Quotes of the Day:
"There is no greater impediment to the advancement of knowledge than the ambiguity of words."
- Thomas Reid
"Either write something worth reading or do something worth writing."
- Benjamin Franklin
“You never change things by fighting the existing reality. To change something, build a new model that makes the existing model obsolete.”
- Buckminster Fuller
1. North Korea Signals Will to Cross US Red Line Amid Deadlocked Nuclear Talks
2. The real message behind North Korea’s missile tests
3. Why North Korea's Threat to Test ICBMs and Nuclear Weapons Is Serious
4. U.S., 7 other nations urge full implementation of N. Korea sanctions
5. U.S. ready, prepared to talk with N. Korea at anytime: Thomas-Greenfield
6. U.S. senator highlights need for strengthened deterrence against N. Korea
7. U.N. offered to provide N.K. with 60 mln doses of COVID-19 vaccines: lawmaker
8. Kim Jong Un: A Decade of Trial and Error
9. China, Russia block US bid to sanction North Koreans at UN
10.S. Korea, U.S. detect signs of North Korean military parade
11. How to Understand North Korea’s Demand for the Withdrawal of ROK-U.S. “hostile policy”
12. US hits snag in pursuit of sanctions against North Korea
13. Column: North Korea continues to be a growing threat while South Korea grows its economy
1. North Korea Signals Will to Cross US Red Line Amid Deadlocked Nuclear Talks
Deadlocked? I do not think we have any substantive talks since the June 30, 2019 Trump-Kim meeting at Panmunjom.
But Kim knows how to stir up a reaction. Just a few subtle words and some of us go out of our minds.
North Korea Signals Will to Cross US Red Line Amid Deadlocked Nuclear Talks
In a Politburo meeting held on Wednesday, North Korea implied that its “confidence-building measures” can be withdrawn after the U.S. imposed sanctions over its ballistic missile tests.
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North Korea held a Politburo meeting of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) on Wednesday and discussed “immediate work and important policy issues,” according to Korea Central News Agency (KCNA), North Korea’s state media. KCNA reported that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attended and presided over the meeting.
North Korea discussed two main agenda items in this meeting: celebration of the birth anniversaries of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, current leader Kim Jong Un’s grandfather and father, respectively, and the current situation around the Korean Peninsula, especially about the U.S. “hostile policy” and sanctions.
North Korea accused the United States of threatening its security by conducting joint military drills with South Korea and deploying strategic nuclear weapons in and around the Korean Peninsula after the North Korea-U.S. summit meetings, while Pyongyang has been suspending intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and nuclear tests as a friendly gesture to build trust and improve relations with the U.S.
As a countermeasure to the U.S. “hostile policy,” North Korea implied that it may resume testing ICBMs and nuclear weapons as part of its plan to beef up the country’s military and missile capabilities for its “self-defense.” North Korea has self-imposed a moratorium on ICBM and nuclear tests since 2018 as a part of its “confidence-building” measures for the nuclear talks with the United States. However, after the U.S. and North Korea failed to reach a deal at their 2019 summit in Hanoi, Kim later said that he no longer felt bound by this self-moratorium, resetting his policy and approach on the nuclear talks and inter-Korean relations. Despite that, North Korea has so far refrained from ICBM or nuclear tests, instead test-firing a variety of shorter-ranged missiles.
At the party meeting, North Korean leaders assessed “that the hostile policy and military threat by the U.S. have reached a danger line that cannot be overlooked any more despite our sincere efforts to maintain the general trend of easing tension on the Korean peninsula since the DPRK-U.S. summit in Singapore,” KCNA said in a statement on Wednesday. (DPRK is an anonym of North Korea’s official name: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea).
“…[T]he Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK concluded that we switch over to a practical action to bolster up our physical strength for defending the dignity, sovereign rights and interests of our state in a more reliable and credible manner.”
It also criticized the recent U.S. decision to impose sanctions on six North Korean individuals who are involved in the development of the ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. KCNA pointed out the U.S. “committed the rash act of adopting unilateral sanctions for over 20 times.”
Since the North Korea-U.S. nuclear talks fell apart after the “no-deal” Hanoi summit meeting in 2019, Pyongyang has been adamant that Washington and Seoul’s efforts are not enough to restore the dialogues. It once pinned the blame on Seoul for failing to persuade Washington to lift the crippling economic sanctions, even though the main reason for the failed Hanoi summit was then-U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim’s different views on the scope of the denuclearization process and lifting economic sanctions in return.
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More clearly, the U.S. insistence on Complete Verifiable Irreversible Denuclearization (CVID) of the Korean Peninsula was not acceptable for Kim. He will never give up his nuclear weapons in a way that matches CVID.
Since then, North Korea has criticized the United States’ so-called “hostile policy” in a bid to entice the U.S. to make concessions – lifting economic sanctions and ending the joint South Korea-U.S. military drills – first before renewing the talks.
Responding to Pyongyang’s clear stance, the Biden administration has said that it has no “hostile intent” toward North Korea and has expressed its willingness to meet the North Korean counterparts “anytime, anywhere, with no preconditions.” However, the COVID-19 pandemic has made the North more isolated than ever. Pyongyang has no interest in diplomacy with the U.S. when the country is facing devastating food shortages and a sluggish economy.
In the wake of North Korea’s recent series of short-range ballistic missile tests, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) will hold a closed-door meeting on Thursday to discuss North Korea and non-proliferation issues. The meeting may spark another response from Pyongyang. North Korea conducted its second hypersonic missile test of 2022 on January 11, two hours after Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the U.S. ambassador to U.N., condemned the North’s January 5 hypersonic missile test in a joint statement.
North Korea has constantly insisted that the purpose of its missile tests is strengthening its self-defense, not targeting specific countries. However, UNSC resolutions ban North Korea from testing and developing any ballistic missiles, regardless of range. North Korea thinks the U.S. and international community are violating its right to conduct military activities for self-defense.
If UNSC imposes new sanctions over the North’s missile tests after the meeting, North Korea will likely show off the follow-up steps it discussed in the Politburo meeting on Wednesday.
2. The real message behind North Korea’s missile tests
Useful analysis from Daniel Sneider.
And I would add that this is really business as usual and Kim is still using his father's and grandfather's playbook.
But regarding the missile capabilities: I defer to the experts who know about these things but I would caution anyone from downplaying this too much and to consider how many times in the past north Korea has surprised with new capabilities. And if the regime is getting assistance from Russia and China, which seems likely, we should consider how quickly they could develop and field some of these systems. But the real important "message" is these systems support warfighting. Kim still harbors the notion that he must unify the peninsula under his control to ensure regime survival.
Excerpts;
The North Koreans issued statements saying that they first tested the more advanced HGVs last fall, and again on January 5 and 11. The statements claim these were the “final test-fire” of an HGV that made a dramatic maneuver to hit a target a thousand kilometers away.
But American experts are skeptical of those claims and believe the more recent tests were of MARVs, which carried out some degree of maneuver – “not a drastic maneuver,” says Van Diepen, but “a right-hand turn.” This was visible in photos of Kim observing the launch which showed a video screen with a trajectory roughly consistent with what Japanese tracking also observed, he says.
There is clearly a challenge for existing radar tracking and missile defenses to hit these vehicles, experts mostly agree. But it is hardly impossible since infrared satellite data can see the launch and a good part of the trajectory, and share that data with South Korean and Japanese interceptor operators. In any case, these MARVs are a minor contributor to other ways to beat missile defenses already tested by North Korea.
“This is not a game-changer, particularly in the theater context,” says Van Diepen, who served as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation for seven years and previously as the National Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation.
“The North Koreans already have oodles of ways to overcome missile defenses,” the former senior official told me. “They can overwhelm the defense. They can target it with different weapon systems simultaneously.”
Despite the alarming coverage, North Korea’s claimed hypersonic weapons are at most a “niche capability,” he says. “But it is sexy, it is scary and they are clearly exploiting that.”
