Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners



Quotes of the Day:


“This whole tendency to see ourselves as the center of political enlightenment and as teachers to a great part of the rest of the world strikes me as unthought-through, vainglorious and undesirable.”
- George F. Kennan (of ‘Long Telegraph’ fame)


“I believe that reading and writing are the most nourishing forms of meditation anyone has so far found. By reading the writings of the most interesting minds in history, we meditate with our own minds and theirs as well. This to me is a miracle.”
- Kurt Vonnegut


Choose your leaders with wisdom and forethought.
To be led by a coward is to be controlled by all that the coward fears.
To be led by a fool is to be led by the opportunists who control the fool.
To be led by a thief is to offer up your most precious treasures to be stolen.
To be led by a liar is to ask to be told lies period to be led by a tyrant is to sell yourself and those you love into slavery.
- Octavia E. Butler, Parable of the Talents




1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 12 (Putin's War)

2. CDS Daily brief (12.11.22) CDS comments on key events

3. U.S. intel report says key Gulf ally meddled in American politics

4. In an Era of Confrontation, Biden and Xi Seek to Set Terms

5. China wants to mend ties with the U.S. But it won’t make the first move.

6. Here's what's at stake in Monday's meeting between Biden and China's Xi Jinping

7. Opinion | In a VA hospital hallway, one last ritual works its power

8. Ukraine war, tensions with China loom over big Bali summit

9. After Kherson success, Kyiv vows to keep driving out Russia

10. Inside The Iranian Regime’s Propaganda Machine

11. Veteran candidates saw big gains in midterms

12. The West must stop ‘shooting behind the duck’ and provide Ukraine the weapons it needs

13. 100,000 Dead or Wounded in Ukraine: Putin Has the Blood of His Army On His Hands

14. Imagining peace in Ukraine

15. Ukraine Got its Miracle in Taking Kherson Without a Fight (But Winter Is Coming)

16. Anti-Access Bubbles: How to Stop China from Militarily Dominating Asia?

17. The U.S. Marine Corps Is Facing A Crisis Like No Other

18. Red meat is not a health risk. New study slams years of shoddy research





1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 12 (Putin's War)


Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12


Key Takeaways

  • Russia’s withdrawal from Kherson City is igniting an ideological fracture between pro-war figures and Russian President Vladimir Putin, eroding confidence in Putin’s commitment to and ability to deliver on his war promises.
  • Russian officials are increasingly normalizing the public and likely illegal deportation of thousands of Ukrainian children to Russia.
  • The Russian military leadership is trying and failing to integrate ad hoc military formations into a more cohesive fighting force in Ukraine.
  • Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove.
  • Ukrainian forces continued to liberate settlements on the right (western) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations in the direction of Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar.
  • Russian officials may be trying to avoid providing military personnel with promised payments.
  • Russian forces and occupation officials continue to endanger residents and subject them to coercive measures.




RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 12

Nov 12, 2022 - Press ISW


Download the PDF

 

understandingwar.org

Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 12, 7:30 ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russia’s withdrawal from Kherson City is igniting an ideological fracture between pro-war figures and Russian President Vladimir Putin, eroding confidence in Putin’s commitment and ability to deliver his war promises. A pro-war Russian ideologist, Alexander Dugin, openly criticized Putin—whom he referred to as the autocrat—for failing to uphold Russian ideology by surrendering Kherson City on November 12.[1] Dugin said this Russian ideology defines Russia’s responsibility to defend “Russian cities” such as Kherson, Belgorod, Kursk, Donetsk, and Simferopol. Dugin noted that an autocrat has a responsibility to save his nation all by himself or face the fate of “king of the rains,” a reference to Sir James Frazer’s The Golden Bough in which a king was killed because he was unable to deliver rain amidst a drought. Dugin also downplayed the role of Putin’s advisors in failing to protect the Russian world and noted that the commander of Russian Forces in Ukraine, Army General Sergey Surovikin was not responsible for the political decision to withdraw from Kherson City. Dugin noted that the autocrat cannot repair this deviation from ideology merely with public appearances, noting that “the authorities in Russia cannot surrender anything else” and that “the limit has been reached.” He also accused the presidential administration of upholding a “fake” ideology because of its fear of committing to the “Russian Idea.” Dugin also made a reference to the use of tactical nuclear weapons, which he vaguely stated was “the end” and proceeded to note that overdue Russian changes to the military campaign have not generated any effect to change the course of the war. He also suggested, however, that Russia must commit to the Russian Idea rather than pursuing the “stupid” use of nuclear weapons.

Putin is having a harder time appeasing parts of the highly ideological pro-war constituency due to his military’s inability to deliver his maximalist goals of overthrowing the Ukrainian government and seizing all of Ukraine, as ISW has previously assessed.[2] Putin’s nationalist-leaning propagandists such as Vladimir Solovyov are increasingly demanding that the Kremlin and higher military command to fully commit to their goals in Ukraine, and Solovyov even called for full mobilization and the firing of incompetent officials following the Russian surrender of Kherson City.[3] Select milbloggers have previously criticized Putin for his failure to respond to the attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge on October 9, while others noted that Putin has failed to uphold the ideology of Russian superiority since 2014.[4] Direct criticism of Putin within the pro-war community is almost unprecedented, and Dugin’s high-profile and unhinged attack on Putin may indicate a shift among the Russian nationalist ideologues.[5] Putin needs to retain the support of this community and has likely ordered some of his propagandists to suppress any critiques of the Russian withdrawal from Kherson City, since many state TV news programs have been omitting or downplaying the aftermath of withdrawal.[6] The ever-increasing doubts among extreme Russian nationalists about Putin’s commitment to Russian ideology reduce Putin’s appeal to the nationalist community, while mobilization and high casualties will likely continue to upset members of the Russian society.

Wagner-affiliated channels are also turning on the Kremlin following the loss of Kherson Oblast, which may further elevate the influence of the siloviki faction. Some milbloggers implied that the Kremlin has betrayed Kherson City by “selling out,” while others noted that the Kremlin has consistently surrendered its territories without asking the Russian people.[7] Other milbloggers further questioned the legitimacy of the claimed 87% support rate for Russian annexation of Kherson Oblast.[8] Wagner Group financier Yevheny Prigozhin and some milbloggers have previously discussed the possibility of “Russia’s civil society” stepping up to defend Russia.[9] The growing criticism of the decision to withdraw from western Kherson contrasts with the general support for the decision among the milblogger community before today.

Russian officials are increasingly normalizing the public and likely illegal deportation of thousands of Ukrainian children to Russia. Russian Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova publicized the illegal kidnapping of 52 medically fragile Ukrainian children from Kherson Oblast to an unspecified “safe” area in Russia on November 12, likely under a medical relocation scheme that Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia Rodion Miroshnik confirmed had started on November 5.[10] High level Kremlin officials, including Lvova-Belova and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin have publicly acknowledged and praised the relocation of thousands of Ukrainian children to live with Russian families or in Russian facilities in recent weeks.[11] Russian Zaporizhia Oblast occupation officials have made public statements in recent weeks about the planned forced relocation of over 40,000 Kherson Oblast children to Russia and acknowledged on November 12 that their systems for caring for Ukrainian children are inadequate.[12] Russian and Ukrainian sources have previously reported that Russian and occupation officials have deported Ukrainian children to Russia under education, vacation, and other schemes within the past 10 days.[13] Such frequent and public acknowledgements are a stark contrast to the first Russian official confirmation of such actions on August 23, when Krasnodar Krai authorities deleted an announcement about the arrival of 300 adoptable Ukrainian children from Mariupol and denied ever issuing the statement.[14] As ISW has noted and will continue to observe, the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia represents a possible violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[15]

Russian military leadership is trying and largely failing to integrate combat forces drawn from many different organizations and of many different types and levels of skill and equipment into a more cohesive fighting force in Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian officials stopped the distribution of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) documents, including documents regarding the participation of DNR and LNR forces in combat, on November 11.[16] Russian authorities also ordered Southern Military District commanders to centralize payments to DNR and LNR fighters through Russian financial institutions and offered DNR and LNR soldiers the option to continue their service as contract servicemembers under Russian law.[17] These efforts will likely increase friction between Russian officials and LNR and DNR officials due to the exclusion of DNR and LNR officials from the process. DNR and LNR servicemembers reportedly feel pressured to accept Russian contracts and have expressed fears that refusal of the new Russian contracts would lead to the annulment of their documents and termination of DNR/LNR benefits.[18] ISW has previously reported bureaucratic conflict between DNR, LNR, and Russian authorities over administrative structures in occupied areas.[19]

The lack of structure inherent in the combination of DNR forces, LNR forces, Russian contract servicemembers, Russian regional volunteer servicemembers, Russian mobilized servicemembers, and Wagner Group Private Military Company (PMC) forces creates an environment that fosters intra-force conflict. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 12 that tense relations between mobilized soldiers and Chechen volunteer soldiers triggered a brawl in Makiivka that injured three.[20]

Key Takeaways

  • Russia’s withdrawal from Kherson City is igniting an ideological fracture between pro-war figures and Russian President Vladimir Putin, eroding confidence in Putin’s commitment to and ability to deliver on his war promises.
  • Russian officials are increasingly normalizing the public and likely illegal deportation of thousands of Ukrainian children to Russia.
  • The Russian military leadership is trying and failing to integrate ad hoc military formations into a more cohesive fighting force in Ukraine.
  • Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove.
  • Ukrainian forces continued to liberate settlements on the right (western) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations in the direction of Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar.
  • Russian officials may be trying to avoid providing military personnel with promised payments.
  • Russian forces and occupation officials continue to endanger residents and subject them to coercive measures.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
  • Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove on November 12. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults within 15km northwest of Svatove near Volodymyrivka and Kuzemivka, Luhansk Oblast.[21] The Russian MoD reported that Russian forces also defeated Ukrainian forces by artillery fire in the vicinity of Pishchane, Kharkiv Oblast (24km northwest of Svatove).[22] The Russian MoD also reported that Russian actions repulsed Ukrainian assaults towards Svatove and within 21km northwest of Kreminna in the direction of Ploshchanka, Makiivka, and Chervonopopivka.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within 30km northwest of Svatove near Masyutivka and Orlianka in Kharkiv Oblast and near Miasozharivka and Novoselivske in Luhansk Oblast.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground assaults within 21km northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka and within 12km south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[25] Russian forces conducted these counterattacks likely to constrain the actions of Ukrainian forces in eastern Kharkiv and western Luhansk oblasts and not to regain limited territory. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces continued routine missile and artillery strikes in eastern Ukraine.[26]


Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Ukrainian forces continued to clear liberated settlements in Kherson Oblast on the right (western) bank of the Dnipro River. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces have liberated over 60 settlements, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing to undertake stabilization measures.[27] Ukrainian officials announced that Ukrainian regional military administration officials returned to Kherson City.[28] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that some advanced Ukrainian units have reached the right bank of the Dnipro River.[29] Most Russian sources also acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are in control of the entire right bank, but some claimed that Russian artillery in Kakhovka is preventing Ukrainian forces from reaching the right bank.[30] Ukrainian military officials noted that Russian forces are continuing to use UAVs, MLRS systems, and artillery to strike Ukrainian forces in liberated settlements.[31] Ukrainian officials are also looking for Russian servicemen out of uniform and abandoned military equipment.[32] Social media footage showed that Russian forces have abandoned some military equipment like helicopters and armored vehicles, despite the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claims that Russian forces transferred 5,000 pieces of weaponry to the left (eastern) bank.[33]

Russian forces are continuing to engineer defensive positions on the left bank of the Dnipro River and establish logistics in southern Kherson Oblast.[34] Recent Maxar Technologies and Satellogic satellite footage showed that Russian forces have established a new base approximately 70km southeast of Kherson City, likely in an effort to protect their equipment from Ukrainian HIMARS strikes.[35] Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian positions on the left bank and reportedly destroyed a Russian ammunition depot in Kakhovka Raion.[36]


Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Siversk, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka on November 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks east of Siversk near Verkhnokamianske, near Soledar, and near Bakhmut.[37] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces captured the Mayorsk Rail Station south of Bakhmut.[38] Geolocated footage shows Ukrainian forces storming Russian positions east of Bakhmut along the T0504 highway.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground assaults west of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske, Krasnohorivka, and Marinka.[40] Russian sources claimed there was ongoing fighting near Pervomaiske and south of Avdiivka near Opytne.[41]

Russian forces made marginal gains in their offensive push towards Vuhledar as of November 12. Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces made marginal advances into Pavlivka.[42] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces shelled Pavlivka, indicating that Russian forces likely do not control the entire settlement.[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack near Pavlivka.[44] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian ground attack east of Vuhledar towards Stepne and Volodymyrivka.[45]


Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued routine air, missile, and artillery strikes west of Hulyaipole, and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv oblasts on November 12.[46] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Nikopol in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Zaporizhzhia City.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian concentration area in Zaporizhia Oblast on November 10, wounding more than 100 Russian personnel.[48]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian military officers may be attempting to limit the cost of force generation by manufacturing justifications to avoid giving soldiers promised payments and benefits. Russian media reported on November 11 that two wounded Russian volunteer soldiers received notices of desertion and stopped receiving payments.[49] A prominent Russian Telegram channel accused officers of intentionally labeling the wounded soldiers as deserters to eliminate the need to fund their benefits and medical care.[50] The channel claimed that public outcry pushed authorities to correct the situation of one of the soldiers. Hospital workers allegedly threw the second soldier out on the streets, and he has reportedly received no response to his situation.[51] ISW has previously reported that payments to contract soldiers, volunteer soldiers, and mobilized reservists place a heavy financial burden on both the Russian federal government and Russian regions.[52] It remains unclear where officials will find funding to support force generation, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has already failed to provision soldiers with basic supplies and equipment.[53] Incentives and bonus payments further exacerbate financial challenges. However, officials continue to promise volunteers and mobilized soldiers further benefits as societal discontent with force generation grows.[54]

Desertion remains a challenge for Russian forces as morale continues to drop. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on November 12 that Russian commanders are actively searching occupied Horlivka for deserters who fled Ukrainian counteroffensives in now-liberated Kharkiv Oblast.[55] Commanders reportedly issue weapons to discovered deserters, force them to purchase ammunition, and redeploy them to the southern front.[56] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) released an audio intercept on November 12 in which a Russian soldier tells his mother that Russian commanders do not care about the lives of their personnel and that one commander told the rank-and-file soldiers they will all die anyway.[57] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian authorities in occupied Henichesk instituted a prohibition on alcohol in response to deteriorating moral and psychological conditions among soldiers in occupied territories.[58]

The popularity of Wagner Group forces may have inspired the creation of further private military companies (PMCs) for use in the war in Ukraine. Odesa Oblast Administration Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk claimed that Russian officials are planning the creation of an “Orthodox PMC” under the Russian Orthodox Church on November 12.[59] Private military companies are illegal in Russia.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian forces and occupation officials continue to endanger residents and subject them to coercive measures as of November 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 12 that Russian forces in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhia oblasts use the properties of religious organizations, educational institutions, and healthcare facilities to accommodate military personnel, store military equipment, and establish artillery fire positions.[60] Ukrainian Melitopol mayor Ivan Fedorov reported on November 12 that Russian occupation officials in Melitopol block residents from accessing certain radio, television, internet, and social media sources.[61] Russian forces and occupation officials will likely continue to endanger residents and subject them to coercive measures as they prioritize the offensive against Ukraine over administrating the territories that they have already illegally annexed.

Russian forces continued to engage in measures designed to erase Ukrainian cultural heritage on November 12. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 12 that Russian forces stole 15,000 paintings from Kherson Oblast, including from the Kherson Art Museum and its branch in Nova Kakhovka.[62] The looting of museums is a part of a wider Russian campaign to erase Ukrainian cultural heritage to undermine the strength of the Ukrainian national and ethnic identity.

