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Quotes of the Day:
"Writing is like driving a car at night. You can only see as far as the headlights, but you make the whole trip that way."
- E.L. Doctorow
"You can't depend on your judgment when your imagination is out of focus."
- Mark Twain
“To be nobody-but-yourself – in a world, which is doing its best, night and day, to make you everybody else – means to fight the hardest battle which any human being can fight; and never stop fighting.”
- E.E. Cummings.
1. US scorns Putin's possible turn toward North Korea
2. N. Korea will face 'repercussions' if it provides weapons to Russia: Kirby
3. Chinese delegation to visit N. Korea for celebrations of founding anniv.
4. N. Korean leader may choose unexpected route for upcoming meeting with Putin: NIS
5. Why the North Korea-Russia alliance is worrying America
6. US considering long-range fires for Ukraine, State Dept. official says
7. Navy warship to help reenact Korean War’s pivotal amphibious assault on Incheon
8. ‘US Navy group heading for Yellow Sea in biggest show of strength near eastern China in 10 years
9. A Desperate Move’ – Kremlin Under Fire Over Russia’s Ammo Situation
10. North Korea, the original Hermit Kingdom, slowly reopens after covid
11. North Korea Finds New Leverage in the Ukraine War
12. Yoon says N. Korea's nuclear program is existential threat to Indo-Pacific
13. Why China, Russia, and North Korea Joining Forces in the Indo-Pacific Isn’t a Prelude to War
14. N. Korea moves to accelerate production of automatic rifle ammunition
15. There is no ‘nuclear peace’ on the Korean Peninsula
16. Kim Jong-un's Arms Deals with Putin Must Be Stopped
17. N. Korea’s defense ministry criticizes military units that failed to collect enough salt
18. North's mid-air detonation tests suggest will to kill
19. South Korea’s Political Bifurcation Will Stifle Any Trilateral Agreement
1. US scorns Putin's possible turn toward North Korea
Excerpts:
While the US is dismissive of the possible Kim-Putin meeting, both leaders have the capacity to make trouble for Washington. Russia once joined the US in a multi-national effort to constrain Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs, but that clearly isn’t likely anymore as Putin seeks to puncture US influence around the globe. That means the North’s arsenal of mass destruction will remain an increasingly grave threat to US national security.
There’s a political dimension here as well. If North Korea is able to offer Putin significant military help, it would bolster Russia’s hopes of prolonging the war just at the moment when Ukraine’s slow-to-start offensive seems to be beginning to make some real gains. If the war stretches deep into the US election year, Putin could increase the political pressure on President Joe Biden amid growing public questions about Washington’s multibillion-dollar lifeline for Ukraine. This skepticism is being fueled by Trump’s warnings that Ukraine should be cut loose and that he’d end the war – on terms likely favorable to Russia – if he wins the 2024 election.
US scorns Putin's possible turn toward North Korea | CNN Politics
CNN · by Stephen Collinson · September 7, 2023
CNN —
Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un may each have something the other wants – a dangerous combination as far as the US is concerned.
A meeting that may be in the works between the Russian and North Korean autocrats could have an impact on the war in Ukraine, complicate Washington’s repeatedly failed efforts to rein in Pyongyang’s nuclear program, and play into the wider geopolitical chess game unfolding in the Pacific in which China is the major player.
Washington has reacted to the possibility of the meeting – which could possibly take place after Kim climbs aboard his armored train headed for the Russian far east – by mocking Putin, warning North Korea and trying to work out what it might mean.
Russia may be looking to Kim to replenish its ammunition and artillery supplies as the war in Ukraine grinds into another bloody winter. Pyongyang is also adept at drone and missile technology. Kim, meanwhile, knows that Russia is a longtime and sophisticated nuclear power whose expertise could help his own expanding program. It’s also a big oil supplier, and North Korea and Russia are both living under punishing Western sanctions and restrictions on their access to the global market. If they can help each other ease the pain of blockades, they may be able to do business.
KCNA/Reuters
North Korea's Kim Jong Un may meet Putin in Russia to discuss arms deal, US says
Plus, for the North Korean leader, the propaganda value of his impoverished country helping to shore up the much bigger Russia could be valuable. And he’ll get Washington’s attention after a years-long diplomatic freeze following the flurry of praise and summitry of former US President Donald Trump’s administration.
As it often has during the Ukraine war, Washington is trumpeting information from its intelligence agencies to foreshadow and discredit Putin’s moves before they happen. When it comes to cruel sarcasm, there’s no better practitioner than Rahm Emanuel, the US ambassador to Japan and an acerbic political operative. If the overarching goal of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was to recreate Moscow’s empire, Emanuel told CNN “that empire is now dependent on North Korea, it is dependent on Iran – two isolated countries, two countries that are seen as pariahs. That tells you how much of a failure this war is.”
At the White House, national security adviser Jake Sullivan said that the US is trying to work out whether North Korea could make a significant difference to Russia’s war effort. “We have asked our intelligence community that … question. It is a good question. Our visibility into both the question of quantity of stocks and then, of course, quality of stocks is somewhat constrained,” Sullivan said, adding: “I think there is an open question about how much materiel and what the quality of the materiel is that could be provided if it were to be provided.”
Sullivan warned that selling arms that Russia could use to attack grain silos or the heating infrastructure of major Ukrainian cities would not reflect well on North Korea. But moral arguments won’t move Kim, who keeps his population locked in a vast prison camp wracked by repression and famines.
While the US is dismissive of the possible Kim-Putin meeting, both leaders have the capacity to make trouble for Washington. Russia once joined the US in a multi-national effort to constrain Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs, but that clearly isn’t likely anymore as Putin seeks to puncture US influence around the globe. That means the North’s arsenal of mass destruction will remain an increasingly grave threat to US national security.
There’s a political dimension here as well. If North Korea is able to offer Putin significant military help, it would bolster Russia’s hopes of prolonging the war just at the moment when Ukraine’s slow-to-start offensive seems to be beginning to make some real gains. If the war stretches deep into the US election year, Putin could increase the political pressure on President Joe Biden amid growing public questions about Washington’s multibillion-dollar lifeline for Ukraine. This skepticism is being fueled by Trump’s warnings that Ukraine should be cut loose and that he’d end the war – on terms likely favorable to Russia – if he wins the 2024 election.
A Putin and Xi Jinping meeting would also cement concerns that the world’s tyrants are combining in an anti-US alliance. Putin’s friendship with the Chinese leader has worried the US, although Beijing may not have offered quite the assistance that the Russian leader might have hoped for – one reason he may be turning to North Korea for military supplies. Russia is of course also a Pacific power and could further destabilize an already tense geopolitical theater there that represents America’s most vexing national security challenge.
CNN · by Stephen Collinson · September 7, 2023
2. N. Korea will face 'repercussions' if it provides weapons to Russia: Kirby
Repercussions? Let's implement an aggressive information campaign. Kim very much fears that and we have for too long given him a pass on it.
N. Korea will face 'repercussions' if it provides weapons to Russia: Kirby | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Duk-Kun Byun · September 7, 2023
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Sept. 6 (Yonhap) -- North Korea will face repercussions from the United States and other countries should it provide weapons to Russia that can kill innocent people in Ukraine, a White House official said Wednesday.
John Kirby, National Security Council (NSC) coordinator for strategic communications, also called on North Korea to stop its negotiations with Russia for a potential arms deal.
"We are not seeing them provide any wholesale assistance to the Russian military, and we continue to urge North Korea not to do that," the NSC official said when asked if the North has already provided a significant amount of weapons to Russia.
"We have not seen the DPRK provide major munitions to the Russian military. We have seen them provide some rockets and artillery ammunition to the Wagner Group. This was months ago," he added in a press briefing at the Washington Foreign Press Center.
John Kirby, National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications, speaks during a press briefing at the Washington Foreign Press Center on Sept. 6, 2023. (Yonhap)
DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name. The country was earlier said to have provided artillery shells to Wagner, a Russian paramilitary group, in late 2022.
The remark by Kirby comes one day after National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan warned that Pyongyang will "pay a price" in the international community should it provide weapons to Russia.
"I would remind you that just a couple of weeks ago, the treasury department issued sanctions against three entities that were directly involved in trying to broker this particular arms deal," Kirby told the press briefing.
The U.S. has hinted at the possibility of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un traveling to Russia in the near future for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin on a potential arms deal, citing what it called "information" that Kim has expectations for high-level or leader-level engagement with Russia.
The reports about a potential arms deal between North Korea and Russia followed Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu's trip to Pyongyang in late July. U.S. officials said earlier that Shoigu's visit had been followed by a trip of some 20 Russian officials to the North Korean capital, indicating what they called "active" negotiations between the two countries for an arms deal.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (3rd from L), alongside Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (2nd from L) and Chinese Communist Party politburo member Li Hongzhong (R), waves during a military parade at Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang on the night of July 27, 2023, to mark the 70th anniversary of the signing of the armistice that halted the 1950-53 Korean War, in this photo released the next day by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Kirby said the U.S. has not had any direct communication with North Korea on the issue, but that it will not shy away from calling out any illicit arms deal between Pyongyang and Moscow.
"Again, we urge Pyongyang not to get involved in military transfers with Russia and not to get themselves involved in a war ... which continues at Russia's hand to kill innocent Ukrainians," said Kirby.
He said the U.S. was not currently engaged in any active dialogue with its key allies on the issue because "there has been no deal consummated between Pyongyang and Moscow with respect to arms."
The U.S., still, "takes our treaty commitments very, very seriously to both Japan and South Korea," he added.
When asked why North Korea would engage in such an arms deal with Russia, the NSC coordinator noted the country must be seeking to benefit from such a deal.
"One could presume, one must presume that Pyongyang would benefit," he said.
"It's not clear to us exactly what benefits Mr. Kim was looking for. Could it be food or could it be advanced arms and technology from Russia. We just don't know," he added, referring to the North Korean leader.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Duk-Kun Byun · September 7, 2023
3. Chinese delegation to visit N. Korea for celebrations of founding anniv.
We should consider what is in the Kim family regime DNA: since Kim Il Sung the regime has effectively, at times, played the USSR then Russia and China off against each other. It is one reason why there will not be an equivalent of a JAROKUS (Japan-ROK-US) security arrangement. Recall during the ceremonies in Pyongyang last month which had both Chinese and Russian delegations, it was the Russian Defense Minister who was treated with greater respect while the Chinese delegation was somewhat slighted.
