Quotes of the Day:

"The Department will also campaign day-to-day to gain and sustain military advantages, counter acute forms of our competitors’ coercion, and complicate our competitors’ military. preparations. Campaigning is not business as usual – it is the deliberate effort to synchronize the Department’s activities and investments to aggregate focus and resources to shift conditions in our favor. Through campaigning, the Department will focus on the most consequential competitor activities that, if left unaddressed, would endanger our military advantages now and in the future."

- Secretary Austin, NDS 2022.

"Because humans are the executors of political conflict, regardless of the form it takes, narratives loom large. Technological developments, especially social media, mean that the use of force is under near-real time public scrutiny. In light of these developments, there is great need for a dynamic and compelling legitimation of a state’s military action."

- Narratives and Competing Messages, Assessing Revolutionary And Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) Studies

“Always be more than you appear, and never appear to be more than you are.”

- Horst Kastner

1. Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China | The White House

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 14 (Putin's War)

3. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (14.11.22) CDS comments on key events

4. 4 takeaways from President Biden's 'very blunt' meeting with China's Xi Jinping

5. The Seeds of Russia's Military Collapse in Ukraine Were Planted by its Bungled Elimination of Conscription

6. Elbridge Colby Has It Right on Taiwan and Ukraine

7. Lawmakers Urge More Action to Ensure Resilience of the U.S. Economy

8. Grounded: Why Biden Must Sanction Iranian Aviation

9. The IAEA’s Iran NPT Safeguards Report - November 2022

10. Turkey Seeks Sovereign Immunity in Two Cases Before the Supreme Court

11. Exclusive: Russian software disguised as American finds its way into U.S. Army, CDC apps

12. Drowning death spotlights problem with older military dive vests

13. Biden-Xi lower the temperature in cooldown summit

14. Biden’s Nuclear Policy Fails the Ukraine Test

15. Senator to Elon Musk: 'Fix Your Companies. Or Congress Will'

16. Video: China buying US farmland near military bases

17. CCP: Who makes up the party

18. Should the United States Pledge to Defend Taiwan?

19. Too Sino-Centric? US Marine Corps Needs Bottom-Up Reform

20. Weapons of the War in Ukraine

1. Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China | The White House

Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China | The White House

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · November 14, 2022

President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. met on November 14 with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in Bali, Indonesia. The two leaders spoke candidly about their respective priorities and intentions across a range of issues. President Biden explained that the United States will continue to compete vigorously with the PRC, including by investing in sources of strength at home and aligning efforts with allies and partners around the world. He reiterated that this competition should not veer into conflict and underscored that the United States and China must manage the competition responsibly and maintain open lines of communication. The two leaders discussed the importance of developing principles that would advance these goals and tasked their teams to discuss them further.

President Biden underscored that the United States and China must work together to address transnational challenges – such as climate change, global macroeconomic stability including debt relief, health security, and global food security – because that is what the international community expects. The two leaders agreed to empower key senior officials to maintain communication and deepen constructive efforts on these and other issues. They welcomed ongoing efforts to address specific issues in U.S.-China bilateral relations, and encouraged further progress in these existing mechanisms, including through joint working groups. They also noted the importance of ties between the people of the United States and the PRC.

President Biden raised concerns about PRC practices in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong, and human rights more broadly. On Taiwan, he laid out in detail that our one China policy has not changed, the United States opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, and the world has an interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. He raised U.S. objections to the PRC’s coercive and increasingly aggressive actions toward Taiwan, which undermine peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the broader region, and jeopardize global prosperity. President Biden also raised ongoing concerns about China’s non-market economic practices, which harm American workers and families, and workers and families around the world. He again underscored that it is a priority for us to resolve the cases of American citizens who are wrongfully detained or subject to exit bans in China

The two leaders exchanged views on key regional and global challenges. President Biden raised Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine and Russia’s irresponsible threats of nuclear use. President Biden and President Xi reiterated their agreement that a nuclear war should never be fought and can never be won and underscored their opposition to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. President Biden also raised concerns about the DPRK’s provocative behavior, noted all members of the international community have an interest in encouraging the DPRK to act responsibly, and underscored the United States’ ironclad commitment to defending our Indo-Pacific Allies.

The two leaders agreed that Secretary of State Blinken will visit China to follow up on their discussions.

###

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · November 14, 2022

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 14 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14

Key Takeaways

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) escalated claims of Russian territorial gains in Donetsk Oblast on November 13 and 14, likely to emphasize that Russian forces are intensifying operations in Donetsk Oblast following their withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson Oblast.
• Russian milbloggers seized on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s November 14 visit to Kherson City to criticize Russian military capacity more substantively than in previous days during the Russian withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson Oblast.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continues to establish himself as a highly independent, Stalinist warlord in Russia, becoming an even more prominent figure within the nationalist pro-war community.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line and clashed with Russian troops near Bilohorivka.
• Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain positions in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast.
• Russian forces intensified offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and claimed to have gained territory around Bakhmut and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops launched an unsuccessful raid onto the Kinburn Spit.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed additional decrees refining mobilization protocols and expanding military recruitment provisions, likely in an ongoing effort to reinforce Russian war efforts.
• Russian occupation officials continued to drive the “evacuation” and forced relocation of residents in occupied territories and took efforts to move occupation elements farther from the Dnipro River.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 14

Nov 14, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 14

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Layne Philipson, Angela Howard, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, Madison Williams, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 14, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) escalated claims of Russian territorial gains in Donetsk Oblast on November 13 and 14, likely to emphasize that Russian forces are intensifying operations in Donetsk Oblast following withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces completed the capture of Mayorsk (20km south of Bakhmut) on November 13 and of Pavlivka (45km southwest of Donetsk City) on November 14 after several weeks of not making claims of Russian territorial gains.[1] As ISW assessed on November 13, Russian forces will likely recommit troops to Donetsk Oblast after leaving the right bank of Kherson Oblast, which will likely lead to an intensification of operations around Bakhmut, Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast.[2] Russian forces will likely make gains in these areas in the coming days and weeks, but these gains are unlikely to be operationally significant. The Russian MoD is likely making more concrete territorial claims in order to set information conditions to frame Russian successes in Donetsk Oblast and detract from discontent regarding losses in Kherson Oblast.

Russian milbloggers seized on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s November 14 visit to Kherson City to criticize Russian military capacity more substantively than in previous days during the Russian withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson Oblast. Russian milbloggers largely complained that Zelensky arrived in Kherson City and was able to move around with relatively little concern about Russian strikes in his vicinity and questioned why Russian forces did not launch strikes on Zelensky.[3] One prominent milblogger noted that this shows that Russia does not want to win the war and criticized Russian forces for allowing Zelensky to step foot on “Russian territory.”[4] Russian milbloggers have notably maintained a relatively muted response to the Russian loss of the right bank in the past days, as ISW has previously reported.[5] The clear shift in rhetoric from relatively exculpatory language generally backing the withdrawal as a militarily sound decision to ire directed at Russian military failures suggests that Russian military leadership will likely be pressured to secure more direct gains in Donetsk Oblast and other areas.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continues to establish himself as a highly independent, Stalinist warlord in Russia, becoming a prominent figure within the nationalist pro-war community. Prigozhin commented on a Russian execution video of a reportedly exchanged Wagner prisoner of war, Yevgeniy Nuzhin, sarcastically supporting Nuzhin’s execution and denouncing him as a traitor to the Russian people.[6] Most sources noted that Wagner executed Nuzhin following a prisoner exchange on November 10, but a few claimed that Wagner kidnapped the serviceman via Prigozhin’s connections to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Russian General Staff.[7] Prigozhin claimed that Nuzhin planned his escape to free Ukraine and used the opportunity to compare Nuzhin to Russian elites who disregard the interests of the Russian people and fly away from Russia‘s problems in their personal business jets.[8] The Russian nationalist community overwhelmingly welcomed the public punishment of the supposed deserter, noting that the Wagner command is undertaking appropriate military measures to discipline its forces.[9] Some milbloggers even compared the execution to Joseph Stalin’s “heroic” execution of Russian Marxist revolutionary Leon Trotsky who had also fled Bolshevik Russia, further confirming Prigozhin’s appeal among the proponents of Stalin’s repressive legacy.[10] Prigozhin is taking actions that will resonate with a constituency interested in the ideology of Russia’s national superiority, Soviet brutalist strength, and distasteful of the Kremlin’s corruption, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has used as a political force throughout his reign.

Prigozhin is steadily using his participation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine to consolidate his influence in Russia. One milblogger voiced a concern that the integration of Wagner mercenaries into Russian society is “the destruction of even the illusion of legality and respect for rights in Putin’s Russian Federation.”[11] The milblogger added that Prigozhin is seizing the initiative to expand Wagner’s power in St. Petersburg while Russian security forces are “asleep.” Such opinions are not widespread among Russian nationalists but highlight some concerns with Prigozhin’s rapid expansion amid the Russian “special military operation” and its implications on the Putin regime. Prigozhin, for example, has requested that the FSB General Prosecutor’s office investigate St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov for high treason after St. Petersburg officials denied a construction permit for his Wagner Center in the city.[12] He had also publicly scoffed at the Russian bureaucracy when asked if his forces will train at Russian training grounds, likely to further assert the independence of his forces.[13] Prigozhin’s unhinged antics in the political sphere are unprecedented in Putin’s regime.

Key Takeaways

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) escalated claims of Russian territorial gains in Donetsk Oblast on November 13 and 14, likely to emphasize that Russian forces are intensifying operations in Donetsk Oblast following their withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson Oblast.
• Russian milbloggers seized on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s November 14 visit to Kherson City to criticize Russian military capacity more substantively than in previous days during the Russian withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson Oblast.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continues to establish himself as a highly independent, Stalinist warlord in Russia, becoming an even more prominent figure within the nationalist pro-war community.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line and clashed with Russian troops near Bilohorivka.
• Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain positions in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast.
• Russian forces intensified offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and claimed to have gained territory around Bakhmut and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops launched an unsuccessful raid onto the Kinburn Spit.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed additional decrees refining mobilization protocols and expanding military recruitment provisions, likely in an ongoing effort to reinforce Russian war efforts.
• Russian occupation officials continued to drive the “evacuation” and forced relocation of residents in occupied territories and took efforts to move occupation elements farther from the Dnipro River.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces continued their counteroffensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line on November 13 and 14. Geolocated footage published on November 13 confirmed that Ukrainian forces liberated Makiivka, approximately 23km southwest of Svatove.[14] Commander of the Russian combat army reserve unit BARS-13, Sergey Femchenkov, claimed that the situation on the Svatove frontline “escalated,” forcing Russian forces to retreat from the Makiivka area.[15] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported ongoing clashes in the direction of Novoselivske, Volodymyrivka, and Stelmakhivka (all just northwest of Svatove) in the direction of the R66 highway.[16] Some Russian milbloggers noted that motorized rifle elements of the 1st Tank Army are holding defensive positions in the vicinity of Novoselivske.[17] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to attack Russian positions in the Chervonopopivka area, fewer than 10km northwest of Kreminna.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces stopped Russian assaults near Torske, about 16km due west of Kreminna.[19] Ukrainian forces also continued to target Russian logistics on the Svatove-Kreminna line, and geolocated footage showed the aftermath of a Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian base on Miluvatka, just south of Svatove.[20]

Ukrainian and Russian forces engaged in clashes northwest of Lysychansk. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast, approximately 13km northwest of Lysychansk.[21] Russian sources for the second time since November 7 claimed that Wagner Group troops and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) units broke Ukrainian defenses in Bilohorivka and entered the settlement.[22]

Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain positions in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast on November 13. Ukrainian and Russian sources claimed that a Russian attack helicopter conducted a sortie against Ukrainian positions in Ternova (about 31km northeast of Kharkiv City), and a Russian milblogger noted that Russian forces failed to get a foothold in the settlement on November 13.[23] Russian forces also launched missile strikes from S-300 air defense systems on an enterprise in Kharkiv City on November 14.[24]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces intensified offensive operations around Bakhmut on November 13 and 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Bakhmut, Bilohorivka (about 20km northeast of Bakhmut), Spirne (30km northeast of Bakhmut), Toretsk (25km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[25] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Mayorsk (20km south of Bakhmut) on November 13, but Ukrainian Armed Forces spokesperson Serhiy Cherevatyi disputed these claims.[26] ISW is unable to independently confirm these reports. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also conducted ground assaults northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamianske, Spirne, and Bilohorivka.[27] Russian sources also claimed that Wagner forces advanced deep into the southeastern outskirts of Bakhmut, and that fierce fighting between Ukrainian and Wagner forces persists in the southeastern outskirts of Soledar (about 12km northeast of Bakhmut).[28] These sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are equipping their strongholds in the path of Russian forces, near Bakhmut and Soledar.[29] The Ukrainian government reported that Russian forces dropped prohibited chemical weapons, several K-51 aerosol grenades, on Ukrainian strongholds on November 14.[30] The use of chemical weapons such as K-51 aerosol grenades is explicitly prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[31] Both Russian and Ukrainian forces intensified shelling, missile, and artillery strikes along the contact line in the Bakhmut area.[32]

Russian forces intensified offensive operations around Avdiivka–Donetsk City on November 13 and 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Krasnohorivka, Pervomaiske, and Vodiane, on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City, and Marinka and Novomykhailivka on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.[33] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces slowly advanced through Ukrainian fortified areas near Marinka, Krasnohorivka, and Novomykhailivka.[34] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces slowly advanced through Ukrainian fortified areas near Pervomaiske, Vodiane, and Nevelske (19km northwest of Donetsk City).[35] Geolocated footage posted on November 12 showed that Russian forces advanced into northwestern outskirts of Opytne (about 12km northwest of Donetsk City), and Russian sources claimed that Russian troops are attempting to push Ukrainian forces farther west of the settlement.[36] A Russian source reported that Ukrainian forces set up mine barriers in the Russian forces’ path to slow this Russian push west.[37] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces aim to capture Vodiane, which would allow them to bypass Avdiivka and ultimately take Tonenke (about 19km northwest of Donetsk City), in an effort to cut off Ukrainian supply lines in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area.[38] Both Russian and Ukrainian forces intensified shelling, missile, and artillery strikes along the contact line in the Avdiivka–Donetsk City area.[39]

Russian forces claimed to have made gains southwest of Donetsk City on November 13 and 14. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian news outlets claimed that Russian troops captured Pavlivka (45km southwest of Donetsk City) on November 14 after Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks near Pavlivka and Nikolske on November 13.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Pavlivka on November 13, while Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to consolidate control over the northern outskirts of Pavlivka.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assault operations from the direction of Pavlivka in an attempt to dislodge Ukrainian forces from behind the Kashlahach River.[42]Russian sources claimed that advancing units of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet, the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, and the “Kaskad” Battalion killed a large number of Ukrainian personnel who did not have time to withdraw from positions in Pavlivka on November 13 and took the remaining Ukrainian servicemembers in Pavlivka as prisoners of war on November 14.[43] Certain Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made no significant progress south of Novomykhailivka due to Ukrainian forces using elevation differences between Pavlivka and Vuhledar to their advantage.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine shelling along the line of contact in Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on November 13 and 14.[45]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Note: ISW will report on activities in Kherson Oblast as part of the Southern Axis in this and subsequent updates. Ukraine’s counteroffensive in right-bank Kherson Oblast has accomplished its stated objectives, so ISW will not present a Southern Ukraine counteroffensive section until Ukrainian forces resume counteroffensives in southern Ukraine.

