Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:


"The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here." 
-- Abraham Lincoln

“There is general agreement that the greatest potential armed threats to US interests overseas lie in low- intensity conflicts, which include (some say feature) foreign internal defense. Debates about alleged “lessons of Vietnam,” however, create extensive inconsistencies between U.S. FID objectives, policies, practices, and forced postures. Political-military planners, who are uncertain how to proceed, see no sign that their doubts will soon disappear. Basic U.S. FID concepts still subscribe to the Nixon doctrine, which redefined relationships between helpers and the helped in 1969. “Experience has shown,” it stated, “that the best means of dealing with insurgencies is to preempt them through economic development and social reform and to control them with police, paramilitary and military action by the threatened government… [A] direct combat role for U.S. general purpose forces arises primarily when insurgency has shaded into external aggression... In such cases, we shall consider the efforts of our allies in determining our response.” Subsequent refinements, coupled with the so-called post-Vietnam syndrome, strengthened that prescription for self-help and a low U.S. profile.”
-John M. Collins, United States and Soviet Special Operations, 53-54 (1987)

"You must all be aware that modern war is not a mere matter of military operations. It involves the whole strength and all the resources of the nation. Not only soldiers, but also all citizens without exception, take part."
- Chiang Kai-shek




1. World Cup Shows Need to Crack Down on Kim’s Labor Exploitation

2. South Korea to Sell Arms to U.S. for Ukrainian Forces Fighting Russia

3. The threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons — Markus Garlauskas on "Intelligence Matters"

4. The Immensity of Seoul’s Sadness

5. Are We Too Complacent About N.Korean Threats?

6. Yoon unveils S. Korea's strategy for free, peaceful, prosperous Indo-Pacific

7. U.S. supports helping N. Korean people, but Pyongyang ultimately responsible: State Dept.

8. U.S. concern over possible N. Korean nuclear test remains real: Sullivan

9. Outrage in N. Korea upon learning about government’s missile budget

10. N. Korean foreign ministry creates materials to justify nuclear-armed status to allies

11. Yoon is expected to reap fruitful diplomatic results in G20

12. Intelligence officer under investigation in relation to Itaewon crowd crush found dead

13.  Korea negotiates exporting ammunition to the United States

14. Yoon's media policy feared to tarnish Korea's image

15.  Establishing North Korean human rights foundation for both Koreas

16. Unpacking South Korea’s Recovery of a North Korean Missile at Sea





1. World Cup Shows Need to Crack Down on Kim’s Labor Exploitation

From my two colleagues at FDD and HRNK.


We need a ROK/US alliance human rights upfront approach.


Excerpts:

In its new national security strategy, the Biden administration placed special emphasis on human rights. Yet it has thus far failed to meaningfully address the Kim regime’s oppression and exploitation of its own people at home and abroad. For over three decades, nuclear and other negotiations with North Korea have sidelined human rights, with no tangible results. As long as the United States fails to act, abuses against North Koreans will grow as surely as Kim’s military stockpile.
Hopefully, the Biden administration will find a willing partner to address these issues in Yoon Suk-yeol, South Korea’s new president. Compared with previous administrations, Yoon has shown he is serious about North Korean human rights. In August, his administration urged China to stop returning defectors—those who, unlike the laborers, flee the country without state approval—to North Korea, where they face torture, abuse, and in some cases death. Yoon is also investigating his predecessor’s record, including the forced repatriation of two North Korean fishermen in 2019.




World Cup Shows Need to Crack Down on Kim’s Labor Exploitation

Foreign Policy · by Anthony Ruggiero, Greg Scarlatoiu · November 10, 2022

Argument

An expert's point of view on a current event.

Shipping workers abroad helps the North Korean leader evade sanctions and finance his nuclear weapons.

By Anthony Ruggiero, the senior director of the nonproliferation and biodefense program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and Greg Scarlatoiu, the executive director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.

Visitors take photos of the 2022 FIFA World Cup countdown clock in Doha, Qatar, on Oct. 30.

Visitors take photos of the 2022 FIFA World Cup countdown clock in Doha, Qatar, on Oct. 30. GABRIEL BOUYS/AFP via Getty Images


When tourists flood Qatar for the FIFA World Cup later this month, they will find themselves—likely without knowing it—in facilities that North Korean laborers helped build. The glitzy new hotels and ultramodern stadiums constructed for soccer’s biggest event hide an ugly reality: the deplorable living and working conditions of the people who built them—and the governments that were eager to exploit their labor for profit. For the North Korean regime, these overseas workers were a useful way to evade international sanctions and earn hard currency, in part to finance its burgeoning nuclear and missile programs. For the Qataris, it was a cheap source of docile labor.

If the Biden administration is serious about holding human rights violators accountable and curbing North Korea’s military threat, it needs to put an end to this practice—and get creative about closing the loopholes in North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un’s sanctions evasion playbook.

It’s been widely reported that Qatar secured the hosting rights to the world’s preeminent sporting event through bribes and other forms of corruption. Since winning the bid, preparations for the World Cup have shined an even less flattering light on Qatar, especially for its kafala system, which long gave employers near-total control over the employment and immigration status of vulnerable migrant workers. Although some aspects of the system were recently reformed following considerable international pressure, it continues to create conditions for rampant abuse and exploitation.

North Korea was one of the countries eager to cash in on Qatar’s noncompliance with international labor standards. In 2014, the Guardian reported that North Korean laborers worked at four construction sites in Qatar’s Lusail City, where the 2022 World Cup final will be held. In January 2016, according to reports the Qatari government filed with the U.N. Security Council, there were around 2,500 North Korean laborers in the country. By March 2019, that number had been reduced to 70. For North Korea, renting out its workers to other countries allows the Kim regime to fund its prohibited nuclear and missile programs, as well as pay for imported luxury goods to keep core elites happy. To accomplish this, Pyongyang mandates that overseas workers’ salaries be deposited into government-controlled accounts, of which workers receive only a small fraction. According to a May report by the Biden administration, the “North Korean government withholds up to 90 percent of wages of overseas workers which generates an annual revenue to the government of hundreds of millions of dollars.”

One North Korean worker told the Guardian that they were in Qatar “to earn foreign currency for our nation.” At the time of the newspaper report, Doha admitted there were 2,800 North Korean workers in the country but said it had “no recorded complaints about their payment or treatment.”

In the run-up to the World Cup, Qatar has come under increased scrutiny for its broader labor conditions, under which migrant workers “face conditions indicative of labor trafficking, to include restricted movement, delayed salaries or payment withholding, denial of employment-associated benefits, passport confiscation, and threats of deportation,” according to a U.S. State Department report in July. In what appears to be an attempt to minimize the government’s responsibility and avoid addressing migrant labor issues systematically, Qatar has blamed the exploitation of workers on three Qatari companies. The State Department has credited Doha for undertaking labor reforms in recent years, writing that Qatar “does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so.”

The exploitation of North Korean laborers is longstanding and widespread, stretching far beyond the World Cup. In 2017, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that outlawed the employment of cheap North Korean labor, requiring all U.N. member states to repatriate the workers and their oversight personnel. Qatar has largely complied with this mandate. According to the sanctions implementation reports it filed with the U.N. Security Council, all North Korean laborers were gone from Qatar by January 2021. Unfortunately, the U.N. resolution’s success has been limited in other contexts, in no small part because China and Russia have ignored its mandates—despite having initially supported the measure. In July, the U.S. State Department estimated that between 20,000 and 100,000 North Korean laborers were still dispatched to China on official orders. Given Russia’s and China’s own reprehensible human rights records, it should not be surprising that both are willing to perpetuate Kim’s abuse of overseas workers.

In its new national security strategy, the Biden administration placed special emphasis on human rights. Yet it has thus far failed to meaningfully address the Kim regime’s oppression and exploitation of its own people at home and abroad. For over three decades, nuclear and other negotiations with North Korea have sidelined human rights, with no tangible results. As long as the United States fails to act, abuses against North Koreans will grow as surely as Kim’s military stockpile.

Hopefully, the Biden administration will find a willing partner to address these issues in Yoon Suk-yeol, South Korea’s new president. Compared with previous administrations, Yoon has shown he is serious about North Korean human rights. In August, his administration urged China to stop returning defectors—those who, unlike the laborers, flee the country without state approval—to North Korea, where they face torture, abuse, and in some cases death. Yoon is also investigating his predecessor’s record, including the forced repatriation of two North Korean fishermen in 2019.

North Koreans officially dispatched on overseas labor contracts do not face the same danger upon returning home as defectors do, unless they disobey guidance from the party or Kim’s regime. But because they provide an important source of funding to the state’s nuclear and missile programs, the return of these workers is mandated by the U.N. Security Council’s resolution and applicable U.S. legislation. Given that Russia and China have already ignored this resolution and would likely veto any further Security Council action, U.S. President Joe Biden and Yoon should instead pursue resolutions in the U.N. General Assembly and U.N. Human Rights Council to investigate host countries that do not comply with their obligation to repatriate North Korean laborers. The U.N. special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea, Elizabeth Salmón, could be a key promoter of such an endeavor.

For host states, noncompliance with international labor conventions will hurt their reputation and could affect their access to foreign direct investment. To avoid these consequences, hosting states should, at a minimum, conduct scheduled and surprise inspections of work sites employing North Koreans. Hosts should also use this access to distribute material—in Korean—informing workers of their rights, including the International Labour Organization’s 11 core conventions protecting fundamental rights such as freedom of association and elimination of forced labor.

Under its current approach, North Korea views forced labor as crucial to its economic development under the existing sanctions. However, for the United States and South Korea to improve North Korean workers’ treatment, they must make North Korea understand that its long-term economic prospects hinge on protecting labor and human rights. North Korea’s repeated breach of international agreements dating back to the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework has devastated its international credibility. Taking steps toward compliance with international labor standards could be a way for the regime to rebuild credibility as a basis for future negotiations that might bring economic relief.

If Biden and Yoon can reengage Kim, they should urge him to abide by his country’s existing obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and its own constitution and domestic legislation to protect the rights of its workers. To build further credibility, North Korea could also join the International Labour Organization and apply internationally accepted minimum labor standards to its employment practices.

At home, the Biden administration can act unilaterally to promote North Korean human rights, for which it will find strong bipartisan support in Congress. Republican Sen. Marco Rubio and Republican Rep. Young Kim have submitted bills with Democratic cosponsors to reauthorize the North Korean Human Rights Act, which encourages the administration to provide unfiltered news and information to the North Korean people and promotes the protection of North Korean refugees and defectors. Congressional mandates for North Korean sanctions, including human rights provisions, passed in 2016, 2017, and 2019 with overwhelming bipartisan majorities. The United States should implement these sanctions to target North Korean, Russian, and Chinese companies, individuals, and banks supporting human rights abuses by the Kim regime.

In May, the Biden administration took an important first step by issuing an advisory warning of “reputational risks and the potential for legal consequences” for those who support overseas North Korean information technology workers, for example, by processing financial transactions related to their deployment. To build on this progress, the administration should update the list of sanctions evasion tactics used by North Korea that were listed in a 2018 advisory detailing the risks for businesses with supply chain links to North Korea.

Perhaps the lowest-hanging fruit would be for Biden to appoint a special envoy for North Korean human rights. While Yoon has already appointed a South Korean ambassador-at-large on the issue, the position has been vacant in Washington since January 2017, despite a congressional mandate to fill it. Naming an envoy for this crucial issue would be a relatively low-cost way of demonstrating the administration’s commitment to human rights in North Korea, Qatar, and other countries.

