Quotes of the Day:

"However [political parties] may now and then answer popular ends, they are likely in the course of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people and to usurp for themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion."

​- George Washington, Farewell Address, September 17, 1796​

"Never forget that intelligence rules the world and ignorance carries the burden. Therefore, remove yourself as far as possible from ignorance and seek as far as possible to be intelligent."

- Marcus Garvey

"Self education is, I firmly believe, the only kind of education there is."

- Isaac Asimov

1. Support slipping for indefinite U.S. aid to Ukraine, poll finds

2. Fake parts: A Pentagon supply chain problem hiding in plain sight

3. The failure of integrated deterrence, and what to do about China

4. The 2022 War On The Rocks Holiday Reading List

5. Irregular War's War on Thinking About War

6. NATO prepares for cyberwarfare integrated with military operations

7. Is the US Military's Favorite Novel a Timeless Classic or Overrated Drivel? Yes.

8. No, Iran didn’t ban morality police — it duped press, and Biden administration

9. This week in Congress: Final NDAA compromise expected to be unveiled

10. Am I willing to sacrifice my son's life for Taiwan?

11. Opinion | A week in the life of Vladimir Putin

12. Xi’s Shattered Illusion of Control

13. The Global Zeitenwende – How to Avoid a New Cold War in a Multipolar Era

14. 12 Psychological Warfare Strategies Used Throughout History

15. Ukraine appears to expose Russian air defence gaps with long-range strikes

16. Pentagon, Chinese analysts agree US can’t win in Taiwan Strait

17. Japan’s Ruling Coalition Approves Counterstrike Capability

18. Russian commander 'executed' following mass desertions of his unit: Report

19. Robert Louis Stevenson knew about guerrilla warfare

1. Support slipping for indefinite U.S. aid to Ukraine, poll finds

Excerpts:

A plurality of Republicans, however, would opt to gradually withdraw U.S. support from Ukraine. Overall, 29 percent of respondents hold this view, while about a quarter said the United States and its allies should intervene militarily to help Ukraine win the war quickly.

...

“If people think that Ukraine has the upper hand, they’re much more supportive of continuing aid to Ukraine,” said Dina Smeltz, one of the researchers.

...

“We have been very clear that the United States and countries around the world will never — never, never, never — recognize territory that Russia has illegally annexed,” State Department spokesman Ned Price said at a news conference Friday.

But Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggested to reporters last month that the moment could be approaching for Ukraine to negotiate. He suggested to reporters that it was unrealistic to think Ukraine could recapture the 20 percent of its land occupied by Russia.

Support slipping for indefinite U.S. aid to Ukraine, poll finds

The Washington Post · by Claire Parker · December 5, 2022

A strong majority of Americans continue to support sending arms and economic aid to Ukraine, according to a poll released Monday. But as the conflict drags into winter, Americans are divided over whether Washington should push Ukraine to reach a negotiated peace as soon as possible.

More than two-thirds of respondents back supplying Ukraine with weapons and economic assistance, and about three-quarters support accepting Ukrainian refugees and sanctioning Russia, according to the survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs last month.

While support among the American public for assistance to Ukraine remains robust, Republican backing for aid to Ukraine has slipped since the spring, with 55 percent of Republicans saying they support sending military aid, compared with 68 percent in July and 80 percent in March. Half of Republicans favored providing economic assistance to Ukraine last month, compared with roughly three-quarters in March, according to the Chicago Council’s findings.

The United States announced its latest tranche of military aid to Ukraine last month — the 25th since August 2021. The $400 million package includes additional arms, munitions and equipment, the Defense Department said, and brings total U.S. military assistance to Ukraine to nearly $20 billion since President Biden took office.

The United States is also sending $53 million to help repair Ukraine’s electrical systems, which have sustained significant damage from Russian missile strikes in recent weeks.

With Russia’s war in Ukraine in its 10th month, and no end in sight, Americans are split over whether Washington should urge Ukraine to reach a peace settlement with Russia imminently, the survey found. A plurality — 40 percent — said the United States should continue its current levels of support to Ukraine indefinitely. Fifty-three percent of Democrats favor this approach. In July, however, 58 percent of American respondents said the United States should help Ukraine for as long as it takes, even if that meant higher gas and food prices for American consumers. Now, 47 percent say Washington should push Kyiv to reach a peace settlement soon.

A plurality of Republicans, however, would opt to gradually withdraw U.S. support from Ukraine. Overall, 29 percent of respondents hold this view, while about a quarter said the United States and its allies should intervene militarily to help Ukraine win the war quickly.

Ukraine launched a major counteroffensive this fall, recapturing the northeastern Kharkiv region and forcing Russia to withdraw from the southern city of Kherson. Kyiv has vowed to press on with its counteroffensive, with the stated goal of returning all territory captured by Russia — including eastern Ukraine and Crimea, which Russia seized in 2014 — to Ukrainian control. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has accused Ukraine of refusing to negotiate but suggested that Russia will not budge from its demand for international recognition of the Ukrainian territories it claims to have annexed.

But obstacles threaten to slow the Ukrainian advance, and Russian positions are entrenched along a front line stretching hundreds of miles through southern and eastern Ukraine. Americans held differing perceptions of which side has the upper hand, the Chicago Council survey found. Around a third of Democrats say Ukraine has the advantage, compared with 23 percent of Republicans and 22 percent of independents. Overall, 46 percent of respondents think neither Ukraine nor Russia has the advantage.

“If people think that Ukraine has the upper hand, they’re much more supportive of continuing aid to Ukraine,” said Dina Smeltz, one of the researchers.

In October, Group of Seven leaders formally endorsed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s terms for a peace deal, which would require Russia to withdraw from all illegally occupied Ukrainian sovereign territory.

Last week, Biden said he is prepared to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin if Putin indicates he is interested in ending the war. “He hasn’t done that yet,” Biden told reporters at joint news conference with French President Emmanuel Macron in Washington. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, meanwhile, has promised to keep helping Ukraine achieve its battlefield aims.

“We have been very clear that the United States and countries around the world will never — never, never, never — recognize territory that Russia has illegally annexed,” State Department spokesman Ned Price said at a news conference Friday.

But Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggested to reporters last month that the moment could be approaching for Ukraine to negotiate. He suggested to reporters that it was unrealistic to think Ukraine could recapture the 20 percent of its land occupied by Russia.

With Republicans soon to take control of the House of Representatives, ushering in an era of divided government, proposals for additional aid to Ukraine could face more resistance. Ahead of the midterm elections last month, some Republican candidates campaigned on ending financial support for Ukraine. Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.), the Republican nominee to be the next House Speaker, has said Republicans will not write a “blank check” for Ukraine.

Isabelle Khurshudyan, Paul Sonne, Liz Sly and Scott Clement contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Claire Parker · December 5, 2022

2. Fake parts: A Pentagon supply chain problem hiding in plain sight

Excerpts:

“We’re moving to a point that in areas we know have more critical risk exposure, how do we get better insights,” Stone said.

And across the defense-industrial base, firms are trying to figure out how to find potential problems.

“Unfortunately, we often get caught flat-footed,” Stone said. “There’s all this data out there. Well, it’s not just about getting all the data; we need to get smart about what the data tells us about risk and how we get humans in the loop.”

Najieb-Locke sees continuous improvement in communication with industry as the best option for catching counterfeit parts before they make their way into the DoD’s ecosystem, more so than tightening up its own processes.

“It’s not really a process of what can we tighten up, as much as … working with industry and our suppliers to make sure we are aware of who is out there counterfeiting their products,” Najieb-Locke said. “And making our acquisition corps aware that, here is a new list of counterfeit products and this is what the counterfeit looks like. So it’s an education regime more than a process. Because if it slips through that check, that means it passed technical viability.”

Fake parts: A Pentagon supply chain problem hiding in plain sight

Defense News · by Stephen Losey · December 5, 2022

WASHINGTON — For about half the summer, 18 newly completed F-35 fighter jets sat outside Air Force Plant 4, a Lockheed Martin-operated facility in Fort Worth, Texas.

Instead of flying to military bases around the world, the F-35s were parked while U.S. Defense Department officials tried to untangle the supply chain mess that had stuck them there.

In August, the Pentagon had halted delivery of the aircraft after Honeywell, the maker of a key engine component in the F-35, told Lockheed it had new concerns about the provenance of one part. Specifically, the subcontractor had learned a magnet in the component had been made for years using raw materials sourced in China — a violation of federal procurement rules.

The Defense Department ultimately decided the Chinese alloy didn’t endanger or compromise the F-35, and it granted a waiver in early October for deliveries to resume.

But the high-profile incident spotlighted a quandary for Pentagon leaders, one the department has struggled to address and was warned about for more than a decade: how to keep counterfeit parts and other unauthorized material from sneaking into the department’s sprawling supply chain.

It’s a problem Pentagon officials worry could lead, in a best-case scenario, to poorer equipment performance — or in a worst-case scenario, to the accidental death of troops.

Amid China’s rise as a military rival to the United States and its status as the origin of much counterfeiting in the world, officials and experts say it’s a growing concern.

“Obviously [there are] lives at stake,” said Bryan Clark, a defense analyst at the Hudson Institute who has studied the Pentagon’s supply chain for computer chips.

The Defense Department’s far-reaching network of suppliers makes trying to catch counterfeit, shoddy or otherwise unacceptable parts a daunting task. Pentagon leaders say they are developing new tests to find counterfeit parts, putting a renewed emphasis on reporting when problematic components are found, and encouraging the military and industry to compare notes more often about counterfeit parts they discover.

“The good news is there are tools coming out using artificial intelligence and open source, that we can dive in and maybe find some of these things,” Bill LaPlante, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, said in a September news conference after the F-35 deliveries stopped. “But I think it’s going to be a constant issue for us … understanding our supply chain.”

After the discovery that a key magnet in the F-35's engine had been made with Chinese materials for years, the Pentagon halted deliveries for about a month and a half while a waiver was prepared. (R. Nial Bradshaw/U.S. Air Force)

‘Constant vigilance’

The trouble with counterfeit parts isn’t only the theft of intellectual property, Halimah Najieb-Locke, deputy assistant secretary of defense for industrial base resilience, told Defense News in September. More importantly, they might not work, or could be shoddy or unreliable.

In the case of the June 2020 death of Air Force pilot 1st Lt. David Schmitz, the lack of transparency may have proved deadly. Schmitz died after his parachute didn’t deploy from his malfunctioning ejection seat, which the Air Force Research Laboratory said may have had up to 10 counterfeit and faulty transistors and semiconductor chips.

While the lab said the parts were “suspect,” it noted more analysis would be required to determine if they were truly counterfeit.

Schmitz’s widow, Valerie, has filed a federal civil lawsuit against three defense contractors, seeking to learn through the discovery process whether the components were proved to be fake. The Air Force has declined to comment on this case.

In the midst of a worldwide semiconductor shortage, some Pentagon officials are worried about a potential influx of counterfeit chips — both through vendors seeking to profit from suppliers in a tight spot and through an adversary who’s created a cloned part that’s home to a cyber backdoor.

“There is more incentive than ever to profit off of counterfeit components just by advertising that you have them available within the supply chain when no one else does,” said Nick Martin, director of the Pentagon’s in-house semiconductor supplier, the Defense Microelectronics Activity.

In 2018, Bloomberg Businessweek reported the Chinese government got a stealth doorway into servers made by the Oregon-based company Elemental Technologies in the form of a tiny microchip.

According to the report, the servers — with chips inserted at factories run by manufacturing subcontractors in China — could be found in Defense Department data centers, CIA drone operations and the onboard networks of Navy ships.

Now, with it often taking as long as two years to obtain some components from approved sources, electronics manufacturers find themselves facing fewer options. The most common counterfeits are not malicious, Martin said, and might simply have had their serial numbers altered to disguise that they’re not suited for military purposes.

“Our DoD weapons systems are long in the tooth in terms of time in the field, and we need to make sure that there’s specific reliability requirements for the components that we put into them,” Martin said. “Counterfeits or even cloned components will compromise the reliability” of equipment.

Counterfeit chips can pass for the genuine article for a while, but they can wear out faster, Clark said. If a chip isn’t coated or hardened correctly, uses substandard materials, or is connected with cheap wires, he explained, then it’s not living up to the standard the military expects — and could potentially endanger service members

“When we talk about these [military] standards, a lot of it is designed to perform the way it’s supposed to, even if it’s kept in service beyond when it was supposed to,” Clark said. “In a commercial product, Apple’s never going to stand behind your iPhone for 10 years; whereas in DoD, that F-16 [fighter jet] is supposed to run for decades.”

Electronics Technician 3rd Class Nicholas Vandesteene solders a microchip onto a radio’s circuit board while underway on the U.S. Navy cruiser Normandy. (MC2 Malachi Lakey/U.S. Navy)

The scale of the Defense Department’s supply chain makes keeping an eye on what goes into it a daunting task. Najieb-Locke estimated the department has 200,000 significant suppliers in the defense-industrial base, and scores more subcontractors.

“It’s hard to give a truly firm number … given the fact that we only have visibility so far down the chain,” Najieb-Locke said. “Lockheed can contract with whoever they want to contract [with] for their widget that goes into” what they supply as a prime manufacturer.

Indeed, the F-35′s problem this summer shone new light on the Pentagon’s complex supply chain and how opaque it can be to the department.

The F-35 relies on more than 1,700 suppliers at all levels providing roughly 300,000 parts. The Air Force’s network is even broader; the service said it depends on about 12,000 direct suppliers. But further down the supply chain, the network expands to about 1 million companies.

“One of the lessons of COVID is we [have not] understood supply chains as well as we thought we did,” Andrew Hunter, the service’s acquisition chief, told reporters at a conference in September. “Both COVID impacts and inflation [are] causing people to go back and say: ‘Hey, there’s more complexity in the supply chain than we may have fully appreciated.’ ”

This isn’t the first time the F-35 has had this kind of issue, Hunter said. During the Obama administration, an F-35 part initially manufactured in Scotland was outsourced to China — without the knowledge of Lockheed or the manufacturer of the component that used the part.

“These supply chains are not static,” Hunter said. “It’s a challenge, and it’s a constantly moving target. So it does require ' to make sure that our supply chains are resilient, they are secure, and that we know where stuff is coming from and whether they’re compliant.”

An information-sharing push

This summer, the Pentagon adopted a new policy aimed at fixing gaps in reporting suspected counterfeit parts to an unclassified government-industry clearinghouse — an issue the Government Accountability Office identified in 2016.

The 24-page policy would mandate all DoD component chiefs ensure counterfeit and “nonconforming” items are reported within 60 days of being found to a decades-old but little-known program now called the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program, or GIDEP.

Long-standing regulations mandate the Defense Department’s suppliers test and inspect their wares before they’re handed off to the government. Under the new policy, when those suppliers and DoD components find a suspected counterfeit part, that should yield a report to GIDEP.

The policy taps the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, currently Heidi Shyu, to oversee GIDEP and chair two panels established around it that will have representatives of the military departments, the Defense Logistics Agency and other DoD entities.

The undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, currently Heidi Shyu, oversees GIDEP. (Kristen Kushiyama/U.S. Army)

The new policy will also bring the Pentagon in line with a 2019 federal acquisition regulation requiring GIDEP reporting and monitoring mandates be written into certain contracts.

“The GAO recommendation [that prompted the policy] was intended to make sure there was a level playing field,” said GIDEP Program Manager Jim Stein. “Industry would share what it knew across industry and government, and the government would share what it knew across government and industry. One benefit of this for industry is the government will start reporting what it should.”

Following a congressional probe, GIDEP participation surged in 2011 but later fell off significantly, GAO found. The watchdog agency said the Army, Air Force and Missile Defense Agency weren’t making any reports, blaming the lack of a central point person and varying approaches to reporting across the department.

According to Stein, the Defense Department has seen counterfeits increase in number and sophistication over the last two decades, with batches of counterfeits increasingly hidden in authentic parts, making them harder to find. But the DoD has also seen vendors grow more vigilant about testing and vetting.

“An example would be if you bought a reel of capacitors,” he said. “Some cases … are that the first 100 on the reel are authentic, and then they start inserting the counterfeits farther back. It makes testing difficult, but then conferences of experts are held, and then that information becomes more widely known.”

Meanwhile, the Defense Department is exploring is a zero-trust policy that would assume no microelectronics are safe and all must be validated. This could mean only allowing microelectronics into the supply chain if testing shows there are no exploits built into them and that they meets all the requirements.

“I don’t need to have its entire back history if I can test it in situ and say, ‘go’ or ‘no-go,’ ” Clark said.

Indeed, Najieb-Locke confirmed the Defense Department doesn’t require complete visibility throughout the supply chain. As long as a screw works, she said, it doesn’t matter who made it or whether the contractor bought it at a local hardware store.

But in some cases involving crucial systems, she noted, the Pentagon might track suppliers down to the 15th tier or so. In others, such as basic maintenance contracts, the department might only track suppliers to the second tier.

The Pentagon has qualification systems and other safeguards in place to catch these phony parts before they slip into its supply stream, Najieb-Locke said. Suppliers are also supposed to send a test batch first so the defense organization can verify the parts before accepting ownership.

But the Pentagon also has tests to catch counterfeit parts and checks components during maintenance, she said.

Congress in 2018 ordered the Pentagon to create a pilot program to evaluate machine-vision technologies to determine the authenticity and security of microelectronics parts and weapon systems. (Colin Demarest/Staff)

The department is exploring a less-invasive technique that analyzes the emissions from a part when it is pulsed with an electromagnetic signal. Martin said electronic fingerprint-detection equipment is promising because it costs less than $1 million and works in a few minutes or less. But the artificial intelligence needed to perform the comparative analysis still must mature before it can, for example, detect intentionally inserted flaws.

Congress in 2018 ordered the DoD to create a pilot program to evaluate machine-vision technologies to determine the authenticity and security of microelectronics parts and weapon systems. The Defense Microelectronics Activity, which led the pilot program, is due to soon release a public report on its findings.

“For the machine-learning stuff right now, there’s still a considerable amount of work that needs to be done,” Martin said, but it’s “showing a lot of promise.”

The role of contractors

Hunter said the Air Force is watching some defense contractors build new relationships with companies that specialize in supply chain management to improve their visibility.

But at times, the government’s longing for supply chain visibility can conflict with suppliers’ desires to keep their trade secrets.

“How do we get more transparency into second, third, fourth and fifth layer[s] of suppliers?” said Edward Smith, director of F-35 domestic engagement at Lockheed. “Some of that becomes proprietary information for our suppliers, so they don’t have to share that with us because it is proprietary on how they produce their product and get the economic value.”

Beyond the second and third layer of the supply chain, Smith said, the process relies on trust that subcontractors are going to follow the acquisition rules.

“We have to say … we expect you to maintain your supply chain inside of your own IP [intellectual property], and we’re going to respect your IP since you’re a partner on this — and expect [compliance],” Smith said.

Who takes responsibility between industry and the Pentagon for counterfeit parts at the third tier of the supply chain and below is already part of a high-level tug of war, according to Chris O’Donnell, a senior Pentagon acquisition official.

“We’ve heard from the primes that: ‘Hey, you’re not paying us to do that. Do you expect us to do that? Well then, pay us to do that,’ ” O’Donnell said. “And our answer is: ‘No, we sort of, kind of expected you to do that. If it’s your design, and you’re producing it, and you’re responsible for sustainment, that you’re watching out for your supply chain.’ And the answer is, not so much.”

The question snowballs into whether the Pentagon or industry would be responsible for ensuring zero-trust standards are met. Whether the department should even go to a zero-trust approach remains unresolved.

“It’s a big debate,” O’Donnell said. “What we’re saying is we can make these chips anywhere in the world, and because we designed it with zero trust in mind, we’re good to go. I still haven’t pushed the ‘I believe’ button on that.”

Chris Stone, the vice president for supply chain for enterprise operations at Lockheed, said the F-35 incident underscores the need for the company and others to see better into its supply chain.

“We’re moving to a point that in areas we know have more critical risk exposure, how do we get better insights,” Stone said.

And across the defense-industrial base, firms are trying to figure out how to find potential problems.

“Unfortunately, we often get caught flat-footed,” Stone said. “There’s all this data out there. Well, it’s not just about getting all the data; we need to get smart about what the data tells us about risk and how we get humans in the loop.”

Najieb-Locke sees continuous improvement in communication with industry as the best option for catching counterfeit parts before they make their way into the DoD’s ecosystem, more so than tightening up its own processes.

“It’s not really a process of what can we tighten up, as much as … working with industry and our suppliers to make sure we are aware of who is out there counterfeiting their products,” Najieb-Locke said. “And making our acquisition corps aware that, here is a new list of counterfeit products and this is what the counterfeit looks like. So it’s an education regime more than a process. Because if it slips through that check, that means it passed technical viability.”

About Stephen Losey and Joe Gould

Stephen Losey is the air warfare reporter for Defense News. He previously covered leadership and personnel issues at Air Force Times, and the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare at Military.com. He has traveled to the Middle East to cover U.S. Air Force operations.

Joe Gould is the senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry. He served previously as Congress reporter.

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Defense News · by Stephen Losey · December 5, 2022

3.  The failure of integrated deterrence, and what to do about China

Sir Lawrence Freedman: "Deterrence works. Until it doesn't."​

The question is what can we practically deter? Can we deter the rise of China? Its military growth and power? Or can we deter an attack on Taiwan? Has China attacked Taiwan? And the key question, will it attack Taiwan and under what conditions? Can we deter the Kim family regime from developing nuclear weapons and missiles and advanced military capabilities? Can we deter north Korean provocations? Or can we deter a north Korean attack on the South?

I think we throw around the words deterrence and deter too much with no understanding of what can be practically deterred.

That said, I agree with the Congressman that we need to ensure we are improving our defense capabilities in so many areas. A strong defense with the will to employ capabilities judiciously and but effectively in defense of US and allied interests is the foundation of deterrence.

I actually think the Congressman is (perhaps unknowingly) embracing one aspect of integrated deterrence. Integrated deterrence does not belong solely to DOD. It is a whole of government effort employing all elements of national power and not just the military. But the military must be properly funded and of course Congress is the key element to funding and thus a critical element of integrated deterrence. Our failure to properly fund defense fails at the feet of Congress.

The failure of integrated deterrence, and what to do about China

Defense News · by Rep. Ken Calvert · December 5, 2022

A year before the U.S. entered World War II, Gen. Douglas MacArthur warned: “The history of failure in war, or in any other human endeavor, can almost be summed up in two words: ‘too late.’ Too late in comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy. Too late in realizing the mortal danger. Too late in preparedness. Too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance.”

