Quotes of the Day:

Liberty and freedom and democracy are so very precious that you do not fight to win them once — and then stop. Liberty and freedom and democracy are prizes awarded only to those peoples who fight to win them, and then keep fighting eternally to hold them.

- Alvin York, sergeant and Medal of Honor recipient who was one of the most decorated U.S. Army soldiers of World War I

"Our worst enemies are not the ignorant and simple, however cruel; our worst enemies are the intelligent and corrupt." 

- Graham Greene

"Someone ought to do it, but why should I?

Someone ought to do it, so why not I?

Between these two sentences lie whole centuries of moral evolution."

- Annie Besant

1. An interview with a high-ranking N. Korean cadre about weapons exports to Russia

2. S. Korea holds regular Dokdo defense drills: source

3. PM reaffirms S. Korea's support for Ukraine in phone talks

4. Submission on Rights of Women and Girls in North Korea for the Special Rapporteur’s Report to the 52nd Human Rights Council Session in March 2023

5. China denies presence of 'secret police station' in Korea

6. Is President Yoon an American conservative?

7. Nat'l Assembly passes 2023 budget, cuts corporate tax

8. Chinese patrol boat fires on North Korean smuggling vessel in late November

9. S. Korean, Romanian defense chiefs discuss security cooperation

10. North Korea inspects party membership cards after alcohol bill goes unpaid

11.  The Drive Toward Larger and More Powerful Launch Vehicles at Sohae

12. South Korea ramps up arms exports in goal to become world supplier

13. North Korea blames U.S. for Ukraine "bloodshed" after Wagner arms reports

14. President Biden signs legislation in Otto Warmbier’s name

15. North Korea blasting to stay relevant in new Cold War

16. Three foreign policy developments to watch for in 2023

17. The Greatest Threat to World Peace: North Korea’s Kim Jong-un?

1. An interview with a high-ranking N. Korean cadre about weapons exports to Russia

We have to take this with a grain of salt since the source cannot be verified (one of the challenges of Daily NK). But the points in this "interview" make sense (which of course marks something as good propaganda).

An interview with a high-ranking N. Korean cadre about weapons exports to Russia

"The oil, gas and flour now coming from Russia is all the result of the weapon deals," the cadre told Daily NK

By Seulkee Jang - 2022.12.23 5:00pm

dailynk.com

Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un in Vladivostok, Russia, on April 25, 2019. (Sputnik/Alexei Nikolsky/Kremlin via Reuters)

North Korean authorities are repeatedly denying rumors of arms transactions with Russia, but testimony has emerged that North Korea really did supply conventional weapons to Russia countless times. However, Daily NK’s source says North Korea did not supply weapons to Russia through third countries in the Middle East and Africa, as the US has claimed.

The source, a high-ranking member of the regime, told Daily NK that North Korean authorities directly supplied several kinds of conventional weapons to Russia until recently. He said North Korea directly sent ammunition, grenades, aircraft rounds and other conventional weapons by ship from the port of Najin.

The source said to ensure security, personnel at the Ministry of State Security’s No. 10 checkpoints – tasked with guarding the area around the port of Najin – were completely withdrawn for five or six hours at night, and only a bare minimum of personnel mobilized by the Munitions Industry Department and Ministry of State Security took part in loading the weapons on the ships.

Additionally, the area 10 kilometers around the port was completely locked down for about 12 hours on days ships carrying secret items departed.

However, North Korea supplied Russia with old conventional weapons that have been in the possession of the KPA for decades. It reportedly provided Russia with no recently produced weapons. The source said late North Korean leader Kim Il Sung’s dying instruction was not to export new weapons, and that this is the country’s current weapons export policy.

In November, Daily NK reported that North Korean authorities ordered munitions factories to produce several kinds of ammunition, including grenades, aircraft ammo and anti-aircraft shells in October. The order was aimed at refilling weapon stores that had shrunk due to the exports to Russia.

Below is the full interview with the high-ranking source in North Korea.

Daily NK (DNK): Recently, the US Defense Department said North Korea is supplying a lot of ammunition for Russia’s war in Ukraine, sending it to Russia by disguising the shipments as destined for the Middle East or North Africa. Does North Korea provide Russia with weapons through third countries?

Source: “We can send them directly, so why go through the Middle East or Africa? It seems that either the US intentionally released wrong information that we sent weapons to Russia disguised as shipments to the Middle East or Africa as a smokescreen to verify other intelligence they collected, or they haven’t got a firm basis that we provided weapons to Russia. That’s why we can feign innocence in public about not having ever conducted weapons transactions with Russia.”

DNK: North Korean authorities have denied Washington’s allegations of weapon transactions with Russia countless times. Last month, the vice director of the Military Foreign Affairs of the Ministry of National Defence issued a statement in which he said “we have never had ‘arms dealings’ with Russia.” In late September, the vice director general of the General Bureau of Equipment of the Ministry of National Defence claimed that “we have never exported weapons or ammunition to Russia before and we will not plan to export them.” Did these officials make false statements?

Source: “Basically, the Defense Ministry does not get directly involved in arms exports. Does our nation seem so lax that the vice director of a bureau at the Defense Ministry would know about arms dealings with Russia? We intentionally made cadres at the Defense Ministry make the announcements, but doing things and pushing things without telling them is what happens in this line of work.”

DNK: What is North Korea getting in return for supplying weapons to Russia? Has North Korea directly received foreign currency as payment for the weapons?

Source: “We haven’t received anything in the form of money. Russia’s cash has all dried up, too, because of the war. I understand that at first, Russia offered to either pay in dollars when the war ended, or to pay now in rubles. Russia’s money is worthless, so what would we do with it? And we can’t be certain that Russia will pay in dollars later. So we decided to accept supplies we need right now. The oil, gas and flour now coming from Russia is all the result of the weapon deals.”

DNK: South Korea and the US said they will continue to watch for moves pertaining to illegal deals between North Korea and Russia. Will North Korea continue dealing weapons with Russia despite this?

Source: “We won’t make a sound. Russia is full of US spies, and Russia is too slow footed, so the US is continuing to hear information and poke at us about how we’re dealing weapons with Russia. I’m not exactly certain that we’ll continue dealing with Russia. We do it whenever an order comes down from above.”

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

2.  S. Korea holds regular Dokdo defense drills: source

Regular or in response to Japan's recent statement?

S. Korea holds regular Dokdo defense drills: source

koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · December 23, 2022

By Yonhap

Published : Dec 23, 2022 - 10:32 Updated : Dec 23, 2022 - 10:32

•  Back to List
• More article by this Writer

In the Aug. 25, 2019, file photo, service members carry out a military drill on South Korea's easternmost islets of Dokdo in the East Sea to deter trespassers. (Yonhap)

South Korea conducted regular military drills earlier this week to enhance the defense of its easternmost islets of Dokdo, an informed source said Friday, following Japan's renewed claims to the East Sea outcroppings in a revised security document.

Personnel of the Navy and Coast Guard staged the biannual drills on Thursday after Tokyo renewed its claims to Dokdo in the revised National Security Strategy last week despite the growing need for bilateral cooperation against evolving North Korean military threats.

The drills were aimed at ensuring the country's military readiness to fend off potential foreign infiltrations to the rocky outcroppings, according to the source.

South Korea launched the Dokdo drills in 1986. Since 2003, it has conducted them twice a year.

Dokdo has long been a recurring source of tension between the two neighbors, as Tokyo continues to make sovereignty claims in its policy papers, public statements and school textbooks.

South Korea has been in effective control of Dokdo, with a small police detachment, since its liberation from Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule. (Yonhap)

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3. PM reaffirms S. Korea's support for Ukraine in phone talks

Excerpt:

Han said South Korea has so far provided US$100 million worth of assistance and will remain in solidarity with Ukraine.

PM reaffirms S. Korea's support for Ukraine in phone talks | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · December 23, 2022

SEOUL, Dec. 23 (Yonhap) -- Prime Minister Han Duck-soo reaffirmed South Korea's support for Ukraine to help its fight against Russia during phone talks with his Ukrainian counterpart, Denys Shmyhal, on Friday, his office said.

In their first phone talks since the war began in February, the two sides discussed Seoul's humanitarian aid and Ukraine's post-war recovery plans, the prime minister's office said.

Han said South Korea has so far provided US$100 million worth of assistance and will remain in solidarity with Ukraine.

Earlier this month, the Seoul government shipped power generators, vaccines and medical supplies to Ukraine to help people cope with severe cold weather during the winter.

Shmyhal gave thanks for Seoul's support and said his government wants South Korea to take part in Ukraine's post-war recovery efforts, and Han expressed hope for the reconstruction plan, according to his office.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · December 23, 2022

4. Submission on Rights of Women and Girls in North Korea for the Special Rapporteur’s Report to the 52nd Human Rights Council Session in March 2023

From Human Rights Watch.

​A human rights upfront approach is necessary for north Korea.

Submission on Rights of Women and Girls in North Korea for the Special Rapporteur’s Report to the 52nd Human Rights Council Session in March 2023

hrw.org · December 21, 2022

Discrimination and Violence against Women and Girls

Despite claims by officials in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) that gender equality has been achieved, North Korean women and girls are subject to intense and pervasive human rights abuses including sexual and gender-based violence, widespread discrimination, and enforcement of rigid gender stereotypes.