(2nd LD) Chinese delegation to visit N. Korea for celebrations of founding anniv. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · September 7, 2023
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; UPDATES with more details throughout)
By Kim Soo-yeon
SEOUL, Sept. 7 (Yonhap) -- A Chinese delegation, led by Vice Premier Liu Guozhong, will visit North Korea this week to participate in celebrations of the 75th founding anniversary of the North Korean regime, Pyongyang's state media said Thursday.
The Chinese delegation of party and government officials will visit North Korea to attend events to mark the anniversary at the invitation of the North's ruling Workers' Party and the government, according to the Korean Central News Agency.
North Korea is set to mark the 75th anniversary of its founding on Saturday, with a militia parade scheduled for celebrations.
The announcement came amid a report that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un may travel to Vladivostok for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin next week amid suspected arms transactions between Pyongyang and Moscow.
This file photo, taken July 25, 2011, shows Liu Guozhong, currently serving as vice premier of the State Council of China, speaking at an economic event in Seoul. (Yonhap)
South Korea's unification ministry said Liu's planned visit indicates North Korea is trying to expand economic cooperation with China, while bolstering its military cooperation with Russia.
Liu, a Chinese Communist Party politburo member and vice premier of the State Council of China, had served as governor of Jilin Province bordering North Korea.
"Given that he has a good understanding of North Korean issues and is currently in charge of economic affairs, North Korea and China appear to focus their ties on economic cooperation," a ministry official told reporters on condition of anonymity.
In 2018, North Korea sent a delegation, led by Li Zhanshu, then head of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, to celebrations of North Korea's 70th founding anniversary. His status at the communist party was higher than Liu's current one.
"China could not fully welcome deepening cooperation between North Korea and Russia, as Seoul, Washington and Tokyo will likely bolster their cooperation, mounting pressure on Beijing," the ministry official said of China's sending of an official at a lower level.
China and Russia sent their respective delegations in late July to North Korea to attend events to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the signing of the Korean War armistice, called Victory Day in the North.
Flanked by Russia's defense minister and a senior Chinese official, the North's leader Kim watched a military parade, displaying solidarity with Beijing and Moscow vis-a-vis the strengthening of three-way security cooperation among Seoul, Washington and Tokyo.
A report of Kim's possible trip to Russia spawns speculation that North Korea may provide artillery shells and other weaponry to Russia for use in Moscow's war with Ukraine in exchange for a weapons-related technology transfer from Russia, such as a spy satellite.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C), alongside Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (L) and Chinese Communist Party politburo member Li Hongzhong (R), observes a military parade at Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang on July 27, 2023, to mark the 70th anniversary of the signing of the armistice that halted the 1950-53 Korean War, in this photo released the next day by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · September 7, 2023
4. N. Korean leader may choose unexpected route for upcoming meeting with Putin: NIS
Will Kim be late and keep Putin waiting as I believe he did during the last visit?
N. Korean leader may choose unexpected route for upcoming meeting with Putin: NIS | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · September 7, 2023
SEOUL, Sept. 7 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un may opt for an unexpected route when he travels to Russia for a meeting with President Vladimir Putin, according to South Korea's spy agency Thursday.
The New York Times reported earlier this week that Kim plans to travel to Russia's Vladivostok, possibly by armored train, later this month for talks with Putin about the possibility of supplying Russia with more weaponry for its war in Ukraine and other military cooperation.
"As it was revealed to the New York Times, there is a possibility of Kim Jong-un making a surprise move by choosing a different route than what is expected," a National Intelligence Service (NIS) official reported during a parliamentary intelligence committee meeting, according to Rep. Yoo Sang-bum of the ruling People Power Party.
During the meeting, NIS Director Kim Kyou-hyun said the agency is closely monitoring the planned visit and sharing intelligence with other national spy agencies as a summit between the North and Russia would have a big effect on the international situation.
The New York Times report said a delegation of some 20 North Korean officials traveled to Vladivostok in late August, indicating an upcoming trip by the North Korean leader.
This combined photo provided by the Korean Central News Agency and the EPA show North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) and Russian President Vladimir Putin. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
khj@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · September 7, 2023
5. Why the North Korea-Russia alliance is worrying America
I am not that worried. Kim is exploiting Russia and playing China off against each other. It is also a sign of weakness (and perhaps desperation) of both Russia and north Korea. And yes they could be responding ot JAROKUS (Japan-ROK-US) but because of their strategic cultures they will never have the foundation of trust necessary for effective alliances. But not all my comments made it into this article.
Few journalists get this statement correct as Mr. Dress has:
North Korea, which is still technically at war with South Korea in a frozen conflict, has a strong defense industrial base for the production of artillery shells. North Korean forces consistently fire artillery rounds near the border, particularly in response to joint U.S.-South Korean drills.
The war remains between the north and South, not the north and the US.
Why the North Korea-Russia alliance is worrying America
BY BRAD DRESS - 09/07/23 6:00 AM ET
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4190956-why-the-north-korea-russia-alliance-is-worrying-america/
FILE – Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un shake hands during their meeting in Vladivostok, Russia on April 25, 2019. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s possible trip to Russia might be like his first one in 2019, a rattling, 20-hour ride aboard a green-and-yellow armored train that is a quirky symbol of his family’s dynastic leadership. (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko, Pool, File)
The U.S. is bristling over a potential military support deal between North Korea and Russia, which would likely further entrench the grinding war in Ukraine and bolster Pyongyang’s nuclear aims.
North Korea is considering supplying Moscow with artillery rounds and rockets in return for critical technology and food, in a deal that could be inked later this month during a planned visit by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to Moscow.
David Maxwell, the vice president at the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, said it was in both North Korean and Russian interests to follow through on the deal, and Kim especially might see a trade as another way to bolster his image.
“From a North Korean perspective, I think Kim Jong Un values the meeting because it makes him appear as somewhat relevant,” Maxwell said. “I’m sure that we’ll see their domestic internal propaganda spin this as one of the quasi-great powers coming to beg for aid from North Korea.”
North Korea has not directly supported Russia’s armed forces during the war in Ukraine, although Pyongyang did reportedly supply the mercenary company Wagner Group with rockets and artillery. That led to U.S. sanctions against North Korean entities responsible for the arms transfers.
But U.S. officials have recently warned that the North Korea-Russia ties may soon tighten.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu traveled to North Korea in July and asked for military support, according to White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan, who said Russia was growing increasingly desperate to fill its munition stocks in the Ukraine war.
“We have continued to squeeze Russia’s defense industrial base and they are now going about looking to whatever source they can find,” Sullivan told reporters Tuesday.
The conflict in Ukraine has devolved into a grinding war of attrition, one in which Russian President Vladimir Putin hopes to prevail by outlasting Ukraine. Artillery rounds are among the most important types of munitions on both sides — the U.S. has even turned to allies (including South Korea) for help to keep up with Ukraine’s expenditure rates.
Russian forces are expending artillery at a much higher rate than Ukraine, and while they are not desperate, they do need additional sources of production, said George Beebe, director of grand strategy at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
“This is a war that’s being fought over resources, the ability to generate forces to supply the battle lines with arms and ammunition,” he said. “Russia has big advantages in both those areas. So the Russians are trying to preserve their advantages.”
North Korea, which is still technically at war with South Korea in a frozen conflict, has a strong defense industrial base for the production of artillery shells. North Korean forces consistently fire artillery rounds near the border, particularly in response to joint U.S.-South Korean drills.
Russia has almost no significant economic ties to North Korea, and though Moscow has supported Pyongyang, it has largely done so out of support for China, according to Fyodor Tertitskiy, a senior research fellow at Seoul’s Kookmin University.
Tertiskiy said in an analysis that the Shoigu visit saw North Korea welcome the Russian defense minister with open arms, including red banners naming him a “comrade,” which he said “suggests that Pyongyang is looking back to Cold War times in hope of a return to the flow of economic aid from Moscow.”
Kim met Putin for the first time in 2019, and the two have maintained friendly relations ever since, including during the war in Ukraine.
On Russia’s National Day in June, Kim pledged “full support” for Putin and the Kremlin as he claimed they “continue to add glory to the history of victory.”
In late August, the White House said both Putin and Kim had recently traded letters, and The New York Times first reported on their planned meeting. The Kremlin declined to comment Tuesday on the reports of an upcoming Kim-Putin meeting.
The U.S. appears to be trying to expose the potential deal in the hopes of dashing it. At the White House Tuesday, Sullivan warned that North Korea would “pay a price” from the international community if it supported Russia with lethal aid.
Pentagon press secretary Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder also said any arms transfers agreement would “violate multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions.”
“And it would prolong the unnecessary suffering of Ukrainian civilians who are impacted by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine,” he told reporters Tuesday.
Earlier this year, the U.S. publicly aired intelligence indicating that China was considering providing lethal aid to Russia, in part to dissuade Beijing from following through. There are no indications an official arms trade happened.
North Korea-U.S. tensions have grown increasingly hostile during the Biden administration. The U.S. has renewed major military exercises on the Korean Peninsula, infuriating North Korean leadership. Pyongyang has also dramatically increased its missile tests in the past two years.
Experts are divided on whether the U.S. can use its leverage to scuttle a potential deal between Moscow and Pyongyang, given how much North Korea is already sanctioned.
David Silbey, a military historian at Cornell University, said it was “almost a positive for Kim Jong Un to be threatened by the U.S.”
“It fits into his narrative that the West is coming after him,” Silbey said.
However, China has some leverage over North Korea, Silbey said, and the U.S. may be able to pressure Beijing to curb any emerging deal.
“The question becomes whether we can convince them or push them to use that leverage against North Korea,” Silbey said. “I don’t see the Chinese stepping in to do this. From their perspective, this is a nice distraction for us.”
While the terms of the potential deal are not clear, it could end up being very lucrative for North Korea.
Pyongyang needs more food to feed its population, oil for energy and critical technology for a variety of uses in its nuclear program, including the miniaturization of nuclear warheads and improved technology for satellites after recent failed launches.
North Korea also wants to weaken its dependence on China as a trading partner, said Naoko Aoki, an associate political scientist with the RAND Corporation focusing on East Asian security.
“North Korea and China have a very difficult relationship. They’re sometimes very close. Sometimes close from the outside but not too friendly privately,” she said. “For any opportunity to diversify that would be a good opportunity from the North Korean perspective, and at this point they don’t have too many friends.”
On Russia’s side, the deal would expand its informal alliance of eastern authoritarian powers — with a common interest in undermining American power.
Iran, for example, has supplied Russia with suicide drones for use in Ukraine and was invited into the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) economic alliance last month.
