Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

Each generation doubtless feels called upon to reform the world. Mine knows that it will not reform it, but its task is perhaps even greater. It consists in preventing the world from destroying itself.”

- Albert Camus

 “Keep reading books, but remember that a book’s only a book, and you should learn to think for yourself.”

- Maxim Gorky

"Critics are men who watch a battle from a high place then come down and shoot the survivors."

~ Ernest Hemingway

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 18, 2023

2. 8 Lessons for Taiwan From Russia’s War in Ukraine

3. SOF HEALTH DEEP DIVE: CANCER IN SOF

4. Tech titans are a 'risk to democracy:' Ian Bremmer

5. Lavrov accuses the West of launching 'hybrid war' against Russia

6. ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Has the U.S. and Taiwan Trapped

7.Russia’s Fifth Column in Ukraine Is Alive and Well

8. Chinese researchers are making claims that, if true, would threaten national security

9. A Tale of Two Failed Armies

10. U.S. prepping major military package for Ukraine

11. Don’t appease China, warns Taiwan’s likely presidential successor

12. U.S., Germany head for showdown over tanks for Ukraine

13. Robert Kaplan’s "The Tragic Mind" Counsels Prudence and Realism in Ukraine and the South China Sea

14. Kahl: U.S. Focused on ‘Next Phase’ of Ukraine Conflict

15. A Prosecutor Was Murdered for Investigating Iran and Argentinian Corruption

16. How A Digital Footprint Provides A Criminal Foothold

17. Regional defense partnerships rise with China’s power

18. Pentagon Can't Account for $220 Billion of Gear Given to Contractors

19. Democracy defenders and Rambo wannabes: Ukraine’s volunteer foreign fighters

20. How China planted an FBI mole who was discovered only after gutting the CIA's vast spy network by James Bamford

21. Russia’s Shadow Army Exposed and Humiliated by Bogus ‘Recruit’

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 18, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-2023

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech commemorating the siege of Leningrad continued to illustrate that Putin remains uncertain about his ability to significantly shape the Russian information space.
Putin’s speech is likely part of a larger informational effort to wrap the "special military operation" inside the greater Russian national mythos of the Great Patriotic War (the Second World War) to increase Russian support for a protracted war and mobilization.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov augmented these efforts to increase Russian support for a protracted war by explicitly and ludicrously claiming that Ukraine and the West are pursuing the genocide of the Russian people.
Putin continues efforts to reinvigorate Russia’s defense industrial base to support a protracted war in Ukraine.
Putin and Lavrov continue to deny Ukrainian sovereignty and outright reject direct negotiations with Ukraine.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is becoming increasingly bold in his verbal attacks against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin.
Prigozhin and other notable voices in Russia are carving out a new space to criticize Russian President Vladimir Putin without fear of retribution.
Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions near Kreminna.
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Soledar, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
The Russian MoD continues to attempt to downplay the role of the Wagner Group in claimed tactical advances in the Soledar area.
Ukrainian officials have indicated that Russian forces are concentrating in Zaporizhia Oblast, possibly for a large defensive or offensive effort.
Russian forces’ increasing use of incendiary munitions to conduct what appear to be otherwise routine strikes in southern Ukraine supports ISW’s recent assessment that Russian forces likely face a shortage of conventional artillery rounds.
Ukrainian and Russian sources continued to indicate that Russian authorities are likely preparing for a second wave of mobilization.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 18, 2023

Jan 18, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Riley Bailey, George Barros, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 18, 8:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech commemorating the Soviet forces’ breaking of the siege of Leningrad illustrated that he remains uncertain about his ability to significantly shape the Russian information space. Putin used his January 18 speech to reiterate standard and longstanding Kremlin rhetoric that falsely maintains that Russia launched the invasion of Ukraine to protect residents in the Donbas from neo-Nazis who, the Kremlin claims, seized control of the Ukrainian government in 2014.[1] Putin did not use the publicity of the event to make any announcements concerning the war in Ukraine, such as a new mobilization wave or a formal declaration of war, which some Russian milbloggers had floated.[2] Putin has notably declined to use several high-profile public addresses, including his annual New Year’s Speech and his canceled annual address to the Russian Federation Assembly, to make any notable new announcements about the war.[3] Putin likely reiterated standard Kremlin rhetoric because it has resonated well with the Russian ultra-nationalist pro-war community, elements of which have been increasingly critical of his conduct of the war.[4] Putin may seek to shape the Russian information space over time, but he appears to be unwilling or unable to attempt a dramatic speech that represents a significant inflection in his rhetoric.

Putin’s speech is likely part of a larger and relatively new informational effort to wrap the "special military operation" inside the greater Russian national mythos of the Great Patriotic War (the Second World War) to increase Russian support for a protracted war and increasing mobilization. Putin’s speech was symbolically significant for the Russian domestic audience. Putin is fond of using symbolic dates and historical analogies to address the Russian people and delivered this speech in St. Petersburg to commemorate the 80th anniversary of Soviet forces breaking the Nazi siege of Leningrad. Putin said that Soviet forces defeated Nazi Germany’s "genocide of Leningrad" and drew comparisons with how contemporary Russia is fighting "Ukrainian neo-Nazis" in Donbas—where Putin previously accused Ukraine of conducting a genocide to justify his 2022 invasion.[5] Putin likely seeks to shape the information space over time to regenerate support for the invasion and for maintaining a protracted war by reintroducing pre–February 24 narratives about "Ukrainian neo-Nazis" and "genocide of Russians" to regain control over war coverage after having largely ceded this space to a variety of quasi-independent actors.[6]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov augmented these efforts to increase Russian support for a protracted war by explicitly claiming that Ukraine and the West are pursuing the genocide of the Russian people. Lavrov accused the West of assembling a coalition of European countries to use Ukraine as a proxy in a war that aims to solve the "Russian question" in the same way that Adolf Hitler had sought a "final solution" to eradicate Europe’s Jewish population.[7] Lavrov argued that Western officials’ desire for the strategic defeat of Russia is tantamount to the genocide of the Russian people.[8] Lavrov likely made the comments to set more explicit information conditions for a protracted war by framing the war in Ukraine as just as existential for Russians as Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in the Second World War. Lavrov’s comments are far more noteworthy than Putin’s speech, which may suggest that the Kremlin is instructing high-ranking officials to attempt to substantially shape the Russian information space for a protracted war, and open themselves to criticism, instead of having Putin do so himself.

Lavrov’s equations of the West with Nazi Germany and its support for Ukraine with an effort to exterminate the Russian people are ludicrous and almost certainly aimed at a domestic Russian audience. Ukraine has never threatened to invade or seize territory beyond the internationally recognized borders of 1991. Neither NATO as an alliance nor any individual member state has threatened to invade Russia, let alone to pursue the destruction of Russians as a people. The purpose of Lavrov’s outrageous and absurd comparison was very likely meant to complement Putin’s rhetoric and other Russian efforts to persuade the Russian people that Ukraine and its Western backers pose a real and imminent threat to Russian territory and to the Russian people in their homes. Russian governments, the Wagner Private Military Company, and the Russian military have dug trenches and established militias in areas bordering Ukraine for months, ostensibly to defend against the nonexistent threat of a Ukrainian invasion.[9] These efforts, together with Putin’s and Lavrov’s statements wrapping themselves in the banners of the Red Army waging the Great Patriotic Special Military Operation, are meant to galvanize support for protracted mobilization and suffering in pursuit of Putin’s unprovoked aggression and search for territorial conquest.

Putin and Lavrov continue to deny Ukrainian sovereignty and outright reject direct negotiations with Ukraine. Putin emphasized in his speech that Russia is fighting to protect people who live in its "historical territories" in Ukraine, a continuation of Kremlin rhetoric that rejects Ukrainian sovereignty and seeks to justify Putin’s maximalist goals of territorial acquisition in Ukraine.[10] Lavrov explicitly stated that "there can be no talk of negotiations with [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelensky" and argued that Western insistence on Ukraine’s involvement in negotiations is "nonsense" as the West is in charge of making decisions in Ukraine.[11] Lavrov stated that the Kremlin would respond seriously to any noteworthy proposals from the United States.[12] Lavrov’s and Putin’s statements are indicative of ongoing Russian information operations that aim to reject Ukraine’s sovereignty and delegitimize Kyiv’s right to negotiate, shifting the onus for negotiations onto Western officials, whom the Kremlin believes to be more willing to offer concessions that Ukraine could not accept and could seek to compel Ukrainian officials to negotiate on terms more favorable to Russia.[13]

Putin continues efforts to reinvigorate Russia’s defense industrial base to support a protracted war in Ukraine. Putin visited workers at the Obukhov State Plant—part of the Almaz-Antey Russian state-owned defense industrial company—on January 18.[14] Putin stated that the Russian defense industry currently can produce more than it could previously in an unspecified past time frame and stated that Russia will achieve the defense industrial production level that Russia needs.[15] Putin acknowledged that workers at the Obukhov factory work three shifts a day and reiterated that defense industry workers were exempted from mobilization, likely because Putin needs to keep specialized workers in Russia’s defense industrial base.[16] Putin also used this visit to draw historical parallels between the Great Patriotic War and the current war in Ukraine. Putin and Obukhov workers discussed how over 6,500 workers at the Obukhov plant died during the Great Patriotic War and how Russia is "absolutely justified" in fighting against neo-Nazis in Ukraine today.[17]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is becoming increasingly bold in his verbal attacks against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Prigozhin criticized the MoD’s new guidelines for Russian troops in Ukraine that restrict the use of certain personal electronic devices in combat zones and set stricter guidelines for men’s grooming standards on January 18.[18] Prigozhin defended Russian line soldiers who do not adhere to grooming standards (Prigozhin observed that beards are customary for many Muslim and Orthodox Christian fighters) and claimed that soldiers’ use of smartphones and tablets is necessary for modern warfare.[19] Prigozhin stated that "war is the time of the active and courageous, and not of the clean-shaven who turned in phones to the warehouse."[20] Prigozhin further criticized out-of-touch Russian MoD officials who must "develop along with the development of modern warfare, learn how to effectively kill the enemy and seize territories," and not "comb everyone under your ridiculous rules, principles and whims."[21] Prigozhin’s statement was the latest of several designed to undermine confidence in the MoD and promote Prigohzin as the face of the Russian "special military operation" in Ukraine.[22] Prigozhin’s comments reflect a cowboy approach to war that is unsuited to the development and maintenance of an effective large-scale and disciplined modern military.

Prigozhin directly attacked Russian President Vladimir Putin’s presidential administration and insinuated that some officials working there are traitors who want Russia to lose the war in Ukraine—one of Prigozhin’s boldest attacks against the Kremlin to date.[23] Prigozhin weighed in on an ongoing Russian policy debate about banning YouTube and stated that some officials in the Kremlin presidential administration oppose banning YouTube because it would undermine their effort to have the United States and Russia reestablish relations after Russia loses the war in Ukraine.[24] Prigozhin stated that such officials think that the United States will "forgive [Russia] its sins" of supporting "pro-Russian interests" and "supporting Putin" if Russia begs for Western forgiveness after losing the war.[25] Prigozhin called these officials "traitors of the people" who proclaim exalted pro-Russian values but nevertheless live and vacation abroad and "support the West in every possible way."[26]

Prigozhin and other notable voices in Russia are carving out a new space to criticize Russian President Vladimir Putin without fear of retribution. Prigozhin and other prominent Russian nationalists such as Igor Girkin, a former Russian militant commander and prominent critical voice in the Russian milblogger information space, have been opening a new sector in the Russian information space where certain figures can criticize Putin and the highest echelons of the Russian government without any apparent retribution. Igor Girkin heavily implied that he would support the removal of Russian President Vladimir Putin from office in his most direct criticism of Putin to date on January 10, for example.[27] Putin has decided to not censor these voices for far.

A helicopter transporting Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs officials crashed in a residential area in Brovary, Kyiv Oblast on January 18. Ukraine’s State Emergency Service announced that the crash killed 16, including Ukrainian Interior Minister Denys Monastyrsky and three children, and injured 30, including 16 children.[28] The crash damaged a local kindergarten and a large residential building.[29] Ukrainian authorities have not yet specified the cause of the crash.[30]

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech commemorating the siege of Leningrad continued to illustrate that Putin remains uncertain about his ability to significantly shape the Russian information space.
Putin’s speech is likely part of a larger informational effort to wrap the "special military operation" inside the greater Russian national mythos of the Great Patriotic War (the Second World War) to increase Russian support for a protracted war and mobilization.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov augmented these efforts to increase Russian support for a protracted war by explicitly and ludicrously claiming that Ukraine and the West are pursuing the genocide of the Russian people.
Putin continues efforts to reinvigorate Russia’s defense industrial base to support a protracted war in Ukraine.
Putin and Lavrov continue to deny Ukrainian sovereignty and outright reject direct negotiations with Ukraine.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is becoming increasingly bold in his verbal attacks against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin.
Prigozhin and other notable voices in Russia are carving out a new space to criticize Russian President Vladimir Putin without fear of retribution.
Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions near Kreminna.
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Soledar, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
The Russian MoD continues to attempt to downplay the role of the Wagner Group in claimed tactical advances in the Soledar area.
Ukrainian officials have indicated that Russian forces are concentrating in Zaporizhia Oblast, possibly for a large defensive or offensive effort.
Russian forces’ increasing use of incendiary munitions to conduct what appear to be otherwise routine strikes in southern Ukraine supports ISW’s recent assessment that Russian forces likely face a shortage of conventional artillery rounds.
Ukrainian and Russian sources continued to indicate that Russian authorities are likely preparing for a second wave of mobilization.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions near Kreminna on January 18. Geolocated footage published on January 18 indicates that Russian forces have made marginal advances south of Ploshchanka (17km northwest of Kreminna).[31] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 18 that Russian forces attempted to counterattack near Kreminna but that Russian forces are unlikely to launch a counteroffensive in the area in the near future.[32] Haidai also stated that Russian forces are transferring equipment to the other side of the Krasna River, which flows through Kreminna, in preparation for defensive operations and that Russian forces are continuing to move reserves to the Svatove-Kreminna line.[33] Geolocated footage published on January 17 shows Russian forces moving reserves and military equipment near Severodonetsk (15km southeast of Kreminna).[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[35]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Soledar on January 18. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attempted to advance towards Verkhnokamianske (20km northeast of Soledar), Spirne (18km northeast of Soledar), and Krasnopolivka (3km north of Soledar).[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Sil (3km northwest of Soledar).[37] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian "volunteers of assault detachments" captured Sil, although ISW still cannot independently verify Russian claims that Russian forces control the settlement.[38] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Soledar by the end of January 16 and that they continue to defend against Russian forces on the outskirts of the settlement.[39] Geolocated footage posted on January 18 indicates that Russian forces have likely advanced further west of Soledar in Dvorichchia (2km west of Soledar).[40] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Krasna Hora (5km southwest of Soledar).[41]

The Russian MoD continues to attempt to downplay the role of the Wagner Group in claimed tactical advances in the Soledar area. The Russian MoD’s use of "volunteers of assault detachments" to describe the formations that supposedly captured Sil likely refers to Wagner Group fighters. The Kremlin previously challenged Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s claim that Wagner Group forces were solely responsible for capturing Soledar.[42] The Russian MoD faced significant backlash when it failed initially to acknowledge the Wagner Group in its announcement of the capture of Soledar.[43] The Russian MoD is likely using odd language to simultaneously shield itself from criticism that it is not acknowledging the Wagner Group while also downplaying the Wagner Group’s role in tactical advances in the Soledar area.

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on January 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut itself and Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group fighters attempted to advance to the western outskirts of Klishchiivka and are engaged in fierce battles with Ukrainian forces near the settlement.[45] The Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces attempted to advance towards Pivnichne (22km southwest of Bakhmut).[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on January 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within 32km southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Nevelske, Marinka, and Pobieda.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to cut a road that runs through part of Ukrainian-controlled Marinka.[48] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that an Akhmat Special Forces Regiment successfully stormed a Ukrainian stronghold in the direction of Marinka.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that the stronghold was located south of Marinka near Novomyhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[50] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a ground attack near Kamianske (5km northeast of Avdiivka), where Ukrainian forces reportedly still control the H-20 highway.[51] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[52]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian officials have indicated that Russian forces are concentrating in Zaporizhia Oblast, possibly for a large defensive or offensive effort. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Russian forces conducted unspecified offensive actions near Hulyaipole and Orkhiv, an inflection from the General Staff’s normal reporting of the Zaporizhia Oblast front.[53] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Starukh stated recently that Russian forces are concentrating in Zaporizhia Oblast and later intensified shelling in Zaporizhia Oblast, as ISW has previously reported.[54] Other Ukrainian officials have recently reported that Russian forces are transporting large convoys of military personnel, equipment, and defensive fortifications along critical logistics lines throughout Zaporizhia Oblast.[55] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated that Russian forces train mobilized personnel on the Arabat Spit in Crimea and then transport them to unspecified areas east, which could include Zaporizhia Oblast.[56] It is currently unclear which effort Russian forces aim to support by concentrating in Zaporizhia Oblast. However, Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on January 13 that new pro-Russian volunteers from Serbia arrived in Zaporizhia Oblast to "defend the front lines," suggesting that Russian forces may be preparing for a defensive effort.[57] Russian milbloggers and minor occupation officials, including Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov, have claimed for months that Ukrainian forces are preparing for an offensive in Zaporizhia Oblast.[58] Rogov claimed on January 18 that Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhia direction began preparing for a defensive rather than offensive effort, suggesting that Rogov may aim to prepare the information space for a battle in the Zaporizhia direction without inciting panic over a possible future Ukrainian counteroffensive.[59]

Russian forces’ increasing use of incendiary munitions to conduct what appear to be otherwise routine strikes in southern Ukraine supports ISW’s recent assessment that Russian forces likely face a shortage of conventional artillery rounds.[60] Footage shows that Russian forces used incendiary munitions to strike Kherson City overnight on January 17-18, the second observed instance of Russian forces using incendiary munitions in Kherson City within 24 hours and the third observed instance of Russian forces using incendiary munitions in Ukraine within the past two weeks.[61] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Administration Head Oleksandr Starukh stated that Russian forces fired incendiary munitions at an unspecified area along the Zaporizhia Oblast front line on January 18.[62] Ukrainian strikes against Russian military assets along critical ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in southern Ukraine likely exacerbated an existing shortage.

