Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners



Quotes of the Day:



“Personnel policies that prohibit stabilized assignments prevent active UW, FID, and PSYOP specialists from attaining required cultural expertise, including language proficiency, in respective areas of responsibility.”
- The late COL John M. Collins, aka The Warlord. April 28, 1987


“One ought, every day at least, to hear a little song, read a good poem, see a fine picture, and, if it were possible, to speak a few reasonable words.” 
- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe


​"​Ideas are more powerful than guns. We would not let our enemies have guns, why should we let them have ideas.​"​ 
​-​Joseph Stalin


​1. Ukraine's Intel Chief On How The War Ends, Putin's Nuclear Threats, Iranian Drones, And More

​2. Somalia's president says at least 100 killed in car bombings

3. He Lifeng: China's expected new economic tsar has big shoes to fill

4. Ukraine Unleashes Mass Kamikaze Drone Boat Attack On Russia's Black Sea Fleet Headquarters

5. Russia Now Has a Second Frontline Set Up Just to Kill Its Deserters: Intel

6. Is Iran facing a revolutionary moment?

7. The Art of Hitting Disinformation Where It Lives

8. Is attacking the electricity infrastructure used by civilians always a war crime?

9. Russian official: US reducing ‘nuclear threshold’ by deploying modernized weapons

10. Don’t Rule Out Diplomacy in Ukraine

​11. ​Just how ominous is the China threat?

​12. ​Man vs machine: US preparing an AI Bill of Rights

​13. ​ The Pentagon's new defense strategy is out. Now the real work begins, experts say

​14. ​US 'Killer Missiles' In China's Backyard Is Giving Nightmares To Beijing; Why Is PLA Edgy Over THAAD?

​15. ​US To 'Withdraw' Its Entire F-15 Fighter Jet Fleet From Japan Amid Chinese Vow To Unite All Lost Territories - Reports

16. Correcting the Record on US Taiwan Policy

17.  Investigation: Oct. 29 drone attack likely hit Russian frigate Admiral Makarov in Sevastopol

18.  Inside a US military cyber team’s defence of Ukraine

19. Biden faces 'unpredictable' era with China's empowered Xi

20. How ‘graveyard’ of Russian tanks in Ukraine is upending armour doctrines worldwide & for India





1. Ukraine's Intel Chief On How The War Ends, Putin's Nuclear Threats, Iranian Drones, And More


A fascinating interview that is being picked up by other media outlets. Kudos to Howard Altman.




Ukraine's Intel Chief On How The War Ends, Putin's Nuclear Threats, Iranian Drones, And More

In a wide-ranging interview with The War Zone, Ukrainian Maj. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov answers our questions about the war and where it’s headed.

BY

HOWARD ALTMAN

|

PUBLISHED OCT 28, 2022 7:30 PM

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · October 28, 2022

Friday morning, The War Zone caught up with Ukrainian Maj. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, head of that nation’s Defense Intelligence directorate for a wide-ranging hour-long discussion about when and how the war will end, whether the Russians will use nuclear weapons, how the fight to retake Kherson City is going, when Ukraine will attempt to retake Crimea and much, much more.

The questions and answers have in some cases been slightly edited for clarity.

TWZ: How long will it take Ukraine to recapture Kherson City?

KB: Most likely the seizure operation of Kherson will last until the end of the next month.

TWZ: How have the Russians fortified the city and who do they have fighting there?

KB: The most trained and most capable Russian units are currently in Kherson. A large share of them are from airborne troops of the Russian Federation, Russian special operation forces and the naval infantry, so the most capable units that Russia has. Those units form the backbone of the grouping and it's being strengthened by the mobilized personnel also.

TWZ: How many Russian forces are in Kherson right now?

KB: So the combat component - the units that can pose any danger to us with our operation - is about 40,000. So it's the grouping. Kherson [City] is in the middle of that grouping. Those are troops in Kherson and also just in areas of the western bank [of the Dnipro RIver] and also troops that support actions of the western bank but that are stationed on the eastern bank.

TWZ: That sounds like it will be a bloody fight.

KB: We're trying to alleviate that to the extent that we're able to but it won't go through without a fight.

TWZ: Why not just encircle the city and isolate the troops there?

KB: That's exactly what we're trying to do. But they're opposing outwardly. They're trying to obstruct our movement forward, and you should understand that fighting is going on every day.

TWZ: You’ve talked about the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant Dam being mined in April. Do you really think the Russians will blow that up?

KB: In our assessment, if such a decision is taken, they will only blow up the road that goes over the dam to make it impossible to use for our vehicles and also the water locks of the dam which will cause only a partial ruination of the facility.

The Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant Dam in Kherson City. (Ukraine military photo)

TWZ: If they do that, will it impede your ability to retake Kherson?

KB: No. This might happen when we take Kherson and if they decide to withdraw. After withdrawal from the west bank, they might turn to doing it to obstruct our advancement to the east bank.

TWZ: As you were planning out the counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson, did you have tabletop exercises with U.S. officials?

KB: This question is not a question to me. It's a question to the commander of the armed forces of Ukraine and the general staff and I'm not authorized to respond to that.

TWZ: Let’s turn to Belarus. Ukraine just bolstered troops along its northern border. Can you provide any further details about why and how concerned are you about a Russian attempt to attack perhaps not Kyiv, but western Ukraine to cut off supplies pouring in from allies?

KB: Cutting off those supply lines from the west is a strategic goal. And I could say a cherished dream of the Russian Federation. Speaking of Russian military activities in Belarus, the presence of the Russian military in Belarus currently is not that high. Only about 4,300 servicemen are there. And they are very limited. That grouping is very limited in heavy weapon systems and the majority - about 80% of the grouping - are mobilized personnel. So summarizing the abovementioned, I can say that in the current stage there is not a threat of invasion from Belarus. But that situation could change very fast when Russia loses Kherson. That capable grouping in Kherson after the withdrawal from Kherson will partially be relocated to the Zaporizhzhia direction but part of them might move northwards to Belarus and create a threat there. So we have to be cautious about it.

TWZ: Is that why Ukraine shifted troops north to the border to prevent that?

KB: Naturally of course, because we need to get ready for any possible actions of the Russian Federation.

TWZ: How big a strain does that put on Ukraine, given the counteroffensives in the Kharkiv and Kherson Oblasts?

KB: We have enough forces for the defense of our state. And as you see we have no other options but to do that, and as you see, we're still continuing offensive operations in other directions.

TWZ: Let me ask you about the Kerch Bridge. Who attacked it?

KB: So I've already answered this question also to your colleagues [in the media]. And when they asked me about it, I asked them back. Why is that? Why did they think that Ukraine is the only possible actor that could do that? There were multiple cases before when the Russians have blown out their own constructions and buildings, and just to unbind their hands for doing something else.

Explosion causes fire at the Kerch bridge in the Kerch Strait, Crimea on Oct. 8. (Photo by Vera Katkova/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

TWZ: So do you deny any Ukrainian involvement in that attack?

KB: I'm not confirming or disproving. We're just having a discussion.

TWZ: What about the attacks on the Saki Air Base in Crimea? Did Ukraine have anything to do with that and how did you carry that out if you did?

KB: Look, Ukraine has the right to cause the military defeat to come to that attacker. We're striving for victory over the enemy. That victory can come in the course of engagement of adversary targets and in the final stage, this victory is only possible when we reached the boundaries of 1991. That's how it's happened.

TWZ: But can you give me more details about how the Saki Air Base was attacked? What kind of a weapon was used?

KB: Regretfully, I cannot comment on all the details of these events.

TWZ: In terms of Crimea, when do you think Ukraine might be launching an offensive there and how long do you think it would take to take Crimea back?

KB: So this is only happening by military force and that will happen next year.

TWZ: Roughly when next year?

KB: I'll refrain from that, excuse me.

TWZ: There's been a number of attacks in the Russian Belgorod region. Is that something that Ukraine is carrying out?

KB: It's another question that I cannot provide you with an answer to.

TWZ: Is there any thought about using any of the American-supplied weapons to attack in Belgorod or elsewhere in Russia?

KB: I can assure you that none of the weapon systems provided to us from the West were used, are being used or most likely won't be used in attacks anywhere but on the territory of Ukraine. Those weapons systems were provided to Ukraine as aid in order to regain its territorial integrity. That is why those weapon systems are used exclusively on the territory of Ukraine.

TWZ: Was the wave of missile and drone attacks that launched on Oct. 10 planned before the Kerch Bridge attack?

KB: Yes, we possess information and evidence that that attack was pre-planned before the 10th of October and before the Kerch Bridge explosion they just used the Kerch Bridge explosion as a pretext, as justification for those massive strikes at Ukraine. But as I say it was pre-planned long before all of that.

A Ukrainian man tries to survive in his house destroyed by the missile attack after Russia's latest shelling across Ukraine on Oct.11. (Photo by Metin Aktas/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

TWZ: These attacks were designed largely to take out your power infrastructure. How is Ukraine going to cope with providing power as Russia continues to attack those facilities?

KB: Mobile teams of engineers and electricians are working 24/7 these days to restore the infrastructure. Yes, there has been some damage done but it's not critical.

TWZ: How is the mobilization of so many untrained and poorly supplied troops affecting the battle from your point of view?

KB: It doesn't have a significant influence. We have to give them credit that they've managed to mobilize about 220,000 troops. But you were right to say that they're poorly trained and poorly equipped. That is why it has no significant influence.

TWZ: They’re not going to slow you down just because they are there?

KB: They're just throwing cannon fodder at us but in modern warfare that doesn't have a lot of impact and decisive meaning for the war.

TWZ: Why are the Russians investing so much in attacking Bakhmut?

KB: Bakhmut is just their desire that they want to achieve for eight months now. From the military standpoint, Bakhmut has a very favorable position because it opens further routes to such towns as Sloviansk [about 20 miles to the northwest], Kramatorsk [about five miles south of Sloviansk] and Chasiv Yar [about five miles southwest of Bahkmut].

TWZ: Can you tell me how many troop losses there have been on the Ukrainian and Russian sides?

KB: We're not calculating and we're not responsible for registering the losses on the Ukrainian side. It's not in the confidence of the Defense Intelligence. But for the adversary, I can provide you data. On the personnel, it's 65,765 [killed in action], 2,637 tanks, 5,379 armored combat vehicles, artillery systems along with multiple launch rocket systems slightly more than 2,000, about 250 helicopters and about 1,400 unmanned aerial vehicles and also about 16 ships and boats.

TWZ: How much difference is mud playing in current combat operations?

KB: It's a problematic issue. At a stage, it played in our favor but it also played against us. For example, currently, for wheeled equipment, the terrain is not passable. And you cannot even move tracked vehicles across the terrain for a few days right after the rain. That is why currently it is both sides that are unable to conduct active actions.

TWZ: Can you talk about the Kharkiv counteroffensive? Is that slowing down?

KB: So in the Kharkiv direction, we're standing actually at the border with Russian Federation and we're not moving into the territory of the Russian Federation.

TWZ: Vladimir Putin has made several threats about the use of nuclear weapons. And then there is this narrative out of Moscow that Ukraine is developing a dirty bomb [a device with a conventional explosive designed to disburse radioactive material]. First of all, do you think Putin will order a nuclear strike on Ukraine?

KB: Look, let's go step by step. First, on the potential usage, the theoretical potential usage of nuclear weapons by Russia against us, theoretically that is possible. Because Russia is a terrorist state with a nuclear mace. But that is just a potential possibility. We're not observing any preparations for a nuclear strike at Ukraine. Speaking of lies spread by the Russian Federation that Ukraine allegedly is preparing a dirty bomb, Ukraine has never in its history produced such devices. It has never planned, it's not planning and it's not going to plan to do anything like that. Unlike the Russian Federation, who is, as I said before, a terrorist state and they're likely to do anything.

TWZ: So why is Russia continuing to spread a story about Ukraine preparing to use a dirty bomb?

KB: They want to force us into peace talks and they want to threaten the rest of the world so they would apply pressure to us to make a seat at the table of negotiations with Russia.

TWZ: How much of a difference has Sergei Surovikin, the new commander of the Russian Army in Ukraine, made to the fight?

KB: There hasn't been any changes made by this appointment because nothing in Russia is able to fix the very bad state, the very bad position in which Russia currently is in. But contrary to that, there should be someone responsible in Russia for all the military defeats they're taking and they're going to take and as they lose Kherson, this person will be the one to blame.

TWZ: Can you talk about any Ukrainian weapons innovations that are making a difference on the battlefield?

KB: Ukraine currently is producing all the weapons it's able to produce and all those weapons are used. That is why it's a very broad question. For example, there are large numbers of Ukrainian drones, of Ukrainian production, that are currently used on the front line.

TWZ: Drilling down a bit on the drones, can you talk about their capabilities?

KB: Of course, I won't be talking about the new systems and the older systems such as the PD-1 or Leleka-100 are well known and their technical features are public.


TWZ: Is Ukraine working on its own short-range ballistic missile systems?

KB: I won’t be able to comment on this.

TWZ: How big of a difference have the Iranian drones used by Russia made? Which Iranian drones are making the biggest impact and how are you countering them?

KB: The massive application of loitering munitions - kamikaze drones - against civilian infrastructure and critical infrastructure sites is typical terrorism. As an example, there was a case when they were targeting an energy infrastructure site but in parallel to that they engaged a residential building on the way and as a result of that, a whole entrance to the building with few floors above it collapsed which led to deaths of women and children. The main types of drones are the Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6.

TWZ: Which of those are the most effective, from the Russian point of view?

KB: The Shaheds, because they're launching them in large quantities and eventually we downed about 70% of those, but 30% are reaching their targets.

TWZ: Can you talk about how you’re downing them?

KB: With all available air defense systems that we have currently and also by electronic warfare.

TWZ: Can you provide more details about what kinds of electronic warfare measures you are using?

KB: Using the chance, the other thing I'd like to say is that we're lacking those systems. So we need more, both of the electronic warfare systems and our air defense systems because the systems that we have, taken together with the systems that are incoming, are still not enough to counter the numbers of air targets that we have to count.

TWZ: Speaking about air defense systems, is Ukraine running low on munitions for those systems given how many have been expended against drones and missiles?

KB: Of course, we are using a lot of those systems. But we're resupplying and also thanks to the assistance of your nation, that is happening. But I'd like to underline once again we need more of these systems. So the air defense and electronic warfare and of course munitions for them, firstly, to provide protection to peaceful cities and the civilian population living there, and the infrastructure that supports them.

TWZ: Are the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missiles Systems, or NASAMS, actually being used in Ukraine right now?

KB: Of course, all the systems that were supplied to us by our allies we are using.

TWZ: But are the NASAMS being used?

KB: As I just said, everything that we've received, we're using immediately.

TWZ: Do the Russians have their own ability to develop and produce loitering munitions?

KB: Yes, at the very beginning of the conflict on the 24th of February and so forth, there were a few cases recorded of the application of a Russian loitering munition called Kub. And also recently there was a case when the creation of another system called Lancet was detected. But those uses [aren't massive] because critical Russian defense industry is unable to secure the production of those weapon systems in enough quantities.

TWZ: How concerned are you about the Iranian short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) - Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar SRBMs capable of striking targets at distances of between 186 and 435 miles - that are coming to Russia? And when do you think those will get there?

KB: I believe that likely that next month we'll see them used here.

TWZ: And how concerned are you about that threat?

KB: It's a serious threat because Iranian missiles, unlike Russian ones, are quite high precision, very high speed and those features have been battle proven.

TWZ: What can you do about that?

KB: All we can rely on is the brilliant work of our air defense troops. And on hopes that our allies will provide us more of those air defense systems to provide coverage.

TWZ: Are you getting any useful help at all from Israelis to defend against Iranian drones or missiles?

KB: I don't have an answer to that question.

TWZ: Do you think the Russians will really shoot down commercial satellites that are going over Ukraine?

KB: As I said Russia is a terrorist state and its activities are no different from any terroristic activities out there.

TWZ: Is it possible? Do you believe it will happen?

KB: Yes it is possible.

TWZ: Do you believe that they will?

KB: As I said, you can anticipate anything from a terrorist.

TWZ: How important is the SpaceX Starlink system, supplied to Ukraine by Elon Musk’s SpaceX since the first days of the Russian invasion?

KB: We're using the Starlink system. They have made life a lot easier on the front lines and we're gladly using them and we're grateful for them.

TWZ: Can you operate without Starlink?

KB: We have the communications systems without Starlink. But the availability of Starlink makes life easier for the units on the front line.

TWZ: Do you believe Starlink will continue to operate in Ukraine?

KB: We hope for that very much and we see no reasons why it should stop.

TWZ: Are you aware of former Afghan troops fighting in Ukraine on behalf of Russia?

KB: We had confirmed information that there are mercenaries fighting for Russia from Afghanistan, from Syria and a few other countries but it doesn't have any strategic impact or meaning.

TWZ: Are you concerned about efforts by Iran and Russia to recruit more former Afghan troops, especially former Afghan Special Operations Forces (SOF)?

KB: You know that in this situation we are in, and considering the numbers of enemy troops that we're dealing with daily, the presence of 100 or 200 of those mercenaries - whatever the training is from anywhere in the world - is irrelevant.

TWZ: What about if it is in the thousands? We were told that Russia and Iran are trying to recruit as many as 5,000 former Afghan SOF troops.

KB: The Russian grouping [in Ukraine] is over 170,000 troops and they’ve mobilized another 220,000. I don't believe that any country across the world is able to provide a quantity of mercenaries that can be somehow compared to this armada we're facing.

TWZ: How does this end? What does victory look like for Ukraine?

KB: It's very simple. At the first stage, we'll reach our borders of 1991 [when Ukraine gained its independence from Russia] And we'll consider that a good sign and a good opportunity to finish the war.

TWZ: When do you think that will happen? When do you think you’ll be able to restore the 1991 borders?

KB: Next year.

TWZ: Roughly what time next year?

KB: Let's not go into the military planning here.

TWZ: Will Vladimir Putin survive? And who could replace him?

KB: It's unlikely that he survives it. And currently, there's active discussions happening in Russia about who'd be there to replace him.

TWZ: Can you provide some names of who might replace him and are they any better than Putin?

KB: I’ll refrain from that yet.

TWZ: Back in November when I first met you, and you laid out pretty much how Russia would attack, you are ahead of the curve in a lot of ways. How difficult was it to convince your leadership that Russia was going to attack?

KB: I'll provide you with the following answer due to the fact that today it's the ninth month of this war since its beginning and Ukraine is still standing. It means we have been successful doing that.

TWZ: What is the sentiment of the Russian people in terms of support for this war? How long will the Russian people support this war? And is there any real resistance in Russia?

KB: The Russian Federation population will continue to support the government and its actions until the very defeat of the Russian Federation. And when Russia loses they will immediately start saying that they have nothing to do with this [and] that their leaders were wrong.

TWZ: Do you think that there's any real chance that there'll be an effort to overthrow Putin?

KB: Not now, but as soon as Russia suffers defeat, this will happen really fast.

TWZ: And then what?

KB: Then the Russian Federation will change its form.

TWZ: Do you think that there's anybody behind Putin that's going to be any better in terms of Ukraine’s future and really the future with the West?

KB: I don't believe Russians at all. I don't believe that there's any good person behind him but whoever comes to power will surely blame Putin for all the bad that was done.

TWZ: The midterm election are coming up in the U.S. on Nov. 8. Are you concerned that the flow of support for Ukraine might get cut off or slow down if the Republicans take control of Congress, as some have suggested?

KB: I very much hope that after elections in the U.S. that the support that is coming to Ukraine from the U.S. will only grow. And excuse me, we are running out of time. Thank you for this interview and for the chance to thank the U.S. and also the wide world for the assistance that is providing to Ukraine.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · October 28, 2022


2. Somalia's president says at least 100 killed in car bombings


Excerpts:

It was not immediately clear how vehicles loaded with explosives again made it to the high-profile location in Mogadishu, a city thick with checkpoints and constantly on alert for attacks.
The United States has described al-Shabab as one of al-Qaida’s deadliest organizations and targeted it with scores of airstrikes in recent years. Hundreds of U.S. military personnel have returned to the country after former President Donald Trump withdrew them.