Four years ago, more than 3.5 billion people watched France defeat Croatia in the final match of the World Cup. The United States, together with its allies and partners, should use this year’s tournament as an opportunity to raise international attention to the Kim regime’s crimes and the unconscionable circumstances of the North Korean people. The Biden administration can make an actual difference in their lives, and it should not waste another moment.

Anthony Ruggiero is the senior director of the nonproliferation and biodefense program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense on the U.S. National Security Council during the Trump administration. Twitter: @NatSecAnthony

Greg Scarlatoiu is the executive director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Twitter: @GregScarlatoiu


Foreign Policy · by Anthony Ruggiero, Greg Scarlatoiu · November 10, 2022




2. South Korea to Sell Arms to U.S. for Ukrainian Forces Fighting Russia


A significant development. 


Did we really want to make this public? On the other hand it is probably impossible to keep an action like this out of the news.


Note the information on the US providing ammunition from US stocks in South korea.


This issue is whether the ROK industrial base can produce enough ammunition to sustain readiness and provide it to the Ukrainaisn (through the US). How many days of supply of critical ammunition stocks does the ROK have? Are they ordering new ammunition from the factories to replace that which is being sold to the US for Ukraine?



South Korea to Sell Arms to U.S. for Ukrainian Forces Fighting Russia

Artillery units are to be supplied for at least several weeks of intensive combat


By Michael R. Gordon

 and Gordon Lubold

Updated Nov. 10, 2022 9:44 pm ET


https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-korea-to-sell-arms-to-u-s-for-ukraine-11668116294?utm_source=pocket_saves



South Korea will for the first time sell artillery shells destined for Ukrainian forces through a confidential arms deal between Seoul and Washington, a move that reflects a global scramble for munitions after months of war with Russia.

U.S. officials familiar with the deal said that the U.S. will purchase 100,000 rounds of 155mm artillery ammunition that will be delivered to Ukraine, enough to supply Ukraine’s artillery units for at least several weeks of intensive combat.

Routing the deal through the U.S. allows South Korea to stick to the letter of its public commitment not to send lethal military support to Ukraine while assisting Washington, Seoul’s paramount ally in deterring North Korea.


South Korea Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup met with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin earlier this month and agreed in principle to proceed with the artillery deal.

PHOTO: SHAWN THEW/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK

The South Korea-provided arms will enable the U.S. to supply the Ukrainians without digging deeper into the American inventory of artillery rounds, which U.S. officials have acknowledged are dwindling quickly. In August, the stockpile of U.S. 155mm artillery rounds had fallen to levels that concerned the Pentagon as Ukraine engaged in fierce artillery duels with the Russian forces, and U.S. officials say the situation is considerably worse now.

South Korea Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup met with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin earlier this month and agreed in principle to proceed with the artillery deal.

The Defense Ministry in Seoul said in a statement that a South Korean company is in talks with the U.S. to supplement America’s stockpile of 155mm artillery shells. The South Korean government’s position of not supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine remains unchanged, according to the statement.

“The negotiations are happening under the premise that the U.S. will be the final user,” the statement added

The White House recently said North Korea was providing artillery shells for Russia, setting the unusual stage for armaments from the two Asian countries to be used by opposing forces in Europe. The arms deals highlight the limits of industrial bases in the U.S. and Russia, which have been stretched to the limit during the war in Ukraine.


Russian President Vladimir Putin, who met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in 2019, has warned South Korea about supplying Ukraine with weapons.

PHOTO: ALEXANDER ZEMLIANICHENKO/ASSOCIATED PRESS

A Pentagon spokesman said the U.S. has been in discussions with the South Korean industrial base for the ammunition.

“Any potential sales or transfers of equipment are always closely evaluated against current and future U.S. and ROK military readiness requirements on the peninsula, and will not detract from our defensive posture or readiness to respond against regional threats,” said Lt. Col. Marty Meiners, a Defense Department spokesman, using an abbreviation for the Republic of Korea, South Korea’s formal name.

Earlier this month, the U.S. sent a shipment of American artillery shells from its stockpiles in South Korea, a transfer that hasn’t been previously reported or acknowledged by the Defense Department.

“United States Forces Korea has been requested to support this effort by providing some of its equipment,” Col. Isaac Taylor, a spokesman for the U.S. command in South Korea, said in a statement on the previous shipment. “This has zero impact on our operations and our ability to execute on our ironclad commitment to the defense of our ally, the Republic of Korea.”

U.S. officials say that South Korea’s provision of its own artillery for Ukraine won’t undermine military readiness, even as tensions with North Korea intensify. While North Korea has enormous stockpiles of artillery ammunition, military experts say that South Korea has a range of systems to respond to the threat, including its own rocket force.

“South Korea’s advancing missile force, but more generally its defense modernization and increasing defense industry capacity, may be providing it options to supply arms to Europe and other partners,” said S. Paul Choi, a defense expert at the Rand Corp., a nonpartisan think tank.

Poland has signed contracts with South Korea worth $5.8 billion to buy tanks, howitzers and rocket launchers. Those will make it easier for Warsaw to send weapons to Ukraine without putting itself at risk.

Kherson Retreat: Timeline of Russian Rule of the Strategic Ukrainian City

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Ukrainian troops have cautiously advanced toward Kherson after Russia announced its retreat from the strategic city. WSJ looks at how Russia went from capturing the regional capital to ordering its troops to leave, in a symbolic blow for the Kremlin. Illustration: Adele Morgan

Meanwhile, Russia has turned to North Korea for artillery shells, which are being sent through indirect routes that include shipments through third countries in the Middle East and North Africa, the Biden administration said recently.

White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said that while the U.S. has had indications for some time that Russia had requested artillery shells from North Korea, the administration now has information that shipments have been sent.

“It’s a significant number of artillery shells,” Mr. Kirby told reporters. “We’re still monitoring this to determine if the shipments have been actually received.”


North Korea has denied that it is sending the munitions

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How might South Korea’s support of Ukraine influence the trajectory of the conflict? Join the conversation below.

Russian President Vladimir Putin warned last month that South Korea would destroy relations with Moscow if it sends weapons and ammunition to Ukraine.

South Korea has provided bulletproof vests, helmets and medical supplies to Ukraine but hasn’t provided lethal arms.

“We’ve provided humanitarian and peaceful assistance to Ukraine in solidarity with the international community but never lethal weapons or any such things,” South Korea President Yoon Suk-yeol said last month, stressing the desire for good relations with Russia.

Tensions have soared on the Korean Peninsula in recent weeks as North Korea has conducted a series of aggressive missile tests and South Korea and the U.S. have extended a joint air exercise that involves 240 aircraft.

At a press conference earlier this month, Mr. Austin and his South Korea counterpart said that their countries would return to large-scale field exercises next year.

—Timothy W. Martin in Seoul contributed to this article.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Gordon Lubold at gordon.lubold@wsj.com




3. The threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons — Markus Garlauskas on "Intelligence Matters"


Excerpts:


MICHAEL MORELL: I guess the other thing is the war is not over yet and we don't know the result. So that's important here in terms of the lessons learned. Last question, I worked on North Korea 25 years ago. And at that time, we in the intelligence community would say this regime can't last. This is not possible. This runs against the currents of history. What's your reaction to the possibility of regime change there, or a collapse of the regime? What would that take? Is that even possible?
MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: I certainly think it's possible. And I think any system that's based around one man rule and it's important to keep in mind it's even more stark than that is that Kim Jong-un has no clearly defined successor at this point. They've got this publicly announced position, essentially, that would allow for a successor, but they haven't announced anybody that's in it. And so I think that the sudden death of Kim Jong-un from an accident, say from a lone assassin, someone who's wronged by Kim Jong-un, who decides to go out fighting. I think those are possibilities that could very easily lead to disruption with the North Korean system to the point where it could collapse. But these are not black swans, but the term gray rhino is right. These are low probability, high impact events.
I think the more likely scenario is that a future generation, that the succession of Kim Jong-un to another leader, maybe even if it's prepared over time, doesn't go well. And that's what causes the system to finally collapse. And certainly we've seen a lot of change internally in North Korea in the last 20 years. The access to information, the changes in attitudes, the really entrenchment of the markets into North Korea, despite the regime's efforts to constrain them and roll them back. And so I am cautiously optimistic that over time, particularly if the international community really with South Korea and the United States in the lead, encourage those bottom up changes in North Korea, do more to get information into North Korean society, do more to to shape attitudes that I could see some some change over time and ultimately leading to to building pressure that fundamentally changes the system. Again, particularly if there is a key moment like, say, the sudden death of Kim Jong-un or a generation from now a gradual change of successor. So I wouldn't rule it out. But I think the system is so artificially imposed against human nature on the North Korean people that eventually that regime is going to fall. But it could take a very long time.




The threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons — Markus Garlauskas on "Intelligence Matters"

CBS News

This week on "Intelligence Matters," host Michael Morell sits down with Markus Garlauskas, who formerly led the U.S. intelligence community's strategic analysis on North Korea issues. Garlauskas shares his assessment of North Korea's missile tests and the threat of nuclear weapons under Kim Jong Un's regime. Garlauskas also lays out how the U.S. can deter North Korea, even as China works as an enabler for the regime.

Listen to this show on ART19

Highlights:

North Korea and use of nuclear weapons: "North Korea is not claiming their weapons are just for deterrent purposes, as they have on occasion. Now, they're saying that they'll be used for operational missions to repulse hostile forces, aggression and attack, and to achieve decisive victory in war if deterrence fails. They say that they're going to retaliate with a nuclear strike if their command and control system and their state leadership is put under threat. That they can be justified in using nuclear weapons if they've come under a nuclear or non-nuclear attack on important strategic targets and even if such an attack is on the horizon. So they're saying that they could use them preemptively."

How U.S. should deter North Korea: "The typical approach of trying to prevent, deter the use of a nuclear weapon is the traditional Cold War thinking of mutually assured destruction, or in this case, a variation. Not mutually assured, because North Korea can't destroy us, but basically assuring them that if they use a nuclear weapon, that's going to lead to the destruction of the regime. And that's actually been the declared policy of the United States, essentially put out in public in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the idea that essentially if the North Korean regime were to use a nuclear weapon, then that would lead to the end of the regime. That's paraphrasing the statement that's been our policy. But I would argue that that's going to be a harder statement to remain credible as North Korea considers these different limited options and capabilities. And then also because of the concern about how China might react if we were to go after the North Korean regime in such a scenario."

China as North Korea enabler: "China has been an enabler of North Korea's bad behavior for a very long time. And it's not because the Chinese necessarily are out there to see North Korea engage in aggression or that they're particularly happy about North Korea's nuclear program, but that ultimately their goal of avoiding a war or chaos on their doorstep means that they're very sensitive to the potential of backing North Korea into the corner or causing the collapse of the North Korean regime. And so when they look at how can they restrain the situation from spiraling into conflict, how can they restrain the situation from getting to the point where the North Korean regime's control collapses, it's ultimately easier to try and restrain South Korea and the United States."


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INTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH MARKUS GARLAUSKAS

PRODUCER: PAULINA SMOLINSKI

MICHAEL MORELL: Marcus, welcome to the show. Welcome to Intelligence Matters. It's very nice to have you with us.