The real message behind North Korea’s missile tests
Experts have put forth various reasons for the recent test launches but none of them represent a serious game-changer
The intense flurry of North Korean missile tests since the beginning of the new year has caught even experienced watchers of their program by surprise.
“The North Koreans have ramped it up,” Joshua Pollack, a senior researcher at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, told Toyo Keizai. The tests “started earlier and are going at a faster pace than I had expected,” based on North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s New Year address to the ruling Workers’ Party plenum, he said.
“Not only has he put his foot down on the gas, but he started showing up at these events, which is something he used to do routinely.”
Why this escalation of testing? Some analysts see this as part of a long arc of planned development of North Korea’s missile arsenal, laid out a year ago in Kim’s address to a party congress.
Kim presented a wish list of weapons to be developed, including solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), hypersonic missiles, tactical nuclear weapons and submarines capable of firing ballistic missiles. Kim made it clear, says Pollack, that they are “still pursuing a military modernization program.”
This verbal show of strength was followed by a series of tests last fall of rail-mobile short-range missiles, designed to be hard to find and able to survive a preemptive strike by the US or even South Korea and Japan.
There was also the first test of a hypersonic glide vehicle, aimed at evading missile defense systems. In October the North Koreans held a “defense expo” where all these weapons and more were displayed, with Kim, his senior military leadership in tow, shown strolling through elaborate exhibits of the new hardware.
A bid to negotiate
Since early January, the North Koreans have carried out four missile tests, two of what they claim to be a hypersonic missile system, along with tests of ballistic missiles fired from a train and short-range, solid-fueled ballistic missiles. Some interpret these tests as an attempt to set the stage for negotiations with the US, an effort to create leverage.
In a statement issued after a meeting of the ruling party’s Political Bureau in Pyongyang this week, the North Korean regime denounced the US for its “hostile policy and military threat” and hinted that it may reconsider its current self-imposed moratorium on long-range missile and nuclear tests.
People watch a television broadcast showing footage of a North Korean missile test at a railway station in Seoul on September 28, 2021, after North Korea fired an ‘unidentified projectile’ into the sea off its east coast, according to the South’s military. Photo: AFP / Jung Yeon-je
“I think some of this is North Korea trying to get attention,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken told MSNBC in a January 13 interview. He characterized the North Korean moves as a response to American offers to hold talks, without preconditions. US officials have even interpreted the latest tests as a direct response to recent sanctions.
That view is not entirely shared by most US experts on North Korea. “The recent spate of missile launches was not spontaneous,” says former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Evans Revere, who has long experience of negotiation with Pyongyang and frequent meetings with senior North Korean officials.
In his view, the North Koreans are pursuing a game plan intended to achieve several goals. First, and probably foremost, Pyongyang aims to “unnerve the United States and remind Washington that the DPRK’s missile threat is growing in sophistication and capability, and can now threaten US bases on the Korean peninsula and in nearby Japan,” says Revere.
Secondarily, the North Koreans want to establish that these launches are now a normal part of its military posture.
Finally, the former senior State Department official says, the North Koreans seek to “entice the United States into a dialogue designed (in North Korea’s mind) to explore whether Washington might be now willing, in light of the escalating missile threat, to try to slow Pyongyang’s missile program in return for sanctions easing.”
But Revere is quick to add that North Korea has no intention of ending its missile and nuclear programs.
Nonproliferation expert Pollack rejects the idea that this is a negotiating ploy aimed at the US. There is no indication of North Korean interest in any engagement at this moment with the US, he argues.
“It is not paired with any diplomatic outreach,” Pollack points out. “This is not being done for near-term bargaining advantage.”
The political motivation
Even if this is not a bid to force talks in the short term, the launches are not just a technical exercise. “It is very clear that missile activity for the North Koreans has a very heavy political component,” former senior State Department non-proliferation official Vann H Van Diepen told Toyo Keizai.
“If there was no political component you would see very different patterns of activity,” pointing to the decision to provide detailed statements about the tests and their purported outcomes. “What gets tested, when, and probably how – those are dictated by Kim for political reasons,” he says.
Experts are divided on the reasons behind Kim Jong Un’s last flurry of missile tests. Photo: Agencies
The political purpose behind these launches is not entirely clear but Pyongyang is likely addressing both domestic and international audiences, argues Van Diepen, who contributes analyses of the missile testing to 38 North, a website devoted to North Korea.
The party leadership wants to trumpet its technological prowess, not least that it is ahead of South Korea, and bolster the “domestic legitimacy of the regime,” the former State Department official says. But an effort to reach a foreign audience is “not mutually exclusive.”
North Korea “can easily be sending messages to Japan and South Korea, and to us, at the same time.”
Deterrence and missile defenses
The testing program since last fall has focused on two primary goals, the experts believe – to demonstrate to the US, Japan and South Korea that North Korean nuclear weapons can withstand attack, that they are what is called a “survivable deterrent,” and that they are capable of neutralizing and overwhelming missile defenses.
The tests since January have continued to demonstrate the development of mobile launched systems, mounting missiles on platforms like wheeled transports and trains which are much more difficult to locate and attack.
Some of the mobile launchers have been used to fire shorter-range missiles such as the KN23, a tactical weapon that has the range to hit targets in South Korea. But they have also tested the Hwasong 8 missile, which can target Japan and perhaps ultimately the US bases on Guam.
The testing program has also perfected fueling systems that do not require long – and more visible – preparations of the rocket before launch. The North Koreans have been carrying out tests of solid fuels that offer that quick-launch capability.
But they also claim to have successfully tested more powerful liquid fuels that can be prepackaged in the factory and shipped to the rocket forces for immediate use, a technique known as “ampoulization.”
The most widely publicized tests in January were of what the North Koreans claimed were “hypersonic” missiles that can carry a warhead on a glided vehicle able to maneuver around missile defenses. The weapons are designed to put American bases in South Korea and Japan at risk, as well as Japanese and South Korean forces.
“If this technology does what experts say it can do, our bases in Korea (and ROK bases) and Japan (and Self Defense Force bases) are now under a new threat that we don’t now have the ability to counter,” former State Department official Revere told me.
Some press accounts, bolstered by statements from senior US military officials, have labeled these missiles as “game-changers.” But many experts dismiss such claims as the overhyped salesmanship of a defense industry eager for contracts to build similar systems.
The term “hypersonic” is itself misleading, those experts say, since the missiles use the same rockets as other ballistic missiles, which already go much faster.
The main threat represented by these systems is not from their speed but the ability of the glider-shaped warheads that detach from the tip of the rocket to fly faster through the atmosphere and carry out unpredictable turns and maneuvers that make it harder for missile defenses to detect and intercept them.
These are called hypersonic or ballistic glide vehicles (HGV) or also maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MARV). The HGV uses more advanced specialized materials that allow it to enter the atmosphere at higher speeds and make more drastic maneuvers.
The North Koreans issued statements saying that they first tested the more advanced HGVs last fall, and again on January 5 and 11. The statements claim these were the “final test-fire” of an HGV that made a dramatic maneuver to hit a target a thousand kilometers away.
This screen-grab image taken from North Korean broadcaster KCTV in 2019 shows North Korean leader Kim Jong Un watching the launch of a ballistic missile at an unknown location. Photo: AFP / KCTV
But American experts are skeptical of those claims and believe the more recent tests were of MARVs, which carried out some degree of maneuver – “not a drastic maneuver,” says Van Diepen, but “a right-hand turn.” This was visible in photos of Kim observing the launch which showed a video screen with a trajectory roughly consistent with what Japanese tracking also observed, he says.
There is clearly a challenge for existing radar tracking and missile defenses to hit these vehicles, experts mostly agree. But it is hardly impossible since infrared satellite data can see the launch and a good part of the trajectory, and share that data with South Korean and Japanese interceptor operators. In any case, these MARVs are a minor contributor to other ways to beat missile defenses already tested by North Korea.
“This is not a game-changer, particularly in the theater context,” says Van Diepen, who served as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation for seven years and previously as the National Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation.