Somalia's president says at least 100 killed in car bombings

AP · by OMAR FARUK · October 30, 2022

MOGADISHU, Somalia (AP) — Somalia’s president says at least 100 people were killed in Saturday’s two car bombings at a busy junction in the capital and the toll could rise in the country’s deadliest attack since a truck bombing at the same spot five years ago killed more than 500.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, at the site of the explosions in Mogadishu, told journalists that nearly 300 other people were wounded. “We ask our international partners and Muslims around the world to send their medical doctors here since we can’t send all the victims outside the country for treatment,” he said.

The al-Qaida-linked al-Shabab extremist group, which often targets the capital and controls large parts of the country, claimed responsibility, saying it targeted the education ministry. It claimed the ministry was an “enemy base” that receives support from non-Muslim countries and “is committed to removing Somali children from the Islamic faith.”

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Al-Shabab usually doesn’t make claims of responsibility when large numbers of civilians are killed, as in the 2017 blast, but it has been angered by a high-profile new offensive by the government that also aims to shut down its financial network. The group said it is committed to fighting until the country is ruled by Islamic law, and it asked civilians to stay away from government areas.

Al-Qaida

Two explosions rock Somalia's capital, killing at least 30

Pakistan: Oldest prisoner freed from Guantanamo, back home

Mali accuses France of `duplicitous acts' which it denies

US hits al-Shabab finance facilitators with sanctions

Somalia’s president, elected this year, said the country remained at war with al-Shabab “and we are winning.”

The attack in Mogadishu occurred on a day when the president, prime minister and other senior officials were meeting to discuss expanded efforts to combat violent extremism and especially al-Shabab. The extremists, who seek an Islamic state, have responded to the offensive by killing prominent clan leaders in an apparent effort to dissuade grassroots support.

The attack has overwhelmed first responders in Somalia, which has one of the world’s weakest health systems after decades of conflict. At hospitals and elsewhere, frantic relatives peeked under plastic sheeting and into body bags, looking for loved ones.

Halima Duwane was searching for her uncle, Abdullahi Jama. “We don’t know whether he is dead or alive but the last time we communicated he was around here,” she said, crying.

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Witnesses to the attack were stunned. “I couldn’t count the bodies on the ground due to the (number of) fatalities,” witness Abdirazak Hassan said. He said the first blast hit the perimeter wall of the education ministry, where street vendors and money changers were located.

An Associated Press journalist at the scene said the second blast occurred in front of a busy restaurant during lunchtime. The blasts demolished tuk-tuks and other vehicles in an area of many restaurants and hotels.

The Somali Journalists Syndicate, citing colleagues and police, said one journalist was killed and two others wounded by the second blast while rushing to the scene of the first. The Aamin ambulance service said the second blast destroyed one of its responding vehicles.

It was not immediately clear how vehicles loaded with explosives again made it to the high-profile location in Mogadishu, a city thick with checkpoints and constantly on alert for attacks.

The United States has described al-Shabab as one of al-Qaida’s deadliest organizations and targeted it with scores of airstrikes in recent years. Hundreds of U.S. military personnel have returned to the country after former President Donald Trump withdrew them.

AP · by OMAR FARUK · October 30, 2022


3. He Lifeng: China's expected new economic tsar has big shoes to fill


Excerpts:

He Lifeng, a home-groomed economist and bureaucrat with close Xi ties, had worked for 25 years in Fujian province before moving to the northern municipality of Tianjin in 2009. His track record suggests he is likely to favour a more statist approach to economic management, Evans-Pritchard said.
Serving under Xi in Fujian in the 1980s, He attended Xi's wedding ceremony when he married his second wife, the popular singer Peng Liyuan, sources have said.
In 2014, He was named vice head at the National Development and Reform Commission - the state planning agency - before taking full control in 2017. Since then He has joined Xi on domestic tours, diplomatic meetings and other engagements.
The expected departure of pro-reform officials, including Liu, top banking regulator Guo Shuqing and central bank chief Yi Gang, has raised concerns over the quality of policymaking as officials become increasingly focused on displays of loyalty to Xi and less on governance and economic performance.
"The chance of making policy mistakes will be greater if officials only talk about politics and do not follow economic rules," a policy source said, speaking on condition of anonymity.



He Lifeng: China's expected new economic tsar has big shoes to fill

Reuters · by Kevin Yao

BEIJING, Oct 30 (Reuters) - He Lifeng, head of China's state planning agency, is likely to succeed the country's economic tsar Vice Premier Liu He in March, but may struggle to maintain his predecessor's policy clout.

He, 67, a confidant of President Xi Jinping, was elevated to the ruling Communist Party's Politburo during its once-every-five-years congress this month. That paves the way for He's expected promotion as the 70-year-old Liu is due to step down in March.

The top priority for He will be to help Li Qiang - another Xi ally, tipped to become the new Premier in March - to pull the world's second-largest economy out of its worst downturn in decades amid disruptive COVID-19 curbs and a prolonged property crisis.

The departing Liu, Xi's top economic adviser and a childhood friend, holds an unusually powerful portfolio: it covers economic policy, the financial sector and trade ties with Washington, overshadowing the role of outgoing Premier Li Keqiang.

Xi, who secured a precedent-breaking third term as president at the party conclave, may want to restore some of the premiership's previous power under the incoming Li Qiang. Some analysts say part of the expanded role that Liu built up during his time as economic tsar could be taken over by other top officials.

"If He Lifeng does indeed get the job, his portfolio will overlap with that of the new Premier, Li Qiang," Julian Evans-Pritchard at Capital Economics said in a note. "It remains to be seen who will have more influence in practice."

Liu, who has been vice premier since 2018, is seen by China watchers as the brains behind earlier reforms, including those to reduce excess factory capacity and financial risks. The Harvard-trained economist was also Xi's point person on trade negotiations with Washington, thanks to his international experience and fluent English.

He Lifeng, a home-groomed economist and bureaucrat with close Xi ties, had worked for 25 years in Fujian province before moving to the northern municipality of Tianjin in 2009. His track record suggests he is likely to favour a more statist approach to economic management, Evans-Pritchard said.

Serving under Xi in Fujian in the 1980s, He attended Xi's wedding ceremony when he married his second wife, the popular singer Peng Liyuan, sources have said.

In 2014, He was named vice head at the National Development and Reform Commission - the state planning agency - before taking full control in 2017. Since then He has joined Xi on domestic tours, diplomatic meetings and other engagements.

The expected departure of pro-reform officials, including Liu, top banking regulator Guo Shuqing and central bank chief Yi Gang, has raised concerns over the quality of policymaking as officials become increasingly focused on displays of loyalty to Xi and less on governance and economic performance.

"The chance of making policy mistakes will be greater if officials only talk about politics and do not follow economic rules," a policy source said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Reporting by Kevin Yao; Editing by Kenneth Maxwell

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Kevin Yao


4. Ukraine Unleashes Mass Kamikaze Drone Boat Attack On Russia's Black Sea Fleet Headquarters




Ukraine Unleashes Mass Kamikaze Drone Boat Attack On Russia's Black Sea Fleet Headquarters

Russia says Ukrainian aerial drones and unmanned surface vessels targeted the home of its Black Sea Fleet, damaging at least a minesweeper.

BY

HOWARD ALTMANSTETSON PAYNETYLER ROGOWAY

|

PUBLISHED OCT 29, 2022 12:55 PM

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman, Stetson Payne, Tyler Rogoway · October 29, 2022

The largest city in Crimea and the home of Russia's Black Sea Fleet woke up to heavy explosions and anti-aircraft fire during an attack Russian officials say included aerial drones and especially unmanned surface vessels (USV), both of which were 'suicide' or 'kamikaze' types mean to explode when they arrive at their targets.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces have since released incredible footage purportedly from aboard several unmanned surface vessels used in the attack. The video shows the purported attack run on a guided missile frigate and Russian forces engaging the USVs with machine-gun fire.

The USVs appear to be of the same design as the mystery drone boat found near Sevastopol in September.

The mysterious unmanned surface vessel that washed ashore in Crimea in early September. At the time, The War Zone's analysis stated the very low profile jet-ski engine-powerd unmanned boat was a weaponized 'suicide drone' setup for impact detonation.

Russian officials claimed that only one vessel was slightly damaged while all Ukrainian aerial drones were destroyed and that "British specialists" were involved, without offering any proof. Russian-installed officials in occupied Crimea call it "the most massive since the beginning of the special operation."

The low-light footage clearly shows a Project 11356R Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate — one of Russia's most modern and powerful warships — underway, as well as Sevastopol harbor. There are reports that the Admiral Makarov, reportedly the Black Sea Fleet's new flagship after the Project 1164 Slava-class cruiser Moskva sank in April, was damaged in the attack. At this time, The War Zone cannot independently confirm reports about damage to the Admiral Makarov, though the low-light footage from the USV appears to show it getting very close to the missile frigate before cutting to other video of the harbor and an explosion on CCTV.

Ukrainian officials previously claimed in May that the Admiral Makarov sank like the Moskva after being hit by Ukrainian anti-ship missiles, though this was later debunked.

Another video released appears to corroborate separate footage that showed a Russian Mi-8'Hip' helicopter engaging a target off the coast. The USV is moving pretty quickly through the waves and heavy machine-gun fire, at one point only barely missing a small harbor patrol boat before a distant CCTV camera shows its likely demise out at sea.

Video from Sevastopol showed several explosions both in the water and near the port itself, and the Russian Ministry of Defense has since confirmed the minesweeper Ivan Golubets, a Black Sea Fleet Project 266M Natya-class, was damaged.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) said Ukraine launched an attack against its Black Sea fleet at 4:20 a.m. “with the participation of British specialists,” slightly damaging one vessel and a boom net, according to its Telegram channel.

The Russian MOD offered no proof to back up its claims.

The British Ministry of Defense (MOD) said Russia was "peddling false claims of an epic scale," without specifically mentioning the Sevastopol attack claims. We have reached out to the British MOD for clarification and will update this story with any information we receive.

“The attack involved nine unmanned aerial vehicles and seven autonomous maritime drones,” the Russian MOD said. “The prompt measures taken by the forces of the Black Sea Fleet destroyed all air targets.”

During the attack, on the outer roadstead of Sevastopol, “four marine unmanned vehicles were annihilated by shipborne weapons and maritime aviation of the Black Sea Fleet, and three more were destroyed on the inner roadstead,” according to the Russian MOD.

“Minor damage was received by the sea minesweeper Ivan Golubets as well as the floating net boom in Yuzhnaya Bay.”

The Russian MOD said Russia “suspends its participation in the implementation of the agreements on the export of agricultural products from Ukraine.”

Russia claims they made the decision because of the “terrorism committed by the Kiev regime with the participation of British specialists” today “against the ships of the Black Sea Fleet and civil vessels involved in the security of the grain corridor.”

The Russian MOD said “the training of military personnel of 73rd Marine Special Operations Center were carried out under supervision of British specialists in the city of Ochakov, Nikolayev region in Ukraine.”

A month ago, The War Zone specifically highlighted how Russia had upped its security leading into Sevastopol's harbor likely due to the threat of unmanned surface vessel attacks.

The attack was “the most massive since the beginning of the special operation,” according to RIA Novosti, citing Crimean occupation authorities.

In the wake of the attack, Crimean occupation authorities ordered city surveillance cameras and video streams from them will be closed to civilians, according to RIA Novosti. Security services, he said, “will deal with the already published video fragments that make it possible to detect the city's defense systems,” RIA Novosti reported.

As we predicted at the time, a drone attack on Sevastopol's Black Sea Fleet headquarters over the summer proved an incredible harbinger of the war's next chapter. Ukraine has used improvised unmanned systems – primarily its so-called 'Alibaba drones' — to attack beyond its current territorial bounds and even into Russia proper. The introduction of unmanned drone ships configured as anti-ship weapons is an extension of these tactics. Russia's use en-masse of Iranian kamikaze drones against Ukrainian infrastructure in the last two months, as well as Ukraine increasing its own kamikaze drone operations in an attempt to strike back, has further evolved at least one major facet of conflict into a drone war of sorts.

We will continue to update this post throughout the day as more information comes available.

Contact the editor: Tyler@thedrive.com

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman, Stetson Payne, Tyler Rogoway · October 29, 2022


5. Russia Now Has a Second Frontline Set Up Just to Kill Its Deserters: Intel


It is still a "Red Army."


“It takes a brave man to be a coward in the Red Army.”

-- Joseph Stalin



Russia Now Has a Second Frontline Set Up Just to Kill Its Deserters: Intel

DON’T TURN BACK

Russian soldier on leaked call said: “If someone runs back, we snuff them out.”


Allison Quinn

News Editor

Published Oct. 27, 2022 8:34AM ET 

The Daily Beast · October 27, 2022

AFP via Getty

Russian’s Vladimir Putin sparked the wrath of his own people by drafting hundreds of thousands to join the war against Ukraine, and now it seems some of those men were sent not to fight the so-called “enemy” but to “snuff out” any of the Russian troops who dare to retreat.

Ukrainian intelligence on Thursday released an audio recording that appears to capture in disturbing detail the mayhem and internal rifts between Russian troops on the battlefield. In the five-minute clip, described as an intercepted phone conversation between a Russian soldier and his wife, the man says he and the other men in his unit are a comfortable distance from the actual fighting.

“They moved us back to the second line, there’s shooting somewhere ahead of us, but we’re back here for now in the trenches,” he says, before boasting that he’d been lucky and found a “Rosneft jacket covered in blood, but warm.”

“They brought the inmates here... from prison. But they led them somewhere way up front. And we’re sitting here as a retreat-blocking detachment, fuck. If someone runs back, we snuff them out.”

“What a nightmare,” his wife says.

“That’s how we have it set up. We sit on the second line, guarding the first. Behind us, there’s another line. If you go that way, you also won’t make it. So it’s impossible to run away. They shoot their own.”

“If someone goes [that way], you need to wipe him out,” he said.

While both the purported soldier and his wife suggested they’d tried to complain about conditions with appeals to an unspecified “committee,” the man seemed convinced any kind of outcry would be futile, noting that Russian defense officials had cleverly listed him and other men in his unit as being “in training” and not on the battlefield.

It was not clear where exactly the soldier was based. But there have been myriad reports of Russian commanders threatening to execute any of their own men who try to ditch the war. A Moscow resident who was called up under Putin’s draft last month said Colonel General Alexander Lapin had personally pulled out a pistol and held it to the head of a commander overseeing drafted troops who’d retreated in Luhansk, threatening to shoot if the unit did not return to the frontline, Sota reported Wednesday.

And amid a humiliating retreat from northern Kharkiv last month, a volunteer fighting for Ukraine in the region who spoke to The Daily Beast on the condition of anonymity said his fellow volunteers and Ukrainian troops had found several dead Russian commanders with gunshot wounds to the back of their heads after top Russian military brass gave an order to gun down any fleeing troops.

While Russia has bolstered forces with thousands of newly drafted soldiers and prison inmates recruited by the Wagner Group, it would seem those reinforcements have only added to the dysfunction among the ranks.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported earlier this month that Russian inmates freed from prison to fight regularly “leave their units and try to return to Russian territory” after receiving their weapons. While the inmates are enticed by promises of a pardon, Putin crony Yevgeny Prighozin, the man behind the Wagner Group's prisoner-recruitment scheme, is said to have privately told the Russian president that “for the majority of inmates joining Wagner, it’s not a reprieve but a death sentence,” according to Yellow Folder, a Telegram channel ostensibly run by former members of Russia’s Federal Protective Services.

And in occupied Donetsk, Putin’s troops appear to be hard at work battling each other. A man identified by Ukrainian intelligence as a Russian soldier was caught calling his mother to tell her how another soldier sent with “reinforcements” was tied up and held for ransom by fighters for the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic.

“He went into the city, basically, for moonshine… The commandants bashed him over the head and locked him in a basement. They sent photos [of him] to his... mother-in-law and wife. Tied him up basically and demanded money, as if he were a captive.”

“Good God! They thought he was Ukrainian, right?” his mother asked.

“They didn’t think anything,” he said, adding: “It’s fun here with us.”

The Daily Beast · October 27, 2022



6. Is Iran facing a revolutionary moment?


Will the revolution be successful? What does success look like? What happens next if it is "successful?"

Is Iran facing a revolutionary moment?

Facing a wave of public anger, Iran’s regime could be in a fight for its long-term survival, experts say

Analysis: The protests in Iran transcend class or geography, and show no sign of abating.

NBC News · by Dan De Luce · October 29, 2022

Every night in Tehran, when the clock strikes nine, Iranians take to apartment rooftops and windows, and their voices echo across the city.

“Death to the dictator!” they shout, along with the slogan that has become the rallying cry of more than a month of protests, “Woman, Life, Freedom!”

“We chant every night from behind the window with the lights off, so we can’t get recognized or shot” by the police in the streets below, said one Iranian woman, who spoke on condition of anonymity to protect her safety.

The same chants can be heard in daily protests in cities and towns across the country, a wave of public anger that only seems to gain momentum even in the face of a violent crackdown by heavily armed security and paramilitary forces.

Tehran's rooftops.Thomas Janisch / Getty Images

Since the protests erupted in mid-September after a 22-year-old woman, Mahsa Amini, died in the custody of the country’s morality police for allegedly failing to comply with a law requiring women to cover their hair, Iran’s clerical regime has struggled to contain a movement that keeps spreading and growing.

Every day seems to bring another humiliation for the regime.

From anti-government graffiti to students heckling government officials, to women walking in the street without headscarves to workers putting down their tools, Iran’s regime looks increasingly bewildered by events.

Historians who study Iran, human rights activists, political analysts, U.S. officials and Iranians on the ground all say the protests represent a potentially revolutionary moment, and that Iranian citizens are increasingly ready to risk their lives for the cause.

“It’s like a war, the Islamic Republic versus the Iranian people,” said the woman from Tehran. She and other Iranians say the helmeted police flooding the streets resemble an occupying force, unsure of their position and unable to trust the local population.

There have been major protests before, but the protests this time are different, Iranians say, because the movement transcends class and geography, and the demands are explicitly political, calling for an end to the regime and not reforms or higher wages.

Students protest outside a university in the city of Mashhad, Iran, on Oct. 1.via AFP - Getty Images

“Every protest we’ve seen before has been limited geographically, or social-economically or related to a particular grievance,” said Hadi Ghaemi of the New York-based Center for Human Rights in Iran.

The “Green movement” protests of 2009 focused on an election that demonstrators believed was rigged and lasted months, but the movement was dominated by mostly educated, more affluent people in Tehran. Protests in 2019 were shaped by economic hardship and the frustrations of the working class, Ghaemi said.

“This is different. It seems to have touched every Iranian, in every corner of the country,” he said.

The protests have no formal leadership or opposition leader, making it difficult for the regime to cut off oxygen to the movement.

The protest are often smaller scale than the mass demonstrations of the past in major cities, but they are more numerous and dispersed across rural as well as urban areas. The security forces have to put down constant pockets of defiance in well-organized neighborhoods where the locals know where to hide and how to outmaneuver the police, human rights groups and Iranians said.

The demonstrators have even set up separate medical care for injured protesters in private homes to try to bypass official clinics, said Ramin Ahmadi, an Iranian-American physician based in the U.S. who is a longtime human rights activist.


Powerful images as crowds in Iran travel to grave of Mahsa Amini

Oct. 27, 202202:18

“They don’t even go to the hospital when they get injured. There is a whole network of physicians now that they have and they treat them at home,“ said Ahmadi, who has provided medical advice by phone to the doctors treating the protesters.

But the regime has shown it is ready to unleash lethal force to stifle the protests, using live ammunition, buckshot, pellets, rubber bullets, tear gas and batons to roll back the demonstrators, according to human rights groups. Thousands of people have been arrested, including civil society and labor leaders, the rights groups say, and an unknown number have been killed by bullets or beatings.

The Norway-based group Iran Human Rights and the U.S.-based Human Rights Activists News Agency said Friday more than 250 protesters have been killed in the six weeks since protests began. The death toll includes more than 20 protesters under the age of 18, according to Amnesty International. Iranian authorities last month put the death toll at that point at 41 people, including security officers.