Russian forces continued defensive actions on the left bank of Kherson Oblast on November 13 and 14. Geolocated satellite imagery posted on November 13 shows newly created Russian defensive lines along the left bank of the Dnipro, east of Beryslav around Hornostaivka (28km northeast of Beryslav), Liubymivka (8km southeast of Beryslav), and Petropavlivka (25km southeast of Beryslav).[46] Additional satellite imagery shows the development of Russian defensive lines in Lukyanivka (16km southeast of Beryslav) between October 8 and November 10.[47] Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian troops are conducting defensive preparations on the left bank and striking Ukrainian positions and residential communities on the right bank.[48] The spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Forces, Nataliya Humenyuk, stated that Russian forces struck an abandoned equipment concentration in Chornobaivka (just northwest of Kherson City) on November 13, which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed was a strike on a Ukrainian command post.[49] Ukrainian sources also stated that Russian forces conducted a mortar strike on November 14 on the private sector of Hornostaivka, a settlement on the left bank of the Dnipro River, because civilians refused to evacuate.[50]

Russian sources widely claimed that Ukrainian troops launched a limited raid and attempted to land on the Kinburn Spit on the night of November 13 and 14. Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian landing groups formed in Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast, and attempted to land on the Kinburn Spit at Pokrovske, but that Russian forces destroyed the grouping during the ensuing battle.[51] Ukrainian sources did not comment on these claims. Russian milbloggers voiced concerns that this raid is indicative of Ukraine’s ability to land on the left bank of the Dnipro River.[52]

Russian forces continued routine artillery, air, and missile strikes in Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and on the right bank of Kherson Oblast on November 13 and 14.[53] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces launched anti-aircraft missiles at Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast on November 14, which Russian sources reported was intended to disrupt Ukrainian fire control over the Kinburn Spit.[54] Ukrainian forces notably struck Russian concentration areas on the left bank of Kherson Oblast on November 13 and 14 and targeted personnel concentrations in Dnipryany, Chaplynka, and Hola Prystan.[55]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed additional decrees refining mobilization protocols and expanding military recruitment provisions, likely in an ongoing effort to reinforce Russian war efforts. Putin decreed that foreign citizens can serve in the Russian armed forces on November 14.[56] The decree also allows Russian officials to conscript Russian dual-nationals or foreigners with residence permits.[57] Such provisions will allow the Kremlin to recruit forces internationally and among immigrant populations in Russia. Recruitment of foreigners can also ignite further ethno-religious conflicts that have been plaguing Russian ad hoc forces, however.

Putin is establishing enforcement measures for censorship of foreigners with acquired Russian citizenship, which would allow military recruitment officials to further carry out covert mobilization and respond to criticism of the failures of the Russian military campaign in Ukraine. Putin proposed an amendment that would deprive people of their acquired Russian citizenship if they spread “fakes about the Russian Armed Forces” or affiliate with “extremist organizations” that advocate against Russian territorial integrity. The Russian State Duma is also considering a law that would deprive residents of acquired Russian citizenship if they surrender or evade military service.[58] Both proposals excluded Russian-born citizens and are likely attempts to silence immigrant groups and ethnically based civil society in Russia. The amendment would task the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) with prosecuting individuals with such views, and Putin may be attempting to set up an internal repression apparatus. ISW previously assessed that Putin has never built an internal repression apparatus like the Soviets, instead relying on control over the information space.[59]

Putin may also be refining conditions for future force-generation efforts, such as a new wave of mobilization. Putin decreed that individuals with drug possession and consumption criminal charges will not be able to sign a contract with the Russian Armed Forces, likely in an effort to appear to address instances of substance abuse among new recruits and mobilized men.[60] It is unclear if Russian officials will actually follow Putin’s order prohibiting individuals with drug-related charges from serving, but the Wagner Group private military company (PMC) will likely continue to recruit these individuals regardless of Putin’s order regarding the conventional Russian military.

Russian authorities continue their struggle to integrate combat forces lacking a coordinated central command structure. Putin eliminated one inconsistency in Russian and Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’ (DNR and LNR) force-generation policy by decreeing the demobilization of students in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts on November 13.[61] The students were mobilized as part of DNR/LNR efforts rather than as part of the general Russian mobilization effort. The DNR and LNR will likely maintain their covert mobilization practices to ensure a supply of reinforcements, however. The Ukraine Resistance Center stated on November 14 that Russian forces continued to forcibly mobilize students in Donetsk and Luhansk from universities.[62] It is unclear whether DNR and LNR officials had any input into Putin’s decision, though DNR Head Denis Pushilin thanked Putin for giving DNR students the same opportunity as students in “other regions of Russia.”[63] A prominent Russian milblogger also noted that such issues will not resolve instantly due to divergences between DNR, LNR, and Russian laws.[64] Another Russian milblogger noted that Russian hospitals continue to deny treatment to DNR and LNR servicemen, and it is likely that Russian Armed Forces’ disparaging attitude towards non-Russian forces will persist throughout Russian efforts to consolidate the proxy republics’ and Russian Federation’s legal systems.[65] The resolution of discrepancies between Russia and forces the Kremlin is working to absorb has contributed to friction between the force groups, as ISW has previously reported.[66]

The aftermath of partial mobilization is continuing to have domestic social ramifications in Russia. Social media footage from November 13 shows a large group of mobilized servicemembers in Patriot Park, Moscow Oblast, protesting against the poor quality of their training and threatening their commander for disregarding training and material necessities.[67] The protestors angrily questioned why mobilized recruits are conducting small-arms fire exercises at tank training grounds.[68] The families of forcibly mobilized servicemembers similarly continue to claim that Russian command deployed their loved ones to the frontlines in Ukraine without training or equipment and stated that they have lost contact with their relatives.[69] The Sverdlovsk and Voronezh military registration authorities are reportedly refusing to issue the badge numbers of certain mobilized servicemen, which makes it impossible for families to view information about service payments belonging to their deceased loved ones on the battlefield.[70]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continued to drive the “evacuation” and forced relocation of residents in occupied territories on November 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 14 that Russian officials are evicting Ukrainian citizens from their homes in some temporarily occupied settlements in Zaporizhia Oblast to house Russian servicemen.[71] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on November 14 that Russian forces plan to completely evacuate the civilian population from Rubizhne, Kreminna, and Severodonetsk, all of which are in Russian-occupied Luhansk Oblast.[72]

Russian occupation officials continued efforts to relocate their administrative presence away from the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on November 14. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 14 that the Russian Duma Liberal Democratic deputies Leonid Slutsky, Vladimir Koshelev, and Vladimir Sibyagin are supervising Kherson occupation officials as they attempt to launch operations of the administrative center after officially moving the Kherson Oblast temporary administrative capital to Henichesk on November 12.[73] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that Russian occupiers are evacuating the families of Russian workers from Zaliznyi Port, Kherson Oblast.[74]

Russian authorities are continuing to import Russian citizens to serve in occupation administrations, replacing possibly ineffective Ukrainian collaborators and personnel from Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Luhansk Oblasts. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 13 that Russian occupation officials have appointed new heads of prosecutors’ offices in occupied territories after chief prosecutors arrived in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Luhansk Oblasts on November 7.[75] A Russian source similarly claimed on November 14 that Russia is abolishing the LNR’s prosecution office to further integrate the territory into Russia.[76]

Russian occupation officials are continuing efforts to erode Ukrainian national identity among residents of occupied territories. Enerhodar Mayor Dmytro Orlov stated on November 14 that Russian occupation officials in Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast, destroyed Ukrainian history textbooks and literature.[77] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 14 that the Commissioner for Children’s Rights under the Russian Presidential Administration, Maria Lvova-Belova, is personally responsible for the forced deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children into Russian families for the purpose of forces assimilation into Russia.[78]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[9] https://vk dot com/concordgroup_official?w=wall-177427428_1435; https://t.me/rybar/41109; https://t.me/niviynii/769; https://t.me/nivi...

[16]

[20] tps://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1591788457864892421; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1591354083252015104; https://t.me... https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/42651

[31] https://zakon.rada.gov(dot)ua/laws/show/995_182#Text; https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention

[48] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/videos/1930029017201206/; https://www... ua/2022/11/14/rechnyczya-syl-oborony-pivdnya-rozpovila-pro-obstrily-zvilnenyh-naselenyh-punktiv/

[49] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2022/11/14/bojova-robota-na-pivdni-ukrayiny-ne-zupynylasya-nataliya-gumenyuk/; https://t.me/mod_russia/21736

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08gdEhBLPwrrJVfPJF9C... ua/2022/11/14/rechnyczya-syl-oborony-pivdnya-rozpovila-pro-obstrily-zvilnenyh-naselenyh-punktiv/; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1522365958245901; https://www.faceboo...

[55]

[57] https://centralasia dot media/news:1818719

[62] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/14/na-shodi-ukrayiny-rosiyany-mobilizuvaly-studentiv-psevdouniversytetiv/

[73] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/11/13/rosiyany-namagayutsya-nalagodyty-robotu-okupaczijnoyi-administracziyi-v-genichesku/; https://ria dot ru/20221112/genichesk-1830990519.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... gov.ua/2022/11/14/rosiyany-vyvezly-svoyih-posipak-z-zaliznogo-portu-do-skadovska/

[74] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/14/rosiyany-vyvezly-svoyih-posipak-z-zaliznogo-portu-do-skadovska/

[75] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/11/13/okupanty-zavezly-svoyih-prokuroriv-na-tymchasovo-okupovani-terytoriyi/

[78] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/14/upovnovazhena-putina-osobysto-kontrolyuye-vykradennya-ukrayinskyh-ditej-do-rf/

understandingwar.org

3. Ukraine:  CDS Daily brief (14.11.22) CDS comments on key events

CDS Daily brief (14.11.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

On Monday, November 14, from 00:00 to 24:00, electricity shutdowns are planned in the city of Kyiv and 8 oblasts, namely Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Donetsk, Ukrenergo informed. Blackouts in other regions of Ukraine are currently not expected.

On November 13, 10 civilians were injured in Ukraine due to the armed aggression of the Russian Federation, Deputy Head of the Office of the President Kyrylo Tymoshenko reported

The number of vacancies registered in the State Employment Service of Ukraine decreased by 55.9% during January-October of the current year, the data published by the State Employment Service indicates. As of November 1, the Employment Service registered more than 32,300 job offers. Whereas on the same date a year earlier, there were 70.3 thousand offers.

On November 14, a Cabinet resolution will enter into force that allows Ukrainians who found themselves outside of the country without documents to get the documents necessary for their return remotely. "The identity card for returning to Ukraine is an 8-page booklet that will allow Ukrainians in Russia to leave through third countries, in particular Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Georgia. Previously, it could only be issued by diplomatic missions and consular institutions, but there are none of them left in Russia after the start of the full-scale invasion” – Zmina Human Rights Center explained.

Around midnight, the Russian army launched a missile attack on Kharkiv, city mayor Igor Terekhov said. The Industrial district of the city, most likely an industrial enterprise, came under attack. No victims of significant damage were reported.

During the past day, the Russian forces shelled Kupyansk and Vovchansk in Kharkiv Oblast, located near the contact line and the border with Russia. A residential building was damaged in Vovchansk, a boiler house and a lyceum were damaged in Shevchenkive village of Kupiansk district. According to the Regional Emergency Medical Center, a 48-year-old man and a 26-year- old woman were hospitalized with injuries in Kupyansk.

In Derhachi, an unknown explosive device exploded yesterday and a 45-year-old man was hospitalized. A 54-year-old man was injured by an explosive device in the village of Volokhov, Chuhuyiv district, Kharkiv Oblast.

In Donetsk Oblast, the Russian forces launched a rocket attack on Kurakhove in the evening, damaging high-rise buildings and private houses. One person was injured, the local Military State Administration reported. 4 other communities in Donetsk Oblast also came under Russian fire.

Today, the Russian military shelled two districts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with MLRS and heavy artillery, the head of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Council, Mykola Lukashuk reported. Residential buildings and civilian infrastructure sustained damages.

Today, during repair work on a high-voltage power line near the village of Bezruky, Kharkiv Oblast, a specialized electrician car with employees of Kharkovoblenergo hit a mine. At the time of the explosion, there were five workers in the car, who came to the community to do repairs. They sustained minor injuries, spokeswoman of JSC "Kharkivoblenergo" Maryna Shevchenko said.

Mykolayiv city mayor noted a decreased intensity of the shelling in the last two weeks. Mykolaiv was bombarded very actively throughout the war, but the last time the city was shelled was three days ago. A five-story building collapsed killing seven people. Since then, there have been explosions on the outskirts of the city, but no explosions in the city itself, Mayor of Mykolaiv Oleksandr Sienkievych said. He stressed, however, that coming back to the city is still dangerous.

Currently, there are no more than 70-80 thousand residents in Kherson, the Office of the President reported. This is a quarter of the pre-war population of about 280,000 people.

For the first time since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Ukrzaliznytsia is resuming passenger rail service to Mykolaiv. The first train to Mykolaiv is to leave from Kyiv on November 14 at 10:00 p.m. The last long-distance passenger train came to Mykolaiv on February 24. It’s also planned to restore railway service to Kherson in the next several days.

Investigators seized almost 1,500 Russian textbooks in one of the city's lyceums in Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast. They were brought to Ukraine during the occupation to extend the reach of the Russian propaganda, Serhiy Bolvinov, head of the Investigative Department of the State Police in the Kharkiv region, said.

Occupied territories:

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported that Russia plans to move the civilian population out of Kreminna, Sievierodonetsk, and Rubizhne due to the difficult humanitarian situation in Luhansk Oblast. Kreminna has been under Russian occupation since the end of April, Rubizhne - since mid-May, Sievierodonetsk - since the end of June.

