Quotes of the Day:

“But to my surprise no studies have looked at the [Civil Rights] Movement through the prism of its similarity to military operations. A search of the American Historical Association’s database of doctoral dissertations in recent decades found more than 250 that studied the American Civil rights movement, but none that looked at the movement in this way.

Given that the civil rights movement relied heavily on nonviolent approaches, it may seem surprising or even jarring to think of it in military terms. Yet participants in the Movement often invoked the analogy. James Lawson, a key figure in developing the Movement’s philosophy and tactics and in training a cadre of influential leaders, once commented, “Protracted struggle is a moral struggle that is like warfare, moral warfare.” Another activist, Charles Sherrod of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, in looking back, said, “It was a war. Though it was a non-violent war, but it was indeed a war.” Cleveland Sellers said of the 1964 Freedom Summer campaign in Mississippi, it was almost like a shorter version of probably the Vietnam War.” And remember that the central tactic of the Movement – the march – is also the most basic of military operations. Indeed, even in war, marching sometimes is the more decisive than violence. For example, Napoleon observed that his great victory at Ulm in 1805 was achieved not by arms but by legs, as his foot soldiers outmaneuvered his Austrian foe.”

-Thomas E. Ricks in Waging A Good War – A Military History of the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1968 (2022)

"All tyrannies rule through fraud and force, but once the fraud is exposed they must rely exclusively on force."

-George Orwell

"The harshest tyranny is that which acts under the protection of legality and the banner of justice." 

- Montesquieu 

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 6 (Putin's War)

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (06.11.22) CDS comments on key events

3. Special Operations News Update - Nov 7, 2022 | SOF News

4. Xi Jinping has secured his power at home. Now he's stepping back out on the international stage

5. Refurbished Soviet tanks, HAWK missiles and more Phoenix Ghost drones coming soon to Ukraine

6. How the U.S. Navy Can Compete with China in the Gray-Zone

7. UK PM Rishi Sunak to take big step against China, may shut Confucius Institutes

8.  Opinion | I helped fight terrorists at the CIA. I have some advice for the GOP.

9. Watch a lone Ukrainian paratrooper single-handedly knock out a Russian tank

10. Putin Fires Back: Why the Ukraine War Will Get Even Bloodier

11. Buy Artillery Or Buy Coffins: The Russian Marine Corps’ Dire Choice As Its Troops Die In Record Numbers

12.  [ANALYSIS] Experts see growing chances for arms control talks amid NK's rising belligerence

13. Why Dictators are Afraid of Girls: Rethinking Gender and National Security

14. Why Japan Is Gearing Up for Possible War With China

15. Teaching Irregular Warfare in the Era of Strategic Competition

16. David or Goliath? How Thinking Like a Small Nation Can Help Counter China

17. Special Ops Applies Ukraine Lessons to Indo-Pacific

18. US Special Forces will showcase first ever live fire of airdropped cruise missiles off Northern Norway

19. Biden’s ‘consequences’ for Saudi Arabia are reaping quiet results

20. Are We Living in the Modern Day Middle Ages? | A Conversation with Milo Jones

21. The power of inaction in Ukraine

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 6 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on November 6:

• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin confirmed on November 6 that the Wagner Group is creating training and management centers for local “people’s militias” in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts.[18]
• Russian milbloggers amplified reports that the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade sustained severe losses during the recent offensive push towards Pavlivka, Donetsk Oblast.[19]
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the direction of Svatove and Kreminna.[20]
• Russian opposition sources reported that Ukrainian shelling near Makiivka, Luhansk Oblast may have killed up to 500 Russian mobilized personnel in one day.[21]
• Russian forces continued establishing defensive positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[22] Ukrainian forces continued their interdiction campaign against Russian logistics in Kherson Oblast.[23]
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar.[24] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces broke through Ukrainian defenses near Bakhmut, made marginal gains south of Avdiivka, and remained impaled near Pavliivka in western Donetsk Oblast.[25]
• Ukrainian personnel repaired two external power lines to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on November 5, resuming the supply of electricity to the ZNPP after shelling deenergized the facility on November 3.[26]
• Russian occupation officials continued to cite the threat of a Ukrainian strike on the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station to justify the continued forced relocation of civilians in Kherson Oblast.[27]
• Russian occupation officials continued to forcibly transfer Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia under the guise of “vacation” schemes.[28]
• Russian forces continued to struggle with domestic resistance to and poor provisioning of ongoing mobilization efforts.[29]

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 6

Nov 6, 2022 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Kateryna Stepanenko and Mason Clark

November 6, 7:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, November 6. This report discusses the recent reduction of nuclear threats by key Kremlin figures and the likely role of Russia’s military leadership and the international community in prompting this change, and the risks of further Russian nuclear saber rattling.

Key Kremlin officials began collectively deescalating their rhetoric regarding the use of nuclear weapons in early November. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) released a statement on “the prevention of nuclear war” on November 2, stating that Russia “is strictly and consistently guided by the postulate of the inadmissibility of a nuclear war in which there can be no winners, and which must never be unleashed.” The Russian MFA also stated that it is committed to the reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons.[1] Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on October 27 that Russia has no need to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine and claimed Russia has never discussed the possibility of using nuclear weapons, only “hinting at the statements made by leaders of Western countries.”[2] The deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, has similarly increasingly downplayed the fiery nuclear rhetoric he used throughout October and is now focusing on promoting Russian unity in the war in Ukraine.[3]

Putin and key Kremlin officials had increased their references to the use of nuclear weapons from Putin’s September 30 annexation speech and throughout October, likely to pressure Ukraine into negotiations and to reduce Western support for Kyiv. Putin made several general references to nuclear weapons in his September 30 speech but avoided directly threatening the use of nuclear weapons.[4] Putin’s rhetoric during this speech and throughout October was consistent with his previous nuclear threats and failed to generate the degree of fear within the Ukrainian government that the Kremlin likely intended.[5] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Chief Kyrylo Budanov stated on October 24 that the Russian nuclear threat has remained at the same level even prior to the start of the war.[6] The Kremlin also escalated its nuclear rhetoric after Russian military failures in Kharkiv Oblast and during Ukrainian counteroffensives in Lyman and northern Kherson Oblast in early October. The Kremlin likely continued its thinly veiled nuclear threats to deflect from their military and mobilization problems and to intimidate Ukraine’s Western partners.

The Kremlin’s rhetorical shift indicates that senior Russian military commanders and elements of the Kremlin are likely to some extent aware of the massive costs for little operational gain Russia would incur for the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine or NATO. The New York Times, citing senior US officials, reported that senior Russian defense officials discussed the conditions for nuclear use against the backdrop of growing nuclear narratives in mid-October.[7] The meeting reportedly did not involve Putin. Putin’s illegal September 30 annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts, much of whichRussian forces do not occupy, likely overcomplicated existing Russian military doctrine. Russian nuclear doctrine clearly allows for nuclear weapons use in response to “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy,” which the Kremlin could conceivably apply to Ukrainian advances into claimed ”Russian” territory in Ukraine.[8] All of the current frontlines fall within claimed Russian territory, andPutin has not publicly defined what now constitutes an attack on Russian territory. It is possible that senior Russian military officials are equally confused about the application of Putin’s annexation order to existing military doctrine. ISW previously reported that Putin’s annexation order was likely a polarizing issue that ignited a fracture within the Kremlin, creating pro-war and pro-negotiations factions.[9] US officials also noted that they have not observed any indicators that Russia has moved its nuclear weapons or undertaken any preparatory steps to prepare for a strike.[10]

Kremlin-run television shows still air the occasional nuclear threat, which are common in Russia’s jingoistic domestic information space. For example, Russia’s State Duma Committee Chairman on Defense, Andrey Kartapolov, briefly discussed nuclear threats on Russian state TV on November 5 despite the general softening of the Kremlin’s narrative.[11] Russian state TV (alongside some populist figures) have previously amplified nuclear threats prior to Russian military failures in the autumn, and their rhetorical flourishes should not be misconstrued as indicators of the Kremlin’s official position. Figures such as the late Russian ultra-nationalist and then leader of the Liberal Democratic Party Vladimir Zhirinovsky made regular and outlandish nuclear threats on Russian state broadcasts for years, even threatening to drop a ”little” nuclear bomb on the residence of then-Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in 2018.[12] The Russian milblogger community largely did not interact with these nuclear narratives and continued to criticize that Russian military command for its conventional battlefield failures. Russian propagandists will continue to make these threats as a way of reminding domestic audiences of Russia’s might amidst clear military failures on the frontlines.

The Kremlin likely privately clarified its nuclear policies to deescalate with the United States and its allies. US and allied officials reported that US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has been in contact with Putin’s foreign policy advisor Yuri Ushakov and Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev in an effort to reduce the risk of nuclear use.[13] The Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Andrey Kelin, also noted on October 26 that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu made several calls to his counterparts, reportedly assuring them that Russia is uninterested in using nuclear weapons in the war.[14] China might have also played a role in pressuring the Kremlin to reduce its nuclear threats. Chinese President Xi Jinping stated on November 4 that “the international community should… jointly oppose the use or threats to use nuclear weapons, advocate that nuclear weapons must not be used and nuclear wars must not be fought, in order to prevent a nuclear crisis in Eurasia.”[15] Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe likely expressed a similar notion to Shoigu during an October 26 call.[16]

The Kremlin may conduct future rhetorical nuclear brinksmanship in an effort to prompt the United States and its allies to pressure Ukraine to negotiate; the Kremlin will be unable to directly force Kyiv to negotiate through nuclear threats. ISW continues to assess that Russian nuclear use in Ukraine remains unlikely and that the Kremlin is currently taking steps to deescalate its nuclear rhetoric. The Kremlin’s nuclear threats failed to undermine Ukrainian political and societal will to continue to oppose Russia’s invasion. As ISW wrote on September 30, “Ukraine and its international backers have made clear that they will not accept negotiations at gunpoint and will not renounce Ukraine’s sovereign right to its territories.”[17] The United States and its allies should not undermine Ukraine’s continued dedication to recapturing all Russian-occupied territory and halting Russia's genocidal invasion.

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on November 6:

• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin confirmed on November 6 that the Wagner Group is creating training and management centers for local “people’s militias” in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts.[18]
• Russian milbloggers amplified reports that the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade sustained severe losses during the recent offensive push towards Pavlivka, Donetsk Oblast.[19]
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the direction of Svatove and Kreminna.[20]
• Russian opposition sources reported that Ukrainian shelling near Makiivka, Luhansk Oblast may have killed up to 500 Russian mobilized personnel in one day.[21]
• Russian forces continued establishing defensive positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[22] Ukrainian forces continued their interdiction campaign against Russian logistics in Kherson Oblast.[23]
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar.[24] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces broke through Ukrainian defenses near Bakhmut, made marginal gains south of Avdiivka, and remained impaled near Pavliivka in western Donetsk Oblast.[25]
• Ukrainian personnel repaired two external power lines to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on November 5, resuming the supply of electricity to the ZNPP after shelling deenergized the facility on November 3.[26]
• Russian occupation officials continued to cite the threat of a Ukrainian strike on the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station to justify the continued forced relocation of civilians in Kherson Oblast.[27]
• Russian occupation officials continued to forcibly transfer Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia under the guise of “vacation” schemes.[28]
• Russian forces continued to struggle with domestic resistance to and poor provisioning of ongoing mobilization efforts.[29]

[1] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1836575/

[2] https://www dot kommersant dot ru/doc/5634719; https://tass dot ru/politika/16176049

[6] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/articles/2022/10/24/7373160

[8] https://globalsecurityreview.com/nuclear-de-escalation-russias-deterrenc...; https://rusemb dot org dot uk/press/2029#:~:text=25.,with%20the%20Collective%20Security%20Treaty.

[12] https://lenta dot ru/news/2018/02/05/bomba/

[15] https://www dot cmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3198505/no-nuclear-weapons-over-ukraine-chinese-president-xi-jinping-says-clear-message-russia

[29] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1589263903053475840; https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/12432; https://t.me/astrapress/15284; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-nov-4-5; https://74 dot ru/text/world/2022/11/04/71789159/; https://www.chita dot ru/text/society/2022/11/03/71786258/; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/sered-rosiiskykh-chastkovo-mobilizovanykh-u-bilorusi-spalakh-zakhvoriuvan-cherez-nedotrymannia-sanitarnykh-umov.html; https://vk dot com/wall-62488888_1140420; https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/12426; https://t.me/astrapress/14640; https://t.me/astrapress/15307; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/14523

understandingwar.org

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (06.11.22) CDS comments on key events

Dear subscribers,

Please note that because of power outages in Kyiv (due to Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure), our briefs might be delayed or missing some parts you get used to.

Please find attached the CDS Daily Brief on Russia's war against Ukraine. 

Kind regards, 

CDS Team

CDS Daily brief (06.11.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

The Ukrainian National portal “Children of the war” reports that 10,570 Ukrainian children have been deported to Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion.

Power outage schedules have been introduced in Kyiv and 7 Ukrainian Oblasts on Sunday, November 6, Ukrenergo power generation company informed.

Russian military continues shelling Ukrainian cities at night and during the day. Information on the consequences is provided by respective Military State Administrations.

-             The Russian army shelled seven towns and villages in Donetsk Oblast yesterday. 18 residential buildings, an administrative building of the city territorial community, a business and a car were destroyed or damaged. On November 5, the troops of the Russian Federation killed one civilian and injured three others.

-             At night, the Russian forces hit Zaporizhzhia with S-300 missiles. The building of a commercial enterprise was destroyed. The son of the enterprise’s owners died.

-              5 communities came under fire from the Russian territory in the northern Sumy Oblast. No victims were reported. Later, on November 6, 72 shells fired from the Russian territory landed in the Vorozhba community of Sumy Oblast. A local 62-year-old woman who was in the garden during the shelling was killed by shrapnel. Another local resident was injured.

-             In Chernihiv Oblast, 2 communities got shelled during the previous day. No victims or damages were reported.

-              In Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, the Russian forces shelled Myrove, Marhanets, and Nikopol communities at night. A 9-year-old girl was injured late in the evening in Myrove community. 5 houses, farm buildings, several cars and a gas line were damaged.

-              Russian troops continued shelling the territories of Kupyansk, Kharkiv and Chuhuyiv districts of Kharkiv Oblast, adjacent to the contact line and the border with the Russian Federation. According to preliminary data, there were no casualties.

-              In Mykolaiv Oblast, the Russian military shelled a village in the Halytsyniv community at night.

An industrial infrastructure object was hit. There are no casualties.

-              72 shells fired from the Russian territory landed in the Vorozhba community of Sumy Oblast on November 6. A local 62-year-old woman who was in the garden during the shelling was killed by shrapnel. Another local resident was injured.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Health published the latest data on the destruction of medical institutions that occurred as a result of the full-scale Russian aggression. During the eight months of the war, 1,100 medical facilities were damaged, of which 144 were completely destroyed. As

of November 1, Ukraine has fully restored 95 medical facilities and 204 facilities had been partially restored.

30 municipal stationary warm-up locations are being organized in Vinnytsia in Western Ukraine in case there is no electricity and heat. They will be located in libraries, youth clubs, and schools in different areas of the city. Electricity generators and heaters have already been procured, the Vinnytsya Municipal Council reported.

Over the past three months, 135,000 people have moved from the war zones. Roughly, up to half a million people are yet expected to move. At least 400,000 people can move during the winter period, Iryna Vereshchuk, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine, said.

The full-scale war has already affected 20% of nature reserves and 3 million hectares of forests in Ukraine, the World Wildlife Fund WWF-Ukraine said.

Occupied territories:

Kherson and 10 other towns and villages in Kherson Oblast are left without electricity and water supplies because the Russian forces cut the high-voltage transmission line, First Deputy Chairman of the Kherson Regional Council Yury Sobolevskyi reported. Sobolevskiy said that the occupying authorities blamed a terrorist act, although eye witnesses say that it was the Russian forces who did this.

According to the legally elected Ukrainian mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov, during the past week, Russian occupying forces allowed a total of 906 people to leave the occupied parts of Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and move to Zaporizhzhia city which is under the Ukrainian control. To leave the occupied territories, people have to apply for a permit. It usually takes up to a month to obtain one due to the large number of those who want to leave. In Melitopol, the application slots are taken until mid-December.

In the temporarily occupied Melitopol, the Russian occupying authorities form “Yunarmiya” (Youth Army) detachments, Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov said. This organization operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and is supposed to provide young people with basic military training. The children are prepared to serve in “volunteer battalions” Fedorov said.

Operational situation

(Please note that this section of the Brief is mainly on the previous day's (November 5) Developments)

It is the 256th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to defend Donbas"). The enemy tries to maintain control over the temporarily captured territories,

concentrates its efforts on disrupting the counteroffensive actions of the Ukrainian troops, and conducts the offensive in the Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Novopavlivka directions.

Over the past day, units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled Russian attacks in the areas around Zybyne of Kharkiv Oblast, Bilohorivka of Luhansk Oblast; Andriivka, Bakhmutske, Berestove, Mayorsk, Makiivka, Maryinka, Ozaryanivka, Opytne, Pavlivka, Yakovlivka and Yampolivka in Donetsk Oblast and Shcherbaky in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Over the past day, the Russian forces have launched 4 missile strikes and 19 air strikes and fired over 75 MLRS rounds. Areas around more than 35 towns and villages were hit by the Russian fire in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Mykolaiv Oblasts. Near the state border, Mykolaivka and Senkivka in Chernihiv Oblast, Studenok in Sumy Oblast, Bilohorivka, Budarky, Zybyne, Krasne, Odnorobivka, Okhrymivka, Starytsia, Strilecha, and Udy in Kharkiv Oblast were shelled.

Over the past day, the aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces made 7 strikes against the enemy. 6 areas of enemy weapons and military equipment concentration and an anti-aircraft missile systems position were hit. The Ukrainian air defense units shot down 4 UAVs.

Over the past day, Ukrainian missile and artillery forces hit one Russian command post, 7 areas of weapons and military equipment concentration, 1 ammunition depot, and 3 other important Russian military targets.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Kharkiv direction

• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the

RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.

The Russian military fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the areas of Berestove, Vyshneve, Kotlyarivka of Kharkiv Oblast, Nevske in Luhansk Oblast, and Lyman and Torske of Donetsk Oblast.

On November 5, Ukrainian troops continued their counteroffensive on the Svatove-Kreminna line. They advanced in the direction of Kreminna, stormed Kuzemivka, repulsed the Russian attack on Bilohorivka, and forced the Zherebets River west of Svatove. The Ukrainian forces also

probed Russian positions on the Kuzemivka-Kolomiychikha line. The Russian military is trying to maintain its positions in the Yahidne - Orlyanka area. Units of the Defense Forces are regrouping in this area after an unsuccessful assault on Yahidne.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military shelled the areas around Andriyivka, Bakhmut, Bakhmutske, Bilohorivka, Verkhnokamianske, Ivanivka, Klishchiivka, Mayorsk, Opytne, Soledar, Spirne, Yakovlivka, Avdiivka, Krasnohorivka, Maryinka, Nevelske, Novomykhailivka, Opytne and Pervomaiske with tanks and artillery.

On November 5, the occupying forces continued offensive actions around Bakhmut. They were repulsed by the Ukrainian Joint Forces near Spirne, Bakhmutske, Ivanhrad, Klishchiivka, Ozaryanivka, and Mayorsk. Russian troops stormed Ukrainian positions northeast of Bakhmut in the Verkhnokamyanske area.

Ukrainian forces constantly rotate units south of Bakhmut in the areas of Ivanhorod and Vesela Dolyna in order to deter the attacks "Wagner" PMC units advancing in the direction of Opytne.

Russian troops repelled Ukrainian counterattack south of Bakhmut near Opytne and Kurdyumivka. Ukrainian troops, however, continue to restrain the Russian troops south of Bakhmut near Ivanhrad, Odradivka, Vesela Dolyna and Zaitseve. They are preparing for urban combat in Bakhmut itself.