With China’s military growing in size, scope and sophistication, American military leaders are echoing this very same warning.

Recently, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday said: “What we’ve seen over the past 20 years is that they [the Chinese Communist Party] have delivered on every promise they’ve made earlier than they said they were going to deliver on it.”

“So when we talk about the 2027 window, in my mind that has to be a 2022 window or potentially a 2023 window. I can’t rule that out. I don’t mean to be alarmist by saying that,” Adm. Gilday added.

In a speech last month, Adm. Charles Richard, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, cautioned: “As I assess our level of deterrence against China, the ship is slowly sinking. It is sinking slowly, but it is sinking, as fundamentally they are putting capability in the field faster than we are. … And that is a very near-term problem.”

To add to the urgency of the moment, the war in Ukraine has become a prolonged conventional conflict that has exhausted production lines for Stinger and Javelin missiles and illuminated the fact critical components are no longer produced in sufficient quantity to meet future demand. Supply chain issues and decades of offshoring further complicate our production issues. To confidently deter our nation’s adversaries, America’s domestic industrial base will need to produce historic levels of battlefield replacements for munitions, conventional capabilities and exquisite platforms.

In 2021, there were about 12.8 million manufacturing jobs in the U.S., according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, which tracked data from 1939 onward. That’s a 34% decrease from the peak recorded number of 19.4 million in 1979.

U.S. Navy Hull Maintenance Technician 2nd Class Michael Meneses uses a welder aboard the guided-missile destroyer Chung-Hoon. (MC2 Logan C. Kellums/U.S. Navy)

Russia’s ongoing invasion in Ukraine proves that the Department of Defense’s strategy of integrated deterrence is a losing proposition. The Biden administration’s timid measures to prevent Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression and its haphazard scramble in response sent signals that were received loud and clear in Beijing. A similar message was broadcast during our chaotic and disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan just months before the war in Ukraine began.

If Adm. Richard is correct that our level of deterrence against China is a sinking ship, and if Adm. Gilday is correct that the U.S. may be called to project power 7,000 miles to defend against a forceful unification of Taiwan in the very near future, should we not heed the words of Gen. MacArthur and ensure we are not “too late?”

In order to maintain peace, we must implement a disciplined strategy that ruthlessly prioritizes the most critical threats, which include continued Russian aggression, as well as China’s desire to invade Taiwan and become a regional hegemon in South Asia.

To prepare to “fight tonight,” we must reassess the arduous and overly complicated acquisition process that has been built up since WWII, and remove major bureaucratic hurdles for commercially available capabilities. We must increase investment in land, sea, air and space assets that can be fielded in the next 12-24 months. Congress should provide funding to expand short-term orders of necessary weapons systems and equipment with functioning production lines. Existing orders to support the Taiwanese must be prioritized, and we must immediately address any backlogs.

To shrink the time frame from innovation to the deployment of new technologies, Congress must also continue to fund programs like Accelerate the Procurement and Fielding of Innovative Technologies that aim to address the Defense Department’s notoriously inefficient procurement process.

Furthermore, we must implement a whole-of-government approach to protect our economic and supply chain infrastructure against potential threats from the Chinese Communist Party. Every industry must look at the vulnerabilities of our dependency on China’s manufacturing base, many of which were exposed during the pandemic, and take measures to insulate themselves from a dramatic shift in China’s geopolitical posture.

To be prepared for tomorrow, we must secure and defend international leadership in the technologies of tomorrow. Cyber, space, intelligence and information are just as essential to enabling our warfighters as food, fuel and ammunition. Advanced technologies that outpace human cognition — like artificial intelligence, machine learning and quantum computing — will determine the victors of future conflicts. Modernization must not be sacrificed during this time of crisis, or we risk winning the battle to ultimately lose the war.

Our adversaries continually seek to exploit our free and open society using indirect and asymmetric approaches that influence populations and affect legitimacy to erode our global leadership. While deterring, we must continue to engage with our partners and allies to present a unified front on both the military and diplomatic stage. We must send a clear message to authoritarians around the world that we stand ready with an unassailable international coalition that is prepared to compete and win across the entire spectrum of competition and conflict.

These must be the priorities of the Department of Defense and the 118th Congress as reflected in the budget, authorization and appropriations process. Anything less will leave us all asking, again, why were we too late.

Rep. Ken Calvert, R-Calif., is the ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee’s defense panel.

4. The 2022 War On The Rocks Holiday Reading List

I think one or both of my recommendations may be controversial.

The 2022 War On The Rocks Holiday Reading List - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by WOTR Staff · December 6, 2022

Kerry Anderson

The Daughters of Kobani, Gayle Tzemach Lemmon. This deeply researched book highlights the role of Kurdish women fighting against ISIS in Syria. In sharing their stories, the author offers nuanced perspectives on the war in Syria, the plight of the Kurds, and the battle against ISIS. In particular, the individual motivations and experiences of the women warriors in this book provide a crucial contribution to understanding the Middle East and the role of women in war more broadly.

The Women of Chateau Lafayette, Stephanie Dray. A great fiction book for easy and enlightening reading over the holidays, Dray presents the experiences of different women in France during the French Revolution and both world wars. She highlights the long-overlooked role that Adrienne Lafayette played in history through her courage and determination, as well as Beatrice Chanler’s role in World War I and World War II, particularly through her charitable work. A delight to read, the author also is serious about her historical research.

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Emma Ashford

Chip War: The Fight For the World’s Most Critical Technology, Chris Miller. I’ll be the first to admit I’m a bit of a luddite, at least when it comes to computer technology. But Chris Miller’s book on America’s long-running entanglement with the global semiconductor industry was engaging enough to keep even me interested in the technical details. Miller details how semiconductors enabled America’s Cold War victory, its military preeminence over the last few decades, and the significant challenges that China’s rise within global semiconductor supply chains poses for U.S. security.

Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World, Adam Tooze. This book is a few years old now, but holds up surprisingly well for it. There are relatively few books that place economic statecraft at the core of global geopolitics — at least when compared to the piles of books written on military-technical questions — but it’s an approach that yields surprising insights. Tooze’s book is eminently readable, and the long scope of the book provides a distinct advantage, allowing the author to connect seemingly disparate events: the 2008 financial crisis, the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine, Brexit, or the rise of Donald Trump.

Dave Barno

A Game of Birds and Wolves, Simon Parkin. This fascinating account tells the story of World War II’s Battle of the Atlantic primarily through the lens of an obscure unit known as British Western Approaches Command. Parkin reveals how a medically retired naval officer and hundreds of largely unknown women of the Royal Navy auxiliaries known as “Wrens” helped run an intricate series of war games to develop the tactics that ultimately defeated the German U-Boat threat that nearly cost Britain the war. A new and timely contribution to World War II literature, this very human story shines a much-needed light on the vital importance of unsung women to winning critical parts of the war — from code-breaking to air defense plotting to defeating German subs.

Churchill as Warlord, Ronald Lewin. Keeping with the themes of World War II and Britain’s desperate war effort, this wartime leadership biography of Winston Churchill focuses on the extraordinary combination of traits that made him an irascible, frustrating, but absolutely essential war leader — serving Britain in an unprecedented wartime role as both Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. This book insists that we take seriously the notion that individuals in wartime deeply matter to the outcome of every conflict — and remind us that Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky is merely our most recent example.

Nora Bensahel

The New Neighbor, Karen Cleveland. I devoured this spy novel during a transatlantic flight, which made the hours fly by (pun intended). Beth Bradford is a CIA analyst who has been tracking a specific Iranian intelligence agent for many years. Yet she gets pulled from the case at the same time that an impending divorce leads her to sell her house and move away from her close friends on that quiet cul-de-sac. Soon she becomes obsessed with the woman who bought her house, who seems to have everything that Beth once had. Is the new neighbor the Iranian agent that Beth has been searching for all these years? The plot twists and turns until a final reveal, which I’m still thinking about months later.

Carrie Soto Is Back, Taylor Jenkins Reid. This is the perfect Christmas equivalent of a summer beach read. Curl up in front of a fire and meet Carrie Soto, the fictional analogue of Serena Williams, who set a (fictional) record by winning 20 Grand Slam titles in her remarkable career. That record holds until six years after her retirement, when rising superstar Nicki Chan wins her 21st title at the U.S. Open. 37-year-old Soto decides to come out of retirement and try to reclaim her record during one final season. Of course a romance ensues, with the male training partner who is also trying to regain his former glory. Even if you don’t know much about tennis, you’ll enjoy joining Soto along a journey that ends up being about what she learns along the way.

Claude Berube

The Autobiography of Admiral Dewey, George Dewey; and Nimitz at War, Craig Symonds. The autobiography of the admiral whose victory arguably brought the U.S. Navy to the world stage and the biography of the Admiral who was the architect of the war that solidified America’s role on the high seas both enlighten readers on maritime operations. Dewey’s autobiography, while lacking the eloquence of Grant’s memoirs, is important for understanding Dewey’s experience during the Civil War, peacetime activities, and the Battle of Manila Bay. Unfortunately Dewey does not address his brief presidential run in 1900. The Nimitz biography is expertly told by Symonds, one of the best contemporary naval historians and he doesn’t disappoint with this work.

Born Standing Up, Steve Martin; All About Me! My Remarkable Life in Show Business, Mel Brooks; and So, Anyway, John Cleese. A grouping of autobiographies from three of the greatest comedians/writers of the late 20th century may be an odd selection for a national security site, but there are important lessons from all three, such as what one can learn from early failures or the analysis into how audiences respond to commentaries. Plus, after COVID, a continuing war in the Ukraine, and the potential for an economic recession, we all need a few laughs and comedic memories in 2023.

Ralph Clem

Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine, Mark Galeotti. It is handy as an overview that helps place the current war in Ukraine in a larger context.

Redeployment, Phil Klay. Just had the chance to read this, well worth the effort. Short stories but continuity among them.

Zack Cooper

Ascending Order: Rising Powers and the Politics of Status in International Institutions, Rohan Mukherjee. Mukherjee examines how international institutions can either enable or constrain rising powers. His cases studying the rise of the United States, Japan, and India are insightful and contain many lessons for managing modern day challenges.

Trafficking Data: How China Is Winning the Battle for Digital Sovereignty, Aynne Kokas. Kokas examines how the Chinese government and Chinese companies approach data. She makes the case that the United States must get its own digital house in order before it can effectively address the challenges that China poses in the digital domain.

Nicholas Danforth

Worldmaking in the Long Great War: How Local and Colonial Struggles Shaped the Modern Middle East, Jonathan Wyrtzen. For everyone who has been exasperated by simplistic historical accounts that trace the origins of the modern Middle East — and its problems — back to the Sykes-Picot agreement, Worldmaking in the Long Great War offers a long overdue corrective. Wyrtzen shows how the overlapping and conflicting interests of local actors and imperial powers interacted across several decades to reshape the political geography of the region stretching from Morocco to Iran.

Sultan in Oman, Jan Morris. In 1955, journalist Jan Morris tagged along with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman as he toured his newly consolidated realm. The result was this concise, colorful account, one of the last and least well known installments in the Orientalist travel genre.

Richard Fontaine

By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783, Michael Green. To know where we’re going in Asia, it helps to know where we’ve been. Mike’s masterful account not only recounts events and personalities, but also explores the strategic rationale underlying America’s long engagement in the region. It was published a few years ago but remains a must-read.

Veritas: A Harvard Professor, a Con Man and the Gospel of Jesus’s Wife, Ariel Sabar. This nonfiction account weaves together papyrus, Biblical history, Harvard Divinity School and the East German Stasi. Fascinating. Forgery? Read on.

Ryan Evans

Superpower in Peril: A Battle Plan to Renew America, David McCormick with James Cunningham. I had the privilege to read this book as it was being written. It surfaces critical ideas on how the United States can prepare itself for the competition ahead. It offers an optimistic vision for American renewal that will resonate with people across the partisan divide.

Command, Lawrence Freedman. Freedman delivers a beautifully written and eclectic book on one of the most important and tragic human activities: command in wartime.

The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan, the Cold War, and the World on the Brink, William Inboden. An often divisive figure in his time, the legacy of Ronald Reagan unites more than it divides as time goes on. Inboden has written an important book based on years of archival research that will appeal to people who hold all sorts of opinions on the 40th U.S. president.

Ulrike Franke

Au Café de la Ville Perdue, Anaïs LLobet. Sorry non-French-speakers: So far, this brilliant book is only available in French. It tells the story of Varosha, a ghost town in the no-mans land between the part of Cyprus that is occupied by Turkey, and the Greek-Cypriot part. It is the story of a war, of a family, and of a nation, set brilliantly in different moments in time. My book of the year.

The Passenger, Ulrich Alexander Boschwitz. There is the story in the book, and the story of the book. Both are important, insightful, and harrowing. The Passenger tells the story of a German Jew, trying to leave his country while its society’s values are crumbling. The book takes the reader on a frantic, and at times kafkaesk, trip, and makes one realise what it really means to having to leave a life behind. The Passenger was (re-)published only last year, but written in 1938, by 23-year-old Ulrich Alexander Boschwitz. Boschwitz had managed to leave Germany in time — only to be deemed an “enemy alien” and interned on the Isle of Man, and then deported to Australia where he was interned again. When he was allowed to return, the boat that brought him back was sunk by a German submarine. The book, and Boschwitz story remind us that there is little justice in life.

Doyle Hodges

The Gun, C.J. Chivers. While the subject of this book is the AK-47 and its many derivative variants, Chivers takes on several tasks more ambitious than the history of a single weapon. He traces the development of automatic weapons generally, and institutional resistance to their integration into militaries before World War I. He highlights the degree to which the Soviet and Nazi militaries in World War II began to recognize that the cartridge fired by a gun was at least as important as the weapon that fired it, and that the advent of automatic weapons diminished the importance of long-range power and accuracy. And he details how the Soviets used the licensing and export of a cheap, robust weapon to transform combat in the 20th century, lending capability to rebels that had previously been the purview of states with large military budgets, and how the U.S. military struggled to catch up, both conceptually and technologically. In a time of military uncertainty and transformation, this book offers food for thought.

No Picnic on Mount Kenya, Felice Benuzzi. A true story set in East Africa in World War II. Young Italian men who had been part of the administration of Ethiopia are held in a British POW camp from which they can see Mt. Kenya in the distance. Armed with this vision and a picture of the mountain from the label on their tinned beef rations which they use as a map, they resolve to break out of the camp and climb the mountain. Their escape is not part of any war effort — rather, it is an attempt to do something difficult just for the challenge of it and the good of their soul. A fascinating and inspiring story by a participant who went on to a distinguished post-war career as an Italian diplomat.

Bruce Hoffman

The Oppermans, Lion Feuchtwanger. The saga of a cultured, assimilated extended Jewish family living in Berlin during the eve and dawn of Nazi rule. Already exiled from his native Germany when this book was first published in 1934, the Jewish novelist wrote presciently and incisively about a country that had lost its mind and morality. Everyone — including some of Feuchtwanger’s Jewish characters — believed that Hitler’s violent rhetoric and vituperation was merely electioneering noise: Once he actually had to govern, they consoled themselves, he and his followers would surely temper their extremism. Feuchtwanger knew better — and also excoriates the Western democracies (including the United States) for similarly believing that over time Hitler would become more moderate. “It was an earthquake, one of those great upheavals of concentrated fathomless, world-wide stupidity,” Feuchtwanger writes. “Pitted against such an elemental force, the strength and wisdom of the individual was useless.” I had watched the PBS dramatization of The Oppermans in 1983 and never forgot it. I was therefore thrilled when Carroll & Graff recently published a new edition of this classic work — with an appendix reproducing the review published in the New York Times on March 18, 1934. The book’s chilling message of how easily democracy is destroyed when lies become truth; the media is suppressed; and, anyone who stands in “the Leader’s” way is silenced, driven from office, and worse, resonates as clearly today as it did eight decades ago.

The Zealot and the Emancipator, H.W. Brands. Is the United States today on the verge of civil war? Will a version of “Bloody Kansas” — a nineteenth-century evocation of Northern Ireland’s more recent “Troubles” — surface before or more likely following the 2024 presidential election? Although such comparisons are now almost routinely invoked, Brands’ magisterial history of America in the 1850s dispels the simplicity of such comparisons. Intertwining the stories of the violent abolitionist, John Brown, with the future U.S. president, Abraham Lincoln.

Frank Hoffman

The Politics of Command, Lawrence Freedman. An insightful study into the complex nature of supreme leadership and decision making at the summit. Explore the fusion of political and military counsel in major conflicts, ranging from the Korean War to the present. Concludes with an exposition into the nature of command in an age of disruptive technologies that offers deep insights with unusual clarity.

Degrade and Destroy: The Inside Story of the War Against the Islamic State, Michael Gordon. We’re now far enough away from this war to see the second edition of history, told in a compelling manner by a master journalistic. Gordon blends a journalist’s concise pen with the tenacious attention to detail of an historian. Its time to draw critical lessons from nearly 20 years of an incomplete conflict, Degrade and Destroy is the place to start.

Resourcing the National Security Enterprise: Connecting the Ends and Means of US National Security, Susan Bryant and Mark Troutman. This is a concise anthology about the process and politics of the U.S. national security budget. The admixture of bureaucratic culture and Byzantine federal mechanisms to assess and allocate scarce resources has rarely been well understood. These two practitioners have crafted a taut product that should be employed in any strategic studies program.

Carolyn Just

The Last Policeman, Ben H. Winters. The first in a trilogy, this book follows Detective Hank Palace as he tries to solve a mystery with the world on the edge of extinction. Winters keeps you on the edge of your seat as Palace gets to work – I ordered the rest of the series before I got to page 100.

The Mechanical, Ian Treggilis. Another great series, The Mechanical is the first in the trilogy known as The Alchemy Wars. Set in an alternate timeline where the Dutch are the world superpower, it follows the story of a robot named Jax. There is something for everyone in this series, topics of free will, ethics and of course…war.

Al Mauroni

Managing U.S. Nuclear Operations in the 21st Century, Charles Glaser, Austin Long, and Brian Radzinsky (eds). There are no end of books and articles on the theory of strategic deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons, but fewer on the process by which the U.S. government manages its nuclear operations. This book offers a sound examination of the topic, with contributions by some of the best practitioners in the field. It clearly illustrates a post-Cold War approach to how nuclear weapons contribute to U.S. defense policy. The book is easily digestible by the general interested reader and should be included in any educational course on nuclear deterrence.

Seeking the Bomb, Vipin Narang. While it is important to understand how the U.S. government manages its nuclear operations, it is equally important to understand how other nations with nuclear stockpiles have developed their nuclear weapons programs, in as much as they are different than the U.S. model. Dr. Narang’s previous book Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era started the discussion on how other states developed their nuclear postures; he continues the discussion here with a strong history of those efforts along with the development of proliferation strategies adopted by various nations. While it may be true that a nuclear war cannot be won, there are still a lot of nations who have seriously considered how to develop this capability, and understanding how they did this assists in future nonproliferation activities.

David Maxwell

The Hard Road Out: One Woman’s Escape From North Korea, Jihyun Park and Seh-lynn Chai. An incredible story of survival and escape that provides tremendous insight into North Korea that can only be told by someone who has experienced such hardship. It is also unusual that the story of North Korea contradictions is told to a Korean from the South who is a successful businesswoman and human rights advocate. On a personal note, despite my years in the military with Special Forces qualification, Ranger School, and survival training, I question whether I could have endured the unbelievable adversity and suffering like Jihyun Park. Anyone who wants to understand North Korea and be inspired by the strength of a true survivor must read this book. (Available now in Kindle and in hardback on Amazon on Jan. 31, 2023.)

Waging A Good War: A Military History of the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1968, Thomas E. Ricks. This is an important history told from an expected perspective — that of a military campaign and as Ricks notes, “strategic decision making.” He also notes that “the central tactic of the movement — the march — is also the most basic of military operations. Indeed, even in war, marching is sometimes more decisive than violence.” All students of revolution, resistance, and insurgency (and unconventional warfare) should read this history. Anyone who wants to better understand American history should read this book. I would add this book to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies studies.

Michael Mazarr

Mr. X and the Pacific, Paul Heer. This study of George Kennan’s role in shaping U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific after World War II is a fascinating and important reminder of the twists and turns of U.S. policy during that time — including a momentary choice to write off Taiwan/Formosa. Without the Korean War, the whole course of the Cold War, at least in Asia, would have been very different. It’s also an important reminder of the practical challenges of holding to a consistent foreign policy theory: Kennan repeatedly worries about excessive applications of his containment doctrine, but couldn’t divorce himself from parallel worries about credibility. He was fine writing Korea out of the U.S. security perimeter, for example — then turned around and urged his government to intervene once North Korea attacked. An engagingly written, deeply researched account.

The Guardians, Geoffrey Kabaservice. Formally a biography of Kingman Brewster, the reformist president of Yale during much of the 1960s, this is a brilliant study of the public service ethic of the old Eastern establishment, and the decline of that establishment in the late 1960s and 1970s. The story of Brewster alone is worth the price of admission — a tremendous leadership study with more than a few magnificent episodes. But the book also provides a thoughtful and superbly written snapshot of American politics and culture during these years: The turbulent 60s, the discrediting of the old-style establishment, the rise of Nixon and a more bitter and combative political style, and much more. One of the most instructive and enjoyable books I have read in years.

Doug Ollivant

Living in the Long Emergency: Global Crisis, the Failure of the Futurists, and the Early Adapters Who Are Showing Us the Way Forward, James Howard Kunstler. Read Ullman and Kunstler together. Harlan Ullman (a friend) gives us the 30,000-foot theory of likely future disruption in our politics, infrastructure, and ecosystems (“Massive Attacks of Disruption,” his new MAD), while Kunstler agrees, and then shows how Americans will struggle through it. A powerful reminder that while the big picture may be ugly, there are always smaller success stories that can give hope. There can be optimism along with the doom.

Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as the Fuel and Fire of Thinking, Douglas R Hofstadter and Emmanuel Sander. A deep, slow, philosophical treatment of how we use analogy not only to communicate, but more simply to make sense of all the unpredictable sense images that constantly bombard us. The authors bring real insight on the intersection of sense perception and language, with example after example to make the theory far more tangible. The authors maintain that “analogy is the core of all thinking.” You’ll likely agree after this read — and you’ll not see the world, or communication, in the same way.