Russian occupation officials continued to relocate their administrative presence further away from the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on November 12. Russian outlet RIA Novosti reported on November 12 that Kherson occupation administration spokesperson Alexander Fomin announced that from now on the temporary administrative capital for Russian-occupied Kherson is officially Henichesk.[63] Russian sources reported on November 12 that Kakhovka raion occupation head Pavel Filipchuk announced that occupation administration employees are leaving the 15 km evacuation zone on the left bank of the Dnipro River.[64] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 11 that Russian occupation officials and their families planned to evacuate from Nova Kakhovka to Arabat Spit on November 12. [65] Russian occupation officials will likely further struggle to administer Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast in these new administrative locations.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://tsargrad dot tv/articles/aleksandr-dugin-herson-poslednij-rubezh-otstuplenija_662480

[6] https://meduza.i dot /feature/2022/11/11/rossiyskie-federalnye-telekanaly-pochti-nichego-ne-rasskazyvayut-ob-otstuplenii-iz-hersona

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://suspilne dot media/273917-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-181-tekstovij-onlajn/; https://uvsd dot ru/news/info/339-malyshi-iz-mariupolja-ishhut-novye-semi.html; https://t.me/andriyshTime/2469

https://twitter.com/Arvelleg1/status/1591331058473369600

https://twitter.com/Etern8tyOSINT/status/1591385920502120449

[44] /posts/pfbid0X6fNAW4TRNhBbms6zjtiM4EfVqb7NnNbC3CFFqWcKCV91DGFMVKZHnW5VZmA54Yrl?__cft__[0]=AZVafm2_KQrfLVFe6Z6uAGXJtxZaL_Th3Ae5fqgJLwGt_02oWivyrp402XKKwK_bPZBT2mYDRMNAUTzZD1ijJZzdY5Y0aN9mDlqDDwjYq9_hVBdWHXF-wz_ND03segKv-kjUP22olYbQCNeAHMAS98kgMf5Pax907EABfXdDd_psYn3eY7jFYHnyYuTlvgehfnU0p8JB-mywGchuVe58KZ4n&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[55] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/11/12/rosiyany-rozshukuyut-dezertyriv-vtikachi-perehovuyutsya-na-donechchyni/

[56] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/11/12/rosiyany-rozshukuyut-dezertyriv-vtikachi-perehovuyutsya-na-donechchyni/

[57] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/mam-tut-debylyzm-takoi-ponymaesh-na-odny-y-te-zhe-hrably-nastupaem-y-vsyo-ravno.html

[62] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/11/12/vyvezly-15-tys-kartyn-okupanty-rozikraly-kulturnyj-fond-hersonshhyny/

[63] https://ria dot ru/20221112/genichesk-1830990519.html

[65] . https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/11/11/okupanty-pochaly-evakujovuvaty-kolaborantiv-z-novoyi-kahovky/

understandingwar.org


2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (12.11.22) CDS comments on key events


 




CDS Daily brief (12.11.22) CDS comments on key events

 

Humanitarian aspect:

In Ukraine, 279 children are currently considered missing since the beginning of the full-scale war with the Russian Federation, and 7,460 have been found, according to the data from the "Children of War" state portal. In addition, 11,028 children are considered deported, and 96 are returned [home].

 

Juvenile prosecutors also informed that 430 children died as a result of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, and more than 829 were injured.

 

Over the past day, November 11, due to Russian armed aggression against Ukraine, eight civilians were killed, and 13 more were injured, according to data from Oblasts' military administrations, published by the deputy head of the Office of the President, Kyrylo Tymoshenko.

 

As of 9 a.m. this morning, Oblast Military Administrations reported that the Russian army struck eleven Oblasts of Ukraine over the past 24 hours.

Consequences of enemy shelling on the morning of November 12:

      In the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Russian troops shelled civilian infrastructure in the past day. Twenty-seven reports were received about the destruction of houses (apartments) and infrastructure objects due to enemy shelling. Detailed information is being clarified.

      In the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, the enemy again shelled the Nikopol district. The Russians also shelled Marganets, Nikopol and Chervonohryhorivka communities. No civilian casualties, but damaged houses were reported. Detailed information is being clarified.

      In the Kharkiv Oblast, the enemy shelled the civilian population of the Kupyansk, Chuhuiv and Kharkiv districts along the contact line and the border with the Russian Federation. The shelling damaged farm facilities and fires broke out. An 80-year-old woman was injured by enemy shelling in the Chuguyiv district. In Kharkiv, two boys were wounded by the exploded cluster munition. There is a high level of mine danger in the region.

Over the past 24 hours, on November 11, rescuers provided assistance and evacuated 110 civilians from unsafe territories in the Donetsk Oblast; the police evacuated another 188 people, reported the Donetsk regional military administration. Since November 2, a free evacuation train has been evacuating people from Donetsk Oblast to Ternopil Oblast. According to Ukrinform, more than 1.2 million people left the Oblast, where 1,670,000 people lived before the full-scale invasion. By winter, at most 235,000 people involved in the defense and support of critical infrastructure should remain in the region.

 

Power outages and critical infrastructure:

Emergency blackouts were introduced in Kyiv and eight regions, NEC "Ukrenergo" stated. It is noted that this is a temporary forced step to balance the power system. The damage suffered by the energy infrastructure during yesterday's enemy attack led to an increase in the load on the working part of the power grid.


Liberated and occupied territories:

The Russian occupiers declared Genichesk the "temporary capital" of the occupied Kherson Oblast after the Ukrainian Armed Forces entered Kherson. This city was occupied on February 24, the first day of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation.

 

The head of the press center of the Southern Defense Forces, Natalya Gumenyuk, said that the Armed Forces of Ukraine had liberated more than 3,000 square kilometers in the south of Ukraine. In the liberated territories, the Ukrainian military found a lot of abandoned weapons, ammunition and military equipment as the invaders retreated in a hurry.

 

In the liberated Kherson, there is currently a shortage of water, medicine, bread, and food in general, but humanitarian cargoes are already starting to arrive in the city, said the adviser to the Kherson City Mayor Roman Golovnya. He stated that according to his personal calculations, there are currently around 70-80 thousand people in the city, compared to 320 thousand before February 24. Russia has completely destroyed the entire energy system of Kherson, said Dmitry Sakharuk, Executive Director of DTEK. It may take about a month to restore the regular power supply. Joint-stock company "Khersonoblenergo" will start working on restoring the electricity supply in Kherson immediately after the permission of the Ukrainian military.

 

The military administration, the National Police and the Security Service of Ukraine resumed their work in Kherson. A curfew is being introduced from 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 a.m. tomorrow, announced the head of Kherson Military Administration, Yaroslav Yanushevich, in a video message. The authorities are also restricting the possibility of leaving and entering Kherson while the demining of the liberated territories continues, Yanushevich said.

 

Russian invaders took about 15 thousand paintings from the museums of the Kherson Oblast, reported by the Center of National Resistance. At the same time, as noted, the invaders took away not only cultural values. "The Russians, according to tradition, stole sanitary ware, including toilets and household appliances," the Center said. As was earlier reported by Ukrinform, the invaders brought the exhibits stolen from the Kherson Art Museum to the temporarily occupied Simferopol (Crimea) in trucks without the plates.

 

Residents of the occupied left bank of the Kherson Oblast receive messages from the occupation authorities with a call to evacuate. It became known that the Russians are starting to evacuate collaborators from Nova Kakhovka with their families.

 

The Russians released only 227 people from the temporarily occupied territories through the checkpoint in Vasylivka during the day, the Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration reported in Telegram. Earlier, the Mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov, reported that the invaders let people out of the captured territories only if they had "special passes", which can be obtained only by prior appointment at the [Russian Occupation] commandant's office. In Melitopol, the queue is scheduled a month in advance.


Operational situation


(Please note that this section of the Brief is mainly on the previous day's (November 11) developments)

 

It is the 262nd day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). In the liberated towns and villages of the Kherson Oblast, units of the Defense Forces are carrying out stabilization measures.

 

The enemy is improving the fortification equipment of the defensive lines on the left bank of the Dnieper and is trying to maintain the temporarily captured territories while at the same time conducting offensive operations in the Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Novopavlivka directions.

 

Over the past 24 hours, units of the Defense Forces repelled enemy attacks in the areas of Masyutivka and Orlyanka in Kharkiv Oblast; Novoselyvske, Myasozharivka, Makiivka and Bilohorivka in Luhansk Oblast and Soledar, Bakhmut, Krasnohorivka, Verkhniokamianske, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Maryinka and Pavlivka in Donetsk Oblast.

 

The enemy does not stop shelling the Defense Forces units along the entire contact line, conducts aerial reconnaissance, and continues to strike critical infrastructure, violating the norms of International Humanitarian Law, laws and customs of war.

 

During the past 24 hours, the enemy launched 4 missile strikes and 23 air strikes, and carried out more than 70 MLRS rounds. More than 25 towns and villages in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Mykolaiv Oblast were hit. In addition, near the state border, Bologhivka, Vilkhuvatka, Krasne, Ohirtseve and Starytsia were shelled in the Kharkiv Oblast.

 

In the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, the enemy continues to use the buildings and territory of religious organizations, educational and healthcare institutions to accommodate military personnel, military equipment and the equipment of firing positions for mortars and artillery.

 

The formation of a Russian-Belarusian grouping of troops on the territory of the Republic of Belarus continues. There is still a threat of the enemy launching missile and air strikes from the territory of Belarus.

 

Over the past day, Ukrainian aircraft has carried out 16 strikes, hitting 13 areas of concentration of enemy personnel, weapons and military equipment, and 3 positions of the enemy's anti- aircraft missile systems.

 

Ukrainian missile forces and artillery units hit 2 enemy command and control points, 9 areas of concentration of manpower, weapons and military equipment and 2 other important military targets.

 

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low.


In the temporarily occupied territory of the Donetsk Oblast, relations between the mobilized servicemen and the occupiers from the Chechen Republic remain tense. Thus, another conflict in the city of Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast, resulted in the injury of 3 people.

 

Kharkiv direction

Topoli - Siversk section: approximate length of combat line - 154 km, number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 23-28, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 5.5 km;

 Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments (TR), 245th motorized rifle regiment (MRR) of the 47th tank division (TD), 6th and 239th TRs, 228th MRR of the 90th TD, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades (SMRBr) of the 6th Combined Arms (CA) Army, 27th SMRBr of the 1st Tank Army, 252nd and 752nd MRRs of the 3rd MRD, 1st, 13th, and 12th TRs, 423rd MRR of the 4th TD, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th SMRBrs of the 2nd CA Army, 35th, 55th and 74th SMRBrs of the 41st CA Army, 275th and 280th MRRs, 11th TR of the 18th MRD of the 11 Army Corps (AC), 7th MRR of the 11th AC, 80th SMRBr of the 14th AC, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, military units of the 1st AC of so-called DPR, 2nd and 4th SMRBrs of the 2nd AC, PMC

 

The enemy fired at the Defence Forces' positions in Bilohorivka, Kyslivka, Krokhmalne, Makiivka, Nevske, Novoselivske and Stelmakhivka in Luhansk Oblast; Berestove, Kupyansk and Tabaivka in Kharkiv Oblast, and Serebryanka and Terny in Donetsk Oblast.

 

Donetsk direction

Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 144 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments (TR), 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th TR of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 51st and 137th parachute airborne regiment of the 106 airborne division, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade of Baltic Fleet, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

 

The enemy shelled from tanks and artillery the areas of Andriivka, Bakhmut, Bakhmutske, Verkhnokamianske, Zalizne, Klishchiivka, Mayorsk, Opytne, Soledar, Yakovlivka, Avdiivka, Vesele, Vodyane, Kamianka, Kostyantynivka, Krasnohorivka, Maryinka, Nevelske and Novomykhailivka.

 

Zaporizhzhia direction

 Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade (SMRBr) of the 29th Combined Arms (CA) Army, 38th and 64th SMRBrs, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th CA Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37th of the 36th CA Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments (MRR) of the 19th motorized rifle division (MRD) of the 58th CA Army, 70th, 71st and 291st MRRs


of the 42nd MRD of the 58th CA Army, 136th SMRB of the 58 CA Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps (AC), 39th SMRB of the 68th AC, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st AC of the so-called DPR, and 2nd AC of the so- called LPR, PMCs.

 

The enemy shelled the Defense Forces' positions in the areas of Bohoyavlenka, Velyka Novosilka, Vremivka, Vuhledar, Neskuchne, Pavlivka, and Prechistivka in Donetsk Oblast, Dorozhnyanka, Hulyaipole, Zeleny Hay, Malynivka, Olhivske, Stepove, Charivne, Chervone, and Shcherbaky in Zaporizhia Oblast.

 

Ukrainian Defense forces hit the area of enemy concentration. As a result, the enemy lost more than 100 people wounded.

 

Tavriysk direction

Vasylivka – Sofiivka section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 39, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7,5 km;

Deployed BTGs of: the 8th and 49th Combined Arms (CA) Armies; 11th, 103rd, 109th, and 127th rifle regiments of the mobilization reserve of the 1st Army Corps (AC) of the Southern Military District; 35th and 36th CA Armies of the Eastern Military District; 3rd AC of the Western Military District; 90th tank division of the Central Military District; the 22nd AC of the Coastal Forces; the 810th separate marines brigade of the Black Sea Fleet; the 7th and 76th Air assault divisions, the 98th airborne division, and the 11th separate airborne assault brigade of the Airborne Forces.

 

The enemy shelled from the artillery the areas of Vyshchetarasivka in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Havrylivka, Dudchany, Zolota Balka, Mykhailivka and Novooleksandrivka in Kherson Oblast.

 

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Federation continue actions to carry out two operational tasks against Ukraine:

      projection of force on the coast and continental part of Ukraine by launching missile strikes from surface ships, submarines, coastal missile systems and aircraft on targets in the coastal zone and deep into the territory of Ukraine and readiness for the amphibious marine landing to assist ground forces in the coastal direction;

      control of the northwestern part of the Black Sea by blocking Ukrainian ports and preventing the restoration of sea communications (except for the areas of the BSGI "grain initiative") by carrying out various attacks on ports and ships and hidden mine laying.

The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea as much as possible, to expand and keep the captured territories of Ukrainian coastal regions.

 

The enemy has significantly increased its grouping and keeps 21 surface ships and boats at sea. They are located along the southwestern coast of Crimea. Two ships on patrol carry 16 Kalibr missiles.


Four combat ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which were in the port of Tartus (Syria) at the beginning of the aggression, continue to stay in the Mediterranean Sea due to Turkey's ban on their return (based on the Montreux Convention). These are the frigate (project 11356) "Admiral Hryhorovych", missile corvette (project 21631) "Orekhovo-Zuyevo" (both ships are carriers of Kalibr missiles), submarines (project 636.3) "Krasnodar" and "Novorossiysk" (the last made the transition to the Baltic Sea in October for repair).

 

In the Sea of Azov, the enemy continues to control sea communications, keeping one ship on combat duty.

 

Enemy aviation continues to fly from Crimean airfields Belbek and Gvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 17 combat aircraft from Belbek and Saky airfields were involved. The enemy monitors the waters adjacent to the grain corridor, thus keeping itself ready for the renewal of blockade actions of Ukrainian ports.

 

Russia has forbidden ships loaded outside its borders to pass through the Kerch Strait into the Sea of Azov. The reason for this decision is not specified. As reported in the Main Directorate of Maritime Affairs under the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure of Turkey: "According to the official notification we received from the Maritime Administration of the Russian Federation, the passage of vessels loaded outside the territory of the Russian Federation to the north through the Kerch Strait, which provides passage to the Sea of Azov, prohibited".

 

As experts previously noted, after the liberation of Kherson, the Armed Forces of Ukraine acquired a new zone of reach by HIMARS ammunition. This includes the Perekop Isthmus in Crimea and the entire Tavria steppe north of the peninsula. Perhaps the Russian Federation is preparing for the further advance of Ukrainian troops and hostilities, including in the Sea of Azov waters.

 

Grain initiative: as of the morning of November 12, 4 ships with 120,000 tons of agricultural products left the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdenny for the countries of Asia and Europe. Currently, 25 vessels are being processed in the ports of Greater Odesa. 741 thousand tons of Ukrainian agricultural products are loaded onto them. Yesterday, the ports of Great Odesa accepted 4 ships with 148,000 tons of agricultural products for loading. Currently, 7 vessels are moving along the "grain corridor", loading 198.2 thousand tons of agricultural products. In particular, the bulkers will export 40,000 tons of wheat for Ethiopia (BUZBURUN M) and 40,000 tons for Yemen and Afghanistan (GOKOVA M). Since September 1, 442 ships have left the ports of Great Odesa, exporting 10.3 million tons of Ukrainian food to the countries of Asia, Europe and Africa.

 

Meanwhile, negotiations between the UN and the Russian Federation regarding the grain agreement's continuation after its expiration on November 19 are ongoing in Geneva (Switzerland). Russia reiterated its desire for unimpeded access to world markets for its food and fertilizer exports at talks with UN officials in Geneva. The Russian Federation insists that its


economic interests are not considered during the agreement's implementation. Currently, there is no information about continuing the agreement between the UN and the Russian Federation.

 

 

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 12.11

Personnel (KIA)- almost 80,210 people (+810);

Tanks - 2,838 (+24)

Armored combat vehicles – 5,730 (+34);

Artillery systems – 1,829 (+12);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 393 (0); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 205 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 4,279 (+20); Aircraft - 278 (0);

Helicopters – 261 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,506 (+1); Intercepted cruise missiles - 399 (0);

Boats / ships - 16 (0).


 

International diplomatic aspect

"Ukraine is the party of peace in this conflict, and Russia is the party of war," National Security Advisor to POTUS Jake Sullivan said. "Russia invaded Ukraine. If Russia chose to stop fighting in Ukraine and left, it would be the end of the war. If Ukraine chose to stop fighting and give up, it would be the end of Ukraine." It was a reaction to media speculations that the Biden Administration is pushing President Zelenskyy for talks with Russia and possibly to cede territories as a "compromise."

 

After intriguing for too long, the Kremlin announced that Vladimir Putin wouldn't attend the G20 summit in Bali. Though he could have relied on welcome from the leaders of developing nations, his ego wouldn't bear their asking eyes why his war is so poorly run, and he has just lost his face with the Kherson retreat. He could have faced sharp criticism from the Western leaders, while there was a slim chance of Putin talking to the US President. He might have felt humiliated because other leaders wouldn't be willing to pose in the summit's family picture. Anyway, it's Sergey Lavrov who won't appear in the joint photo and will face the negative attitude his country deserves. The Western diplomats are going to ignore Russia's Foreign Minister while criticizing Russia and underlying its international isolation.