Russian troops continued their offensive in the Avdiyivka-Donetsk area, but Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks near Kamianka and in the radius of 35 km southwest of Avdiyivka near Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Maryinka, and Novomykhailivka. Russian troops also tried to advance to the southwest from Avdiyivka to Kostyantynivka but failed. The Ukrainian Joint Forces also repelled the Russian attack on Pavlivka.

Zaporizhzhia direction

● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military shelled positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the areas of Bohoyavlenka, Velyka Novosilka, Vodyane, Vuhledar, Vremivka, Pavlivka, and Prechystivka in Donetsk Oblast, Zaliznychne, Olhivske, Shcherbaky, and Yuryivka in Zaporizhia Oblast.

On November 5, the Russian forces continued to carry out air, missile and artillery strikes west of Hulyaipole, striking Nikopol in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Vilniansk in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

Tavriysk direction

-   Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 39, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7,5 km;

-  Deployed BTGs of: the 8th and 49th Combined Arms Armies; 11th, 103rd, 109th, and 127th rifle regiments of the mobilization reserve of the 1st Army Corps of the Southern Military District; 35th and 36th Combined Arms Armies of the Eastern Military District; 3rd Army Corps of the Western Military District; 90th tank division of the Central Military District; the 22nd Army Corps of the Coastal Forces; the 810th separate marines brigade of the Black Sea Fleet; the 7th and 76th Air assault divisions, the 98th airborne division, and the 11th separate airborne assault brigade of the Airborne Forces.

Areas of more than 25 towns and villages along the contact line were hit by the Russian fire.

The Russian military continued to build defensive positions along the Dnipro River. They build robust strongholds with firing positions on the eastern bank of the Dnipro, plant mines on the left bank, and prepare Nova Kakhovka for urban combat by mining underground communication lines such as sewers. They continue to destroy civilian vessels and have already destroyed more than 50 vessels.

Russian occupying forces continue to forcibly move the population from the temporarily occupied territories of Kherson Oblast. The population of the right bank of the Dnipro River, as well as the 15-kilometer zone of the left bank, is subject to the so-called "evacuation". According to available information, local residents are being taken from Zavodivka to the temporarily occupied territory of the Republic of Crimea, with further resettlement to the Russian Federation.

On November 5, the occupying authorities sent messages to subscribers of Russian mobile operators in Kherson warning them about the alleged preparation of massive shelling by the Armed Forces of Ukraine and appealing to them to leave the right-bank part of the city as soon as possible. At the same time, the occupiers destroy the towers of Ukrainian mobile operators in some locations.

According to the updated information, the strikes on the Russian forces in the temporarily occupied territories of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts in the previous days were confirmed. Thus, in the village of Chulanivka, Kherson Oblast, an attack was made on the area where an occupying unit was concentrated. The headquarters of one of the units of the armed forces of the Russian Federation was hit in the village of Basan, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and up to 10 units of military equipment and about fifty servicemen were destroyed. In the areas of Polohy and Marfopil, 20 units of military equipment were destroyed and up to 80 servicemen of the Russian occupation forces were wounded.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.

Due to worsening weather conditions, the Russian fleet returned part of the ships to their base points and keeps only 3 ships at sea. They are located along the southwestern coast of Crimea. There is not a single Kalibr cruise missile carrier among them. Nevertheless, a rapid build-up of surface and underwater Kalibr missile carriers in the sea launch areas is possible.

In the Sea of Azov waters, 6 enemy patrol ships and boats are located on the approaches to the Mariupol and Berdyansk seaports to block the Azov coast.

Russian aviation continues to fly from the Crimean airfields of Belbek and Hvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 10 combat aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved. The airplanes, in particular, constantly monitor the area of the grain corridor.

Meanwhile, the statement of the Russian Ministry of Defense that Ukraine used the port of Odesa, the grain corridor, and ships with grain to launch combat drones on October 29 was not confirmed. Even Russian bloggers and experts report this. Analysis of a possible operation scenario shows that this area of the sea does not ensure the implementation of the main feature of drones, i.e. covert deployment. Also, the attack distance (by 30%) and the risk of collision of drones with ships in the sea area in the northwestern part of the Black Sea, where navigation existed at the time, also increase. Also, the statement made by Putin personally that 500 tons of explosives were carried by the 6-meter drone (the maximum possible weight with such dimensions is several hundred kg) and the presence of tracking equipment in the navigation unit of the kamikaze drone (there is no need for such a function) also appear absurd.

In Odesa Oblast, the night of November 5 to 6 passed without air raid warning signals and without shelling. On the Kinburn spit, located a few kilometers from Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast, an enemy grouping was destroyed. In addition to the personnel of the occupying forces who were stationed there, there is information that it was the base from which the Iranian kamikaze "Shahed-136" drones were launched over the south of Ukraine, particularly over Odesa.

"The Grain initiative": The G7 countries hope to continue the work of the "grain corridor" regarding the export of Ukrainian agricultural products. "We strongly support the UN Secretary General's call for the continuation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which has led to a decrease in world food prices. We call on Russia to heed the call of the Secretary General," the document says. It is noted that the G7 in turn implements other vital international initiatives, including the Global Alliance for Food Security (GAFS) and the EU-led Pathways of Solidarity. The group also wants to speed up work to get fertilizers to the most vulnerable and calls on the G20 to support these efforts.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 06.11

Personnel - almost 75,930 people (+490);

Tanks 2,765 (+7)

Armored combat vehicles – 5,611 (+10);

Artillery systems – 1,781 (+5);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 391 (0); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 202 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 4,191 (+7); Aircraft - 277 (0);

Helicopters – 260 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,465 (+3); Intercepted cruise missiles - 399 (0);

Boats / ships - 16 (0).

Ukraine, general news

Next year, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine will direct almost 90% of all taxes and fees paid by citizens and businesses to the defense and security of Ukraine, Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal said. In particular, it is planned to allocate UAH 1.1 trillion to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and security, almost UAH 450 billion will be directed to social programs and pensions. UAH 176 billion is planned to be allocated to health care and UAH 156 billion to education. It is planned to finance the deficit of more than 20% of GDP with the support of international partners.

In Rivne, the memory of the Jews executed by the Nazis in 1941 in the Sosonka hollow was commemorated, the Rivne City Council reported. Every year on November 6 and 7, Rivne residents and guests remember with sorrow the events when more than 17 thousand Jews of Rivne fell victim to the largest mass shooting of Jews in the region during the Holocaust. Today,

the mayor of Rivne Oleksandr Tretyak, local government representatives, the Jewish community, commemorated the victims.

International diplomatic aspect

The Washington Post reported that the US is privately encouraging Ukraine to signal an openness to negotiate with Russia. Though the Biden Administration reiterates its unwavering support for Ukraine and that it's up to the Ukrainian nation to decide when and on what conditions to start peace talks, there're some concerns that should be taken into account. "Ukraine fatigue is a real thing for some of our partners," said an unnamed US official meaning some Europeans and even more representatives of the developing world that are indirectly suffering from the Russian war.

The official rhetoric hasn't changed, though, "the Kremlin continues to escalate this war. The Kremlin had demonstrated its unwillingness to seriously engage in negotiations since even before it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine."

However, there has been a new wave of calls on Ukraine to employ diplomacy recently. It's strange, but all those who are "worrying" about Ukrainians are calling on Ukrainians to compromise with Russia or urging Western governments to push Ukraine towards a diplomatic "solution" by reducing security aid. The "peacemakers" ignore that Putin has shown no sign of willingness to stop his brutal war. Quite the opposite. The Kremlin conducted the so-called partial mobilization, throwing draftees into the hell of war without proper preparation. The defense industry was boosted to produce more weapons, and Moscow begged for help from Iran and North Korea. Any ceasefire now means Russia will be holding more favorable positions for the future assault. The European "pacifists" don't consider that Vladimir Putin has broken all existing norms and principles of international law, and anyone thinking soberly wouldn't believe a word of his assurances. Those who can't "bear" the sufferings of Ukrainians anymore tend to ignore that crimes committed by Russia can't be tolerated, forgiven, or forgotten. The "appeasers" are happily ignoring that in the Russian view, this war is between the West and Russia, while Ukraine is just one of the battlegrounds.

"We do not consider statements that deepen the military conflict to be correct. Instead of such statements, an immediate ceasefire and peace negotiations are necessary," Hungarian Foreign Ministry responded to Putin's statement that Poland, Romania, and Hungary might also have territorial claims against Ukraine. Russia still pushes this absurd piece of propaganda after it illegally annexed more Ukrainian territories, while Poland is championing support for Ukraine, and Romania is trying to follow suit. Hungary has been more reluctant to support Ukraine, but even if it had entertain thought to join Russia in tearing Ukraine apart, it isn't capable of doing so, let alone that the EU and NATO would make Hungary cool off instantly.

"Decisions cannot be made instead of Ukraine. Ukraine must say when it wants such negotiations and considers them promising," the German President told the ARD. "Czechia is among the countries advocating the creation of a special tribunal to try Russia's top political leadership for crimes in Ukraine… Now is not the time to talk about peace. Russia understands only force," said the Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic.

"Iran didn't give a limited number of drones before the war. They transferred dozens just this summer and have military personnel in occupied Ukraine helping Russia use them against Ukrainian civilians. Confronted with the evidence, they need a new policy, not a new story," stated US Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley.

"External power supply to Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) was restored two days after it lost all access to off-site electricity in the latest incident highlighting the precarious nuclear safety and security situation at Europe's largest such facility," the IAEA Director General said. Once again, a nuclear disaster caused by Russian reckless behavior was avoided. Meanwhile, Energoatom, Ukraine's state nuclear energy company, is consider scenarios of the consequences of possibly blowing up the Kakhovka dam by Russian troops. It might lead to a significant drop in the water level in the Kakhovka Reservoir that provides cooling for the ZNPP.

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3. Special Operations News Update - Nov 7, 2022 | SOF News

Special Operations News Update - Nov 7, 2022 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · November 7, 2022

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo: CV-22 Osprey of the 21st Special Operations Squadron. Photo by SOCPAC, Oct 2022.

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

SOF Base in Syria Under Attack. A remote U.S. special operations base in Syria along the Iraq and Jordan border has been targeted by Iranian-backed militias. In a recent attack on the Al-Tanf (Google maps) garrison three Americans were wounded in a rocket attack. The base was established in 2016 and sits along the M2 Baghdad-Damascus highway. It is a launchpad for CT missions, intelligence monitoring platform, and base for training activities. “A secretive US special-operations base in Syria is taking fire from a shadowy Middle East war”, by Rachel Nostrant, Business Insider, November 1, 2022.

From College Football Star to Silver Star Recipient. After graduating from Kansas State University where he played football, a Antonio Gonzalez decided to join the Army. He went infantry and several years later would be a member of the 7th Special Forces Group. Read about his career in SF. “For Veterans Day, war hero recounts lives saved in Afghanistan”, Army.mil, November 2, 2022.

Air Force Commandos – the Fight Isn’t Over for Some. Combat Control Team (CCT) members had a difficult job over the past twenty years operating alongside their special operations colleagues from the Navy SEALs and Special Forces. But the struggles continue even though the GWOT fight seems to be over. Many former combat controllers, leaving the community they lived with for so long, are now in civilian life – without the support of their fellow comrades. But there is help available. The First There Foundation provides support. “These Air Force commandos saved troops under fire for years. Now they are fighting to save their buddies”, Task and Purpose, November 2, 2022.

Defense Strategies Institute presents SOF & Worldwide Operations, December 7-8, 2022, Tampa, Florida. The 11th Annual SOF & Worldwide Symposium will convene senior level leaders and decision makers from across the Special Operations Community, regional combatant commands, Department of State, intelligence community, academia, and industry.

Navy SEAL Museum in New York. The Michael P. Murphy Navy SEAL Museum opened in June 2022 and is named after a Medal of Honor recipient killed in action during Operation Red Wings in 2005. The museum provides visitors a look at the history of naval special warfare using unique digital experiences. The interactive displays include the invasion of Normandy (D-Day), World Trade Center attacks, and many more. “Snap One is honored to serve at Navy SEAL Museum”, AV Magazine, November 2, 2022.

A Green Beret and His Poetry. Ryan Stoval, a former U.S. Army Special Forces medic, has penned a book of poetry about his three tours in combat in Afghanistan. His book, Black Snowflakes Smothering a Torch, is meant to help people learn how to better understand and interact with those who have been through war. “Former Green Beret wants his poetry to serve as a manual for talking to veterans”, Press Herald, November 6, 2022.

ARSOF – Honorary Members of the Regiment. Members of the Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations community were inducted as honorary members of their respective regiments. “Special operation forces induct notable veterans at Fort Bragg”, The Fayetteville Observer, November 4, 2022.

International SOF

Al-Hajras Gun Truck for SOF. A Jordanian government research organization has developed a gun truck with a remote controlled weapons station in the front . . . where the engine is usually found on trucks. The vehicle has ballistic protection, run flat tires, infrared lights, and a 7.62mm remotely operated machine gun. The vehicle is expected to used by special forces units in the future and was displayed at the SOFEX Conference in Aqaba, Jordan on November 1, 2022. “SOFEX News: New Truck Puts Machine Gun Where Engine Should Go”, National Defense, November 2, 2022.

SAS Formation in WWII. In the early days of World War II the United Kingdom recognized the need for special operations units to conduct missions behind the enemy lines. Learn how the UK’s Special Air Service was formed during the Second World War. “How the First Military Special Force Was Formed”, History of Yesterday, November 2, 2022.

Ukraine Russia Conflict

Reporting on the Ukraine – Russia Conflict. For many weeks following the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine SOF News published detailed daily reports on the conflict. We were on top of it and doing a fine job of it. However, it soon became apparent that other media sources quickly came up to speed in a matter of weeks due to better resources and funding. So we ventured away from reporting on Ukraine. However, we will now begin covering the conflict within our Monday SOF News update; including links to organizations like the Institute for the Study of War that bring you to their detailed reports. Enjoy.

Who Controls Russia’s Missiles? An interesting article about how Russia targets its cruise missiles against Ukraine targets is offered by Bellingcat. It is a long read but very revealing. “The Remote Control Killers Behind Russia’s Cruise Missile Strikes on Ukraine”, Bellingcat, October 24, 2022.

ISW on Ukraine. The Institute for the Study of War continues to be one of the leading sources of information about the Ukraine – Russia conflict. Read their November 5, 2022 assessment.

T-72B Tanks to Ukraine. Over 45 refurbished tanks with advanced optics, communications, and armor are on the way to Ukraine. Some of the T-72 tanks (Wikipedia) will arrive in late December with others to follow in early 2023. “Aid Package to Ukraine Includes T-72B Tanks”, DoD News, November 4, 2022.

SAG-U Command. The Pentagon is setting up a new command in Germy that is focused on the mission to help train and equip Ukraine’s military. The command is called Security Assistance Group – Ukraine and will have a staff of about 300 people. “Pentagon Unveils New U.S. Command and More Ukraine Aid”, New York Times, November 6, 2022. (subscription).

Ukraine Lessons Learned for SOF. The United States Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) is using lessons learned during the war between Ukraine and Russia. They will apply the LL to partner forces in the Indo-PACOM region. Many of these lessons learned are passed on to SOCPAC by Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). One lessons is the use of “nonstandard” platforms for sharing information. Relationship building is another lesson learned. “Special Ops Applies Ukraine Lessons to Indo-Pacific”, Signal, November 3, 2022.

National Security

Irregular Warfare and the IWFC. A number of prominent leaders in the special operations community (Charles Cleveland, Dave Maxwell, Daniel Egel, and others) have collaborated on an opinion piece describing the importance of the Irregular Warfare Functional Center (IWFC). The institution would improve the U.S. military’s understanding of IW and professionalize the next generation of U.S. leaders and staff officers. However, the devil lies in the details – or in this instance, the implementation. “Defense Department needs to capitalize on historic opportunity”, The Hill, November 6, 2022.

Spirit of America – Civilians in the Struggle. Jim Hake, of Spirt of America, is interviewed about his organization and the important work it does overseas advancing the security interests and values of the United States. Spirit of America’s efforts in Ukraine have been very appreciated by the Ukrainian military. Read more in “Spirit of America: Democracy’s Civilian Force”, Kiplinger, November 4, 2022.

Local Clans in Somalia Join the Fight. Somali’s clans have always had an impact on the security situation of that country. Now some clans located in farm and rural areas of Somali are joining the fight against al-Shabab. Government security officials say that this has made a difference in the conflict. The locals pass on reliable intelligence about al-Shabab . . . and know ‘where they live’. There is concern that the growth of the clan militias will take Somalia back to the clan wars of the 1990s. But for now . . . it appears that they may be key to degrading al-Shabab. “Somalia’s men in sarongs taking on al-Shabab militants”, by Mary Harper, BBC News, November 2, 2022.

IO – Make it an Enlisted MOS. Nestor Lora-Oriz, an IO officer with the Maryland National Guard, argues that there should be an enlisted information operations military occupational specialty. “Army leaders: Consider making information operations an enlisted MOS”, Military Times, November 4, 2022.

Upcoming Events

November 8, 2022

Webinar – By, With and Through Partner Special Forces in the Middle East. The Middle East Institute will host a panel discussion about how U.S. Special Forces, working along side partner special operations forces, was able to destroy the caliphate and severely degrade the capabilities of ISIS in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. The speakers on the panel are Katie Crombe, Michael K. Nagata, and Joseph Votel.

https://www.mei.edu/events/and-through-partner-special-forces-middle-east

November 8-9, 2022. Fort Bragg, NC

Modern Warfare Week

Global SOF Foundation

November 17, 2022

JSOU Webinar – Degrade and Destroy (War against ISIS)

Joint Special Operations University

November 17-18, 2022

33rd Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium

NDIA

December 7-8, 2022

SOF & Worldwide Operations

Defense Strategies Institute (DSI)

SOF News is not a ‘money making’ enterprise; but we do have administrative, operating, and publishing expenses. Individuals and businesses provide the funds to defray these expenses. Their contributions are deeply appreciated. Learn how you can support SOF News.

sof.news · by SOF News · November 7, 2022

4. Xi Jinping has secured his power at home. Now he's stepping back out on the international stage

Excerpts:

Xi called for the international community to “oppose the threat or use of nuclear weapons” and prevent a “nuclear crisis in Eurasia” – drawing an apparent red line, even as China has yet to condemn Russia’s invasion of its neighbor and as Xi maintains a close rapport with President Vladimir Putin.

Scholz, who came in for heavy criticism at home for taking the trip, which was seen by critics as an endorsement of Xi’s rule, said later those comments on nuclear weapons alone made the trip “worth it.”

Xi’s strategy in upcoming summits may fall along similar lines.

“He will try to demonstrate that China is still committed to the world, and is ready to assume its due leadership,” said Sun of the Stimson Center.

However, there will be challenges, nearly three years into the pandemic, as China’s top leader is only beginning to re-engage in person. Sun added: “There is a lot of catch-up to do.”

Xi Jinping has secured his power at home. Now he's stepping back out on the international stage | CNN

CNN · by Simone McCarthy · November 7, 2022

Chinese leader Xi Jinping welcomes German Chancellor Olaf Scholz at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on November 4, 2022.

Kay Nietfeld/AFP/Getty Images/File

Editor’s Note: A version of this story appeared in CNN’s Meanwhile in China newsletter, a three-times-a-week update exploring what you need to know about the country’s rise and how it impacts the world. Sign up here.

Hong Kong CNN —

After securing his iron grip on power in a leadership reshuffle late last month, Chinese leader Xi Jinping is now moving back onto the world’s stage – in person – in an apparent bid to bolster China’s standing amid rising tensions with the West.

A handful of state visits in Beijing last week, which included meetings between Xi and leaders of Tanzania, Pakistan, Vietnam and Germany, and expected travel to international summits later this month are a sharp change of pace for Xi, who has drastically limited his foreign guests and only left the country once since start of the Covid-19 pandemic.

For more than two years, Xi – who is the most important figure in China’s Communist Party by a long shot – hunkered down as China ramped up a stringent zero-Covid policy that seeks to eliminate the virus using border controls, mandatory quarantines, lockdowns and routine mass testing.