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: Michael, thank you so much for this opportunity.

MICHAEL MORELL: Markus, I want to certainly get to North Korea and to your insights on everything that has been going on there recently. But I actually want to start with a little bit about your career. And the question I want to ask you is what got you interested in North Korea and what was your path to becoming the intelligence community's top analyst on North Korea?

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: I definitely did not plan to be the NIO for North Korea early in my career. I actually started with a regional focus more on Europe when I was an undergraduate, and it wasn't until later on when I was in the Security Studies program at Georgetown getting my master's that I did my pivot to Asia long before Kurt Campbell ever coined that term, to focus on on East Asia, because I realized that the role that East Asia would play for the future of American security in the 21st century be very similar to the importance of Europe for U.S. national security in the 20th. And then I specifically started to zero in on Korea, because even back then over two decades ago, I saw Korea as being the central nexus point in the coming competition with China and really a key both metaphorical and literal potential battleground in East Asia. So that's what led me to focus on Korea. And thenI really got bit by the Korea bug, so to speak, when I was first stationed there in 2002. That was in the intelligence estimate shop in the the G2 in U.S. forces Korea and the combined command there. And that really got me even more interested in focusing on Korea. And that was where I really learned a lot about estimative, forward looking intelligence. And that's where I learned about the history of national intelligence officers in the National Intelligence Council.

That's when I made up my mind. I wanted to be a national intelligence officer someday, if I could. But back then, they didn't even have a national intelligence officer for North Korea, it was the national intelligence officer for East Asia. That was where it started. I spent 12 years at the USFK and my last five years there, I wasn't even in the intelligence community. I had left the IC to become the the chief of the the strategy division and focusing on not so much just understanding the challenges posed by North Korea and in the region, but coming up with the the strategic approaches and the recommendations for how to deal with them for the four star there and for the for the policy and strategy community in Washington, and then working a lot with our allies. And so I never thought I would go back into intelligence. But as it turned out, it was the perfect preparation for me to be able to be the national intelligence officer. So when I was offered the opportunity then at the end of my time there in Korea, bringing an end to my time there in Korea in 2014, I jumped at the chance.

MICHAEL MORELL: I want to get a baseline from you on North Korea's strategic weapons programs. And let's start with nuclear weapons. What types do they have? Roughly how many? I know you're constrained somewhat on how you can talk about that. And how well do they work?

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: Overall, the start, it's important to note that North Korea's nuclear weapons program began as a plutonium program, and it was very limited by the fact that they can only produce the fissile material at the Yongbyon reactor. And so relatively small amounts of this fissile material it could be used for nuclear warheads was really where the program started. And that was the initial focus of our negotiations to try and halt and roll back North Korea's nuclear program, the plutonium program. But then over time, they also developed a uranium based program, enriched uranium based weapons. And so that's added tremendously to North Korea's ability to continue to grow their stockpile. So I'm not going to get into the numbers, but the typical estimate is that they can produce somewhere between five or six of these a year when you look at what a lot of these institutions that study this are saying.

The stockpile continues to grow, particularly again because of the uranium enrichment program that North Korea has.

Now, as far as the types of weapons, we've seen them do six nuclear tests and one of those tests was claimed to be with a 2 stage hydrogen weapon. What's known as an H-bomb, a fusion weapon. What's been put out there by the U.S. government is that the yield of this this weapon or this test was large enough to be consistent with with the hydrogen bomb. So you've got that. And that's referred to colloquially as the peanut. It's this big silver peanut shaped thing that looks like it could fit onto the end of North Korea's ICBMs and even their intermediate range missile. And then you've got a smaller device, a fusion implosion device that is spherical. It's dubbed the disco ball. And that one, again, looks like it can fit on a whole range of different missiles from North Korea. You've got here at least two different types of warhead that look like they could be used on missiles. One that has a much higher yield that could basically- we're talking about destroying cities, not just a limited use. And then we see the approach. There's a lot of talk about the potential for North Korea to conduct a seventh nuclear test. And much of the discussion that you see on this is the concern that it will be a tactical, much smaller device that could fit on a on a smaller missile and that would have a lower yield, but that would make it much more useful for a limited strike or for battlefield use, what they would call a tactical nuclear weapon. We don't know how big the arsenal is, but it's growing, it's diversifying. It's becoming more sophisticated over time. There's this concern about an imminent seventh nuclear test. I don't know when it's going to happen, but I'm certainly expecting that it's going to come soon.

MICHAEL MORELL: Let's do exactly the same thing with ICBMs capable of hitting the United States. What's the story there?

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: For the longest time, the concern about ICBMs for North Korea was that they were going to use this large, cumbersome, essentially space launch vehicle,the Taepodong, as an ICBM. For so much of the time that there was focus on North Korea's missile program that was the concern. That all started to rapidly change in 2017 when you saw that North Korea was testing mobile ICBMs, what they called the Hwasong-14 and then later 15. And this marked a fundamental change in the nature of the ICBM threat. So you saw instead of a notional system that based on a space launch vehicle, that would take a long time to stack up and be very visible out in the open. Now, you had a system that could really have military utility that was being tested in such a way that it was not just a notional ICBM capability, but that showed the potential to be able to lift a payload consistent with the size of what you'd expect from a North Korean nuclear weapon to be able to reach the United States.

The only thing that left some ambiguity was the fact that they were launching these things on a very high trajectory. So they weren't imitating the pathway that they would take to get to the United States. And so the conditions for which the reentry vehicle will be going through the atmosphere are not the same as they would be fired on a flatter trajectory. There's still some debate and some question about what the reliability and capability there is to really strike the United States. But I think I would air on the side of caution and say that they've established that capability to some degree. And then they had this pause in an ICBM testing associated with the negotiations in 2018 and 2019. But then they resumed their ICBM testing earlier this year with an even larger mobile ICBM system. So they've continued to make progress. But I think that progress has been accelerating. And the testing program has really shown that North Korea is willing to take some risks and push the envelope. But at the end of the day, we're talking about a technology that was developed in the 1960s and had really become mature by the seventies or eighties. So the fact that North Korea is making all this progress in ICBMs, given how long these technologies have been out there and how much progress there's been made in things like material science and how much the North Koreans can learn from the other's missile programs. It shouldn't be a surprise that they've made this much progress.

MICHAEL MORELL: Right. You mentioned earlier the idea that these weapons can fit on top of these missiles. But they've never actually tested that. Is that correct? And so what's our confidence level that they can actually make a nuclear device to a missile and deliver it where they want and make it work? What's your sense on that question?

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: This question of confidence levels is really tough. And a lot of it's a matter of personal opinion. I'm just speaking for myself here. But I would say, just my personal assessment, is that we have to make the assumption that they have that capability. And so my confidence level would still be relatively low but confident enough to be able to make the call that that's what we should be basing our thinking on. That's what I've written on, what I published on since I've left the government. But I think there's always going to be skepticism until North Korea conducts a full end to end test with a missile, and then there is a nuclear yield detonation at the other end of that launch. But I'd like to point out, this is not a typical test profile. This is something that's been very rare in the history of nuclear weapons testing and for other countries, the bar has not really been set that high, that you have to have a fully realistic end to end test with a nuclear detonation at the end to consider that country to be nuclear armed. And so I don't think we should apply that standard to North Korea either. We can really delude ourselves into a sort of false sense of security if that's the standard we're going to hold them to.

MICHAEL MORELL: You mentioned tactical nuclear weapons earlier. How long have they been working on those and what kind of weapons are those? Are those mines or those warheads for very short range rockets? What do those actually look like?

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: I couldn't tell you exactly when they started it, but it's very clear that North Korea has been looking at the potential for battlefield use of weapons for a long time. And in particular, when you look at what Kim Jong-un had to say in his remarks in the party Congress in 2021, he had said that North Korea had actually successfully developed nuclear weapons and turned them into tactical ones. And so I think we can say that the North Koreans have been doing this effort for a while. If you take Kim Jong-Un at his word. I think this is a concern not just because they've been working on warheads and potentially you could see a smaller warhead tested, but also because they've been working on delivery systems that they're billing as providing a tactical nuclear capability. So we're talking about shorter range missiles, solid fuel missiles, very mobile, very hard to track, and very much of battlefield utility, not these big cumbersome things. So shorter range, yes, but there are a lot of potential options for North Korea to put this on a range of different weapons systems. And that's one of the reasons why it's a concern. Because in that case, you might not be able to distinguish a particular missile system from carrying a nuclear weapon or not?

MICHAEL MORELL: Let's switch to maybe the hardest question, which is doctrine and use. And I'm wondering in your mind, under what circumstances do you think Kim Jong-un would actually consider using nuclear weapons, either strategic or those tactical battlefield weapons?

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: So actually, Kim Jong-un has been kind enough to actually give us a bit of a sense of the conditions for nuclear weapons use. They just promulgated a new law from North Korea very publicly on the conditions for use of nuclear weapons, and overall, on the role of nuclear weapons in North Korea's security. And so I think you can take from this some very important conclusions. One is that North Korea is not claiming their weapons are just for deterrent purposes, as they have on occasion. Now, they're saying that they'll be used for operational missions to repulse hostile forces, aggression and attack, and to achieve decisive victory in war if deterrence fails. They say that they're going to retaliate with a nuclear strike if their command and control system and their state leadership is put under threat. That they can be justified in using nuclear weapons if they've come under a nuclear or non-nuclear attack on important strategic targets and even if such an attack on the horizon. So they're saying that they could use them preemptively.

They're also saying in this document that they could use nuclear weapons to prevent the expansion and protection of a war and to retake the initiative. And then, of course, they have an open ended any number of other other situations. And the emphasis in this document is that they're going to be able to use them on very short notice. There's not a lengthy preparation period. The military units are being directed in this document. If they receive the order, they need to be able to be ready for action to use them. And so I've done some analysis and some work since leaving the government on this question of the mindsets that North Korea could have in mind that would lead to nuclear use. And you could see it in a circumstance, maybe in a limited way that's very opportunistic at the start of a conflict. But I think it's more likely, as you get to the point where the regime is losing the initiative or as the document says, where you see North Korea's regime is under threat, then to retake the initiative and to try and bring the conflict to a conclusion on favorable terms for North Korea. I could definitely see the potential for them to use weapons to both operationally blunt alliance counterattack against North Korean aggression, but also for the strategic purpose of forcing the U.S. to think very carefully about going any further at risk of other nuclear escalation, going beyond just a tactical use. So it's a way for North Korea to achieve some practical effects, but also strategically put us back on our heels and make us concerned about further nuclear escalation.

MICHAEL MORELL: You were the strategy guy at USFK so if you think about what you just said in terms of how Kim Jong-un might be thinking about this, what should our response be? What should we signal to them in terms of how we would deal with such a situation in order to deter them?

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: I think what's called for is a much greater focus on what we call deterrence by denial, deterrence by punishment. So the typical approach of trying to prevent, deter the use of a nuclear weapon is the traditional Cold War sort of thinking of mutually assured destruction, or in this case, a variation. Not mutually assured, because North Korea can't destroy us, but basically assuring them that if they use a nuclear weapon, that's going to lead to the destruction of the regime. And that's actually been the declared policy of the United States, essentially put out in public in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the idea that essentially if the North Korean regime were to use a nuclear weapon, then that would lead to the end of the regime. That's paraphrasing the statement that's been our policy. But I would argue that that's going to be a harder statement to remain credible as North Korea considers these different limited options and capabilities. And then also because of the concern about how China might react if we were to go after the North Korean regime in such a scenario. And so focusing on deterrence by denial, essentially denying them success or advantage from being able to use nuclear weapons, I think is really key.

