on digital technology, less communication between nuclear rivals, reduced decision time for leaders of nuclear-armed countries, and new defensive challenges resulting from advances in nuclear systems.

Washington has recognized the need to address these growing threats. On the recommendation of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, legislators included a provision in the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act requiring the secretary of defense to “provide for the conduct of an independent review of the safety, security, and reliability” of nuclear systems. This congressional authorization has given the White House a rare bipartisan foundation for advancing nuclear fail-safe at home and abroad. The Biden administration has also given priority to nuclear security, including by committing to a fail-safe review in its October 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. The administration has assigned the RAND Corporation and the MITRE Corporation to lead that effort under the direction of the Department of Defense.

The broader aim of the U.S. review of nuclear fail-safe protocols should be to reduce and, where possible, eliminate the risk of mistaken nuclear use. In particular, the review should seek to prevent the use of nuclear weapons through an accident, a miscalculation, a false warning, terrorism, or a deliberate act by an unhinged leader. The review should assess ways the government could improve technologies, processes, and policies related to the nuclear arsenal while maintaining required levels of command and control for deterrence. For example, the review could propose a system that would allow for the post-launch destruction of nuclear weapons or their associated delivery systems before they reached their target, in the event that a launch takes place in error. The review should also call for new guidance informing the president’s decision to use nuclear weapons, including specifying consultations with relevant officials in the executive branch and in Congress when the decision-making time allows for it. Importantly, a forward-looking U.S. fail-safe policy must look beyond the current Nuclear Posture Review and provide for regular reviews, perhaps every five years, to take account of rapidly changing technological and political realities.

The 1990–92 U.S. fail-safe review came at a crucial time: the Cold War was ending, and new technologies were rapidly emerging. New fail-safe measures were badly needed, and the review led to important enhancements in U.S. security, including steps to strengthen safeguards against the mistaken launch of a nuclear ballistic missile. Thirty years later, with cyberwarfare already well developed and a dangerous new nuclear age beginning, the new U.S. fail-safe review is even more urgent. Amid the erosion of arms control agreements and other global and regional security mechanisms, the U.S. review will be critical to reducing nuclear risks. Other nuclear-armed countries must take their own parallel steps.

A SAFER NUCLEAR CLUB

In today’s perilous era, every nuclear weapons state has a vital national interest in using all available tools to prevent a mistake or security breach from turning into a disaster. The same dangerous and potentially deadly dynamics that have spurred Washington to pursue a fail-safe review almost certainly exist in other nuclear capitals. No matter how recently such measures might have been incorporated into nuclear planning, the case for frequent, updated fail-safe reviews has never been stronger. The absence of such periodic reviews in most of the nuclear weapons club elevates the present and future danger to all.

Given that a nuclear accident, an act of sabotage, or a terrible miscalculation would surely have global implications, any country with nuclear weapons should conduct its own internal review of fail-safe protocols. When these reviews are completed, declassified portions could be shared with other nuclear powers. The five acknowledged nuclear weapons states in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, along with the United States—could share their declassified reviews in the context of the P5 Process, the forum that brings together those countries to discuss their NPT obligations. Other nuclear-armed powers, such as India and Pakistan, may find it in their security interests to follow suit.

Every nuclear power has a vital interest in preventing a mistake from turning into a disaster.

The United States can also encourage international cooperation as part of its own nuclear fail-safe review. For example, it could call on other nuclear states to work with the U.S. government to establish cyber-nuclear “rules of the road”—steps that governments should take to help define norms to protect their nuclear arsenals from cyberattacks. And it could seek to establish clear redlines, including cyberattacks on vital nuclear infrastructure such as early warning and command and control systems. The U.S. review should also call for the creation of a joint center of nuclear-armed states—and perhaps NATO member states, too—for the exchange of data from early warning systems and for notifications of missile launches. Such a step could provide a crucial guardrail to prevent a mistaken nuclear response.

Current geopolitical tensions must not stand in the way of such dialogue. Since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has made reckless statements about its readiness to use nuclear weapons, and many Western powers are understandably reluctant to maintain communication with Moscow. But the Russian government, no less than any other nuclear-armed state, has a crucial interest in the safety and security of its own arsenal and the arsenals of the other nuclear powers. Moscow and Washington have discussed the issue in the past: during the Cold War, of course, but also as recently as June 2021, when Russia and the United States established a bilateral strategic stability dialogue, in which both sides committed to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures. Although the prospect of Russia taking action in coordination with the United States and other nuclear-armed states may now seem remote, it is still possible to envision Russia contributing to global nuclear risk reduction by engaging in a serious fail-safe review of its own nuclear weapons. The same could reasonably be expected of Beijing. In parallel with dialogue among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, internal fail-safe reviews could also lead to proposals for bilateral and multilateral risk reduction measures by nuclear weapons states.

