Quotes of the Day:
"Do not spoil what you have by desiring what you have not; remember that what you now have was once among the things you only hoped for."
- Epicurus
“Words are, of course, the most powerful drug used by mankind.”
- Rudyard Kipling
“I cannot help fearing that men may reach a point where they look on every new theory as a danger, every innovation as a toilsome trouble, every social advance as a first step toward revolution, and that they may absolutely refuse to move at all.”
- Alexis de Tocqueville
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 18 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. An Interview with Richard D. Clarke (JFQ)
3. Rediscovering the Value of Special Operations (JFQ)
4. Making the Case for a Joint Special Operations Profession (JFQ)
5. How a Mariupol steel plant became a holdout for the city’s resistance
6. Use of Army’s prepositioned ‘afloat’ equipment is expected to grow in the Pacific
7. Russia forces attacking along broad east front, Ukraine says
8. Three US Army vehicle upgrade programs look smart after Russia's Ukraine debacle
9. Special Operations Command Targets Vehicle Upgrades
10. The West Is As Poorly Prepared to Help Taiwan As It Was for Ukraine
11. US troops to train Ukrainian forces on howitzers in coming days
12. Paratroopers with the 173rd Airborne Brigade fire live Stinger missiles in Croatia
13. Russia’s Military: Failure on an Awesome Scale
14. Hearts Not Minds: Morale and Inspiration in Insurgency and Territorial Defense
15. Russia's special-operations forces are under fire in Ukraine
16. Special Operations News Update - April 19, 2022 | SOF News
17. Ad execs and car salesmen: Meet the Ukrainian volunteers fighting back against Russia
18. Putin’s May 9 problem: Can there be a Victory Day in Russia with nothing to celebrate?
19. Russia's War for the Donbas Begins: What Happens if Putin Can't Win?
20. FDD | What is the Future of Cyber Deterrence?
21. White House finally awakens to PRC capture of Solomon Islands
22. Analysis: Hamas-Led Militant Groups Create Strife at Al-Aqsa Mosque
23. Beijing Is Used to Learning From Russian Failures
24. Pentagon, industry wrestle with how to boost weapons production for Ukraine
25. How Ukraine War Is Changing The World Order – OpEd
26. Russia’s favorite war propagandist is a Navy veteran from Missouri
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 18 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 18 (PUTIN'S WAR)
Mason Clark, George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Karolina Hird
April 18, 6:30pm ET
Russian forces began a new phase of large-scale offensive operations in eastern Ukraine on April 18 likely intended to capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Russian forces have been concentrating reinforcements—including both newly-deployed units and damaged units withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine—to the Donbas axis for several weeks. Russian forces conducted large-scale assaults focused on Rubizhne, Popasna, and Marinka with heavy artillery support on April 18 after previously conducting only localized attacks and shelling along the line of contact. Russian forces have not secured any major territorial gains as of publication.
The Russian offensive in the east is unlikely to be dramatically more successful than previous Russian offensives, but Russian forces may be able to wear down Ukrainian defenders or achieve limited gains. Russian forces did not take the operational pause that was likely necessary to reconstitute and properly integrate damaged units withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine into operations in eastern Ukraine. As we have assessed previously, Russian forces withdrawn from around Kyiv and going back to fight in Donbas have, at best, been patched up and filled out with soldiers from other damaged units, and the Russian military has few, if any, cohesive units not previously deployed to Ukraine to funnel into new operations.[1] Frequent reports of disastrously low Russian morale and continuing logistics challenges indicate the effective combat power of Russian units in eastern Ukraine is a fraction of their on-paper strength in numbers of battalion tactical groups (BTGs). Russian forces may certainly be able to wear down Ukrainian positions in eastern Ukraine through the heavy concentration of firepower and sheer weight of numbers, but likely at a high cost. A sudden and dramatic Russian offensive success remains highly unlikely, however, and Ukrainian tactical losses would not spell the end of the campaign in eastern Ukraine, much less the war as a whole.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces likely began large-scale offensive operations in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts focused on Rubizhne, Popasna, and Marinka.
- Russian forces may be able to gain ground through the heavy concentration of artillery and numbers. However, Russian operations are unlikely to be dramatically more successful than previous major offensives around Kyiv. The Russian military is unlikely to have addressed the root causes—poor coordination, the inability to conduct cross-country operations, and low morale—that impeded prior offensives.
- Successful Ukrainian counterattacks southeast of Kharkiv will likely force Russian forces to divert some units intended for the Izyum offensive, but Ukrainian forces are unlikely to completely sever Russian lines of communication north of Izyum in the coming days.
- Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol continued to hold out against heavy Russian artillery and air bombardment.
Russian authorities face mounting unwillingness to fight among both conscript and contract personnel. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 18 that Russian forces began efforts to form additional units in Rostov and Crimea by April 24 to form a “second echelon” to occupy administrative buildings and important infrastructure in occupied Ukraine.[2] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 18 that the number of Russian personnel refusing to join the war effort is increasing, including 60-70% of contract soldiers in the 150th Motor Rifle Division of the 8th Combined Arms Army—the primary Russian combat force in eastern Ukraine.[3] The GUR stated that Russian authorities are threatening the families of servicemen who refuse to fight and making permanent marks in the criminal records of those servicemen.
Russian cruise missiles struck a Ukrainian vehicle repair shop in Lviv, western Ukraine, killing civilians in Lviv for the first time in the war. Social media users depicted several missiles striking a warehouse and railway junction in Lviv and killing several civilians on April 18.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces destroyed a logistics center in Lviv used to store weapons arriving in Ukraine from the United States and European Union on April 18.[5] Russian forces seek to disrupt western aid shipments to the Ukrainian military but likely lack large numbers of the precision weapons needed to frequently strike these targets in western Ukraine.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:
- Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
- Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
- Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
Russian forces continued assaults against Ukrainian defenders in the Azovstal steel plant but did not make any verifiable gains in the last 24 hours. Russian Tu-22M3 strategic bombers, unspecified other aircraft, and heavy artillery continued to pound Ukrainian defensive positions around the Azovstal plant.[6] The commander of the Ukrainian 36th Marine Brigade (one of the Ukrainian units remaining in Mariupol) appealed to the United States and EU to provide Ukrainian forces with additional heavy weaponry, stating “we are ready to fight to the last drop of blood, but we must know that the world has done everything possible for this.”[7] Mariupol mayor advisor Petro Andryushenko said that Russian forces did not mark the promised “safe exit corridors” through which they demanded Ukrainian forces leave Mariupol on April 17 and that the Russian ultimatum was likely a trap for Ukrainian defenders.[8] Ukrainian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Oleksandr Motuzyanyk stated on April 18 that Ukrainian forces in Mariupol are successfully tying down Russian forces and enabling Ukrainian offensives elsewhere.[9] Ukrainian military sources shared footage of Ukrainian forces conducting limited counterattacks near the Azovstal plant on April 18.[10] Russian forces will likely clear any isolated Ukrainian forces active in Mariupol outside the Azovstal plant in the coming days.[11]
Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces likely began large-scale offensive operations in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts on April 18. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian General Staff, and the Ukrainian Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council all stated that Russian forces began a new phase of large-scale offensive operations in eastern Ukraine on April 18.[12] Russian forces concentrated on Popasna, Rubizhne, and Marinka.[13] Luhansk Governor Serhei Haidai stated that Russian forces captured Kreminna, directly northwest of Rubizhne, but did not make any major gains elsewhere along the line.[14] Social media footage depicted heavy fighting ongoing in Rubizhne and Popasna.[15] Russian forces conducted heavy air and artillery strikes along the line of contact.[16] Russian forces may be able to make advances in eastern Ukraine by dividing Ukrainian forces among many small axes of advance, but Russian offensive operations are unlikely to be dramatically more successful than failed operations around Kyiv, as ISW has previously discussed.[17]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Izyum axis)
Ukrainian forces continued a successful counterattack (begun on April 16) southeast of Kharkiv, taking several small towns on April 17-18. Ukrainian forces reportedly seized Bazaliivka, Lebyazhe, and Kutuzivka and claimed to capture several unspecified villages near Izyum.[18]
This Ukrainian offensive will likely force Russian forces to divert some of the combat power intended for the stalled Izyum axis to defend against Ukrainian advances but is unlikely to threaten the Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) to Izyum in the coming days. Ukrainian forces already controlled elements of the M03 highway, preventing direct Russian movement from the outskirts of Kharkiv to Izyum. ISW has documented Russian forces, including a major Russian convoy observed by Maxar Technologies on April 8, deploying to Izyum using a GLOC extending from the main Russian logistics and communications center in Belgorod, Russia, directly southeast into Ukraine through Velykyi Burluk and Kupyansk before reaching frontline positions in Izyum.[19] Ukrainian counterattacks would need to capture and hold Velykyi Burluk, approximately 45km from their current forward positions in Bazaliivka, to disrupt this GLOC. Ukrainian forces may be able to conduct such an advance over several days or weeks, but Russian forces east of Kharkiv are unlikely to collapse as quickly as Russian forces did during the final withdrawal from Kyiv and northeastern Ukraine.
Russian forces additionally have a secondary GLOC from Valuyki, Russia, directly south through Kupyansk to Izyum. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 6 that Russian forces began using the Valuyki-Kupyansk railway to reinforce Izyum, and several Russian units fighting in Izyum (including the 252nd Motor Rifle Regiment, 752nd Motor Rifle Regiment, and 237th Tank Regiment) are permanently based directly in or near Valuyki.[20] Russian forces will be able to use this GLOC to reinforce operations around Izyum even if Ukrainian forces prove capable of capturing Velykyi Burluk in the coming days. The Ukrainian counterattack may successfully force Russian forces to redeploy some units intended for the Izyum axis but is unlikely to completely disrupt Russian lines of communication and reinforcement in the coming week.
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Fighting continued in Oleksandrivka, just west of Kherson, without any major territorial changes.[21] Ukraine’s Airborne Forces command claimed the Ukrainian 80th Airborne Brigade captured several villages in the Mykolayiv direction, but ISW cannot confirm this claim.[22]
Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)
There was no significant change in this area in the past 24 hours.
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces likely commenced large-scale offensive operations in Donbas but are unlikely to achieve a major breakthrough.
- Ukrainian counterattacks southeast of Kharkiv may divert some Russian units but are unlikely to sever Russian lines of communication in the coming days.
- Russian forces concentrating around Izyum will continue small-scale offensive operations to the southeast and southwest and may begin larger-scale offensives.
- Russia and its proxies may declare victory in the Battle of Mariupol.
- Russian forces could launch a new offensive operation from Donetsk City to the north through Avdiivka toward Kramatorsk.
[8] https://t dot me/andriyshTime/316.
[9] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/18/operatyvna-sytuacziya-na-fronti-bryfing-rechnyka-mo-ukrayiny-4/.
2. An Interview with Richard D. Clarke (JFQ)
Important points about lifelong study and props to the National War College and NDU.
Excerpts:
JFQ: As a graduate of the National War College who has obviously been successful in your post–joint professional military education experience, looking back on that year, what advantages did National Defense University provide you? What would you recommend to the faculty to consider when developing strategy related courses for future leaders like yourself?
General Clarke: First, I thank NDU for that great year in 2006–2007. I had just finished about 5 years focused directly on combat. I had conversations about those experiences not only across the joint force but also with interagency partners and allies—to reflect on where we were going, where we’d been, and where we were going in the future. That exposure for me to all elements of our national command and infrastructure as well as our international partners was invaluable.
I had some world-class instructors who stretched me. But it was also a time to reflect and think. What I found was that year was just one step of what must be a lifelong investment in the profession and in continued study as a military professional. You cannot remain static. You must continue to read and develop. I have found that I read and study more in each subsequent year. The National War College gave me some ideas and gave me some frameworks to help look at problems into the future. JFQ
An Interview with Richard D. Clarke
By William T. Eliason Joint Force Quarterly 105
General Richard D. Clarke, USA, is Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command.
General Richard D. Clarke, USA
Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command
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JFQ: What are your priorities as commander of U.S. Special Operations Command [SOCOM]? Have these changed since you took command in 2019? If so, how and why?
General Clarke: When I came into command, I had some thoughts about priorities and where to take the command, having just come from the Joint Staff. I was also given some great guidance from Secretary [James] Mattis who put me in the position. I sat down with all the commanders and the senior enlisted leaders, and we set the priorities.
Those priorities have largely remained unchanged: compete and win for the Nation, preserve and grow readiness, innovate for future threats, advance partnerships, and strengthen our force and family. While I would argue that the operating environment has changed in those years—and it’s now clear that China is our pacing threat—these priorities are timeless for SOCOM going into the future.
JFQ: As you know, SOCOM has three Department-wide coordinating authority roles: countering violent extremist organizations [CVEO], countering weapons of mass destruction [CWMD], and the Internet-based military information support operations [MISO]. How do you see global security challenges affecting the ability of special operations forces [SOF] to perform these missions and your ability to stay ready and modernize?
General Clarke: It’s important first to talk about how coordinating authority is supposed to be executed and what a coordinating authority even is. The way I look at coordinating authority is that it is to lead planning, assess, and provide recommendations. And in that role, I provide those recommendations in those three areas you just brought up. But every Service and every combatant command is critical to helping address CWMD, CVEO, and Internet-based MISO—or WebOps. They all know the information space is important.
I think we can all agree that terrorism and violent extremism aren’t going away. They’re still threats. But we must approach countering these threats in a sustainable way because in the long run, they are not as important as the pacing threats or those near-peer threats we’re seeing today with Russian activities in Ukraine.
For the CWMD threat, I think we should all be more concerned about where that is. On the nuclear basis, everyone’s seen the buildup that China has undertaken with its nuclear capabilities. For the first time in our history, we’re going to have two near-peer nuclear threats.
But then look at the chem-bio [chemical-biological] aspect. On the bio side, all you have to do is look at COVID-19 and what the pandemic has done to our nation. Then if you look on the chem side, the bar has been lowered on two fronts. One is the barrier to entry. Terrorists have used sarin and mustard gas in Syria and Iraq. And we know for a fact that the capability for terrorists to use chemical agents is there.
Then we’ve had state actors—like Kim Jong-un—using it against a family member. There have been several instances that prove the Russians have used it against political adversaries of the Russian government outside their own soil—in a U.S. Ally’s territory. We all are sure that the landscape is changing and that we must in fact prepare the joint force for those possibilities.
Finally, the other important coordinating authority is WebOps or MISO. This is critical to campaigning in the gray zone because it’s below the threshold of conflict. As everyone is aware, misinformation and disinformation are being sown by many of our competitors, and the problem is only growing. We have to be able to see that in real time. But we also have to be able to counter with all elements of statecraft.
I think we’re seeing great examples of that today where we, as a government, are releasing intelligence to show malign behavior and are going public with it. And once it’s been released publicly, it’s then being reinforced in the information space by many. It’s a great example of how information operations are going to remain critical going forward—as you look at integrated deterrence and deterring our adversaries. We’ve all studied deterrence theories, and it is as much in the mind of the person you’re trying to affect. That is important.
Special operations forces board Greek CH-47 Chinook during ORION 21
Special operations forces from Cyprus, Greece, Serbia, and United States board Greek CH-47 Chinook during ORION 21, June 3, 2021 (U.S. Army/Monique O’Neill)
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JFQ: Special operations are so heavily dependent on the quality of the people who carry out these missions. How are your units leveraging the diverse talents, skills, and backgrounds of your special operators and their partners while performing their missions?
General Clarke: SOF truth number one: Humans are more important than hardware. We continuously come back to that. That fact will remain inviolable. We are going to continue to recruit and retain the best talent that our nation can provide.
Today’s challenges continue to show that the number one SOF value proposition is our people. It’s the culture of who we are—our innovative problem-solvers. We’ve been emphasizing that they’re part of a cohesive and disciplined team that’s going to accomplish some of our nation’s hardest missions.
Those dedicated and trusted professionals are forward, fighting in combat zones, but also working with allies and partners. And they’re conducting the WebOps MISO. It’s emphasizing the whole of our force.
What we’re trying to do at all times is tap into our nation’s incredibly deep pool of talent. And we welcome anyone who wants to join our formation who is capable of meeting our standards—from all walks of life.
A lot of people think about SOCOM as just the military component. In addition to 70,000 Active-duty members, we also have 10,000 civilians who are part of this team. Some of them deploy with us, but a lot of them are technical experts—whether it’s in acquisition, technology, or procurement of our special operations equipment. We have talented professionals throughout—to include our artificial intelligence and machine learning experts that are coding and helping us develop new capabilities across the board.
We’re going to recruit and retain a very diverse force with cultural and language expertise. Inherently, we are also a joint team. If you come to SOF, you know that we’re “born purple.” I’d say we integrate with the joint force at a lower echelon than any other force.
Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewman candidates from Basic Crewman Selection Class 111 low-crawl under obstacle during “The Tour” at Naval Special Warfare Center in Coronado, California, June 1, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Anthony W. Walker)
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JFQ: How do you see the special operators in relation to achieving the concept of jointness? What is the working relationship between your command and the Services that provide the capabilities you task? Do you see areas where the Services and National Guard might better leverage what special operators bring to the joint force?
General Clarke: As I said a moment ago, many say that if you come into SOF, you are born purple. We inherently work as a joint team, and we bring joint and combined solutions at a lower echelon than any other part of our joint force. This was born out of Operation Eagle Claw with the failed rescue attempt [of American hostages in Iran] that brought about our modern-day SOCOM.
It also addresses the realities of our adversaries’ malign behavior because we must come together to see and understand. And we need to build access and placement to reach locations that small teams can access—but with a joint capability that can help solve those problems. Because our forces are inherently joint, they can reach back into the best of the Services and bring in those lessons learned and those experiences from both the SOF and the conventional sides of the force.
One thing that we must be aware of is that SOF can’t be the easy button or the solution to everything. There have been times when it’s just more convenient or easier to say, “Let’s get SOF to do it.” We have to stick with our core missions.
We shouldn’t be put into a conventional-type fight when we’re not the appropriate tool. Back in World War II, a Ranger battalion was completely wiped out in Italy because it wasn’t properly employed. If we’re not careful and observant, the same type of activities could take place today. We always have to be very cognizant of that.
JFQ: As a combatant command with unique Title X authorities to develop a budget input for DOD [Department of Defense] and to direct spending, what has been your experience with Congress in advocating how you train and equip your force?
General Clarke: We as a force are more integrated, credible, and capable than ever before and that really stems from the steadfast support of Congress. Congress established SOCOM in 1987. That was against the recommendations of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As I discussed earlier, this was born from Operation Eagle Claw in 1980. Senators [Sam] Nunn [D-GA] and [William] Cohen [R-ME] realized it, and they legislated it.
If you read the history of how SOCOM was created, the Services did not want to give up their own individual special operations forces that had been created. Congress realized that it needed to strengthen joint interoperability, especially for high-risk missions. Needs were emerging as terrorism was popping up around the globe.
But what Congress did that specifically made SOCOM special was the unique acquisition authority that it directed—with specific funding that didn’t have to go through the Services. That was really the power behind what created SOF.
Every time I talk to Congress, I talk about their key role in this—but then how much we value the oversight of Congress along with the civilian DOD side, specifically an ASD (SO/LIC) [Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict]. Congress directed its standup at the same time for that oversight aspect. That’s an important part that aligns with the Constitution—with civilian oversight and a military accountable to civilian leadership. Congress asks me tough questions all the time, and they should. When we get congressional delegations into SOCOM headquarters—and to all our subordinates and overseas—we welcome those visits.
While we’re a very small part—about 3 percent—of the DOD budget with about 2 percent of the force, Congress still pays an incredible amount of attention to us, and they should. The American public and Congress must trust in special operations forces, and we must sustain that every day.
JFQ: Many conflict zones are not traditional ones and labeling these situations has become a popular industry with names such as gray zones, asymmetric warfare, and competitions short of war. How does your command describe these challenges and plan to account for them?
General Clarke: None of us should be surprised by this. Our rivals have studied us, and they know that we have incredible and overwhelming power in our joint force. They won’t challenge us directly. We expect them to seek advantage through asymmetric means. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t just keep moving along without paying attention.
SOCOM’s position is that we can operate in this gray zone and counter our adversaries. We’re born out of this. Go all the way back to our roots with the OSS [Office of Strategic Services] in World War II, when small teams jumped into France and helped the resistance forces.
That’s one example of using asymmetric capabilities. Because at the end of the day, this is about undermining adversary confidence. They are going to think twice that their aggression can succeed or that it will be easy.
What SOF does is present multiple dilemmas. We expand those options to threaten what an adversary may hold dear. We can place some of those adversary assets at risk. We can fight in the war around the edges without having to be directly involved. We set the conditions for that today.
Think about a place like the Baltics right now. We’ve been working with our Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian partners for decades in Afghanistan. But we’re also with them right now in their countries training alongside them, looking at their resistance capabilities, and continuing to think about how they could, in fact, resist as nations.
I think this will be a great lesson as we look at potential conflict zones around the world—to be there before they start. Building those capabilities with our allies and partners presents an unmatched advantage. We have the culture and language capabilities and the understanding of what irregular warfare could be. For competition in the gray zone, it’s not just our adversaries contending there, but SOF and the joint force can compete there as well.
JFQ: Can you discuss how you see the impact of technology that used to be solely available to nation-states and their militaries but is now available to anyone who can buy it? What ways are you working to operate in such a world?
General Clarke: There’s multiple examples. Right now, one of the most pressing threats is the UAS [unmanned aerial systems] threat. These are the IEDs [improvised explosive devices] of the future. Everyone remembers 2003–2004 when the number one killer of our forces was IEDs—first in Iraq, and then it transitioned into Afghanistan. Now, an IED has wings and it can move. The wire that connected that IED or the remote device is now harder to defeat.
We’re seeing our adversaries really pick up their game in this area—again starting in Iraq. You can clearly see where this technology of small UAS can grow. That’s one example that is concerning.
We’re also developing technologies and capabilities to counter them and then looking where we can be “left of launch” to disrupt supply chains, transportation, [and] development before it’s too late. Then we only have to defeat them “right of launch” when we’re trying to shoot down the final UAS that could be coming at our forces.
The future of UAS leads to another technology—AI [artificial intelligence] and machine-learning. One example of using those and UAS together would be in swarming and remotely operated or independently operated technologies. We’re really looking hard within SOCOM, training leaders in artificial intelligence and in machine-learning and exploring capabilities to counter those technologies.
The final technology I’ll talk about is in the information domain. Our adversaries compete at very low cost, using misinformation and disinformation. We’ve got to develop technologies to counter those efforts by using AI and machine-learning to immediately identify and counter those messages before the narrative gets wide distribution. All of those are really important in today’s environment.
JFQ: U.S. Special Operations Command is also unique in that it is the only combatant command with an education mission that is embodied in the Joint Special Operations University [JSOU]. How will your command leverage this evolving professional military education capability to your advantage?
General Clarke: Go back to our founding and that unique authority where we are required to oversee SOF-unique training. That’s why we have a JSOU. That is tied to the broader joint education and training mission. That’s still SOF truth number one: Humans are more important than hardware.
We must invest in those people by continuing to train and educate those innovative problem-solvers. JSOU sharpens the edge of SOF by investing in our junior leaders by training and developing them.
They’re also specifically looking at the priorities of this command and where this command needs to go. They’re developing coursework that is specific to those problems. And that unique training includes some of the coordinating authorities—teaching specific classes on CWMD or teaching classes on the gray zone, campaigning, and integrated deterrence.
Because JSOU is on the SOCOM campus, it is deeply integrated with the staff. Our J5 and our JSOU president are closely linked for that thought process and for the development of the future SOF force. It’s incredible what they’re doing there. JSOU is involved in all our commanders’ conferences to see where the command is going and how to be linked. I consider it one of SOCOM’s most important resources in the training, equipping, and development of our force.
The other thing that JSOU does in addition to teaching is they do detailed research looking deep into some of our most vexing problems. As I talked about earlier with the J5, they’re helping us solve those problems. That research is a big advantage for us, and some of it is cutting-edge. There’s a huge ecosystem of civilian educations programs and institutions that can really help us. They’re going to places like NDU [National Defense University], but also going to Carnegie Mellon or the Fletcher School at Tufts to bring in expertise—whether on counterterrorism or WMD. JSOU really helps us in those areas, too.
JFQ: How will the rise of the U.S. Space Force affect your command and special operations forces? As a force highly dependent on what the Space Force provides, what opportunities do you see for your command to assist in how the Space Force evolves?
General Clarke: Space is a critical domain. SOF is and will remain reliant on space-based capabilities. But I also want space to view SOF as an enabler to space in the future.
I do think that a great triad can exist between cyber, space, and SOCOM. As I told Secretary [Mark] Esper as we were discussing operations in space, I said that I’d recommend we don’t talk about in space, but we talk about this for space. The space capabilities start here on the terrestrial side. We have to protect our own capabilities, but we could also hold adversaries’ terrestrial base capabilities at risk.
SOF’s unique access and placement can provide those opportunities in the future. We realized the importance of space and the need to continue to work very closely with SPACECOM [U.S. Space Command] and the Space Force to provide those capabilities for the joint, all-domain warfighting aspect.
JFQ: As a graduate of the National War College who has obviously been successful in your post–joint professional military education experience, looking back on that year, what advantages did National Defense University provide you? What would you recommend to the faculty to consider when developing strategy related courses for future leaders like yourself?
General Clarke: First, I thank NDU for that great year in 2006–2007. I had just finished about 5 years focused directly on combat. I had conversations about those experiences not only across the joint force but also with interagency partners and allies—to reflect on where we were going, where we’d been, and where we were going in the future. That exposure for me to all elements of our national command and infrastructure as well as our international partners was invaluable.
I had some world-class instructors who stretched me. But it was also a time to reflect and think. What I found was that year was just one step of what must be a lifelong investment in the profession and in continued study as a military professional. You cannot remain static. You must continue to read and develop. I have found that I read and study more in each subsequent year. The National War College gave me some ideas and gave me some frameworks to help look at problems into the future. JFQ
3. Rediscovering the Value of Special Operations (JFQ)
From our leading SOF thinker and the President of the Joint Special Operations University.
Rediscovering the Value of Special Operations
By Isaiah Wilson III Joint Force Quarterly 105
Dr. Isaiah (Ike) Wilson III is a Professor of Political Science and President of the Joint Special Operations University.