Megan Oprea

Kristin Lavransdatter, Sigrid Undset. This trilogy follows the life of Kristin Lavransdatter in the late 13th and 14th centuries. Both captivating in its story and fascinating in its historical detail, this is a unique piece of literature. I recommend reading the older translation by Charles Archer (he was friends with the author), which, although a bit more challenging because of the archaic English Archer uses, helps transport the reader to another age. The author, Sigrid Undset, won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1928 for her depiction of northern life during the Middle Ages.

The End of the Affair, Graham Greene. Graham Greene’s well-known novel, The End of the Affair, follows the rather brief romance between the protagonist Maurice Bendrix and a married woman, Sarah Miles. But the bulk of the novel focuses on his obsession with learning why she suddenly put an end to their affair. This is a beautiful story about love, heartbreak, and, ultimately, faith.

Michael Pietrucha

Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder. Infinitely depressing and will upend your understanding of how Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany devastated the civilian population in occupied Eastern Europe — even before World War II. The story here connects

and intertwines the two stores of catastrophically murderous regimes and their combined effects. One of the most disturbing books you’ll ever read.

Confessions of a Phantom Pilot, Tug Wilson. Lighthearted and funny, and a necessary complement to the unsettled feeling in the pit of your stomach engendered by my other recommendation.

Iskander Rehman

The Georgetown Set: Friends and Rivals in Cold War Washington, Gregg Herken. A riveting, beautifully written examination of American foreign policy and grand strategy debates during the early decades of the Cold War. The story is told through the remarkable lives, tumultuous friendships, and oft-picayune squabbles of a colorful set of individuals — ranging from the Alsop Brothers to Dean Acheson, Chip Bohlen, Allen Dulles, Averell Harriman, and Katherine Graham — all of whom at one stage lived in close proximity to each other, in the quaint, leafy neighborhood of Georgetown. Herken transports us back to the smoky parlors and raucous, booze-drenched dinners of Cold War Washington at a time when, as Henry Kissinger once memorably quipped, “the hand that mixed the Georgetown martini” was often that which “guided the destiny of the Western world.” By focusing on the rich inner lives of these brilliant, yet deeply flawed characters who helped shape the contours of American statecraft at a singularly momentous period in its history, Herken has provided us with a unique history of Cold War, one which has the benefit of being genuinely entertaining in addition to immensely informative.

Ivan the Terrible, Andrei Pavlov and Maureen Perrie. I enjoyed this concise, tersely written biography on Ivan the Terrible, part of Routledge’s excellent “Profiles in Power” series. Ivan IV, more commonly known as “Ivan the Terrible,” (r.1547–1584) was, through his creation of the Oprichnina system and reign of terror, in many ways the “founding father” of tsarist despotism. Refusing to listen to many of his more seasoned advisors, Ivan embarked on a ruinous and unnecessary campaign of aggression which united much of Europe against him. The Livonian war lasted 24 years, drained the state’s coffers, and encouraged large-scale emigration and defections of boyars, princes & nobles. It also revealed to Russia’s neighbors its military deficiencies. As another historian, Alexander Filyushkin, notes Russian forces had little experience in fighting technologically advanced foes, were unused to early modern siege warfare, and to “storming heavily fortified stone positions.” This “was a different kind of war” during which, even to their Western European adversaries’ surprise, they performed far more poorly than anticipated. Ivan’s pigheaded focus on the Baltic military theater, even in the face of considerable losses, left Russia vulnerable to a resurgence of threats from other axes and to devastating attacks from the foreign-supported Crimean Tatars, with Moscow burning to the ground in 1571. After a colossal expenditure in blood and treasure, Russia was defeated, driven out of Livonia (a territory comprising much of present-day Estonia and Latvia), and forced to forfeit vast tracts of previously occupied territory. Ivan’s great Baltic gambit had been for naught. Through his toxic blend of domestic despotism and military imprudence, Ivan had brought Russia’s economy to the brink of ruin, reinforced its isolation and undermined its societal stability, helping to usher in the Time of Troubles.

Emma Salisbury

Our Man: Richard Holbrooke and the End of the American Century, George Packer. A brilliant but abrasively arrogant man, Holbrooke’s career is a perfect lens through which to view American statecraft from Vietnam to the Balkans to Afghanistan. Despite never rising above the level of assistant secretary at the State Department, Holbrooke was at the forefront of several of the biggest events in 20th-century U.S. history. Packer’s writing is some of the best in the business, and he deftly weaves together diplomacy, power, and Holbrooke’s personal life (which could be gently called “complicated”). An absolute must-read.

How to Stage a Coup: And Ten Other Lessons From the World of Secret Statecraft, Rory Cormac. The dark arts of statecraft are all here: assassination, propaganda, disinformation, subversion. Cormac takes us through how states use covert action to shape our world, with in-depth research and an eye for a piquant anecdote. It has almost become cliché to say that such subjects are more important to understand than ever, but it is nonetheless true, and this is the perfect book for doing so. (The author is careful to note that this is not actually a “how-to” book — but he would say that, wouldn’t he?)

Kori Schake

The Fleet At Flood Tide, James Hornfisher. Read it for many reasons, including to appreciate the monumental achievements of Chester Nimitz. Even with a couple of new biographies and his compliment etched in the Marine Corps memorial, Chester Nimitz is World War II’s least appreciated great leader. A Texan who grew up speaking German, convicted at court martial for running a ship aground, developer of underway replenishment, courageous enough to wager the fleet on Midway, he’s the most interesting innovator of the era. Eisenhower is deservedly credited for emollient leadership of intractable personalities, Nimitz had it equally rocky and managed it equally well. I’m still laughing at Hornfischer’s fabulous description of Nimitz that “He lay like a valley of humility between two mountains of conceit: Ernest King and General Douglas MacArthur.”

The Passenger, Cormac McCarthy. Nobody writes like McCarthy — the archaic language, garrulous psychopaths, his brief description of a Comanche raid in Blood Meridian is terrifyingly unforgettable. Same with this book. It opens with the suicide of a brilliant and disturbed women whose conversations with the flipper armed dwarf in her head carry through, interspersed with the guilt of the brother that loved and lost her as he tries to figure out the connection between physicists of the Manhattan Project and a contemporary plane crash. One of the characters gives a perfect summation of McCarthy’s books: “If I think about things that I just don’t want to know about, they’re all things that I do know about.” Not an uplifting read, but a haunting one.

Loren DeJonge Schulman

Recommending completed series to a dear friend (or those who might be) is such a delight. This year I could share Naomi Novik‘s Scholomance series, which could be shorthanded as Harry Potter but with realistic risk and violence, but is really about friendship, alliances, expressions of care, and our monsters. Or I could pass on Daniel O’Malley‘s The Rook Files, a supersecret supernatural government bureaucracy (that does bureaucracy brilliantly!) that just wrapped up with Blitz, set partially, in, uh, the Blitz and featuring deep cut cameos from A Little Princess and The Secret Garden. But with bitter and sweet I’ll ask if you’ve read Hilary Mantel‘s Wolf Hall trilogy, her glorious reimagining of Thomas Cromwell that has made prior appearances on this list but deserves a final mention. I was sneaking in a chapter of the Mirror and the Light with my coffee before work earlier this year when I learned that Dame Hilary had passed away. After so many rereads Thomas Cromwell was a friend — an unexpected one — who offered treasures from each pass in his love of his family and friends, his commitment to service and England, abiding loyalty, and ultimate lack of foresight. The first time I read the concluding book it was with anxiety, knowing what was coming, but the last time was with a little glee, watching foes apply webs Cromwell had himself woven first and with greater skill.

Aaron Stein

Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet, James P. Stevenson. I wanted a very niche book about a specific topic: how the F-18 was built and paid for. This book delivers, and more. It is an exhaustive look at the debates surrounding Naval aviation and how the F-18 was justified, built, and then tested.

Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold Story Of American Submarine Espionage, Sherry Sontag, Christopher Drew, with Annette Lawrence Drew. It is rare to recommend a book that you can easily finish in an afternoon. You can easily finish Blind Man’s Bluff in an afternoon. It is that good. As someone who spends too much time reading about air power and Turkey, this was a welcome jaunt into a world I knew so little about. I learned a lot about submarine warfare and espionage and had fun doing so.

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Lists and Contests

warontherocks.com · by WOTR Staff · December 6, 2022

5. Irregular War's War on Thinking About War

​Excerpts:

For every “New Model Army,” “AirLand Battle” or “War Plan Orange,” there is a “New Look” or “Transformationalism.”

Let me just put this marker out there: what we call “Irregular Warfare” is about as “Regular Warfare” as can be. There is nothing “new” here. There is nothing “exciting” here … but there is danger in selling it too hard or worse, bureaucratize the entire concept.

Just one example that should be top of mind to everyone. You know the last war that was started based on the concept of “Irregular War” being primary? Someone sold to their political bosses that war would be quick, cheap, and all the hard parts of traditional war could be solved by a few highly trained “irregular” forces?

​

Irregular War's War on Thinking About War

cdrsalamander.substack.com · by CDR Salamander

Building a coherent intellectual foundation of an effective military force to be ready to defend the nation and its interests never ends. As a levee against a large and turbulent river must be constantly monitored, maintained, and reinforced – so too must support for reasoned, reality-based, up-to-date, and sound arguments continue against the constant erosion from doe-eyed “war is new” and sharper “this is my hobby horse” idea/concept sellers looking to grow an empire or to reinforce their world view.

For every “New Model Army,” “AirLand Battle” or “War Plan Orange,” there is a “New Look” or “Transformationalism.”

Let me just put this marker out there: what we call “Irregular Warfare” is about as “Regular Warfare” as can be. There is nothing “new” here. There is nothing “exciting” here … but there is danger in selling it too hard or worse, bureaucratize the entire concept.

Just one example that should be top of mind to everyone. You know the last war that was started based on the concept of “Irregular War” being primary? Someone sold to their political bosses that war would be quick, cheap, and all the hard parts of traditional war could be solved by a few highly trained “irregular” forces?

The Russians in February of 2022, that’s who. The “Special Military Operation” that was supposed to be just a few days, lighting quick, transformational. 2014 but with Kyiv/Kiev instead of Crimea. Instead they have a grinding war regressing to the mean; mass, firepower, logistics, manpower.

As if the Russo-Ukrainian War isn’t happening, over the last year there has been a big push to sell the military cure-all of “Irregular Warfare.”

As we have outlined here often through the years, from riverine to specialized helicopter squadrons, in peace too many short sighted people want to decommission capabilities in the irregular warfare area that we will need again in the next war - like we always do. I do not care if “thought leaders” find them icky, short of sponsorship, or "too specialized" (whatever that means), they will be needed. You can do a job with a good tool well, or with a bad tool poorly - but the job must be done.

This failure of vision from the uniformed and civilian leaders in the bureaucracy cannot be solved by growing the bureaucracy, can it? The intentional distraction and sub-optimization of our existing war colleges cannot be fixed by creating yet another, should it?

I am sympathetic to a desire to make sure this skillset does not die on the vine – I was there at C5F at 09/11/2001 in the opening months of the Afghan conflict - but we need to be careful about keeping it in the proper context.

A solid overview of the challenges is in Sean McFate’s latest in The Hill.

Warning here, it reads like two different articles. It starts off in a direction that triggered the first part of my post - McFate is the author of The New Rules of War: How America Can Win--Against Russia, China, and Other Threats, so this is kind of his bag. He also attacks wargaming - something I would think he would want more of, not less. Anyway, the second part that should stand alone has some solid observations on what/where such a a “Functional Center for Security Studies in Irregular Warfare” should be. It all revolves around Section 1299L of the Mac Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act of 2021.

Congress authorized the creation of a “Functional Center for Security Studies in Irregular Warfare” in Section 1299L of the Mac Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act of 2021. The center should fill critical gaps between thought leaders, irregular warriors, and international partners. Done well, it will vastly improve our irregular warfighting capabilities and understanding.

In some way, I guess this is Congress doing what I've asked it to do - force DOD to do its job - but this is such a blunt tool. It is the law though, so how do you execute it?

Let me get the bad part of his article out of the way first;

Today’s defense community has forgotten that strategic competition is won through irregular warfare — a dangerous mistake. Taiwan wargamers view ultimate “competition” as conventional warfare, and recreate the Battle of Midway in the Taiwan Straits with Ford-class carriers and F-35s. It proves the saying: “Generals always fight the last war, especially if they won it.” The conflict probably would go nuclear in hours or days, and the gamers’ artificially prolonged conventional war phase is fantasy.

I'm sorry, but no. The last 10-months have clearly showed everyone that "prolonged conventional war" is a reality. It is the normal flow of events when major powers or their alliances reach near parity. "The last war" was/is where "irregular warfare" was the reality. When the next war comes, what haunts my mind is a cleverly briefed "72-hr War" turns in to 72-weeks or 72-months.

McFate has 180-deg lockoff here.

Policymakers are equally misguided. Of the $780 billion defense budget, the Pentagon is overwhelmingly buying conventional war weapons like fighter jets and navy ships while ignoring irregular war capabilities. The budget for U.S. Special Operations Command, which oversees all American special operators everywhere, is 75 percent the cost of an aircraft carrier, and we’re building three at $13.3 billion a ship, with two more planned. Budgets are moral documents because they do not lie. The Defense Department is preparing for a war with China that looks like World War II with better technology, an improbable scenario.

Again, I'm not buying what he is selling. All evidence points to the greatest military threat in the short to medium term is from the People's Republic of China. If we are lucky, it will be for us at least a maritime and aerospace war. That is what we need to prepare and invest in. That means "fighter jets and navy ships." Their missions will be supported by properly funded "irregular forces" - not the other way around.

Again, "irregular warfare" is subset of "regular warfare." Always has been. Always will be.

Now to Part-2 of the article I like;

...there are four pitfalls the Irregular Warfare Center (or whatever it will be called) must avoid. First, it should not “reinvent the wheel.” There is a relatively small but robust infrastructure within the Defense Department that already delivers elements of the center’s mission.

Yes. Agreed. Improve that. McFate does outline significant dangers of rent-seeking and poor thinking;

Second, some think the center should be housed at a civilian university, but this would be a mistake. Most universities eschew the study of war as distasteful, and academic literature is notoriously left-wing. It’s why war colleges exist. Last year, the director of Yale University’s Grand Strategy Program resigned in controversy over her public disdain for Henry Kissinger and teaching Black Lives Matter and “Strategies of U.S. Social Change.” When Yale demurred, she caviled it had succumbed to “donor pressure.” Yale’s Faculty Senate and History Department backed her up, stating professors and programs should never be “under outside surveillance.” Not a good omen for the Defense Department. Additionally, exceedingly few professors specialize in irregular warfare strategy, and there are zero programs dedicated to the topic. Housing the center at a place full of rookies makes no sense. The Defense Department’s desire to leverage academic institutions is principled but unwise.

This is correct. However, if he thinks in 2022 that the academic disease has not infected not just our war colleges but also our service academies, he is greatly mistaken. These are not "right wing" institutions, just the opposite. Especially in the last 15-years, in many areas and departments they are fully left-wing - and not very military.

Third, to do its job, the center must constantly interact with warfighters, the interagency, and policymakers, and that means Washington, D.C. You cannot influence from afar. The National Defense University might be the optimal choice because it’s located in D.C. and is the Defense Department’s premiere senior service school. It houses five war colleges, three regional centers, and a research arm. It offers an accredited master’s degree in Security Studies and its students are exclusively senior leaders (15+ years of service) from across the military, interagency and allied nations, and all are moving up in their organizations. This is the exact population the center is tasked to influence.

Sadly, I believe he is correct here. I say "sadly" because as many here can attest, DC is an abnormal carbuncle on our nation. Its social, intellectual, cultural, and informational stew is out of alignment with the nation it serves. The longer military personnel spend in DC, the more of them become "of" DC and not just "in" DC. It is not a healthy place.

I don't like this reality, but I can accept it.

Fourth, some in the Pentagon overlook the importance of allies and imagine the center as inherently inward gazing. We are delusional if we think we can “go it alone.” Building partnership capacity is a form of integrated deterrence and mutual strength...In some ways, the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) offers a blueprint for the new center. It’s the U.S. military’s “Irregular War College” and resides at the National Defense University and Fort Bragg, home of the U.S. Army Special Operations Forces.

This may be a better idea. Sure would get fewer people and brains being corrupted in DC, and the deer hunting is better if nothing else. Like the DC option, it would give us an opportunity to retool an existing institution.

Give me 96-hours and the manning documents for the DC and NC operations, and I might be able to help pay for it out of hide - especially if I had the option of taking some of the paid positions in Newport, Carlisle, and Leavenworth. Some of those academic positions are, how does one say, "sub-optimally aligned with the mission of the Department of Defense."

I have a list.

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cdrsalamander.substack.com · by CDR Salamander

6. NATO prepares for cyberwarfare integrated with military operations

NATO prepares for cyberwarfare integrated with military operations

english.almayadeen.net · by Al Mayadeen English · December 4, 2022

• NATO member states and allies working on a cyber front as digital war looms closer following the war in Ukraine

As world conflicts have morphed from traditional bombs and footsoldiers into more sophisticated and complex fields such as cyberspace, POLITICO reported that around 150 NATO cybersecurity experts have convened in Estonia to make ready for an upcoming anticipated cyberwar.

“There is a level of seriousness added; it’s not anymore so fictitious. It has become quite obvious those things are happening in reality,” Colonel Bernad Hansen, director of the Cyberspace department at NATO Command Transformation, said referring to the current war in Ukraine.

“It has made it much more live, it’s reality,” Major Tobias Malm from the HQ of the Swedish Armed Forces stated regarding the events in Ukraine.

“It’s the real world, you sit in the middle of it, and it’s a daily struggle to address these issues.”

According to the news site, the events in Ukraine brought NATO to consider the scenario to be "all too real" as Russia is actively engaging in cyber attacks against Kiev and targeting vital infrastructure that could cause more damage to a country than traditional warfare, including cutting the water off, shutting down electricity, putting metro stations in a state of mayhem among many other scenarios.

The cyber experts in NATO have been closely monitoring the war to draw-up lessons in order to prepare member states against cyber attacks carried out by adversaries, which in turn has elevated the importance of the alliance's annual Cyber Coalition exercise that aims to join efforts of over 40 member states and their allies in addition to several organizations to cooperate on training to defend cyber operations targeting critical infrastructure (power grids etc) and respond to them.

The exercise usually includes around 1,000 cyber experts who take part in the training remotely from their countries, the site added.

The exercises this year focused on defending a fictional island "Icebergen" from simulated cyber attacks.

Experts from different parts of the world, spanning from the US to Asian countries such as Japan, took part in the simulation.

The virtual operation was launched on November 28, while roles have been assigned to different countries that were tasked to protect the island from hackers targeting government vital services, including shutting down its power, in addition to breaching intelligence documents to steal them.

According to the report, the US was the lead on air command and control, while the UK was responsible for ground control, Romania with narrative building and Poland managed the special operations units.

NATO officials did not disclose the results of the virtual operation, however, the director of the exercise, US Navy Colonel Charles Elliot stated to reporters that all participants passed the simulation without adding more detail regarding vulnerabilities detected.

Referring to the increasing number of specialists that joined this year's exercises, Elliott stated that “it’s certainly possible” that the ongoing war in Ukraine was a primary factor, but is not the sole reason.

Ukraine, which has been a participant in the past exercises, did not join this year due to being "too busy defending their networks from a barrage of Russian attacks — including on major power substations," the report said.

Questions regarding NATO's Article 5 have emerged following the war in Ukraine, as member states are yet to decide whether a cyberattack on one of the countries would invoke the article or not, and what is the bearable threshold of the attack before implementing it.

According to the POLITICO report, the critical networks of member states are vulnerable to cyberattacks which are causing matters to be more complicated.

Cyberattacks can span from complex operations to simple click-bait links targeting users that can cause malware to breach the system and shut it down and demand ransom.

The news site suggests that a new form of integration of cyberwarfare with that of the military can be witnessed in Ukraine where "Russia has coordinated missile strikes in Ukraine with cyberattacks," simultaneously.

Part of the exercise incorporated experimentation of new technologies, including adapting the use of artificial intelligence technologies to help counter cyber threats.

The exercise aims also at trying out new technologies within the field in an operational mode.

Colonel Bernad Hansen stressed that cyberattacks must be fended off using means beyond the government and the military, hinting at the participation of the private sector.

Earlier this year, following the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia announced that aggressive cyber warfare has been launched against the country, where President Vladimir Putin stated that the number of cyberattacks has since multiplied.

Putin noted that the cyberattacks against Russia have been perpetrated by various well-coordinated sources in multiple countries. Experts said that lone hackers cannot conduct such well-devised and complex attacks. In essence, said Putin, "these are the actions of state structures".

It's noteworthy that in 2008 NATO established the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) following a large-scale cyberattack on Estonia's governmental networks in 2007, which the country's officials quickly blamed on Russia at first, but later Tallinn officials admitted that they lacked conclusive evidence to implicate the Kremlin.

english.almayadeen.net · by Al Mayadeen English · December 4, 2022

7. Is the US Military's Favorite Novel a Timeless Classic or Overrated Drivel? Yes.

It is worthy of reading, reflection, and discussion.  

A lesson in this that I learned fmr Max Brooks (World War Z). Stories are one the best ways to impart knowledge. It is the entertainment factor that draws people to read the book (or watch a film). But within that book or film there can be important lessons to be learned. Myrer's important contribution is that it gets officers talking about important leadership issues and in that way contributes to education and improving the leadership of the force.

Is the US Military's Favorite Novel a Timeless Classic or Overrated Drivel? Yes. - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Brendan Gallagher · December 6, 2022

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After sitting on the shelf for nearly two decades, it was beckoning me with its siren song again. The last time I’d read Once an Eagle I was a lieutenant and had eagerly devoured Anton Myrer’s ambitious tale of war and peace. But not long ago I felt drawn to pay another visit to Sam Damon, Courtney Massengale, and company to see if their trials and tribulations stood the test of time.

Once an Eagle occupies a special, elite status among military books. It frequently finds itself atop Army professional reading lists, and young officers are urged to absorb it and may even receive a copy as a gift at some point (myself included, once upon a time). Yet it has forceful detractors. Hence many readers of Myrer’s 1968 novel seem to fall into one of two polarized camps: those who believe it is one of the greatest military-themed tales of all time and those who believe it is pure drivel, a soap opera to be avoided at all costs.