Traditional Confucian patriarchal values remain deeply embedded in North Korea. Confucianism is an ethical and philosophical system that is strictly hierarchical and values social harmony. In such a society, a woman’s position in society is lower than a man’s and her reputation depends largely on maintaining an image of “sexual purity” before marriage and obeying the men in her family.

Discrimination against women and girls is accepted as an inevitable part of everyday life in North Korea. Stereotyped gender roles begin in childhood. Girls learn they are not equal to boys and cannot resist mistreatment and abuse, and that they should feel shame if they become targets of abuse by men, whether in the home or in public spaces. In interviews in Human Rights Watch’s 2018 report “You Cry at Night but Don’t Know Why,” North Korean students and teachers explained that in mixed gender classes boys were almost always made leaders and that male teachers usually made decisions in schools, even though the majority of teachers in the school were women. Social structures and conventions that discriminate against women are also reflected in socially enforced rules of interaction between girls and boys. As teenagers, girls are often asked to use an honorific form when speaking to boys, even though there is no reverse requirement. This practice continues through university, extending into the workplace, marriage, and family life. Lee Chun Seok, a female former schoolteacher from Ryanggang province who left North Korea in 2013, told Human Rights Watch: “Men are the sky and women are the earth. What men think and say are what matters. We must absolutely obey men, respect them, and treat them with honor.”

According to North Korea’s 2016 state party report submitted to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee), women had minimal representation in positions of influence within the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), comprising 10 percent of divisional directors in government bodies, 11.9 percent of judges and lawyers, 4.9 percent of diplomats, and 16.5 percent of officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the time of that report, there were no women in the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK, the main policymaking mechanism in the country.

The number of women in the Central Committee has doubled between 2016 and 2019, with increased visibility in state-run media of female officials like Kim Yo Jong, Kim Kyong Hui, and Choe Son Hui. However, the increased involvement of women in leadership does not appear to have resulted in policy changes.

Domestic violence in North Korea is considered a “private matter” and cases of sexual harassment and violence, even in public, go virtually unreported. North Korean escapees have told Human Rights Watch that authorities do not consider violence against women to be a serious crime. Others have stated that the stigma surrounding the victims of sexual violence and harassment prevents women and girls from seeking redress. Survivors of sexual assault lack the language itself to describe what happened to them, an issue compounded by the lack of public sex education in the country. Cho Byul Me, a former smuggler from North Hamkyung province who left North Korea in 2014, explained that she sometimes had to run away from her house when her husband started beating her up, but had nowhere to go. “Eventually I’d just have to go back home and wait outside the door sometimes in the bitter cold, under the snow or the rain, until I’d think he had fallen asleep,” she said. “I had nowhere to go and I would have left him if I had anywhere to go.”

Notably, during North Korea’s CEDAW Committee review in 2016, one government official did not even seem to understand questions about “marital rape” or what the term meant, and asked the committee to explain it. The same official also claimed that punishments for superiors coercing women into sex should be much less than in cases of rape involving outright physical violence, because, the official claimed, there is less of an impact on victims.

According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, 81 percent of North Korean escapees in 2019 were female, prior to the Covid-19 related border closure. This can partly be explained by the decreased scrutiny women face compared to men in North Korea, as men are required to go to state-run workplaces while many married women stay at home to care for the family. In addition, many North Korean women and girls are trafficked and sold to Chinese men or enter the sex industry in China. The Chinese trafficking markets are well connected with local Chinese authorities, who facilitate these practices. Still, the Chinese government routinely labels North Koreans as illegal “economic migrants” and forcibly repatriates them under a 1986 bilateral border protocol. The 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry report on the human rights situation in North Korea found that North Korean escapees who are forcibly repatriated face systematic torture, arbitrary detention, and sexual violence, including invasive body searches and forced abortions, that amount to crimes against humanity.

Human Rights Watch has heard many unconfirmed calls from the Pyongyang government to authorities in the border areas and in detention facilities ordering local officials to protect unspecified human rights of people in custody, However, Human Rights Watch is not aware of any new policies or legal reforms that address protections of rights of women and girls.

Women in the Markets

Prior to the outbreak of Covid-19, women were estimated to contribute more than 70 percent of the country’s household incomes. Because married women are not forced to go to official workplaces like their husbands, and single women are not universally conscripted into the military, North Korean women had more mobility to work in the informal markets (jangmadang). These markets increased trade with China and bolstered the economy after the collapse of the public distribution system during the famine in the late 1990s. Reports from before the pandemic estimated that women comprised roughly 80 percent of the market. The wages of North Koreans in official, state-approved ordinary workers’ roles are capped at pre1990s prices, equivalent to an average of seven to nine kilograms of corn per month, which were eclipsed by market vendor earnings. Many North Korean women became the primary breadwinners of their families. Participation in the markets gave them stronger voices at home, increased their decision-making power about finances and children’s education, and improved their access to information about issues inside and outside of North Korea. Involvement in these informal markets was one and perhaps the only way that North Korean women enjoyed empowerment and autonomy in North Korea.

However, women leaving their homes to work in the markets also exposed them to increased gender-based discrimination. Female North Korean escapees told Human Rights Watch that the increased visibility of women in markets drew scrutiny from the authorities. North Korea’s vague laws and the possibility of technical illegality in nearly all market business activity created opportunities for guards or officers to harass or detain women in the markets, including by extracting bribes in the form of sexual demands. The 2014 Commission of Inquiry report found that “the male dominated state, agents who police the marketplace, inspectors on trains, and soldiers are increasingly committing acts of sexual assault on women in public spaces.” This was described as “the male dominated state preying on the increasingly female-dominated market.”

Since 2020, the excessive and unnecessary measures that the North Korean government has ostensibly implemented to quell the spread of Covid-19 have disproportionately impacted women and girls. These measures, including “buffer zones” on the borders with China and Russia and orders given to border guards, limitations on domestic travel, trade, and product distribution, and increased ideological campaigns, have blocked virtually all movement between North Korea and China, both commercial and otherwise. These overbroad measures have subjected North Koreans to food and medicine shortages, plunging the country into renewed economic hardship and austerity. These new regulations also appear to be a means by the government to return to the strict economic controls and social values of decades past, when the government more tightly controlled its northern border, the imports and distribution of products, and all access to information.

The measures disproportionately affect North Korean women and their livelihoods by cutting them out of many of the market activities they had been engaged in prior to the pandemic and reversing many of the socioeconomic gains they had obtained.

Recommendations

Human Rights Watch urges the Special Rapporteur to:

• Request a visit to North Korea to assess the rights situation of women and girls, including those in custody.
• Urge the government to relax Covid-related border and import restrictions, citing their disparate impact on women’s rights.
• Urge the government to launch public interest and awareness campaigns, especially in schools, to promote gender equality and combat discriminatory attitudes and policies that contribute to subordination of women and girls in society and within the family.
• Request the government launch comprehensive sexuality education programs for children and adults that are age-appropriate, medically and scientifically accurate, and inclusive of all students.
• Urge the government to provide appropriate criminal penalties for all forms of genderbased violence, including marital rape, establish safe reporting systems for victims, and ensure that the authorities investigate and prosecute cases of gender-based violence with a survivor-centered approach. This includes training the relevant authorities such as agents and inspectors about gender-based violence and developing protocols for those who will respond to these cases.
• Urge the government to develop social services for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, including counseling and medical care, accessible to all women and girls who need it.
• Urge the government to ensure that survivors of gender-based violence can access and petition courts for restraining or protection orders.
• Urge the government to ensure that authorities dealing with women who have been forcibly repatriated are not punished.
• Urge the government to end all violations of reproductive rights, including all forced or coerced medical examinations or procedures. The authorities should ensure that women who have been trafficked or suffered gender-based violations have access to support and services.

Human Rights Watch urges the Special Rapporteur to call on concerned governments to:

• Mark and commemorate the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry on North Korea in March 2023 through events and initiatives.
• Urge UN Security Council member states and other governments to use the opportunity of the 10th anniversary of the Commission of Inquiry to recommit on addressing human rights in North Korea, and organize a formal session, open to the public and media, to discuss the situation of human rights in North Korea, including the rights of women and girls.
• Call on Security Council members and other governments to mainstream discussion of human rights in all discussions regarding North Korea, including weapons proliferation, aid, economy, or culture.
• Call on Human Rights Council member states to renew and strengthen the mandate of the accountability experts to consolidate and analyze evidence of the most serious international crimes, including violations against women and girls, and prepare files in view of cooperating, sharing, and expediting fair and independent criminal proceedings in national and international courts that have or may have in the future jurisdiction over these crimes.
• Encourage Human Rights Council member states and other governments, including Albania, Argentina, Ecuador, EU, Ghana, Japan, Lichtenstein, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, Republic of Korea, and the United States, to express support for the Officer of the High Commissioner for Human Rights accountability mandate and encourage the office to advance its work towards accountability for rights violations in North Korea.

hrw.org · December 21, 2022​

5. China denies presence of 'secret police station' in Korea

Of course they do.

China denies presence of 'secret police station' in Korea

The Korea Times · by 2022-12-23 17:04 | Foreign Affairs · December 23, 2022

Chinese paramilitary police officers patrol in front of the Indian Embassy in Beijing in this June 17, 2020, file photo. AFP-Yonhap

By Nam Hyun-woo

The Chinese foreign ministry has denied allegations that its government is operating a "secret police station" in Korea to monitor and terrorize Chinese nationals as part of Beijing's efforts to keep them under its influence.