“The North Koreans already have oodles of ways to overcome missile defenses,” the former senior official told me. “They can overwhelm the defense. They can target it with different weapon systems simultaneously.”
Despite the alarming coverage, North Korea’s claimed hypersonic weapons are at most a “niche capability,” he says. “But it is sexy, it is scary and they are clearly exploiting that.”
Daniel Sneider is a lecturer on international policy at Stanford University and a former Christian Science Monitor foreign correspondent. Follow him on Twitter: @DCSneider.
3. Why North Korea's Threat to Test ICBMs and Nuclear Weapons Is Serious
Ankit Panda is one of the missile experts.
Of course we should take Kim seriously. But we should not overreact or give in to his demands because we want him to stop these tests (And I am not saying Ankit is recommending that). We must understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime and deal with Kim as he really is and not as we would wish him to be.
I think Ankit rightly points out that Kim may very well be a spoiler in 2022.
Excerpts:
While Kim hasn’t said what will be done to commemorate these dates this year, he noted that “No holidays are more significant than the Day of the Sun and the Day of the Shining Star,” using North Korea’s official titles for those dates, and that these deserved to be celebrated “with splendor.”
All of this points to a rockier 2022 in Northeast Asia—and the possibility of a new crisis between the United States and North Korea. The Biden administration has, to date, not treated North Korea as a major priority, but Pyongyang has always been adept at making itself a priority in Washington.
As the year picks up, we should expect more missile testing. Kim Jong Un shows few signs of backing down.
Why North Korea's Threat to Test ICBMs and Nuclear Weapons Is Serious
Why We Should Take North Korea’s Latest Threat Seriously: In October 2021, standing beside his new, untested Hwasong-17 intercontinental-range ballistic missile at a defense expo in Pyongyang, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was explicit about why he hadn’t shown much interest in the Biden administration’s overtures.
Since the conclusion of their North Korea policy review in May 2021, Biden administration officials had, at least in principle, been saying many of the right things. Sung Kim, Biden’s special representative for North Korea, had, for example, repeatedly emphasized that the United States was ready to meet North Korea anywhere and anytime—to discuss any issues of interest.
Other officials have pushed back on North Korea’s perennial claims that the U.S. harbors a “hostile policy” by emphasizing that the U.S. has no intention to change North Korea’s regime.
But, in October, Kim said he didn’t care much for words. “The United States has frequently sent signals that it is not hostile to our state, but its behaviors provide us with no reason why we should believe in them.”
This brings us to January 2022. Following North Korea’s tests of a new maneuverable reentry vehicle-equipped ballistic missile, the United States Treasury Department announced sanctions against individuals and entities involved with illicit weapons-related procurement activities.
The North Koreans repeatedly cited that moratorium as a step that deserves rewards—or “corresponding measures”—from the United States throughout the period between the 2018 Singapore summit and the aftermath of the 2019 Hanoi summit.
This week’s politburo meeting takes Kim closer than ever to pulling back from that pledge. Kim didn’t corner himself; he gave himself ample flexibility, including on a timeline, but suggested that the Workers’ Party should “promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporarily-suspended activities.”
Despite the Biden administration’s sanctions this month, it is likely that North Korea would have gotten here anyway. In January 2021, Kim, prior to Biden’s administration, outlined a wide-ranging military modernization agenda at the 8th Party Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea.
That agenda included, among other items, new intercontinental-range ballistic missiles—including solid-fuel ICBMs and multiple warhead-capable ICBMs—and tactical nuclear weapons. The first of those objectives would certainly require new ICBM flight tests; the latter may require a return to nuclear testing, though this is less certain.
The modernization agenda was laid out over a five-year period, from 2021 to 2026. As a result, the Biden administration’s recent sanctions may be a convenient excuse for North Korea to proceed with testing that it intended to pursue anyways—perhaps on an accelerated timeline.
During the politburo meeting, Kim also emphasized two important upcoming anniversaries for North Korea—both in the coming months. First, his father’s 80th birthday is due in February, and his grandfather’s 110th birthday is due in April. In previous years, North Korea has staged satellite launches around these dates.
While Kim hasn’t said what will be done to commemorate these dates this year, he noted that “No holidays are more significant than the Day of the Sun and the Day of the Shining Star,” using North Korea’s official titles for those dates, and that these deserved to be celebrated “with splendor.”
All of this points to a rockier 2022 in Northeast Asia—and the possibility of a new crisis between the United States and North Korea. The Biden administration has, to date, not treated North Korea as a major priority, but Pyongyang has always been adept at making itself a priority in Washington.
As the year picks up, we should expect more missile testing. Kim Jong Un shows few signs of backing down.
Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. An expert on the Asia-Pacific region, his research interests range from nuclear strategy, arms control, missile defense, nonproliferation, emerging technologies, and U.S. extended deterrence. He is the author of Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea (Hurst Publishers/Oxford University Press, 2020).
A widely published writer, Panda’s work has appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Diplomat, the Atlantic, the New Republic, the South China Morning Post, War on the Rocks, Politico, and the National Interest. Panda has also published in scholarly journals, including Survival, the Washington Quarterly, and India Review, and has contributed to the IISS Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment and Strategic Survey. He is editor-at-large at the Diplomat, where he hosts the Asia Geopolitics podcast, and a contributing editor at War on the Rocks.
4. U.S., 7 other nations urge full implementation of N. Korea sanctions
China and Russia are openly complicit in their support for north Korea's sanctions evasion.
The UN Panel of Experts, which oversees sanctions, has no US representative and it appears the China and Russia representatives are working to block efforts to enforce sanctions and hold north Korea accountable.
U.S., 7 other nations urge full implementation of N. Korea sanctions | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Jan. 20 (Yonhap) -- The United States and seven other members of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) on Thursday called on all U.N. members to fully implement UNSC sanctions on North Korea.
The call came after China blocked a U.S. proposal to impose additional U.N. sanctions against the North for conducting at least four missile launches since the start of the year.
"We also call on all member states to implement Security Council resolutions, to which the Security Council unanimously agreed, and which calls on the DPRK to abandon its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner," said the joint statement, delivered by U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield on behalf of her counterparts from Albania, Brazil, Britain, France, Ireland, Japan and the United Arab Emirates.
"It is extremely important that Member States take the necessary steps to implement the sanctions in their jurisdictions, or risk providing a blank check for the DPRK regime to advance its weapons program," the joint statement added. DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.
The UNSC was originally scheduled to hold a closed session on the day to discuss additional sanctions against North Korea proposed by the U.S.
China, one of the five permanent members of the UNSC with veto power, blocked the U.S. proposed sanctions, according to earlier news reports.
"We will continue to speak out against the DPRK's destabilizing actions as affronts to regional and international peace and stability," said the joint statement issued by the U.S. and the seven other members of the 15-member UNSC.
They also pointed out the fact that North Korea conducted four missile launches should not be in dispute, noting the North itself has released photos of those launches.
"And we know that DPRK missile launches that use ballistic missile technology violate Security Council resolutions," they said.
"These facts should not be in dispute. The DPRK's unlawful behavior is a threat to international peace and security. These launches demonstrate the regime's determination to pursue weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs at all costs, including at the expense of its own people," they added.
North Korea on Thursday (Seoul time) said it will consider restarting "temporarily-suspended activities," which many believe suggested the resumption of nuclear and long-range missile testing.
Pyongyang has maintained a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing since November 2017, although leader Kim Jong-un said in 2019 that he no longer felt bound by such restrictions.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. U.S. ready, prepared to talk with N. Korea at anytime: Thomas-Greenfield
Yes we have been prepared to talk and we always will be. We will give Kim Jong-un a chance to become and act as a responsible member of the international community.
We should keep in mind the Administration policy. It is not just about engagement.
1. Principled and practical diplomacy. This is the press and pundit focus. But what the Biden administration is doing in this line of effort is offering Kim the chance to act as a responsible member of the international community. But the administration is not banking on that, thus the other three lines of effort that are too often overlooked.