The regime has survived street protests before, by using violence, imprisonment and censorship to silence dissent. And the government still retains support among a significant section of the population, especially those with ties to the state’s bureaucracy.

The country’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has the final word in Iran’s theocratic system, has dismissed the protests as “scattered riots” orchestrated by Iran’s enemies.

But the protests represent the most serious challenge to the theocracy since the 1979 revolution and its aftermath, and could mark the start of an unraveling of the regime — though that process could take months or years to play out, experts and U.S. officials said.

Demonstrators gather around a burning barricade during a protest for Mahsa Amini, in Tehran on Sept. 19.AFP - Getty Images

“There’s an increasing separation between state and society, and it’s widening under (Iranian President) Raisi’s administration,” a senior Biden administration official told NBC News.

The official said that “you have an erosion of the legitimacy of the system, that’s basically hanging on by threats of force.”

He added that “nobody can say for certain how this will unfold.”

Roya Hakakian, an Iranian-American writer who recently met with Biden administration officials along with other activists, said the protests were the start of a revolution “about democracy in its purest form — the desire for a normal life.”

“The cultural foundation is there and the shift from theocratic thinking to democratic thinking has already occurred, but when and how they will pragmatically succeed is a matter of time and the confluence of other forces,“ she said.

Students at a school in Shiraz chanting “Basiji, go and get lost!” towards a man standing at the podium.Twitter

Despite the increasingly violent crackdown, Iranians — especially women — keep coming back to protest. The fear that tended to discourage open defiance of the regime has begun to dissolve, said Abbas Milani of the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University.

“The fear is dissipating, because I think people are recognizing that from their large numbers, they’re not alone,” Milani said.

Seven years ago, Milani wrote that underneath a facade of normality, while most of the world focused on Iran’s nuclear program, Iranian society was shifting away from the ultra-conservative ideology promoted by the regime, and that its leaders were sitting atop a “seething volcano.”

“The trend line is that this regime is becoming increasingly isolated, increasingly misogynist, increasingly incompetent, increasingly corrupt, and Iranian society is becoming increasingly democratic, increasingly secular, and increasingly desiring an economic future that doesn’t exist,” Milani said. “That cannot continue.”

The Iranian government could decide to deploy even more lethal force to try to snuff out the protests, but there’s a risk such all-out violence — especially against young women — could backfire, and trigger a massive reaction on the streets, he said.


Iranian American women speak out about protests

Oct. 21, 202202:31

“I think we are at the beginning of a process. Iran has been in a revolutionary moment for some time, it needed a spark, we have to see where this will head,” said Ali Ansari, an Iran scholar at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. “But even if this subsides it won’t be long before the next wave begins.”

For Iranians in the streets, there is a feeling they have the regime on the backfoot, but that there is still terrible bloodshed to come.

“We all know that this time we will overthrow the regime,” said the woman in Tehran. “But at what cost? How many people should get killed?”


NBC News · by Dan De Luce · October 29, 2022


7. The Art of Hitting Disinformation Where It Lives


Some important points to consider in this piece. Note the conclusion. However I would also argue we need to spend less time countering disinformation and more time on transmitting superior messages in both words and deeds.  Actions speak louder than words. (Of course we must also recognize the propaganda of the deed: "Propaganda of the deed (or propaganda by the deed, from the French propagande par le fait) is specific political direct action meant to be exemplary to others and serve as a catalyst for revolution.:)


"We don’t need military minds; we need creative minds."


Maybe so, but I know there are a lot of military personnel working in the PSYOP community who have the creative minds we need. Unfortunately we fail to properly employ them and instead use amateurs and contractors.


Excerpts:


But beyond documenting and archiving and debunking disinformation, what can be done? How do we respond to this emergent property, an artistic movement born of the digital age?
The knottiest problem in disinformation theory is Brandolini’s Law: “the amount of energy needed to refute bullshit is an order of magnitude larger than to produce it.” But you cannot “refute” an art form at all. To try is to fail.
Art asks uncomfortable questions and sparks difficult discussions. Adversaries of disinformation must take the same approach by entering into the field as artists. We need to think creatively about solving problems and have tough debates in the open: Are we willing to bend a few rules, break others, subvert some more? Do the ends justify the means?
At this level, we need less policy thinking and more design. We don’t need military minds; we need creative minds. Tamers, Larpers, musicians, comedians, painters, filmmakers, dreamers, activists, and so many more must join forces with the other missing link—psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists.
...
Ceding control to artists outside of warfare is a complex political strategy—the relationship may become strained when creators start criticizing the government. But giving artists license, backing, and no-strings-attached support is the only way any government is going to succeed in fighting a problem as amorphous as digital disinformation.
It is not just a solution to disinformation, it is likely the only solution we have right now. Tech approaches have failed, and there’s no incentive for that to change. The laws have failed, and it’s likely they will never be able to keep up. Cold facts fail because they don’t speak to the soul. If artists have caused this problem, then it’s up to artists to solve it.


The Art of Hitting Disinformation Where It Lives

Combating fake news with facts doesn't work because humans are wired for emotion. It's time for more creative tactics.

Wired · by Condé Nast · October 28, 2022

Digital disinformation is now a well-documented problem, but extensive documentation could actually be the downfall of the counter-disinformation movement. Data means nothing if you don’t do anything effective with it.

The situation becomes even worse as people tie themselves into knots deciding whether something is fake news or misinformation or disinformation or malinformation or conspiracy theory or trolling. “Disinformation” is sufficient to capture the whole landscape, and some of the other labels were invented by social media companies as a smokescreen to make their inaction seem less egregious.

The disinformers themselves certainly don’t care what their work is called. Crucially, their audiences don’t sit there categorizing it either, and the effect on audiences is what matters. It’s difficult to care about semantics when people die because they didn’t take a vaccine or storm a pizza parlor because they believe the Democrats are hiding children there.

Counter-disinformation efforts are often too far removed from the everyday reality of those affected, which is to say everyone online. Those of us working in the field document disinformation so that policymakers take note and, if we’re lucky, pass laws. We archive so that prosecutors take on the (thankfully increasing) legal cases that are starting to crop up. We report so that social media companies are pressured to change their policies. This process of meticulous documentation and advocacy may be best described as the scientific method, and it has been hugely effective in countering state-sponsored influence operations at a grand scale, as we at Centre for Information Resilience have been able to do through our Eyes on Russia project.

But in the online battleground for attention, this approach does not work on its own. The best-in-class purveyors of disinformation create a simulacrum of reality, where they are able to convince an audience that someone—something—else is the problem. Campaigns can exploit a kernel of truth to further the creator’s goals (be they political, financial, or personal), while others are nothing short of digital Dadaism.

QAnon is perhaps the poster child for this, though there are millions more examples, ranging from largely harmless to world-shattering. Some of the biggest conspiracies in recent years: Bill Gates is microchipping people with vaccines to depopulate the earth. The Democrats run a satanic pedophile ring. Ukraine’s Jewish president is actually a Nazi. The people who crafted these stories, and who designed the content that reached millions and continues to spread to this day, are creators par excellence. These narratives are all patently nonsense, and while they can be disproved, any efforts to do so apparently confirm their validity to target audiences. We have to respect the skill of the deceiver, the art of their deceit.

These creators understand that we are a species of storytellers, not rational actors. To speak to our irrationality, and tell these stories, they adopt an approach that has been tried and tested throughout history.

Like all good artists, disinformers either ignore the rules or actively subvert them, smashing past any considerations their counterparts in counter-disinformation have to abide by, from the philosophical (free will, deception, impersonation) to the technical (GDPR, social media guidelines, fair use software policies). The scientific model is right for so much, but not for this, at least not on its own. It’s not that the field is uneven, it’s just not the same field.

But beyond documenting and archiving and debunking disinformation, what can be done? How do we respond to this emergent property, an artistic movement born of the digital age?

The knottiest problem in disinformation theory is Brandolini’s Law: “the amount of energy needed to refute bullshit is an order of magnitude larger than to produce it.” But you cannot “refute” an art form at all. To try is to fail.

Art asks uncomfortable questions and sparks difficult discussions. Adversaries of disinformation must take the same approach by entering into the field as artists. We need to think creatively about solving problems and have tough debates in the open: Are we willing to bend a few rules, break others, subvert some more? Do the ends justify the means?

At this level, we need less policy thinking and more design. We don’t need military minds; we need creative minds. Tamers, Larpers, musicians, comedians, painters, filmmakers, dreamers, activists, and so many more must join forces with the other missing link—psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists.

The scientific model has been hugely democratized by the internet, with amateur activists passionately beavering away in their spare time to geolocate, chronolocate, and track Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine. We need to do the same for digital disinformation. Like any art, there will always be some creators who get paid or are institutionally sanctioned, but the most innovative, the edgiest success stories are likely to come from enthusiastic amateurs who do it because it is their passion.

Amateur artists don’t have to adhere to the decorum required of those who take on more formal government work. If they are edgelords, so be it. They can go after the disinformation artists with clever, funny methods those under contract can’t employ. Free agents may be guided and mentored by people like myself, but they will always outstrip me in creativity.

We are seeing green shoots of innovation through major events like the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Some of the best counters to Kremlin disinformation have been through the likes of the Ukrainian Memes Forces, whose recent art includes a fake Pornhub page. The page features a video of the Kersch bridge bombing with the tag “Former KGB officer received an unexpected birthday present on the bridge.” Other content they’ve produced includes “disturbing facts by Skeletor” about Russia’s invasion and a portrayal of Russia as Pennywise the Clown. Governments would never sign off on these, and yet they don’t just blunt the Kremlin’s information warfare, they cut it to the bone.

The Ukrainian government—famously run by younger comedians and artists—might not get to commission these efforts, but officials are very happy to promote the content through state channels. They understand that digital disinformation is memetic, psychological, and emotional, and that government is none of those things.

Ceding control to artists outside of warfare is a complex political strategy—the relationship may become strained when creators start criticizing the government. But giving artists license, backing, and no-strings-attached support is the only way any government is going to succeed in fighting a problem as amorphous as digital disinformation.

It is not just a solution to disinformation, it is likely the only solution we have right now. Tech approaches have failed, and there’s no incentive for that to change. The laws have failed, and it’s likely they will never be able to keep up. Cold facts fail because they don’t speak to the soul. If artists have caused this problem, then it’s up to artists to solve it.

Wired · by Condé Nast · October 28, 2022


8. Is attacking the electricity infrastructure used by civilians always a war crime?


In depth analysis from Maj Gen (RET) Charles Dunlap who is an expert on the law of war.


Is attacking the electricity infrastructure used by civilians always a war crime?

sites.duke.edu · by Charlie Dunlap, J.D. · October 27, 2022

Since Russia’s grotesquely illegal invasion of Ukraine last February, experts have detailed the failures, incompetence, and savagery of its military. In that context, consider this disturbing new report from CNBC:

Since Oct. 10, Russia has launched a series of devastating salvos at Ukraine’s power infrastructure, which have hit at least half of its thermal power generation and up to 40% of the entire system.

President Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Union (EU), immediately charged that “Russia’s attacks against civilian infrastructure, especially electricity, are war crimes.

Let’s readily acknowledge Russia’s horrifying criminality in this war, but let’s also step back and analyze specifics as it is important that we understand exactly how the law of armed conflict (LOAC) applies in this instance.

Why? While we must support Ukraine in this profoundly unjust war being waged against them, we also need to be wary of seeming to establish new legal interpretations and precedents that might handicap U.S. and allied forces in a future conflict against another shamefully malevolent yet powerful adversary. Sadly, we should never forget that “” even if waged justly and lawfully.

This brings us to the question for today: Is attacking the electricity infrastructure used by civilians always a war crime as the EU president appears to suggest? Actually, an attack against infrastructure used by civilians might be a war crime, but not necessarily. As we’ll see, LOAC does permit attacks on infrastructure but only if certain prerequisites are observed.

We’ll explore whether those legal requirements were met with respect to the recent Russian attacks. This really is a post where you need to observe Lawfire’s mantra: gather the facts, examine the law, evaluate the arguments – and then decide for yourself!

Distinguishing “jus ad bellum” and “jus in bello”

Before diving into today’s question, allow me to emphasize something I’ve said in a previous post: there isn’t any moral equivalency between Ukraine and Russia in this conflict; Ukraine is clearly the victim of horrific aggression by Russia – a stunning violation of jus ad bellum (the law governing resort to war).

However, keep in mind that a different body of law – jus in bello – governs the lawfulness of belligerent activity during the war. It is important to keep these two legal regimes separate. As the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) explains:

[LOAC] applies to the belligerent parties irrespective of the reasons for the conflict or the justness of the causes for which they are fighting. If it were otherwise, implementing the law would be impossible, since every party would claim to be a victim of aggression. Moreover, IHL is intended to protect victims of armed conflicts regardless of party affiliation. That is why jus in bello must remain independent of jus ad bellum.

Accordingly, a Russian violation of jus ad bellum—however egregious—doesn’t mean every act in bello by Russian forces is a war crime. Conversely, simply because Ukraine was unlawfully attacked doesn’t mean LOAC would not apply to its in bello activities. In short, both sides could commit war crimes during the conflict irrespective of the reasons for the war in the first place.

With that in mind, let’s unpack the legality (or not) of these attacks.

Can the electrical power system used by civilians be a lawful “military objective”?

Perhaps the most primary of all the LOAC rules is the principle of distinction, that is, the prohibition on directing attacks against civilians or civilian objects. That said, an object may be civilian-owned and used by civilians yet still be directly attacked as a lawful target under certain circumstances.

What are those circumstances? As a threshold matter, the object must be shown to be a military objective. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Law of War Manual (DoD LoW Manual) defines military objectives this way (¶5.6.3):

Military objectives, insofar as objects are concerned, include “any object which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”

Can a civilian-owned and operated electrical system qualify as a military objective? The DoD LoW Manual (¶ 5.6.8.5) says:

Electric power stations are generally recognized to be of sufficient importance to a State’s capacity to meet its wartime needs of communication, transport, and industry so as usually to qualify as military objectives during armed conflicts. (Emphasis added.)

Indeed, attacks on electrical systems have long been a part of modern war. As one commentator put it, “electrical systems have been a favorite target of air attacks since the 1930s.”

There is history of attacks on electrical infrastructure in the Russo-Ukraine conflict. In 2015 Ukrainian nationalists opposed to Russia’s occupation of Crimea were allegedly responsible for an attack which blew up pylons carrying electrical power to the peninsula leaving nearly two million Crimeans in darkness.

Still, is there evidence that Ukraine’s electrical system in this instance is of sufficient importance to qualify as a military objective? Does it make “an effective contribution to military action”? Would its “partial destruction…neutralization” offer “a definite military advantage”? Let’s start by examining the relationship of civilian power sources to military needs.

Do modern militaries really need electricity from the civilian grid?

Typically, yes. For example, a 2020 report by RAND Corporations detailed the dependence of the U.S. military on commercial power sources. It found that:

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) increasingly relies on electric power to accomplish critical missions. As a result, ensuring that forces and facilities have access to a reliable supply of electric power is critical for mission assurance. However, DoD does not directly manage its supply of power; most of the electricity consumed by military installations in the continental United States comes from the commercial grid—a system that is largely outside of DoD control and increasingly vulnerable to both natural hazards and deliberate attacks. (Emphasis added.)

Why this dependence? RAND says:

Increased reliance on intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination; networked real-time communications for command and control; and a proliferation of electronic controls and sensors in military vehicles (such as remotely piloted aircraft), equipment, and facilities have greatly increased the [the U.S. military’s] dependence on energy, particularly electric power, at installations.

The fact that most electricity consumed by DoD installations in the continental United States is drawn from the commercial electric power grid…underscores the significance of DoD’s reliance on that power grid. (Emphasis added.)

There is no reason to think that Ukraine’s military – which emulates the U.S.’ and is fighting on its own territory – is any less dependent on the commercial power grid than America’s armed forces when operating here at home.

Electrical power is also critical to other elements of Ukraine’s defense efforts. For example, experts say the Starlink, a privately-owned system that provides internet service––and is obviously dependent upon electrical power––has

Similarly, electrical power is intrinsic to cyber operations. In this respect, Ukraine has created what is called its “IT Army” of thousands of hackers to conduct cyber-attacks against Russian targets. Wired Magazine says:

The [IT army’s Telegram] channel’s administrators, for instance, asked subscribers to launch distributed denial of service attacks against more than 25 Russian websites. These included Russian infrastructure businesses, such as energy giant Gazprom, the country’s banks, and official government websites. Websites belonging to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Kremlin, and communications regulator Roskomnadzor were also listed as potential targets. Russian news websites followed. (Emphasis added.)

In a September 27th essay, two experts said “Patriotic” hackers “have hit so-called dual-use targets, such as the Russian satellite-based navigation system GLONASS, and purely civilian targets.” (Emphasis added.)

Moreover, the experts said that on “July 28, the IT Army Telegram channel announced that its members would ‘start working on Russian online banking,’ upping its DDoS initiative from targeting just a handful of banks to well over 50, most of which are not currently under Western sanctions.”

Other warfighting activities arising from civilian settings require access to electricity. As further discussed below, ordinary Ukrainian citizens are using cell phones and other civilian devices employing electrical power to assist their military in locating and targeting Russian forces.

An illustration of this is found in a June ABC News story which said a 15-year-old boy “was asked to use his drone to spy on advancing Russian vehicles.”

The boy was quoted as saying he located Russian “fuel trucks, tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers,” and “passed the coordinates to [a Ukrainian civil defense official] who passed them on to the Ukrainian artillery [which] decimated the column of Russian tanks within minutes.”

War-sustaining targets as military objectives

In addition, a civilian enterprise can become, in the U.S.’ controversial (but correct in my opinion) view, a proper military objective if it is “war-sustaining.” Specifically, the DoD LoW Manual says (¶ 5.6.1.2):

It is not necessary that the object provide immediate tactical or operational gains or that the object make an effective contribution to a specific military operation. Rather, the object’s effective contribution to the war-fighting or war-sustaining capability of an opposing force is sufficient. Although terms such as “war-fighting,” “war-supporting,” and “war-sustaining” are not explicitly reflected in the treaty definitions of military objective, the United States has interpreted the military objective definition to include these concepts. (Emphasis added.)

In the case of Ukraine, this may not only include the sizeable domestic military-industrial complex directly producing war goods to sustain fighting, but also, the Washington Post tells us:

The damage halted electricity exports in the region, affecting neighboring countries along Ukraine’s western border. This is also significant because Ukraine relies on the revenue from energy exports to shore up the country’s war-ravaged economy, [an expert] said. (Emphasis added.)

Beyond denying electricity to Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities and eroding war-sustaining industry, the DoD LoW Manual further indicates (¶ 5.12.2) that “diverting enemy forces’ resources and attention” can also constitute a “concrete and direct military advantage” the proportionality principle requires.

In this instance, could it be that the attacks will cause Ukraine to divert “resources and attention” from attacking Russian forces on the frontlines to defending the electrical grid? Consider DoD’s October 26th statement that Ukrainians “need more air defense capabilities” deployed to defend infrastructure.

Moreover, there is substantial historical precedent for the proposition that diverting “resources and attention” to air defense provided a clear “concrete and direct military advantage.” As I said elsewhere, during World War II the U.S.’ strategic air attacks on Germany had such an effect:

The overall bombing campaign – for all its many faults – did have the effect of imposing a huge burden on the Nazis’ ability to wage war. Among other things, they were obliged to divert two million people, 55,000 anti-aircraft guns [and] 20 percent of all ammunition” to the air defense effort. Were it not for the allied air offensive, says historian Richard Overy, Nazi “frontline troops might have had as much as 50 percent more weaponry and supplies.” (Citations omitted.)

Decide for yourself if the electrical grid is a proper “military objective” in this case and, if so, would attacking it yield a “concrete and direct military advantage”?

How is the principle of distinction applied in this instance?

In analyzing the legitimacy of attacking the electrical system that has both civilian and military uses, the DoD LoW Manual observes (¶ 5.6.1.2):

Sometimes, “dual-use” is used to describe objects that are used by both the armed forces and the civilian population, such as power stations or communications facilities. However, from the legal perspective, such objects are either military objectives or they are not; there is no intermediate legal category.