Russian forces continued defensive operations in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on January 18. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Southern Military District tank elements in Kherson Oblast fired at unspecified targets on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast and prevented Ukrainian forces from landing on the east bank of the Dnipro River.[63] This report suggests that Ukrainian forces occasionally reach east bank Kherson Oblast, assuming that the milblogger meant to say east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, (which Russian forces control), rather than the Ukrainian-controlled west (right) bank. Russian forces continued routine fire against areas in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast on January 18, including Kherson City and its environs.[64] Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian force concentrations in Ahaimany on January 12-16 and Velyka Lepetikha on January 18.[65]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Ukrainian and Russian sources continued to indicate that Russian authorities are likely preparing for a second wave of mobilization. Pskov Oblast Deputy Artur Gaiduk claimed on January 16 that the Kremlin responded to his inquiry on the status of mobilization, stating that the call-up of mobilized persons has ended but that Putin’s initial partial mobilization decree remains active.[66] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on January 18 that military recruitment centers are increasing recruitment efforts among older men and migrants from former Soviet republics.[67] The Ukrainian Resistance Center that Russian military recruiters in North Ossetia are mobilizing people who struggle with drug addiction.[68] Russian lawmakers submitted a bill to the Russian State Duma on January 16 to defer mobilization for farmers, entrepreneurs, and other small business owners.[69]

Russian authorities continue to struggle with and crack down on insubordination and desertion within Russian forces. A Russian source reported on January 18 that Russian authorities conducted a manhunt for a Russian military servicemember who escaped from his unit and traveled through Voronezh to Lipetsk Oblast.[70] The source claimed that the soldier opened fire on police and died in the shootout.[71]Russian authorities charged eight mobilized personnel from Kaliningrad Oblast with desertion after the personnel traveled from Luhansk Oblast to Podolsk, Russia, via taxi and bus with their weapons.[72] An Omsk Oblast military court sentenced one mobilized servicemember to six years in a strict regime penal colony for assaulting and threatening to kill his commander.[73] A Russian source claimed that police in Lipetsk Oblast had to intervene with 200 military personnel who rioted due to the lack of heat on the train transporting them to the front lines.[74] Radio Free Kavkaz reported on January 15 that Dagestani contract personnel of the 136th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 58th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District refused to fight in Ukraine or follow their commander’s orders, and left Ukraine for their permanent base in Buynaksk, Dagestan.[75]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities are intensifying efforts to consolidate economic control of occupied territories. Russian-appointed Governor of Sevastopol Mikhail Razvozhaev announced on January 18 that Russian state-owned Sberbank began operations in Russian-controlled Crimea and claimed that a large number of Sberbank ATMs will activate within one year.[76] A Russian milblogger complained about Sberbank’s inability to open ATMs in Crimea any sooner and suggested that it will take eight years for Sberbank to operate in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[77] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 18 that Russian occupation authorities have levied a 15-20% fee when Ukrainian citizens withdraw the hryvnia (Ukraine’s national currency) and have artificially inflated prices of the hryvnia in occupied territories to promote a societal transition to the Russian ruble.[78] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported on January 18 that Russian occupation authorities are raiding small businesses and forcing Ukrainian enterprises to accept the ruble.[79] Russian forces and occupation authorities continued intensifying law enforcement measures to identify pro-Ukrainian civilians and partisans in occupied territories on January 18. A Kherson Oblast Telegram channel reported on January 18 that Russian forces and occupation authorities are searching for partisans under the guise of anti-terrorist operations in occupied Hola Prystan, Kherson Oblast.[80] The Telegram channel amplified reports that Russian occupation forces and authorities plan to search Hola Prystan residents’ cell phones and advised locals to purge their data.[81] A Russian source reported on January 18 that Russian forces detained four people in an unspecified area in Kherson Oblast under charges of being a Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) sabotage group.[82] Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov stated on January 18 that Russian state media is boasting about reported Russian successes at identifying and expelling alleged Ukrainian partisans from occupied territories.[83] A Russian source claimed on January 18 that Russian officials are transferring counterintelligence officers from Russia to occupied territories as occupation authorities continue to face persistent challenges in maintaining adequate counterintelligence operations in occupied territories.[84]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing efforts to consolidate administrative control of occupied territories. Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on January 18 that Russian occupation authorities gave residents in occupied Ivanivka Hromada, Kherson Oblast, a three-day deadline to submit documentation to reregister houses and land under Russian law.[85] Russian media outlet "MVD Media" stated on January 18 that the Russian State Traffic Directorate has opened 21 registration and examination divisions in occupied territories and has facilitated over 55,000 public administration transactions in occupied territories since December 14.[86] MVD Media stated that the State Traffic Directorate will no longer require that drivers pass an exam in order to receive Russian driver’s licenses, noting that the special procedure for providing public services in occupied territories is valid until January 1, 2026.[87]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing to restrict civilian movement from Russian-occupied Ukraine. Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on January 18 that Russian occupation authorities have not yet honored previous promises to reopen the Vasylivka checkpoint, previously the only exit from occupied Kherson Oblast, on January 15.[88] Khlan also reported that Russian forces are continuing to incessantly shell Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast, and evacuating residents to Russia.[89] Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov stated on January 18 that Russian occupation authorities in Zaporizhia Oblast are deporting Ukrainian residents without warning, forcing them out of their homes with little to no belongings.[90]

Russian occupation authorities continue to face bureaucratic issues in maintaining a sufficient pro-Russia workforce in occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Russian officials are importing civilians from Russia and Russian-occupied Crimea to perform administrative tasks as occupation authorities continue to face resistance from Ukrainian workers and struggle to recruit collaborators in occupied territories.[91]

ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the current assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv.

ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.

Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

Nothing significant to report.

Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

A local Russian media outlet in the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug reported on January 17 that mobilized soldiers from Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug deployed to Belarus for training.[92]
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense reported that Russian and Belarusian pilots continued conducting joint combat training tasks as part of the joint Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV) on January 18.[93] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced that Commander of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces Colonel Andrey Lukyanovich is presiding over these exercises.[94]
Belarusian mechanized elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced that elements of the Belarusian 6th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade conducted unspecified tasks in an unspecified location as part of a combat readiness check on January 18.[95]

Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 18 and reported that Russian and Belarusian forces are conducting exercises on interactions between airforce and ground force elements during offensive operations.[96]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70367

[10] kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70367

[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-zelenskiy-peace-plan-absurd-... com/politics/1564139

[12] https://tass dot com/politics/1564139

[14] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70368

[15] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70368

[16] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70368

[17] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70368

[55] ttps://t.me/andriyshTime/5970; https://t.me/andriyshTime/5926; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1167; https://t.me/energoatom_ua/11492

[67] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/v-rf-hotuiutsia-do-novoi-khvyli-mobilizatsii-pid-prytsilom-viiskkomativ-zhyteli-moskvy-vvodytsia-zaborona-zbyratysia-hrupamy-ponad-20-liudei.html

[68] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/18/rosiyany-mobilizuyut-do-vs-rf-narkozalezhnyh/

[69] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/business/articles/2023/01/16/959198-otsrochku-ot-mobilizatsii; https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/63c66c6c9a794738d0bb50f1; https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/bill/278782-8

[72] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/18/na-vosmeryh-mobilizovannyh-uehavshih-s-oruzhiem-na-taksi-iz-lnr-v-podolsk-zaveli-delo-o-dezertirstve

[73] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/18/mobilizovannogo-iz-omskoy-oblasti-prigovorili-k-shesti-godam-po-obvineniyu-v-napadenii-na-komandira

[78] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/17/okupanty-zagostryuyut-gumanitarnu-kryzu-na-tot-aby-zmusyty-lyudej-otrymuvaty-rosijski-pasporty/

[79] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/17/okupanty-zagostryuyut-gumanitarnu-kryzu-na-tot-aby-zmusyty-lyudej-otrymuvaty-rosijski-pasporty/

[92] https://muksun dot fm/news/2023-01-17/posledniy-zalp-mobilizovannye-yugorchane-iz-omska-otpravilis-v-belarus-2639125

understandingwar.org

2. 8 Lessons for Taiwan From Russia’s War in Ukraine

Pretty sound advice.

The eight:

1. National security cannot rely solely on promises of peace, even in writing.

2. Continuity of government operations both demonstrates and bolsters a people’s determination and will to resist a military onslaught.

3. A military strategy based on sea denial.

4. Take threat signals seriously and strengthen defenses rapidly.

5. Redesign investment strategies to account for military asymmetry.

6. Design an effective communications strategy.

7. Strengthen defensive resilience.

8. Conduct joint training with allied partners but prepare for the worst-case scenario

8 Lessons for Taiwan From Russia’s War in Ukraine | Russia Matters

January 18, 2023

Tzu-yun Su

russiamatters.org

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power in China have raised fears of a comparable military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Moscow has annexed, on paper, parts of eastern Ukraine that it sees as its traditional territory and regards NATO as a hostile force. China, meanwhile, sees Taiwan as a local government and the Taiwan Strait as an internal sea. Such claims of sovereignty and maritime rights challenge international norms embraced by the West and its allies, as well as some of their interests, thus creating contestation beyond the borders of the regions in question.

While the fighting in Ukraine is on land, and thus very different from the maritime battlefield that would surround Taiwan, there are still many things my island nation can learn from Ukraine's defensive operations. One similarity in particular is that Taiwan, like Ukraine, is a relatively weak power facing the threat of a much larger one—and that asymmetry lies at the heart of many of the lessons outlined below, including that a nation’s security cannot rely solely on promises of peace and that continuity of government operations is vital.

In some key respects, Taiwan finds itself in a more advantageous position than Ukraine. It is geographically separated from its adversary by the strait and its GDP in 2021 was nearly four times Ukraine’s by one measure,1 giving Taiwan the financial leeway to bolster its defenses in advance.

Before considering lessons for Taiwan, it is important to note that China has also learned from the Russian-Ukrainian war, most notably by improving its psychological warfare capabilities, which have increasingly targeted Taiwan, and enlarging its nuclear arsenal (a process that began before the current war). Nuclear weapons afford Beijing a “political denial” capability, in addition to its conventional military anti-access/area-denial capabilities, to deter other countries from assisting Taiwan. The fact that Moscow's nuclear arsenal has kept the West from sending troops into Ukraine has likely reaffirmed China’s drive to accelerate the build-up of its nuclear arsenal and rocket forces.

Below I have listed eight possible lessons for Taiwan from the Ukraine war.

1. National security cannot rely solely on promises of peace, even in writing. While dialogue may help reduce misunderstandings, it is useless against a determined aggressor. The so-called Budapest Memorandum of 1994, which provided assurances meant to safeguard Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, did not prevent Moscow from annexing Crimea 20 years later or starting a full-blown war early last year. Likewise, the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and its protocols did not keep the Nazis from invading the Soviet Union in June 1941.

2. Continuity of government operations both demonstrates and bolsters a people’s determination and will to resist a military onslaught. Western countries originally thought Ukraine would quickly fall. However, the courage of President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian people succeeded in resisting the Russian army and made the European countries understand that Ukraine was the first front of defense of democracy and succeeded in gaining international support. In practical terms, Zelensky and other senior officials have stayed in Kyiv, kept the trains running, empowered local authorities and volunteers to help those affected by Russian attacks and tried tenaciously to repair damaged infrastructure.

3. A military strategy based on sea denial. Ukraine may not have seemed well-prepared before the war—corruption in the defense sector, for example, impacted war preparations—but it was able to resist effectively after the war started. In addition to demonstrating courage and will, the reinstatement of military conscription after 2014 provided the Ukrainian army with sufficient reserve manpower to play a key role in defending the frontlines against the Russian army and attacking Russian rear lines of communication, including by flank attack or circuitous means. Taiwan, with its democratic beliefs, espouses a policy of strategic defense and will never launch a first strike, so its military strategy must be deterrence. It is necessary to ensure counterstrike capability and credibility in order to deter effectively; therefore, lower cost and high survivability of precision-guided weapons systems become the preferred choice and can make good use of Taiwan's geographical characteristics to quickly establish Taiwan's sea denial capability in responding to China's threats.

4. Take threat signals seriously and strengthen defenses rapidly. Beijing has signaled in its "White Paper on Taiwan Policy" and in Xi's speeches that it will never promise to renounce the option of using force against Taiwan; official Communist Party communications likewise make it clear that Xi wants to see the unification of Taiwan with mainland China. These policies are even more explicit than Russia's publicly stated concerns about Ukraine drawing closer to NATO and statements, in its military doctrine and elsewhere, about Moscow’s right to protect its citizens beyond its borders. Faced with such a clear signal of threat, Taiwan must quickly increase its defense budget to strengthen its war readiness, in my view: By raising spending to 3% of GDP, we can build sufficient military capabilities and readiness.

5. Redesign investment strategies to account for military asymmetry. By some estimates, China spends 17 times more on its military than Taiwan, so Taiwan needs investments that boost its chances of defending itself successfully. Military strategy is like a symphony that must combine very different capabilities. Aside from Stinger and Javelin missiles, the war in Ukraine has highlighted the value of long-range defensive weapons such as M777 howitzer and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System（HIMARS）. The same would apply in the Taiwan Strait. Relying only on small, short-range weapons systems would make the sea an enemy highway. Taiwan needs modern military technology and precision-guided munitions that favor the defender and would allow Taiwan’s smaller force to destroy the enemy's amphibious fleet and prevent it from landing. This will be helped along by Taiwan's special five-year budget of $8.5 billion to enhance air and sea missile capabilities. The main force, in my view, should be ground-based anti-ship and air-defense missiles, uncrewed vehicle systems and counter-strike missiles that help keep the enemy at bay. (This is also good value for money: For example, it may take 24 months to construct a frigate but only three and a half days for Taiwan to build an anti-ship missile; Ukraine's sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva with two anti-ship missiles serves as a good example of the effectiveness of such asymmetry.) The challenge is that Taiwan must also contend with coercive gray-zone campaigns that may become China’s “new norm”: quasi-military operations using warplanes and warships close to Taiwan's airspace and waters to create psychological pressure. This makes it necessary to also invest in platforms such as fighter planes and warships.

6. Design an effective communications strategy. Ukraine's experience in international communications is also valuable. Taiwan must make the international community understand that Taiwan does not see China as an enemy, but that China sees democracy as an enemy. Taiwan is democratic and China is authoritarian. This is a competition of systems. The issue of the Taiwan Strait is not an issue of unification versus independence. Taiwan’s position should be cast as anti-communist, not anti-China. This, in my view, will help counter Beijing's propaganda about the "One China Principle" because in the PRC constitution the Chinese Communist Party is the only legal ruling party of China, which means that Beijing's assertion of “one China” equals one-party rule. Breaking Beijing’s strategic narrative could spare Taiwan a lot of trouble and obstacles and gain more international support.

7. Strengthen defensive resilience. Taiwan’s government has announced the resumption of conscription, replacing four-month training with one-year military service, which will help improve Taiwan's defensive resilience, in my view. According to a Taiwanese poll released in August, 65.5% of respondents agreed that year-long compulsory military service should be reinstated. Conscription will provide more manpower to destroy the small number of enemy troops (amphibious or airborne) that do come ashore and, at the same time, instill a sense of "citizen soldiers." Ukraine has also been relying on conscription as part of its attempts to repel the Russian invasion.

8. Conduct joint training with allied partners but prepare for the worst-case scenario. Pre-war joint exercises involving U.S., NATO and Ukrainian forces, as well as the emergency training during wartime, have been plentiful and seemingly effective. The West’s sharing of real-time intelligence with Ukraine has, meanwhile, greatly contributed to Kyiv’s ability to effectively combat the invading Russian forces. Similar assistance from allies would likewise contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Despite Washington's efforts to provide various kinds of assistance to Taiwan, including military exchange, there are still many obstacles, not least due to the lack of formal diplomatic relations. For Taiwan, this is full of uncertainty—I personally position international politics as an art—and that is why Taiwan must still prepare for the worst-case scenario and the prospect of fighting alone.

Since the Battle of Marathon during the first Persian invasion of Greece, the history of war is replete with cases of small armies defeating large enemies, and Ukraine offers Taiwan strategic inspiration in terms of systematic political-military thinking. Taiwan is already strengthening various defense preparations, including continuous government operations, civil defense, critical infrastructure protection and strategic material reserves. The lessons of Ukraine's defensive war have shortened the learning curve for Taiwan and will be a good reference. Taiwan understands that it will never become a "free rider" in security matters. Therefore, Taiwan needs “armed democracy” to protect its own survival and the security of its partners.

russiamatters.org

3. SOF HEALTH DEEP DIVE: CANCER IN SOF

This is a problem that does not get enough visibility.

My evidence is only anecdotal but based on my SOF related social media feeds there does seem to be a lot of cancer among our veterans in numbers that seem greater than average or what they should be. Perhaps it is because I see too many names of people I know.

Video at the link: https://msofc.org/cancer/

SOF HEALTH DEEP DIVE: CANCER IN SOF

By MSOFC Editor | December 5, 2022

Save

On December 19th, 2022, we hosted a live Q&A with several experts (jump to experts) leading the way to understand cancer trends in the special operations community – several of whom are cancer survivors themselves. We heard from a SOF spouse who shared her moving story about losing her husband to cancer, and also spoke to the culture shift needed in SOF to eliminate the stigma of seeking care. Another common theme was the difficulty of reaching the veteran population with up-to-date information on SOF-specific risk factors and exposures, recommended screenings, and treatment options. To that end, please share this page widely with any special ops service members, veterans, family members, and providers in your networks to help us get the information and resources (jump to resources) to everyone who may be affected by cancer.

Cancer is a devastating diagnosis, but with early detection and quality care – there is hope.

As mentioned during the event, MSOFC is collecting the contact information (link) of current and former special ops service members and family members impacted by a cancer diagnosis who are interested in potentially sharing their story for the U.S. Special Operations Command study.

And if you attended the live event, or watched the recording, please share your feedback (here) so we can continue to improve these events in the future. Thank you!

DEEP DIVE REPLAY

The MSOFC team pulled out some key take-aways by the minute to highlight questions frequently asked. You can easily jump to these spots by clicking on the timestamp in the YouTube video description.