"China has always adhered to the principle of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs, strictly observed international law and respected the judicial sovereignty of all countries," Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said in a press conference, Thursday. "The so-called 'overseas police stations' simply do not exist."

The comment came after a Spain-based human rights group, Safeguard Defenders, reported that the United Front Work Department, a Chinese Communist Party body that coordinates influence operations in China and abroad, is operating more than 100 secret police stations in at least 53 countries, including Korea.

The report accused the Chinese government agency of exploring a new model of using overseas Chinese residents to control other ethnic Chinese people living in the same country, as well as hiring Chinese students in Korea and several other countries as "overseas liaison officers to cooperate with domestic officers both internally and externally."

Seoul restaurant suspected of being secret Chinese police station said to close next month

In Korea, authorities began investigating whether there were such activities, which could amount to violations of international law, and news reports allege that the authorities have suspicions about a Chinese restaurant operated by a Chinese entity in southern Seoul.

The Chosun Ilbo, a local newspaper, reported Friday that counterespionage authorities have suspicions about the restaurant due to its parent company's suspicious profit flow and sudden notice that it would suspend operations after the Safeguard Defenders report gained international attention.

A spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in Seoul said in a statement that "the report is groundless" and there is "no such thing as the so-called overseas police stations."

"For the past several years, Chinese police and prosecution have been maintaining high-level cooperation with their Korean counterparts," the spokesperson said. "We express our regret about the groundless reports and hope for practical efforts to promote friendship and understanding between the two countries' people."

In response, Korea's foreign ministry said it was communicating with local relevant organizations, adding that any foreign agencies active here must be operated in compliance with relevant domestic and international laws.

The Korea Times · by 2022-12-23 17:04 | Foreign Affairs · December 23, 2022

6. Is President Yoon an American conservative?

I think this provides some useful analysis and insights for us non-Koreans

​Excerpts:

But how do the Korean wings differ? Is belief in freedom the mark of Korean conservatives? Is freedom their core value, as it is with conservatives in other countries? Does a fundamental conviction about individual liberty, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom of choice underpin their vision of what makes the Republic of Korea a great country and one worth living in and dying for? Is it their fundamental conviction that the duty of government is to safeguard these freedoms so that citizens may pursue their individual goals?

...

To add to the confusion, as many, if not most, people are a mix of right and left, it's quite normal for an individual to relate comfortably with both versions of Korea.

The second problem that arises when the outsider, flying into Korea, applies the left-right labels to politics here is the depth of animosity between those two camps in the place he's departed from. The main thing these days the American right and left, for example, have in common, it seems, is mutual hatred and contempt. The bigotry and vulgarity on both sides is astounding.

It is that mentality, I would suggest, that is invisibly at work when the outside commentator refers to the Korean politicians and slaps on the right or left label and proceeds to tell us how we should think about them.​

Is President Yoon an American conservative?

The Korea Times · December 22, 2022

By Michael Breen

According to the press, Korean and foreign, President Yoon Suk-yeol is a conservative. But is he?

This may seem like a stupid question, but I ask it, in part because he was the chief prosecutor for a very progressive government and is said to be quite socially liberal, but mainly because, as a foreign observer, I notice that many non-Koreans who consider themselves to be progressive or liberal disapprove of Yoon without knowing much about him.

It seems to me that a lot of foreign press coverage, for example, is not just critical ― that would be a normal reflection of a correspondent's professionalism ― but is often condescending and sneering, if not in the stories, then in the reporters' own Tweets and social media posts in a way that I don't recall them being towards former President Moon Jae-in.

Why would that be? Because one has liberal slapped across his forehead and the other has conservative? What I mean is, they don't seem to check what the president is doing, disapprove of it and describe it as either liberal or conservative. Rather, they approve or disapprove before he starts because of the label. Then everything he does is made to fit. We've kind of become used to this type of political commentary, so it may not strike people as odd.

The problem with it, though, is that, for the foreigner, the conservative-liberal labels might mean something different than they do for the Korean.

So, what am I talking about?

Broadly speaking, we have two main inclinations in democracies: progressives (or liberals, in the American sense) believe in improving society by changing things, while conservatives believe in keeping hold of things as they are. Obviously, progressives will argue for the status quo sometimes and conservatives will want to make changes, so the difference between them is a matter of degrees.

Obviously, expressed like this, we can understand what is being said when someone is labeled one way or the other. We can understand, for example, that a conservative in a communist state does not share the same convictions as a conservative in a long-established democracy. What they share is the predisposition to preserve what they know and move forward into new territory with caution.

But when a non-Korean, say an American, reads that Yoon is a conservative or that Moon was a liberal, what is that likely to mean to them?

In America, you could say, leftists, be they moderate or hardline socialists, are nice because they tend to prioritize justice and equality over other values. They think it is the fundamental duty of the government to solve social problems, protect civil rights and help the less fortunate. In this, they are not entirely wrong, which is why the left is necessary and often has the better arguments and policies.

As for conservatives in America and elsewhere, they tend to be distinguished from progressives for their bedrock belief in individual liberty, personal responsibility and the free market. A government's fundamental role, they think, is not to deliver happiness but to safeguard the freedom needed for citizens to pursue their individual goals. This makes some sense and is why the right often has good points and good policies.

Both right and left wings are attached to the body of democracy in that they share a belief in individual liberty and rights, in the rule of law, in clean and effective government and in the market. But the wings themselves differ in how values are prioritized, with equality on the left and freedom on the right. All well and good, because you need two wings to fly.

But, flying back to Korea, we have two problems. The first is that conservative and progressive don't mean what they mean elsewhere. Also, that central body part where they both agree is different. For example, both left and right in Korea agree with what in America would look like a progressive level of expectation of government and subsequent intrusion by the state.

But how do the Korean wings differ? Is belief in freedom the mark of Korean conservatives? Is freedom their core value, as it is with conservatives in other countries? Does a fundamental conviction about individual liberty, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom of choice underpin their vision of what makes the Republic of Korea a great country and one worth living in and dying for? Is it their fundamental conviction that the duty of government is to safeguard these freedoms so that citizens may pursue their individual goals?

I think not. I think the real differentiator is far deeper and more elusive. It concerns the concept of the nation itself. There are two of them. One is the familiar Republic of Korea. This nation has roots going back millennia but is itself young. It began in 1948, freed from Japanese rule after World War II and spawned by America. It was illiberal but is now a democracy. It has done so well that it is respected around the world as an advanced state, standing shoulder-to-shoulder with other free-market, liberal democracies. This is the Korea of the "conservatives" and it is one they expect North Koreans to one day join.

The other version of Korea has its roots in the Japanese colonial period, although the identity also goes back millennia. This is Unified Korea, yet to be born. It is the country of the political left, its body battered by a hostile power but its soul intact, pure and innocent. The devotees of this nation see both North Korea and South Korea as impostors, temporary and imperfect.

To add to the confusion, as many, if not most, people are a mix of right and left, it's quite normal for an individual to relate comfortably with both versions of Korea.

The second problem that arises when the outsider, flying into Korea, applies the left-right labels to politics here is the depth of animosity between those two camps in the place he's departed from. The main thing these days the American right and left, for example, have in common, it seems, is mutual hatred and contempt. The bigotry and vulgarity on both sides is astounding.

It is that mentality, I would suggest, that is invisibly at work when the outside commentator refers to the Korean politicians and slaps on the right or left label and proceeds to tell us how we should think about them.

Michael Breen (mike.breen@insightcomms.com) is the author of "The New Koreans."

The Korea Times · December 22, 2022

7. Nat'l Assembly passes 2023 budget, cuts corporate tax

​The US is not the only country having challenges passing the budget.

Nat'l Assembly passes 2023 budget, cuts corporate tax | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · December 24, 2022

SEOUL, Dec. 24 (Yonhap) -- The National Assembly on Saturday passed the 638.7 trillion won (US$497 billion) of government budget for 2023 as well as bills to cut corporate tax rate and delay financial investment income tax amid signs of economic slowdown.

The ruling People Power Party (PPP) and the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) approved the Yoon Suk Yeol administration's first budget, 22 days after its legal deadline of Dec. 2.

The bill passed 251-4, with 18 abstentions, in an assembly where the DP holds a majority of 169 out of 300 seats.

The final package was down 314.2 billion won from the government proposal of 639.4 trillion won. It marks the first time in three years that the budget was decreased by the parliament.

Next year's budget includes 352.5 billion won for issuing local currency in a program championed by DP leader Lee Jae-myung, which was not included in the government's initial proposal.

The budget for the police bureau at the Ministry of Interior and Safety and the personnel information management team at the Ministry of Justice was cut by half from 510 million won, one of major sticking issues between the rival parties.

The plenary session approved an amendment on cutting the corporate tax rate by 1 percentage point in each of the four tax brackets, which would bring the highest tax rate of 25 percent down to 24 percent.

When implemented, the upper cap of the corporate tax bracket will be lowered for the first time since 2017.

Rival parties also passed another amendment to postpone imposing taxes on income of more than 50 million won from investments in stocks, bonds and other financial products by two years to January 2025.

Until then, capital gains taxes will continue to apply only to major shareholders with shares worth at least 1 billion won per type of stock.