Now it might be easier to convince you to keep reading if I take a hard-line stance: either elevate Myrer and his protagonist Damon to godlike status or describe the book as only fit for the burn pit. But neither of those arguments wholly rings true. Intellectual honesty requires the book’s ardent defenders to accept there is notable room for improvement and its harshest critics to acknowledge there is at least something worthwhile in its hundreds of pages.

In truth, this is a book with both meaningful strengths and glaring weaknesses, and it is nearly impossible to consider one side of the equation without the other. The book’s positive attributes are indeed impressive and the novel can be inspirational in some ways. However its flaws are also truly enormous and inescapable. So perhaps one logical way to analyze Once an Eagle is by looking at the good and the bad in turn.

The Good

Epic, Sweeping Scope

First, Once an Eagle is noteworthy for its sheer scope. Put simply, this is an epic saga of a soldier’s life, from youth to death, including the key decisions he makes and the resulting impacts on those he knows and cares about. Over the course of more than nine hundred pages, the novel spans Sam Damon’s experiences in World War I, World War II, and a burgeoning conflict in Southeast Asia. As it traverses these conflicts, its narrative carries readers to both the front lines and the home front. It include Damon’s experiences in China and the Philippines, unglamorous peacetime assignments in the middle of nowhere, and various personal developments that unfold over a half century. It is difficult to overstate the striking breadth of Myrer’s story.

Inspiring a Lifetime of Service

The novel can help provide perspective and meaning to the notion of service—in Damon’s case, a lifetime of service. Arguably the book’s most memorable passage is a flashback scene in which Damon tells his son Donny: “That’s the whole challenge of life—to act with honor and hope and generosity, no matter what you’ve drawn. You can’t help when or what you were born, you may not be able to help how you die; but you can—and you should—try to pass the days between as a good man.” It is hard to argue with this sentiment, and it reveals the core of Sam Damon: a decent person trying to do the right thing in some extremely perilous situations. Even when Damon realizes at various points that he is engaged in a military campaign that is folly, he remains motivated to do his part because he feels a sense of duty and believes he can likely carry out the mission better than anyone else. Further, Damon’s personal actions are a testament to leading at the tip of the spear and sharing in the hardships with your subordinates. To the extent that Myrer’s novel might inspire young Americans to set a positive example and heed an honorable calling, that should be considered a good thing.

The Book’s Second Half

The novel’s first half is fairly stiff and unimpressive. But it hits its stride in the second half, as events in World War II hit a climax and Damon evolves from noble hero to a sad figure to be pitied. He loses his best friend, Ben. He loses his son. His marriage all but collapses. He loses his virtue when he makes a deal with the devil (Courtney Massengale) from his hospital cot. And ultimately, he loses his life. In this final act of the book, the cumulative effects of his actions fully manifest themselves, helping to make the book more complex and memorable, and altering this from a straightforward hero’s tale into a something that feels more like a tragedy.

The Bad

Soap Opera Qualities and Clumsy Dialogue

Now we move to the other side of the ledger. For starters, let’s be frank: the dialogue in many parts of Once an Eagle feels stilted, groan worthy, and not even remotely realistic. Significant portions of the book read a bit like a soap opera, and some scenes feel as if they are merely setups for the reader to be lectured on the importance of certain principles of war. These latter scenes occasionally seem as if they were teed up to enable Damon or another sympathetic character a platform to do or say something that could practically appear in an Army manual. Such passages weigh the book down. And they occur repeatedly, particularly in the novel’s first half.

Simplistic Take on Civ-Mil Relations and Politics

This is a more serious problem with the book, and it relates to the contest at its core: the perpetual tension between Damon and his archnemesis, Courtney Massengale. Massengale sometimes comes across as so vile and conniving that it is hard to picture him as a real person, much less one with the four-star general rank he attains. On the flip side, Damon can occasionally come across as a one-dimensional protagonist, a noble warrior competing against an over-the-top bad guy.

But more concerningly, Damon as protagonist also frequently displays a barely veiled contempt toward anyone not serving on the front lines. Those on staff. Those in higher headquarters. And most of all, anyone seemingly tainted by politics. Even within Damon’s military chain of command, the higher-ups are usually portrayed as screwed up, and Damon, at the tactical level, inherently knows the right way forward, though he is repeatedly ignored. In some respects the book could be considered the glorification of all things tactical. Rather than acknowledging Clausewitz’s dictum that war is politics by other means, Myrer’s novel treats politics as something inherently nefarious from the opening chapters. In stark contrast to Damon, Massengale spends much of his career on staff and is supremely knowledgeable about strategy and policy, but as the tale’s bad guy he only leverages his broader understanding to help concoct the next devious scheme. Why does any of this matter? Well, it could lead the reader to conclude that, if you serve on a staff (which practically all military officers do at some point) or show more than a passing interest in broader strategic or political affairs, you may put yourself at risk of being an odious “Massengale.” The novel might also implicitly endorse Samuel Huntington’s objective control model in which there are separate political and military spheres so military leaders should just focus on strictly military affairs. Problematic issues related to this notion have been addressed by Eliot Cohen and Risa Brooks, among others.

Once an Eagle can indeed be worth admiring—well, portions of it, anyway—as long as we also keep in mind the massive, glaring flaws. The novel may very well help inspire readers to pursue a lifetime of service, which is certainly commendable. But it could also promote a narrow grasp of the military profession and a detrimental, simplistic view of civ-mil relations. So I think Once an Eagle is worth reading, but only if readers acknowledge and wrestle with these countervailing dynamics.

I wonder if Myrer’s story could find a new life today if adapted into, say, a high-quality streaming series (the last major televised adaptation having occurred over forty-five years ago). Its scope and girth might lend itself to such an adaptation. And after all, Once an Eagle is seemingly at the pinnacle of works we collectively assign value to from a professional development standpoint. But readers will never derive maximum value from a book without engaging with it critically, and a book without flaws doesn’t exist. Knowing what to read is only half of the professional development equation. The other half is knowing how to read—with eyes wide open and a full appreciation of the good along with the bad.

It seems fitting to close with Sam Damon’s final words, which reflect a recurring theme in the novel: “If it comes to a choice between being a good soldier and a good human being—try to be a good human being.” Despite Once an Eagle’s inescapable flaws, such aspects of Damon’s counsel can still be worthwhile for readers to consider today.

Brendan Gallagher is a US Army colonel currently assigned to the Army staff at the Pentagon. He has served in Iraq and Afghanistan and previously commanded 1st Battalion, 3rd Security Force Assistance Brigade. He earned a PhD from Princeton as a fellow with the ASP3 Program and is the author of The Day After: Why America Wins the War but Loses the Peace (Cornell Press, 2019).

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

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mwi.usma.edu · by Brendan Gallagher · December 6, 2022

8. No, Iran didn’t ban morality police — it duped press, and Biden administration

As suspected. Iranian political warfare.

No, Iran didn’t ban morality police — it duped press, and Biden administration

New York Post · by Richard Goldberg · December 6, 2022

More On: iran

Iran shutters state ‘morality police’ as protests continue after Mahsa Amini’s death: report

Iranian rock climber Elnaz Rekabi’s family home ‘destroyed’ by police: report

Letters to the Editor — Dec. 4, 2022

Iran players get mixed welcome after returning from World Cup

For a few hours this past weekend, the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism pulled off a global disinformation operation to undermine a popular revolt, falsely suggesting the regime in Tehran had moderated its position on women’s rights.

The truth: Iranian women are still subject to the oppression of a radical theocracy in Tehran, millions of Iranians want to see an end to the Islamic Republic of Iran and President Joe Biden needs to finally pick a side.

How did it happen? More than 11 weeks ago, the brutal killing of a young woman arrested for not properly wearing an Islamic head-covering set off what increasingly appears to be a national revolution in Iran — with more than 1,800 protests documented around the country and more on the way despite hundreds already murdered and thousands more detained by the regime.

Knowing that underground activists were urging a three-day national strike this week, state media ran a series of quotes from Iran’s chief prosecutor, which sent mixed signals about whether the mullahs would continue cracking down on women who do not wear a hijab according to the regime’s religious specifications.

Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei at a meeting for commanders and officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

ZUMAPRESS.com

Iranian women are subject to the oppression of a radical theocracy in Tehran.

AFP via Getty Images/ Behrouz Mehri

By Sunday morning in the United States, the New York Times sent a breaking news alert declaring that Iran had abolished its so-called morality police. The Wall Street Journal soon followed. On CBS’s “Face the Nation,” Margaret Brennan opened her interview with Secretary of State Antony Blinken saying, “I want to start with some breaking news overnight out of Iran: They have abolished the morality police.”

see also

Iran shutters state ‘morality police’ as protests continue after Mahsa Amini’s death: report

Within minutes of the Sunday’s breaking news, Persian-speaking reporters took to Twitter to expose the regime’s gambit. Iran’s state television and its official Arabic-language channel soon denied the reports. A few hours later, Reuters filed a more carefully crafted story, clarifying that there was “no confirmation of the closure from the Interior Ministry which is in charge of the morality police” and that the chief prosecutor “was not responsible for overseeing the force.” Other outlets would soon follow.

As of today, the regime in Tehran has yet to pull back on a single element of its brutality and repression — whether it be targeted at women or millions of other Iranians, including minors.

Based on the convoluted statement of one official in a regime that bans all basic freedoms, including freedom of the press, Western reporters and editors irresponsibly pushed a misleading narrative designed by Tehran to undermine the people in the streets demanding freedom.

Fortunately, the ruse didn’t work. Thousands of businesses around Iran are now closed. Workers are on strike. Students are bringing upheaval to their schools. More and more people are joining the revolt.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken said, “I want to start with some breaking news overnight out of Iran: They have abolished the morality police.”

REUTERS/Saul Loeb

Media criticism in this case is warranted, with the need to reassess how newsrooms cover deceitful and repressive dictatorships like Iran. But coverage of the Biden administration’s Iran policy must improve as well. The White House and State Department are trying to have it both ways — claiming support for the people of Iran while holding the door open to an economic bailout for their oppressors.

Blinken expressed solidarity with the protesters during his CBS interview Sunday. But in a separate appearance on CNN, Blinken was asked if nuclear negotiations with Iran were still ongoing. His response? “We continue to believe that ultimately diplomacy is the most effective way to deal with this, but that’s not where the focus is.”

In other words, an appeasement pact that would generate $274 billion for the regime in its first year — $1 trillion by 2030 — remains on the table for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to accept at a time of his choosing. Contrary to Biden’s pre-election declaration that he would “free Iran,” Blinken’s comment signals a willingness to sacrifice the Iranian people if their oppressors would agree to delay a nuclear weapon by a few short years — ignoring other potential options to achieve the same goal without paying Tehran’s extortion racket.

A national revolution in Iran is happening after a young girl was brutally killed for not properly wearing an Islamic head-covering.

AP

How demoralizing to millions who might be contemplating joining the revolt. President Biden should be put to a choice: The Iranian people or their terror-sponsoring, anti-American oppressors. Maximum support for Iran’s new revolution starts with taking the nuclear deal off the table and working with European allies to restore UN sanctions on the regime. From there, Biden could authorize the provision of supplies, money, and intelligence to the protest movement — all with an explicit goal of precipitating the collapse of the Islamic Republic. Other active measures, including cyberattacks to disrupt security force crackdowns, could be considered, too.

The Islamic Republic is an enemy of the United States, directly responsible for the murders of hundreds of U.S. citizens and actively plotting to assassinate former officials. A regime that chants “Death to America” is now being challenged by people who honk their horns when Team USA defeats Iran in the World Cup. It’s a moment America has been waiting more than 40 years to see — one the Biden administration appears comfortable letting slip away.

Richard Goldberg, a senior adviser at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, served as a National Security Council official, deputy chief of staff to former US Sen. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and US Navy Reserve Intelligence Officer. He was sanctioned by Iran in 2020.

New York Post · by Richard Goldberg · December 6, 2022

9. This week in Congress: Final NDAA compromise expected to be unveiled

​Get it done.

This week in Congress: Final NDAA compromise expected to be unveiled

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · December 5, 2022

House leaders are expected to bring a compromise version of the annual defense authorization bill to the floor this week, but details of what the massive military policy legislation will include still haven’t been released.

The House passed its version of the authorization bill over the summer, an $840 billion spending plan that includes a 4.6% pay raise for troops next year and a host of new program starts.

The Senate has been discussing the measure for months but appears unlikely to pass its own version now, opting instead to simply approve a compromise draft after the House acts. The measure has passed through Congress for more than 60 consecutive years, and is seen as must-pass legislation by many in both chambers.

But that hasn’t stopped House minority leader Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., from calling for the measure to be delayed until next month, when his party takes control of the House.

He has argued that many issues in the bill — including mandates that troops get COVID-19 vaccines and overall military spending levels — need to be decided by the new majority, rather than outgoing Democrats.

Tuesday, Dec. 6

House Foreign Affairs — 10 a.m. — 2200 Rayburn

Yemen

State Department officials will testify on the current humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

House Veterans' Affairs — 10 a.m. — Visitors Center H210

Veterans housing

VA officials will testify on efforts to make transitional housing more available to veterans.

House Science — 1 p.m. — 2318 Rayburn

Antarctic Research

Outside experts will testify on ways to make U.S. research efforts in the Antarctic more efficient and safe.

House Foreign Affairs — 2 p.m. — Visitors Center H210

Pending Business

The committee will mark up several pending bills.

Wednesday, Dec. 7

House Veterans' Affairs — 10 a.m. — Visitors Center H210

PACT Act implementation

VA officials will testify on plans to implement new toxic exposure legislation.

House Transportation — 10 a.m. — 2167 Rayburn

Coast Guard's Arctic Responsibilities

Coast Guard officials will testify on current missions and goals in the Arctic.

House Foreign Affairs — 10 a.m. — 2200 Rayburn

Mekong Region

Outside experts will testify on security issues in the Mekong Region of Asia.

Senate Foreign Relations — 10 a.m. — Capitol S116

Pending Business

The committee will consider several pending measures.

House Foreign Affairs — 2 p.m. — 2172 Rayburn

International Development Assistance

Outside experts will testify on ways to improve U.S. development assistance to foreign countries.

Senate Foreign Relations — 2:30 p.m. — 419 Dirksen

Nominations

The committee will consider several pending nominations, including Karen Sasahara to serve as ambassador to Kuwait.

About Leo Shane III

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

10. Am I willing to sacrifice my son's life for Taiwan?

​A question that also must be asked and answered by fathers in Taiwan as well as the PRC. ​

There is a lot to think about in this piece.

Am I willing to sacrifice my son's life for Taiwan?

Thinking about World War III with Stephen Wertheim.

joelmmathis.substack.com · by Joel Mathis

Photo by Pixabay

Just a few weeks before my senior year in high school, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.

It quickly became apparent that America would go to war to liberate Kuwait, a prospect that filled my contemporaries with emotions ranging from patriotic fervor to fear. We'd been born at the end of the Vietnam War -- a big conflict, with thousands or even tens of thousands of casualties, had never been fought by the United States in our living memories. Yes, we'd felt some nuclear dread inspired by movies like The Day After during the closing years of the Cold War. Mostly, though, we were inheritors of tiny, temporary battles like Grenada and Panama. Some of us remembered the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, though we were elementary schoolers when it happened. Our real wars were second-hand -- stories told us by our fathers about why they were or weren't in Vietnam, by our grandfathers about World War II. For a few months between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the start of the American-led war to push the Iraqis out, something big and dangerous and real seemed possible.

My late adolescence was spent in a small, central Kansas town with a thoroughly Mennonite population. The churches were still conducting services in German in the 1950s. The people I was around weren't that far removed from folks who'd fled militarized Europe a couple of generations earlier in order to uphold their pacifist beliefs.

So one Wednesday night, my Mennonte Brethren youth pastor gathered some of us older guys together and gave us some advice about how to declare ourselves conscientious objectors. When it was time to fill out our selective service cards, he told us, write it down on the card -- even though the form didn't actually have a spot to list it.

If memory serves -- and it has been more than 30 years, so I might be wrong -- that's exactly what I did.

I thought about that moment recently while reading Stephen Wertheim's NYT piece about preparing for World War III. Between the war in Europe and the possibility of a conflict with China over Taiwan, the world feels more dangerous for Americans than it has since the end of World War II. There's very little living memory left of the the devastation wrought by that conflagration -- one reason why we're edging back into conflict now, perhaps. And Wertheim wants us to know that such battles wouldn't be like the wars we've become used to in Iraq and Afghanistan, fought by other people and largely ignored until it's time to bring our troops home.

There would be sacrifice.

This summer, the Center for a New American Security held a war game that ended with China detonating a nuclear weapon near Hawaii. “Before they knew it,” both Washington and Beijing “had crossed key red lines, but neither was willing to back down,” the conveners concluded. Especially in a prolonged war, China could mount cyberattacks to disrupt critical American infrastructure. It might shut off the power in a major city, obstruct emergency services or bring down communications systems. A new current of fear and suspicion would course through American society, joining up with the nativism that has reverberated through national politics since Sept. 11.

And the economic costs would be terrible.

Researchers at RAND estimate that a yearlong conflict would slash America’s gross domestic product by 5 to 10 percent. By contrast, the U.S. economy contracted 2.6 percent in 2009, the worst year of the Great Recession. The gas price surge early in the Ukraine war provides only the slightest preview of what a U.S.-China war would generate. For the roughly three-fifths of Americans who currently live paycheck to paycheck, the war would come home in millions of lost jobs, wrecked retirements, high prices and shortages.

Of course, lots of people would die.

In most rounds of a war game recently conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the United States swiftly lost two aircraft carriers, each carrying at least 5,000 people, on top of hundreds of aircraft, according to reports. One participant noted that although each simulation varied, “what almost never changes is it’s a bloody mess and both sides take some terrible losses.”

But it wasn't the forward-looking scenarios that bothered me the most about Wertheim's piece. Instad, it was this.

The deaths of more than 7,000 service members in the post-Sept. 11 wars — and approximately four times as many by suicide — devastated families and communities but were not enough to produce a Vietnam-style backlash.

That's right. More than 30,000 veterans have died by suicide during the last 20 years.

My God. My God.

This got me thinking about my son. He's 14. He's the tallest person in our household right now. He's a sensitive kid. Wears pink pants quite often. He lives with ADHD and can get overwhelmed easily. I don't know who he is going to be when he is 18 or 20 years old. But I want desperately to find out.

Wertheim's piece suddenly raised a question for me that I'd never really considered before, at least in a way that felt viscerally. It's the kind of question we've largely walled off from our collective experience during the all-volunteer era of the armed forces, during the era of invisible wars. It's maybe time we started asking it of ourselves.

Am I so committed to Taiwan's independence from China that I'm willing to have my son die for that cause?

Luckily, that's not a question I have to answer right away. And really, it's not even a question that I can answer: I'm old and broken -- I'll never be called to fight. My son would be the one to make that decision for himself.

But with due respect to the Taiwanese people ... right now, it's difficult for me to imagine a scenario where losing my son to the defense of a nation on the other side of the planet would be worth it.

I believe in public service. I believe in doing things for the community, even at some cost. I don’t think, though, that I could ever justify sacrificing my son. Or his soul.

If I don't believe that, how can I believe it for somebody else's son?

And if we don’t believe it, isn’t the time to say so now? Before events sweep us along?

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joelmmathis.substack.com · by Joel Mathis

11. Opinion | A week in the life of Vladimir Putin

Excerpts:

At no point during this week does Putin acknowledge, in any way, that his military is conducting a brutal campaign that has terrorized Ukrainian civilians and made the country itself, rather than its armed forces, its target. This was a week when Putin fired scores of missiles and drones at Ukraine’s infrastructure, trying to freeze the nation into submission. Much of the world is outraged, but Putin appears oblivious.

Over this week, Putin tries instead, in nearly every encounter, to justify a war that many Russians don’t understand. He is an enigmatic leader, everywhere and nowhere. He talks falsely of Russia as the victim, rather than the aggressor. His confidence never appears to flag. But he would not work so hard to appear all-powerful if he didn’t fear that the foundation beneath his throne was fragile.

Opinion | A week in the life of Vladimir Putin

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · December 5, 2022

All politics is local, as the saying goes, and that applies even to Russian President Vladimir Putin. That truth becomes evident from a close look at Putin’s publicly available calendar, which offers fascinating insight into a leader who oversees virtually every aspect of Russian life.

Putin is often portrayed in the Western media as something of a cartoon villain. But he’s also a skillful politician who has used the state-run media, a pliant bureaucracy and brutal repression to dominate Russian politics so totally that he appears to have no significant opposition. For many in the West, he’s a figure of derision, even hatred. But at home, he retains a bedrock of popular support, even amid the Ukraine fiasco.

The calendar shows Putin filling his days with a surprisingly mundane string of meetings, videoconferences and ceremonies that demonstrate how he tries to bolster domestic confidence even as he wages a failing war in Ukraine. He is peripatetic, talking with aides about animal husbandry one day and artificial intelligence the next. He knows that he rules a vast nation, and although he’s often seen as a Russian nationalist, he assiduously cultivates Russia’s other, disparate ethnic groups. And although the Soviet Union is gone, he stays in regular touch with fractious leaders of former republics. His nostalgia for the Soviet era is palpable.

When confronting a dangerous adversary such as Putin, it can be useful to imagine the world through his eyes — to examine his template for maintaining power, rather than trying to impose our own. What does he worry about? What public messages does he try to send? Putin operates in secret, but he also leaves a public trail. His official agenda is published on the internet, and it helps explain the practical, “retail politics” side of his life as an autocrat.

What’s it like to be a 21st-century czar? Here’s a compilation of his public events during five days last month, drawn from his official website, Kremlin.ru. There’s nothing revelatory in this “week in the life.” But you can see how governance works, Russia-style. And you sense how hard Putin is working to maintain the appearance of normalcy as the war in Ukraine grinds on.

Monday, Nov. 21: Turkeys and taxes

Putin pays almost obsessive attention to the small details of government. He begins the week with a videoconference on the state of Russia’s livestock and poultry industry. The nominal reason for this virtual meeting is the opening of a new breeding center for turkeys in the Tyumen region in Siberia. “We have spoken many times about the importance of creating our own selection and genetic reserve in animal husbandry and in poultry farming,” Putin admonishes his agriculture apparatchiks on the video call.