2. Alliance based focus for deterrence, defense and diplomacy. (and trilateral cooperation among both of the U.S. Northeast Asia alliances with the ROK and Japan).
3. "Stern deterrence" - this is about revitalizing the ROK/U.S. military alliance and strengthening defense capabilities to include returning exercises to a level that will sustain readiness (and support OPCON transition) to reverse the dangerous trend established by the previous administration and welcomed by the current Moon administration.
4. A human rights up front approach (though the administration has failed to nominate an Ambassador for nK human rights)
5. Full implementation of all relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
Obviously the stated objective is denuclearization.
However, in regards to the end state, or the acceptable durable political arrangement that will protect, sustain, and advance US and ROK/US alliance interests, I think most know my position: solve paragraph 60 of the Armistice - the "Korea question." (or UROK).
U.S. ready, prepared to talk with N. Korea at anytime: Thomas-Greenfield | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Jan. 20 (Yonhap) -- The United States is willing and prepared to talk with North Korea at anytime, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations said Thursday, while also stressing that the option has always been on the table for Pyongyang.
Linda Thomas-Greenfield, however, also stressed the need to respond to North Korea's recent missile tests that she said jeopardized peace and security in the East Asian region.
"We have been clear from day one that we are willing to go to the negotiating table with the DPRK without any preconditions," she said when asked about the prospects of diplomacy with the North, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"So yes, we are prepared to talk to them if they are prepared to talk and to listen. So that has always been on the table," she added.
Her remarks came in a webinar hosted by the Heritage Foundation, a Washington-based think tank, and after North Korea conducted four rounds of missile launches since the start of the year, including the test firing of a self-claimed new hypersonic missile in two of those four launches.
Pyongyang has also said it will consider resuming "temporarily-suspended activities" that were aimed at building trust with the U.S., which many believe refer to its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing that has been maintained since November 2017.
Thomas-Greenfield stressed the need for the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) to respond to the North Korean missile launches.
"We have to respond to them. We have to let them know that their actions are unacceptable. It is jeopardizing peace and security in the region. The countries in the region feel very insecure about the tests that they have done," she said, noting the UNSC was set to discuss the North Korean missile issue later in the day.
The top U.S. diplomat to the U.N. earlier said her country will push for additional UNSC sanctions against North Korea for its latest missile launches.
Reports, however, said China, a close neighbor of North Korea and a permanent member of the 15-member UNSC, has blocked U.S.-proposed sanctions on five North Korean diplomats by requesting a six-month delay of UNSC discussions on the issue.
AFP reported the delay can be extended by an additional three months, upon which the U.S. proposal can be permanently removed from the UNSC.
Thomas-Greenfield said the U.S. will work with China in areas where it is necessary, including North Korea.
"We see China as both a competitor and an adversary. We know that there are areas where we can work with the Chinese," she said.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. U.S. senator highlights need for strengthened deterrence against N. Korea
I disagree with the senator on one point. If we are going to execute a superior form of political warfare (which he did not address) we need to use talks to our advantage. This Is especially true if we are going to conduct the necessary supporting information and influence activities campaign.
"Our priority needs to be on U.S. and allied cooperation and military readiness through a strong tempo of training and exercises -- not on "talks," which historically have not worked," the senator said in a statement released Wednesday.
"We must also maintain a strong nuclear deterrent, along with missile defense to protect the United States," he added.
U.S. senator highlights need for strengthened deterrence against N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Jan. 20 (Yonhap) -- Sen. James Risch (R-ID) has called on the U.S. government to enhance and improve its nuclear capabilities to provide added deterrence in support of U.S. allies against threats posed by North Korea.
The ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also highlighted the need for joint military readiness to deter any North Korean aggression.
"Our priority needs to be on U.S. and allied cooperation and military readiness through a strong tempo of training and exercises -- not on "talks," which historically have not worked," the senator said in a statement released Wednesday.
"We must also maintain a strong nuclear deterrent, along with missile defense to protect the United States," he added.
The statement comes after North Korea staged four missile launches since the start of the year, including the test firing of what Pyongyang claims to be a new hypersonic missile in two of those four launches.
Risch insisted the missile launches were aimed at advancing the North's missile capabilities. Many North Korea watchers have said the launches may have been at least partly aimed at drawing the U.S.' attention or U.S. concessions.
"Having already fielded intercontinental ballistic missiles to threaten the United States, North Korea is now refining tactical capabilities to fight and win a war through the use of nuclear weapons," said Risch.
"These tests represent key milestones in North Korea's developing ability to coerce U.S. allies, prevent the United States from being able to respond to aggression, and to control escalation during a crisis. This is an incredibly dangerous situation."
North Korea has refrained from talks with the U.S. since late 2019, while it also remains unresponsive to all U.S. overtures since Joe Biden took office a year ago.
On Thursday (Seoul time), the North said it will examine the issue of restarting "all temporarily-suspended activities," which were aimed at building trust with the U.S.
Pyongyang has maintained a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing since November 2017, despite leader Kim Jong-un saying in 2019 that he no longer felt bound by such restrictions.
Risch argued the U.S. must modernize its nuclear capabilities for its own defense, as well as that of U.S. allies, against North Korean aggression.
"It's imperative we accelerate the modernization of our aging nuclear forces, maintain our own capabilities to provide extended deterrence and control escalation, and resist any moves to make dramatic or risky changes in our nuclear declaratory policy -- such as a 'sole or fundamental purpose' policy -- that would only weaken our alliances," he said.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. U.N. offered to provide N.K. with 60 mln doses of COVID-19 vaccines: lawmaker
if accurate (and I think it likely is).
north Korea: Looking a gift horse in the mouth AND biting the hand that feeds it.
Excerpts:
"North Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Kim Song expressed considerable interest. He asked whether the vaccines were Pfizer's or Moderna's and said he would report to Pyongyang," he said, quoting the NIS.
The exchange took place in December, but the U.N. has yet to hear back from the North, he said.
"The Vatican also expressed its willingness to provide vaccines," the lawmaker added.
U.N. offered to provide N.K. with 60 mln doses of COVID-19 vaccines: lawmaker | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Jan. 21 (Yonhap) -- The United Nations offered to send 60 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines to North Korea last month and the North expressed an interest in receiving them although it has yet to formally respond, a South Korean lawmaker quoted Seoul's spy agency as saying Friday.
The National Intelligence Service (NIS) shared the information during a briefing for the chairman and ranking members of the parliamentary intelligence committee, Democratic Party Rep. Kim Kyung-hyup, the chairman, told Yonhap News Agency.
"North Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Kim Song expressed considerable interest. He asked whether the vaccines were Pfizer's or Moderna's and said he would report to Pyongyang," he said, quoting the NIS.
The exchange took place in December, but the U.N. has yet to hear back from the North, he said.
"The Vatican also expressed its willingness to provide vaccines," the lawmaker added.
North Korea has insisted the country is coronavirus-free while enforcing tough restrictions and border closures.
Earlier this week, a pair of North Korean freight trains were spotted crossing into the Chinese border city of Dandong for the first time in 1 1/2 years.
The NIS said the trains appeared to transport medical supplies, food and construction materials from China but nothing from the North as they departed empty, according to the lawmaker.
The spy agency also supported speculation regarding this weeks' Workers' Party politburo meeting during which the North hinted at resuming nuclear and long-range missile tests.
"The North's position is that it will reconsider if the U.S. does not offer corresponding measures for its suspension of nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests," the lawmaker said.
"North Korea likely needed ways to the draw the U.S.' attention because the U.S. has taken little interest in the North while dealing with Ukraine and the Middle East," he added.
Meanwhile, the NIS also reported plans to establish a new department to handle supply chain issues following the recent shortage of urea solution imports.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
8. Kim Jong Un: A Decade of Trial and Error
I want to push back on this. I actually think there has been consistency in policies, most importantly and significantly, its actions for the last decade. There have been name changes and different speeches emphasizing different priorities but I have seen no change in regime strategy, goals, and objectives. It has consistently prioritized development of nuclear weapons. It continues to improve its military to support warfighting objectives. It continues to oppress the population. It consistently abuses human rights and commits crimes against humanity. There has only been an increase in cyber attacks. Proliferation and global illicit activities continue apace. Actions speak louder than words.