The tax law amendments came as the government is seeking ways to boost corporate investment and the stock market amid signs of economic slowdown.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · December 24, 2022

8. Chinese patrol boat fires on North Korean smuggling vessel in late November

Nothing is ever as it seems.

Excerpts:

The boat was carrying five or six North Koreans, one of whom was shot in the chest.

Fortunately, he survived since the Chinese police were using rubber bullets instead of live ammunition.

The boat, which failed to leave even after the Chinese issued warning broadcasts, immediately returned to North Korea after taking fire.

The boat was a North Korean patrol boat, suggesting the North Korean border guard — itself tasked with guarding the frontier and cracking down on smuggling — was trying to engage in some smuggling of its own to make money.

Chinese patrol boat fires on North Korean smuggling vessel in late November

The boat was carrying five or six North Koreans, one of whom was shot in the chest

By Seulkee Jang - 2022.12.23 12:16pm

dailynk.com

FILE PHOTO: A North Korean patrol boat near Sinuiju can be seen circled in red. (Daily NK)

There has been a noticeable rise in smuggling activity along the China-North Korea border after China relaxed some of its COVID-19 controls, Daily NK has learned.

According to a source in China on Wednesday, a Chinese patrol boat fired on a North Korean boat that approached a coastal region of Dandong, Liaoning Province, in late November.

The boat was carrying five or six North Koreans, one of whom was shot in the chest.

Fortunately, he survived since the Chinese police were using rubber bullets instead of live ammunition.

The boat, which failed to leave even after the Chinese issued warning broadcasts, immediately returned to North Korea after taking fire.

The boat was a North Korean patrol boat, suggesting the North Korean border guard — itself tasked with guarding the frontier and cracking down on smuggling — was trying to engage in some smuggling of its own to make money.

In fact, a source in North Korea confirmed that the boat that was fired upon left from Cholsan County, North Pyongan Province, and headed southward to China to deal some smuggling goods.

All the soldiers who were on the patrol boat were relieved of their assignments as a result of the incident, while the captain of the vessel was demoted to an enlisted rank and is currently undergoing a court martial.

He likely faces a severe sentence given that the North Korean authorities have strongly cracked down on smuggling activity since the closure of the border in January 2020.

The source in China said a growing number of North Korean boats have been attempting to engage in smuggling along coastal regions of the China-North Korea border since November, when China began easing its quarantine restrictions.

As Chinese border restrictions have loosened, Chinese people are freer to go outside, making it easier for smuggling rings to purchase or deal goods.

Because civilian vessels still have difficulties leaving ports in North Korea due to quarantine protocols, civilians are often working with the border guard or security officers to smuggle, or the border guard or local security officers are engaging in smuggling themselves.

SMUGGLED GOODS INCLUDE HERBS, COPPER AND GOLD

North Korean smugglers are reportedly selling a variety of items to China.

Sometimes they trade relatively cheap items such as medicinal herbs, but they are mostly selling expensive minerals like copper and gold.

North Korean smugglers occasionally trade with their Chinese counterparts in open waters, but recently, North Korean boats often approach the Chinese coast to deal.

The source in China said even though North Korean authorities forbid smuggling, even ordinary people can smuggle if they pay the border guard RMB 2,000 or 3,000 (around USD 286 to 430).

“Actually, people could smuggle [all they want] if they get past the North Korean border guards, but they are facing trouble because the Chinese authorities are heavily policing the border with North Korea,” he explained.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

9. S. Korean, Romanian defense chiefs discuss security cooperation

​Some historical irony. Kim Il Sung and  Nicolae Ceaușescu​ were as best of friends as dictators could be​.

S. Korean, Romanian defense chiefs discuss security cooperation

koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · December 23, 2022

By Yonhap

Published : Dec 23, 2022 - 11:30 Updated : Dec 23, 2022 - 11:30

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Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup (second from right) poses for a photo with his Romanian counterpart Angel Tilvar (second from left) as they hold talks in Seoul on Friday, in this photo provided by Lee's office. (Yonhap)

The defense chiefs of South Korea and Romania held talks Friday over arms industry cooperation, regional security and other issues, Seoul's defense ministry said.

Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup met his Romanian counterpart Angel Tilvar in Seoul as the latter arrived here earlier this week with a delegation at the invitation of National Assembly Speaker Kim Jin-pyo.

During the meeting, Lee noted the two countries have developed friendly, cooperative ties since the establishment of a "strategic partnership" in 2008 and expressed hopes for Tilvar's visit to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation.

Tilvar expressed hopes for continued expansion of defense cooperation in such areas as military information exchanges and education, as well as interest in arms industry cooperation, according to the ministry.

The ministers agreed to work toward signing a bilateral defense cooperation agreement based on a revised letter of intent the two sides signed in September to promote defense cooperation, it said.

They also shared the view on the need for continued support for Ukraine that has been striving to repel Russia's aggression since its invasion in February.

Tilvar previously visited South Korea in September to attend DX Korea 2022, a biennial international defense exhibition. (Yonhap)

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10. North Korea inspects party membership cards after alcohol bill goes unpaid

​Even in a country with the philosophy of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," you still have to pay your bar tab.

​

North Korea inspects party membership cards after alcohol bill goes unpaid

Membership in the Korean Workers’ Party used to come with perks and prestige. Now few want to join.

By Chang Gyu Ahn for RFA Korean

2022.12.23

rfa.org

Authorities in North Korea are inspecting membership cards for the ruling Workers’ Party after a man used his to get out of paying for alcohol, thereby sullying the party’s good name, sources in the country told Radio Free Asia.

Membership in the Korean Workers’ Party was once seen as prestigious as it conferred many benefits to citizens, such as preferable job placement and access to better education and housing. To be a member of the party requires exemplary action, such as superior military service.

But with the country’s economy in shambles, the government is no longer able to provide the same advantages to party members.

RFA was only able to confirm that the inspections are happening in the coastal city of Chongjin, in the northeastern province of North Hamgyong.

“I found out [about the inspections] the next day,” a resident of Chongjin told RFA’s Korean Service Wednesday on condition of anonymity for security reasons. “It was because a male party member … bought some alcohol, left his party membership card, and promised to pay the next day.”

According to the source, the man did not return, even 15 days later, so the seller turned over the card to the local party committee and reported him. Shortly after, local authorities began a citywide inspection, and party members in every organization in Chongjin had to show their card was well cared for as a sign of their continued respect for their membership.

“They looked at the condition of the card, the case and bag used to insert and hold it, and the condition of the strap used to wear it on the body,” said the source.

All members are required to carry their cards with them, displayed in its case on the left front of the chest and secured with shoulder and waist straps. But most members only bring their cards to party meetings and other special occasions.

The source said the inspection is the first widespread review since the party introduced the current version of the card in 2013.

“After the inspection, the local party secretary emphasized at the next meeting of party members that they should not tarnish their honor and take good care of their membership card,” he said.

It is believed that anyone caught without a membership card in good condition will be expelled from the party, the source said. RFA could not confirm any party expulsions.

Members are supposed to have their card inspected when they pay their monthly party fees, which amount to 2% of their monthly income, to their cell leader. Members in one company were surprised that it was the local party secretary, who has a much higher position than the cell leader, performing the inspection, said a worker in the company who declined to be named.

He said the secretary checked to see if the card was properly laminated and shielded from moisture.

“But it seemed like he was really just trying to see whether each member was carrying the card,” the second source said.

Members have now become indifferent to their status as party members, and few people are striving to join like they used to, he said.

“In the past, every man devoted himself to becoming a party member,” the source said. “But among the relatively young people in our company who are not members … there is not a single person who is trying to become one.”

Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee and Leejin J. Chung. Written in English by Eugene Whong.

rfa.org

11. The Drive Toward Larger and More Powerful Launch Vehicles at Sohae

​Imagery at the link.​

The Drive Toward Larger and More Powerful Launch Vehicles at Sohae

• BY: JACK LIU, PETER MAKOWSKY AND OLLI HEINONEN
• DECEMBER 23, 2022

https://www.38north.org/2022/12/the-drive-toward-larger-and-more-powerful-launch-vehicles-at-sohae/

Commercial satellite imagery of North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launching Ground (also referred to as Musudan-ri) from December 19 provides an increasingly comprehensive perspective of the construction and improvements underway. These activities substantiate the conclusion that Sohae is being revamped to accommodate a larger family of launch vehicles that will likely incorporate larger and heavier satellites. This is consistent with the statements and directives made by Kim Jong Un in March 2020.

Moreover, this image was taken 24 hours after two separate missile launches; one reportedly carried an experimental imaging payload and was launched possibly within the Sohae Satellite Launching Station itself, given probable launch scorch marks on the site.

Given Pyongyang’s emphasis on developing and launching military reconnaissance satellites in the near future, construction at Sohae is likely to remain high even through the winter months, and additional engine and/or missile tests are probable.

Vertical Engine Test Stand (VETS) Update

In November, 38 North reported extensively on activities at the VETS, focusing on the engine test stand—the country’s largest liquid fuel engine test stand. At that time, construction of a new structure was noted east of the VETS, although it was unclear what its purpose would be. Based on recent photographs released by North Korean state media, it is clear that the new structure is a Horizontal Engine Test Stand for testing solid-fueled rocket motors.

Figure 1 shows these two test stands—the VETS for testing liquid-fueled rocket motors and the Horizontal Rocket Motor Test Stand for checking the performance of solid-fueled motors.