 

At the same time, Putin's junior partner Medvedev expressed his belief that "it is Russia today that is shaping the future world order and not the United States with Britain or "dark" Kyiv. And this new equal world order will be built." He thinks that Russia is "fighting" with NATO and the West alone. He went on to threaten with the "entire arsenal of possible means of destruction" of Ukraine or NATO or the West that Russia is fighting within his out-of-touch reality. And it hasn't been done yet "out of our [Russia's] inherent human kindness."


After flying from Moscow to Geneva and back for sixteen hours via the Black Sea (due to the closed skies of the EU) with no success in revising the "grain deal," Russia decided to impose new restrictions on the Kerch Strait passage. After the illegal annexation of Crimea, Russia seized control over the Kerch Strait, which allowed it to sail in and out of the Sea of Azov. Moscow has been impeding freedom of navigation in the Sea of Azov since 2018. Now, it banned the passage of cargo ships loaded in ports other than in Russia. It's a clearly discriminatory decision that runs against the requirements of international maritime law, including UNCLOS. Moreover, it makes transporting goods from the Azeri, Kazakh, and Turkmen ports in the Caspian Sea impossible.

 

Three former PwC partners decided to set up a new firm that will work for clients connected to Russia. "Kiteserve is fully independent of PwC Cyprus and is not a member of the PwC network," stated PwC Cyprus. The firm pulled out 20 of its 30 employees from PwC and about half of its clients. Claiming to cut all ties, the Kiteserve occupies the same premises that its "mother" company though physically "separated." How the new company will navigate the sanctions- charted territory remains to be seen.

 

"We will not supply lethal weapons to Ukraine," stated the South Korean Ministry of Defence after concluding an agreement with the US on providing artillery shells to the United States. It is still possible that the ROK ammunition would backfill US-made rounds that were and will be sent to Ukraine.

 

"When victory comes, it will be our joint success," Ukraine's Foreign Minister encouraged the Australian Prime Minister to assist in providing weapons for the UAF. Anthony Albanese said that his government would commit a further 30 Bushmasters, taking the total to 90.

 


Dmytro Kuleba couldn't be more right, saying it would be a shared victory over the aggressor. Ukraine's success in restoring its territorial integrity with international assistance, from defense aid to sanctions, is a bold message to China and smaller countries who might cherish ideas of forcefully annexing neighboring territories or waging aggressive wars. It would strengthen the rules-based world order Russia has been trying to undermine. And it's also true that Kherson was liberated with Ukrainian sacrifice, will, and determination backed by capabilities provided by the Western partners.

 

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3. U.S. intel report says key Gulf ally meddled in American politics


Excerpts:


The intelligence report is careful not to identify specific individuals, according to people who have read it, but it mentions several meetings and conversations involving U.S. and Emirati officials. One passage refers to a meeting of a senior U.S. and senior UAE official who commended each other for “single-handedly” salvaging the U.S.-UAE relationship. One person who read the report said it was an unmistakable reference to Otaiba.


When asked about the intelligence community’s findings, Otaiba said he has been “honored to be among a group of serious people with good intentions in both countries that have built a full and lasting partnership that has made the UAE, the U.S. and the region more secure, more prosperous, and more open-minded.”

Some U.S. lawmakers in both parties have proposed legislation to curb foreign influence in U.S. politics. A bill introduced last year by Rep. Katie Porter (D-Calif.) would prohibit political campaign committees from accepting money from lobbyists registered with a foreign country. Other reform proposals include increasing disclosure requirements, providing more resources to the Justice Department’s foreign influence unit and standardizing filing data, said Anna Massoglia, a foreign-influence expert at OpenSecrets, an organization that tracks political spending,

“While the U.S. does have some disclosure rules in place, there are still a number of loopholes that allow individuals to work on behalf of foreign interests in this country without disclosing their work,” Massoglia said.



U.S. intel report says key Gulf ally meddled in American politics

The Washington Post · by John Hudson · November 12, 2022

U.S. intelligence officials have compiled a classified report detailing extensive efforts to manipulate the American political system by the United Arab Emirates, an influential, oil-rich nation in the Persian Gulf long considered a close and trusted partner.

The activities covered in the report, described to The Washington Post by three people who have read it, include illegal and legal attempts to steer U.S. foreign policy in ways favorable to the Arab autocracy. It reveals the UAE’s bid, spanning multiple U.S. administrations, to exploit the vulnerabilities in American governance, including its reliance on campaign contributions, susceptibility to powerful lobbying firms and lax enforcement of disclosure laws intended to guard against interference by foreign governments, these people said. Each spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss classified information.

The document was compiled by the National Intelligence Council and briefed to top U.S. policymakers in recent weeks to guide their decision-making related to the Middle East and the UAE, which enjoys outsize influence in Washington. The report is remarkable in that it focuses on the influence operations of a friendly nation rather than an adversarial power such as Russia, China or Iran. It is also uncommon for a U.S. intelligence product to closely examine interactions involving U.S. officials given its mandate to focus on foreign threats.

“The U.S. intelligence community generally stays clear of anything that could be interpreted as studying American domestic politics,” said Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who served on the National Intelligence Council in the 1990s.

“Doing something like this on a friendly power is also unique. It’s a sign that the U.S. intelligence community is willing to take on new challenges,” he said.

Lauren Frost, a spokeswoman at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, declined to comment when asked about the report.

The UAE’s ambassador to Washington, Yousef Al Otaiba, said he is “proud of the UAE’s influence and good standing in the U.S.”

“It has been hard earned and well deserved. It is the product of decades of close UAE-US cooperation and effective diplomacy. It reflects common interests and shared values,” he said in a statement.

The relationship is unique. Over the years, the United States has agreed to sell the UAE some of its most sophisticated and lethal military equipment, including MQ-9 Predator drones and advanced F-35 fighter jets, a privilege not bestowed on any other Arab country over concern about diminishing Israel’s qualitative military edge.

Some of the influence operations described in the report are known to national security professionals, but such activities have flourished due to Washington’s unwillingness to reform foreign-influence laws or provide additional resources to the Department of Justice. Others activities more closely resemble espionage, people familiar with the report said.

The UAE has spent more than $154 million on lobbyists since 2016, according to Justice Department records. It has spent hundreds of millions of dollars more on donations to American universities and think tanks, many that produce policy papers with findings favorable to UAE interests.

There is no prohibition in the United States on lobbyists donating money to political campaigns. One U.S. lawmaker who read the intelligence report told The Post that it illustrates how American democracy is being distorted by foreign money, saying it should serve as a wake-up call.

“A very clear red line needs to be established against the UAE playing in American politics,” said the lawmaker. “I’m not convinced we’ve ever raised this with the Emiratis at a high level.”

Both the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the State Department declined to comment on whether they have addressed the issue with senior UAE counterparts.

The U.S. government’s muted public response follows President Biden’s impassioned pitch to midterm elections voters last week that American democracy is under threat from powerful interests and needs concerted safeguarding. “With democracy on the ballot, we have to remember these first principles: Democracy means the rule of the people — not the rule of monarchs or the moneyed, but the rule of the people,” Biden said during a speech in Washington.

The National Intelligence Council, or NIC, is the intelligence community’s premier analytic hub. Its products draw on information from the nation’s 18 intelligence agencies to speak with one voice on pressing national security issues.

People who shared information about the report declined to provide copy of it. They said the activities attributed to the UAE in the report go well beyond mere influence peddling.

One of the more brazen exploits involved the hiring of three former U.S. intelligence and military officials to help the UAE surveil dissidents, politicians, journalists and U.S. companies. In public legal filings, U.S. prosecutors said the men helped the UAE break into computers in the United States and other countries. Last year, all three admitted in court to providing sophisticated hacking technology to the UAE, agreeing to surrender their security clearances and pay about $1.7 million to resolve criminal charges. The Justice Department touted the settlement as a “first-of-its-kind resolution.”

It did not involve prison time, however, and critics viewed the financial penalty as paltry given the substantial payments received by the former U.S. officials for their work, raising concerns it did little to dissuade similar future behavior.

Those seeking reform also note the federal trial of Thomas Barrack, a longtime adviser to former president Donald Trump, who was acquitted this month of charges alleging he worked as an agent of the UAE and lied to federal investigators about it.

U.S. prosecutors accused Barrack of exploiting his access to Trump to benefit the UAE and working a secret back channel for communications that involved passing sensitive information to Emirati officials. The evidence introduced in court included thousands of messages, social media posts and flight records, as well as communications showing that Emirati officials provided him with talking points for media appearances in which he praised the UAE. After one such interview, Barrack emailed a contact saying “I nailed it … for the home team,” referring to the UAE.

Barrack, who never registered with the U.S. government to lobby for the Gulf state, vehemently denied the charges and prosecutors failed to convince a jury that his influence-peddling gave rise to crimes. An assistant of his, Matthew Grimes, was also acquitted. Barrack, though a spokesman, declined to comment.

The UAE is far from alone in using aggressive tactics to try to bend the U.S. political system to its liking. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel, Taiwan and scores of other governments run influence campaigns in the United States in an effort to impact U.S. policy.

But the intelligence community’s scrutiny of the UAE indicates a heightened level of concern and a dramatic departure from the laudatory way the country is discussed in public by U.S. secretaries of statedefense and presidents, who routinely emphasize the “importance of further deepening the U.S.-UAE strategic relationship.”

The UAE is a federation of sheikhdoms with more than 9 million people including the city-states of Abu Dhabi and Dubai.

Since 2012, it has been the third-biggest purchaser of U.S. weapons and built what many consider the most powerful military in the Arab world by cultivating close ties to the U.S. political, defense and military establishment.

The UAE’s armed forces have fought alongside U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. The country also hosts 5,000 U.S. military personnel at al-Dhafra Air Base and U.S. warships at the Jebel Ali deep-water port.

Boosters of the Gulf state in U.S. think tanks and military circles often hail it as “Little Sparta” for its military prowess while sidestepping its human rights record and ironclad kinship with Saudi Arabia.

There are no elections or political parties in the UAE, and no independent judiciary. Criticism of the government is banned, and trade unions and homosexuality are outlawed. Freedom House ranks the Gulf state among the least free countries in the world.

The stifling political environment stands in stark contrast to the country’s opulent cosmopolitan offerings, including the world’s tallest building, ski slopes inside a shopping mall and Ferrari World, a theme park inspired by the Italian sports car manufacturer. Its largest city, Dubai, is a tax-free business hub with glitzy five-star hotels, nightclubs and DJ concerts that feel incongruous to the nearby religious zeal of Saudi Arabia. In recent years, U.S. officials and independent watchdogs have warned that smuggling and money-laundering in the UAE have allowed criminals and militants to hide their wealth there.

Focus on the UAE’s role in Washington grew following the death of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey. The CIA concluded his killing was done at the behest of Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman, a revelation that caused Washington lobbying firms and think tanks to sever their financial ties to Riyadh. Though the UAE had no involvement, the crown prince’s status as a protege of Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the ruler of the United Arab Emirates known as MBZ, invited greater scrutiny.

“MBZ was a big part of the crowd who said the Saudi crown prince would be a reformer, make Saudi Arabia a more normal country, give women the right to vote — all of which crashed when Khashoggi was killed,” Riedel said.

Concerns about the UAE among human rights groups grew with its military involvement in the brutal war in Yemen, from which it has since withdrawn. The Gulf state also angered U.S. officials after the Defense Department’s watchdog said the UAE may have been financing the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary army close to the Kremlin that has been accused of atrocities in Libya, Ukraine and Africa. The UAE denies the charge.

Though the UAE has maintained strong bipartisan support in the United States, it cultivated a particularly close connection to the Trump administration, which approved the $23 billion sale of F-35s, MQ-9s and other munitions to the Gulf state. The transfer, which has faced resistance by congressional Democrats, has not moved forward yet but is supported by the Biden administration.

Last month, The Post revealed the UAE’s extensive courtship of retired high-ranking U.S. military personnel. The investigation showed that over the past seven years, 280 retired U.S. service members have worked as military contractors and consultants for the UAE, more than for any other country, and that the advisory jobs pay handsomely.

Instrumental to the UAE’s success in Washington has been Otaiba, an ambassador who has forged strong connections with powerful politicians and business leaders across the political spectrum.

The intelligence report is careful not to identify specific individuals, according to people who have read it, but it mentions several meetings and conversations involving U.S. and Emirati officials. One passage refers to a meeting of a senior U.S. and senior UAE official who commended each other for “single-handedly” salvaging the U.S.-UAE relationship. One person who read the report said it was an unmistakable reference to Otaiba.

When asked about the intelligence community’s findings, Otaiba said he has been “honored to be among a group of serious people with good intentions in both countries that have built a full and lasting partnership that has made the UAE, the U.S. and the region more secure, more prosperous, and more open-minded.”

Some U.S. lawmakers in both parties have proposed legislation to curb foreign influence in U.S. politics. A bill introduced last year by Rep. Katie Porter (D-Calif.) would prohibit political campaign committees from accepting money from lobbyists registered with a foreign country. Other reform proposals include increasing disclosure requirements, providing more resources to the Justice Department’s foreign influence unit and standardizing filing data, said Anna Massoglia, a foreign-influence expert at OpenSecrets, an organization that tracks political spending,

“While the U.S. does have some disclosure rules in place, there are still a number of loopholes that allow individuals to work on behalf of foreign interests in this country without disclosing their work,” Massoglia said.

The Washington Post · by John Hudson · November 12, 2022


4. In an Era of Confrontation, Biden and Xi Seek to Set Terms


I heard a report today where the President said they are going to determine what are the red lines. That is a good question. What are the red lines for each country? Obviously each has a different red line about Taiwan.


Following this meeting where will be on the spectrum of co-existence, cooperation, collaboration, competition, or conflict?




In an Era of Confrontation, Biden and Xi Seek to Set Terms

nytimes.com · by David E. Sanger · November 12, 2022

Their first in-person presidential meeting, coming after both warned of deepening military, economic and diplomatic rivalry, will show how they address a range of U.S.-China tensions.

President Biden in Egypt on Friday.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

Just weeks after President Biden and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, laid out competing visions of how the United States and China are vying for military, technological and political pre-eminence, their first face-to-face meeting as top leaders will test whether they can halt a downward spiral that has taken relations to the lowest level since President Nixon began the opening to Beijing half a century ago.

Their scheduled meeting Monday in Indonesia will take place months after China brandished its military potential to choke off Taiwan, and the United States imposed a series of export controls devised to hobble China’s ability to produce the most advanced computer chips — necessary for its newest military equipment and crucial to competing in sectors like artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

Compounding the tension is Beijing’s partnership with Moscow, which has remained steadfast even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet that relationship, denounced by the Biden administration, is so opaque that U.S. officials disagree on its true nature.

Whether it’s a partnership of convenience or a robust alliance, Beijing and Moscow share a growing interest in frustrating the American agenda, many in Washington believe. In turn, many in China see the combination of the U.S. export controls and NATO support for Ukraine as a foreshadowing of how Washington could try to contain China, and stymie its claims to Taiwan, a self-ruled island.

“This is in a sense the first superpower summit of the Cold War Version 2.0,” said Evan S. Medeiros, a Georgetown University professor who was President Obama’s top adviser on Asia-Pacific affairs. “Will both leaders discuss, even implicitly, the terms of coexistence amid competition? Or, by default, will they let loose the dogs of unconstrained rivalry?”

Tamping down expectations about the summit with Mr. Xi, American officials recently told reporters that they expected no joint statement on points of agreement to emerge. Still, Washington will dissect what Mr. Xi says publicly and privately, especially about Russia, Ukraine and Taiwan.

This month, Mr. Xi told the visiting German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, that China opposes “the threat or use of nuclear weapons,” an oblique but unusually public reproach to the Russian president Vladimir V. Putin’s saber rattling with tactical nuclear weapons.

If Mr. Xi cannot say something similar with an American president next to him, one senior administration official noted, it will be telling. China sees Russia as a vital counterweight to Western power, and Mr. Xi may hesitate to criticize Mr. Putin in front of Mr. Biden.

“If Putin used nuclear weapons, he would become the public enemy of humankind, opposed by all countries, including China,” said Hu Wei, a foreign policy scholar in Shanghai. But, he added, “If Putin falls, the United States and the West will then focus on strategic containment of China.”

For American officials, the Xi-Putin relationship is a topic of internal debate. Colin Kahl, the No. 3 official in the Pentagon, told reporters Tuesday that Chinese leaders have “been much more willing to signal that this thing is edging toward an alliance as opposed to just a superficial partnership.” Mr. Biden seems doubtful. “I don’t think there’s a lot of respect that China has for Russia or for Putin,” he said the next day.

Mr. Xi and Mr. Biden have talked on the phone five times in the past 18 months. This will be different: For the first time since assuming the presidency, Mr. Biden will “sit in the same room with Xi Jinping, be direct and straightforward with him as he always is, and expect the same in return from Xi,” Jake Sullivan, the National Security Adviser, said at a White House briefing Thursday.

More on the Relations Between Asia and the U.S.

“There just is no substitute for this kind of leader-to-leader communication in navigating and managing such a consequential relationship,” Mr. Sullivan said.