According to the advisor to Mariupol city mayor Petro Andryushchenko, graffiti saying “Help, we are freezing” became common in the city of Mariupol. Mariupol currently has no regular supply of electricity, water, and gas. Currently, more than 100,000 residents remain in the city. The city is blocked and they are not allowed to move out. Also, in Mariupol, the occupying authorities have started accepting applications for Russian passports, Andryushchenko said.

Collaborator Maksym Zubarev, who headed the occupation administration in the village of Yakymivka, Melitopol district, died today. The announcement about his death appeared on his Facebook page. It said that he died in the Yakymivka district as a result of a "terrorist attack".

Operational situation

(Please note that this section of the Brief is mainly on the previous day's (November 13) Developments)

It is the 264th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). The Russian military is trying to maintain control over the temporarily captured territories. It concentrates its efforts on restraining the actions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in certain directions, continues to build up defense lines on the left bank of the Dnipro River, and at the same time conducts offensive actions in the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Novopavlivka directions.

In order to replenish personnel losses and form units, the Russian military continues to move mobilized personnel to the areas of hostilities on the territory of Ukraine. Civil defense training is held in the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don.

Over the past 24 hours, units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled Russian attacks in the areas of Novoselivske, Stelmakhivka and Bilogorivka in Luhansk Oblast and Bilohorivka, Kurdyumivka, Vodyane and Maryinka in Donetsk Oblast.

The Russian military does not stop shelling towns and villages and positions of the Ukrainian troops along the contact line. It fortifies frontiers in certain directions and conducts aerial reconnaissance. In violation of the norms of international humanitarian law, the laws and customs of war, the Russian forces continue to strike critical infrastructure. The city of Kharkiv and the towns and villages of Kharkiv Oblast were affected by the Russian fire. Over the past day, the Russian forces have launched 4 missile strikes and 13 air strikes and fired about 60 MLRS rounds. Near the state border, the enemy shelled Mykolaivka, Zalizniy Mist, Leonivka in Chernihiv Oblast, Vovkivka, Zarutske, Sosnivka, Khodyna, Fotovizh, Ulanov, Svarkove, Volfyne, Pavlivka and Kindrativka in Sumy Oblast, Vodrodhenivske, Udy, Strilecha, Ohirtseve, Anyskyne, Ambarne, Kolodyazne and Kamianka in Kharkiv Oblast.

Over the past day, the aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces made 16 strikes against the enemy hitting 10 areas of weapons and military equipment concentration, and 6 anti-aircraft missile systems positions. The Ukrainian defense forces shot down an Orlan-10 UAV. Units of the rocket and artillery troops hit 2 enemy control points, 11 areas of manpower, weapons and military equipment concentration, and 2 other important enemy targets.

Kharkiv direction

• Topoli - Siversk section: approximate length of combat line - 154 km, number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 23-28, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 5.5 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments (TR), 245th motorized rifle regiment (MRR) of the 47th tank division (TD), 6th and 239th TRs, 228th MRR of the 90th TD, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades (SMRBr) of the 6th Combined Arms (CA) Army,

27th SMRBr of the 1st Tank Army, 252nd and 752nd MRRs of the 3rd MRD, 1st, 13th, and 12th TRs, 423rd MRR of the 4th TD, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th SMRBrs of the 2nd CA Army, 35th, 55th and 74th SMRBrs of the 41st CA Army, 275th and 280th MRRs, 11th TR of the 18th MRD of the 11 Army Corps (AC), 7th MRR of the 11th AC, 80th SMRBr of the 14th AC, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, military units of the 1st AC of so-called DPR, 2nd and 4th SMRBrs of the 2nd AC, PMC

The Russian military fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the areas near Kyselivka, Tabaivka, Krokhmalne, Berestove, Novoselivske, Stelmakhivka, Makiivka and Nevske.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 144 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments (TR), 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th TR of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 51st and 137th parachute airborne regiment of the 106 airborne division, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade of Baltic Fleet, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military shelled the areas of Bilohorivka, Hryhorivka, Verkhnokamyanske, Spirne, Rozdolivka, Yakovlivka, Soledar, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Klishchiivka, Pervomaiske, Krasnohorivka, Maryinka, and Novomykhailivka with tanks and artillery.

Since November 10, the so-called "evacuation" of the property of the Donetsk Railway Administration to the city of Ilovaisk has been observed.

Zaporizhzhia direction

●  Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade (SMRBr) of the 29th Combined Arms (CA) Army, 38th and 64th SMRBrs, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th CA Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37th of the 36th CA Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments (MRR) of the 19th motorized rifle division (MRD) of the 58th CA Army, 70th, 71st and 291st MRRs of the 42nd MRD of the 58th CA Army, 136th SMRB of the 58 CA Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps (AC), 39th SMRB of the 68th AC, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st AC of the so-called DPR, and 2nd AC of the socalled LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military shelled positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the areas of Vuhledar, Pavlivka, Novoukrainka, Prechystivka, Velyka Novosilka, Vremivka, Novopil, Temyrivka, Olhivske and Zaliznychne.

In some temporarily occupied villages of Zaporizhzhia Oblast, local residents are evicted from their homes to house servicemen of the occupying Russian forces.

Tavriysk direction

• Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 39, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7,5 km;

• Deployed BTGs of: the 8th and 49th Combined Arms (CA) Armies; 11th, 103rd, 109th, and 127th rifle regiments of the mobilization reserve of the 1st Army Corps (AC) of the Southern Military District; 35th and 36th CA Armies of the Eastern Military District; 3rd AC of the Western Military District; 90th tank division of the Central Military District; the 22nd AC of the Coastal Forces; the 810th separate marines brigade of the Black Sea Fleet; the 7th and 76th Air assault divisions, the 98th airborne division, and the 11th separate airborne assault brigade of the Airborne Forces.

Towns and villages near the contact line were hit by mortar, barrel and rocket artillery fire. The Russian forces fired artillery directly at Vyshchetarasivka, Dobra Nadiya, and Illinka in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

On the night of November 13, the Ukrainian Defense Forces destroyed an enemy ammunition depot, about 40 Russian personnel, 2 armored vehicles, and 10 trucks in the area of Kairy.

A high level of mine danger persists in the liberated villages of Kherson Oblast. An intensification of the Russian aerial reconnaissance has been noted, which may indicate that the Russian forces are planning to fire at both military and civilian targets. Units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces continue to carry out stabilization measures.

On November 12, the Russian occupiers launched mortar shells at the private sector of Hornostaivka, whose residents refused the so-called evacuation. As a result of the shelling, two local residents were killed and three were injured.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to stay ready to carry out two operational tasks against Ukraine:

•       to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine by launching missile strikes from surface ships, submarines, coastal missile systems, and aircraft at targets in the coastal zone and deep into the territory of Ukraine and readiness for the naval amphibious landing to assist ground forces in the coastal direction;

•       to control the northwestern part of the Black Sea by blocking Ukrainian ports and preventing the restoration of sea communications (except for the areas of the BSGI "grain initiative") by carrying out attacks on ports and ships and concealed mine laying.

The Russian fleet keeps 12 surface ships and boats at sea. They are located along the southwestern coast of Crimea. There are no Kalibr missile carriers among them.

In the Sea of Azov, the Russian military continues to control sea communications, keeping 1 ship and 1 boat on combat duty.

Russian aviation continues to fly from the Crimean airfields of Belbek and Hvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 16 combat aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved.

The Grain Initiative: in the last two days, 12 ships with 400,000 tons of agricultural products left the ports of Greater Odesa for countries in Africa, Asia, and Europe.

Among them are bulk carriers STAVROS and CEBIHAN, which will deliver 55,000 tons of Ukrainian wheat to Oman. 55 thousand tons also go to Yemen, whose population are on the verge of starvation. Bulk carrier EAST WIND 1 took 25 thousand tons of grain to Libya.

In two days, the ports of Greater Odesa accepted 8 ships for loading. The total cargo capacity is 200,000 tons of agricultural products.

Currently, 6 vessels are moving along the "grain corridor" in the direction of Ukraine to load 317,000 tons of agricultural products.

Since August 1, 456 vessels have left the ports of Greater Odesa, which exported 10.7 million tons of Ukrainian food to the countries of Asia, Europe and Africa.

Today, working-level negotiations on the extension of the "grain initiative" involving Ukraine, Turkey, the UN and the Russian Federation began in Istanbul (Turkey).

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 14.11

Personnel - almost 81370 people (+510);

Tanks 2,848 (+8)

Armored combat vehicles – 5,748 (+6);

Artillery systems – 1,839 (+2);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 393 (0); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 206 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 4,316 (+21); Aircraft - 278 (0);

Helicopters – 261 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,509 (+2); Intercepted cruise missiles - 399 (0);

Boats/ships - 16 (0).

Ukraine, general news

President Zelensky visited the recently liberated Kherson today. "We are moving forward," Zelensky said, addressing the military in Kherson. "We are ready for peace, peace for all our country… This [the liberation of Kherson] is the beginning of the end of the war," he said. "It is impossible to kill Ukraine." When asked about the further directions of the offensive of the Armed Forces, Zelenskyi said, “It will not going to be Moscow, we are only interested in the territories of Ukraine”.

During the meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council on November 14, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba formulated ten steps to true peace in Ukraine. "These are ten steps that will ensure that both Ukraine and the EU will survive this military winter," he told fellow ministers.

•       Maintaining and strengthening sanctions against Russia

•       Supporting Ukraine with weapons

•       Supporting Ukraine with money

•       Humanitarian support to Ukraine

•       Preservation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative

•       Recognition of the Holodomor as a genocide of the Ukrainian people

•       Start of negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU

•       Creation of a special tribunal regarding the crime of aggression against Ukraine

•       International isolation of Russia

•       Ignoring Russian ultimatums

The minister considers the last two points to be the most important.

International diplomatic aspect

Meeting President Xi Jinping, President Joe Biden "raised Russia's brutal war against Ukraine and Russia's irresponsible threats of nuclear use." Both leaders "reiterated their agreement that a nuclear war should never be fought and can never be won and underscored their opposition to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine." It's a clear message to Vladimir Putin, who decided not to meet the criticism of the Western leaders at the G20 summit face-to-face against the backdrop of the Kherson retreat and footage of Volodymyr Zelensky visiting the recently liberated city. Putin has been mocked many times for his oversized table meetings, staged encounters (with disguised bodyguards pretending to be workers or ordinary Russians), and even video-edited "holograms" of the stewardess.

Unfortunately, Ukraine's leader won't address the G20 summit via the video link, for the hosts decided that criticism of Russia's aggression would overshadow the positive agenda of the summit. However, softening the tone turned out to be a problem for agreeing on the final communiqué, which might not be issued at all.

"He is not conducting negotiations of any kind. He is not discussing settlement of the war in Ukraine," the White House spokesperson commented on the meeting between the CIA Director and Russia's chief of intelligence in Ankara. "He is conveying a message on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons by Russia and the risks of escalation to strategic stability."

Ukraine's Foreign Minister wrote on his Facebook: "we will liberate our land and people; Russia must withdraw its occupying forces from the territory of Ukraine within internationally recognized borders." He warned that "Russia is pretending to play a constructive role, but in fact wants to take a break to recover from defeats and later continue the war with new strength. We will not go for it and urge our partners not to play along with Moscow… Kyiv does not even theoretically consider any concessions regarding the Crimea issue."

The Finnish Foreign Minister echoed Ukraine's statements on the possibility of talks after Russia's troops' withdrawal from the illegally occupied and annexed territories: "I think the final agreements between Ukraine and Russia would be made only when Russia has been withdrawing from the areas." "No, such conditions are certainly unacceptable. Our president [Putin] has repeatedly said that we are ready for negotiations. But these negotiations must, of course, take into account the situation on the ground," Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko commented on Finnish Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto's statement.

"Ukraine will decide what to do. Our duty is to support them," the EU chief diplomat replied to the question of whether Ukraine should be ready to negotiate. Josep Borrell went on to say: "It seems that the strategy of supporting Ukraine militarily was the good one. We have to continue. We have to continue supporting Ukraine with our military capacities, putting pressure on Russia, and reaching out to the rest of the world to face the consequences of this war."

The EU is launching the [Military Assistance] training Mission for the Ukrainian army (EUMAM). About 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers will be trained in Poland and Germany by instructors from several European countries.

The UN GA Resolution for Furtherance of Remedy and Reparation for Aggression against Ukraine was adopted by 94 ayes, 14 noes, and 73 abstained. "The requirements of the Resolution adopted are aimed not only at restoring justice but at issuing a serious warning to all those who might be inclined to embark on the path of aggression, occupation, and annexation… The adoption of this Resolution provides the necessary conditions to restore normal economic relations in the region, the speedy elimination of the consequences of the environmental crisis, and compensation for the damage" – these were words of Soviet Ambassador Vorontsov about the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution on Kuwait in 1991 quoted by Ukrainian Ambassador Kyslytsya in 2022. Though Putin's Russia doesn't even think about stopping the war of aggression and paying for the damage, the Resolution lays the ground for making Russia pay either against its will or after the collapse of the current regime.

Russia, relevant news

The Canadian outerwear and sportswear producer Helly Hansen has decided to leave Russia, Russian newspaper Vedomosti reported.

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4. 4 takeaways from President Biden's 'very blunt' meeting with China's Xi Jinping

The four:

A "baby step" — but a step in the right direction

Taiwan, technology and human rights remain areas of intense disagreement

Ukraine and North Korea were elephants in the room

U.S. domestic politics also plays a role

4 takeaways from President Biden's 'very blunt' meeting with China's Xi Jinping

NPR · by Emily Feng · November 14, 2022

President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping hold a meeting on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Bali on Monday. Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images

NUSA DUA, Indonesia — A highly anticipated meeting between China's leader Xi Jinping and President Biden finished Monday with both leaders expressing an openness to restoring channels of communication and repairing a relationship that has been compared to a second Cold War.

The leaders of two superpowers met face-to-face and unmasked on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, on Monday evening. In a substantial meeting, they touched on the war in Ukraine, military tension in the Taiwan Strait and North Korean missile tests.

Biden said he and Xi were "very blunt with one another." Xi, according to his spokesperson, viewed the meeting as "in-depth, candid and constructive."

Here's what you need to know about their three-hour discussion.