China has declared a “no limits” partnership with Russia while conducting frequent drills with Moscow during the Ukraine war.
“Russia’s motivation here is not just to demonstrate that it can sustain its advantages and artillery for a long time to come. It’s also part of a broader trend on the part of Russia and China to be reaching out to parts of the global south that the United States has labeled rogues,” said Beebe of the Quincy Institute.
“That includes North Korea. It includes Iran and it is, in part, an attempt to demonstrate to the United States that it no longer has the ability to isolate and punish the states the way it did 20 years ago.”
6. US considering long-range fires for Ukraine, State Dept. official says
Deep attack is a key capability.
US considering long-range fires for Ukraine, State Dept. official says
Defense News · by Bryant Harris · September 6, 2023
WASHINGTON ― The Biden administration is “closely considering” providing long-range fires and other capabilities to Ukraine, a State Department official overseeing arms transfers said.
“We do need to continue to take a very close and deliberate look at what it is Ukraine needs,” Laura Cressey, director of regional security and arms transfers at the State Department’s political-military affairs bureau, said Wednesday at the Defense News Conference in Arlington, Va.
“There’s been a lot of talk about F-16s, a lot of talk about long-range fires,” she said. “All of those the U.S. government is very closely considering, but it takes a lot in terms of training.”
The U.S. can’t provide “whatever is the hot topic at the moment,” Cressey said. “We need to take a close look at the conditions on the battlefield, the absorptive capacity of the Ukrainians themselves, the training.”
“This is not just the United States that is providing Ukraine the capabilities,” said Cressey. “This is a coalition of over 50 countries and it’s significant. Other countries are not gap filling. They’re providing significant materiel whether you’re looking at air and missile defense, modern fighters, armor, the like.”
Cressey and Mike Miller, the deputy director of the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, expressed hope that Congress will continue appropriating funds to arm Ukraine.
“The support of the U.S. Congress in this effort has been remarkable,” Miller said during a panel discussion, pointing to presidential drawdown authority to provide weapons from U.S. stockpiles, longer-term aid contracted out through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, foreign military financing grants and authorizations for multiyear procurement of munitions.
Congress has passed $61 billion worth of military aid for Ukraine since Russia’s invasion. The White House in August asked Congress for an additional $13 billion in Ukraine military aid via a supplemental spending request. Most senators, including Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., support the request but House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., has ruled out additional Ukraine aid amid growing opposition from the right-flank of his caucus.
An August CNN-SSRS poll found 55% of U.S. voters oppose additional aid for Ukraine. The poll found 71% of Republicans oppose additional Ukraine aid while 62% of Democrats favor more assistance for Kyiv.
Reversing course on F-16s
Pro-Ukraine Republicans in Congress have pressured the Biden administration to send Kyiv long-range capabilities like Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, as requested by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy – so far to no avail. President Joe Biden did reverse course on providing F-16s to Ukraine in August, authorizing training for Ukrainian pilots who will fly jets provided by Denmark and the Netherlands.
A provision in the House’s fiscal 2024 defense policy bill would require the Pentagon to build the Lockheed-made ballistic missiles for Kyiv via the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. Britain has also provided long-range Storm Shadow cruise missiles to Ukraine.
Estonia’s No. 2 defense official, Defense Ministry Permanent Secretary Kusti Salm, called the Ukraine war “an existential question for NATO” noting “we’re fairly confident” that the U.S. and its European allies can help Kyiv win despite a slow-moving counteroffensive.
“Russia has pushed this into a war of attrition,” said Salm at the conference. “Our job is to send the message that we can out-manufacture you.”
“Our defense has been a self-inducing spiral of declining defense budgets, especially in Europe,” he added “Our job is to turn this around.”
About Bryant Harris
Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.
7. Navy warship to help reenact Korean War’s pivotal amphibious assault on Incheon
Navy warship to help reenact Korean War’s pivotal amphibious assault on Incheon
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · September 6, 2023
The amphibious assault ship USS America docks at Manila's South Harbor, March 21, 2023. (Bullit Marquez/For Stars and Stripes)
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OSAN, South Korea — A U.S. amphibious assault ship will join South Korean navy vessels next week for a historical reenactment of the Incheon landing during the 1950-53 Korean War.
The USS America will help mark the operation’s 73rd anniversary during a Sept. 15 ceremony in the coastal city of Incheon, a South Korean navy headquarters officer said by phone Wednesday.
The Sasebo, Japan-based ship was commissioned in 2014 and carries a crew of roughly 1,200 sailors, 1,900 Marines and an air arm of tiltrotor MV-22B Ospreys and F-35B Lightning IIs. The ship is powered by a hybrid electric-propulsion system.
Around 20 South Korean navy ships, 10 aircraft and 3,300 service members will participate in the reenactment, according to a Ministry of National Defense news release Tuesday.
The event will also commemorate the 70th anniversary of the armistice agreement that ended Korean War hostilities and “reexamines the historical meaning and value” of the operation,” the release said.
The amphibious assault ship USS America docks at Manila's South Harbor, March 21, 2023. (Bullit Marquez/For Stars and Stripes)
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The navy official said the Canadian frigate HMCS Vancouver will also participate in the reenactment. No joint naval drills, apart from the reenactment, were scheduled as of Wednesday, he said.
South Korean officials regularly speak to the media on a customary condition of anonymity.
U.S. Forces Korea spokesman David Kim declined to comment on the reenactment in an email Wednesday, saying the command does not “publicly discuss the movement of a specific asset due to operational security concerns.”
On Sept. 13, 1950, allied warships encircling Incheon harbor fired on North Korean fortifications on the beachhead to prepare for Operation Chromite, the U.S.-led amphibious assault on Incheon by U.N. Command forces. The “daring” attack on Incheon was designed to catch the North Koreans off guard, strike a psychological blow and recapture Seoul, according to Naval History and Heritage Command.
Allied troops led by Gen. Douglas MacArthur successfully retook Incheon and marched east to Seoul, 18 miles inland. By Sept. 28, 1950, they had liberated the capital city, cut the North Koreans’ supply routes and separated them from their forces to the south.
Around 600 U.N. Command troops were killed and 2,750 were wounded in the operation. About 14,000 North Korean troops were killed and 7,000 were taken prisoner.
Stars and Stripes reporter Yoo Kyong Chang contributed to this report.
David Choi
David Choi
David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · September 6, 2023
8. US Navy group heading for Yellow Sea in biggest show of strength near eastern China in 10 years
US Navy group heading for Yellow Sea in biggest show of strength near eastern China in 10 years
- Local media reports say the amphibious group led by the USS America will take part in a joint exercise with South Korean forces
- The US and South Korean presidents have pledged to ‘enhance the regular visibility of strategic assets’ amid rising tensions with China and the North
+ FOLLOWPublished: 9:00am, 5 Sep, 2023
By Seong Hyeon Choi South China Morning Post3 min
September 4, 2023
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The United States Navy is expected to take part in its first large-scale exercises in the Yellow Sea off the coast of northern China in 10 years, a move that risks further fuelling tensions with Beijing.
A South Korean defence ministry official said a US amphibious ready group, led by the USS America, and the Canadian frigate HMCS Vancouver would “participate in the celebration of the 73rd anniversary of the Battle of Incheon during the Korean war and the 70th anniversary of the US-South Korea alliance”.
Local media, citing senior government officials, reported that the group would also take part in what will “practically be a large-scale joint amphibious operation drill between the US and South Korea” around the commemorations.
The USS America is an amphibious assault ship that can also carry vertical take-off and landing aircraft, including the F-35B stealth fighter, giving it the capacity to take part in joint air and sea operations.
The last US major operation in the Yellow Sea was in 2013, when the carrier group led by USS George Washington took part in a joint exercise.
Since then it has only sent smaller groups or single ships into the waters – which at their narrowest point separate South Korea from China by less than 230km (140 miles) – in part to avoid a backlash from Beijing.
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Washington recently increased air force activity over the Yellow Sea following a series of North Korean missile launches and amid rising tensions with China.
In April, US President Joe Biden and his South Korean counterpart Yoon Suk-yeol pledged to “enhance the regular visibility of strategic assets” around the Korean peninsula.
Last week, the US conducted an air force drill in the Yellow Sea, involving strategic assets such as B-1B bombers, as a part of Ulchi Freedom Shield, an annual joint exercise that was revived last year.
Last week the Chinese defence ministry accused the US of “provocation” for regularly dispatching navy and air force units around China to “contain and suppress it” and the latest exercise is likely to add to tensions.
Kim Hyun-wook, a professor at Korea National Diplomatic Academy, said the US is demonstrating its commitment to deterring China and North Korea.
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“The current situation clearly shows the US superiority over China,” said Kim. “It holds various messages such as Washington’s containment of Beijing through trilateral cooperation with Seoul and Tokyo.” Last month the three countries agreed to stage regular joint exercises following a summit at Camp David.
Choo Jae-woo, professor of Chinese studies at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, said the USS America’s presence in the Yellow Sea was “very encouraging”.
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“It could be a sign that joint naval and air force drills between the US and South Korea will resume,” Choo added.
Kang Jun-young, a professor of Chinese studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, said the move was a “concrete demonstration” of the power of the US-South Korean alliance in response to the North’s nuclear threat.
“Because the North Korean nuclear threat has actually increased, the current South Korean government is strengthening military cooperation with the United States in order to secure minimal deterrence,” said Kang.
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“Naturally, China’s opposition is expected … it can be seen that there is also an aspect of expecting China to play an active role in North Korea’s nuclear negotiations, which are at a standstill.”
Collin Koh, a senior fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said the Yellow Sea has long been a secure area for Beijing, given its location and relatively low levels of maritime traffic.
“Basically, in the Yellow Sea it’ll be China and the two Koreas sharing a common maritime space. And amongst them China is the largest coastal state,” said Koh.
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“Therefore, having foreign militaries exercise in the Yellow Sea isn’t exactly a common occurrence and something that Beijing has anticipated as much as those in the South China Sea, East China Sea and Sea of Japan/East Sea.”
“It’s also a signal of deterrence against China – perhaps a reminder that the US can project military presence across all of China’s near seas.”
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9. ‘A Desperate Move’ – Kremlin Under Fire Over Russia’s Ammo Situation
He's "a desperate man - send lawyers, guns, and money." (apologies to Warren Zevon)
‘A Desperate Move’ – Kremlin Under Fire Over Russia’s Ammo Situation
As Ukraine's counteroffensive proceeds, experts from UK think tank Chatham House see signs of desperation in Moscow's plans to trade its technology and food for North Korean ammunition.