So things like making our missile defenses better, making our forces more resilient and basically coming to grips with the idea that North Korea may use a nuclear weapon in the event of a conflict. And being prepared to, as the saying goes, fight through and still achieve victory, that North Korea can't gain any advantage by limited nuclear use. That is just going to make the situation worse for them. It's not going to get them an advantage. Those are some of the military things that I would consider. And then also, I think another big element is to really emphasize alliance, cohesion and coordination, to make it clear that we will have a unified alliance response and there won't be a break in the alliance if North Korea engages in nuclear escalation, that that will push the ROK and the U.S. together and the U.S. and Japan together. It won't really create a dilemma that North Korea might be hoping for by using such a weapon.

MICHAEL MORELL: And what's the state of the alliance today? How healthy is it?

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: I think it's on the mend. But there certainly were some rough spots in the last few years, some pretty significant differences of focus and some very public disagreements. But I still think it can't be taken for granted. I think there's a lot of work to be done all the time in an alliance like the important one that we have with the Republic of Korea. And so even though things I think are improving and certainly the overall relationship between the ROK and the US is good, we have to very carefully work with what the South Koreans to reassure them and recognize that more than just providing military support to each other and the U.S. providing its so-called nuclear umbrella to South Korea, that political, economic informational coordination between the ROK and the U.S. is is important as well. And so when I see things like friction over trade issues or I see different messages to North Korea and to Beijing coming from Seoul and Washington, that tells me that we have some more work to do to get the alliance more closely aligned.

MICHAEL MORELL: Let me ask about all the recent activity we've seen in the last several months, the missile tests. You talked about a coming possible nuclear test. How much of this is actually driven by military necessity in terms of testing? How much is driven by domestic politics in North Korea? How much is coercive diplomacy? And to the extent that it's the latter, what do they want?

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: I think it's a great question. And the bottom line answer that is often the case with analysts, I'm sure you've heard it many times before. It's complicated and it depends. So it's a bit of each. But let me say first, I'm really glad that you didn't include the hypothesis of they're just doing it to get attention because that's the I think, the most mistaken case that we often see. But looking at some of these other possibilities, I do think it's a combination. And I think some of it depends on the individual profile. But overall, I think you've seen a fundamental change from the era of Kim Jong-il, where he was really testing weapons for political signaling and the actual progress of the weapons systems was a secondary or maybe even an irrelevant component in some cases.

Whereas Kim Jong-un, I think we have very good reason to believe that he's genuinely trying to advance not just the credibility of his nuclear and missile arsenal, but also its actual capability, qualitative improvements in the arsenal. I think that's a big part of it. And certainly, is there political signaling involved there, other domestic political considerations? Sure. But I think a lot of times those things come into play in terms of the messaging and the timing of these particular launches as opposed to really completely driving and dictating what's going to be tested or what sort of weapons are going to be pursued. Because to have an effective weapons program, you need to do testing. To have an operationally effective military. You need to do training, and you need to ensure that you can operationally employ these systems. And so I think I would weight this much more toward the advancement of the programs. To some degree, yes, coercion and messaging involved. But overall that's more related to how it's messaged and the timing more so than the big picture of the direction where those tests and demonstrations are headed.

MICHAEL MORELL: And then back to your strategy hat, how should we respond to all of this? And particularly if there's another nuclear test. How do you think about that?

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: This is a real challenge to be quite blunt, there's really no good option that's really going to put us in a really great place after North Korea conducts a weapons test, in part because China has been so uncooperative in holding North Korea accountable. And ultimately, if China is not fully on board in holding North Korea accountable and applying economic sanctions on North Korea and making sure the international community is united, not to forget Russia who is also pretty uncooperative, but ultimately much less economically and politically important to North Korea than China.

I think that the focus really needs to be on improving the deterrence capability of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, even more so than focusing on trying to apply some sort of economic pressure or punishment after launches. I think it should be part of the equation. We can do a lot more to tighten up enforcement of sanctions. I think we should be doing more to go after different institutions that are doing business with North Korea in violation of sanctions. I think we should be willing to go after a broad range of Chinese companies that are doing business with North Korea in violation of sanctions or other other different means that we can use to hold North Korea accountable to inflict some economic punishment, particularly as it relates to the currency generation for the regime.

But ultimately, we have to recognize that each time North Korea moves forward with demonstrating and improving its capabilities, that we have to be sure we're doing the right things on the military side, the defense side, to make sure that we're ready to be able to counter that. And we can be often very risk averse, both in terms of how we approach sanctions and how we approach military readiness. And I think the key is not to feel like you have to make a public demonstration every time North Korea fires a weapon, tests a weapon. But you do have to think through how we can improve the posture of our forces? How can we improve their readiness level? What changes do we need to make that we've been reluctant to make because they might be considered provocative that ultimately are necessary to shore up deterrence as North Korea's capabilities improve and ultimately may be the thing that gets China's attention. Because if China sees that the military posture on the peninsula is changing, like for example, the deployment of the fad missile defense battery a few years ago in response to North Korean missile tests. That might be the very thing that actually gets the Chinese to do more to actually put some pressure on North Korea. But at the end of the day, I think it's tightening the sanctions enforcement as best we can on those really key areas where we've been reluctant to accept risk and then being willing to to improve the posture of the U.S.-South Korea alliance to be able to to to deal with aggression by North Korea.

MICHAEL MORELL: And to do those things that you talked about earlier in terms of our strategic response to what they're doing overall. It sounds like that's a whole package.

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: Absolutely. Yes. So it all fits within how do we improve the deterrence by denial.

MICHAEL MORELL: You just mentioned China, which I think is a great place to pivot here to China. What's China's role in North Korea's behavior and could they be more helpful? Would the North Koreans be responsive? How do you think about that whole question?

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: China has been an enabler of North Korea's bad behavior for a very long time. And it's not because the Chinese necessarily are out there to see North Korea engage in aggression or that they're particularly happy about North Korea's nuclear program, but that ultimately their goal of avoiding a war or chaos on their doorstep means that they're very sensitive to the potential of backing North Korea into the corner or causing the collapse of the North Korean regime. And so when they look at how can they restrain the situation from spiraling into conflict, how can they restrain the situation from getting to the point where the North Korean regime's control collapses, it's ultimately easier to to try and restrain South Korea and the United States. So when you look at the situation now, the added factor is the strategic competition, strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington is really affecting China's thinking as well. I think the level of cooperation that we can expect from China going forward is definitely going to be even less than it was before. And so I do see the potential, even if the Chinese are not actually going to encourage intentionally North Korea to escalate. That's always a possibility, right. If there's a U.S.-China conflict going on over Taiwan. Who knows? They might actually want the North Koreans to escalate to tie down our forces and maybe even open a second front.

But even if China is not intentionally encouraging the North Koreans to escalate, that push back against ROK and U.S. military activities, that constant shielding of Pyongyang from the consequences of its actions, I think unintentionally encourages North Korea to believe that it can escalate further and essentially has a lot more space to do to continue to conduct not just testing in demonstrations of weapons, but even in the future to conduct some limited aggression against South Korea like it has in the past, and really push the envelope of its coercive approach against South Korea and its push back against the United States. And so I really think the prospects for close cooperation with China on North Korea were never really that great as it appeared. But they're getting worse. And I think ultimately it's more about making it in China's interest to restrain North Korea, to pressure North Korea into trying to try to pull it back from aggression, to make it in China's interest rather than expecting through open cooperation and trust that that's going to happen. And to be fair, there's limits to probably how far China actually can go to restrain North Korea without putting itself in the situation where it does destabilize North Korea or it does push North Korea into a position where it decides that it's worth the risk to go against what China is looking for. I think there are practical limits to what China can accomplish, even if we could get them to be more in line with our approach of restraining and pressuring North Korea.

MICHAEL MORELL: It also seems that we have more room today to bring some pain to China with regard to its behavior vis-a-vis North Korea, because the relationship is in this strategic rivalry point. And we're not having to worry about undermining the US-China relationship the way we used to.

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: Michael, I think you're right. And it's my personal view that we do need to do a lot more to hold Chinese individuals and institutions, businesses accountable for their role in aiding and abetting North Korean sanctions evasion.

MICHAEL MORELL: And do you have any sense what the relationship is like between Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping? I know it's a tough question.

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS:Certainly it's something that's evolved. When Kim Jong-un came into power, you really had no relationship between him and Xi Jinping. And it took years before they met in their status as leaders. And then you saw this very rapid shift into a much more positive relationship after the North Koreans paused their weapons testing for a while. And then you had these summits with Xi. Remember, the summit with Xi took place before the first summit with President Trump. And so Kim was in some ways, I think, setting conditions to make sure that Xi Jinping was in his corner and that he had Xi's view on how to approach this. And so I think that that has shown in a much more positive relationship with North Korea. Even though it's resumed the weapons testing, that hasn't resulted in a setback in the relationship at the national level.

I can imagine maybe Xi Jinping might be a little bit irritated with Kim Jong-un in some ways. But more broadly, they seem to have a much more positive relationship, certainly than earlier in Kim Jong-un's tenure. But as far as the level of personal warmth or that sort of thing between the two, I just couldn't say. But certainly I think you see some positive body language in Kim Jong-un being willing to show deference to Xi Jinping, which I imagine makes a positive impression on Xi.

MICHAEL MORELL: Two more questions. One is, you frequently hear, how do the Chinese look at the Russia-Ukraine war and what are the lessons they might be learning from it? Have you given any thought to how the North Koreans might be looking at it and what lessons they might be drawing from it?

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: I think that's a great question. And I have thought about that. And there's a whole range of different theories about what North Korea could be learning. But the thing that concerns me the most is the potential for North Korea to take the lesson that nuclear threats and nuclear coercion will lead to restraint on the part of the U.S. and its allies. And certainly that's the impression I think a lot of people have about how the United States and NATO are reacting to Putin's nuclear threats, that it is giving us pause that we might be doing more if it were not for that, we might be doing more to support Ukraine. So I hope that's not the lesson that the North Koreans take away at the end of the day. I hope the North Koreans pay close attention to the fact that simply bombarding a democratic society with missiles is not going to lead them to surrender. And then certainly conducting an offensive with ground forces against a determined opposition, particularly armed with anti-tank missiles and in urbanized terrain is not going to be very, very successful. It's going to be very hard. So it could go either way. And I think it will probably take years for all of this to play out to the point where you can really see how it's affected North Korean thinking. Because I think we need to watch changes in force structure, changes in doctrine, bigger picture things. And we can focus a lot on what the North Koreans are saying in public about this. But that might not give us really deep insights into what they're really learning.

MICHAEL MORELL: I guess the other thing is the war is not over yet and we don't know the result. So that's important here in terms of the lessons learned. Last question, I worked on North Korea 25 years ago. And at that time, we in the intelligence community would say this regime can't last. This is not possible. This runs against the currents of history. What's your reaction to the possibility of regime change there, or a collapse of the regime? What would that take? Is that even possible?