And of course there is something else that is consistent: The regime calls for the US to end its hostile policy and certain political factions in the ROK and US agree with Kim Jong-un that it is the US hostile policy that is to blame.
Conclusion:
And so the Kim Jong Un administration has been one of ongoing trial and error. The speed and breadth of policy changes by Kim shows that power is concentrated in one person. If it were a system of collective leadership, change could not be brought about so quickly.
Kim Jong Un: A Decade of Trial and Error
The pace of policy turnarounds has been dizzying.
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On New Year’s Day 2012, shortly after the death of his father, Kim Jong Un issued the customary joint editorial. The following year, he resurrected the “New Year Address” of the Kim Il Sung era. From 2019, he decided that the plenary meeting of the Central Committee would be held at the end of the year, to review its achievements and outline the administration’s policies for the year ahead. What all these changes signify is an ongoing process of trial and error, unfettered by principle or precedent.
This process has dominated the past decade. Policies in each sector were not set in stone from the outset, but were adapted to respond to subsequent developments and the internal and external environment. Policy measures appear to have been surprisingly flexible – just as long as they did not conflict with the ultimate goal of perpetuating the system that had been in place for three generations since the time of Kim Il Sung.
This tendency towards a trial-and-error approach was evident early in the administration. In April 2012, Kim Jong Un immediately admitted the failure of a “satellite” launch, pledging a successful launch at the end of the year. Key officials in the Congress of the Party and the Supreme People’s Assembly have repeatedly been instructed to expose “errors” made in the sectors for which they are responsible and to propose plans to redress them.
The dizzying pace of personnel change over the past decade is part of the trial-and-error process. The first surprise was the sudden dismissal of Chief of the General Staff Ri Yong Ho in July 2012. Since then, frequent personnel changes have been made not only in the post of chief of the General Staff but also in key posts such as the director of the General Political Bureau and the minister of People’s Armed Forces. The fact that seven key officials who accompanied Kim Jong Un in the motor hearse at the funeral of Kim Jong Il have all disappeared over the past decade is symbolic.
Conversely, instances have occurred of Kim Jong Un suddenly promoting a subordinate whom he had once criticized. In June last year, Vice Chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission (member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau) Ri Pyong Chol and Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army Pak Jong Chon were both publicly criticized. The following month it was revealed that they were only demoted, not dismissed, yet in September Pak received an exceptional promotion to member of the Presidium of the Politburo. Moreover, a missile test was “guided (jido)” for the first time by someone other than Kim Jong Un, whereas previously key officials had only “attended” weapons tests.
Since 2020, there have been sporadic reports in the North Korean media that Kim, who had been “presiding over (sahoe)” meetings, had in fact been “guiding” not “presiding over” them. “Presiding over” is more neutral and entails less responsibility than “guiding,” giving rise to rumors that Kim may have tried to introduce elements of a collective leadership system, albeit for form’s sake. Since last year, however, he has reverted once more to “guiding” meetings, suggesting that the Supreme Leader is still working out his role.
Kim had placed consistent emphasis on the consolidation of the party organization in order to perpetuate the regime, yet his title was changed from First Secretary to Party Chairman and then to Party General Secretary. His title in the state was also changed from the first Chairman of the State Affairs Commission to Chairman of the State Affairs Commission and from last year to President of the State Affairs.
On the cultural front, to give the public a real sense of the dawn of a new era, in July 2012 the Moranbong Band was formed to great fanfare, the stage filled with costumed Disney characters. However, the spectacle was a one-off, never to be repeated. Kim later shifted his interest from the Moranbong Band to the Samjiyon Orchestra, with the Band of the State Affairs Commission his favorite group currently.
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August 2015 saw the sudden introduction of Pyongyang Time (PYT), which was 30 minutes behind South Korea’s standard time. However, the inconvenience of being in a different time zone to Seoul led to its abrupt abolishment in May 2018.
Turning to the diplomatic front, Kim’s vilification of U.S. President Donald J. Trump continued until 2017, but criticism of the U.S. ceased entirely after a date for the North Korea-United States summit in Singapore was set in June 2018. The negotiations in Singapore constituted a major “trial,” which turned into a major “error” in Hanoi the following year. This is evidenced by the fact that upon Kim’s return, the Rodong Sinmun reported that the leader, who was supposed to have departed North Korea for the second North Korea-U.S. summit, had achieved a successful North Korea-Vietnam summit. It is like declaring excitedly that you are going out for a hamburger, but when you get home you are raving about the pho.
Meanwhile, while Sino-North Korean relations had deteriorated to the extent that Rodong Sinmun went as far as to issue a harsh condemnation of China, an ally, Kim’s “sudden and unexpected” visit to China in March 2018 quickly put relations back on an even keel.
And so the Kim Jong Un administration has been one of ongoing trial and error. The speed and breadth of policy changes by Kim shows that power is concentrated in one person. If it were a system of collective leadership, change could not be brought about so quickly.
9. China, Russia block US bid to sanction North Koreans at UN
Perhaps it is time for secondary sanctions on Chinese and Russian banks and entities that are complicit in support north Korean sanctions evasion. We have never exerted sufficient effort to do this on a scale that will have an impact.
We have long recommended this but neither this administration nor the last has been willing to do this to the extent necessary to achieve effects (yet!):
-
Target Chinese and Russian obstruction: Maximum pressure 2.0 should seek to build the most comprehensive and cohesive multilateral diplomatic effort possible. This must include efforts to build consensus for additional action at the UNSC. If Beijing and Moscow obstruct additional measures against North Korea, the United States should name and shame both governments wherever possible to raise the diplomatic costs of their obstruction. If this obstruction persists, the United States should shift the cost-benefit analysis of both governments. For example, Washington could move to build an increased U.S. military presence in the region and on the peninsula (with South Korean agreement). The mere announcement of this step could create new leverage and elicit increased cooperation from Beijing and Moscow. Washington could also initiate a diplomatic campaign to impose aggressive secondary and sectoral sanctions against Chinese and Russian persons that do business with North Korea or undermine existing sanctions. Beijing and Moscow are vulnerable to such sanctions.
E.O. 13810 – Imposing Additional Sanctions with Respect to North Korea187 Effective date: September 21, 2017Applied sanctions on key sectors of North Korea’s economy and on aircraft and vessels that have traveled to North Korea. Most importantly, it introduced secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that engage in a range of transactions involving North Korea.
China, Russia block US bid to sanction North Koreans at UN
China and Russia have delayed a US effort at the United Nations to impose sanctions on five North Koreans in response to recent missile launches by Pyongyang, diplomats said.
The move by Beijing and Moscow came before a closed-door UN Security Council meeting on North Korea on Thursday – the second in two weeks – after Pyongyang fired tactical guided missiles this week.
China and Russia, however, placed a “hold” on the United States’s proposal on Thursday, which puts it in limbo.
China told council colleagues it needed more time to study the sanctions, while Russia said more evidence was needed to back the US request, the diplomats said.
Under current UN rules, the block period can last for six months. After that, another council member can extend the block for three more months, before the proposal is permanently removed from the negotiating table.
Monday’s test was North Korea’s fourth so far this year, with two previous launches involving “hypersonic missiles” capable of high speed and manoeuvring after liftoff, and another test last Friday using a pair of short-range missiles fired from train cars.
People watch video of a North Korean missile launch shown during a news programme at Seoul Railway Station in South Korea on Thursday [Ahn Young-joon/AP Photo]
In a joint statement, seven UN Security Council members – the US, Albania, Brazil, France, Ireland, the United Arab Emirates and Britain – and Japan said on Thursday that the launches “demonstrate the regime’s determination to pursue weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs at all costs, including at the expense of its own people”.
“It is extremely important that Member States take the necessary steps to implement the sanctions in their jurisdictions, or risk providing a blank check for the DPRK regime to advance its weapons program,” the statement said, using an acronym for North Korea.