04 November 2022, China, Peking: German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (r, SPD) is received with military honors by Li Keqiang, Premier of the People's Republic of China, in the North Hall of the Great Hall of the People. Scholz is traveling to China for his first visit as chancellor. The focus of the visit will include German-Chinese relations, economic cooperation, the Ukraine conflict and the Taiwan issue. Photo: Kay Nietfeld/dpa (Photo by Kay Nietfeld/picture alliance via Getty Images)

Kay Nietfeld/picture alliance/Getty Images

Germany's leader and top CEOs have arrived in Beijing. They need China more than ever

China continues to restrict its citizens under that policy, but Xi’s recent and expected diplomatic schedule suggests he is no longer willing to forfeit his place alongside other world leaders after assuming a norm-breaking third term following the ruling Communist Party’s National Congress last month.

There Xi gave a stark assessment of external threats facing China. Those growing challenges stem from “a grim and complex international situation,” with “external attempts to suppress and contain China” threatening to “escalate at any time,” Xi told his party members and the nation in a work report delivered during the congress.

“(Xi) made it very clear … that the big challenges China will face (stem from) the less and less conducive international environment – and that is an area that China must contest,” said Steve Tsang, director of the University of London’s SOAS China Institute.

Xi’s apparent ramping up of foreign engagement is likely a bid to counter those headwinds, but also one based on a calculation: “He must have come to some kind of a conclusion that the risk of Covid is more containable than he had thought before,” according to Tsang.

Rallying support

For a leader whose aim throughout his decade in power has been to enhance China’s global stature, a diminished physical presence on the world’s stage – such as sending his foreign minister to last year’s G20 – threatens to hinder Xi’s personal diplomacy.

Even as other leaders resumed international travel and hosted dignitaries, Xi’s roster of diplomatic events remained largely dominated by remote engagements – speaking in online summits to the leaders of key partner countries, delivering addresses via video link, taking “cloud” group photos with counterparts at virtual events – in an apparent bid to minimize potential Covid-19 risk.

A handful of foreign leaders have met Xi in Beijing this year, marking his first in-person state meetings since 2020. But the vast majority who visited before the party congress were there for Beijing’s Winter Olympics in February. Then, China-friendly nations like Russia and Egypt attended, while the US and its allies launched a diplomatic boycott over China’s human rights record.

Xi made his first foray out of the country since the start of the pandemic in September to attend a meeting of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Uzbekistan.

Xi Jinping with participants of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization leaders' summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan on September 16, 2022.

Murat Kula/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

Xi’s foreign affairs priorities in the weeks and months ahead will likely continue to focus on shoring up relationships with friendly nations, experts say, as he finds himself operating in a very different world from the last time he was playing regular host or attending summits like G20 or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders’ summit – both of which convene later this month and which he is expected to attend, though yet unconfirmed by Beijing.

Since then, Western concerns about China’s rising global power have been fanned by Beijing’s close rapport with Moscow, damning reports on China’s human rights record in its Xinjiang region and shrinking liberties in Hong Kong, as well as negative views of how China has handled the pandemic.

“The main challenge that China faces is the deterioration of relations with the US … With the US being hostile, China faces great headwinds in its relations with the West, especially in terms of decoupling of the economy,” said Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Washington-based think tank Stimson Center.

“China will not directly discuss the US as the competitor, but instead will try to rally support and solidarity from the rest of the world,” she said.

China first

Xi’s meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on Friday, the first between Xi and a G7 leader in about three years, may be one aspect of that strategy, as a Germany that is more friendly toward China has the potential to hinder solidarity in an approach toward China from within the European Union, experts say.

During his visit, which also included talks with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, Scholz voiced support of economic partnership with China, “on equal footing,” but said he raised issues like human rights, market access and the future of self-governing Taiwan, while also stressing that China’s relationship with one EU member affects all.

Scholz brought up the responsibility to push for peace in Ukraine, and Xi used the meeting to release what may be his strongest comments about the escalation of the conflict.

Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Mongolian President Ukhnaa Khurelsukh pose for a picture during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan September 15, 2022. Sputnik/Alexandr Demyanchuk/Pool via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS IMAGE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY.

Alexandr Demyanchuk/Pool/Sputnik/Reuters

China and Russia present united front at summit as Ukraine war risks exposing regional divisions

Xi called for the international community to “oppose the threat or use of nuclear weapons” and prevent a “nuclear crisis in Eurasia” – drawing an apparent red line, even as China has yet to condemn Russia’s invasion of its neighbor and as Xi maintains a close rapport with President Vladimir Putin.

Scholz, who came in for heavy criticism at home for taking the trip, which was seen by critics as an endorsement of Xi’s rule, said later those comments on nuclear weapons alone made the trip “worth it.”

Xi’s strategy in upcoming summits may fall along similar lines.

“He will try to demonstrate that China is still committed to the world, and is ready to assume its due leadership,” said Sun of the Stimson Center.

However, there will be challenges, nearly three years into the pandemic, as China’s top leader is only beginning to re-engage in person. Sun added: “There is a lot of catch-up to do.”

CNN · by Simone McCarthy · November 7, 2022

5. Refurbished Soviet tanks, HAWK missiles and more Phoenix Ghost drones coming soon to Ukraine

Refurbished Soviet tanks, HAWK missiles and more Phoenix Ghost drones coming soon to Ukraine - Breaking Defense

“These are tanks that the Ukrainians know how to use on the battlefield,” Pentagon Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said of a US-Dutch-Czech effort to supply Ukraine with refurbished Soviet tanks.

breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · November 4, 2022

The Soviet-era T-72B tank, shown here in Poland in July 2022, is one of the platforms included in the Defense Department’s latest $400 million weapons package to Ukraine. (Photo by Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon will supply Ukraine with refurbished Soviet tanks along with drones, air defense missiles and armored vehicles as part of a new $400 million arms package announced today.

The centerpiece of the latest tranche of aid is the US-funded provision of 45 refurbished Soviet T-72B tanks, which will come from the Czech Republic and be upgraded with “advanced optics, communications and armor packages,” the Defense Department stated.

The tanks are part of a larger agreement with the Czech Republic and the Netherlands, in which the Dutch will pay to upgrade an additional Czech 45 T-72Bs also bound for Ukraine. Through this initiative, which is worth $90 million in total, the countries will begin delivering the 90 tanks to Ukraine as early as December 2022, the countries said in a trilateral statement.

“These are tanks that the Ukrainians know how to use on the battlefield,” said Pentagon Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh. “In terms of why aren’t we providing new tanks or American tanks, introducing a new main battle tank is extremely costly, it’s time sensitive, and it would be a huge undertaking for the Ukrainian forces.”

Singh added that she expects contracting actions for the T-72 upgrades to begin “soon.” The United States would continue discussing Western platforms that could be sent to Ukraine in the future, but “these tanks, we believe, will make a difference on the battlefield,” she said.

Another new item included in the package is funding to refurbish air defense missiles for the Raytheon MIM-23 HAWK system, following Spain’s decision to send Ukraine four HAWK medium-range surface-to-air missile launchers in October.

Singh said the missiles will come out of the US military’s existing stores, but declined to comment on how many missiles will be provided to Ukraine and when they will be delivered.

The package also includes:

• 1,100 Phoenix Ghost tactical drones
• 40 Armored Riverine Boats
• Funding to refurbish 250 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles (another item provided to Ukraine by the United States for the first time)
• Tactical secure communications systems and surveillance systems
• Funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment

The upcoming order for Phoenix Ghost represents a major plus up for the secretive aircraft made by AEVEX and developed by the Air Force’s Big Safari group. The existence of the drone was first revealed in April when the United States pledged to send more than 121 systems to Ukraine. The Pentagon has ordered an additional 116 systems for Ukraine since then, according to a Defense Department fact sheet published on Sept. 9.

Singh said she didn’t have an exact timeline for when this latest tranche of Phoenix Ghost drones would be delivered to Ukraine, but a portion of a previous order made in this summer have been transferred to Ukrainian troops.

RELATED: It took ‘couple of months’ to put US anti-radiation missiles on Ukrainian fighters, USAF reveals

The United States has pledged more than $18.9 billion in security assistance since the beginning of the Biden administration in January 2021, with $18.2 billion of that funding being made available after Russia invaded Ukraine in February.

This latest package is funded through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which allows the Defense Department to procure items for Ukraine by contracting directly with defense companies.

The Pentagon has also used a mechanism known as Presidential Drawdown Authority, which allows the department to furnish weaponry from its own stockpiles. The refurbished HAWK missiles will eventually be made available to Ukraine using this authority, the department said in a statement.

breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · November 4, 2022

6.  How the U.S. Navy Can Compete with China in the Gray-Zone

Excerpts:

Such innovations are all to the good, but someone does have to be on the scene of gray-zone competition to wield them. The finest capability in the world makes no difference unless you use it. U.S. political and military magnates must make the conscious strategic choice to compete with China in the gray zone. That means mounting a standing presence in the South China Sea in the form of U.S. Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard seafarers, ships, and planes. In other words, it means setting aside the past practice of showing up once in a while and then steaming away. That practice cedes the contested ground to China, which is always there.

You have to compete to win, and you have to be there to compete. Let’s go—and stay.

How the U.S. Navy Can Compete with China in the Gray-Zone

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · November 6, 2022

The latest entry in the U.S. Naval Institute’s Maritime Counterinsurgency Project, titled “Winning without Gunsmoke in the South China Sea,” comes from Wendell Leimbach and Eric Duckworth of the Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office, a directorate overseen by the U.S. Marine Corps commandant. The office is doing crucial work. Gaming and analysis have revealed that the United States and its allies and partners have no palatable way to defeat China’s “gray-zone” strategy in the China seas.

They can either stand idle, and let China make good its claim to state ownership of the South China Sea in defiance of the law of the sea. Or they can open fire, and bear the blame for aggression. Friends of maritime law need some recourse short of blazing away with guns or missiles. Hence the search for “intermediate force capabilities” between passive acquiescence and hot war.

Leimbach and Duckworth report on a seemingly minor yet essential shift in the lingo U.S. military folk apply to gray-zone operations. Until fairly recently, efforts to find ways to operate effectively in this murky realm went under the guise of “nonlethal weapons.” But a weapon is an implement—not a capability. The Pentagon defines a capability as “the ability to complete a task or execute a course of action under specified conditions and level of performance.” In other words, it’s the ability to do something or another.

Shifting the focus from widgets to tactics, operations, and strategy was a wise move.

In this case, the necessary capability is the ability to meet and deflate China’s abuses of Southeast Asian fishermen, coast guards, and navies without resort to violent force. China’s fishing fleet, maritime militia, and coast guard routinely prevent Southeast Asian neighbors from harvesting natural resources from their “exclusive economic zones” (EEZs). An exclusive economic zone is an offshore preserve, generally reaching 200 nautical miles out to sea, that’s guaranteed to a coastal state for its sole use.

China deploys ships to neighbors’ EEZs to deprive fellow Asians of their rights under international law. And yet it gets away with lawlessness by using nonmilitary sea services to anchor its claims. That doesn’t mean China refrains from using force in regional quarrels. Chinese mariners use force all the time, but they refrain from the overt use of armed force. From gunfire, in other words. Fishing craft flood the zone in large numbers, for instance, defying efforts to police regional waters. The China Coast Guard outnumbers and outmuscles Southeast Asian coast guards and even navies—opening up sweeping operational vistas before Beijing.

Once deployed, intermediate force capabilities will give the United States and its regional parties the ability to escalate a confrontation while remaining beneath the threshold of open warfare. They can match China’s gray-zone capabilities with their own. In effect, they can dare China to pull the trigger first—and expose itself for the predator it is—or they can induce Xi & Co. to deescalate to noncoercive nautical diplomacy.

Now, weapons and sensors remain indispensable tools of the trade despite the shift in parlance from weaponry to capability. The coauthors list such novel and sometimes madcap technologies as “synthetic slime” that clings to small-boat propellers and expands to hinder propulsion; microwave directed-energy systems that impede electronics or shut down a vessel’s engines; and dazzling lasers that cast a glare that obscures eyesight or interferes with optics.

Such innovations are all to the good, but someone does have to be on the scene of gray-zone competition to wield them. The finest capability in the world makes no difference unless you use it. U.S. political and military magnates must make the conscious strategic choice to compete with China in the gray zone. That means mounting a standing presence in the South China Sea in the form of U.S. Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard seafarers, ships, and planes. In other words, it means setting aside the past practice of showing up once in a while and then steaming away. That practice cedes the contested ground to China, which is always there.

You have to compete to win, and you have to be there to compete. Let’s go—and stay.

James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. The views voiced here are his alone.

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · November 6, 2022

7. UK PM Rishi Sunak to take big step against China, may shut Confucius Institutes

I would not ban the Confucius INstitutes. I would advise all those UK (and US) institutions who are hosting Confucius Institute to not follow the demands made by Chinese officials or overseers. I would ensure absolute academic freedom to include criticism of Chinese actions (including highlighting human rights abuses in China). I would take Chinese funding for as long as possible without complying with Chinese demands until China gives up and withdraws the Confucius Institutes themselves. 

UK PM Rishi Sunak to take big step against China, may shut Confucius Institutes

firstpost.com · by FP Staff · November 3, 2022

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UK has the highest number of Confucius Institutes in the world with a total of 30 in universities across the island nation. All of them are in the cross hairs of the British government led by Rishi Sunak

November 03, 2022 14:19:22 IST

UK has the highest number of Confucius Institutes in the world with a total of 30 in universities across the island nation. All of them are in the cross hairs of the British government led by Rishi Sunak Image Courtesy AFP

London: Rishi Sunak is set to take a drastic step almost immediately after becoming the prime minister of the United Kingdom (UK). The British government is planning to shut down Confucius Institutes in universities across the UK citing security concerns.

“China is the biggest-long term threat to Britain and the world’s economic and national security,” Rishi Sunak had told the media earlier this week.

UK has the highest number of Confucius Institutes in the world with a total of 30 in universities across the island nation. All of them are in the cross hairs of the British government led by Rishi Sunak.

In an adresss at the House of Commons, UK Security Minister Tom Tugendhat claimed that the Confucius Institutes in UK pose a threat to civil liberties in several universities. Tugendhat also announced that the creation of a taskforce that to probe the threats facing democratic institutions in the UK.

The announcement by the UK government follows widespread concerns of covert operations by the Chinese government across Britain. The Confucius Institutes allegedly play a crucial in spreading propaganda by the Chinese government.

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Updated Date: November 03, 2022 14:19:22 IST

World

Look forward to working closely together on global issues: PM Modi congratulates UK PM Rishi Sunak

Rishi Sunak will be the youngest British prime minister in 210 years. His vision for India-UK bilateral ties has gone beyond the opportunity for the UK to sell things in India, wanting Britain to also 'learn from India'

World

Explained: Britain’s new Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and his Indian connection

Rishi Sunak has some firsts to his credit. He is not only the youngest British prime minister at 42, but also the first Indian-origin politician to claim the top spot. The former finance minister is proud of his Indian roots and has ties to Infosys co-founder Narayana Murthy

World

From fixing Britain’s economy to the Ukraine war, the challenges awaiting Prime Minister Rishi Sunak

Rishi Sunak has scripted history by becoming the first Indian-origin prime minister in Britain. But, there’s no rest for him. He has a mountain of problems — from a broken economy to reviving faith in the Conservatives — as he takes office

firstpost.com · by FP Staff · November 3, 2022

8. Opinion | I helped fight terrorists at the CIA. I have some advice for the GOP.

Yes, this is an apparent partisan view.

But we should sondeir this excerpt and how to deal with propaganda (and how hard it is to do so)

Excerpts:

Terrorist propaganda is particularly dangerous because lone wolf attacks have been our greatest challenge in the international counterterrorism arena. A single individual is much harder for an intelligence service to detect and disrupt; larger terrorist cells are much easier to penetrate because of the clues they leave in travel patterns or phone records. And lone wolves are often radicalized online in the same country that they will eventually target so the threat comes from within, often from citizens of the country.

Lone wolves are a thorn for domestic U.S. law enforcement as well, as we saw last week when a man not affiliated with any known group but immersed in right-wing propaganda attacked Paul Pelosi, the husband of Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. While the authorities have taken appropriate action against him, there are few signs that the government is taking the big-picture approach needed to combat the violence-inducing propaganda behind his crime.

The Constitution confers certain free-speech protections for extremist propaganda in the U.S. that prevent authorities from exactly replicating our foreign counterterrorism strategy here at home. But there are important lessons we can and should apply. For one thing, we can exercise free speech to proclaim that the normalization of violence against politicians is dangerous and unacceptable. Some violent rhetoric might not be illegal, but it is all morally repugnant.

To start with, we need to clearly identify what crosses the line into the realm of dangerous rhetoric. That means calling out those in the right-wing ecosphere who for years have demonized, and at times even promoted and encouraged, attacks on Pelosi.

​

Opinion | I helped fight terrorists at the CIA. I have some advice for the GOP.

The GOP needs a counterradicalization strategy

It’s not Democrats who must act. We need to find strong voices within the Republican Party.

NBC News · by Marc Polymeropoulos, former Senior Intelligence Service officer at the CIA · November 6, 2022

I worked in counterterrorism operations for nearly my entire career at the CIA before retiring in 2019. The battle we engaged in with international terrorist groups like Al Qaeda wasn’t just with their legions of foot soldiers but with their highly effective propaganda arms as well. The U.S. and our allies considered those propagandists fundamental cogs in a terror group’s machinery, and just as culpable as any other terrorist. So we held them accountable when innocent civilians were killed.

Why are these propagandists so dangerous? Because, while they might not supply weapons, they can effectively radicalize individuals to obtain them and put them to use — even from the comfort of their own homes via the internet. They do that by sending the message that violence is permissible, even admirable, in a process of normalization that breaks down the resistance most humans usually experience to such acts. They give them a cause to justify the need for acting out violently, which goads foot soldiers to take steps toward action. And they can provide suggested targets and detailed information on how to carry out attacks.

Who will step up now? As we used to say in the counterterrorism arena, the system is “blinking red.”

Inspire magazine, the media arm of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, was one such insidious propaganda source. It actively promulgated the killing of Americans and motivated adherents to conduct terrorist attacks around the globe, publishing bomb-making instructions online, for example. So the U.S. tried to shut down its operations in a variety of ways, including reportedly altering the actual content of the magazine.

Terrorist propaganda is particularly dangerous because lone wolf attacks have been our greatest challenge in the international counterterrorism arena. A single individual is much harder for an intelligence service to detect and disrupt; larger terrorist cells are much easier to penetrate because of the clues they leave in travel patterns or phone records. And lone wolves are often radicalized online in the same country that they will eventually target so the threat comes from within, often from citizens of the country.

Lone wolves are a thorn for domestic U.S. law enforcement as well, as we saw last week when a man not affiliated with any known group but immersed in right-wing propaganda attacked Paul Pelosi, the husband of Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. While the authorities have taken appropriate action against him, there are few signs that the government is taking the big-picture approach needed to combat the violence-inducing propaganda behind his crime.

The Constitution confers certain free-speech protections for extremist propaganda in the U.S. that prevent authorities from exactly replicating our foreign counterterrorism strategy here at home. But there are important lessons we can and should apply. For one thing, we can exercise free speech to proclaim that the normalization of violence against politicians is dangerous and unacceptable. Some violent rhetoric might not be illegal, but it is all morally repugnant.

To start with, we need to clearly identify what crosses the line into the realm of dangerous rhetoric. That means calling out those in the right-wing ecosphere who for years have demonized, and at times even promoted and encouraged, attacks on Pelosi.

The long list includes Marjorie Taylor Greene, a sitting member of Congress from Georgia who once supported the idea of Pelosi’s execution for treason. And it includes the NRA, which put a picture of Pelosi next to an article with the headline “Target Practice.” Beyond Pelosi, there are odious examples like Donald Trump Jr. holding a semiautomatic rifle with an ammunition clip that has Hillary Clinton’s face drawn on it.

It’s also important to note that there is nothing equivalent being done on the other side of the aisle. Democratic politicians and leaders may not like Trump, but they don’t call for violence against him, let alone his execution.