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/21310
by Kyiv Post | September 6, 2023, 1:16 pm | Comments ( 1)
The Kremlin is facing increasing criticism from Russian milbloggers over a lack of artillery ammunition, as a British think tank said President Putin’s courting of North Korea to gain more military supplies is a sign of “desperation.”
As Ukrainian forces’ counteroffensive advances, Moscow is growing more desperate to trade its technology for North Korean ammunition, experts at the UK think-tank Chatham House said.
“Ukraine has made significant progress and reached Russia's main defensive line in the south. This is therefore both a desperate and a logical move by Russia,” James Nixey, the director of the Russia and Eurasia program at Chatham House said in a press release.
Recent comments from Russian milbloggers also suggest the Kremlin’s ammo situation at the front is bleak.
In a post on Telegram, one prominent commentator said Russia’s forces are increasingly having to rely on Lancet drones and 220mm and 300mm rounds for Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), both of which are available in limited quantities.
The Institute for the Study of War in its latest daily assessment, wrote: “Russian sources continue to complain that Russian forces lack sufficient counterbattery capabilities and artillery munitions in the face of ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive activities, which the Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are reportedly attempting to combat.
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Speaking at a conference on mental health in Kyiv on Wednesday, the Hollywood actor and activist responded to a question from Kyiv Post with a brutal assessment of the Russian president.
Moscow now appears to be turning to North Korea to help solve the problem.
“One should be wary of falsely connecting cause and effect, but this weapons-for-tech (and money) exchange between Moscow and Pyongyang comes as the Russians are being pushed back in the counter-offensive,” Nixey said.
After weeks of mine clearance – Ukrainian forces broke through Russia’s first line of defense in the Zaporizhzhia region, Brig Gen Oleksandr Tarnavskiy told British media on Saturday, Sept. 2.
On Tuesday, Sept. 6, Ukrainian forces continued their advance south of the strategically important village of Robotyne – which they liberated on Aug. 28.
Tarnavskiy estimated that Russia had devoted 60 percent of its time and resources to building the first defensive line and likely only 20 percent to its second and third lines.
Nixey’s comments follow news that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was planning to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in Russia.
“Just as you can tell a person by their friends, you can tell a country by the company it keeps. In Russia's case, that company now consists largely of fellow rogue states,” Chatham House Senior Consulting Fellow Keir Giles said in the press release.
“China's reluctance to overtly supply Russia with serious and/or voluminous offensive weaponry leaves Russia with three primary options: indigenous production, Iran, and North Korea,” Nixey said.
According to The New York Times, Kim would come to Russia seeking advanced technology for satellites and nuclear-powered submarines as well as food aid for his impoverished nation.
“And Russia wants what North Korea has – vast stockpiles of the ammunition Russia has been burning through in its colonial war of reconquest at the other end of the country seven time zones away,” Giles said.
“Russia's past involvement in setting up a UN sanctions regime on [North Korea] is irrelevant. Such contradictions are no problem for Russia in peacetime, let alone wartime,” Nixey said.
Although he’s announced plans to visit China in October, Putin has not traveled abroad – apart from Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine – since his arrest warrant following an International Criminal Court ruling in March.
However, world leaders have been traveling to Russia.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Putin in Sochi, Russia on Monday, Sept. 4 in an attempt to revive a Ukrainian grain export agreement.
Kim would likely visit the far-eastern Russian city of Vladivostok to attend Russia’s Eastern Economic Forum, which is scheduled to run Sept. 10 to 13.
10. North Korea, the original Hermit Kingdom, slowly reopens after covid
North Korea, the original Hermit Kingdom, slowly reopens after covid
By Min Joo Kim
September 5, 2023 at 6:24 a.m. EDT
The Washington Post · by Min Joo Kim · September 5, 2023
SEOUL — North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was a master of social distancing long before the covid-19 pandemic, as head of a totalitarian state that has exerted tight control on its contacts with the outside world for seven decades. But even by Kim’s standards, the last 3½ years have been extraordinary.
North Korean authorities shut down international borders at the beginning of the pandemic in 2020. Almost all cross-border exchanges, including tourism, diplomatic visits, aid deliveries and trade, were restricted to prevent the coronavirus from infiltrating the country’s poor health-care system.
Now, the state is cracking open its doors.
North Korea’s flagship airline Air Koryo restarted services late last month from Pyongyang to Beijing and the Russian port city of Vladivostok. Freight transport by rail and waterways had already been increasing months before the resumption of passenger travel.
Kim himself is expected to make a rare trip to Russia to meet Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin later this month, his first known international trip since the pandemic closure, U.S. officials said Monday. Washington has accused Moscow of illegally seeking North Korean munitions for use in Ukraine.
Kim’s pandemic dictatorship
The Kim regime exploited the coronavirus as an excuse to impose even more control on people’s economic and social rights, experts and human rights advocates say. North Korea’s civilian economy, led by underground entrepreneurs, took a hit from the border closures barring black-market trade with China. Kim imposed restrictions on ordinary citizens’ movements, assembly and access to outside information, citing risks of exposure to covid.
The prolonged isolation also deepened the country’s chronic food insecurity, making people grow more dependent on Kim’s authoritarian leadership for their livelihoods.
“The past 3½ years of self-isolation provided an ideal environment for the North Korean leadership to exert greater central control over all realms, from one’s way of life to the economy,” said Rachel Minyoung Lee, a senior analyst at the Open Nuclear Network in Austria.
Aid workers, trade delegations and diplomats have been unable to enter the country, shuttering firsthand insights that could help inform those on the outside.
“Reopening borders will mean a greater likelihood of inflows and outflows of information, which will pose challenges to North Korea’s ongoing policy of greater centralization,” Lee said.
Why reopen the borders now?
During the lockdown, North Korea tried to make do with its ideology of self-reliance, such as boosting domestic manufacturing in limited areas, including textiles and agriculture. The regime has also ramped up its cybercrime activities to steal foreign currency in forms of cryptocurrency and other virtual assets, cyber analysts say.
But worsening economic conditions have pushed the Kim regime to seek external relief and partially reopen its borders to trade, according to experts.
“The cost of isolation that piled up over the years, however, has reached a breaking point for Kim,” said Heo Jeong-pil, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University in Seoul.
North Korea’s economy shrank for three years in row from 2020, according to estimates by South Korea’s central bank. The North’s essential trade with its ally China tumbled to a decades-long low of $320 million in 2021, down 90 percent from pre-pandemic levels.
Following a limited resumption of freight traffic last year, trade with China rebounded rapidly to $1.06 billion during just the first half of 2023. Since May, train services between North Korea and China have increased to twice daily, and some customs facilities reopened in June, according to a parliamentary briefing by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service.
And trade with Russia is increasing as well, though at lower levels than with China. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the growing global isolation of Moscow has pushed the Kremlin closer to the Kim regime.
North Korea has “a capacity to promptly supply Russia with the sought-after munitions” following a full-fledged reopening of the land route between the two countries, said Cho Han-bum, an analyst at Seoul’s Korea Institute for National Unification.
Overseas North Koreans return
Pyongyang is set to repatriate thousands of North Korean nationals stranded in China and Russia during the pandemic lockdown. Air Koryo last month resumed trips to Beijing and Vladivostok to bring back North Korean citizens.
North Korea’s health authorities said last week that Pyongyang has approved the return of its citizens abroad, citing an adjustment in the degree of its anti-epidemic stance amid “the eased worldwide pandemic situation.” Returnees will be monitored at quarantine wards for one week, according to state media.
“Many hundreds, or thousands, of North Koreans have been stuck outside of their home country for more than 3½ years now and so these first chances are for them to return,” said Simon Cockerell, the general manager of Beijing-based North Korea tour operator Koryo Tours.
Among the North Koreans facing imminent repatriation are students studying abroad, diplomats and laborers, as well as defectors detained in China. As a close ally of Pyongyang, Beijing regards North Korea defectors not as refugees but as illegal economic migrants.
Some experts believe North Korea may push to send more workers abroad to take the place of repatriated laborers. They provide an important source of foreign income for the regime, despite international sanctions banning overseas workers.
Covid-19 concerns remain
Despite the gradual reopening, the covid-19 situation inside the country remains unclear.
Kim, North Korea’s leader, made a highly disputed claim of “victory” over the coronavirus in August 2022, just three months after the country reported its first outbreak. Kim hinted at a covid-19 vaccination drive later that year, but there is still no evidence of a mass immunization campaign in North Korea.
“Lacking vaccines, North Korea resorted to a severe lockdown to fight the virus, and the country managed to remain shut until the pandemic began to wane globally,” said Ahn Kyung-su of the Seoul-based research center dprkhealth.org.
Covid-19 is still a risk to the country’s ill-equipped medical system, but the need for reopening has grown to outweigh the risk, according to Ahn. The borders have been reopening in phases to allow time and resources for the North’s health authorities to prepare accordingly, he said.
Will foreigners be allowed in?
Pyongyang has yet to make an announcement about when foreigners will be able to enter the country.
The Kim regime will gradually allow in accredited diplomats and aid workers, as well as tourists, said Heo, the Dongguk University professor. “While very careful at this point, North Korean authorities do need opportunities to raise foreign currency, and that is why they ultimately want tourists back.”
Last week, North Korea’s parliament passed a law for “expanding” international tourism, hinting the country is preparing to allow in more tourists. But it is unclear exactly when.
“Nobody knows when a border opening for foreign tourists will happen, but given that they do tend to move slowly and that the opening for North Koreans has only just started, it would be expected to be sometime later,” said Cockerell, the tour company manager.
The Washington Post · by Min Joo Kim · September 5, 2023
11. North Korea Finds New Leverage in the Ukraine War
North Korea Finds New Leverage in the Ukraine War
By Choe Sang-Hun
Reporting from Seoul
The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · September 7, 2023
News Analysis
Kim Jong-un is likely to seek missile and warhead technology in an expected visit to Russia, and he is already getting a public embrace he has long sought.
North Korea leader Kim Jong-un with Russia’s President Vladimir V. Putin in Vladivostok, Russia, in 2019. Russia has long been a crucial ally for the isolated North Korea.Credit...Shamil Zhumatov/Reuters
Sept. 5, 2023
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For Kim Jong-un, the leader of North Korea, a rare trip to Russia this month to discuss military aid for President Vladimir V. Putin’s Ukraine war effort could provide two things the North has wanted for a long time: technical help with its weapons programs, and to finally be needed by an important neighbor.