The US last week imposed unilateral sanctions over the missile launches. It blacklisted five North Koreans, one Russian and a Russian firm, accusing them of procuring goods for the programmes from Russia and China.
It then proposed five of those individuals also be subjected to a UN travel ban and asset freeze. The request had to be agreed by consensus by the Security Council’s 15-member North Korea sanctions committee.
The US Treasury Department said on January 12 that one of the North Koreans being sanctioned, Choe Myong Hyon, was based in Russia and had provided support to North Korea’s Second Academy of Natural Sciences (SANS), which is already subject to sanctions.
Also targeted were four China-based North Korean representatives of SANS-subordinate organisations, the Treasury Department said: Sim Kwang Sok, Kim Song Hun, Kang Chol Hak, and Pyon Kwang Chol.
Nuclear-armed Pyongyang is banned from testing ballistic weapons by the UN, but denuclearisation talks have been stalled since 2019 when a summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and then-US President Donald Trump collapsed over North Korea’s demands for sanctions relief.
US President Joe Biden’s administration has sought unsuccessfully to re-engage Pyongyang in dialogue to persuade it to give up its nuclear weapons and missiles.
But Kim has refused new talks with the US and warned North Korea would restart weapons development activities it had previously paused.
The North Korean leader, who took power 10 years ago, has sought to modernise the military and says more advanced weapons are necessary for the country’s self-defence.
The powerful politburo of North Korea’s ruling party, presided over by leader Kim, said during a meeting on Wednesday that it would reconsider resuming “all temporarily suspended” nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests in light of “hostile” US actions.
The country’s Rodong Sinmun newspaper quoted politburo members saying they were looking to “examine the issue on resuming all actions, which had been temporarily suspended”, in an apparent reference to a self-imposed moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons and ICBMs that began in 2017.
“We should make more thorough preparation for a long-term confrontation with the US imperialists,” the politburo concluded.
“Facts have proven time and again that blindly resorting to sanction and pressure would only escalate the tension further rather than settle the Peninsula issue. This meets no party’s interests,” Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said when asked about Pyongyang’s announcement.
Meanwhile, North Korea is expected to come up during virtual talks on Friday between Biden and Japan’s new Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.
Daniel Russel, a former US diplomat for Asia who is now with the Asia Society Policy Institute, said the meeting showed Washington and Tokyo were on the same wavelength.
“We should expect their discussion to focus on practical measures to deter and defend against destabilising behaviour, whether from North Korea or in hot spots like the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China Seas,” he said.
US national security adviser Jake Sullivan and his Japanese counterpart Akiba Takeo set the agenda on Thursday when they spoke about their respective approaches to North Korea, China and economic issues in the Indo-Pacific, the White House said.
10. S. Korea, U.S. detect signs of North Korean military parade
Whew. It is a good thing parades do not win wars. But I look forward to seeing what Kim wants to show off.
S. Korea, U.S. detect signs of North Korean military parade
Posted January. 21, 2022 07:42,
Updated January. 21, 2022 07:42
S. Korea, U.S. detect signs of North Korean military parade. January. 21, 2022 07:42. by Sang-Ho Yun ysh1005@donga.com.
Signs of North Korean military parade have been detected by the intelligence authorities of South Korea and the U.S. North Korea fired tactical guided missiles at the dawn of the new year, making a series of provocations. The intelligence authorities are closely monitoring the situation with a focus on the signs of military parade to mark the 80th birthday of the regime’s former leader Kim Jong Il, which is February 16.
According to the South Korean military authority on Thursday, its reconnaissance satellite captured images of a large number of soldiers and weapons gathering and marching near the Mirim airfield in Pyongyang, which Seoul and Washington consider as a rehearsal for military parade. The satellite imagery reportedly did not capture strategic weapons system such as ICBM, and the number of soldiers mobilized was about the same as that of the military parade held last year (8,000-10,000 soldiers).
Earlier, North Korea held a midnight military parade on Sept. 9, 2021 at Kim Il Sung Square marking the 73rd anniversary of the nation’s foundation. Strategic weapons system such as ICBM and SLBM and the regular army and weapons were not mobilized at the time, and instead the Worker-Peasant Red Guards (equivalent to the reserved army forces) and civilian defense and public security forces (similar to the police) participated in the event. Meanwhile, the country’s leader Kim Jong Un did not deliver a speech. Given that North Korea forewarned a large-scale event commemorating 80th birthday of Kim Jong Il (Feb. 20) and 110th birthday of Kim Il Sung (April 15), it is anticipated that the forthcoming military parade will showcase strategic weapons system, such as its newly built ICBM, to boast the strength of the regime’s defense capability under Kim Jong Un’s leadership.
11. How to Understand North Korea’s Demand for the Withdrawal of ROK-U.S. “hostile policy”
The author is not provided. This is from the Asan Institute in South Korea.
Quite an aggressive conclusion:
We must establish a multi-layered defense system capable of intercepting North Korean nuclear weapons and also possess capabilities to destroy North Korea if it uses nuclear weapons. We should announce that the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has become a dead document due to North Korea’s nuclear development. We need to pursue ROK-U.S. nuclear sharing and the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, as it was recommended by the House Armed Service Committee in an amendment to the fiscal 2013 National Defense Authorization bill. We must accumulate operational experience on nuclear weapons by establishing a plan for the actual use of nuclear weapons and conducting relevant drills. The redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons does not imply giving up on the denuclearization of North Korea; rather, this would serve as an opportunity to achieve denuclearization and make the North abandon its hostile policy towards South Korea.
How to Understand North Korea’s Demand for the Withdrawal of ROK-U.S. “hostile policy”
*This is to inform you that this manuscript can be revised in part.
Recently, North Korea has been demanding that South Korea and the U.S. withdraw their hostile policy toward North Korea. In a speech at the 5th Meeting of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly on September 2021, Chairman Kim Jong Un (hereafter Kim Jong Un) referred to an end-of-war declaration promoted by the current South Korean government stating that “hostile viewpoint and policies” should first be removed before declaring the end of war. The North Korean regime has continuously claimed that the hostile policy of South Korea and the U.S. is the biggest obstacle to peace on the Korean Peninsula and that denuclearization can only be achieved when it is removed first.
What does North Korea mean by the hostile policy of South Korea and the U.S.? The withdrawal of the U.S. hostile policy toward the regime means the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, which is an obstacle to achieving the unification of the Korean Peninsula under its control. Since the very existence of a free and prosperous ROK is the political threat to his regime, in order to stabilize his system of one-man rule, it is necessary for Kim Jong Un to remove such a threat through the unification of Korea under a communist flag. However, the biggest obstacle to achieving this is the ROK-U.S. alliance and U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK). Kim Jong Un calls for the removal of this “hostile policy” because he believes that his ultimate objective of unifying the Korean Peninsula under communism can be achieved as soon as U.S. troops are withdrawn from the Peninsula, as in Vietnam and Afghanistan. According to Bob Woodward’s 2020 book, Rage, Kim Jong Un wrote in a letter to President Trump that “Now and in the future, the South Korean military cannot be my enemy … that “the South Korean military is no match against my military.” It shows that Kim Jong Un bluntly demanded the withdrawal of USFK, the biggest obstacle to the unification of the Korean Peninsula under a communist flag.
China emphasizes its alliance with Pyongyang as being forged in blood, referring to the Korean War as a war to “Resist U.S. aggression and Aid Korea.” Their 1961 ‘Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance’ stipulates that “In the event of one of the contracting parties being subjected to armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other contracting party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal,” which means automatic intervention.
In July 2017, when North Korea tested missiles capable of hitting the U.S. mainland such as the Hwasong-12 and 14, President Trump threatened to unleash “Fire and Fury” and hinted a possible military attack on North Korea. As tensions escalated on the Korean Peninsula, with North Korea launching the Hwasong-15 and the U.S. reviewing the so-called “bloody nose” pre-emptive strike option in November, China deployed more than 100,000 troops along the border with North Korea and prepared to support North Korea in case of contingency. The fact that China is right across the Yalu River and thus poised to intervene militarily in North Korea whenever it wants, while the U.S. is very far away across the Pacific Ocean, shows how unstable South Korea’s security environment is.