A "baby step" — but a step in the right direction

Biden and Xi both said in their opening remarks that they were looking for ways to coexist despite their disagreements. The two spent lots of time together when they were both vice presidents more than a decade ago — and both men referenced their lengthy relationship in warm greetings before the talks began.

"Do I believe he's willing to compromise on certain issues? Yes," Biden told reporters afterward about his meeting with Xi. "We were very blunt with one another about places where we disagreed."

Today's meeting was the first face-to-face exchange between the two since Biden became president. It took place after both leaders had just strengthened their respective political positions at home, analysts say.

Yu Jie, a senior research fellow on China at the London-based think tank Chatham House, says that given Biden's "reasonable success" in the midterms, he is in a stronger position to steer Washington's relationship with Beijing.

And for Xi, Yu says his further consolidation of power in the Chinese system may leave him more space for conducting diplomacy. "Xi is keen to resume a routinized mechanism and dialogue to steady the bilateral ties with Biden," she says.

President Biden speaks at a press conference on the eve of the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia. Christoph Soeder/DPA/Picture Alliance/Getty Images

U.S. officials share this relative optimism. "The fact of a leaders' meeting coming together has created space in the Chinese system, for reopening what we believe to just be simply ongoing work between our side to get things done," a senior administration official told reporters before the meeting.

In what analysts called a "breakthrough," Beijing and Washington said they would resume climate talks that had been frozen following House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's controversial visit to Taiwan in August, which Beijing claims as its own. The White House said the leaders "agreed to empower key senior officials to maintain communication and deepen constructive efforts."

However, Yu warns that Monday's meeting is just "a baby step" towards improving relations: "It will not resolve any substantial grievances both sides have had against each other, but only slowing down the deterioration of their relations."

The State Department said that Secretary of State Antony Blinken will also visit China in person sometime early next year to follow up on the Xi-Biden meeting.

Taiwan, technology and human rights remain areas of intense disagreement

During their meeting, Biden and Xi did not resolve the key issues that have driven competition and disagreement between the U.S. and China.

Last month, the U.S. imposed dramatic export bans on certain advanced semiconductor technology — trade sanctions explicitly designed to hobble critical technology sectors like military modernization and artificial intelligence that are important to China.

Meanwhile, according to the U.S. readout, Biden "raised concerns about PRC practices in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong, and human rights more broadly." China has long insisted these issues are of "internal affairs" and has warned against "external interference."

"The world is big enough for the two countries to develop themselves and prosper together," tweeted Hua Chunying, a foreign ministry spokesperson who accompanied Xi in his meeting with Biden.

On Taiwan, despite intense media speculation over Beijing's intention, Biden said he did "not think there's any imminent attempt on the part of China to invade Taiwan."

Chinese military helicopters fly past Pingtan island, one of mainland China's closest points to Taiwan, on Aug. 4, following House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to the self-ruled island. Hector Retamal/AFP/Getty Images

But the president objected to Beijing's "coercive and increasingly aggressive" Chinese actions in the waters around Taiwan, according to the White House readout, adding such behaviors "undermine peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the broader region, and jeopardize global prosperity."

China regards the "Taiwan question" an internal matter. It is "at the very core of China's core interests, the bedrock of the political foundation of China-U.S. relations, and the first red line that must not be crossed in China-U.S. relations," wrote Hua, the spokesperson, on Twitter after the meeting ended.

Both Chinese and American militaries have recently been beefing up their capabilities in case of a conflict over Taiwan. For Washington, this is also a part of the broader paradigm shift in its strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. After decades of concentrating its fighting power in the Middle East, the U.S. is now shifting its focus to Asia.

China is watching closely, too. Xi recently appointed a new slate of top military leaders from China's Eastern Theater Command, which encompasses Taiwan, indicating that going forward, the island is a priority for China's fighting forces. Last week, he urged his military to "focus all its energy on fighting."

Ukraine and North Korea were elephants in the room

The U.S. has pushed China to take a clearer stand against Russia's war in Ukraine, which China has tried to remain neutral on despite signing a partnership with Moscow in February.

Some analysts say China appeared to be blindsided when Russia invaded Ukraine in February. Beijing has called repeatedly for a peaceful, negotiated end to the war.

During their meeting, Xi and Biden agreed "that a nuclear war should never be fought and can never be won and underscored their opposition to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine," according to the White House statement. The Chinese readout included no mention of nuclear weapons.

The two leaders also spoke about North Korea — a longstanding regional security issue. Biden warned if Beijing is unable to rein in Pyongyang's weapons ambitions, the U.S. would beef up its presence in the region — a move that will be read by Beijing as a threat to its own security.

U.S. domestic politics also plays a role

Last year, China's foreign minister Wang Yi put out three core demands — "bottom lines" — that China wanted the U.S. to agree to in order for relations to improve: to not get in the way in the country's development, to respect China's claims over places like Taiwan and to respect Beijing's Communist Party rule.

From Beijing's perspective, the U.S. has since done the opposite on all counts. It has imposed the semiconductor export bans and sanctioned some of China's leading technology firms — moves Beijing decried.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has upped ties with Taiwan, with lawmakers including Pelosi visiting the island since August. Congress is considering drawing on the U.S. weapons stockpile to arm the island at American expense. Biden stressed in the press conference after meeting Xi that U.S. policy on Taiwan remains unchanged.

And while Biden came in to the G20 with a stronger position due to the narrow Democratic victory in the battle to control the Senate, he is up for reelection in two years himself.

Many in China now worry that should Republicans win the presidency in 2024, the U.S. will take an even more starkly hostile position against it.

Aowen Cao contributed research from Beijing.

NPR · by Emily Feng · November 14, 2022

5. The Seeds of Russia's Military Collapse in Ukraine Were Planted by its Bungled Elimination of Conscription

Conclusion:

Moreover, the Russians not only maintained conscription but did not establish a Total Force. And they are paying the price for it. Their conscripted military is, for the most part, not fighting effectively in this war of choice in Ukraine, and its reserves do not belong to organized units and do not train. Consequently, when Putin conscripted the reserves, hundreds of thousands of these potential draftees fled the country, and those who were caught or did not leave were sent into battle with little or no training, even though many of them had been out of uniform for more than a decade. Many were quickly killed or wounded.

The Seeds of Russia's Military Collapse in Ukraine Were Planted by its Bungled Elimination of Conscription

military.com · by 14 Nov 2022 Military.com | By Larry Korb · November 14, 2022

Larry Korb is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, a former assistant secretary of defense and retired Navy captain.

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to opinions@military.com for consideration.

In the spring of 1992, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, I was invited to Moscow. As a former assistant secretary of defense who dealt with manpower issues in the 1980s, I was part of a four-person American delegation meeting with Russian military leaders to discuss why and how the United States transitioned successfully from a conscript or draft military to an all-volunteer force (AVF) after the war in Vietnam.

The advice I would give at that meeting, and the Russian failure to follow it, helped create the conditions that allowed Russia's forces to be overwhelmed by Ukrainian troops to the point of failure in its attempted conquest of its neighbor.

According to our military host at that 1992 meeting, the Russians were considering moving to an AVF because of the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the increasing unpopularity of conscription after their failure to achieve their objectives in Afghanistan.

I was fortunate to be joined on the trip by Professor Samuel Huntington, an international relations scholar and author of the classic work, "The Soldier and the State;" Jim Webb, who served as secretary of the Navy, was elected senator from Virginia and earned the Navy Cross and a Silver Star for heroism as a Marine officer in Vietnam; and retired Gen. Carl Vuono, Army chief of staff from 1987 to 1991 and a recipient of the Bronze Star with combat "V" for his service in Vietnam.

In addition to discussing our transition to the AVF, I also compared the inability of the Russian military in Afghanistan and U.S. military in Vietnam to achieve their nation's objectives even though both countries deployed significant numbers of troops and used massive amounts of firepower against smaller and less-equipped militaries. Over drinks at night, war veterans from both countries shared stories of their service in those wars. As just a naval flight officer in Vietnam, I could not match the heroic stories of Webb and Vuono, who had been involved in fierce ground combat.

In my formal presentation, I made six main observations. First, I pointed out that, even with a draft, many U.S. political and military elites, including several who became president, were able to avoid service in the war in Vietnam and paid no political price for it, even though the less fortunate or less well connected men who took their places sacrificed and suffered -- making up a block of the roughly 58,000 deaths, more than 150,000 wounded and 1,600 missing.

Second, trying to draft people to fight in an unnecessary and unpopular war of choice, as we did in Vietnam, would lead them to take other steps to avoid conscription, even if it meant leaving the country. For example, it is estimated that more than 200,000 men of draft age went abroad in the late '60s and early '70s to avoid serving in the war in Vietnam (most to Canada and Sweden).

Third, an AVF is a more effective military. The members not only want to serve, but they remain in the service longer than the draftees, most of whom served only two years compared to the volunteers who serve, on average, six years and receive more training than the draftees before their initial deployments.

Fourth, many military leaders will initially oppose ending the draft and relying on the marketplace. During my five years in the Pentagon handling personnel policy, many of them argued that it would not only raise personnel costs significantly but could lead to a mercenary ethos, with people joining for the money rather than serving or sacrificing for their country. Moreover, the transition is difficult. It took us about a decade, from the end of the draft, to develop the marketing skills necessary to attract and maintain qualified volunteers. Catch phrases from the U.S. military commercials evolved from "today's Army wants to join you," to "be all you can be."

Fifth, if a country pursues or engages in unnecessary or unwinnable wars of choice, it will have a difficult time attracting volunteers. Consequently, its leaders should be more careful about engaging in those conflicts, as President Ronald Reagan was by not attacking Iran after 241 US Marines were among those killed in Beirut in 1983.

Sixth, the United States' active-duty military force, while smaller than its conscript force because it is more expensive, is more capable and is backed up by a well-trained and organized reserve component that is ready to be deployed and carry out its mission effectively almost immediately. In other words, the United States has a Total Force of more than two million troops.

U.S. reserves are more capable because, for the most part, they are part of organized units that train at least 50 days per year and therefore are ready to carry out their missions as soon as they are activated. Many of them also routinely deploy around the globe for extended purposes.

When we left Moscow, I believed that I had made a good case for transitioning from a conscript force to an AVF, especially now that the Cold War was over. However, during the years following our visit, Russia went through a decade of economic and political turmoil, ending with the leadership transition from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin in 1999. It would have been difficult for the Russians to make the transition even if its military wanted to.

Moreover, the Russians not only maintained conscription but did not establish a Total Force. And they are paying the price for it. Their conscripted military is, for the most part, not fighting effectively in this war of choice in Ukraine, and its reserves do not belong to organized units and do not train. Consequently, when Putin conscripted the reserves, hundreds of thousands of these potential draftees fled the country, and those who were caught or did not leave were sent into battle with little or no training, even though many of them had been out of uniform for more than a decade. Many were quickly killed or wounded.

military.com · by 14 Nov 2022 Military.com | By Larry Korb · November 14, 2022

6. Elbridge Colby Has It Right on Taiwan and Ukraine

Excerpts:

Colby argues for a more sensible division of labor. “America,” he writes, “should laser-focus its military on Asia, reducing its level of forces and expenditures in Europe.… Meanwhile, Europe should focus on taking the lead on Ukraine and, more broadly, assuming the primary role in its own conventional defense.” This division of labor would enable the United States to rely less on economic warfare against China, thereby lessening the strain on the Atlantic alliance.

Here, Colby demonstrates a geopolitical realism that is currently missing from the Biden national-security team, which appears to have prioritized Ukraine over Taiwan and, more generally, Europe over the western Pacific. China, Colby recognizes, poses a much greater threat to the United States than does Russia or Iran. The United States is not without limits, and our European allies have sufficient resources to provide aid to Ukraine and beef up their conventional defenses. If we fail to defend Taiwan due to a lack of resources and a lack of will, our allies in Europe and Asia will take note and act accordingly.

Eighty years ago, Walter Lippmann reminded U.S. statesmen that a realistic foreign policy means aligning the nation’s commitments with its power and resources. Elbridge Colby in this important article updates Lippmann’s sage advice to the national-security challenges of our 21st-century world.

Elbridge Colby Has It Right on Taiwan and Ukraine 

spectator.org · by Francis P. Sempa · November 14, 2022

Elbridge Colby Has It Right on Taiwan and Ukraine

Without a realistic division of labor between the U.S. and its NATO allies, Taiwan will go undefended.

November 13, 2022, 11:02 PM

The USS Carpenter on patrol in the Taiwan Strait in 1953 (U.S. Navy/WikimediaCommons)

Elbridge Colby is one of the new generation of defense/national-security intellectuals in the mold of Andrew Marshall and Edward Luttwak, and, before them, Herman Kahn and Albert Wohlstetter. Colby served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Strategy and Force Development in the Trump administration, where he led the way to shifting U.S. strategy to focus on renewed great-power rivalry after two decades of fighting “small” wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the so-called Global War on Terror. His most recent book, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, is a must read for understanding today’s global security environment.

This division of labor would enable the United States to rely less on economic warfare against China, thereby lessening the strain on the Atlantic alliance.

Colby recently penned an article on the website UnHerd to explain how the United States can best prepare for and meet the gathering storm in the western Pacific. He foresees that China may move against Taiwan within the next few years, and he laments that the Biden administration has left us dangerously unprepared for war in the western Pacific.

China, Colby notes, has the advantages vis-à-vis the United States of proximity and force structure in the Taiwan Strait. If China moves against Taiwan in the near future, the United States (assuming we would try to defend Taiwan) would need to draw upon its military resources in Europe and the Middle East, thereby leaving our allies in those regions on their own to meet the ongoing threats posed by Russia and Iran. And we would likely have to rely on waging economic warfare against China, but, to be effective, such economic warfare would require the support of our European allies at precisely the time when we are shifting our resources from Europe to the western Pacific. Colby doubts that our European allies would be willing to decouple from China and notes the recent statement by Germany’s chancellor that Europe’s largest economy will not decouple from China. And the war in Ukraine, Colby writes, has already caused economic pain among our European allies, which will make them even less likely to join the United States in waging economic warfare against China. This would greatly strain the NATO alliance.

Because the Biden administration has failed to pour sufficient military resources into the western Pacific, while sending significant financial and material aid to Ukraine, the outbreak of war in the western Pacific may result in the worst of both worlds: a Chinese victory over the United States (and the loss of Taiwan) and a fractured Western alliance as a result of fewer U.S. resources for Europe and Europe’s unwillingness to help us economically against China.