North Korea has not been used to getting a lot of attention other than global condemnation for its nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests. But Russia’s urgency to make new gains in the war is offering Mr. Kim a bit of the geopolitical spotlight — and a new way to both irk the United States and draw closer to Moscow and Beijing.
Though Russia has long been a crucial ally for the isolated North, relations between the two countries have at times grown tense since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. And Russia accounts for very little of the economic trade that North Korea needs; China alone provides nearly all of that.
Now, common interests and worldview are bringing the neighbors closer.
The White House has repeatedly warned that North Korea was starting to ship artillery shells and rockets to Russia and negotiating for more arms deals. And Western officials’ claims this week that Mr. Kim will travel to Russia soon indicate that they fear the process is moving forward with more intent.
A news broadcast on a North Korean missile launch, at a train station in Seoul, South Korea, last week. North Korea has not been used to getting a lot of attention other than global condemnation for its nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests.Credit...Jeon Heon-Kyun/EPA, via Shutterstock
For its part, North Korea faces critical technological hurdles in its nuclear and missile programs, as well as dire economic need, and Russia could help more on those fronts.
“It’s a win-win situation for both sides,” said Lee Byong-chul, a North Korea expert at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University in Seoul.
One question hanging over such a deal is just how much North Korean aid could move Russia’s war effort forward, especially given the North’s economic difficulties and chronic food shortages. In recent weeks, Mr. Kim has visited a series of munitions factories, exhorting the officials there to step up production, according to state media.
But Mr. Lee said the North may have a large surplus of ammunition already available, as it has not fought a war since the Korean War armistice in 1953. And with armaments largely based on Soviet weapons systems, North Korean munitions are widely compatible with Russia’s arsenal.
“It’s shocking news for the U.S. and countries in Europe hoping for an early end to the war in Ukraine,” Mr. Lee said. “North Korean munitions can add fuel to the fire.”
A deal with Russia could also further raise tensions around the Korean Peninsula, helping North Korea advance its nuclear weapons program and pushing both South Korea and Japan to strengthen their own military cooperation with the United States, analysts say.
“Kim is looking for technological shortcuts for his military satellite and missile programs that have been frustrated by economic sanctions,” said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul. He added that increased military exchanges between Russia and North Korea “would undermine peace and security in Europe and Asia, and demonstrate Moscow and Pyongyang’s willingness to blatantly enable each other’s violations of international law.”
A trench in a village occupied by Russian soldiers and recaptured by Ukrainian forces in July. North Korean aid could move Russia’s war effort forward in Ukraine.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times
Mr. Kim’s potential trip to Russia would be the first since he made an initial official visit there by armored train in 2019.
Since taking power in 2011, the North Korean leader has sought parallel goals: building a nuclear arsenal and reviving his country’s decrepit economy. He first focused on his weapons programs, conducting four underground nuclear tests and launching ICBMs. He tried to use his country’s growing military threat as leverage to force Washington to ease sanctions so he could improve its economy.
That hope evaporated with the collapse of his diplomacy with Mr. Trump in 2019. And Mr. Kim has since struggled to chart a new course. Soon, he bet his luck on a changing world order he termed a “neo-Cold War,” seeking to align his country more closely with Beijing and Moscow against the “unipolar” world order dominated by the United States.
His strategy has already reaped benefits, allowing his country to conduct a series of ICBM and other missile tests with impunity despite resolutions by the United Nations Security Council. Though the North has traditionally offered Russia and China at least as much trouble as comradeship, both countries wielded their veto power at the Council when the United States and its allies tried to adopt new penalties against the North in recent months.
Both Russia and China sent high-ranking officials — Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu came from Russia, and the Communist Party Politburo member Li Hongzhong from China — to Pyongyang in July. In a scene symbolic of deepening ties among the countries, the two officials joined Mr. Kim on a balcony as North Korea held a military parade.
Mr. Kim, center, with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chinese Communist Party Politburo member Li Hongzhong in Pyongyang during a military parade in July.Credit...Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service, via Associated Press
The parade was to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of the Korean War, celebrated in North Korea as “Victory Day.” The Korea conflict was the last war in which the three nations fought together against the United States and its allies. And by bringing them together again, Mr. Kim sought to evoke an intensifying trilateral alliance to counter the three-way partnership among Washington, Tokyo and Seoul, analysts said.
“Kim Jong-un is jumping on the ‘new Cold War’ bandwagon,” said Sung Ki-young, an analyst at the Institute for National Security Strategy, a think tank affiliated with South Korea’s National Intelligence Service. “There is no better time for him to elevate his relevance by aligning closely with Russia.”
During his trip, Mr. Shoigu suggested joint military drills with North Korea and China to counter trilateral military cooperation in the region by the United States, South Korea and Japan, according to South Korean lawmakers who were briefed by the South’s National Intelligence Service on Monday.
And in August, Mr. Kim and Mr. Putin exchanged letters pleading to expand “bilateral cooperation in all fields” and build “a longstanding strategic relationship in conformity with the demand of the new era,” according to state media.
Moscow currently offers little in economic aid or trade to the North: North Korea only imported 5,380 tons of corn and flour from Russia in the first five months of this year, compared with 102,000 tons of rice imported from China, according to South Korean government economists.
An annual rice planting event in Nampho City, North Korea, in 2019. Russia currently offers little in economic aid to North Korea, which gets most of its rice imports from China.
But Russia has crucial technologies that could help advance North Korea’s weapons programs. Although North Korea has launched multiple ICBMs since 2017, Western experts still doubt that the country has all the technology needed to make its nuclear warheads small and light enough to traverse an intercontinental range.
North Korea has also twice attempted to launch its first military spy satellite into orbit since May, but both attempts failed. The country is also trying to build its first ballistic missile submarine and is believed to face technical hurdles there as well.
“I don’t think that any economic assistance from Russia could be more than symbolic,” Mr. Sung said. “But North Korea needs technological help from Russia. North Korea’s five major weapons projects are all based on original Russian technology.”
Choe Sang-Hun is the Seoul bureau chief for The Times, focusing on news in North and South Korea. More about Choe Sang-Hun
A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Ukraine War Puts a Lever In Kim’s Grip
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The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · September 7, 2023
12. Yoon says N. Korea's nuclear program is existential threat to Indo-Pacific
(LEAD) Yoon says N. Korea's nuclear program is existential threat to Indo-Pacific | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · September 7, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with Yoon's actual remarks, other details; CHANGES photo)
By Lee Haye-ah
JAKARTA, Sept. 7 (Yonhap) -- South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol said Thursday that North Korea's nuclear and missile development poses an existential threat to the Indo-Pacific region and called for the strict implementation of U.N. sanctions on the regime.
Yoon made the remark during an East Asia Summit (EAS) in Jakarta that brought together leaders from the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and South Korea, the United States, Japan, China, Russia, India, Australia and New Zealand.
"North Korea's nuclear and missile development is a serious violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions and a direct challenge to world peace," he said. "It is an existential threat that can target and strike all nations participating in today's meeting."
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (2nd from L) arrives at the East Asia Summit at the Balai Sidang Jakarta Convention Center in the Indonesian capital on Sept. 7, 2023, alongside Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (2nd from R) and U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris (R). (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
Yoon especially noted the obligation of all U.N. member states to abide by U.N. Security Council sanctions resolutions against the North.
"The responsibility of the Security Council's permanent members that adopted the resolutions can be said to be heavier," Yoon said, apparently directing his remarks at Russia and China, two countries suspected of being lukewarm on sanctions enforcement against the North.
The remark came amid reports North Korean leader Kim Jong-un may travel to Vladivostok, Russia, next week to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin and discuss a possible arms deal. A day earlier, Yoon had urged an immediate halt to "attempts at military cooperation with North Korea."
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Chinese Premier Li Qiang were present at the EAS, where Yoon also discussed the need to block sources of funding for North Korea's nuclear and missile development, including cryptocurrency stealing, labor exports and maritime transshipments, and called attention to the issue of North Korea's human rights abuses.
Yoon has been in Jakarta since Tuesday to attend a series of annual summits involving ASEAN, including a South Korea-ASEAN summit and an ASEAN Plus Three summit with Japan and China.
ASEAN comprises Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
During the EAS, Yoon outlined South Korea's positions on key global issues.
On the war in Ukraine, he reaffirmed that Russia's invasion constitutes a clear violation of international law and shared South Korea's own experience of facing an existential crisis due to North Korea's illegal invasion in 1950. He also recalled his trip to Kyiv in July and his announcement of the "Ukraine Peace and Solidarity Initiative," a comprehensive package of security, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.
"South Korea will faithfully execute the Ukraine Peace and Solidarity Initiative that we pledged," Yoon said. "We will contribute in a responsible manner to Ukraine's reconstruction and recovery efforts in the future."
On tensions in the South China Sea, Yoon said South Korea will not tolerate unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force and emphasized the need to establish a rules-based maritime order in the critical sea lane.
Yoon voiced concern over the continued violence and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar and expressed support for the ASEAN-proposed solution of halting violence and holding inclusive dialogue.
He also noted that both South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific aim for freedom, peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific by seeking solidarity through the establishment of a rules-based order under the principles of inclusivity, trust and reciprocity.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · September 7, 2023
13. Why China, Russia, and North Korea Joining Forces in the Indo-Pacific Isn’t a Prelude to War
Conclusion:
But while experts agree that the threat of a great power is not likely to increase even if this new trilateral alliance were to be realized, it could still have a significant impact on the region by further forcing smaller states in the region, who have long abided by principles of non-alignment, to pick a side.
Why China, Russia, and North Korea Joining Forces in the Indo-Pacific Isn’t a Prelude to War
TIME · by Chad de Guzman · September 5, 2023
Russia has reportedly proposed conducting three-way naval exercises with North Korea and China in the Indo-Pacific, potentially formalizing a union between countries that already individually pose security threats to the U.S. and its allies.
According to South Korean news agency Yonhap, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service revealed the proposal to lawmakers in a closed-door briefing on Monday, alleging that the Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu offered such a show of alliance to North Korea during his meeting with Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un in July. Just this past weekend, Russia’s ambassador to North Korea, Alexander Matsegora, told Russian media that it “seems appropriate” to include North Korea in joint military drills between Russia and China.
China, so far, has kept silent on the proposal. And there’s also no sign yet that Kim will accept Russia’s overture, which would mark the first such large-scale drills for the isolationist state since the end of the Korean War in the 1950s, though North Korea does stand to benefit the most from joining forces with comparatively more modernized militaries.
Bernard Loo, senior fellow specializing in military and defense policy at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, says the proposal is almost certainly motivated by the recently formalized U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral defense alliance.