While military objectives may be directly attacked, the principle of distinction still has relevance. For example, although an electrical system may generally be considered a military objective, if part of it serves exclusively civilian areas or purposes, the principle of distinction would require that portion not to be attacked if it is reasonably feasible to segregate it out from the overall strike.

However, many national electrical grids are thoroughly integrated to enhance resilience. This may be the case with Ukraine’s system. According to a Ukrainian energy official, “Since Soviet times, we have built unified energy systems so that if one of the generation flows fails at some part of the system, another one picks it up. That is, everything is looped[,] and we work in a single system.”

The same official says Russia’s “strikes are not aimed at generating facilities to prevent us from producing electricity but at connection systems tied to the Ukrainian energy system [rather] they are aimed at “open switchgears, transformers, switches, so that a station that can produce electricity cannot be connected to the unified power system.”

Decide for yourself: Does that suggest that civilians or civilian objects are being directly targeted (a war crime), or does it indicate it is the military objective (elements of the dual-use electrical system) that is being directly targeted (as permitted by LOAC)?

Regardless, it is difficult to imagine a practical way that any reasonable commander could find a target in this kind of integrated electrical system that would only impact military capabilities.

Moreover, as already indicated above, even electricity flowing to traditionally civilian areas has military implications. In late March, the Washington Post reported:

Increasingly, Ukrainians are confronting an uncomfortable truth: The military’s understandable impulse to defend against Russian attacks could be putting civilians in the crosshairs. Virtually every neighborhood in most cities has become militarized, some more than others, making them potential targets for Russian forces trying to take out Ukrainian defenses. (Emphasis added).

Additionally, other media reports indicate that civilian enterprises that use electricity have been adapted to military uses. For example, Sky News reported in March that “museums, libraries and churches” in Ukrainian cities have been converted into factories to create camouflage netting for the Ukrainian military.

Likewise, Business Insider says that within a few weeks of the Russian invasion, “shops and small factories [have] had popped up inside and outside of Ukraine to convert pickup trucks and SUVs…into battlefield vehicles.”

In June, Wired published an article——that illustrates the sheer difficulty of trying to draw a distinction between civilian electricity users and those using electrical devices for military purposes.

The article points out that a Ukrainian government app was repurposed following the Russian invasion. Writer Lukasz Olejnik explains:

The [app] was once used by more than 18 million Ukrainians for things like digital IDs, but it now allows users to report the movements of invading soldiers through the “e-Enemy” feature. “Anyone can help our army locate Russian troops. Use our chat bot to inform the Armed Forces,” the Ministry of Digital Transformation said of the new capability when it rolled out.

Parenthetically, the ICRC says that is an act that causes a civilian to lose protected status and become lawfully targetable.

Similarly, the DoD LoW Manual (¶ 5.8.3.1) says that “providing or relaying information of immediate use in combat operations” and “acting as a guide or lookout for combatants conducting military operations” are examples of the kind “direct participation in hostilities” that would cause a civilian to lose protection from direct attack.

Decide for yourself: Based on available information, does there appear to be a reasonably feasible way to attack the electrical system, that is, the military objective, in a manner that avoids incidental harm to civilians?

Nonetheless, even if an attack causes only “incidental” harm to civilians, it might still be prohibited if such harm violates LOAC principle of proportionality.

How is the principle of proportionality applied in this instance?

Accordingly, simply because something is a proper military objective doesn’t automatically mean it can be legally attacked. It must still pass the proportionality test. The ICRC says:

Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited. (Emphasis added.)

The DoD LoW Manual similarly makes it clear that the principle of proportionality applies to “dual-use” military objectives like electrical power facilities. Specifically, it says in ¶ 5.6.1.2:

If an object is a military objective, it is not a civilian object and may be made the object of attack. However, it will be appropriate to consider in applying the principle of proportionality the harm to the civilian population that is expected to result from the attack on such a military objective. (Emphasis added; citations omitted).

Some Ukrainian sources indicate as many as 70 civilians were killed in the attacks, but—given the “concrete and direct military advantage” the attacks accomplished (that is, damage to 40% of the electrical system with the warfighting uses described above)—a reasonable military commander might well consider that such losses, while heartbreaking, are nevertheless not “excessive.”

However, the ICRC contends that more than the immediate effects must be considered. Specifically, it says that attackers must take into account “reverberating effects,” which they define as “those effects that are not directly caused by the attack, but are nevertheless a product thereof.”

The ICRC adds that the “incidental destruction of civilian housing and essential civilian infrastructure – which often leads to a disruption of essential services – can result in civilian death and injury that may far outweigh the immediate civilian casualties caused by an attack.”

What complicates this view is the fact that the damage to the power system is not “incidental,” but rather it is the deliberate destruction of a military objective—and the proportionality analysis does not apply to the military objective itself. Nevertheless, there is the issue of harm to civilians.

Harm to civilians

It’s important to understand what is—and isn’t—“harm” that must be considered in the LOAC proportionality analysis. The analysis is principally concerned with injury or loss of life to civilians, or damage or destruction to civilian objects in the actual attack. It does not include even significant interference to commerce, inconvenience, or even hardship imposed upon civilians.

Civilians who were not killed or injured in the actual attack but who may die at some future time because of the loss of electrical power should also be considered in the proportionality calculation, but the scope and extent of that consideration is the subject of debate among some legal scholars. The DoD LoW Manual (¶ 5.12.1.3) sets out the U.S. view:

For example, if the destruction of a power plant would be expected to cause the loss of civilian life or injury to civilians very soon after the attack due to the loss of power at a connected hospital, then such harm should be considered in assessing whether an attack is expected to cause excessive harm.

The DoD LoW Manual further explains (¶ 5.12.1.3):

The expected loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects is generally understood to mean such immediate or direct harms foreseeably resulting from the attack. Remote harms that could result from the attack do not need to be considered in applying this prohibition. (Emphasis added.).

The issue of “remote harms” will be discussed in more detail below, but first let’s review an earlier infrastructure attack.

The Kerch Strait Bridge infrastructure attack analogy

Kerch Strait Bridge (Shutterstock)

The application of the proportionality analysis on a strike against infrastructure in the Russo-Ukraine conflict was discussed in a thoughtful essay by Professors Michael Schmitt and Marco Milanovic. They examined it in the context of the October 8th attack (allegedly by Ukrainians) on the Kerch Strait Bridge that connects Russia with Crimean Peninsula.

Professors Schmitt and Milanovic—both armed with formidable LOAC expertise—conclude, as I do, that notwithstanding its civilian uses, the bridge is properly categorized as a military objective. Indeed, in my view there is no real question that the bridge is such an extremely important logistics link for the Russian military that it easily meets the legal definition of “military objective.”

Professors Schmitt and Milanovic also readily acknowledge “the attack could also have been expected to affect the supply of the civilian population and disrupt civilian activities ranging from personal travel to commercial activities.”

That is a very reasonable conclusion as there are about 2.4 million civilians living in Crimea, and they import from Russia. Indeed, CNN says the Kerch Strait Bridge “is a critical artery for supplying Crimea with both its daily needs and supplies for the military.”

In addition, reports say that the significance of the attack…

…has not been lost on residents of Crimea who, as news spread, rushed to petrol stations to fill up their cars… while there are other ways of supplying the Crimea, including its ports, damage to the bridge is hugely important to a place that until very recently was seen by Russia as being beyond the reach of Ukraine.

However, Professors Schmitt and Milanovic contend that such impacts need not be considered in assessing the proportionality of the attack unless the damage to the bridge would foreseeably cause civilians to get sick or die from starvation. They put their views this way:

[Effects on civilians short of starvation] do not factor into the proportionality analysis, which is limited in the text of the rule itself to loss of life, injury, and damage to civilian objects. Interference as such with the use of a civilian object generally does not qualify as collateral damage unless the foreseeable consequences of that loss include these enumerated effects. This would likely only be the case if the attack caused starvation and sickness, which was unlikely in this case. (Emphasis added.)

Consequently, they conclude – and I agree – that “assuming Ukrainian agents conducted the operation against the Kerch Strait Bridge, the attack was plainly lawful under [LOAC].”

The unsettled law as to indirect/reverberating/remote harms

A somewhat different tone is taken about the Russian attacks on Ukraine’s electrical grid. In a new post, Professor Schmitt says the proportionality analysis includes indirect loss, that is, “those with a causal link to the attack but not immediately caused by it.”

This seems broader than the position the DoD LoW Manual takes. In ¶ 5.12.1.3 it says:

[I]f the destruction of a power plant would be expected to cause the loss of civilian life or injury to civilians very soon after the attack due to the loss of power at a connected hospital, then such harm should be considered in assessing whether an attack is expected to cause excessive harm. (Emphasis and italics added.)

But Professor Schmitt contends that “[w]ith winter approaching, any loss of heating could prove dangerous for the Ukrainian population; foreseeable harm to them would also qualify for the purposes of the rule.”

There is no question that cold weather presents a potentially serious threat to the health of civilians, but the legal issue is whether harm that arises weeks or months after the strikes meets the “very soon” standard to mandate its consideration in the proportionality analysis, or is it a “remote effect” that need not be considered?

Moreover, how likely are the harms? Fortunately, Reuters reports that the Ukrainian weather forecasters are predicting a “relatively mild winter in Ukraine” explaining that “”

On October 19th, former Ukrainian infrastructure minister Volodymyr Omelyan was queried by NPR about the state of the electricity infrastructure, and he said:

Ukrainian electrical substation (Shutterstock)

[W]e still have a lot of reserve lines, which were produced and implemented in previous years. But its limit is also not very high. And we had to stop supply of electricity from Ukraine to European Union – and trying to satisfy our needs right now.

Plus, we also imposed kind of personal limit for each family and Ukrainian just somehow to reduce the impact on the electrical grid in Ukraine. But as of today, I wouldn’t say that it’s critical. (Emphasis added.)

In an October 22nd NPR story, Kyrylo Tymoshenko, an adviser to Ukraine’s president, told them that “Ukraine has the capacity to repair the grid quickly and repeatedly.” This seems accurate so far as the Washington Post reported on Tuesday (Oct 25th) that a Ukrainian power official said “90 percent of Ukrainians have had their power restored within a day of an attack.”

Australian scholars Ian Henderson and Kate Reece grappled with the issue of indirect/reverberating effects in a 2018 law review article. Their research found:

[W]hile a strong argument can be made that military commanders are under a legal obligation to consider the indirect effects of an attack when calculating the expected collateral damage as part of the proportionality assessment, there is no apparent consensus as to the scope of this obligation. (Emphasis added.)

After examining what authorities there are, and noting that none are definitive, they concluded that:

[I]f military commanders expect that indirect harm will eventuate as a result of the attack, that is civilians are likely to be killed or injured, or that civilian objects are likely to be damaged, then that expected collateral damage must be factored into the proportionality assessment. (Emphasis in original.)

Decide for yourself: Do the facts show that the indirect/reverberating effects mean civilians are likely to be killed or injured? And, if so, was it reasonably foreseeable in advance of the strikes that their numbers would be excessive in the relation to the “concrete and direct military advantage[s] anticipated”?

Responsibilities of the defender to protect civilians

A further factor is that LOAC also imposes responsibilities on the defending party. DoD LoW Manual (¶ 5.12.1.3) explains:

The exclusion of remote harms is based on the difficulty in accurately predicting the myriad of remote harms from the attack (including the possibility of unrelated or intervening actions that might prevent or exacerbate such harms) as well as the primary responsibility of the party controlling the civilian population to take measures to ensure that population’s protection. (Emphasis added.)

The “party controlling the civilian population” with the “primary responsibility” to “ensure [the civilian] population’s protection” in this case is Ukraine.

The defender’s obligations to its own population under LOAC have been addressed in two important essays: Professor Eric Jensen’s piece from last March “Ukraine and the Defender’s Obligations,” as well as Professor Aurel Sari’s 2019 article, “Urban Warfare: The Obligations of Defenders.”

These experts—citing especially Article 58 to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions—point out that LOAC imposes obligations to take precautions to protect civilians not only on the attacker, but on the defender as well. Both Russia and Ukraine are parties to Protocol I and it says:

The Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible:

(a) without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, endeavour to remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives;

(b) avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas;

(c) take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military operations.

Professor Jensen explains the rules as to the defender’s responsibilities “can be reduced to two general commitments: 1) the obligation to segregate the civilian population from military operations; and 2) the obligation to protect those that you can’t segregate.” He adds:

[The] obligation exists despite any potential inconvenience to the defender and even regardless of the actions of the attacker. In other words, Ukraine’s obligations remain despite potential Russian violations.”

Professor Sari notes that the Article 58c “obligation is very broad in scope, in so far as it requires whatever action is necessary to protect civilians and civilian objects from the manifold dangers that result from military operations, subject to the overriding principle of feasibility.”

As previously discussed, Ukraine has taken a number of actions in its defense that involve civilians in ways that appear relevant to Article 58. Recall that, as the Washington Post put it, it “militarize[d]…[v]irtually every neighborhood in most cities.”

It also established workshops in “museums, libraries and churches” to manufacture military goods; and called upon millions of its citizens to join the “IT Army” to conduct cyber-attacks against the Russia and to use its government app to provide intelligence to the Ukrainian military.

Although I don’t find Ukraine’s actions are necessarily violative of LOAC as others have claimed (see here and here), it could impose particular responsibilities to protect its own civilian population. Professor Sari points out that in general the defending party is best suited to mitigate harm to civilians:

Authorities defending urban areas often find themselves in a better position to protect the civilian population than the attacking party. They may have at their disposal more comprehensive information about the location of civilians. They should have a better understanding of civilian needs and infrastructure vulnerabilities. They are also likely to be better placed to provide humanitarian relief.

To be clear, there is zero indication that the Ukrainian government (nor, for that matter, the dozens of countries aiding them), would abdicate its responsibilities to its own citizens.

So, decide for yourself: Given the aid Ukraine and it supporters would provide (and acknowledging that any Ukrainian death is tragic), would it be reasonable as a matter of LOAC for a military commander to nevertheless foresee that there would still be “excessive” civilian deaths weeks or months in the future as a result of the attack?

Of course, this is where the U.S. and other countries can double down on their humanitarian aid to help Ukraine fulfill its LOAC responsibility, not to mention alleviate the suffering of the Ukrainian people.

LOAC and terror attacks

In addition to the requirements above, there are some other prohibitions on attacks. The ICRC notes in its customary law study that Furthermore, Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention says that “all measures of intimidation or of terrorism [against protected persons such as civilians] are prohibited.” (The DoD LoW Manual is in accord – see ¶ 5.2.2).

How does this apply to infrastructure attacks? After the explosion on the Kerch Strait Bridge, it was reported that “panic gripped” the Crimean populace. Yahoo! said “Refat Chubarov, the head of the Majlis of the Crimean Tatars, reported that people are panic-buying food and fuel following the fire and partial destruction of the Crimean Bridge over the Kerch Strait.”

Russia immediately labeled the strike as a terror attack. The New York Times quotes Russian President Putin as saying, “[t]here is no doubt that this is a terrorist attack aimed at destroying the critically important civilian infrastructure of the Russian Federation.”

Notwithstanding Putin’s claims, there is an utter dearth of evidence showing that “the primary purpose of the attack was to spread terror among the civilian population” or, for that matter, showing it was meant as a “measure of intimidation” against Crimea’s civilians.

The fact that panic, extreme fear, and even intimidation resulted from an otherwise lawful attack on a bona fide military objective doesn’t mean that the attack was designed primarily as a “measure of intimidation” against civilians or that the “primary purpose” was to “spread terror” among them. In short, the attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge did not violate this proscription.

What about Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s energy sector? NBC News quotes Putin as explaining what he called Russia’s “massive strike” on Ukraine’s “energy, military command and communications facilities” as “revenge for what he said was Kyiv’s long track record of ‘terrorist’ actions, including the bridge blast.”

NBC News also attributed this to Putin:

Vladimir Putin (Shutterstock)

“If attempts to carry out terrorist attacks on our territory continue, Russia’s responses will be tough and will correspond in scale to the level of threats posed to Russia,” he said. “No one should have any doubts about this.”

While I am prepared to believe that “a” purpose of Putin’s attack was to spread terror among civilians or even to intimidate the civilian population, there is no evidence that it succeeded. Yes, he did speak of wanting “revenge” but is that really conterminous with “spreading terror”?

Ask yourself this: does the available evidence seem to suggest that Putin’s primary purpose was to “spread terror,” per se, or is the better view that it was aimed at detering further attacks against Russian infrastructure, and especially the Kerch Strait Bridge which was said to hold value for Putin?

Furthermore, if Putin did intend to intimidate anyone, would it not be Ukraine’s wartime leadership, as opposed protected civilians? Again, decide for yourself.

It is worth noting that secondary or tertiary motives that would not themselves be a lawful basis for an attack ab initio, they do not necessarily render strikes unlawful if there was an otherwise proper basis for the attack.

The DoD Law of War Manual (¶ 5.6.8) points out that “attacks that are otherwise lawful are “not rendered unlawful if they happen to result in diminished civilian morale.” It then cites (fn. 187) with approval a 2002 commentary about NATO’s Kosovo campaign from a former DoD General Counsel regarding attacks on Serbia’s electrical infrastructure:

I will readily admit that, aside from directly damaging the military electrical power infrastructure, NATO wanted the civilian population to experience discomfort, so that the population would pressure Milosevic and the Serbian leadership to accede to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, but the intended effects on the civilian population were secondary to the military advantage gained by attacking the electrical power infrastructure.” (Emphasis added).

Concluding thoughts

In his analysis, Professor Schmitt concludes that it “would seem clear that at least some of the Russian power infrastructure attacks violate [LOAC].” That is hardly an implausible inference but decide for yourself whether you have enough information to definitively conclude that a criminal act occurred.

For example, would you want to see more evidence showing that it was feasible––based on information reasonably available in advance—for the commander ordering the strikes to limit the attacks to those parts of the grid that serve only civilians? Moreover, would you want to know more about the motives of the commanders, to include their reasons for target selection?

In a June 2nd, article professors Geoff Corn and Sean Watts discussed the Ukraine war and observed that “[c]ondemnation and accountability…require evidence that meets the law’s standards of proof and persuasion.” To that end they say, “the focal point of inquiry related to targeting operations must be the attack judgment, not the attack outcome.”

They recognize that the “captivating visual nature of attack effects—especially harm to civilians and civilian property—make them an enticing focal point” but warn that “attack effects can also offer incomplete or even misleading impressions of legality.” They contend that:

[S]ound legal evaluations of attacks demand consideration of the complexities normally associated with the totality of the operational and tactical circumstances—the enemy situation, friendly situation, anticipated civilian risk, available resources and assets, alternative options, timing and pace of operations, urgency, knock-on effects—all of which inform attack decisions.

So, once again, decide for yourself if you have enough information to make an informed decision as to the legality (or not) of attacks on the electrical systems that serve civilians.

Allow me to reiterate a point made at the beginning this post: We need to think very carefully about what precedents and norms we might be establishing.

In his article about how the use of smartphones by Ukrainian civilians might (unwittingly) turn them into legal targets, Wired writer Lukasz Olejnik noted that how the situation was handled “could influence future models of conduct, and after sometime, these could become global norms” adding that the “precedents set now may have consequences for future armed conflicts.”

Much the same can be said with respect to attacks on dual-use electricity infrastructure. It would be a serious mistake, in my view, to broadly condemn them as they can be conducted lawfully and still produce very significant concrete and direct military advantages.

In fact, in many instances depriving an enemy of electricity (as opposed to attempting to root out and kill all his forces and/or destroy his war material and industries) would be more humane and, particularly, more protective of civilians. Each situation is unique and needs to be evaluated on its own facts and merits.

If we find ourselves battling a technically-advanced military, it would be unconscionable to allow overly-restrictive interpretations of the LOAC to deprive our forces of the targeting options they need to prevail. Again, it is possible to strictly adhere to LOAC and yet still conduct strikes against enemy infrastructure.