To achieve meaningful progress, a broader fail-safe effort would benefit from strong endorsement in international forums. The G-7 meeting scheduled to take place in Hiroshima in May offers an important opportunity to address the issue. For example, a joint statement by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in which each country commits to undertaking its own internal fail-safe review and supports dialogue on nuclear dangers, could open the door to risk-reduction steps by all nuclear-armed states, including Russia and China. In turn, the nonnuclear members of the G-7—Canada, Germany, Italy, and Japan—have a shared interest in advancing a global nuclear fail-safe and could also support such an initiative.

THE WORLD CAN’T WAIT

As long as there is war in Ukraine, there will be a real risk of nuclear escalation in the region. The most effective and durable solution to reducing that risk would be a negotiated cease-fire that moves the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. But such a breakthrough will only happen when Kyiv and Moscow conclude that it is in their best interests. Russian leaders must accept that while Russia can destroy Ukraine, it cannot own or peacefully occupy it. Ukraine’s leaders must be confident that they can defend their territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty from any future Russian aggression.

Beyond Ukraine, it is clear today that an increasing reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence by nine nuclear-weapons states threatens the future of humanity. A new global security paradigm is urgently needed. The ultimate nuclear fail-safe measure, of course, would be to verifiably eliminate nuclear weapons, once and for all. That historic step, however, is unrealistic in the near term, given the growing great-power tensions and the decline of arms control regimes. Indeed, it now seems more likely that the world could see global nuclear weapons inventories grow substantially in the coming years. Even if the goal of disarmament remains elusive, there is still much that nuclear-armed states can do now to prevent a possible catastrophe. The world cannot afford to wait for more peaceful times to reduce the risks of nuclear use.

• ERNEST J. MONIZ is Co-Chair and CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and Cecil and Ida Green Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems Emeritus at MIT. He served as U.S. Secretary of Energy from 2013 to 2017.
• SAM NUNN is Co-Chair of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, which he founded with Ted Turner, and a former U.S. Senator from Georgia. He served as Chair of the Senate Committee on Armed Services from 1987 to 1995.

Foreign Affairs · by Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn · April 5, 2023

​25. The United States Has Given Ukraine All The Heavy Trucks, Tankers And Recovery Vehicles the Ukrainians Need To Breach Russian Defenses

Armor, artillery, infantry, and engineering breaching and bridging equipment, and close air support are necessary to breach Russian defenses. Logistics are critical and that is where heavy trucks, tankers, and recovery vehicles will play a critical role but they are in support of the armor, artillery, infantry, and engineers.

The United States Has Given Ukraine All The Heavy Trucks, Tankers And Recovery Vehicles the Ukrainians Need To Breach Russian Defenses

Forbes · by David Axe · April 5, 2023

An American convoy, including heavy equipment transporters, departs Iraq in 2011.

U.S. Navy photo

It’s no secret Ukraine is planning a counteroffensive. One that could roll back Russian advances in eastern and southern Ukraine.

All eyes are on the tanks that Ukraine’s European allies have pledged to the war effort, and which could lead the coming counterattack: 14 Challenger 2s, 71 Leopard 2s and a hundred or more Leopard 1s.

But pay close attention to the support equipment the United States is providing as part of a $2.6-billion aid package the U.S. Defense Department announced on Tuesday.

That equipment—armored recovery vehicles, tank-transporters, fuel tankers and armored bridgelayers—arguably is even more critical to the success of any counteroffensive.

With careful planning, it could help the Ukrainians swiftly to reposition heavy forces, and then deploy those forces to punch through the dense fortifications the Russians have built along much of the front line.

It would be a combined-arms operation far more complex than any the Ukrainians have attempted before now. Good leadership would be essential.

“This uplift in mobility and survivability support to the Ukrainian army tells us that not only have battlefield conditions changed since the beginning of the war, but that the coming offensives by the Ukrainians will look different to those that have been conducted previously,” tweeted Mick Ryan, a retired Australian army general.