Colby argues for a more sensible division of labor. “America,” he writes, “should laser-focus its military on Asia, reducing its level of forces and expenditures in Europe.… Meanwhile, Europe should focus on taking the lead on Ukraine and, more broadly, assuming the primary role in its own conventional defense.” This division of labor would enable the United States to rely less on economic warfare against China, thereby lessening the strain on the Atlantic alliance.

Here, Colby demonstrates a geopolitical realism that is currently missing from the Biden national-security team, which appears to have prioritized Ukraine over Taiwan and, more generally, Europe over the western Pacific. China, Colby recognizes, poses a much greater threat to the United States than does Russia or Iran. The United States is not without limits, and our European allies have sufficient resources to provide aid to Ukraine and beef up their conventional defenses. If we fail to defend Taiwan due to a lack of resources and a lack of will, our allies in Europe and Asia will take note and act accordingly.

Eighty years ago, Walter Lippmann reminded U.S. statesmen that a realistic foreign policy means aligning the nation’s commitments with its power and resources. Elbridge Colby in this important article updates Lippmann’s sage advice to the national-security challenges of our 21st-century world.

spectator.org · by Francis P. Sempa · November 14, 2022

7. Lawmakers Urge More Action to Ensure Resilience of the U.S. Economy

Excerpts:

With much of the response planning and structure already in place, the critical, missing step will be centralizing the coordination necessary to develop, implement, and execute COTE plans. For this reason, Congress initially tasked the president and not a specific department with COTE planning. The national effort requires the ability to convene interagency partners, establish priorities, and hold federal agencies accountable so that the government can rapidly execute COTE if necessary. So, while CISA can write a COTE plan, only the president can lead its implementation.

CISA’s report to Congress in January is likely to be a plan for a plan rather than a fully developed COTE plan. However, if that report begins to identify the existing and missing structures and authorities, CISA will have made important progress towards ensuring the United States can quickly recover and respond to a significant cyberattack.

Lawmakers Urge More Action to Ensure Resilience of the U.S. Economy

fdd.org · by Annie Fixler CCTI Deputy Director and Research Fellow · November 14, 2022

Two Republican lawmakers sent a letter to President Joe Biden earlier this month expressing concern about the “limited action” the administration has taken to create plans to ensure the Continuity of the Economy (COTE) in the wake of significant, widespread cyberattacks or other natural or man-made events that severely degrade economic activity. As the two-year deadline approaches for the administration to provide its statutorily mandated initial plans to Congress, the letter signals congressional intent to continue prioritizing national cyber resilience.

The letter from Reps. Andrew Garbarino (R-NY) and Mike Gallagher (R-WI) expresses “immense concern” regarding an apparent lack of progress towards developing COTE plans since Congress first tasked the executive branch with doing so in the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act. The letter follows previous missives from Garbarino and from Gallagher and Sen. Angus King (I-ME) at the end of last year. Garbarino noted last week that his prior letter has gone unanswered. The earlier letters apparently caused a reaction, however, as the White House did transfer its responsibility for developing the COTE plan to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).

Calling COTE planning a “national security imperative,” the letter laments this nearly 15-month delay in tasking CISA. At the same time, the letter praises the choice of CISA, given its unique capabilities to analyze threats and to partner with the private sector — both of which are essential to develop and implement COTE plans.

Fortunately, despite the delay, CISA is not starting from scratch. The U.S. government has robust continuity of operations, continuity of government, national disaster response, and national infrastructure response plans. COTE planning can leverage existing infrastructure prioritization, emergency authorities, and response mechanisms to meet the statutory requirement to ensure the United States can withstand and quickly recover from a widespread cyberattack.

As the letter notes, what is different about COTE planning compared to other federal continuity and resiliency planning is the central role the private sector will need to play because the vast majority of critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. Much of the structure is already in place for the public-private coordination necessary for COTE planning. Each of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors enumerated by the federal government has a Government Coordinating Council and a Sector Coordinating Council. As the names denote, these councils serve as coordination bodies and facilitate cross-sector engagement, the latter of which is especially important because a widespread cyberattack might directly affect multiple sectors simultaneously. Alternately, because of the interdependencies among sectors, an attack affecting one sector might cause cascading degradation across others.

With much of the response planning and structure already in place, the critical, missing step will be centralizing the coordination necessary to develop, implement, and execute COTE plans. For this reason, Congress initially tasked the president and not a specific department with COTE planning. The national effort requires the ability to convene interagency partners, establish priorities, and hold federal agencies accountable so that the government can rapidly execute COTE if necessary. So, while CISA can write a COTE plan, only the president can lead its implementation.

CISA’s report to Congress in January is likely to be a plan for a plan rather than a fully developed COTE plan. However, if that report begins to identify the existing and missing structures and authorities, CISA will have made important progress towards ensuring the United States can quickly recover and respond to a significant cyberattack.

Annie Fixler is the deputy director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and an FDD research fellow. For more analysis from the Annie and CCTI, please subscribe HERE. Follow her on Twitter @afixler. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CCTI. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

fdd.org · by Annie Fixler CCTI Deputy Director and Research Fellow · November 14, 2022

8. Grounded: Why Biden Must Sanction Iranian Aviation

Excerpts;

The case of Emtrasur also provides a blueprint for how the Biden administration can exert more pressure on Iran for supplying Russia with weapons. Tracking intermediaries involved in the procurement necessary to keep the Revolutionary Guards-linked cargo fleet in the air means disrupting and incapacitating their ability to sustain the ongoing airlift to Russia. Case in point: Fars Air Qeshm’s two airplanes, both old Boeing 747s the airline bought through an Armenian cutout, have been grounded for months, likely due to maintenance issues.

Targeting banks that transact payments for arms deliveries is also likely to create pressure. Finally, the Biden administration could replicate the Emtrasur case through quiet pressure on companies that sell the fuel at airports where Iranian cargo also flies.

Iran’s airlift does not rely on a massive fleet. The Biden administration’s sanctions arsenal can make a difference. The case of the Emtrasur cargo plane shows the way.

​

Grounded: Why Biden Must Sanction Iranian Aviation

Iran’s airlift does not rely on a massive fleet. The Biden administration’s sanctions arsenal can make a difference.

The National Interest · by Emanuele Ottolenghi · November 11, 2022

Iran is preparing to supply Russia with more advanced weapons, including surface-to-surface missiles, according to Western officials. The Biden administration should respond by leveraging existing U.S. sanctions and designations against Iran’s aviation sector, which plays a key role in weapons transfers to Russia.

The U.S. Treasury Department could target companies acting as intermediaries for sanctioned Iranian entities, such as Mahan Air, which are involved in the procurement and sale of aircraft and component parts. Targeting intermediaries, their officials, and the financial institutions they rely on should be part of a broader effort to incapacitate the part of Iran’s aviation sector implicated in sustaining Tehran’s weapons’ airlift to Moscow.

The recent case of Emtrasur, a subsidiary of the Venezuelan state-owned and U.S.-sanctioned Conviasa, offers a blueprint for further action.

On June 6, Emtrasur’s only Boeing 747 cargo plane landed in Buenos Aires. Local jet fuel companies concluded the aircraft was on the U.S. sanctions list and refused to resupply it. Without fuel, the airplane remained stranded in Argentina. Local authorities then launched an ongoing investigation into the plane and crew. It was the crew’s composition that raised suspicion. Corporate records and media reports indicate that its captain, Gholamreza Ghasemi, was at one point a board member of Iran’s Fars Air Qeshm, a cargo airline operated by Mahan Air. Fars Air Qeshm, also sanctioned by the United States in 2019, has been involved since 2017 in weapons transfers to Syria and, more recently, to Russia. And records found aboard the plane show that Emtrasur flew to Moscow at least once since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The Argentinian investigation quickly determined that Emtrasur’s plane formerly belonged to Mahan Air. Its transfer to Venezuelan ownership constituted a violation of U.S. sanctions. On that basis, on July 26, the U.S. Department of Justice announced an international warrant to seize the plane. The cargo aircraft, still stuck in Buenos Aires nearly five months after landing, is likely to never fly again for Iran or Venezuela.

Yet more can be done on this front. The Emtrasur plane is not the only aircraft Mahan transferred to Conviasa. As part of the judicial process, lawyers for Emtrasur submitted the sales agreement for their cargo plane into evidence, revealing that Conviasa had in fact bought three more aircraft formerly owned by Mahan Air, alongside six engines and a maintenance contract for parts and service.

It is therefore possible that Iran’s previously owned fleet of aircraft now under Conviasa’s stewardship are also part of the effort to resupply Vladimir Putin’s weapons-strapped army.

Nicolás Maduro’s regime in Venezuela sought to prevent further U.S. attempts to seize its other aircraft. Days after the Emtrasur aircraft became stranded in Argentina, Conviasa suspended its flights from Caracas to Santiago, Chile, and to Buenos Aires, fearing that more planes might run the same risk of seizure. The Chilean parliament subsequently launched an investigation into the Conviasa flights, as local police authorities revealed that at least ten Iranians had entered the country as crew members of the Conviasa Caracas-Santiago flights.

Conviasa no longer flies to Buenos Aires or Santiago, but two of its former Mahan Air aircraft – currently identified with tail registration numbers YV3533 and YV3535 – still visit numerous other destinations, including frequent flights to Iran and Russia, according to data obtained from the commercial flight tracker FlightRadar24. What happened in Buenos Aires with the Emtrasur cargo plane could happen in other airports if the Biden administration revived the type of diplomatic outreach with private companies the United States pursued under presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, and convinced fuel suppliers to deny service to Conviasa.

Exhibit one could be the sales contract that Conviasa produced as evidence in its so-far unsuccessful effort to release its aircraft from Argentina. The contract shows Conviasa bought its planes, engines, parts, and maintenance services not from Mahan, but from a Dubai-registered company called Lance Tech Trading LLC, which acted as an intermediary. Conviasa’s lawyers likely hoped that by showing the seller was not Mahan they would convince Argentinian authorities the plane was not subject to U.S. sanctions. Instead, they provided conclusive evidence that Mahan and Conviasa used a Dubai-based cutout to evade U.S. sanctions, a practice Mahan Air relied on multiple times in the past to obfuscate large procurement transactions. The difference is that past operations used intermediaries to buy aircraft and parts; this time, Mahan is selling its aircraft, parts, and maintenance services for hard cash, earning money to continue its logistical support and arms supplies to Russia on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The Biden Administration has already identified Lance Tech Trading as a Mahan intermediary in the affidavit in support of the international seizure warrant. Corporate records show the company has an Emirati and two Iranian nationals as shareholders. The company does not have a history of sales and procurement in the aviation sector. As U.S. court records show, Lance Tech “is involved in the tourism industry” – likely a reference to one of its Iranian shareholders, the CEO of an Iranian travel and tourism company with subsidiaries in both Dubai and Tbilisi, Georgia. Despite a lack of track record in the aviation sector, Lance Tech processed a deal worth more than €54 million, as indicated in the sales contract Conviasa submitted into evidence during the Argentine proceedings. The Biden administration should sanction Lance Tech as well as the banks involved in facilitating transactions for the aircraft sale.

The case of Emtrasur also provides a blueprint for how the Biden administration can exert more pressure on Iran for supplying Russia with weapons. Tracking intermediaries involved in the procurement necessary to keep the Revolutionary Guards-linked cargo fleet in the air means disrupting and incapacitating their ability to sustain the ongoing airlift to Russia. Case in point: Fars Air Qeshm’s two airplanes, both old Boeing 747s the airline bought through an Armenian cutout, have been grounded for months, likely due to maintenance issues.

Targeting banks that transact payments for arms deliveries is also likely to create pressure. Finally, the Biden administration could replicate the Emtrasur case through quiet pressure on companies that sell the fuel at airports where Iranian cargo also flies.

Iran’s airlift does not rely on a massive fleet. The Biden administration’s sanctions arsenal can make a difference. The case of the Emtrasur cargo plane shows the way.

Emanuele Ottolenghi is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a non-partisan research foundation based in Washington, DC.

Image: Reuters

The National Interest · by Emanuele Ottolenghi · November 11, 2022

9. The IAEA’s Iran NPT Safeguards Report - November 2022

The full report can be downloaded here: https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/The_IAEA%E2%80%99s_Iran_NPT_Safeguards_Report_November_2022.pdf

The IAEA’s Iran NPT Safeguards Report - November 2022

https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/the-iaeas-iran-npt-safeguards-report-november-2022/

by David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Andrea Stricker [1]

November 14, 2022

 Download PDF

• Iran has consistently violated its obligations under its comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA), a key part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under which it must cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and fully account for its past and present nuclear activities. The IAEA refers to this process as a country providing both a correct and complete nuclear declaration.
• For four years, the IAEA has been investigating the presence of man-made uranium particles at three Iranian sites. Earlier, it sought information about nuclear material and activities at a fourth site. In March 2022, the IAEA found Iran in breach of its safeguards obligations for failing to declare its use of nuclear material at the fourth site, a former Amad Plan site called Lavisan-Shian.
• The IAEA concluded in September 2022 it is “not in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.” This means the IAEA cannot verify Iran’s compliance with its CSA and the NPT and is implying Iran is violating both agreements.
• This analysis summarizes and assesses information in the IAEA’s latest NPT safeguards report on Iran, issued on November 10, 2022. It also provides extensive background information on the former Iranian nuclear weapons sites under IAEA investigation, in conjunction with the IAEA findings.

Findings

• The Director General states he is “seriously concerned” that there has been no progress in clarifying and resolving the outstanding safeguards issues during this reporting period.
• The IAEA is requesting “technically credible explanations” regarding the presence and origin of uranium particles detected at the three locations, as well as the “current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of the contaminated equipment.” Thus, it is unlikely that the four locations publicly discussed by the IAEA are the only remaining sites in Iran with traces of undeclared uranium.
• Although Iran has engaged with the IAEA during this reporting period, the IAEA reported that no progress was made. The day before the reports were released, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi told Reuters, “They didn’t bring anything new.”
• Iran agreed to hold a technical meeting with the IAEA “before the end of November” aimed at resolving the outstanding safeguards issues, but it provided no credible indication that it will truly cooperate. In anticipation, the IAEA reiterated to Iran that “at this meeting it expects to start receiving from Iran technically credible explanations on these issues, including access to locations and material, as well as the taking of samples as appropriate.”
• The IAEA provides additional, significant details on two of the three undeclared locations where nuclear material was detected.

Read the full analysis as PDF here.