Finally, we must not forget that Russia has been – and continues to be – the aggressor in this illicit war against Ukraine. The Ukrainian people have suffered intensely due to the rapacious and profoundly misguided attempt by Putin to multiply his perceived fiefdom.

Ukrainians in bomb shelter (Shutterstock)

While discussion may ensue about whether specific incidents amount to actual war crimes, no one can debate the horrors this war has inflicted on Ukrainians who continue to be under malicious attack. People huddled in basements with no windows for days. Soldiers and volunteers who stepped up killed and maimed. Historical and art treasures lost. Homes and cities decimated.

Putin is to blame. And there’s no debate about that.

Remember what we like to say on Lawfire®: gather the facts, examine the law, evaluate the arguments – and then decide for yourself!

sites.duke.edu · by Charlie Dunlap, J.D. · October 27, 2022


9. Russian official: US reducing ‘nuclear threshold’ by deploying modernized weapons


Excerpt:


“We cannot ignore the plans to modernize nuclear weapons, those free-fall bombs that are in Europe,” Grushko told the state-run news agency RIA Novosti, according to Reuters. “The United States is modernizing them, increasing their accuracy and reducing the power of the nuclear charge, that is, they turn these weapons into ‘battlefield weapons’, thereby reducing the nuclear threshold.”


Russian official: US reducing ‘nuclear threshold’ by deploying modernized weapons

BY JULIA SHAPERO - 10/29/22 9:46 AM ET

The Hill · · October 29, 2022

Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko on Saturday accused the U.S. of reducing the “nuclear threshold” by deploying modernized tactical nuclear weapons to NATO bases in Europe.

“We cannot ignore the plans to modernize nuclear weapons, those free-fall bombs that are in Europe,” Grushko told the state-run news agency RIA Novosti, according to Reuters. “The United States is modernizing them, increasing their accuracy and reducing the power of the nuclear charge, that is, they turn these weapons into ‘battlefield weapons’, thereby reducing the nuclear threshold.”

The U.S. told NATO allies in a recent meeting that it was planning to fast-track its deployment of modernized B61 gravity bombs, moving up their arrival date in Europe from next spring to this December, Politico reported Wednesday.

However, the Pentagon told Politico that the modernization has “been underway for years.”

The new B61-12 air-dropped gravity bomb that will be heading to NATO bases has a lower nuclear yield than earlier versions, according to Reuters.

Nuclear tensions have been increasingly heightened between the U.S. and Russia amid the latter’s war in Ukraine. As Russian forces have continued to falter, the country’s president, Vladimir Putin, has made increasingly explicit nuclear threats.

President Biden warned earlier this month that the world is facing its greatest nuclear threat — the prospect of nuclear “Armageddon” — since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

Ukraine says Iran’s help for Russia should push Israel out of neutral stance US releases oldest detainee from Guantanamo Bay after 17 years

But following the president’s Armageddon comments, White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre sought to frame Biden’s words as a general warning on nuclear escalation. Asked if there has been intelligence to increase the president’s level of concern, Jean-Pierre said, “no.”

Putin said Thursday that Russia does not intend to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Biden responded, calling Putin’s approach in Ukraine “very dangerous.”

“If he has no intention, why does he keep talking about it?” Biden said. “Why does he talk about the ability to use a tactical nuclear weapon?”

The Hill · by Zach Schonfeld · October 29, 2022



10. Don’t Rule Out Diplomacy in Ukraine


We cannot negotiate away Ukraine. I do not see how the proposals in this piece will not be acts of appeasing Kim (despite the authors' words here).


Excerpts:


The United States can also make clear that a negotiated settlement would not be an act of capitulation. The G-7 statement anticipates an outcome—effectively, total Russian surrender—that seems highly implausible. Diplomacy, by definition, will entail some give-and-take, so it is important to be vague about the terms of a possible settlement at this stage.
Finally, the Biden administration should consider keeping all lines of communication with Moscow open, from the president on down, both to signal openness to an eventual negotiated end to the war and to have channels in place to facilitate peace talks when the time is right. There is no guarantee that these steps would lead to peace any time soon. But they could mitigate the risks of dramatic escalation and indefinite war. Letting the conflict play out may seem like a wise decision. But a negotiated outcome—still the Biden administration’s stated goal—will likely remain elusive unless it lays the groundwork for one now.


Don’t Rule Out Diplomacy in Ukraine

Biden’s Current Strategy Risks Escalation and Forever War

By Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe

October 28, 2022

Foreign Affairs · by Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe · October 28, 2022

U.S. President Joe Biden has said that the United States is committed to a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine. But his administration has taken few, if any, steps to create a diplomatic process that could produce such an outcome. Buoyed by Ukrainian battlefield successes and horrified by Russian atrocities, the United States seems committed to continuing its current approach of helping Ukraine recapture as much territory as possible without provoking a wider war. The mantra in Washington is to support Kyiv “for as long it takes” and to rule out, at least for now, practical steps toward diplomacy. That message was reinforced this week when 30 Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives released a letter urging the Biden administration to pursue direct negotiations with Moscow, only to withdraw it a day later amid the predictable outcry.

In fact, the United States and its G-7 partners have already proposed a peace deal. But the terms read like conditions for Russia’s surrender: Kyiv regains all its territory, receives reparations from Moscow, and signs security agreements with Western countries. Such an outcome would indeed be ideal, restoring Ukraine’s control over its internationally recognized borders, strengthening the international order, and chastening Russia—but it also is improbable. Communicating that an outright Ukrainian victory is the desired U.S. endgame without making a concerted effort to prepare for future diplomatic negotiations could lead either to a dangerous escalation or to prolonging the conflict indefinitely. It would be premature to push for any particular deal or even for direct negotiations today. But, by laying the groundwork for these negotiations now, the United States, together with its Ukrainian partners and its allies, could minimize the risk of these dangerous outcomes and help chart a path toward ending the war.

MAXIMAL OBJECTIVES, MINIMAL ODDS

On October 11, after Russia carried out attacks on civilian infrastructure across Ukraine, the United States and its G-7 allies issued a statement indicating how they think the war will progress. “We will continue to provide financial, humanitarian, military, diplomatic and legal support and will stand firmly with Ukraine for as long as it takes,” the G-7 leaders said, adding that Kyiv has the right to “regain full control of its territory within its internationally recognised borders.” The G-7 also demanded that Russia “cease all hostilities and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its troops and military equipment from Ukraine,” including, presumably, not only areas seized this year but also Ukrainian territory that Moscow has controlled since 2014. And the group pledged to support Ukrainian efforts to pursue a “just peace,” which should include “respecting the UN Charter’s protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty; safeguarding Ukraine’s ability to defend itself in the future; ensuring Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction, including exploring avenues to do so with funds from Russia; pursuing accountability for Russian crimes committed during the war.”

All of this is morally and legally justified. It might also be possible, thanks to Russia’s astonishing underperformance in the war. But there are good reasons to doubt that Ukraine and its Western backers can force Russia’s military to relinquish all the Ukrainian territory it currently holds and then persuade Moscow to abide by the victor’s terms of peace.

First, Russia may opt to escalate rather than to capitulate on the battlefield. The United States and its G-7 partners appear to think that Moscow will accept complete territorial loss without provoking a wider war or using weapons of mass destruction. It is certainly possible that Russian President Vladimir Putin is bluffing when he threatens to use nuclear weapons. But unlike U.S. President Richard Nixon, who embraced the “madman theory” of nuclear intimidation in his standoff with the North Vietnamese, which took place thousands of miles from the United States, Putin is fighting for what he claims is Russia’s own territory. The stakes are therefore much higher. If his conventional forces are being routed, Putin could draw on his immense arsenal of nonstrategic nuclear weapons for use against Ukrainian forces or government targets. The use of nuclear weapons might seem futile or even self-defeating, but during the Cold War NATO envisioned using them to offset its conventional disadvantages vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact. Putin could also test or use a nuclear weapon away from the battlefield to demonstrate his resolve and his willingness to use more of them in the future.


Even in the absence of a nuclear attack, the risk of a direct clash between NATO and Russia—and the attendant risk of a strategic nuclear exchange—will remain high and possibly increase as long as the war continues. In a moment of desperation, Russia could attempt to turn the tide of the war by trying to stop the flow of Western arms that enables Ukraine to keep fighting.

Second, Ukraine may not be able to sustain its current pace of territorial gains. The G-7 statement seems to assume that time is on Ukraine’s side and that Russia will be unable to recover from its military setbacks. That may be true. After all, Ukraine has made significant gains in its counteroffensives over the last two months, the Russian military has struggled with nearly all of its operations throughout the war, and Moscow’s mobilization efforts have been plagued with problems, including the flight of many fighting age men from the country. Moreover, Russia remains under heavy economic sanctions that could make it harder to sustain the war.


The United States can do more to create the conditions for eventual negotiations to succeed.

Still, it is far from certain that Ukraine will be able to retake all of its internationally recognized territory. Russia’s mobilization has been a mess, but it could eventually produce a much larger force. Insufficient troop numbers have been perhaps the Russian military’s biggest weakness, leaving it unable to defend a frontline that stretches more than six hundred miles. A bigger Russian fighting force could compel Ukraine to ramp up its own mobilization efforts, even though it faced challenges with enlistment during its last wave of recruitment.

Finally, Russia may not give up even if it is forced to withdraw from Ukrainian territory. The current U.S. and G-7 approach presumes that territorial loss will force Putin to realize that he cannot achieve his goals militarily—or that it will wear Russia’s military down to the point where it cannot continue fighting. But even a victory that returns all of Ukraine into Ukrainian hands would not eliminate all of Russia’s military capability. Such a victory would likely devastate Russia’s ground forces, but Moscow would retain a large inventory of missiles, ample artillery, and formidable air and naval assets. And because Russia and Ukraine share a long land border, Moscow would be able to contest a Ukrainian victory for years to come. Given enough time to rearm and regroup, Russia’s military could eventually invade again.

For this reason, territorial victory would need to be combined with an agreement to end the war. The G-7 statement envisions Russia consenting to Ukraine’s full control over its internationally recognized borders and formally agreeing not to contest that new status quo. But Russia’s current leadership is highly unlikely to agree to such terms, especially if they involve giving up Crimea. Therefore, as Andriy Zagorodnyuk, a former defense minister of Ukraine, has argued in Foreign Affairs, Kyiv would probably need regime change in Moscow in addition to victory on the battlefield to avoid living under the constant threat of reinvasion. And despite increasing (and understandable) calls from Kyiv for Washington and its allies to seek Putin’s ouster, the Biden administration has studiously avoided embracing this as an objective of the war.

Barring regime change, the likely pathways forward given current Ukrainian, U.S. and allied policies are either Russian escalation, as noted above, or a conflict of indefinite duration. A protracted war could benefit Washington to the extent that it weakens Moscow and forces it to pare back its ambitions elsewhere. But a war that drags on would also have significant downsides for the United States. It would continue to eat up military and financial resources as well as the time and energy of U.S. policymakers, diminishing Washington’s ability to prioritize long-term strategic competition with China. A protracted conflict would likely also sustain the deep freeze in U.S.-Russian relations, potentially jeopardizing cooperation between Washington and Moscow on issues of global importance, such as arms control.


A long war would also disrupt the global economy. The United States’ most important trading partners and allies in Europe would be the hardest hit, mainly because of higher energy prices. And, of course, the country that would suffer the most—in terms of lives lost, infrastructure destroyed, and economic devastation—is Ukraine. Even a conflict that continues at a lower level of intensity would disrupt the economy and scare off investment, complicating the country’s economic recovery.

TALKING AND FIGHTING

In an op-ed in The New York Times in May, Biden wrote that U.S. military assistance to Ukraine was intended to put the country’s leaders in “in the strongest possible position at the negotiating table.” Quoting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, he wrote that “ultimately this war ‘will only definitively end through diplomacy.’” Five months later, that diplomacy has yet to materialize—a fact for which Russia bears primary responsibility.

But the United States could be doing more to enable diplomacy. As Ukraine has gained the upper hand on the battlefield, Washington has coalesced around the view that it should let the war play out because escalation risks can be managed, Ukraine will keep winning, and Russia will eventually be forced to accept defeat. Western military support should continue, in this view, so that Ukraine can take back its territory and frustrate Russia’s annexation efforts. The United States should not reward Putin’s nuclear saber rattling by backing down or by pressuring the parties to negotiate. No give-and-take is necessary. Russia can either accept the terms laid out by the G-7 now or it can accept them once it has been defeated on the battlefield.

It is possible that this optimistic scenario will come to pass. But the assumptions underlying it are questionable. And if they prove wrong, the result will be at best a protracted conflict and at worst a catastrophic escalation. Laying the groundwork for eventual negotiations could reduce the risk of these dangerous outcomes.

That doesn’t mean that Washington should seek to launch direct talks today. The parties are not yet ready. But the United States can do more to create the conditions for eventual negotiations to succeed. For instance, Washington could begin discussions with its allies and Ukraine about the need for all parties to demonstrate openness to the prospect of eventual talks, and to moderate public expectations of a decisive victory. The Biden administration could work with these partners to develop shared language to that effect and feature it more prominently in official statements. Making “this war will only definitively end through diplomacy” as much of a mantra as “supporting the Ukrainians for as long as it takes”—and emphasizing that one does not contradict the other—could help begin to change the narrative.

The United States can also make clear that a negotiated settlement would not be an act of capitulation. The G-7 statement anticipates an outcome—effectively, total Russian surrender—that seems highly implausible. Diplomacy, by definition, will entail some give-and-take, so it is important to be vague about the terms of a possible settlement at this stage.

Finally, the Biden administration should consider keeping all lines of communication with Moscow open, from the president on down, both to signal openness to an eventual negotiated end to the war and to have channels in place to facilitate peace talks when the time is right. There is no guarantee that these steps would lead to peace any time soon. But they could mitigate the risks of dramatic escalation and indefinite war. Letting the conflict play out may seem like a wise decision. But a negotiated outcome—still the Biden administration’s stated goal—will likely remain elusive unless it lays the groundwork for one now.

Foreign Affairs · by Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe · October 28, 2022



11. Just how ominous is the China threat?


I still believe China may be trying to influence us to prepare for the wrong war - which is the war the military industrial complex wants us to fund for obvious reasons. I think we need to pay more attention to understanding unrestricted warfare and the Chinese three warfares.


Some cautionary words from Michael O'Hanlon:

There is ample reason to worry about China, to be sure. The Pentagon has good cause to describe it as our “pacing challenge,” given that China’s military budget of some $250 billion to $350 billion is far and away the world’s second largest, its research and development efforts with national security relevance the second largest as well, and its manufacturing base easily the planet’s biggest. These realities combined with China’s avowed desire to absorb Taiwan back into the motherland as soon as possible, and its dangerous military activities in the western Pacific in general, give serious pause.
But we need to approach the China threat with perspective. For all its potential seriousness, there remain at least three objective realities and structural restraints on China’s behavior to date. Factoring them into the equation should not make us lower our guard, or relent in the various kinds of economic and military efforts we are now making in the interest of vigilance. But our outlook should be tempered by a certain calm, especially in regard to handling crises that may occur in the western Pacific. China may now be the No. 1 strategic challenge to the United States, but it is not public enemy No. 1.




Just how ominous is the China threat?

BY MICHAEL O’HANLON, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 10/30/22 8:00 AM ET

THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL

The Hill · by Julia Manchester · October 30, 2022

China’s recently concluded 20th Party Congress was highlighted visually by the Godfather-like scene of former president Hu Jintao being abruptly escorted off stage as an indifferent Xi Jinping mumbled a brief word to his predecessor and then let him depart. The results of the Congress were to consolidate control even further for Xi, as he prepares for a third five-year term in office with no signs of slowing down.

Onlookers have understandably worried about a strengthening autocracy under Xi. Given that China has become more powerful during Xi’s reign, less tolerant of dissent at home, and more menacing to its neighbors as well, Xi’s strengthening position would seem to portend a more dangerous China in the years ahead. Together, these developments seem to support the Biden administration’s view, as expressed in its new National Security Strategy, that China represents America’s “most consequential strategic challenge” — even as it is Vladimir Putin’s Russia that rains down missiles and artillery on Ukraine, while driving up global energy and food prices and issuing nuclear threats to the world.

There is ample reason to worry about China, to be sure. The Pentagon has good cause to describe it as our “pacing challenge,” given that China’s military budget of some $250 billion to $350 billion is far and away the world’s second largest, its research and development efforts with national security relevance the second largest as well, and its manufacturing base easily the planet’s biggest. These realities combined with China’s avowed desire to absorb Taiwan back into the motherland as soon as possible, and its dangerous military activities in the western Pacific in general, give serious pause.

But we need to approach the China threat with perspective. For all its potential seriousness, there remain at least three objective realities and structural restraints on China’s behavior to date. Factoring them into the equation should not make us lower our guard, or relent in the various kinds of economic and military efforts we are now making in the interest of vigilance. But our outlook should be tempered by a certain calm, especially in regard to handling crises that may occur in the western Pacific. China may now be the No. 1 strategic challenge to the United States, but it is not public enemy No. 1.

Chinese military spending. Yes, the People’s Liberation Army budget is large, and partially hidden from view; yes, it has doubled over the past decade (as it had done each of the previous two decades at least). But even when adjusted to account for activities that NATO considers military-related, even if China does not, it represents about 1.5 percent to 1.75 percent of GDP, according to the U.S. Intelligence Community and independent observers such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. That is about half the American level as a fraction of national economic output — explaining why China’s military budget is less than half our own. China devotes most of its military effort to the western Pacific region, whereas America’s responsibilities and commitments are more global. But we have global allies that collectively spend more than China on their armed forces themselves; China, by contrast, has North Korea.

No doubt about it, China has plenty of money to invest in its armed forces — and alas, Beijing is investing much of it well. Huge numbers of precision missiles, more quiet submarines, semi-stealthy aircraft, lots of satellites, and a couple aircraft carriers are among the results to date. Yet it has not built a viable amphibious fleet to take Taiwan. Its much-touted navy is now the world’s largest by ship count — but is actually still only half the size of America’s as measured by tonnage (not that either ship counts or aggregate tonnage constitute the ultimate metric of modern naval capability). The overall point here is that China is building up its military power steadily and impressively, but it is not arms-racing as the term is commonly understood.

Chinese use of force. China is misbehaving plenty around its borders. It is flying planes and sailing ships near or in the territorial waters of Japan’s Senkaku islands, Taiwan, and various locations in the South China Sea — which it continues, unreasonably and threateningly, to claim as its own. It also often operates unsafely near American warships exercising the right of free passage in those waters.

But China has not gone to war since 1979 and it rarely uses lethal force on a smaller scale. Its troops did kill a couple dozen Indian forces along those countries’ Himalayan border in the recent past, and its military has taken a few lethal shots against countries such as Vietnam from time to time in recent decades. So the PLA certainly doesn’t deserve a Nobel Peace Prize. But by the standards of rising powers, China has been restrained in its overall levels of aggression this century. In contrast to Vladimir Putin, China seems to appreciate the huge consequences of military aggression and does not seem inclined to make war lightly.

US needs a new partnership with Guyana The dangers of Iran’s drones in Ukraine

China’s support for Russia. Speaking of Putin, while Chinese rhetoric has callously sought to justify his war against Ukraine as a somewhat understandable reaction to NATO expansion, Beijing has drawn sharp limits on its actual help extended to Russia. It has not sent Russia weapons during the war; it has curtailed high-tech exports to Russia dramatically since Feb. 24 when the large-scale aggression began. Much of this restraint was likely out of fear of Western economic retribution, rather than goodwill. But it has still been the right call — and suggests that for all our fears of a Russia-China axis, their relationship stops well short of a military alliance or even a close strategic partnership at present.

This is not a call for complacency. We can and should continue to reduce the appeal to Beijing of any attack on Taiwan in particular, through economic as well as military preparations. But we also need to avoid pushing China further towards Russia or treating it as an adversary in a way that contributes to a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Michael O’Hanlon is the Philip H. Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy at the Brookings Institution and the author of several books, including “The Art of War in an Age of Peace: U.S. Grand Strategy and Resolute Restraint,” “Defense 101: Understanding the Military of Today and Tomorrow,” and the forthcoming “Military History for the Modern Strategist.” Follow him on Twitter @MichaelEOHanlon.

