Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The United States can and should develop a more holistic approach to strategic competition that recognizes and seizes upon the irregular, non-lethal, and non-military

aspects of competing as fundamental to success, and that focuses on U.S. interests and values, not just what it opposes.

...

The Joint Force will conduct irregular warfare operations and activities proactively to subvert, create

dilemmas for adversaries, and impose costs on an adversary’s strategic interests, including its

economy, civil society, institutional processes, and critical infrastructure. Irregular warfare

favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and

other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and political will."

- The Joint Concept for Competing, 10 February 2023

"Man is never happy, but spends his whole life striving after something which he thinks will make him so."

-Arthur Schopenhauer

"The only means of strengthening one's intellect is to make up one's mind about nothing, to let the mind of a thoroughfare for all thoughts."

-John Keats

1. Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Marking One Year Since Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 24, 2023

3. West Looks Askance at Beijing’s Apparent Desire To Play Peacemaker

4. BIDEN’S UKRAINE TRIP A CHANCE FOR SECRET SERVICE AND JSOC TO RENEW OLD TIES

5. Eight Ways the Russia-Ukraine War Changed the World

6. China Is Trying to Quickly Launch 13,000 Satellites to Defeat Starlink

7. Don't Let Retired Generals Drag America Into the Ukraine War

8. A global divide on the Ukraine war is deepening

9. IntelBrief: China Aids and Abets Russian Disinformation Efforts in the Ukraine Conflict

10. ABC News: Biden says Ukraine does not need F-16 fighter jets

11. Blinken heads to Asia, with China, Russia tensions soaring

12. 20 Ways to Win the Future of War, and Not One Is a Balloon

13. Red flags: China, North Korea flex military capabilities as fears over new conflicts continue to rise in Asia

14. After a Green Beret’s Suicide, His Wife Hopes Revised Army Program Will Reach Others

15. Ukraine Is the West’s War Now

16. Beijing's Global Media Offensive: Book Review and Author Interview

17. Year One of the Ukraine War: The Big Lessons and Questions

1. Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Marking One Year Since Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

Conclusion:

Difficult times may lie ahead, but let us remain clear-eyed about what is at stake in Ukraine. And let us remain united in purpose and in action—and steadfast in our commitment to ensure that a world of rules and rights is not replaced by one of tyranny and turmoil.

Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Marking One Year Since Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

defense.gov

Release

Immediate Release

Feb. 24, 2023 |×

One year ago today, Russia launched an unprovoked and indefensible invasion of its peaceful and democratic neighbor Ukraine—a cruel war of choice that has killed thousands of innocent Ukrainians, forced millions more from their homes, left countless Ukrainians wounded or traumatized, and inflicted tragedy and terror on a sovereign U.N. member state.

Today's solemn anniversary is an opportunity for all who believe in freedom, rules, and sovereignty to recommit ourselves to supporting Ukraine's brave defenders for the long haul—and to recall that the stakes of Russia's war stretch far beyond Ukraine.

The United States has rallied the world to support Ukraine and hold Russia accountable. Under President Biden's leadership, the United States has committed more than $32 billion in game-changing security assistance to Ukraine over the past year. This includes more than 1,600 Stinger anti-aircraft systems; more than 8,500 Javelin anti-armor systems; 232 howitzers and more than two million rounds of artillery ammunition; 38 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and ammunition; a Patriot air-defense battery; eight National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and other key air-defense capabilities; 109 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles; 31 Abrams tanks; and 90 Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers. We have done all this with bipartisan backing in Congress and with the proud support of the American people.

The United States has also rallied nations of goodwill from around the planet to condemn Russia's aggression and rush urgently needed assistance to Ukraine. The engine of our efforts is the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, an extraordinary coalition of some 50 countries that I convene regularly to coordinate support to Ukraine's defenders. Our allies and partners in the Contact Group have committed more than $20 billion in security assistance to Ukraine, including hundreds of tanks, thousands of other armored vehicles, vital air-defense systems, hundreds of artillery systems, and other crucial capabilities.

In response to the most urgent danger to European security since the end of World War II, we have moved swiftly with our allies to further unify and strengthen NATO. The Alliance has bolstered its defenses on the Eastern Flank. Meanwhile, the United States has deployed or extended more than 20,000 additional U.S. forces to Europe and forward-stationed the first permanent U.S. forces on NATO's Eastern Flank. NATO is more united than ever, and the U.S. commitment to defend every inch of allied territory remains ironclad.