Using the bully pulpit if not the law to bat down these violent messages is important because if left unchecked, these intimations of violence automatically inch toward the mainstream; that increases their exposure to impressionable people. On the other hand, a reminder that not everyone agrees with this worldview can keep some who are on the fence in check.

According to recent polling, almost 1 in 3 Republicans believe that violence may be necessary to save the U.S. That is a deeply alarming poll that should shock all of us. (Democrats were better, with only 11% agreeing with the idea, but still far too high. The poll of 2,508 American adults had a 2.1% margin of error).

That’s why it’s so distressing that one of the most-accessible tools in our arsenal isn’t being deployed. While a few members of the GOP have spoken out against the attack on Pelosi, far too many are silent. History is rife with examples of extremism growing while many look the other way. It should not be courageous to simply stand up and say “violence is wrong.” Rather, it should be normal practice of any politician. As a matter of self-preservation alone, it seems like it should be happening without any prompting. Which political figure has the hubris to think the violence won’t reach them?

Politicians’ clear denunciation of violence is also important for another lesson that came from my time running counterterrorism operations in the Middle East: One of the more effective counterradicalization efforts in Arab countries was led by Muslims themselves articulating that extremism was wrong.

The U.S. and our allies considered those propagandists fundamental cogs in a terror group’s machinery, and just as culpable as any other terrorist.

In Saudi Arabia, for example, government officials took the lead in identifying at-risk individuals at all stages, including those in prison who had already perpetrated terror attacks. Rehabilitation programs provided counseling, religious re-education and help reintegrating into society. They encouraged individuals to find stable support networks, family and faith-based alike, and also promoted dialogue to find out why individuals had turned to violence. Though a minority of those who have gone through the process have returned to terrorism, there have also been clear cases of success.

These efforts came from within, from Muslim communities saying “this is not us.” That is the key component of other nations’ counterradicalization programs that America should focus on, since the details of the programs themselves might not translate across the Atlantic. The Rand Corporation has been one important organization investigating more specific strategies that might work to deradicalize U.S. extremists.

So it’s not Democrats who must act. Instead, we need to find strong voices within the GOP who will denounce Marjorie Taylor Green, denounce former President Donald Trump’s calls for violence against protesters and denounce the many voices demonizing Pelosi. If the GOP leaders do this, their followers will listen. But it will only be successful if comprehensive. Republican Reps. Lynn Cheney of Wyoming and Adam Kinzinger of Illinois have shown great bravery in leading the way, but they paid a political price because too many of their colleagues drowned them out.

Who will step up now? As we used to say in the counterterrorism arena, the system is “blinking red.”

NBC News · by Marc Polymeropoulos, former Senior Intelligence Service officer at the CIA · November 6, 2022

9. Watch a lone Ukrainian paratrooper single-handedly knock out a Russian tank

The only thing better than LGOPs (Little Groups of Paratroopers*** see  HERE) is a lone paratrooper getting the job done.  

See the (music) video here: https://taskandpurpose.com/news/watch-lone-ukrainian-paratrooper-knock-out-russian-tank/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

Watch a lone Ukrainian paratrooper single-handedly knock out a Russian tank

taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton · November 5, 2022

A single soldier taking out a heavily-armed tank on their own is usually the stuff of Hollywood, but it’s become a relatively common occurrence in the war in Ukraine.

This is probably best captured in a new video released by the Ukrainian government showing a Ukrainian paratrooper sneaking up behind a Russian tank and killing it with only two shots.

The footage, released by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and apparently taken by drone, shows a Russian tank trundling down a dirt road in a forested part of the country. A single soldier, identified by the defense ministry as a paratrooper, sneaks out of the woods, takes aim with an unidentified anti-tank weapon, and scores a direct hit on the top of the tank, identified by Ukraine Weapons Tracker on Twitter as a T-80BV. The tank veers forward in a plume of smoke, firing back briefly before a second explosion, apparently another strike, blows off its top.

See for yourself:

Воїн 95-ї окремої десантно-штурмової бригади ДШВ ЗСУ практично впритул знищив ворожий танк.

Слава Україні!#єТАНЧИК pic.twitter.com/5tFw0YD9rY

— Генеральний штаб ЗСУ (@GeneralStaffUA) November 4, 2022

“A soldier of the 95th Air Assault Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine practically destroyed an enemy tank at close range. Glory to Ukraine!” the defense ministry wrote in its caption to the video in Ukrainian.

The video doesn’t say when or where the ambush took place, although others identified it as taking place in the eastern part of the country where Ukrainian forces have been recapturing territory previously under Russian control.

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Despite a large mobilization in the last two months, Russian forces have been losing ground near Kharkiv following a Ukrainian counteroffensive. It’s also unclear what weapon was used by the paratrooper, although Ukrainian forces have access to several shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons.

The war has not been great for Russian armor. With Western-supplied anti-tank missiles and powerful artillery, Ukrainian troops have decimated Russia’s tank fleet, with as many as 1,000 tanks lost, per estimates from the open-source database Oryx. And those tanks that weren’t fully destroyed have been recovered and refielded by Ukraine, with more than half of the country’s tank fleet now consisting of captured Russian ones. Meanwhile, Ukraine is set to get a new complement of T-72 tanks, currently owned by the Czech Republic but paid for by the United States.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive has also revealed the disarray of Russian troops as they are pushed back. Indeed, despite an influx of manpower, Russian forces have proven unable to gain air superiority as Ukrainian anti-air missiles continue to pick Russian helicopters out of the sky. Ukraine has also been striking deeper into Russian-controlled territory, launching a bold aerial and marine drone attack on the Russian Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol in late October.

A lone paratrooper taking out a Russian tank is an impressive feat on its own, but it also captures the wider dynamics of why Ukraine has been able to mount such strong resistance in the months-long war.

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Want to write for Task & Purpose? Click here. Or check out the latest stories on our homepage.

taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton · November 5, 2022

10.  Putin Fires Back: Why the Ukraine War Will Get Even Bloodier

Putin Fires Back: Why the Ukraine War Will Get Even Bloodier

19fortyfive.com · by Jack Buckby · November 6, 2022

Ukraine Repels Russian Attacks As Battle for Kherson Draws Closer: Ukrainian forces used captured Russian weapons against invading forces in the eastern city of Bakhmut on Friday following a bombardment of Russian attacks in Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk in recent days.

According to a statement from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on November 6, Ukrainian forces repelled attacks by the Russians in 14 settlements in recent days. The statement described how Russian forces attempt to maintain control of occupied territories, focusing specifically on deterring new Ukrainian offensives in strategic areas.

“They are conducting offensive operations in the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Novopavlovsk directions… Over the past day, the Russian occupiers launched 4 missile and 19 air strikes, carried out more than 75 attacks from multiple launch rocket systems,” the update reads.

In Bakhmut, Russian forces reportedly launched a barrage of attacks against Ukrainian positions in the city, but Kyiv claimed invading forces suffered heavy losses afterward.

Reuters reports how one soldier said that there was a “lot of them,” referring to both Russian soldiers and weapons, and described “intense” fighting over the last week. The outlet reported how Ukrainian forces used a captured 2S23 Nona SVK self-propelled mortar and T-80 tank to repel Russian attacks. Both the Nona and T-80 were reportedly seized in March and spent months being repaired and refitted with new weaponry and armor.

Battle for Kherson Approaches

After months of speculation of a new battle for the Kherson region, Ukrainian officials now expect a new offensive from the Russians to be imminent. It comes after Kirill Stremousov, the deputy head of the Kremlin-installed Kherson administration, told Russian television that he expects Russian troops to put up a fight in the region.

“If we leave Kherson, it will be a huge blow,” he told Russia Today.

Kherson city, which was seized by the Russians when the invasion began, remains a target for the Ukrainian military. By taking back control of the region, as well as the west bank of the Dnieper River, Ukrainian forces would be better positioned to launch an attack on Ukraine – something Ukrainian President Volodymyr has promised since before the war began.

On Friday, Russian President Vladimir Putin also endorsed the evacuation of civilians from occupied Kherson, an indication that more intense fighting is expected in the coming days and weeks.

Putin said during Russian Unity Day celebrations on Friday that “the civilian population should not suffer” in the area. His comments come after reports revealed that some 70,000 people are already understood to have been moved out of Kherson so far.

Jack Buckby is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and reports on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society.

19fortyfive.com · by Jack Buckby · November 6, 2022

11. Buy Artillery Or Buy Coffins: The Russian Marine Corps’ Dire Choice As Its Troops Die In Record Numbers

They could make coffins out of the crates for artillery ammunition. (apologies for the attempt at dark humor).

Video at the link: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/11/05/buy-artillery-or-buy-coffins-the-russian-marine-corps-dire-choice-as-its-troops-die-in-record-numbers/?sh=2d2b77e7480b&utm_source=pocket_mylist

Buy Artillery Or Buy Coffins: The Russian Marine Corps’ Dire Choice As Its Troops Die In Record Numbers

Forbes · by David Axe · November 5, 2022

155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade troopers in 2021.

Russian defense ministry photo

A Russian marine brigade reportedly lost 63 troops in a doomed, two-day assault on Ukrainian positions in eastern Ukraine on or before Nov. 4.

It apparently was one of the worst single-operation losses for the small Russian marine corps since before the Chechen wars in the 1990s.

Worse for the Kremlin’s war effort, Russia’s marines—or “naval infantry,” if you will—are some of its best remaining troops after eight months of grinding warfare against an increasingly determined, experienced and well-armed Ukrainian military.

Russia’s best forces are getting ground up in Ukraine, leaving the worst forces—including the 300,000 unhappy, unfit draftees the army rounded up this fall—to do more of the fighting.

The doomed Russian assault targeted the Ukrainian garrison in Pavlivka, 28 miles southwest of Donetsk in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. The garrison repelled the Russian attack, the Ukrainian general staff reported on Friday.

The Russian Pacific Fleet’s 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade has been the main Russian formation along that sector since this summer. The brigade, based in Vladivostok, has been in Ukraine since Russia widened its eight-year war on Ukraine back in late February.

The brigade with its 3,000 troops and hundreds of T-80 tanks, BMP-3 and BTR-82 fighting vehicles, mortars and artillery was part of the Russian force that tried, and failed, to capture Kyiv in the early weeks of the wider war.

Battered by stiffening Ukrainian defense, its supply lines fraying, the brigade in April joined the Russian retreat from Kyiv Oblast. The 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade withdrew to Belarus then redeployed to Donbas, where it threw its remaining battalions at Ukrainian defenses between Yehorivka and Pavlivka.

It didn’t always go well for the marines. A video that circulated in August depicts two of the 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade’s BMPs racing across a field in the direction of Yehorivka—and triggering powerful anti-tank mines.

Another video, from the Ukrainian army’s 72nd Mechanized Brigade, in essence is a montage of destruction as 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade T-80s and BMPs explode.

But the worst losses came later, as the marine brigade tried to pry the Ukrainians from Pavlivka. The Ukrainians reportedly had artillery superiority—a reversal of the pre-war balance of forces and a testimony to the Ukrainian military’s months-long effort to target Russian supply lines and artillery batteries.

Without enough 122-millimeter shells of its own, the 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade can’t suppress Ukraine’s big guns. Its troopers are defenseless. “Either the country will mass-produce 122-millimeter shells, or it will mass-produce coffins,” a Russian officer told one blogger in reference to the Pavlivka fight.

It’s worth noting that, along most of the front extending all the way from Donbas south to Kherson Oblast on the Black Sea coast—a distance of hundreds of miles—Russian forces mostly are retreating or digging in, not attacking. Twin Ukrainian counteroffensives that kicked off in the east and south back in late August have got them on the run.

In the few places where Russian troops are attacking—Pavlivka and also Bakhmut—they’re suffering heavy casualties ... and gaining nothing.

Forbes · by David Axe · November 5, 2022

12. [ANALYSIS] Experts see growing chances for arms control talks amid NK's rising belligerence

We could be going down a very dangerous path if we follow the advice of these experts.

However, based on the statements I have heard from ROK and US government officials I am confident we are not going to fall into the arms control trap. Our officials know better.

Yes, the north will not denuclearize as long as the Kim family regime is in power. Yet it will also not negotiate in good faith and achieve the kind of effects arms control advocates fantasize about.

This is why we need a new strategy that rests on the foundation of the highest state of military readiness to ensure deterrence and defense and consists of three lines of effort: a human rights upfront approach, a comprehensive influence campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.

[ANALYSIS] Experts see growing chances for arms control talks amid NK's rising belligerence

The Korea Times · November 7, 2022

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-Sup participate in a news conference at the Pentagon on November 3, 2022 in Arlington, Virginia. Following North Korea's launch of three short-range ballistic missiles into the oceans off its east coast, South Korea's Lee Jong-Sup is meeting with the United States' Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. AFP-Yonhap 

Developing nukes will be politically difficult path for Seoul

By Kim Yoo-chul

The skies over the Korean peninsula came within inches of becoming the scene of a supersonic dogfight last week after 80 South Korean fighter jets, including an unspecified number of F-35A stealth fighters, were scrambled to intercept 180 North Korean warplanes that flew dangerously close to the inter-Korean border.

The latest incident illustrated just how tensions continue to escalate on the Korean Peninsula, with military and security experts voicing concerns that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is veering closer to a high-level demonstration of his regime's military strength amid geopolitical uncertainty represented by deepening conflicts between the United States, China and Russia.

The North's rare display of airpower came as Operation Vigilant Storm, which continued from Oct. 31 to Nov. 5, brought out a total of 240 South Korean and U.S. fighter jets with heavy opposition from North Korea. During the joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States, North Korea fired 30 missiles.

Now, the North is feared to extend its most intense period of missile testing.

Intelligence officials and security experts in the United States and South Korea said a seventh nuclear test conducted by Pyongyang would increase the likelihood of Washington and Seoul taking stern actions against the North. Ned Price, a U.S. State Department spokesperson, told reporters that there would be profound costs and consequences if North Korea conducts another nuclear test, although he did not elaborate.

The latest situation warrants an analysis of the broader strategies behind the recently escalated shows of missile development from Pyongyang. Some say the North Korean nuclear issue should be approached from an arms control standpoint.

Arms control talks with N. Korea: one feasible scenario

One lesson learnt from the 2018 Hanoi summit, where the leaders of North Korea and the United States met but failed to yield any results, was that the Kim Jong-un regime wants its nuclear program to be regarded as undeniable and irreversible, said experts.

A TV screen shows a file image of North Korea's missile launch during a news program at the Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, Wednesday, Nov. 2, 2022. AP-Yonhap

 "I strongly doubt complete denuclearization of North Korea is possible. After the midterm elections, the U.S will have no options but to start arms control talks with North Korea based on the North's commitment to the non-proliferation of its nuclear weapons as it's unlikely for the United States to be in sync with the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's 'pricey hope' for the U.S.' regular rotational deployment of strategic assets including bombers and carrier strike groups," Chung Se-hyun, a former unification minister under the Moon Jae-in administration, told The Korea Times.

"The Yoon administration should not rule out the possibility of the United States restarting negotiations with North Korea. The government has to be prepared to pursue an inclusive mediation process with Washington because Pyongyang wants direct talks with Washington, if the discussion process is renewed, which I think will happen sometime after the U.S. midterm elections."

Pursuing arms control talks with North Korea is not an easy process, as it would mean the recognition of the North as a nuclear state under the international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). North Korea became a state party to the NPT in 1985, but withdrew in 2013 and began developing nuclear weapons.

Any engagement in arms control talks with Pyongyang would signify the U.S.' policy change toward North Korea, because Washington has long stressed that the North Korean nuclear program is illegal and subject to United Nations sanctions. Washington said its commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has not changed and added that it is ready to meet the North Koreans without preconditions.

"Despite Washington's repeated commitment to pursuing the complete denuclearization of the peninsula, I would say pursuing complete denuclearization is something that can't be achieved at all. That's why it's a very realistic idea to develop discussions with North Korea from an arms control standpoint," said Kim Jeong-dae, a former South Korean defense official and a visiting professor at Yonsei University.

"If the peninsula sees a further increase in tensions, it's very feasible for the international community to move forward with arms control talks with the North. South Korea has to articulate ideas and suggestions actively and present deliverables when it comes to risk reduction on the peninsula," Kim added.

North Korea is anticipated to increase its nuclear arsenal to between 151 and 242 nuclear weapons by 2027 with the country having the capacity to manage between 30 kilograms to 60 kilograms of plutonium, and 175 kilograms to 645 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) by then, according to estimates by Asan Institute and RAND Corporation, a U.S.-based nonprofit think tank.

The former Moon Jae-in administration had asked the United States to persuade North Korea to follow the Kazakhstan model, but the request was refused as Washington opposes accepting the North as a nuclear state. In return for sovereignty guarantees from major nuclear powers, Kazakhstan, formerly a test site for Soviet nuclear weapons, abandoned its nuclear weapons in the wake of the Soviet collapse.

This handout photo taken on November 5, 2022 and released by Japan's Ministry of Defense shows members of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) and the US participating in a bilateral military exercise in the skies over Kyushu island. North Korean forces said they would respond to joint exercises by the US and South Korea with "sustained, resolute and overwhelming" military measures, its state media reported on November 7, 2022. The warning came following a spate of missile tests by North Korea last week, including four ballistic missiles on November 5, while the US and South Korea conducted their biggest-ever air force drills. AFP-Yonhap 

"As even China, the North's economic lifeline, doesn't want to see a further escalation of geopolitical tensions on the peninsula, given Pyongyang's nuclear strengths, it would be a logical course of action for the United States to review the Kazakhstan model by having the North as a responsible nuclear non-proliferation state, eventually. As its law makes denuclearization negotiations a non-starter, Pyongyang won't repeat its failure in Hanoi by retaining its nuclear program," a presidential security adviser under the former Moon administration said by telephone.

US doesn't want South Korea to become 'nuclear state'

Because it is apparent that North Korea was able to have secured some degree of sanctions relief through China and Russia's non-enforcement of sanctions, some political analysts are asking the Biden administration to impose more extensive sanctions on China and Russia including the imposition of sanctions on leading Chinese commercial banks.

But an expansion of areas of sanctions aimed at pressuring China would cost a lot for the United States as inter-Korean relations are already in jeopardy. Within that context, there are calls from the ruling People Power Party (PPP) politicians for the country to have its own nuclear weapons. Additionally, the reliability of the American nuclear umbrella is being questioned as North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles are capable of striking the U.S. mainland.

A March poll conducted by Asan Institute found some 70.2 percent of South Koreans hoped Seoul would build up its nuclear capability, while another poll in June by the South and North Development (SAND) institute also found that some 74.9 percent Koreans favor a nuclear capability with more than half in support even if it violates the NPT.

"South Korea has to explore self-defense measures. Because we can't counter nuclear threats by using conventional weapons, now it's time to think about asking the United States to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons here, or having our own nuclear capability. I think we have to pursue methods of building our own nuclear weapons, eventually," Rep. Kim Ki-hyun, a PPP lawmaker and one of the leaders in the race for the party chairman post, said in a recent local radio interview.

His suggestion, which aims to reach an "equilibrium" of nuclear force with North Korea, has been shared by other PPP lawmakers, while the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) strongly opposes the idea of South Korea building its own nuclear capability.

While more South Korean citizens and experts are increasingly joined by politicians, who doubt whether Washington will come to Seoul's defense as North Korean missiles could possibly reach any major U.S. city, U.S. experts said developing nuclear weapons would be a politically difficult path for South Korea.

"It would be better for Washington and Seoul to work together on extended deterrence arrangements. The United States needs to ensure that South Korean leaders are confident in U.S. extended deterrence guarantees. That may require closer integration, more information sharing, and perhaps even new strategic mechanisms ― but I think that would be better for both sides than South Korea developing its own nuclear capabilities," Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), told The Korea Times.

"The United States and South Korea need to avoid spending too much time debating the division of spending between the two allies and devote more time to the division of responsibilities," he said.