^{1. Andrea Stricker is deputy director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ (FDD) Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program and an FDD research fellow. ↩}

10. Turkey Seeks Sovereign Immunity in Two Cases Before the Supreme Court

Turkey Seeks Sovereign Immunity in Two Cases Before the Supreme Court

fdd.org · November 14, 2022

Latest Developments

Two recent Supreme Court rulings in the United States may shed light on whether entities owned by foreign governments can claim immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in both civil and criminal cases. In the first instance, the high court declined to hear the matter petitioned by Turkey in what is sometimes referred to as the Sheridan Circle case, where Turkish security officials attacked peaceful Kurdish protestors in 2017. In a separate ruling, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Halkbank case, which will consider whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 confers blanket immunity on foreign state-owned enterprises from all criminal proceedings in the United States. In 2019, a lower court indicted the Turkish bank, citing the bank’s brazen breach of U.S. sanctions on Iran.

Expert Analysis

“The Supreme Court’s decision not to hear the Sheridan Circle case is a legal setback for Turkey and is potentially financially costly as well. If the court rules against Turkey in the Halkbank case, the penalties that may be levied against Turkey can prove to be catastrophic for the bank and for Turkey’s already fragile economy.” – Sinan Ciddi, FDD Non-Resident Senior Fellow on Turkey

“Beyond impacting whether Turkey can rely on the court to get it out of legal jeopardy, how the Supreme Court rules on whether FSIA bestows wholesale immunity on foreign state-owned entities from all criminal proceedings in the U.S. may set a precedent for how Russia, China, Venezuela, and other sanctions evaders are treated. It’s hard to imagine that the intent of the law was to permit any entity affiliated with a foreign government that was engaging in criminal activity to be protected against U.S. prosecution.” – Toby Dershowitz, FDD Senior Vice President of Government Relations and Strategy

The Sheridan Circle Case

During President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 2017 Washington visit, a group of peaceful protestors gathered near the Turkish ambassador’s residence on Sheridan Circle. President Erdogan’s security detail proceeded to attack and wound many of them. The Supreme Court’s decision not to hear the case means that a lower court will litigate it. The case could ultimately result in a ruling that requires Ankara to pay significant fines to the victims.

The Halkbank Case

The Turkish state-owned Halkbank, indicted by a U.S. federal court in 2019 for laundering approximately $20 billion of Iranian gas and oil money, petitioned the Supreme Court to overturn a lower court’s decision upholding the indictment. Turkey, which denied the allegations of misconduct, argued that it should be protected from prosecution under FSIA. The U.S. Justice Department countered that the FSIA does not protect Turkey from criminal prosecution, and even if it applied, the case fell within the law’s exceptions for cases involving commercial activities.

If the Supreme Court ultimately sides with Ankara in the Halkbank case, Turkey would be protected from criminal prosecution. If it rules against Ankara, officials at the highest levels of the Turkish government could expect significant fines, potentially in the billions of dollars. Turkey also could be subject to further U.S. sanctions and monitoring.

Related Analysis

“Halkbank’s Supreme Court Appeal Will Delay Iran Sanctions-Evasion Case,” by Aykan Erdemir

fdd.org · November 14, 2022

11. Exclusive: Russian software disguised as American finds its way into U.S. Army, CDC apps

Exclusive: Russian software disguised as American finds its way into U.S. Army, CDC apps

Reuters · by James Pearson

LONDON/WASHINGTON, Nov 14 (Reuters) - Thousands of smartphone applications in Apple (AAPL.O) and Google's (GOOGL.O) online stores contain computer code developed by a technology company, Pushwoosh, that presents itself as based in the United States, but is actually Russian, Reuters has found.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the United States' main agency for fighting major health threats, said it had been deceived into believing Pushwoosh was based in the U.S. capital. After learning about its Russian roots from Reuters, it removed Pushwoosh software from seven public-facing apps, citing security concerns.

The U.S. Army said it had removed an app containing Pushwoosh code in March because of the same concerns. That app was used by soldiers at one of the country's main combat training bases.

According to company documents publicly filed in Russia and reviewed by Reuters, Pushwoosh is headquartered in the Siberian town of Novosibirsk, where it is registered as a software company that also carries out data processing. It employs around 40 people and reported revenue of 143,270,000 rubles ($2.4 mln) last year. Pushwoosh is registered with the Russian government to pay taxes in Russia.

On social media and in U.S. regulatory filings, however, it presents itself as a U.S. company, based at various times in California, Maryland and Washington, D.C., Reuters found.

Pushwoosh provides code and data processing support for software developers, enabling them to profile the online activity of smartphone app users and send tailor-made push notifications from Pushwoosh servers.

On its website, Pushwoosh says it does not collect sensitive information, and Reuters found no evidence Pushwoosh mishandled user data. Russian authorities, however, have compelled local companies to hand over user data to domestic security agencies.

Pushwoosh's founder, Max Konev, told Reuters in a September email that the company had not tried to mask its Russian origins. "I am proud to be Russian and I would never hide this."

He said the company "has no connection with the Russian government of any kind" and stores its data in the United States and Germany.

Cybersecurity experts said storing data overseas would not prevent Russian intelligence agencies from compelling a Russian firm to cede access to that data, however.

Russia, whose ties with the West have deteriorated since its takeover of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and its invasion of Ukraine this year, is a global leader in hacking and cyber-espionage, spying on foreign governments and industries to seek competitive advantage, according to Western officials.

Reuters Graphics

HUGE DATABASE

Pushwoosh code was installed in the apps of a wide array of international companies, influential non-profits and government agencies from global consumer goods company Unilever Plc (ULVR.L) and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) to the politically powerful U.S. gun lobby, the National Rifle Association (NRA), and Britain's Labour Party.

Pushwoosh's business with U.S. government agencies and private companies could violate contracting and U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) laws or trigger sanctions, 10 legal experts told Reuters. The FBI, U.S. Treasury and the FTC declined to comment.

Jessica Rich, former director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection, said "this type of case falls right within the authority of the FTC," which cracks down on unfair or deceptive practices affecting U.S. consumers.

Washington could choose to impose sanctions on Pushwoosh and has broad authority to do so, sanctions experts said, including possibly through a 2021 executive order that gives the United States the ability to target Russia's technology sector over malicious cyber activity.

Pushwoosh code has been embedded into almost 8,000 apps in the Google and Apple app stores, according to Appfigures, an app intelligence website. Pushwoosh's website says it has more than 2.3 billion devices listed in its database.

"Pushwoosh collects user data including precise geolocation, on sensitive and governmental apps, which could allow for invasive tracking at scale," said Jerome Dangu, co-founder of Confiant, a firm that tracks misuse of data collected in online advertising supply chains.

"We haven't found any clear sign of deceptive or malicious intent in Pushwoosh's activity, which certainly doesn't diminish the risk of having app data leaking to Russia," he added.

Google said privacy was a "huge focus" for the company but did not respond to requests for comment about Pushwoosh. Apple said it takes user trust and safety seriously but similarly declined to answer questions.

Keir Giles, a Russia expert at London think tank Chatham House, said despite international sanctions on Russia, a "substantial number" of Russian companies were still trading abroad and collecting people's personal data.

Given Russia's domestic security laws, "it shouldn't be a surprise that with or without direct links to Russian state espionage campaigns, firms that handle data will be keen to play down their Russian roots," he said.

'SECURITY ISSUES'

After Reuters raised Pushwoosh's Russian links with the CDC, the health agency removed the code from its apps because "the company presents a potential security concern," spokesperson Kristen Nordlund said.

"CDC believed Pushwoosh was a company based in the Washington, D.C. area," Nordlund said in a statement. The belief was based on "representations" made by the company, she said, without elaborating.

The CDC apps that contained Pushwoosh code included the agency's main app and others set up to share information on a wide range of health concerns. One was for doctors treating sexually transmitted diseases. While the CDC also used the company's notifications for health matters such as COVID, the agency said it "did not share user data with Pushwoosh."

The Army told Reuters it removed an app containing Pushwoosh in March, citing "security issues." It did not say how widely the app, which was an information portal for use at its National Training Center (NTC) in California, had been used by troops.

The NTC is a major battle training center in the Mojave Desert for pre-deployment soldiers, meaning a data breach there could reveal upcoming overseas troop movements.

U.S. Army spokesperson Bryce Dubee said the Army had suffered no "operational loss of data," adding that the app did not connect to the Army network.

Some large companies and organizations including UEFA and Unilever said third parties set up the apps for them, or they thought they were hiring a U.S. company.

"We don't have a direct relationship with Pushwoosh," Unilever said in a statement, adding that Pushwoosh was removed from one of its apps "some time ago."

UEFA said its contract with Pushwoosh was "with a U.S. company." UEFA declined to say if it knew of Pushwoosh's Russian ties but said it was reviewing its relationship with the company after being contacted by Reuters.

The NRA said its contract with the company ended last year, and it was "not aware of any issues."

Britain's Labour Party did not respond to requests for comment.

"The data Pushwoosh collects is similar to data that could be collected by Facebook, Google or Amazon, but the difference is that all the Pushwoosh data in the U.S. is sent to servers controlled by a company (Pushwoosh) in Russia," said Zach Edwards, a security researcher, who first spotted the prevalence of Pushwoosh code while working for Internet Safety Labs, a nonprofit organization.

Roskomnadzor, Russia's state communications regulator, did not respond to a request from Reuters for comment.

FAKE ADDRESS, FAKE PROFILES

In U.S. regulatory filings and on social media, Pushwoosh never mentions its Russian links. The company lists "Washington, D.C." as its location on Twitter and claims its office address as a house in the suburb of Kensington, Maryland, according to its latest U.S. corporation filings submitted to Delaware's secretary of state. It also lists the Maryland address on its Facebook and LinkedIn profiles.

The Kensington house is the home of a Russian friend of Konev's who spoke to a Reuters journalist on condition of anonymity. He said he had nothing to do with Pushwoosh and had only agreed to allow Konev to use his address to receive mail.

Konev said Pushwoosh had begun using the Maryland address to "receive business correspondence" during the coronavirus pandemic.

He said he now operates Pushwoosh from Thailand but provided no evidence that it is registered there. Reuters could not find a company by that name in the Thai company registry.

Pushwoosh never mentioned it was Russian-based in eight annual filings in the U.S. state of Delaware, where it is registered, an omission which could violate state law.

Instead, Pushwoosh listed an address in Union City, California as its principal place of business from 2014 to 2016. That address does not exist, according to Union City officials.

Pushwoosh used LinkedIn accounts purportedly belonging to two Washington, D.C.-based executives named Mary Brown and Noah O'Shea to solicit sales. But neither Brown nor O'Shea are real people, Reuters found.

The one belonging to Brown was actually of an Austria-based dance teacher, taken by a photographer in Moscow, who told Reuters she had no idea how it ended up on the site.

Konev acknowledged the accounts were not genuine. He said Pushwoosh hired a marketing agency in 2018 to create them in an attempt to use social media to sell Pushwoosh, not to mask the company's Russian origins.

LinkedIn said it had removed the accounts after being alerted by Reuters.

Reporting by James Pearson in London and Marisa Taylor in Washington Additional reporting by Chris Bing in Washington, editing by Chris Sanders and Ross Colvin

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by James Pearson

12. Drowning death spotlights problem with older military dive vests

Drowning death spotlights problem with older military dive vests

armytimes.com · by Kyle Rempfer · November 14, 2022

Army Special Operations Command will test new programmable swim vests after a Green Beret drowned during a roughly one mile swim in a quarry at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, while preparing for combat diver school in fall 2021.

Staff Sgt. Paul Lincoln Olmstead was the second Green Beret to drown during dive-related training in 2021. An airman also drowned at his service’s dive school in 2020 under circumstances similar to those of Olmstead.

The new programmable vests ― which are found on the civilian market ― automatically inflate using carbon dioxide, or CO2, cartridges when a swimmer sinks below a set depth.

That could have saved Olmstead’s life after he went unconscious for unknown reasons and drowned Sept. 21, 2021, according to an investigation report obtained by Army Times through a Freedom of Information Act request.

Investigators found that the “primary contributing factor” to Olmstead’s death was the “inadequacy of the Aqualung Scout Swimmer Vest,” which requires a drowning victim to be conscious to activate the CO2 cartridges in their vest.

Investigators also raised concerns about other practices at 5th Special Forces Group’s Maritime Assessment Course, which prepares soldiers for formal combat diver training.

Although instructors running the course weren’t negligent or in violation of any regulations, the risk mitigation measures “were not adequate to prevent SSG Olmstead’s death,” the report reads. “Specifically, allowing swimmers to swim without a buoy attached contributed to the instructors’ and students’ inability to locate SSG Olmstead after he had gone subsurface.”

Because Fort Campbell’s Joe Swing Quarry is such a confined space, 5th SFG abandoned the use of buoys years ago, the report added. An unnamed individual from 5th SFG said in the report that the buoys risked causing swimmer entanglement.

Special Forces Staff Sgt. Paul Lincoln Olmstead has been identified as the Green Beret killed during a water training accident at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. (Utah National Guard)

Previous deaths

Olmstead’s death came months after another Green Beret, Staff Sgt. Micah Walker, drowned at the Army’s combat diver school in Key West, Florida, and a year after an airman drowned at the Air Force’s combat diver school in Panama City, Florida.

None of the deaths involved breathing compressed gas or actual diving.

Walker’s death occurred during a water treading exercise, according to a dive official with John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. The official spoke with Army Times days after the death on condition of anonymity due to an ongoing investigation.

Safety swimmers had Walker out of the pool within three to five seconds of losing consciousness and slipping underwater, the official said in July 2021. He also disputed an Army Safety Center press release that called Walker’s death a drowning.

However, Army casualty records prepared this summer and obtained by Army Times via a Freedom of Information Act request stated that Walker’s death was indeed a drowning.

Maj. Rick Dickson, a spokesman at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, declined to comment further on the incident and said the investigation into Walker’s death remains ongoing.

Cadre with the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Special Forces Combat Diver Qualification Course monitor a student during rescue dive training, June 6, 2018, Key West, Florida. (Robert Lindee/Army)

A third recent drowning death in Panama City involving Air Force Special Tactics trainee Airman 1st Class Keigan Baker occurred during an open ocean swim.

Similar to Olmstead’s case, investigators found no indication that Baker attempted to activate his CO2 cartridges before drowning, meaning he likely was unconscious. Also like Olmstead’s case, investigators did not definitively determine why he went unconscious, though overexertion was one possible explanation.

Wear and tear

After Baker’s death in 2020, the Air Force Special Warfare Training Wing tested several commercially available automatic inflating swim vests, said wing spokesman 1st Lt. Xiaofan Liu.

However, the wing ultimately decided not to acquire any of them.