In recent decades, the Indo-Pacific has become a theater of several security flashpoints. China is increasingly exerting its influence and military might on neighboring states and maritime territories, prompting the U.S. to shore up its security pacts with partners in the region. Nuclearization is also a growing concern around the Korean peninsula, as North Korea continues to ramp up missile testing and warmongering rhetoric.
Should looping in North Korea in joint China-Russia military exercises happen, observers say the risks to neighboring states would be minimal, as a trilateral naval drill would be less a preparation for war and more just a diplomatic signaling of a counter-alliance in the Indo-Pacific. “I see this as more a coming together of states, particularly North Korea and Russia, that have a dwindling circle of friends,” Loo says.
A potential naval exercise between China, Russia, and North Korea would move one step closer towards the establishment of a formal united front against the U.S. and its allies. But despite the world being seemingly split into two factions with this possible counter-alliance, experts say it could actually have a stabilizing effect by creating a check on each of its parties from instigating conflict unilaterally.
Russia and China, for example, are partly aligned on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, so they may not support North Korea’s continued threats to use its nuclear arsenal. “While North Korea is obviously a partner, due to the convergence of their strategic interests, I don't think there is a convergence in terms of what they think North Korea should do,” says Collin Koh, another senior fellow specializing in Asia-Pacific naval affairs at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.
Koh also tells TIME that any drills between the nations would only have “peacetime utility,” as they couldn’t properly simulate what would happen in an actual war due to geographical limitations. Exercises would likely only take place near the coasts of the Yellow Sea to the Korean peninsula’s west and the Sea of Japan to its east.
But while experts agree that the threat of a great power is not likely to increase even if this new trilateral alliance were to be realized, it could still have a significant impact on the region by further forcing smaller states in the region, who have long abided by principles of non-alignment, to pick a side.
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TIME · by Chad de Guzman · September 5, 2023
14. N. Korea moves to accelerate production of automatic rifle ammunition
Has this been coordinated with Russia? is this one of their initial requirements? If so, what does this say about the war in Ukraine?
N. Korea moves to accelerate production of automatic rifle ammunition
Specially designated munition plants in Chagang Province and North Pyongan Province are producing ammunition, a source told Daily NK
By Mun Dong Hui -
2023.09.07 5:00pm
dailynk.com
N. Korea moves to accelerate production of automatic rifle ammunition | Daily NK English
Home News
The Chongjin Munitions Factory (Google Earth)
North Korea is revving up production of automatic rifle ammunition, Daily NK has learned.
Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a Daily NK source in North Korea said Tuesday that the country is “producing ammunition to meet the specs of [newly developed] rifles,” adding that the “performance of the ammunition currently in production has been doubled to increase revolutions and speed to match the long barrels of the new rifles.”
He said several calibers are in production “as there are several types of new rifles,” and that the authorities “plan to distribute weapons and ammunition to each unit in line with their combat duties.”
Daily NK reported in late August that North Korea had developed a new sniper rifle, which it plans to distribute first to the 11th Corps, or so-called Storm Corps, a special forces unit.
However, North Korea still lacks the money, supplies, electricity and manpower to produce the ammunition.
“Generally speaking, munition factories don’t have the wherewithal to produce the new ammunition,” the source said. “This is because they operate to produce only the amounts stipulated in their annual quotas.”
That being said, given how North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called for increasing production capacity of weapons during his recent inspections of key munition factories, reminding them that “the material level of the country’s war preparations depends on the development of munition industries,” some factories are mobilizing all resources on hand to urgently produce ammunition, the source said.
“To carry out an emergency task, the Workers’ Party must provide money, the necessary supplies and electricity, ensure worker attendance and supply work uniforms, tools and other items,” the source said. “Specially designated munition plants in Chagang Province and North Pyongan Province are producing ammunition, even though [government] support is lacking.”
Meanwhile, North Korea plans to export its old ammunition, with the remainder either provided to militia units or used in training. This suggests that North Korea is exporting not only weapons, but also ammunition.
“We are exporting what existing ammunition we have,” the source said. “As for the ammunition we can’t export, we plan to provide it to the armories of militia units, Worker-Peasant Red Guards and Red Youth Guards and expend it during exercises.”
In late July, North Korean media released of photos of Kim Jong Un at a weapons exposition with a Russian military delegation visiting North Korea to celebrate Pyongyang’s “victory” in the Korean War on July 27. The North Korean leader was shown providing personal explanations of the systems on display, and state-run media published severeal reports on Kim’s inspections of munitions factories. Following these reports, speculation emerged that North Korea was gearing up to export weapons to Russia to relieve the country’s arms shortages due to the war in Ukraine.
Daily NK reported in late August that North Korea is smuggling weapons and ammunition to armed groups overseas, including Russia, though a source confirmed that the DPRK is adhering to a rule that prohibits the sale of newly produced weapons.
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources who live inside North Korea, China and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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Mun Dong Hui
Mun Dong Hui is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about his articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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15. There is no ‘nuclear peace’ on the Korean Peninsula
Countering Mearsheimer.
Excerpt:
Earlier this year, the DPRK defense minister said the deployment of nuclear-capable US platforms to South Korea could meet the requirements set out in the new law for Pyongyang to launch a nuclear strike. This is not what peace and stability look like.
Finally, Mearsheimer’s argument does not account for what international relations scholars call the stability-instability paradox: Nuclear-armed adversaries may be so confident that the other side is deterred from using its nuclear weapons that one or both is emboldened to indulge in conventional military adventurism.
If and when Pyongyang believes it has a sufficiently robust second-strike capability – meaning it could absorb a US nuclear attack and still hit back hard enough to cause unacceptable death and destruction on the US homeland – the Kim regime might use stronger and more frequent conventional military attacks against South Korea than before, because it will have negated America’s nuclear umbrella over the Peninsula.
This could enable a DPRK strategy that aims first to destroy South Korean confidence in US protection, then to break up the alliance and, finally, to use nuclear coercion to force Seoul to submit to Pyongyang’s political demands.
The Cold War notion of nuclear peace fares poorly in the case of the Korean Peninsula, where none of the three main actors necessarily behaves as a general theory would predict. Pyongyang’s deployment of nuclear weapons has made a bad situation worse.
There is no ‘nuclear peace’ on the Korean Peninsula
If North Korea’s Kim succeeds in negating the US nuclear umbrella, what’s to stop him from attacking South Korea?
asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · September 5, 2023
A controversial take on nuclear weapons is that they have the upside of preserving peace by making war so dangerous that states try harder to avoid it.
Many international relations analysts within the neo-realist school subscribe to this view. They point out that despite decades of tense relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, there was never a hot US-Soviet war.
A major reason might have been the fear that even a war fought with conventional weapons would escalate to the use of nuclear weapons, against which neither side could defend itself. Washington and Moscow backed opposing sides in proxy wars, but the specter of total annihilation caused both to behave with extraordinary caution toward each other’s military forces.
Is this interpretation of Cold War history relevant to today’s Northeast Asia? America’s most prominent neo-realist scholar, John Mearsheimer, applied the “nuclear peace” logic to the Korean Peninsula during his speech at the 2023 Korea Global Forum in Seoul on August 30.
“North Koreans with nuclear weapons is, I think, better than North Korea without nuclear weapons,” Mearsheimer argued. “I think the Korean Peninsula is more peaceful with a nuclear-armed North Korea than without.”
Mearsheimer said the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) acquired nuclear weapons to offset two threats to its security: First, its conventional military forces became weaker than those of South Korea, which left the DPRK vulnerable to invasion by its southern cousins.
Second, Pyongyang “has to worry greatly about the United States, [which] is obsessed with regime change, and … would like nothing more than to effect regime change in North Korea.”
Now that the DPRK is nuclear-armed, he said, “war on the Peninsula is extremely unlikely.” The US and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are deterred from attacking North Korea, while Pyongyang dares not use its nukes because of likely US nuclear retaliation.
John Mearsheimer makes a point but his analysis of peace on the Peninsula misses the mark. Image: Twitter
As with the US and the USSR during the Cold War, Mearsheimer argues, nuclear arsenals possessed by both North Korea and the US-ROK alliance compel both sides to behave cautiously, bolstering peace and stability.
The notion that DPRK nukes cause peace on the Korean Peninsula, however, is flawed from several angles.
A key part of Mearsheimer’s argument is that Pyongyang acquired nuclear weapons because it believed South Korea, the United States or both would attack unless deterred by something more than the DPRK’s conventional forces.
That presumed belief is clearly wrong. The combined strength of US and ROK conventional forces has outmatched DPRK military strength at least since the 1990s. On top of this, the United States had total asymmetrical dominance in nuclear weapons over North Korea for six decades after the end of the Korean War. Yet Washington and Seoul chose not to invade or even attack the North.
A possible rebuttal is that even if there was never an actual danger of an unprovoked US/ROK attack, what matters is the Kim regime believed there is a danger. That the regime harbors such a belief is plausible.
US bombing destroyed much of North Korea during the Korean War; the American government threatened to use nuclear weapons before Pyongyang had them; and North Korean officials constantly allege – especially during US-ROK military exercises – that Washington is bent on going to war against the DPRK.
The DPRK’s actions, however, cast doubt on the notion that the Kim regime really fears attack from the US, as opposed to merely saying so for domestic propaganda purposes. Creating the image of a powerful and belligerent enemy gives the regime an excuse for economic underperformance at home and allows Kim to take undeserved credit for scaring off the expected enemy aggression.
In practice, for many years Pyongyang has felt so confident that its adversaries would not strike that it regularly carried out its own small-scale and sometimes lethal attacks against South Koreans.
These included placing a bomb that killed ROK officials visiting Rangoon, Burma/Myanmar, in 1983; the bombing of a Korean Airlines passenger jet in 1987, killing all 115 aboard; and the sinking of the ROK Navy vessel Cheonan in 2010, which killed 46 South Korean sailors.
Results of the October 9, 1983, bombing attack on South Korean presidential party visiting Yangon, Myanmar. President Chun Doo-hwan’s life was spared but the blast left 21 people dead and 46 others injured. In their investigation into the bombing, Myanmar police identified three North Korean agents who had come aboard a ship to Yangon and received explosives in the North Korean embassy. Photo: Kim Sang-yeong / Chosun Ilbo
There are two reasons why South Korea, as Pyongyang came to learn, has been loath to get into a military conflict with the DPRK.