The Korea Times · November 7, 2022

13. Why Dictators are Afraid of Girls: Rethinking Gender and National Security

Excerpts:

Given the centrality of gender – and repression – to regime survival, understanding how gender is used to reinforce power dynamics is important to unlocking opportunities for eroding authoritarian power structures. It is high time, therefore, that policymakers and practitioners across the national security community use gender to explore core perceptions and experiences of power, roles, and identities at individual and institutional levels. Gender represents deeply embedded ideas of identity and power relationships that the national security community should better account for when, for example, building tailored deterrence strategies or theater campaign plans.

After all, war is an inherently human activity, and gender is a core expression of what it means to be human; to ignore gender is to ignore core dimensions of war itself.

Why Dictators are Afraid of Girls: Rethinking Gender and National Security - War on the Rocks

BENJAMIN JENSEN, KATHLEEN J. MCINNIS, AND JARON WHARTON

NOVEMBER 7, 2022

warontherocks.com · by Benjamin Jensen · November 7, 2022

In 1987, Argentinian mothers gathered to protest the disappearance of their sons and husbands at the hands of the authoritarian military junta. The movement served as a catalyst for a successful pro-democracy movement in Argentina that ended the Videla regime. Similarly, through public demonstrations of maternal grief, the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, which began in 1989, during the Soviet-Afghan War, raised public awareness of the corruption and human rights violations occurring in the Soviet Military. Arguably, this movement exacerbated concerns about the Soviet system, which in turn contributed to its collapse.

Now, a powerful protest movement is gaining momentum in Iran that was sparked and carried forward by women and girls. Russia is using notions of hyper-masculinity as a key vehicle for both maintaining regime control domestically while promulgating disinformation across Western publics. As Xi consolidates his power in Beijing, the Chinese Communist Party is fomenting concerns that boys are being “feminized,” a move that appears to contradict decades of Chinese policy promoting gender equality.

The common thread between all these examples: gender. Gender plays a powerful role in the construction and promulgation of power and identity that is particularly meaningful in authoritarian regimes. As history shows, when those gender-based power structures are challenged by everyday citizens, profound societal change becomes possible. Gender therefore appears to be a key, if underappreciated, fault line in the authoritarian societies with which the United States and its allies are strategically competing. While considerable scholarship is dedicated to understanding the role of gender in social relations and social sciences, what has not been sufficiently developed is an application of gender as an analytic tool to better understand hard national security problems, such as strategic competition, gray zone operations, and how best to challenge the rising tide of authoritarian states in the international system. If that isn’t enough, there is another important reason for the national security community to start paying more attention to gender: adversaries like Russia are weaponizing gender in order to justify invading Ukraine.

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Gender is a way to express and promulgate core notions of identity and power at individual and structural levels. Although women often play important roles in challenging authoritarian power structures, as recent events in Iran demonstrate, they do so in opposition to the traditionally conservative gender roles prescribed for all citizens by many of today’s authoritarian regimes. While women are often drivers for thinking about gendered aspects of security questions – if not catalysts for social change – analytically focusing on one gender misses the bigger societal and structural pictures of which gender is a key part. “Gender” as a conceptual lens is therefore not limited to women and women’s representation. Rather, it also allows us to explore – among other things – how men perceive their roles and identities, how those identities and roles are expressed at individual and structural levels, and how those ideas shape strategic cultures and national policy decisions. Further, because it is so core to human existence, gender creates pathways for understanding and exploring intersections with other identities – ethnicity, religion and so on. In other words, gender affords us a mechanism to better appreciate the human dimensions of war and statecraft – if we allow it to do so.

In fact, this opening of the aperture on what “gender” encompasses is exactly what academic scholarship has been advocating for decades since scholars like Cynthia Enloe and J. Ann Tickner started to question how failures to discuss patriarchy and gender skewed the entire study of global politics. There remains a vibrant academic community in international relations built around constructivism and post-structuralism that sees gender as one of many identities people use to make sense of the world and advance their interests. Today, feminist literature is integral to international relations, adapting how scholars look at everything from war initiation and misperception to terrorist recruitment, counterinsurgency and drone warfare. The latest literature has moved beyond second and third wave feminism to explore discourse, Judith Butler’s ideas about performative identity, and even Donna Haraway’s Cyborg manifesto. Haraway’s work in particular is especially important to understanding current national security challenges in which gender is performed through online personas and troll circulated simulacra-like memes. As more of our lives are lived online, the roles we assume in social media become part of national security and a target for propaganda. Unfortunately, these and other scholarly insights have only partially been translated into policy or policy frameworks that would afford strategists a more nuanced understanding of hard national security problems such as strategic competition.

The lack of a practical national security-oriented framework for assessing and exploiting gender-based societal fault lines is particularly acute when considering the need to develop and apply tailored integrated deterrence strategies in the context of political and gray zone warfare. What might be achieved if the United States explored the intersection of gender and power structures within authoritarian regimes and incorporate those insights into, for example, its theater and campaign planning – or even the latest National Defense Strategy which is silent on gender? Instead, it argues that the United States ought to compete with adversaries using traditional realpolitik notions of power – and misses way identity plays a role in framing authoritarian politics.

Brass Tacks

All this discussion of theory leads the practical policymaker to a fundamental question: how is gender – broadly conceived – playing out in the strategic competitive space? Moreover, why does all this stuff matter? In the first instance, autocrats around the world are rushing to embrace patriarchal totalitarianism and wage a whole new form of information warfare. It is no longer enough to control speech or assembly. Dictators manipulate identify and discourses – especially powerful ones like gender norms – to justify their grip on society. This patriarchal backlash takes place at a particularly difficult time for democracies, where societies are negotiating new, often controversial, understandings of gender identity and traditional values. This tendency puts the contest to define gender roles and identify at the center of a new era of great power competition.

In Iran, there is a long history behind the recent wave of protests led by women. The regime has used gender norms and identity as a central instrument of repression for decades. Traditional values have long served as a justification for denying basic freedoms and a platform to mobilize supporters. Yet, the struggle for women’s rights and individual rights are intertwined in Iran. Gender has become a space of resistance, making the latest wave of protests especially challenging to the authoritarian regime and increasingly putting women at the forefront of the resistance.

In Russia, Putin has pushed for the re-masculinization of Russia, manipulating traditional cultural symbols and language to justify territorial expansion, nationalism, and resistance to what his inner circle views as a corrupt, decadent west. This campaign has led to a significant deterioration in the rights of women and historically marginalized groups in Russia. Putin has gone as far as saying Russians who seek gender freedoms are part of a larger anti-Russia fifth column. Russian social media is awash with hate speech groups like Male State that have become vocal supporters of Putin’s war in Ukraine. Between 2005 and 2019 Russian elite used youth groups like Nashi – a self-proclaimed “anti-fascist movement” described as Putin’s Generation – to link gender, support for Moscow and traditional values as a counterpoint to the West. The manipulation of gender roles and identity helps Putin reach a larger, global network of populists who view traditional values and society as under threat.

Less appreciated it the role of gender and discourse about order and stability in modern China. The Chinese Communist Party increasingly views feminism as a threat to its own ideology and perception of China as a socially conservative country. Xi Jingping has been defined as a neo-traditionalist propagating a notion of cultural deficiency and degeneracy to justify centralized rule and repression. The communist party increasingly focuses on gender as a threat to stability, calling for state institutions to prevent the feminization of males and adolescents and to promote Chinese celebrities deemed masculine counterweights to “sissy men” with “abnormal aesthetics.”

The manipulation of gender roles is central to the communist party’s efforts to thwart color revolutions and any threat to their rule. According to Leta Hong Fincher, author of Betraying Big Brother: the Feminist Awakening in China,

China’s all-male rulers have decided that the systematic subjugation of women is essential to maintaining Communist Party survival. As this battle for party survival becomes even more intense, the crackdown on feminism and women’s rights – indeed, on all of civil society – is likely to intensify.

Xi sees traditional family values and his project of national rejuvenation as intertwined making feminism a threat to party survival. This notion of a more traditional, masculine Chinese man rising to challenge a decadent West is one display in everything from PLA recruitment videos to blockbuster films like the Wolf Warrior franchise.

In other words, gender roles and identify are a center of gravity in the information environment for autocrats seeking to limit free expression and exchange in their societies. These regimes have a critical requirement to advance an image – often using a mix of computational propaganda and censorship – as champions of traditional values under threat. Since this discourse relies on manipulating gender roles and identities, gender is also a critical vulnerability that can be held at risk to gain a position of advantage. Any strategy designed to challenge authoritarian states that doesn’t exploit this vulnerability misses an opportunity to gain a competitive edge and win without fighting.

Okay, So Now What?

Dictators these days appear to be afraid of girls – and women, as well as, mothers, grandmothers, and men who bristle against cartoonish notions of masculinity – becoming politically aware and active. This is because they represent the inverse of the hyper-macho, bear-riding ideal that has become so central to contemporary authoritarian power projection, both at home and abroad. So, what can the United States do to use this pressure point to its advantage?

First, and perhaps most important, the United States should build on earlier U.N. resolutions, executive orders, and legislation that recognizes that gender is an important dimension of human existence and worthy of serious study when it comes to matters of statecraft. Many democracies realize this through the vitally important Women, Peace and Security agenda. Despite this, discussions about gender in national security tend to evoke visceral reactions. On the one hand, some embrace the notion that women play a vital role in lifting fragile societies – from education to civic and political participation. On the other hand, gender is dismissed as background noise to realpolitik and castigated as ‘soft’ or relegated to an externality. Even when gender is made part of national security programs it tends to be treated more as a “pet rock” or “add on” than a core dimension of promoting civil society and democratic values. These simplified notions prevent serious discourse on gender as an analytic lens for policy analysis and how the performance and manipulation of gender identity are key dimensions of national security in the twenty-first century.

Second, gender ought to mean more than women and counting the number of females in leadership positions – noble goals to be sure but limited when it comes to confronting authoritarianism. In other words, representation is necessary, but certainly not sufficient. This is because although more women may be elected to legislative bodies around the world, they are at times placed in “women’s issues” and “family” committees rather than the actual decision-making bodies. Highly constrained, male-dominated notions of gender roles and stereotypes are replicated in governance institutions, reproducing, perpetuating, and reinforcing oppression.

Rather than a thing that is achieved (representation), gender is also usefully conceptualized as a lens through which to view the search for advantage in the information environment that is central to great power competition. To that end, strategists must embrace that if gender is both a critical requirement and vulnerability, then it warrants new kinds of crisis simulations and wargames to explore the competition. This effort should follow recent scholarship and combine the best of strategic games and social science to isolate the ways competing groups use the manipulation of gender roles and identities to advance their interests and the potential effects. There is a need to understand how gender intersects with campaign and theater plans as well as competition, gray zone activities, and political warfare. These questions, by the way, form a key component of the Smart Women, Smart Power research agenda at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Given the centrality of gender – and repression – to regime survival, understanding how gender is used to reinforce power dynamics is important to unlocking opportunities for eroding authoritarian power structures. It is high time, therefore, that policymakers and practitioners across the national security community use gender to explore core perceptions and experiences of power, roles, and identities at individual and institutional levels. Gender represents deeply embedded ideas of identity and power relationships that the national security community should better account for when, for example, building tailored deterrence strategies or theater campaign plans.

After all, war is an inherently human activity, and gender is a core expression of what it means to be human; to ignore gender is to ignore core dimensions of war itself.

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Kathleen J. McInnis, PhD is a senior fellow and director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Benjamin Jensen, PhD is a professor of strategic studies at the School of Advanced Warfighting in the Marine Corps University and a senior fellow for future war, gaming, and strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Jaron S. Wharton, PhD is a colonel in the U.S. Army currently serving as a military fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and at the Modern War Institute.

The views expressed are their own and do not reflect the views or positions of the School of Advanced Warfighting, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Benjamin Jensen · November 7, 2022

14. Why Japan Is Gearing Up for Possible War With China

​Excerpts:

To be sure, it’s a halfway revolution. Doubling defense spending would take Japan’s military outlays to just 2% of GDP. The country’s constitution still imposes serious constraints on foreign and defense policy. But the overall trend is clear and, most likely, durable. Kishida, once considered a dove, is carrying out the policies that his more hawkish predecessor, Shinzo Abe, envisioned — without provoking nearly as much blowback as the more polarizing Abe.

This is good news for Washington. Access to Japanese bases and the involvement of Japanese forces would make the odds in a war over Taiwan far more favorable for the US. An alliance that began as a one-way security guarantee after World War II is steadily evolving into a more authentic partnership.

That’s not say that the two countries are in lockstep. The volatility of US politics and the legacy of the Trump years have led to lingering concerns about America’s long-term reliability. As I learned in Tokyo, Japanese think-tanks are quietly studying geopolitical “plan B’s” (or “plan A’s”) in case Trump returns to power. Military and diplomatic investments that make Japan a better ally of the US today serve as insurance against a future in which America retreats into isolationism or angry unilateralism.

Japanese and American diplomats I spoke to also worried that Washington sometimes elevates the symbolic aspects of support for Taiwan, such as the Pelosi visit or calls to recognize that island as an independent country, over concrete action to strengthen its defenses. Whereas Tokyo prefers deterrence without provocation, the US periodically practices provocation without deterrence. That’s not a good way to handle a dangerous rival — or to keep America’s single most crucial ally in the fold.​

OpinionHal Brands

Why Japan Is Gearing Up for Possible War With China

The threat of Chinese aggression is producing a quiet revolution in Tokyo’s statecraft — and officials are pushing the nation to get ready for a fight.

ByHal Brands

November 6, 2022 at 5:00 PM EST

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/features/2022-11-06/why-japan-is-gearing-up-for-possible-war-with-china-over-taiwan?sref=hhjZtX76&utm_content=business&cmpid=socialflow-twitter-business&utm_campaign=socialflow-organic&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social

(This is the second in a series of dispatches from partner nations the US will depend on in its rivalry, and potential war, with China. Read part one here.)

If China were to attack Taiwan, it wouldn’t just have to face a hostile superpower. It would also likely have to confront its longstanding regional rival, Japan. For centuries, Japan and China have vied for hegemony in East Asia; at times, they have threatened each other’s survival. Today, as I found from three days of meetings with Japanese officials and analysts in Tokyo, the threat of Chinese aggression is producing a quiet revolution in Japanese statecraft — and pushing the nation to get ready for a fight.

For the US, China is a dangerous but distant challenge. For Japan, China is the existential danger next door. Years before American leaders were proclaiming the return of great-power rivalry, Japanese officials were warning that Beijing was up to no good. As China’s capabilities become more formidable and its conduct in the Taiwan Strait more menacing, Tokyo’s concerns grew more acute.

The weather may have been beautiful when I visited the capital, but there is very much a sense that storms are on the horizon. “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,” warned Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in June. The same month, some 90% of the Japanese public believed the country should prepare for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. That was before Chinese leader Xi Jinping ratcheted tensions by firing ballistic missiles into Japan’s exclusive economic zone following House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei.

In Tokyo, as in Washington, opinions differ regarding when the risk of war will be greatest, and even whether Xi would hazard everything in a high-stakes military gamble. Some officials told me that Xi’s recent personnel reforms — which included placing a veteran of China’s last foreign conflict, against Vietnam in 1979, and a former commander of Chinese military forces opposite Taiwan in the two top spots on the Central Military Commission — amount to a creation of a “war council.” Others counter that the People’s Liberation Army will lack key capabilities necessary to invade Taiwan, such as sufficient amphibious landing craft, for years to come.

But there is little debate the country must brace for trouble, because China taking Taiwan by force would be disastrous for Japan.

If Taiwan fell, the islands at the far southwestern end of the Japanese archipelago might become indefensible. China could constrict Japan’s vital trade routes, increase the pressure around the disputed Senkaku Islands, and otherwise coerce its historic rival.

This is why the Tokyo government has stated — as strongly as it can, given Japan’s post-1945 aversion to the use of force — that it would not stand by while Taiwan was subjugated. Already a serious regional military power, Japan is moving rapidly to strengthen its capabilities for deterrence and defense.

Japan plans to nearly double defense spending by 2027. It is turning some of the southwestern islands into strongpoints studded with anti-ship missiles and air defenses; it reportedly has plans to use its high-quality submarine fleet to bottle up the Chinese navy. Tokyo is also moving to acquire American Tomahawk cruise missiles and other “counterstrike” capabilities that could target the Chinese mainland.

Some of these moves are publicly justified as measures to deal with a very real threat from North Korea, which livened my arrival in Tokyo by launching ballistic missiles that triggered alerts for residents of north and central Japan to seek cover. But Japanese officials acknowledged privately to me that every crisis with Pyongyang strengthens their argument for acquiring weapons that can blunt aggression by Beijing.

Meanwhile, cooperation with the US is getting deeper, with American and Japanese forces stepping up training together – including large-scale exercises off several southern islands this month – and preparing joint-operational plans in case conflict over Tawian breaks out.

These measures are part of a larger shift, as Tokyo — which in the 1930s and 40s ravaged its neighbors — becomes a pillar of Indo-Pacific security. When the US withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement under President Donald Trump, Japan salvaged a pared-down version of that accord, to act as a counterweight to Chinese influence.

Japanese officials are weaving a web of security partnerships, with countries from Australia to India, meant to strengthen checks against Chinese expansion. Tokyo even coined the idea of preserving a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” a phrase Washington has now appropriated.

To be sure, it’s a halfway revolution. Doubling defense spending would take Japan’s military outlays to just 2% of GDP. The country’s constitution still imposes serious constraints on foreign and defense policy. But the overall trend is clear and, most likely, durable. Kishida, once considered a dove, is carrying out the policies that his more hawkish predecessor, Shinzo Abe, envisioned — without provoking nearly as much blowback as the more polarizing Abe.

This is good news for Washington. Access to Japanese bases and the involvement of Japanese forces would make the odds in a war over Taiwan far more favorable for the US. An alliance that began as a one-way security guarantee after World War II is steadily evolving into a more authentic partnership.

That’s not say that the two countries are in lockstep. The volatility of US politics and the legacy of the Trump years have led to lingering concerns about America’s long-term reliability. As I learned in Tokyo, Japanese think-tanks are quietly studying geopolitical “plan B’s” (or “plan A’s”) in case Trump returns to power. Military and diplomatic investments that make Japan a better ally of the US today serve as insurance against a future in which America retreats into isolationism or angry unilateralism.

Japanese and American diplomats I spoke to also worried that Washington sometimes elevates the symbolic aspects of support for Taiwan, such as the Pelosi visit or calls to recognize that island as an independent country, over concrete action to strengthen its defenses. Whereas Tokyo prefers deterrence without provocation, the US periodically practices provocation without deterrence. That’s not a good way to handle a dangerous rival — or to keep America’s single most crucial ally in the fold.

Next up in this series: Australia.

More From This Writer at Bloomberg Opinion:

• America Can Contain China With an Alliance of Five: Hal Brands
• Can the US Take on China, Iran and Russia All at Once?: Hal Brands
• Xi's Total Control Over Foreign Policy Is a Big Problem: Hal Brands

Want more Bloomberg Opinion? OPIN <GO>. Web readers click here.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. The Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, he is co-author, most recently, of "Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China" and a member of the State Department's Foreign Affairs Policy Board. 

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15. Teaching Irregular Warfare in the Era of Strategic Competition

We need more of this kind of thinking if we want Irregular Warfare to no longer be an intellectual orphan in DOD.

Excerpts:

Only when students of IW have a foundation in the six competencies above should they also study best practices in particular branches of IW. These can include what has worked and what has failed in countering terrorist and insurgent groups, what has proven to be effective in resistance operations, or what has been successful in countering propaganda and disinformation. Applications of best practices without an intimate knowledge of an enemy can lead to counterproductive results. But IW expertise that is grounded in the six competencies above will allow students of IW to make better decisions—and help the United States compete more effectively in all forms of warfare, conventional and irregular alike.

Teaching Irregular Warfare in the Era of Strategic Competition - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Elena Pokalova · November 7, 2022

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The 2022 National Security Strategy focuses on US leadership in strategic competition over the future of international order. The document lays out the threats and challenges the United States faces today from adversaries such as Russia and China. In order to prevail over such competitors and secure US leadership in the future, the United States needs to reconsider the way it approaches teaching irregular warfare (IW) in its professional military education (PME) institutions.