Green Berets business as usual during COVID-19
Army Green Berets assigned to 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, prepare to breach and enter building as part of Close Quarter Battle training in Germany, May 5, 2020 (U.S. Army/Thomas Mort)
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Today, America’s special operations forces (SOF) face a moment of strategic inflection and identity reflection at the threshold crossing of two fundamental questions: How has the character of global geopolitical competition changed? What are the implications for the future roles, missions, and force structures (that is, future utility) of SOF for the 2020s through the 2050s? Even as the United States enters this age, this new era brings new demands of striking a rebalance from its focus for the past two decades on countering terrorism, violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and insurgencies to coping with threats of confrontations between so-called Great Powers. Tomorrow’s special operations and SOF must adjust accordingly.
Lessons Gathered but Not Yet Learned?
Amid all the present-day ambiguities and grayness in all things, including security and defense matters, perhaps the one thing crystal clear is that we must learn lessons from the past and make changes now to best face the future. And from such a “back to our futures” review, one lesson is clear: SOF is, as it has always been, a great value proposition for our country.
As we continue to think about and work through this question of (re)defining SOF’s utility in Great Power competition (GPC), we need to go back to fundamentals. The win in this environment of competition is, as it has always been throughout the history of special operations, in “left-of-boom” operations, activities, and investments. The key is comprehensive integrated deterrence. In other words, the win is achieved through placing the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational force in positional advantage over competitors and adversaries through access, placement, and strategic influence, setting the conditions for the possibilities of winning before—or even without—the fight.
Table.
SOF Activities
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As the United States and the West learned in the 20th century, preventing the Cold War from going hot was an essential element in the theory of victory in the strategic rivalry between totalitarianism and communism on one side and democracy and capitalism on the other. The United States and its allies and partners achieved their geostrategic interests in the Cold War without fighting the Soviet Union directly in open armed conflict, and the same logic can apply in the 21st century.
GPC is the high end of a rising scale of international relations ranging from interactions of cooperation, competition, conflict, and classic war. The potential impact of SOF’s utility in an environment of competition will demand, as it always has, anticipating, finding, and creating ways and opportunities that allow the Nation and its allies and partners to do two things simultaneously: lower the amplitude and the temperature of competition and conflict between competitors and deter and prevent a next Great Power war from happening at all.
SOF must compete in the information space and not concede to their adversaries. Today’s new compound security normal for SOF will be to operate in remote, denied, and disrupted environments under ubiquitous intelligence surveillance with the threat of targeting by high-end military capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction, where the cyber and electronic warfare domains are contested and increased scrutiny is routine. We will need to return to the ideas of special operations use and utility that empowers SOF as Sentinel, preparing the environment as the frontline ambassadors of the joint force and as the “first three feet” employed in any competition or confrontation zone.
Rediscovering SOF for a New Age: A “Back to the Future” Approach
To understand and appreciate SOF of the future, we must understand SOF then to now. From an organizational perspective, arguably, there have been three previous ages of U.S. special operations, beginning in World War II with the “Wild Bill” Donovan years and the Office of Strategic Services. The 1960s perhaps mark an official beginning of the second age of SOF. President John F. Kennedy was visionary in his efforts during this time to increase the capability of the Department of Defense pointedly in the conduct of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, focused at the time, as President Kennedy stated plainly, “against the struggle against despotic insurgency.” The so-called third age was the period of a global war on terror and finding China and Russia probing the perimeter of their spheres of prior influence and to an extent beyond. Key events marking the transition from this third age to the fourth age can be appreciated in compounding occurrences dating back to “spring movements” as early as 2006. These movements began with the orange and green movements of the Republic of Georgia, Ukraine, and Iran, continued through Arab variations of the same including Egypt (2010 and a second wave in 2013), Syria (2011), and the ongoing Syria-Iraq compound conflict (which began in 2014), just to name a few.
The U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) withdrawal from Afghanistan in late summer of 2021 may mark an ending of the third age. However, the fourth age is marked by a clear exploitation of traditional Western institutions and influence, especially at fragile geographic and sectoral nexuses and with the Russians and Chinese openly no longer playing by established rules and norms. One need look no further for examples than China’s island-building activities and Russia’s “little green men” territorial incursions.
SOF’s Enduring Value at the Intersectionality of Threats
The new Interim National Security Strategic Guidance speaks to all these aspects and dynamics of a “compounded security threats” world in terms of an “intersectionality of threats.” At the heart of such intersectionality lies a new security dilemma—the compound security dilemma—that today, much more than in the past, demands nothing less than a working at the nexuses and between the boundaries and seams of our own created divisions between matters of “defense and security” from the traditional and nontraditional “water’s edge” that separates the foreign from the domestic.
SOF have incredible value in this intersectional space. And they always have. SOF understand gray zones and are making sound adjustments to not only compete but also prevail. As we—in collaboration with the joint force, our interagency partners, and our foreign country allies—look ahead, SOF must once again gain the influence, leverage, and positional advantage (that is, physical, virtual/digital, and cognitive) necessary to compete and protect the Nation’s interests short of armed conflict while also establishing the ability to transition rapidly to combat if, when, and where required, enabling our country and its allies to deliver overmatching decisive combat power. Choosing the right tools at the right time and for the right problem to be solved is the most imperative gray matter requirement for SOF leaders today and for the SOF professionals of tomorrow.
SOF mission sets, in and of themselves, have not significantly changed. However, the environment in which they are conducted has continued to change significantly. This was true for the last 20 years that found special operators missioned more in roles of direct action, crisis response, counterterrorism, and counter-VEO profiles, but not exclusively so. One benefit of 20 years of countering VEOs is the strong ties we have to the interagency community, not to mention allies and partners. This was just as true throughout SOF’s prior 55 years of use and utility dating back to World War II. And this will remain true in future years.
SOF is tailor-made to conduct military information support operations, psychological operations, and influence operations. There will be great need for these capabilities now and in the future. Again, working with and through alliances and partnerships is not just a nice-to-have additive, but rather an essential part of any intended winning solution. Building partner capacity, advising and assisting indigenous resistance forces, and leveraging language and cultural knowledge are longstanding SOF strengths.
Operating with and by proxies and surrogates, through partners, and in the gray zone are just additional longstanding SOF applied art and strengths. Using commercial-off-the-shelf equipment and being flexible, agile, and on the cutting edge of technology are other classic SOF strengths that will be as vital as we move into the fourth age.
Tech-Enabling Tomorrow’s SOF HE2RO
The compound security character of the global security environment is such that it will demand a future utility of SOF that is equally compounded: a comprehensive combination of all the skills, techniques, and uses of technological and operational methods of all three preceding ages, amplified by 21st-century technological advancements. Nothing less than this comprehensive, joint-combined utility of SOF philosophy, culture, and approach is required for overmatching power in and under fourth-age conditions and in this period of rebalance for assuring an integrated deterrent power capacity for the Nation.
The dynamics of stability and control are changing as emerging technologies such as 5G, artificial intelligence (AI), and the Internet of Things lead to a decentralization of influence and less hierarchical political structures. Rapid advancement and proliferation of these new technologies is also redefining traditional views and norms on such things as what it means to win, what constitutes a crime, and what behavior is acceptable in (post)modern war. SOF leaders must be able to apply AI. Future SOF professionals must be(come) AI-ready leaders.
Special Operations as Part of Integrated Statecraft Solutions
In addition, SOF’s utility must be considered not as transactional but rather transformational. The way we measure the return on investment on SOF must be measured in new ways that fully acculturate the interests and capabilities of allies and partners into our own national use and utility of force strategies and calculations. This is comprehensive joint-combined readiness.
Looking ahead, SOF force structure, capabilities, and design will also likely need to adapt significantly to this new era. In this fourth age, geography has returned with a vengeance as a governing dynamic of international relations. Also, positional advantage is once again a determinative factor of this new compound security world (dis)order. This speaks to matters of geostrategy and is vital because attaining strategic influence from key geographical areas is an essential element to the disruptors’ playbooks, and more pointedly, to China’s expansion globally as they seek to couple targeted control and access to key geostrategic locations to outmaneuver and hold at risk U.S. interests regionally and globally. And much of China’s and Russia’s actions are done in a manner that operates outside traditional boundaries set by long-standing international rules and norms.
While the United States cannot and should never envy such subversive approaches that seek to undermine the rules-based international order, much less attempt to replicate them, we can instead orient our efforts on positive aims that reinforce our democratic values and ideas that underpin our conceptions of political sovereignty and territorial integrity, the very cornerstones of the international system we seek to strengthen in our strategic competition with China and Russia as major power-brokering disruptor states along with other malign actors. We do this by helping our allies and partners in their efforts to build national resilience and resistance against predatory, subversive, gray zone threats and by helping to shape mutually beneficial security environments through our foreign assistance and security cooperation programs. As far back as its origins in World War II, support of national resistance and resilience operations has long been a core competency of special operations as well as a cornerstone to SOF’s use and utility as an early indication and warning, strong-pointing, and “rheostat” capability for the Nation.
As we know, Russia, China, and Iran are deliberate in the what and the where of their activities, and it is the where that makes issues of geostrategy all the more relevant. For example, amplifying around 2014, Russian operational reach in Crimea, Cyprus, Greece, Egypt, and Syria has been about ensuring that there is a buffer zone (Ukraine) between Russia and NATO, about holding the eastern Mediterranean sea lines of communication at risk, and about restoring Russia’s role on the world stage.
When it comes to China’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP), its economic activities through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are significant indicators of China’s global ambitions. China’s efforts in Latin America involve gaining influence to place the Panama Canal in a series of overlapping influence levers to salami slice to a new normal of either control or positional denial of U.S. access, basing, and overflight, all while carving away support from Taiwan via BRI financial inducements to fragile democracies in the Western Hemisphere. With regard to Africa, China is outperforming the United States diplomatically and economically. China has more embassies in Africa than the United States, which erodes American influence and the dwindling support for Taiwan from previously friendly African states. China is now Africa’s largest trading partner and the largest bilateral lender to many African countries, “creating an asymmetric power dynamic with the potential for dependency.”
Chinese strategists think and write using geopolitical terms, dividing the world up into regions or zones, and deploy concepts such as “heartland” and “rimland” in their works with frequent direct referrals to the great geostrategic theorists such as Sir Halford Mackinder and Alfred Thayer Mahan. SOF leaders need to think and act in geopolitical and geostrategic terms as well, particularly if they seek to achieve intellectual overmatch against their CCP and Kremlin counterparts.
We must also recognize that our competitors and adversaries have already redefined the notion of competition, even of warfare itself, and the role of their militaries within it. Loosely referred to as the X in special operations, objectives—or rather the specific goal that directs and purposes every military operation—have often been mistakenly considered only in terms of the physical domain. The concept of the X has now become all-domain, demanding a reframing of the way we fight in the future and a reframing of even what constitutes a fight itself. In the fourth age and under conditions of compound security, special operations professionals must be trans-domain problem-solvers. A geostrategic positional advantage approach also forces a competitor or adversary to focus their resources at what the famed George Kennan called the “strong points.”
For this next age, we will need SOF to play point-versus-area defense at or proximate to these geographic, human security, and cognitive strong points. And in so doing, it is important to note that the point of action may be far removed from the point of effect. And in that sense, SOF can indirectly affect behavioral and decisionmaking calculations through actions that may be in other physical and nonphysical (for example, virtual, cognitive, and ideational) domains. This is the exact logic of placing combined joint interagency task forces (CJIATFs) within combined joint special operations task forces placed at or proximate to the geostrategic nexuses.
SOF has employed this logic worldwide and through several evolutions of the find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate actionable-intelligence CJIATF process. For example, in Iraq, SOF Task Force 714 was able to adapt to the mission of finding and dismantling al Qaeda in Iraq through the fusion of interagency, intergovernmental, and allied and foreign country partner collaboration, producing the very sort of big data–supported, intelligence-driven operations throughout and at key critical locations across a vast theater of operations and activities that is intended when we speak of whole-of-government solutions. It is through such command and control and force-projection platforms—strategically placed, sustainable counterterrorism plus GPC platforms—where use (employment) and utility (service provision) of SOF can and must be combined and integrated and where and how compound threats can be overmatched in cost-effective ways.
Another Case in Point: Syria
We need to look no further than SOF’s operational placement in and throughout northeast Syria since 2014 and how that presence and those roles have evolved over time for proof of principle of SOF’s utility beyond counterterrorism and counter-VEOs, beyond the context of the war on terror, and moreover, as an expression of integrated deterrence in action. What began as an effort to destroy the physical manifestations of the caliphate through direct action, raids, and strikes, many times in concert with state and nonstate actors committed to defeating the so-called Islamic State (IS), quickly became a mission to deter further Russian (and Turkish) territorial provocation, assure new partners (Syrian Kurds), deny freedom of action to Iran and its surrogates and proxies, defend critical resources and infrastructure, deny any resurgence of IS as an existential threat to friendly regional governments, and maintain U.S. access and influence where the East and West truly converge.
The fact that the U.S. Government did this with such minimal investment, while assuming acceptable risk, must be understood and appreciated, even lauded, for what it was: a new paradigm in which the use and utility of SOF goes well beyond its two decades of direct action merely in the context of counterterrorism, but instead where direct action and counterterrorism are integral use-of-force activities endemic to, and not separate or separable from, GPC.
In this enlarged context, from use to utility of force, SOF serves as the regulating rheostat for a new geopolitical environment that challenges conventional wisdom but demands new ways of thinking and acting toward an array of threats, state and nonstate, and the underlying conditions that drive them.
Implementing Change: The Future of SOF Professionals
We will maintain the proficiency of special operations forces to focus on crisis response and priority counterterrorism and unconventional warfare missions. And we will develop capabilities to better compete and deter gray zone actions.
—Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
In today’s strategic environment, information technology has significantly enabled action in the cognitive domain. For SOF, the cognitive domain is the primary medium through which we operate. As we transition through an era of attempted strategic control, we will move into an era of strategic influence, the currency of (Great Power) competition. This demands a new SOF H.E2.R.O.TM—the highly educated, hyper (tech)-enabled, responsible operator. This comprehensive SOF utility for the future will produce:
- continuous integration of national instruments of power and influence in support of national objectives
- an unprecedented degree of global integration of the all-domain resources available from the combatant commands, Service component commands, and theater special operations commands to generate advantage for ourselves and dilemmas for our competitors
- assured access through strategic shaping and support to resistance and resilience strong-pointing of allies and partners
- critical and creative strategic thinking across the Joint Staff and other joint headquarters and approaches to joint warfighting
- highly effective coalition, allied, international partner, and U.S. coordination and integration
- deeper understanding of the implications of disruptive and future technologies for adversaries and ourselves.
At U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), our Campaign Plan for Global Special Operations is our blueprint. We are focusing in real investment terms on making informational advantage and influence operations, adding both as new tips-of-spears to SOF’s quiver of capabilities. USSOCOM’s recently created Joint Military Information Support Operations WebOps Center is only one example of the types of new emphases on new operations, activities, and investments reflecting a rediscovery of the full utility of special operations.
The future focus of special operations will be what it has always been: to remain exquisite, proactive, and aimed at solving problems in ways that avoid moral injury to the Nation. This imperative has always found the country’s special operators, working with and through allies and partner forces, in the gray zones between competition, conflict, and war. As it has always been, so it shall continue to be. JFQ
Notes
1 United States Special Operations Command, “Guidance on Briefing Notes,” available at <https://slideplayer.com/slide/9402754/>.
2 White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2021), available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf>.
3 Geostrategy is a subfield of geopolitics, a type of foreign policy guided principally by geographical factors as they inform, constrain, or affect political and military planning. It is the systematic analysis to develop a sensitive understanding of geographical realities, political forces, historical experience, and the factors that change these to formulate prescriptions on the application of military power to achieve vital objectives. Derived from the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Brzezinski Institute on Geostrategy, available at <https://www.csis.org/programs/brzezinski-institute-geostrategy>.
4 Landry Signé, “How to Restore U.S. Credibility in Africa,” Foreign Policy, January 15, 2021, available at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/15/united-states-africa-biden-administration-relations-china/>.
5 U.S. Special Operations Command, “SOF 2030,” February 7, 2020, 14.
6 Giles D. Harlow and George C. Maerz, eds., Measures Short of War: The George F. Kennan Lectures at the National War College, 1946–47 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1991), available at <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/139669/1991-05_Measures_Short_War.pdf>.
7 Richard H. Schultz and Richard D. Clarke, “Big Data at War: Special Operations Forces, Project Maven, and Twenty-First-Century Warfare,” Modern War Institute at West Point, August 25, 2020, available at <https://mwi.usma.edu/big-data-at-war-special-operations-forces-project-maven-and-twenty-first-century-warfare/>.
8 Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Education & Talent Management (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, May 1, 2020), available at <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/jcs_pme_tm_vision.pdf?ver=2020-05-15-102429-817>.
4. Making the Case for a Joint Special Operations Profession (JFQ)
Conclusion:
Special operations personnel address unique, specialized, and difficult military problems that require exceptionally trained, superbly equipped, and tremendously supported warfighters. While other Services can overwhelm enemies with massive combat power, special operations provide discreet, sometimes covert, precision military capabilities that have become increasingly relevant in modern warfare but have at the same time, over the past 20 years, come with its own gray area legal and ethical ambiguities and complications. The compound security dilemmas of today and tomorrow demand a restriking of that critical balance between SOF’s specialized warfighting and the Nation’s core values in a fourth-age, JSOF professional ethic.
Making the Case for a Joint Special Operations Profession
By Isaiah Wilson III and C. Anthony Pfaff Joint Force Quarterly 105
Dr. Isaiah (Ike) Wilson III is a Professor of Political Science and President of the Joint Special Operations University. Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff is a Research Professor for Strategy, the Military Profession, and Ethics in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College and a Senior Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council.
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Air Force special tactics operators assigned to 24th Special Operations Wing conduct hoist operations with Navy MH-60 Seahawk aircrew members assigned to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron Nine, during Emerald Warrior 21.1, at Hurlburt Field, Florida, February 18, 2021 (U.S. Air Force/Edward Coddington)
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The year 2021 proved a period of strategic inflection, a moment of standout changes in the character of geopolitical competition. Arguably, the last similar period of such strategic inflection began with the terrorist attacks of 9/11, what scholars and practitioners comfortably regard as a historic watershed event in international relations. Those attacks gave rise to what became known as the war on terror. Just as there was a great deal of uncertainty in 2001 of how best to prosecute a war on terror, there is now a great deal of uncertainty regarding how best to compete against peer and near-peer competitors who pose challenges in the current inflection. How to strike an effective strategic rebalance between those functional imperatives that have defined the war on terror and the imperatives of the coming era only further complicate the situation.
Moreover, the experience of two decades of counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan and Iraq suggests that this uncertainty may be unresolvable. While both wars have nominally ended, the doctrinal debates they inspired rage on. These conflicts have now largely defined the context and character of special operations forces (SOF) and perhaps too narrowly focused them on the three counterforce operations, activities, and investments of CT, counter–violent extremist organizations, and COIN. However, while special operations and SOF played a vanguard role in rediscovering and refining tactics, techniques, tradecraft, and incorporating new technology for waging the fights during the war on terror, their successful operations alone did not always translate into lasting strategic success.
As SOF transition operations to support competition with peer and near-peer competitors, there is persistent frustration over apparent U.S. failures. At the time of this writing, China continues to provoke its neighbors in its near abroad while expanding its influence in Africa and South America. Russia, prior and in addition to the invasion of Ukraine, has successfully prevented its neighbors from strengthening ties with the West as well as challenged the United States in Syria. Iran, for its part, has limited U.S. influence in Iraq, Yemen, and the Levant through its use of proxies and terror operations. In each of these cases, it can seem that there is little the United States—especially the U.S. military—can do to reverse these developments.
This frustration, of course, is not the fault of SOF. International competition is best accomplished through the coordinated efforts of a variety of Services and agencies. SOF, however, are in a unique position to participate. However, as described in the 2020 U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Comprehensive Review, a high operating tempo (OPTEMPO), coupled with statutory and resource limitations regarding SOF assessment, recruiting, and professional education, currently limit SOF ability to expand their role. To do so, SOF will have to establish the kind of institutional infrastructure that can transform them from highly skilled operators to a joint special operations forces (JSOF) profession where certified professionals exercise autonomy over a specific jurisdiction. Mature professions provide a public good over a jurisdiction, as in health care where certified professionals such as doctors and nurses exercise autonomy regarding how to best to serve their clients. Providing that public good requires more than just skill at task execution; it requires robust institutions capable of building and maintaining client trust by certifying persons in those skills as well as governing how those skills are employed and holding professionals accountable for the service they provide. Currently, due largely to statutory limitations, SOF have no unique jurisdiction; they are limited in their ability to certify and govern the employment of SOF operators.
This article seeks to introduce for consideration and debate this question of whether there is now a need for a formal JSOF profession. University of Chicago sociologist Andrew Abbott argues that the purpose of a profession is to diagnose, infer, and treat problems that arise within its jurisdiction. How, when, and where a profession accomplishes those functions largely establish practitioners’ identity, which is expressed as shared standards, norms, and laws that collectively place the professional in a better position to serve a social good than the nonprofessional. That positioning is what gives the nonprofessional client reasons to trust not the professional but the profession itself. That trust is then expressed in terms of the autonomy that society grants professionals to exercise their expert knowledge. In this context, the opportunity for SOF is clear: claiming a jurisdiction within the context of international competition will place SOF in a better position to build trust and assure autonomy. Doing so will require clarity on what counts as expert knowledge (as opposed to skills and tasks) and the necessary institutional development to certify SOF professionals in the application of this knowledge.
Rethinking Joint-Combined SOF from a Systems of Professions Point of View
Abbott’s framework, drawn largely from his seminal work in sociology, has new relevance to the Armed Forces’ professions in the 21st century, and we propose even more relevant application to the questions regarding the professional status of special operations and SOF use and utility, particularly in the context of joint and combined integration. By integration, we refer to the imperative of approaching complex, complicated, wicked, and compounded challenges through “whole of governments, whole of societies,” multilateral ways, means, and coordinated ends. The lack of jointness (that is, cross–Armed Forces’ SOF component’s interoperability) was a major finding of the Holloway Commission Report in the wake of the tragic Iranian hostage rescue mission, Operation Eagle Claw, more popularly referred to as Desert One. Today, under compound security conditions, similar operational needs-based arguments for greater integration (extended now well beyond joint) to full joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial (JIIMC) dominate, defining the central logic of the 2022 U.S. national security, defense, and military strategies. Joint integration in the past and JIIMC integration now and into the future find SOF once again of central focus—JIIMC integration is the new functional imperative.
Abbott’s model portrays professions locked in competition for jurisdiction over once solvable problems that have become relatively and suddenly more intractable. For example, in the bipolar, relatively unnetworked geostrategic environment of the 20th century, nuclear overmatch coupled with technologically advanced conventional forces seemed sufficient to deter/contain peer adversaries. In today’s globalized, multipolar environment, weaker adversaries can exploit technology to bypass military strength to place the United States at strategic disadvantage and undermine U.S. interests.
In this context, Abbott’s distinctive contribution to the discourse is to methodically define professions “wholly in terms of an elbows-out application of expertise; professions compete with each other for expertise-based jurisdiction over solvable problems.” According to Abbott’s systems of professions theory, competition can arise when social or technical changes act to weaken an existing profession’s jurisdiction or to create an entirely new niche, as with the proliferation of computers. The outcomes of competition may be that one profession seizes turf from another, or there may be one of several forms of negotiated symbiosis.
Central to Abbott’s model is his definition of profession itself, wholly founded on this competitive process. To Abbott, an occupation is a profession if (and only if) it can abstract its knowledge not only to solve novel problems but also to adapt its practices to new niches. Abbott argues, “Many occupations fight for turf, but only professions expand their cognitive domain by using abstract knowledge to annex new areas, to define them as their own proper work.” An equally valuable contribution of Abbott’s work to the questions central to this article is Abbott’s invocation of a classic healthcare metaphor of diagnosis ➝ inference ➝ treatment as a model of all professional problem-solving. In this article, we apply this model (but present it nonlinearly) as a device to diagnose the potential needs of a JSOF profession and to infer a potential treatment therein.
Diagnosis: Fragmented Professional Development Complicated by a Dramatically Altered State of Global Security and Stability
Diagnosis, in this sense, metaphorically involves framing a problem in terms of the profession’s known and reconsidered domain of expertise. Applied to the questions of this initial study, the inability to locate special operations clearly and definitively and SOF in a prior, clearly delineated jurisdiction may be an artifact and signal of a profession under the stressors of change in mission, orientation, applicability, or even identity, or the absence of a formal profession altogether.
As the USSOCOM Comprehensive Review candidly and publicly acknowledged, high OPTEMPO has resulted in a bias toward employment, often without a clear understanding for how such employment relates to achieving strategic ends. The result has been a stressed force focused on the immediate task but not the long-term objective. Another major contributing factor to the 20-year tendency toward fragmented SOF professional development has been the statutorily directed dependency of SOF on the conventional forces for most recruitment, assessment, certification, and professional development. These two factors are related. Given the high demand for employment and the limited relevancy of conventional professional military education, there is little incentive to take advantage of professional development opportunities that do exist and the limited means to create ones unique to special operations.
Other critical factors and areas of relative gapped leader focus, capabilities, and capacities resourcing revealed in the USSOCOM Comprehensive Review include a recognized emphasis on physical and tactical skill training at the expense of focus on broader education and professional development, arguably contributing to a general sense of entitlement growing with and within a limited joint governing ethic. When combined with the dramatic changes in the character of global competition, it is not hard to see why applications of force prove more and more anemic—proving too little, applied too late to prevent, and applied not long enough and in the right ways to solve problems in sustainable ways.
Treatment: Joint Professionalization and a Joint-Combined SOF Profession
Abbott’s metaphor of treatment draws from the available toolkit of a given profession. For special operations and SOF, this toolkit typically relates to 12 classic SOF core activities (also referred to as core tasks):
- military information support operations
- unconventional warfare
- civil affairs operations
- special reconnaissance
- security force assistance
- foreign internal defense
- hostage rescue and recovery
- counterterrorism
- counter–proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- counterinsurgency
- direct action
- foreign humanitarian assistance.
Of course, these 12 activities do not comprehensively describe the abstract expert knowledge necessary to operate in hybrid contexts; however, they do represent a good start, the completion of which is one task SOF must fulfill to fully professionalize.