First, neither the ROK government nor South Korean society is interested in conquering North Korea, even if they could do it at a low military cost. While they support the idea of reunification in principle, they are wary of the expense of rebuilding the North and the difficulty of managing a people who are inexperienced in democracy and ill-equipped to be productive in an advanced free market economy.
Second, Seoul, and by extension Washington, has long been deterred from taking military action by the likelihood that North Korean retaliation using conventional munitions delivered by artillery and rockets would devastate Seoul, where much of the ROK’s wealth and population are concentrated. In effect, the DPRK already had a sufficient capability to deter a serious US/ROK attack prior to acquiring nuclear weapons.
As for the US, rather than being “obsessed with regime change” in Pyongyang, Washington has expended considerable effort since the start of the long-running nuclear weapons crisis trying to assure the Kims that overthrowing them is not on the menu.
A common feature of official US efforts to subvert unfriendly foreign governments is pressure over human rights abuses, but the Trump and Biden administrations left the US government post of special envoy for North Korea human rights issues vacant from 2017 to 2023.
If the pre-nuclear DPRK government feared US attack, logically it would have viewed the period of time when it was known to be developing its nuclear weapons as the apogee of its vulnerability.
The US would have had the maximum incentive to launch a preventive strike or regime-ending invasion before the North gained nuclear symmetry with the United States and perhaps the capability to threaten the US homeland. If Pyongyang was afraid, it should have kept its nuclear aspirations as low-profile as possible.
Instead, however, the DPRK government taunted the United States, implying an eagerness to use nuclear weapons to kill Americans even years before this capability was operational. When former US secretary of defense William Perry led a delegation to North Korea in 1999, a military officer told him that DPRK nuclear weapons could hit Perry’s hometown of Palo Alto, California “the next day.”
North Korea released a video in 2013 depicting the nuclear destruction of New York. It gave Washington, DC, similar treatment with a 2016 video.
Kim Jong Un looks at a rocket warhead tip after a simulated test of atmospheric re-entry of a ballistic missile, at an unidentified location in this undated photo released March 15, 2016. Photo: KCNA
If, as Mearsheimer argues, fear of a US or South Korean invasion was the driving factor in Pyongyang’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, these weapons might increase peace by making North Korea feel secure. But if North Korea was not afraid of attack even before it got nukes, Mearsheimer’s argument is undercut.
The evidence suggests Pyongyang sought a nuclear capability for some other reason—perhaps as a bargaining chip, to bolster the regime’s prestige, or to force concessions from its adversaries.
Whatever the theoretical appeal of Mearsheimer’s argument, in empirical terms, it’s clear that North Korea’s getting nuclear weapons has increased, not decreased, tensions on the Peninsula. Washington and Seoul have proven they are content to ignore North Korea unless Pyongyang forces a crisis upon them.
The DPRK government’s demonstration of a nuclear capability, followed by its announced intentions to make that capability more threatening to its adversaries, has drawn reactions from the USA and the ROK, leading to counter-reactions from Pyongyang. The Peninsula is not “more peaceful.” Rather, it is seeing a negative spiral.
The DPRK going nuclear led the South Korean government to announce a risky, aggressive posture of targeting the North Korean leadership with missile strikes if a nuclear attack appears imminent.
Washington attempted to restore South Korean confidence in US extended deterrence by announcing that US “strategic assets” will regularly visit the ROK. In response, Pyongyang announced a law in late 2022 that allows for a pre-emptive nuclear strike against an adversary suspected of targeting the DPRK leadership.
Earlier this year, the DPRK defense minister said the deployment of nuclear-capable US platforms to South Korea could meet the requirements set out in the new law for Pyongyang to launch a nuclear strike. This is not what peace and stability look like.
Finally, Mearsheimer’s argument does not account for what international relations scholars call the stability-instability paradox: Nuclear-armed adversaries may be so confident that the other side is deterred from using its nuclear weapons that one or both is emboldened to indulge in conventional military adventurism.
If and when Pyongyang believes it has a sufficiently robust second-strike capability – meaning it could absorb a US nuclear attack and still hit back hard enough to cause unacceptable death and destruction on the US homeland – the Kim regime might use stronger and more frequent conventional military attacks against South Korea than before, because it will have negated America’s nuclear umbrella over the Peninsula.
This could enable a DPRK strategy that aims first to destroy South Korean confidence in US protection, then to break up the alliance and, finally, to use nuclear coercion to force Seoul to submit to Pyongyang’s political demands.
The Cold War notion of nuclear peace fares poorly in the case of the Korean Peninsula, where none of the three main actors necessarily behaves as a general theory would predict. Pyongyang’s deployment of nuclear weapons has made a bad situation worse.
Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu.
Related
asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · September 5, 2023
16. Kim Jong-un's Arms Deals with Putin Must Be Stopped
This is quite a leap in logic - South Korean nuclear powered submarine? What for?
Excerpt:
If Putin tries to supply nuclear-powered submarines, reconnaissance satellites and cutting-edge fighter jets to North Korea, South Korea should consider supplying weapons directly to Ukraine. That could have a huge effect on the direction of the war in Ukraine. Until now, Seoul has only provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine due to concerns of damaging its ties with Russia. But stern measures are called for if Putin takes steps that could have a direct impact on South Korea's national security. Talks with the U.S. may also be needed to that South Korea can secure its own nuclear-powered submarines capable of monitoring North Korean subs around the clock.
Kim Jong-un's Arms Deals with Putin Must Be Stopped
english.chosun.com
September 06, 2023 13:42
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is highly likely to visit Vladivostok next week to talk arms deals with Russian President Vladimir Putin. So far North Korea has been providing ammunition to Russia through Wagner Group, the private military outfit fighting in Ukraine, but now the two countries are discussing direct supply. That would constitute a violation of UN Security Council sanctions against the North which Russia, a permanent member of the UNSC, signed up to.
The New York Times reported that Kim is likely to visit a naval base and space station in Vladivostok, which suggests the North could demand technology transfer of Russian nuclear-powered submarines and reconnaissance satellites. Since 2021, North Korea has focused on achieving five goals for strategic weapons development, but the project has not been progressing smoothly. The North has failed two consecutive reconnaissance satellite launches so far this year and lacks the technology to build a nuclear-powered submarine. Kim will surely try to secure those technologies when he meets Putin.
North Korea could also ask for Russia's help in modernizing its outdated weapons. North Korea's main fighter jet is the Russian MiG-29 that was purchased in the 1980s. If Russia provides the North with cutting-edge fighter planes and air defense systems, South Korea's national security will be threatened. North Korea already has submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and if it gets its hands on nuclear-powered subs that can remained submerged indefinitely, Seoul's ability to monitor the North's nuclear weapons will be disabled. The deals Putin signs with Kim must be closely watched and met with an appropriate response if they involve nuclear-powered submarines and other prohibited technologies.
If Putin tries to supply nuclear-powered submarines, reconnaissance satellites and cutting-edge fighter jets to North Korea, South Korea should consider supplying weapons directly to Ukraine. That could have a huge effect on the direction of the war in Ukraine. Until now, Seoul has only provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine due to concerns of damaging its ties with Russia. But stern measures are called for if Putin takes steps that could have a direct impact on South Korea's national security. Talks with the U.S. may also be needed to that South Korea can secure its own nuclear-powered submarines capable of monitoring North Korean subs around the clock.
english.chosun.com
17. N. Korea’s defense ministry criticizes military units that failed to collect enough salt
What happens to Ranger School students who steal or hoard food?
Not as bad as what might happen to these logistics officers.
N. Korea’s defense ministry criticizes military units that failed to collect enough salt
Some logistics officers were found to have sold some of the salt they collected to purchase meat and alcohol for their personal consumption
dailynk.com
N. Korea’s defense ministry criticizes military units that failed to collect enough salt | Daily NK English
Kim Jong Un at the Kwisong Saltern in 2016. (Yonhap)
After reviewing this year’s salt collection efforts in mid-August, North Korea’s Ministry of Defense sharply criticized military units that failed to meet their collection quotas, Daily NK has learned.
“The defense ministry instructed various military units to complete salt collection by mid-July. The ministry received reports on those efforts in late July and then reviewed them in mid-August,” a source in Pyongyang told Daily NK on Sept. 1, speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
Since military units were running low on fuel oil, the defense ministry had provided them with extra fuel from the reserves set aside for wartime use to support the salt collection efforts. In the review, the ministry severely criticized units that had not collected in the necessary amount of salt despite the extra support.
“This year, the defense ministry had ordered that experienced logistics officers be dispatched to collect a year’s supply of salt, but units failed to meet their salt targets once again this year,” the source said.
Experienced logistics officers were supposed to visit salt producing areas to personally assist the work crews and take ownership of the salt collection efforts.
To facilitate those efforts, the officers were expected to learn about the technical aspects of salt production in advance. But some military units dispatched staff who had not been adequately trained, earning a sharp rebuke in the ministry’s review.
“The defense ministry noted that it had provided units with fuel oil from the combat reserves to use in salt collection, but they only brought back three or four months’ worth of salt, instead of a year’s worth, as if they’d been on some kind of field trip,” the source said.
Review finds evidence of corruption
Another serious problem that the ministry found in the review was that some logistics officers had sold off portions of the meager amount of salt they had collected and then pocketed the proceeds, the source said.
In the review, the ministry claimed that some logistics officers had constantly griped about salt collection without showing any remorse or contrition and had even sold some of the salt they collected to purchase meat and alcohol for their personal consumption. The ministry’s review emphasized that those officers would be harshly punished.
The defense ministry’s review provided a detailed account of the problems that had occurred during this year’s salt collection, stressing that there will be no more salt rations this year and that military units will have to make up for a lack of salt through “self-sufficiency.”
Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources who live inside North Korea, China and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
Jong So Yong
Jong So Yong is one of Daily NK’s freelance reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynk@uni-media.net.
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18. North's mid-air detonation tests suggest will to kill
Thursday
September 7, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Published: 07 Sep. 2023, 18:38
North's mid-air detonation tests suggest will to kill
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2023-09-07/national/northKorea/Norths-midair-detonation-tests-suggest-will-to-kill/1864529
In this photo released by Pyongyang's state-controlled Korean Central News Agency, the North Korean military launches a missile as part of an exercise aimed at rehearsing the ″devastation″ of South Korean command nodes and communications. [YONHAP]
North Korea’s recent tests involving the mid-air detonation of missile warheads are likely intended to maximize casualties in the event of armed hostilities with South Korea, according to Seoul’s intelligence and independent analysis conducted by the JoongAng Ilbo.