Russia and China have demonstrated the rising significance of IW in the era of strategic competition. The Kremlin has used “little green men” to annex Crimea and deployed the Wagner Group to foment separatism in eastern Ukraine. China has stolen Western technology to get ahead and used its Belt and Road Initiative to undermine Western economic institutions. In what looks like an increasingly multipolar world, more and more actors are willing to resort to IW to compete; the United States’ IW curriculum needs to reflect that fact.

In the era of strategic competition, IW has become about building influence, creating leverage, and undermining opponents through all instruments of national power. It is about the use of all available capabilities to pursue hostile intentions without having to resort to the use of military force. When wars do break out, US adversaries have shown that IW is about fighting dirty, with little regard to internationally accepted norms and rules of armed conflict. What has been unthinkable for Western democracies has become the norm for autocratic governments in Moscow or Beijing. As a result, US PME students need to graduate with a proficiency in IW if they wish to fight and compete effectively.

IW Curriculum

To date, IW has had a light presence in PME curricula. The situation has begun to change with the publication of the IW Annex to the 2018 National Defense Strategy. However, most IW-relevant courses have focused on the operational level, examining best practices in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, resistance operations, or countering information warfare. Such competencies are not enough. The basic knowledge of best practices is similar to training in which officers are given checklists that they have to follow to achieve a desired outcome. But without understanding the larger context and the fundamental variables at work in IW, simply following best practices might be counterproductive. Best practices work only when combined with a deep knowledge of the adversary and an understanding of the strategic logic behind its actions. In order to achieve that, IW proficiency in the contemporary world in the era of strategic competition should include the following competencies.

First, students of IW should have a solid understanding of how the United States fights wars and how others do. They should be proficient in conventional warfare and should have a clear understanding of how IW fits into what happens on the battlefield. As the war in Ukraine demonstrates, conventional warfare and IW go hand in hand. In addition to the conventional genius of the Ukrainian military, Kyiv has been able to gain advantage with the help of IW operations like the covert attack on Saky airbase in Crimea or the bombing of the Kerch Strait Bridge that connects Russia to Crimea. In the era of strategic competition, adversaries are even more likely to rely on IW to avoid direct confrontations that are costly. As a result, students of IW should know what strengths and weaknesses come with conventional warfare and IW, how the United States can maximize its strengths and minimize weaknesses, and what lessons it can learn from past wars.

Second, students of IW should know how the United States competes and how others do. IW is not all about warfare. In fact, successful IW often involves undermining an adversary without having to fight at all. Russia, for example, has used troll factories to spread propaganda and undermine its opponents, while China has used its Belt and Road Initiative to undermine US economic interests. Such actions demonstrate that US opponents will use all instruments of national power to build influence and create leverage. As a result, students of IW should study statecraft and comparative politics. They should know how the United States conducts foreign policy and how others do. They should be proficient in how US adversaries use various forms of power, employ hostile ideologies, and manipulate political legitimacy to fight without fighting. This knowledge is essential to comprehend how the US military fits into strategic competition and how US interagency partners can work with the military toward the same objectives.

Third, students of IW should invest in critical thinking. Critical thinking remains one of the most crucial capabilities for a warfighter. As explained above, US adversaries will exploit any combinations of tools and methods to compete. Adversaries such as China, Russia, and Iran will not adhere to US-led rules-based ways to interact with others: they will eagerly weaponize humans, food, and energy. No matter how well trained and prepared the US military is to fight an opponent, PME graduates need excellent analytical skills to quickly navigate among the surprises and tricks that permeate IW. The United States needs to invest more effort in active learning and scenario-based exercises to allow students to practice applying their theoretical knowledge and practical skills to real-life situations. Students of IW should graduate as agile thinkers who can quickly pivot to put the pieces of IW puzzles together.

Fourth, students of IW need education in strategic networking. A lot of IW work happens with interagency partners outside of the Department of Defense. For example, the US Departments of Transportation and Commerce are working with Ukraine on infrastructure resilience. As a result, students of IW should be able to effectively communicate with interagency partners. Additionally, successful strategic competition can depend on international partnerships. The more friends, allies, and partners the United States has, the fewer opportunities for malign influence Russia and China will have. For example, Central Asian states today offer a unique networking opportunity for the United States: hesitant to trust Russia due to its invasion of Ukraine, they are also cautious about the hidden costs that come with China’s expansion in the region. Students of IW should be able to identify the importance of such networking and should be capable of engaging with interagency and international partners so that the United States can improve its ability to make a phone call to prevent a war.

Fifth, students of IW should be trained to conduct themselves ethically. Too often, the Kremlin would point out that the United States is no better than Russia, and that the Russian government is only doing in Ukraine what the United States has done in many parts of the world. US students of IW have to be able to counter such narratives. Democratic regimes come with checks and balances, transparency and accountability, and the rule of law—ideals that place additional constraints on democratic governments. Authoritarian regimes in Moscow and Beijing do not have to answer to the same standards of public oversight as the United States. So wouldn’t getting rid of the constraints allow the United States to compete more effectively?

The answer is no. Emulating Russian or Chinese behavior will only undermine the United States’ international standing. The world is currently witnessing how ethical conduct is working in favor of Ukraine: Kyiv is confidently building international support through the professionalization of its special operations forces and its strict adherence to international rules of armed conflict. Russia, meanwhile, is isolating itself even further by sending prisoners to the front lines in Ukraine who then unsurprisingly engage in war crimes. Students of IW have to be proficient in ethical ways of fighting and competing that will bring the United States more leverage, recognition, and global leadership without undermining the very principles and ideals Washington says it stands for.

Sixth, the United States needs a continued commitment to build its foreign language expertise. The United States is woefully behind in foreign language skills. Budgetary constraints often lead to cuts in critical foreign language education. But the United States has already seen how the dearth of foreign language expertise can affect its warfighting. In order to win, the US military needs experts who not only have a deep understanding of US adversaries, but will also be able to converse with those adversaries in their language. Linguistic competence opens so many doors to cultural proficiency, which is invaluable in reading IW prompts and signals. The US government needs to expand opportunities for IW students to gain linguistic competency, even if at a basic level. Exposure to the Russian, Chinese, or Persian languages can help US soldiers better understand the way US adversaries think.

Only when students of IW have a foundation in the six competencies above should they also study best practices in particular branches of IW. These can include what has worked and what has failed in countering terrorist and insurgent groups, what has proven to be effective in resistance operations, or what has been successful in countering propaganda and disinformation. Applications of best practices without an intimate knowledge of an enemy can lead to counterproductive results. But IW expertise that is grounded in the six competencies above will allow students of IW to make better decisions—and help the United States compete more effectively in all forms of warfare, conventional and irregular alike.

Elena Pokalova is professor and department chair, College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: NDU Press

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mwi.usma.edu · by Elena Pokalova · November 7, 2022

16. David or Goliath? How Thinking Like a Small Nation Can Help Counter China

Conclusion:

The continued posturing of the United States as the main geopolitical power represents a grave strategic misstep against the rising power of China. This posture overcommits resources to a narrow conception of warfare that then limits the availability of options. If, however, the U.S. were to strategize as a smaller, less wealthy nation, it may develop the strategic flexibility required to counter China. This small nation perspective deemphasizes investment in long-term kinetic capabilities while prioritizing the sociocultural elements of multidomain warfare. The U.S. can no longer take its place in the world for granted. We must learn to embrace being a geopolitical David if we are to survive against the new Goliath.

David or Goliath? How Thinking Like a Small Nation Can Help Counter China

Garrett Martin  November 7, 2022

thestrategybridge.org · November 7, 2022

The posture of the U.S. as the global hegemon is creating strategic vulnerabilities.[1] The growing misalignment between American capabilities and geopolitical realities is allowing China to unseat the world order; small, iterative advances in ship design will not solve China’s growing influence in the South China Sea nor the expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Yet, the U.S. seems determined to continue its arms build-up, putting the nation on a brash warpath with China. Many declining empires fought their rising adversaries only to lose, and in doing so, signaled a global transfer of power. This is popularly known as the Thucydides Trap.[2] Perhaps the U.S. can avoid this trap by adopting the perspective of a small nation. If the U.S. proactively assumes the posture of a smaller, militarily disadvantaged nation, it may be able to outmaneuver the rising power of China without direct armed conflict.

"David and Goliath" by Michelangelo, on the Sistine Chapel ceiling. (Web Gallery of Art/Wikimedia)

The Thucydides Trap

China is emerging as a dominant world power as it continues its build-up of arms, leverages its manufacturing strength over supply chain disruptions, and expands its economic investments.[3] China’s multidomain strategies, which employ sub-kinetic means across a wide spectrum of conflict, have garnered a predominately kinetic strategic response from the U.S. The 2022 defense budget, for example, allocated $27.3 billion towards missile and radar systems in the Indo-Pacific region.[4] This continued investment in kinetic capabilities signals that the U.S. is primarily positioned to fight a traditional, kinetic war with China. But going to war with your number one trading partner immediately creates a myriad of disadvantages, such as the loss of over $541 billion annually in imported goods.[5] China’s aggression in the South China Sea, and particularly its increasing antagonism of Taiwan, seem designed to provoke U.S. intervention.[6] Chinese strategists have criticized Americans for being “slaves to technology in their thinking,” understanding that the U.S. is more likely to engage in an expensive arms build-up than an organizational pivot towards a new conception of warfare.[7] In this sense, China strategizes around the assumption that the U.S. will act as the geopolitical Goliath.

The current American defense mindset of buying down risk does not work if the U.S. loses ground across multiple domains. American grand strategy takes its supremacy axiomatically, ignoring the very real possibility that it may have already lost the geopolitical advantage. If, however, the U.S. proactively strategizes as a militarily disadvantaged nation, it may effectively reorient its capabilities towards domains outside direct armed conflict. Countering China in sub-kinetic domains, as a smaller nation might, allows the U.S. to avoid Thucydides Trap without losing its geopolitical position.

Thinking Small

We can conceptualize a “small nation” as a one that lacks the necessary capital to strategize around buying their security. Most notably, this economic disadvantage prevents plans for long term defense acquisitions. Adopting a small nation perspective, then, would first mean the consideration of budgetary constraints. It seems likely at least part of China’s economic strategy against the U.S. is to coerce it into an increasingly expensive arms race. A small nation cannot consider the prospect of expanding its defense budget to the tune of billions or trillions. Actively avoiding the Thucydides Trap would naturally deemphasize military spending on kinetic capabilities, allowing for strategic reallocations to sub-kinetic capabilities.

We can conceptualize a “small nation” as a one that lacks the necessary capital to strategize around buying their security.

Deprioritizing kinetic capabilities encourages military leaders to break with the fixation on bigger and better technology; there is no silver bullet technology that is going to counter China. Rather, there must be an organizational focus on leveraging existing capabilities into new domains of warfare. A small nation perspective particularly emphasizes how these domains affect the social dynamics and culture of the host nation, what we might call the sociocultural element of warfare. This is analogous to how economic warfare creates direct avenues to engage in other, more culturally grounded domains of warfare like psychological and political warfare. [8] When an adversary consolidates influence over industries in a target nation, they also appropriate the societal access those industries possess. This access manifests as government connections, control over labor, media influence, and more. In this sense, one domain of conflict becomes many. The U.S. globally achieved these ends in the post-WWII period, partially through the Marshall plan, as China now employs this strategy through the Belt and Road Initiative.[9]

Whether we consider the United Kingdom’s occupation of Malaysia, the various American campaigns of “winning hearts and minds,” or China’s most recent Belt and Road Initiative efforts in Africa, host nation culture has provided the strongest defense against hegemonic foreign influence.[10] A small nation perspective gives culture a new significance in multi-domain warfare. Directly countering the economic incentives of the Belt and Road Initiative with pro-American aid is a difficult venture; fighting an economic war with China is as appealing as fighting a kinetic one. But there are other domains available to counter China’s economic warfare—domains that intersect in sociocultural spaces that small nations have traditionally competed in by necessity. By deprioritizing kinetic capabilities, the American military can allocate its resources to more effectively engage across other domains. Cyber warfare is one such non-kinetic capability that allows smaller nations to maximize their impact across sociocultural domains of warfare.[11]

Force Multiplying Domains

Cyber warfare has gained global attention due its ability to penetrate directly into a target society. Cyber capabilities, like hacking, can reveal military secrets while also disabling defense systems or key infrastructure.[12] But cyber warfare can also serve as an example of how one domain can create opportunities into other domains: cyber operations can be leveraged into psychological operations. The proliferation of information technology has enabled disinformation to shape the collective consciousness in new ways. Similar to the information forging efforts of the past, publicly available information can be altered to affect a target society.[13] An adversary could publish press statements from official government websites in order to confuse a population, particularly during a moment of crisis. Russia used a version of this disinformation tactic in 2015 when they hacked U.S. Central Command’s twitter account. Notably, this was also a false flag cyber attack as they made it appear as though ISIS conducted the operation.[14] Many reports published the misinformation of the attack, which then impacted domestic and international perceptions on American cyber capabilities—despite a twitter password being the only vulnerability actually exposed.[15]

The small nation perspective highlights the cultural aspects of warfare and helps realign sub-kinetic capabilities. Even various forms of political warfare find a renewed clarity in the cultural context of multidomain warfare. Economic aid provides one such example. The U.S. has predominantly used aid to create political leverage in smaller nations. To an extent, this has translated into the use of aid to bribe foreign governments to acquiesce to policy or defense objectives. Small nations contribute aid, but they generally do not use it as an economic or political lure. There is an underlying symbolic impact of aid that small nations are more keen to combat or maximize.[16]

The U.S. can undermine certain aspects of China’s economic expansion by maximizing the cultural and symbolic impact of aid. Aid by itself would do little to undermine the economic partnerships China is fostering through the Belt and Road Initiative. But the Belt and Road Initiative is an effective strategy because it utilizes a long-term economic plan to open other domains of conflict. China often requires the use of Chinese labor for international projects which allows them to export their citizens, culture, and currency.[17] This cultural dimension of their economic strategy helps to spread China’s influence, but it also creates vulnerabilities. Sociocultural dynamics are especially important to a small nation perspective as these cultural spaces increasingly represent avenues of warfare.[18] For example, aid can be given to countries experiencing increased pollution due to Belt and Road Initiative partnerships.[19] An accompanying psychological operation would shape media coverage and political discourse to highlight the negative environmental consequences of participating in the BRI. In this scenario, an emerging geopolitical opportunity—Chinese pollution from the Belt and Road Initiative—becomes an avenue to employ multi-domain capabilities that maximize a cultural response to undermine China’s economic partnerships.

Rethinking Domestic Strategy

Countries like Taiwan have countered China by pursuing clear ideological delineations from China. For Taiwan, this has meant a public embrace of democracy to create an international juxtaposition with China’s totalitarianism. Aside from democratizing their formal institutions, Taiwan has taken the notable step of democratizing their approach to diplomacy. Taiwan’s “people’s diplomacy” initiative encouraged all Taiwanese citizens to identify as representatives of the nation.[20] The program served the dual purpose of fostering informal diplomacy from their population to the international community, but also served an exemplary domestic function. The Taiwanese government educated their citizens on foreign policy through workshops and educational resources.

Flag of Taiwan (Office of the President of the Republic of China)

Taiwan’s example focuses on the role of domestic operations on thinking like a smaller nation. Information warfare, to include disinformation campaigns, seek to directly affect target societies; disinformation can be used to sow disunity or confusion within a population, but it can also be used to create positive public opinion.[21] When formal institutions, like those of the Taiwanese government, create partnerships with informal institutions, like those targeted by their “people’s diplomacy” program, they open opportunities for defensive information operations. Strong public buy-in of alternative or counter-narratives remains the primary means of countering disinformation.[22] Greater communication between a government and its people inherently limits the effectiveness of foreign disinformation by bolstering domestic narratives. Improved societal cohesion works as a bulwark against foreign operations meant to chip away at civic unity. Despite having limited resources for countering disinformation campaigns, small nations may have cultural systems that are better equipped at limiting their effects. The U.S. could use domestic programs like Taiwan to foster similar cultural systems.

Improved societal cohesion works as a bulwark against foreign operations meant to chip away at civic unity. Despite having limited resources for countering disinformation campaigns, small nations may have cultural systems that are better equipped at limiting their effects.

Conclusion

The continued posturing of the United States as the main geopolitical power represents a grave strategic misstep against the rising power of China. This posture overcommits resources to a narrow conception of warfare that then limits the availability of options. If, however, the U.S. were to strategize as a smaller, less wealthy nation, it may develop the strategic flexibility required to counter China. This small nation perspective deemphasizes investment in long-term kinetic capabilities while prioritizing the sociocultural elements of multidomain warfare. The U.S. can no longer take its place in the world for granted. We must learn to embrace being a geopolitical David if we are to survive against the new Goliath.

Garrett Martin is a graduate student at UCLA, a Marine Corps veteran, and a research fellow at the Naval Postgraduate School in the department of Defense Analysis. His research primarily centers on grand strategy, institutions, culture, information warfare, and the role of group identity in contemporary warfare. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: David, 2020 (FMR Noor)

Notes:

[1] Christopher Layne, “The unipolar exit: beyond the Pax Americana,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 (Jul 2011): 149–164; Fareed Zakaria, “The Self-Destruction of American Power: Washington Squandered the Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, July 2019; Bidisha Biswas and Anish Goel, “What Comes After US Hegemony? The Asia-Pacific region looks beyond the United States,” The Diplomat, December 19, 2018; Ron Huisken, “China, the US and the Waxing and Waning of Power,” The Strategist, May 21, 2020.

[2] Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Mariner Books, 2017).

[3] David Brown, “Why China Could Win the New Global Arms Race,” BBC News, July 28, 2022; Anjani Trivedi and Shuli Ren, “Good Luck Taking Away China’s Manufacturing Mojo,” The Washington Post, August 24, 2022; “China Increases Investments in PNG, Sparking Security Fears for Australia,” News.com.au, July 4, 2022.

[4] Paul McLeary, “Indo-Pacific Commander Delivers $27 Billion Plan to Congress,” Breaking Defense, March 1, 2021.

[5] “United States Imports from China,” TradingEconomic.com

[6] Iain Marlow, “Taiwanese Independence is a Charging Rhino That Must Be Stopped, Chin Says,” Bloomberg, September 22, 2022; Alys Davies, “Taiwan Tensions: China Condemns ‘manic’ Visit as Pelosi Continues Tour,” August 4, 2022.

[7] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (People’s Liberation Army Publishing House, 1999): 24.

[8] Lt Gen PC Katoch, “Economic Warfare – Nuances in 21st Century,” Journal of the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (Dec 2014).

[9] Daniel Immerwahr, How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019): 215 - 227; 298 - 336; Greg Castillo, “Domesticating the Cold War: Household COnsumption as Propaganda in Marshall Plan Germany,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 40 (2005): 261 - 288.

[10] Yangbin Chen, “From ‘Lamb Kebabs’ to ‘Shared Joy’: Cultural Appropriation, Ignorance and the Constrained COnnectivity within the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol 29 (2020): 1 - 16; Andrei Miroiu, “Deportations and Counterinsurgency,” Studia Politica, Romain Political Science Review, Vol 2 (2015): 177 - 194.

[11] Daniel Hughes and Andrew Colarik, “Small State Acquisition of Offensive Cyberwarfare Capabilities: Towards Building an Analytical Framework,” Intelligence and Security Informatics (2016): 166 – 179.

[12] Simone Dossi, “On the asymmetric advantages of cyberwarfare: Western literature and the Chinese Journal Guofang Keji,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 43, Iss 2, (2020): 281-308.

[13] Thomas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare (New York: Picador 2020): 61 -134.

[14] Thomas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare (New York: Picador 2020): 367.

[15] David C. Gompert and Martin C. Libicki, “Decoding the Breach: The Truth About the CENTCOM Hack,” The RAND Blog, February 3, 2015.

[16] Tomohisa Hattori, “Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid,” Review of International Political Economy, Vol 8 (2001): 633 - 660.