During the past three decades, trips by American presidents to Beijing and Chinese presidents to Washington became relatively commonplace. Testy exchanges over disputes were often balanced by promises to cooperate on areas of mutual interest, whether climate change or containing North Korea’s nuclear program. For now, it is hard to imagine a meeting taking place in either capital, especially with China still under heavy Covid controls.

Summits on neutral ground, like this one in Bali ahead of the Group of 20 meeting of leaders, have an increasingly Cold War feel: more about managing potential conflict than finding common ground. The rancorous distrust means that even short-term stabilization and cooperation on shared challenges, like stopping pandemics, could be fragile.

Neither side calls it a Cold War, a term evoking a world divided between Western and Soviet camps bristling with nuclear arsenals. And the differences are real between that era and this one, with its vast trade flows and technological commerce between China and Western powers.

The Apple iPhone and many other staples of American life are assembled almost entirely in China. Instead of trying to build a formal bloc of allies as the Soviets did, Beijing has sought to influence nations through major projects that create dependency, including wiring them with Chinese-made communications networks.

Even so, the declarations surrounding Mr. Xi’s appointment to a third term and Mr. Biden’s new national security, defense and nuclear strategies have described an era of growing global uncertainty heightened by competition — economic, military, technological, political — between their countries.

The anxieties have been magnified by China’s plans to expand and modernize its still relatively limited nuclear arsenal to one that could reach at least 1,000 warheads by 2030, according to the Pentagon. China sees threats in American-led security initiatives, including proposals to help build nuclear-powered submarines for Australia.

“It may not be the Cold War, with a capital C and capital W, as in a replay of the U.S.-Soviet experience,” Professor Medeiros said. But, he added, “because of China’s substantial capabilities and its global reach, this cold war will be more challenging in many ways than the previous one.”

The Biden administration last month issued extensive new restrictions on selling semiconductor technology to China, focusing on the multi-million dollar machines needed to make the chips with the smallest circuitry and the fastest speeds. It was a clear effort to slow China’s progress in one of the few technological areas where it is still playing catch up.

In a 48-page National Security Strategy document, Mr. Biden wrote that China “is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to advance that objective.” The U.S. National Defense Strategy paper, weeks later, declared that China “remains our most consequential strategic competitor for the coming decades.”

The stakes rose for the relationship after Mr. Xi, 69, secured a third five-year term as Communist Party leader in October, and set in place a resolutely loyal leadership lineup likely to keep him in power even longer than that. At the party congress that crowned Mr. Xi, he warned of an increasingly perilous world, where unnamed foes — implicitly, the United States and allies — were trying to “blackmail, contain, blockade, and exert maximum pressure on China.”

Since then, Mr. Xi and his officials have repeated similar warnings. Wearing camouflage to visit a People’s Liberation Army command center, Mr. Xi told China’s military to steel for the intensifying challenges. “Hostile forces” were bent on blocking China’s rise, Ding Xuexiang, a top aide to Mr. Xi, wrote in People’s Daily, the party’s main newspaper.

“The United States regards our country as its main strategic rival and most severe long-term challenge, and is doing its utmost to contain us and beat us down,” said an article in Guangming Daily, another prominent party-run newspaper.

Mr. Xi’s speech to the congress last month suggested that his assessment of international trends has grown bleaker. That shift may reflect worries about the repercussions of the war in Ukraine, and vanished hopes that Mr. Biden would take a milder approach to China than the Trump administration did.

The Biden administration’s support for Taiwan has become a sore point.

In early August, China launched menacing military drills around Taiwan after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island as a show of support. Mr. Biden has suggested that the United States would support Taiwan militarily if China attempted to take it by force, firmer wording than Washington’s formal position. Each time he has talked about direct involvement in Taiwan’s defense, his aides have rushed to assure that policy has not changed, while not disputing Mr. Biden has made it less ambiguous.

“The difference between Biden and Trump is that Trump wanted to fight China single-handed,” said Mr. Hu, the foreign policy scholar. By contrast, he said, Mr. Biden “has attached particular importance to alliances in strategic competition with China.”

Mr. Sullivan, the national security adviser, indicated that the Biden administration would brief Taiwan on the results of the Xi meeting.

Despite their differences, Mr. Biden and Mr. Xi want to avoid pent-up tensions exploding into a crisis that could wreak economic havoc.

“I’ve told him: I’m looking for competition, not — not conflict,” Mr. Biden told reporters at the White House on Wednesday about his relationship with Mr. Xi. Their ties go back more than a decade, to when both were vice presidents.

Mr. Biden said that he and Mr. Xi may discuss “what he believes to be in the critical national interests of China, what I know to be the critical interests of the United States, and to determine whether or not they conflict with one another. And if they do, how to resolve it and how to work it out.”

Ahead of the meeting, Mr. Xi has also put on a somewhat friendlier demeanor.

He told the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations that he wants to “find the right way to get along.” Zhao Lijian, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, repeated that point at a regular briefing on Friday, and said Beijing would defend its “sovereignty, security and development interests,” while adding that “the U.S. and China should move toward each other, managing and controlling disagreements in a proper way and promoting mutually beneficial cooperation.”

Mr. Xi wants to put China’s growth back on track after heavy blows from Covid restrictions and problems in the housing market. He also wants to prevent tighter rules on purchases of high-end technology, which could spook investors and slow his plans for upgrading the economy.

Mr. Xi is “preparing for a spectrum of tensions and conflict, but China is not going to fix all the vulnerabilities in its system — in the financial sector, exposure to the U.S. dollar system, exposure to tech dependencies — in just a few years,” said Andrew Small, author of “No Limits: The Inside Story of China’s War With the West.”

He added, “They want to prevent this from sliding too far and too fast, and this may be a moment to explore whether they can stabilize things.”

nytimes.com · by David E. Sanger · November 12, 2022



5. China wants to mend ties with the U.S. But it won’t make the first move.


Excerpts:


When Biden first took office, China signaled a degree of willingness to work with the United States on areas of shared interest while both tried to minimize differences. But the approach has largely failed, with Beijing suspending or canceling military-to-military talks, anti-narcotics cooperation and climate change discussions in retribution for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August.
“On the U.S. side, it’s all about crisis communications. How do we prevent a worst-case scenario? Whereas on the Chinese side, the way to responsibly manage the competition is to reach an agreement on basic principles,” said Rorry Daniels, managing director of the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York.
Some Chinese scholars, Daniels added, had even raised the idea of trying to produce a joint communique such as the three foundational documents that shaped the nations’ dealings with each other in the 1970s and 1980s.
“China is really probing for a north star to point to and say ‘This is the nature of the relationship,’” she said. “But the U.S. isn’t approaching China with the same mind-set.”
report released in May by Renmin University of China offered three possibilities for future ties between the countries. The best case was simmering tension and fierce competition. The middle scenario was technological, economic and cultural decoupling.
The last was all-out nuclear war.


China wants to mend ties with the U.S. But it won’t make the first move.

By Christian Shepherd and Lyric Li 

November 13, 2022 at 1:00 a.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Christian Shepherd · November 13, 2022

An American policy wonk in China rarely receives the attention paid last month to Scott Kennedy, the first U.S. scholar to visit since Beijing’s strict coronavirus travel restrictions began over two years ago.

For Kennedy, an expert on Chinese business and economy at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank, it was intended as an icebreaker trip. But the tenor of his meetings with more than 100 academics, businesses and officials, including Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng, surprised him.

Their interest in dialogue was in part to make clear the country’s apprehension over its strained relationship with the United States. “There is significant concern in Beijing about U.S. motives. They see Washington as having a deep-seated fear of any rivals,” Kennedy said after returning home. “From their perspective, the ball is in the U.S. court.”

President Biden intends to use his Monday meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the Group of 20 summit in Bali to establish a “floor” for the relationship. China, too, has signaled it wants to put ties back on track after several years of fierce disagreements over trade, technology and human rights. But for Beijing, doing so is not about agreeing to disagree or working out how to avoid the worst-case scenario of outright conflict.

Since being reconfirmed as paramount leader last month, Xi is more focused than ever on China becoming a modern socialist superpower with global influence — a status he expects the United States to accept. Chinese experts say that fixing the relationship will require more than a show of goodwill from the United States. It will take agreement on fundamental aspects of the relationship, including the fate of Taiwan, the self-governed, democratic island of 23 million that Beijing claims as part of its territory.

“The United States thinks that so long as there is no conflict or crisis in relations, then that’s fine. But China wants to see evidence of progress, especially when it comes to Taiwan,” said Wu Xinbo, dean of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai.

Yet Xi’s determination to take control of the island, by force if necessary, has only grown in response to American efforts to shore up Taiwanese defenses in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

After back-to-back pandemic years of minimal in-person contact, with many government channels canceled, suspended or lapsed, unofficial dialogues have been among the few tools left to keep the two sides from continuing to talk past each other. Well-known Chinese scholars have begun traveling to the United States in recent months, and they have invited American counterparts to do the same in reverse.

“If we can revive communication mechanisms, then in the future we won’t have to overly rely on top leaders meeting,” Wu noted.

That state media hailed this uptick in exchanges as a sign of easing tensions reveals just how bad things are. Sixteen months ago, Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented lists of complaints and demands to U.S. diplomats in Tianjin. China made clear the United States would need to make the first move, and it had three bottom-line requirements: no attempts to undermine China’s development, no challenges to its political system and no “harm” to its sovereignty claims on Taiwan, Hong Kong and the South China Sea.

Beijing’s position hasn’t changed since then. What has changed, however, is Xi’s degree of control at home and concern about the state of the world. At the recently concluded 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, where his rule was extended for at least another five years, Xi stacked the top leadership with loyal lieutenants and warned of “dangerous storms” undermining China’s rise.

Some in China argue that Biden is too constrained domestically to make lasting agreements or truly improve ties.

“Beijing thinks that White House control over the Taiwan issue is decreasing, because Congress has grabbed the wheel,” said Zhao Minghao, a professor at the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. “Biden faces a divided government after the midterms, which has escalated the risks of China and the U.S. falling into open hostilities over Taiwan.”

Chinese leaders are especially concerned about Biden’s efforts to rally allies. In a response to Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s speech on China policy in May — in which he called the country “the most serious long-term challenge to the international order” — the Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the United States of attempting to create an Asian-Pacific version of NATO with Australia, Japan and Korea to “disrupt security and stability” in the region.

Though the relationship began deteriorating during the Trump administration, Zheng Yongnian, an influential scholar at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, said its decline has become more substantive under Biden. The president has “weaponized and politicized” trade rather than merely try to slow China’s economic and technology development, Zheng said.

When Biden first took office, China signaled a degree of willingness to work with the United States on areas of shared interest while both tried to minimize differences. But the approach has largely failed, with Beijing suspending or canceling military-to-military talks, anti-narcotics cooperation and climate change discussions in retribution for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August.

“On the U.S. side, it’s all about crisis communications. How do we prevent a worst-case scenario? Whereas on the Chinese side, the way to responsibly manage the competition is to reach an agreement on basic principles,” said Rorry Daniels, managing director of the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York.

Some Chinese scholars, Daniels added, had even raised the idea of trying to produce a joint communique such as the three foundational documents that shaped the nations’ dealings with each other in the 1970s and 1980s.

“China is really probing for a north star to point to and say ‘This is the nature of the relationship,’” she said. “But the U.S. isn’t approaching China with the same mind-set.”

report released in May by Renmin University of China offered three possibilities for future ties between the countries. The best case was simmering tension and fierce competition. The middle scenario was technological, economic and cultural decoupling.

The last was all-out nuclear war.

The Washington Post · by Christian Shepherd · November 13, 2022


6. Here's what's at stake in Monday's meeting between Biden and China's Xi Jinping



Here's what's at stake in Monday's meeting between Biden and China's Xi Jinping

NPR · by John Ruwitch · November 12, 2022


Left: U.S. President Joe Biden takes questions from reporters after he delivered remarks in the State Dining Room at the White House in Washington, DC on Wednesday. Right: Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Grand Hall in Beijing while welcoming German Chancelor Olaf Scholz on Nov. 4. Left: Samuel Corum/Getty Images, Right: Kay Nietfeld/Pool/AFP

There's a great deal of Taiwan sympathy among the Republican hawks, so that's what I really feel very, very afraid of.
Zhu Feng, Nanjing University professor
... the lack of travel, the lack of direct communication, makes solving those problems almost impossible.
Scott Kennedy, China expert at CSIS

SHANGHAI — The rare face-to-face meeting between the leaders of the world's two largest economies will take place during what some are calling the first global summit of the second Cold War.

On Monday, President Joe Biden will sit down for talks with Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, on the sidelines of the Group of 20 meeting in Indonesia.

The last time a U.S. president shook hands with the leader of China was more than three years ago. Donald Trump was in the White House, the COVID-19 pandemic was months away and relations between Beijing and Washington, while experiencing friction over trade, were on much firmer ground.

Today, trust is running low, the rhetoric is increasingly antagonistic and disputes continue to fester in areas including trade, technology, security and ideology.

Whether Biden and Xi can find any common ground in Bali is a huge question — and a reflection of the current state of relations.


Chinese President Xi Jinping and his new Politburo Standing Committee members arrive for a group photo at The Great Hall of People in Beijing on Oct. 23. Kevin Frayer/Getty Images

Expectations are low in the U.S.

"There's not going to be a joint statement of any sort here. This is really not a meeting that's being driven by deliverables," a senior U.S. administration official told reporters this week. "The president believes it is critical to build a floor for the relationship and ensure that there are rules of the road that bound our competition."


The two leaders have talked by phone several times since Biden took office last year, but they have been unable to reverse — or even slow — the downward slide in ties between the world's two largest economies.

"I don't think one meeting is going to rescue or really even redefine the relationship," says Evan Medeiros, a professor at Georgetown University and former White House China advisor. "If they're lucky, if it goes well, maybe they can bend the trajectory a little bit."

Biden said on Wednesday his goal for the meeting is to get a deeper understanding of Xi's priorities and concerns, and "lay out what each of our red lines are."


President Biden meets with China's President Xi Jinping from the White House during a virtual summit on Nov. 15, 2021. Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images

Washington will be less flexible on Taiwan after the midterms

For China, there is no bigger issue than Taiwan. Beijing considers the self-governed island a part of China, and has vowed to unite it politically with the mainland — but it sees the U.S. as standing in the way.

"Those who play with fire will perish by it. It is hoped that the U.S. will be clear-eyed about this," Xi warned Biden over the summer, when the two leaders met virtually.

And in October, the Communist Party chief again reiterated that China's preference would be for "peaceful reunification" but repeated that the use of force remains an option.


Tensions spiked when House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August. Beijing responded with sanctions and large-scale military exercises around the island.


House Speaker Nancy Pelosi speaks with Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen after arriving at the president's office in Taipei on Aug. 3. Chien Chih-Hung/Office of The President/Getty Images

Biden will likely seek to reassure Xi that Washington's long-standing policy regarding Taiwan has not changed, and that the United States does not support Taiwan independence. Analysts say Xi is likely to remain skeptical — particularly with the Republican Party projected to take control of at least the House of Representatives following the midterm elections.

"I think the Biden administration will be less flexible or maneuverable" on China, says Zhu Feng, a professor of international relations at Nanjing University.

Changes in the U.S. Congress may complicate matters, he says.

"There's a great deal of Taiwan sympathy among the Republican hawks, so that's what I really feel very, very afraid of," he says.

House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy has said he would like to visit Taiwan if he becomes majority leader. Such a move could be disastrous, warns another Chinese expert on international relations.

"When Pelosi went, the Chinese lost face. Next time, maybe they will just take action," says a Chinese expert on international affairs, who declined to be identified because he was not authorized by his university to speak to the media.

Cold War 2.0?

Biden's foreign policy has centered on countering perceived threats posed by China. The latest salvo came in early October, when the administration imposed export controls that prohibit the sale to China of cutting-edge microchips and the equipment used to make them.

Some hear echoes in this move of America's policy from half a century ago toward Moscow.


An employee inspects integrated circuit boards at the Smart Pioneer Electronics Co. factory in Suzhou, China, on Sept. 23. Qilai Shen/Bloomberg/Getty Images

"Throughout the Cold War, there were a series of really tough export controls imposed on the Soviet Union by the U.S.," says Chris Miller, author of the recently published Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology. "There's really a lot of similarities, to be honest."

The U.S. says the latest export controls are designed to keep key technologies out of the hands of China's military and security agencies, but experts say they will have a broader impact.

"I think it's pretty clear that the controls kept the Soviet Union substantially further behind than it otherwise would have been," says Miller.

In China's case, enforcing the restrictions could be difficult, though. Microchips are small and easy to smuggle across borders. Also, total enforcement would require other countries that are part of the complex semiconductors supply chain to be on board, and that's a work in progress.

Beijing has voiced opposition to the move — and officials regularly decry what they call Washington's "Cold War zero-sum mentality." China has yet to take action in response, though. Analysts say that may be because the controls were announced at an awkward time for Chinese policy makers, days before a leadership reshuffle at the twice-a-decade Communist Party Congress.

A possible window of opportunity

If Biden and Xi can muster the political will, experts think the Bali meeting could realistically yield a commitment to opening more channels of communication.