The altitudes at which the North’s missile warheads detonated during tests have been included in recent reports by Pyongyang’s state media, suggesting that the regime is sending a message that it could inflict serious loss of life or injuries on South Korean civilian populations.
For example, a 10-kiloton tactical nuclear warhead that detonates at a 400-meter (1,312-feet) altitude over central Seoul — the same as a test warhead on a KN-24 short-range ballistic missile launched into the East Sea late last month — would likely kill 46,510 South Koreans and seriously maim 164,850 more, according to the JoongAng Ilbo’s analysis.
The JoongAng Ilbo reached that estimate using Nukemap, an online map tool developed by Alex Wellerstein, a historian of science at the Stevens Institute of Technology, that calculates the effects of the detonation of a nuclear bomb.
Such a warhead would also generate a fireball approximately 153 meters in radius and destroy all residential buildings within 1.36 kilometers (0.84 miles) of the detonation point, while the resulting shockwaves would likely hit a total area of 41.7 square kilometers (10,304 acres).
In another test publicized on Saturday, the North’s state media said that test warheads mounted on what appeared to be recently developed Hwasal-1 or Hwasal-2 cruise missiles detonated at a pre-set altitude of 150 meters.
Related Article
If such cruise missiles successfully evaded South Korean air defenses and detonated over Seoul City Hall at an equivalent distance above ground, approximately 60,910 people would be killed and another 113,870 would be seriously injured.
At a parliamentary intelligence committee briefing on Monday, officials from South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) told lawmakers that the North’s reports on mid-air missile warhead detonation are aimed at “testing the power of tactical nuclear weapons” and indicate the North’s military tactics in the event it decides to recommence full-scale hostilities against the South.
Beginning this year, the North has frequently included the altitude at which its various missile warheads exploded in its media reports, highlighting the regime’s ability to control their detonation.
On March 19, the Pyongyang’s state media reported that it had “verified” devices that control and ignite tactical nuclear warheads during a test launch of a KN-23 short-range ballistic missile that detonated at a pre-set altitude of 800 meters.
Three days later, the regime also said that it had tested igniting a warhead on a “strategic cruise missile” at 600 meters above ground, followed shortly after by a test of a KN-24 missile on March 27 at an altitude of 500 meters.
In this photo released by the Pyongyang's state-controlled Korean Central Televsion on March 28, a warhead on a North Korean KN-24 short-range ballistic missile launched the day before detonates mid-air. In its report, the KCTV claimed that the missile warhead detonated mid-air at an altitude of 500 meters. [YONHAP]
According to Kwon Yong-su, a missile expert and former professor at the Korea National Defense University, the North’s recent tests of warhead detonation at varying altitudes suggest that the regime is focusing on drawing up tailored plans to attack South Korean civil and defense facilities in the event of war.
“The optimal altitude [of detonation] can vary depending on the intended strike target sites and personnel,” he said, adding that this would explain why the North “appears to be carrying out different tests.”
According to Nukemap, the optimal altitude for a 10-kiloton tactical nuclear weapon to maximize casualties is a detonation point just over 1 kilometer from the ground, but such a weapon would have to explode at an altitude of just 102 meters to destroy a reinforced concrete structure.
A South Korean military official who spoke on condition of anonymity told the JoongAng Ilbo said that the North’s announcement that it had conducted a missile launch exercise to rehearse “devastating” command nodes and communications in the South was “likely intended to emphasize its capabilities.”
BY LEE KEUN-PYUNG,MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
19. South Korea’s Political Bifurcation Will Stifle Any Trilateral Agreement
Excerpts:
The future of the Camp David principles depends on a range of issues. Not least, South Korea’s domestic politics will impact the newly minted agreement. Any trilateral agreement will be torn to shreds and discarded when the Korean left makes it into office, whether in 2027 or later in the future.
The Democratic Party has proven it has a penchant for deferring security issues in favor of nationalist populist ideas. When the South Korean left re-enter the executive, all momentum will be lost. Understanding this domestic dynamic is essential. Without convincing the South Korean political left that various threats in the Indo-Pacific are more critical than perceived threats to their national identity, there is little chance that the Camp David Principles will institutionalize the trilateral alliance.
South Korea’s Political Bifurcation Will Stifle Any Trilateral Agreement
The whole point of the Camp David Summit was to institutionalize Japan-South Korea-U.S. cooperation. But no one should expect South Korea’s left to keep to the same path.
thediplomat.com · by Dylan Stent · September 7, 2023
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On August 18, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, and U.S. President Joe Biden met at Camp David for a trilateral meeting. Afterwards, they publicly stated they shared a vision for their partnership and the Indo-Pacific. They declared that this partnership was based on “a bedrock of shared values, mutual respect, and a unified commitment to advance the prosperity of our three countries, the region, and the globe,” while resisting other unilateral attempts (meaning China) to change the status quo by force or coercion. The resulting Camp David Principles listed several liberal norms based on trust, respecting human rights, free and open economic economics, and other promises.
These ideas sound pleasing in a briefing on the White House website, the South Korean Presidential Office website, or the Prime Minister of Japan’s website. Multiple journalists and scholars have noted that the agreement significantly shifted East Asian geopolitics; the summit has been described as historic and a new era in trilateral relations. Others have been skeptical for a number of reasons.
Less discussed is how an important ideological bifurcation within South Korea – “South-South conflict” – and left-leaning nationalist populism will likely stifle any agreement being realized.
The South-South Conflict and Leftist Populism
South Koreans have a penchant for aphorisms, with controversy over the Sunshine Policy in the 2000s leading to the creation of the term “South-South conflict.” South-South conflict is a term used to explain how political polarization in South Korea impacts foreign policy. In particular, the political left (liberals and progressives) and the political right (conservatives) have been locked in an ideological conflict that has resulted in different foreign policy preferences.
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The foreign policy platform for the South Korean left has been clear: justice in relation to Japan, engagement with North Korea, and, when applicable, autonomy from other powers, including the United States. This approach contrasts with conservatives, who have favored more conditional engagement with North Korea, cooperation with Japan on security and other strategic concerns, and a reliance on the South Korea-U.S. military alliance.
Many observers, including U.S. policymakers, journalists, and scholars, view South Korea more through conservative positions. However, a clearer understanding of South Korea’s domestic political bifurcation is required to fully comprehend how future left-leaning leadership will act toward the Camp David principles. Below, I offer two examples of how preferences have undermined security agreements in the past.
On November 23, 2016, the governments of South Korea and Japan signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). GSOMIA allows more seamless intelligence sharing between Japan and South Korea, and the United States regarding North Korean activities in the region. This would be a bipartisan issue in most countries. Not in South Korea.
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In 2019, the left-leaning Moon Jae-in government terminated GSOMIA after spats over trade and historical matters soured relations. To the South Korean left, distancing itself from Japan was more important than the security benefits brought by the agreement. In March of this year, conservative leadership in South Korea and Japan formally agreed to reinstate GSOMIA.
Anti-Americanism is also associated with the South Korean left. In late 2016, the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) was deployed to South Korea in response to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile threats. However, as a presidential hopeful, Moon Jae-in proposed to postpone THAAD deployment for the next president to decide. When elected, Moon “characterized the THAAD deployment as ‘temporary’. Moon also ordered the suspension of the additional deployment of the THAAD launcher, citing the need to conduct an ‘environmental impact assessment.’”
This disappointed the United States. However, like the case above, Seoul’s position reversed and THAAD was fully deployed when Yoon became president.
Both examples highlight the divergence in how the Korean left and right tackle ideologically sensitive issues, particularly concerning independence and sovereignty.
Lee Jae-myung Labels Japan and Yoon ‘Terrorists’
In 2023, the South Korean left remains anti-Japanese and willing to risk cutting security ties over ideational concerns. One issue highlights this topic quite clearly. The release of treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant into the ocean prompted discussions on why it was occurring and saw outrage from countries in the region, including China and South Korea.
There are, of course, legitimate concerns with the release of treated nuclear water. However, many responses, including South Korea, expose anti-Japanese sentiment and, in some cases, misinformation campaigns.
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On August 25, Lee Jae-myung, current leader of the opposition Democratic Party, led an anti-Yoon Suk-yeol and anti-Fukushima water discharge demonstration through the middle of Seoul. Lee, who narrowly lost the 2022 election to Yoon, led the marching crowd through many anti-Japanese chants. Lee also used the Fukushima issue for a domestic political attack when he made the rather outrageous claim that Yoon was an accomplice in Japan’s environmental “terrorism.” Subsequently, Lee has gone on a hunger strike, protesting various government policies, including Yoon’s passive stance over releasing treated water from the Fukushima plant.
There is no debate about the nuclear issue or the science behind what is happening. Instead, discussions are replaced by normative values of Japan being the proverbial bogeyman. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has clearly stated the water coming out of Fukushima is treated water; the Korean left has labeled it as waste. Scientists and the South Korean and Japanese governments have labeled the release of water as safe. Both Yoon and Kishida have also eaten fish from the waters around Fukushima.
But the Korean left has already decided this action is a negative for the region. If another country conducted similar measures, the Democratic Party’s response might be very different.
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When the Left Wins, Trilateral Cooperation is Finished
Trilateral cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the United States is vital for the U.S.-centric security architecture in East Asia, especially with a more assertive China and a well-armed North Korea.
However, the South Korean left and conservative Japanese governments mix like oil and water. Shunning cooperation with Japan has long been a linchpin of the South Korean progressive and liberal agenda stemming from historical human rights and decolonization issues. Cleansing South Korea from any Japanese influence has been a self-professed desire of the Korean left, including former President Moon Jae-in. Lee Jae-myung has firmly played by the Democratic Party playbook, seeking to bring back most of the policies Moon and Roh Moo-hyun promoted.
The future of the Camp David principles depends on a range of issues. Not least, South Korea’s domestic politics will impact the newly minted agreement. Any trilateral agreement will be torn to shreds and discarded when the Korean left makes it into office, whether in 2027 or later in the future.
The Democratic Party has proven it has a penchant for deferring security issues in favor of nationalist populist ideas. When the South Korean left re-enter the executive, all momentum will be lost. Understanding this domestic dynamic is essential. Without convincing the South Korean political left that various threats in the Indo-Pacific are more critical than perceived threats to their national identity, there is little chance that the Camp David Principles will institutionalize the trilateral alliance.
Dylan Stent
Dylan Stent is a Ph.D. candidate at Victoria University of Wellington. His study looks at South Korea’s unification policies in the democratic era.
thediplomat.com · by Dylan Stent · September 7, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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