The Hill · by Julia Manchester · October 30, 2022


12. Man vs machine: US preparing an AI Bill of Rights



Man vs machine: US preparing an AI Bill of Rights

The White House’s ‘AI Bill of Rights’ outlines five principles to make artificial intelligence safer, more transparent and less discriminatory


asiatimes.com · by Christopher Dancy · October 29, 2022

Despite the important and ever-increasing role of artificial intelligence in many parts of modern society, there is very little policy or regulation governing the development and use of AI systems in the US Tech companies have largely been left to regulate themselves in this arena, potentially leading to decisions and situations that have garnered criticism.

Google fired an employee who publicly raised concerns over how a certain type of AI can contribute to environmental and social problems. Other AI companies have developed products that are used by organizations like the Los Angeles Police Department where they have been shown to bolster existing racially biased policies.

There are some government recommendations and guidance regarding AI use. But in early October 2022, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy added to federal guidance in a big way by releasing the Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights.


The Office of Science and Technology says that the protections outlined in the document should be applied to all automated systems. The blueprint spells out “five principles that should guide the design, use, and deployment of automated systems to protect the American public in the age of artificial intelligence.” The hope is that this document can act as a guide to help prevent AI systems from limiting the rights of US residents.

As a computer scientist who studies the ways people interact with AI systems – and in particular how anti-Blackness mediates those interactions – I find this guide a step in the right direction, even though it has some holes and is not enforceable.

It is critically important to include feedback from the people who are going to be most affected by an AI system – especially marginalized communities – during development. Photo: FilippoBacci/E+ via Getty Images / The Conversation

Improving systems for all

The first two principles aim to address the safety and effectiveness of AI systems as well as the major risk of AI furthering discrimination.

To improve the safety and effectiveness of AI, the first principle suggests that AI systems should be developed not only by experts but also with direct input from the people and communities who will use and be affected by the systems.

Exploited and marginalized communities are often left to deal with the consequences of AI systems without having much say in their development. Research has shown that direct and genuine community involvement in the development process is important for deploying technologies that have a positive and lasting impact on those communities.


The second principle focuses on the known problem of algorithmic discrimination within AI systems. A well-known example of this problem is how mortgage approval algorithms discriminate against minorities.

The document asks for companies to develop AI systems that do not treat people differently based on their race, sex or other protected class status. It suggests companies employ tools such as equity assessments that can help assess how an AI system may impact members of exploited and marginalized communities.

These first two principles address big issues of bias and fairness found in AI development and use.

Privacy, transparency and control

The final three principles outline ways to give people more control when interacting with AI systems.

The third principle is on data privacy. It seeks to ensure that people have more say about how their data is used and are protected from abusive data practices. This section aims to address situations where, for example, companies use deceptive design to manipulate users into giving away their data. The blueprint calls for practices like not taking a person’s data unless they consent to it and asking in a way that is understandable to that person.


The next principle focuses on “notice and explanation.” It highlights the importance of transparency – people should know how an AI system is being used as well as the ways in which an AI contributes to outcomes that might affect them.

Take, for example, the New York City Administration for Child Services. Research has shown that the agency uses outsourced AI systems to predict child maltreatment, systems that most people don’t realize are being used, even when they are being investigated.

The AI Bill of Rights provides a guideline that people in New York in this example who are affected by the AI systems in use should be notified that an AI was involved and have access to an explanation of what the AI did. Research has shown that building transparency into AI systems can reduce the risk of errors or misuse.

The last principle of the AI Bill of Rights outlines a framework for human alternatives, consideration and feedback. The section specifies that people should be able to opt out of the use of AI or other automated systems in favor of a human alternative where reasonable.

As an example of how these last two principles might work together, take the case of someone applying for a mortgage. They would be informed if an AI algorithm was used to consider their application and would have the option of opting out of that AI use in favor of an actual person.


Smart guidelines, no enforceability

The five principles laid out in the AI Bill of Rights address many of the issues scholars have raised over the design and use of AI. Nonetheless, this is a nonbinding document and not currently enforceable.

It may be too much to hope that industry and government agencies will put these ideas to use in the exact ways the White House urges. If the ongoing regulatory battle over data privacy offers any guidance, tech companies will continue to push for self-regulation.

One other issue that I see within the AI Bill of Rights is that it fails to directly call out systems of oppression – like racism or sexism – and how they can influence the use and development of AI. For example, studies have shown that inaccurate assumptions built into AI algorithms used in health care have led to worse care for Black patients.

I have argued that anti-Black racism should be directly addressed when developing AI systems. While the AI Bill of Rights addresses ideas of bias and fairness, the lack of focus on systems of oppression is a notable hole and a known issue within AI development.

Despite these shortcomings, this blueprint could be a positive step toward better AI systems, and maybe the first step toward regulation. A document such as this one, even if not policy, can be a powerful reference for people advocating for changes in the way an organization develops and uses AI systems.

Christopher Dancy is Associate Professor of Industrial & Manufacturing Engineering and Computer Science & Engineering, Penn State

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

asiatimes.com · by Christopher Dancy · October 29, 2022

 

13. The Pentagon's new defense strategy is out. Now the real work begins, experts say



Time to put theory into practice. Although I think we are missing the fact that DOD has been implementing much of this strategy over the past two years. This strategy is not a major course correction for the department and those who are looking for that are going to be disappointed. The NDS merely codifies what we have been doing and points a way forward. loading the current path we are one. The question is whether the path we are on is headed in the right direction?






The Pentagon's new defense strategy is out. Now the real work begins, experts say - Breaking Defense

“The issue is, can the department execute this strategy and really do it in time?” said Jim Mitre, he director of the international security and defense policy program at the RAND Corporation. "In particular can it do so on a timeline that's sufficient to deter war with China, not just in some far-off future, but in the next few years?”

breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · October 28, 2022

Izumo-class multi-purpose destroyer JS Izumo (DDH 183) cruises in formation with Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Higgins (DDG 76) while conducting routine operations in the South China Sea, Oct. 1, 2022. (Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Donavan K. Patubo/US Navy)

WASHINGTON — After months of delays, the unclassified version of the National Defense Strategy hit the streets on Thursday, pledging a renewed focus on China and including not much in the way of surprises.

Now, experts say, is time to answer the big question: Can the Defense Department actually execute it?

“Bottom line, regarding the strategy writ large, I’d say it’s fundamentally sound and logically supported. The department did a good job of thinking through what problem it needs the military to focus on, and has a sensible, coherent approach to getting after it,” said Jim Mitre, who served as executive director of the 2018 NDS.

“The issue is, can the department execute this strategy and really do it in time?” Mitre, currently the director of the international security and defense policy program at the RAND Corporation, told Breaking Defense. “Can it modernize its forces, establish greater resilience to adversary attack, develop a more tech savvy workforce, et cetera, with alacrity? … In particular can it do so on a timeline that’s sufficient to deter war with China, not just in some far-off future, but in the next few years?”

Stacie Pettyjohn, director of defense programs at the Center for a New American Security, agreed that the strategy lays out a “sound vision,” but will require the Biden administration to make difficult choices to allocate resources to prioritize threats — in particular, managing the immediate threat posed by Russia without “derailing efforts” to compete against China.

The need to deter China is the single biggest theme of the NDS, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said yesterday during a briefing on the new strategy. China is “the only competitor out there with both the intent to reshape the international order and increasingly, the power to do so,” he said. In contrast, Russia represents an “acute threat” that poses an immediate threat to US interests, as seen in its invasion of Ukraine, the NDS states.

“Immediate needs have a tendency of overwhelming future threats, and the Pentagon has repeatedly deferred making changes to its force structure and posture necessary to bolster deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region,” Pettyjohn said in a written statement.

On the technology side, the NDS lists command, control and communications systems, long-range strike, and space as key investment priorities, said Seamus Daniels, the defense budget analysis fellow for the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

However, “I think the strategy lacks a discussion of sort of the main trade offs when we’re talking about force structure versus modernization versus readiness,” he said. “Are they going to try and free up funds by limiting the day-to-day deployments? Or is that going to come in the form of force structure cuts?”

One missed opportunity, Mitre said, was that the strategy did not focus enough on how the department plans to overcome the well-established barriers that keep it from moving as quickly as it needs to accomplish its goals.

For example, the strategy notes a need for the Pentagon to forge closer ties with academia and industry — particularly with companies outside its typical roster of defense firms. It states that the department will be a “fast follower” on technologies like artificial intelligence, autonomy and microelectronics, where commercial firms are driving innovation. The NDS also vows to increase collaboration with the commercial space industry, a space it believes it can leverage “[industry’s] technological advancements and entrepreneurial spirit to enable new capabilities.”

But all those ideas have been well agreed upon for years, with a serious push for commercial technology starting with former Defense Secretary Ash Carter in 2015. While it’s positive that the NDS signals the Pentagon’s desire to work more closely with the private sector, Mitre noted that the strategy falls short in that it does not spell out why that has historically been difficult, and how the department will overcome those impediments this time.

“We know that that’s been a challenge, there’s been some important progress there. But the department’s still grappling with the ‘valley of death.’ And the strategy doesn’t have a clear solution to how the department should address the valley of death problem,” he said, using a phrase that describes the funding gap between the research and development phase and a program of record, where technologies often wither and die.

During a Thursday background briefing on the NDS, a journalist asked how the strategy would lead to faster technology adoption. A senior defense official acknowledged that “this is a refrain you have no doubt been subjected to before,” but said they had greater hope of success after seeing how the Pentagon mobilized to provide weaponry for Ukraine, including existing systems that have been used in new ways on the battlefield.

“So it does tell me … that this can be more more feasible going forward, because we’ve had this experience,” the official said.

The fiscal 2024 budget could shed further light on how serious the Pentagon is about funding its strategic priorities, as well as the tradeoffs it is willing to make, Daniels said. One key indicator to look at is the size of the FY24 budget request next spring, specifically whether the department is able to keep defense spending from dropping below the rate of inflation.

“The still a significant and expensive strategy, similar to 2018,” he said. “It will still require a significant level of investment, at least keeping pace, if not above inflation.”

Daniels added he would be interested in seeing how the Pentagon “balance[s] the procurement platforms for the fight today versus [long-term] modernization investments.”

Mitre added that the responsibility for implementing the defense strategy doesn’t fall squarely on the Defense Department’s shoulders. Congress must also allow the Pentagon to take calculated risks in order to fund its strategic priorities.

“There’s too many programs that are sacred cows. Too many times people claim that any reduction in US forces anywhere is assuming unacceptable risk,” he said. “As people critique what the department is trying to do, what happens is that the trade space gets narrower, and as its trade space narrows, its progress slows down.”

breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · October 28, 2022

14. US 'Killer Missiles' In China's Backyard Is Giving Nightmares To Beijing; Why Is PLA Edgy Over THAAD?


These are not "offensive" missiles. They can only shoot down incoming missiles in a certain engagement envelope.


US 'Killer Missiles' In China's Backyard Is Giving Nightmares To Beijing; Why Is PLA Edgy Over THAAD?

eurasiantimes.com · by Tanmay Kadam · October 24, 2022

South Korea’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is set to get new performance improvement equipment, as per the press release of South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). Expectedly, China is not happy.

‘Thaad Rate’ Logic – China Angry With THAAD Deployment In S.Korea But Overlooks India’s Very Similar Concerns In Bhutan

As per the press release, US Forces Korea (USFK) will be integrating the new equipment with the THAAD missile defense unit located in Seongju, situated around 200 kilometers from Seoul.

The MND press release said that the new equipment would enhance “the defense capability of the existing THAAD system to protect the [South] Korean people from the North Korean missile threat and further strengthen the defense capability for core assets.”

The press release did not provide details about the new equipment but a day before it was released, around ten vehicles loaded with THAAD-related equipment entered the Seongju base in North Gyeongsang Province, according to a report by Kyunghyang Shinmun, a major South Korean daily newspaper.

The vehicles reportedly contained radar, electronic equipment (EEU), and missile transport vehicles, and the equipment is said to be related to the last stage of the USKF’s Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON) program, aimed at integrating the THAAD system with the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile-defense system.

JEON is a three-stage program that integrates the THAAD and the PAC-3 missile-defense systems.

The program’s first stage is to separate the launchers from the THAAD battery to enable remote control of the launchers. A full THAAD battery comprises six launchers, a fire-control unit, the THAAD system’s AN/TPY-2 radar, and a support unit.

The second stage is to use advanced THAAD radar information to launch Patriot missiles.


The third stage aims to integrate the PAC-3 MSE (Missile Segment Enhanced) interceptor of the Patriot missile system into the THAAD launchers.

Integrating Patriot With THAAD

In March, the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) successfully fired a PAC-3 MSE interceptor from a THAAD system at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.

The PAC-3 MSE interceptor flew to the intercept point. Subsequently, it self-destructed, demonstrating that the Patriot M903 Launching Stations and PAC-3 MSE interceptors can be deployed with the THAAD Weapon System using only the THAAD radar and TFCC (Fire Control & Communication) for support.

The Patriot missile system is a lower-tier surface-to-air (SAM) system produced by Raytheon and Lockheed Martin that can counter tactical ballistic missiles (TBM), cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and advanced aircraft.

Patriot is a long-range, high-altitude, all-weather missile tested more than 2,500 times with US Army oversight. (Image: Raytheon)

THAAD is an anti-ballistic missile defense system designed to shoot short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their mid-course and terminal phases (descent or re-entry) by intercepting with a hit-to-kill approach.

The PAC-3 MSE has an operational range of 40 kilometers and can intercept targets at altitudes of up to 24.2 kilometers. Interceptors from the THAAD system have an operational range of more than 200 kilometers and can hit targets at altitudes up to 150 kilometers.

Also, THAAD AN/TPY-2 radar can detect targets farther than the PAC-3 system’s AN/MPQ-65 or AN/MPQ-65A radar.

So, the general idea is to use the PAC-3 MSE interceptors and the THAAD system, coupled with the AN/TPY-2 radar, simultaneously for upper and lower defenses.

Tensions Over The Korean Peninsula

Notably, the new THAAD-related equipment has arrived in South Korea amid soaring tensions over the Korean Peninsula in the wake of recent ballistic missile launches by North Korea suspected to be a build-up for the resumption of nuclear testing by Pyongyang for the first time since 2017.

File Image: THAAD Missile Defense System

The US Army and MDA have been working over the past several years to integrate THAAD and Patriot in the wake of an ‘urgent operational need’ (or JEON) from the USFK for a defensive capability against the rising missile threat from North Korea.

Retd. Brig. Gen. Randy McIntire, the former cross-functional team lead for AMD, told Defense News in a March 14, 2018 interview that THAAD and Patriot are both deployed on the Korean peninsula and the integration effort is to take advantage “of the great radar that is part of THAAD to increase the battlespace of Patriot.”

Over the past decade, North Korea has amassed many offensive missile systems such as KN-23 Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) and KN-25 600mm caliber super-large long-range artillery. KN-23s and KN-25s can operate below the effective altitude of THAAD and can hit all areas of South Korea and reach parts of Japan.

Therefore, the best countermeasure for such threats is integrating THAAD with other weapons systems like Patriot missiles, thereby providing the combatant commanders with the capability to deploy the suitable missile for the right threat at the right time.

File Image: Kim Jong-un

China Worried By THAAD Deployment

While the THAAD system in South Korea is meant to counter North Korean missile threats, its presence on the Korean Peninsula is a cause of worry for China as well, as it could be used to spy on Chinese military facilities.

Therefore, in 2016 Beijing protested Seoul’s decision to allow THAAD systems in South Korea, even going as far as imposing trade and cultural sanctions that resulted in substantial economic losses for the country.

The trade and cultural exchanges only resumed after South Korea’s former President Moon Jae-in committed to a “three nos” policy in 2017 – no additional deployment of THAAD, no South Korean integration into a US-led regional missile defense system, and no trilateral alliance with the US and Japan.

However, tensions between China and South Korea over the THAAD missile system have reignited because of the reversal of the “three nos” policy by Moon’s successor Yoon Suk Yeol, who was elected President in March 2022.

Yoon has said that the “three nos” policy was only a statement of Moon’s political position and not a commitment or a formal agreement with China.

Accordingly, the Yoon administration has granted an additional 400,000 square meters (98 acres) of land to the US to “normalize operations” of the THAAD system, bringing the total land in South Korea set aside for the THAAD systems up to 730,000 square meters (180 acres).

Beijing is worried that THAAD’s AN/TPY-2 radar system, if directed at China, could be used to monitor missile launches within a radius of 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers.

Furthermore, THAAD is also deployed in Guam and Japan. Experts suggest that if the THAAD systems in Japan and Guam are upgraded the same way as the South Korean THAAD, they could all be linked automatically via the Alaska Central Command Center, known as regional missile defense.

eurasiantimes.com · by Tanmay Kadam · October 24, 2022


1​5. US To 'Withdraw' Its Entire F-15 Fighter Jet Fleet From Japan Amid Chinese Vow To Unite All Lost Territories - Reports



​Excerpts:

Experts believe the F-22 is the logical choice to replace the F-15C/D in Okinawa as the Air Force’s premier air superiority fighter. However, the Air Force has a limited fleet of F-22s because its production line was shut down in 2012, and they are in high demand for routine deployments.

Amid heightened tensions with Russia over Ukraine, Alaskan F-22s are presently temporarily stationed in Poland. The capacity of Raptors to undertake both air-to-air and air-to-ground operations, according to the USAF, will dramatically boost warfighting power along the eastern flank, as this rotation strengthens NATO’s Air Shielding.
Additionally, only about half of the F-22s are typically fully mission capable at any given moment. This is made worse because only about 125 F-22s with combat codes are now in service.
Although it looks like “heel-to-toe” rotations, in which one fighter squadron arrives at Kadena as another departs, Deptula expressed his doubts about this in an interview with the Financial Times.
“They won’t have a heel-to-toe replacement. That’s why they’re doing a rotation. You could supplement by rotating F-22s to help plug that gap, but that [then] stresses that force,” Deptula said.
Even with all of this, it is unclear why the US will choose to evacuate fighter jets from Okinawa, considering China’s growing military activity in the region, particularly in the area bordering Taiwan, where it deploys many aircraft virtually every day.



US To 'Withdraw' Its Entire F-15 Fighter Jet Fleet From Japan Amid Chinese Vow To Unite All Lost Territories - Reports

eurasiantimes.com · by Ashish Dangwal · October 28, 2022

The United States Air Force reportedly intends to withdraw its entire fleet of F-15 fighter jets based in Okinawa, Japan, by the end of next year. Analysts fear the move could encourage China to boost its presence in the region further.

The sole USAF F-15C/D Eagle units outside the United States are located at Kadena Air Base on the Japanese island of Okinawa. According to a report from Financial Times, the current permanent units will be replaced by rotational fighter detachments.

The US Air Force’s Eagles first landed at Kadena in September 1979, and the model has been continuously stationed there. According to six people familiar with the situation, the push aims to retire two squadrons of aging F-15 Eagles as part of a larger “modernization program.”

The decision could also be linked to proposals to reduce planned acquisitions of F-15EX Eagle II fighter jets from at least 144 to roughly 80. Even so, Gen Kenneth Wilsbach, commander of the Pacific Air Forces, had already designated Kadena as his top choice for the F-15EX recipient.

The two squadrons of F-15C/Ds that are currently flown out of the base, according to Wilsbach, might be replaced with the Eagle II.

At a March Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies event, Milsbach stated, “What we intend to use it for there, if we’re so fortunate to get that replacement, is air superiority and some long-range weapons capabilities that you can conduct on the F-15EX.”

US Air Force and Japanese Air Force F-15s performed joint flights with tactical objectives over Okinawa, Japan. Pacific, August 4th. – Twitter

Nonetheless, the chances of deploying the F-15EX to Kadena have decreased as the number of aircraft will likely be limited to 80.

Meanwhile, some Pentagon and Japanese government officials have expressed concern over the latest decision because the air force does not plan to replace them with a permanent presence anytime soon.