Moments of geostrategic change, transformation, transition, and threshold crossings herald new unknowns that challenge previously “known knowns.” Confidences in and questions over established jurisdiction regarding both diagnosis and treatment are susceptible to these changes; history shows these competitive challenges often, if not mostly, come in the form of new technologies or expertise claims from competing professions, often driven by dramatic changes in the demand-to-supply dynamics defining of that occupation’s and/or organization’s prior understandings of its value proposition and public service relevancy.
Today’s rebalance toward a presumably new era of strategic competition, integrated deterrence, and active campaigning (cornerstone concepts underpinning the 2022 national defense and military strategies) is already giving an amplified and accelerative rise in competitions between and within the public service professions characterizing the national, global security, and defense establishment(s)—competitions of a character of change that inevitably incite fundamental reconsiderations of previous knowns regarding uses and utilities of force and core versus peripheral identities (that is, the functional imperatives of the individual professional as well as the collective profession itself).
At times and under conditions of transformational disruptive change, foundations of the profession are questioned, at times even shaken, at their core four tenets: jurisdiction(s), expertise and expert knowledge, and culture (ethic and ethos), culminating in (re)defined functional imperative(s). The following are general (and generalizable across varied professions) term descriptions of these four tenets:
- Jurisdiction: A domain where diverse skills can integrate to achieve a social good, such as health, justice, or security.
- Expert knowledge: Technical, political, human development, and ethical knowledge that is abstract, legitimizes professional work, and establishes how the profession conducts research on, diagnoses, treats, and makes inferences regarding the problems its professionals are supposed to solve.
- Autonomy: The principle that professionals have authority (are licensed by the client, that is, society) to apply this expert knowledge over the jurisdiction and nonprofessionals do not.
- Certification: Institutional certification of not only skills but also professional knowledge at every level for which there is a problem the profession is supposed to solve.
- Professional ethic: Governing the profession to maintain trust of the client, which is informed by the profession’s functional imperative, moral norms reflecting client values, and law.
Professionalizing provides an infrastructure for rebalancing bureaucratic requirements with a professional ideal, for integrating other efforts to address psychological and physical conditions for ethical failure, and for attaining not only the knowledge but also the authority granted to professions versus their intendedly supporting bureaucracies (see table).
Table.
Profession vs. Bureaucracy
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Photo By: Don M. Snider, “The Army Profession and Ethic,” symposium presentation
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Understanding the distinction between the characteristics of a profession and those of a bureaucracy is important. There are times when the military should act as a bureaucracy—when it performs routine things, such as the annual budget process. Just as the medical profession should guard against arguing for doctors’ parochial interests (instead of the interests of patients and overall health care) in the national healthcare debate, military officers must guard against wrongly using their specialized expertise merely to advance a bureaucratic agenda. Doing so could sacrifice the value of professional advice and relegate the military to being considered as just another interest group.
As the United States grapples with the post-9/11 conditions of new enemies, new battlespaces, and new kinds of wars, military officers and perhaps especially the commissioned, noncommissioned, and warrant officers of the SOF community should avoid at least three traditional pitfalls typically associated with times of geostrategic ambiguity, budget stringency, and force reductions:
- becoming overcommitted to the latest technological trends at the expense of historical military challenges
- being tempted to rename, oversell, and fetishize new war concepts, especially in support of single-Service parochial interests
- overplaying the “hollow force” card, asserting that any reduction will irreparably degrade national security.
Instead, military effectiveness needs to be seen, understood, appreciated, and approached from a comprehensive, multi-Service perspective. Military professionals need to focus on maximizing national security while recognizing the fiscal impact that military spending has on overall national power. This is uniquely and peculiarly true for SOF professionals and a joint-combined special operations forces (J-CSOF) profession.
Inference: Professionalize J-CSOF
However, it is inference—the uncertain space between diagnosis and treatment that defines professional expertise—that also represents a great deal of vulnerability. When the needed inference is simple (that is, a narrow “say-do gap” to be traversed, mitigated, or outright eliminated), the new required work can be automated or claimed by subordinate occupational groups, such as clerks and technicians, with no demand for whole-cloth change of the occupation. An example of this simple inference would be the automation of critical and physically demanding tasks or functions permitting the change or elimination of certain biophysical requirements as exclusionary in accession and selection talent management processes. Yet when the inference is complex, the result may herald the birth of a new profession and/or the death of others.
SOF undergo rigorous selection and training that sets them apart by a unique functional imperative and body of expertise and expert professional knowledge from their parent Service, creating a greater bond among special operators who often identify first as being part of special operations and second as having originally joined their specific Service. Those areas of expert professional knowledge include:
- achieving information advantage and strategic influence
- leveraging emergent technologies to develop strategic-operational intelligence
- promoting ethical leadership in ungoverned spaces
- supporting national resilience and resistance to authoritarian disruptors
- advancing national interests in compound security competition.
Related to the last area of expert professional knowledge, the Syria problem is a perfect but tragic example. Syria was and remains not one single conflict but rather a four-in-one compound war. It is part insurgency against the Bashir al-Asad regime, part counter–Islamic State coalitional war, part Syrian civil war in the making, and a war of forced extra-territorial human migration. Despite the United States demonstrating a high degree of skill at working with indigenous forces, Syria remains a low-rent quagmire for the United States with no end in sight. Thus, the inference is figuring out where the responsibility lies for resolving the quagmire in the favor of the United States, which then indicates who should determine how best to solve not only that problem but also other problems of a similar character.
As noted, SOF are uniquely suited to operating in such complex, hybrid environments. But because SOF do not conceive of this environment as their unique jurisdiction, they have so far not developed the expert knowledge necessary to fully realize U.S. interests in this space. Moreover, they lack the institutional depth to manage how this expert knowledge affects their functional imperative.
Unique Expertise and Expert Knowledge
Being and becoming more anticipatory is the new imperative leader attribute to attain the intellectual overmatch desired by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to confront compound security threats that define the evolving character of global geopolitical competition. Equally imperative is building a “strategic mindedness” within the current and future SOF leader-operator—equal and matching to that same operator’s operational acumen—and finding and making new ways and moments of building this in earlier, more consistently, and continually throughout the full life cycle of JSOF professional officership development, cradle to SOF for life.
Expertise in the core competencies of hybrid warfare against state and nonstate adversaries, integration of information operations, cyber operations, foreign direct assistance, limited kinetic operations to achieve political objectives (that is, political warfare), and discrete, covert, and clandestine adversary denial operations, activities, and investments all define the core of JSOF unique expertise and knowledge, along with SOF’s classic roles as escalation ladder “rheostat” and “sentinel” (that is, indication and warnings sensor-shooter capability), all while avoiding escalation to war.
It is important to recall that a key determinant (the distinction) between a general functionary and that of a unique profession lies in the matter of certification. For certification of JSOF as a joint profession, the SOF enterprise as an institution certifies not just or only along the lines of skills, activities, or tasks but also professional knowledge (core competencies) at every level for which there is a problem the profession is supposed to solve.
After 18 months of a rigorous and still running comprehensive, J-CSOF education, leader preparation, and development curriculum and training programs of instruction review and refit study, the Joint Special Operations University has identified—(re)discovered—five JSOF core competency knowledge arenas presently missing from (gapped) current Service SOF doctrine:
- Uses and utilities of JSOF in compound security competition (i.e., SOF in support of 21st- century irregular warfare)
- SOF support to resilience and resistance operations
- SOF support to economic statecraft
- SOF support to strategic-operational shaping (“unconventional” deterrence)
- Informational advantage and strategic influence
- SOF as profession (SOF leadership and the SOF professional ethic)
- SOF and strategic-operational intelligence and emergent technology
- Design-based integrative campaigning and support to statecraft
SOF mission sets, in and of themselves, have not significantly changed. However, the environment in which they are conducted has continued to change significantly. Yet amid all this change, tomorrow’s fourth-age SOF leader-operator will always need to be comprehensively versed in the following core arenas—derivative from, as well as generating of—these five JSOF common core competencies: geostrategy and transnational affairs, strategic intelligence and integrative JIIMC operations, science and technology and futures, and SOF leadership and the SOF professional ethic.
A Unique J-CSOF Functional Imperative
The compound security character of the global security environment is such that it demands a utility of SOF that is equally compounded (that is, a comprehensive combination of all the skills, techniques and technics, and operational methods of all three preceding ages of SOF, amplified by 21st-century technological advancements). This, in short, speaks to the imperative of revisiting competition and rediscovering SOF historic roles, missions, and identity.
This does not mean SOF will not have a warfighting function. Neither does it mean other Services will not play a role in competition. What it does mean, in Abbott’s terms, is that SOF will “elbow” their way into owning something no other Service currently fully embraces. Consequently, and from a professional viewpoint, SOF must grapple with and find answers to core questions that define the coming strategic competition era, such as:
- What are the new modes of competition already seen today as well as ones that adversaries are likely to initiate?
- How can the U.S. shift from merely reacting to these and instead become more opportunistic?
- What are the limits of what SOF can do and what help must they seek from others?
The key—the ultimate functional imperative—then, of a J-CSOF profession is to apply SOF for the Nation’s power purposes in ways and at points along the continuum of competition that defend and deter against the adversaries’ “disruptor’s playbooks” (that is, asymmetrical and irregular competitive and warfare techniques) within the gray zone (below thresholds of armed conflict) through credible presence and preparedness of compellent force.
Relating to the autonomy granted to a JSOF profession, SOF and USSOCOM will be(come) lead organizations for hybrid operations, leading in the integration of Service/JIIMC capabilities to deter and compel adversaries below the threshold of war. Professional certification brings an imperative of aligning Service programs’ training tactical skills with SOF professional needs and pointedly from the joint, allied, partnered SOF perspectives, establishing higher level training and education to certify professionals at operational and strategic levels. All this in combination will demand a professional ethic that establishes a JSOF professional ethic governing competition and hybrid operations with special focus below the contact layer of the threshold of conflict. As a joint-combined profession, we argue that SOF will need to play a leading role in these additional three critical areas.
Understanding and Redefining the Future Value of Alliances. All the still-under-draft (at the time of this publication) 2022 U.S. national strategic documents—security, defense, and military—emphasize the importance of allies and partners to affect integrated deterrence through active campaigning. There can be no say-do gaps in this functional imperative; such gaps will manifest holes-in-government nonsolutions—the stuff of self-inflicted “Thucydides traps.” If the U.S. continues to diminish its support for and its valuation of alliances, what would SOF look like without such alliances?
Redefining Information Operations. After decades of being out-hustled and out-messaged by far more agile adversaries and their disinformation campaigns, the United States needs to level, rethink, and then rebuild its approach and methods to messaging so that it can fight and win the battle of the narrative. SOF, in JIIMC configurations, must return to their classic global scouting and sentinel roles and functions and accept a leadership role in redefining SOF roles in strategic-operational influence and information advantage operations, activities, and investments.
Technological Development. Developments today in robotics, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and a wide variety of other areas may lead to astounding new capabilities that radically change human life and how humans interact with technology. As technological innovation and proliferation continue to accelerate rapidly, how can SOF adapt themselves to better leverage technology for their own use and better prepare for its use by adversaries?
Bedrock to the functional imperatives of a JSOF profession will be SOF’s roles in the overdue revisitation of deterrence and SOF’s classic roles therein. Since the ending of the Cold War, there has been a precipitous decline in practical experience with and knowledge of the theories, history, and practice of deterrence (simply defined as the action of discouraging an action or event through instilling doubt or fear of the consequences). If the change in the character of geopolitical competition does in fact find, among many factors and variables, a return to a new 21st-century form of Great Power competition, then the recovery of our understandings of deterrence (and its relationship with compellence theory and praxis) and its differing types (including recognizing several important complexities of deterrence such as distinctions between specific and general deterrence, absolute and restrictive deterrence, and actual and perceived punishments) is of vital importance.
How does the utility of SOF need to be relearned, reconceived, and recalibrated as a more effective instrument of strategic-operational escalation/deescalation management? This issue and the questions it raises is perhaps the most important (re)defining factor of SOF utility, purpose, and relevancy. It is perhaps the fundamental gray matter puzzle to be solved as J-CSOF campaign in the gray zones.
Conclusion: Epilogue as Prologue
Any move toward a J-CSOF profession will be a heavy lift, to say the least. (Re)defining JSOF profession jurisdiction will have necessary, imperative overlaps with the Services, requiring some consensus and cooperation; however, the autonomy that comes with being its own profession will permit greater focus on unique-to-SOF professional development requirements. Eventually, SOF will require deliberate guidance on whether and how to continue functioning as a “quasi-Service.” Specifically, decisions will be required to address each of the following concerns:
- SOF-related skills are not additive.
- Integration at higher levels is critical.
- New professional military education infrastructures are likely required (especially for senior officers and noncommissioned officers).
- Paucity of law and ethics below the threshold of armed conflict requires research and advocacy.
It is appropriate to conclude by speaking to the importance of the professional officer commissioning oath. Returning to S.L.A. Marshall’s classic work, The Armed Forces Officer, both Marshall and George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense at the time, emphasized the linkage of the officer corps with service to Nation: “Thereafter, [the officer] is given a paper which says that because the President as representative of the people of this country reposes ‘special trust and confidence’ in his [or her] ‘patriotism, valor, fidelity, and abilities,’ he [or she] is forthwith commissioned.”
S.L.A. Marshall went on to highlight one quality in particular: fidelity. Fidelity is commonly considered faithfulness to something to which one is bound by pledge or duty. In spite of all the formal rules and legal statutes obligating the commissioned and noncommissioned officer to the Constitution, and through it, to the American people, officer fidelity has proved to be the most enduring tie that binds officership and the profession of arms to the Nation. This bond has helped the Nation weather many storms, both foreign and domestic. The fidelity of the military professional has always found its strongest roots in the rich soils of American history. Examples set by leaders from General George Washington to Admiral William McRaven reinforce the principle of subordination of the military practitioner to civilian authority, and through that authority, to the defense of the Nation.
Special operations personnel address unique, specialized, and difficult military problems that require exceptionally trained, superbly equipped, and tremendously supported warfighters. While other Services can overwhelm enemies with massive combat power, special operations provide discreet, sometimes covert, precision military capabilities that have become increasingly relevant in modern warfare but have at the same time, over the past 20 years, come with its own gray area legal and ethical ambiguities and complications. The compound security dilemmas of today and tomorrow demand a restriking of that critical balance between SOF’s specialized warfighting and the Nation’s core values in a fourth-age, JSOF professional ethic. JFQ
The authors acknowledge Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Long, USA (Ret.), Special Forces, Ph.D.; Dr. Kari Thyne; Command Sergeant Major John Labuz, USA (Ret.); and Lieutenant Colonel Lukas Berg, USA, for their contributions to the advancement of ideas and emerging theses regarding joint special operations forces professionalism through their teaching and research on leadership, culture, and ethics as the professoriat of Joint Special Operations University.
Notes
1 U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Comprehensive Review (Tampa, FL: USSOCOM, 2020), available at <https://sof.news/pubs/USSOCOM-Comprehensive-Ethics-Review-Report-January-2020.pdf>.
2 Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988).
3 The Holloway Commission Report (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1980), available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB63/doc8.pdf>.
4 Abbott, The System of Professions, 2, 91–96.
5 Colin Furness, “The System of Professions,” Education for Information 35, no. 3 (August 2019), available at <https://content.iospress.com/articles/education-for-information/efi190271>.
6 Abbott, The System of Professions.
7 Furness, “The System of Professions.”
8 Ibid., 102.
9 Abbott, The System of Professions, 40–52.
10 USSOCOM, Comprehensive Review.
11 Ibid.
12 For further reference, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Belknap Press, 1981), 8–10; James Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession,” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd Matthews (Boston: McGraw-Hill Custom Publishing, 2005), 43–44; Magali S. Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 208.
13 Don M. Snider, “The Army Profession and Ethic,” symposium presentation, Command and General Staff College Ethics Symposium, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, December 4, 2012, available at <https://www.slideserve.com/esben/the-army-profession-and-ethic-the-center-for-the-army-profession-and-ethic-04-dec-12>.
14 Isaiah Wilson III and Michael J. Meese, “Officership and the Profession of Arms in the 21st Century,” in Fundamentals of Military Medicine, ed. Francis G. O’Connor, Eric B. Schoomaker, and Dale C. Smith (Fort Sam Houston, TX: Office of the Surgeon General, 2019).
15 Isaiah Wilson III and Scott Smitson, “Solving America’s Gray-Zone Puzzle,” Parameters 46, no. 4 (Winter 2016), 65.
16 Furness, “The System of Professions.”
17 Isaiah III Wilson, Learning Pathways-in-Action, White Paper No. 6 (Tampa, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2021).
18 Lew Irwin, “JCS Vision and Guidance for PME & Talent Management and Optimizing Joint Leader Development” PowerPoint, October 23, 2019, available at <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/MECC2019/mecc2019day1brief2jcs_vision_guidance_rev5.pdf?ver=2019-10-21-092954-007>.
19 Isaiah Wilson III and Scott A. Smitson, “The Compound Security Dilemma: Threats at the Nexus of War and Peace,” Parameters 50, no. 2 (Summer 2020), available at <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Parameters_50-2_Summer-2020_Wilson.pdf>; “Compound Security as a Theory of Next with Dr. Isaiah ‘Ike’ Wilson III (Part 1 of 4),” February 18, 2021, video, 10:33, available at <https://www.yout
V7z6CqO2BysAi5sQyc4-W5LJILj8>.
20 SOF for life is a common referent across the special operations communities connotating formal transition of the Active-duty special operations forces member (that is, on separation or retirement from Active service). And despite no longer being “licensed to practice” as a formal special operations professional, the member is still regarded as a lifelong part of the profession.
21 Kuang-Ming Kuo, Paul C. Talley, and Chi-Hsien Huang, “A Meta-Analysis of the Deterrence Theory in Security-Compliant and Security-Risk Behaviors,” Computers & Security, vol. 96 (September 2020), available at <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404820302042>.
22 S.L.A. Marshall, The Armed Forces Officer (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1950), 6, available at <https://www.usna.edu/Ethics/_files/documents/SLA%20Marshall%20Armed%20Forces%20Officer.pdf>.
5. How a Mariupol steel plant became a holdout for the city’s resistance
We will have to study this to learn lessons about fighting in tunnels.
How a Mariupol steel plant became a holdout for the city’s resistance
Long before Mariupol’s Azovstal Iron and Steel Works became a key battleground in Ukraine, it played a dominant role in the port city’s economy. As one of the largest metallurgical factories in Europe, it pumped out more than 4 million tons of crude steel annually and provided livelihoods to tens of thousands of people.
But now, amid a devastating war and a weeks-long siege by Russian forces, the sprawling industrial park is no longer producing steel. Instead, the plant and its network of underground tunnels are serving as a shelter and final holdout for thousands of Ukrainian fighters, including many from the Azov Battalion, one of Ukraine’s most skilled — and controversial — military units.
Azovstal was originally constructed in the early Soviet era and was later rebuilt after the Nazi occupation of Mariupol between 1941 and 1943 left it in ruins. It now occupies four square miles along the city’s waterfront.
“Under the city, there is basically another city,” Yan Gagin, an adviser with the pro-Moscow separatist group Donetsk People’s Republic, told Russian state news network Ria Novosti over the weekend.
Gagin complained that the site was designed to withstand bombings and blockades — and that it has an inbuilt communication system that strongly favors the defenders, even if they are far outnumbered.
Sergiy Zgurets, a Ukrainian military analyst, told Reuters that the Russians are using “heavy bombs” in the Azovstal area, given its large size and number of workshops.
Mariana Budjeryn, an expert at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, said the situation in Mariupol looked increasingly “hopeless,” based on the information that is trickling out.
“This city got besieged slowly and the area of control under Ukrainian forces choked, as it were,” said Budjeryn, who is from Ukraine. “There is probably tactical and security advantage for the defending forces to make their last stand at this large industrial facility. It’s like a mini fortress.”
A lot remains unknown, she said, including what kind of armaments or access to air defenses the Ukrainian forces have left.
But if Russia were to take the steelworks, it would be a much-needed victory for the Kremlin.
After failing to overrun Kyiv in the war’s first days, Russian forces have regrouped in eastern Ukraine with an apparent plan to seize large parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, together known as Donbas.
Mariupol, with a prewar population of around 450,000, is one of the last urban areas of Donetsk that is not fully under Russian control. Capturing it would give Russian forces a land bridge between Russia and Crimea, the peninsula it annexed from Ukraine in 2014.
Azovstal and similar sites in the city are also prime examples of why Donbas and its industrial heritage are so important for both Ukraine and Russia. Mariupol is Ukraine’s second-largest port city, and before comprehensive Western sanctions, Russia had a booming steel sector that was valued as the fifth-largest in the world.
Donbas is known best for its coal, but Mariupol also had a profitable metal industry. Roughly 40,000 residents were employed at Azovstal and another nearby steelworks owned by the same company, Ilyich Iron and Steel Works, according to Ukrainian steel giant Metinvest.
Together, Azovstal and Ilyich accounted for roughly one-third of Ukraine’s crude steel production in 2019, according to tracking from the analyst group GMK Center. That year, steel and related industries contributed 12 percent of Ukraine’s gross domestic product.
Russian forces stormed the smaller Ilyich plant last week. But Metinvest said in a statement to Reuters last week that it would “never operate under Russian occupation.”
Taras Shevchenko, director general of Ilyich Iron and Steel Works, said Monday in an interview with the Ukraine 24 news channel that the Russian action in Mariupol was a “deliberate, systematic destruction of industry.”
He said the company was assessing the extent of the damage and vowed to restore the metallurgical plants. His remarks were published on Metinvest’s website.
Azovstal has seen conflict before. Production at the site began in 1933, but less than a decade later Mariupol was overrun by German troops during World War II, and works were halted amid a dramatic exodus of civilians from the city.
But by 1944, just one year after the occupation ended, work was already underway to rebuild the plant, which soon became a productive and profitable part of the Soviet steel industry.
Seventy years later, steelworkers from Azovstal organized to forcefully retake Mariupol from pro-Russian separatists in 2014. The resistance — in a city where a majority spoke Russian and had often voted for politicians friendly to Moscow — surprised many observers.
Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine’s richest man and the owner of Metinvest, has served as a member of parliament for the pro-Moscow Party of Regions and has been accused of murky underworld dealings — including a supporting role in federal investigations of President Donald Trump’s links to Moscow.
Akhmetov turned against the separatists in 2014. This year he refused to back the Russian invasion, and despite a public feud with President Volodymyr Zelensky, he has helped fund the government by making a $34 million advance tax payment.
Ukraine’s steel and iron industry declined after 2014, with crude steel production from Azovstal dropping by more than 1 million tons between 2013 and 2015, according to GMK Center. But with new investment in Mariupol, there had been a positive trend for the industry in more recent years. Metinvest had plans for a $1 billion investment in its steel and iron industry sites in the area.
In mid-March, the chief executive of Azovstal said nearby fighting meant the site had been shut down for the first time since the Nazi occupation. Enver Tskitishvili, speaking in a video address from Kyiv, said the shutdown would be only temporary.
“We will return to the city, rebuild the enterprise and revive it. It will work and bring glory to Ukraine the same way it always has,” Tskitishvili said. “Because Mariupol is Ukraine. Azovstal is Ukraine.”
6. Use of Army’s prepositioned ‘afloat’ equipment is expected to grow in the Pacific
As people are learning in Ukraine, logistics is key to warfare. But we can be sure the Chinese will be targeting these ships as well as any SPOD (seaport of debarkation) where they might offload their equipment. Long range precision strike capabilities will have an effect.
Excerpts:
On the other hand, this inaugural down offloading of prepositioned afloat stock faced no adversary attempting to prevent it, Wilson said.
“We have to be able to account for that in our planning,’ he said. “As we can build subsequent exercises, simulations and war games, we will be able to do that and put a finer point on it.”
Wilson has been on a quest to expand the logistics “toolbox” for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command since taking the reins of the sustainment command in June 2020.
Within weeks he ordered up a theater sustainment posture review, which he said to his knowledge had not been done before.
Use of Army’s prepositioned ‘afloat’ equipment is expected to grow in the Pacific
Vehicles assigned to the 402nd Army Field Support Brigade are loaded onto the USNS Red Cloud at Subic Bay, Philippines, April 11, 2022. (Shelia Cooper/U.S. Army)
FORT SHAFTER, Hawaii – Army leaders in the Pacific are lauding the inaugural use of floating prepositioned supplies and equipment for a pair of recently completed exercises in the Philippines as a significant step forward in strategic agility.
Vehicles and supplies were delivered aboard the Military Sealift Command’s USNS Red Cloud and offloaded at Subic Bay for Hawaii-based soldiers who participated in the back-to-back exercises Salaknib and Balikatan March 5 to April 8.
This week the equipment was reloaded onto the ship, which is now headed back to Hawaii.
“I think the significance of the use of Army prepositioned stocks to extend our operational and strategic reach in the region is substantial,” Gen. Charles Flynn, commander of U.S. Army Pacific, said during an interview at his headquarters in Fort Shafter on Wednesday.
Employing land-based prepositioned stocks has been routine in Europe, the Middle East, Japan and South Korea, but prepositioned “afloat” stock has been underutilized, particularly in the Pacific, he said.
“To be able to rapidly offload that equipment, issue it to a unit, have the unit go out and conduct training, and then be able to collapse that equipment back to, in this case, the port, and then be able to reload that on those vessels is really a demonstration of our strategic agility,” Flynn said.
The Army will continue to adjust and refine the use of floating prepositioned stocks in this region, Maj. Gen. David Wilson, commander of the 8th Theater Sustainment Command, said at his Fort Shafter headquarters on Tuesday.
“This is an evolution,” said Wilson, who heads the Indo-Pacific theater’s top Army logistics command that is tasked with enabling and prolonging the operational reach needed by combatant commanders.
“What we have found is that every operation we conduct west of the international dateline is an opportunity for us to conduct strategic rehearsal and strategic movement,” he said.
Thus, if offloading prepositioned equipment were needed during a time of crisis or conflict, the Army is now gaining an understanding of the “time and tempo” required for the task, Wilson said.
“And that's invaluable,” he said. “I mean, now you’re actually operating on the terrain in which you may have to fight.”