00:07:30 Introduction
00:03:47 War is Toxic
00:12:30 Common Exposures in SOF
00:33:00 Lifestyle & Nutrition Protective Factors
00:36:36 Documenting Exposures on Active Duty
00:40:52 State of the Research on Cancer in the Military
00:45:34 Upcoming Navy SEAL Foundation Survey
00:47:26 Common Cancers in Military Population
00:54:05 Upcoming SOCOM Cancer Study
00:58:05 Development of SOF Cancer Screening Protocol
01:02:30 Blood Biomarker Screening Uses & Limitations
01:08:13 Genomic Testing for Targeted Therapies
01:18:26 Family Support in Seeking Screening & Care
01L23:21 Nurse Case Management in Cancer Care
01:26:53 Vanessa’s Story as Surviving Spouse
01:32:23 Peer-to-Peer Health Coaching
01:38:14 Reaching SOF from Qualification to Post-Service
01:48:23 Survivorship – Life After Cancer
01:58:00 Closing Comments

DEEP DIVE EXPERT SPEAKERS

Rula Geha, MD

Medical Director of Soteria Precision Medicine Foundation

Alexander Lazar, MD, PhD

The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center

Bryan Stepanenko, MD, MPH

Army Family Physician

Chelsey Simoni, RN, MSN, MPH, CCM

Clinical Nurse Researcher

Co-Founder of HunterSeven Foundation

Geoff Dardia

Director of TFDSOF Health Initiatives Program

Rob Newson, PhD, MSc, MA

MSOFC Cancer Task Force Chair

Former Navy SEAL

RESOURCES ON CANCER IN SOF

HELPFUL WEBSITES AND ARTICLES

HunterSeven Foundation: Research, Education, and Immediate Needs
Soteria Precision Medicine Foundation Services
Veterans, Military Service, and Cancer Risk. By Christina Bach, MBE, LCSW, OSW-C, FAOSW. “There are approximately 50,000 new cancer cases in Veterans reported annually. As the Veteran population continues to age, this number will continue to rise. This is an unexpected risk of military service. A service member likely doesn’t think about his or her risk of developing life-threatening cancer, 20 years later, as a result of exposure to chemicals or radiation.”

FACT SHEETS AND PRINTABLES

MSOFC Fact Sheet on Cancer in SOF

MSOFC Fact Sheet: Cancer in Special Operations
HunterSeven Foundation Fact Sheet: VA Caregiver Program
HunterSeven Foundation Resource: SOF Transition Chart
HunterSeven Foundation Resource: Cancer Screening Chart
HunterSeven Foundation Fact Sheet: Galleri x HunterSeven Early Detection Blood Test

RESEARCH & ACADEMIC PAPERS

Slow Burns: A Qualitative Study of Burn Pit and Toxic Exposures Among Military Veterans Serving in Afghanistan, Iraq and Throughout the Middle East. “During deployment to the Persian Gulf War and Southwest Asia theatre of operations, Veterans often experienced various hazards, foremost being open-air burn pits and oil well fires. While over 23 presumptive conditions (ranging from brain cancer, interstitial lung disease, and lymphomas to sleep/mood disorders, depression, and cognitive impairment) have been studied in connection with their military-related exposures, there is a paucity of qualitative research on this topic. This is especially true in the context of explanatory models and health belief systems, vis-à-vis underlying social and cultural factors. The current paper provides a balanced conceptual framework (summarizing causal virtues and shortcomings) about the challenges that Veterans encounter when seeking medical care, screening assessments and subsequent treatments.”
A Pilot Study of Airborne Hazards and Other Toxic Exposures in Iraq War Veterans. “During their deployment to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), many Veterans were exposed to a wide array of toxic substances and psychologic stressors, most notably airborne/environmental pollutants from open burn pits. Service members do not deploy whilst unhealthy, but often they return with a multitude of acute and chronic symptoms, some of which only begin to manifest years after their deployment. Our findings, while preliminary in nature, suggest that Iraq War Veterans who participated in our survey reported a decrease in overall physical fitness and increased respiratory clinical symptoms compared with pre-deployment periods. The objective of this report is to provide information that will benefit how combat Veterans are cared for post-deployment. Strategies for a wider and more comprehensive assessment and medical screening process post-deployment are recommended.”

If you missed the November Team Room you can watch the replays at the Global SOF Foundation website. And check out other virtual SOF health events by subscribing to MSOFC’s YouTube channel.

4. Tech titans are a 'risk to democracy:' Ian Bremmer

Tech titans are a 'risk to democracy:' Ian Bremmer

Julie Hyman and Daniel Howley

Wed, January 18, 2023 at 9:13 PM GMT+1·3 min read

finance.yahoo.com · by Julie Hyman

Tech leaders ranging from Mark Zuckerberg and Jeff Bezos to Elon Musk are powerhouses of industry, generating billions of dollars in revenue for their companies each year. But according to Eurasia Group President Ian Bremmer, their focus on growth and their companies' unchecked strength pose an existential risk to the U.S.

In an interview with Yahoo Finance Live at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Bremmer claimed that tech CEOs and founders are contributing to business models that hurt America's democracy.

"The fact is that those people, worth hundreds of billions of dollars, also at the same time have literally no interest or conception in their role as stewards for civil society and American democracy," Bremmer said.

"All of America's lionizing of free markets and capitalism has also led to a vastly more dysfunctional democratic process, because these companies are inadvertently, but nonetheless, aligning with business models that destroy democracy."

In a December 2021 op-ed that appeared in Foreign Affairs titled, “The Technopolar Moment: How Digital Powers Will Reshape the Global Order,” Bremmer wrote that Big Tech companies are "exercising a form of sovereignty” and are increasingly shaping geopolitics. "They have created a new dimension in geopolitics—digital space—over which they exercise primary influence. People are increasingly living out their lives in this vast territory, which governments do not and cannot fully control," he wrote.

Facebook Chairman and CEO Mark Zuckerberg testifies at a House Financial Services Committee hearing on October 23, 2019. REUTERS/Erin Scott

And while Democrats and Republicans in Congress recognize tech giants' unfettered expansion could prove dangerous, Bremmer says neither side of the aisle can agree exactly why.

"Democrats, Republicans, they don't agree on what should be done. They don't agree on what the problem is. Some people want to break them up. Some people want regulate them harder. Some people think it's all about free speech. Some people think it's about woke capitalism," Bremmer said. "I mean you pick a congressman, you have a different issue with AI, right?"

Members of Congress have been battling over how they can bring Big Tech to heel for years. While they agree that they need to pass some form of legislation to protect user privacy, address competition, and revise Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (which allows web operators to moderate user speech and content as they see fit), there's been little movement toward any kind of regulatory solution.

While Republicans believe something needs to be done about Big Tech's alleged anticompetitive behavior, they don't want to stifle growth in the industry. Democrats, however, believe they should take bigger steps to curtailing tech companies' ability to box out smaller competitors.

And though both sides want to reform Section 230, Republicans say they need to ensure that tech companies can't limit speech on their platforms, while Democrats want firms to moderate content more aggressively.

Bremmer also called out tech companies for attempting to get Americans addicted to their services.

“These are literally platforms where the A-B testing they’re doing is: How can we better addict our product?" he said. "And our product happens to be citizens of the United States and other democracies around the world.”

So when will Congress make meaningful reforms with regards to Big Tech? According to Bremmer, it'll likely still take some time.

"I would say until you have a serious crisis," he said.

Julie Hyman is the co-anchor of Yahoo Finance Live, weekdays 9am-11am ET. Follow her on Twitter @juleshyman. Dan Howley is Yahoo Finance's tech editor. Follow him on Twitter at @DanielHowley.

—

More Yahoo Finance coverage of Davos 2023:

Click here for the latest technology business news, reviews, and useful articles on tech and gadgets

Read the latest financial and business news from Yahoo Finance

Download the Yahoo Finance app for Apple or Android

Follow Yahoo Finance on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Flipboard, LinkedIn, and YouTube

finance.yahoo.com · by Julie Hyman

5. Lavrov accuses the West of launching 'hybrid war' against Russia

Admit nothing, deny everything, and make counter accusations. Or are you mirror imaging? Or tell us how you are conducting hybrid warfare by accusing the West of doing so.

Lavrov accuses the West of launching 'hybrid war' against Russia

euronews.com · January 18, 2023

Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov has lashed out at the West's support for Ukraine in a series of fierce rhetorical blows during an hour-long news conference in Moscow.

As the West steps up military aid for Kyiv, the Kremlin's rhetoric appears to become increasingly hostile.

Speaking to reporters, Russia's top diplomat claimed the west was to blame for the war in Ukraine.

"What is taking place now in Ukraine is the result of many years of preparation by the United States and its allies to start a global hybrid war against the Russian Federation," Lavrov said.

"In fact, nobody hides this. Just recently Croatian President Milanovic said that it is NATO’s war against Russia. It is a straightforward and honest statement," he added.

The West decides - and decides for Ukraine without Ukraine.

Sergey Lavrov

Russian Foreign Affairs Minister

Lavrov also appeared to rule out peace talks, saying it was the West which had prevented Kyiv from negotiating.

"The West decides on behalf of Ukraine. It was them who forbade Zelenskyy to reach an agreement with Russia at the end of March last year when such an agreement was ready", he claimed.

"The West decides - and decides for Ukraine without Ukraine."

Russian President Vladimir Putin has long blamed the West for provoking the war in Ukraine and has justified his decision to send troops into Ukraine on 24 February by the need to “demilitarise” and “denazify” the country, and to prevent Kyiv from joining NATO.

Ukraine and its Western allies have rejected those arguments as a cover for an unprovoked act of aggression.

euronews.com · January 18, 2023

6. ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Has the U.S. and Taiwan Trapped

Excerpts:

Strategic clarity might offer the best chance for a superior Taiwanese force posture that is aligned with the United States’ defense strategy. Moreover, as Taipei enhances its asymmetric defenses, the need for U.S. intervention decreases. Ukraine’s successful fight against Russia’s invasion demonstrates how the right weapons, paired to an effective strategy, can defeat a seemingly overwhelming force—all at relatively little cost to the United States and other NATO allies. Strategic clarity would resolve the political obstacles currently preventing Taiwan from adopting a similar posture. Clarity would advance U.S. interests by improving Taiwan’s defense, lowering the risk of a wider war, and containing China.

For its proponents, the idea of strategic ambiguity seems to have become an end in itself that has not, and logically cannot, adapt to the disruptive growth in Beijing’s military power. The conditions under which the policy worked seem to have evaporated with China’s rise.

‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Has the U.S. and Taiwan Trapped

Foreign Policy · by Raymond Kuo · January 18, 2023

As the United States settled into the winter holiday season, China dispatched 71 aircraft for military maneuvers around Taiwan, its largest single incursion ever. The incident came on top of hundreds of flights over the past 18 months as well as military exercises and missile launches near the main island in the wake of then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit in August last year. Alongside warnings of further military reprisals, Beijing has also increased its nuclear warhead stockpile, deployed a hypersonic glide vehicle, launched a third aircraft carrier, and further modernized its military.

Meanwhile, the United States continues to debate how best to maintain the status quo in the region, support the self-ruled island, and deter a Chinese attack. Washington’s current policy is one of “strategic ambiguity”—based on the theory that it’s best to keep all parties guessing whether, and to what extent, the U.S. military will intervene in a war across the Taiwan Strait. Is that still the appropriate strategy to deter Beijing? Or should Washington publicly commit to Taiwan’s defense, as former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen urged on Jan. 5?

Strategic ambiguity typically is understood as deliberately creating uncertainty in Beijing and Taipei about whether the United States would intervene in a war. This supposedly creates dual deterrence: The threat of U.S. intervention prevents China from invading, and the fear of U.S. abandonment prevents Taiwan from sparking a war by declaring independence, which China considers a casus belli. This approach, supporters contend, has kept peace for decades and prevented entrapment, whereby the United States unwillingly gets pulled into war.

Strategic ambiguity, however, may rest on faulty concepts and little systematic evidence. The United States has never officially articulated what it means nor adopted it as policy. At this point, strategic ambiguity may be doing more harm than good. And there are good arguments that Washington might consider switching to a policy of strategic clarity—such as a NATO-style security guarantee for Taiwan—instead.

Washington wants Taipei to increase defense spending and implement its porcupine strategy before making further, unspecified commitments.

Political science considers strategic ambiguity a form of pivotal deterrence, where one state prevents two others from going to war against each other. But this only works under three conditions. First, the pivot (the United States, in this case) must possess decisive military power over the adversaries (China and Taiwan). Second, both adversaries must want war more than the pivot does. (Otherwise, the pivot should simply line up with its preferred partner.) Finally, neither adversary can be irrationally committed to going to war. When all three conditions hold, the pivot can swing its decisive power against whichever country is upsetting the status quo. Because it doesn’t commit to any particular course of action, both adversaries are unsure about the U.S. reaction and therefore avoid escalation.

Across the Taiwan Strait today, the first two of these conditions no longer hold. The Chinese military budget has increased fivefold since 2001, and it now fields the world’s largest missile force, the second-largest navy, and the third-largest air force. According to a Rand Corporation report, in 2017, China already possessed parity with or even an advantage over U.S. forces in five of nine operational areas involved in a Taiwan scenario. In deterrence theory, the United States is no longer a pivot.

Beijing’s rising power also deters Taiwanese adventurism. Taipei doesn’t want a war because it knows that it will be the first to suffer Beijing’s retaliation. No major Taiwanese politician has advocated declaring independence from China since 2005. In any event, Taiwan’s president has no constitutional authority to unilaterally declare independence, and solid majorities consistently favor maintaining the status quo for fear of a military reprisal.

As Beijing’s military capabilities have increased, pivotal deterrence has steadily faltered—exactly as the theory predicts. In 1996, Beijing fired missiles over the island to protest the Taiwanese president speaking at his college reunion in the United States. But it avoided further provocation after Washington sailed two aircraft carriers through the strait. After Pelosi’s 2022 trip to Taiwan, China responded with military exercises and missile overflights. Washington restricted itself to verbal condemnation and avoided any military displays, even as the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has continued its coercion and incursions.

Despite this, proponents cling to strategic ambiguity in large part because they worry that an unconditional security guarantee would enable Taiwan to entrap the United States into going to war against China.

But entrapment almost never happens. One scholar found only five possible instances since 1945, and in only of them—Vietnam—was the United States dragged into war. Countries wriggle out of alliance promises by attaching conditions, taking advantage of ambiguity, employing legal language tricks, or simply walking away. Washington could put guardrails on any defense promises, such as mandatory crisis consultation and nullification if Taiwan declares independence. Even NATO’s supposedly ironclad mutual security guarantee is implemented “in accordance with [each country’s] respective constitutional processes,” language specifically inserted by U.S. negotiators. If the United States can avoid entrapment by NATO, then it likely can avoid it by Taiwan.

Further, strategic ambiguity is largely irrelevant to whether China decides to attack Taiwan. China “has already priced in a full U.S. defense,” U.S. Sen. Chris Murphy tweeted. Its operational plans assume Washington will intervene. U.S. and allied power—not ambiguity—is what deters China. Ambiguity by itself offers little additional benefit.

Strategic ambiguity seems to have snared the United States and Taiwan in a prisoner’s dilemma.

That means that if anything is likely to deter Chinese aggression, it is further improvements to Taiwan’s security. Strategic ambiguity could cause more harm than good on this front as well.

As I’ve written, U.S. intervention is essential to defeating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Taipei must ensure that the United States shows up, and arms sales are the clearest and strongest indication of U.S. support. Taipei purchases high-end weapons systems, believing that Washington’s willingness to sell these platforms raises the likelihood that it will step in to defend the island.

However, analysts agree that Taiwan’s best strategy is an asymmetric, porcupine defense, which is embodied in a Taiwanese military plan called the Overall Defense Concept. The island would bristle with mines and anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-vehicle missiles, buying time for the U.S. military to arrive. However, high-end equipment like F-16 aircraft, heavy tanks, and submarines are useless for this mission; they are likely to be destroyed in any invasion’s opening salvo. But Taipei cannot fully switch to asymmetric defense because strategic ambiguity leaves it uncertain whether Washington will intervene.

This creates a U.S. problem in Taiwanese politics. Former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou stated, “The Americans … will sell us weapons and provide us with intelligence, but they won’t send troops.” Kuomintang, his political party, is skeptical of Washington’s intentions, prompting some members to advocate greater autonomy in Taiwan’s defense decisions. Other experts go so far as to suggest accommodating China. This attitude shouldn’t come as a surprise. Military alliances allow small states to resist overwhelming threats. Without them, countries tend to bandwagon with their threatener to avoid a hopeless war.

If this were to happen in Taiwan, Washington would lose a critical partner in strategic competition with China. Beijing could use Taiwan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” to project power into the Pacific, choke off U.S. support to Japan and South Korea, dominate the Philippines, and further consolidate control over the South China Sea.

Strategic ambiguity seems to have snared the United States and Taiwan in a prisoner’s dilemma. Washington wants Taipei to increase defense spending and implement its porcupine strategy before making further, unspecified commitments. Taiwan spends a larger proportion of its government budget on defense than even the United States, but it wants to receive the U.S. commitment its defense concept depends on before further implementation. The Taiwanese will to fight increases significantly if Washington intervenes. Each side’s strategy hinges on the other’s actions, and each side is stuck waiting while China continues modernizing its military.

Strategic clarity may offer a way out of this dilemma. Of course, any shift would have to be implemented carefully, with military preparations in place before any public announcement of a U.S. commitment. But as the weaker, threatened party, Taiwan runs much greater risks from closing the door on accommodating China; it would need private, concrete assurances that these risks would be rewarded. These, of course, would have to be tied to clear markers that Taipei is actually implementing its existing defense strategy.

Strategic clarity might offer the best chance for a superior Taiwanese force posture that is aligned with the United States’ defense strategy. Moreover, as Taipei enhances its asymmetric defenses, the need for U.S. intervention decreases. Ukraine’s successful fight against Russia’s invasion demonstrates how the right weapons, paired to an effective strategy, can defeat a seemingly overwhelming force—all at relatively little cost to the United States and other NATO allies. Strategic clarity would resolve the political obstacles currently preventing Taiwan from adopting a similar posture. Clarity would advance U.S. interests by improving Taiwan’s defense, lowering the risk of a wider war, and containing China.

For its proponents, the idea of strategic ambiguity seems to have become an end in itself that has not, and logically cannot, adapt to the disruptive growth in Beijing’s military power. The conditions under which the policy worked seem to have evaporated with China’s rise.

Foreign Policy · by Raymond Kuo · January 18, 2023

7. Russia’s Fifth Column in Ukraine Is Alive and Well

Russia’s Fifth Column in Ukraine Is Alive and Well

A year after the invasion, Ukraine is riddled with Russian collaborators and sympathizers.

By Stefanie Glinski, a journalist covering conflicts and crises with a focus on Afghanistan and the wider Middle East.

Foreign Policy · by Stefanie Glinski · January 17, 2023

KHERSON, Ukraine—The sound of incoming and outgoing fire was almost constant as the older woman paused for a moment near Kherson’s main hospital, a shopping cart with several water bottles that she had just filled up at the riverbank of the Dnipro resting by her side.