“The message to China is that the US is not serious about reversing the decline in its military forces,” David Deptula, former Vice Commander of Pacific Air Forces and a retired F-15 pilot, told the Financial Times. “This will encourage the Chinese to take more dramatic action,” he asserted.


Former Pentagon officer Christopher Johnstone, who now works for the CSIS think tank and focuses on Japan, said the transfer came at the wrong time. When attention focuses on Taiwan, “it sends a concerning signal to Tokyo about US commitment,” he said.

Separately, the main island of Honshu is home to Misawa Air Base, which also houses two squadrons of F-16s from the United States Air Force. But then again, the F-15 gives the USAF better long-range air superiority capabilities that the Viper cannot offer.

This capability is critical because Chinese military aircraft are becoming more active in the area surrounding Taiwan and flying farther away over the South China Sea and East China Sea.

File Image: A USAF F-15C fires an AIM-7 Sparrow in 2005. (Wikimedia Commons)

Deployment Of Raptors

After the F-15s depart Kadena, the new strategy purportedly calls for six months to deploy an F-22 stealth fighter detachment. Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska, a part of the Pacific Air Forces, is where the Raptors would arrive.

Experts believe the F-22 is the logical choice to replace the F-15C/D in Okinawa as the Air Force’s premier air superiority fighter. However, the Air Force has a limited fleet of F-22s because its production line was shut down in 2012, and they are in high demand for routine deployments.

Amid heightened tensions with Russia over Ukraine, Alaskan F-22s are presently temporarily stationed in Poland. The capacity of Raptors to undertake both air-to-air and air-to-ground operations, according to the USAF, will dramatically boost warfighting power along the eastern flank, as this rotation strengthens NATO’s Air Shielding.

F-22 Raptor of the F-22 Raptor Demonstration Team – Twitter

Additionally, only about half of the F-22s are typically fully mission capable at any given moment. This is made worse because only about 125 F-22s with combat codes are now in service.

Although it looks like “heel-to-toe” rotations, in which one fighter squadron arrives at Kadena as another departs, Deptula expressed his doubts about this in an interview with the Financial Times.

“They won’t have a heel-to-toe replacement. That’s why they’re doing a rotation. You could supplement by rotating F-22s to help plug that gap, but that [then] stresses that force,” Deptula said.

Even with all of this, it is unclear why the US will choose to evacuate fighter jets from Okinawa, considering China’s growing military activity in the region, particularly in the area bordering Taiwan, where it deploys many aircraft virtually every day.

eurasiantimes.com · by Ashish Dangwal · October 28, 2022


16. Correcting the Record on US Taiwan Policy


Excerpt:


Biden’s promises of intervention do not alter this dual deterrence, because the question was never whether the United States would intervene but when. This is why both Biden and his national security staff can speak with honesty and frankness of a U.S. commitment to Taiwan without changing the structure of long-standing policies. What has changed is Beijing’s more obvious threat to Taipei. As a totalitarian leader, Xi is unlikely to back down from his military threats absent a credible deterrent from Taiwan in coordination with the global coalition of democracies, first of all the United States. Biden’s statements are thus neither unintentional nor embarrassing. They are a vital part of deterring Xi.

Correcting the Record on US Taiwan Policy

The important nuances of “strategic ambiguity” and other elements of U.S. policy are often lost in the headlines.

thediplomat.com · by Ben Lowsen · October 28, 2022

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It is often said most Americans wouldn’t be able to find Taiwan on a map. True or not, we are seeing much more news of the democratic island these days. It is especially on the minds of American leaders. In September, President Joe Biden reiterated U.S. support for Taiwan should the People’s Republic of China attempt an invasion. Then in October, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Gilday each warned of stepped up PRC efforts to force Taiwan’s unification, sparking alarming headlines like “Beijing speeding up plans to seize Taiwan” and “China’s Accelerated Timeline to Take Taiwan Pushing Navy in the Pacific.” For those who have dealt with cross-strait issues for some time, however, these statements aren’t as dramatic as they may appear.

Speaking at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, Blinken said:

There has been a change in the approach from Beijing toward Taiwan in recent years. … Instead of sticking with the status quo that was established in a positive way, [it made] a fundamental decision that the status quo was no longer acceptable and … Beijing was determined to pursue reunification on a much faster timeline. … And if peaceful means didn’t work, then it would employ coercive means and possibly, if coercive means don’t work, maybe forceful means — to achieve its objectives. And that is what is profoundly disrupting the status quo and creating tremendous tensions.

In some sense, Taiwan’s status quo was never acceptable to the PRC, which always insisted that Taiwan and its people were part of one Chinese nation. (Many Taiwanese believed the same, although that number is shrinking.) It would be more appropriate to say that past Chinese leaders had shelved the dispute, not that they had accepted the status quo.

On the other hand, Xi Jinping has clearly changed his country’s policy, effectively “unshelving” the dispute and behaving more aggressively toward Taiwan. His decision to do so is the “much faster timeline” to which Blinken refers. Although I believe this is a fair statement, the reference to a timeline does suggest Xi has a specific date in mind, which is misleading. Xi’s most recent statements show no such plan and are at most mildly more pressing than past pronouncements. Presumably, he would like to absorb Taiwan before his tenure expires, but there is no evidence he has set a certain date and his tenure may be long indeed.

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Xi’s aggressive actions in Hong Kong and against Taiwan have accelerated Taiwan’s alienation from China, all but eliminating any potential for a peaceful settlement in the foreseeable future. Xi has thus painted himself into a corner: If he is to unify Taiwan, it will have to be through military conquest. And although the PLA is improving its capabilities, a military operation to conquer Taiwan would still be an extremely risky operation. It would seem completely counter to China’s interests to launch such an invasion, but ultimately all that matters is whether Xi believes that.

U.S. leaders are right to warn of the threat and help the coalition of democracies and like-minded countries to prepare; however, the important nuances of the situation are too often lost in the headlines.

Biden’s statement in particular merits more thought. It marks the fourth time he has publicly provided an assurance (see herehere, and here for the other instances). The reactions to such pronouncements by the president are at this point predictable: Beijing condemns it, the White House insists U.S. policy has not changed, and commentators claim that the White House is trying to “walk back” the offending statement. Some portray these statements as a new development in relations between the United States, China, and Taiwan. Others point to the president’s statements as “dangerous… gaffes” that create unnecessary tension in China-U.S. relations. Still others claim that in promising to defend Taiwan, the United States has dropped its “strategic ambiguity policy” (here and here).

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Lost in these conversations is what U.S. policy actually is and what terms like “strategic ambiguity” mean. Regardless of one’s position, it pays to ground the debate in authoritative sources and facts.

The outline of modern Taiwan-U.S. relations took shape in the 1972 China-U.S. joint statement, known as the first Shanghai Communique, the result of President Richard Nixon’s opening to China. The U.S. “One China policy” is based on this statement from it:

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.

This is superficially similar to Beijing’s “One China principle” that “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.” But by acknowledging purported Chinese views instead of affirming the One China Principle directly, the United States differentiated its policy. Moreover the insistence on “peaceful settlement” suggested limits on what it might tolerate in terms of China’s behavior toward Taiwan.

The fact that this is a China-U.S. communique shows how much Washington’s Taiwan policy is dependent on its relations with China. Indeed, the United States has at times shown an exaggerated deference on the issue. Some would even say its Taiwan policy is subordinated or “held hostage” to its relations with Beijing. The issue has inspired policies to mitigate the perceived imbalance. When President Jimmy Carter formally shifted diplomatic recognition to the PRC away from the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1979, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in response. The act affirmed that:

It is the policy of the United States… to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

Because of U.S. support stemming from the TRA over the years, China accuses the United States of encouraging “Taiwan independence.” To Xi, the strengthening of a Taiwanese identity separate from that of mainland China, as exemplified by the election of proudly pro-Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, is intolerable. China escalated its malign activity in connection with her election in 2016 and re-election in 2020. But the fact is that American policy has never advocated Taiwan’s independence (and neither has Tsai, for that matter).

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Importantly, there is no significant movement on Taiwan for some declaration of independence beyond maintaining its present government and democratic political system. Xi’s escalations are in response to his own dissatisfaction with Taiwan’s choices, not because the choices themselves have caused some irreparable split between China and Taiwan. Xi’s hostility toward Taiwan and abrogation of China’s agreement to protect Hong Kong’s political status have done far more to alienate Taiwan than Taiwanese or American actions ever could.

We might best categorize U.S. policy as a mixed bag: tough at times but mostly accommodating. For example, even as the Reagan administration sought improved ties with Beijing, the president himself provided greater clarity to Taiwan with his “Six Assurances” in 1982:

U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC differences. It should be clearly understood that the linkage between these two matters is a permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy.

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President George H.W. Bush imposed sanctions on Beijing over its Tiananmen Massacre, but also sought to revitalize economic relations with the Communist government. President Bill Clinton continued to work with Beijing but also sent U.S. aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait during the 1996 crisis as a symbol of resolve. President George W. Bush said the United States would do “whatever it took” to help Taiwan defend itself, while relying on Beijing for support in the U.S. War on Terror. The Obama administration hyped its “Rebalance” to the Pacific and maintained relations with Taiwan. President Donald Trump attempted an ill-fated trade deal with China and took a dim view of Taiwan’s prospects, even as his administration later put pressure on Beijing. Biden has been clearer in affirming that the United States would come to Taiwan’s aid, but also hesitant to employ the U.S. military directly, as in Afghanistan and Ukraine.

We should remember that Biden’s statements on Taiwan have come in response to questions, not as formal policy statement. They represent the current president’s thinking and likely action on the issue. But to the extent that these statements differ from those of past presidents, it is a difference of degree, not of kind. Moreover, he says nothing about the circumstances under which the United States would intervene.

To understand why this is important, we should reexamine the meaning of strategic ambiguity, which Steven M. Goldstein defines as follows:

Strictly speaking, strategic ambiguity is not about whether the United States would intervene should either side upset the present status quo by initiating a cross-strait conflict, as is commonly assumed. Instead, it is about providing conditional clarity regarding the circumstances under which intervention by the United States would be appropriate. It creates a type of “dual deterrence” in which both sides are deterred from endangering the status quo by the possibility of U.S. intervention while at the same time being assured that the other side will not unilaterally seek to change the status quo.

Note that the term “strategic ambiguity” does not appear in official policy but as a descriptor applied by commentators. The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy clarifies:

We will also work with partners inside and outside of the region to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, including by supporting Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, to ensure an environment in which Taiwan’s future is determined peacefully in accordance with the wishes and best interests of Taiwan’s people. As we do so, our approach remains consistent with our One China policy and our longstanding commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.

Biden’s promises of intervention do not alter this dual deterrence, because the question was never whether the United States would intervene but when. This is why both Biden and his national security staff can speak with honesty and frankness of a U.S. commitment to Taiwan without changing the structure of long-standing policies. What has changed is Beijing’s more obvious threat to Taipei. As a totalitarian leader, Xi is unlikely to back down from his military threats absent a credible deterrent from Taiwan in coordination with the global coalition of democracies, first of all the United States. Biden’s statements are thus neither unintentional nor embarrassing. They are a vital part of deterring Xi.

Ben Lowsen

Ben Lowsen is a Sinologist and military strategist. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

thediplomat.com · by Ben Lowsen · October 28, 2022



17. Investigation: Oct. 29 drone attack likely hit Russian frigate Admiral Makarov in Sevastopol




Investigation: Oct. 29 drone attack likely hit Russian frigate Admiral Makarov in Sevastopol

kyivindependent.com · by The Kyiv Independent news desk · October 30, 2022

GeoConfirmed, a group of volunteers that maps Russia's war against Ukraine, published videos showing Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), or ship drones, attacking ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, a port city in Russian-occupied Crimea, on Oct. 29.


One of the published videos shows an alleged attack on a Russian Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate, and "only the Admiral Makarov matches this class for the Black Sea Feet," the investigation says. "The footage stops when the USV seems to impact on the vessel, it likely exploded," the investigation says.

In this video you see the attack on an Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate. According to @CovertShores (9 May 22) only the Admiral Makarov matches this class for the Black Sea fleet.

The footage stops when the USV seems to impact on the vessel, it likely exploded.

Video 08

19/ pic.twitter.com/vIlHCl4aOF
— GeoConfirmed (@GeoConfirmed) October 29, 2022

Another video shows an attack on a Russian "Natya-class minesweeper." According to GeoConfirmed, 6-8 ship drones were used to attack the fleet.

Earlier on Oct. 29, Russia's Defense Ministry blamed Ukraine for sending nine drones to Sevastopol. The ministry claimed that its minesweeper and a dam suffered minor damages as a result of the strike and that its forces had downed all of the drones.

Ukraine's government hasn't commented on the alleged attack.

The strike comes two months after Russian naval headquarters in Sevastopol were targeted multiple times by drone attacks, which caused damage to the buildings on July 31 and Aug. 20.

kyivindependent.com · by The Kyiv Independent news desk · October 30, 2022



18.  Inside a US military cyber team’s defence of Ukraine



Excerpts:

"One of the reasons the Russians may not have been so successful is that the Ukrainians were better prepared," says Gen Hartman.
"There's a lot of pride in the way they were able to defend. A lot of the world thought they would just be run over. And they weren't," says Al, a senior technical analyst who was part of the Ukrainian deployment team. "They resisted."
Ukraine has been subject to continued cyber-attacks which, if successful, could have affected infrastructure. But the country it has continued to defend better than many expected. Ukrainian officials have said that this has been in part thanks to help from allies, including US Cyber Command and the private sector as well as their own growing experience. Now, the US and other allies are turning to the Ukrainians to learn from them.
"We continue to share information with the Ukrainians, they continue to share information with us," explains Gen Hartman. "That's really the whole idea of that enduring partnership."
With Ukrainian and Western intelligence officials expressing concerns that Moscow may respond to recent military setbacks by escalating its cyber-attacks, it is a partnership that may still face further tests.


Inside a US military cyber team’s defence of Ukraine

BBC · by Menu

  • Published
  • 31 minutes ago

Image source, Josef Cole

By Gordon Corera

Security correspondent

Russia failed to take down Ukrainian computer systems with a massive cyber-attack when it invaded this year, despite many analysts' predictions. The work of a little-known arm of the US military which hunts for adversaries online may be one reason. The BBC was given exclusive access to the cyber-operators involved in these global missions.

In early December last year, a small US military team led by a young major arrived in Ukraine on a reconnaissance trip ahead of a larger deployment. But the major quickly reported that she needed to stay.

"Within a week we had the whole team there ready to go hunting," one of the team recalls.

They had come to detect Russians online and their Ukrainian partners made it clear they needed to start work straight away.

"She looked at the situation and told me the team wouldn't leave," Maj Gen William J Hartman, who heads the US Cyber National Mission Force, told the BBC.

"We almost immediately got the feedback that 'it's different in Ukraine right now'. We didn't redeploy the team, we reinforced the team."

Since 2014, Ukraine has witnessed some of the world's most significant cyber-attacks, including the first in which a power station was switched off remotely in the dead of winter.

By late last year, Western intelligence officials were watching Russian military preparations and growing increasingly concerned that a new blizzard of cyber-attacks would accompany an invasion, crippling communications, power, banking and government services, to pave the way for the seizure of power.

The US military Cyber Command wanted to discover whether Russian hackers had already infiltrated Ukrainian systems, hiding deep inside. Within two weeks, their mission became one of its largest deployments with around 40 personnel from across US armed services.

In January they had a front-row seat as Russia began paving the way in cyberspace for a coming invasion in which Ukraine's cyber-defences would be put to an unprecedented test.

Image source, Josef Cole

Image caption,

Maj Gen William J Hartman

The infiltration of computer networks had for many years been primarily about espionage - stealing secrets - but recently has been increasingly militarised and linked to more destructive activities like sabotage or preparation for war.

This means a new role for the US military, whose teams are engaged in "Hunt Forward" missions, scouring the computer networks of partner countries for signs of penetration.

"They are hunters and they know the behaviour of their 'prey'," explains the operator who leads defensive work against Russia.

The US military asked for some operators to remain anonymous and others to be identified only by their first names due to security concerns.

Since 2018, US military operators have been deployed to 20 countries, usually close allies, in Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region. - although not countries like the UK, Germany or France, which have their own expertise and are less likely to need or want outside help.

Most of their work has been battling state-hackers from China and North Korea but Russia has been their most persistent adversary. Some countries have seen multiple deployments, including Ukraine, where for the first time cyber attacks were combined with a full-scale war.

Inviting the US military into your country can be sensitive and even controversial domestically, so many partners ask that the US presence remains secret - the teams rarely wear uniform. But increasingly, governments are choosing to make missions public.

In May, Lithuania confirmed a three-month deployment had just finished working on its defence and foreign affairs networks, prioritised because of concerns over threats from Russia in the wake of the Ukraine invasion.

Croatia hosted the most recent deployment. "The hunt was thorough and successful, and we discovered and prevented malicious attacks on Croatian state infrastructure," Daniel Markić, the head of the country's security and intelligence agency, says.

"We were able to offer the US a new 'hunting ground' for malicious actors and share our experience and acquired knowledge," he adds.

Image source, Josef Cole

Image caption,

The Americans need to convince their hosts they are there to help them and not to spy on them

But warm public statements mask the reality that these missions often begin uneasily.

Even countries allied to the US can be nervous about allowing the US to root around inside sensitive government networks. In fact, revelations from former intelligence contractor Edward Snowden 10 years ago suggested that the US spied on friends as well as enemies.

That suspicion means the young men and women arriving on a mission are often faced with a stern test of their diplomatic skills. They show up at an airport hauling dozens of boxes of mysterious technical equipment and need to quickly build trust to get permission to do something sensitive - install that equipment on the host country's government computer networks to scan for threats.

"That is a pretty scary proposition if you're a host nation," explains Gen Hartman. "You immediately have some concern that we're going to go do something nefarious or it's some super-secret kind of backdoor operation."

Put simply, the Americans need to convince their hosts they are there to help them - and not to spy on them.

"I'm not interested in your emails," is how Mark, who led two teams in the Indo-Pacific region, describes his opening gambit. If a demonstration goes well they can get down to work.

Local partners sometimes sit with US teams around in conference rooms observing closely to make sure nothing untoward is going on. "We have to make sure we convey that trust," says Eric, a 20-year veteran of cyber operations. "Having people sit side-saddle with us is a big factor in developing that."

And although suspicion can never be totally dispelled, a common adversary binds them together.

"The one thing that these partners want is the Russians out of their networks," Gen Hartman recalls one of his team telling him.

US Cyber Command offers an insight into what the Russians, or others, are up to, particularly since it works closely with the National Security Agency, America's largest intelligence agency which monitors communications and cyberspace.

In one case, proof of infiltration came in real-time. One US operator, Chris, who has led multiple European missions, recalls observing someone move suspiciously around the computer network of a partner country.

What was bizarre was that it appeared to be one of the local network administrators the team was working with. That person was standing right behind Chris. Could it be some kind of insider threat?

"Is that you?" Chris asked.

"That is my computer, but I swear that's not me," the administrator responded, transfixed as if watching a movie. Someone had stolen his online identity.

"Finding someone on your network is not a good moment especially when they are using your credentials," Chris recalls. That moment conveyed the reality of the threat and in turn helped secure more access.

Image source, Spc. Craig Jensen

Image caption,

The US operations overseas also helps its military at home

The US teams say they share what they find to allow the local partner to eject Russians (or other state hackers) rather than do it themselves. They also use commercial tools so that local partners can continue after the mission is over.

A good relationship can pay dividends. At the end of one mission, US operators say that local partners handed them a parting gift - a computer disc containing malicious software, or malware, from another network the team had not been inside.

Each mission is different and there are some where an adversary has been found on the very first day of looking, explains Shannon who has led two missions in Europe. But it often takes a week or two to unearth more advanced hackers who have burrowed deeper.

A cat-and-mouse game is often played with hackers from Russian intelligence agencies who are particularly adept at changing tactics.

In 2021, it emerged the Russians had used software from a company called SolarWinds to infiltrate the networks of the customers who bought it, including governments.