[17] Jennifer Hillman and Alex Tippett, “Who Built That? Labor and the Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2021.

[18] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (People’s Liberation Army Publishing House, 1999): 206.

[19] Kang-Chun Cheng, “Chinese Businesses are at the Forefront of Environmental Change in Africa,” Quartz Africa, July 20, 2022.

[20] Hongying Wang & Yeh-Chung Lu, “The Conception of Soft Power and its Policy Implications: a comparative study of China and Taiwan,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 47, Iss. 56, (2008): 425-447

[21] Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (University Press of Kansas 2006).

[22] Andrew Dowse and Sascha Dov Bachmann, “Information warfare: methods to counter disinformation,” Defense & Security Analysis (Sep 2022).

thestrategybridge.org · November 7, 2022

17. Special Ops Applies Ukraine Lessons to Indo-Pacific

Special Ops Applies Ukraine Lessons to Indo-Pacific

Lessons learned drive new capabilities for regional forces.

afcea.org

U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific is using lessons learned during the war between Russia and Ukraine to determine which technologies to provide to partner forces in the region, according to Army Col. Ronnie Geronimo, director of Communications (SOJ6), Special Operations Command Pacific.

Col. Geronimo told the audience at the AFCEA TechNet Indo-Pacific conference in Honolulu that he was tasked with two things when he was assigned to the Indo-Pacific region four months ago. The first was to “find out what Ukraine is doing and communicate externally to the partner forces what they're communicating with.” The second was to “bring that to the Pacific and figure out how to get that capability to the partner force of choice and make sure that we're resilient, reliable and survivable.”

“So, everything that we've done for the past four months now to develop new capabilities, has been around that. We've taken a lot of lessons learned from our [Special Operations Command Europe] counterparts to get those key things they've taken out of the Ukraine conflict, and we started applying those lessons learned here,” he said.

COL Ronnie E. Geronimo, USA

Director of Communications (SOJ6) @USSOCOM @INDOPACOM: We can learn from Ukraine the use of non-standard platforms for info exchange, to push info real-time. #AFCEATechNet @afceahawaii @AFCEA

— Kimberly Underwood (@Kunderwood_SGNL) November 3, 2022

One of the lessons learned is the importance of “nonstandard” platforms for sharing information. “The Ukrainian conflict has demonstrated how crucial it is to have nonstandard platforms towards information exchange in today's operational environment. So not only must we stay the course and develop a mission partner environment and secret releasable capabilities to ensure that we can have our type of mission command systems interoperate across the forest, but we also must recognize that enriched data observed from commercially or publicly available information shared by the U.S. and partner forces of choice is just as effective in getting our point across and assisting that partner force and time of crisis,” Col. Geronimo added.

Much of the command’s efforts are toward delivering technologies that can push information to partners in real time, even though the Indo-Pacific partners and allies are not likely to adopt unified standards in the near future, he indicated. “I think there's a good push towards a unified standard out there. But if you factor in our partner forces, who have capabilities—and more importantly the ones that don't have capabilities—it becomes very challenging to do that.”

The colonel also emphasized the need for strong relationships. “In situations where authorities limit our abilities towards information sharing, another lesson from Ukraine is that relationships matter. Your partners and allies matter, right? It's not really a technology but more of a process. And that's what we've seen really become very, very useful in the current conflict.”

afcea.org

18. US Special Forces will showcase first ever live fire of airdropped cruise missiles off Northern Norway

Photos/Video at the link: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/11/us-special-forces-will-showcase-first-ever-live-fire-rapid-dragon-airdropped-cruise?utm_source=pocket_mylist

US Special Forces will showcase first ever live fire of airdropped cruise missiles off Northern Norway

thebarentsobserver.com · by Thomas Nilsen

Named Rapid Dragon, the new weapon system is dropped from a military C-130J Super Hercules transport plane. The palletized weapon modul is first stabilized by a parachute before launching flying munitions, like cruise missiles. Screenshot from Lockheed Martin video

The brand new Rapid Dragon is a highly potent weapon system that can launch a swarm of cruise missiles from a standard military transport plane. The United States, with NATO members, will for the first time exercise this strike capability inside the Arctic Circle over the Norwegian Sea, sometime from November 9 to 11.

November 05, 2022

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“This is not signaling to Russia or any adversary,” assures U.S. Army Cpt. Margaret Collins.

She said in a phone interview with the Barents Observer that the area off the coast of Northern Norway is chosen because of the size needed for the test. The Rapid Dragon is developed to hit targets far away in different directions on land and at sea.

The exercise area west of Andøya and Tromsø in Northern Norway is about 150 kilometers long and 100 kilometers wide.

From this part of the Norwegian Sea, the distance to the homeports for Russia’s nuclear submarines on the Kola Peninsula is some 650 kilometers. In February, just days before Moscow’s onslaught on Ukraine, a Northern Fleet frigate tested a Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile near Norway’s Bear Island in the Barents Sea as part of a larger strategic nuclear missile drill.

An area of about 15,000 km2 (marked red) in the Norwegian Sea west of Tromsø is closed off for civilian air traffic and shipping November 9-11. Map sources: NotamMap / Google Earth / Barents Observer

Neither the Norwegian Joint Headquarters nor the US Army are willing to share details with the Barents Observer about which missiles will be used in the upcoming exercise. However, a test of Rapid Dragon over the Gulf of Mexico in December last year was conducted with the JASSM long-range ground attack cruise missile which can hit targets at a distance of 925 kilometers.

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According to Wikipedia, the Rapid Dragon is well suited for launching a swarm of cruise missiles as a mass attack on air defense systems such as S-300 and S-400. These are the transportable air defense missiles Russia’s Northern Fleet has along the coast of the Kola Peninsula to protect the strategically important submarine bases.

“We will demonstrate the weapon when training interoperability with our NATO partners. This is the first time a live fire of the system will happen in training,” said Public Affairs Officer, Cpt. Margaret Collins.

She added that the Rapid Dragon live fire outside Northern Norway is part of a drill with special forces also taking place in Poland and Romania.

The plane to bring in the Rapid Dragon up nort is a C-130J Super Hercules which will take off from an air base in the United Kingdom.

Short runway deployment

An advantage of the new weapon system is that the United States could rapidly provide massive strike capability to any NATO member by using the existing fleet of transport planes. Such planes, like the Hercules, can operate from landing runways as short as 900 meters.

There are several tens of such runways in northern Scandinavia, airports that can deploy the planes in case military air bases with longer runways are attacked by an adversary.

The module with the missiles is designed as a roll-on roll-off capability to enable rapid fielding and eliminate the need for aircraft modification.

Rapid Dragon has an onboard control module attached to the pack that enables the missiles and battle management system to communicate so missions and targets can be updated while the plane is airborne.

After the module is parachuted, weapons will be systematically released. Each will ignite, pull up, and proceed normally to the target.

The larger C-17 transport plane can carry several 9-packs with the palletized weapon drop system Rapid Dragon. Screenshot from Lockheed Martin video

The exact timing for the Rapid Dragon live fire within the 3-day period November 9-11 will not be announced.

“We can’t disclose details,” said Cpt. Collins. She noted that it could depend on the weather.

Strengthened NATO up North

Andøya air base is by the Norwegian Government earmarked for receiving allied forces in case of crisis or war. The air base is on the coast to the exercise area and is today home to the country’s fleet of P-3 Orion maritime surveillance aircraft, to be phased out as six new P-8 Poseidon will be deployed to Evenes air base.

For Norway, NATO’s renewed focus on the North is welcomed.

“This type of integrated training with close allies increases our joint ability to cooperate in our immediate areas,” said spokesperson with the Joint Headquarters, Corporal Jonny Karlsen, to the Barents Observer.

“The United States is one of our closest allies. American presence in the northern regions is important for a credible defense of Norway and NATO,” Karlsen said and added: ”

“Through military presence and joint training in Europe, the US communicates that it contributes to NATO’s collective defense.”

The Norwegian Armed Forces have over the last years boosted training with other NATO forces inside the Arctic Circle, including joint fighter jets training with American bombers, warship navigation at sea, and army forces exercises together with the two neighboring coming members of NATO; Sweden and Finland.

Russian air-defense drill

Last week, Russia’s nuclear-powered battle cruiser, the “Pyotr Veliky” sailed out from Severomorsk for combat training in the Barents Sea.

The warship will exercise anti-submarine warfare and air defense operations, according to the press center of the Northern Fleet.

Nuclear-powered battle-cruiser “Pyotr Veliky” at port in Severomorsk, the main base of Russia’s Northern Fleet. Photo: Thomas Nilsen

thebarentsobserver.com · by Thomas Nilsen

19. Biden’s ‘consequences’ for Saudi Arabia are reaping quiet results

Biden’s ‘consequences’ for Saudi Arabia are reaping quiet results

Riyadh’s decision to cut OPEC oil production was met with fury in Washington. But the White House is taking its time on meting out any public punishment.

By Karen DeYoung

November 5, 2022 at 4:24 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Karen DeYoung · November 5, 2022

Despite its furious reaction to Saudi Arabia’s decision last month to cut oil production in the face of global shortages, and threats of retaliation, the Biden administration is looking for signs that the tight, decades-long security relationship between Washington and Riyadh can be salvaged.

Those ties, and a commitment to help protect its strategic partners — particularly against Iran — are an integral part of U.S. defenses in the Middle East. When recent intelligence reports warned of imminent Iranian ballistic missile and drone attacks on targets in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Central Command launched warplanes based in the Persian Gulf region toward Iran as part of an overall elevated alert status of U.S. and Saudi forces.

The scrambling of the jets, dispatched as an armed show of force and not previously reported, was the latest illustration of the strength and importance of a partnership the administration has said it is now reevaluating.

“There’s going to be some consequences for what they’ve done,” President Biden said after the Saudis agreed last month, at a meeting of the OPEC Plus energy cartel they chair, to cut production by 2 million barrels a day.

The cuts serve only to increase prices, the White House charged, and would benefit cartel member Russia at precisely the moment the United States and its allies were trying to choke off Moscow’s oil revenue to undercut its war in Ukraine.

In the angry days that followed, the Saudis publicly countered that the administration had asked for the cuts to be delayed by a month, indirectly suggesting that Biden wanted to avoid increased prices at the gas pump before the upcoming U.S. midterm elections. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby let loose to reporters that the Saudis were trying to “spin” the U.S. concerns over Ukraine and world energy stability into a domestic political ploy, and to deflect criticism of fence-sitting on Russia’s war.

Many lawmakers, some of whom have long advocated cutting ties with the Saudis, reacted with even greater umbrage, calling for the immediate withdrawal of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in the kingdom and a stop to all arms sales, among other punitive measures.

But the White House, as it considers how to make good on Biden’s “consequences” pledge and despite its ongoing anger, has become uneasy over the reaction its sharp response has provoked at home. Rather than moving quickly to respond, it is playing for time, looking for ways to bring the Saudis back in line while preserving strong bilateral security ties.

“Are we rupturing the relationship? No,” said a senior administration official, speaking on the condition of anonymity about what has become a sensitive political and diplomatic situation. “We had a fundamental disagreement on the state of the oil market and the global economy, and we are reviewing what transpired.”

“But we have important interests at stake in this relationship,” the official said.

Oil, and Saudi Arabia’s influence on the global market, is second only to U.S. strategic interests in the Persian Gulf, where the kingdom plays a central role, not least in countering Iranian aggression. The White House, which confirmed a Wall Street Journal report on the recent Iranian threat and high-level alert, declined to comment on the launch of U.S. warplanes.

“Centcom is committed to our long-standing strategic military partnership with Saudi Arabia,” said command spokesman Joe Buccio. “We will not discuss operational details.” The United States maintains significant air assets in the region, including F-22 fighter jets in Saudi Arabia, although the location from which they were scrambled was not clear.

Only about 6 percent of U.S. oil imports now come from Saudi Arabia. China is the kingdom’s largest trading partner, and commercial ties with Russia have broadened. But security and intelligence ties are the linchpin of U.S.-Saudi relations, and defense officials in Washington are unsettled by what the current upheaval might mean.

Major U.S. deployments there ended after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and there have been repeated bilateral strains in recent years, including human rights concerns over the Saudi-led war in Yemen, and the 2018 murder by Saudi agents of journalist and regime critic Jamal Khashoggi, a U.S. resident and columnist for The Washington Post.

There are about 2,500 U.S. forces now in Saudi Arabia, many of them involved in high-tech intelligence work and training. The United States is the supplier of nearly three-quarters of all weapons systems used by the Saudi military, including constantly needed parts, repairs and upgrades.

Military sales to the kingdom have been the subject of repeated controversy in recent years, as many in Congress have objected to them. While President Donald Trump, who boasted of billions in potential U.S. sales to the Saudis, vetoed congressional attempts to stop particular transactions, Biden banned the kingdom’s purchase of offensive U.S. weapons shortly after taking office.

Since then, there have been two major Saudi purchases, of air-to-air missiles, and replacement missiles for Patriot air defense batteries. Another order for 300 Patriot missiles — at more than $3 million per unit — was approved by the State Department in August, after a Biden visit to the kingdom, where he reportedly believed he cemented an agreement with the crown prince not to cut oil production.

Although Congress did not formally object to the new sale within a 30-day allotted window, there has been no public indication that the next step in the transaction — a signed contract with the Defense Department — has been taken. The Pentagon has “nothing to announce at this time” regarding the sale, spokesman Lt. Col. Cesar Santiago said Friday.

In a reflection of the current level of congressional ire, Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) said last month that all weapons sales to Saudi Arabia should be stopped, and that any Patriot systems there should be removed and sent to Ukraine. “If Saudi Arabia isn’t willing to take the side of Ukraine and U.S. over Russia, why should we keep these Patriots in Saudi Arabia when Ukraine and our NATO allies need them,” Murphy wrote on Twitter.

While two U.S.-controlled Patriot systems remain in Saudi Arabia to protect U.S. personnel from missile attacks from Yemen’s Houthi rebels, and presumably from Iran, the bulk of the systems in use there were purchased years ago by the Saudis and belong to the kingdom.

Biden has said he wants to consult with lawmakers over the promised “consequences,” and while strong statements by lawmakers buttress his threat, the current congressional recess also gives the administration some breathing room.

The strongest objections to business as usual with the kingdom have come from Democrats. Rep. Ro Khanna (Calif.) and Sen. Richard Blumenthal (Conn.) last month introduced a bill to halt all U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia until they reconsider the oil production cuts. “The Saudis need to come to their senses,” Blumenthal said in announcing the measure. “The only apparent purpose of this cut in oil supplies is to help the Russians and harm Americans.” A separate bill by a trio of Democratic House members, led by Rep. Tom Malinowski (N.J.), would require the removal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), the powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, last month issued a statement saying that “the United States must immediately freeze all aspects of our cooperation with Saudi Arabia,” and vowed he would “not green-light any cooperation with Riyadh until the kingdom reassesses its position with respect to the war in Ukraine.”

Most Republicans who have taken a stand on the issue have said Biden should use the opportunity of the cuts to increase domestic oil production, although the United States is already pumping roughly one millions barrels a day more than when Biden took office.

So far, the administration has offered no clues as to what, if any, punitive measures it might consider during its review of the relationship, and appears in no rush to decide. “We don’t need to be in a hurry,” Kirby said last week. In the meantime, officials have emphasized steps they say the Saudis have taken to assuage U.S. anger and prove they’re not leaning toward Russia.

“Our displeasure has already been clearly stated and has already had an impact,” the senior official said. “We’ve seen the Saudis react in ways that are constructive.”

In addition to a Saudi vote in favor of last month’s U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s illegal annexation of four regions of Ukraine, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the kingdom’s de facto ruler, called President Volodymyr Zelensky to tell him Saudi Arabia would contribute $400 million in humanitarian aid to Ukraine, far more than its only previous donation of $10 million in April.

The Saudis have been actively supportive of a recent truce in Yemen that the Biden administration has championed. And after years of U.S. effort to persuade the Persian Gulf countries to adopt a regional missile defense system against Iran, long resisted by the Saudis, the administration believes it is finally making headway.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken has indicated that’s not yet enough. Speaking last week to Bloomberg News, he called the U.N. vote and the Ukraine donation “positive developments,” although “they don’t compensate [for] the decision made by OPEC Plus on production.”

But the more time that elapses, the more chances Saudi Arabia will have to make things right and temper any U.S. response. One key indicator is likely to come next month, when the European Union has scheduled a ban on seaborne imports of Russian crude oil — followed by a prohibition against all Russian petroleum products two months later — and U.S.-promoted plans to impose a price cap on Russian oil.

Any market shortages those measures may create could be made up by increased production by Saudi Arabia, officials believe. Saudi Energy Minister Abdulaziz bin Salma said last week in remarks to an investor conference in Riyadh that this was his country’s plan all along.

The Saudis have repeatedly insisted that their only interest is in global market stability. Reduced production now, the minister said, would create spare capacity to make up for upcoming sanctions on Russia without creating major global shortfalls.

“You need to make sure you build a situation where if things [get] worse you have the ability” to respond, he said. “We will be the supplier of those who want us to supply.”

The Saudis, Abdulaziz said, had “decided to be the maturer guys,” as opposed to those who were “depleting their emergency stocks … as a mechanism to manipulate markets.” Biden has withdrawn about a third of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve this year, in an effort to keep gas prices within reach for Americans already struggling with high inflation and interest rates.

The Washington Post · by Karen DeYoung · November 5, 2022

20. Are We Living in the Modern Day Middle Ages? | A Conversation with Milo Jones

Interesting discussion with a friend of mine who is a board member of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy (https://apstrategy.org/).

Are We Living in the Modern Day Middle Ages? | A Conversation with Milo Jones • Forbes Georgia

forbes.ge · by Georgy Aronia · November 4, 2022

“The so-called modern world has many features that are perfectly recognizable to historians in the Middle Ages”, – says Milo Jones when I ask him whether the new order bestowed upon the world with the beginning of the war in Ukraine. In Jones’s vision, the new equilibrium the planet had entered is a multipolar world with a few powerful state actors and multinational tech companies, or important non-state actors that must be taken into consideration. This system, it turns out, closely resembles the Middle Ages, when kings battled barons, all fighting for their interests.

“Aha!”, – I think during the interview. Our world has a medieval vibe; the pandemic is a cherry on top. It is what Milo told me laughingly: “I would warn you that the Middle Ages was also a time of new plagues. I’m glad we don’t live in that era”. Another thought I had, is that clichéd history repeats itself, repeated so many times that it lost its value, one way or another. Yet, as it turns out, there is truth to it.

Milo Jones is a great interviewee with whom I could talk for hours. We met in the lobby of the Rooms Hotel in Tbilisi. “It’s my second time in Georgia”, – Milo told me, the first time being in 1984. “It was a different country back then”, – I told him. We have talked for a bit about current affairs but quickly transitioned to the discussion of the Russia-Ukraine war, Georgia, and its function in what appears to be a new world order and technologies, as the intersection of these two is where Milo’s lies. What follows is a transcript of our conversation.

Dr. Jones, I would like to pick up on something you said during our previous encounter about Ukraine transforming into a new Israel. How do you see this happening? Is it a good scenario?

What I meant by a new Israel is this idea of constraints applicable to anything whether it is a work of art or a nation. On the one hand, everyone looks at resources, but in some other ways, your disadvantages also shape you. I do not see Ukraine surviving as anything except a strong military power receiving help from the West, but also in its ways, innovating and betting on nobody for its defense, finally but itself. This is the circumstance in which Israel has found itself for the last seventy-five years.

In addition, like Israel, Ukraine has a large body of people skilled in many things like IT. It has a well-performing military with a strong sense of nation and self. In some ways, that is Vladimir Putin’s ultimate gift – the creation of Ukrainian nationhood, or at least the maturation of Ukrainian nationhood. They are not going back to where they were in January of this year. Ever. That is the sense of birth and that you can rely only on yourself. It has historically had a strong arms industry, a remnant of the Soviet Union. It should make most of that strength the same way Israel does.