“It was better when the Russians were here,” she said, and either way, “Crimea rightfully belongs to Russia.” She kept on, praising Putin, declining to share her name or to be photographed, and explaining that, at 75, she was still “young at heart” as several Ukrainian soldiers gathered around her. A missile hit nearby, loud and clear, and then another one. Moments later, the woman was off, pulling her two-wheeled cart along—and the soldiers had, in the meantime, already informed the police.

“Anyone can be a Russian collaborator or traitor—age, gender, or background doesn’t matter,” explained Maj. Serhiy Tsehotsky of the 59th Motorized Brigade, adding that it’s the police’s job, not the army’s, to “find out where she lives, who she talks to, and whether she’s involved in illegal activities.”

“The key collaborators have gotten out of Kherson, but many remain,” he said.

Informants, traitors, and collaborators have supported Russia in fighting Ukraine from the start. They have helped geolocate targets throughout the country and even managed to infiltrate the government. Thousands have been detained in the past year; hundreds of court cases have been opened.

“Russian agents are everywhere: in the government, the judicial system, the church. They are members of parliament, judges, priests, and of course civilians,” said Iryna Fedoriv, the editor in chief of Chesno, a Kyiv-based nonprofit that has operated in Ukraine for the past decade and has, since the start of the full-scale invasion, exposed more than 1,000 collaborators—of whom 47 percent are politicians and 27 percent judges.

“Collaborators have infiltrated the entire system—the police, the courts, even the government—and while many people have been detained, many fewer cases have been sent to court,” she explained.

“That’s because the system is rotten and corrupt. We urgently need to reform it. We still have members of parliament from pro-Russian parties. We have pro-Russian judges. Why do we keep them there? We need to get rid of them. Otherwise, we’re destroying our own country.”

A wintry street scene in Kyiv, Ukraine. Residents say Russian collaborators can be found anywhere.

A street scene in Kyiv on Nov. 30, 2022. Residents say Russian collaborators can be found anywhere—in every city, the church, the courts.

While there have been drastic changes since the start of last year’s invasion, Russian influence remains deeply ingrained in many parts of Ukraine, which was part of the Soviet Union for nearly 70 years, from 1922 until 1991. The Kremlin’s ideology still largely regards Ukraine as a historical part of Russia. People throughout eastern Ukraine have traditionally spoken Russian—even though many have now switched to Ukrainian—and Russian propaganda television channels have largely been available, watched predominantly by the older population. Even Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s famous television show, Servant of the People, aired with the majority of characters speaking Russian. But historical ties between people in eastern Ukraine, particularly, and Russia have been reappraised since the 2013-14 Maidan Revolution—and especially since the start of Russia’s full-bore invasion last year.

Former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who was ousted during the revolution, consistently opted for close ties with Russia during his term and now lives there in exile. In recent years, more than 15 pro-Russian political parties have been prohibited throughout Ukraine.

Even the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) needs to be “cleansed of moles and traitors,” spokesperson Artem Dekhtiarenko admitted, saying the agency had given special importance to this.

“There are enemy agents in the highest authorities and among high-ranking officials, unfortunately,” he said, pointing to some of the SBU’s recent successes.

Ukrainian soldiers ride a tank in an undisclosed location in eastern Ukraine.Ukrainian soldiers ride a tank in an undisclosed location in eastern Ukraine.

Peace May Be a Long Way Off in Ukraine in 2023

Both sides believe they can win on the battlefield.

Since last February, the SBU’s investigators have initiated around 2,500 criminal proceedings based on signs of collaborative activity, detained 600 enemy agents and spies, and neutralized more than 4,500 cyberattacks and incidents on state institutions—three times more than in the previous year. A man who had provided the Russians with information about critical infrastructure facilities in the Donetsk region and who had tried to geolocate Ukrainian rocket launchers was recently sentenced to 12 and a half year in prison.

In two other cases, the head of a directorate of the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the head of a unit of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers were detained in Kyiv; both had passed intelligence to Russia regarding Ukraine’s defense capabilities as well as personal data of Ukrainian law enforcement officers.

“Finding collaborators, Russian spies, and agents is constant work and one of our main priorities. We work with the local population. We find witnesses of war crimes and listen to people who tell us about traitors and collaborators from among local residents,” said Dekhtiarenko, the SBU spokesperson.

Throughout the country, and especially in recently liberated cities such as Kherson, posters encourage the civilian population to help.

“Do you know about a collaborator or traitor? Inform us,” a newly placed ad reads at the entrance to Kherson. Most civilians have a story about a collaborator they have come across: a neighbor who was sharing Russian propaganda on social networks or a co-worker accused of spying. And while some cases of collaboration are obvious, many people’s agendas are hidden.

A doctor at the Kherson Children's Hospital speaks about a trusted colleague in Ukraine who turned out to be a Russian collaborator.

Inna Holodnyak, the head doctor at Kherson Regional Children’s Hospital, speaks on Nov. 21 of her “pain and disappointment” when she discovered that a trusted colleague and well-regarded doctor turned out to be a Russian collaborator.

At Kherson Regional Children’s Hospital, head doctor Inna Holodnyak spoke of her “pain and disappointment” when she discovered that one of her longtime trusted colleagues and a well-regarded doctor turned out to be a collaborator. “He was the only doctor at the hospital who chose to work with the Russians. He even handed them all our health documents,” she said, adding that he has since escaped into Russian-occupied territory.

At the start of Kherson’s occupation, Holodnyak had about 300 patients at the hospital. Today, only a few children remain—including cancer patients who haven’t been able to receive their treatment. Most others were evacuated when the Russians first arrived. Today, electricity, water, and medicine are still scarce.

Holodnyak refused to collaborate when the Russians approached her, knowing that the decision could cost her life. She spent several months in hiding after it had become too dangerous to work at the clinic, but she was back in her office as soon as the city had been liberated. “I’ve since had to admit to myself that Russian collaborators are everywhere: in every workplace, every city. It’s difficult to trust anyone,” she said.

“There’s a lot of work to be done,” said Fedoriv of Chesno. While her organization remains an independent watchdog, since the start of the full-scale invasion it has occasionally worked directly with the police and the country’s intelligence agency.

“We remain critical of the government, but we also need to work with them. Times are different now. This is war—and we all need to fight together.”

Foreign Policy · by Stefanie Glinski · January 17, 2023

8. Chinese researchers are making claims that, if true, would threaten national security

Game changer. But the only secure encryption remains one time pads. Time to return to old school.

Chinese researchers are making claims that, if true, would threaten national security

NPR · by Jenna McLaughlin · January 18, 2023

Chinese researchers are claiming they can break modern encryption with today's quantum computers. Experts are skeptical, but the possibility remains a top U.S. national security concern.

AILSA CHANG, HOST:

The threat of hackers piercing through the digital protections that guard state secrets - that's the sort of thing that keeps national security experts up at night. So it was news when Chinese researchers recently claimed that they could break a common encryption algorithm with an emerging technology called quantum computing. But some encryption experts are skeptical.

NPR's Jenna McLaughlin is here to explain. Hey, Jenna.

JENNA MCLAUGHLIN, BYLINE: Hey, Ailsa.

CHANG: So what exactly are these Chinese researchers claiming?

MCLAUGHLIN: So there's a brand-new paper that came out on an academic site called arXiv. The authors say that they found a method where today's very basic quantum computers could already break a very common form of modern encryption. It's honestly a really complicated paper, but the experts explained it to me like this - the authors used what's called a heuristic algorithm to try to break encryption. That's basically a formula that's designed to solve a problem really fast by starting with an estimate and using the result to get closer to the answer.

CHANG: OK.

MCLAUGHLIN: You can think of it like throwing a dart at a dart board and using that first hit to try to help you get closer to the bullseye. And all of this is scary because the U.S. government says that its adversaries - China, in particular - is collecting tons of encrypted, sensitive U.S. data in the hopes that, one day, they can use a quantum computer to decrypt it all. If this paper is right, that's a lot sooner than they thought it was.

CHANG: Wow. OK. That's disturbing. But how possible is that, actually? Like, what are experts are saying?

MCLAUGHLIN: So first of all, it's important to clarify that the website where this paper appeared, arXiv, is commonly used in the academic community, but it's not peer-reviewed. Even so, experts in math and physics have taken a closer look already because of the buzz that the paper was getting. They say that it's interesting in terms of incremental scientific progress, but there's basically no evidence at this point that the method would work at scale. At the end of the paper, even the researchers admitted that more work needs to be done.

CHANG: OK. So does that mean that there's no reason to worry? Like, what should be the takeaway from this paper and all of the response to it?

MCLAUGHLIN: So there's not exactly no reason to worry. Experts say that there will, indeed, come a day when quantum computers can break encryption. It's just not here yet. It's really hard to predict these kinds of breakthroughs, but experts say we're probably closer to decades away from that. The real takeaway, I think, is that it's really good to exercise skepticism, especially on overhyped subjects like quantum computing, particularly when geopolitics are involved.

CHANG: Sure.

MCLAUGHLIN: It's tough to speculate about the researchers' intentions when they published, but by putting these claims out there, it had the impact of creating some fear that China is way ahead of the U.S.

CHANG: OK. But you mentioned that China's already stealing data and waiting to decrypt it. So is it just too late at this point to protect those secrets that they've already stolen?

MCLAUGHLIN: It might indeed be too late to protect some of the things already stolen. But, you know, for national security officials who need to keep things secret for a really long time, they've got to do what they can. So that includes designing algorithms that are quantum-proof. The U.S. government's already working on that, but it's going to take a long time. It could also mean rethinking entirely how we store data. Some researchers think breaking files up into little pieces could help prevent an enemy from piecing them back together. You know, a lot of really smart people are working on this full-time.

CHANG: That is NPR's Jenna McLaughlin, another very smart person. Thank you so much, Jenna.

MCLAUGHLIN: Thanks, Ailsa.

NPR · by Jenna McLaughlin · January 18, 2023

9. A Tale of Two Failed Armies

Excerpts:

The original sin of the whole Afghan debacle was a bipartisan effort when the decision was made to implement the nation-building strategy by creating a military in our image. That was initially a Republican project. If any of our generals saw the fallacy of that, they lacked the moral courage to question it. To some extent, it worked in Iraq, which had the road and administrative infrastructure to implement it. A reasonably mechanized and motorized army could be resupplied using those networks. Trying to implement a similar approach in the 15th-century environment of Afghanistan was a fool's errand.

The proper operational approach would have been to build a national army on a decentralized, regional basis. Troops should have been recruited and based locally, where they could fall back on tribal support when needed. Supplies, with the exception of ammunition, could have been procured locally as well. Such a system would have helped local economies and increased support for the government. As it was, only the Taliban were buying locally. This would have cut out the need for resupply over roads that did not exist or by an air force that would never have been up to the task. Instead of pay going through layers of national and regional army headquarters, where each level took its cut before some or any reached the troops in the field, there could have been two or three levels within which accountability against graft could have been monitored more closely.

...

The strategic failure in Afghanistan was truly a bipartisan civilian and joint military venture. We lost Afghanistan, and the Russians will very likely lose in their attempt to dominate Ukraine. The Russians will probably try to pin the blame for poor performance entirely on their troops.

American civilian and military leaders -- former and present -- do not have that luxury. They need only look in the mirror.

A Tale of Two Failed Armies

military.com · by 17 Jan 2023 Military.com | By Gary Anderson · January 17, 2023

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps colonel who served as a civilian adviser In Iraq and Afghanistan.

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to opinions@military.com for consideration.

Russia's most recent debacle, the latest in a long string caused by tactical incompetence in the Ukraine, highlights the lack of leadership, training and combat discipline that plagues the Russian army from top down.

Soldiers were apparently housed by the hundreds in a building where ammunition was also stored. Whether through a lack of proper command discipline or simple inattention to security, many were making cell phone calls home. That made it fairly simple for Ukrainian electronic warfare personnel to triangulate an ideal target for an M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, rocket attack that resulted in anywhere from 60 to 400 Russian deaths, depending on whose counting one trusts.

The number of casualties suffered by Russian troops since last February, when the invasion began, has exceeded by multiples those suffered in two decades by American forces in Afghanistan. Pentagon officials gleefully point out the superiority of the discipline, training and weaponry of U.S. forces. All that is true, but it is also irrelevant.

Our exit from Afghanistan was as humiliating as that of the Russians from Ukraine will likely be. Great tactics cannot make up for bad strategy and flawed operational art. In this, both Russian and American political-military leadership has shown amazing incompetence.

At the strategic level, the Russians miscalculated Ukrainian national will. At first, they tried to execute shock and awe by decapitating the Kyiv government. After failing, they have tried terror bombing and the destruction of Ukrainian infrastructure to compel a loss of will; that has not worked either. Instead of dividing Ukraine, they brought it together in ways that political action never could.

In Afghanistan, the American strategy was nation-building. We wanted to turn a country with an 80% illiteracy rate that excluded women from any public role into a western-style liberal inclusive democracy. The majority of Afghan men might have accepted our money, but few accepted our vision as something to die for. The concept was flawed from the start. The idea of negotiating for a one nation-two systems agreement with the Taliban might have worked, or at least bought time for our allies, but was never seriously considered. By 2021, it was too late to seek alternatives.

At the operational level of war, the critical vulnerability of both nations was logistics. In the case of the Russians, it was the fact that, since World War II, they have never developed an army capable of operating much more than 70 miles from its railheads. That, combined with systemic corruption in the defense logistics community, ensured that Russian troops would not be properly supported. Ammunition, fuel, food and even medical care remains in critically short supply. It adds to a justifiable sense among rank-and-file soldiers that they are led by incompetents.

To fix this, the Russian leadership would need to do two things that it currently cannot do. The first would be to totally reform the logistics system, an incredibly difficult undertaking in the midst of a war.

The second problem makes the first impossible. The very people who run the corrupt defense industrial complex are also the elites that Russian President Vladimir Putin needs to retain power. They would resist reform to the point of throwing Putin to the wolves and even actively working against him if a serious reform movement were ever undertaken.

America's operational art problem was never fully recognized at the highest levels of command. Or if it was, it was papered over. By 2012, it should have become obvious to anyone looking closely that the Obama administration's efforts to "Afghanize" the war were only an attempt to create a decent interval between our withdrawal and ultimate failure.

In the remote district where I was a civilian interagency team leader, this reality was particularly stark. Our only resupply in winter was by helicopter or airdrop because roads were nonexistent. However, we were on a strict timeline to turn over operations to the Afghans by September of that year. It was obvious to us that the Afghan battalion supported by a U.S. Marine Special Operations Team and their Italian partners would not be resupplied by the Afghan air force once we had departed. Our coalition military commanders and I sent reports to higher headquarters that were universally met by the explanation that "orders are orders."

Within weeks of our leaving, the local Afghan military had cut deals with the Taliban to live and let live, and the district reverted to effective Taliban control. This situation would be played out on a grand scale in the summer of 2021 when the Biden administration finally gave up the ghost.

The original sin of the whole Afghan debacle was a bipartisan effort when the decision was made to implement the nation-building strategy by creating a military in our image. That was initially a Republican project. If any of our generals saw the fallacy of that, they lacked the moral courage to question it. To some extent, it worked in Iraq, which had the road and administrative infrastructure to implement it. A reasonably mechanized and motorized army could be resupplied using those networks. Trying to implement a similar approach in the 15th-century environment of Afghanistan was a fool's errand.

The proper operational approach would have been to build a national army on a decentralized, regional basis. Troops should have been recruited and based locally, where they could fall back on tribal support when needed. Supplies, with the exception of ammunition, could have been procured locally as well. Such a system would have helped local economies and increased support for the government. As it was, only the Taliban were buying locally. This would have cut out the need for resupply over roads that did not exist or by an air force that would never have been up to the task. Instead of pay going through layers of national and regional army headquarters, where each level took its cut before some or any reached the troops in the field, there could have been two or three levels within which accountability against graft could have been monitored more closely.

Unfortunately, a decentralized system would have diminished the power of national politicians. Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his successors resisted this, and few senior American military leaders had the moral courage to wage the political battles that reform would have entailed. To his credit, U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus made an effort with the creation of the Afghan Local Police, but it soon became obvious that the Afghan national kleptocracy was only going to wait him out. The concept never got the support it deserved. At the end, soldiers from Kabul were defending Herat and troops from Herat were in Kandahar, often unable to send home what little money that trickled down to them. With the exception of Petraeus, most of the revolving door of generals who commanded in Afghanistan chose to go along to get along.

The strategic failure in Afghanistan was truly a bipartisan civilian and joint military venture. We lost Afghanistan, and the Russians will very likely lose in their attempt to dominate Ukraine. The Russians will probably try to pin the blame for poor performance entirely on their troops.

American civilian and military leaders -- former and present -- do not have that luxury. They need only look in the mirror.

military.com · by 17 Jan 2023 Military.com | By Gary Anderson · January 17, 2023

10. U.S. prepping major military package for Ukraine

U.S. prepping major military package for Ukraine

By LARA SELIGMAN and PAUL MCLEARY

01/18/2023 01:15 PM EST

Updated: 01/18/2023 05:38 PM EST

Politico

Friday’s announcement is expected to include Stryker vehicles, but not tanks.

U.S. Army Strykers are pictured at the National Training Center, Ft. Irwin, Calif. | U.S. Army Sgt. Michael Spandau

01/18/2023 01:15 PM EST

Updated: 01/18/2023 05:38 PM EST

The U.S. is gearing up to announce a major new weapons package for Ukraine on Friday, as top military leaders from around the world gather in Germany to discuss how to help Kyiv in its fight against Russia, according to three U.S. officials and another person familiar with the discussions.

While the next tranche will include additional artillery, ammunition and armor — likely Stryker armored combat vehicles — the U.S. is not expected to sign off on American M1 Abrams tanks, said the people, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the talks ahead of an announcement.

The Biden administration currently has no plans to send the Abrams, the Army’s 60-ton main battle tank, the people said.

The reluctance is due to the logistical and maintenance challenges of the tanks, and not over concern that their transfer could escalate the conflict, one of the U.S. officials said. This person noted that the U.S. has helped Ukraine obtain Soviet-era tanks and supports the British decision to send around a dozen of its Challenger 2 tanks.

The package will likely include a number of Strykers, an eight-wheeled armored fighting vehicle built by General Dynamics Land Systems, as well as ground-launched Small Diameter Bombs, which have a range of roughly 100 miles, two of the people said. POLITICO first reported last week that the Pentagon was considering sending Strykers in the upcoming tranche of aid. Reuters first reported that Boeing-made Small Diameter Bombs were under discussion.

This package will not include the long-range Army Tactical Missile System that can reach deep behind Russian lines in Crimea or the Donbas, according to two of the people. The Biden administration has balked at sending long-range munitions, despite Kyiv’s pleas, for fear of provoking Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The administration believes Ukraine can “change the dynamic on the battlefield” and repel Russian invaders without those missiles, an offensive weapon that can fly up to 190 miles, said Colin Kahl, the Pentagon’s top policy official.