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As the Russian leader is briefed on pig rearing, egg production and a half-dozen other details of what he calls “the agro-industrial complex,” it’s obvious that more than 30 years after the end of communism, Russia is still in many ways a command economy. Putin wants to show he’s boss — even of turkey breeding.

Putin’s other big Monday event is a “working meeting” with Daniil Yegerov, the head of the Federal Tax Service. As usual, Putin quizzes his subordinate about details, starting with collection rates over the past 10 months (during which the “special military operation” in Ukraine was underway). The tax man cheerily (and not quite believably) reports that receipts are up 18 percent over the previous year. “How are things going with you on VAT refunds?” Putin asks. It’s as if Putin has a compulsion to demonstrate that he has a handle on every issue.

Tuesday, Nov. 22: Fidel and nuclear icebreakers

Putin takes an emperor’s delight in ceremonial events, and the first one Tuesday celebrates two new nuclear-powered icebreakers, the Ural and the Yakutia. The ceremony takes place in St. Petersburg, but Putin participates by videoconference. Putin describes the two ships as “part of our large-scale, systematic work … to strengthen Russia’s status as a great Arctic power.” He thanks the shipbuilders “from the bottom of my heart.” Putin later attends the unveiling of a new bronze statue in Moscow honoring Cuban leader Fidel Castro, a charismatic ally in the glory days of the Soviet Union. Dedicating the monument, Putin recalls Castro as “a true friend of our country” whose “power, energy and unbending will … still attract like a magnet.”

Putin meets later with Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel. Describing his encounters with Castro, Putin tells his visitor: “I was very surprised by his immersion in details. … He knew and was able to analyze everything that was happening in the world.” Putin might be talking about how he sees himself.

Putin ends his official day with a phone call to Ilham Aliyev, the president of Azerbaijan, a former Soviet republic that, like many others, chafes at Russian hegemony in the region.

Wednesday, Nov. 23: Fertilizer and a not-so-fraternal visit to Armenia

Putin’s day begins with Dmitry Mazepin, chairman of the Commission for the Production and Marketing of Mineral Fertilizers. Mazepin provides the boss with a blur of statistics about fertilizer production.

The fertilizer industry, like so many others, has been affected by the war in Ukraine. Putin tells Mazepin that poor countries in Africa that need fertilizer are suffering food shortages because of Western sanctions. (That’s false, according to U.S. officials, but Putin insists that the blame lies with “obstacles created by some countries.”) Exporting more, Putin says, “will be right from a humanitarian point of view and … a business point of view.”

Then Putin travels to Yerevan, Armenia — a place where Russian power has been unraveling — for a summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, an alliance of former Soviet republics. Russia sees it as a version of NATO, but it has become a bitterly divided and ineffective group whose members quarrel with Moscow and one another.

Putin’s speech evokes “the memory of the common history of our states, that our peoples together won the Great Patriotic War,” and he describes himself as “your obedient servant.” But the backdrop for the meeting is the group’s failure to prevent a 2020 war between two member states, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Russia’s failure since then to make peacekeeping plans work.

When Putin meets later that day with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, he touts a supposed 67 percent increase in trade between the two countries in the first nine months of 2022. The Kremlin website does not mention Pashinyan’s snub earlier that day in refusing to sign the CSTO communique that Russia had drafted.

Thursday, Nov. 24: Artificial Intelligence, an ‘Order of Courage’ and no ‘extraordinary measures’

Putin’s big event Thursday is attending a long, detailed discussion of “Artificial Intelligence Technologies for Economic Growth.” Putin discusses AI with surprising intensity — and verbosity. My printout of his remarks is 42 pages long. Putin asks interesting questions: What is the cognitive basis for intuition? How can data improve governance? What will AI mean for employment? How can data be anonymized?

In reality, Russia lags badly behind the United States, Europe and China in AI research. But Putin imagines a brighter future and tells the gathering of researchers, “the success of the country as a whole will depend on your success.” It’s one of those moments where Russian ambition and Russian reality simply don’t match.

But Putin presses on. When one of the AI researchers pledges, “We will definitely do everything,” Putin interjects: “This immediately worries me: ‘We will do everything.’ ” The chastened researcher responds, in language that recalls the Stalin era: “We will overfulfill everything, yes.”

Putin takes time later that day to award the “Order of Courage” to a propagandistic Russian blogger named Semyon Pegov, who stepped on a land mine and was wounded in Ukraine. The Russian leader closes his day in a videoconference with the coordinating council of the Russian armed forces. Putin’s website doesn’t give any hint that recent events have gone disastrously for Russia: Russian troops have retreated from areas they had captured in Kharkiv and Kherson, Ukraine.

The public Putin insists that all is well. New efforts have been made to “correct our joint work.” And to those who demand changes in the special military operation, Putin argues: “There is no need to introduce any extraordinary measures — nothing needs to be done.”

Friday, Nov. 25: Grieving mothers, Chechen allies and Russian gunsmiths

Two days before Mother’s Day in Russia, Putin meets with a group of women said to be Russian mothers whose sons are fighting and dying in Ukraine. “We share this pain,” Putin tells them. “We understand that nothing can replace the loss of a son, a child.”

What’s striking about this carefully selected gathering of mothers is how many of them are from Russia’s ethnic minorities and distant regions. And here, Putin is canny. For these areas, not cosmopolitan Moscow or St. Petersburg, are supplying an inordinate share of the soldiers for the costly, unsuccessful campaign in Ukraine.

Putin tells a mother from Dagestan: “Russia as a whole is unique civilization, where people of different nationalities, ethnic groups, different religions live side by side for a thousand years.” He comforts a Cossack mother from Krasnodar; a mother from Tuva, near the Mongolian border; a mother from Sakha, in eastern Siberia.

The Ukrainians are “playing someone else’s game, but we have to fight for our interests, our people, our country,” he tells the mothers. And then he offers this extraordinary, chilling comment: “Today’s events are the way to some kind of … internal purification and renewal.”

Putin meets next with his war cabinet, the permanent members of his security council. What’s said here isn’t explained on Putin’s website. After that, he receives Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya, a region brutalized by Putin’s scorched-earth campaign in the early 2000s that is now supplying fighters to Ukraine. Again, no details of their conversation.

The Russian leader closes his day, after 11 p.m., with a speech to a state company called Rostec, which is struggling to maintain production of high-tech weapons despite Western sanctions.

Across the country, Rostec factories are “working at maximum capacity, in several shifts,” Putin says. “Indeed, people are working hard, looking up to our ancestors, to the great traditions of many generations of our gunsmiths, who proved by deed that Russian weapons are weapons of victory.”

At no point during this week does Putin acknowledge, in any way, that his military is conducting a brutal campaign that has terrorized Ukrainian civilians and made the country itself, rather than its armed forces, its target. This was a week when Putin fired scores of missiles and drones at Ukraine’s infrastructure, trying to freeze the nation into submission. Much of the world is outraged, but Putin appears oblivious.

Over this week, Putin tries instead, in nearly every encounter, to justify a war that many Russians don’t understand. He is an enigmatic leader, everywhere and nowhere. He talks falsely of Russia as the victim, rather than the aggressor. His confidence never appears to flag. But he would not work so hard to appear all-powerful if he didn’t fear that the foundation beneath his throne was fragile.

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · December 5, 2022

12. Xi’s Shattered Illusion of Control

Excerpts:

In the days after the protests came the death of former CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin, an avuncular and garrulous (if sometimes clownish) leader. When I joined U.S. President Bill Clinton’s 1998 trip to China, I was riveted by the open and solicitous way Jiang interacted with his American counterpart. He demonstratively wanted to be accepted by the cosmopolitan Western world.

Compared with Xi’s rigid formalism and dependence on ritual and protocol, Jiang’s beguiling informality came from a completely different universe of leadership. Now Xi will be compelled to preside over a memorial for Jiang. In the past, such ceremonial occasions have proved dangerous for the CCP. When Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai died in 1976, Tiananmen Square spontaneously filled with tens of thousands of mourners who wanted not just to celebrate him but also to criticize Mao and his Cultural Revolution. And when former CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang passed away in 1989, his death set off the Tiananmen Square demonstrations that led to the Beijing massacre.

Although it is impossible to foretell whether Jiang’s funeral will become such a catalytic agent, the events that have been playing out reveal that just underneath the crust of order maintained by the CCP, there is a molten core of alienation. Totalitarian control mechanisms may have prevented people from openly expressing their outrage, but they have not prevented anger from quietly pooling up beneath the seemingly orderly surface. And historically, when such pressure has become too great, this molten core has erupted in surprising ways.

Xi’s Shattered Illusion of Control

Recent Protests Revive a Long Tradition of Chinese Dissent

By Orville Schell

December 5, 2022

Foreign Affairs · by Orville Schell · December 5, 2022

It has been a long time since demonstrators filled the streets of Chinese cities crying out, “We want freedom!” and “The Chinese Communist Party should step down!” But the seemingly unthinkable has happened in recent days as an upwelling of protest erupted against Beijing’s draconian “zero COVID” policies and then morphed into a more general expression of opposition against the suffocating controls that the CCP has imposed on Chinese society.

Do these events threaten the reign of President Xi Jinping, who has just been anointed with a third term as general secretary of the party? Are they a historical tipping point? Or will they prove to be an epiphenomenon that the well-organized CCP will easily bring to heel with more repression? After all, in the wake of the far more tectonic 1989 demonstrations, and even the ensuing Beijing massacre around Tiananmen Square, Chinese leaders not only put the protest genie back in the bottle but also went on to initiate a period of impressive economic growth and stability.

Although the United States has no shortage of China experts, we have never accurately predicted moments of historical inflection in this “people’s republic.” Few of us foresaw Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, the mass demonstrations that led to the massacre in 1989, or Xi’s embrace of a neo-Maoist techno-autocracy over the last decade. But our failure to anticipate this most recent spark of dissent is perhaps more understandable; after all, as Xi’s one-party Leninist imperium has gathered momentum, most foreign journalists have been expelled from China. Compounding the problem, Chinese citizens themselves have also been cowed into silence. Without independent polling, a free press, fair elections, and academic freedom, and with Xi now exercising control over every organ through which public sentiment might find expression, it has become difficult for outsiders to gauge public sentiment there.

For those looking into this black box from the outside, it had been too easy to assume that everything is under control and that Xi has found an effective recipe for a durable autocracy. But whatever the outcome of these demonstrations, they indicate that Xi has no more discovered the secret sauce for totalitarian success than did Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Joseph Stalin, Fidel Castro—or Mao himself. The protests remind us, instead, that the people Xi rules, like people everywhere, do not live by bread, shopping malls, video games, and leisure travel alone, and that many do not want to be confined, censored, bullied, detained, or imprisoned. To assume otherwise is patronizing and overlooks the long and august Chinese historical tradition of seeking rights and freedoms.

To hear voices calling for Xi and the CCP to step down suggests that an elusive but important psychological line may have been crossed. But Xi is not a leader who accepts lèse majesté easily, and he will most certainly take umbrage and seek retribution.

BLANK SHEETS

The current wave of disaffection was extraordinary, given the number of protests across China and the depth of the emotions that were expressed against the CCP and Xi. But even more striking is that the protests happened at all. Under Xi, the cost of speaking out has been so high that silence has prevailed. But as the Polish poet and essayist Czeslaw Milosz observed upon accepting the 1980 Nobel Prize in Literature, “In a room where people unanimously maintain a conspiracy of silence, one word of truth sounds like a pistol shot.” In China, the trigger may have been dissatisfaction over management of the pandemic, but it did not take long for angry people to also voice grievances of a more political nature and begin criticizing Xi’s autocratic leadership and suppression of free expression.

In so doing, they are continuing a long tradition. As I wrote for Foreign Affairs in 2004, “In the first decades of the twentieth century—when, after the fall of the last imperial dynasty in 1911, the Chinese last found themselves searching for a new political beginning—China was a fermentation vat of free thinking, political inquiry, open discussion, self-criticism, research, and writing.” The first major public expression of this ferment came with the 1919 May Fourth Movement, when Chinese intellectuals demonstrated not only against the predations of European great powers but also in favor of science and democracy at home. The same spirit motivated movements against Chiang Kai-shek’s autocratic Nationalist rule in the 1930s and 1940s, criticism of CCP rule in the late 1970s by pamphleteers such as Wei Jingsheng, the pro-democracy student movement and the essays of the astrophysicist Fang Lizhi in the mid-1980s, the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989, and the critiques made by members of the Charter 08 movement led by Liu Xiaobo, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 and died a political prisoner in 2017.

The recent demonstrations were not rooted in abstract ideological concerns: they were spurred by anger over China’s zero-COVID restrictions, poor working conditions in factories (such as the Foxconn plant in Zhengzhou that manufactures equipment for Apple), and the deaths of ten people as a result of an apartment-building fire in Urumqi, a city in the predominantly Muslim Uyghur area of Xinjiang in northwestern China. Many believe these deaths would have been avoidable were it not for zero-COVID policies.

Those grievances quickly grew to include demands for more freedoms and liberties. But because protesters feared arrest, many simply held up blank sheets of paper to express their disapproval and remind observers that they cannot speak freely. Since everyone understands those sheets to be symbols of remonstration, images of blank paper have become as forbidden as dissident political tracts on the Chinese Internet. Therein lies a great irony. Xi’s avatar, Mao, once penned a famous essay in which he proclaimed: “On a blank sheet of paper free from any mark, the freshest and most beautiful characters can be written, the freshest and most beautiful pictures can be painted.”

A DANGEROUS MOMENT

In the days after the protests came the death of former CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin, an avuncular and garrulous (if sometimes clownish) leader. When I joined U.S. President Bill Clinton’s 1998 trip to China, I was riveted by the open and solicitous way Jiang interacted with his American counterpart. He demonstratively wanted to be accepted by the cosmopolitan Western world.

Compared with Xi’s rigid formalism and dependence on ritual and protocol, Jiang’s beguiling informality came from a completely different universe of leadership. Now Xi will be compelled to preside over a memorial for Jiang. In the past, such ceremonial occasions have proved dangerous for the CCP. When Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai died in 1976, Tiananmen Square spontaneously filled with tens of thousands of mourners who wanted not just to celebrate him but also to criticize Mao and his Cultural Revolution. And when former CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang passed away in 1989, his death set off the Tiananmen Square demonstrations that led to the Beijing massacre.

Although it is impossible to foretell whether Jiang’s funeral will become such a catalytic agent, the events that have been playing out reveal that just underneath the crust of order maintained by the CCP, there is a molten core of alienation. Totalitarian control mechanisms may have prevented people from openly expressing their outrage, but they have not prevented anger from quietly pooling up beneath the seemingly orderly surface. And historically, when such pressure has become too great, this molten core has erupted in surprising ways.

• ORVILLE SCHELL is Arthur Ross Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society and the author of the novel My Old Home.

Foreign Affairs · by Orville Schell · December 5, 2022

13. The Global Zeitenwende – How to Avoid a New Cold War in a Multipolar Era

Excerpts:

Eventually, in a multipolar world, dialogue and cooperation must extend beyond the democratic comfort zone. The United States’ new National Security Strategy rightly acknowledges the need to engage with “countries that do not embrace democratic institutions but nevertheless depend upon and support a rules-based international system.” The world’s democracies will need to work with these countries to defend and uphold a global order that binds power to rules and that confronts revisionist acts such as Russia’s war of aggression. This effort will take pragmatism and a degree of humility.

The journey toward the democratic freedom we enjoy today has been full of setbacks and errors. Yet certain rights and principles were established and accepted centuries ago. Habeas corpus, the protection from arbitrary detention, is one such fundamental right—and was first recognized not by a democratic government but by the absolutist monarchy of King Charles II of England. Equally important is the basic principle that no country can take by force what belongs to its neighbor. Respect for these fundamental rights and principles should be required of all states, regardless of their internal political systems.

Periods of relative peace and prosperity in human history, such as the one that most of the world experienced in the early post–Cold War era, need not be rare interludes or mere deviations from a historical norm in which brute force dictates the rules. And although we cannot turn back the clock, we can still turn back the tide of aggression and imperialism. Today’s complex, multipolar world renders this task more challenging. To carry it out, Germany and its partners in the EU, the United States, the G-7, and NATO must protect our open societies, stand up for our democratic values, and strengthen our alliances and partnerships. But we must also avoid the temptation to once again divide the world into blocs. This means making every effort to build new partnerships, pragmatically and without ideological blinders. In today’s densely interconnected world, the goal of advancing peace, prosperity, and human freedom calls for a different mindset and different tools. Developing that mindset and those tools is ultimately what the Zeitenwende is all about.

The Global Zeitenwende

How to Avoid a New Cold War in a Multipolar Era

By Olaf Scholz

January/February 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Olaf Scholz · December 5, 2022

The world is facing a Zeitenwende: an epochal tectonic shift. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has put an end to an era. New powers have emerged or reemerged, including an economically strong and politically assertive China. In this new multipolar world, different countries and models of government are competing for power and influence.

Auf Deutsch lesen (Read in German)

For its part, Germany is doing everything it can to defend and foster an international order based on the principles of the UN Charter. Its democracy, security, and prosperity depend on binding power to common rules. That is why Germans are intent on becoming the guarantor of European security that our allies expect us to be, a bridge builder within the European Union and an advocate for multilateral solutions to global problems. This is the only way for Germany to successfully navigate the geopolitical rifts of our time.

The Zeitenwende goes beyond the war in Ukraine and beyond the issue of European security. The central question is this: How can we, as Europeans and as the European Union, remain independent actors in an increasingly multipolar world?

Germany and Europe can help defend the rules-based international order without succumbing to the fatalistic view that the world is doomed to once again separate into competing blocs. My country’s history gives it a special responsibility to fight the forces of fascism, authoritarianism, and imperialism. At the same time, our experience of being split in half during an ideological and geopolitical contest gives us a particular appreciation of the risks of a new cold war.

END OF AN ERA

For most of the world, the three decades since the Iron Curtain fell have been a period of relative peace and prosperity. Technological advances have created an unprecedented level of connectivity and cooperation. Growing international trade, globe-spanning value and production chains, and unparalleled exchanges of people and knowledge across borders have brought over a billion people out of poverty. Most important, courageous citizens all over the world have swept away dictatorships and one-party rule. Their yearning for liberty, dignity, and democracy changed the course of history. Two devastating world wars and a great deal of suffering—much of it caused by my country—were followed by more than four decades of tension and confrontation in the shadow of possible nuclear annihilation. But by the 1990s, it seemed that a more resilient world order had finally taken hold.

Germans, in particular, could count their blessings. In November 1989, the Berlin Wall was brought down by the brave citizens of East Germany. Only 11 months later, the country was reunified, thanks to far-sighted politicians and support from partners in both the West and the East. Finally, “what belongs together could grow together,” as former German Chancellor Willy Brandt put it shortly after the wall came down.

Those words applied not only to Germany but also to Europe as a whole. Former members of the Warsaw Pact chose to become allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and members of the EU. “Europe whole and free,” in the formulation of George H. W. Bush, the U.S. president at the time, no longer seemed like an unfounded hope. In this new era, it seemed possible that Russia would become a partner to the West rather than the adversary that the Soviet Union had been. As a result, most European countries shrank their armies and cut their defense budgets. For Germany, the rationale was simple: Why maintain a large defense force of some 500,000 soldiers when all our neighbors appeared to be friends or partners?

The world is not doomed to once again separate into competing blocs.

The focus of our security and defense policy quickly shifted toward other pressing threats. The Balkan wars and the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, heightened the importance of regional and global crisis management. Solidarity within NATO remained intact, however: the 9/11 attacks led to the first decision to trigger Article 5, the mutual defense clause of the North Atlantic Treaty, and for two decades, NATO forces fought terrorism shoulder to shoulder in Afghanistan.

Germany’s business communities drew their own conclusions from the new course of history. The fall of the Iron Curtain and an ever more integrated global economy opened new opportunities and markets, particularly in the countries of the former Eastern bloc but also in other countries with emerging economies, especially China. Russia, with its vast resources of energy and other raw materials, had proved to be a reliable supplier during the Cold War, and it seemed sensible, at least at first, to expand that promising partnership in peacetime.

The Russian leadership, however, experienced the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and drew conclusions that differed sharply from those of leaders in Berlin and other European capitals. Instead of seeing the peaceful overthrow of communist rule as an opportunity for more freedom and democracy, Russian President Vladimir Putin has called it “the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.” The economic and political turmoil in parts of the post-Soviet space in the 1990s only exacerbated the feeling of loss and anguish that many Russian citizens to this day associate with the end of the Soviet Union.

It was in that environment that authoritarianism and imperialistic ambitions began to reemerge. In 2007, Putin delivered an aggressive speech at the Munich Security Conference, deriding the rules-based international order as a mere tool of American dominance. The following year, Russia launched a war against Georgia. In 2014, Russia occupied and annexed Crimea and sent its forces into parts of the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, in direct violation of international law and Moscow’s own treaty commitments. The years that followed saw the Kremlin undercut arms control treaties and expand its military capabilities, poison and murder Russian dissidents, crack down on civil society, and carry out a brutal military intervention in support of the Assad regime in Syria. Step by step, Putin’s Russia chose a path that took it further from Europe and further from a cooperative, peaceful order.

EMPIRE STRIKES BACK

During the eight years that followed the illegal annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of conflict in eastern Ukraine, Germany and its European and international partners in the G-7 focused on safeguarding the sovereignty and political independence of Ukraine, preventing further escalation by Russia and restoring and preserving peace in Europe. The approach chosen was a combination of political and economic pressure that coupled restrictive measures on Russia with dialogue. Together with France, Germany engaged in the so-called Normandy Format that led to the Minsk agreements and the corresponding Minsk process, which called for Russia and Ukraine to commit to a cease-fire and take a number of other steps. Despite setbacks and a lack of trust between Moscow and Kyiv, Germany and France kept the process running. But a revisionist Russia made it impossible for diplomacy to succeed.

Russia’s brutal attack on Ukraine in February 2022 then ushered in a fundamentally new reality: imperialism had returned to Europe. Russia is using some of the most gruesome military methods of the twentieth century and causing unspeakable suffering in Ukraine. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians have already lost their lives; many more have been wounded or traumatized. Millions of Ukrainian citizens have had to flee their homes, seeking refuge in Poland and other European countries; one million of them have come to Germany. Russian artillery, missiles, and bombs have reduced Ukrainian homes, schools, and hospitals to rubble. Mariupol, Irpin, Kherson, Izyum: these places will forever serve to remind the world of Russia’s crimes—and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

But the impact of Russia’s war goes beyond Ukraine. When Putin gave the order to attack, he shattered a European and international peace architecture that had taken decades to build. Under Putin’s leadership, Russia has defied even the most basic principles of international law as enshrined in the UN Charter: the renunciation of the use of force as a means of international policy and the pledge to respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all countries. Acting as an imperial power, Russia now seeks to redraw borders by force and to divide the world, once again, into blocs and spheres of influence.