The Horizontal Rocket Motor Test Stand is clearly operational, and several personnel and vehicles are nearby. The reported solid rocket motor test occurred about five days prior to this image being taken, so these personnel may be involved in post-test cleanup efforts. Note also that the facing panels of the VETS tower have been removed, suggesting that it is being improved to accommodate testing larger and more powerful liquid-fueled rocket engines.

The question is why North Korea would build a new Horizontal Rocket Motor Test Stand when others around the same size already exist, such as at Magunpo. One possibility is that solid-fueled rocket motors tested at Sohae belong to and are design-specific to the satellite launch vehicles.

Figure 1. Activity visible at the Vertical Engine Test Stand and Horizontal Engine Test Stand on December 19, 2022.

Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2022. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Launch Pad Update

Figure 2 shows that the tower crane on top of the launch gantry has been disassembled and placed in sections on the tarmac. This may mean that they intend to increase the gantry height to accommodate a new generation of larger and taller launch vehicles, consistent with ongoing modifications to the engine test stands to accommodate more powerful rocket engines. Note also all the side panels and roof of the moveable transfer structure have been removed and placed on the tarmac, ostensibly to accommodate larger and taller launch vehicles as well.

Figure 2. Activity visible at the launch gantry on December 19, 2022.

Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2022. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Probable Missile Launch from Sohae

News reports stated that the December 18 launch of an imaging payload [References] was from the area of the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground. Figure 3 shows an apparent scorch mark, possibly due to the launch of one missile from within the Sohae complex. That mark is new; there was no such scorch mark in an image from December 9.

The first missile launch occurred at 11:13 a.m. local time, and the second launch occurred at 12:15 p.m. on December 18. The satellite image was taken on the next day at 11:50:22 a.m. December 19. The tracking and data collection resources at the Sohae complex would have been a good reason to conduct the launch from there. The scorch mark was only 500 meters from the National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA) satellite launch control center, so it would have been straightforward to control and manage the data collection of the missile and its imaging payload from there.

Figure 3. Probable missile launch scorch marks visible on December 19, 2022.

Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2022. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

The satellite image provides a next day picture of the hustle and bustle of cleanup and departing personnel after the engine test and launches. For example, Figure 4 shows there were people and vehicles, including a bus, at the entrance. Near the railway station, there was a large group of soldiers marching in parade formation (Figure 5). There was also a single railcar sitting by the recently constructed railway depot, just outside the entrance to the Sohae complex (Figure 6); it could have been waiting for VIPs to depart. Notably, the helipad (Figure 7) had been cleared of snow for arriving and departing VIPs. Imagery from December 9 shows the helipad still snow covered.

In summary, all this activity suggests that an important event occurred over the weekend at Sohae, possibly the much-touted missile launches.

Figure 4. Personnel and vehicle activity the day after the engine test and launches on December 19, 2022.

Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2022. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Figure 5. Marching soldiers in parade formation on December 19, 2022.

Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2022. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Figure 6. Single railcar just outside the entrance to the Sohae complex, possibly waiting for departing VIPs, on December 19, 2022.

Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2022. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Figure 7. Helipad cleared for snow and departing VIPs on December 19, 2022.

Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2022. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Other Activity

Meanwhile, construction of the new building in the VIP housing area and the tunnel entrances continues.

12. South Korea ramps up arms exports in goal to become world supplier

​Again, South Korea is becoming a major partner in the Arsenal Of Democracy. This could become one of the most important long term contributions from the Global Pivotal State of South Korea.

​

South Korea ramps up arms exports in goal to become world supplier

By Min Joo Kim, Michelle Ye Hee Lee and Dan Lamothe

December 23, 2022 at 2:00 a.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Min Joo Kim · December 23, 2022

SEOUL — Amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, the rising demand for arms among Western countries has presented an unprecedented opportunity for South Korea’s defense industry to become a top arms seller and global player.

South Korean defense companies more than doubled their foreign sales this year, with the biggest arms export deal to date struck with Poland during the summer. The first shipment of K2 battle tanks and K9 self-propelled howitzers arrived in Poland this month, and President Andrzej Duda hailed South Korea as a country that could serve up sought-after weapons fast. During a ceremony, he welcomed the “quick delivery of crucial importance” given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

South Korea is increasingly favored as an affordable provider to nations seeking to refill stockpiles depleted of Soviet-era weapons. The country’s arms exports this year topped $17 billion in November, far surpassing a record $7.25 billion last year. Of those sales, the deal with Poland accounted for $12.4 billion, followed by a $1.7 billion deal with Egypt.

The South Korean minister of arms procurement, Eom Dong-hwan, said the “world is watching with attention” the budding defense cooperation between his country and Poland. The Polish government purchased nearly 1,000 K2 tanks, dozens of FA-50 jets, hundreds of K9 howitzers and Chunmoo multiple rocket launchers, and Eom voiced hope that the equipment will contribute to the nation’s deterrence at a time of “rapid changes in the security situation.”

South Korea’s defense industry has its origins in Cold War-era hostilities with rival North Korea in the mid-1940s. The South, initially armed by U.S. forces to fight the Soviet-backed North during the Korean War, was pursuing its own weapons systems as the United States reduced its military presence in the early 1990s. The threat of conflict with the North remains a prime industry focus today.

“As a country that technically remains in a state of war, South Korea has a distinctive capability for mass production of arms that can be promptly deployed in actual warfare,” said Choi Gi-il, a military expert at Sangji University in South Korea. Government support has given the industry a “decisive competitive edge,” with the global arms market taking note of the weapons’ performance as well as their cost-effectiveness, according to Choi.

“This past year in Ukraine was sort of a coming-out party, this public unveiling of what was very well underway [in Korea] and underappreciated publicly. But it’s not just Poland. They’re winning in the Middle East. They’re winning in Southeast Asia,” said Rexon Ryu, the president of the Asia Group in Washington who served as chief of staff to U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel in the Obama administration.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol announced in August that the country aims to rise four spots in the rankings to become the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter by 2027. As part of the plan, Seoul this month unveiled a funding package of $770 million to support investment and research. Yoon and his defense officials said Australia, Norway and other countries are looking to work with South Korean weapon producers.

South Korean defense companies often say they want to become the “Hyundai of defense exports,” a reference to the South Korean automaker that initially filled a niche by making affordable sedans to compete with giants such as Toyota and Ford. Hyundai is today a top global automaker, including of electric vehicles.

The country’s defense industry aspires to coordinate with and sell to the United States. Some U.S. defense companies are watching closely to see where South Korea may become competitive with American firms — particularly if, as Biden administration officials foresee, future needs mean seeking solutions outside of the strapped domestic defense industry.

Bill LaPlante, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, told a crowd of lawmakers, analysts and military officers at the Reagan National Defense Forum this month that he now meets regularly with counterparts from allies and partners to discuss more weapons “co-production” and “co-development” because of the Ukraine war.

“There is this recognition that we are all going to need to do this together,” LaPlante said. “We’re going to have to be comfortable using equipment developed in another country in our own military, and vice versa.”

South Korean defense companies’ far-reaching sales pitch has not targeted Ukraine as a potential direct consumer. Wary of its bilateral relations with Moscow, the Yoon government has said it will not send lethal weapons to Ukraine despite Kyiv’s repeated requests.

“The benefits [of that position] are much, much bigger” than the risks of angering Russian President Vladimir Putin, noted Go Myong-hyun, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul.

Still, Korean weapons are making their way into Ukraine via other countries. South Korea is poised to send the United States 155mm howitzer shells that will be destined for Ukraine under a confidential deal the Wall Street Journal disclosed last month. The South Korean Defense Ministry said discussions were underway “on the understanding that the U.S. would be the end user.”

A senior U.S. defense official said the structure of the American ammunition deal — the United States is already shipping the Ukrainians thousands of rounds of artillery shells every month — helps Seoul deal with both internal politics and diplomatic relations.

“It’s extraordinarily touchy for the South Koreans to donate ammo to Ukraine,” the official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.

A Pentagon spokesman, Army Lt. Col. Martin Meiners, acknowledged the U.S. government’s discussions about potential ammunition purchases from South Korea’s defense industry. Meiners said the Pentagon does not disclose specific numbers or schedules involving ammunition production or capacity.

Meanwhile, the Biden administration has accused North Korea of helping to arm the Russian military and then trying to cover up its actions. North Korea has provided infantry rockets and missiles directly to Russia’s Wagner mercenary group, White House national security spokesman John Kirby told reporters on Thursday.

South Korea’s growing defense industry and the fighting in Ukraine have been an economic boon to some manufacturing towns. South Gyeongsang Province, facing “rust belt” concerns as its once-powerful manufacturing sector declined, is among the areas gearing up to recapture past glory.

A recent editorial in the newspaper Kyungnam Shinmun said the province’s defense industry “has been given wings” by the latest surge in business: “As the Russia-Ukraine war prolongs, our defense industry has gained standing as a fruitful one for South Korea’s exports.”

Lee reported from Tokyo and Lamothe from Washington.

The Washington Post · by Min Joo Kim · December 23, 2022

13. North Korea blames U.S. for Ukraine "bloodshed" after Wagner arms reports

Admit nothing, deny everything, make counter accusations (I know I am a broken record - but so is the Kim family regime's Propaganda and Agitation Department).