“Our judgment to date has been that the juice isn’t really working the squeeze on the ATACMs. You never know, that judgment at some point could change, but we’re not there yet on the ATACMs,” Kahl told reporters after a trip to Kyiv this weekend.

The White House has not yet signed off on the package, which is still being finalized and could change this week. But officials expect an announcement around the regular Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on Friday, where Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. Mark Milley will meet with their counterparts to discuss new Ukraine aid.

The latest meeting comes as Kyiv raises alarms that Moscow is preparing to launch a major new offensive to take the capital city. Ukrainian intelligence officials have warned the Kremlin plans a new mobilization of up to 500,000 conscripts, while on Monday, Russia and Belarus began joint military exercises.

Pressed by Kyiv to send heavier weapons in recent weeks, Western nations have dramatically increased their pledges of new armor, aimed at helping Ukraine build new armored units for hard fighting this spring and summer. Late last year, the U.S. and the Netherlands agreed to spend $90 million to upgrade around 90 Soviet-era T-72 tanks operated by the Czech Republic for shipment to Ukraine. Germany has also pledged its Marder infantry fighting vehicle and France its AMX-10 RC, a wheeled system built around a turret-mounted 105mm gun. Canada will also provide 200 Canadian-made personnel carriers, Defense Minister Anita Anand announced on Wednesday while visiting Kyiv.

This month, the U.S. announced it would send 50 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, a tracked armored vehicle that carries an autocannon, a machine gun and TOW missiles. The administration has already provided thousands of combat vehicles, including Humvees and mine-resistant vehicles used to move troops on the battlefield.

In a sign the U.S. sees the need as urgent, senior Biden administration officials visited Kyiv over the weekend ahead of the meeting in Germany. Jon Finer, the White House deputy national security adviser; Kahl, the undersecretary of defense for policy; and Wendy Sherman, the deputy secretary of state, met with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and other senior Ukrainian officials.

“I salute everything that the Ukrainian people have done to continue to survive & endure. Frankly, that’s why Putin will lose, because his theory of victory is that we’ll give up. @POTUS & @SecDef have been clear: We will stay w/the Ukrainian people for as long as it takes,” Kahl tweeted after the visit.

But Ukraine is still pleading for Western tanks on top of the U.K.’s Challengers. A handful of nations have signaled their willingness to send their German-made battle tanks, but are waiting on a decision from Berlin to greenlight the re-export. The Leopards are seen as a better option than the Abrams because of the sheer number in use already in Europe. Leopards are also considered easier to maintain and consume less fuel.

While German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, who replaced Christine Lambrecht this week, is expected to meet on Thursday with Austin, it’s possible a decision has already been made higher up in the German government on whether to approve the transfers.

Both Poland and Finland have said they’re willing to send some of their Leopard tanks to Ukraine, but no movement has been made publicly to make that transfer appear imminent. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said this week he’s not yet ready to make a decision on the Leopard tanks in his army’s warehouses, however. Other countries that field the German tanks, such as Spain and Norway, have not commented publicly on the matter, though Spain expressed a willingness to send some Leopards last summer.

“We believe the provision of modern tanks will significantly help and improve the Ukrainians’ ability to fight where they are fighting now and fight more effectively going forward,” National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby told reporters on Wednesday, referring to European tanks. He declined to comment on any upcoming aid package from the U.S.

This week’s Ramstein meeting promises to be one of the most significant of the monthly gatherings of defense ministers, as the 50 nations discuss how to prepare Ukraine for more hard months of fighting. In addition to the recent British announcement of Challenger tanks and the new American package, Finland is expected to unveil its largest Ukraine military aid shipment to date, according to one person familiar with the thinking in Helsinki. Finland doesn’t publicize its contributions, but has sent artillery, small arms and winter clothing in the past.

Western leaders have been cautious about publicly pushing Germany too hard on the tank issue. Support for Ukraine is “about making sure that each of us can do what we can do,” James Cleverly, the U.K.’s foreign secretary, told reporters in Washington on Tuesday. “And our ability to support is going to be different from one nation to another.”

Meanwhile, the U.S. kicked off new training programs for Ukraine this week: an expanded course to enhance Ukrainian forces’ fighting skills in Germany, and training on the Patriot missile system at Fort Sill, Okla. Ukraine is set to receive three Patriot batteries, a defensive system designed to shoot down missiles and aircraft: one from the U.S. and one each from Germany and the Netherlands.

Before heading to the Ramstein meeting, Milley stopped by to see the training in Germany, which is expanding the pipeline to 500 Ukrainian soldiers per month and includes instruction on how to coordinate infantry maneuvering with artillery support.

Alexander Ward and Erin Banco contributed to this report from Davos, Switzerland.

POLITICO

Politico

11. Don’t appease China, warns Taiwan’s likely presidential successor

Appeasement never works, especially with authoritarian regimes.

Don’t appease China, warns Taiwan’s likely presidential successor

William Lai urges Taiwanese to unite in the face of ‘the expansion of China’s authoritarianism’, in first comments since taking party leadership

The Guardian · January 19, 2023

Appeasing China will not bring peace, Taiwan’s vice-president has said, days after he was elected head of the ruling party in a move that makes him a prime presidential contender at the next election.

William Lai, 63, is seen as a likely successor to President Tsai Ing-wen, who is barred from running again after her second four-year term ends in May 2024.

Lai has been more outspoken on Taiwanese independence than Tsai, and he is openly loathed by Beijing for that reason.

“Appeasement cannot buy peace,” Lai said on Wednesday in his first comments on China since assuming the Democratic Progressive party leadership.

Taiwan extends compulsory military service amid mounting tensions with China

He urged Taiwanese people to unite in the face of “the expansion of China’s authoritarianism”, saying that “only by uniting all people and strengthening our defence capabilities can we truly protect our security”.

Self-governed Taiwan lives under constant fear of an invasion by China, which claims the island democracy as a part of its territory to be seized one day, by force if necessary.

China has ramped up military, diplomatic and economic pressure on Taiwan since Tsai’s 2016 election as she rejects China’s stance and views the island as a sovereign nation.

Beijing has said any Taiwanese move towards a declaration of a formal independence would prompt a military response.

Lai said on Wednesday there was no need to declare independence because Taiwan was “already a sovereign country”, echoing previous comments by Tsai.

The Guardian · January 19, 2023

12. U.S., Germany head for showdown over tanks for Ukraine

This tank dispute is obviously important on multiple levels. How will it turn out and what effect will it have on NATO relations?

U.S., Germany head for showdown over tanks for Ukraine

Reuters · by Max Hunder

Summary
Germany's Leopard tanks seen as best suited for Ukraine
All eyes on Germany when defence leaders meet on Friday
Austin in Germany, to meet new defence minister
Russia's Wagner mercenaries claim to capture village

KYIV/BERLIN, Jan 19 (Reuters) - Ukraine pleaded on Thursday for the West to finally send it heavy tanks as the defence chiefs of the United States and Germany headed for a showdown over weapons that Kyiv says could decide the fate of the war.

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was in Germany on Thursday to meet new Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, just hours after Pistorius was sworn into office.

The next day both will convene dozens of allies to pledge weapons for Ukraine at the United States' Ramstein Air Base, a meeting billed as a chance to provide the arms to shift the war's momentum in 2023.

Billions of dollars worth of military aid is expected, and countries including Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden have already announced new packages of armoured vehicles and air defences. But the meeting's success could depend on whether it brings heavy tanks, which Kyiv says it needs to fend off Russian assaults and recapture occupied land.

"We have no time, the world does not have this time," Andriy Yermak, head of the Ukrainian presidential administration, wrote on the Telegram messaging app on Thursday.

"The question of tanks for Ukraine must be closed as soon as possible," he said. "We are paying for the slowness with the lives of our Ukrainian people. It shouldn't be like that."

A big pledge of tanks requires resolving a stand-off between Washington and Berlin, which has so far blocked allies from sending its Leopard 2 tanks, workhorse of militaries across Europe.

Washington and many Western allies say the Leopards - which Germany made in the thousands during the Cold War and exported to its allies - are the only suitable option available in big enough numbers.

A German government source said Berlin would lift its objections if Washington sends its own Abrams tanks. U.S. officials say the Abrams, which runs on powerful turbine engines, uses too much fuel for Kyiv's strained logistics system to keep many of them supplied at the front.

Poland and Finland have already said they would send Leopards if Germany lifts its veto, and other countries have indicated they are ready to do so as well. Britain added to the pressure by breaking the taboo on heavy tanks last week, offering a squadron from its fleet of Challengers, though far fewer of these are available than Leopards.

Germany has been reluctant to send offensive weapons that could be seen as escalating the conflict. Many of its Western allies say that concern is misplaced, with Russia showing no sign of backing away from its onslaught against Ukraine.

Colin Kahl, the Pentagon's top policy adviser, said on Wednesday Abrams tanks were not likely to be included in Washington's next massive $2 billion military aid package, which will be headlined by Stryker and Bradley armoured vehicles.

[1/9] German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius receives his U.S. counterpart, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin for talks, at the Defence Ministry in Berlin, Germany January 19, 2023. REUTERS/Michele Tantussi

NOT THERE YET

"I just don't think we're there yet," Kahl said. "The Abrams tank is a very complicated piece of equipment. It's expensive. It's hard to train on. It has a jet engine."

Germany has said the tank decision is the first item on the agenda of Pistorius, named to replace Christine Lambrecht who quit as defence minister this week. At a ceremony after being sworn in, Pistorius pledged to support Ukraine, including with military hardware, but gave no specifics.

"These are not normal times, we have a war raging in Europe. Russia is waging a brutal war of annihilation on a sovereign country, on Ukraine," he said.

Opening his meeting Pistorius, Austin described Germany as one of Washington's closest allies and thanked it for its suppport for Ukraine so far.

Ukraine, which has relied primarily on Soviet-era T-72 tank variants, says the new tanks would give its troops the mobile firepower to drive out Russian troops in decisive battles.

Western tanks have more effective armour and better guns than Soviet-era counterparts, which have been destroyed in their hundreds on both sides during the 11 months of war in Ukraine.

Fighting has been concentrated in the south and east of Ukraine, after Russia's initial assault from the north aimed at taking Kyiv was thwarted during the first months Russia's "special military operation".

After big Ukrainian gains in the second half of 2022, the frontlines have largely been frozen in place over the past two months, with neither side making big gains despite heavy casualties in intense trench warfare.

Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the Russian mercenary force Wagner which has taken a leading role in fighting near the eastern city of Bakhmut, claimed on Thursday his forces had seized the village of Klishchiivka on Bakhmut's outskirts. Kyiv has previously denied that the settlement has fallen. Reuters could not confirm the situation there.

Prigozhin, who recruits convicts from Russian prisons with promises of pardons for his privately-run force outside the regular military command, complained last week that his fighters were not being given enough credit by top brass.

Live: Ukraine House in Davos stages the event "The Path to Victory: A Conversation with Ukraine's Top Diplomat" on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum.

Reporting by Reuters bureaux; Writing by Peter Graff; Editing by Simon Cameron-Moore and Angus MacSwan

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Max Hunder

13. Robert Kaplan’s "The Tragic Mind" Counsels Prudence and Realism in Ukraine and the South China Sea

Another book for my "to read" pile. This is an interesting thesis: foreign policy made "in the shadow" of the failures of Afghanistan and Iraq.

I ordered it (unfortunately no Kindle edition). Here are the book flap reviews:

“Classical drama provides crucial lessons for policymakers. . . . A road map for effective, well-considered policy.”—Kirkus Reviews

“Robert Kaplan has augmented his many penetrating studies of societies, regions, and strategies with The Tragic Mind. It deals brilliantly with the impact on the human mind of the changes wrought by conflicts and transformations in various historical periods. A moving culmination by one of America’s most thoughtful observers of international trends.”—Henry A. Kissinger, author of Leadership: Six Studies in World Strategy

“This is a brilliant and unique philosophical journey from the ancient Greeks through Shakespeare’s canon and on to modern existential literature. But above all, it is a meditation on geopolitics grounded in a lifetime of global reporting.”—Admiral James Stavridis, 16th Supreme Allied Commander at NATO and author of To Risk It All

“Robert Kaplan combines his knowledge of the classics with four decades of firsthand experience with wars and crises to wisely warn ahistorical Americans that all could have been helped by a greater tragic sensibility. He shows that tragedy is not fatalism or despair, but comprehension. A beautifully thoughtful essay.”—Joseph S. Nye, Jr., author of Do Morals Matter?

“Robert Kaplan has long been his own toughest critic. Now, in The Tragic Mind, he draws on Aeschylus, Euripides, and Sophocles for an unflinchingly courageous course correction: a deeply significant book for troubled times.”—John Lewis Gaddis, author of On Grand Strategy

“This is an author who has made it his business to see the world we live in. I have always read his work with awe. In this book, Kaplan takes the reader beyond the realm of information and knowledge and into the territory of wisdom. It is a profound must-read for all who wish to understand the world as it is.”—Ayaan Hirsi Ali, author of Prey: Immigration, Islam, and the Erosion of Women’s Rights

Excerpts:

Kaplan uses the Iraq and Afghan Wars as recent exhibits of the tragedy that imperils even well-intentioned actions and decisions. Saddam Hussein was a brutal tyrant who refused to abide by United Nations’ resolutions, but when the U.S. and allied forces removed him from power the anarchy that resulted drew Washington decision-makers into a military and political quagmire. Instead of recognizing the tragedy the war had created, the Bush 43 administration doubled-down and with pride and hubris sought to democratize the greater Middle East, including Afghanistan which we had invaded and occupied in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. “Suddenly,” Kaplan writes, “Americans learned that their power to change the world was circumscribed. The world had histories and traditions that were not subject to America’s own historical experience with democracy.”

Kaplan believes that American foreign policy is made today “in the shadow” of its failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, just as our mid-to-late 1970s foreign policy was made in the shadow of our failure in Vietnam. We recovered from what some called the “Vietnam syndrome,” and we can recover from the Afghan and Iraq failures. But we face much more consequential failure in a “new age of great power rivalry” if our leaders act without reference to a tragic sensibility in today’s crises. The stakes today in Ukraine and the South China Sea are far greater than in Iraq and Afghanistan. “Never before,” he writes, “has thinking tragically--and husbanding fear without being immobilized by it – been more necessary.” Unfortunately, there are no Eisenhowers, Nixons, Kissingers, or George H. W. Bushes currently at the helm in Washington.

Robert Kaplan’s "The Tragic Mind" Counsels Prudence and Realism in Ukraine and the South China Sea

By Francis P. Sempa

January 19, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/01/19/robert_kaplans_the_tragic_mind_counsels_prudence_and_realism_in_ukraine_and_the_south_china_sea_876519.html

Robert Kaplan, the Robert Strausz-Hupe Chair in Geopolitics at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, has written a short book titled The Tragic Mind that counsels American policymakers to proceed with caution in dealing with the twin crises of the Ukraine War and the increased tension in the South China Sea. His principal recommendation is for those policymakers to approach these crises with a “tragic sensibility” that looks to certain constants in history and human nature that will enable them to “think tragically in order to avoid tragedy.”

We are once again in an era of great power rivalry, and history teaches that when great powers go to war the consequences will usually be grave and in many instances unanticipated. But, according to Kaplan, it is not just history that teaches us that, but also the literary classics – especially those from ancient Greek writers like Aeschylus and Euripides, but also Shakespeare. The Greek tragedies and Shakespeare show us the unchanging nature of the human condition. The characters in their stories and plays engaged in “heroic and often futile struggles against fate” and had to make choices between lesser evils or between one good over another. Our statesmen are no different. Foreign policy “realism” is an acceptance of constraints, limits, and human imperfections. It values order and stability over chaos and anarchy.

Kaplan’s motivation for writing The Tragic Mind was his public support of the post-9/11 Iraq War, even though he worried about what a post-Saddam Iraq would look like. He admits to suffering “clinical depression” due to this mistake, confessing: “I failed my test as a realist – on the greatest issue of our time.” He writes that he kept thinking about a medieval Persian philosopher’s observation that “one year of anarchy is worse than a hundred years of tyranny.” That led him to consult the ancient Greeks who, he writes, “were too rational to ignore the power of the irrational that lay on the other side of civilization.” The tragic mind knows that civilization is fragile. Thus, the need for order.

And Kaplan notes that it is experience--the experience of war--that most shapes a tragic mind. War erases the illusions of progress held by intellectuals and commentators who have never experienced it, and it reveals what Kaplan calls the “human proclivity for destructiveness.” War confirms for Kaplan (who experienced it as a reporter embedded with U.S. troops in Iraq and as a foreign correspondent covering the carnage of conflicts in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Sierra Leone) the wisdom of the Greeks who held that “the tension between civilization and savagery is constant and ubiquitous.” And the literary classics, he writes, confirm that “[b]arbarism always lies within us.” The ancient Greeks understood this and created the mythical god Dionysus, whom Kaplan calls the “patron-god of Tragedy.” Walter Otto, the German classical philologist and expert on Greek mythology, described Dionysus as “the raving god whose presence makes man mad and incites him to savagery and even to lust for blood.”

A tragic sensibility, Kaplan writes, would also have cautioned Western leaders against “the blithe assumption that the end of the Cold War would lead to the unimpeded spread of democracy and free markets worldwide,” the widely held assumption that a post-Cold War China would transform into a more liberal society, the idea that NATO expansion would be grudgingly accepted by post-Cold War Russia, and that geoeconomics would replace geopolitics as the fulcrum of international politics. Kaplan is well-versed in classical geopolitics, having written several books on the subject, including The Revenge of Geography and The Return of Marco Polo’s World (parts of which were originally written for the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment). He understands – like Halford Mackinder, Nicholas Spykman and Alfred Thayer Mahan did before him – the importance to Western security of maintaining the geopolitical pluralism of Eurasia. An appreciation of geopolitics is also part of having a “tragic sensibility.”

Kaplan believes that Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger and George H. W. Bush possessed tragic minds that made them capable stewards of U.S. foreign policy. Eisenhower had to send thousands of American soldiers to their deaths in World War II, yet as president he ended the Korean War, skillfully managed crises in the South China Sea, prevented the Suez Crisis from becoming a great power war, and publicly warned about the undue influence of the “military-industrial complex.” Nixon and Kissinger helped reshape global geopolitics to America’s benefit by conducting triangular diplomacy with Soviet Russia and China in the midst of waging then ending the disastrous Southeast Asian war they had inherited. Bush 41 successfully managed the peaceful collapse of the Soviet empire and displayed tragic sensibility in using military power to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait without toppling Saddam’s regime. All four statesmen sided with order over anarchy.