US operators began looking for traces of their presence. A tech sergeant in Cyber Command who liked puzzles spotted the way the Russians were hiding their code in one European country, General Hartman says. Unscrambling it, he was able to establish the Russians were hiding on a network. Eight different samples of malicious software, all attributed to Russian intelligence, were then made public to allow industry to improve defences.

Hunting is not an altruistic act by the US military. As well as providing hands-on experience for its teams, it can also help at home. In one mission, a young enlisted cyber operator found the same malware they had discovered in a European country was also present on a US government agency. The US has often struggled to identify and root out vulnerabilities domestically, whether in industry or government, because of overlapping responsibilities between different agencies even as it sends out its operators abroad.

Hunt Forward missions are classed as "defensive" but Gen Paul Nakasone, who leads both the military's Cyber Command and the National Security Agency confirmed offensive missions have also been undertaken against Russia in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine. But he and others declined to provide further detail.

Image source, Unknown

Image caption,

A threatening message appeared on Ukrainian government websites last year

This January, the team in Ukraine were trying to avoid slipping on icy pavements when a series of major cyber-attacks hit. "Be afraid and expect the worst," read a message posted by hackers on the Foreign Ministry website.

The US team watched in real-time as a wave of so-called wiper software, which renders computers unusable, hit multiple government websites.

"They were able to assist in analysing some of the ongoing attacks, and facilitate that information being shared back to partners in the United States," Gen Hartman says.

The aim was to destabilise the country ahead of the February invasion.

By the time Russian troops flooded over the border, the US team had been pulled out. Knowledge of the physical risk for their Ukrainian partners who remained weighed heavily on them.

Hours before the invasion began on 24 February, a cyber-attack crippled a US satellite communications provider that supported the Ukrainian military. Many predicted this would be the start of a wave of attacks to take down key areas like railways. But that did not happen.

"One of the reasons the Russians may not have been so successful is that the Ukrainians were better prepared," says Gen Hartman.

"There's a lot of pride in the way they were able to defend. A lot of the world thought they would just be run over. And they weren't," says Al, a senior technical analyst who was part of the Ukrainian deployment team. "They resisted."

Ukraine has been subject to continued cyber-attacks which, if successful, could have affected infrastructure. But the country it has continued to defend better than many expected. Ukrainian officials have said that this has been in part thanks to help from allies, including US Cyber Command and the private sector as well as their own growing experience. Now, the US and other allies are turning to the Ukrainians to learn from them.

"We continue to share information with the Ukrainians, they continue to share information with us," explains Gen Hartman. "That's really the whole idea of that enduring partnership."

With Ukrainian and Western intelligence officials expressing concerns that Moscow may respond to recent military setbacks by escalating its cyber-attacks, it is a partnership that may still face further tests.

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19.  Biden faces 'unpredictable' era with China's empowered Xi




​The Chinese curse: "May you live in interesting times."


Biden faces 'unpredictable' era with China's empowered Xi

AP · by AAMER MADHANI · October 30, 2022

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Joe Biden’s administration is taking stock of a newly empowered Xi Jinping as the Chinese president begins a third, norm-breaking five-year term as Communist Party leader. With U.S.-Chinese relations already fraught, concerns are growing in Washington that more difficult days may be ahead.

Xi has amassed a measure of power over China’s ruling party unseen since Mao Zedong, the leader from 1949 until his death in 1976. Xi’s consolidation of power comes as the United States has updated its defense and national security strategies to reflect that China is now America’s most potent military and economic adversary.

Biden takes pride in having built rapport with Xi since first meeting him more than a decade ago, when they served as their countries’ vice presidents. But Biden now faces, in Xi, a counterpart buoyed by a greater measure of power and determined to cement China’s superpower status even while navigating strong economic and diplomatic headwinds.

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“We’re not back in the Mao era. Xi Jinping is not Mao,” said Jude Blanchette, chair of China studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “But we are definitely in new territory and unpredictable territory in terms of the stability and predictability of China’s political system.”

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Biden and Xi are expected to hold talks on the sidelines of next month’s Group of 20 summit in Indonesia, a long-anticipated meeting that would come after nearly two years of tense relations. The leaders are dug into winning the upper hand in a competition that both believe will determine which country is the leading global economic and political force driving the next century.

“There’s an awful lot of issues for us to talk to China about,” said National Security Council spokesman John Kirby. He added that U.S. and Chinese officials have been working to arrange a meeting of the leaders, though one has yet to be confirmed. “Some issues are fairly contentious and some should be collaborative,” Kirby said.

Biden and Xi traveled together in the U.S. and China in 2011 and 2012, and they have held five phone or video calls since Biden became president in January 2021. But the U.S.-China relationship has become far more complicated since those getting-to-know-you talks over meals in Washington and on the Tibetan plateau a decade ago.

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As president, Biden has repeatedly taken China to task for human rights abuses against the Uyghur people and other ethnic minorities, Beijing’s crackdowns on democracy activists in Hong Kong, coercive trade practices, military provocations against self-ruled Taiwan and differences over Russia’s prosecution of its war against Ukraine.

Xi’s government has criticized the Biden administration’s posture toward Taiwan — which Beijing looks eventually to unify with the communist mainland — as undermining China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Chinese president also has suggested that Washington wants to stifle Beijing’s growing clout as it tries to overtake the U.S. as the world’s largest economy.

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“External attempts to suppress and contain China may escalate at any time,” Xi warned in his address before the Communist Party congress. “We must therefore be more mindful of potential dangers, be prepared to deal with worst-case scenarios, and be ready to withstand high winds, choppy waters and even dangerous storms.”

Dali Yang, a political scientist at the University of Chicago who researches Chinese politics, said there are some potentially stabilizing developments emerging in the relationship after months of rancor.

Two of China’s best-known diplomats in Washington were elevated at the Communist Party meeting. Foreign Minister Wang Yi was selected for the Communist Party’s Politburo, the policymaking body made up of the 24 most senior officials. China’s ambassador to the U.S., Qin Gang, is joining its central committee. Their elevation should bring a measure of continuity to the U.S.-China relationship, Yang said.

Yang noted there has also been an effort on the part of the Communist Party leadership to “tone down its warm embrace of Russia.” Last month, after meeting with Xi on the sidelines of a summit in Uzbekistan, Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged that Xi had expressed “concern and questions” about the war in Ukraine.

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With his third term confirmed, “in some ways, Xi is now freer to act and less encumbered in terms of no longer having to always watch what his rivals are doing,” Yang said. “I think that actually may affect his approach and may make him more comfortable in dealing with Biden.”

White House officials have played down hopes that Xi’s new five-year hold on the Communist Party could give him breathing room to more fully engage on matters where China has some overlapping interests with the U.S.

Biden, during a meeting with Defense Department officials on Wednesday, stressed that the U.S. was “not seeking conflict” with China. Hours later, Chinese state television reported Xi told members of the national committee on U.S.-China relations that Beijing should find ways to work with Washington on issues of mutual concern.

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The conciliatory moment was short-lived.

The following day, U.S. and Chinese officials were trading rhetorical shots about the U.S. move earlier this month to expand export controls on the sale of advanced semiconductor chips to China.

“The U.S. has overstretched the national security concept and suppressed China’s development, and normal business cooperation has been politicized and weaponized,” Wang Hongxia, counselor at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, told reporters.

Her comments came not long after a top Commerce Department official, Undersecretary Alan Estevez, said at a Washington forum that “if I was a betting person, I would put down money” on the U.S. imposing additional export controls on China.

China’s economy is slowing, with Beijing reporting this month that growth for the first nine months of the year was 3%, putting it on pace to fall well below its official full-year target of 5.5%. The country’s economy is also dragging from strict “zero” COVID rules, and Beijing is confronting a deceleration in exports and home prices that fell to a seven-year low in September.

It also faces increased competition from a U.S. and European Union that are investing tens of billions of dollars to compete on semiconductors and other technologies. All of this points to the possibility that China might not eclipse U.S. gross domestic product by 2030 as many economists have forecast.

Ruchir Sharma, chairman of Rockefeller International, recently concluded that with its likely growth trajectory China would exceed the U.S. economy by 2060, if it manages to do so at all.

At the same time, Secretary of State Antony Blinken as well as the U.S. chief naval operations officer, Adm. Mike Gilday, have recently expressed concern that Beijing may try to step up its timeline to seize Taiwan. Blinken said China had made “a fundamental decision that the status quo was no longer acceptable.”

China has largely refrained from criticizing Russia’s war in Ukraine, but also has held off on supplying Moscow with arms. Still, the conflict has raised concerns in Taiwan that China — which has never controlled the island — might be further emboldened to move on its long-stated plan for unification.

U.S.-China tensions have been further enflamed by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August visit to Taiwan and Biden’s remark in May that the U.S. military would defend Taiwan in case of an attack by China, comments the White House later played down.

“What’s concerning now is that with Xi’s unlimited power and ambition, he may use Taiwan to distract from his internal problems,” said Keith Krach, a former undersecretary of state during the Trump administration. “I hope he’s looked at the courage of the Ukrainians and reckoned that the people of Taiwan are just as courageous, perhaps even more so.”

___

Associated Press writer Josh Boak contributed to this report.

___

Follow AP’s coverage of China at: https://apnews.com/hub/china

AP · by AAMER MADHANI · October 30, 2022




20. How ‘graveyard’ of Russian tanks in Ukraine is upending armour doctrines worldwide & for India


A view from India but with global implications. I think it will be interesting to hear the analysis from the  experts in armored warfare.


How ‘graveyard’ of Russian tanks in Ukraine is upending armour doctrines worldwide & for India

Decimation of Russian tanks suggests heavy armour is no longer enough to dominate the battlefield. The 2nd of a 3-part series on lessons for India’s military from the Ukraine war.

SNEHESH ALEX PHILIP

30 October, 2022 11:10 am IST

theprint.in · by Snehesh Alex Philip · October 30, 2022

New Delhi: What’s the decimation of the feared Russian tanks in Ukraine telling us? Is the tank, along with other armoured fighting vehicles as we’ve known them, headed the same way as the medieval war elephant?

Lately, besides the numerous pictures and videos of burning, exploding or wrecked Russian tanks, we’ve also been witnessing some contrasting sights. Consider these two:

The Tank X drove down a pleasant country lane outside Tallinn, Estonia, this summer, its engine humming like a well-tuned sports car. Soon, its sensors, controlled by artificial intelligence systems, detected a threat and the tank alerted a remote human operator. When the tank got permission to open fire, it trained its Bushmaster 30 mm cannon on the ‘threat’ — a car — and tore it apart. Had a tank crew been on board, they might have felt some satisfaction at the accurate targeting.


Contrast this with a scene from last year. As Indian and Chinese troops facing off on the southern shores of Pangong Tso in Ladakh disengaged, columns of tanks and armoured personnel carriers belched great clouds of smoke into the freezing February air. This, in fact, has been the face of modern war from when Nazi Germany’s armoured columns cut into the Ardennes in 1940.

The decimation of Russian armour in Ukraine — including T-72s and T-90s, which make up more than nine-tenths of the Indian Army’s fleet — has shown that scenes like the one from Pangong Tso might be better suited to a history textbook than the battlefield.

Lightweight, shoulder-fired American-manufactured Javelins, and the Swedish- and British-made New Generation Light Anti-Tank Weapon (NLAW), together with drones, have relentlessly hunted down the king of the battlefield. Over 1,400 Russian tanks are confirmed by independent photographic evidence to have been destroyed, abandoned, or captured — and that’s not counting armoured personnel carriers, infantry combat vehicles, and tracked artillery.

It’s the greatest tank disaster since Israel’s army destroyed the combined forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the Six-Day War of 1967, despite their superior armoured strength.

So, is it the outcome of problems with Russian technology and tactics? Or have tanks themselves become an expensive liability? And what lessons must India draw from new classes of technology as it prepares to fight future wars?

Why Russia’s tanks failed

Experts are divided on why tanks have, well, tanked in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

To some, like military analyst Rob Lee, the problem isn’t so much tanks themselves, as mistakes in employment and planning, and the lack of proper infantry support. The contest between tanks and anti-tank systems, he argues, has been constant. For example, the Soviet Union’s Sagger 9M14 Malyutka wire-guided anti-tank missiles blunted Israeli tank supremacy in the 1973 Yom Kippur war.

Learning from the experience, Israel began producing the heavily armoured Merkava —and insurgents in southern Lebanon learned, in turn, to adapt booby-trapped artillery shells to knock out the tank.

Even though Kyiv is knocking out large masses of Russian armour, it’s still seeking more tanks of its own from the West — knowing they’ll be protected by superior artillery like the United States-made HIMARS and other precision munitions, as well as armour that can defeat Moscow’s existing anti-tank missiles.

For radical strategic thinkers, though, the Ukraine war underlines a fundamental shift in warfare driven by technology. The heavy, expensive military platforms that formed the foundations of militaries in the industrial age, Phillips Payson O’Brien argues, are giving way to nimbler, smarter systems. Together with the fighter jet and the warship, he writes, tanks “are being pushed into obsolescence”.

Graphic: Soham Sen | ThePrint

Like many big arguments about warfighting, there’s no simple answer to this debate. Little doubt exists that the commanders in charge of Russia’s T-72, T-80, and T-90 tanks made serious mistakes. Tank columns choked highways, enabling Ukrainian forces to pick them off. Having destroyed the first and last tank in a column, Ukrainian soldiers could pick off the rest at leisure — almost, as it were, with a drink in hand.

The armoured operation was also unleashed in the pre-winter wet season, known as the rasputitsa, when mud makes armoured movement tough. The Russians should have known this, since the Nazi offensive on Moscow in 1941 stalled for just this reason: “General Mud” and “General Winter”, Red Army soldiers used to joke, were their most reliable commanders.

A third of the over 1,400 Russian tanks independently estimated to have been lost were captured or abandoned — a sign that poor logistics left crews without fuel or spares.

To make things worse, the bulk of tanks Russia has deployed in Ukraine were produced in the 1970s and 1980s. Even though they have been modernised with explosive reactive armour, designed to mitigate threats from shoulder-fired missiles, the tanks remain vulnerable to systems with tandem warheads, like the Javelins and NLAWs. Russian tanks are especially vulnerable to missiles which target their turrets from above, because of design flaws in the ways in which their ammunition-loading systems are configured.

Graphic: Soham Sen | ThePrint

Western tanks, like the United States’ Abrams main battle tank, are already being equipped with active protection systems to defeat incoming missiles and fight off drones. Israel’s latest tank, the Merkava 5, includes protection systems capable of fighting off the country’s own state-of-the-art Spike anti-tank missile.

While acknowledging that tanks indeed face an existential threat, serving Indian Army officers and experts in India that ThePrint spoke to believe it’s too early to write them off.

Former mechanised infantry officer Maj. Gen. Yash Mor (Retd) argues that while Western technology has exposed vulnerabilities of Russian-designed tanks, tactical innovation can help. “You will have to have electronic eyes and ears ahead of your forces to detect threats,” Mor says.

Graphic: Soham Sen | ThePrint

Lt Gen. Vinod Bhatia (Retd) concurs. “Armour tactics will obviously have to change,” he says, “but the psychological impact of a tank can’t be wished away.”

To some, though, the problem isn’t the tactics or the weapons Russia used: It is the tank itself.

Reimagining the tank

The AI-powered Type-X Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV) — dubbed Tank X — developed by Estonia-based Milrem Robotics, is just one of many projects worldwide that are bringing artificial intelligence and unmanned technologies to fighting vehicles.

Tanks without crews don’t need heavy armour protection, allowing for gains in mobility and speed. The United States military says it doesn’t know, for certain, what the next generation of its Abrams main battle tank will look like — but there are many experiments underway, involving multiple kinds of sensors, protective systems, and integration with drones.

In tests carried out in California earlier this summer, the United States Defense Advance Research Project Agency established that unmanned off-road vehicles were approaching the capabilities of trained drivers. Testing is also underway of robots that can autonomously protect landing zones, engage enemies ahead of human troops, and sabotage forward airfields.

A technologist involved in the experiments described the new generation of combat technologies as “lightning in a bottle”: “This thing was light, it was agile, and it was lethal.”

Future tanks could also become hubs at the centre of multiple kinds of robotic vehicles, missiles, and airborne platforms. Israel’s Elbit Systems in June this year unveiled one such vehicle that will go into testing next year. An unarmed version of Tank X served with French forces fighting jihadists in Mali, back in 2019.

For some military thinkers, however, endlessly upgrading tanks to cope with new threats seems a pointless enterprise. The tank was designed to defeat a very specific military challenge that emerged at the dawn of the industrial era — the machine gun. Post-industrial technology offers new means to do what the tank does, but cheaper and better.

The United States Marine Corps is simply dumping its tanks, replacing them with lightweight high-technology equipment, such as more drones and precision-guided missiles, even though the US Army still believes in tanks. That radical approach, though, is a step too far for most forces in the West — leave alone India.

The future of India’s tanks

Led by Gen. Krishnaswami Sundarji, the Indian Army began planning in the mid-1980s for wars where fast-moving armoured formations would cut deep into Pakistan. Gen. Sundarji’s war planning was the result of painful lessons learned in past wars.

But even though the great India-Pakistan tank battles of 1965 are celebrated, their outcomes were less than decisive, Amarinder Singh and Tajindar Shergill have shown.

Singh and Shergill are sharply critical of some Indian commanders who, they claim, operated without focus, like “a fire brigade that heard of imaginary fires here, there and everywhere”. Former Pakistani military officer Agha Amin’s history of India-Pakistan armoured engagements also has also shown that they yielded stalemates, not breakthroughs.

The vulnerabilities of its largely Russian fleet now shown up in stark relief, should India invest in more or better? Or explore the possibilities offered by new technologies?

In the short term, the Army is seeking to address its most pressing gap — unmanned aerial vehicles. Two sets of swarm drones were acquired by the Armoured Corps and the Mechanised Infantry in August this year. The AI-based recognition systems in these drones enable them to autonomously recognise targets like tanks, guns, vehicles, and humans. The information is relayed back to a control station, where human operators can order appropriate responses.

Like other militaries, however, the Indian Army is also rethinking what the armoured warfare of the future might look like. It is committed to acquiring 1,700 Future-Ready Combat Vehicles (FCRVs) — a new platform that will be able to engage with the large tank fleets of both China and Pakistan. Among other things, FRCV planners are considering a turret-less tank that is integrated with its own drone swarms and anti-drone electronics.

The Army has also launched Project Zorawar to develop a light tank weighing 25 tonnes or less that can operate in the Himalayas. The Zorawar, like the FRCV, will be empowered with artificial intelligence systems, as well as integrated with drones.

FRCVs are scheduled for induction in 2030 — an ambitious target, given that the Army is yet to even finalise exactly what it wants. Even if the Army makes a conceptual decision tomorrow, seven years is a short time to design, test, and manufacture the FRCV.

The prototype of the Arjun main battle tank — which even today remains controversial, because of its weight and a slew of other technology issues — was first revealed in 1985. The production version Arjun 1A, though, was only cleared for induction into the Army in 2018.

Even more fundamental than the question of what kinds of tanks India will need, then, is the kinds of wars India might fight.

“A single anti-tank guided missile can hold back an entire regiment of tanks in a narrow Himalayan pass,” notes Lt Gen. D.S. Hooda (Retd), former commander of the Army’s Northern Command.

In the decades since the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, the plains where tank battles were fought have become densely built up, with villages growing into towns and cities. That means there will be limited room for armoured manoeuvre — and that large-scale artillery bombardments could have unacceptable human costs for both countries.

“From the Chenab River down to Ganganagar, the urban build has become incredibly thick,” says Lt Gen. Rakesh Sharma (Retd), former Corps Commander of the Leh-based 14 Corps. “One would have to flatten entire cities with artillery barrages to allow tank formations to move forward. The human geography of the battlefield is not what it was 30 years ago.”

Each age creates its own weapons. The tank was designed as a response to specific challenges that emerged in the late 19th century. The machine gun had mired troops in trench warfare, and the tank was created to make wars of manoeuvre possible again. Together with the battleship and the bomber, the tank might face its final defeat at the hands of post-industrial technology.

(Edited by Asavari Singh)

theprint.in · by Snehesh Alex Philip · October 30, 2022





De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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