This is similar to the recent situation in Ukraine. Russia has assembled more than 100,000 troops on the border with Ukraine and is prepared to invade at any time. Mr. Robert Lee at King’s College London, a Russia expert, said that “If Russia really wants to unleash its conventional capabilities, they could inflict massive damage in a very short period of time.” He forecasted that “They can devastate the Ukrainian military in the east really quickly, within the first 30-40 minutes.” To a certain extent, the situation in Ukraine seems to be similar to that of the Korean Peninsula.
It is the North Korean regime, not South Korea, that pursues a hostile policy. Since the Armistice in 1953, North Korea has carried out more than 3,000 provocations – big and small – against South Korea, and whenever tensions arose, it frequently threatened to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.” As soon as the post-war recovery period was over following the Armistice Agreement in 1953, North Korea resumed its military buildup, chanting the slogan “a gun in one hand, and a hammer and sickle in the other” at the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in 1962. At the Plenum, it also adopted the ‘Four Military Guidelines’: arm the entire populace, fortify the whole country, train the entire army as a “Cadre Force”, and modernize the army. In 1968 and 1969, North Korea carried out major provocations that threatened to plunge the entire Korean Peninsula into an all-out war, such as the Blue House (Presidential Office) raid, the capture of U.S. Navy intelligence ship Pueblo, the infiltration operations in Uljin and Samcheok, and the shootdown of American EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft. Shortly after South Vietnam fell to communism in 1975, Kim Il Sung requested military assistance from China, arguing that the South Korean people “have only a demarcation line to lose but reunification to gain.” Such statements and actions contradict North Korea’s assertion that it is South Korea and the U.S. that are pursuing a ‘hostile policy.’ The regime now has nuclear weapons and has become more aggressive and is threatening South Korea without hesitation.
The contradictions of North Korea’s demand for the U.S. to withdraw its hostile policy can be found in its development of nuclear weapons. South Korea does not possess nuclear weapons, and the U.S. withdrew all of its tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula in 1991. In 1994, under the Geneva Agreed Framework, North Korea promised to implement measures under the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. It further agreed to abandon all existing nuclear programs and promptly return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and IAEA safeguards in the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks on September 19, 2005. However, North Korea violated all these promises and agreements by continuously developing nuclear weapons and has focused on upgrading its nuclear weapon capabilities through six nuclear tests so far. As of 2021, the regime has intensively strengthened its nuclear capabilities that can primarily target South Korea. North Korea’s development of ‘cutting-edge tactical nuclear weapons’ against South Korea, who has no nuclear weapon, shows how deceptive North Korea’s call for the withdrawal of ‘hostile policy’ is.
In a recent column, Dr. Victor Cha, Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), pointed out that U.S. presidents and senior officials have offered assurances of non-hostile intent on at least 40 separate occasions since 1989. For example, in June 1993 joint communique between the U.S. and North Korea, the United States provided “assurance against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons.” In the October 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, the United States agreed to provide “formal assurance to North Korea, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.” In 2002, President George W. Bush stated that “We have no intention of invading North Korea.” President Obama said in November 2009, “The United States is prepared to offer North Korea a different future … it could have a future of greater security and respect.” After the Singapore Summit with Kim Jong Un in June 2018, President Trump stated, “Yesterday’s conflict does not have to be tomorrow’s war. And as history has proven over and over again, adversaries can become friends.”
Although we hope for the denuclearization of North Korea, it seems that North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons. According to a 2021 poll conducted by the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), 90 percent of South Koreans said North Korea will not denuclearize. A CNN poll conducted right after the Trump-Kim summit in Singapore in 2018 also showed that 70% of Americans believe that North Korea will not denuclearize. This is because nuclear weapons are the key means by which North Korea’s hereditary dictatorship can survive and eventually force South Korea to submit to unification under a communist flag. According to a joint research conducted by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies and the RAND Corporation in 2021, the current situation will continue and North Korea could have up to 242 nuclear weapons by 2027. In that case, the report estimates that more than 60 North Korean nuclear weapons could be used against South Korea alone in the initial phase of a war. Instead of denuclearization, North Korea will try to make a deal with the U.S. through nuclear blackmail and be able to control South Korea. Since North Korea will not abandon its nuclear program, South Korea’s survival can only be guaranteed when South Korea is prepared for it. Like the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) of the Cold War era, we should respond to nuclear North Korea by achieving a ‘Balance of Terror,’ but have yet to do so.
Very worrisome is the U.S. position on the “No First Use (NFU)” policy which is being discussed recently. Until now, the U.S. has maintained the position that it does not rule out the possibility of a preemptive use of nuclear weapons to counter an adversary’s imminent nuclear attack and to enhance deterrence by making the adversary unaware of when the U.S. will use nuclear weapons. However, the Biden administration sees nuclear weapons as a means to deter the use of nuclear weapons, not a weapon to be used, and is reportedly re-considering the NFU. If the NFU becomes an official position of the U.S., North Korea may misjudge that the U.S. extended deterrence promise is faltering, and South Korea will be in a situation where it may depend on North Korea’s favor for its survival.
While we need to pursue the denuclearization of North Korea in the long-term, we must first strengthen the ROK-U.S. readiness posture to counter the North Korean nuclear threat. No matter how advanced they are, conventional weapons are just conventional weapons and cannot provide the political and psychological effects that nuclear weapons have. Based on the fact that nuclear weapons can only be deterred by nuclear weapons, a Korean version of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) must be formulated and implemented. The key is to make North Korea realize that it will lose more than it can gain if it uses nuclear weapons against South Korea.
We must establish a multi-layered defense system capable of intercepting North Korean nuclear weapons and also possess capabilities to destroy North Korea if it uses nuclear weapons. We should announce that the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has become a dead document due to North Korea’s nuclear development. We need to pursue ROK-U.S. nuclear sharing and the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, as it was recommended by the House Armed Service Committee in an amendment to the fiscal 2013 National Defense Authorization bill. We must accumulate operational experience on nuclear weapons by establishing a plan for the actual use of nuclear weapons and conducting relevant drills. The redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons does not imply giving up on the denuclearization of North Korea; rather, this would serve as an opportunity to achieve denuclearization and make the North abandon its hostile policy towards South Korea.
12. US hits snag in pursuit of sanctions against North Korea
Time to go "nuclear" (on secondary sanctions that is! - note sarcasm)
US hits snag in pursuit of sanctions against North Korea
U.S. President Joe Biden holds an Infrastructure Implementation Task Force meeting in the Cabinet Room at the White House in Washington, D.C., Thursday. UPI-Yonhap
Experts split over effectiveness of Biden's strategy
By Jung Da-min
The U.S. is facing major challenges in its pursuit of additional sanctions against North Korea for conducting a series of missile launches this year, as China and Russia have been vetoing the move amid growing doubts over the effectiveness of the punitive measures. According to media reports citing diplomats, Thursday (local time), China and Russia placed a "hold" on the U.S. proposal for additional U.N. sanctions against Pyongyang, ahead of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting held later that day.
China told other member countries that it needed more time to study the U.S.' proposal for such additional sanctions, while Russia said more evidence was needed to back Washington's request, diplomats said.
The U.S. had imposed unilateral sanctions over the missile launches by blacklisting six North Koreans, one Russian and a Russian firm, Jan. 12, accusing them of procuring goods from Russia and China for the North's weapons development programs.
The U.S. then sought to put five of the North Korean individuals under a U.N. travel ban and freeze their assets, which China and Russia have virtually rejected.
International relations experts said the veto from China and Russia was much anticipated considering that the two countries have been in conflict with the U.S. on many other regional issues.