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: I certainly think it's possible. And I think any system that's based around one man rule and it's important to keep in mind it's even more stark than that is that Kim Jong-un has no clearly defined successor at this point. They've got this publicly announced position, essentially, that would allow for a successor, but they haven't announced anybody that's in it. And so I think that the sudden death of Kim Jong-un from an accident, say from a lone assassin, someone who's wronged by Kim Jong-un, who decides to go out fighting. I think those are possibilities that could very easily lead to disruption with the North Korean system to the point where it could collapse. But these are not black swans, but the term gray rhino is right. These are low probability, high impact events.

I think the more likely scenario is that a future generation, that the succession of Kim Jong-un to another leader, maybe even if it's prepared over time, doesn't go well. And that's what causes the system to finally collapse. And certainly we've seen a lot of change internally in North Korea in the last 20 years. The access to information, the changes in attitudes, the really entrenchment of the markets into North Korea, despite the regime's efforts to constrain them and roll them back. And so I am cautiously optimistic that over time, particularly if the international community really with South Korea and the United States in the lead, encourage those bottom up changes in North Korea, do more to get information into North Korean society, do more to to shape attitudes that I could see some some change over time and ultimately leading to to building pressure that fundamentally changes the system. Again, particularly if there is a key moment like, say, the sudden death of Kim Jong-un or a generation from now a gradual change of successor. So I wouldn't rule it out. But I think the system is so artificially imposed against human nature on the North Korean people that eventually that regime is going to fall. But it could take a very long time.

MICHAEL MORELL: Thank you so much for joining us and thank you for the conversation. It's been terrific.

MARKUS GARLAUSKAS: Thank you, Michael. I appreciate the opportunity.

CBS News



4. The Immensity of Seoul’s Sadness



The Immensity of Seoul’s Sadness

nytimes.com · by Suki Kim · November 9, 2022

Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

In April 2014, South Koreans watched in horror as TV news showed live footage of a huge ferry tilting 50 to 60 degrees, sinking into the sea. Aboard were over 300 high school students on a school trip to Jeju Island, the country’s most popular resort. Initial reports said the students were all rescued, but it soon emerged that they were, in fact, still on the ship. The nation watched in real time — for two and a half hours — as the ship sank completely and disappeared from view. It would turn out that rescue efforts had been botched, and the captain and crew had escaped in lifeboats after telling the students and other passengers to stay put. The trapped teenagers sent final video messages to their parents, some of which were broadcast on the news. No statement came from either the Blue House or President Park Geun-hye, whose whereabouts was not clear. Seven hours later, President Park finally appeared, visiting the Central Disaster Safety and Countermeasures Headquarters and asking: “Why is it so hard to find or rescue the students if they are wearing life jackets?”

Within two years, Ms. Park’s approval rating was 5 percent, the lowest of any president in modern South Korean history. Over a million Koreans took to the streets, demanding her resignation. I was among them.

On Oct. 29, 2022, another tragedy consumed the nation when 156 people were crushed to death at a Halloween gathering in Itaewon, Seoul’s liveliest neighborhood. The news footage showed bodies strewn around the pavement, with people performing CPR while club music pumped through the air. Most of the victims were in their 20s, the age that the teenagers on the Jeju Island ferry would have been had they survived.

As hundreds of casualties were transported to hospitals and a nearby gymnasium turned morgue, it was once again parents who were summoned, to administer care or to identify the bodies. They told interviewers how their sons had just finished taking an exam and were looking forward to a night out, or how their daughters had just been accepted to their first jobs and were meeting friends to celebrate. Such innocent fun is the privilege of youth, and beholding it is supposed to be a reward for parenthood. Since the ferry disaster, multiple parents and relatives of victims have committed suicide.

If the rituals of public grief are well established, however, the rituals of the holiday that the Itaewon victims were celebrating are fairly new in South Korea — new enough that news anchors had to keep explaining, for the presumably older viewing demographic, what Halloween is. It’s only been a decade or two since the American tradition, as part of the English learning boom, entered the cultural life of Seoul in full force. Along the way something was lost, or perhaps gained, in translation. The holiday was partly co-opted by Korea’s selfie generation for what they call “cospre” — an abbreviation of “costume play,” after the similar tradition of Japanese youths in the Harajuku district — in which they dress up as characters from animations and computer games.

Halloween now exists in the shifting space — cultural and geographic — between the United States and South Korea. Those shifts are nowhere more visible than in the Itaewon neighborhood itself.

Situated in the heart of Seoul at the foot of Namsan, or “South Mountain,” hilly with narrow alleys, Itaewon is an attractive backdrop for fun as well as the setting of a blockbuster K-drama. It’s a neighborhood known for exotic restaurants, counterfeit goods, gay bars and trendy clubs. In the past, I would often wander its winding roads in search of fake designer bags to bring back to the United States as gifts. Later, as the neighborhood gentrified, the seedy ambience gave way to nightlife with an international flair. Yet through most of South Korean history Itaewon was known as a playground for American G.I.s; within walking distance was Yongsan Garrison, a 617-acre compound made to look like an American suburb for over 20,000 military personnel until 2018, when the United States, after seven decades, moved its base out of Seoul.

I visited Yongsan Garrison in its final days and was shocked at the immensity of it, a massive foreign military headquarters in the center of the country’s capital. The place had been off limits to the South Korean public since 1910, when the Imperial Japanese Army built it during the occupation. In May, President Yoon began his term and moved the presidential office from the Blue House to the former defense ministry building adjacent to what used to be the garrison. The huge compound will be turned into a public park, peaceful and welcoming. Yet the Halloween deaths in Itaewon, of so many young Koreans who were following a Japanese twist on an American holiday in the most American part of Seoul, are an uncomfortable reminder of the tension between South Korea and foreign powers.

After the 2014 ferry sinking, President Park was eventually convicted of abuse of power, coercion and other criminal charges. One of the prosecutors was Yoon Suk-yeol, who rose to political stardom as a result and now leads the nation. In response to the Halloween tragedy, he declared a period of national mourning, during which flags were lowered and public altars were set up across the country to pay respect to the dead. Nationwide measures such as those had only been undertaken once before, when 46 navy sailors died in what was likely an attack by North Korea. Already the Yoon government is being accused of both inaptitude and playing politics. Call it belated crowd control or simple pandering, but Mr. Yoon surely has not forgotten the tragedy that led to Ms. Park’s downfall, and neither has the generation of parents left once again with a wound that will never heal.

Suki Kim, a journalist, novelist and essayist, is the author of “Without You, There Is No Us: Undercover Among the Sons of North Korea’s Elite.”

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

nytimes.com · by Suki Kim · November 9, 2022


5. Are We Too Complacent About N.Korean Threats?


A critique of the ROK military response and readiness.

Are We Too Complacent About N.Korean Threats?

english.chosun.com

November 10, 2022 13:12

Yang Seung-sik


A North Korean ballistic missile slammed into South Korean waters off Sokcho in Gangwon Province on Nov. 2 even as the country grieved for the victims of the Halloween stampede in Itaewon. Air-raid sirens forced Ulleung islanders to flee or scurry for shelter. For the first time since the 1950-53 Korean War, the North fired a missile south of the Northern Limit Line, the de facto maritime border. The North fired a total of 25 missiles on that day, but South Korean politicians remained calm and the public was also surprisingly tranquil despite the unprecedented provocation.


Until recently North Korea refrained from provocations when the South suffered a major tragedy. When the ferry Sewol sank in 2014 with over 300 mostly young students on board, the North was unusually quiet. But not this time. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was incensed when a U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier was engaged in naval drills in the South and hundreds of American and South Korean warplanes also took part in joint exercises. His aim is clear. He wants to sow fear in South Korea.


But South Koreans have grown used to the renegade country's attention-seeking and were not jolted by the latest provocations. People were aware of the escalating tensions but were unfazed since there was no direct damage, and politicians seemed unruffled. The main opposition Minjoo Party mentioned North Korea's provocations just once last week, and the People Power Party issued a relatively large number of warnings to the North, but they sounded perfunctory. The National Assembly issued a resolution criticizing North Korea's provocations, but the prevailing sentiment was that lawmakers were only interested in avoiding flak if they had stayed completely silent.


The South Korean military, meanwhile, bumbled along. South Korean fighter jets fired three missiles in response to North Korea's provocations, and one was the wrong one. A Cheongung anti-aircraft missile exploded during flight at a firing contest in the seaside range in Daecheon, South Chungcheong Province, and a Hyunmoo ballistic missile that was fired in response to North Korea's launch of an intermediate-range ballistic missile last month ended up landing dangerously close to a South Korean military base.


Of course South Koreans should not panic, because that is exactly what the North wants to happen. But it is sad to see that their increasing tolerance of North Korea's threat made the blunders of the military seem trivial. Perhaps the Itaewon tragedy overshadowed the threat posed by North Korea's latest provocations. But another attack by North Korea like the artillery bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island would be devastating, and young soldiers guarding the frontlines would bear the brunt.

Read this article in Korean

  • Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com

english.chosun.com


6. Yoon unveils S. Korea's strategy for free, peaceful, prosperous Indo-Pacific


Excerpt:

"Peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region is directly connected to our survival and prosperity," he said during a South Korea-ASEAN summit, describing the Indo-Pacific as a region where 65 percent of the world's population lives, accounts for more than 60 percent of the world's gross domestic product and through which half of the world's cargo travels. "I plan to create a free, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region through solidarity and cooperation with ASEAN and other major nations."



(LEAD) Yoon unveils S. Korea's strategy for free, peaceful, prosperous Indo-Pacific | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · November 11, 2022

(ATTN: UPDATES with Korea-ASEAN solidarity initiative, other details; ADDS photos)

By Lee Haye-ah

PHNOM PENH, Nov. 11 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk-yeol unveiled South Korea's new Indo-Pacific strategy on Friday, with a focus on promoting freedom, peace and prosperity in a region that has gained increasing strategic importance amid the U.S.-China rivalry.

Yoon announced the strategy shortly after arriving in Cambodia to attend a series of summits involving the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the first leg of a two-nation tour that will later take him to Bali, Indonesia for a Group of 20 summit.

"Peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region is directly connected to our survival and prosperity," he said during a South Korea-ASEAN summit, describing the Indo-Pacific as a region where 65 percent of the world's population lives, accounts for more than 60 percent of the world's gross domestic product and through which half of the world's cargo travels. "I plan to create a free, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region through solidarity and cooperation with ASEAN and other major nations."


Yoon outlined key elements of the strategy, starting with a strengthening of the rules-based international order built on universal values.

"We will promote a harmonious regional order upon which countries in the region respect each other's rights and interests, and seek common benefits," he said, promising to work to prevent conflict and armed clashes through rules and to uphold the principle of peaceful resolution through dialogue.

"A unilateral change of the status quo by force should never be tolerated," he said.

Yoon also vowed to strengthen cooperation with countries in the region in the areas of nuclear nonproliferation; anti-terrorism; and maritime, cyber and health security.

"Also, I will build a prosperous Indo-Pacific region through an open and fair economic order," he said, adding that he plans to strengthen economic security by increasing supply chain resilience and achieve joint prosperity by creating a cooperative and inclusive economic and technological ecosystem.

"South Korea will carry out active contribution diplomacy in areas such as climate change, the digital gap and health," Yoon continued.

"Based on the three key visions of freedom, peace and prosperity, and under the three key cooperation principles of inclusivity, trust and reciprocity, we will implement the Indo-Pacific strategy," he said.