“The automatic inflating swim vests that the Special Warfare Training Wing initially tested were not designed for the continual wear and tear of the combat swimming conducted by trainees at the Air Force Combat Dive Course,” Liu wrote in an emailed statement.

“These automatic inflating swim vests were designed to save someone if he or she were to fall overboard from a vessel or aircraft ... [and] didn’t hold up well to the strenuous activities conducted by the trainees,” Liu added, which include “open water swims, water jumps from fixed-wing aircraft, hoisting patients out of the water, and fast-roping into the water.”

The Air Force did implement some changes, though, because there were problems found after Baker’s death that also echo issues later found in Olmstead’s case.

The investigation into Baker’s death found that instructors had special tactics trainees conduct a 2,000-yard open water swim without lines tethering them to swim buddies to ensure they didn’t become separated.

The Air Force now requires dive trainees to swim within six feet of a swim buddy at all times so a teammate can inflate a distressed swimmer’s vest if they go unconscious. Trainees also must wear buoys during swims after it took hours to find Baker’s body.

Olmstead was also lost for some time underwater despite vigorous efforts by teammates to locate him.

Pallbearers and Green Berets stand graveside during services for Staff Sgt. P. Lincoln Olmstead, a member of Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group, held in Olmstead’s hometown of Spring City, Utah, Oct. 5, 2021. (Ileen Kennedy/Army)

The investigation into Olmstead’s death stated that he was close to finishing the quarry swim when he drowned. An instructor spotted Olmstead pass by his boat, then turned to observe other students.

“When he passed by, it was clear he was putting out incredible effort, typical of students sprinting the last couple hundred meters of the swim when close to cut off time,” an instructor’s witness statement reads. “The noise was typical of a soldier exerting great physical effort. It was not a sound of distress.”

When the instructor looked back at where Olmstead had been, he realized the student was missing. Instructors dove underwater and students waded in the shallow areas in search of him. The fire department and scuba teams were called in to sweep the quarry for him.

Olmstead’s scout swimmer vest was “without defect” and inflated as designed when investigators later manually activated the CO2 cartridges to test it out. Investigators determined that Olmstead most likely went unconscious before drowning.

In addition to recommending new swim vests, the investigation called out how difficult it had been for soldiers to find Olmstead in a timely manner, which may have saved his life. Army special operations officials said they’ve reviewed those findings and made changes.

“At this time, the command is looking at acquiring the recommended vests for further testing and evaluation to determine suitability,” said Maj. Russell M. Gordon, spokesman for 1st Special Forces Command. “In the meantime, the command took immediate action to mitigate risks by requiring students to wear an attached buoy for easy identification in the water, increase the number of safety boats, and increase the number of safety swimmers and also safety personnel outside the water.”

“The loss of SSG Paul Olmstead was an absolute tragedy, and he will always be a valued member of our Army special operations family,” Gordon added.

About Kyle Rempfer

Kyle Rempfer is an editor and reporter who has covered combat operations, criminal cases, foreign military assistance and training accidents. Before entering journalism, Kyle served in U.S. Air Force Special Tactics and deployed in 2014 to Paktika Province, Afghanistan, and Baghdad, Iraq.

13. Biden-Xi lower the temperature in cooldown summit

One interpretation.

Biden-Xi lower the temperature in cooldown summit

Two leaders de-escalate their superpower rivalry with agreement to enter high-level talks on wide range of contentious issues

asiatimes.com · by John McBeth · November 15, 2022

JAKARTA – With Russian President Vladimir Putin staying close to home, it was left to a face-to-face meeting between US president Joe Biden and Chinese supremo Xi Jinping to provide the headline act at Bali’s G20 Summit where the prospect of a joint communique looks hardly on the cards.

On the surface at least, the two leaders appear to have delivered beyond expectations, agreeing to establish a series of joint working groups to address a litany of contentious issues, ranging from Taiwan and human rights to trade and technology transfers.

Biden indicated the talks would be held at the highest levels. “We agreed we would have appropriate Cabinet members and others to sit and meet with one another to discuss the details of every issue that was raised – and we raised a lot of issues,” he said.

Without going to specifics, he specifically mentioned North Korea, saying a team of senior security advisers and the Pentagon would be engaged with their Chinese counterparts over what to do about reducing tensions on the divided peninsula.

The US president revealed he would be sending Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Beijing in the coming weeks to begin the process of keeping open the lines of communication and identifying what he had previously called “red lines,” particularly over Taiwan.

“We are going to compete vigorously, but I am not looking for conflict. I’m looking to manage this competition responsibly,” he told reporters after the three-hour meeting, which by his calculation brought to 80 hours the time the pair have met over the past decade.

Buoyed by the Democrat Party’s surprisingly robust showing in the mid-term elections, Biden had said he was “coming in stronger” in his first encounter with Xi as president, which the Chinese leader’s spokesperson characterized as “in-depth, candid and constructive.”

“We covered an awful lot of territory and he was as straight with me as has been in the past,” the president told reporters, adding that for his part “I want to be clear that I mean what I say, and I say what I mean.”

Biden ruled out any prospect of a new Cold War and said he didn’t believe there was an imminent threat on the part of China to invade Taiwan, despite increased People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exercises around the island following House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s controversial visit last August.

Biden and Xi in a warm embrace in Bali. Image: Screengrab / NTV

“Our ‘One-China’ policy has not changed,” he added. “We oppose any unilateral change in the status by either side and we are committed to maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. I’m convinced he (Xi) understood exactly what I was saying, and I understood what he was saying.”

On North Korea, Biden said he wasn’t sure China could control unpredictable dictator Kim Jong Il, but he said he told Xi he thought the Chinese had an obligation to attempt to persuade Pyongyang to refrain from conducting nuclear and long-range missile tests.

“I’m confident China is not looking for North Korea to engage in further escalation, Biden said, warning that further provocative acts by Pyongyang risked the US taking more defensive actions that would not be directed against China but would send a clear message to North Korea.

US officials have said there have been hours of quiet diplomacy behind the scenes over the past two months aimed at repairing ties between the two superpowers. “These meetings do not take place in isolation, they are part of a very sustained process,” one administration source was quoted as saying.

Biden and Xi have held five phone or video calls since Biden became president in early 2021. They had last met in person when Biden was vice president in 2015, but his efforts to build a personal relationship with the Chinese leader began four years earlier during a visit to Beijing.

Relations have deteriorated significantly since then to perhaps their lowest point, exacerbated by rising tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea and, more recently, by a US ban on advanced semiconductors that is described as a national security issue.

Goldman Sachs forecasts that the ban will shave a quarter of a percentage point off China’s economic growth in 2023, at a time when it is already dealing with the fallout from Xi’s “zero-Covid” policy, which he has clung to from the beginning.

The Biden administration is still considering whether to roll back some Trump-era tariffs on Chinese consumer goods as officials weigh whether the move to address inflation will also have the effect of lessening economic pressure on China.

Xi and Putin have drawn closer together over the past few years because of their shared mistrust of the West, but Xi has been uncomfortable with the Russian president’s nuclear rhetoric and the economic fallout from the prolonged Ukraine conflict.

Biden said in his discussions with Xi about Russian aggression, which is likely to overshadow the two-day G20 summit, “we reaffirmed our belief that the use and threat of nuclear weapons is totally unacceptable.”

Asked about Ukraine’s recapture of the southern city of Kherson on the eve of the summit, the president described it as “a significant victory and I can’t do anything but applaud the tenacity of the Ukrainian people and military. It has been amazing.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin didn’t make the trip to Bali to meet with Indonesian President Joko Widodo. Photo: AFP

Putin’s absence was long predicted, but with a Russian delegation led by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in the room the geopolitical fallout from the Ukraine war threatens to diminish efforts at the summit to tackle a growing global food and energy crisis.

Lavrov walked out of a G20 foreign ministers meeting in July after his Western counterparts blamed the Russian invasion for disrupting the supply of wheat and other grain from one of the world’s leading bread baskets.

“Western leaders should not use the G20 as an opportunity to condemn Russia, but must try to find some common ground with the broader G20 on steps to contain the war,” said International Crisis Group UN director Richard Gowan.

“If all Western powers want to do in Bali is belittle Russia,” he said, “they will find that a lot of non-Western colleagues will not play along” – a reference to countries like China, India and South Africa which have declined to impose sanctions on Moscow and abstained in UN votes on the war.

Analysts say the most constructive thing the leaders can do is press for the continuation of the UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative when it comes up for renewal of November 19. So far more than 500 bulk carriers have used the vital humanitarian corridor.

Shawn W Crispin provided reporting from Bangkok

asiatimes.com · by John McBeth · November 15, 2022

14. Biden’s Nuclear Policy Fails the Ukraine Test

Excerpts:

One of the underappreciated lessons of the Ukraine crisis is that the West would be better off if nuclear weapons were not part of the conflict. Russia might have not invaded if it did not have nukes to hide behind, and the United States could play a bigger role in helping Ukraine if it did not have to worry about Russian nuclear escalation. As Putin is showing, the bomb is a weapon of the weak and only serves to neutralize the U.S. conventional military advantage.

The Biden NPR missed a golden opportunity to update our nuclear policies for a new era. We cannot meet the Ukraine moment with Cold War thinking. President Biden must, and can, do better.

Biden’s Nuclear Policy Fails the Ukraine Test

His administration’s Cold War-style thinking is missing a golden opportunity.

defenseone.com · by Tom Z. Collina

Senior Russian military leaders reportedly recently discussed how they might use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, while other Russian officials were suggesting that Kyiv might detonate a “dirty bomb”—suggestions widely dismissed as a setup for a false-flag excuse to escalate the war. And even before all that, President Joe Biden reckoned that the world was closer to “Armageddon” than any time since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

Cause for concern? You bet. But if you’re looking for new ideas to address Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attempts at nuclear blackmail in Ukraine, you won’t find them in the Biden administration’s new statement on nuclear policy. Known as the Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, the report is a disappointing defense of the status quo. It breaks little new ground, and it fails to respond to the Ukraine moment. Reading it, you might almost forget that the world is facing the most serious nuclear threat in 60 years.

President Putin has repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons to keep the United States and NATO from getting too involved in the war. The NPR notes that Russian leaders view their nuclear arsenal “as a shield behind which to wage unjustified aggression against their neighbors.” Not only do these reckless actions increase the risk of nuclear war, but they also threaten the future of U.S.-Russian arms control and could give non-nuclear states new motivations to get the bomb.

That Biden’s NPR has no answer for this is not surprising. The report was drafted before Russia invaded Ukraine in late February and then hastily updated before its classified release in March. Little, if anything, appears to have changed before the release of the unclassified version on Oct. 27.

Lacking fresh thinking on the Ukraine crisis, the Biden team has fallen back on the old Cold War playbook: when in doubt, build more nuclear bombs. Biden lends his support to essentially all the new nuclear weapons proposed by his predecessor, including a new $260 billion intercontinental ballistic missile and new lower-yield warheads for missiles on Trident submarines. As a candidate, Biden said the Trump administration’s new Trident warheads were a “bad idea,” and that having them would make the U.S. “more inclined to use them.” Now that he’s president, Biden opposes just one Trump-proposed nuke—a new and unneeded sea-launched cruise missile—that will likely win support in Congress anyway due to the administration’s tepid effort to stop it.

Building new nukes we don’t need will not solve the Ukraine crisis, but it could get us into another expensive and dangerous arms race. One of the more troubling assertions in the NPR is that “By the 2030s the United States will, for the first time in its history, face two major nuclear powers as strategic competitors and potential adversaries.” This sets the stage for a future administration to argue, erroneously, that the Pentagon needs a larger nuclear arsenal—say, as big as Russia’s and China’s combined. This could lead to a new arms race with both Moscow and Beijing.

What should we do instead? In the short term, the Biden team needs to talk with Russia’s leaders, as it has started to do. These talks should not yet be about ending the war in Ukraine, but we need to set clear expectations with Russia about preventing the war from going nuclear or spreading beyond Ukraine’s borders. As Biden has rightly said, we must do all we can to prevent direct U.S. conflict with Russia, which would lead to World War III. Biden has so far successfully balanced support for Ukraine while withholding U.S. forces, a no-fly zone, and more sophisticated weapons.

In the longer term, we need a new international coalition that can isolate Putin and his dangerous nuclear behavior as much as possible. For example, Putin is threatening first use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Biden considered a no-first-use policy and a related sole-purpose policy, but rejected them, even though he had endorsed both in the past. This is a missed opportunity. China is a long-term supporter of no first use, and leader Xi Jinping, a key Putin ally, recently said that the international community should “jointly oppose the use of, or threats to use, nuclear weapons.” With the right policy behind him, Biden could be calling for global condemnation of Putin’s first-use threats. As it stands, Biden’s nuclear policy looks a lot like Putin’s.

Getting Putin to change his bad-boy nuclear saber-rattling will not be easy. We must convince him that his current trajectory will lead to greater and greater isolation. If Putin wants Russia to become a larger version of uber-isolated North Korea, then so be it. But if Moscow eventually wants to come in from the cold, we must make it crystal clear what needs to change.

One of the underappreciated lessons of the Ukraine crisis is that the West would be better off if nuclear weapons were not part of the conflict. Russia might have not invaded if it did not have nukes to hide behind, and the United States could play a bigger role in helping Ukraine if it did not have to worry about Russian nuclear escalation. As Putin is showing, the bomb is a weapon of the weak and only serves to neutralize the U.S. conventional military advantage.

The Biden NPR missed a golden opportunity to update our nuclear policies for a new era. We cannot meet the Ukraine moment with Cold War thinking. President Biden must, and can, do better.

defenseone.com · by Tom Z. Collina

15. Senator to Elon Musk: 'Fix Your Companies. Or Congress Will'

Senator to Elon Musk: 'Fix Your Companies. Or Congress Will'

The SpaceX and social-media mogul mocked Sen. Ed Markey’s concerns about Twitter verifying fake accounts.

defenseone.com · by Edward Graham

An influential Democrat on the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee threatened to rein in Elon Musk’s companies on Sunday, after the senator and CEO exchanged heated words on Twitter over the platform’s verification process.

The exchange between Sen. Ed Markey, D-Mass., and Musk came after The Washington Post on Nov. 11 published an article describing how one of the newspaper’s columnists—with Markey’s blessing—was able to set up a verified Twitter account posing as the senator. Following the article’s publication, Markey sent a letter to Musk demanding answers about the company’s recently announced subscription-based verification service, saying that “allowing an imposter to impersonate a U.S. senator on Twitter is a serious matter that you need to address promptly.”