In the wake of the Pelosi visit, Beijing cut three channels of dialogue and suspended cooperation in five other areas, including climate change. That came on top of already sharply curtailed contact between China and the United States.

The lack of communication is a serious and dangerous problem, says Scott Kennedy, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Kennedy visited China this fall and claims he is "the only think tanker from Washington that's been to China since the outbreak of the pandemic."

Under its controversial "dynamic zero" COVID policy, Beijing has effectively closed its borders to try to keep the virus out.


Tourists look on as a Chinese military helicopter flies past Pingtan Island, one of mainland China's closest points to Taiwan, in Fujian province on Aug. 4, ahead of Chinese military drills off Taiwan following House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to the self-ruled island. Hector Retamal/AFP/Getty Images

"With China, whether it's on Taiwan or interdependence in technology or our views of the international order — those have all been there. What divides us, has divided us for a while," Kennedy says. "But the lack of travel, the lack of direct communication, makes solving those problems almost impossible."

There is a window of opportunity "to take a little bit of a gamble," he believes, now that China's Party Congress and the U.S. midterm elections are over.

"It is an opportunity to focus on the strategic elements of the relationship without domestic politics hanging over every sentence," he says.

The leaders might consider expanding conversations about economics and trade, he suggests, or move toward the resumption of more normal travel.

But Zhu warns that nobody should expect too much from this summit. A sincere discussion may help deepen understanding between the two leaders, he says — but that's it.

"I think maybe there will be some sort of, at a maximum, common ground where some sort of understanding could widen," he says.

Medeiros, the former U.S. official, says the current moment is dangerous — and in some ways, similar to the 1950s and early 1960s, when mistrust grew between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and they each "tested and probed" each others' boundaries.

"After the Cuban Missile Crisis, both sides, because of that incredibly searing experience, internalized the belief that strategic restraint, often institutionalized through things like arms control agreements, was in their mutual interests," he says.

But now, he says, "There is no such consensus between Washington and Beijing."

NPR · by John Ruwitch · November 12, 2022


7. Opinion | In a VA hospital hallway, one last ritual works its power


Powerful.


Opinion | In a VA hospital hallway, one last ritual works its power

The Washington Post · by Lauren Koshere · November 10, 2022

Voices Across America

Opinion In a VA hospital hallway, one last ritual works its power

By

November 10, 2022 at 7:00 a.m. EST

Lauren Koshere is a writer who works in food service at William S. Middleton Memorial Veterans Hospital in Madison, Wis., and volunteers for Veterans Affairs’ “My Life, My Story” program.

MADISON, Wis. — Final Salutes don’t come with much notice, maybe five minutes. But even those of us in chronically understaffed departments can attend. I join a river of co-workers flowing toward Ward 1B: nurses in turquoise scrubs, doctors in white coats, executives in business suits, police in uniform and me in a hairnet and black polyester polo — “VA Food Service” embroidered over the heart — but without my usual stainless-steel tray cart.

Most of us working in Veterans Affairs hospitals are not veterans. But the nurse standing across from me, in a hall lined with people, must be a veteran: She knows exactly how to stand with respect for a memorial service. I try to copy her posture, feet shoulders-width apart, hands joined behind my back.

No one speaks. Then the quiet is broken by a single resonant tone. Five seconds of silence. Then another tone. A nurse carrying a brass singing bowl and wooden mallet appears from the hospice unit. She strikes the bowl again. Behind her, another nurse escorts a morgue cart draped in an American flag.

I think of a hospice patient I’ve been bringing meals to for weeks. He was born in the late 1940s. Every day, his thin form lies at the same angle under a faded Green Bay Packers blanket.

Until a hot day in July, we had never spoken — I suspected he couldn’t — but he always nodded and made eye contact when I set down his dinner tray. On this day, I pointed to a cup of chocolate ice cream he had ordered. “It’s a good day for ice cream.”

He surprised me by replying, “Every day is a good day for ice cream.”

The gurney comes into full view, and I now see a black baseball cap with a yellow, red and green Vietnam veterans badge resting on the flag.

When the procession stops, people remove their hats. Veterans salute, and hold it, while the rest of us raise our hands to our hearts. The first notes of a “Taps” recording fill the hallway, and we are locked in stillness.

I think of a cold sunny March morning in Wausau, Wis., when we buried my Grandpa Clem, a World War II Navy veteran. My vision blurs as the song continues, and I wonder how many other funerals are being remembered in this hallway. I hear soft, deep sighs and a few sniffles.

The procession resumes, and I see an elderly man trailing the gurney. A relative or friend; his shoulder sags under the weight of a bag the hospital uses for patients’ belongings.

As the flag-draped gurney passes on its way to the morgue, I realize it isn’t every day that I’m this close to the sharply defined red, white and blue. Working with veterans reminds me of what millions have invested for the idea of that flag. But it also reminds me of what that flag has asked, has taken. There’s a profound promise in those colors, yet the Vietnam veterans hat speaks of all there is to question.

In a series of conversations with Bill Moyers for the 1988 PBS series “The Power of Myth,” the writer Joseph Campbell said, “Affirmation is difficult. We always affirm with conditions.” But “affirming it the way it is — that’s the hard thing, and that is what rituals are about.”

To affirm unconditionally. To affirm the way it is. Ritual asks us to suspend our noise and our opinions and our egos. For a few moments of sacred silence, we affirm, creating the space where ritual works its power: weaving the personal to the anonymous, the individual to the universal, the known to the unknown.

During a Final Salute, the deceased veteran’s identity is not disclosed.

I learn later that VA ceremonies for veterans who have died vary from place to place. And they don’t happen at every hospital. There’s a saying: “If you’ve been to one VA, you’ve been to one VA.” This is just the ritual at our facility, one of about 140 VA hospitals, among more than 1,300 VA care sites.

The Final Salute on this day has gathered strangers in honor of a stranger. I don’t know whose loved one walks behind the gurney. I don’t know who lies under the Vietnam veterans hat, the American flag. But I did know a veteran who liked the Packers and chocolate ice cream.

I never saw him again.

The Washington Post · by Lauren Koshere · November 10, 2022


8. Ukraine war, tensions with China loom over big Bali summit


Excerpts:

This year’s event is bracketed by the United Nations climate conference in Egypt and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in Cambodia, which Biden and some other G-20 leaders are attending, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Thailand right afterward.
The American president vowed to work with Southeast Asian nations on Saturday, saying “we’re going to build a better future that we all want to see” in a region where China is working to grow its influence. On Sunday, Biden huddled with the leaders of Japan and South Korea to discuss China and the threat from North Korea.
One question hanging over the Bali summit is whether Russia will agree to extend the U.N. Black Sea Grain Initiative, which is up for renewal Nov. 19.


Ukraine war, tensions with China loom over big Bali summit

AP · by ADAM SCHRECK and ELAINE KURTENBACH · November 13, 2022

NUSA DUA, Indonesia (AP) — A showdown between Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin isn’t happening, but fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and growing tensions between China and the West will be at the fore when leaders of the world’s biggest economies gather in tropical Bali this week.

The Group of 20 members begin talks on the Indonesian resort island Tuesday under the hopeful theme of “recover together, recover stronger.” While Putin is staying away, Biden will meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping and get to know new British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and Italy’s Giorgia Meloni.

The summit’s official priorities of health, sustainable energy and digital transformation are likely to be overshadowed by fears of a sputtering global economy and geopolitical tensions centered on the war in Ukraine.

The nearly 9-month-old conflict has disrupted trade in oil, natural gas and grain, and shifted much of the summit’s focus to food and energy security.

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The U.S. and allies in Europe and Asia, meanwhile, increasingly are squaring off against a more assertive China, leaving emerging G-20 economies like India, Brazil and host Indonesia to walk a tightrope between bigger powers.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo has tried to bridge rifts within the G-20 over the war in Ukraine. Widodo, also known as Jokowi, became the first Asian leader since the invasion to visit both Russia and Ukraine in the summer.

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Russia's Putin won't attend upcoming G-20 summit in Bali

He invited President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine, not a G-20 member, to join the summit. Zelenskyy is expected to participate online.

“One of the priorities for Jokowi is to ease the tension of war and geopolitical risk,” said Bhima Yudhistira, director of the Center of Economic and Law Studies in Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta.

Last year’s G-20 summit in Rome was the first in-person gathering of members since the pandemic, though the leaders of Russia and China didn’t attend.

This year’s event is bracketed by the United Nations climate conference in Egypt and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in Cambodia, which Biden and some other G-20 leaders are attending, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Thailand right afterward.

The American president vowed to work with Southeast Asian nations on Saturday, saying “we’re going to build a better future that we all want to see” in a region where China is working to grow its influence. On Sunday, Biden huddled with the leaders of Japan and South Korea to discuss China and the threat from North Korea.

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One question hanging over the Bali summit is whether Russia will agree to extend the U.N. Black Sea Grain Initiative, which is up for renewal Nov. 19.

The July deal allowed major global grain producer Ukraine to resume exports from ports that had been largely blocked for months because of the war. Russia briefly pulled out of the deal late last month only to rejoin it days later.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba on Saturday called for more pressure on Russia to extend the deal, saying Moscow must “stop playing hunger games with the world.”

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As leaders contend with conflicts and geopolitical tensions, they face the risk that efforts to tame inflation will extinguish post-pandemic recoveries or cause debilitating financial crises.

The war’s repercussions are being felt from the remotest villages of Asia and Africa to the most modern industries. It has amplified disruptions to energy supplies, shipping and food security, pushing prices sharply higher and complicating efforts to stabilize the world economy after the upheavals of the pandemic.

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres is urging the G-20 to provide financial help for the developing world.

“My priority in Bali will be to speak up for countries in the Global South that have been battered by the COVID-19 pandemic and the climate emergency, and now face crises in food, energy and finance — exacerbated by the war in Ukraine and crushing debt,” Guterres said.

The International Monetary Fund is forecasting 2.7% global growth in 2023, while private sector economists’ estimates are as low as 1.5%, down from about 3% this year, the slowest growth since the oil crisis of the early 1980s.

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China has remained somewhat insulated from soaring inflation, mainly because it is struggling to reverse an economic slump that is weighing on global growth.

The Chinese economy, the world’s second largest, grew at a 3.9% pace in the latest quarter. But economists say activity is slowing under the pressure of pandemic controls, a crackdown on technology companies and a downturn in the real estate sector.

Forecasters have cut estimates of China’s annual economic growth to as low as 3%. That would be less than half of last year’s 8.1% and the second lowest in decades.

Chinese President Xi will be coming to the summit emboldened by his appointment to an unusual third term as party chairman, making him China’s strongest leader in decades. It’s only his second foreign trip since early 2020, following a visit to Central Asia where he met Putin in September.

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Biden and Xi will hold their first in-person meeting since Biden became president in January 2021 on the event’s sidelines Monday.

The U.S. is at odds with China over a host of issues, including human rightstechnology and the future of the self-ruled island of Taiwan. The U.S. sees China as its biggest global competitor, and that rivalry is only likely to grow as Beijing seeks to expand its influence in the years to come.

The European Union is also reassessing its relationship with China as it seeks to reduce its trade dependency on the country.

Biden said he plans to talk with Xi about topics including Taiwan, trade policies and Beijing’s relationship with Russia.

“What I want to do ... is lay out what each of our red lines are,” Biden said last week.

Many developing economies are caught between fighting inflation and trying to nurse along recoveries from the pandemic. Host Indonesia’s economy grew at a 5.7% pace in the last quarter, one of the fastest among G-20 nations.

But growth among resource exporters like Indonesia is forecast to cool as falling prices for oil, coal and other commodities end windfalls from the past year’s price boom.

At a time when many countries are struggling to afford imports of oil, gas and food while also meeting debt repayments, pressure is building on those most vulnerable to climate change to double down on shifting to more sustainable energy supplies.

In Bali, the talks are also expected to focus on finding ways to hasten the transition away from coal and other fossil fuels.

The G-20 was founded in 1999 originally as a forum to address economic challenges. It includes Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. Spain holds a permanent guest seat.

Some observers of the bloc, like Josh Lipsky, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, question whether the G-20 can even function as geopolitical rifts grow.

“I’m skeptical that it can survive long-term in its current format,” he said in a briefing last week.

That makes things especially tough on host Indonesia.

“This is not the G-20 they signed up for,” Lipsky said. “The last thing they wanted was to be in the middle of this geopolitical fight, this war in Europe, and be the crossroads of it. But that’s where they are.”

___

Associated Press writer Joe McDonald in Beijing contributed to this report.

AP · by ADAM SCHRECK and ELAINE KURTENBACH · November 13, 2022


9. After Kherson success, Kyiv vows to keep driving out Russia



​Reinforce success but beware of Russian deception.


After Kherson success, Kyiv vows to keep driving out Russia

AP · by SAM MEDNICK and JOHN LEICESTER · November 13, 2022

MYKOLAIV, Ukraine (AP) — Ukraine’s president vowed to keep pushing Russian forces out of his country after they withdrew from Kherson, leaving behind devastation, hunger and booby traps in the southern Ukrainian city.

The Russian retreat from Kherson marked a triumphant milestone in Ukraine’s pushback against Moscow’s invasion almost nine months ago. Kherson residents hugged and kissed the arriving Ukrainian troops in rapturous scenes.

“We will see many more such greetings” of Ukrainian soldiers liberating Russian-held territory,” President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in his nightly video address Saturday.

He pledged to the people in Ukrainian cities and villages that are still under occupation: “We don’t forget anyone; we won’t leave anyone.”

Ukraine’s retaking of Kherson was a significant setback for the Kremlin and the latest in a series of battlefield embarrassments. It came some six weeks after Russian President Vladimir Putin annexed the Kherson region and three other provinces in southern and eastern Ukraine — in breach of international law — and declared them Russian territory.

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The U.S. embassy in Kyiv tweeted comments Sunday by National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, who described the turnaround in Kherson as “an extraordinary victory” for Ukraine and “quite a remarkable thing.”

Russia-Ukraine war

Ukrainian police, TV broadcasts return to long-occupied city

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Zelenskyy says Ukrainian special military units in Kherson

EXPLAINER: How important is a Russian retreat from Kherson?

The reversal came despite Putin’s recent partial mobilization of reservists, raising available troop numbers by some 300,000. That has been hard for the Russian military to digest.

“Russian military leadership is trying and largely failing to integrate combat forces drawn from many different organizations and of many different types and levels of skill and equipment into a more cohesive fighting force in Ukraine,” the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War, a think tank that tracks the conflict, commented.

British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace said the Kremlin will be “worried” by the loss of Kherson but warned against underestimating Moscow. “If they need more cannon fodder, that is what they’ll be doing,” he said.

Driving toward Kherson from the Mykolaiv region, AP reporters saw downed electrical lines, used projectile casings and the decomposed carcass of a cow. Several destroyed tanks lined the muddy road.

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As Ukrainian forces on Sunday consolidated their hold on Kherson, authorities contemplated the daunting task of clearing out explosive devices and restoring basic public services in the city.

One Ukrainian official described the situation in Kherson as “a humanitarian catastrophe.” The remaining residents in the city are said to lack water, medicine and food. There are shortages of key basics such as bread because of a lack of electricity.

Ukrainian police called on residents to help identify collaborators with Russian forces during the eight-month occupation. Ukrainian police officers returned to the city Saturday, along with public broadcasting services, following the departure of Russian troops.

The national police chief of Ukraine, Ihor Klymenko, said Saturday on Facebook that about 200 officers were at work in the city, setting up checkpoints and documenting evidence of possible war crimes.

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In what could perhaps be the next district to fall in Ukraine’s march on territory illegally annexed by Moscow, the Russian-appointed administration of the Kakhovka district, east of Kherson city, announced Saturday it was evacuating its employees.

“Today, the administration is the number one target for Ukrainian attacks,” said the Moscow-installed leader of Kakhovka, Pavel Filipchuk.

“Therefore, by order of the government of the Kherson region, we, as an authority, are moving to a safer territory, from where we will lead the district,” he wrote on Telegram.

Kakhovka is located on the left bank of the River Dnieper, upstream of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station.

The deputy head of Ukraine’s presidential office, Kyrylo Tymoshenko, said six people died on Saturday as a result of Russian shelling.

Writing on Telegram on Sunday, he said four people were killed and one wounded in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region, two were killed in the Kherson region, and two wounded in the central Dnipropetrovsk region.

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In Kherson, photos on social media Saturday showed Ukrainian activists removing memorial plaques put up by the occupation authorities. A Telegram post by Yellow Ribbon, the Ukrainian resistance movement in the occupied regions, showed two people in a park taking down plaques picturing Soviet-era military figures.

Moscow’s announcement that Russian forces were withdrawing across the Dnieper River, which divides both the Kherson region and Ukraine as a whole, followed a stepped-up Ukrainian counteroffensive in the country’s south. In the past two months, Ukraine’s military claimed to have retaken dozens of towns and villages north of the city of Kherson, and the military said that’s where stabilization activities were taking place.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba sought to temper the excitement over the Russian retreat from Kherson.

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“We are winning battles on the ground, but the war continues,” he said from Cambodia, where he was attending a summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told journalists Sunday that a joint statement on the results of the summit was not adopted, since “the American side and its partners insisted on an unacceptable assessment of the situation in Ukraine and around it.”