While Israel is certainly no colony of the West, to put it mildly, that is the accusation. I can see similar accusations being made against Ukraine, including that it will be a battering ram for NATO. We are already hearing that, but the reality is – Ukraine is a battering ram for Ukraine. When I talk about Ukraine as a new Israel, to me that is the most positive aspiration it can have. I would remind you that Israel is also quite a fractious society; there are plenty of fights about what should Israel be and how should Israel behave. So, none of this is saying there is one Ukraine in that sense. It is just saying that you can fight among yourselves but present a formidable picture to the outside world. To me, that is a positive aspiration for Ukraine.

Does this entail a constant war between Ukraine and Russia, as is the case with Israel and its neighbors?

I cannot see a circumstance of Ukraine achieving a full-fledged peace certainly while Vladimir Putin lives and breathes. So, effectively short of an outright Russian defeat that is internalized by the Russian people as a defeat that, in some sense, confers legitimacy on Ukraine. I think there is still a feeling not just by Vladimir Putin, but among the Russian elite that Ukraine is not a real country. Maybe they do not want to rebuild the Soviet Union, but let’s be honest: “We are all Slavs together. We all speak Russian”. This, of course, is idiocy. Great Britain, Ireland, the United States, Canada, and Australia all speak English, but oddly enough, we are separate countries, and we all get it. Russia’s got to digest that idea. Just because you speak the same language does not mean you run from Moscow. Just because the historical roots of the Russian state lie in Kyiv does not mean you are the same country either, because the historical roots of the United States, in some ways, line in Britain but that does not mean the United States could claim ownership of Britain. Thus, unless Russia historically grows up sometime soon, Ukraine will remain under threat.

What is the new world that we have entered ever since the war in Ukraine began? If there is such a thing, of course.

I see the war in Ukraine as reflecting the new world rather than creating the new world. I see it as a symptom of a multipolar world. So yes, the United States remains the most powerful force, but there are other powerful countries and there is a lot of room for allies to play one side off against the other in a way that there has not been for many years. We have a phrase at the Center for the Study of Digital Life: “Digital Retrieves the Medieval”. One of the things we mean by that is that the so-called modern world has many, many features that do not fit with contemporary political science’s view of how modern states work but are perfectly recognizable to historians in the Middle Ages. I am talking about things like kings and nations that are very powerful. Kings must deal with barons, which are not complete state actors, but you better account for them. By that I mean everything from Australia having to negotiate with Baron Mark Zuckerberg, so to speak, to even non-state actors wielding serious military force.

It is a measure of the degree of crisis one sees in the Russian state that by far the most effective military unit of the Russian army is a private military company. It’s a band of mercenaries. The state itself is less effective than a non-state actor. My country just lost a twenty-year war to what amounted to a non-state actor – The Taliban and in some sense Al-Qaeda. Non-state actors and countries are recognizing them. Did you know that Denmark has an ambassador to Silicon Valley? They have decided that if we, the government of Denmark, are going to have an impact on the well-being of our citizens, we need to talk to Facebook and Apple, Netflix, and Google every bit as much, as we need another new outpost in the neighbor, less obscure country.

We are seeing many features of the medieval world. Of course, we are all worried about wealth inequality because we assume that modernity would bring a growing world middle class. Yet, what do we have? We have a transnational aristocracy of very wealthy people who are most interested in one another and the meeting at Davos than they are with the peasants. I have to say to a great degree, that is not entirely foreign to people who have studied the Middle Ages. Right? I would warn you that the Middle Ages was also a time of new plagues. I’m glad we don’t live in that era. (Laughs.) The Middle Ages was also a time of new heresies, new religious beliefs, and a lot of religious ferment. I look at nut bags from QAnon during the storming of the U.S. Capitol in January and I say: “Wow. Yeah, it is very easy to get new cults going in the digital age”.

We assumed the modern era was going to be what I call the Star Trek world – an ever-closer union, a global federation. In the old Star Trek, the captain is American; of course, that makes sense. (Laughs.) But, you know, there is Mr. Sulu. There is Mr. Spock. There is Lieutenant Uhura. It’s diverse. There’s Scotty. There is even an alien. How diverse can you be? Everything was going to happily go that way. Instead, we are going back to doggy dog medieval non-state actors – a very different identity from the global identity we all expect. I don’t see the Chinese and the Russians getting on board a big global happy federation any time soon. If you are waiting for the UN and the WTO to solve your problems, I’m afraid you’ve got a long wait.

Let’s talk about Georgia. There was the Bucharest Summit in 2008, quickly followed by the Russian invasion of Georgia. The recent histories of Georgia and Ukraine are quite similar in this regard. How should Georgia act in this context?

There is the answer I want to give and there is an answer I have to give. I will give you both. The answer I want to give is that Georgia is Western; Georgia is European. Georgia resembles Southern Europe and should seek to fully embrace and identify with that element of its past and present. Yet, I am not sure the European Union is ready for that. The war in Ukraine creates a real crisis for the EU, not in the short term, but in the long term, because in the long term, Europe was about peace, security, and trade. “Let’s just pretend that geopolitics is over” – was their motto. “We will use soft power and sooner or later, the world will catch up with us”.

Everyone talks about America having this sense of exceptionalism, but Europe had it too. The European Union also developed a sense of exceptionalism. “We are prosperous and free and have nice welfare states and avocado toast and cappuccino, and thirty days of holiday a year. The rest of the world will one day catch up and join us. They will join us and sign me a key and all will be well”. Well, we know that such a world is gone, but we don’t know how Europe then defines itself. Is it just Europe plus NATO? Will it continue to outsource its military needs to NATO? I don’t know.

I think Georgia must, as it has, continue to live with ambiguity. What do I think that means? Let’s face it. The better the Georgian state functions domestically, the louder Georgia’s voice will be internationally, and the more leverage Georgia has insofar as the Georgian government can do things like build roads, provide decent health care and education, collect taxes, and enforce laws in an objective matter. We are talking about the basic stuff. Impartial institutions, protection of minority rights, and a regular, orderly change of government. Once you get those three things right internally, Georgia’s external options go up. Whether that is renewed talks about NATO’s membership, renewed hope for the EU membership, or all these things. Georgia must rely on Georgia to generate its options and these options are best achieved by working on your house here.

The other thing I would say is Georgia, like Poland, needs to understand what is at its root. To me, the roots of its survival are not military force. Georgia exists as a proud and independent nation ultimately for cultural reasons and the treasuring and nurturing and supporting of a Georgian sense of self is crucial. Not to diminish any minority within Georgia, indeed, to celebrate minorities within Georgia and not to look down on any other culture, but to understand the central role of culture, as a long-term guarantee of survival. That’s important.

I always tell Poles that in some ways they remind me of South Korea. I have never spent time in the North. I have spent time in the South. If I had spent time in the North, I could not tell you. (Laughs.) South Korea has been sandwiched between Japan and China for more than a thousand years. It has been swallowed repeatedly but never got digested. Why? For cultural reasons. Georgia has been repeatedly swallowed but never has been digested. That is about cultural strength, not military strength.

One of the main reasons behind the Soviet Union’s collapse was the inefficient centralized state. Today, centralized entities could analyze a vast amount of data very efficiently. Democracies, however, still rely on data sharing, consensus mechanisms, and agreement between many, many people. What do you think, does the future belong to authoritarian states?

In some ways, one of the central questions we are all going to answer in the century ahead, is the following: Do digital technologies give a structural advantage to authoritarian systems? The shining example of this will, of course, be China. As you know, I’m an advisor to a Spanish investment firm called Arcano. We just did a paper on the results of the latest Chinese Party Congress. In the next ten to fifteen years, we are going to find out, whether what Xi Jinping thinks, which one could abbreviate as XJP equals total factor productivity or TFP. Can you get truly a modern, efficient economy with what the Russians call a power vertical? I remain deeply skeptical that you can. For day-to-day control, however, I think it works.

I don’t think centralized control gets you prosperity, but I don’t think that it necessarily means that you lose control when a country in the developing world wants to jump forward with the best will in the world and adopt 5G technology. They have their choice. They could adopt more expensive and sometimes less effective Western 5G or Huawei. When the Chinese come to you with this deal, they don’t just say, we’ll give you a loan. It goes further. They will come and say: “Hello, Mr. Prime Minister, you want Georgia to get Huawei and 5G? In addition to our package, how would you like to send the top 200 policemen in Georgia to the Huawei School of Governance and Order in Beijing? Let us show you how these technologies will help you maintain a smooth and efficient functioning on the streets of Tbilisi”. They offer to train the secret police in the use of this facial recognition, widespread surveillance, and all that.

Did you know that every streetlamp in Singapore has a high-definition camera doing facial recognition? It’s driving the CIA crazy. There are ways to fool those cameras, but it is not easy. If you are visibly fooling them, that creates a problem. I mean, gee, you are a standout. It is like using the Tor browser. Go ahead, feel free to download Tor and use the dark web. But if do so, the NSA is going to watch you, as you are doing something you should not do.

You just said you were skeptical about getting a modern efficient economy with a so-called power vertical. Why?

I think that a big part of innovation comes from the free exchange of ideas in an open environment. You can’t scare people into creating the best technologies. If you steal them, you can scare people into reproducing them. Sometimes. That is the story of the Soviet bomb, right? Everything could be quickly imitated once you have the magic formula. Take things like K-Pop, It’s a stupid example, but it’s a huge industry. Or let me ask you this: what is your favorite Chinese movie? What is your favorite Chinese song? Right. That is not just because we do not speak Chinese – they have their favorite Western movies and songs. In that sense, I’m not a full-fledged libertarian, but I do think that there is an intimate connection between creativity, innovation, and intellectual freedom. Not always, but often. Over time, of course, this gives an edge.

There is another more prosaic and less romantic reason – the fact that there are entrenched elites in every society. You have oligarchs in some sense in every society. Yet, the turnover of those elites tends to be less rapid in less open societies. To use Schumpeter’s metaphor, if society is a hotel, I don’t object to the fact that some people live in beautiful suites on the top floor, and other people are working down in the kitchen. What I want to make sure of is that the same tenants do not keep the same rooms for hundred years. A constant change, right? I want the son of the person working in the kitchen to one day be able to live in the suite and I want to make sure that people living in the suites, if they’re not giving back to society and if their kids are frankly crap, then they end up working in the kitchen. It’s not that I want to create a completely equal society, it’s that I want a turnover of elites. I think the turnover of elites plays a part in economic innovation, because, you know, upstarts indeed put out of business the old way of doing things. This often can be done better in a free society.

What role will artificial intelligence (AI) play in helping or assisting politicians in making better decisions?

Artificial intelligence is one of a suite of digital technologies that are changing everything and bringing about this neo-medieval world. It’s not just politicians. We think digital technologies, including AI, are what Aristotle called formal causes. I’m not going to bore you with Aristotle’s formal causes, but they don’t just have effects; they start structuring the choices. It is not technological determinism, but it does mean that at first, we shape our tools and then our tools start shaping us. We create artificial intelligence and then it starts changing us. Thus, it’s not just politicians who are using AI. You use AI. You are in some sense shaped by the algorithms around you already. What do you want to read? Where do you go on holiday? What are you going to eat tonight? If you are going to a restaurant, which one are you choosing? How are you going to get there? Artificial intelligence is informing all those choices; it is shaping them. You won’t choose a restaurant that is not on your phone. Again, that gives enormous authoritarian power in some sense, but to whom? To governments? I don’t know. To tech companies? Maybe.

What role will tech companies accumulating the vast amount of data play in this new world order?

It’s not just data accumulation. First, I talked about digital retrieving the medieval and the importance of non-state actors. You must understand some non-state actors are combatants in the Ukraine war right now. You might have heard of some of them, including Amazon Web Services, Google, Microsoft, and Starlink. Whether you want it or not, these are private companies playing vital roles in the war. Does that make them legitimate targets? We will find out.

The bigger tech companies become the sort of barons and lords, and they need to be. There is not a politician on Earth who does not take social media seriously. You can’t run for dogcatcher in Tbilisi without making sure what your Facebook post going to be and whether you need a Twitter account or not. I can remember when everybody wanted disruption. Disruption was a good thing because it was good to be in business. It was disrupting business models. Now I tell people we want a disruption. Guess what? You got it. Trump is Uber. What did Uber do? Uber used digital technology to go over the heads of existing service providers to talk to a customer base that felt underserved by existing service providers. What did Trump do? He used digital technology to go over the head of existing service providers – the traditional political parties to speak – to customers who felt underserved. Digital technologies are disrupting more than business models. They’re disrupting our culture, our politics, and our identities. That is why I think we live in an era of durable disorder.

Let me come back to your question about how Georgia should think about the future. Georgia should think about how to best prosper in an era of durable disorder without any truly dominant power and with no real friends, as always happens in foreign affairs. Nobody has friends. Everybody’s got allies that come and go. The stronger Georgia is, not in a simple sense, but the in the complex emotional and more internally resilient way, the better shot it has at making the right alliances, making the right choices, and remaining independent and in my hopeful world, a full-fledged and valued member of the West, meaning Europe, NATO, etc. Yet, I am an idealist. On the other hand, I was last in Georgia in 1984. If you had told people in 1984 about the world we live in today, they would think that you either smuggled some sort of LSD into Georgia, into the Soviet Union, or you are just mad. The world is not going to settle down any time soon. We are going to stay in a rapidly changing world.

Dr. Milo Jones is an Adjunct Professor at IE University*, a Fellow of the Center for the Study of Digital Life, and a Fellow of the Salzburg Global Seminar. He is also a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. In the past, Milo worked for Morgan Stanley Dean Witter in New York and for Accenture in London. He began his career by serving as an officer in the US Marine Corps. In addition to his Ph.D. from the UK’s University of Kent, Milo holds an MA with Distinction in International Relations from Kent, an MBA from London Business School, and a BA from Northwestern University.

*IE University, whose Business School is currently one of the top Business Schools in the world. IE has more than 60 Master’s alumni and 150 Bachelor’s alumni and students from Georgia, who are currently holding top positions in different Georgian companies, such as TBC Bank, Bank of Georgia, Archi Group, Lisi Development, Evex, PWC, KPMG and many others.

forbes.ge · by Georgy Aronia · November 4, 2022

21. The power of inaction in Ukraine

Excerpts:

Amid episodic euphoria over Ukrainian successes, or occasional anxiety when Ukraine faces setbacks, it is important to highlight the wisdom of a strategy of restraint. Western nations have refrained from falling into the traps that would provide Putin with an excuse to widen the war, while continuing to support Ukrainian politicians and diplomats on the world scene, and Ukrainian forces on the ground. 

War is serious business. Do too little and you lose. Do too much in the nuclear era and everyone loses, permanently. There is no need for impatience. Putin has committed profound errors that are steadily weakening Russia’s economy and its ability to fight. Russia’s long-term prospects for influence, and hold on power, are increasingly tenuous. All that NATO and the West must do is to stay the course, which to date has involved wise restraint.

The power of inaction in Ukraine

BY ERIK GARTZKE, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 11/06/22 7:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3715990-the-power-of-inaction-in-ukraine/?utm_source=pocket_mylist

Those in the West who worry that Vladimir Putin might use nuclear weapons should be conscious of one thing: Whatever one thinks is the risk of a nuclear nightmare in the coming weeks and months, it likely is less than it might have been. The United States and NATO practiced restraint, choosing to not put boots on the ground and instead to aid Ukraine in its war with Russia. The decision to pursue inaction eventually may prove to be one the most consequential, and fruitful, policy choices in recent decades. This decision also highlights the benefits of restraint in foreign policy. 

It is easy to forget that things appear to be going well for the Ukrainians. Russia’s invasion is failing. Two phases of the unprovoked Russian campaign have proven unsuccessful. First there was the abortive “smash and grab” aimed at Kyiv and other cities that ran out of gas, literally. Next, the Russian military retreated, at the same time falling back on familiar archaic tactics of massive artillery bombardments and plodding frontal assaults. Ukrainian forces countered by deploying surprise-and-maneuver tactics that cost Russia more territory than it had gained since the retrenchment. 

To top things off, the Russian military apparatus in Ukraine appears to be imploding. Again defying his own public pronouncements, Putin has altered Russian law to compel the haphazard conscription of just about any adult male found wandering the streets in Russia. This desperate attempt to shore up his faltering army in Ukraine is even more doomed than earlier efforts. Sending old, ill or unwilling and poorly trained draftees into combat exposes the depths of Russia’s military deficiencies, while further undermining Putin’s tragic foreign policy.

Americans are used to thinking that our intervention is required to address just about all of the world’s problems. Occasionally, this can be the case. But our active involvement is needed much less often than Americans may think. Much as Ukrainian commanders have skillfully “shaped” battlefields in Kharkiv, Kherson and now Lugansk, the United States can play a pivotal role in world affairs by shaping geostrategic conditions, preventing the unwanted actions of others by the prospect of our involvement, something that can be wielded only when we are not already involved. Inaction is one of America’s most impactful and underappreciated policy options.

Putin has been desperate to keep NATO out of the fight in Ukraine. Initially, Russian threats of nuclear use did exactly that. But now the shoe is on the other foot. The United States and its allies have clearly signaled to Putin that the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as “low yield” or “tactical” nuclear weapons would unwind the very conditions that have been the foremost element of Putin’s strategy. If the United States or NATO had decided earlier to deploy their forces to Ukraine, they could not now hold this threat over Putin’s head. Indeed, the presence of NATO troops in Ukraine would instead create a juicy target for Russia’s nukes.

The threat seems to be working. Putin was clearly rattled when his expensive pet project, the Kerch Bridge, was attacked by saboteurs. Instead of a nuclear response, Putin chose to expend a large portion of his army’s shrinking arsenal of precision cruise missiles on an illegal attack on population centers in Ukraine, in the process targeting innocent civilians, as well as Ukraine’s power infrastructure. Low-yield nuclear weapons are not of much value to Russian commanders under the conditions present on Ukrainian battlefields. But they might still be used against Ukrainian cities. The fact that Putin has hesitated, choosing for the moment to strike Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure with Russia’s limited and dwindling supply of expensive precision cruise missiles, tells us that NATO’s decision to hold the threat of intervention in reserve continues to discourage Russian officials from escalating to unconventional (i.e., nuclear) options.

There are other benefits of Western inaction that perhaps deserve more recognition. By fighting for their own country’s survival, Ukrainians have discovered enormous reserves of strength and resilience. Like the British in the Blitz in World War II, or Israeli citizens in subsequent conflicts, the fortitude of Ukrainians during this time of national peril may be exactly what is needed in the wake of the current contest, when the world’s attention wanes and Russian forces remain on Ukraine’s borders. The record of nations that rely on others to protect them is not enviable.

Western nations have provided valuable material assistance, of course. The contribution to the Ukrainian war effort of weapons such as Javelin and NLAW anti-tank missiles, the M777 howitzer and HIMARS have been hailed by the Ukrainians themselves. But it is Ukrainians in harm’s way who are wielding these foreign weapons. Western assistance alone cannot extinguish Russia’s territorial ambitions. Nor can the West give Ukrainian forces the confidence to prevail against whatever more persistent efforts supplant the current faltering Russian invasion.

Did misreading of key labor market shifts lead the Fed astray?

Putin’s Ukraine bombing campaign will not end well

Amid episodic euphoria over Ukrainian successes, or occasional anxiety when Ukraine faces setbacks, it is important to highlight the wisdom of a strategy of restraint. Western nations have refrained from falling into the traps that would provide Putin with an excuse to widen the war, while continuing to support Ukrainian politicians and diplomats on the world scene, and Ukrainian forces on the ground. 

War is serious business. Do too little and you lose. Do too much in the nuclear era and everyone loses, permanently. There is no need for impatience. Putin has committed profound errors that are steadily weakening Russia’s economy and its ability to fight. Russia’s long-term prospects for influence, and hold on power, are increasingly tenuous. All that NATO and the West must do is to stay the course, which to date has involved wise restraint.

Erik Gartzke is professor of political science and director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at the University of California at San Diego.

TAGS NATO NUCLEAR THREAT RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE UKRAINE WAR VLADIMIR PUTIN VLADIMIR PUTIN REGIME

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com