That cannot truly be replicated even in the Army’s massive training centers at Fort Irwin, Calif., and Fort Polk, La., he said.
On the other hand, this inaugural down offloading of prepositioned afloat stock faced no adversary attempting to prevent it, Wilson said.
“We have to be able to account for that in our planning,’ he said. “As we can build subsequent exercises, simulations and war games, we will be able to do that and put a finer point on it.”
Wilson has been on a quest to expand the logistics “toolbox” for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command since taking the reins of the sustainment command in June 2020.
Within weeks he ordered up a theater sustainment posture review, which he said to his knowledge had not been done before.
“What drove me to that was sitting and looking at a map when taking my initial counseling from [then-commander of U.S. Army Pacific Gen. Joseph LaCamera] when I assumed command,” Wilson said. “He described how he saw operations occurring during times [of conflict] out here in the Pacific.”
The posture review, completed in December 2020, concluded that while no military service in the Indo-Pacific is advantaged to single-handedly handle sustainment, “we do have enough collectively as a joint force to solve the problems,” Wilson said.
With the Indo-Pacific’s “tyranny of distance” dilemma, sustaining the joint force requires close collaboration with partner nations throughout the region, he said.
“That investment in or partners and allies is an investment in us being able to execute our requirements west of the international dateline during crisis or conflict,” he said.
7. Russia forces attacking along broad east front, Ukraine says
Russia forces attacking along broad east front, Ukraine says
AP · by ADAM SCHRECK · April 19, 2022
KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Russian forces attacked along a broad front in eastern Ukraine on Tuesday as part of a full-scale ground offensive to take control of the country’s eastern industrial heartland in what Ukrainian officials called a “new phase of the war.”
Ukraine’s General Staff said Russian forces are focusing their efforts on taking full control of the Donbas region. “The occupiers made an attempt to break through our defenses along nearly the entire frontline,” the General Staff said in a statement early Tuesday.
The stepped-up assaults began Monday along a front of more than 300 miles (480 kilometers), focused on the Donbas regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, with the Russian forces trying to advance in several sections, including from the neighboring Kharkiv region.
In southern Donetsk, the General Staff said the Russian military has continued to blockade and shell the strategic port city of Mariupol and fire missiles at other cities.
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On Monday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in a video address that a “significant part of the entire Russian army is now concentrated on this offensive.”
Moscow-backed separatists have been fighting Ukrainian forces for eight years in the mostly Russian-speaking Donbas and have declared two independent republics that have been recognized by Russia. Russia has declared the capture of the Donbas to be its main goal in the war since its attempt to seize the capital, Kyiv, failed.
“No matter how many Russian troops are driven there, we will fight,” Zelenskyy vowed. “We will defend ourselves.”
Troops battled in the streets of Kreminna on Monday before Russia was able to gain control of the city, according to Serhiy Haidai, Luhansk regional military administrator.
Haidai said that before advancing, Russian forces “just started leveling everything to the ground.” He said his forces retreated to regroup and keep fighting.
The breakthrough at Kreminna brings the Russians closer to the city of Slovyansk, which is seen as a key target in the Russian offensive. Slovyansk was seized by pro-Russian fighters in 2014, only to be retaken by Ukrainian forces months later following intense fighting.
Russian troops have already seized the city of Izyum, which sits along a highway north of Slovyansk, and they are poised to push toward the city from the north and the east. Slovyansk lies just north of another key city, Kramatorsk, where an earlier Russian attack on a train station killed more than 50 people.
On Monday morning, Oleksiy Danilov, secretary of Ukraine’s national security council, told Ukrainian media that the defensive line had not been broken elsewhere.
“Fortunately, our military is holding out,” Danilov said.
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In Mariupol, Denys Prokopenko, commander of the Azov Regiment of the Ukrainian National Guard, said in a video message that Russia had begun dropping bunker-buster bombs on the Azovstal steel plant where the regiment was holding out.
The sprawling plant contains a warren of tunnels where both fighters and civilians are sheltering. It is believed to be the last major pocket of resistance in the shattered city.
Russia has Mariupol surrounded and has been fighting a bloody battle to seize it. If Russia takes Mariupol, it would free up troops for use elsewhere in the Donbas, deprive Ukraine of a vital port, and complete a land bridge between Russia and the Crimean Peninsula, seized from Ukraine from 2014.
In western Ukraine near the Polish border, at least seven people were reported killed Monday in missile strikes on Lviv.
Lviv has been a haven for civilians fleeing the fighting elsewhere. And to the Kremlin’s increasing anger, the city has also become a major gateway for NATO-supplied weapons.
The attack hit three military infrastructure facilities and an auto shop, according to the region’s governor, Maksym Kozytskyy.
A hotel sheltering Ukrainians who had fled the fighting in other parts of the country was also badly damaged, Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovyi said.
“The nightmare of war has caught up with us even in Lviv,” said Lyudmila Turchak, who fled with two children from Kharkiv in the east.
Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, was hit by shelling Monday that killed at least three people, according to Associated Press journalists on the scene. Shelling could be heard overnight and into Tuesday morning in the major eastern city, which has been struck numerous times but remains firmly in Ukrainian control.
Moscow said its missiles struck military targets in eastern and central Ukraine including ammunition depots, command headquarters, and groups of troops and vehicles. It reported that its artillery hit hundreds of Ukrainian targets, and that warplanes conducted 108 strikes on troops and military equipment. The claims could not be independently verified.
Gen. Richard Dannatt, a former head of the British Army, told Sky News that Russia was waging a “softening-up” campaign ahead of the Donbas offensive.
A senior U.S. defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the Pentagon’s assessments of the war, said there are now 76 Russian combat units, known as battalion tactical groups, in eastern and southern Ukraine, up from 65 last week. That could translate to around 50,000 to 60,000 troops, based on what the Pentagon said at the start of the war was the typical unit strength of 700 to 800 soldiers.
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Associated Press journalists Felipe Dana in Kharkiv; Nico Maounis and Philip Crowther in Lviv, Ukraine; and Robert Burns in Washington contributed to this report, as did other AP staff members around the world.
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AP · by ADAM SCHRECK · April 19, 2022
8. Three US Army vehicle upgrade programs look smart after Russia's Ukraine debacle
Excerpts:
Primarily, American forces would have more success because of better training — the secret sauce we are seeing exposed in the Ukrainian conflict. But the American military is also making investments in three key technologies that would amp its armor in a future war.
If the US Army has its ways, instead of manned vehicles blundering into ambushes, the first machines into the danger zone could be robotic scouts. Vehicle-mounted active protection systems would intercept anti-tank missiles before they hit, while specialized air defense vehicles would use guns, missiles, and even lasers to shoot down drones. All three technologies are works in progress, but based on the lessons so far from Russia’s invasion, these three investments should set America up well against the near-term threats their fleets of armored vehicles may face.
Three US Army vehicle upgrade programs look smart after Russia's Ukraine debacle - Breaking Defense
US investments, from scout robots to anti-drone and anti-missile defenses, look remarkably smart after Russian forces ran into repeated ambushes in Ukraine.
on April 18, 2022 at 10:15 AM
A Robotic Combat Vehicle-Medium fires a around at a target during the vehicle’s live fire testing at Fort Dix, N.J., June 30, 2021. (US Army)
The following is one in a series of regular analysis pieces by deputy editor Sydney Freedberg.
Video after video shows Russian armored vehicles burning in Ukraine, which has raised the question of whether armored vehicles are simply a tool of the past. But that’s not the right question. Instead, the question is whether American armored forces would fare any better — to which the answer is yes, with some caveats.
Primarily, American forces would have more success because of better training — the secret sauce we are seeing exposed in the Ukrainian conflict. But the American military is also making investments in three key technologies that would amp its armor in a future war.
If the US Army has its ways, instead of manned vehicles blundering into ambushes, the first machines into the danger zone could be robotic scouts. Vehicle-mounted active protection systems would intercept anti-tank missiles before they hit, while specialized air defense vehicles would use guns, missiles, and even lasers to shoot down drones. All three technologies are works in progress, but based on the lessons so far from Russia’s invasion, these three investments should set America up well against the near-term threats their fleets of armored vehicles may face.
The most revolutionary — but also, speaking realistically, the furthest away — of these developments is the Robotic Combat Vehicle program, a family of relatively expendable reconnaissance machines: Qinetiq’s seven-ton RCV-Light and Textron’s 10-ton RCV-Medium. (A prospective RCV-Heavy would be 30 tons).
RCV is still experimental, and the Army’s putting the Qinetiq and Textron proto-prototypes through years of field trials with no commitment to buy either in quantity. There are plenty of technical problems to work out, especially the balance between artificial intelligence and remote control: Offroad terrain is a much more confusing and cluttered environment than the empty air, so ground-vehicle autonomy lags behind aerial drones, and the current RCVs require constant direction from human operators. That’s labor-intensive – two humans per robot, currently — and vulnerable, since adversaries could potentially jam the control link. The Army hopes to make the robots more autonomous and ultimately allow one human to supervise multiple RCVs.
But excited tacticians are already talking about a “forward line of robots” preceding human troops into danger zones. And while the current generation of remote-controlled RCVs isn’t ready to replace manned vehicles in all-out combat, they have real possibilities as scouts, with the human operators using their sensors to scope out potential ambush sites.
Now, experienced enemies wouldn’t reveal themselves by firing at the first robot to trundle down the road; they’d try to hold their fire until manned targets came along — but that becomes a lot harder if an RCV drives right up to your hiding spot and starts nosing around. Capable of carrying heavy machineguns and Javelin tank-killer missiles, an RCV is a threat the enemy can’t ignore, potentially forcing them to either abandon their position or reveal it by wasting shots on a mere robot.
On the flipside, US forces need protection against opposing robots, especially the drones that have proven increasingly ubiquitous and effective on battlefields from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine. Those are difficult targets for traditional air-defense systems, especially since they tend to be small, slow, low-flying, and cheap — often cheaper than the missiles that would be used to take them out. So the US is fielding a Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) variant of the eight-wheel drive Stryker armored vehicle, armed with both Stinger missiles and anti-aircraft guns. A laser-armed version enters testing in September: Lasers still lack the power to burn through vehicle armor, but their high accuracy and unlimited ammo (they can keep firing as long as they have power) makes them highly effective against drones.
Of course, some threats will always make it past the drone-killers and the robot scouts, so it’s important to upgrade the manned vehicles themselves. Here, US armored vehicles already have one sizable advantage over their Russian counterparts: They tend to be bigger.
The American main battle tank, the M1 Abrams, grew from 60 to 75 tons as it was uparmored over the years, while the latest upgrade of the Russian T-90 is just 51 (46.5 tons metric, according to the official Rosoboronexport site). The main US troop carrier, the M2 Bradley, is up to 40 tons in its latest A4 model, while the Russian BMP-3 is just over 20. Even the Stryker, originally purchased specifically as a lightweight alternative to tracked vehicles and spec’d at 19 tons, has grown to the mid-twenties with various uparmor packages and other upgrades. All that weight makes American machines more expensive, more fuel-hungry, and less capable of crossing many bridges, but it also allows for a lot more armor protection.
Nonetheless, even the mighty Abrams has fallen to man-portable anti-tank missiles in Yemen, albeit in a Saudi Arabian model that lacks some US-only upgrades like high-density depleted uranium armor. (Saudi tactics are also poor). So back in 2018, the US Army decided to upgrade several brigades of M1s with the Israeli-made Trophy Active Protection System, which detects incoming projectiles on radar and shoots them down. The smaller Bradley is getting the similar Iron Fist-Light, also Israeli-made, although the Bradley must be upgraded to the latest model, the A4, to generate enough electrical power to run it. While such systems have little success against the solid shot fired by tank cannons – that kind of projectile flies too fast and it’s too tough – APS’ have proven effective against high-explosive missiles, which are (relatively speaking) slower and more fragile.
At least some Russian tanks have similar defenses. “Ukrainian [soldiers] complained bitterly about the ‘magical shield’ that sends their AT-5 guided missiles off in the sky or to the ground out of control just as the missile is about to hit the [Russian] tank,” the Potomac Institute’s Philip Karber wrote in 2015. But those AT-5s (aka the 9K113 Konkurs) were a Soviet 1970s-vintage design, and the targets were the latest Russian tank, the T-90. In the current invasion, by contrast, the Russians have deployed large numbers of the older T-72 and T-80.
Meanwhile the Ukrainians are now using advanced Western missiles like the US Javelin and the British NLAW: These are “top attack” weapons that aim for the thinly armored turret roof, coming in at a steeply vertical angle where most countermeasures can’t intercept them. While the older tanks have suffered heavily, at least some T-90s have been destroyed as well, according to open-source intelligence website Oryx. That suggests the top-attack missiles are overcoming even the latest Russian defenses.
Would Trophy do better against top attack? While that’s a highly sensitive question, with no clear answer in open sources, our sources suggest it would. “Fielded active protection systems have capability against top-attack threats,” one Army official told me. “Specifics would be classified.”
9. Special Operations Command Targets Vehicle Upgrades
Special Operations Command Targets Vehicle Upgrades
4/19/2022
By Yasmin Tadjdeh
MRZR Alpha
Polaris photo
NORFOLK, Va. — New vehicle upgrade opportunities are available for industry seeking to work with Special Operations Command.
“We have a pretty unique fleet out here in SOCOM that kind of touches different programs,” said Marine Corps Lt. Col. Alfredo Romero, program manager for Special Operations Command’s family of special ops vehicles.
The command’s inventory includes joint light tactical vehicles, purpose-built non-standard commercial platforms, light tactical all-terrain systems, ground mobility vehicles and more. There are platforms currently in concept, production and sustainment stages, Romero said during the National Defense Industrial Association’s annual Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Conference in Norfolk, Virginia.
One vehicle in the concept stage includes the purpose-built non-standard commercial vehicle, which is being pursued through an other transaction authority prototyping effort, Romero said.
“The idea of this vehicle platform was to build a vehicle from the ground up on the chassis, with the ability to change out the skins,” he said.
The command is designing the platform to have an extended service life with the ability to traverse longer distances.
Special Operations Command has recently completed some tests with the vehicle and is currently waiting for the results to come in before making its next move, Romero said.
Meanwhile, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, or JLTV — which is being developed through a joint program office for the Army and Marine Corps — is another project in the concept stage. The platform is a service-common vehicle being provided to SOCOM components, Romero said. In fiscal year 2023, the command will begin applying special operations forces-specific modifications.
Part of Special Operations Command’s acquisition strategy is to leverage platforms from the services, he said.
Whatever the Army and Marine Corps provides is “good enough for SOF,” Romero said.
The command then applies SOF-peculiar modifications to the platforms which offers users greater flexibility, he added.
Upcoming milestones include a SOF command, control, communications, computers, cyber and intelligence, or C5I, integration kit which will be tested in fiscal year 2022, according to slides shown during Romero’s presentation.
The JLTV will be one of SOCOM’s newer vehicles and will be a workhorse in the fleet, he said.
The command is also pursuing a hybrid-electric ground mobility vehicle 1.1 system. A prototype platform is expected to be completed by July and the command will then commence testing, Romero said.
Meanwhile, platforms in production include the light tactical all-terrain vehicle, which is a SOF-modified commercial-off-the-shelf system that can be internally air transported via V-22, H-53 and H-47. The platform includes two- and four-seat variants. It can perform missions such as offset infiltration, reconnaissance and medical evacuation.
The command is using Polaris’ MRZR Alpha for the vehicle, Romero said. The program is a collaborative effort between Special Operations Command and the Marine Corps.
“We are sharing the same common vehicle baseline,” he said. The platform is known as the ultra-light tactical vehicle within the Corps, he added.
“It’s an overall nice vehicle,” Romero said. “The user community here really likes this platform.”
Moving forward, areas of interest for the vehicle include integrating autonomy packages, signature management systems and inserting a communications suite, he said. There is also interest in electrifying the platform.
The LTATV was slated to complete performance testing in March, according to Romero’s slides.
Meanwhile, the service is sustaining its fleet of mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles as well as its ground mobility vehicle 1.0 and 1.1 platforms, he said.
In general, as SOCOM looks forward, it is seeking lightweight armor for its vehicle fleet, he said. Current armor solutions are heavy and limit the available payload for users, as well as decrease the platform’s durability.
The command is also looking for new signature management technologies, he said.
“That is a big topic for us,” Romero said. “How do we do signature management on the move?”
Hybrid-electric technology is another area of interest, he said. “Anything that we can do to create that extended range and also that silent watch … we’re all in on that.”
Autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicle technology — as well as augmented reality maintenance capabilities — are also areas that SOCOM is eyeing, Romero said.
10. The West Is As Poorly Prepared to Help Taiwan As It Was for Ukraine
An important aspect of preparation in addition to all that is outlined below is training. For all those who oppose training or want to cancel training due to either funding constraints or to assuage adversaries who have security "concerns" because of our training. (e.g., north Korea) we do not want to end up like the Russians. Training is perishable and must be sustained. Our adversaries pressure us to cancel or reduce training so the US and allied forces will end up like the Russians in Ukraine.
The West Is As Poorly Prepared to Help Taiwan As It Was for Ukraine
April 19, 2022
Without better preparation for war against a threatened Chinese invasion, Taiwan will suffer far worse consequences than Ukraine because of the constraining effects of its island geography. There are five immediate lessons from the first month of the Russian-Ukraine conflict that war planners in Taipei and Washington need to address.
First, Taiwan is completely ill-equipped for the refugee flows likely to result from a Chinese bombardment campaign, and amphibious and airborne assault. Ukraine, with a population density of 75 persons per square km, produced 10.5 million refugees, or a quarter of its population of 45 million, of which 6.5 million were internally displaced. Taiwan has half the population, but nine times the population density, and 90 percent of Taiwanese live within 30 km of the nearest likely Chinese beachheads of Kaohsiung, Tainan, Taichung, and Taoyuan. This is likely to produce twice the proportion of refugees, or 12 million Taiwanese, entirely internally displaced to the inhospitable Eastern coast, and unable to leave Taiwan. Evidence from city bombing during the Second World War indicates that up to seventy percent of housing may be destroyed before populations are compelled to displace for lack of shelter, and this threshold is likely half that in Taiwan due to the prevalence of apartment living.
Second, Taiwan will be far more problematic to resupply in a conflict. In terms of military equipment, Ukraine has received 6,000 AT-4, 3,615 NLaw, 2,000 Javelin, 1,400 Stinger, and 8,000 other assorted missiles, 100 Switchblade drones, Saxon armored cars, 5 Mi-17 helicopters, artillery munitions, and 20 million rounds of small arms ammunition. Taiwan will be especially difficult to resupply with food, fuel, and weaponry. Taiwan does have a rice reserve of 28 months, and its aquatic catches are 170 percent above consumption. In other foodstuffs, it is less than 40 percent self-sufficient and imports 94 percent of its non-rice food, translating into a six month reserve of food overall. Much of this will be destroyed during a surprise conflict before it can be dispersed, assuming transport is even available. Food imports during a conflict will be limited to ports along the East coast of Taiwan (Hualian and Su Ao), which have less than ten percent of the capacity of the easily-blockaded West coast ports. Taiwan consumes over 900,000 barrels of oil per day, and only maintains a thirty-day reserve. Furthermore, it only has thirty percent of the tanker capacity required to maintain the flow of oil from its suppliers, and less than a 14-day reserve of liquid natural gas. Unlike Western Ukraine, which is several hundred kilometers from the battlefield, notwithstanding occasional strikes by Russian Iskander theatre missiles, there is no sanctuary in Taiwan. The high central mountains of the island provide some cover, but precarious highways severely constrain the flow of supplies.
Third, Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping will very likely mimic Russian President Vladimir Putin’s threat to use nuclear weapons as a way of frightening democratic leaders from authorizing the entry of their militaries into the theatre of war. There is not much for Taipei to do here except to request extensive political wargaming to prepare a diplomatic response. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen will likely make the same desperate plea directly to the legislatures of the leading democracies, as Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy did so ineffectually with the U.S. Congress, the U.K., Japan, the European Union, and Canada. However, annual full-spectrum allied naval exercises, including sea control, convoy escort, amphibious landing, anti-submarine warfare, and blockading, by the fleets of the U.S., Japan, Australia, Canada, U.K., France, and Germany, including Taiwan, will create a ready-made menu of policy options available to decision-makers in the event of a crisis. To counteract the threat of tactical nuclear warfare, this could include both an emphasis on fleet dispersal as a signal to China and recuperation drills after simulated nuclear strikes.
Western fleets should also re-implement the Cold War strategy of conventionally targeting China’s ballistic missile submarine fleet, comprising the six Jin-class boats, in the event of hostilities. Knowing that Beijing could not secure Taiwan before their six Jin boats were destroyed either in the South China Sea, along the shallow Chinese continental shelf, or in their bases on Hainan Island would secure the West's escalation dominance and thereby strengthen deterrence against war initiation by China. The original contingency in the event of a war with the Soviet Union was to dispatch a significant NATO carrier fleet into the Barents and Okhotsk Seas, which served as bastions for the Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet. Once there, they would destroy the USSR's surface anti-submarine helicopter carriers, and then unleash NATO hunter killer submarines to either destroy or pursue the enemy submarines into the Arctic ice. NATO's explicit threat to pursue this policy in war, would result in both the USSR and China having to rely instead on their land-based missile and bomber forces, which are vulnerable to a U.S. nuclear first strike. Under the circumstances of a Soviet conventional invasion of Western Europe, Moscow was unlikely to escalate to a strategic nuclear exchange until after they secured territorial gains in West Germany.
Fourth, despite the rapid implementation of some sanctions on the Russian economy, the continued flow of Russian gas to Germany, Italy, and Hungary through Polish and Baltic pipelines is financing the war in Ukraine, and is more than canceling out the benefit of NATO weapon deliveries to fight Russia. It is even more painfully ironic that its desperation compels Ukraine to tranship Russian natural gas through its territory to Germany, Austria, Italy, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The absurdly illicit supplying of the British fleet blockading America, by Boston merchants, during the War of 1812, and Dutch neutrals that enabled Imperial German maritime trade to continue during the First World War, are all examples of this recurring incongruity. A war with China, a country with an economy that is 74 percent of the size of the U.S. economy in nominal GDP in 2022, will lead to significant sanctions skirting by neutral states, including most of South and Southeast Asia, South Korea, most of South America, the Middle East, and Africa. Convincing, rather than coercively alienating neutral states to accede to a blockade regime against China, will require a prior coordinated contingency between the U.S. and Europe to provide alternative markets. However, as University of Virginia professor Dale Copeland has warned, such plans need to be clearly linked to a bid to take Taiwan because if such a contingency begins to look like an inevitable policy against China, Beijing will begin to entertain military solutions to its anticipated isolation. The insecurity caused by this misunderstanding led Germany to engage in a naval arms race and attack Great Britain during the First World War, despite being their largest trading partner.
Fifth, the West needs to invest in understanding the difference between mainstream Chinese nationalism, and distortions in foreign policy championed by the Communist Party in Beijing if it is to have an effective information war strategy. Western capitals have fatally misjudged the temporary increase in Putin's popularity caused by the rally-around-the-flag effect of economic sanctions. The Russian population is very deferential to strong leaders that successfully deliver an increase in national security, and there is a widespread public consensus that Ukraine should not be allowed to join NATO, even at the cost of war. There are also insufficient youth in Russia to mobilize against the lethargy of the deferential majority. Mainland Chinese are similarly nationalist, given historical depredations by Western and Japanese imperialists, and are as likely to see an independent Taiwan as illegitimate. In both cases, the instigating message should be a focus on the corruption and immorality of the leadership, given that per capita income levels in both countries have risen sufficiently to make the quality of governance an issue of public concern.
The cost of providing successful deterrence for Taiwan will be far more expensive, both in direct military costs, and in diplomatic instability with Beijing, than a Western gamble on the inertia of inaction. However, Chinese hostilities against an unprepared Taiwan that escalates to involve the United States and its Western allies will be the equivalent of the expenditures of decades of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, compressed into a single year.
Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill is an associate professor of international relations at Concordia University (Montreal), former army engineer officer, and has written extensively on Pakistan, where he conducted field research for over ten years.
11. US troops to train Ukrainian forces on howitzers in coming days
As the song goes: "Should have been done long ago."
US troops to train Ukrainian forces on howitzers in coming days
A Marine with Echo Battery, 2d Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment, 2d Marine Division, carries 155mm artillery shells during Exercise Rolling Thunder 22-2 at Fort Bragg, N.C., March 30, 2022. (Ryan Ramsammy/U.S. Marine Corps)
WASHINGTON — American troops will train Ukrainian forces in the coming days on how to operate U.S. howitzers as the Pentagon sends them 18 of the cannons as part of the latest $800 million in military aid, a senior U.S. defense official said Monday.
The training, which will occur outside Ukraine, will teach Ukrainian forces to operate the 155mm howitzers. They will then return to the fight and train other Ukrainians to use the American cannons, the official said. The aid package includes 40,000 artillery rounds.
“We have made some progress in terms of setting up some training for Ukrainians,” the official told reporters at the Pentagon. “These are train-the-trainer [sessions], so training trainers outside of Ukraine in coming days on the howitzers, specifically.”
The U.S. does not expect it to take long to complete the instruction, Chief Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said Friday.
“It's not going to be exorbitant. It won't take a long time. It won't require a large pool of trainees,” he said. “We don't believe that it's going to be an onerous task, or lengthy in time or in resources.”
Ukraine already uses howitzers, such as the Soviet-era 152mm mSATA-B and 122mm D-30, but their troops will still need instruction on the American cannon, whose “basic outlines” are “not unlike other artillery,” Kirby said Monday.
“This particular system is new to the Ukrainians … [but] they understand how to use artillery and we don’t believe it will take very long or require much detailed training to get them up to speed on American howitzers,” Kirby told reporters at the Pentagon.
Defense officials have not said which of two U.S. howitzer models — the older M198 system or its replacement, the M777 — is being used by the Ukrainians. With respective ranges of 14 and 18 miles, according to the Army Acquisition Support Center, they are most comparable to the Msta-B, which can fire artillery as far as 15 miles away.
The howitzers announced Wednesday in the latest $800 million military aid package are the first the U.S. has sent Ukraine since Russia invaded the country on Feb. 24. Other countries, such as Estonia, have also recently sent howitzers to Ukraine.
The U.S. is sending the cannons as Russia prepares to launch a renewed assault on the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. The land there is flat, rolling plains and conducive to using long-range fires, Kirby said.