The Kremlin is angered by the support Ukraine receives from its Western allies, including the United States.

___

Leicester reported from Kyiv, Ukraine.

___

Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine


AP · by SAM MEDNICK and JOHN LEICESTER · November 13, 2022




10. Inside The Iranian Regime’s Propaganda Machine



For the PSYOP professionals.


Inside The Iranian Regime’s Propaganda Machine

iranwire.com · by Ehsan Mehrabi

In the 1990s, the so-called principalists and associates of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei controlled few media outlets besides the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). But by the early 2000s, they founded several newspapers and news agencies while reformist papers were being suspended. And, in the 2010s, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its affiliates established various agencies to expand its propaganda activities to social media in what became known as the IRGC’s “cyberarmy.”

These media outlets, however, play different roles and have different levels of influence. Some principalist papers such as Resalat and Javan have lost their influence among the public, but they are still being published for their own dedicated audiences.

With the 2021 election of Ebrahim Raisi as president that has homogenized the ruling establishment, Khamenei’s supporters have also taken control of media outlets such as the Iran and Hamshahri newspapers and news agencies like the Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency (ISRA) and Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), which previously were at times under the control of the reformists.

Ettela’at and Islamic Republic are the only newspapers affiliated with the ruling establishment that are controlled by the so-called moderates or supporters of late President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani but they are considered harmless by Khamenei’s supporters.

IRIB, The Regime’s Main Propaganda Tool

With its reach and the variety of its audiences, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting is the main cog in the Islamic Republic’s propaganda machine. The end of the eight-year Iran-Iran war in the 1980s allowed the regime to allocate more financial resources to expand state-run radio and television networks, which currently consist of some 20 national TV channels, 20 foreign-language TV channels, 31 provincial TV channels and around 20 radio channels.

From the mid-2000s, a number of TV programs were dedicated to fighting the opposition. One of them was “20:30,” which initially attracted a wide audience because it broadcast news that other new programs usually ignored, it had young and articulate presenters such as Kamran Najafzadeh and its format was different from other programs. However, it later became just another propaganda instrument for the regime, regularly airing forced confessions or maligning the opposition with trumped-up charges.

The Ofogh (“Horizon”) channel is broadcast worldwide. It does not enjoy a wide TV audience but gets a good amount of attention on social media.

The Young Journalists Club was founded by IRIB in 1999. It has direct ties with security agencies, and has produced and aired forced confessions and made-to-order programs for these agencies.

Some IRIB reporters have been so closely associated with forced confessions that they are called “interrogator-reporters.” One of them, Ali Rezvani, is also an interrogator for the Intelligence Organization of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.

Press TV broadcasts in English and French languages. Arabic-language Al-Alam is aimed at Iran’s neighbors in the Middle East and the Arab world at large.

Kayhan Newspaper, or “Tomorrow’s News”

Political activists view Kayhan as a paper that reports on “tomorrow’s news.” By reading this newspaper’s attacks against critics of the regime you can get a good idea of who is going to be arrested tomorrow and of the government’s upcoming policies. Kayhan’s “Semi-Secret” section attacks the opposition and critics and tries to incriminate them.

Analysts believe that the editorials of this paper, which are written by Hossein Shariatmadari, Khamenei’s representative at Kayhan, reflect the views of the ruling establishment, in particular of the supreme leader himself.

Fars: The IRGC’s First News Agency

Fars News Agency, which is affiliated with the IRGC, was founded in 2003 under the presidency of the reformist Mohammad Khatami. Previously, there were only two major news agencies in Iran — the official IRNA and the semi-official ISNA — and both of them were managed by reformists.

Fars was at the time the first major news agency run by principalists and supporters of the supreme leader. With the support of the so-called “revolutionary agencies,” this news agency opened offices across the country; at one point, it was said to enjoy the largest audience.

Mehr: The Islamic Development Organization’s News Agency

Mehr News Agency was also founded in 2003. It is affiliated with the Islamic Development Organization, which is supervised by Khamenei.

Mehr opposed President Khatami’s administration and sometimes criticized his successor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. However, over recent years it has been reduced to a mere propaganda tool in the hands of the regime and has lost much of its influence.

Tasnim: The Revolutionary Guards’ Second New Agency

Tasnim, founded in 2012, is also affiliated with the IRGC. Its founding coincided with the Arab Spring and its stated goal was to cover protests in Arab countries, called the “Islamic Awakening” by Iranian officials.

One reason behind the launch of this news agency was disagreements within the IRGC. Hamid Reza Moghadamfar co-founded Mehr after having been dismissed as CEO of Fars.

Seraj: The Revolutionary Guards’ Cyberspace Arm

The Seraj Cyberspace Organization, founded in 2016, is considered the main cyberspace arm of the IRGC. Its main task is to influence public opinion in Iran by producing content for social media and interactive platforms. The organization is the wealthiest, most powerful IRGC media cartel.

Seraj encourages, mobilizes and funds online projects conducted by pro-regime individuals, mostly members of the Basij paramilitary force. It runs branches in all 31 Iranian provinces that operate in coordination with Basij headquarters. These branches run training courses about social media and interactive platforms during which hardliners learn how to promote online campaigns, boost specific hashtags and attack designated targets.

The great majority of Seraj-related accounts on social media use fake profiles. It is believed that every cyberactivist runs a number of social media accounts to more efficiently promote pro-regime hashtags, spread fake news and disseminate abusive and defamatory content about opponents or critics.

Rasa: A Seminary News Agency

Over the past two decades, the Islamic Republic has launched several media outlets to specifically target Shia seminaries. Rasa News Agency was founded in 2003 just for that purpose. According to its website, it is “dedicated to promoting the discourse of the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of approximation between the Islamic Seminaries and the Islamic system of government.”

Vatan-e Emrooz And Its Controversial Headlines

The full-color daily Vatan-e Emrouz was launched just before the disputed 2009 presidential election by Mehrdad Bazrpash, an ally of Ahmadinejad. It has become a forum for young hardline supporters of the supreme leader.

This newspaper is known for its controversial and sometimes outrageous headlines, such as “Death of King Abdullah,” which was published before the former Saudi king died.

Javan: The Revolutionary Guards’ Daily

The Javan (“Young”) daily, founded in 1999, is affiliated with the IRGC. From the very beginning it has been distributed in IRGC barracks and offices. Some of its staff are employees of the IRGC’s political bureau.

Daneshjou: The Students Basij’s Medi Outlet

The Daneshjou (“University Student”) News Agency was launched in 2003 with the motto “This is the voice of a nation's students.” It covers general news and developments touching the Students Basij Organization and universities, and has an online TV channel that broadcasts certain conferences held at universities. One of its best-known TV program is Dr. Salam, which is aimed at ridiculing critics of Ayatollah Khamenei.

The Basij Organization has another news agency at its disposal, called Basij.

Mizan And Hemayat: The Judiciary And Prisons Organization News Outlets

Mizan News Agency is the official news agency of the judiciary. Its main tasks include responding to criticisms against this institution and to reports about the appalling situation inside Iranian prisons.

The Hemayat newspaper was launched by Iran’s Prisons Organization and is mainly distributed in prisons and at courthouses.

Mashregh: The IRGC Intelligence Organization’s Website

Mashregh News is known as being an affiliate of the Revolutionary Guards’ Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO) and is seen as its mouthpiece.

Raja: The Website Of Supporters Of Ahmadinejad And Raisi Relative

The website Raja News was founded by Ahmadinejad supporters, but it later supported the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability, often described as Iran’s most right-wing party. Meysam Nili, brother of Raisi’s son-in-law, serves as CEO of this website.

Jahan: Tehran Mayor’s Website

Jahan News is a website affiliated with Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani, the deputy chairman of the Tehran City Council, Parviz Sarvari, and the Society of Path Seekers of the Islamic Revolution, a principalist political group. Besides Zakani and Sarvari, other political figures such as Faridodin Haddad, brother-in-law of Khamenei’s son Mojtaba, are members of this group.

Jam-e Jam: A Principalist Newspaper With A Moderate Face

The newspaper Jam-e Jam is affiliated with IRIB. Its first issue came out in 2000 and mostly covered social issues. At the time, it brought in a number of reformist figures to appear moderate to the public, but it has unabashedly become conservative and principalist.

IRNA And Iran: Drop In Quality

The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) and the newspaper Iran are both published by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and, as a result, their orientations change with each administration. With Raisi now in power, the ruling establishment is more homogenized than ever, and their quality has dropped sharply.

Khorasan And Quds: Newspapers For Eastern Provinces

The newspaper Quds is published by Astan Quds Razavi, an organization that manages the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad and other institutions. The newspaper Khorasan is published by the Khorasan Institute, whose members of the board of directors are appointed by the supreme leader.

These papers are distributed across the country, but their main audience is in the provinces of Razavi Khorasan, North Khorasan and South Khorasan. Quds and Khorasan have a significant Afghan audience because the three provinces border Afghanistan.

Resalat: Traditional Principalists’ Newspaper

During the 1980s and 1990s, Resalat was the main newspaper of the so-called right-wing movement among the supporters of the Islamic Republic. With the marginalization of the right-wing and left-wing movements in recent years, Resalat is no longer taken very seriously on the political scene.

Hamshahri: Drop In Circulation

Hamshahri newspaper is published by the Tehran city government. In the 1990s it had the highest circulation in Iran because of the quality of its reporting on social issues and its advertisement pages. Its popularity dropped after Ahmadinejad and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf were elected as Tehran mayors.

Azad University’s Media Outlets

The Islamic Azad University has branches in many cities in Iran, as well as its own media outlets such as the Azad News Agency (ANA) and Iranian Student Correspondent Association (ISCA).

In 2009, Azad University launched the newspaper Farhikhtegan, which supported reformist presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi. However, after the dismissal of the university’s president Abdollah Jassbi in 2012, its media outlets eventually fell under the control of Khamenei supporters.

iranwire.com · by Ehsan Mehrabi


11.  Veteran candidates saw big gains in midterms





Defense & National Security — Veteran candidates saw big gains in midterms

BY ELLEN MITCHELL - 11/11/22 7:06 PM ET



https://thehill.com/policy/defense/overnights/3731723-defense-national-security-veteran-candidates-saw-big-gains-in-midterms/


At least 81 veterans running for a Congressional seat in the 2022 midterms won their respective races, the largest group of individuals who have served in the military and have won office in a decade.  

We’ll detail the results and races still being watched that are too close to call, plus Russia’s retreat from Kherson. 

This is Defense & National Security, your nightly guide to the latest developments at the Pentagon, on Capitol Hill and beyond. For The Hill, I’m Ellen Mitchell. A friend forward this newsletter to you? Subscribe here.

NASA says moon rocket set to launch as planned despite minor effects from Hurricane Nicole

How the cyber agenda would shift if the GOP takes over Congress

How veterans did in the 2022 midterm elections

The election results are all but in for the 196 veterans running for Congress this cycle, with at least 81 winning their respective races as of Friday. 

The total marks the largest group of individuals who have served in the military and have won office in a decade.  

The numbers: When added to the 12 incumbent senators who are veterans and were not up for reelection this year — and considering one undecided race in New York that involves two former service members going up against each another — that means at least 94 lawmakers with prior military experience will be a part of the

118th Congress starting January. 

Though 11 races involving former service members are still to be called, the current tally means more veteran lawmakers will serve in Congress starting in 2023 than any other time in the past 10 years. The figure just squeezes past the 91 members with prior military experience who served at the start of the 117th Congress two years ago. 

Climbing higher?: What’s more, that number of 94 could rise to closer to 100 — nearly 20 percent of Congress — as several undecided races seem to be leaning in favor of veteran candidates. 

The last time more wins happened was in 2012, when 84 veterans won a Congressional seat.   

Why the uptick?: This election cycle saw a major surge of veterans from the wars of the 1990s and those following the attacks of 9/11, with one in five individuals on the November ballots having served, according to Pew Research Center.  

The uptick in veterans in Congress has been building for some time, “as Iraq and Afghanistan vets have been running and winning in increasingly large numbers,” Seth Lynn, a University of San Francisco adjunct professor and founder of Veterans Campaign, told The Hill. 

Races still being watched: Veteran-involved contests that are yet undecided include the battle for a U.S. Senate seat in Arizona between former astronaut and Navy pilot Sen. Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.), and Blake Masters, a venture capitalist.  

In New York’s 22nd congressional district, Republican Brandon Williams, formerly in the Navy, hopes to beat Democrat Francis Conole, a U.S. Naval Academy graduate and Iraq War veteran. The race has been too close to call as of Friday.  

Read the full story here 

NASA says moon rocket set to launch as planned despite minor effects from Hurricane Nicole

How the cyber agenda would shift if the GOP takes over Congress

Russia: Troop withdrawal from Kherson is complete

The Russian Defense Ministry announced on Friday that it had successfully withdrawn its troops from Kherson, Ukraine. 

“In Kherson direction, today, at 05.00 am [Moscow time], units of the Russian forces finished their redeployment to the left bank of Dnepr river,” wrote the ministry in a report

Earlier: The Russian military announced its intentions to retreat from Kherson earlier this week, saying it was unable to supply all of the soldiers stationed in the city. 

Skepticism high: However, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed skepticism that Russian troops would withdraw from Kherson, which they have occupied since late February, without incident. 

“Actions speak louder than words,” said Ukrainian presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak in response to the withdrawal announcement. 

“We see no signs that Russia is leaving Kherson without a fight. … [Ukraine] is liberating territories based on intelligence data, not staged TV statements.” 

Read the rest here 

NASA says moon rocket set to launch as planned despite minor effects from Hurricane Nicole

How the cyber agenda would shift if the GOP takes over Congress

ON TAP FOR MONDAY

  • The Stimson Center will host a discussion on “Ukraine and the Future of Air Warfare,” at 10 a.m. 
  • The George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs will hear fromAssistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Karen Donfried, who will talk about “the challenges of the war in Ukraine and her vision for the future,” at 12 p.m. 
  • The Brookings Institution will host a conversation on “U.S. Defense Innovation and Great Power Deterrence,” at 2 p.m. 
  • The Institute of World Politics will hold a talk on “The Ukraine War and the Caucasus: Is Russia Losing Both?” at 3 p.m. 
  • The Stimson Center will host a webinar on “Military Operations Other Than War in China’s Foreign Policy,” at 7 p.m. 

NASA says moon rocket set to launch as planned despite minor effects from Hurricane Nicole

How the cyber agenda would shift if the GOP takes over Congress

WHAT WE’RE READING

NASA says moon rocket set to launch as planned despite minor effects from Hurricane Nicole

How the cyber agenda would shift if the GOP takes over Congress

That’s it for today! Check out The Hill’s Defense and National Security pages for the latest coverage. See you next week!



12. The West must stop ‘shooting behind the duck’ and provide Ukraine the weapons it needs





The West must stop ‘shooting behind the duck’ and provide Ukraine the weapons it needs

BY GARRETT I. CAMPBELL, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 11/13/22 8:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3727884-the-west-must-stop-shooting-behind-the-duck-and-provide-ukraine-the-weapons-it-needs/?utm_source=pocket_saves



Eight months into Russia’s invasion, Vladimir Putin remains committed to the territorial conquest and destruction of Ukraine. Ukrainians have had successes, such as the recent counteroffensive around Kharkiv and now Russia’s ordered pullout from Kherson. Still, the future is uncertain, with winter approaching and the outcome of Putin’s mobilization in play. The West must stop “shooting behind the duck” regarding its military aid to Ukraine. 

Ukraine has shown it can defeat Russian forces and deter future Russian aggression, but it requires Western leaders to recognize what Russia is doing militarily and what is needed to defeat it. It’s time for the West to send a strong message to Putin and his generals that come spring, their military will meet a worse fate if they renew the offensive.

Russia’s strategic approach to the war is neither haphazard nor representative of a military power grasping at straws. Russia is pursuing a war-of-attrition strategy meant to slowly wear down the Ukrainian military while relentlessly destroying civilian infrastructure. Putin is playing the long game and, predictably, has fallen back on traditional Russian military strategy and doctrine.

After its defeat in the initial phase of the war and the battle for Kyiv, Russia shifted its military strategy to seizing the Donbas. The shift represented a definitive return to Russia’s traditional doctrinal approach of attrition warfare. It quickly became evident that Ukraine needed weapons to offset Russian firepower advantages, more than simply Javelins and Stingers. Withholding heavier weapons contributed to the destruction of Ukrainian cities such as Mariupol, Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk. From May to July, many observers opined that Ukrainian military losses were unsustainable, and in an effort to avoid the destruction of its Donbas forces, the Ukrainians retreated from their last positions in Luhansk Oblast, allowing the Russians to occupy roughly 25 percent of Ukrainian territory.

Wars of attrition go both ways, however, and the Russian strategy of attrition effectively exhausted their own army. As Russia paused to reconstitute its forces, Ukraine began to field an influx of Western artillery systems, including HIMARS, to destroy Russian command-and-control and logistics hubs and key infrastructure such as the bridges, robbing the Russians of the operational pause they needed and setting the stage for Ukraine’s counteroffensive.  