But they said the U.S. does not have many other options in terms of its North Korea policy but to place additional sanctions on the North, considering that Pyongyang has not made any conciliatory gestures toward Washington, instead only heightening tensions by conducting four missile launches during the first few weeks of the new year.
Experts divided on effectiveness of sanctions
Experts have also expressed mixed opinions over the effectiveness of the sanctions themselves.
Some said that the effectiveness of sanctions is questionable in terms of pushing North Korea to return to the negotiating table, when the country has long been at an intense level of economic self-isolation.
But others said the purpose of the sanctions is rather to show the international community's disapproval of the North's weapons development, having more meaning as punishments rather than as measures to actually prevent further weapons development, which many people often misunderstand.
"People misunderstand the purpose of sanctions. There is no evidence that sanctions have prevented the development of any nuclear or missile programs," said Jeffrey Lewis, the director of the East Asia nonproliferation program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, California.
"What sanctions are intended to do is create pressure on the leadership to change its policies. Such an approach is obviously doomed with a country like North Korea, which values autarky."
The United Nations headquarters building in New York is pictured though a window with the U.N. logo in the foreground, in this Aug. 15, 2014, file photo.
Reuters-Yonhap
Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, said the sanctions might not prevent North Korea from developing missiles, but they punish the North for its defiance of the U.N.
Bennett, however, said he favors the selective lifting of sanctions if North Korea begins to recognize the authority of the U.N. and follows the UNSC resolutions.
He has acknowledged the limitations of the current sanctions on North Korea when China, which can impose the most serious sanctions on the North, vetoes additional UNSC sanctions on it.
"With North Korea, we have to remember that the most severe sanction that has been implemented was the closing of the North Korean border with China, something that Kim did to his country (rather than being a sanction imposed from outside)," Bennett said.
Eric Gomez, the director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute, said that imposing secondary sanctions seems to be the only effective option, when the reclusive country already went into a period of very intense economic self-isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic.
"North Korea went into a period of very intense economic self-isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic to prevent virus spread. This put the economy under significant strain, plus sanctions were in effect, yet North Korea did not come to the negotiating table, which damages the theory that sanctions will force North Korea to the negotiating table via economic pressure," Gomez said.
"At this point, the only real place sanctions could go next is secondary sanctions against entities outside of North Korea."
However, Gomez pointed out that secondary sanctions are unlikely to be authorized, given the Chinese and Russian vetoes of additional U.N. sanctions at the UNSC.
He also said such secondary sanctions often involve Chinese banks related to North Korean individuals or entities, and that implementing them, accordingly, could escalate tensions between the U.S. and China, while they might not serve their original purpose of getting the North back to the negotiating table.
"The United States could sanction Chinese banks directly and cut off parts of China's economy from the U.S. banking system. This would be a big gamble to take, as it would likely make any U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea impossible, while also having a questionable chance of success, given the failure of sanctions to get Kim to the table during the period of economic self-isolation I described."
Meanwhile, the prospects of regional security are getting more complicated, following North Korea's message that it is considering resuming "all temporally-suspended activities," suggesting the possible resumption of nuclear or inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) testing.
The North's message came two days after it fired two presumed KN-24 missiles, Jan. 17, marking the country's fourth missile testing since the start of the new year. It also came just a day before the UNSC's closed-door meeting held Thursday.
In this photo provided by the North Korea's state-run Korean Central News Agency, Thursday, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attends a meeting of the Central Committee of the country's ruling Workers' Party of Korea in Pyongyang, a day before. YonhapPolitical watchers have said that North Korea is expected to conduct more testing of its weapons this year. But they have said that it is yet to be seen what kind of weapons will be included, as it will depend on the U.S.' responses to the North's messages.
Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University, said that Kim Jong-un's message at the political bureau meeting has left room for many different options on the North Korean side, as seen in the report of the meeting carried by the country's state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Thursday.
"The KCNA report said that the members of the political bureau of the party central committee recognized the need to prepare for long-term confrontation with the U.S., but it did not say that any further decision has been made regarding the matter," Park said.
Park also said that North Korea is expected to adjust the level of its provocation in accordance with the U.S.' reactions.
"We can draw different scenarios at this moment, including one with the two sides confronting each other with hardline policies, or another where they make conciliatory gestures by toning down their messages to each other. . . . In my opinion, the two sides are likely to exchange verbal messages rather than taking any real action."
Park also said that Pyongyang's continued missile tests and Kim's message suggesting a possible resumption of nuclear or ICBM testing are aimed at both Seoul and Washington, as both countries are at important political junctures.
"For South Korea, whoever becomes the next president after the March 9 election, North Korea is likely to conduct many missile tests in an attempt to tame the new administration and create a favorable situation for their side in future inter-Korean negotiations," Park said.
"For the United States, the Biden administration is preparing for a midterm election in November. As its foreign policies, especially those regarding North Korea, are already unpopular, the Biden administration will not want to risk provoking the North to conduct a nuclear or ICBM testing."
13. Column: North Korea continues to be a growing threat while South Korea grows its economy
Column: North Korea continues to be a growing threat while South Korea grows its economy
North Korea is once again rattling the cage. Over several weeks, the regime has carried out four ballistic missile tests, the most recent on Jan. 17. Pyongyang describes them as essential for self-defense.
Meanwhile, South Korea continues on a positive course of exceptional economic growth and profitability, combined with now firmly established representative democracy. Scare stories about actions of the North overshadow the good news regarding the South. This is most unfortunate.
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North Korea has possessed at least rudimentary nuclear weapons since 2006. From time to time, Pyongyang threatens to use them against South Korea, Japan and even the United States, though long distance makes that last target still impractical.
In September, Pyongyang announced the successful launch of a cruise missile, an insidious weapon, flying low and difficult to detect with radar. An early version, the V-1 rocket of Nazi Germany, killed many in Britain during World War II.
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Meanwhile, the Biden administration reevaluates Korea policies. A natural assumption is that North Korea leader Kim Jong Un is returning to rigid hostility, after some flexibility during the Trump administration. Despite highly publicized meetings between Trump and Kim, there were no diplomatic or other breakthroughs.
In reality, North Korea is literally a disaster area in economic and human terms. The population has endured decades of desperate hardship, including famine. United Nations sanctions effectively isolate the extreme and dangerous government.
By contrast, South Korea moves from strength to strength. Considerable credit goes to President Moon Jae-in, completing his five-year term and ineligible for a second.
Behind the scenes, Moon has worked diligently to try to improve long-hostile relations with North Korea, and assert effective leadership more widely in Asia. Moon and Kim met in May 2018, following earlier summits in 2000 and 2007.
At the end of 2018, the influential Asia News Network named President Moon “Person of the Year.” South Korea’s chief executive rightly received praise for mediation between the U.S. and North Korea, important in bringing the two national leaders together. This accomplishment is too easily oversimplified and minimized.
Moon insisted on meeting with the North Korea delegation to the 2018 Winter Olympics, held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The group included Kim’s sister, an influential figure in the bizarre regime.
President Moon Jae-in personifies in important ways the positive effective qualities of his nation. He assumed office as national chief executive on May 10, 2017, following a special election. From the very start, he emphasized relations with North Korea
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Moon became president in a time of tension and uncertainty on both sides of the 38th Parallel, the border that divides Korea into north and south. South Korea had just experienced the ordeal of impeachment and removal from office of a sitting president, Park Geun-hye. North Korea greeted the inauguration of a new president in South Korea by launching a new long-range missile, the Hwasong-12, four days later.
Earlier, South Korea’s dictatorship imprisoned Moon for his youthful reform activism. Later, he became a human rights lawyer. He also served in the Republic of Korea Army Special Forces, and saw action in the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) along the 38th Parallel.
After a period of low popularity measured by public opinion polls, Moon’s standing has risen dramatically over the past year. In March, the voters elect a new president. Moon will leave office enjoying the great respect he deserves.
South Korea should lead initiatives toward North Korea, supported by the United States. Together, our position is strong.
Learn More: Arthur I. Cyr, “After the Cold War — American Foreign Policy, Europe and Asia.”
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