"The terrain lends itself to the use of artillery, and we know that the Russians also believe the same thing because we're seeing them move artillery units into the Donbas, as well," he said. "So, we want to give the Ukrainians every bit of advantage that we can. They specifically asked for artillery support."
The U.S. on Sunday sent the first four planes carrying military equipment from the most recent security assistance package and plans to make another delivery within the next 24 hours, said the official who spoke on condition of anonymity.
The official did not detail what kinds of equipment were delivered in those flights. Aside from the howitzers, the package also includes 300 Switchblade tactical drones, 11 Mi-17 helicopters, 200 M113 armored personnel carriers and other weapons and military equipment, according to the Pentagon.
The defense official did not say where the training would take place but said U.S. European Command is working on it. There are more than 100,000 U.S. troops in Europe, roughly 15,000 of whom are deployed to NATO countries that border Ukraine, such as Poland, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia.
Most of that 15,000 — about 8,750 — are in Poland, where U.S. troops have previously advised Ukrainians on U.S.-donated systems, such as Javelin missiles, as they transferred the weapons to Ukrainian hands, defense officials said last month.
“There's some liaising going on, but we wouldn't call it classic training,” a senior U.S. defense official said of the prior advising March 31.
The U.S. also recently trained Ukrainian troops in the United States on Switchblade drones. Those troops, who were already in the U.S. for military education prior to the start of the war, have since returned to Ukraine to share the Switchblade training with other troops.
U.S. troops might be called upon in the future to train Ukrainians on other weapons in the $800 million package, the official said.
"We're exploring other options for other systems as well, and even if there needs to be additional training for the howitzers, we're certainly looking at that, as well,” the official said. “There’s a range of options that are still being explored."
12. Paratroopers with the 173rd Airborne Brigade fire live Stinger missiles in Croatia
Think about this. There are Ukrainian forces who have fired more Stinger missiles than any US soldier has.
Paratroopers with the 173rd Airborne Brigade fire live Stinger missiles in Croatia
The missiles were shot as part of Exercise Shell 22 in Croatia.
Soldiers from 1st and 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, based in Vicenza, Italy, fired a dozen of the surface-to-air missiles in two-man squads.
Each missile costs about $38,000. The 173rd Airborne Brigade has only previously fired replica Stinger rounds, Stars and Stripes reported.
Each squad was comprised of a team chief and a gunner. The soldiers fired the missiles toward a small target with a flare, brigade spokesperson Capt. Rob Haake told Stripes. The missiles landed in the Adriatic Sea, he said.
According to Haake, “every single [soldier] walked away with a big smile” after firing their missiles. “Everyone felt very fulfilled. They said it was an amazing experience.”
Paratroopers assigned to the 173rd Airborne Brigade fire an FIM-92 Stinger during an air defense live-fire exercise near Medulin, Croatia, on April 9, 2022. (Staff Sgt. John Yountz/Army)
Exercise Shell 22, which was held alongside Croatian forces, also marked the first time the Croatian Air Defense Regiment had conducted a live-fire exercise with U.S. troops.
Also included in the exercise were training events involving airspace control, deconfliction and surveillance.
RELATED
As the Army sends off Stinger and Javelin missiles to Ukraine, the service begins the process of replacing its aging Stinger missiles for short-range air defense.
“We get to cross-train with them, and they get the same with us. My favorite part wasn’t even the live fire; it was seeing our soldiers interact with the Croatians,” Chief Warrant Officer Mark Giauque, the lead coordinator of the exercise told Stripes. “You see them working together and exchanging patches, and you just see the overall camaraderie build over the training.”
U.S. paratroopers stand alongside soldiers with the Croatian Air Defense Regiment as part of Exercise Shield 22 near Medulin, Croatia, on April 9, 2022. (Staff Sgt. John Yountz/Army)
Stingers have been in the spotlight lately.
Haake told Stripes that around 300 troops from the 173rd Airborne Brigade are currently deployed in Latvia in response to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.
The 173rd Airborne Brigade is the U.S. Army’s contingency response force in Europe, meaning it provides rapidly deployable paratroopers to combatant commanders in Europe, Africa and the Middle East.
Rachel is a Marine Corps veteran, Penn State alumna and Master's candidate at New York University for Business and Economic Reporting.
13. Russia’s Military: Failure on an Awesome Scale
But we should not gloat.
Excerpt:
Russia, like the United States and China, seems to have fallen in love with technology. It announces triumphs at a regular clip — including intermediate-range nuclear platforms, hypersonic missiles, advanced torpedoes, aircraft, and armored vehicles. All states make decisions on prioritizing and resourcing the various parts of their security services. Countries like the US have the resources to pay for both technology and the sinews of war such as training and logistics. Russia seems to have prioritized one at the expense of the other. And since their public commentary about the success of their military reforms is so clearly untrue, should we also be questioning their claimed advances in technology, such as hypersonic weapon systems?
...
What went wrong for the Russians? A major problem is corruption. Although the Russian Federation apportioned resources to update the military (the 2010 state armaments program alone invested around $626bn from 2010-20), much of that money disappeared into the greedy maw of the Russian state, mainly the oligarchs and the siloviki or former security service men who run the government for Putin.
Transparency International rates the risk of corruption in operations budgets at “critical” and “high” in the political oversight, financial, and procurement sectors. Polina Beliakova at the Fletcher School has done an in-depth review of this corruption and says that both equipment and logistics suffered as a result. The cost is hard to judge, but some estimates suggest up to 40% of military funds are stolen. Russian publications have reported that service personnel are fed small quantities of rotting food by contractors whose behavior is apparently blessed by the defense ministry.
It is fair to say that Russian military reforms have been a disaster, and not just for Russia. Their failure means that the Kremlin can only succeed by falling back on old 20th-century doctrines of applying overwhelming firepower to a target, like a Ukrainian city, and occupying the rubble with ground forces.
Russia’s Military: Failure on an Awesome Scale | CEPA
In the wake of the dismal performance by Russia’s military in Georgia in 2008, the Russian Federation poured administrative and financial resources into the military. To no avail.
In a 2020 report, the Congressional Research Service identified the major areas for reform: modernizing military equipment, improving combat readiness and coordination across service branches, command and control, electronic warfare, recruitment of professional soldiers, force structure changes, and logistics. Many informed observers believed that the Russian armed forces had become significantly more formidable, leading some to argue that Ukraine’s smaller and lower-tech force would be swiftly beaten in the early days of the war.
Russia's dismal military performance in Ukraine has shown not only that it has failed to achieve several of its stated priorities, but also that it has ignored the basic building blocks central to the efficient working of military forces. That debacle is now playing itself out on the battlefields of Ukraine, where its performance has been no better than in Chechnya and Georgia.
Russia, like the United States and China, seems to have fallen in love with technology. It announces triumphs at a regular clip — including intermediate-range nuclear platforms, hypersonic missiles, advanced torpedoes, aircraft, and armored vehicles. All states make decisions on prioritizing and resourcing the various parts of their security services. Countries like the US have the resources to pay for both technology and the sinews of war such as training and logistics. Russia seems to have prioritized one at the expense of the other. And since their public commentary about the success of their military reforms is so clearly untrue, should we also be questioning their claimed advances in technology, such as hypersonic weapon systems?
One place where Russia has focused has been in munitions, particularly intermediate-range nuclear-capable systems such as the Iskander as well as precision-guided munitions (PGMs) such as the Kalibr. They say that they deployed the hypersonic Kinzal missile in Ukraine, however, the munition in the video they released is clearly not traveling at over 3,800 mph (the slowest speed considered hypersonic). Their performance has been dismal. Specialists will remember when the Russians fired 26 Kalibrs at targets in Syria and four went down in Iran, not even hitting the right country.
Another area the Russians claimed to have made improvements is in command and control (C2) capability, by refocusing on how they organize and the use modern secure communications systems. A new military district system was created to shift the emphasis at the tactical level from the division to the brigade, copying the US innovation of using brigade combat teams as the main tactical units of maneuver.
Brigades were also reorganized to create Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) where the first battalion in each brigade consists of professionals, which allows them to deploy quickly and (theoretically) fight competently. Unfortunately, if most of the professionals are concentrated in the first unit out the door and it then takes significant casualties during an operation, all that is left is conscripts, reservists, and other second-tier personnel, which does not bode well for longer-term operations.
The other major problem they have is with secure communications. The Ukrainians have killed seven Russian generals and a number of colonels because the Russians are using civilian cell phones in an attempt to provide C2 at the forward edge of the battle area. This is a pretty simple way for the Ukrainians to see where senior officers are and to target them.
This failure indicates that the Russians have not invested enough in providing secure C2 assets to their forces. Further, the Russians lacked the ability to coordinate amongst different units: BTG to BTG, front line forces with support forces (including fire support), and ground to air are only some of the areas where the Russians have suffered significant problems.
During the 2010s, the Russians proudly announced a shift from a conscript-based force to armed forces manned by professionals, together with an improved and empowered non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps. A competent NCO corps is what makes the most effective militaries in the world function at the tactical level.
Unfortunately for the Russians, their system is designed to prevent precisely this. Empowered NCOs need to have information and to be able to make decisions while leading. The Russian system is based on tight control of information and highly centralized decision-making. Reports that Russian soldiers deployed for combat believed they were still on exercises in friendly territory are common. This hurts the Russian military where it matters — on the front line. It is extremely unlikely that the Russian military will ever allow an empowered NCO corps.
One of the major areas that the Russians needed to change after 2008 was logistics. But once again, Russia’s armed forces are having difficulty with resupply, with the result that many mechanized units have been sitting by the side of the road out of fuel. No fuel implies no food or ammunition for front-line units. The author worked with a Lithuanian brigadier-general at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) who had been in the Soviet army prior to the Fall of the Wall in 1989. He noted that the Soviets would use existing units and send them into combat until they became combat ineffective. The army would then send in fresh units to support areas that had been successful rather than reconstitute the wrecked units by giving them fresh weapons, ammunition, and people.
This may have been sustainable during the Soviet period when they had a very large ground force and Warsaw Pact allies to provide additional forces. With 850,000 active-duty forces, the modern Russian army is just not big enough to conduct large-scale offensive operations and occupy territories without reconstituting units, especially as their best soldiers were disproportionately concentrated in the BTGs initially sent into combat and badly battered by the Ukrainians.
What went wrong for the Russians? A major problem is corruption. Although the Russian Federation apportioned resources to update the military (the 2010 state armaments program alone invested around $626bn from 2010-20), much of that money disappeared into the greedy maw of the Russian state, mainly the oligarchs and the siloviki or former security service men who run the government for Putin.
Transparency International rates the risk of corruption in operations budgets at “critical” and “high” in the political oversight, financial, and procurement sectors. Polina Beliakova at the Fletcher School has done an in-depth review of this corruption and says that both equipment and logistics suffered as a result. The cost is hard to judge, but some estimates suggest up to 40% of military funds are stolen. Russian publications have reported that service personnel are fed small quantities of rotting food by contractors whose behavior is apparently blessed by the defense ministry.
It is fair to say that Russian military reforms have been a disaster, and not just for Russia. Their failure means that the Kremlin can only succeed by falling back on old 20th-century doctrines of applying overwhelming firepower to a target, like a Ukrainian city, and occupying the rubble with ground forces.
G. Alexander (Alex) Crowther is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, is a Professor of Practice for Cyber Issues at Florida International University, and does research for the Swedish Defense University.He has held numerous previous posts including as a Special Assistant for the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).
14. Hearts Not Minds: Morale and Inspiration in Insurgency and Territorial Defense
Excerpts:
In war, morale always matters. The US military knows this better than most. In July 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara requested additional deployments of US ground forces in Vietnam to “destroying” the morale of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Viet Cong, including through the use of “informational actions.” While McNamara accurately predicted the impact of the information environment on the morale of insurgents and counterinsurgents alike, he overlooked how these deployments would affect the morale of US soldiers in Vietnam and the US public at home. Despite suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces held out, capturing Saigon a decade after McNamara’s request for additional forces. The relative willpower of US forces compared to that of the Viet Cong insurgents was one of many reasons for this outcome.
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But morale will likely play an even more important role in the now-unraveling next phase, particularly if Russia ultimately succeeds in occupying parts of eastern Ukraine. Insurgency and guerrilla warfare are notoriously difficult to prosecute, and are sapping to energy and spirit—guerrillas will face food and supply shortages, adverse weather, and relentless manhunts. But the Ukrainian resistance will receive sustained financial and political support, including from an international diaspora movement. These are also excellent conditions for insurgency; in the words of former US Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Michael Vickers, “Ukraine has all the conditions going for it” to wage an insurgent campaign. And Russia’s reaction—to escalate bombings against civilian infrastructure in an “effort to break Ukrainian morale”—has only fed Ukrainian anger and patriotism. As Ben Connable notes in a study of the will to fight on both sides, Ukrainian morale may stay strong: “Given the existential nature of the Russian invasion and the demonstrated power of Ukrainian national identity, there is a good chance that the Ukrainians can sustain much of their will to fight through the invasion and into a long-term insurgency.”
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Understanding the history of morale’s role in insurgencies is essential for analyzing the ongoing war in Ukraine and developing sound policy options for what could be a drawn-out conflict. But one thing seems clear: Russia will struggle to win its war in Ukraine if its troops do not want to be there.
Hearts Not Minds: Morale and Inspiration in Insurgency and Territorial Defense - Modern War Institute
Kharkiv, a largely Russian-speaking city of over one million people, is known for poetry and the arts. But over the past few weeks, as the northeastern Ukrainian city has faced the brunt of the Russian invasion, it has become one of many proud symbols of Ukrainian resistance. Facing a barrage of Russian airstrikes, artillery, armor, and infantry, the city has held its ground, with the Ukrainian military joined by everyday citizens to protect the city from invaders from the north and east.
In war, morale always matters. The US military knows this better than most. In July 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara requested additional deployments of US ground forces in Vietnam to “destroying” the morale of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Viet Cong, including through the use of “informational actions.” While McNamara accurately predicted the impact of the information environment on the morale of insurgents and counterinsurgents alike, he overlooked how these deployments would affect the morale of US soldiers in Vietnam and the US public at home. Despite suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces held out, capturing Saigon a decade after McNamara’s request for additional forces. The relative willpower of US forces compared to that of the Viet Cong insurgents was one of many reasons for this outcome.
Morale would similarly play a central role in US struggles in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although patriotic sentiment was widespread after the 9/11 attacks, US morale waned over time, beaten down by improvised explosive devices, sniper attacks, and the knowledge that blood and sweat shed in conflicts in the Middle East and south Asia were yielding few strategic results. As one Taliban fighter is said to have declared, “You have the watches. We have the time.” Both insurgent and counterinsurgent in Iraq and Afghanistan were well aware of one of the golden rules of guerrilla warfare, once neatly summarized in the Vietnam context by Henry Kissinger: “The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.”
In these historical conflicts, the belligerent that successfully prioritized morale won. A wide-ranging RAND Corporation report supports this conclusion, noting that “failure of will has signaled the ending of almost every military conflict in world history.” Morale, then, should be considered a critical factor as the Ukrainian crisis progresses. Predicting the outcome of this bloody conflict is a difficult task, but one possible outcome is a protracted insurgency, with Russian occupiers facing a fierce Ukrainian resistance. The fate of such an insurgency would be determined by many factors, including Russia’s counterinsurgency strategy, the intervention of outside powers, and the morale of both sides. On the latter point, in particular, Ukraine appears to hold a decisive advantage.
Morale in the Russia-Ukraine War
Morale has been an essential factor in the territorial defense of Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s leadership has played a central role in keeping Ukrainian morale high; he has repeatedly rebuffed Russian disinformation through public appearances around Kyiv and refused offers of Western exfiltration, at one point declaring, “I need ammunition, not a ride.” The media has regaled Western publics with accounts of heroism—such as the story of the troops at Snake Island who were killed (although that later proved untrue) after defying a Russian warship with the proclamation “Russian warship, go fuck yourself”—as well as stories of plucky Ukrainian soldiers outwitting their far more powerful Russian counterparts, such as at Kharkiv, where Ukrainian ambushes repeatedly stalled a Russian advance. Civil society, meanwhile, has also stepped up, with one journalist summarizing the atmosphere as “not a climate of fear or pessimism. Rather, there was a clear strength forged by community action. A single purpose to which everyone had subscribed—victory. And in that common cause all individual anxieties seemed to fade.”
But morale will likely play an even more important role in the now-unraveling next phase, particularly if Russia ultimately succeeds in occupying parts of eastern Ukraine. Insurgency and guerrilla warfare are notoriously difficult to prosecute, and are sapping to energy and spirit—guerrillas will face food and supply shortages, adverse weather, and relentless manhunts. But the Ukrainian resistance will receive sustained financial and political support, including from an international diaspora movement. These are also excellent conditions for insurgency; in the words of former US Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Michael Vickers, “Ukraine has all the conditions going for it” to wage an insurgent campaign. And Russia’s reaction—to escalate bombings against civilian infrastructure in an “effort to break Ukrainian morale”—has only fed Ukrainian anger and patriotism. As Ben Connable notes in a study of the will to fight on both sides, Ukrainian morale may stay strong: “Given the existential nature of the Russian invasion and the demonstrated power of Ukrainian national identity, there is a good chance that the Ukrainians can sustain much of their will to fight through the invasion and into a long-term insurgency.”
Morale will grow increasingly important as the conflict drags on—and increasingly hard for Russia to sustain, as Russian soldiers continue to realize there will not be a quick return home, as their comrades head back in body bags, and as Russia’s bombing campaign intensifies the resistance and global support for Ukraine.
Next Steps
Asymmetric wars are not just asymmetric in capability but also in stakes: the lesser force often faces an existential threat, and therefore summons a spirit that an invading army simply cannot match. Ukraine, as a nation seeing its right to self-determination in mortal danger, will always maintain that advantage against Moscow. But policymakers must also consider whether morale can be maintained, constructed, or cajoled.
Morale’s importance offers the West an opportunity to push the war in Ukraine’s favor. The information environment, and its intersection with cyber operations, could already be shaping morale in the ongoing conflict. So far, Russia’s use of cyber operations in its invasion of Ukraine has been limited. Despite the discovery of destructive malware targeting organizations in Ukraine in January and February, predictions that Russia would use highly destructive cyberattacks to aid in its military operations have not come true. Rather than causing serious damage to Ukrainian critical infrastructure, cyber operations may leave a very different impact on the conflict: curbing the morale of Russian invaders. In the early days of the invasion, a Ukrainian newspaper published the personal information of 120,000 Russian troops, which was possibly obtained through cyber operations. Analysts quickly pointed out how the exposure of this data could leave Russian soldiers vulnerable to targeted anti-Russian messaging, further eroding the morale of the invading forces. The leak came only days after the hacktivist group Anonymous declared “cyber war” on Russia, subsequently conducted denial-of-service attacks against Russian government and state media websites, and posted data allegedly belonging to the Russian Ministry of Economic Development on Twitter.
Anonymous and other groups’ hacktivism fits into the narrative that the heroic, less capable Ukrainian forces are locked in a noble struggle against the more powerful Russian aggressors. Information operations, possibly enabled by cyber operations, can further promote such narratives, complicating Russia’s counterinsurgency efforts.
As the United States weighs how to support Ukraine, it should recognize that the US military has already created multiple units capable of integrating and projecting military power across the information environment and the cyber domain. Should an insurgency emerge, the United States should deploy this capability to help maintain the conflict’s narrative in favor of Ukraine. Highlighting Russian atrocities, using cyber operations to expose the identities of those who target innocent civilians, and spreading messages about the heroism of the Ukrainian people are just a few options to bolster Ukrainian morale while curbing that of the Russian invaders. US military and covert operations to promote such narratives should be accompanied by complementary diplomatic messaging, as well as domestic political messaging from US leaders, to sustain the American public and private sectors’ support for pressuring Russia. Given Western unity in countering Russia up to this point, it is likely that US allies and partners will echo these messages.
Understanding the history of morale’s role in insurgencies is essential for analyzing the ongoing war in Ukraine and developing sound policy options for what could be a drawn-out conflict. But one thing seems clear: Russia will struggle to win its war in Ukraine if its troops do not want to be there.
Daniel Karr is an intelligence consultant at Recorded Future, an intelligence company, and a former intelligence analyst at the US Department of Defense.
Jacob Ware is the research associate for counterterrorism at the Council on Foreign Relations and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
15. Russia's special-operations forces are under fire in Ukraine
I notice most SOF try to copy the equipment of US SOF.
Excerpts:
When it comes to special-operations forces, the Russian military has had ample opportunity to learn from the US.
For the past 20 years, US special operators have been at the tip of the spear. Their ability to conduct high-reward missions with less military or political risk than larger conventional units has made them a go-to option for American policymakers.
Russia's military began a major reorganization in 2008, part of which was the formation of a dedicated special-operations command organization. Created in 2009, the Russian Special Operations Forces Command is a strategic-level special-operations organization tasked with the hardest, most important missions.
"The Russians aren't stupid. They would have seen how successful we've been employing SOF [special-operations forces] downrange during the GWOT [Global War on Terror] and have taken their notes. That's what we would do," a retired Delta Force operator told Insider.
What Russian forces have learned in terms of military doctrine isn't apparent, but open-source information showed "how our operations have influenced their equipment and training," said the retired operator, speaking anonymously because they still work with their unit.
Russia's special-operations forces are under fire in Ukraine
Russian Spetsnaz troops march through Red Square in a Victory Day military parade, May 9, 2021.
Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images
- Amid its struggles in Ukraine, Russia's military has relied heavily on its most highly trained troops.
- The fighting has taken a outsize toll on those troops, including Russia's famed Spetsnaz special operators.
- Moscow may rely on those operators even more as it renews its campaign with a focus on eastern Ukraine.
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Russian forces have struggled in Ukraine, failing to achieve any of their primary objectives after two months of fighting.
Moscow has reduced its ambitions, focusing on eastern Ukraine. It appears to be renewing its offensive, but its performance has already affected assessments of its military prowess, calling into question its status as a "near peer" force.
Among the Russian units affected are the famed Spetsnaz. During and after the Cold War, these special operators achieved legendary status in the West. Recent successes in Crimea and Syria seemed to add to their credentials.
Alongside the rest of the Russian military, however, their reputation is being tarnished in Ukraine.
The city of Irpin, only miles from Kyiv, was a base Russian special-operations forces until Ukrainian forces ousted the Russians in late March. The brutal fight for the port city of Mariupol — the kind of strategic target where Moscow has concentrated its most capable forces — appears to have taken an outsize toll on Russia's special operators.
Spetsnaz: Russia's special operators
Troops with the Russian military's 14th Separate Special Purpose Brigade during an exercise, February 15, 2017.
Russian Ministry of Defense/Mil.ru
Moscow established the Spetsnaz, its first special-operations unit, in the 1950s to conduct strategic missions.
Spetsnaz initially had a strategic role, but now every special-operations unit in the Russian military, law enforcement, and emergency and security services are called Spetsnaz.
In general, military Spetsnaz units are a light infantry airborne force that can act as shock troops. A few elite Spetsnaz units, such as Alpha and Vympel Groups, have strategic missions, such as counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and the security of nuclear installations.
There has been limited reporting on what Russian special-operations units have done in Ukraine or how they've performed, but their missions there may include special reconnaissance, direct-action operations, and unconventional warfare.
One of the few advantages that Russia's military has leveraged against Ukraine is its long-range weapons. Russia has launched more than 1,500 ballistic and cruise missiles at Ukrainian targets.
Troops of the Russian military's 2nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade, a Spetsnaz GRU brigade, during an exercise.
Konstantin Morozov/Russian Ministry of Defense/Mil.ru
Russian special operators could infiltrate close to those targets and use specialized equipment to help guide the munition. Moscow's utter disregard for collateral damage means it may not be using such targeting assistance, but that skill set could still be used if the Kremlin wants to take out the Ukrainian leadership with a strategic strike.
Russian special-operations forces might also be conducting direct-action operations, such as raids and ambushes, in pursuit of tactical-level goals, such as capturing a city block.
Generally, it would be folly to use special operators for conventional operations, as their potential casualties would squander the time and expense used to train them to a high level, but the lack of progress may prompt Russian commanders to do so, especially in urban settings where the close-quarters-combat training of Russian commandos might make the difference between winning and losing.
Russia may also use its special-operations forces for unconventional warfare and asymmetric operations. Russian forces have been supporting separatist forces in eastern Ukraine for years, and that effort may expand as Moscow redirects its military campaign toward that region.
Russian special operators may also target Ukrainian strategic targets, such as airfields or fuel and arms depots. There have already been reports of Russian naval commandos attacking a Ukrainian military intelligence ship.
Learning from the enemy
Members of the Russian military's 22nd Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade during an exercise, November 24, 2017.
Russian Ministry of Defense/Mil.ru
When it comes to special-operations forces, the Russian military has had ample opportunity to learn from the US.
For the past 20 years, US special operators have been at the tip of the spear. Their ability to conduct high-reward missions with less military or political risk than larger conventional units has made them a go-to option for American policymakers.
Russia's military began a major reorganization in 2008, part of which was the formation of a dedicated special-operations command organization. Created in 2009, the Russian Special Operations Forces Command is a strategic-level special-operations organization tasked with the hardest, most important missions.
"The Russians aren't stupid. They would have seen how successful we've been employing SOF [special-operations forces] downrange during the GWOT [Global War on Terror] and have taken their notes. That's what we would do," a retired Delta Force operator told Insider.
What Russian forces have learned in terms of military doctrine isn't apparent, but open-source information showed "how our operations have influenced their equipment and training," said the retired operator, speaking anonymously because they still work with their unit.
Troops of the Russian military's 22nd Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade during an exercise, November 24, 2017.
Russian Ministry of Defense/Mil.ru
"It's funny because sometimes it's hard to distinguish between an American and Russian operator because they tend to both wear MultiCam [camouflage], high-cut helmets, and carry similar assault loadouts. It's only from the weapons that you can really tell the difference," the former operator added.
Moscow drew on the creation of the US's Joint Special Operations Command, which is a component of US Special Operations Command, as a model for its new command.
Moscow wanted to replicate the effectiveness of the JSOC, bringing together its top special-operations units to facilitate better command and control. Even Spetsnaz units from the GRU, Russia's military intelligence agency, were transferred to the new organization, though they were reassigned to the GRU in 2013.