While the Russians prepared for the counteroffensive around Kherson, Ukraine’s biggest successes came by exploiting the weakened Russian defenses around Kharkiv. With the momentum again swinging in favor of Ukraine, the Russian military responded by shifting their strategy — again in line with Russian military doctrine. The shift to an air and missile campaign with the aim of decimating Ukraine’s civil and military infrastructure is central to attrition warfare. However, the West once more found itself shooting behind the duck and scrambling to bolster Ukraine’s air defenses.

While rightfully characterized as a “terror campaign” against Ukrainian civilians, we are witnessing the execution of well-known elements of Russian military doctrine — strategic aerospace operations against critical infrastructure meant to disorganize and undermine an adversary’s war effort. It’s a rough version of Russian strategic aerospace operations (SAO) and strategic operations to destroy critical infrastructure targets (SODCIT), two of the four Russian military strategic operations developed for war with NATO. With a new Russian commander in Ukraine — Gen. Sergey Surovikin, the former aerospace commander who employed this strategic operation effectively in Syria — it should be no surprise that the Russians returned to this element of their military doctrine.

The recognizable shifts in Russian military strategy provide Western leaders with a guide for future security assistance efforts that might deter and defeat Russian forces. With this in mind, it is likely the aerospace campaign will be followed by a return to major ground offensives. Now is the time to stop shooting behind the duck and proactively provide the Ukrainians what they need to continue to alter the course of the war.

Of course, this will require more of the same weapons that have forced the Russian military to change its strategy — artillery, HIMARS, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS), and armored vehicles — as well as new ones that we have been reluctant to provide. Some will require training that can be undertaken during the winter; others can be transferred now to ensure the Ukrainians can both keep the Russian military on its heels and remain ready come spring.

The arrival of NATO air defense systems is welcomed, but it is time to revisit the strike-fighter debate and provide modern aircraft. Russia’s response to the West’s earlier self-deterrence regarding the transfer of MiG-29 aircraft has been continuous escalation using air and missile attacks on Ukraine’s cities. In addition to drones, Iran reportedly now may provide Russia with advanced missile systems to replace its depleted inventory. This cannot go unanswered. We should no longer deny the Ukrainians armed combat drones such as the MQ-1 Predator/Gray Eagle and MQ-9 Reaper. 

The attack on the Black Sea Fleet on Oct. 29 should be just the beginning. The West should continue to provide such systems, as the strategic implications of Russia’s ability to wage unrestricted drone and missile strikes on NATO’s Black Sea periphery and project maritime power from southern Russia are obvious. Empowering the Ukrainians to impose losses on Russian air and naval platforms (and their sanctuary operating areas) will impart to Putin what he will incur if he continues the war.  

There are also short-term answers to meet the next shift in Russian strategy, likely to springtime ground offensives. Ukraine needs Army Tactical Advanced Missile Systems (ATACMS) with greater ranges to destroy Russian logistics and C2 nodes and drone bases. GMLRS and 155mm cluster munitions, specifically the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM), are needed. These munitions are compatible with current systems, bring efficiencies, and can be provided immediately. The Ukrainians understand the risks associated with these weapons and we should honor that. For naysayers who rebuke the idea of transferring cluster munitions because the United States has a moratorium on providing them, or for fear of escalation, we have failed to get out in front of the Russian military strategy to date and, as a result, the Ukrainians have been unable to set conditions for negotiated conflict termination. 

The difference between Republicans and MAGA Republicans is violence

Xi Jinping downplays climate change, risking his own priorities

This is no ordinary time. The West has acknowledged the stakes that Putin’s war presents to the European security environment and international order. If we continue to shoot behind the duck, allowing the Russians to reconstitute their forces and launch springtime offensives, we will be confronted with these same decisions again, after more Ukrainian lives and territory have been lost. 

Putin has responded to Western self-deterrence with escalation, reinforcing his belief that he is winning and the West is weak and strategically inept. Shifts in Russia’s strategy aligned with their military doctrine provide us with clues to where they are going. These trends may be imperfect, but they are still evident — and the West must send a strong message by providing weapons for not only today’s fight, but also tomorrow’s. That could irreversibly alter Putin’s strategic calculus and level of risk, and thus the course of this war.


Retired Capt. Garrett I. Campbell directed the U.S Navy’s Staff OPNAV N5 Russia Strategy, Policy, and Engagement Branch, and served as a federal executive fellow at the Brookings Institution.





13. 100,000 Dead or Wounded in Ukraine: Putin Has the Blood of His Army On His Hands



Who would have thought the RUssians would see casualties on this scale?


100,000 Dead or Wounded in Ukraine: Putin Has the Blood of His Army On His Hands

19fortyfive.com · by Peter Suciu · November 12, 2022

Putin’s Ukraine Disaster: Though nations typically like to promote their success on the battlefield – and even today, the Kremlin regularly holds its Victory Day Parade that marks the Soviet Red Army’s victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War – Russia is a nation that has seen more than its fair share of military debacles and disasters. From the 13th century, when the country was overrun by the Mongols, to the Crimean War of the 19th century, Russia suffered terrible defeats.

In the opening weeks of the First World War, in August 1914, Russia saw the near destruction of its First and Second Armies at the Battle of Tannenberg – losing upwards of 170,000 men. Though Russia was able to fight on for nearly three years, it never truly recovered from the defeat.

Now more than a century later, Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine is on track to be as ruinous for Russia.

According to Pentagon estimates, the Russian military has seen more than 100,000 of its soldiers killed or wounded since Russia began its invasion nearly nine ago. The figures were released shortly before the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that its troops had begun withdrawing from Kherson – the first city, and only regional capital, seized by Russia during the conflict.

A full retreat could still take weeks, suggested United States Army General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Russia had amassed up to 30,000 troops in Kherson, and while it remains a vital Ukrainian port city, Moscow may not want to risk losing its fighting force as Kyiv is set on retaking it.

“The initial indicators are they are in fact doing it,” Milley told attendees at an event at the Economic Club of New York on Tuesday. “I believe they’re doing it in order to preserve their force, to re-establish defensive lines south of the (Dnieper) river, but that remains to be seen.”

Ukraine’s forces have been slow to enter out of caution that the Kremlin could be laying a trap, however, Milley suggested that the withdrawal is moving according to Russia’s plans.

“It won’t take them a day or two, this is going to take them days and perhaps even weeks to pull those forces south of that river,” Milley added.

Ukraine: Lessons From History

The loss of Kherson has already been seen as a significant setback for Moscow, but it could present an opportunity for both sides to end the fighting.

Some experts have suggested Russia may see that the war is too costly to continue; and that its recent victories could even allow Ukraine to negotiate from strength. Yet, others argue Russia could be using any negotiations as a way to buy time, and refit its forces for a renewed spring offensive.

Moscow might be wise to heed the lessons of history and stop the suffering. It is already facing intense criticism from those in the ranks – as there have been repeated reports that soldiers have been extremely vocal about the state of the war effort.

Ukraine Map as of September 9, 2022. Image Credit: UK Military.

It isn’t just Russian soldiers that are suffering. Milley said that the conflict may have turned anywhere from 15 to 30 million Ukrainians into refugees, while some 40,000 Ukrainian civilians have been killed.

As winter approaches, the horrors are likely only to increase. The Ukrainian people will likely continue to face extreme hardships, but the Russian Army will certainly face more losses – and those losses could be so great that they could threaten the Putin regime, but even the very future of the Russian nation.

A Senior Editor for 19FortyFive, Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,000 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

19fortyfive.com · by Peter Suciu · November 12, 2022



14. Imagining peace in Ukraine


So many times since World War II that we have called for a "Marshall Plan" in so many places that were mostly not suited for a Marshall Plan. Ukraine is probably one of the few places where the conditions are sufficiently similar to post WWII for it to have a positive effect.


I hope we are planning for the coming successful peace now.


“If you concentrate exclusively on victory, while no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.” B.H. Liddel-Hart

“If in taking a native den one thinks chiefly of the market that he will establish there on the morrow, one does not take it in the ordinary way.” Lyautey: The Colonial Role of the Army, Revue Des Deux Mondes, 15 February 1900

"We make war that we may live in peace." --Aristotle

“Arms alone are not enough to keep the peace. It must be kept by men.” - John F. Kennedy, State of the Union Message, 11 January 1962. 





Imagining peace in Ukraine

How a stable and successful country could emerge from the trauma of Russia’s invasion


The Economist

IMAGINE A VICTORIOUS Ukraine in 2030. It is a democratic nation, preparing to join the European Union. Reconstruction is almost complete. The economy is growing fast; it is clean and diverse enough to keep corrupt oligarchs at bay. All this is underpinned by stout Ukrainian security. Defence against another invasion does not depend on the Kremlin’s goodwill, but on the sense that renewed Russian aggression would never succeed.

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Today, as Russia’s tattered army appears to retreat from Kherson in the south, an end to the fighting still seems far off. But news that Ukraine and its backers are starting to outline their views of the future makes sense, because the coming months will determine what is possible at the decade’s end. It means thinking about how to rebuild post-war Ukraine, and the security guarantees needed to deter future invaders.

In the past, Western leaders have wisely insisted that Ukraine should determine its own objectives. Ukrainians are dying in a conflict all about the right of sovereign countries to decide their own future. If peace is foisted on them, it is less likely to last. However, Ukraine’s Western backers have interests at stake, too. If the war escalates, they could be sucked in. If Russia ends up denying Ukraine victory, by creating a failing state on its western borders, Vladimir Putin or his successors would threaten the security of the entire Atlantic alliance.

Ukraine also has reasons to share its plans for the future with NATO. At present the West rations arms and money partly to steer the war, accelerating the supply of advanced weaponry if Ukraine appears to be struggling, but refusing aircraft and the longest-range munitions for fear that it will press on too far—whatever that means. Ukraine should be more of a partner and less of a supplicant. Another reason for Ukraine to work together with its allies is to bind them in, especially in America. Nothing can guarantee the support of the next president (Donald Trump is not a fan, for example). But a successful, settled plan for the war and its aftermath is the best available assurance of continued backing.

Such a plan must include a framework for reconstruction. The Ukrainian people need to restore their shattered lives. More than that, if Ukraine’s economy fails, so will its democracy.

Donors at a meeting in Berlin in October tried to sketch out a plan for rebuilding Ukraine and to estimate its costs. Patching the country up while the fighting continues, which could last another three years, will cost tens of billions of dollars, they reckoned. Initial reconstruction, lasting a further two years, might cost $100bn. A third phase—in effect, a Marshall Plan for Ukraine, probably costing even more—would seek to create an economy that is fit to join the EU.

Clearly, such plans require vast amounts of capital from private-sector investors. A few dozen governments and multilateral lenders will be involved in laying the groundwork to attract outside money. If their grants and loans are pilfered by oligarchs, the country will fail. Hence Ukraine and its backers must harness the national purpose forged in war to give anti-corruption groups the clout to police how the money is spent.

If Ukraine is to thrive, it also needs security. To be viable, Ukraine needs to keep its access to the Black Sea. Many people focus on how much land Ukraine recaptures; Mr Putin needs to suffer a decisive defeat so that his failure is unambiguous. Beyond that, though, Ukraine’s victory will rest as much on the health of its democracy as on the extent of its territory.

When the fighting does stop, Russia will continue to re-arm rapidly. The government in Kyiv will therefore need Western security guarantees that are more robust than those that spectacularly failed to deter Mr Putin in 2014 and, again, earlier this year. NATO membership would be the gold standard, under which a Russian attack on Ukraine would count as aggression against the entire alliance. But America and many of its allies are unwilling to court direct conflict with Russia. And Turkey, which is still delaying membership for Sweden and Finland, may resist.

A more plausible alternative, put forward in September by a Ukrainian official and a former NATO secretary-general, is modelled on America’s relations with Israel. The Kyiv Security Compact foresees a web of legally and politically binding commitments between Ukraine and its allies. Some countries will pledge military, financial and intelligence support if Russia attacks; others will commit to sanctions. The plan also calls for investment in weapons transfers and in Ukraine’s defence industry to be sustained over decades.

Be under no illusion how hard this compact will be to bring about. One worry is the state of the Western arms industry, which was run down after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It may struggle to sustain the supply of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine while the fighting continues, let alone outpace Russia as it re-arms when the war is over. Work on bolstering weapons production should begin right away, by creating a pipeline of orders and rationalising procurement.

The other worry is that the West may not have staying power. Polling of Republicans in America and voters in eastern Germany, and anti-war protests in Rome and Prague, suggest that support for Ukraine cannot be taken for granted. Governments everywhere have limited supplies of money and attention. America has other business, such as with China in the Pacific. After decades of contracting out its security to the United States, Europe has barely begun to reckon with the extra responsibilities it must take on.

The West needs to see that spending many billions of dollars in Ukraine is not an act of charity, but of self-preservation. In recent decades, Russia has started a war on its borders every few years. Mr Putin sees today’s conflict as a clash of civilisations between Russia and the West. Half-hearted Western support of Ukraine will not appease him; nor will it lead to the rebuilding of relations with Russia, as some Europeans hope. On the contrary, it will convince him that the West is decadent and vulnerable. If Mr Putin creates a failed state in Ukraine, NATO members will be the next targets of his aggression. Ukraine’s dream of victory would ensure lasting peace for its 43m inhabitants. It would also ensure peace for countless more people across Europe. ■

Please visit our Ukraine hub to read the best of our coverage of the war. For subscribers only: to see how we design each week’s cover, sign up to our weekly Cover Story newsletter.

The Economist



15. Ukraine Got its Miracle in Taking Kherson Without a Fight (But Winter Is Coming)


Okay, I normally disagree with Lt Col Davis. However, his winter warning must be heeded.


Conclusion:


Ukraine should celebrate its accomplishment in taking Kherson city, but they and their supporters in the West need to realize that the Russian loss was not a fatal wound. The greatest danger for Zelensky’s forces will come in the next one to two months when the ground freezes and the reservists are ready to employ. Only then will we know whether Ukraine was able to pull off the other two miracles.


Ukraine Got its Miracle in Taking Kherson Without a Fight (But Winter Is Coming)

19fortyfive.com · by Daniel Davis · November 12, 2022

On August 6 here in 19FortyFive, I published a military assessment entitled, “Ukraine Needs a Miracle to Drive Russia’s Military out of Kherson” in which I argued Kyiv would need three miracles to retake the oblast of Kherson. In light of Ukraine’s recapture of the city of Kherson, its worth reexamining my arguments against how things have played out since. Possibly of greater importance is looking forward to what might come next.

The Fight for Kherson, Explained

To its great credit, Ukraine produced one of the three needed miracles and succeeded, against the odds, in retaking Kherson city. Capturing the remainder of the oblast, however, will require Kyiv to produce the other two miracles, each progressively more complex than the last.

The first of the three miracles Ukraine needed was for Russia to fail to make changes and adjustments to the Ukrainian offensive in the south so that Zelensky’s troops would be able to overcome the stout defenses. Up until barely two weeks ago, all appearances were that Russia had adjusted to the approaching reality of a Ukrainian drive on Kherson, in that Russia increased the number of troops it had defending the western bank of the Dnipro and reportedly building significant defensive positions in and around the city of Kherson.

As recently as October 25, one of Zelensky’s senior advisors, Oleksiy Arestovych, declared that in “Kherson everything is clear. The Russians are replenishing, strengthening their grouping there.” For the Ukrainian military, Arestovych continued, it meant “that nobody is preparing to withdraw. On the contrary, the heaviest of battles is going to take place for Kherson.” Three days later, Ukrainian media reported that another 1,000 Russian troops had been sent to defend Kherson, bringing the total to approximately 30,000.

With such a force, Russia could have built a defensive position that would have imposed a severe cost on any attacking force. One of the reasons cited by Russian Gen. Sergei Surovikin as necessitating the withdrawal was the difficulty in resupplying the Russian garrison at Kherson. Indeed, since July, when Ukraine first started using HIMARS rockets to attack the bridges over the Dniper that Russia used to resupply the city, logistics were indeed seriously hampered.

But Zelensky had been signaling since at least July that his forces intended to retake Kherson. The first miracle that Ukraine needed to make their dream of recapturing the oblast was for Russia not to take the threat seriously, and especially given the attacks on the logistic routs to their troops on the western bank of the Dnipro. If Russia had taken the threat seriously, they would have started last summer stockpiling significant quantities of all key war stocks, especially food, water, ammunition, and fuel.

Yet when Gen. Surovikin took over the Russian war effort in October, he hinted that his troops may eventually have to leave Kherson when he said “difficult decisions” might need to be made. There were many pro-Russian war bloggers and military analysts that assumed Russia would turn Kherson into a modern day “Stalingrad” in which they would fight to keep the city no matter how great the cost.

Given the amount of reinforcements and the time Russia had to stockpile supplies, I feared they would indeed take the “Stalingrad” path. We now know they didn’t, and that unexpected decision handed Ukraine the first of the three miracles, in that they retook control of Kherson without having to even fight the battle. But to continue to fulfill Zelensky’s pledge to recapture the oblast, two more miracles are needed.

Where the Kherson Fight Is Now: Miracle Two Needed

As pointed out in my August 6 analysis, the second miracle Ukraine needs is to overcome geography. While having the Dnipro River at their backs was a hindrance for Russia to keep its troops supplied in Kherson, it also served as a major obstacle for Ukraine to continue eastward.