Kaplan uses the Iraq and Afghan Wars as recent exhibits of the tragedy that imperils even well-intentioned actions and decisions. Saddam Hussein was a brutal tyrant who refused to abide by United Nations’ resolutions, but when the U.S. and allied forces removed him from power the anarchy that resulted drew Washington decision-makers into a military and political quagmire. Instead of recognizing the tragedy the war had created, the Bush 43 administration doubled-down and with pride and hubris sought to democratize the greater Middle East, including Afghanistan which we had invaded and occupied in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. “Suddenly,” Kaplan writes, “Americans learned that their power to change the world was circumscribed. The world had histories and traditions that were not subject to America’s own historical experience with democracy.”

Kaplan believes that American foreign policy is made today “in the shadow” of its failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, just as our mid-to-late 1970s foreign policy was made in the shadow of our failure in Vietnam. We recovered from what some called the “Vietnam syndrome,” and we can recover from the Afghan and Iraq failures. But we face much more consequential failure in a “new age of great power rivalry” if our leaders act without reference to a tragic sensibility in today’s crises. The stakes today in Ukraine and the South China Sea are far greater than in Iraq and Afghanistan. “Never before,” he writes, “has thinking tragically--and husbanding fear without being immobilized by it – been more necessary.” Unfortunately, there are no Eisenhowers, Nixons, Kissingers, or George H. W. Bushes currently at the helm in Washington.

Francis P. Sempa is the author of Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21^stCentury, America’s Global Role: Essays and Reviews on National Security, Geopolitics and War, and Somewhere in France, Somewhere in Germany: A Combat Soldier’s Journey through the Second World War. He has written lengthy introductions to two of Mahan’s books, and has written on historical and foreign policy topics for The Diplomat, the University Bookman, Joint Force Quarterly, the Asian Review of Books, the New York Journal of Books, the Claremont Review of Books, American Diplomacy, the Washington Times, The American Spectator, and other publications. He is an attorney, an adjunct professor of political science at Wilkes University, and a former contributing editor to American Diplomacy.

14. Kahl: U.S. Focused on ‘Next Phase’ of Ukraine Conflict

Kahl: U.S. Focused on ‘Next Phase’ of Ukraine Conflict

A big aid package is expected this week, but it likely won’t contain long-sought, controversial items like ATACMS.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

In the weeks ahead, frontline progress in the war in Ukraine will be measured not in miles but in “hundreds of meters,” defense undersecretary for policy Colin Kahl told reporters at the Pentagon on Wednesday.

Kahl, who just returned from a trip to Ukraine for meetings with that nation’s leadership, said the United States is focused on “surging those capabilities to Ukraine for the next phase of the conflict to really try to change that dynamic and continue the momentum that the Ukrainians had in the late summer and early fall.”. But that doesn’t portend a big change in the types of equipment the U.S. might send.

Kahl spoke to reporters ahead of a meeting of the Defense Contact Group in Germany later this week. The group is the assembly of nations providing military and other forms of aid to Ukraine. Observers expect the United States to announce a substantial aid package at the meeting, but some items Ukraine has asked for will not be on the list. For instance, Ukraine has repeatedly said that it wants more tanks to break through entrenched Russian positions in the country’s east. And they’ve been asking for long-range guided ATACMS missiles since the start of the conflict.

Ukraine has also asked Germany to send Leopard 2 tanks, and if the U.S. sends M1 Abrams tanks, that could compel Germany to to follow suit. But Kahl said logistics barriers and other concerns are contributing to the Biden administration’s reservations. “The Abrams tank is a very complicated piece of equipment. It's expensive. It's hard to train on…I think it's about three gallons to the mile of… fuel.”

On the issue of longer-range fires such as ATACMS, which would allow Ukraine to strike targets 185 miles away, Kahl likewise indicated no change in the Biden administration’s policy. “Our position has been—as a matter of US policy—we're not comfortable enabling strikes into Russia. We'll let you know if that changes, but that's current U.S. policy,” he said. However, the United States could send ground-launched Small Diameter Bombs, Politico reported, which have a range of 100 miles.

The new Republican majority in Congress could add a new dynamic to the conversation about how the United States aids Ukraine. Some 44 percent of registered Republican voters in a November poll said the United States is doing too much to help Ukraine’s defense efforts, and some members, such as Rep. Paul Gosar, R-Ariz., have even gone so far as to say that Ukraine is not an ally of the United States.

But that view isn’t shared by the party’s leadership. Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Ala., the incoming chair of the House Armed Services Committee, released a statement on Wednesday urging the administration to be bolder in the weapons it sends to Ukraine.

“The current handwringing and hesitation by the Biden administration and some of our European allies in providing critical weapon systems to Ukraine stinks of the weak policies of 2021, such as not sanctioning Nord Stream 2 or providing U.S.-origin Stingers before the full-scale invasion. While those policies failed to deter this conflict, the current indecision and self-deterrence will prolong it—costing Ukrainian lives. Now is the time for the Biden and [German] Scholz governments to follow the lead of our U.K. and Eastern European allies—Leopard 2 tanks, ATACMS, and other long-range precision munitions should be approved without delay,” it reads.

However, Kahl said the main thing Ukraine needs is more capable air defenses.

“At, I think, the top [of the needs list] very remains air defense. Andit's more systems, but it's also keeping their Soviet legacy systems that have proven extraordinarily effective, viable. Clearly, the Russians are hoping that through the mix of their cruise missile strikes, you know, rejiggering their air defense systems as surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, and the use of Iranian drones, they're clearly trying to turn the lights out across Ukraine…So Ukrainians know that. We know that, and as a consequence, we're committed to keeping, making sure that the Ukrainians’ [air defenses] remain viable.”

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

15. A Prosecutor Was Murdered for Investigating Iran and Argentinian Corruption

January 18, 2023 | The Algemeiner

A Prosecutor Was Murdered for Investigating Iran and Argentinian Corruption

Toby Dershowitz

Senior Vice President for Government Relations and Strategy

fdd.org · · January 18, 2023

Argentina has “serious corruption problems,” according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. Will this regrettable condition continue to conceal the truth behind the identity of those who murdered Alberto Nisman eight years ago this week?

Formally, Argentina is still looking into the suspicious death of special prosecutor Alberto Nisman, who investigated the country’s deadliest terrorist attack ever — the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, which took 85 lives and injured hundreds more. Sordid politics and some members of the country’s judiciary might still prevent a formal determination of what the nation’s Gendarmerie police concluded in 2018 and the Federal Court of Buenos Aires affirmed: that Nisman’s murder was due to his AMIA investigation, and that it was a “direct consequence” of his accusation that then-President Cristina Kirchner sought to absolve Iran of its role in the bombing in return for economic benefits for her country.

Nisman was found dead with a bullet in his head on January 18, 2015, hours before he was to present his findings that Kirchner and a dozen of her associates sought to cover up Iran’s role in the AMIA bombing. Debunking Kirchner’s allegation that Nisman had committed suicide, there was no gun powder residue on his hands.

To date, only Diego Lagomarsino, Nisman’s computer consultant, has been implicated as an accessory to murder in Nisman’s death. While Nisman himself owned a gun for protection, Lagomarsino claimed that Nisman had asked to borrow his gun. Was that part of Kirchner’s debunked suicide story, which she promptly announced after he was found dead and before any investigation had been conducted?

Nisman was well aware of the threats he faced while undertaking the dual investigations into the bombing and the alleged attempt to whitewash Iran’s role. He made public and filed formal complaints about some of the threats to his life and to his family. The threats were ugly. But he was determined to present what he learned from 40,000 wiretaps, legally obtained, which led him to present a 300-page complaint with Federal Judge Ariel Lijo on the Wednesday before he was found dead and about which he had planned to brief the Congress the next Monday.

Nisman had shared the essence of his findings with reporters and others when he filed the complaint. Kirchner must have known he had presented his initial findings to Judge Lijo. It was no secret.

Days after Nisman was found dead, Kirchner disbanded the Secretariat of Intelligence, known as the SIDE, which she believed had cooperated with Nisman in his investigation against her. A new intelligence agency, the Federal Intelligence Agency (AFI) was set up, headed by her ally Juan Martin Mena, who today is vice minister of justice.

Even after his death, when opponents of Nisman wanted to dissuade prosecutors and judges from looking too deeply into those crimes, they would often engage in not-so-subtle threats: one of Nisman’s opponnents, for example, posted an image of the person being threatened next to a picture of Nisman and asked if he wanted to face the same fate that had befallen Nisman. “Meet the next Nisman.”

In another example, the daughter of a prosecutor looking into allegations of Kirchner money-laundering, announced that neither her father nor any family members had any intention of committing suicide, signaling that if any of them were found dead, it would not be by their own hands.

In 2016, activist Fernando Esteche — one of those implicated along with Kirchner in the attempted cover up of Iran’s involvement in the AMIA bombing — proclaimed that any judge seeking to imprison Kirchner “could be found dead.”

In December 2016, Eduardo Taiano received threats in connection with his role as head prosecutor investigating Nisman’s death. The messages threatened “to do the same thing to him and his son Federico that was done to Nisman.”

In 2022, an Argentine court found Kirchner guilty of fraud during her tenure as president, for directing millions of dollars in taxpayer money to a family friend. A panel of judges sentenced her to six years in prison and banned her from ever holding public office. The prosecutor in the case, Diego Luciani, called the case “one of the most extraordinary corruption schemes” in Argentine history. Kirchner has temporary immunity and will be able to remain free due to her current role as a vice president, and can appeal the verdict.

Argentina’s President Alberto Fernandez shocked the country when he smugly sent a thinly veiled threat to Luciani as that case was proceeding. “Nisman committed suicide; I hope that the prosecutor Luciani does not do something similar.” Fernandez knows well that Nisman did not commit suicide. He had himself said before becoming president that even Kirchner knew Nisman had not killed himself. His point to Luciani was crystal clear. What was done to Nisman could be done to him.

There are national security implications for Argentina and for the world in the attempts to cover up Nisman’s murder. It was Nisman’s granular reports that provided a roadmap for law enforcement on how the Islamic Republic of Iran had penetrated, recruited, radicalized, financed, and executed terrorism in the Western Hemisphere.

His investigation exposed how Iran had created terrorist networks and sleeper cells — to be deployed at the time of its choice — throughout Latin America, including in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Suriname. The network also extended to parts of Europe, including Germany. His reports showed how Iran uses its embassy pouches, diplomatic cover, illicit financing, front companies, and other mechanisms operated out of the line of sight to carry out terrorist activities.

Iranian officials plotted the AMIA bombing in Mashad, Iran, on August 14, 1993. Many of them plotted terrorist attacks both before and after the AMIA bombing. Argentina maintains warrants for their arrest. Some of them have Interpol red notices, which seek the arrest of wanted individuals. Two of the Iranian officials implicated in planning the AMIA bombing serve in President Ibrahim Raisi’s cabinet today.

In a surreal twist, a Boeing 747 cargo plane, sanctioned by the US Department of the Treasury for ferrying weapons from Iran to Syria, is sitting on a Buenos Aires tarmac. The Iranian-owned plane was sold to Venezuela’s flagship carrier, Conviasa Airlines. It landed in Buenos Aires on June 6, 2022. Rather than carrying a small crew of four or five needed to offload automotive parts, 19 “crew members” were on the plane, including Gholamreza Ghassemi, a pilot from the Islamic Republic Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force. He was one of for Iranians on the plane. All the “crew members” were eventually released.

While the cargo plane’s exact mission has yet to be determined, one thing is clear. Iran and its proxies are not done with seeking to carry out nefarious, dangerous activities in our own backyard.

While Nisman is no longer physically with us, the lessons of his investigation, his murder, and its coverup remain. We ignore them at our peril.

Toby Dershowitz is senior vice president for government relations and strategy at the non-partisan Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow her on Twitter @tobydersh

fdd.org · by Danielle Kleinman · January 18, 2023

16. How A Digital Footprint Provides A Criminal Foothold

Download the 23 page report here: https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/fdd-memo-how-a-digital-footprint-provides-a-criminal-foothold.pdf

How A Digital Footprint Provides A Criminal Foothold

fdd.org · · January 18, 2023

January 18, 2023 | TCIL Technical Note

How A Digital Footprint Provides A Criminal Foothold

Dr. Georgianna Shea

CCTI and TCIL Chief Technologist

Download TCIL Technical Note

Executive Summary

The threat to U.S. national security and economic prosperity from ransomware, cyber-enabled intellectual property theft, and malicious code inserted into key supply chains is rising. So too is the adversarial manipulation of American elections, America’s cultural divides, and the broader fundamentals of American democracy.

Billions of dollars and some of the nation’s brightest minds are working to shore up networks and infrastructure under attack. However, nearly all academic research on countering the effects of influence operations since the early 1970s has focused on fact-checking and other efforts to educate consumers so they do not fall victim to disinformation, according to a Harvard study. Little research has focused on interventions that undermine or disable the disinformation operation and its enabling infrastructure.

FDD’s Transformative Cyber Innovation Lab (TCIL) conducted a live-fire pilot demonstrating the similarities between offensive cyber operations and cyber-enabled influence operations. TCIL partnered with the Sports Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (ISAO) and its primary sponsor, the nonprofit Cyber Resilience Institute, to conduct the pilot. TCIL leveraged Sports-ISAO’s open-source threat hunting and analysis capability during the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. The project identified the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) malicious actors use to create operational infrastructure to spread disinformation, commit fraud, and compromise systems.

After assessing the commonality in the operational digital footprint, this study offers recommendations to obstruct cyber and influence operations by identifying the dangerous loopholes in internet infrastructure that allow criminals to find safe haven.

Download

How A Digital Footprint Provides A Criminal Foothold

Laura Courchesne, Julia Ilhardt, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Review of social science research on the impact of countermeasures against influence operations,” Misinformation Review, Harvard Kennedy School, September 13, 2021. (https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/review-of-social-science-research-on-the-impact-of-countermeasures-against-influence-operations/)
Sports-ISAO is a membership organization of industry and academic stakeholders committed to the physical and cybersecurity of sporting events. See: https://sports-isao.org/
“About us,” The Cyber Resilience Institute, accessed January 4, 2023. (https://www.cyberresilienceinstitute.org/about-us/)

Read in TCIL Technical Note

fdd.org · by Daniel Ackerman · January 18, 2023

17. Regional defense partnerships rise with China’s power

Regional defense partnerships rise with China’s power

By Andrew Salmon - The Washington Times - Tuesday, January 17, 2023

washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon

Subscriber-only

SEOUL — The U.S. and its allies in the long shadow of rising China are forging a complex web of defense relationships, bilateral and multilateral, linking democracies across the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

This week, Indian and Japanese warplanes kicked off 11 days of joint drills over Japan featuring Japan’s U.S.-made F15s and India’s Russian-built SU30s. In another first, Australian and British paratroopers this month jumped alongside American and Japanese counterparts in the first exercise to unite airborne troops of all four nations in the skies above Japan.

On Jan. 11, Tokyo and London signed a “reciprocal access agreement” enabling an exchange of forces and equipment. It was based on an agreement that Australia and Japan signed a year ago.

The new partnerships paper over a yawning gap. Since the post-Vietnam War collapse of the anti-communist Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1977, no “Asian NATO” has risen to share regional defense burdens or coordinate policy toward the threats posed by a rising China or a hostile North Korea.

“For the U.S., it was easier to create unity of vision on the European continent after World War II and during the Cold War,” said Alex Neill, a Singapore-based security consultant. “There was no Marshall Plan for recovery in the Indo-Pacific, so there was an ad hoc bilateral approach.”

The U.S. is committed under various treaties to separately defend allies such as Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea and Japan. For historical and military reasons, the commitment to Taiwan is fuzzier, though President Biden has repeatedly insisted that the U.S. military will react if China takes action against Taipei.

Now, after a long vacuum, more multilateral groupings are emerging. Analysts say the endpoint is hard to ascertain.

Democracies that make up the “Quad” – Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. – are increasingly drilling together, and South Korea and Japan are showing signs of an easing of tensions that have long bedeviled U.S. strategic planning in the region. In 2021, the AUKUS partnership of Canberra, London and Washington, designed to offer Australia nuclear submarines, added another security framework to the region.

Internal changes

Some of the major players in the patchwork of new connections are finding internal changes as well.

Nominally and constitutionally pacifist Japan is spreading its military wings wider than at any other time since 1945. In the past two years, Japanese troops have drilled with partner nations in the Philippines, the Bay of Bengal and the South Pacific. The government of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has committed Japan to beefing up its offensive assets: marine landing forces, light carriers and cruise missiles that can strike an adversary from a long range.

“Japan is playing catch-up,” said Lance Gatling, a former operational planning officer with the U.S. military command in Japan. “It is chasing countries it wants to have bilateral relations with.”

Even Atlanticist Europe, shaken by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and wary of China, is looking east.

Japan and South Korea were invited to the NATO summit in Madrid last year, and German air assets, led by the commander of the German air force himself, conducted drills in Australia and Japan.

In 2021, the United Kingdom deployed its new F-35 aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, beefed up with U.S. and Dutch assets, on a 28-week maiden voyage to the Indo-Pacific. France, which maintains territories in the South Pacific, has sent its Charles de Gaulle carrier strike group on regional tours and is currently drilling in the Indian Ocean. French Rafale jets from the vessel landed in Singapore on Tuesday.

Tricky dynamics

It is all a response to two dynamics: a U.S. government demanding more from its allies and a reaction to what many in the region see as Beijing’s heavy-handedness as its economic and military prowess expand.

“The major trigger was the Trump presidency, which was a huge shock to the whole network of ‘hub and spoke’ alliances,” said Richard Javad Heydarian, an international relations professor at the University of the Philippines. “And that went hand in hand with the rise of China.”

The shifting, tricky dynamics have raised troubling questions for regional defense chiefs.

“Will the U.S. be here forever?” Mr. Gatling wondered. “I think so, but it’s a legitimate question.”

The U.S. has welcomed cooperative initiatives by like-minded partners for regional flashpoints.

They include a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan, a North Korean strike against South Korea with the threat of a nuclear escalation, a clash around China’s expanding network of maritime bases in the South China Sea, an escalation of Chinese-Japanese territorial tensions in the East China Sea, and a fresh outbreak of military clashes on the unsettled China-India border in the high Himalayas.

Weak punch, minimal commitment

Although the risks are real and in many cases growing more acute, many say the regional alignments lack backbone and staying power.