The presidential office said it was the first time South Korea has presented a diplomatic strategy specific to the Indo-Pacific.

Yoon also presented an ASEAN-specific plan, called the Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI), which will form a core component of the Indo-Pacific strategy.

He proposed that as part of the initiative the two sides hold more active strategic dialogue between their diplomatic channels and regular defense ministerial meetings.

He especially pointed to the "direct and serious threat" North Korea's nuclear and missile program poses to the international community and asked that ASEAN work together to get North Korea to choose a path of peace and coexistence, not confrontation and conflict.

On economic cooperation, Yoon called for upgrading the South Korea-ASEAN free trade agreement to include digital trade and vowed to strengthen cooperation in the areas of electric vehicles, batteries and digital technologies, all of which are in high demand among ASEAN states.

Moreover, he promised to support various projects and partnerships designed to address climate change and environmental issues, including the establishment of a South Korea-ASEAN center on carbon neutrality and green transformation set to begin in 2024.

Yoon also formally proposed that the two sides upgrade their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of establishing a dialogue partnership in 2024.

The ASEAN leaders welcomed the proposal and called for closely communicating at the leader level to make the CSP a reality, according to the presidential office.


hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · November 11, 2022


7. U.S. supports helping N. Korean people, but Pyongyang ultimately responsible: State Dept.

Note the spokesman does NOT conflate humanitarian assistance (HA) with a human rights upfront approach. Providing humanitarian assistance does not change the human rights situation in the north. It does not hold the regime accountable for human rights abuses and crimes against humanity it commits against the Korean people living in the north. It is morally right to try to provide humanitarian assistance. However, it is also correct to demand transparency to ensure the assistance goes to those in need and is not diverted to the military and elite.  All that said, the spokesman makes an important point that we must never overlook, the suffering of the Korean people in the north is the result of Kim Jong Un's deliberate policy decisions to prioritize the nuclear and missile programs and the elite and the military over the welfare of the Korean people in the north. Calling out Kim for this and trying to hold him accountable can be part of an influence campaign in support of a human rights upfront approach. But trying to provide humanitarian assistance does not equal a human rights upfront approach.


I support trying to help the Korean people in the north. However, I have spoken with many escapees who counsel against this. They say that when we provide HA, it is either diverted to the military and elite or if provided to the people in need it is accompanied by propaganda that supports Kim.  Most escapees I know are not in favor of providing HA as they say it provides support to and prolongs the life of the Kim family regime.


U.S. supports helping N. Korean people, but Pyongyang ultimately responsible: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 11, 2022

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Nov. 10 (Yonhap) -- The United States supports and is taking steps to help the people of North Korea despite differences with the North Korean regime, a state department spokesperson said Thursday.

Ned Price made the remark as he also called on Pyongyang to put its people before its own interests.

"Even when we have profound differences with a particular regime, and that of course applies in the case of North Korea, we are always looking for ways that we can support the humanitarian needs of a particular people," the spokesperson told a press briefing.

"So with our DPRK sanctions regime, similarly, there are appropriate humanitarian carve-outs to see to it that the robust international and U.S. sanctions that are in place against North Korea don't lead to unnecessary suffering on the part of the North Korean people," Price added.

DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.


The state department spokesperson insisted that Pyongyang has "at every step" prioritized its own interests over the interests of its own people, citing its missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.

"This, of course, has had consequences for the DPRK regime. Unfortunately, it has also led to consequences for the North Korean people," Price said when asked what measures the U.S. was taking to cut off resources to North Korea's WMD programs.

North Korea has fired some 60 ballistic missiles this year, which, according to some experts, must have cost the impoverished North billions of dollars.

"The onus has to be on the DPRK regime to change course, to put the interests of its people first and to cease with the provocations that have only led to more pressure and, ultimately, more isolation on the part of the DPRK," said Price.


bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 11, 2022



8. U.S. concern over possible N. Korean nuclear test remains real: Sullivan


One indication that Kim's political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy strategies are failing is that ROK-Japan- US trilateral cooperation is improving.


Excerpts:


Seoul earlier said President Yoon Suk-yeol will hold a bilateral summit with President Biden when they attend regional summits in Cambodia and Indonesia.
Sullivan said the Biden-Yoon summit, along with a trilateral summit involving the two leaders and Japanese prime minister, will be held in Cambodia, where the leaders will attend the East Asia Summit that also involves the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
"We are in very tight coordination with both the ROK and Japan, and the trilateral meeting that the three leaders will be able to have on the margins of the East Asia Summit, I think, will be a significant milestone in the trilateral relationship and will help only strengthen coordination on DPRK," he said, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.




U.S. concern over possible N. Korean nuclear test remains real: Sullivan | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 11, 2022

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Nov. 10 (Yonhap) -- The United States continues to remain concerned about a potential North Korean nuclear test, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said Thursday, noting that Pyongyang may still decide to conduct a test.

Sullivan also expressed concerns over additional North Korean missile tests.

"We have been very transparent about out concern with North Korea that the DPRK would conduct its seventh nuclear test at some point in this broader timeframe, and by broader I mean we have been talking about this now for a couple of months," he told a press briefing when asked if the North may be expected to conduct a nuclear test during President Joe Biden's upcoming trip to North Africa and Asia.

"That window still remains open. Our concern still remains real," added Sullivan.


DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.

Officials here and in Seoul have said the North may have completed all preparations for what will be its seventh nuclear test and that it may only be waiting for a decision from leader Kim Jong-un.

Sullivan also highlighted the possibility of North Korea conducting additional "long-range" missile tests.

"We are also concerned about further potential long range missile tests in addition to the possibility of a nuclear test. And so we'll be watching carefully for both of those," Sullivan said.

North Korea fired an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) early last week, marking its seventh ICBM test launch of the year.

Pyongyang has fired some 60 ballistic missiles this year.

Seoul earlier said President Yoon Suk-yeol will hold a bilateral summit with President Biden when they attend regional summits in Cambodia and Indonesia.

Sullivan said the Biden-Yoon summit, along with a trilateral summit involving the two leaders and Japanese prime minister, will be held in Cambodia, where the leaders will attend the East Asia Summit that also involves the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

"We are in very tight coordination with both the ROK and Japan, and the trilateral meeting that the three leaders will be able to have on the margins of the East Asia Summit, I think, will be a significant milestone in the trilateral relationship and will help only strengthen coordination on DPRK," he said, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.


bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 11, 2022


9. Outrage in N. Korea upon learning about government’s missile budget


Just imagine if we had a comprehensive influence campaign. But this should help justify the miniscule investment we could make in an influence campaign. The message will get through. The RFA and VOA news are getting to the Korean people in the north.



Outrage in N. Korea upon learning about government’s missile budget

“People are starving even though it’s autumn, so I don’t understand how they could fire all that money into the air," a source quoted a Chongjin resident as saying

By Lee Chae Un - 2022.11.11 6:00pm

dailynk.com

A photo published by North Korean state media on Oct. 10 of a missile launch from underneath a reservoir. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

North Koreans living along the country’s border with China are outraged after learning of US expert analysis that their government spent tens of millions of dollars to launch missiles in early November.

A Daily NK source in North Hamgyong Province said Monday that rumors are quickly going around the city of Hoeryong that North Korea spent USD 70 million to launch missiles on Nov. 2.

“People who have heard the news cannot hide their shock and anger,” he said.

Border residents who contact the outside world appear to be spreading the rumors.

FOOD SHORTAGES FUEL PEOPLE’S FRUSTRATION

With the number of food-poor families on the rise due to food shortages, many people are aghast on hearing the news.

In fact, the source said locals have unleashed a torrent of criticism after learning just how much money their leaders sunk into the Nov. 2 launch.

“They retort that it makes no sense to launch expensive missiles into the void while taking no measures to deal with food shortages,” he said.

In fact, the source quoted one Hoeryong resident as saying, “They tell us to ride it out a bit more, even if that means tightening our belts, saying it’s because of the Americans that we’re struggling.”

This Hoeryong resident went on, saying, “Ultimately, looking at [the authorities’] behavior, they are basically saying they don’t care if the common folk live or die. I’m furious that I have to live here.”

A Chongjin resident also laid into the authorities, complaining, “People are starving even though it’s autumn, so I don’t understand how they could fire all that money into the air. If the rumor is true, it shows that the propaganda about ‘politics for the people’ is an outright lie.”

Daily NK’s source, meanwhile, claimed that, “Although it’s true that military force guarantees the state’s security, people who are struggling to make ends meet can’t understand the justifications behind launching USD 70 million into the sky in one day.”

Quoting RAND Corporation Senior Researcher Bruce Bennett, Radio Free Asia (RFA) recently reported that North Korea spent nearly USD 70 million firing 25 missiles over a roughly 10 hour period on Nov. 2.

RFA explained that USD 70 million roughly equals North Korea’s monthly imports from China. That amount also equals annual rice imports from China prior to COVID-19, the outlet said.

Relatedly, Rodong Sinmun ran a report on Nov. 7 titled, “Report of General Staff of KPA on Its Military Operations Corresponding to US-South Korea Combined Air Drill,” in which it detailed its missile launches between Nov. 2 and 5.

“All the corresponding military operations have successfully achieved the planned purposes and the high performance of the KPA operations has been satisfactorily assessed,” the report quoted the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army as saying. “The KPA General Staff once again clarifies that it will continue to correspond with all the anti-DPRK war drills of the enemy with the sustained, resolute and overwhelming practical military measures.”

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com



10. N. Korean foreign ministry creates materials to justify nuclear-armed status to allies



These arguments should be easy to debunk and could be useful to exploit if we were executing a comprehensive influence campaign.


N. Korean foreign ministry creates materials to justify nuclear-armed status to allies

North Korean authorities appear to be setting next January as the final deadline for carrying out the seventh nuclear test, based on reports from several sources inside the country

By Seulkee Jang - 2022.11.11 8:04am

dailynk.com

The entrance to a tunnel at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. (Joint Press Corps)

Amid speculation about when North Korea will conduct a seventh nuclear test, the country’s foreign ministry is drawing up explanatory materials to explain to friendly nations such as Russia and China its justifications for possessing nuclear weapons.

The development suggests North Korea intends to win support for its nuclear-armed status from nations hostile to the US, while at the same time strengthening solidarity with anti–American nations.

According to a high-ranking Daily NK source in North Korea on Tuesday, the foreign ministry’s explanatory materials focus on Pyongyang’s legislation of its nuclear weapons policy in September and is being written in several languages.

The materials are aimed at countries with North Korean embassies and consulates.

The source said the materials say that North Korea had “no choice” but to develop nuclear weapons for self-defense to deter war with hostile nations threatening Pyongyang, including the US, and that North Korea would use the nuclear weapons it possesses for international justice and peace.

The materials also explained that Pyongyang’s status as a nuclear state will help correct the “unfair, Washington-centric world order.”

Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui is reportedly examining the specific copy of the document herself, ordering corrections and additions.

According to the source, as soon as North Korea finishes composing the explanatory materials, the country plans to convey them — through military attaches and diplomats dispatched overseas — to diplomats and defense-related officials in countries that host North Korean diplomatic legations with a view to explain Pyongyang’s position on the nuclear issue.

In fact, North Korea is drawing up plans to complete efforts to explain the legitimacy of its nuclear status prior to the Lunar New Year holiday next January, the source said.