"People in SOF tend to be cut from the same cloth. The training, mission sets, and funding might be different — and in some cases worlds apart — but the people at the highest levels tend to be very similar," the retired operator said.
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate.
16. Special Operations News Update - April 19, 2022 | SOF News
Special Operations News Update - April 19, 2022 | SOF News
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.
Photo: NAVSCIATTS Patrol Boat Light. Photo by Angela Fry, Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School, October 30, 2018.
Ukrainians Graduate from NSCITTS Training. Ukrainian soldiers are heading home after having received training at the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School in Biloxi, Mississippi. NSCITTS is a security cooperation school that is operated by the U.S. Special Operations Command. The Ukrainians received training on patrol craft operations, communications, and maintenance. Since the conclusion of the formal course in early March, the school has provided the Ukrainian group additional training – to include the operation of the Switchblade unmanned aerial vehicle.
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SOF News
NSW and the MV Carolyn Chouest. A highly-modified SOF mothership recently took part in the Balikatan 22 exercise held in the Philippines. This annual exercise featured SOF units from the United States, Australia, and Philippines. The SOF vessel is not usually featured in DoD photographs but recent releases by the Defense Department provides a good look at this unique vessel. “Pentagon Posts Rare Photo of Navy SEAL-Laden Special Ops Sea Base”, The War Zone, April 18, 2022.
Mozart Group – SOF Vets Helping in Ukraine. A private organization is assisting Ukraine with personnel that have some specialty skills – among them medical, information operations, training, logistics, open source intelligence, and emergency ordnance disposal. The Mozart Group is providing training, equipment, and advice to Ukraine SOF and resistance units. The founder of the group is Andy Milburn, a retired Marine Corps officer rich in special operations and combat experience. Read a 16-page PDF describing the organization’s mission and capabilities.
USSOCOM Vehicle Upgrades. U.S. special operators have the ability to tap into a fleet of unique vehicles to accomplish their missions. The inventory includes joint light tactical vehicles, non-standard commercial platforms, all-terrain vehicles, and more. Read about the MRZR Alpha, LTATV, MRAPs, JLTV, and other vehicles used by U.S. SOF. “Special Operations Command Targets Vehicle Upgrades“, National Defense, April 19, 2022.
International SOF
Russian SOF – A Tough Fight for a Special Unit? The war in Ukraine has yielded many surprises. The pluck of the Ukrainians, the way NATO and the West finally got its act together opposing Russia, and the dismal performance of the Russian military. The Russians have failed miserably thus far; although the war is not over and has entered a new stage where the aggressors may make some concrete gains. Russian SOF suffered some severe losses when it attempted to take an airfield a few miles northwest of Kyiv during the initial days of the invasion. Beyond that operation, however, not much is known about the Russian Spetsnaz’s involvement in the war. “Russia’s special -operations forces are under fire in Ukraine”, Business Insider, April 18, 2022.
Brit SOF Stepping Up – Ukraine. There is some recognition in the SOF world that the UK is providing some great assistance to the Ukrainians. The effectiveness of the anti-armor NLAW missiles against Russian tanks and APCs has been widely reported.
New SOF Training Base for Georgia. The government of Georgia has announced plans to establish a base for training special operations forces in the country. Known as the Mukhrovani Base, it will be completed in two to three years. “Georgian PM announces plans for special operations base”, Agenda.ge, April 18, 2022.
Former Afghan SOF With a Fresh Start. Former Afghan Special Forces soldiers and their families are learning how to fit in to their new community. They are assisted by a ‘cultural mentor’ who guides them through the daily activities of living in the United States. The mentor helps them find jobs, set up bank accounts, shop, and perform other life tasks. The former elite Afghans soldiers are now performing menial jobs – a tough transition to make. “Former Afghan special forces members adjust to new lives in Las Cruces”, Sun News, April 7, 2022.
British Sniper Has the Deadliest Mustache. One of the best mustaches ever was on display during the 2022 International Sniper Competition held at Fort Benning, Georgia in early April 2022. Thirty teams from across the U.S. military and law enforcement community as well as the around the world participated. A member of the British sniper team stood out among the competitors. “This British sniper may have the deadliest mustache in the world”, Task & Purpose, April 18, 2022.
SOF History
Book Review – Bush War Operator: Memoirs of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, Selous Scouts and Beyond. A.J. Balaam follows his first book about military service with the Rhodesian military with a second book. It covers his formative years, life serving with elite Rhodesian military units during the bush war, and his adventures across the African continent after the transition from white rule to the new regime in Zimbabwe. Read a book review on Balaam’s new book. (Havoc Journal, April 15, 2022).
Daring SAS Operation in Afghanistan. Following the terrorist attacks in September 2001, US and UK special operations forces began operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban regime. One operation stands out – Operation Trent. The raid was conducted by the SAS operators of A and G Squadrons in November 2001. “This daring daytime Afghanistan raid was the largest SAS operation since WWII”, We Are the Mighty, April 16, 2022.
Army Rangers and Just Cause. Part of the invading force to arriving in Panama in the early morning hours of December 20, 1990 came from the Ranger Regiment. The Rangers parachuted from C-130 Hercules and C-141 Starlifter transport planes onto three different airfields from the low altitude of 500 feet. Read more in “Operation Just Cause: Untold Stories From the Army Rangers Who Invaded Panama”, Coffee or Die Magazine, April 15, 2022.
National Security
Videos
Video – 53rd Ordnance Company SOF Support Training. An NCO with the 53rd SOF SST talks about providing support for U.S. special operations forces that are deployed around the world. The SOF Support Training (SST) element was created a few years ago. DVIDS, April 1, 2022, 2 minutes.
Video – Who Are the Green Berets? “The US Army’s Special Forces (often called the Green Berets after their distinctive headgear) are an elite brotherhood of soldiers who, at their core, are problem solvers. They embody the ethos of special operations — working outside conventional units among indigenous personnel who share a common enemy, training them, and often fighting alongside them. This means learning culture and languages; it also means operating in small numbers and having to master countless combat skills in order to pack one of the hardest punches US ground troops have to offer.” Coffee or Die Magazine, April 15, 2022, YouTube, 3 minutes.
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17. Ad execs and car salesmen: Meet the Ukrainian volunteers fighting back against Russia
Ad execs and car salesmen: Meet the Ukrainian volunteers fighting back against Russia
Before the war, Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Forces numbered in the hundreds. Today, it’s a civilian army of 110,000 and growing.
Less than two months ago, Alexander planned his days “on my own terms,” as he puts it. “Until February, I had a successful business, an advertising agency,” the Kyiv resident told Grid. It was the kind of life you might expect in his line of work: brunch meetings with clients, long days in the office, drinks with friends at Kyiv’s bustling restaurants and bars. And, whenever he got some time off, trips around Europe to follow his favorite sport — soccer.
“Actually, on the day before the invasion, I flew back to Ukraine from a match in Seville, Spain,” he said.
Now Alexander spends his days in a military barracks, in a location in the capital that he will not disclose, for obvious reasons. His schedule is determined by the local commander of Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Forces (TDF), the civilian arm of the country’s resistance against Russia’s invasion. As with others who have enlisted with the TDF, Alexander asked that we not use his last name due to safety concerns.
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At the start of the war, the TDF numbered just a few hundred people. By early April, more than 110,000 Ukrainians — engineers, doctors, bakers and others from different walks of life — had signed up to fight the Russians. Some came with military or firearms experience; others none at all. They range in age from their late teens to 60. The forces include women — no surprise, given that 15 percent of Ukrainian soldiers are women — often working with the medical corps, though they are fighting as well, according to accounts gathered by Grid. Whatever their background, all the members of this growing civilian army work alongside the country’s professional soldiers, learning how to handle firearms, administer medical aid and shield the millions of civilians under threat from Russian fire.
These newly minted fighters have already proved themselves a critical component of Ukraine’s defense — the “core,” according to the top soldier in charge of the TDF. “It took the Russians by surprise,” Brig. Gen. Yuriy Galushkin said earlier this month.
Alexander is surprised as well — by how rapidly his life has been transformed.
Life with his wife and toddler in their Kyiv apartment now seems part of a distant past, he said, replaced by life in a military barracks where he bunks with his fellow civilians-turned-soldiers. “My usual day in the barracks starts at around 7 a.m.,” he said. “Then the commander gives us tasks to do. Usually my unit has been starting with a course on tactical medicine.”
Alexander moved his family to western Ukraine the day after the invasion. “They don’t want to leave the country,” he told Grid. But they are staying as close as possible to the Polish border. If the situation worsens, he said, they might have no choice but to cross the frontier.
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When a hobby comes in handy
Alexander’s story mirrors tens of thousands of others playing out under the dark shadow of the Russian onslaught. Stories like Dmitry’s — a car salesman-turned-soldier who remembers vividly the night of the invasion. “My wife Tanya woke me up at around 4:30 a.m.,” he told Grid. “It was dark and she was showing me something on her phone.”
It was the news from the east: The Russians had begun streaming across the border. Like Alexander, Dmitry moved his wife away from Kyiv. In her case, she traveled to Bulgaria, where she remains. He then returned to Kyiv to join the resistance, signing up with the TDF and bringing with him a rifle he had bought in 2017, when he joined a shooting club.
“It is a real sport,” he said. A sport in which, he said, interest spiked after 2014, following the Russian incursion in the Donbas and annexation of Crimea. “A lot of people began to train hard,” he told Grid. Now, that training is coming in handy.
As Russia turns its attention and its troops to eastern Ukraine, Dmitry is helping to guard military facilities in the Kyiv area. And now his entire shooting club has joined him.
Prewar target practice notwithstanding, Dmitry and his friends are still inexperienced. They have not been deployed to the front lines, but they have had to fight back — against Russian saboteurs who attacked a military post in the Kyiv area where Dmitry was stationed. “We had a firefight for five minutes,” he told Grid. “It was my first serious shooting episode. We managed to beat them off and forced them to retreat.”
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It brought home in the most dramatic fashion, he said, the way circumstances had changed — for Dmitry and for his country. “The day after the start of the war, I went to the territorial defense office with the guys from my shooting club,” he said. “Before the war, people had their businesses, their careers, their own lives. Most of them were not willing to give that up. But since the 24th of February, many of my friends have made a personal decision to join.”
All told, the TDF now comprises some 450 units spread across the country and is involved in everything from fighting at the front lines to helping with evacuations, working as couriers to guarding critical infrastructure. Increasingly, as Russia moves to the east, these new Ukrainian forces are being deployed to those areas as well in anticipation of what will likely be another bloody Russian offensive. Maj. Andriy Shulga, the spokesman for the TDF in the area, told Grid that these civilians have been critical to the resistance, and he believes their skill and bravery have surprised the enemy. “[The Russians] did not expect us to fight back in the way that we have,” Shulga said. It’s a sentiment echoed by U.S. officials.
Growing pains
To be sure, the civilian effort hasn’t been without teething problems, as ordinary people get used to handling firearms in the middle of a brutal war.
“It was chaos and panic in the first days,” Dmitry said. “You had a bunch of people around who already had weapons, and they didn’t know how to handle them. How to put in an ammunition cartridge, how to handle the trigger.”
Others had never handled guns and rifles before. “What we saw was a shock. People with real military weapons in their hands, and all their knowledge about them was from movies and games,” he said. So Dmitry and his friends from the shooting club “ended up becoming voluntary instructors.”
Those who were better-trained led the way, starting with professional soldiers who guided the rookies, and others, like Dmitry and his club partners, who had experience of their own. “Since our group was good with weapons, we were asked to work with young people,” he told Grid. “We started with about 30. We had to give them advice and train them a little.”
Regular soldiers have also had to adjust. A soldier named Valeriy told Grid he fought alongside civilians in the early weeks of the war, taking aim at Russian forces that were threatening Kyiv.
“You have to behave differently next to the civilians: You need to be different, not so aggressive, to change behavior,” he told Grid from an undisclosed location, where he remains deployed in active operations.
Above all, there is a strong sense of unity among those who have been in the business of defending Ukraine for years and those who have just joined the effort. “Fighting with them, you already know who likes what tea, with whom you should not smoke in the car, so as not to cause discomfort, you know the reaction to certain actions,” Valeriy said. “You trust a person with your life and you know that a person trusts his life with you. There is an invisible connection between all of us.”
It’s a sentiment echoed by Dmitry, the car salesman-turned-soldier in Kyiv: “Everyone is trying to do something to win.”
Thanks to Alicia Benjamin for copy editing this article.
18. Putin’s May 9 problem: Can there be a Victory Day in Russia with nothing to celebrate?
Excerpts:
On May 9, Putin might come to the Red Square reviewing stand and remember Russia’s fallen heroes in the great cause of “denazification” — 1,351 of them, by the Kremlin’s lower count. As Gatov notes, under Putin “Victory Day has been ideologically exploited — the shadow of the Soviet victory over Nazis has been feeding Putin’s revanchism.” There may be the usual parade of weapons and some new menacing rhetoric. The few surviving World War II veterans will be there, in their medal-filled jackets. And so will Putin and whichever top aides are in favor at the moment, watching and cheering. Russian television will no doubt do its part.
The catch, for Putin and his warmakers: On a date that so concentrates the Russian mind on soldiers and sacrifice, there will be not 1,351 families but closer to 20,000, all mourning a son or brother or father lost in Ukraine. Perhaps double that number will have landed on the wounded list. All those relatives and friends, and other members of the communities from which they came, will have their own thoughts on May 9 about sacrifice and what it has meant in Ukraine. And while Russians of a certain generation will do as they always have and honor that triumph of eight decades ago, many others will surely expect some news of triumph and greatness from the current war.
Meanwhile, for one nation that was once in the Soviet sphere — and therefore forced to celebrate May 9 for decades — there is a clear plan for this year’s holiday. The government of Latvia has decreed that May 9, 2022, is to be “Ukraine Day,” a day of remembrance for victims of Putin’s war.
Putin’s May 9 problem: Can there be a Victory Day in Russia with nothing to celebrate?
It’s a revered day on the Russian calendar. This year, it may affect the course of war in Ukraine.
Global Editor
April 18, 2022
On May 9, 1995, I was in Moscow, covering the 50th anniversary of Victory Day, the end of World War II in Europe. I had lived in Russia earlier in the 1990s and seen how Russians marked the day — hourslong military parades featuring soldiers past and present, tanks and other armored vehicles, all marching through Moscow’s Red Square. Across the city, all day long, one found a festive atmosphere; older men wore their medals and ribbons on jacket lapels. A sense of pride and patriotism was palpable.
That year’s event drew President Bill Clinton, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and dozens of other dignitaries, but I drove a few hours outside Moscow for a different “V-Day” story: A village was burying two local soldiers whose remains had been found in the spring thaw. Similar ceremonies had been held for decades all over European Russia: men who had been left where they fell in the early 1940s, brought to the surface by the passage of time. Each spring, more bones were found, and each year, May 9 was the day on which they were given a proper farewell, whether anyone knew their names or not.
I thought of all this the other day, when word came that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be factoring May 9 into his war planning.
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In a statement posted to Facebook, the general staff of Ukraine’s Armed Forces cited “propaganda work being carried out among the personnel of the Russian Federation’s armed forces, which imposes the idea that the war must be ended by May 9, 2022.” CNN reported that U.S. intelligence intercepts suggested Putin was focused on May 9 as a date on which “he can show a victory.”
On the one hand, it seems odd that a wartime leader would make tactical decisions based on a holiday. On the other, Victory Day is no ordinary holiday in Russia. It is both a nationwide celebration of the victory over Adolf Hitler’s Reich (in Russia, it’s not “World War II” but the “Great Patriotic War”) and a recognition of extraordinary sacrifice. The Soviet Union lost at least 24 million civilians and troops — by far the highest figure for any country in the war.
To understand Victory Day, think Memorial Day, Veterans Day and July 4 rolled into one, overlaid with an almost North Korea-style military gloss. Put differently, it’s hard to imagine a Victory Day in Russia with nothing to celebrate.
“May 9 is very significant for Russians,” Kseniya Kirillova, a former reporter for Russia’s Novaya Gazeta, told Grid. “It’s important for Putin to secure at least some symbolic victory in Ukraine by May 9, at any cost.” She noted that just prior to last year’s festivities Putin called May 9“the most important, holy holiday.”
Vasily Gatov, an expert in Russian media at the University of Southern California Annenberg Center on Communication, added that “it is very Russian and Soviet to arrange some kind of achievement in accordance with a particular date — Stalin’s birthday, Victory Day or others.” Gatov believes it may not be Putin himself but his top military aides who will have the calendar in mind.
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“I have to presume that Russian generals know how keen Putin is on V-Day celebrations,” he told Grid. “And they may have planned some ‘final solution of the Ukrainian question’ for close to May 9.”
The rub for the generals, and perhaps Putin himself: how to ensure there is something worth celebrating when the day arrives?
The calendar — and the war in Ukraine
The last time the calendar entered conversations and analysis of the war was in its early days. Putin’s “special military operation” was to be a quick, surgical strike, a few days needed to subdue the Ukrainian resistance, capture large swathes of the east and south, perhaps even install a new regime. While the Kremlin never issued a timetable, it was expected to be a matter of days, perhaps a few weeks.
Nearly two months into the war, Russian ground forces have incurred staggering losses of men and materiel, and failed to control areas where they have been fighting.
On March 25, Russian military leaders addressed the nation and redefined their objectives. The “first part of the operation” had been “mainly accomplished,” they said; the focus now would be on the “complete liberation of the Donbas” region in the east. It was a significant pivot, taken outside Russia as an admission of failure but designed to give the impression that all was going as planned.
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Taking the Donbas region — or its smaller slices of the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” that have been a point of contention for eight years now — would give Putin at least something of a “victory” for Victory Day. His forces are also reportedly close to capturing Mariupol, having laid brutal siege to that southern port city for weeks. Mariupol would be a strategic prize as well.
But the reality is that May 9 is less than a month away, and thus far, Russian forces have captured exactly one city — Kherson — only to lose it to Ukrainian defenders. Russia has lost between 7,000 and 15,000 forces — perhaps more than that (these estimates were given several weeks ago) and seven generals. May 9 is above all a day for the symbols and trappings of “victory” — and to date, the iconic symbols of Putin’s war are the charred remains of Russian armored vehicles that have been picked off by the Ukrainians. Last week, the Moskva, flagship of the country’s Black Sea Fleet, went to the bottom of the sea.
Putin’s best hopes may be that the newly articulated plans offer focus — geographically, and in terms of mission; tens of thousands of troops have been redeployed to the new front, and a new commander has the reins.
But the stresses on the Russian military are unmistakable. Rob Lee, an expert in the Russian military at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, said via Twitter last week that “the level of attrition and forces committed isn’t sustainable.”
At a Council on Foreign Relations event last week, Beth Sanner, a Russia expert at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, said that Putin “has to achieve something that looks like a win on the ground.” She was speaking generally, not about May 9 in particular. “He has enough control over the media there so he can declare victory with limited gains … [but] he has to do something that he can shape as a win.”
A Putin advantage: the information war
That iron grip on the Russian media will help Putin and his commanders as they consider the calendar. Whatever is happening on the front lines come May 9, the war has consistently shown the Kremlin’s willingness to reframe or invent the narrative. See the Bucha massacres — a “fabrication” created by Great Britain; the sinking of the Moskva — an accidental fire onboard the ship, in the Russian telling; and the almost-certainly inaccurate counts of Russian casualties. It’s not hard to imagine a combination of theatrics and invention that allows May 9 to look like the celebration it has always been.
On May 9, Putin might come to the Red Square reviewing stand and remember Russia’s fallen heroes in the great cause of “denazification” — 1,351 of them, by the Kremlin’s lower count. As Gatov notes, under Putin “Victory Day has been ideologically exploited — the shadow of the Soviet victory over Nazis has been feeding Putin’s revanchism.” There may be the usual parade of weapons and some new menacing rhetoric. The few surviving World War II veterans will be there, in their medal-filled jackets. And so will Putin and whichever top aides are in favor at the moment, watching and cheering. Russian television will no doubt do its part.
The catch, for Putin and his warmakers: On a date that so concentrates the Russian mind on soldiers and sacrifice, there will be not 1,351 families but closer to 20,000, all mourning a son or brother or father lost in Ukraine. Perhaps double that number will have landed on the wounded list. All those relatives and friends, and other members of the communities from which they came, will have their own thoughts on May 9 about sacrifice and what it has meant in Ukraine. And while Russians of a certain generation will do as they always have and honor that triumph of eight decades ago, many others will surely expect some news of triumph and greatness from the current war.
Meanwhile, for one nation that was once in the Soviet sphere — and therefore forced to celebrate May 9 for decades — there is a clear plan for this year’s holiday. The government of Latvia has decreed that May 9, 2022, is to be “Ukraine Day,” a day of remembrance for victims of Putin’s war.
Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.
19. Russia's War for the Donbas Begins: What Happens if Putin Can't Win?
Excerpts:
The emerging consensus is that if Ukraine does not receive heavier weapons from NATO, it will probably lose ground. This is likely why Russia resumed its offensive so rapidly after retreating in the north. It needs to outrace the arrival of NATO aid.
So Russia has a decent chance in this next phase. Its firepower will be concentrated on one front. It will likely fight more coherently, having learned from last month’s bloody nose. NATO heavy weapons will take time to arrive, and pervious Ukraine’s advantages – in drones, nimble ambush squads, urban terrain – will matter less this time.
But Ukraine survived for the last sixty days when few analysts thought it would. It is better led and motivated, and Russia’s firepower advantage is eroding if only NATO can accelerate its arms transfers. If Ukraine blunt this offensive long enough for those advanced weapons to level the playing field, the war will degenerate into a stalemate. Putin might be tempted to break that with a weapon of mass destruction – but the associated costs of that are massive and unpredictable.
Far more likely is that, post-Donbas offensive, the invasion becomes a battle of attrition which Russia loses slowly over time.
Russia's War for the Donbas Begins: What Happens if Putin Can't Win?
If Russia’s Donbas Offensive is Stopped, the Ukraine War is a Stalemate: The last big Russian push in the Ukraine war has begun. The Russian army has regrouped after its earlier, uncoordinated assaults all over Ukraine. It is now concentrating on Donbas, the eastern portion of Ukraine. After its humiliating defeat around Kyiv, this is likely Russia’s last chance to fight a war of maneuver – to break through Ukrainian lines with its armored columns and wreak havoc in Ukraine’s rear. Russia’s large commitment of tanks and other armored vehicles – and their well-documented destruction by Ukrainian soldiers – strongly suggests this is the type of war Russia wants to fight, but which Ukraine has stymied so far.
The Course of the War So Far
Russian President Vladimir Putin clearly expected a blitzkrieg. Putin seems to have believed his own propaganda that Russian forces would roll over weak defenders weakly committed to a corrupt, semi-failing state with a low sense of national identity. Putin has repeatedly claimed that Ukraine is a ‘fake country.’ He has been subverting it for a decade. In 2014, he snatched Crimea from it. His likely goal in the war now is to break off another chunk in Donbas as Russia-dependent statelets.
The sloppy Russian actions in the first month of the war suggest Putin believed this narrative, and the result is that Russia squandered the advantages of surprise. Had it been staged and coordinated properly – combined arms failed spectacularly – it might have knocked Ukraine out of the war before it could mobilize and before Western aid could make a difference.
This failed, and Russia is now fighting a massive proxy war it probably cannot win if it does not win soon. Western aid coordination problems will soon be worked out, and NATO heavy weapons are already on their way. Ukraine is a motivated, increasingly well-armed opponent. Punishing Western sanctions will gradually undercut the Russian economy’s ability to support the war effort. The window for a quick Russian victory – which could permit a quick end to the war’s losses and a quick end of sanctions – is closing.
The Donbas offensive is Russia’s last chance to wrap this up soon and avoid a long, punishing grind. A drawn-out conflict of attrition similar to World War I or the Vietnam War looms, and even if Russia were to somehow win that in a year or two, it would be a pyrrhic victory.
Donbas is the Best Area for a Russian Assault
Donbas is a good target for a last Russian gamble. The territory is flatter and more open than the urban warfare it tried – and failed at – around Ukraine’s cities. Russia’s desire to deploy tanks is better suited here. Ukrainian ambush teams will find it harder to approach Russian columns in open space.
The population of Donbas is, ostensibly, sympathetic. Eastern Ukraine has a larger portion of Russian-speakers and ethnically Russian people than the rest of Ukraine. It is to defend them against Ukrainian ‘Nazis’ that Putin launched this war. There are already Russian-sponsored separatists active in Donetsk and Luhansk. If there is anywhere in Ukraine where the Russian assault might find local sympathy, it is here.
Russian Advantages
The unfolding Donbas struggle will be the toughest challenge yet for Ukraine. The Russian military has almost certainly learned from its errors of the first six weeks. It will probably not make amateur mistakes – sending light armored units far in advance unaccompanied, leaving long columns of vehicles lined up for days in easy ambush position, not informing its soldiers of their actual missions – again.
Russian armor should, if properly supported by infantry, be much more devasting than before. The lines of contact in Donbas are long; in some cases, there are trenches. Static, open positions like this are precisely what tanks were designed to outmaneuver. If Russian armor can finally move at speed, its tanks should be able to reduce their losses to drone strikes. Ukrainian ambush teams will also find it harder to track them and be more exposed to retaliation. And if the Russians really breakthrough, they might encircle the bulk of the Ukrainian army east of the Dnieper River. Were that to happen, Ukraine would likely sue for peace.
The emerging consensus is that if Ukraine does not receive heavier weapons from NATO, it will probably lose ground. This is likely why Russia resumed its offensive so rapidly after retreating in the north. It needs to outrace the arrival of NATO aid.
So Russia has a decent chance in this next phase. Its firepower will be concentrated on one front. It will likely fight more coherently, having learned from last month’s bloody nose. NATO heavy weapons will take time to arrive, and pervious Ukraine’s advantages – in drones, nimble ambush squads, urban terrain – will matter less this time.
But Ukraine survived for the last sixty days when few analysts thought it would. It is better led and motivated, and Russia’s firepower advantage is eroding if only NATO can accelerate its arms transfers. If Ukraine blunt this offensive long enough for those advanced weapons to level the playing field, the war will degenerate into a stalemate. Putin might be tempted to break that with a weapon of mass destruction – but the associated costs of that are massive and unpredictable.