A retired Indian admiral said the Quad is a “talking shop” lacking mutual defense commitments. He noted that the alliance has no headquarters building or assigned units and no secretary-general to lead members through crises. Multiple Southeast Asian militaries — including those of Myanmar, Indonesia and the Philippines — are far more focused on domestic security threats than the strategic architecture of the region.

Some of the changes will be a long time coming, though a threat from China or North Korea could materialize sooner.

AUKUS is unlikely to deliver nuclear submarines to Australia before 2036. Japan’s role in a potential U.S.-Chinese clash over Taiwan remains hazy, and South Korean officials hesitate to even discuss the possibility of a crisis in public.

In addition, the biggest multinational grouping in the region lacks operational flexibility.

Based in South Korea, the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) comprises 16 “sending states” that defended South Korea in the 1950-1953 Korean War. At a Seoul forum last year, U.S. Forces Korea and Gen. Paul LaCamera, UNC commander, acknowledged that the powerful force has no defined mandate for a role in a conflict beyond the divided peninsula.

Except for the U.S., which has a bilateral treaty with Seoul, UNC member states are not even obligated to defend South Korea if war flares up again.

British Ambassador to South Korea Colin Crooks made that clear at a press conference last week. Though British troops conducted winter drills with South Korean troops in November, Mr. Crooks declined to comment on whether British forces would defend South Korea.

Despite London’s deep commercial and diplomatic links in the region, the military component of its “Tilt to Indo-Pacific” is feeble compared with the U.S. pivot.

Washington maintains a carrier strike group, amphibious assault ships, nuclear submarines, a Marine division and Special Forces units in the region. London’s regional naval assets consist of two offshore patrol vessels.

Force multipliers

So what do U.S. allies bring to the Indo-Pacific table?

“Smaller powers cannot guarantee deterrence but can help as force multipliers. They can offer geography or niche capabilities,” said Mr. Neill, the Singapore security consultant. He said British or Japanese F-35Bs can operate on U.S. carriers and American fighter jets can use allied carriers.

“The U.S. Navy has enough challenges maintaining its current presence,” Mr. Neill said, and “rotational capabilities from other fleets” can fill gaps.

With the U.S. military facing security challenges on a global playing field while Beijing concentrates its forces as an Asian power, regional democracies will have to raise their game. The big players on China’s western and eastern flanks are recognizing that and are drilling their jet fighters.

Japan is pledging to double its defense spend to the NATO standard of 2% of gross domestic product by 2028. Although India’s closeness to Russia disappoints many, the world’s biggest democracy is strongly postured against China.

All this means more — and deeper — alliances are needed.

“A snapshot quantitative look misses the point,” said Mr. Heydarian. “What we have to look at is the trend line and look at China.”

• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.

Click to Read More and View Comments

Click to Hide

washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon

18. Pentagon Can't Account for $220 Billion of Gear Given to Contractors

Sensational headline and allegation.

Interesting legislative proposal here. But will that motivate officials to ensure better accountability?

A bipartisan group of senators including included Chuck Grassley (R–Iowa), Mike Lee (R–Utah), Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.), and Ron Wyden (D–Ore.), proposed a possible solution last year. Their bill would automatically cut 1 percent from the budget of any part of the Pentagon that fails an annual audit. If that had passed, 20 of the Pentagon's 27 agencies would have faced budget cuts this year.

As it stands, there is little incentive for the military bureaucracy to get its act together because lawmakers from both parties will vote to shower more money on the Pentagon even when it can't account for most of what it's already been given. That won't change until Congress' approach to the Pentagon budget does.

Pentagon can't account for $220 billion of gear given to contractors

Reason · by Eric Boehm · January 18, 2023

Government Waste

The actual total is probably higher according to the Government Accountability Office's new report.

Eric Boehm | 1.18.2023 12:35 PM

(Photo by Specna Arms on Unsplash)

Auditors say the Pentagon cannot account for $220 billion worth of government-owned gear provided to military contractors—and the actual total is likely much higher.

In a report released Tuesday, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) slammed the Pentagon's handling of so-called "government-furnished property" (GFP) that has been passed off to contractors with little oversight. The GAO notes that auditors have asked for decades that the Pentagon develop a plan to account for that gear and equipment—which can include "ammunition, missiles, torpedoes," and component parts for those items—to little avail. In 2001, the Pentagon said it would address the issue by 2005. In 2020, it said the process would be complete by 2026.

Perhaps someday we'll know how much taxpayer-funded military gear has been handed out to contractors. For now, the GAO notes that the $220 billion estimate is "likely significantly understated." That figure is based on a 2014 report, but in 2016 the Army told auditors that the actual figure is "unknown and that actual quantities may be greatly different than the Army's documented property records reflect."

The Pentagon failed a fifth consecutive audit in November, when it could only account for 39 percent of its $3.5 trillion in assets. Nevertheless, the military received $858 billion—a 10 percent budget increase—in the omnibus bill passed late last year.

The amount of taxpayer-funded military gear that's been handed out to contractors is a relatively small sum compared to the Pentagon's astronomical budget and gordian accounting issues. Even so, it serves as an illustrative example of the broader accountability problems within the most expensive portion of the federal discretionary budget.

"DOD's lack of accountability over government property in the possession of contractors has been reported by auditors as far back as 1981," the new GAO report states. "These long-standing issues affect the accounting for and reporting of GFP and are one of the reasons DOD is unable to produce auditable financial statements."

It can also serve as a litmus test for the seriousness of would-be fiscal conservatives who are calling for spending cuts.

The new Republican majority in the House of Representatives has vowed to roll back discretionary spending to 2022 levels—effectively undoing the omnibus bill passed in December. But some are already indicating that they would like to exempt the Pentagon from that belt-tightening.

"During negotiations, cuts to defense were never discussed," Rep. Chip Roy (R–Texas) said in a statement posted to his office's Twitter account last week. "Spending cuts should focus on non-defense discretionary spending."

That's a bunch of nonsense. If the Department of Education couldn't account for more than 39 percent of its assets, conservatives would rightly be outraged about the rampant waste. If the Department of Transportation had misplaced more than $220 billion of equipment, they would likely haul Secretary Pete Buttigieg before a committee to answer for the mess. The Pentagon should be treated no differently—in fact, given the long-standing accountability issues there, it should arguably be subjected to even tighter scrutiny.

A bipartisan group of senators including included Chuck Grassley (R–Iowa), Mike Lee (R–Utah), Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.), and Ron Wyden (D–Ore.), proposed a possible solution last year. Their bill would automatically cut 1 percent from the budget of any part of the Pentagon that fails an annual audit. If that had passed, 20 of the Pentagon's 27 agencies would have faced budget cuts this year.

As it stands, there is little incentive for the military bureaucracy to get its act together because lawmakers from both parties will vote to shower more money on the Pentagon even when it can't account for most of what it's already been given. That won't change until Congress' approach to the Pentagon budget does.

Reason · by Eric Boehm · January 18, 2023

19. Democracy defenders and Rambo wannabes: Ukraine’s volunteer foreign fighters

Democracy defenders and Rambo wannabes: Ukraine’s volunteer foreign fighters

The Washington Post · by Jeff Stein · January 18, 2023

KHARKIV, Ukraine — A 30-year-old former British military captain faced a personal crossroads several months before Russia invaded Ukraine, as he contemplated a desk job at a security firm and a future spent discussing trifles with his sisters and mother in their hometown in southeastern England.

He was still struggling with the routines of civilian life when the chance to volunteer to defend Ukraine offered an alternate path. Now, after nearly getting killed in an artillery barrage in Bakhmut, the former officer, who is not being identified for safety reasons, said he is “happier than I have ever been.”

The Ukrainian fight has given him purpose, and he is thrilled by the danger. “This war has been a terrible, terrible thing for Ukraine,” he said in a phone interview last month. “But the last nine months have been the best, most enjoyable of my life. I can’t go sit in an office and do PowerPoint for the next 50 years.”

“There’s a part of me that’s doing it for the right reasons, and there’s part of me that’s doing it for the violence,” the British veteran said. “It’s kind of a bit of both.”

The complex motivations that pulled him to the blood-soaked trenches of Ukraine reflect the experiences of thousands who answered President Volodymyr Zelensky’s appeal for volunteer fighters after Russia invaded last February. Some went to defend democracy, others to escape their own demons.

An estimated 1,000 to 3,000 such foreign fighters are believed to be active, with most serving in three battalions of the International Legion, according to analysts and academics monitoring them, who stressed that the numbers were rough approximations. The Ukrainian military did not reply to requests for details about the volunteers, or estimates of their numbers.

Compared with the battlefield contributions of hundreds of thousands of regular Ukrainian troops, the impact of the volunteers is relatively small. But the foreign fighters draw outsize attention in the West, especially when killed or captured, and they raise a thicket of uncomfortable legal, moral and political questions for Ukraine and for the volunteers’ home governments.

The willingness of tens of thousands to answer Zelensky’s call speaks to the resonance of Ukraine’s cause: a country aspiring to be a free and democratic member of the European Union fighting for survival against a totalitarian regime with a history of violently violating the territorial sovereignty of its neighbors.

But some volunteer fighters are breaking the laws of their home countries to fight in Ukraine, and experts have noted a risk that U.S. volunteers could be violating the Neutrality Act, a law enacted in 1794 that intended to prohibit U.S. citizens from potentially embroiling the country in foreign wars.

Even if legal, the presence of Western fighters in Ukraine cuts against the concerted effort by the Biden administration and its NATO allies to avoid direct involvement in Russia’s war. It is also not clear who is responsible for these volunteer soldiers during and after their dangerous combat service.

The choice of many troubled veterans to volunteer in Ukraine also suggests a failure by their own governments to address past trauma and to reintegrate them into civilian life, experts said. Those who are not professional soldiers have posed challenges for Ukraine’s military, which has found some fighters to be more cumbersome than helpful.

Ukrainian officials said last spring that 20,000 people from more than 50 different countries had volunteered. But the overwhelming majority appear to have returned home before summer, according to academics studying their involvement and interviews with more than a dozen foreign fighters.

Many seemed more interested in posing for Instagram than committing to the drudgery of trench warfare. Others seemed too eager to live out fantasies from the Call of Duty video game. And some have faced more serious allegations of theft or sexual assault, or were found to be fleeing criminal cases at home.

The realities of the war unnerved many initial volunteers. The intensity of the fighting, and high likelihood of death, stunned even many experienced Western soldiers who found themselves in an artillery war without the air support they relied on in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But for many of the fighters, particularly veterans struggling to integrate back into civilian life, the horrors of bloodshed abroad in Ukraine still proved more attractive than the malaise of peace at home.

Hundreds of these better-trained volunteers are also integrated into smaller units that operate independently of the International Legion. These include groups led by longtime regional opponents of Moscow, such as the Georgian Legion and Chechen battalions, as well as other units led by Westerners, with names like Alpha, Phalanx and the Norman Brigade.

The Quebec-born commander of the volunteer Norman Brigade, who goes by the call sign “Hrulf,” said his unit has included fighters from Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Jordan, Egypt and Norway, in addition to the United States, Canada and Britain.

Before the war, Hrulf, whom The Washington Post is identifying only by his call sign for security reasons, thought that “Russians and Ukrainians were one people, like brothers and sisters,” he said. Now, he has a Ukrainian wife and a daughter and is fully committed to Kyiv’s cause. “There’s no turning back,” he said.

Joseph Hildebrand, 33, was tilling his family farm in the fields of Saskatchewan, harvesting lentils and durum wheat and tending to his cows, having assured his wife he had made peace with giving up his career in the Canadian military, which included two tours in Afghanistan. In fact, he had not.

“He literally could not handle it,” Hildebrand’s widow, Carissa, said. “He started talking to his friends who went over and just felt he had to do it. … It just bothered his soul.”

Whatever their motivations, the service and sacrifice of foreign fighters is real: Roughly 100 have died and more than 1,000 have been wounded, according to Kacper Rekawek, a researcher at the Center for Research on Extremism at the University of Oslo.

Hildebrand was killed in combat in Bakhmut, and it took his family more than five weeks to recover his body. A former Canadian paratrooper and close friend of Hildebrand’s said he had been sent on a “suicide mission.” The paratrooper, who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of retribution by the Ukrainian government, voiced frustration that the Ukrainian forces were not better prepared.

“There are really big issues because a lot of these guys are not trained soldiers,” the paratrooper said last month as he was leaving Ukraine after four months of fighting. “It’s really hard for me to watch. There’s a lot of panic. There’s a terrible lack of training.”

Other volunteers said the criticism of the Ukrainians was unfair.

“My biggest frustration has been with foreign fighters who complain about, ‘They’re sending us on suicide missions.’ Yeah, bro: What do you think war is?” said Jason Mann, 37, an American serving in a group called Phalanx. Mann served in Afghanistan, earned a computer science degree at Columbia University and worked as a software engineer at Google before coming to Ukraine.

Another British volunteer in Ukraine, who was on a break from fighting north of Kramatorsk in the eastern Donetsk region and goes by the call sign “Swampy,” said he had a “pretty up-and-down time” after leaving the British military due to a knee injury. But the war in Ukraine has given him direction, he said.

“You know exactly why you’re getting up in the morning,” said Swampy, who is 38 and is being identified only by his call sign for security reasons.

A 28-year-old American who fought in Ukraine for roughly six months said this was a common sentiment.

“For a lot of guys, there really was the ‘Valhalla Mind-set’ — of wanting to die a soldier’s death while taking out as many Russians as possible,” the American said, speaking on the condition of anonymity for his safety. “I don’t want to put anybody down, but there was alienation they felt from what was going on in the world, and there wasn’t a place, or a system, for them outside of this.”

He added: “The kind of people that show up — everybody there was a romantic in some way, and a lot of them had their hearts broken. But all were also idealists who wanted to be part of something bigger than themselves.”

With the war now in its 11th month, those volunteers still in Ukraine tend to be highly committed, willing to withstand the winter conditions and to overcome the language barriers and cultural tensions that occasionally flare.

For some, the war in Ukraine presented a rare opportunity to make use of their training.

A 23-year-old former member of the British army’s Corps of Royal Engineers spent five years learning about demining and building trenches and bridges but never put that knowledge to use in a way that felt useful, he said. He spent time in Eastern Europe training foreign troops but found it tedious and pointless.

“To be completely honest, my main motivation for coming here really was to shoot at people and get shot up,” said the British soldier, who also spoke on the condition of anonymity. “I didn’t want to get my pension with never having done anything useful,” he said. Now, however, he says he is committed to the Ukrainian cause.

Not all the volunteers lacked options at home. When Russia invaded, Zachary Jaynes, 28, a recent graduate of Dartmouth College and former U.S. Army ranger, was about to start a meditation retreat in the Himalayan mountains.

His mother had died, his final year of college was spent during covid lockdowns and, like many Western veterans in Ukraine, he was disillusioned by his time in Afghanistan. He considered a job in consulting, but it did not seem appealing.

“There was this degree of emptiness and existential dread, of trying to move past my military history — and yet I found I also could not get beyond those experiences,” Jaynes said in an interview in Kyiv, where he was on a break from fighting in the south.

When the invasion began, it “felt like the breaking point,” he said. “I could either ignore what’s happening in Ukraine, and ignore this call for help, or I could dive back into the abyss completely to try to find the light.”

Kostiantyn Khudov in Kyiv, Ukraine, and Ievgeniia Sivorka in Dnipro, Ukraine, contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Jeff Stein · January 18, 2023

20. How China planted an FBI mole who was discovered only after gutting the CIA's vast spy network by James Bamford

Another new book. This is an excerpt.

How China planted an FBI mole who was discovered only after gutting the CIA's vast spy network

Business Insider · by James Bamford

The FBI building in Washington, DC.Celal Gunes/Getty Images

The following is an excerpt from "SPYFAIL: Foreign Spies, Moles, Saboteurs, and the Collapse of America's Counterintelligence" by James Bamford.
An alleged spy within the FBI may be largely responsible for unraveling the CIA's Chinese spy network.

Top editors give you the stories you want — delivered right to your inbox each weekday.

Thanks for signing up!

Access your favorite topics in a personalized feed while you're on the go.

The FBI's website carries a stark warning. "The counterintelligence and economic espionage efforts emanating from the government of China," it says, "are a grave threat to the economic well-being and democratic values of the United States. Confronting this threat is the FBI's top counterintelligence priority." But far worse is the threat to the lives of scores of courageous Chinese agents who have volunteered to spy for the U.S. within their own country. Over the past decade, more than a dozen agents recruited by the CIA have been killed or imprisoned.

And it now turns out that it was an alleged Chinese spy within the FBI's own counterintelligence division who may have been largely responsible. A spy whose activities went undetected for upwards of two decades, until his quiet arrest in 2020. Currently in a Hawaiian jail, his little-known case is wrapped in layers of secrecy as he awaits trail. Now in his new book, "SPYFAIL: Foreign Spies, Moles, Saboteurs and the Collapse of America's Counterintelligence," author James Bamford peels back many of those hidden layers.

THE RENDEZVOUS

"Spy Fail" by James Bamford.Twelve Books

In the spring of 2001, Chinese intelligence was on a very big roll. On April 1, a Navy EP-3 electronic spy plane, operated by the National Security Agency and on patrol along the Chinese coast, was forced to make an emergency landing on China's Hainan Island. After evacuating the crew, Chinese intelligence agents went to work extracting some of the agency's most secret espionage and cryptologic equipment, along with piles of documents classified above top secret. An enormous windfall, the hardware, software, and documents gave Chinese intelligence critical insight into the NSA's targets in their country, and the methods used to spy on them. And less than a week earlier, Chinese intelligence came upon another intelligence bonanza when two former CIA clandestine officers, one born in Shanghai and the other in Hong Kong, agreed to change sides.

At the time, four years after the handover from Britain to China, much of Hong Kong remained a world of neon and noise. But now a great many of the tourists haggling over Rolex watches, checking into the Peninsula, and packing Lan Kwai Fong and other nightlife districts had a decidedly Mandarin accent. "Five years ago, everyone looked down on you if you spoke Mandarin," said a Beijing executive living in Hong Kong. "Now, they know we're the big bosses with the money."

Despite predictions that the former colony would turn into a gray vista of hunched workers and nameless noodle shops, travelers from mainland China had become the principal source of visitors to Hong Kong. They were even spending more per capita than their American and Japanese counterparts. And March 2001 was an especially busy time. As soon as the Hong Kong Arts Festival ended, the Hong Kong International Film Festival began.

Deep in the shadows, the city had also become a major crossroads for Eastern and Western spies. "Hong Kong is a place where foreign intelligence agencies conduct a lot of activity," admitted Li Gang, the deputy director of Beijing's Liaison Office in the city. As the arts crowd checked out of their rooms and the film fans checked in, two former American spies quietly slipped into another hotel for a discreet rendezvous with their Chinese counterparts. They were brothers who had both worked as clandestine CIA officers in China, and now they were about to switch sides.