A STRONGER EUROPE

The world must not let Putin get his way; Russia’s revanchist imperialism must be stopped. The crucial role for Germany at this moment is to step up as one of the main providers of security in Europe by investing in our military, strengthening the European defense industry, beefing up our military presence on NATO’s eastern flank, and training and equipping Ukraine’s armed forces.

Germany’s new role will require a new strategic culture, and the national security strategy that my government will adopt a few months from now will reflect this fact. For the last three decades, decisions regarding Germany’s security and the equipment of the country’s armed forces were taken against the backdrop of a Europe at peace. Now, the guiding question will be which threats we and our allies must confront in Europe, most immediately from Russia. These include potential assaults on allied territory, cyberwarfare, and even the remote chance of a nuclear attack, which Putin has not so subtly threatened.

The transatlantic partnership is and remains vital to confronting these challenges. U.S. President Joe Biden and his administration deserve praise for building and investing in strong partnerships and alliances across the globe. But a balanced and resilient transatlantic partnership also requires that Germany and Europe play active roles. One of the first decisions that my government made in the aftermath of Russia’s attack on Ukraine was to designate a special fund of approximately $100 billion to better equip our armed forces, the Bundeswehr. We even changed our constitution to set up this fund. This decision marks the starkest change in German security policy since the establishment of the Bundeswehr in 1955. Our soldiers will receive the political support, materials, and capabilities they need to defend our country and our allies. The goal is a Bundeswehr that we and our allies can rely on. To achieve it, Germany will invest two percent of our gross domestic product in our defense.

German members of the NATO Response Force in Baumholder, Germany, November 2022

Wolfgang Rattay / Reuters

These changes reflect a new mindset in German society. Today, a large majority of Germans agree that their country needs an army able and ready to deter its adversaries and defend itself and its allies. Germans stand with Ukrainians as they defend their country against Russian aggression. From 2014 to 2020, Germany was Ukraine’s largest source of private investments and government assistance combined. And since Russia’s invasion began, Germany has boosted its financial and humanitarian support for Ukraine and has helped coordinate the international response while holding the presidency of the G-7.

The Zeitenwende also led my government to reconsider a decades-old, well-established principle of German policy on arms exports. Today, for the first time in Germany’s recent history, we are delivering weapons into a war fought between two countries. In my exchanges with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, I have made one thing very clear: Germany will sustain its efforts to support Ukraine for as long as necessary. What Ukraine needs most today are artillery and air-defense systems, and that is precisely what Germany is delivering, in close coordination with our allies and partners. German support to Ukraine also includes antitank weapons, armored troop carriers, antiaircraft guns and missiles, and counterbattery radar systems. A new EU mission will offer training for up to 15,000 Ukrainian troops, including up to 5,000—an entire brigade—in Germany. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic, Greece, Slovakia, and Slovenia have delivered or have pledged to deliver around 100 Soviet-era main battle tanks to Ukraine; Germany, in turn, will then provide those countries with refurbished German tanks. This way, Ukraine is receiving tanks that Ukrainian forces know well and have experience using and that can be easily integrated into Ukraine’s existing logistics and maintenance schemes.

NATO’s actions must not lead to a direct confrontation with Russia, but the alliance must credibly deter further Russian aggression. To that end, Germany has significantly increased its presence on NATO’s eastern flank, reinforcing the German-led NATO battle group in Lithuania and designating a brigade to ensure that country’s security. Germany is also contributing troops to NATO’s battle group in Slovakia, and the German air force is helping monitor and secure airspace in Estonia and Poland. Meanwhile, the German navy has participated in NATO’s deterrence and defense activities in the Baltic Sea. Germany will also contribute an armored division, as well as significant air and naval assets (all in states of high readiness) to NATO’s New Force Model, which is designed to improve the alliance’s ability to respond quickly to any contingency. And Germany will continue to uphold its commitment to NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, including by purchasing dual-capable F-35 fighter jets.

Our message to Moscow is very clear: we are determined to defend every single inch of NATO territory against any possible aggression. We will honor NATO’s solemn pledge that an attack on any one ally will be considered an attack on the entire alliance. We have also made it clear to Russia that its recent rhetoric concerning nuclear weapons is reckless and irresponsible. When I visited Beijing in November, Chinese President Xi Jinping and I concurred that threatening the use of nuclear weapons was unacceptable and that the use of such horrific weapons would cross a redline that humankind has rightly drawn. Putin should mark these words.

Our message to Moscow is very clear: we are determined to defend every single inch of NATO territory.

Among the many miscalculations that Putin has made is his bet that the invasion of Ukraine would strain relations among his adversaries. In fact, the reverse has happened: the EU and the transatlantic alliance are stronger than ever before. Nowhere is this more evident than in the unprecedented economic sanctions that Russia is facing. It was clear from the outset of the war that these sanctions would have to be in place for a long time, as their effectiveness increases with each passing week. Putin needs to understand that not a single sanction will be lifted should Russia try to dictate the terms of a peace deal.

All the leaders of the G-7 countries have commended Zelensky’s readiness for a just peace that respects the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and safeguards Ukraine’s ability to defend itself in the future. In coordination with our partners, Germany stands ready to reach arrangements to sustain Ukraine’s security as part of a potential postwar peace settlement. We will not, however, accept the illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory, poorly disguised by sham referendums. To end this war, Russia must withdraw its troops.

GOOD FOR THE CLIMATE, BAD FOR RUSSIA

Russia’s war has not only unified the EU, NATO, and the G-7 in opposition to his aggression; it has also catalyzed changes in economic and energy policy that will hurt Russia in the long run—and give a boost to the vital transition to clean energy that was already underway. Right after taking office as German chancellor in December 2021, I asked my advisers whether we had a plan in place should Russia decide to stop its gas deliveries to Europe. The answer was no, even though we had become dangerously dependent on Russian gas deliveries.

We immediately started preparing for the worst-case scenario. In the days before Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine, Germany suspended the certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which was set to significantly increase Russian gas supplies to Europe. In February 2022, plans were already on the table to import liquefied natural gas from the global market outside Europe—and in the coming months, the first floating LNG terminals will go into service on the German coast.

The worst-case scenario soon materialized, as Putin decided to weaponize energy by cutting supplies to Germany and the rest of Europe. But Germany has now completely phased out the importation of Russian coal, and EU imports of Russian oil will soon end. We have learned our lesson: Europe’s security relies on diversifying its energy suppliers and routes and on investing in energy independence. In September, the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines drove home that message.

To bridge any potential energy shortages in Germany and Europe as a whole, my government is bringing coal-fired power plants back onto the grid temporarily and allowing German nuclear power plants to operate longer than originally planned. We have also mandated that privately owned gas storage facilities meet progressively higher minimum filling levels. Today, our facilities are completely full, whereas levels at this time last year were unusually low. This is a good basis for Germany and Europe to get through the winter without gas shortages.

Russia’s war showed us that reaching these ambitious targets is also necessary to defend our security and independence, as well as the security and independence of Europe. Moving away from fossil energy sources will increase the demand for electricity and green hydrogen, and Germany is preparing for that outcome by massively speeding up the shift to renewable energies such as wind and solar power. Our goals are clear: by 2030, at least 80 percent of the electricity Germans use will be generated by renewables, and by 2045, Germany will achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions, or “climate neutrality.”

PUTIN’S WORST NIGHTMARE

Putin wanted to divide Europe into zones of influence and to divide the world into blocs of great powers and vassal states. Instead, his war has served only to advance the EU. At the European Council in June 2022, the EU granted Ukraine and Moldova the status of “candidate countries” and reaffirmed that Georgia’s future lies with Europe. We also agreed that the EU accession of all six countries of the western Balkans must finally become a reality, a goal to which I am personally committed. That is why I have revived the so-called Berlin Process for the western Balkans, which intends to deepen cooperation in the region, bringing its countries and their citizens closer together and preparing them for EU integration.

It is important to acknowledge that expanding the EU and integrating new members will be difficult; nothing would be worse than giving millions of people false hope. But the way is open, and the goal is clear: an EU that will consist of over 500 million free citizens, representing the largest internal market in the world, that will set global standards on trade, growth, climate change, and environmental protection and that will host leading research institutes and innovative businesses—a family of stable democracies enjoying unparalleled social welfare and public infrastructure.

As the EU moves toward that goal, its adversaries will continue to try to drive wedges between its members. Putin has never accepted the EU as a political actor. After all, the EU—a union of free, sovereign, democratic states based on the rule of law—is the antithesis of his imperialistic and autocratic kleptocracy.

Putin and others will try to turn our own open, democratic systems against us, through disinformation campaigns and influence peddling. European citizens have a wide variety of views, and European political leaders discuss and sometimes argue about the right way forward, especially during geopolitical and economic challenges. But these characteristics of our open societies are features, not bugs; they are the essence of democratic decision-making. Our goal today, however, is to close ranks on crucial areas in which disunity would make Europe more vulnerable to foreign interference. Crucial to that mission is ever-closer cooperation between Germany and France, which share the same vision of a strong and sovereign EU.

Nicolás Ortega

More broadly, the EU must overcome old conflicts and find new solutions. European migration and fiscal policy are cases in point. People will continue to come to Europe, and Europe needs immigrants, so the EU must devise an immigration strategy that is pragmatic and aligns with its values. This means reducing irregular migration and at the same time strengthening legal paths to Europe, in particular for the skilled workers that our labor markets need. On fiscal policy, the union has established a recovery and resilience fund that will also help address the current challenges posed by high energy prices. The union must also do away with selfish blocking tactics in its decision-making processes by eliminating the ability of individual countries to veto certain measures. As the EU expands and becomes a geopolitical actor, quick decision-making will be the key to success. For that reason, Germany has proposed gradually extending the practice of making decisions by majority voting to areas that currently fall under the unanimity rule, such as EU foreign policy and taxation.

Europe must also continue to assume greater responsibility for its own security and needs a coordinated and integrated approach to building its defense capabilities. For example, the militaries of EU member states operate too many different weapons systems, which creates practical and economic inefficiencies. To address these problems, the EU must change its internal bureaucratic procedures, which will require courageous political decisions; EU member states, including Germany, will have to alter their national policies and regulations on exporting jointly manufactured military systems.

One field in which Europe urgently needs to make progress is defense in the air and space domains. That is why Germany will be strengthening its air defense over the coming years, as part of the NATO framework, by acquiring additional capabilities. I opened this initiative to our European neighbors, and the result is the European Sky Shield Initiative, which 14 other European states joined last October. Joint air defense in Europe will be more efficient and cost effective than if all of us go it alone, and it offers an outstanding example of what it means to strengthen the European pillar within NATO.

NATO is the ultimate guarantor of Euro-Atlantic security, and its strength will only grow with the addition of two prosperous democracies, Finland and Sweden, as members. But NATO is also made stronger when its European members independently take steps toward greater compatibility between their defense structures, within the framework of the EU.

THE CHINA CHALLENGE—AND BEYOND

Russia’s war of aggression might have triggered the Zeitenwende, but the tectonic shifts run much deeper. History did not end, as some predicted, with the Cold War. Nor, however, is history repeating itself. Many assume we are on the brink of an era of bipolarity in the international order. They see the dawn of a new cold war approaching, one that will pit the United States against China.

I do not subscribe to this view. Instead, I believe that what we are witnessing is the end of an exceptional phase of globalization, a historic shift accelerated by, but not entirely the result of, external shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine. During that exceptional phase, North America and Europe experienced 30 years of stable growth, high employment rates, and low inflation, and the United States became the world’s decisive power—a role it will retain in the twenty-first century.

But during the post–Cold War phase of globalization, China also became a global player, as it had been in earlier long periods of world history. China’s rise does not warrant isolating Beijing or curbing cooperation. But neither does China’s growing power justify claims for hegemony in Asia and beyond. No country is the backyard of any other—and that applies to Europe as much as it does to Asia and every other region. During my recent visit to Beijing, I expressed firm support for the rules-based international order, as enshrined in the UN Charter, as well as for open and fair trade. In concert with its European partners, Germany will continue to demand a level playing field for European and Chinese companies. China does too little in this regard and has taken a noticeable turn toward isolation and away from openness.

In Beijing, I also raised concerns over the growing insecurity in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait and questioned China’s approach to human rights and individual freedoms. Respecting basic rights and freedoms can never be an “internal matter” for individual states because every UN member state vows to uphold them.

Wind turbines in front of a coal-fired power plant near Jackerath, Germany, March 2022

Wolfgang Rattay / Reuters

Meanwhile, as China and the countries of North America and Europe adjust to the changing realities of globalization’s new phase, many countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America that enabled exceptional growth in the past by producing goods and raw materials at low costs are now gradually becoming more prosperous and have their own demand for resources, goods, and services. These regions have every right to seize the opportunities that globalization offers and to demand a stronger role in global affairs in line with their growing economic and demographic weight. That poses no threat to citizens in Europe or North America. On the contrary, we should encourage these regions’ greater participation in and integration into the international order. This is the best way to keep multilateralism alive in a multipolar world.

That is why Germany and the EU are investing in new partnerships and broadening existing ones with many countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America. Many of them share a fundamental characteristic with us: they, too, are democracies. This commonality plays a crucial role—not because we aim to pit democracies against authoritarian states, which would only contribute to a new global dichotomy, but because sharing democratic values and systems will help us define joint priorities and achieve common goals in the new multipolar reality of the twenty-first century. We might all have become capitalists (with the possible exception of North Korea and a tiny handful of other countries), to paraphrase an argument the economist Branko Milanovic made a few years ago. But it makes a huge difference whether capitalism is organized in a liberal, democratic way or along authoritarian lines.

Take the global response to COVID-19. Early in the pandemic, some argued that authoritarian states would prove more adept at crisis management, since they can plan better for the long term and can make tough decisions more quickly. But the pandemic track records of authoritarian countries hardly support that view. Meanwhile, the most effective COVID-19 vaccines and pharmaceutical treatments were all developed in free democracies. What is more, unlike authoritarian states, democracies have the ability to self-correct as citizens express their views freely and choose their political leaders. The constant debating and questioning in our societies, parliaments, and free media may sometimes feel exhausting. But it is what makes our systems more resilient in the long run.

China’s rise does not warrant isolating Beijing or curbing cooperation.

Freedom, equality, the rule of law, and the dignity of every human being are values not exclusive to what has been traditionally understood as the West. Rather, they are shared by citizens and governments around the world, and the UN Charter reaffirms them as fundamental human rights in its preamble. But autocratic and authoritarian regimes often challenge or deny these rights and principles. To defend them, the countries of the EU, including Germany, must cooperate more closely with democracies outside the West, as traditionally defined. In the past, we have purported to treat the countries of Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America as equals. But too often, our words have not been backed by deeds. This must change. During Germany’s presidency of the G-7, the group has coordinated its agenda closely with Indonesia, which holds the G-20 presidency. We have also involved in our deliberations Senegal, which holds the presidency of the African Union; Argentina, which holds the presidency of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States; our G-20 partner South Africa; and India, which will hold the G-20 presidency next year.

Eventually, in a multipolar world, dialogue and cooperation must extend beyond the democratic comfort zone. The United States’ new National Security Strategy rightly acknowledges the need to engage with “countries that do not embrace democratic institutions but nevertheless depend upon and support a rules-based international system.” The world’s democracies will need to work with these countries to defend and uphold a global order that binds power to rules and that confronts revisionist acts such as Russia’s war of aggression. This effort will take pragmatism and a degree of humility.

The journey toward the democratic freedom we enjoy today has been full of setbacks and errors. Yet certain rights and principles were established and accepted centuries ago. Habeas corpus, the protection from arbitrary detention, is one such fundamental right—and was first recognized not by a democratic government but by the absolutist monarchy of King Charles II of England. Equally important is the basic principle that no country can take by force what belongs to its neighbor. Respect for these fundamental rights and principles should be required of all states, regardless of their internal political systems.

Periods of relative peace and prosperity in human history, such as the one that most of the world experienced in the early post–Cold War era, need not be rare interludes or mere deviations from a historical norm in which brute force dictates the rules. And although we cannot turn back the clock, we can still turn back the tide of aggression and imperialism. Today’s complex, multipolar world renders this task more challenging. To carry it out, Germany and its partners in the EU, the United States, the G-7, and NATO must protect our open societies, stand up for our democratic values, and strengthen our alliances and partnerships. But we must also avoid the temptation to once again divide the world into blocs. This means making every effort to build new partnerships, pragmatically and without ideological blinders. In today’s densely interconnected world, the goal of advancing peace, prosperity, and human freedom calls for a different mindset and different tools. Developing that mindset and those tools is ultimately what the Zeitenwende is all about.

• OLAF SCHOLZ is Chancellor of Germany.
• MORE BY OLAF SCHOLZ

Foreign Affairs · by Olaf Scholz · December 5, 2022

14. 12 Psychological Warfare Strategies Used Throughout History

It is PSYOP not Psyops.​ (apologies for being a doctrine zealot).

But the young graduate student provides a nice summary.

12 Psychological Warfare Strategies Used Throughout History

thecollector.com

Throughout history, militaries have used various strategies of psychological warfare to lure enemies into traps, without physical force.

Dec 5, 2022 • By Owen Rust, MA Economics in progress w/ MPA

Composed image a Nazi rally featuring powerful floodlights during the late 1930s, via the Museum of Nuremberg

In warfare, psychological warfare refers to tactics intended to reduce an opponent’s morale and will to fight. This can include tactics related to fear and intimidation, deception, and surprise. Militaries have long used psychological warfare to gain an advantage over opponents, allowing them to accomplish more without risking their soldiers’ lives or valuable armaments. Psychological warfare can also be used during peacetime to intimidate rivals into delaying or abandoning military intervention. Here we will look at both the ancient and modern eras of psychological warfare and how various militaries gained powerful advantages over opponents, even when they were militarily weaker. Today, psychological warfare, or ‘psyops’ is a common tool of modern military planning.

Ancient Psyops 1: War Elephants

An image of war elephants used circa 200 BC, via the Smithsonian Institution, Washington DC

As the tallest terrestrial animal on the planet, few creatures are as intimidating as an elephant. Add body armor and some blades or spikes to tusks, and you have a fearsome battle beast! Used in Africa and India, both African and Asian elephants were incorporated into armies. In India, war elephants were so common that they were entire corps of militaries. While not completely invincible, an elephant could easily sweep individual soldiers aside by swinging its massive head. Famously, horses were often intimidated by larger elephants and could refuse to charge into battle facing them.

However, the psychological warfare inflicted on opponents by war elephants could be countered. Famously, flaming pigs were used to terrify war elephants, which could turn around and trample their own soldiers in an attempt to escape. If an elephant panicked, it could cause almost as much damage to its own troops as the enemy! Thus, using war elephants was a high-risk strategy. Although the Romans successfully overcame war elephants–at tremendous cost–when fighting the Egyptians and Carthaginians, they came to adopt some for themselves, although mainly for entertainment and spectacle.

Ancient Psyops 2: Mongol Deal-Making

A map of the Mongol Empire, via the World History Encyclopedia

Over a thousand years after war elephants terrified the Romans, the cavalry forces of the Mongol Empire terrified cities from the Pacific Ocean to present-day Ukraine. The Mongols used effective psychological warfare against targeted cities by offering a deal: surrender and pay tribute to the Mongol Empire or face total destruction. The offer of a relatively generous deal made the prospect of brutal combat against highly trained and disciplined Mongol forces that much more painful. As a result, many cities and fortresses chose to become vassal states of the Mongol Empire–taxation rather than combat. To help ensure that most decided to surrender, the Mongols made sure to leave some survivors of each massacre who could spread the word of how brutal the Mongols could be.

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The Mongols expanded much more rapidly by being able to pacify potential foes with their deal-making. Similarly, cocaine kingpin Pablo Escobar in Colombia in the 1980s used the deal of plata o plomo (silver or lead) to convince many law enforcement officials to turn a blind eye to his illegal activities. By offering the proverbial carrot or stick, Escobar benefited when most potential opponents chose the carrot. Like the Mongols, this allowed Escobar to expand rapidly and avoid armed conflicts that could have taken him down sooner. But just like how the Mongol Empire eventually fell apart, so did Escobar’s drug empire. The drug lord was shot dead on December 2, 1993, while fleeing police in Medellin, Colombia.

Ancient Psyops 3: Vlad the Impaler’s Showmanship

A 1499 engraving depicting the brutality of Vlad the Impaler, Vlad III Draculae of Walachia, via the National Geographic Society

If challenged, the Mongols had the military might to conquer virtually any foe and could be plenty brutal about it. However, Vlad the Impaler takes the term “brutality” to another level entirely. In 1456, at about age 25, Vlad III of Walachia defeated his primary rival for leadership, Vladislav II, in hand-to-hand combat and became the leader of the Transylvania region of present-day Romania. He ruthlessly executed just about anyone he did not like, ranging from petty criminals to potential political rivals and their families. Famously, he used impaling as his favored punishment, possibly learned during his childhood with the Ottoman Turks.

Having victims impaled on vertical poles allowed Vlad to visually intimidate potential foes. Despite his brutality, Vlad was tolerated–and even celebrated–throughout Europe for militarily defeating and otherwise terrifying the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire. Famously, invading Ottoman sultan Mehmed II turned back when he encountered thousands of impaled bodies outside the city of Targoviste. Vlad’s sickening showmanship prevented a bloody showdown…at least that time. Later, Vlad the Impaler’s violent ways ended with his own violent death in 1476, when he was ambushed and beheaded on his way into battle.

Modern Psyops 1: Boer War & Siege of Mafeking

A painting of British troops fighting in the Boer War in 1900, via the National Army Museum, London

During the late 1890s, Britain wanted to unite all of South Africa into one colony. Inland, the Boer republics, of primarily Dutch heritage, resisted the influx of British people. In the autumn of 1899, war erupted between the British Empire and the much smaller, but highly skilled and determined Boer republics. The Boers laid siege to several British towns and garrisons and upset the military reinforcements who came to relieve them, which shocked the world. Using modern weapons and guerrilla tactics, the Boers were able to outmaneuver British forces that were used to fighting poorly armed natives.