Far more likely is that, post-Donbas offensive, the invasion becomes a battle of attrition which Russia loses slowly over time.
Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; website) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University. Dr. Kelly is a 1945 Contributing Editor as well.
20. FDD | What is the Future of Cyber Deterrence?
FDD | What is the Future of Cyber Deterrence?
fdd.org · by RADM (Ret) Mark Montgomery CCTI Senior Director and Senior Fellow · April 18, 2022
April 18, 2022 | SAIS Review of International Affairs
What is the Future of Cyber Deterrence?
Erica D. Lonergan
Army Cyber Institute
Excerpt
Scholars and practitioners alike have debated the feasibility of applying deterrence models to cyberspace. Advocates of “cyber persistence theory,” for instance, posit that deterrence strategies are unlikely to succeed in the cyber domain. In contrast, the Cyberspace Solarium Commission’s March 2020 report advocates for updating traditional deterrence concepts to account for the implications of emerging technologies, calling for the United States to implement a strategy of “layered cyber deterrence.” In this article, we unpack the concept of cyber deterrence from three perspectives: definitional differences; distinguishing between general and specific deterrence; and the role of thresholds. Based on our analysis, we demonstrate why cyber strategies anchored in persistent engagement and near-constant offensive maneuver are insufficient to address the range of threat actor behavior in cyberspace. Instead, we offer a theoretical framework that articulates the conditions under which deterrence is possible in cyberspace. Finally, we conclude by providing policy recommendations for the United States.
Introduction
The question of the applicability of deterrence frameworks to cyberspace is an enduring debate among scholars and practitioners. Deterrence is a strategy to prevent a target from taking an action that the deterrer finds undesirable through manipulating the target’s perception of the costs, benefits, and risks of cooperating versus defecting. Deterrence is often associated with the threat of punishment (e.g., threatening to impose significant costs on a target to dissuade them from acting). US nuclear deterrence strategy during the Cold War is associated with this form of deterrence. However, deterrence could also take other forms, such as denial, by making it more difficult for a target to carry out an action through increasing the military costs of doing so, which is prevalent in conventional deterrence; entanglement in leveraging the interdependence of the deterrer and target; or norms, by creating reputational costs for violating the terms of the threat. Deterrence succeeds when the target perceives that these costs outweigh the expected gains and that the deterring state has both the capability and willingness to carry out the threat. Therefore, possessing a capability, or even demonstrating a capability, is not necessarily sufficient for deterrence to succeed. The deterring state must communicate to the target its expectations about behavior and consequences for defection in a way that is appropriately understood by the target, making signaling an essential element of deterrence.
Early academic work on cyber deterrence, largely drawn from nuclear deterrence literature, expressed skepticism that the logic of deterrence could be extended to cyberspace. According to these scholars, while cyber capabilities may change the nature of conflict, certain characteristics of cyberspace also create vexing challenges for deterrence and signaling. For example, several factors may complicate the effective communication of deterrent threats in cyberspace. These include the preference for operating secretly and maintaining plausible deniability and, by extension, challenges of attribution; the absence of common indices or shared frameworks to help clarify the intent behind observed behavior; and the ways that cyber operations function as ambiguous (rather than clear) signals. Additionally, some purported attributes of cyberspace complicate deterrence capabilities beyond communication, such as the “borderless” nature of cyberspace; the speed with which attacks take place; the low barriers to entry and proliferation of capabilities across numerous actors; and the advantages of offense over defense. And finally, there are credibility issues associated with cyber deterrence, particularly in terms of punishment-based strategies, because the lack of violence in cyber operations and the limitations of obtaining strategic effects—the damage that can be inflicted with cyber capabilities in comparison to other military capabilities—raise questions about whether states would actually follow through on the terms of deterrent threats.
Given these challenges, some academics have extended this line of reasoning to reject the feasibility of cyber deterrence outright, particularly for cyber operations that occur in the competitive space below the level of armed conflict. The emergence of cyber persistence theory, epitomized by Richard Harknett and Michael Fischerkeller’s work, reflects the idea that the absence of traditional sovereignty in cyberspace, coupled with a state of “constant contact” between rivals, poses insurmountable hurdles for deterrence strategies. Instead, states should operate continuously in cyberspace to “shape cyberspace ad infinitum.” Over time, Fischerkeller posits, norms of behavior and stability will emerge in cyberspace through a process of tacit bargaining, whereby, through continuously interacting in cyberspace, rivals will come to shared understandings of what is acceptable versus unacceptable behavior, an “agreed competition.”
Dr. Erica Lonergan (née Borghard) is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point. She is also a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Erica previously served as a senior director on the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Retired Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, US Navy, is the senior director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mark previously served as the executive director of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Follow Mark on Twitter @MarkCMontgomery. FDD is a Washington, D.C.-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by RADM (Ret) Mark Montgomery CCTI Senior Director and Senior Fellow · April 18, 2022
21. White House finally awakens to PRC capture of Solomon Islands
Excerpts:
It is a good sign that the US knows it needs to show up in person, and has announced it will be opening an Embassy in the country. Hopefully the US will, as they did 80 years ago, join forces with those in the country who share their vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, and who are willing to fight for it.
The situation is being watched closely, including in other Pacific Island Countries. If locals concerned about China aren’t listened to properly now, some may see incentive in following the path of the Solomons, not because they want more China, but because they want more US.
As Tongan strategic analyst Tevita Motulalo put it: “It’s too bad the only way to get cooperation is to stake a claim for the adversary. Should Tonga have allowed the redevelopment of the Chinese (naval) port? Looks like the only incentivized approach is to play dirty. This security-state policy frameworks is based on scaring the sh*t out of Washington to take action, out of fear, but not out of appreciation of their own legacies. That’s the message given here to everyone: MORE Chinese in order for any US attention!”
Hopefully, that message will change, with a new approach built not on the failures of the past, but on the successes—building on the ties created fighting for freedom and forged in blood 80 years ago.
White House finally awakens to PRC capture of Solomon Islands - The Sunday Guardian Live
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Published : April 16, 2022, 8:26 pm | Updated : April 16, 2022, 8:26 PM
Free and fair election could result in a new government that not only abrogates the security deal but switches back to Taiwan. That would be a serious loss of face for Xi Jinping, giving ammunition to his domestic enemies, and could lead to a politically weakened Sogavare being more exposed to prosecution.
Alexandria, VA.: Within days, Kurt Campbell, the US National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, and Daniel Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, will visit Solomon Islands, a country of around 700,000 people, in the Southwestern Pacific. It will be one of the highest level American visits to Solomons, since 80 years ago, this August, US Marines landed on Guadalcanal.
This time, the Americans are hoping to dislodge an expansionist Asian power that embedded itself through political warfare, rather than through kinetic warfare. Though the kinetic threat is lurking in the background.
The intensity and urgency of the visit was shaped by the leaking of a draft security agreement between China and Solomon Islands that has the potential to give the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) yet another “base in everything but name”, as they have with Gwadar, and are trying to secure in Sri Lanka, Equatorial Guinea and elsewhere.
Add this to declared bases in Djibouti and the South Sea China—both locations China initially promised not to militarize—and it’s easy to see why there is concern across the Indo-Pacific about the agreement.
Additionally, with Chinese political warfare gains in Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste, and growing but quiet positioning in Bougainville and New Caledonia, the PLA is essentially putting pieces in place to create its own version of a first island chain to hem in and isolate Quad/Aukus/Five Eyes member Australia.
For the US to succeed in its mission of giving Solomon Islands a path to the future that doesn’t involve it becoming another piece in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) global game of Go, it helps to learn from what worked in the past, and to understand and avoid previous mistakes.
WHAT WORKS
During the brutal battles in Solomons during World War II, the knowledge, support and sacrifice of Solomon Islanders, who were ready to fight and die for their own sovereignty, was essential. That spirit is still there. Across the country key components of Solomon Islands society have come out against the deal.
To understand why, it helps to think of this not as a security deal between China and Solomon Islands, but between the Chinese Communist Party and the deeply unpopular and corrupt Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare. The provisions in the draft deal for China to provide assistance in “maintaining social order” are seen as Sogavare being able to call on the PLA to suppress anyone who stands in his—or his CCP patron’s—way.
A main target is the country’s most populous province, Malaita. When Sogavare unilaterally switched Solomons from Taiwan to China in 2019, the Government of Malaita and the Malaita High Council of Chiefs issued the Auki Communiqué. In part, it stated the Malaita Provincial Government “strongly resolves to put in place a Moratorium on Business Licenses to new investors connected directly or indirectly with the Chinese Communist Party.”
Celsus Irokwato Talifilu, adviser to Malaita Premier Daniel Suidani, recently described how he saw Chinese businesses operating in Solomons: “Our forests and people have been raped and pillaged by a logging monster that lives in China. While the legs and wings of the dragon are in Malaysia and the Philippines, we know where its home cave is. We’ve watched it bribe and corrupt countless leaders, and we know it will never stop.”
Malaita’s Premier Suidani, later proved how serious he was about not engaging with the CCP. He fell ill and required medical treatment outside the country. Being an honest politician, he didn’t have the funds required for treatment in Australia. Sogavare’s government stalled on providing him with support, saying it would be offered if he rescinded his objections to China’s activities in Malaita. He refused—effectively saying he’d rather die than take CCP money directly or indirectly.
In the end, through the humanitarian interventions of Prof M.D. Nalapat in India and President Tsai of Taiwan, Premier Suidani received the treatment he needed in Taiwan. When he returned to Solomons, Sogavare’s proxies in the province tried to engineer a vote of no confidence to take him out. Widespread ground level support for the premier thwarted the attempt. But Sogavare and the CCP haven’t given up on taking out the irritant.
And the people of Solomon know it.
Leader of the Opposition Matthew Wale wrote that “Malaita perceives this deal as targeted at it—the secrecy does nothing to remove those fears. Quite the contrary, the secrecy is perceived as an escalation by Prime Minister Sogavare in his struggle with Malaita. How this deal will be used on the Malaita situation has direct implications on all provinces in Solomon Islands and governance broadly.”
Other elected leaders have their own concerns, including the Premier of Western Province, Hon Christian Burley Mesepitu, who stated: “I am very concerned with how this new security agreement with China will affect our existing bilateral arrangements with Papua New Guinea in terms of policing and security on our western border. These arrangements directly affect my people in the Shortland Islands which is why my government is deeply concerned.”
He also said that Western Province would not allow its land and assets or people to be used in support of the security deal.
Also against the deal are powerful women’s groups. Solomons has strong matrilineal elements, including around land holdings, and it was women who were key to fending off China’s first attempt at a “soft base” in the country.
Shortly after the switch in 2019, a Chinese company tried to lease Tulagi, a strategically located island that was the British colonial headquarters leading up to World War II, and the site of the first Japanese attack on Solomons. The women landholders staved them off.
This time around, women’s groups are equally clear on their stand. Ruth Liloqula, a member of the Solomon Islands National Council of Women (SINCW) and executive officer of Transparency Solomon Islands (TSI), said: “We are concerned because when you look at the draft agreement, it mentioned ‘social order’. But the social order is our sovereignty. It should not be given to any other country to do it for us. Because if you do that, you are selling the sovereignty of this country by giving them the very function that belongs to the state.”
She added: “The security deal is not in the best interest of the country. So for the sake of the nation, Sogavare must cancel it. He and his government are abusing their powers in pursuing the security deal.”
Many, many others across the political spectrum and civil society have come out against the deal.
All this to say, as with 80 years ago, there is no lack of strong, brave Solomon Islanders willing to fight for their sovereignty.
AVOIDING PAST MISTAKES
So, why haven’t they been able to fight more effectively for their country? Why does the US have to send in the diplomatic version of the Marines?
For years, from a Western perspective, the “strategic” lead on Solomons was Australia. And in the past few weeks, Canberra has been going into overdrive trying to show it still is. It sent its “spy chiefs” on a very public mission to meet with Sogavare. It dispatched a government minister to meet with him even though it’s election season. And it’s announced funding that will run through Sogavare’s government.
Have you spotted the major flaw? It’s all based on doubling down on Sogavare. It entrenches his position domestically, and isolates and undermines those who are against the deal, including popularly elected leaders, women’s groups, church groups, and more.
It is a fundamental misreading of the dynamics. Sogavare is unpopular domestically, which is one reason why he is trying to postpone the 2023 elections. At the same time, China’s position in Solomons is now fully exposed.
Free and fair election could result in a new government that not only abrogates the security deal but switches back to Taiwan. That would be a serious loss of face for Xi Jinping, giving ammunition to his domestic enemies, and could lead to a politically weakened Sogavare being more exposed to prosecution.
Both Sogavare and Xi need the relationship to continue, and both would benefit from the perception of a breakdown of “social order” that triggers the security agreement and gives reason to postpone elections.
At the same time, it is not as if Sogavare has a warm spot for Australia. According to Wale: “Prime Minister Sogavare has long held grievances against Australia and longed for the day he would extract revenge. That day has arrived, and he has gladly thrust his sword into Australia’s back. China is only too happy to oblige Prime Minister Sogavare, there is a meeting of minds on this.”
Focusing on Sogavare is a mistake. Everyone I’ve quoted in here is a prominent Solomon Islander who has deep understanding of their country, knows the stakes involved and is ready to fight. None of the Australian delegations met with any of them.
And it seems as though they’ve been ignored for years.
Remember Premier Suidani, who went to Taiwan for medical care? On the way there, and back, he spent weeks in Australia in transit. No Australian official met with him—a popularly elected leader who put his life on the line to stand up to the CCP—to find out what was going on in the most populous province in Solomons.
Wale said he told the Australian High Commissioner in August that there was a Chinese security deal in the works.
Hon. Peter Kenilorea Jr., former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade said: “I keep repeating myself to certain high commissioners but I’m told ‘we don’t want to upset the apple cart,’ as it were. Also that they want to work with the government of the day. But the government of the day doesn’t have the people’s best interests at heart—they are serving another master.”
If Australians, or anyone, including the other Quad partners, had spoken with any of the people mentioned here, or the many other Solomon Islanders worried about the direction their country is taking, they would not only have found willing partners with shared values, but gained valuable insight into the situation on the ground. And improved their own security.
As Talifilu said: “Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the USA need to help the people of Solomon Islands, not the oligarchs. When we are secure, those countries are secure. If you accommodate a thief in your neighbourhood, expect to lose your security.”
US DELEGATION
It is a good sign that the US knows it needs to show up in person, and has announced it will be opening an Embassy in the country. Hopefully the US will, as they did 80 years ago, join forces with those in the country who share their vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, and who are willing to fight for it.
The situation is being watched closely, including in other Pacific Island Countries. If locals concerned about China aren’t listened to properly now, some may see incentive in following the path of the Solomons, not because they want more China, but because they want more US.
As Tongan strategic analyst Tevita Motulalo put it: “It’s too bad the only way to get cooperation is to stake a claim for the adversary. Should Tonga have allowed the redevelopment of the Chinese (naval) port? Looks like the only incentivized approach is to play dirty. This security-state policy frameworks is based on scaring the sh*t out of Washington to take action, out of fear, but not out of appreciation of their own legacies. That’s the message given here to everyone: MORE Chinese in order for any US attention!”
Hopefully, that message will change, with a new approach built not on the failures of the past, but on the successes—building on the ties created fighting for freedom and forged in blood 80 years ago.
Cleo Paskal is The Sunday Guardian Special Correspondent as well as Non-Resident Senior Fellow for the Indo-Pacific at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.
22. Analysis: Hamas-Led Militant Groups Create Strife at Al-Aqsa Mosque
Analysis: Hamas-Led Militant Groups Create Strife at Al-Aqsa Mosque | FDD's Long War Journal
Clashes erupted between Palestinians and Israeli police Friday morning at Al-Aqsa Mosque as the religious holidays of Ramadan and Passover were soon to overlap. It is the first major clash at the site since the May 2021 Gaza-Israel conflict.
Several weeks before Friday’s clashes, Gaza-based militant groups warned that Israel was planning to undermine the status quo by allowing Jewish activists to perform a prohibited ritual sacrifice on the grounds of Al-Aqsa Mosque for Passover.
Changes to the status quo at Al-Aqsa Mosque have regularly been a catalyst for Israeli-Palestinian violence and the possibility that it may occur during Ramadan was enough to rally Palestinians to defend the perceived threat.
Though some content was published on Facebook encouraging Jews to sacrifice a lamb or a goat on the grounds of the mosque, the Israeli police denied there were any plans to do so and blamed Palestinian militant organizations for provoking violence.
Despite Israeli police denying attempts to change the status quo, some Palestinians arrived at the mosque Friday morning armed with rocks and began to clash to with Israeli police.
After hours of fighting, which was reminiscent of last year’s clashes hours before rockets were launched by Hamas toward Jerusalem, police arrested 400 rioters and temporarily restored calm.
Having partially succeeded in creating a short-lived crisis on Friday, militant groups refrained from responding militarily after their self-imposed red lines were crossed by Israeli police activity on the grounds and inside Al-Aqsa Mosque.
It remains unclear if it was behind the scenes mediation, effective handling of the rioting or both that prevented the clashes from snowballing into a wider conflict.
However, a Western official who spoke to FDD’s Long War Journal cautioned there could be more violence in the coming days.
Hamas often exploits events in the West Bank and Israel. Added to the recent anti-terrorism operations by Israeli security forces that has claimed the lives of a number of militants, manufacturing a crisis at Al-Aqsa Mosque benefits Hamas by further destabilizing the already tense security situation left in the wake of four high-profile terrorist attacks inside of Israel.
Though Palestinian militant organizations seem to have been careful in not responding militarily from Gaza, it’s unlikely these conditions will remain if further violence continues.
Hamas official Zaher Jabarin echoed this assessment on Hezbollah-linked Al-Mayadeen on Sunday when he warned that if Israel continued to cross red lines at Al-Aqsa Mosque, the organization would respond militarily.
Zaher added the response would not necessarily come from Gaza or the West Bank, suggesting the Resistance Axis in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen or Iraq could also launch an assault.
Joe Truzman is a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.
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23. Beijing Is Used to Learning From Russian Failures
Excerpts:
From how to remain in power to how to advance on the international stage, militarily and economically, the CCP has been learning what not to do from the Russian or Soviet experience for decades. Chinese strategists are unquestionably evaluating whether the nature of warfare has changed or if they failed to consider some critical factors necessary for success. Chinese economists are certainly looking to identify missed vulnerabilities based on how the economic dimension of the war in Ukraine plays out—and will work to address them to prevent exploitation by the United States and others.
Not that it will all be easy for Beijing. But China is already better prepared than Russia, economically and militarily. The steps to support Ukraine and punish Russia are immediately less potent in a China contingency. And an unfortunate side effect of the tragedy in Ukraine is that China has a relatively low-cost opportunity to learn—it may become a more formidable challenger than it would’ve been otherwise. The United States and its allies should realize that their effectiveness with regard to Russia is highly unlikely to translate. In a Taiwan contingency, the United States must be able to immediately implement both a stronger package of actions aimed at China and also a second package aimed at minimizing the long-term cost of the first.
Beijing Is Used to Learning From Russian Failures
The invasion of Ukraine is offering useful lessons for the PLA.
By Oriana Skylar Mastro, a center fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. , and Derek Scissors, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Foreign Policy · by Oriana Skylar Mastro, Derek Scissors · April 18, 2022\
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been a double disaster for President Vladimir Putin, as he faces a poorly performing military combined with an inability to shield his country from economic punishment. Both of these possibilities historically have also been sources of apprehension for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). But China’s leadership turned its anxiety into action about 10 years ago, deliberately working to fix many of the problems and minimize the risks currently plaguing Russia in Ukraine.
One result is that the Chinese military is more likely to perform well even though it has not fought a war since 1979, when it lost thousands of troops in a punitive but brief invasion of Vietnam. Adding to that, China’s economy is both far larger and deliberately more diversified than Russia’s. A sanctions effort like the one presently aimed at Russia would be much harder to sustain against China. These two observations do not mean deterrence won’t hold, only that the unfolding events in Ukraine will likely do little to make Beijing more cautious.
Nearly everyone overestimated Russia’s military capabilities—including probably Putin himself. During its invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s air-ground coordination has been ineffective, and Russian forces have shown risk-adverse tendencies in the air. Russia has also struggled with logistics and keeping its military supplied. Notably, it appears that Russia acted on bad intelligence and therefore did not believe initial strikes that maxed out its firepower were necessary. Furthermore, many Russian weapons platforms are outdated (for example, its Cold War-era tanks), and modern Su-57 fighter jets and T-14 Armata tanks only exist in comparatively small numbers.
The Chinese military used to clearly exhibit the same deficiencies. But over the past decade, it has embraced significant reforms, creating a much more capable fighting force that should give even the United States pause.
First, while Russia allowed its conventional capabilities to atrophy, Chinese military spending has exploded over the past three decades, increasing by 740 percent (in comparison to Russia’s 69 percent) from 1992 to 2017. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China spent almost four times on its military in 2020 than Russia ($244.9 billion to $66.8 billion). In 1999, less than 2 percent of its fighter jets were fourth-generation, 4 percent of its attack submarines were modern, and none of its surface ships were. Twenty years later, not only did China have much more of everything, but the majority was the most advanced, modern versions available—with China exhibiting advantages over Russia, even in combat aircraft, a traditional area of weakness for China.
Indeed, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commentators often refer to China’s economic might as one of the reasons their military would outperform Russia’s—Russia has been “stingy” with its military modernization and production of precision-guided munitions primarily because of a lack of resources. By contrast, China has more than 2,200 conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles, making the PLA Rocket Force the world’s largest ground-based missile force. Estimates place the number of missiles positioned against Taiwan alone at around 1,000.
Russia’s poor performance does remind us that it takes more than just a lot of fancy systems to win a war (though having more advanced systems and more of them surely would have helped). The human element of Russia’s failures is front and center. Putin probably did not have an open and honest communication channel with the military, which was fearful of providing unfavorable information to the erratic leader. Russian troops were largely considered incompetent, but Putin thought superior technology could overcome human deficiencies.
Chinese President Xi Jinping identified similar training and competency issues in the PLA 10 years ago. But under his command, the PLA has been proactively implementing significant reforms to avoid similar pitfalls. And unlike Putin, who apparently believed technology could overcome deficiencies in personnel, Xi came to the opposite conclusion. When he came to power, he took one look at the military and recognized that with all its fancy equipment, the PLA probably could not fight and win wars and perform the missions it had been assigned. Of particular importance, according to China’s national military strategy, was to fight local wars under informationalized conditions. This meant that the network between platforms and people—the ease of connectivity—was the main feature of modern warfare. China needed the best equipment; an advanced command, control, computers, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network; and tons of precision-guided munitions. But perhaps most importantly, it needed troops that could leverage these systems to conduct seamless operations across services and top-down through the chain of command.
What followed was a series of slogans—the two incompatibles, two inabilities, two big gaps, the five incapables—all designed to point out the organizational and personnel issues of the military and focus leadership attention and resources on fixing the issue. A massive military reorganization followed with moves such as reorganizing effective combat units to be smaller so that they can mobilize more quickly and can remain self-sufficient for long periods of time. This means, in contrast with the Russian military, the PLA will likely have less reliance on generals at the front lines. China also established theater commands to facilitate joint operations and prioritized realism in its military exercises to help it prepare for real combat. Part of all of this was Xi’s demand that the military communicate its failures and weaknesses so that they could be addressed. Moreover, to improve command and control, China has moved toward engaging in multidomain joint operations all while standing up a new joint operations center that will ensure that, unlike with the Russian military, orders will be communicated and understood at the lowest levels. Indeed, the main reason that Xi has not yet made a play for Taiwan is likely his desire to hone this command and control structure and practice joint operations in realistic conditions for a few more years—a cautious and pragmatic approach that the situation in Ukraine only encourages further.
The PLA itself acknowledges that it still has some distance to go with training, particularly with regards to joint operations, but it looks as if the hard work is paying off. The complexity and scale of China’s national military exercises are eye-opening. It takes a great deal of planning, synchronization, and coordination to take service-level operations to the joint level. China appears to have made great strides in this area. The United States has observed, for example, China executing deep-attack air operations in its exercises that have combined intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) with multi-domain strike; lift for rapid mobility and advanced fighter manuevers. Russia has relied heavily on artillery and tanks, now and historically, while the PLA is showing a more balanced approach to combined arms operations.
For all these reasons, we should not expect the Chinese military to perform as poorly in its first real military operation since 1979. The PLA is structurally superior to the Russian military. And the Chinese know it. Granted, it’s hard to know whether some of the outlandish claims in the Chinese media are true—that the PLA Air Force would actually “be able to take out the Ukrainian air force in one hour.” But one thing is for certain—the Chinese military is learning lessons from Ukraine, whether it is to stockpile more precision-guided munitions, ensure solid command and control, or cut off internet access to prevent the leaking of information to the West, which will only serve to improve its warfighting capability in the future.
That does not mean it’s perfect. China is still in the process of building its corps of noncommissioned officers, recruiting more college graduates and technical experts so as to be less reliant on conscripts and shift away from an officer-heavy structure. Also, there is always the possibility that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, which has impacted even the highest levels of the military, may begin to impinge on these reforms. But to date, it seems that those against necessary reforms have been largely targeted. In other words, Xi has not had to choose yet between his goals of consolidating domestic power and the professionalization of the armed forces.
The economic side is less about what has happened in the past six weeks than what will happen in the next six months or even six years. As tempting as it is in the case of Russia’s invasion, the impact of economic sanctions cannot be properly evaluated over a short time period. The need for a longer time horizon also applies to Russia-China economic comparisons, as it will generally require more extensive and more durable sanctions to deter or compel China than it would Russia.
Russia is thought, at least, to be highly vulnerable to sanctions applied to date. And it is certainly the case that China can be harmed by sanctions. Beijing is more integrated in global trade and finance than Moscow and thus has more to lose. But integration cuts both ways—compared with Russia, more countries would be harmed to a greater extent by equivalent actions taken against China. Further, China has demonstrated greater capacity to weather extended economic blows. This combination of features reduces the willingness of the United States and others to enforce durable sanctions, a fact that Beijing well appreciates.
The CCP survived three decades of worse poverty than experienced by the Soviet Union at the time, a self-inflicted depression in 1989-90 paralleling in some respects the events that ended the Soviet Union, the global financial crisis, and another partly self-inflicted economic wound via China’s determination to maintain its zero-COVID policy in 2021-22.