Alexander Yuk Ching Ma and his older brother David were both veterans of the CIA's clandestine operations division. David was born in Shanghai in 1935, a time of smoky jazz clubs, bustling casinos, and opium dens. The Pudong District, on the eastern bank of the Huangpu River, became the country's major financial hub, and decades later it would also become its high-tech eavesdropping hub.

In 1961, at the age of twenty-six, David moved to Los Angeles, became a naturalized U.S. citizen, and six years later joined the CIA in an entry-level capacity, possibly as a translator. But in the late 1960s the United States was in the middle of its desperate war with North Vietnam, which was aided by China. As a result, a throng of new recruits were continuously making their way to Camp Perry, known as "The Farm," the CIA's boot camp for spies, near Williamsburg, Virginia.

The problem was, nearly all had the physical appearance of cheering fans at a Notre Dame football game. Few would blend into a crowd on a street in Asia. Also, very few spoke Chinese or Vietnamese, especially with any fluency. That was good for David, and in 1971 he was promoted to the officer ranks within the CIA's clandestine service. Entrusted with the identities of many of the agency's human sources in China and elsewhere, as well as its system of covert communications (known as "covcom"), he spent years in the Far East.

People do Tai Chi exercises in Hong Kong's Happy Valley district in February 2001.Dustin Shum/South China Morning Post via Getty Images

In 1983, David resigned after it was determined that he was inappropriately using his government position to assist Chinese nationals in obtaining entry into the United States. But months before, as if taking his place, his thirty-year-old brother Alex had joined up and also became a clandestine officer. He was born in Hong Kong and, like David, lived for a time in Shanghai. Both also graduated from the University of Hawaii at Manoa. Following extensive training at The Farm, he was also provided with the identities of the agency's networks of spies, the various covcom details, and was sent to the Far East. Seven years later he left the agency, and around 1995 he moved to China, there oddly being no restrictions on former spies moving to their target nations. Therefore, little is known about his activities there.

David, however, ran into serious legal and financial trouble. In 1998, while living in Los Angeles, he pled guilty to two counts of defrauding a lending institution. In December he began serving a five-month sentence at Taft Correctional Institution, a low-security federal prison near Bakersfield, California, followed by five years of probation and $145,623 in restitution — money he didn't have. Then in 2000, his brother Alex returned from China, telling Customs and Border Protection officers that he was an "importer and exporter" and was carrying $9,000 in U.S. currency. Not long after, both brothers turned up in Shanghai.

For three days, beginning on March 24, 2001, Alex and David allegedly met secretly in a hotel room with at least five officials from China's Ministry of State Security (MSS) and passed on highly classified information. According to government charges, details included the covers used by CIA officers and CIA activities in China; cryptographic information used in classified and sensitive CIA communications and reports; information concerning CIA officer identities as well as those of CIA human assets in China; the CIA's use of operational tradecraft; and CIA secure communications practices — that is, covcom details. The brothers were then handed $50,000 in cash.

Afterward, as laid out in the indictment, both Alex and David returned to California, but they kept in touch with their handlers. Alex eventually agreed to become a mole for China's intelligence service within the FBI, and on the day after Christmas 2002, he applied for the position of special agent. By then, however, he was about forty-nine years old and was informed that he was over the age limit.

But in 2004 he was nevertheless hired as a Chinese translator since he spoke several Chinese dialects. In many ways, this was an even better position for a spy since he would have access to a very broad range of information, including intercepted Chinese conversations. The day before he started his new job, he called a suspected accomplice, possibly David, to give him the good news that he would now be working full-time for "the other side."

By then the FBI was reeling from another extremely damaging, and extremely embarrassing, counterintelligence disaster involving China. In 2003 it was discovered that the bureau's key U.S.-based China asset, Katrina Leung, was, like Alex, a double agent working for China. Worse, she was simultaneously sleeping with two of the FBI's top China agents. Among them was her longtime handler, through whom she had been passing false information for more than a decade, information that often was quickly passed on to the White House.

Assigned to the Honolulu FBI office, Alex and his wife moved into a $600,000 condominium on Hawaii Kai Drive, a short walk to the ocean on the southeastern corner of Oahu. Strongly built, with a broad natural grin, Alex wore squarish glasses above puffy cheeks that seemed to glow when he smiled, which was often. Over at least the next six years and possibly much longer, he took over the role of FBI mole where Robert Hanssen, who spied for Russia for more than two decades, left off, except for a different spymaster. It was as though no lessons had ever been learned by the bureau.

The method was simple. Attracting no suspicion, Ma would gather up piles of highly secret materials and simply walk out the door with them, just as Hanssen had done for decades. Some he photographed with a digital camera, others he downloaded from his computer onto a flash drive, while still others he copied onto CD-ROM discs. Some dealt with guided missiles and weapon systems, and others revealed the identity of confidential sources, putting their lives at risk.

FBI agents remove evidence from Robert Hanssen's home in Vienna, Virginia on February 20, 2001.Alex Wong/Newsmakers

In addition, Ma had extensive knowledge of the CIA's highly secret covcom techniques by which CIA officers communicated with their sources. Every few months, once he had accumulated a load of secrets, he would call his handlers. They would then book him a hotel room in Shanghai, pick him up at the airport, and take him into town, where he would hand over his secrets and be debriefed by agents of the Shanghai State Security Bureau (SSSB).

The SSSB was the regional office of the Ministry of State Security, China's equivalent of both the CIA and FBI. Headquartered in Beijing at Xiyuan (Western Garden), next to the vast ensemble of lakes, gardens, and palaces of the Summer Palace, its logo still displays the hammer and sickle of the Communist Party. At the time, it was run by Minister of State Security Xu Yongyue, a stern-faced senior party official from Zhenping County, the jade capital of China, in the province of Henan. And in charge of the SSSB was Cai Xumin, who received a very significant promotion to vice minister of the MSS in 2004, likely due to his recruitment of Ma.

Following the rendezvous and document drops in Shanghai, Ma would simply fly back to Honolulu. At one point a curious U.S. customs official pulled him aside for a secondary search and discovered he was carrying $20,000 in cash and a shiny new set of golf clubs. But no questions were raised, no actions were taken, and later that day Ma sent an email to his SSSB handler with an attachment containing additional classified information. Other money paid to him by the MSS was regularly deposited in a bank account in Hong Kong.

David Ma also secretly remained in the loop. Living in Arcadia, a wealthy Los Angeles bedroom community, he established himself as a consultant on immigration rights for the many Asian immigrants in the nearby communities, such as Alhambra and Monterey Park. Familiar with their needs and fluent in various Chinese dialects, including Mandarin, Cantonese, Shanghai, and Chaozhou, he opened several businesses. They included the Chinese American Civil Rights Organization and AsiAmerica Immigration & Consultancy, Inc.

Ironically, in 2005 he was quoted in a Los Angeles Times article about Chinese espionage. As China's economy continued to boom, he said, he could understand the temptation of some Chinese Americans who wanted to do business there to help the government any way they could. "I'm not saying all of them are spies," he said. "But for some of them it is outright greed because they need to do business with [the Chinese government]. It's just like barter or exchange."

Because of his businesses, David became very well known within the Chinese communities in Los Angeles, which was ideal for the SSSB and MSS. Critical for them was discovering community members who had become confidential informants on China for the CIA and FBI. In February 2006, Alex Ma, China's mole in the FBI, sent David photos he received from his handlers of five suspected human sources. Accompanying the pictures was a photo of five dogs sitting on a park bench, which was a coded way of asking him to supply the identity of the sources. Shortly thereafter, David sent Alex an email identifying two of the informants. And a memory card belonging to Alex had pictures of the five sources along with a list of five names.

Shanghai's Pudong district in August 2006.Athanasios Gioumpasis/Getty Images

A few months later, Alex arranged for his wife, Amy Ma, who was also born in Hong Kong, to fly to Shanghai to meet with his handlers and to deliver an encrypted laptop computer to them. An email message soon came back thanking him for sending his wife and delivering "the present." Over the years, without suspicion, Alex continued to fly back and forth to Shanghai every few months with stashes of secrets. And in June 2008, his handler phoned him to say that his "company" would have a lot of work orders in the coming year.

In May 2010, a few months after another clandestine rendezvous to hand over documents to his handler, Alex received a phone call from an MSS officer apologizing for not seeing him during a recent visit to China and extending an invitation to meet in Shanghai in the future. He also asked Alex to get in touch with David and see if he would be willing to discuss their "business venture." About the same time, the MSS was also bringing on board another veteran CIA clandestine officer, one who had just reapplied to the agency, possibly to become a mole. Known as Zhen Cheng Li in China, he was Jerry Chun Shing Lee to his colleagues at Langley.

Born in Hong Kong like Alex, Lee grew up in Hawaii and became a naturalized U.S. citizen. At seventeen, in 1982, he joined the U.S. Army, serving for four years but remaining in the reserves. A few years later he enrolled at Hawaii Pacific University, graduating in 1992 with a degree in international business management. A year later he earned a master's degree in human resource management and shortly thereafter joined the CIA as a case officer in the clandestine service. Over the following fourteen years, he was dispatched on numerous overseas assignments, including to China, where he, like Alex and David Ma, had access to the agency's clandestine networks, both human and covcom.

By July 2007, Lee had become frustrated by his lack of advancement at the CIA. "He was quite critical about the organization and his time there; the fact that he didn't get credit, he didn't get promoted, he didn't get the assignments he deserved," said one of his associates. As a result, Lee resigned and moved to Hong Kong, taking a job with Japan Tobacco International ( JTI). Employing about forty thousand people around the world, the company sells 120 brands of cigarettes, including both Camel and Winston outside the United States.

But a key problem for the company was tobacco smugglers and counterfeiters. Asian crime syndicates were exporting tons of counterfeit cigarettes out of China with the help of corrupt officials. To combat the syndicates, the company had established a Brand Integrity Unit under a veteran CIA officer, David Reynolds, who had worked at the agency from 1988 to 2002. Afterward he was assigned as a U.S. consular officer in Guangzhou for two years. Lee claimed that his last job at the CIA was the agency's official liaison in Beijing to Chinese intelligence, the MSS, and he was hired by Reynolds.

Now, with an office on the forty-second floor of Tower 1 in Times Square, the city's flashy, upscale shopping and restaurant complex at Causeway Bay, Lee could see all of Hong Kong spread out below him. But adjusting to private industry was difficult and he soon ran into problems. Company officials began to suspect that he was alerting corrupt Chinese officials about the firm's investigations and the pending raids and arrests by law enforcement. "Several of the shipments of counterfeits purchased as part of the investiga-tions were seized by the Chinese authorities or simply disappeared, and one of our contract investigators was arrested and imprisoned in China," said a manager.

All evidence pointed toward Lee, and as a result, executives at JTI alerted the FBI, but apparently no action was ever taken. Lee was finally fired in mid- 2009, and soon afterward a Chinese official warned the company that he was not only continuing to share information with MSS officers, but was also actively working with them. And once again JTI officials passed the information to the FBI. "I certainly reported it to the appropriate authorities," said a company supervisor. It was good information, but once again it seemed to go nowhere within the bureau. At about the same time, Lee hooked up with a potential business partner, Barry Cheung Kam-lun, a former Hong Kong police officer who, Lee knew, had close ties to the MSS. And on April 26 the two traveled across the Hong Kong border to neighboring Shenzhen for a private dinner with MSS officers.

Shenzhen, China.Liao Xun/Getty Images

It was time for the official pitch. After excusing Barry, the intelligence officers and Lee reached an agreement that he would begin passing secrets to them and act as their spy. In exchange, they handed him a briefcase full of cash, $100,000, along with an agreement to take care of him "for life." It would be the first of hundreds of thousands of dollars he would receive, and within a few weeks he began receiving his taskings, key among them apparently becoming a mole in the CIA, as Alex Ma had done in the FBI. That same month, he applied for reemployment with the CIA. But given his less than illustrious career and departure from the agency, it went nowhere.

Instead, possibly as a cover, Lee and Barry Cheung Kam-lun established their own company, FTM International, to enter the "Big Tobacco" wars and conduct their own brand integrity investigations. After investing nearly $400,000, they set up shop in the down-market Wan Chai area, renting space in Dannies House. Unlike JTI's soaring skyscraper in Times Square, Lee's new office was in a tired thirteen-story orange high-rise with battered air-conditioning units stuck out the windows like giant steel bird feeders.

But two years later, fed up with Hong Kong and having run out of secrets to sell, Lee decided to move his family back to Virginia, where he had been offered a potential job by the CIA. It had been secretly created to lure him back to the United States, and in August 2012, during a three-day stopover in Hawaii, agents conducted a black bag job on his hotel room. What they found was damning. Inside a small, clear plastic travel pack was a forty-nine-page datebook and a twenty-one-page address book, both of which contained top secret handwritten operational notes from his CIA days. Most critically, they included the true names of secret human sources as well as the dates and operational locations of the meetings. Another clandestine search was conducted on his hotel room in Fairfax, Virginia, soon after he arrived, and the information remained in his possession.

But inexplicably, rather than Lee being arrested, the decision was made to simply question him repeatedly over the following year. Finally, after the fifth interview in June 2013, with the questions becoming more and more revealing of what the bureau knew, Lee fled with his family back to China-controlled Hong Kong. Once more he was out of reach, and once more the FBI had bungled it.

Over the next few years, Lee did security work for the cosmetics company Estée Lauder and the auction house Christie's. Then in January 2018, apparently believing the danger had blown over, he boarded a Cathay Pacific flight to New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport. It was a serious mistake. His name had been flagged on the airline's manifest and he was arrested as soon as he landed. After first vowing to fight the espionage charges, in May 2019 he agreed to plead guilty and was sentenced to nineteen years in prison.

Around the same time, the FBI finally discovered the Chinese mole who had bored his way into the organization sixteen years earlier. In August 2020, an agent posing as an MSS officer approached Alex Ma in Honolulu and snared him in a sting operation. To convince Ma of his bona fides, he showed him a video of the meeting between him, David, and the SSSB agents at the time they signed on as spies in 2001. The pretend MSS officer then offered Ma $2,000 in cash as a "small token" of appreciation for Ma's assistance to China. Ma offered to continue working for the MSS and stated that he wanted "the motherland" to succeed. Shortly afterward he was arrested on charges of espionage and is currently awaiting trial. With regard to David, then eighty-five years old, the decision was made not to arrest him due to his advanced stage of Alzheimer's disease.

James Bamford, winner of the National Magazine Award for Reporting, is the bestselling author of "The Puzzle Palace," "Body of Secrets," and other books on intelligence. His most recent book, from which this excerpt was taken, is "SPYFAIL: Foreign Spies, Moles, Saboteurs and the Collapse of America's Counterintelligence," which will be released on January 17.

Business Insider · by James Bamford

21. Russia’s Shadow Army Exposed and Humiliated by Bogus ‘Recruit’

A pretty gutsy "investigation" (if true).

Russia’s Shadow Army Exposed and Humiliated by Bogus ‘Recruit’

Alcoholics are welcome, social media is forbidden, and terrorism offenses are where Wagner recruiters apparently draw the line.

Allison Quinn

News Editor

Published Jan. 18, 2023 1:04PM ET

The Daily Beast · January 18, 2023

Igor Russak/Reuters

A Russian journalist went undercover as a wannabe recruit for the notorious Wagner Group and was seemingly accepted by the private army after little to no questioning about his background.

The independent outlet The Insider reports that journalists got the idea to call Wagner’s hotline after the group started hanging up recruiting posters at bus stops and security companies.

One such poster, purportedly hung up in Krasnoyarsk, urged wannabe Wagner recruits to “test their spirit” by signing a contract. Bizarrely, the poster claimed all recruits would be required to “answer three questions” upon joining: “Would you rather get stabbed in the eye by a fork or fucked in the butt?,” and, “Would you rather get butt-fucked or sell your mother?”

The last question asked prospective candidates if they’d prefer to eat “soap from the table or bread from the latrine.”

An unnamed Wagner recruiter was quoted telling the Insider the prison-style questions are “nonsense” and there is “no such” requirement to join the group. But he said newbies would likely “see” prisoners serving in the group’s ranks, even though they “won’t cross paths with them.”

Asked by the reporter if he was allowed to “‘bring other guys” along to a Wagner headquarters in the Krasnodar region, the recruiter didn’t skip a beat when answering matter-of-factly: “Make sure they haven’t been sentenced for such crimes as terrorism, extremism, kidnapping and rape.”

He made no mention of murder.

A “juvenile record,” the recruiter said, was fine, along with men struggling with substance abuse.

“Sometimes they come in with a certificate from the narcologist that they are registered alcoholics. Such things are forgiven, but guys like that need to pass lie detector,” the recruiter was quoted saying.

Among other things, the recruiter said funeral costs would be covered, though he couldn’t cite an “exact amount,” and that payment would be about $3,500 a month on a six-month contract. Recruits are then sent on to the battlefield after “two or three weeks” of training, he said.

He told the supposed recruit that “there might be an opportunity for you to serve as a sniper” since he had gone “shooting” with his father “sometimes” in the past.

“Look, you'll need your passport. If you have a military ID, take it, if not, don’t. Passport, health insurance and a certificate from the narcologist and psychiatrist, that you are not registered with them. Next, you'll need to delete all social media accounts and messengers to avoid information leaks,” the recruiter said.

He also stressed that the shadow army operates freely of Russia’s Defense Ministry, noting: “We have our own awards, but we don’t count on ones from the ministry, because we are not part of the Defense Ministry.”

The purported phone call comes as Wagner has reportedly stepped up recruiting efforts in recent weeks, with human rights groups sounding the alarm over female prison inmates joining the group and political prisoners in Chechnya being pressured to join.

The group has reportedly suffered staggering losses recently in Ukraine, particularly among prison inmates tossed onto the frontline. Out of 270 inmates recruited from one penal colony in the Republic of Bashkortostan, only 30 people are still alive, according to the Russian Telegram channel VChK-OGPu.

Just this week, a media outlet under the control of Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin reported on funeral services for a Tanzanian national who came to Russia to study but wound up on the battlefield after Wagner scooped him up from jail.

Tarimo Nemes Raymond died in Bakhmut, RIA-FAN reported, while “defending the interests of the Russian Federation,” despite being a foreign national.

He’s not the first foreign citizen to be ensnared by the mercenary group. Zambian authorities expressed outrage back in November when a 23-year-old engineering student from that country was killed fighting with Wagner in Ukraine, having also been plucked from behind bars.

The Daily Beast · January 18, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website