The stakes are enormous. The Ukrainians for months have been husbanding resources for the coming attack. New tanks, fighting vehicles and howitzers plus tens of thousands of freshly-mobilized troops organized into three new division-size formations. They’ve been saving these forces even while fighting a costly mobile defense in the eastern city of Bakhmut.

It might be impossible to repeat that incredible feat of strategic balance. If the 2023 counteroffensive fails and those vehicles and troops go to waste, Kyiv might not get another chance to liberate Russian-occupied southern and eastern Ukraine.

So the Ukrainian general staff isn’t taking any chances. It’s bolstering the battlefield “enablers” that give attacking tanks and infantry the greatest chance of defeating an entrenched foe.

Starting last fall, American aid packages included a greater proportion of enablers. In the last six months, the United States along with Germany has pledged to Ukraine around 35 heavy equipment transporters: heavy-duty big rigs that can haul a 70-ton tank.

The Americans also have pledged 69 fuel tankers and 105 fuel trailers, plus various medium supply trucks and two batches of armored bridgelayers. They and the Germans also donated two kinds of explosive line-charges that can clear minefields and blast obstacles.

Recent U.S. aid packages also have included no fewer than 32 recovery vehicles—presumably all tracked M-88s—plus another 22 wheeled wreckers for winching and towing stuck and damaged tanks. Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom also have pledged recovery vehicles.

The American and European support equipment is optimized for “breaching” operations. That is, methodical but violent attacks that first punch gaps in defensive fortifications such as minefields, trenches and earthen berms, then send armored forces rolling through the gaps.

Having identified a potential weak spot in Russian defenses, the Ukrainians quickly could deploy at least a battalion of 30 or so Leopard 2s—by loading them onto heavy transporters and speeding them along paved roads toward the attack site.

Under the cover of friendly artillery and tank fire, engineers would fire line-charges and clear paths through minefields and berms. Bridgelayers would race forward and drop their metal spans across trenches.

Tanks would push through the gaps and over the bridges then run amuck in the Russian rear, killing and scattering Russian troops in order to secure a lodgement on the far side of the breached fortifications.

At that point, it’s a race. The Ukrainians would try to shove as many battalions as possible through the breach and into the Russian rear before the Russians deploy reinforcements.

That’s when those scores of American fuel tankers and fuel trailers would shine. With robust supply lines, the Ukrainians could penetrate deep behind Russian lines before the Russians counterattack and potentially slow or halt the Ukrainian advance.

It would be a hard fight for both sides. But thanks to a large force of recovery vehicles, the Ukrainians should be able to tow away and repair damaged tanks and fighting vehicles—and quickly send them back into the battle.

The Ukrainians are well-equipped for this complex operation. But can they synchronize their forces, react to Russian moves and maintain momentum even as casualties mount?

That’s a leadership problem, not a technological one. “There is no military endeavor that is more difficult to plan, orchestrate and execute than combined-arms obstacle-breaching,” Ryan tweeted.

“That said, the Ukrainians have demonstrated continuously throughout this war how quickly they can absorb new knowledge and systems,” Ryan added. “I expect something similar with their uptake of division-level operations.”

Forbes · by David Axe · April 5, 2023

26. Unmanned ships deploying to SOUTHCOM, as Navy seeks to prove technology 'ready to scale'

Unmanned ships deploying to SOUTHCOM, as Navy seeks to prove technology 'ready to scale' - Breaking Defense

Unmanned vessels will head to 4th Fleet this summer, with a mission to "deter the flow of drugs" into the US, according to a top Navy official.

By  JUSTIN KATZ

breakingdefense.com · by Justin Katz · April 4, 2023

The experimental unmanned Sea Hunter is the forerunner of the Navy’s proposed fleet of robotic warships. (U.S. Navy photo)

SEA AIR SPACE 2023 — The Navy’s two top leaders today announced the service is ready to expand the use of unmanned systems to the broader fleet, and will start with US 4th Fleet later this summer.

The Navy is “ready to scale these operations at the fleet level,” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday told an audience here at the Sea Air Space exposition.

“The 4th Fleet area of operations will provide us with an environment best suited to operationalize the concepts of Task Force 59 that’s worked tirelessly to develop to increase our maritime domain awareness,” Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro said during joint remarks with the CNO.