North Korea blames U.S. for Ukraine "bloodshed" after Wagner arms reports

Newsweek · by David Brennan · December 23, 2022

North Korea has blamed the United States for the ongoing "bloodshed" in Ukraine amid reports that Pyongyang has already supplied Russian regular forces—and perhaps notorious Wagner Group mercenaries—with weapons to aid their stalled invasion.

On Thursday, the Japanese newspaper Tokyo Shimbun reported that North Korea sent military equipment including artillery shells to Russia via rail on November 20. Also on Thursday, National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby said Pyongyang has already sent arms—including infantry rockets and missiles—to Ukraine for use by the Wagner Group.

North Korea's foreign ministry released a statement on Friday dismissing the Japanese report and denying it has sent any weapons to Russia for use in Ukraine, though did not mention the Wagner Group specifically.

"The Japanese media's false report that the DPRK offered munitions to Russia is the most absurd red herring, which is not worth any comment or interpretation," a ministry spokesperson said in the English-language statement published by the state-run Korean Central News Agency, using the acronym for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Above, a Ukrainian special forces soldier carries a mortar shell to be fired at Russian forces amid artillery fights on December 20, 2022, in Bakhmut, Ukraine. North Korea has blamed the United States for the "bloodshed" in Ukraine. Pierre Crom/Getty Images

"The DPRK remains unchanged in its principled stand on the issue of 'arms transaction' between the DPRK and Russia which has never happened," the spokesperson added.

"The international community will have to focus on the U.S. criminal acts of bringing bloodshed and destruction to Ukraine by providing it with various kinds of lethal weapons and equipment on a large scale, rather than lending an ear to the groundless theory of 'arms transaction' between the DPRK and Russia cooked up by some dishonest forces for different purposes.

"Taking this opportunity, I would like to say that the Russian people are the bravest people with the will and ability to defend the security and territorial integrity of their country without any others' military support."

Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin—an influential oligarch and ally of President Vladimir Putin—denied Kirby's allegation.

"Everyone knows that North Korea has not been supplying any weapons to Russia for a long time," Prigozhin said Thursday in a statement carried by Reuters. "No such efforts have even been made," added Prigozhin, dismissing the reports as "gossip and speculation."

Known as "Putin's chef" due to the fortune he made from Kremlin catering contracts, Prigozhin for years built and operated Wagner while publicly disavowing any links to the group.

Prigozhin has moved more into the spotlight since the February invasion, becoming a key cheerleader for the so-called "special military operation" and proudly taking up the mantle of Wagner owner, even fronting the group's recruitment drive among Russia's prison population.

Above, a man wearing military camouflage stands at the entrance of the "PMC Wagner Centre," associated with the founder of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in Saint Petersburg, Russia on November 4, 2022. Prigozhin denied allegations that North Korea has been supplying Russia with weapons. OLGA MALTSEVA/AFP via Getty Images

Wagner—which the White House said may now have as many as 50,000 fighters—has been leading the costly assault on the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, an operation intended as a demonstration that the group can succeed in difficult operations beyond the capabilities of Russia's regular forces.

Russia has maintained that it has no need for military equipment from other nations to support its bogged-down offensives in Ukraine. But multiple media reports and evidence from the battlefield have indicated Russian arms purchases—or attempted purchases—from North Korea, Iran, Belarus, and China.

Belarus' weapon, vehicle, and ammunition transfers to Russia are well documented, as is the presence of Iranian drones in Russian use in Ukraine, regardless of the ongoing denials from Tehran. U.S. intelligence said in September that Moscow was already buying millions of shells from Pyongyang.

Newsweek · by David Brennan · December 23, 2022

14. President Biden signs legislation in Otto Warmbier’s name

​Let us never forget the murder of Otto Warmbier by the Kim family regime.

We have not written enough about this. But this legislation is the recognition by Congress and the President of the importance of influence operations in north Korea.

We are slowly seeing the unveiling of the overall political warfare strategy that the alliance should be executing (and there are indications of this in both the ROK and the US): based on a foundation of deterrence and defense we need to have a human rights upfront approach, a sophisticated information campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.

Excerpts:

The act named for Otto Warmbier takes aim at North Korea’s regime of censorship and surveillance.

The House passed it on Dec. 9, days after North Korea executed two teenagers for the crime of watching and distributing South Korean movies, according to a Fox News report citing Radio Free Asia.

Radio Free Asia is one of the act’s direct beneficiaries.

It authorizes $10 million annually over the next five years for the Biden Administration to develop, in general terms, a strategy “on combating North Korea’s repressive information environment.”

The funds are specifically appropriated to the U.S. Agency for Global Media, an independent agency considered an arm of U.S. diplomacy that broadcasts news and information around the world “in support of freedom and democracy.”

USAGM supervises Voice of America and Office of Cuba Broadcasting as well as Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe, Middle East Broadcasting Networks and more. It also fights internet censorship in China, North Korea, Russia and other countries.

President Biden signs legislation in Otto Warmbier’s name

fox19.com · by Brian Planalp

CINCINNATI (WXIX) - Legislation bearing the name of late Wyoming High School graduate Otto Warmbier is now law.

The act was folded into the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, which the House and Senate passed in early December.

President Joe Biden signed the NDAA, which allots $816.7 billion to the Defense Department, on Friday afternoon.

The NDAA only authorizes the allocation of military spending for next year. The money must be appropriated separately by Congressional action. To that end, legislators negotiated a $1.7 trillion omnibus appropriations bill earlier this week. It cleared the House Friday afternoon and awaits Biden’s signature.

The defense act’s most controversial item rescinds the COVID-19 vaccination mandate for servicemembers, which went into effect in Aug. 2021. The rescission will take effect in 30 days. The Pentagon has paused personnel actions in the meantime.

Biden and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin balked at the measure when it was first floated earlier this year, arguing it was essential for troop readiness. Republicans countered it hurt military recruitment and retention, pointing to the reported 8,400 servicemembers who have been discharged for refusing the requirement.

A House amendment that would have required reinstatement for previously discharged servicemembers failed. The act contains no language to prevent Austin from issuing a new vaccine requirement next year.

Some 98 percent of active duty service members and 96 percent of the total force have been vaccinated, according to the DOD. Since April, only two service members have died from COVID-19.

REMEMBERED | Ohio hometown says goodbye to Otto Warmbier

The act named for Otto Warmbier takes aim at North Korea’s regime of censorship and surveillance.

The House passed it on Dec. 9, days after North Korea executed two teenagers for the crime of watching and distributing South Korean movies, according to a Fox News report citing Radio Free Asia.

Radio Free Asia is one of the act’s direct beneficiaries.

It authorizes $10 million annually over the next five years for the Biden Administration to develop, in general terms, a strategy “on combating North Korea’s repressive information environment.”

The funds are specifically appropriated to the U.S. Agency for Global Media, an independent agency considered an arm of U.S. diplomacy that broadcasts news and information around the world “in support of freedom and democracy.”

USAGM supervises Voice of America and Office of Cuba Broadcasting as well as Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe, Middle East Broadcasting Networks and more. It also fights internet censorship in China, North Korea, Russia and other countries.

A 2018 typhoon caused extensive damage to 15 USAGM broadcast antennas in Asia, resulting in reduced programming to North Korea. So far, five of the antennas are rebuilt. The appropriation will restore the remaining 10.

It also targets the following purposes (quoted in full from the legislation text:)

• To promote the development of internet freedom tools, technologies, and new approaches, including both digital and non-digital means of information sharing related to North Korea;
• To explore public-private partnerships to counter North Korea’s repressive censorship and surveillance state; and
• To develop new means to protect the privacy and identity of individuals receiving media from the United States Agency for Global Media and other outside media outlets from within North Korea.

Said U.S. Sen. Rob Portman (R-Ohio) earlier this month, “Otto Warmbier was the best of America, the Midwest, and Cincinnati. This legislation will help ensure that his memory lives on and that the brutal regime responsible for his unjust death is held accountable for this and it’s myriad of other human rights abuses. With the five year anniversary of Otto’s unjust death earlier this year, I look forward to this legislation becoming law very soon.”

The legislation passed out of the U.S. House four days before Otto’s 27th birthday. The Cincinnati-native died on June 19, 2017 after 17 months in North Korean captivity.

Otto entered North Korea eighteen months prior as part of a guided tour. He was waiting for his departing flight on Jan. 2, 2016 at Pyongyang International Airport when he was arrested on accusations that he had tried to steal a propaganda poster from his hotel. The North Korean government convicted and sentenced him in March to 15 years imprisonment with hard labor.

Not long into his sentence, Otto suffered a severe neurological injury and fell into a coma. The cause remains unknown. North Korean authorities ascribed it to botulism and a sleeping pill when they disclosed the coma in June 2017, days before he was freed.

Otto never awoke. He died at the University of Cincinnati Medical Center six days after his return to the U.S. The coroner’s report found he died from an unknown injury that caused oxygen deprivation to the brain.

The incident provoked a strong public response, including trenchant criticism of the Obama Administration for its perceived failure to secure Otto’s release. U.S. Senator John McCain called Otto’s death a “murder,” while U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley described it as a “singular case” that “touches the American heart like no other.”

The U.S. Department of State relisted North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism later that year. A U.S. government ban on travel to North Korea issued a month after Otto’s death remains in effect today.