“Safeguards such as Twitter’s blue checkmark once allowed users to be smart, critical consumers of news and information in Twitter’s global town square,” Markey wrote in the Nov. 11 letter. “But your Twitter takeover, rapid and haphazard imposition of platform changes, removal of safeguards against disinformation and firing of large numbers of Twitter employees have accelerated Twitter’s descent into the Wild West of social media.”

Earlier this month, Musk—who completed his $44 billion acquisition of Twitter at the end of October—said that he would begin charging users around $8 each month to receive the blue-check verification on the platform. Prior to Musk’s announcement, verification was largely reserved for politicians, companies, celebrities, journalists and other well-known figures to signify that the accounts belonged to them.

Markey asked Twitter to respond to questions about how it oversees its verification process to exclude imposters, saying that “Twitter and its leadership have a responsibility to the public to ensure the platform doesn’t become a breeding ground for manipulation and deceit.”

Verified Twitter accounts masquerading as companies have already caused financial repercussions, with the stock of Eli Lilly and Company falling by over 5% during morning trading on Friday, after a blue-checked account posing as the pharmaceutical giant tweeted that it would be giving out free insulin. The digital impersonation issues forced Twitter to pause its $7.99 per month verification subscription last week, a move that came less than two days after the service was launched.

Musk, however, took umbrage to Markey’s letter of concern about impersonation on Twitter, mockingly replying to the senator in a tweet on Sunday that implied that the false account was verified “because your real account sounds like a parody.”

“One of your companies is under [a Federal Trade Commission] consent decree,” Markey tweeted in response to Musk, referencing the FTC’s 2011 privacy order with Twitter. “Auto safety watchdog [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration] is investigating another for killing people. And you’re spending your time picking fights online.”

Musk-owned auto company, Tesla, is currently under investigation by NHTSA for crashes related to their vehicles’ autopilot feature.

Markey—a member of the Senate Commerce Committee, which oversees the FTC and NHTSA and previously brought in former Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey and other ‘Big Tech’ executives to testify about their platforms’ content moderation efforts —floated in his tweet that congressional action was on the table.

“Fix your companies,” Markey said. “Or Congress will.”

defenseone.com · by Edward Graham

16. Video: China buying US farmland near military bases

Video at the link: https://americanmilitarynews.com/2022/11/video-china-buying-us-farmland-near-military-bases/

Video: China buying US farmland near military bases

americanmilitarynews.com · by Ryan Morgan · November 14, 2022

Several Chinese firms have bought or have begun efforts to buy large plots of land near key U.S. military bases in recent years.

In November of 2021, Grand Forks, North Dakota announced that Fufeng Group of Shandong, China had selected the area as a location for a new wet corn mill. According to a May report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), the new Fufeng Group mill would be on a 370-acre plot of land located about 12 miles from the Grand Forks Air Force Base.

The U.S. Air Force base is home to some of the top U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. The base is home to 319th Reconnaissance Wing, which is one of the major operators of the RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles. The base will also host a new space networking center which will help facilitate U.S. military communications across the globe.

The USCC report said the land purchase near the U.S. military base could be “particularly convenient for monitoring air traffic flows in and out of the base, among other security-related concerns.”

The effort to buy up land near the key U.S. military base looks to be part of a pattern of sub-national surveillance and espionage by Chinese firms.

Prior to the Fufeng Group’s effort to buy up land near Grand Forks Air Force Base, another Chinese firm had begun efforts to buy up around 140,000 acres of land located about 70 miles from Laughlin Air Force Base. That Chinese Firm, Guanghui Energy Co. Ltd, wanted to build a massive wind farm known as the Blue Hills Wind Project.

Guanghui Energy Co. is owned by Sun Guangxin. Sun is a Chinese billionaire who reportedly has ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party.

Guanghui Energy Co’s efforts to buy up land near Laughlin Air Force Base caught the attention of both state and federal lawmakers. Lawmakers in the Texas state house passed legislation last year, known as the “Lone Star Infrastructure Protection Act,” the bans all contracts or agreements in Texas with foreign-owned companies related to critical infrastructure in Texas.

Rep. Tony Gonzales (R-TX), a lawmaker in the U.S. House of Representatives, also sponsored legislation along with Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) to halt the Blue Hills wind farm and any Chinese, Russian, Iranian, or North Korean real estate purchases on U.S. land within 100 miles of a U.S. military installation or 50 miles of military operations areas. The legislation was introduced in the House in April of last year but has not yet gone to a vote.

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americanmilitarynews.com · by Ryan Morgan · November 14, 2022

17. CCP: Who makes up the party

Please go to the link to view the charts. Richard MacGregor worte one of the best books on the party (called The Party, 2010).  https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ccp-who-makes-party

CCP: Who makes up the party | Lowy Institute

Demography is destiny, as is said – and the numbers in China make for a compelling story.

lowyinstitute.org · by Richard McGregor

These first three charts, taken together, tell you a lot about the Chinese Communist Party.

The ones on age and gender make China an outlier compared with many other countries. In other words, the senior ranks of the party are mostly old, as in over 60 years old, and overwhelmingly male. Younger, women politicians are now commonplace in many countries. But not in China.

In some respects, the age profile of the senior echelons of the party – in the Central Committee – is similar to many east Asian political systems, or, perhaps more accurately, their bureaucracies. In such systems, promotion is tied to age and time served. In the case of China, the party bureaucracy is the political system, and you rarely rise through the ranks without serving your time outside of Beijing.

Many Chinese will argue this is a positive feature of the system. It is a meritocracy, and you have to prove yourself before being promoted. There is some truth in this. Other east Asian systems also have fewer women in their ranks than many Western countries, but none are as bad as China.

This graph represents the situation at the last Party Congress, in 2017. It may be even worse now, as for the first time in 25 years, there is not a single woman in the Politburo in the wake of the 20th Party Congress, held in October 2022.

The third graph, on professions, encapsulates one of the major reforms of the party in recent decades. Look at 1987, and the dominant professions still represent the party’s revolutionary, and rural, roots. Farmers are the largest group, followed by cadres (party and government officials) and blue-collar workers.

The years of double-digit growth are tailing off – no economy grows at ten per cent for ever – and the world economy is now slowing as well.

Fast forward to 2017 and you can see the impact of Jiang Zemin’s decision 16 years earlier to allow entrepreneurs to officially join the party. They now make up somewhere between ten to 25 per cent of the membership. From the CCP’s perspective, this was an inspired reform, and highly successful, as it merged the party’s interests with the businesses that drive the economy. But I wonder what this chart will look like in ten years hence?

Xi Jinping has shown little empathy with the private sector. A number of high-profile entrepreneurs have been targeted on his watch. Will they be so keen to join the party in the future? More to the point, will the party welcome them in?

The Chinese economy is struggling at the moment. A “Covid zero” policy and associated lockdowns have clobbered growth. A slow burn property crisis is dragging down the biggest sector of the economy, construction. On top of which the country is facing both a secular and cyclical slowdown. Put another way, the years of double-digit growth are tailing off (no economy grows at ten per cent forever), and the world economy is now slowing as well.

All of those trends, though, are to some extent reversible. China’s demographic crisis, however, is not. As this chart shows, China will lose more than 100 million workers in the next decade and a half, and it can do little to reverse that.

The one-child policy, which started in 1980, is largely to blame. But so are the same factors that are present in many economies. Women are having fewer babies. In part, this is an individual choice for many women. But it is also because Chinese couples worry that they cannot afford the cost of raising many children, and so stop at one, even though the government now allows and indeed encourages them to have more.

All is not gloom in the economy. Some of China’s investments in industry policy have paid off, in solar energy, wind turbines and electric vehicles, the supply chains of which are dominated by China. But however well China does on this front, it will have a smaller workforce and high pension costs. Not even the mighty communist party can do much about that.

lowyinstitute.org · by Richard McGregor

18. Should the United States Pledge to Defend Taiwan?

​Please go to the link to read the opinions of the experts : https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ask-the-experts/should-united-states-pledge-defend-taiwan

Should the United States Pledge to Defend Taiwan?

Foreign Affairs Asks the Experts

November 15, 2022

A map displaying the locations around Taiwan where the Chinese People’s Liberation Army conducted military exercises in August, Beijing, October 2022

Florence Lo / Reuters

We at Foreign Affairs have recently published a number of pieces on the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, U.S. policy regarding the island, and the risk of a U.S.-Chinese conflict over the Taiwan strait. To complement these articles, we decided to ask a broad pool of experts for their take. As with previous surveys, we approached dozens of authorities with specialized expertise relevant to the question at hand, together with leading generalists in the field. Participants were asked to state whether they agreed or disagreed with a proposition and to rate their confidence level in their opinion. Their answers are below.

19. Too Sino-Centric? US Marine Corps Needs Bottom-Up Reform

Too Sino-Centric? US Marine Corps Needs Bottom-Up Reform

Marines must remember that being ready to fight in “any climb and place” is part of our DNA, even if the senior leadership has forgotten it.

thedefensepost.com · by Gary Anderson · November 14, 2022

Noted defense analyst Loren Thompson criticizes the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 (FD 2030) strategy as being too Sino-Centric. He joins many retired Marines and surprising numbers of active-duty ones — albeit quietly — in denouncing the approach for ignoring the Marine Corps’ traditional “force in readiness” role while it specializes in addressing the Chinese threat.

The critics, and I am one of them, are trying to get Congress and regional four-star combatant commanders to weigh in on slowing the rush to divest the Corps’ traditional war-fighting force multipliers.

These include tanks, tubed artillery, infantry battalions, transport helicopters, and heavy engineer equipment. While these might not be critical in a primarily naval war with China, they might well be game changers in urban combat or in ground conflict with Russia, North Korea, or Iran.

Unfortunately, much of the damage has already been done. Battalions and squadrons of these assets have already folded their colors. Congress is immersed in the November elections, and senior commanders are always reluctant to publicly criticize another four-star general such as the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Consequently, there will likely be no near-term scrutiny of FD 2030. The nation will remain inwardly focused at least until after November.

Underground Military Reform Movement

Many young Marines I communicate with are genuinely concerned that if this commandant has guessed wrong and they must fight in a place other than the South China Sea, they will not have the necessary tools to win, needlessly risking defeat and casualties.

More disturbing is that Marines might not be invited to a conflict because the regional commander doesn’t think they could add value in a world with constrained air and sea lift to get forces to the theater and sustain them there.

US Marines during Exercise Sea Soldier in 2017, an annual exercise conducted with the Royal Army of Oman. Photo: Gunnery Sgt. Robert B. Brown Jr./US Marine Corps

Sometimes history presents solutions to current problems. After the disastrous defeat by Napoleon at the battles of Jena and Auerstadt in 1805, the resulting peace treaty virtually emasculated the Prussian Army and forced it into an alliance with France.

Some Prussian officers went so far as to fight on the Russian side against Napoleon. These included Carl von Clausewitz. But many went underground, creating a military reform movement that quietly worked to fix what was wrong with the obsolete system inherited from Frederick the Great in the 18th century.

These young (and some older) officers created a vision that would eventually throw off French chains and enable the Prussians to contribute decisively to the final victory over Napoleon at Waterloo.

Maneuver Warfare Concepts

More recently, Marines who believed in Maneuver Warfare doctrine in the 1980s did much the same to socialize and debate new tactics and ideas in the wake of America’s defeat in Vietnam.

Although never officially forbidden, some senior officers discouraged discussing Maneuver Warfare concepts. Meeting in basements or quietly after classes at Marine Corps schools, these reformers began a healthy debate that eventually led to the adoption of Maneuver Warfare which became Marine Corps doctrine after General Al Gray took over as commandant in 1987.

When asked for advice by active-duty Marines, I suggest a similar approach today. I do not advocate insubordination. Marines are bound by oath to obey the lawful orders of their superiors no matter how ill-advised they think them to be.

That includes trying to figure out how best to make FD 2030 work until a future generation of leadership takes things in a new and hopefully more logical direction or a wiser Congress forces the issue.

US Marine throws a practice M67 fragmentation grenade during a live-fire exercise. Photo: Lance Cpl. Christopher J. Moore/Released

Discussion, Using Captured Equipment

So, this is what I recommend to active-duty Marines.

Put together informal education and discussion groups to formulate ways to adapt and innovate if placed in a combat situation not anticipated by current Marine Corps leadership. In this, the war in Ukraine provides some examples.

In a non-Sino conflict, Marines should be prepared to use captured enemy tanks, artillery, logistics equipment, and aircraft to compensate for what they don’t currently have.

They can study the operation of Russian, Iranian, and North Korean equipment and learn to utilize and fight such equipment so they can train their own troops to operate the captured systems. With some innovation, computer simulators and tutorials can be developed and shared through the internet and social media.

Marines have traditionally been underequipped by the defense establishment and have always been exceptional “scrounges.” Other service members billeted near Marine Corps units who have not guarded their equipment carefully have learned this to their sorrow for years.

Similarly, such informal groups can speculate on ways to compensate for the lost five infantry battalions by using allied troops. I am not talking about training foreign units in our image as we did in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam.

Rather, we can educate our officers and senior enlisted to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of allied regular and irregular forces and seamlessly integrate them into their schemes of maneuver.

The same holds true with logistics. It is now fashionable to denigrate the Confederate armies of our Civil War, but they managed to survive (if not thrive) on inadequate logistic support by living off the land for four years.

Given the inadequate attention of Marine Corps leaders, self-taught “desperation logistics” skills by junior and field grade leaders could become critical in a future conflict not anticipated by the current establishment.

Marines should remember that being ready to fight in “any climb and place” is part of our DNA, even if the senior leadership has forgotten it.

Gary Anderson was a senior member of the Defense Adaptive Red Team and a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

He lectures on Wargaming and Alternative Analysis at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

thedefensepost.com · by Gary Anderson · November 14, 2022

20. Weapons of the War in Ukraine

This may be a useful resource for researchers. Please go to the interactive web page at this link: https://ukraine-2021-itrace.hub.arcgis.com/?utm_source=pocket_saves

Weapons of the War in Ukraine

Conflict Armament Research (CAR) field investigators document illicit weapons, ammunition, and related materiel in conflict-affected locations and trace their supply sources. 

Since 2014, Ukrainian defence and security forces have been engaged in combat with separatist elements active in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, two provinces bordering the Russian Federation. CAR field investigators have gained access to weapons, ammunition, and related items recovered from these armed formations.

In 'Weapons of the War in Ukraine', CAR reports on the findings of its investigations. Read the report and explore data from it here, and visit CAR's website for more information about investigations into weapon diversion.

This portal will be updated with new tools to explore and interact with the data and cases that make up this report. 

21.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com