While short on specific details, the service secretary and chief said the Navy plans to begin integrating air and surface unmanned systems into US 4th Fleet, which is part of US Southern Command. Those capabilities will begin operations in that region during the UNITAS 2023 exercise scheduled for July.

Read more of Breaking Defense’s Sea Air Space coverage.

In 2021, the Navy first established Task Force 59, an organization based in Bahrain and focused largely on experimenting with commercially available unmanned systems and artificial intelligence.

That office, as Breaking Defense has reported, has conducted numerous exercises with industry since its inception. The three star admiral overseeing it, Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, has said he wants to have 100 unmanned systems in his AOR by summer 2023.

While both Navy leaders emphasized the success of Task Force 59, they said the new unmanned systems at US 4th Fleet would be “integrated into the command structure.” That represents a shift from TF59, which focused on experimenting with unmanned tech, towards an operational environment where 4th Fleet will aim to use the technology in day-to-day operations.

“We wanted to take a different approach rather than a task force this time because as I mentioned, we’re integrating additional sensors into the battle space,” the CNO told a group of reporters following the announcement.

Del Toro said the choice of US 4th Fleet, whose area of responsibility falls mostly into Central and Southern America, was driven in part by lessons learned from US 5th Fleet’s experimentation efforts. He also said he expects the additional sensors to greatly aid the Navy in combating drug running and illegal fishing in the region.

“The goal here is to have far better [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] across the entire area of operations so that we can actually deter the flow of drugs into the United States as well as help our allies and partners [in stopping] illegal fishing,” Del Toro told reporters.

“We want to scale this,” Gilday added. “The Southern Command AOR seemed like a perfect environment for us to do this. And to get after… those real world missions that we’re responsible for with respect to counter trafficking as well as the illegal and unregulated fishing.”

The Navy leaders declined to characterize the number of unmanned systems that would ultimately be sent to US 4th Fleet, stressing that much of the planning work is still being done and more details would follow in July during UNITAS 2023.

Of course, the Navy’s unmanned efforts are spread through the service. Around the same time as Task Force 59 was set up, Gilday established a service-wide “Unmanned Task Force,” which has received much less in the way of public attention. Asked today about what that panel has been doing to ultimately contribute to the Navy’s expansion of unmanned systems, the CNO said the unmanned task force is largely focused on classified payload development.

breakingdefense.com · by Justin Katz · April 4, 2023

27. Indo-Pacific focus to aid Thomas in info warfare post, Trussler says

​What is the priority for such a position? Technical expertise in the discipline? ​ Or area/regional and subject matter experience (versus expertise) in the "content" area?

Indo-Pacific focus to aid Thomas in info warfare post, Trussler says

c4isrnet.com · by Colin Demarest · April 4, 2023

NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. — President Joe Biden’s pick to be the next U.S. Navy deputy chief of naval operations for information warfare and director of naval intelligence is an ideal candidate with precious frontline experience, according to the man who currently holds the position.

Vice Adm. Jeffrey Trussler on April 3 told C4ISRNET that Vice Adm. Karl Thomas, for now the commander of the 7th Fleet in Japan, is the “perfect replacement for me,” given his time in the Indo-Pacific and exposure to at-sea issues.

“He’s operating in that environment right now,” Trussler said after a speech at the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space conference in National Harbor, Maryland. “Everything we’re trying to do here in D.C. — policy, requirements and resourcing, the ideas we have — he’s going to have come right from there.”

Information warfare is a fusion of offensive and defensive electronic capabilities and cyber operations. It combines data collection, analysis and manipulation to gain an upper hand. Trussler has been in the job since June 2020 and is retiring.

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The fleet Thomas commands is devoted to the Indo-Pacific, a massive region the Biden administration considers invaluable to international stability, financial health and military readiness. The fleet regularly works with friendly forces from Australia, South Korea, New Zealand and more; its area of operations spans more than 124 million square-kilometers.

The Senate received Thomas’ nomination March 6. It was referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee but has not yet advanced.

If and when Thomas is confirmed, Trussler said, the 7th Fleet commander should use his experience to compare and evaluate in his new post everything he’s “been seeing and doing for the last two years to everything we’re doing” in Washington.

“He’s going to provide extraordinary clarity to some of the capabilities that we need,” Trussler said.

About Colin Demarest

Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT. Colin previously covered the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — namely Cold War cleanup and nuclear weapons development — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina. Colin is also an award-winning photographer.

​

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com