President Donald Trump invoked Otto’s death several times during his presidency with the outspoken support from Fred and Cindy Warmbier, Otto’s parents. The Warmbiers were particularly supportive of a Trump-brokered summit between the nations held in 2018. But a small rift formed at the summit’s second installment the following year, when Trump said he took North Korean leader Kim Jong-un “at his word” when he said he didn’t know about Otto’s treatment.

“We have been respectful during this summit process. Now we must speak out. Kim and his evil regime are responsible for the death of our son Otto. Kim and his evil regime are responsible for unimaginable cruelty and inhumanity. No excuse or lavish praise can change that,” the Warmbiers said.

A U.S. federal district court judge in December 2018 handed down a default judgement in the Warmbiers’ suit accusing North Korea of torture and murder in Otto’s death. The North Korean government, which did not defend the case, was ordered to pay $501 million in damages.

North Korea has so far declined to pay, and there’s no real mechanism that could compel it to. Nonetheless, the Warmbiers are entitled to file for asset seizures of North Korean property, such as a cargo ship seized by the U.S. Coast Guard in 2019 that was then sold to compensate them. Similarly, in January 2022, a federal judge in New York ordered $240,000 seized from a North Korean bank paid to the Warmbiers.

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fox19.com · by Brian Planalp

15. North Korea blasting to stay relevant in new Cold War

Kim Jong Un is desperate because his strategy is failing on multiple levels. But he has no other plays in the Kim family regime play book.

North Korea blasting to stay relevant in new Cold War

Pyongyang ramps up its missile program in defiance of UN and overt threat to Japan, South Korea and US

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · December 23, 2022

Unfazed by US sanctions and military shows of force, North Korea is ramping up its missile program in a spate of blasts that have launched a spy satellite, fired ballistic missiles and tested a solid-fuel rocket motor.

This week, Reuters reported that North Korean state media outlet Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) stated that the country on December 18 conducted “an important, final phase” to develop a spy satellite, which it plans to complete by April 2023.

The report mentions that North Korea conducted its tests at the Sohae satellite launching station to review its satellite imaging, data transmission, and ground control systems. The test involved a launch vehicle carrying a mock satellite, two multi-spectral cameras, image transmitters and a storage battery, the report said.

Reuters mentioned that North Korea fired the mock satellite at a lofted angle and reached an altitude of 500 kilometers. In addition, North Korea released blurred pictures of Seoul and Incheon that it claims were taken from the December 18 launch.

However, some analysts are skeptical about North Korea’s claims, as its statement may again be a cover-up for testing its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology.

Reuters says that North Korea’s spy satellite cameras are too weak to provide such imagery and that the test involved an old missile carrying a satellite mockup, which implies the test may have been to validate launch procedures and operational practices, such as sending images back to a ground control station.

This launch may also be a deviation from North Korea’s past practice of disguising missile tests as satellite launches to avoid political and economic consequences.

In line with this analysis, Hwang Ildo writes in a March 2022 article for the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) that North Korea chose not to bother disguising its March 24 ICBM test as a satellite launch as it senses weakness in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

A North Korean ICBM test launch in a file photo. Photo:KCNA

Hwang states that North Korea’s March ICBM test may have been a gamble that paid off considering the UNSC’s lack of a reaction and thus has incentivized Pyongyang to accelerate its missile program.

The fact that North Korea has publicly stated it is preparing a reconnaissance satellite shows that it has military intentions for the launch, which makes any pretense of the planned launch being a national space program project superfluous.

Apart from advancing its missile technology, North Korea may want to rehearse highly-lofted missile launches to increase the chances of penetrating missile defenses. Asia Times has previously noted that highly-lofted trajectory launches result in an extremely high terminal phase velocity, undermining the effectiveness of any missile defense system.

At the same time, the launch trajectory significantly reduces missile range as most of its fuel is expended on reaching a high angle instead of covering great distances.

In such an attack, missile defense radars lose track of the target once it reaches its apex and regains track of the hostile missile too late for interceptors to destroy. Also, as interceptor missiles are flying against gravity, it is harder to catch up, correct course and hit the constantly-accelerating target at the right angle.

Reuters reported last week that North Korea recently tested a high-thrust solid-fuel ICBM rocket engine. This keystone technology enables the development of a solid-fuel ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), increasing the survivability and flexibility of its nuclear arsenal.

Solid fuel rockets offer a slew of advantages over their liquid fuel counterparts, including a more straightforward design without complex pumps and piping, the lack of need for difficult-to-store and volatile liquid fuels, longer storage life, improved mobility, and no requirement for hours-long pre-flight fueling. Given these advantages, a solid-fuel North Korean ICBM can strike targets in South Korea, Japan or even the mainland US with little to no warning.

The solid fuel engine test came almost right after North Korea fired ballistic missiles into its east coast last week. Reuters reported that South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) mentioned two North Korean medium-range ballistic missiles flew 500 kilometers, with Japanese Vice Defense Minister Toshiro Ino saying that the missiles landed outside Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and caused no damage.

North Korea is known to use such tests to attract attention to itself amid intensifying global conflicts. This year, the Ukraine war and Taiwan Strait tensions have taken most of the media spotlight. Nevertheless, North Korea may wish to signal that it is still a relevant player in the global arena by through sustained missile firings.

South Korean and US Marines in a training exercise. Photo: AFP / Kim Jae-Hwan

The US and South Korea staged massive military drills in response to Pyongyang’s saber-rattling. The Associated Press reported this week that US B-52 bombers and F-22 stealth fighters, alongside South Korean F-35s and F-15s jets, staged a massive show of force off Jeju Island. The report mentions that the F-22, the most potent fighter in America’s arsenal, has been deployed to South Korea for the first time in four years.

The US and South Korea are also considering staging live fire exercises in 2023, with the last such drills hosted six years ago. Reuters reported that the live-fire drills had been floated during the 70th anniversary of the US-South Korea alliance, wherein both sides discussed ways to deter North Korea.

The Reuters report notes that should these live-fire drills be held, it would end a years-long hiatus of such exercises under former South Korean president Moon Jae-in, who emphasized engagement rather than provocation with North Korea.

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · December 23, 2022

16. Three foreign policy developments to watch for in 2023

Tell me how north Korea is conducting brinkmanship? What is the "brink?" We need to understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime to include the strategy of political warfare and blackmail diplomacy and the pursuit of advanced warfighting capabilities so that the regime can dominate the peninsula either through subversion or force.. Once understanding all of this we can make an assessment about any "brink" the regime has. Is a nuclear test "the brink?" I think not (unless we make it so).

Three foreign policy developments to watch for in 2023

by Tom Rogan, National Security Writer & Online Editor |  December 23, 2022 08:30 AM

Washington Examiner · December 23, 2022

From the war in Ukraine to China's escalating hostility toward Taiwan, 2022 was a highly consequential year in geopolitics. Here are three things to watch for in 2023.

1) Further Russian reversals in Ukraine

Russia is likely to suffer further setbacks in Ukraine. The fundamental challenges facing Russian President Vladimir Putin's military in Ukraine are probably unsolvable. Russian forces are poorly led, badly equipped, running very short of artillery and other standoff munitions, and beset by low morale. In contrast, Ukrainian forces are highly motivated and generally well-equipped. We should expect Russian forces to struggle in the face of coming Ukrainian counteroffensives. If Crimea is threatened, Putin may order the limited use of nuclear weapons in a desperate attempt to force Western pressure on Ukraine to adopt a ceasefire. Whether the Russian military would follow a nuclear strike order is an open question.

Ukraine's already highly limited appetite to consider a ceasefire will also diminish in tandem with its growing battlefield success. Putin's ability to reopen the Belarus front in support of a successful offensive toward Kyiv is doubtful.

FROM BELARUS WITHOUT MUCH LOVE: RUSSIA'S EXAGGERATED OFFENSIVE ASPIRATIONS

2) An Israeli-Iranian showdown amid Biden-Netanyahu tensions

When Benjamin Netanyahu returns to office as Israeli prime minister, he will face two key challenges.

First, there's the frustration of a Biden administration that despises far-right members of Netanyahu's coalition government. Second, there's the rising threat of Iran developing a nuclear weapon. Netanyahu's challenge is that he needs the Biden administration's support if he is to increase international pressure on Iran significantly. Netanyahu will also need the Biden administration's support to develop a credible military option for degrading Iran's nuclear program. If he fails to thread the needle on these issues, Netanyahu may find himself in the unenviable position of being at once diplomatically isolated, facing an aggressive Iranian nuclear threat, an existential threat in Israeli eyes, and unable to confront that threat with confidence. Expect the Biden administration to leverage new support for Israel against greater Israeli support for U.S. concerns related to China and the war in Ukraine.

The new year may be a very significant one in U.S.-Israeli relations and for Iran's nuclear ambitions.

3) Kim Jong Un's return to nuclear brinkmanship

With escalating ballistic missile launches in 2022, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un sought to pressure the Biden administration and South Korea into making economic concessions. But facing a more hawkish conservative government in power in Seoul, Kim's gambit hasn't paid off.

The new year will almost certainly entail further escalation by North Korea. While an anticipated new nuclear weapons test is yet to occur, Kim may roll the dice if he is unable to garner a more concessionary stance. There's a significant prospect of 2023 looking more like 2017 and its repeated intercontinental ballistic missile launches. Kim may gamble that this escalation will have a greater concessionary impact on the Biden administration as the United States continues to face the distraction of the war in Ukraine and escalating tensions with China. On that point, Beijing may seek to leverage Kim's escalation to extract its own concessions from Washington.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER

Washington Examiner · December 23, 2022

17.  The Greatest Threat to World Peace: North Korea’s Kim Jong-un?

Doug Bandow's argument for withdrawing from Korea and leaving the ROK hung out to dry.