N. KOREA LOOKS TO FINE-TUNE TIMING OF SEVENTH NUCLEAR TEST

North Korea’s creation of the explanatory materials and its efforts to explain the justification of its nuclear policy to friendly nations suggests that the country is fine-tuning the timing of its seventh nuclear test.

Indeed, North Korea may conduct a seventh nuclear test as soon as it confirms the support of major friendly nations such as China and Russia.

Daily NK understands that high-ranking cadres in North Korea say the country needs to conduct a seventh nuclear test to achieve the state’s five-year plan for the development of the defense sciences. Moreover, they claim that the test must be held by the end of the year, or at least before next January’s Lunar New Year holiday.

Based on reports from several Daily NK sources inside the country, North Korean authorities appear to be setting next January as the final deadline for carrying out the seventh nuclear test.

Meanwhile, North Korean authorities are openly demanding that the international community recognize North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state, calling its status “irreversible.”

In fact, in an article on the ”Dynamic Advance of Juche Korea” on Sunday, the Rodong Sinmun stressed that North Korea conducted its largest ever military parade this year. The article further emphasized that the parade showed the whole world the military technology growth and operational capacity of North Korea’s armed forces, and that North Korea’s national status was “irreversible.”

North Korea’s development of nuclear missiles — including a seventh nuclear test — may accelerate if Pyongyang gains the support of major friendly nations for its status as a nuclear-armed state.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

11. Yoon is expected to reap fruitful diplomatic results in G20




Yoon is expected to reap fruitful diplomatic results in G20

donga.com

Posted November. 11, 2022 07:52,

Updated November. 11, 2022 07:52

Yoon is expected to reap fruitful diplomatic results in G20. November. 11, 2022 07:52. .

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol leaves for Phnom Penh, Cambodia and Bali, Indonesia on Thursday to attend the ASEAN and G20 summits. It is his third business trip overseas and multilateral diplomatic summits following the NATO summit in June and the UN General Assembly in September. For his trip for six days and four nights, Yoon will have various bilateral and multilateral dialogues with world leaders, including the summit among Korea, the U.S., and Japan.


The ASEAN and G20 summits are the multilateral diplomatic venues that are held in the buffer zone to keep a distance from global political tensions amid the New Cold War and explore survival strategies maintaining a neutral stance. It may serve as an opportunity to broaden the diplomatic horizons for the leader of South Korea, who has been focusing on enhancing the ROKUS alliance and the solidarity of the liberalist camp for the last six months since his inauguration. Broadening the scope of his diplomatic network in an arena of competition where the U.S.’ Indo-Pacific Strategy and China’s One Belt One Road would run up against each other, and a diplomatic scene that absorbs such collision will be a priceless experience to have.


Moreover, ASEAN is Korea’s key trade and investment partner, following China and the U.S. Amid the economies of the U.S. and China increasingly growing apart, ASEAN is becoming ever more important as an alternative to the Chinese market that Korea has been relying on. In the meeting, Yoon will introduce the Korean version of the Indo-Pacific Strategy built upon the values of freedom, peace, and prosperity and present ways to boost solidarity with the ASEAN countries. His presentation is expected to include an attractive scheme to expand the scope of the country’s diplomacy beyond the Korean peninsula and the four neighboring economies.


During the three-day summit of G20, President Yoon will attend the event for two days and return home. It may be a decision considering the mourning atmosphere in the country after the deadly Halloween disaster. Still, there remains a wonder if he had no option but to shorten his schedule for summit diplomacy. Furthermore, he excluded MBC reporters from his presidential jet because of what his office described as ‘repeated distortion and biased reporting’ on diplomatic issues, sparking an intense backlash from the media and the opposition party. He must ponder hard over the rash decision that made him knock down the diplomatic foundation himself, which is people’s support and encouragement.


Diplomacy that pursues national interest through relations with other countries and the president’s summit diplomacy, in particular, should be free from domestic politics. Amid the dramatic shifts in the international order, Korea faces North Korea’s nuclear issue and complex economic crisis. Political controversies and conflicts only make the nation’s diplomacy drift along. Yoon’s diplomatic visit this time should put the national interest first and serve as an opportunity for the country to elevate its national prestige in the world.

한국어

donga.com



12. Intelligence officer under investigation in relation to Itaewon crowd crush found dead





Friday

November 11, 2022

 dictionary + A - A 

Intelligence officer under investigation in relation to Itaewon crowd crush found dead

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/11/11/national/socialAffairs/Korea-Yongsan-Itaewon/20221111143125262.html


Yongsan Police Precinct [YONHAP]

 

An intelligence officer at Yongsan Police Precinct, known to be under investigation in connection with the Itaewon crowd crush, was found dead Friday.

 

The intelligence officer, surnamed Jeong, was found dead at his home around 12:45 p.m., according to police. 

 

Jeong was one of two officials from the intelligence unit at the Yongsan Police Precinct charged with abuse of authority and destruction of evidence.


 

He had been suspended from duties on Wednesday on suspicion of deleting an intelligence report that detailed concerns about large crowds in Itaewon ahead of Halloween. 

 

The other officer under investigation is Jeong’s boss who is surnamed Kim.

 

The Yongsan Police Precinct, along with the district’s fire station, are under investigation over allegations they failed to immediately and effectively respond to the crowd crush.

 

The Itaewon tragedy claimed 156 lives on the night of Oct. 29. 

 

 


BY LIM JEONG-WON [lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr]



13. Korea negotiates exporting ammunition to the United States




Friday

November 11, 2022

 dictionary + A - A 

Korea negotiates exporting ammunition to the United States

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/11/11/national/defense/Korea-defense-ministry/20221111124654372.html


A U.S. Air Force Staff Sergeant inspects pallets of 155 mm shells at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, on April 29, 2022. [AP]

 

The Ministry of National Defense said Friday that Korea was negotiating with the United States to export 155-millimeter ammunition to the U.S.

 

In a statement, the Defense Ministry said that negotiations are ongoing between Korean and American companies to sell 155-millimeter ammunition, in order to make up for the shortage of ammunition inventories in the United States.

 

Following reports that the ammunition from these negotiations is meant for Ukraine, the Defense Ministry said there was no change in Korea’s position to not provide lethal aid to Ukraine.


 

“[The negotiations to export ammunition] are under the premise that the United States is the end user,” read the statement from the Defense Ministry.

 

The Wall Street Journal had said that 100,000 rounds of 155-millimeter artillery rounds would be delivered to Ukraine after being bought by the United States from Korea, citing U.S. officials with inside information.

 

President Yoon Suk-yeol said in October that Korea has not provided any lethal weapons to Ukraine to fight Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin had warned that any assistance from Korea to Ukraine would bring an end to bilateral relations between Korea and Russia.


BY LIM JEONG-WON [lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr]




14. Yoon's media policy feared to tarnish Korea's image



​Not "will," but "has."


President Yoon needs to correct this.


Yoon's media policy feared to tarnish Korea's image

The Korea Times · November 11, 2022

After the Korean presidential office banned MBC's reporters from boarding the presidential jet when President Yoon Suk-yeol left for Cambodia for ASEAN Plus Three Summit, Friday, representatives of associations of Korean journalists protest in front of the presidential office in Yongsan District, Seoul, Thursday, protesting the decision. The posters made by the National Union of Media Workers read: "You're saying MBC has to get off (the presidential plane)? Who is the person who should really get off (the plane)!!" Yonhap


Foreign journalists add fuel to criticism of Yoon's ban of MBC reporters from presidential jet

By Ko Dong-hwan

President Yoon Suk-yeol's ban of local TV broadcaster MBC's reporters from his presidential plane is drawing mostly negative attention internationally as well as domestically.


Media experts and foreign journalists are expressing concerns that the Yoon administration's recent attempts to limit the access of certain media outlets will hurt the country's reputation globally, with some even likening Yoon's media policies to those of North Korea.


On Thursday, the presidential office banned MBC reporters from boarding the presidential jet during Yoon's visit to Southeast Asia for meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Group of 20. The decision came approximately two months after the broadcaster had reported about Yoon being caught on camera using profanity when speaking about U.S. President Biden and the U.S. Congress during his trip to New York, subtitling his remark.


Bae Jong-chan, the president of Insight K, a political analysis group based in Seoul, told The Korea Times that the ban will tarnish the reputation of Korea. "It is highly likely that the ban will result in damaging the national image particularly from the perspective of press freedom," he said.

He added that it is unfortunate that the measure came a day before Yoon left for the ASEAN+3 Summit in Cambodia and the G20 in Bali, Indonesia where he will encounter hordes of foreign journalists.


"With the crowd crush disaster in Itaewon (which claimed 156 lives, including those of 26 foreign nationals, on Oct. 29), Yoon's public support rating is as low as ever," Bae said. "With this mood, the ban on MBC will only fuel another potential political clash between the parties (which are divided over how the presidential office has been responding to incidents and disasters involving Yoon)."


Michael Breen, a former Korean correspondent for The Guardian, The Times and The Washington Times and now chairman of Seoul-based PR firm Insight Communications Consultants, told The Korea Times that a political leader can never win fighting the press in a democratic country.


"The MBC ban, I think, wasn't very smart and appears to be violation of freedom of press," said Breen. "If there really was a serious damage to national interest as the presidential office insists, the office wouldn't just suddenly ban MBC but instead would claim something and even take a legal action. The excuse by the office may be true but seems a little weak."


Reporters from outside Korea who have paid keen attention to the Itaewon tragedy and worked hard to circulate news on it have already poured out criticism of the ban.


The board of the Seoul Foreign Correspondents' Club (SFCC) issued a statement on its website, Thursday, expressing its concerns.


"Restrictions placed on one outlet for coverage deemed to be 'distorted' raise concerns for the freedom of all press, domestic and foreign," the statement said. "The board will monitor developments closely and expects that moving forward, all media will be treated with the same principles of access, regardless of the tone or nature of the journalistic coverage."


Choi Jae-woong, president of the SFCC, which has around 500 registered members, including representatives of about 100 media organizations, told The Korea Times, Friday, that his opinion of the ban is the same as that of the SFCC board.


Foreign journalists have joined in the criticism online. They have carried and shared on social media platforms statements by various associations of Korean journalists ― both for newspapers and for TV broadcasters ― condemning the ban and saying it violates the democratic freedom of the press in Korea.


President Yoon Suk-yeol, right, talks to Rep. Chung Jin-suk, the interim chief of the ruling People Power Party, before boarding the Korean presidential jet to head to Cambodia at Seoul Airport, Friday. Yonhap


Laura Bicker, a BBC foreign correspondent formerly in Seoul, tweeted that when Yoon was elected in March this year he had pledged to create a "global pivotal state." She added that Seoul has become a hub for the world's press, encouraging many journalists to move from China to Seoul. Her remark reflects The New York Times and The Washington Post having relocated their Asian coverage offices to Seoul in 2021. Publicized reasons behind those moves include the country's higher reputation of protecting freedom of the press compared to other Asian nations, as well as Korea's convenient online working environment.


She then rhetorically asked: "So is banning a broadcaster he dislikes from his foreign trip really the global image he wants to portray?"


Raphael Rashid, a freelance journalist based in Seoul, tweeted, Thursday, that the ban was "not a one-off, and part of a concerted attack on freedom of press/expression in South Korea under the Yoon administration."


Chad O'Carroll, a London journalist based in Seoul who founded NK News, a news outlet dedicated to covering North Korea, tweeted, Thursday, excerpts from the "Regulations for the Activities by Foreign Journalists in the Territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," referring to the official name of the North, abbreviated as DPRK.