Ironically, on August 6 I wrote: “If Ukraine overcame every obstacle and successfully drove Russia out of Kherson (city), they would still need to cross the Dnipro to drive Russia out of the region. If Putin’s troops were driven out of Kherson, they would certainly destroy the bridges on their way out.”

That is exactly what happened. As soon as the Russians cleared the Dnipro with the last of their troops, they blew the last three bridges spanning the Dnipro. It would now require a major effort by Ukraine to reestablish crossing points over the Dnipro, and at present it is unlikely the Ukrainian army has the physical capacity to launch such an operation. Thus, for the present, Russia will likely retain control over the roughly 70% of Kherson oblast it still occupies.

The third miracle I noted from the August 6 analysis was that Ukraine would have to be able to overcome Russia’s substantial advantage in artillery and rocket fire. Though Ukraine has been able to narrow the gap with the delivery of millions of rounds of artillery shells and howitzers from the West, Russia still holds the advantage. It’s what is likely to come next, however, that may prove the most decisive.

Putin’s Winter Offensive?

As part of Putin’s response to the deteriorating situation in his Ukrainian war effort, he announced a mobilization of 300,000 reservists in September. Despite significant difficulties and shortcomings by the Russian state in conducting the effort – and reportedly up to 700,000 Russian men fleeing the border to avoid serving – there are now more than 200,000 new troops (82,000 of the 300,000 mobilized reservists have already been deployed to Ukraine) preparing for a winter offensive that could completely change the nature of this war.

By surrendering Kherson city without a fight and blowing the bridges over the Dnipro, Surovikin has preserved 30,000 of his best-trained and experienced troops for use in the coming offensive, sealed off the southern front from a risk of a Ukrainian flanking action and will soon have a massive new force to employ (I will publish a separate analysis next week looking at potential objectives of this offensive).

Once this force is ready to launch Putin’s winter offensive (likely in late December/early January when the ground has sufficiently frozen), it will likely be preceded by a massive new attack on the Ukrainian energy infrastructure to plunge the country into darkness, cripple the remainder of its electrified rail system, and significantly hamper the government’s ability to supply its troops with basic needs, complicate their ability to move troops around the battlefield, and most critically, degrade their ability to communicate with troops in the field.

It is still a very much open question as to whether these new Russian forces can learn from the (significant) mistakes they have made over the first nine months of the war. Maybe they won’t. But the odds will be in their favor, as the fundamentals still decisively tilt in Moscow’s direction.

Ukraine should celebrate its accomplishment in taking Kherson city, but they and their supporters in the West need to realize that the Russian loss was not a fatal wound. The greatest danger for Zelensky’s forces will come in the next one to two months when the ground freezes and the reservists are ready to employ. Only then will we know whether Ukraine was able to pull off the other two miracles.

Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Daniel L. Davis is a Senior Fellow for Defense Priorities and a former Lt. Col. in the U.S. Army who deployed into combat zones four times. He is the author of “The Eleventh Hour in 2020 America.” Follow him @DanielLDavis.

19fortyfive.com · by Daniel Davis · November 12, 2022



16. Anti-Access Bubbles: How to Stop China from Militarily Dominating Asia?


An interesting concept.


Excerpts:

This is an eminently sensible proposal. It harvests reward while enforcing strategic discipline with regard to resources and risk. A region of fully sovereign nation-states able to provide for their own defense would have less need for outsiders like Britain or America to brace up the balance of power. That would be a welcome development all around. One hopes London heeds—and acts on—the report’s findings and recommendations.
Arm the weak—and watch the domineering weep bitter tears. Get those Anti-acess bubbles ready.




Anti-Access Bubbles: How to Stop China from Militarily Dominating Asia?

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · November 12, 2022

Anti-Access Bubbles: An Idea Whose Time Has Come? Help others help themselves. That’s the gist of a new report out of the London-based Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Great Britain’s premier think tank on defense and security affairs. If Britain wants to help beleaguered Asian states guard their maritime sovereignty against such predators as China, say coauthors Sidharth Kaushal, John Louth, and Andrew Young, it should supply them with “anti-access bubbles” inflated by anti-ship and anti-air weaponry, sensors, and command-and-control systems.

Yes.

Thus armed, local powers can defend offshore waters and skies apportioned to them by the law of the sea while potentially competing to better effect in the gray zone. The weak can make things tough on a stronger aggressor bent on purloining their marine territory and resources. In effect the RUSI team wants to mimic what China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has done vis-à-vis the U.S. Navy and affiliated joint and allied forces. The PLA has strewn swarms of low-cost anti-ship weapons around Fortress China while constructing a sea-denial fleet founded on missile-armed submarines and surface patrol craft. PLA rocketeers can try to deter U.S. forces from coming within reach of anti-access weaponry, or make them pay dearly should they defy the threat and venture within range anyway.

Anti-Access Bubbles, The Concept

Anti-access bubbles are arcs sketched on the map or nautical chart to depict the range of a weapon system, and thus the danger zone around its firing position. The bubble’s centerpoint is where the weapon system is emplaced, and the weapon’s firing range is the arc’s radius. Swing a circle and there’s your bubble. A hostile ship or aircraft goes into harm’s way when it enters that contested geographic space.

But the logic of access denial works both ways; it’s not just a Chinese thing. Weaker coastal states can turn it against the PLA Navy and Air Force, not to mention paramilitary sea services like the China Coast Guard and maritime militia. It promises military efficacy. Better yet, Southeast Asian governments can preserve their strategic autonomy while they reclaim their sovereignty. Liberty of action is of no small consequence. Government chieftains in such coastal states as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia are acutely aware that they have to live with China forever—and that it will be a wrathful China should they side with America in the incipient great-power competition.

Instead Kaushal, Louth, and Young observe that small Asian states prefer to maintain a sort of armed neutrality whereby they enlist with neither major competitor yet uphold their sovereign rights through unilateral measures. They’re chary of alliance entanglements. And with the exception of long-time U.S. treaty allies like the Philippines or Thailand, it’s hard to blame them for taking such a standoffish stance.

J-20 Fighter. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Wouldn’t you if you were in their place?

But it’s not all about local partners. The RUSI coauthors are trying to help the U.K. government and the Royal Navy manage a secondary theater on the cheap. Martial sage Carl von Clausewitz helps strategists evaluate how to handle less-than-paramount commitments while keeping their gaze firmly fixed on what matters most. After all, strategy is about setting and enforcing priorities. If everything is a top priority, nothing is. What I call Clausewitz’s “Three Rs” of secondary theaters go something like this: to justify the effort, such a commitment must promise exceptional reward; a contender must enjoy “decisive superiority” of resources in the primary theater to take care of affairs there; and thus it can afford to divert resources to the secondary theater without undue risk in the primary theater.

Reward, resources, risk. That’s the Clausewitzian calculus.

Europe and NATO comprise the theater that matters most to Britain, but the Indo-Pacific matters a great deal as well. It meets the first Clausewitzian test, promising exceptional reward. But the United Kingdom is a middle-rank power without decisive resources even to safeguard NATO-Europe without help. That being the case, the Indo-Pacific theater fails the Clausewitzian tests of resources and risk. By necessity it is an economy-of-force theater for the United Kingdom. The Royal Navy keeps a couple of offshore patrol vessels on station in East Asia, and occasionally a heavy task force puts in an appearance in the region. But Britain can’t afford an expeditionary battle fleet comparable to the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

Nor should it make the attempt. If London committed one of just two carrier strike groups in the Royal Navy inventory to expeditionary duty east of Suez, it would risk forfeiting security in Europe. Clausewitz would blanch at such a foolhardy undertaking. And so do British political and military leaders.

Wisely.

To conserve Royal Navy resources for European waters, Kaushal, Louth, and Young propose that the navy and British industry work togther to furnish Asian militaries with an array of low-cost armaments. In so doing London can abide by Clausewitzian strictures while still accomplishing its aims in the East. The coauthors observe that small states can afford to purchase finished weapons, sensors, and command-and-control systems, but by and large they can’t afford to develop them. Britain, they conclude, should shoulder the R&D costs while regional partners buy the hardware at a humble per-unit price.

BLACK SEA (Nov 4, 2021) The Blue Ridge-class command and control ship USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20), the Arliegh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Porter (DDG-78), and the Bulgarian navy frigate Gordi (BGS 43) perform ship maneuvering exercises in the Black Sea, Nov 4, 2021. Mount Whitney, forward deployed to Gaeta, Italy operates with a combined crew of Sailors and Military Sealift Command civil service mariners in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations in support of U.S. national security interests in Europe and Africa. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Andrew Eder) 211104-N-NO067-2261

This is an eminently sensible proposal. It harvests reward while enforcing strategic discipline with regard to resources and risk. A region of fully sovereign nation-states able to provide for their own defense would have less need for outsiders like Britain or America to brace up the balance of power. That would be a welcome development all around. One hopes London heeds—and acts on—the report’s findings and recommendations.

Arm the weak—and watch the domineering weep bitter tears. Get those Anti-acess bubbles ready.

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · November 12, 2022




17. The U.S. Marine Corps Is Facing A Crisis Like No Other




The U.S. Marine Corps Is Facing A Crisis Like No Other

19fortyfive.com · by Sandboxx News · November 12, 2022

The U.S. Marine Corps and its future is being hotly debated in think tanks around the DC area and the media. What role should the U.S. Marine Corps play in America’s national defense? What tools does it need to take on China?

The face of war is changing rapidly, and the Marine Corps is facing a crisis regarding where it fits in the U.S.’s future national defense strategy, especially against the threat of China. Tellingly, commandant of the Marine Corps, General David H. Berger, said upon assuming command of the branch in 2019 that the Marines were unprepared for the changes coming in the U.S. defense strategy.

While many senior leaders, active and retired, believe that the Marines need to adapt in their time-honored tradition to the emerging threats, they are split on how that should proceed.

Berger wants to get the Marine Corps back to its roots, according to his 2030 Force Design plan. Specifically, he wants the branch to conduct amphibious and land operations in support of naval campaigns to differentiate it from the Army and the special operations community and avoid becoming irrelevant. The Force Deisgn plan will be updated yearly.

Berger is not the first commandant to feel this way. His predecessor, General Robert Neller, said before the Senate Armed Services Committe in 2017 that “a critical self-assessment that revealed the Marine Corps is not organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment.”

“The Marine Corps must modernize and change to deter conflict, compete and, when necessary, fight and win against our adversaries,” General Neller added at the time.

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Owen West wrote that Berger’s vision calls for the divestiture of current crisis-response and land-battle capabilities in order to build a large-scale, hyper-optimized capability. It is an expensive and bold undertaking that will take eight years to complete.

“We will not seek to hedge or balance our investments to account for other contingencies,” Berger wrote.

Former military leaders oppose the changes

However, a group of 17 retired generals and senior officers, including former Secretary of the Navy Jim Webb, former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, former Joint Chiefs Chairman Joe Dunford, and John Kelly, the former head of Homeland Security and White House chief of staff, have been lobbying Congress to overturn Berger’s initiatives.

In a piece for the Washington Street Journal, Webb said that the daily working group has been formed to communicate concerns to national leaders.

“[The] retired general officers who are gravely concerned about the direction of the Corps in the last two and a half years would be above 90 percent,” according to a retired three-star general in the group.

Marine combat veteran and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Bing West characterized Berger’s Force Design 2030 vision for the Corps as a “Nice slogan, poor machine.”

Using Ukraine as an example, West wrote that “Marines can’t fight in an urban setting without tanks.”

“The U.S. Army has the expertise and is developing a new tank. Marines should pitch in 10 percent of the money and get the opportunity to make changes on the margin,” he added.

On the other hand, Marine Corps Commandant David Berger feels that the heavy armor and short-range artillery tubes of the Marines are not suited to fight in the Indo-Pacific region. He’s divested the Marine Corps of those systems in an effort to make the Marines lighter, faster, and more mobile.

“We have sufficient evidence to conclude that [armor] capability, despite its long and honorable history in the wars of the past, is operationally unsuitable for our highest-priority challenges in the future,” Berger wrote.

General Van Riper (Ret.) censured Berger’s decision lamenting that “the Corps will have more space experts, cyber warriors, influence specialists, missileers and others with unique skills” than “Marines prepared to close with and destroy the enemy.”

Despite the time-honored tradition of the commandant of the Corps being rarely questioned, these generals, right or wrong, feel strongly enough about the changes being implemented that they have gone public with their feelings.

Adapt or fade to irrelevance, say some experts

Under law, the Marine Corps’ primary mission is “the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and […] the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”

However, during the two decades of the Global War on Terror, the Marine Corps adapted to the changing needs of the country. They were heavily involved in the fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq far from the coast. As a result, many Marines received no experience in amphibious operations. Critics called the Marine Corps “a second land Army.”

The Marine Corps will fade to irrelevance if it doesn’t change, according to some.

Dakota Wood, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation wrote that “Transformation is part of the DNA of the Corps. This latest iteration merits the support of all Marines and those charged with the defense of our nation.”

The future path of the Marine Corps could be clarified when the Senate begins hearings on the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act.

Steve Balestrieri is a proven military analyst. He served as a US Army Special Forces NCO and Warrant Officer in the 7th Special Forces Group. In addition to writing for Sandboxx.com, he has written for 19fortyfive.com and SOFREP.com; he has covered the NFL for PatsFans.com for over 11 years. His work was regularly featured in the Millbury-Sutton Chronicle and Grafton News newspapers in Massachusetts. This first appeared in SandBoxx.

19fortyfive.com · by Sandboxx News · November 12, 2022




18. Red meat is not a health risk. New study slams years of shoddy research




Maybe not totally national security related but some good news for those of us who are meat eaters.


Red meat is not a health risk. New study slams years of shoddy research

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Studies have been linking red meat consumption to health problems like heart disease, stroke, and cancer for years, but these invariably suffer from methodological limitations. In an unprecedented effort, health scientists at the University of Washington scrutinized decades of research on red meat consumption and its links to various health outcomes, introducing a new way to assess health risks in the process. They only found weak evidence that unprocessed red meat consumption is linked to colorectal cancer, breast cancer, type 2 diabetes, and ischemic heart disease, and no link at all between eating red meat and stroke.

Big Think · by Ross Pomeroy

Studies have been linking red meat consumption to health problems like heart disease, stroke, and cancer for years. But nestled in the recesses of those published papers are notable limitations.

Nearly all the research is observational, unable to tease out causation convincingly. Most are plagued by confounding variables. For example, perhaps meat eaters simply eat fewer vegetables, or tend to smoke more, or exercise less? Moreover, many are based on self-reported consumption. The simple fact is that people can’t remember what they eat with any accuracy. And lastly, the reported effect sizes in these scientific papers are often small. Is a supposed 15% greater risk of cancer really worth worrying about?

Study slams lazy research

In a new, unprecedented effort, scientists at the University of Washington’s Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) scrutinized decades of research on red meat consumption and its links to various health outcomes, formulating a new rating system to communicate health risks in the process. Their findings mostly dispel any concerns about eating red meat.

“We found weak evidence of association between unprocessed red meat consumption and colorectal cancer, breast cancer, type 2 diabetes and ischemic heart disease. Moreover, we found no evidence of an association between unprocessed red meat and ischemic stroke or hemorrhagic stroke,” they summarized.

The IHME scientists had been observing the shoddy nature of health science for decades. Each year, hundreds of frankly lazy studies are published that simply attempt to find an observational link between some action — eating a food for example — and a health outcome, like death or disease. In the end, owing to sloppy methods, varying subject populations, and inconsistent statistical measures, everything, especially different foods, seems to be both associated and not associated with cancer. How is the lay public supposed to interpret this mess?

A new system to establish risk

And so, the researchers came up with the burden of proof risk function, a novel statistical method to quantitatively “evaluate and summarize evidence of risk across different risk-outcome pairs.” Using the function, any researcher can evaluate published data for a certain health risk, then, using the function, compute a single number that translates to a one- through five-star rating system.

“A one-star rating indicates that there may be no true association between the behavior or condition and the health outcome. Two stars indicates the behavior or condition is at least associated with a 0-15% change in the likelihood of a health outcome, while three stars indicates at least a 15-50% change, four stars indicates at least a 50-85% change, and five stars indicates a more than 85% change.”

When the IHME utilized this function on red meat consumption and its potential links to various adverse health outcomes, they found that none warranted greater than a two-star rating.

“The evidence for a direct vascular or heath risk from eating meat regularly is very low, to the point that there is probably no risk,” commented Dr. Steven Novella, a Yale neurologist and president of the New England Skeptical Society. “There is, however, more evidence for a health risk from eating too few vegetables. That is really the risk of a high-meat diet, those meat calories are displacing vegetable calories.”


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The IHME team plans to utilize their burden of proof function on all sorts of health risks, creating a massive, freely accessible database.

“In addition to helping consumers, our analysis can guide policymakers in developing health and wellness education programs, so that they focus on the risk factors with the greatest impact on health,” Dr. Emmanuela Gakidou, professor of health metrics sciences at IHME and a lead author of the study, said in a statement. “Health researchers can also use this analysis to identify areas where current evidence is weak and more definitive studies are needed.”

Big Think · by Ross Pomeroy







De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
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FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

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