One of the forts that the Boers besieged was Mafeking, where the roles were reversed. Here, a handful of British soldiers used clever deceptions to trick the surrounding Boers into thinking the garrison was more heavily defended. The Brits, including the future founder of the Scouting movement, Robert Baden-Powell, pretended to establish minefields and barbed-wire fences, which convinced the Boers not to attack. After 217 days, British reinforcements arrived and broke the siege in May 1900.

Modern Psyops 2: World War I Propaganda & Leaflets

An American-produced propaganda leaflet intended to help convince German troops to surrender late in World War I, via the National Museum of the US Air Force, Dayton

While most people are familiar with the use of propaganda to bolster support for a war on the home front, World War I saw the use of anti-war propaganda intended to sap enemy morale and convince them to surrender. Already suffering from the industrialized war that saw the wide-scale introduction of machine guns, modern artillery, poison gas warfare, and even the first armored tanks, German troops were bombarded with leaflets announcing their efforts were futile. Some German troops surrendered and asked for the rations promised in the leaflets, perhaps hastening the war’s end.

Future wars saw the use of propaganda leaflets on both sides. They could be dropped by planes or released from artillery shells. World War II saw both Axis and Allied powers try to convince soldiers from the other side to surrender and that they were being used as pawns for the elites. In addition to leaflets, both Germany and Japan used English-speaking radio broadcasts as propaganda. Both Allied and Axis broadcasts (and leaflets) tried to reduce enemy morale by claiming that the war was going according to plan for their side.

Modern Psyops 3: Nazi Rallies Fake Military Might

A Nazi rally in the 1930s, with German dictator Adolf Hitler speaking, via the Wiener Holocaust Library, London

After World War I, Germany was forced to disarm. In the early 1930s, Nazi Party leader Adolf Hitler became the chancellor of Germany and embarked on a policy of rearming the nation. Part of the Nazis’ aesthetic was massive rallies that featured displays of strength and vigor, intended to both inspire Germans and intimidate potential foes. Famously, the rallies featured over a hundred powerful searchlights aimed at the sky. This cathedral of light used most of Germany’s searchlights, but their use at political rallies tricked nations like France and Britain into believing that Germany must have had many more not in use.

The use of Nazi rallies and aggressive propaganda likely led to Britain and France not trying to check Germany’s rearmament. Germany re-occupied the Rhineland and took control of Czechoslovakia in 1938. In retrospect, Germany was not militarily prepared to fight France and Britain in 1938, and the appeasement shown to Germany at the Munich Conference only led Europe further down the path to World War II. However, the Nazis’ skillful propaganda during the 1930s convinced many that it was ready and willing to fight and win.

Modern Psyops 4: Ghost Armies vs. Nazi Saboteurs

An inflatable tank that resembled a genuine M4 Sherman tank, via The National World War II Museum, New Orleans

While World War I saw largely static trench warfare for much of the conflict, especially on the Western Front in France, World War II was much more maneuverable and complex. After the D-Day invasion of France in June 1944, the US used ghost armies of lightweight, artificial equipment, including inflatable tanks, to fool the enemy. In addition to physical decoys, ghost army units also used fake radio chatter and sounds of military action on loudspeakers to convince the Germans that forces were elsewhere than they actually were…or much larger than they actually were. Believing they were facing large units up to 35-40 times their actual size, the Germans chose to disengage rather than fight, potentially saving tens of thousands of Allied troops.

However, the Germans had their own tools of psychological warfare. In late 1944, as Germany planned a final major offensive to re-take lost territory in France and Belgium, it enlisted commando leader Otto Skorzeny to run an ambitious sabotage operation. Skorzeny, famous for rescuing imprisoned Italian dictator Benito Mussolini in September 1943, was a feared opponent. Operation Greif was intended to sow fear and confusion in the American lines during the Ardennes Offensive by implanting German agents in American uniforms who were fluent in English. These agents could then destroy equipment, plant false information, and basically run amok. Discovery that this was occurring did lead to temporary panic among US forces, but fortunately had little effect on the military situation.

Modern Psyops 5: Nazi Wunderwaffe

A German V-2 rocket on display in Virginia, via the National Air and Space Museum, Washington DC

After its unsuccessful Ardennes Offensive, known in the United States as the Battle of the Bulge, there was only one possible way for Germany to end the war in anything other than total defeat: Wunderwaffe. These “wonder weapons” were high-tech aeronautical wonders that included the Me-262 fighter jet, Me-263 rocket fighter, V-1 jet-powered buzz bomb, and V-2 long-range rocket. From September 1944 until late in the war, the V-2 rocket inflicted painful gouges on the London landscape. The V-2 was terrifying because it was supersonic and unstoppable; it could not be heard coming and could not be intercepted.

Although the V-2 only killed some 2,700 people in Britain, it was feared that the V-2 could potentially be launched from ships in the Atlantic at American cities. While Germany undoubtedly hoped that fear of its Wunderwaffe would bring the Allies to the negotiating table, it likely only increased their resolve to push for unconditional surrender. Ultimately, the capture of Me-262 fighter jets and V-2 rockets at the end of World War II in Europe greatly advanced aeronautic technology in the United States.

Modern Psyops 6: Espionage Rings & Red Scare

Movie posters from the early 1950s revealing the fear of communism in American society, via the University of Virginia Miller Center

While espionage has long been a part of war, few were more active in modern espionage than the Soviet Union. At the end of World War II, it was revealed that spies had helped the Soviet Union gain secrets from the Manhattan Project. Active Soviet spy rings helped the USSR develop its own atomic bomb by 1949, erasing the American “trump card” that it had held. It was revealed in late 1945 that Soviet spying was not limited to atomic secrets but general classified information as well. In 1952, it was discovered that a wooden carving of the Great Seal of the United States given to the US ambassador by the USSR contained a listening device.

The early Cold War saw a sweeping hysteria about communist infiltration of American society. This Second Red Scare of the late 1940s and early 1950s saw politicians investigate alleged communist links of fellow politicians, government employees, and media figures. The communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, resulting in the rise of Red China, only amplified tensions. When communist North Korea invaded South Korea a year later, resulting in the US leading a military response in the Korean War, fear of communism grew further. Fortunately, none of the espionage–real and suspected–led to war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Modern Psyops 7: Spooky Recordings vs. Booby Traps

A photograph of a spike-riddled booby trap used by Viet Cong guerrillas during the Vietnam War, via the Digital Public Library of America (DPLA)

After the Korean War, America next took up arms against communists in Vietnam a decade later. This time, the conflict mainly saw guerrilla warfare in a jungle environment rather than conventional warfare. Both the US military and the North Vietnamese military (and their Viet Cong guerrilla allies) looked for psychological warfare advantages to sap the morale of their enemies. The US used spooky tape recordings in Operation Wandering Soul to play on the superstitions of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers, hoping to get them to desert their positions. Success was mixed, with enemy soldiers sometimes discovering the ruse and firing on the speakers or the recordings, spooking South Vietnamese soldiers and civilians as well as the intended targets.

For their part, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong also played on Americans’ anxieties. They used deadly booby traps to sap soldiers’ morale. Knowing that you could be maimed or killed anywhere, even with no sign of an enemy present, made many soldiers question the war effort. Between 1966 and 1971, US military morale plummeted as the Vietnam War dragged on, and little seemed to be accomplished. Some soldiers in Vietnam turned to illegal drug use to cope with continual anxiety and harsh conditions.

Modern Psyops 8: Loud Music Breaks Enemies’ Will

US troops in Panama in December 1989 during Operation Just Cause, via National Public Radio

While much of psychological warfare is intended to frighten or deceive an enemy, some is just intended to tire them out. In December 1989, the US invaded Panama to oust drug-dealing dictator Manuel Noriega, whose police forces had just brutalized and threatened Americans in the country. With 13,000 American soldiers already in Panama thanks to the American-controlled Panama Canal, the additional 13,000 troops brought in during the swift invasion had little trouble defeating Noriega’s forces. But Noriega himself managed to flee to the Vatican City embassy in Panama City.

Storming a foreign embassy is a sociopolitical no-go, so the US had little choice but to wait and see. To break Noriega’s will, the military blasted hard rock at full volume at the embassy. Sure enough, Noriega eventually surrendered. The US continued using loudspeaker psyops during the Gulf War (1990-91), using Humvee-mounted speakers to convince Iraqi soldiers to surrender. A notable success was a combined loudspeaker and leaflet effort convincing 1,400 Iraqi soldiers to surrender to a much smaller force of US Marines.

Modern Psyops 9: Shock and Awe Air Wars

A photograph of the US bombing of Iraq in 2003, via Common Dreams

In early 1991, Operation Desert Storm commenced with a massive US-led bombing campaign against Iraq. The mass coordination of computer- and satellite-guided smart weapons decimated Iraqi military targets. This swift campaign featuring the most modern military technology became known as “shock and awe,” with enemy forces having little hope of defending themselves with obsolete, Soviet-era weapons. The speed, precision, and impact of expensive American air weapons convinced many Iraqi forces to surrender quickly when ground forces rolled in.

The US repeated its shock and awe air attacks in Afghanistan after September 11 and in Iraq again in early 2003. In both cases, the enemy surrendered quickly: the Taliban regime in Afghanistan put up little organized resistance, and Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein saw his forces surrender en masse after the US invasion in March 2003. Shock and awe undoubtedly helped demoralize these enemy forces, both of which were touted beforehand as hardened fighters. Few things can frighten an enemy like showing you can strike fast and hard without being hit back in return.

Summary: Keeping the Enemy on Their Toes Can Exhaust Their Will to Fight 

A photo of an American soldier working in psychological operations during the modern era, via the United States Army

Not all psychological warfare is intended to hurt enemy soldiers. Some, such as Winning Hearts and Minds initiatives, can help US forces by appealing to local civilian populations. If locals begin to sympathize and side with American troops, enemy forces will have fewer resources to work with. From false shows to strength to undetectable booby traps to spooky and anxiety-inducing audio recordings, there is a myriad of ways to wear an enemy down by keeping them constantly guessing. Soldiers can handle tremendous odds, but the anxiety of not knowing what sort of threat is coming can wear down even the toughest warrior.

Today, psychological warfare, or psyops, is a regular part of all military planning. The US Army has posted positions in this field, ideally for those skilled in communications and diplomacy. Those with extra skills, such as foreign language skills, may be recruited to do psyops as part of special forces. Whenever there are potential foes, you can be assured that the US military and intelligence communities are analyzing ways to psychologically weaken and intimidate them.

READ NEXT:

Animals in War: 7 Examples of Animals Fighting in Human Conflict

By Owen RustMA Economics in progress w/ MPAOwen is a high school teacher and college adjunct in West Texas. He has an MPA degree from the University of Wyoming and is close to completing a Master’s in Finance and Economics from West Texas A&M. He has taught World History, U.S. History, and freshman and sophomore English at the high school level, and Economics, Government, and Sociology at the college level as a dual-credit instructor and adjunct. His interests include Government and Politics, Economics, and Sociology.

thecollector.com

15. Ukraine appears to expose Russian air defence gaps with long-range strikes

Ukraine appears to expose Russian air defence gaps with long-range strikes

Reuters · by Pavel Polityuk

• Summary
• Companies
• Three killed at Russian base just hours from Moscow
• One of bases hit was home to Russian bomber fleet
• Ukraine minister jokes that careless Russian smokers to blame

KYIV/NOVOSOFIIVKA, Ukraine, Dec 6 (Reuters) - A third Russian airfield was ablaze on Tuesday from a drone strike, a day after Ukraine demonstrated an apparent new ability to penetrate hundreds of kilometers deep into Russian air space with attacks on two Russian air bases.

Officials in the Russian city of Kursk, located close to Ukraine, released pictures of black smoke above an airfield in the early morning hours of Tuesday after the latest strike. The governor said an oil storage tank there had been set ablaze but there were no casualties.

It came a day after Russia confirmed it had been hit hundreds of kilometers from Ukraine by what it said were Soviet-era drones - at Engels air base, home to Russia's strategic bomber fleet, and in Ryazan, a few hours' drive from Moscow.

Kyiv did not directly claim responsibility for the strikes but celebrated them.

"If Russia assesses the incidents were deliberate attacks, it will probably consider them as some of the most strategically significant failures of force protection since its invasion of Ukraine," Britain's ministry of defence said on Tuesday.

"The Russian chain of command will probably seek to identify and impose severe sanctions on Russian officers deemed responsible for allowing the incident."

Russia's defence ministry said three service members were killed in the attack at Ryazan. Although the attacks struck military targets it characterised them as terrorism and said the aim was to disable its long-range aircraft.

The New York Times, citing a senior Ukrainian official, said the drones involved in Monday's attacks were launched from Ukrainian territory, and at least one of the strikes was made with the help of special forces close to the base.

Ukraine never acknowledges responsibility for attacks inside Russia. Asked about the strikes, Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleskiy Reznikov repeated a longstanding joke blaming carelessness with cigarettes.

"Very often Russians smoke in places where it's forbidden to smoke," he said.

Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleksiy Arestovych went further, noting that Engels is Russia's only base fully equipped for the fleet of huge bombers Moscow has used to attack Ukraine.

"They will try to disperse (strategic aircraft) to airfields, but all this complicates the operation against Ukraine. Yesterday, thanks to their 'unsuccessful smoking', we achieved a very big result," he said.

Russian commentators on social media said that if Ukraine could strike that far inside Russia, it might also be able to hit Moscow.

NEW BARRAGE

The huge Tupolev long-range bombers that Russia stations at Engels are a major part of its strategic nuclear arsenal, similar to the B-52s deployed by the United States during the Cold War. Russia has used them in its campaign since October to destroy Ukraine's energy grid with near weekly waves of missile strikes.

The Engels base, near the city of Saratov, is at least 600 km (372 miles) from the nearest Ukrainian territory.

Russia responded to Monday's attacks with what it called a "massive strike on Ukraine's military control system", though it did not identify any specific military targets for what Ukraine called Moscow's latest strikes on civilian infrastructure.

Missiles across Ukraine destroyed homes and knocked out power, but the impact seemed to be less severe than barrages last month that plunged millions of Ukrainians into darkness and cold.

Ukraine's air force said it had shot down more than 60 of around 70 missiles. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said at least four people were killed.

A missile tore a huge crater out of the earth in the village of Novosofiivka, about 25 km (16 miles) east of Zaporizhzhia city in southern Ukraine, and completely shredded a nearby house. Ambulance workers collected two bodies lying by a destroyed car.

Olha Troshyna, 62, said the dead were her neighbours who were standing by the car seeing off their son and daughter-in-law when the missile struck. With houses now destroyed and winter setting in, she had no idea where she would go.

"We have no place to go back to," she said. "It would be fine if it were spring or summer. We could have done something if it were a warm season. But what am I going to do now?”

On Tuesday, Zelenskiy visited troops in the Donbas region in the east of the country that has seen the war's heaviest fighting.

He praised soldiers in a selfie video filmed in front of a sign on the road outside Sloviansk, near the city of Bakhmut that Russian forces have been trying to encircle for weeks in one of the war's bloodiest campaigns. In other videos, he presented medals and shook hands with troops in a hangar.

Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine's Defence Intelligence agency, said Moscow had enough missiles left for just a few more giant barrages before they were depleted.

RESISTANCE

Russia claims a military justification for attacks on Ukraine's civil infrastructure. Kyiv says the strikes are intended to hurt civilians, a war crime.

"They do not understand one thing - such missile strikes only increase our resistance," Ukraine's defence minister Reznikov said.

No political talks are underway to end the war. Moscow insists it will not negotiate unless Kyiv and the West accept its sovereignty over Ukrainian lands it claims, while Kyiv says Russia must quit all its territory.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Tuesday talks would only be possible when Russia achieves the goals of its "special military operation", which he did not define.

"Russia must and will achieve the goals it has set," he said "As for the prospects for some kind of negotiations, we don't see them at the moment, we have repeatedly said so."

However, the sides have discussed issues such as prisoner swaps. A Russian-installed official said the latest such exchange would see each side free 60 prisoners later on Tuesday.

Reporting by Reuters bureaux; Writing by Peter Graff Editing by Gareth Jones

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Pavel Polityuk

16. Pentagon, Chinese analysts agree US can’t win in Taiwan Strait

Scorched earth???

Wow.

Excerpts:

The strategic takeaway is that the United States cannot win a firefight close to China’s coast, and can’t defend Taiwan whether it wants to or not. That view in the Joe Biden administration’s Department of Defense (DOD) persuaded the president to discuss “guardrails” against military confrontation in his November summit with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping.

Republican hawks appear to have come to the same conclusion. The United States will enact a scorched-earth policy in Taiwan, destroying its semiconductor industry, if the PRC seizes the island, former Trump national security adviser Robert O’Brien told a conference at the Richard Nixon Foundation on November 10, reports army-technology.com.

“If China takes Taiwan and takes those factories intact – which I don’t think we would ever allow – they have a monopoly over chips the way OPEC has a monopoly, or even more than the way OPEC has a monopoly over oil,” O’Brien said.

A much-read paper by two Army War College professors published this year proposes that “the United States and Taiwan should lay plans for a targeted scorched-earth strategy that would render Taiwan not just unattractive if ever seized by force, but positively costly to maintain.”

Pentagon, Chinese analysts agree US can’t win in Taiwan Strait

US mulls ‘scorched earth’ strategy for Taiwan instead of defense

asiatimes.com · by David P. Goldman · December 6, 2022

China’s satellite coverage in the Western Pacific has doubled since 2018, the Pentagon reported last week in its annual assessment of the Chinese military. That gives China the ability to detect American surface ships with an array of sensors that can guide its 2,000 land-based missiles to moving targets, including US aircraft carriers.

The Defense Department’s November 29 report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” reflects a grimly realistic rethinking of China’s military capacity in its home theater.

China hawk Elbridge Colby, a prominent advocate of a Western Pacific military buildup to deny China access to its adjacent seas, tweeted on November 6, “Senior flag officers are saying we’re on a trajectory to get crushed in a war with China, which would likely be the most important war since WWII, God forbid.”

The strategic takeaway is that the United States cannot win a firefight close to China’s coast, and can’t defend Taiwan whether it wants to or not. That view in the Joe Biden administration’s Department of Defense (DOD) persuaded the president to discuss “guardrails” against military confrontation in his November summit with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping.

Republican hawks appear to have come to the same conclusion. The United States will enact a scorched-earth policy in Taiwan, destroying its semiconductor industry, if the PRC seizes the island, former Trump national security adviser Robert O’Brien told a conference at the Richard Nixon Foundation on November 10, reports army-technology.com.

“If China takes Taiwan and takes those factories intact – which I don’t think we would ever allow – they have a monopoly over chips the way OPEC has a monopoly, or even more than the way OPEC has a monopoly over oil,” O’Brien said.

A much-read paper by two Army War College professors published this year proposes that “the United States and Taiwan should lay plans for a targeted scorched-earth strategy that would render Taiwan not just unattractive if ever seized by force, but positively costly to maintain.”

“This could be done most effectively by threatening to destroy facilities belonging to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the most important chipmaker in the world and China’s most important supplier.”

O’Brien evidently agrees with the Pentagon’s assessment that the US can’t win a war in the Taiwan Strait, proposing – apropos of the Vietnam War’s most celebrated sound bite – to destroy the island in order to save it.

Anti-ship missiles are the 21st-century equivalent of the torpedo and dive bombers that banished the battleship from military budgets after the 1940 sinking of the Bismarck by the British and the 1941 sinking of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales by the Japanese. Surface ships including aircraft carriers can’t defend against modern missiles that can downlink guidance data from reconnaissance satellites.

The DOD report states that the PLA Rocket Force’s “conventionally armed CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) ASBM variant gives the PLA the capability to conduct long-range precision strikes against ships, including aircraft carriers, out to the Western Pacific.”

“The [People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s] ground-based missile forces complement the air and sea-based precision strike capabilities of the PLAAF and PLAN.… DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km, is fitted with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV), and is reportedly capable of rapidly reloading in the field.

“The PLARF continues to grow its inventory of DF-26 IRBMs, which it first revealed in 2015 and fielded in 2016. The multi-role DF-26 is designed to rapidly swap conventional and nuclear warheads and is capable of conducting precision land-attack and anti-ship strikes in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea from mainland China.

“In 2020, China fired anti-ship ballistic missiles against a moving target in the South China Sea.”

China tested these weapons thoroughly, the Pentagon report adds:

“In 2021, the PLARF launched approximately 135 ballistic missiles for testing and training, more than the rest of the world combined excluding ballistic missile employment in conflict zones. The DF-17 passed several tests successfully and is deployed operationally.

“While the DF-17 is primarily a conventional platform, it may be equipped with nuclear warheads. In 2020, a PRC-based military expert described the primary purpose of the DF-17 as striking foreign military bases and fleets in the Western Pacific.”

Key to the effectiveness of anti-ship missiles is satellite intelligence and electronic warfare measures. As the Pentagon reports:

“China employs a robust space-based ISR [intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance] capability designed to enhance its worldwide situational awareness. Used for military and civilian remote sensing and mapping, terrestrial and maritime surveillance, and intelligence collection, China’s ISR satellites are capable of providing electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery as well as electronic and signals intelligence data.”

Most important:

“As of the end of 2021, China’s ISR satellite fleet contained more than 260 systems – a quantity second only to the United States, and nearly doubling China’s in-orbit systems since 2018.”

Satellite signals can be jammed or spoofed (misdirected to show incorrect coordinates), but

“The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, and satellite navigation … the PRC continues to develop a variety of counter-space capabilities designed to limit or prevent an adversary’s use of space-based assets during crisis or conflict.

“In addition to the development of directed energy weapons and satellite jammers, the PLA has an operational ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missile intended to target low-Earth orbit satellites, and the PRC probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.

“PLA [electronic warfare] units routinely train to conduct jamming and anti-jamming operations against multiple communication and radar systems and Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite systems during force-on-force exercises.

“These exercises test operational units’ understanding of EW weapons, equipment, and procedures and they also enable operators to improve confidence in their ability to operate effectively in a complex electromagnetic environment.”

China’s military has improved quality as well as quantity, according to the Pentagon:

“Recent improvements to China’s space-based ISR capabilities emphasize the development, procurement, and use of increasingly capable satellites with digital camera technology as well as space-based radar for all-weather, 24-hour coverage.

“These improvements increase China’s monitoring capabilities – including observation of US aircraft carriers, expeditionary strike groups, and deployed air wings. Space capabilities will enhance potential PLA military operations farther from the Chinese coast.”