Article 24 in these regulations states that foreign journalists "Shall promote the development of relations of friendship and cooperation between the DPRK and other countries…through impartial reporting activities." Article 25 states that the journalists are banned from "Distorting the realities in the DPRK or make a false report out of hostile intention" and "Violating the interests of the DPRK and its citizens and defaming the latter."


"Yoon says 'national interests' are at stake…which is why MBC ― whose reporting his office dislikes and disagrees with ― cannot board the presidential aircraft," O'Carroll tweeted amid his posts of the North Korean press regulations. Rashid responded to O'Carroll's tweet, saying that the Yoon administration's measures against distorted or biased reporting seem to be the "same as North Korea."


Main opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) lawmakers from the National Assembly Science, ICT, Broadcasting, and Communications Committee talk to reporters after hosting a press conference at the National Assembly regarding the presidential office's banning of MBC reporters from the presidential jet headed to Cambodia, Thursday. Yonhap


The ruling People Power Party has been supporting the presidential office's decision to ban MBC from boarding the presidential jet during Yoon's latest foreign trip, agreeing to the office's denouncement of the broadcaster.


"This will certainly put the upcoming National Assembly meetings on the state budget and the national investigation of the Itaewon tragedy on an unavoidable course towards more political skirmishes," Bae said.


In response to the mounting criticisms, Lee Ju-il, the presidential secretary for government information, told The Korea Times that he has no comment.


On Thursday, the presidential office explained the ban by saying that there is "important national interest at stake in overseas trips," implying that MBC's reporting of Yoon's hot mic gaffe when he was at a fundraising event in New York on Sept. 21 went against the national interest.


The broadcaster subtitled what the president said to his aides as he was exiting the event: "Biden will surely lose his face if those bastards in the Congress/Assembly do not pass it." The office claimed that the broadcaster deserves to be banned despite many other domestic and foreign media outlets also having reported on Yoon's expletive-laced comment.


Yoon, when asked by reporters about the ban in Thursday morning during an impromptu interview at the presidential office in Yongsan, Seoul, said: "Taxpayer money is used to finance the president's overseas trips because of important national interests…We've been providing this favor to the media to help them cover foreign policy and security issues conveniently, and I'd like you to understand the decision as part of such efforts."



The Korea Times · November 11, 2022



15. Establishing North Korean human rights foundation for both Koreas



Now is the time for the ROK/US alliance to adopt a human rights upfront approach.


Establishing North Korean human rights foundation for both Koreas

The Korea Times · November 10, 2022

By Jeon Su-mi

Since the current government came to power, discussions about creating a North Korean human rights foundation have been rekindled. The North Korean Human Rights Act was narrowly enacted in 2016 when the ruling and opposition parties finally reached an agreement, after repeated proposals and rejections over the previous 11 years. According to Article 10 of the act, the government must establish a foundation to investigate the state of North Korean human rights and to conduct research and policy development related to the promotion of human rights in North Korea.


South Korea was relatively late in enacting such a law, compared to the U.S.' North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004 and Japan's North Korean Human Rights Act in 2006. The reason for this lies in the logic of the left and right-wing camps regarding the issue of North Korean human rights. The liberal Democratic Party of Korea was reluctant to mention North Korean human rights because it feared it would hinder dialogue and relations with the North. On the other hand, the conservative Saenuri Party, the predecessor of the current ruling People Power Party (PPP), took the position that North Korea was South Korea's "main enemy" and that the atrocities of this enemy country should be actively revealed.


In general, the camp that focuses on improving inter-Korean relations focuses on human rights, labor, and welfare, and the camp that is critical of the North Korean system focuses on economics and security. Some in the left-leaning camp, perceiving North Korea as a partner in mutual reconciliation and cooperation to overcome the longstanding division of the Korean Peninsula, were somewhat uncomfortable with the voices of North Korean refugees who denounced the human rights violations of the North Korean regime. This discomfort arose out of concern that these anti-regime voices might make North Korea reluctant to engage in cooperative ventures and inter-Korean exchanges.


But are the critics of the North Korean system more serious about the human rights of North Koreans? Not necessarily. When North Korean women report that they have been sexually assaulted by North Korean men, these critics are silent about human rights violations against North Korean refugee women because the violations were committed by other North Korean refugees and cannot be used as a means of attacking the progressive camp politically.


Thus, when they focus only on the testimony of defectors who reject and criticize the North Korean regime, they appear to be using North Korean human rights as a political tool. As a result, North Korean refugee women, who already lacked a voice in South Korean society, are isolated still further and have become a new lower class even within the North Korean refugee community.


During the 70-year division of the Korean Peninsula, it has been in a volatile state, having gone through the Korean War, which devastated the entire peninsula, the anger and resentment of North against South and South against North, and people from opposing systems being used as political pawns to prove the superiority of each side's regime. North Korean refugees have been being thoroughly exploited as part of this political game, and we South Koreans have been ignoring the voices of North Korean refugee women, a minority group caught in the blind spot of human rights advocacy.


Based on South Korea's view of security, newly arrived refugees are subjected to investigation by the National Intelligence Service, compulsory education at Hanawon, and assignment of a personal protection officer, reflecting the state's attitude of regarding North Korean defectors as "double agents" that it must monitor and control.


Therefore, in the discussion around establishing the North Korean human rights foundation, we must expand and improve our efforts in regard to the human rights of North Korean refugees, especially women, residing in South Korea. In order to achieve this, we need to overcome and remove the existing Cold War mentality and its militaristic logic.


Moreover, it is essential, first, to recognize that the existing concept of North Korean human rights has often been politicized as a means to attack North Korea; then, to break away from the existing political discourse on North Korean human rights; and so, to discuss Korean human rights centered on humans. In this way, we will be able to expand the scope of the discussion from North Korean human rights to the entirety Korean human rights, which is essential for us to be able legitimately to raise the rights issues in relation to North Korea.


At present, we have a North Korean Refugee Support Act, but it does not include provisions to deal with the human rights of North Korean refugees, and the discussion of the issue has hitherto largely neglected the human rights needs of these refugees.


The North Korean human rights foundation will be most meaningful and effective if it is mandated to address the human rights of all North Koreans living in the Korean Peninsula. Such a move would open a new chapter in our efforts to improve human rights on the Korean Peninsula, since North Korean human rights, up to now are too often discussed only as a political tool to some other end and would be reconstructed based on the universal values of mankind.


Jeon Su-mi (sumijeon@ssu.ac.kr), an attorney, is an invited professor at the Soongsil Institute for Peace and Unification. She was a member of the Presidential Committee on Northern Economic Cooperation. Her specialty includes South Korean politics and foreign policy, North Korea politics and human rights.


The Korea Times · November 10, 2022



16. Unpacking South Korea’s Recovery of a North Korean Missile at Sea



Interesting that the regime would anticipate a ROK recovery operation.


Excerpt:

The Pyongae-5 and its successor (speculated to be called Pyongae-6) have thus left the S-200VE, which was designated Pyongae-4 in North Korea, with a much-diminished status. This means the missiles from the few S-200s North Korea has are expendable today at little loss to the overall capabilities of the country’s air defense network. This choice of missile for a launch southwards strongly indicates that a South Korean recovery operation was anticipated before the North conducted its launches.




Unpacking South Korea’s Recovery of a North Korean Missile at Sea

North Korea seems to have purposefully launched an obsolete, low-value missile into waters close to South Korea.

thediplomat.com · by A. B. Abrams · November 10, 2022

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On November 9, South Korea’s defense ministry revealed the findings of an investigation into a North Korean missile launch, after having recovered the remains of the missile in question at sea two days prior. Of the 23 North Korean missiles fired on November 2, one made an unprecedented landing south of the two Koreas’ de facto maritime border, falling 60 kilometers off the South Korean coast. A mission to recover the downed missile was seen as an opportunity to gain key intelligence on Pyongyang’s missile programs.

The nature of the parts salvaged, however, will likely be highly disappointing to Seoul and to its allies, as they were announced to be from the SA-5 system – the United States’ designation for the Soviet air defense system better known as the S-200.

It was previously expected that recovering the remains of a North Korean missile would provide key intelligence either on one of its modern semi-ballistic solid-fueled designs, or at least its heavily modernized Scud-derived missiles, which have benefited from a range of new features, including maneuverable re-entry vehicles.

Both of these kinds of missile were confirmed by footage from North Korean state media to have been part of the November 2 launch. If one of those missiles had been retrieved by the South, analysis of the materials used in the body, the design of the engine, and the kinds of fuel composites relied on, among a wide range of other aspects, could have provided important insights into the state of North Korea’s defense sector and possibly even the suspected commonalities between some of the newer missiles and their counterparts in the Russian military.

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S-200 missiles, by contrast, provide effectively no intelligence of value. The long-range air defense system has long since been compromised by Western intelligence agencies and is currently actively fielded in the militaries of NATO member states Poland and Bulgaria, which received them during the Warsaw Pact era. The latest surface-to-air missiles added to the system entered service over four decades ago in the late 1970s.

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With unusually large anti-aircraft missiles comparable in size to the Scud, and with a very long surface to air engagement range of 300 kilometers, which is longer still if fired ballistically as it was on November 2, firing from an S-200 system could be effectively disguised to resemble a ballistic missile launch. It thus appears that while North Korea fired its modern and indigenous ballistic missiles much farther out into the sea, an obsolete Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missile, which would provide no intelligence value to its adversaries, was chosen to be fired on a trajectory further south. This allowed Pyongyang to send a signal to Seoul and Washington while minimizing the risks of compromising its missile programs. As it integrated the longest ranged missiles ever supplied to North Korea from abroad, the S-200 system was an ideal choice.

The expenditure of an irreplaceable Soviet-supplied missile from the S-200 system, which was only delivered in limited numbers in the late 1980s, highlights the degree to which North Korea’s defense sector has progressed in recent years to leave Soviet equipment behind in terms of performance. Although a decade ago the S-200VE was by far the most capable long-range air defense system North Korea fielded, it is effectively obsolete today compared to its more modern indigenous successors.

The first of these, the Pyongae-5, entered service in 2017 and is technologically several decades ahead with capabilities comparable to the Russian S-300PMU series. An even newer unnamed successor was unveiled in October 2020 and integrated sophisticated surface-to-air missiles with twin rudder controls and double-impulse flight engines. Both use missiles compact enough to be integrated onto road mobile launch vehicles, providing a vital addition to survivability, which contrast sharply with the S-200’s very large fixed sites and bulky Scud-sized munitions.

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The Pyongae-5 and its successor (speculated to be called Pyongae-6) have thus left the S-200VE, which was designated Pyongae-4 in North Korea, with a much-diminished status. This means the missiles from the few S-200s North Korea has are expendable today at little loss to the overall capabilities of the country’s air defense network. This choice of missile for a launch southwards strongly indicates that a South Korean recovery operation was anticipated before the North conducted its launches.

A. B. Abrams

A. B. Abrams is the author of "China and America’s Tech War from AI to 5G: The Struggle to Shape the Future of World Order" and "Immovable Object: North Korea’s 70 Years at War with American Power." He has published widely on international security and geopolitics with a focus on East Asia, and holds related Masters degrees from the University of London.

thediplomat.com · by A. B. Abrams · November 10, 2022









De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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