Conclusion:

Moreover, with federal finances doomed to even-greater strain as the population continues to age, the US can no longer afford to act a global sugar daddy for rich friends, like the ROK, enjoying the good life at Americans’ expense. The ominous silence enveloping Pyongyang makes South Korea a good place to start Washington’s long goodbye to its unofficial role as globocop.

The Greatest Threat to World Peace: North Korea’s Kim Jong-un?

aier.org · by Doug Bandow

Doug Bandow

– December 23, 2022 Reading Time: 6 minutes

For years the North Korean playbook was obvious to the world. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea wanted to be the center of attention. If the rest of the world was keeping Washington busy, the reigning Kim (Il-sung, Jong-il, or Jong-un) would seek to force his way into the international conversation.

That sometimes meant hot military action. A US party attacked, a South Korean ship sunk. American soldiers murdered, South Korean sailors drowned. Pyongyang was adept at brutally capturing the limelight.

Along the way, the latter inflicted harm at a retail rate. In 2010, for instance, a South Korean corvette, the ROKS Cheonan, sank, killing 46 of 104 personnel on board. The likely perpetrator was a DPRK midget submarine. Although a terrible crime, thankfully, it was not a precursor to war.

Today the North Korean menace is much greater, with a potential for wholesale killing. In the United States. What is the evidence? The North is refusing to talk with Washington.

The US is worried about the DPRK only because the former is defending the Republic of Korea, with a garrison of 28,500 personnel. This deployment grew out of the Korean War, which ended in an armistice in 1953. Since then, Washington has guaranteed the South’s security from any revived attempt at conquest by the North.

In the early years, South Korea needed help. The war ravaged the South. Seoul was governed by an erratic, aging authoritarian who was upended by popular demonstrations and replaced by a military dictator. At that time both the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China backed the DPRK and likely would have supported Pyongyang in a military rematch.

By the 1970s, however, The ROK was pulling away economically from its Stalinist adversary. By the late 1980s, democracy came to the South. In contrast, the personality cult of North Korea’s “Great Leader” Kim Il-sung remained suffocating, compared even to those of Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong. At the same time, the Cold War was coming to an end. The Soviet Union dissolved and the China’s relationship with the West continued to improve.

The evolving geopolitical landscape warranted a change in the Seoul-Washington relationship, a gradual shift in defense responsibilities to South Korea. The ROK still needed to be protected, but not by America. The capability gap between North and South has only continued to grow. The latter has more than 50 times the GDP and twice the population. South Korea has much greater economic and diplomatic heft around the world, and even with China.

Unless one imagines a special geographical feature, perhaps a unique gravitational field, that prevents the country on the peninsula’s south from matching the military of the country on the peninsula’s north, why shouldn’t Seoul develop the capability to deter and, if necessary, defeat Pyongyang? The South is another example of a US client desperate to remain on Washington’s generous defense dole, apparently forever.

Of course, equally ridiculous is the status of Europe and of Japan, which for decades have acted as if they were utterly helpless, constantly wailing for America to do more and reassure them. Even now, when they claim to be thinking about finally acting, they are still demanding that the US prove they are number one in its heart and, more important, its military budget. There is literally nothing America’s allies would not have it do for them. Seoul, at least, puts in more effort than the others, but its sense of entitlement is similar.

Of course, alliance advocates wax eloquent about all the supposed benefits of the relationship: containing China, stabilizing Asia, preventing a regional arms race, retaining close economic and cultural ties, cooperating in other areas, and doing many more great and wonderful things. It’s a fantasy list.

With a new government, Seoul is taking a slightly tougher stance toward the PRC diplomatically, but remains unlikely to turn itself into a missile target by backing US-military operations for any contingency against Beijing other than the ROK’s defense. China is likely to attack South Korea only if the latter chooses to become a combatant on America’s behalf.

In any case, it would be much better for the ROK and Japan to arm themselves than for America to remain between them and Beijing. Indeed, the price of Washington continuing to “stabilize” Asia is a rising likelihood of war with the PRC. Allied and friendly states should create their own capable militaries and work together to deter China, with the US backstopping their continued survival as independent states, not micro-managing disputes over who controls which barren rocks in which sea. Better an arms race excluding, rather than including, America.

Finally, most forms of cooperation, both existing and possible, between Washington and Seoul have nothing to do with a military alliance. Personal, cultural, and economic ties between the two nations are strong. These relationships could continue even if military relations were much looser, based on cooperation on shared interests.

Yet, seven decades after the conclusion of the Korean War, Americans are still responsible for the defense of the South. Hence, Americans remain a target of the North. And Pyongyang has been diligently strengthening its geopolitical position.

North Korea’s links with China remain strong, with the latter playing defense at the United Nations, blocking US attempts to sanction the DPRK for its missile tests. Kim has revived his nation’s relations with Moscow. He unreservedly backs its invasion of Ukraine, and apparently is supplying Russia with artillery ammunition. The North also recently revived rail traffic between the old Cold War allies.

Of much greater concern, Pyongyang has been racing ahead militarily. “The world,” as in a small-but-committed band of DPRK-watchers, is waiting for an expected seventh nuclear test. The betting is that North Korea is miniaturizing its warheads and hopes to deploy tactical nukes to enhance its defense against the vastly stronger conventional forces of the South and US.

Even more dramatic has been the upsurge in DPRK missile testing. So far this year the North is at roughly 80, ten times the number launched last year. Most ominously, Pyongyang appears determined to develop submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The former would strengthen North Korea’s deterrent against a preemptive strike, and the latter would place the American homeland within the DPRK’s reach.

At the same time, North Korea refuses to talk, a truly disturbing break from recent behavior. Pyongyang once seemed eager to receive a geopolitical marriage proposal, but no longer. Like a besotted lover, the Biden administration has thrown itself at Kim, begging him to negotiate, but he has rudely rebuffed the administration. Indeed, Kim and especially his sister, have treated allied entreaties with contempt, as if signs of weakness. There is little more Washington can do, other than “strengthen” its alliance with the South further, making the latter even more dependent on America. For instance, Seoul wants Washington to return tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula.

Presumably Pyongyang is building up its arsenal to give it leverage in future negotiations. The potential bottom line is frightening. For instance, the Asan Institute and Rand Corporation posited: “by 2027, North Korea could have 200 nuclear weapons and several dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and hundreds of theater missiles for delivering the nuclear weapons. The ROK and the United States are not prepared, and do not plan to be prepared, to deal with the coercive and warfighting leverage that these weapons would give North Korea.”

This doesn’t mean the North would start a preventive war against America. US retaliation would be sure and overwhelming. However, such a DPRK buildup would mean Washington’s support for the South, even purely conventional to start, would risk nuclear retaliation. If North Korea faced defeat, Kim would have little incentive not to go for broke, “unleashing hell” and hoping for a miracle.

Imagine allied forces breaking free and heading for the Yalu River border with China, like in 1950. This time Beijing probably would keep its troops in their barracks. If so, what if Kim announced that the allies had 24 hours to begin withdrawing, else he would target US cities? Imagine if Pyongyang had a score or more solid-fuel ICBMs with multiple warheads for use against America, a couple submarines carrying SLBMs possibly off America’s coast, and numerous shorter-range missiles capable of hitting Guam, the Commonwealth of Mariana Islands, and US bases in Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and South Korea. How could a president not comply?

Of course, the North’s capabilities might not be so clear. Would the president dare to call what he believed to be a bluff? What if he concluded there was a high probability that at least one nuclear-armed missile was likely to get through? How many American cities and lives would he be prepared to risk? The price of guessing wrong would be catastrophic.

The status quo is becoming untenable. Extended deterrence, Washington’s willingness to defend the ROK with every weapon at its disposal, including nukes, was announced when the DPRK had no means to strike America. US military personnel deployed to the peninsula would be vulnerable, but the homeland was secure. In the not-too-distant future, that will no longer be the case with North Korea.

Which makes it imperative to convince Pyongyang to talk. That likely requires making clear that while Washington still desires denuclearization, it no longer will make that a requirement for negotiations. The US might sweeten its offer by ending the travel ban to the DPRK, offering to open liaison offices, and suggesting some sanctions that could be suspended in return for the North’s agreement to initial arms control measures.

Even more important, Washington should begin shifting responsibility for the South’s defense to the South, where it belongs. The American defense guarantee made sense in 1953, when the “Mutual” Defense Treaty was inked. Today, with the ROK taking its place among the world’s most successful democracies, not so much.

The best way to enhance America’s security is for its defense-dependents to graduate and take care of themselves and their own regions. With the US off the peninsula, Pyongyang wouldn’t much care about affairs in Washington.

Moreover, with federal finances doomed to even-greater strain as the population continues to age, the US can no longer afford to act a global sugar daddy for rich friends, like the ROK, enjoying the good life at Americans’ expense. The ominous silence enveloping Pyongyang makes South Korea a good place to start Washington’s long goodbye to its unofficial role as globocop.

READ MORE

Doug Bandow

Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties.

He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry.

He writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Times.

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aier.org · by Doug Bandow

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com