Overall, the Pentagon’s readout on China’s missile and satellite capability is virtually identical to the estimation of Chinese analysts, for example, the widely read military columnist Chen Feng in the prominent Chinese website “The Observer” (guancha.cn). In a November 27 report, Chen explained why an array of small satellites can achieve precise real-time target location:

“Small satellites are not only small, lightweight, and low-cost, but also operate in low orbits. In terms of space ISR, one is worth nearly three. This is true for optical and radar imaging, as well as for signal interception. So the actual reconnaissance capability of small satellites is no weaker than large satellites, and commercial Synthetic Aperture Radar small satellites in the United States and China are able to reach 0.5-meter resolution.

“Optical imaging has always had the advantage of high resolution, which is also a very mature technology. In the era of digital imaging, there is no longer a need to use the re-entry capsule to send the film back to the ground when the satellite is overhead.”

Synthetic aperture radar, Chen explains, “is not applicable to moving targets, but most of the intelligence can be interpreted from still images, and the similarities and movement can be inferred from differences between the before and after still images can also be inferred from the movement.”

A lead satellite may detect a suspicious object, and follow-up satellites “can be switched to a detailed investigation mode, and relay the results of detailed investigation.” Other satellites with electromagnetic rather than optical sensors can conduct real-time triangulation.

In addition to its satellite ISR capability, Chen says, the other half of China’s reconnaissance capability consists of “unmanned aircraft, unmanned boats, submarines, and networked land-based radar, and undersea hydroacoustic monitoring.”

China, Chen concludes, does not yet have global ISR capability, “but theater coverage has been achieved.”

In the past, the US Navy has insisted that a combination of electronic warfare measures and anti-missile defenses can defend US capital ships against Chinese attack. This year, the navy’s top officer Admiral Jonathan Greenert told reporters that a combination of spoofing (feeding false position coordinates to an incoming missile), masking electronic emissions, and anti-missile systems like Aegis can defend US carriers.

But as Gabriel Honrada reported on August 14, US anti-missile systems like Aegis or Patriot aren’t effective against missiles honing in from a high trajectory. China’s DF-21 and other anti-ship missiles are designed to ascend to the stratosphere and strike vertically.

Electronic countermeasures, moreover, are less effective against multiple sensors. China’s tiered system of sequenced optical, as well as electromagnetic reconnaissance combined with air and sea drones, is getting harder, if not impossible, to spoof. And China’s missile force is so large that it can inflict devastating damage even with a high error rate.

Apart from its formidable inventory of conventional missiles, China has developed hypersonic glide vehicles that hug the ground and maneuver at the speed of intercontinental ballistic missiles, or several times the speed of sound. No conventional missile defense can stop HGVs.

Apart from its missile force, China has about 800 fourth-generation fighters deployed at its coast and close to 200 fifth-generation (stealth) fighters. As the Pentagon report notes, China has corrected the most important deficiency in its domestic warplane production, namely jet engines:

“China’s decades-long efforts to improve domestic aircraft engine production are starting to produce results with the J-10 and J-20 fighters switching to domestically produced WS-10 engines by the end of 2021. China’s first domestically produced high-bypass turbofan, the WS-20, has also entered flight testing on the Y-20 heavy transport and probably will replace imported Russian engines by the end of 2022.”

A noteworthy observation in the new Pentagon report is that China now has only 30,000 marines, compared with a US Marine Corps of about 200,000 including reserves. Only 200 Chinese marines are deployed outside the country, at China’s sole overseas base in Djibouti. China has about 14,000 special forces versus an American count of about 75,000. This isn’t consistent with the report’s claim that China wants to “project power globally.”

asiatimes.com · by David P. Goldman · December 6, 2022

17. Japan’s Ruling Coalition Approves Counterstrike Capability

Excerpts;

Another indicator of how seriously Japan is concerned about a Taiwan contingency is the fact that Yonaguni Island held its first evacuation drill – prompting the 1,700 residents of the island to simulate the appropriate response to ballistic missile strikes – on November 30. Yonaguni Island is Japan’s westernmost island, only 110 kilometers from Taiwan.

None of this will be cheap, of course. Current government estimates come out to 40 trillion to 43 trillion yen (around $293 to $314 billion) in defense spending over five years starting from April 2023. This is far greater than the approximately 28 trillion yen Japan is spending in the current five-year program, and also still less than the 48 trillion yen that the Defense Ministry wanted.

Whether this increased spending will be covered by government bonds, spending cuts, or tax increases is still undecided and will likely fuel intense debate. In a Yomiuri poll, of the 51 percent of respondents who supported the government’s plans to increase defense spending, 38 percent supported issuing government bonds, 30 percent supported cuts in other budget items such as social security, and 27 percent supported tax increases.

Japan’s Ruling Coalition Approves Counterstrike Capability

The long-debated move comes alongside increased defense spending amid worries about Japan’s security environment.

thediplomat.com · by Mina Pollmann · December 6, 2022

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On December 2, Japan’s ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its junior partner, the Komeito, approved Japan possessing the capability to strike enemy bases that are preparing to attack. This change will be reflected in the three defense documents that are expected at the end of this year: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Program Guidelines, and the Mid-Term Defense Program.

Though there had been questions about how the pacifist Komeito would respond to the suggestion that Japan acquire counterstrike capabilities, it ultimately did not pose much of a roadblock. North Korea’s repeated missile launches, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and increased tension over Taiwan appear to have been sufficiently dramatic to convince the Komeito that the changes were necessary for Japan’s defense.

Furthermore, Komeito’s concerns about whether a counterstrike before Japan was attacked was possible without it being confused for an illegal, preemptive attack were assuaged with the agreement that the same conditions requiring Diet approval for the use of force for self-defense would also be applied to counterstrikes. The Diet would approve the use of force for self-defense only when an armed attack threatened Japan’s survival, there are no other appropriate means to repel the attack, and the use of force will be kept to the minimum necessary.

In tandem with this decision, the Japanese Defense Ministry is considering development of at least 10 types of missiles, an impressive mix of hypersonic and glide missiles that can be launched from land, sea, and air. While the development of these new technologies might take time, in the interim, Japan is seeking to bolster its counterstrike capabilities by buying up to 500 U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles by fiscal year 2027. In addition, the government plans to construct about 130 new ammunition depots, which will also store conventional ammunition but are intended mainly to store long-range standoff missiles for Japan’s counterstrike capabilities, as well as to launch a network of 50 small satellites to enable counterstrikes.

Another change being considered is the creation of a group within the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) to defend the Nansei island chain, which includes Okinawa prefecture and parts of southern Kyushu. Currently, the 15th Brigade headquartered in Camp Naha has about 2,000 personnel, including an infantry regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, and a reconnaissance unit. The proposed change for a new Okinawa defense group would add another infantry regiment to the brigade and increase the personnel of the consolidated group; though exact numbers have not yet been published, some media accounts speculate that this will bring its strength to about 3,000 members.

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The Okinawa defense group, if established as envisioned, would allow the GSDF to deploy more flexibly and promptly from Okinawa to remote islands, ideally enhancing deterrence. It will also be responsible for handling evacuations and combating misinformation. The defense of the Senkaku Islands would fall under this group’s area of responsibility. Other proposed changes include upgrading the highest rank from major general to general, so that the Japanese leader would be on equal footing to the commanding general of the U.S. Marine Corps’ III Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa.

Another indicator of how seriously Japan is concerned about a Taiwan contingency is the fact that Yonaguni Island held its first evacuation drill – prompting the 1,700 residents of the island to simulate the appropriate response to ballistic missile strikes – on November 30. Yonaguni Island is Japan’s westernmost island, only 110 kilometers from Taiwan.

None of this will be cheap, of course. Current government estimates come out to 40 trillion to 43 trillion yen (around $293 to $314 billion) in defense spending over five years starting from April 2023. This is far greater than the approximately 28 trillion yen Japan is spending in the current five-year program, and also still less than the 48 trillion yen that the Defense Ministry wanted.

Whether this increased spending will be covered by government bonds, spending cuts, or tax increases is still undecided and will likely fuel intense debate. In a Yomiuri poll, of the 51 percent of respondents who supported the government’s plans to increase defense spending, 38 percent supported issuing government bonds, 30 percent supported cuts in other budget items such as social security, and 27 percent supported tax increases.

CONTRIBUTING AUTHOR

Mina Pollmann

Mina Erika Pollmann is a PhD Candidate in international relations and security studies at MIT’s Department of Political Science.

thediplomat.com · by Mina Pollmann · December 6, 2022

18. Russian commander 'executed' following mass desertions of his unit: Report

Russian commander 'executed' following mass desertions of his unit: Report

Newsweek · by Isabel van Brugen · December 5, 2022

A Russian commander has reportedly died after members of his unit deserted from the front line en masse.

Russian independent news outlet The Insider reported the death of Viktor Sevalnev, a 43-year-old ex-convict who was recruited by the Wagner Group, a mercenary outfit, for Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine.

The outlet cited information it obtained from Vladimir Osechkin, a Russian human rights activist who runs the anti-corruption website Gulagu.net.

Sevalnev headed the 7th motorized rifle company of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) in eastern Ukraine, and had been hospitalized after sustaining injuries in battle.

A Russian serviceman patrols a destroyed residential area in the city of Severodonetsk on July 12, 2022, amid the ongoing Russian military action in Ukraine. A Russian commander has reportedly been killed after members of his unit deserted en masse. OLGA MALTSEVA/AFP/Getty Images

The Insider said a recorded conversation between Sevalnev and his wife in November revealed that he had been threatened with execution because soldiers in his unit had deserted.

"Don't send people here...they want to kill everyone," he said in a phone call with his wife Lilia, according to the report.

"Today it's me, tomorrow another, that's all. We're just murder material [to them]. The Ministry of Defense executes people. They know that we're [dead men] and they don't give a damn," he also reportedly said.

According to the news outlet, in November, Sevalnev's unit sustained heavy losses, some soldiers were killed and the rest deserted.

His wife said she was told on December 1 that Sevalnev had died in the Donbas region on November 25 from shrapnel wounds and a powerful blow to the head.

However, Osechkin told the news outlet he has doubts about the Kremlin's version of events. He said he believes that Sevalnev could have been "executed" for the desertion of his subordinates.

Newsweek has been unable to independently verify Osechkin's claims, and has contacted Russia's foreign ministry for comment.

Osechkin pointed to the recent death of another former convict, Yevgeny Nuzhin, who had been recruited in July by the Wagner Group, which was founded by Putin ally Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Footage of his killing was published last month by the Wagner-linked Telegram channel Grey Zone. The clip showed an unidentified man hitting Nuzhin, 55, with a sledgehammer.

Nuzhin had given a string of interviews in Ukraine after he was captured by Ukrainian forces in September, in which he criticized Russian officials and said he wanted to switch sides.

Nuzhin's son, Ilya, told Osechkin's Gulagu.net in November that his family was "horrified" to learn of his death.

"Our whole family was in tears watching the video ... he was murdered like an animal," the 55-year-old's son said.

Prigozhin said the footage was "excellent directorial work that's watchable in one sitting" while Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said "it was not our business."

Prigozhin denied reports of Sevalnev's murder when pressed on the matter by Gulagu.net. He also denied that Sevalnev had been recruited by the Wagner Group.

Update 12/05/22, 8:30 a.m. ET: This article has been updated to include additional background information.

Do you have a tip on a world news story that Newsweek should be covering? Do you have a question about the Russia-Ukraine war? Let us know via worldnews@newsweek.com.

Newsweek · by Isabel van Brugen · December 5, 2022

19. Robert Louis Stevenson knew about guerrilla warfare

Robert Louis Stevenson knew about guerrilla warfare

Skullduggery, tension and thrilling chases – Kidnapped by Robert Louis Stevenson is both one of the great Scottish novels and a compelling account of unconventional warfare.

engelsbergideas.com

It is a stiflingly hot, cloudless day in early July on Rannoch Moor in Scotland. Dawn begins at 3:30am and dusk ends at 11:15pm, leaving only four hours of darkness. The moor is ‘a piece of low, broken, desert land,’ without trees, shade or water save for that in the peat. You have no money or food, the water in the brandy bottle is gone, and the king’s men are after you. Nearby Glencoe is heavily guarded. There are two options: head to the territory of an enemy clan, or cross the moor. What do you do?

Kidnapped’s narrator, David Balfour, and his companion Alan Breck Stewart, are on the run from King George’s redcoats, wanted for the assassination of the government factor, Colin Campbell of Glenure. Their ‘Flight in the Heather’ can be easily imagined by anyone who has had to cross Rannoch Moor, or even part of it, on foot on a high summer’s day. Nothing has changed since 1751. The blazing sun and lack of relief quickly create a longing for water and shade. Ground that should be mire crunches underfoot. The steep slopes of Glencoe are brown, the sun is vertical overhead, nothing moves in the swathes of bog myrtle and rusty seedheads of bog asphodel. David says: ‘At last, about two, it was beyond men’s bearing.’

I returned to this book recently and was struck by the vivid description of their persecution by the sun, reminded of the unnatural summer of 2022 which left many northern-dwellers longing for clouds. But it is also striking to read with our contemporary backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which must make us all reflect on what it would be like to have a war in our own land, to have to relearn our own landscape, where it hides, where it helps us, and where we cannot cross. There are some wonderful descriptions of the silence and exposure, the risk that a loose step on the scree will cause a rolling pebble to echo around the glen as it falls. Alan asks David: ‘Out on yon bald, naked, flat place, where can a body turn to? Let the redcoats come over a hill, they can spy you miles away; and the sorrow’s in their horses’ heels, they would soon ride you down. It’s no good place, David; and I’m free to say, it’s worse by daylight than by dark.’ We recognise these characters and this land — it is familiar to us as a place of refreshment and recreation — but we suddenly see it through the eyes of fugitives; we realise how quickly a safe place can become a hazardous one in which you must fight to survive.

Things do soon get worse for the pair. At noon they lie down in thick heather to sleep and take turns with the watch. But David has ‘the taste of sleep in my throat,’ and the hot smell of the heather and the drone of wild bees overcomes him. When he wakes it is much later, and ‘a body of horse-soldiers had come down during my sleep, and were drawing near to us from the south-east, spread out in the shape of a fan and riding their horses to and fro in the deep parts of the heather.’ As the troops beat the land, David and Alan are hunted like hares.

The adventure of their escape is about alliances and betrayals, old feuds and revenge. It is, after all, a rollicking story. It is also a reminder of the discontent and division in post-1745 Scotland, following the Jacobite Rising, when trust within communities was not easy (and not sensible). It begins when seventeen-year-old David Balfour sets out to find the House of Shaws, the ancestral home of the Balfours, after his father’s death. The house is decaying and inhabited by his clearly evil Uncle Ebenezer who tricks him into a trip to Queensferry, west of Edinburgh, ostensibly to see a lawyer. Once there he is lured on board The Covenant, a ship about to depart for the Carolinas, trading tobacco, skins, mocking birds and cardinals. Captain Hoseason, who turns out to be in league with his uncle, has him knocked out, bound, and kept in the hold. He is destined for forced labour on tobacco plantations.

Of course they do not get to America. The Covenant leaves the Firth of Forth and travels into head winds around the north coast of Scotland, pushed to within sight of Cape Wrath where, in thick fog, they run down a small boat. The only survivor is Alan Breck Stewart, a Jacobite on his way to France. Alan is ‘small and nimble as a goat … his eyes were unusually light and had a kind of dancing madness in them, that was both engaging and alarming.’ He carried a pair of fine silver-mounted pistols and was dressed in a greatcoat, a hat with feathers, a red waistcoat, black plush breeches and a blue coat with silver buttons and silver lace — giveaway French clothes. The captain, a ‘true-blue Protestant,’ nonetheless takes 60 guineas to land Alan at Loch Linnhe. But he tells David that ‘yon wild Hielandman is a danger to the ship, besides being a rank foe to King George.’ We know the captain is not going to keep his word.

And so begins the key relationship of the book, between David the Lowlander and Alan the Highlander, with a conversation about political difference: ‘And so you’re a Jacobite?’ David asks him. Alan replies ‘And you, by your long face, should be a Whig?’ David is indeed a Whig, but for fear of offence answers ‘Betwixt and between,’ to which Alan replies: ‘And that’s naething’. In terms of allegiance, David has to choose: the murderous ship captain or the Jacobite? His choice of Alan cements a non-political alliance and together they take on and defeat the ship’s crew through a battle in the roundhouse. Alan situates that micro-battle within a grander one when he asks the captain: ‘I bear a king’s name … Do you see my sword? It has slashed the heads of mair Whigamores than you have toes upon your feet.’

We learn a little about Alan: that his father had served King George in the Black Watch, and that Alan himself had fought in the English army until he deserted at Prestonpans. Now he is in the service of the French king and has come to raise money from rents in Appin in the west Highlands for the clan chief in exile in France, and to recruit Highlanders for France. He boasts that he has returned from France to Scotland every year since 1746 because ‘France is a braw place, nae doubt, but I weary for the heather and the deer.’ Through him we see the organisation of the underground movement, where ‘everywhere there are friends’ houses and friends’ byres and haystacks,’ and how resistance is possible despite repression: ‘with never a gun or a sword left from Cantyre to Cape Wrath, but what tenty [careful] folk have hidden in their thatch!’ But this is not just about the endlessly unhappy triumvirate of Scotland, England and France; the need to choose sides has made local clan loyalties and feuds even fiercer — it is never a given that all Highlanders are on the same side. Alan says of the Campbell clan: ‘I know nothing I would help a Campbell to, unless it was a leaden bullet’.

Kidnapped is a work of fiction and romance, but it is deeply rooted in fact. It was published in 1886 but Stevenson had a keen interest in Scottish history and this earlier period in particular. Alan Breck Stewart did actually exist (of which more later). For me, the most thought-provoking geopolitical dimension in the novel is not the French connection, but the American one. Highlanders travelled to the new southern states of America throughout the 1730s and 40s – indeed General James Oglethorpe, the founder of Georgia, was from an English Jacobite family and took Highlanders because they were tough, and would survive and work. In 1735 the Georgia Trustees recruited 170 Highlanders to guard the colony’s frontier with Spanish Florida. One such character was John Mòr McIntosh, a clan chief from Badenoch, who in 1736 founded New Inverness, on the southern Georgia coast. In 1770 his son Lachlan McIntosh was an influential businessman with land, and a leader of the independence movement. He argued that decisions that affected Georgia should be taken locally in Savannah, not in London. When the War of Independence began, Lachlan McIntosh became the commander of Georgia’s Battalion and repelled British assaults from the coast. By 1778 the British had assembled an army of over 3,000 British regulars, German mercenaries, and American loyalists who sailed from New York to recapture Savannah, under the command of Lt Colonel Archibald Campbell. The British entry into Savannah was virtually uncontested; but the following year the-then General McIntosh fought with 6,000 French soldiers, twenty French ships and eleven French frigates to retake the city (they did not succeed — the British held Savannah until 1782). General Lachlan McIntosh’s house still stands in one of Savannah’s garden squares.

But back to our story. The Covenant had drifted in thick fog down the Little Minch and round the coast of Skye. Since Alan is intent on being dropped in Loch Linnhe, they head for the southern coast of Mull. The journey is best enjoyed with the help of the diverting sketch maps Stevenson insisted must accompany the text. Under a full moon and in a westerly swell The Covenant is wrecked on reefs off Mull, the land of the Campbells, Alan’s enemies. David is cast into the sea and finds himself alone on the small Isle of Erraid where he finds no shelter from the endless rain, and no food but shellfish, before some fishermen point out that he can walk to Mull at low tide. Taken in by the wild Highlanders who help him at the sight of a silver button belonging to Alan, he makes for Appin, on the shore of Loch Linnhe and the approach to Glencoe.

While sitting in a birchwood tree on the steep craggy lochside, considering his options (‘troubled by a cloud of stinging midges’), David encounters by chance Colin Campbell of Glenure, the deeply unpopular king’s factor known as the Red Fox. David asks directions, and while they stop a shot rings out from the hill and hits its target. The Red Fox is dead. David immediately scrambles up and into the trees looking for the murderer. This moment is the turning point of the book: redcoats run immediately to the scene, David is assumed to have been an accomplice, the soldiers fan out and start firing at David in the birches. He is suddenly grabbed by Alan Breck Stewart, who just happens to be hiding nearby, and they set off running along the side of the mountain towards Ballachulish, pursued by the redcoats.

Thus the flight through the heather; the slow inching through the chokepoint of Glencoe, crawling with soldiers, while settlements across Appin are being searched, arms being found, poor people being arrested and held as accomplices for the murder, covering for the real culprit as he gets away. The chilling aspect of this tale has its basis in fact: Colin Campbell of Glenure was the king’s factor in Appin and was indeed shot by a marksman. A man called James Stewart of Appin, who features in Kidnapped as ‘James of the Glens,’ was arrested and tried for murder. We witness James and his household taking the guns and swords out to hide in the moss; we witness his wife sitting by the fire and weeping because she knows of the punishment that is certain to come; we witness James Stewart giving David and Alan a sword and pistols, some ammunition, a bag of oatmeal, an iron pan and a bottle of French brandy. ‘If it falls on you,’ he says to Alan, ‘it falls on me that I am your near kinsman and harboured ye while ye were in the country.’ During his real-life trial, a letter from James Stewart used in evidence described the visit of Alan Stewart, a distant friend of the clan chief’s, who was in French service, was known to have been in the area at the time and who had since disappeared (Stevenson took his description of the character precisely from that letter). James Stewart alleged that the now-disappeared Alan was the murderer, but to no avail. The presiding judge at the trial was a Campbell and the fifteen-man jury contained Campbell clansmen. James Stewart was hanged in 1752 above the narrows at the village of Ballachulish; he died protesting his innocence.

And how does it end? The adventure, of course, concludes satisfactorily if abruptly. Although our sympathies lie with David and Alan, this story is not simply a sentimental tract about Highlanders, and they don’t all come out of it well by any means. We see the madness and sadness that comes from taking sides. But the taste the novel leaves behind is of the heather and the birchwoods and that blisteringly hot day on the peat moor. ‘By what I have read in the books, I think few that have held a pen were ever really wearied, or they would write of it more strongly,’ reflects David. Stevenson evokes not only the unique sensations of the Scottish wilderness but also the dislocation and fear caused by conflict. He was clearly writing from the heart.

engelsbergideas.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com