During more recent events, Beijing has been able to mobilize first greater capital resources than Moscow and then far greater. In 2020, the World Bank put China’s gross fixed capital formation at 20 times Russia’s. Xi attacked some of China’s richest citizens, as well as other elements of the private sector, in part because he believed them too intertwined with foreign capital. These were voluntary steps by China that mirror how the world currently seeks to punish Russia. Whatever their wisdom, Xi knows China can afford them, while Russia’s capability is in doubt.
Some Russian foreign reserves have been effectively frozen and some financials excluded from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), limiting international transactions. In the short term, these steps could have a similar impact on China, but they would be much harder to sustain.
Beijing has conducted currency swaps with dozens of countries that will want their renminbi to be useful. China also holds foreign government bonds in amounts that countries cannot ignore. U.S. Treasurys see the largest holdings, but there are also sizable quantities of Japanese government bonds, for instance. With official Chinese reserves upwards of $3 trillion, perhaps five times Russia’s, a partial freeze would quickly wear on governments and firms looking for bond buyers.
For any SWIFT restrictions that interfere with outbound U.S. portfolio investment, that volume stood at $85 billion in Russia and $1.15 trillion in China in 2020. The stock of U.S. direct investment was 10 times higher in China than Russia—companies willing to exit Russia would face leaving a lot more behind in a China contingency. Most broadly, the yuan can erode the role of the dollar; the ruble certainly cannot. Beijing lacks the will to allow free movement of the yuan and make it a true reserve currency, but heavy, durable sanctions might change that.
On the goods side, existing pressure to spare Russian vital exports would be more intense in China’s case. The loss of Russian oil and gas exports of $230 billion in 2021 threatens energy markets. Chinese exports are at least as important within chemicals, textiles, household appliances, industrial machinery, and consumer electronics. Would they all be exempted?
Certain Russian exports, such as palladium, play supply chain roles beyond their direct financial value. As expected from its manufacturing and export volumes, China’s supply chain participation is far larger than Russia’s, extending from inputs crucial to global pharmaceuticals to processed rare earths crucial to clean-energy applications. Russian ships have been banned from some ports. By tonnage, Russia accounts for a bit over 1 percent of the world’s commercial fleet, while China accounts for more than 11 percent. Banning Chinese ships would cause seaborne trade to noticeably contract, hitting supply chains that would already be strained by the diversion of Chinese goods.
Even an area of clear Russian advantage—lower import dependence—is double-edged. Inhibiting Chinese imports of iron ore or integrated circuits, for example, would hit the country hard. But China is such a huge purchaser that many producers would refuse to join a sustained embargo against it. As elsewhere, the barriers to Russian imports adopted thus far could hurt China only in the unlikely event that they are maintained for many months.
From how to remain in power to how to advance on the international stage, militarily and economically, the CCP has been learning what not to do from the Russian or Soviet experience for decades. Chinese strategists are unquestionably evaluating whether the nature of warfare has changed or if they failed to consider some critical factors necessary for success. Chinese economists are certainly looking to identify missed vulnerabilities based on how the economic dimension of the war in Ukraine plays out—and will work to address them to prevent exploitation by the United States and others.
Not that it will all be easy for Beijing. But China is already better prepared than Russia, economically and militarily. The steps to support Ukraine and punish Russia are immediately less potent in a China contingency. And an unfortunate side effect of the tragedy in Ukraine is that China has a relatively low-cost opportunity to learn—it may become a more formidable challenger than it would’ve been otherwise. The United States and its allies should realize that their effectiveness with regard to Russia is highly unlikely to translate. In a Taiwan contingency, the United States must be able to immediately implement both a stronger package of actions aimed at China and also a second package aimed at minimizing the long-term cost of the first.
Foreign Policy · by Oriana Skylar Mastro, Derek Scissors · April 18, 2022
24. Pentagon, industry wrestle with how to boost weapons production for Ukraine
The US superpower used to be military equipment and weapons production. We could outproduce any adversary. Do we still have it?
Pentagon, industry wrestle with how to boost weapons production for Ukraine
WASHINGTON — As Pentagon officials gauge the defense industry’s ability to ramp up arms production in response to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, firms are still grappling with pandemic-related supply chain and workforce woes.
Top defense executives are likely to face questions starting this week during quarterly earnings calls about how they’ll be able to overcome those issues. Experts say the answers are unclear.
According to Bill Greenwalt, who served as deputy undersecretary of defense for industrial policy during the George W. Bush administration, it has historically taken the U.S. defense industrial base 18 months to 3 years to get ready for conflicts.
“Our budget, appropriations, requirements, and acquisition systems are stuck in a peacetime mode where time doesn’t matter, and it will be difficult to pivot out of those processes quickly,” Greenwalt, now with the American Enterprise Institute, said in an email.
“The U.S. will face start-up production line issues, labor issues, supply chain issues, parts and machine tool obsolescence issues, time constraints certifying new suppliers and technical approaches, plus time waiting for budgets and contracts to be issued,” he added.
Last week, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks convened a meeting with representatives of eight major defense firms to discuss industry proposals to accelerate production of existing systems. The meeting was focused on satisfying the needs of the U.S., Ukraine and other allies, according to an official readout.
Andrew Hunter, who was performing the duties of undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, led a roundtable during the meeting to discuss ways of boosting production capacity for “weapons and equipment that can be exported rapidly, deployed with minimal training, and prove effective in the battlefield,” the readout said.
Boeing, L3 Harris Technologies, Raytheon Technologies, BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin, HII, General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman all attended, according to DoD.
The gathering marked the second time in three months DoD leaders have convened a group of industry executives at the Pentagon. Hicks, with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, in early February met with hypersonics industry executives, who urged investment in testing infrastructure.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began Feb. 24, the U.S. has provided $2.6 billion in security assistance to Ukrainian forces, most from U.S. military stockpiles. An $800 million package announced last week was the seventh such drawdown package.
DoD says that as of April 14, it’s provided more than 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems; 5,500 Javelin anti-armor systems; 700 Switchblade tactical unmanned aerial systems; 7,000 small arms; 50 million rounds of ammunition; and 18 155mm Howitzers with 40,000 155mm artillery rounds; 16 Mi-17 helicopters; hundreds of armored Humvees and 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers.
Last month, Congress finalized the fiscal year 2022 $1.5 trillion spending bill, which provides $13.6 billion in new aid for the Ukraine crisis. The money was in large part to restore military stocks of equipment already transferred to Ukrainian military units through the president’s drawdown authority.
Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby assured reporters last week none of the military’s stocks for the systems are so low that the military’s readiness would be imminently affected. He described the discussion with CEOs as a precaution.
“As these packages go on, and as the need continues inside Ukraine, we want to … be ahead of the bow wave on that and not get into a point where it becomes a readiness issue,” he said.
One analysis by Mark Cancian, a Center for Strategic and International Studies senior adviser, estimated that, based on DoD’s own reporting, the U.S. military has probably given about one-third of its Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine and has between 20,000 to 25,000 left.
To ramp up from the U.S. military’s current buy of 1,000 per year to maximum capacity of about 6,480 Javelins a year would take a year, Cancian found. Replenishing U.S. stocks would require 32 months, unless the president invokes the Defense Production Act to prioritize deliveries of components to the manufacturer, a joint Lockheed-Raytheon venture.
“To get from 1,000 to 6,000 more quickly, you need some help,” Cancian said.
Cancian noted that not only is DoD concerned with its own supplies and equipping Ukraine but backfilling allies who are sending Ukraine tanks and missile defense systems, placing further demands on the U.S. defense industrial base.
Long-term planning
Meanwhile, as industry weighs investments in its production lines, the Pentagon has yet to release detailed and long-term spending plans for FY23. Industry should be wary of the government’s ability to finalize those plans in a timely way, according to Greenwalt.
“The department sometimes has a history of leaving industry holding the bag when the money doesn’t show up from the appropriators,” he said. “When it comes to DoD’s relationship with industry, no good deed ever goes unpunished.”
In a note to investors Monday, Capital Alpha Partners Managing Director Byron Callan cautioned against factoring demand from the Ukraine fight into predictions for the defense outlook.
“It’s going to take months to see how the changed security environment in Europe will translate to changes in defense demand in 2023-25,” Callan said. “For analysts, it’s best, for now, to build scenarios as there could still be downside risk (Russian defeat, Putin falls).”
Even if it makes financial sense for industry to ramp up production, there’s a question of how. The National Defense Industrial Association’s “Vital Signs” survey of defense firms recently gave a failing grade to the defense industrial base and its ability to surge production capacity, as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic continues to roil the sector.
The diversity, productivity and compensation of the industry’s workforce was the No. 1 concern in the survey, with the availability of materials right behind it. Asked what issues could have been raised in the recent meeting between industry and Pentagon leaders, NDIA representatives said those concerns, among others, have not gone away.
“We asked, ‘Where is your supply chain most vulnerable?’ and the No. 1 answer was ‘gap in U.S.-based human capital,’ and ‘constrained supply chain’ was the No. 2 response,” said Nick Jones, NDIA’s director of strategy.
Among the top 100 publicly traded defense contractors, the cash conversion cycle — how long it took for firms to buy parts and turn them into a system and sell it — rose from 56 days in 2019 to 128 days in 2020.
“If it takes you 128 days from start to finish, that really hampers your ability to surge,” said NDIA Regulatory Associate Robbie Van Steenburg.
Callan, in his note, also said workforce issues could hinder the defense sector’s ability to meet higher demand. Whether defense firms can find the workers needed to build more weapons, if required, remains an open question.
“It’s been tough to hire people, particularly in engineering and skilled trades, and extremely challenging to hire people with clearances,” Callan said. “These sorts of issues are not new for the sector, but they raise a fundamental issue — can capital investments and workforce expansion earn acceptable returns, or is there a view that surging demand in 2022-23 could ebb away in 2024-26?”
Joe Gould is senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry.
25. How Ukraine War Is Changing The World Order – OpEd
Excerpts:
Of course, Russia hopes that the United States and Europe accept the fact that in the long run, they cannot isolate Russia to the extent that its very existence is endangered and completely exclude Moscow from the world political and financial system. Also, Europe must take the threat of nuclear attacks seriously as the first victims of any nuclear conflict are European countries.
In any case, in the Ukraine war, Russia has been portrayed as a dangerous monster, and the Europeans, who have been suffering from a lack of unity and dissensus in the face of a potential Russian threat for years, now have lined up against Moscow and increased its defense budget to be ready for a more serious confrontation with Russia. Under such circumstances, the United States could engage Russia as a close friend of China with Europe and address its own concern in recent years which is a practical confrontation with China.
How Ukraine War Is Changing The World Order – OpEd
The change in history has been triggered by the Ukraine war, in the heart of Europe and it has given rise to a new order that is going to affect the international arena for decades. In other words, with Washington and Moscow, as the world’s greatest military powers, going head-to-head against one another, new world order is inevitably upon us which will drastically change the nature of international relations.
This trend has existed since before the First and Second World Wars and has created various types of international order in the forms of Pax Persica, Pax Romana, the European Concert, and the Bipolar Order after the Second World War and the subsequent Cold War. Now, nearly a century after the establishment of the order that followed the First and Second World Wars, it seems that the United States and Europe, in opposition to Russia in Ukraine, are seeking to lay the foundation for new world order.
Russia sought to take the initiative in international relations through a pre-emptive war under the pretext of Ukraine joining NATO and achieving its global interests by breaking the barrier of sanctions. Now that the war is in its second month and the Kremlin has seemingly failed to achieve the expected victories, the conflict is reeling in the United States and Europe in the political, economic, and security dimensions.
What is clear so far is that the Ukraine crisis cannot be compared to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the subsequent agreements that opened a new chapter in US-Soviet relations. In 1962, an agreement was reached between the two superpowers which divided the world into East and West camps now something else is happening as the United States and its allies are putting more and more direct pressure on Russia.
Politically, the United States is facing the fact that the Russians and Chinses have fundamentally changed since the Cold War. Russia has dominated Europe for years through unprecedented energy leverage, and China has become a huge economic superpower holding the pulse of the global economy. The Biden administration is trying to make the best of Ukraine’s war by bringing Moscow under pressure and furthering its international isolation. The United States is even planning for the aftermath of the fall of Kyiv and the possible transfer of the Ukrainian capital to the western city of Lviv near the Polish border, and with the full support of Ukrainian defenders, seeks to increase Russia’s military and economic spending to bring Putin to its knees.
Miscalculations in the planning and executing stages have thwarted the Russian military from fully invading Ukraine. The United States is seeking this golden opportunity to separate Moscow and Beijing via the pressure of war and economic sanctions. Biden’s strong support of Ukraine is communicating this message with China that, as in the Cold War, new blocs and spheres of influence can be defined.
In the Ukraine crisis, the United States is seeking to divide the world into two blocs. One bloc is Western Europe and NATO which is under full control of the US and is supposed to reduce its dependence on Russian energy supplies and turn to US-controlled energy companies.
As the situation in Ukraine worsens and Moscow threatens to use nuclear weapons, Europe perceives the Russian threat as intended by the United States and stands by the United States in such a way that today NATO’s brain death, in Macron’s terms, has turned into an epiphany for Europe. The United States needed to portray the Russian threat objectively to Western European countries. Now, as the United States sees it, Russia is a long-term strategic threat that requires a planned confrontation.
The other bloc includes countries with energy resources. Until just a few weeks ago, few could have imagined that the United States and Venezuela as well as Europe and Qatar enter into serious negotiations on the purchase of oil and gas. Thus, the United States’ determination to sanction Russia’s oil sales and cut off its access to all sales revenues is indicative of the Biden administration and Congress’s collaboration in devising a comprehensive and multifaceted plan to counter Russia.
The unwavering support of European countries for Ukraine through sending anti-tank weapons and rocket launchers is another sign that, unlike the last two decades, Europe has increasingly more tendency for a US-led Western world. As a result, the more Russia advances in Ukraine, the deeper it will be stuck in the quagmire of this war. In other words, Europe and the United States have formed an alliance that is unprecedented after the Second World War at the international level, prefer the war in Ukraine to continue as long as possible so that they can build an international consensus and impose extensive sanctions against Russia. Sanctions imposed against Russian oil can also be a major threat to China.
At Russia’s domestic level, payment companies like Visa, Mastercard, and Apple Pay have also suspended all operations in Russia in a bid to instigate social discontent and create serious challenges to Putin’s government. In fact, there is nothing worse than social discontent for a country at war with a foreign adversary. This problem can spread rapidly across Russia, weaken the military’s morale, and lead to serious internal unrest that could pose a serious threat.
Of course, Russia hopes that the United States and Europe accept the fact that in the long run, they cannot isolate Russia to the extent that its very existence is endangered and completely exclude Moscow from the world political and financial system. Also, Europe must take the threat of nuclear attacks seriously as the first victims of any nuclear conflict are European countries.
In any case, in the Ukraine war, Russia has been portrayed as a dangerous monster, and the Europeans, who have been suffering from a lack of unity and dissensus in the face of a potential Russian threat for years, now have lined up against Moscow and increased its defense budget to be ready for a more serious confrontation with Russia. Under such circumstances, the United States could engage Russia as a close friend of China with Europe and address its own concern in recent years which is a practical confrontation with China.
*Greg Pence is an international studies graduate of University of San Francisco.
26. Russia’s favorite war propagandist is a Navy veteran from Missouri
I thought Tucker Carlson was Putin's favorite.
Russia’s favorite war propagandist is a Navy veteran from Missouri
Putin’s invasion has catapulted Patrick Lancaster, who calls himself an independent journalist, into the limelight.
It was late March, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was going poorly. The Kremlin had done its best to black out Western coverage of the war domestically, as well as its reports of failed Russian advances and widespread brutality.
On the Kremlin’s flagship media channel, Russia-1, came a very different, ghoulish story: from Russian-occupied Ukraine, an “exclusive” report alleging Ukrainian militants brutally raped and murdered a Ukrainian woman and disfigured her corpse.
In the footage, a correspondent follows a pro-Russian separatist soldier into a school basement in Mariupol to view the corpse of a dead woman. The body’s hands appear bound, and a plastic bag is over its head. The body is partially covered by what’s described as a Ukrainian military uniform; a swastika appears either burned or carved into the corpse’s exposed skin.
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The video contained no evidence to identify the culprit of the heinous crimes, and Ukrainian officials have said they were committed by Russian forces, noting evidence of similar atrocities had surfaced in other Russian-held areas. For Russia-1′s story, that was irrelevant: To them, this was a Ukrainian atrocity and underscored Putin’s claimed mission to “denazify” Ukraine.
A thumbnail from Lancaster's YouTube channel. In the video, posted on March 27, he is led to a disfigured body and alleges Ukrainian troops tortured and murdered the woman in a basement in Mariupol, Ukraine. (YouTube, PLNewsToday)
The reporter on the scene wasn’t Russian but was Missouri-born Patrick Lancaster, 39, a U.S. Navy intelligence veteran and self-styled “independent, crowd-funded journalist.” Over the years, he’s shown a knack for being first on the scene to capture what appeared to be staged evidence benefiting Kremlin narratives. He has also courted an audience of American conspiracy theory enthusiasts by appearing on Alex Jones’ radio show, which promotes falsehoods like Joe Biden stealing the 2020 presidential election.
Lancaster’s work has become a regular feature of Russian state media. His footage and commentary have appeared on Russia Today, a state-run English-language channel; Russia-1 and Russia-24, two of the flagship state-owned Russian language channels; and Zvezda, a channel owned by the Russian Ministry of Defense.
A screenshot from Patrick Lancaster's profile on Russian social media website VKontakte shows him appearing as a guest on Russia-24, a state-owned Russian language news channel. The image was uploaded on Feb. 14. (VKontakte)
In Ukraine, he enjoys access to Russian-controlled territories, where he is often the only English-speaking reporter. In his videos, he sometimes appears to accompany Russian military. In one recent video posted to his Telegram channel, he dons a white strap around his arm and leg, a form of identification used by Russian soldiers to recognize one another. He tells the camera if he didn’t do this, he has been informed he could be mistaken for a Ukrainian soldier and shot. On Telegram, pro-Russian trolls encourage users to support Lancaster’s work.
Just prior to Russia’s invasion, Lancaster was one of the first to report on an alleged “terrorist attack” on three civilians, purportedly carried out by Ukraine. In his coverage, he uncritically repeats what he appears to have been told by Russian military: Ukrainian saboteurs had detonated an improvised explosive device from the side of the road.
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In this case, the scene appears to have been so lazily constructed that Lancaster’s own footage captures apparent evidence of the lie: his images of the remains inside the vehicle revealed an impossibly clean cut along the front of one “victim’s” skull, consistent with an autopsy. Grid confirmed with experts at the time that this was the case, and subsequent reporting further established the truth: This was not evidence of an IED attack, and the bodies appeared to have been sourced from a morgue.
As far back as 2014, Lancaster was shooting and posting videos from the region, including a dubious piece meant to challenge the veracity of the investigation into a civilian airliner shot down by a Russian anti-aircraft missile.
Lancaster is one node in an elaborate network of propagandists Putin and his allies have exploited for years to maintain Putin’s support with the Russian public and beyond. Since the invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has used a heavy-handed media campaign to paint Ukraine as a nation overrun by Nazis and in need of liberation by Russian forces. The strategy has boosted Putin’s approval ratings even as the economy craters, news stations are forced off the air and the military suffers enormous losses.
From the heartland
Lancaster grew up in St. Louis, where he attended a private Catholic high school. Just after graduation in 2002, he joined the Navy. After attending the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center in Dam Neck, Virginia, he served on the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk on deployments to the Persian Gulf, Australia and South Korea. He worked as a cryptologic technician and likely held a top-secret clearance, according to Navy documents.
An undated photo from Patrick Lancaster's time in the Navy, where he served on the USS Kitty Hawk, is shown on his page on Russian social media website VKontakte. (VKontatkte)
The branch confirmed Lancaster’s service, and declined to make further comment. Grid asked to speak with Lancaster for this story. He agreed, and then stopped replying to messages. Grid also reached out to Lancaster’s friends and family, most of whom declined to speak about him or did not respond.
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After his discharge from the Navy in 2006, Lancaster tried his hand at real estate for a few years, according to his LinkedIn profile. It was a uniquely poor time to enter the U.S. real estate market; the sector collapsed in 2008 and triggered a global financial crisis. After that foray, Lancaster worked briefly for a South Dakota construction firm, the company’s owner confirmed. Then Lancaster went to Europe and settled in Berlin, where he became involved in videography.
He first traveled to Ukraine in 2014, where he observed the Crimean referendum vote. In interviews with Russian media, he has said what he saw on the ground did not match what was portrayed in Western media, and it inspired him to begin documenting the scene. In his early videos, Lancaster seems more interested in opposing views, interviewing several people who thought the region should remain part of Ukraine. During this time, Patrick contributed videos of the conflict between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists to RT, formerly known as Russia Today, a Russian state-controlled media company.
Lancaster’s LinkedIn profile says he worked in a freelance capacity for Sky News and Thomson Reuters. A Reuters spokesperson told Grid that “Patrick John Lancaster was not a Reuters employee, freelancer or stringer at any time. Reuters purchased a small number of video clips from Lancaster in Ukraine over a brief period in the mid-2010s. These clips were not commissioned by Reuters.” Sky News did not respond to a request for comment.
“I remember Patrick being compromised from the beginning”
David Ferris, an American filmmaker and writer, met Lancaster when the two were part of a group of freelancers based at the Red Cat Hostel in Donetsk, Ukraine, in 2014. The unaffiliated, young, broke journalists bonded over being a step removed from the better-resourced journalists affiliated with legacy news publications staying in a real hotel on the other side of the city, he said.
Although that group didn’t work together, they often traveled to sites together for ease and safety, Ferris said. Others in the group included Antoine Delaunay, a French photojournalist, and Christopher Allen, an American journalist. Allen was killed in South Sudan in 2017. Reached by phone Wednesday, Delaunay confirmed he was part of the friend group and did not dispute any portion Ferris’ account.
“I remember [Patrick] sort of being compromised from the beginning,” Ferris said. “He would regularly sell to Russia Today.”
Despite ideological and professional differences, the group was close, Ferris said, bound by their empathy for civilians in wartime and the shared experience of personal risk. “All of us did sympathize with the plight of the people who were living under this war and who had their lives upended, and who were, honestly, on the receiving end of Ukrainian bullets and shells,” he explained.
That camaraderie came to an end after Allen, Ferris and Lancaster were detained at the unofficial border between the pro-Russian, separatist-controlled region of Ukraine, known as the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), and Ukraine, according to Ferris. With no translators, fixers or security — or real press credentials to speak of — the Ukrainian intelligence agency pulled the reporters off the public bus they were traveling in and held them overnight in an old Soviet hotel.
The U.S. embassy got them out the next day, Ferris said. But when Lancaster agreed to be interviewed by a “conspiratorial,” “anti-imperialist” podcaster, Allen grew angry, Ferris recalled, and the dispute culminated in a fist fight in the hostel’s kitchen.
“Chris had objected to Patrick’s coverage because it did not adhere to journalistic norms,” Ferris said. After the fight, “that was pretty much the end of that harmonious relationship.”
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Grid could not independently confirm the group’s detention by Ukrainian officials or the U.S. embassy’s intervention.
Shortly thereafter, Lancaster has said he moved to the DPR. In 2017, he married a Donetsk woman from the area. They have two children.
Lancaster’s wedding was covered by multiple Russian news organizations including Zvezda, which is owned and controlled by Russia’s Ministry of Defense. His wedding was attended by infamous Serbian mercenary sniper Dejan Beric, who claims to have killed many Ukrainians while fighting for the Russians.
“He poses as a journalist”
That year also saw an early example of Lancaster’s participation in a dubious, macabre story that advocated for the Russians. That July, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was shot down over Ukraine, killing 298 people. A subsequent investigation concluded the plane was downed by a Russian missile, fired by pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine who likely mistook the civilian craft for a military target.
Russia denied responsibility for the disaster and repeatedly tried to cast doubt on the Dutch-led investigation. Lancaster took an active role in this effort, producing videos raising doubts about the investigators’ efforts.
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In one video, Lancaster stumbles upon fragments of human bones at the crash site, months after it was meticulously scoured, documented and cleared by the investigative team.
His video angered families of the deceased and frustrated the Dutch investigative team. “Take that American, Patrick Lancaster,” Michael Pistecky, who led the effort to retrieve the bodies, said in 2019. “He poses as a journalist and works with the … I wouldn’t call them separatists, not rebels, but rather bandits, because we now know that they were involved in the downing of MH17.
“Well, Lancaster claims to have found bone remains at the crash site in 2017 and then says that the forensic experts from the Netherlands did a bad job. In this way, the feelings of the next of kin are played into in an annoying way. As if we didn’t go to great lengths to retrieve the bodies.”
Lancaster’s internet empire
Lancaster has built a global audience for himself since then, in part by skillfully leveraging the many social media platforms available to broadcast content worldwide. He has about 500,000 followers across Twitter, YouTube, Telegram and VK, the Russian Facebook clone. He releases new videos almost daily. YouTube, his most trafficked outlet, reports over 30 million views for his videos.
Lancaster’s reach has been further boosted by American uber-conspiracy-theorist Jones, who has made Lancaster a recurring guest on his show, “Infowars.” Jones has been a major proponent of the “Stop the Steal” movement to overturn Donald Trump’s 2020 election loss, and his shows often describe real news events as fantastical “false flag” intelligence operations meant to mislead and confuse the American public. Jones did not respond to a request for comment. In an unrelated lawsuit, Jones’ lawyers have argued that no reasonable person would believe his over-the-top rhetoric.
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In one “Infowars” segment with Lancaster, titled “American Reporter in Ukraine Exposing the Globalist WW3 Russian False Flag Op in Real Time,” Jones heaps praise on the expatriate Missourian, in between advertisements selling buckets of shelf-stable food and dietary supplements. “He shows what the Western media will not show you,” Jones said on one episode. To Lancaster, he said, “You’ve done so much amazing work I feel like I know you.”
On a recent “Infowars” appearance, Lancaster implored Jones’ audience to “do your own research.” On screen, Jones promotes Lancaster’s Patreon, a fundraising platform popular with podcasters.
“Think for yourself,” Lancaster says, “Don’t listen to the narrative the Western mainstream media gives you. Research and find out the facts.”
Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