One year into a war of aggression waged by a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, our allies and partners worldwide stand united and resolute. Putin's reckless, illegal war is not just an all-out assault on Ukraine's sovereignty and a historic threat to European security. It is also a direct attack on the system of rules, institutions, and laws that the world built at such great cost after World War II—a system that rejects aggression and respects the rights of all countries, big and small.

Putin thought that Ukraine's defenses would collapse, that America's resolve would falter, and that the world would look the other way. He was wrong. One year later, Ukraine's brave defenders have not wavered, and neither has our commitment to support them for as long as it takes.

Despite the Kremlin's campaign of cruelty, the people of Ukraine have shown stunning bravery, skill, and fortitude. Today and every day, we stand by the courageous Ukrainians fighting to defend their country, and we mourn with those who have lost their loved ones in Moscow's monstrous and unnecessary war.

Difficult times may lie ahead, but let us remain clear-eyed about what is at stake in Ukraine. And let us remain united in purpose and in action—and steadfast in our commitment to ensure that a world of rules and rights is not replaced by one of tyranny and turmoil.

ukraine response NATO Defense Secretary Austin

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2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 24, 2023

Map/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2023

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin did not comment on the first anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, likely because Russia has failed to achieve any of its stated objectives and has not made significant territorial gains since July 2022.
A Russian source capitalized on China's release of a 12-point peace plan to inaccurately portray China as supporting Russia's war in Ukraine.
US intelligence reportedly continues to assess that China is seriously considering sending lethal aid to Russia amid continued pressure from Western sanctions regimes on Russia's defense industrial base.
Western governments made a variety of statements on the provision of military aid to Ukraine on February 24.
The Kremlin escalated its information condition-setting for a possible false-flag operation in occupied Transnistria, Moldova.
Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks northwest of Svatove and near Kreminna.
Russian sources confirmed that Russian forces have split certain Airborne (VDV) force formations across at least two axes of advance.
Russian forces made marginal territorial gains around Bakhmut and continued to conduct ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast front line.
Ukrainian officials suggested that Russian forces may feel insecure in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
Russian authorities continue measures to expand the capacity of Russian peacekeepers.
Russian sources likely attempted to shift the blame for scandals associated with Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) commanders to the conventional Russian military.
Ukrainian partisans likely blew up a railway segment near Poshtove, Crimea.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 24, 2023

Feb 24, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

February 24, 7:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Kremlin did not comment on the first anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, likely because Russia has failed to achieve any of its stated objectives and has not made significant territorial gains since July 2022. Russian President Vladimir Putin and his administration made no statements relating to the anniversary even though Putin has made numerous public appearances over the past three days.[1] Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev made inflammatory claims that Russia will win the war and reiterated that it is vital for Russia to achieve its goals to "push back the borders that threaten [Russia] as far as possible, even if they are the borders of Poland."[2] ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin has been using Medvedev to sustain information campaigns targeting Western military support for Ukraine and to deflect attention from Russia's military failures.[3] Medvedev's statements highlight the fact that the Kremlin is continuing to pursue its unrealistic maximalist goals even though it has no meaningful successes to offer the Russian people after a year of costly war in Ukraine.

Select Russian milbloggers commented on the Kremlin's silence on the first anniversary of the war. Russian former officer and an avid Kremlin critic Igor Girkin criticized Medvedev's statements as delusional and lamented the fact that no one remembers the severe losses Russian airborne troops suffered during the fight for Hostomel Airfield near Kyiv on February 24, 2022.[4] Girkin claimed that he had long been forecasting that Russia had embarked upon a protracted and exhausting war. He noted that it is very difficult to defeat a state that receives external support using Russia's unmotivated forces, absent civil society, and strong brainwashing.[5] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger attempted to downplay Russia's military failures expressing thanks that the war revealed shortcomings but distress at the high price paid in Russian blood.[6] The milblogger also amplified the Kremlin's false narrative that the war was necessary to stop supposed Ukrainian "aggression" in Donbas. The milblogger's statements closely mirror comments made by unnamed Kremlin-affiliated officials to Financial Times who noted that Putin will try to frame Russia's catastrophic military failures as a necessary learning experience that Russia will use to prepare for future supposed NATO aggression against Russia that Putin purportedly fears.[7]

A Russian source capitalized on China's release of a 12-point peace plan to inaccurately portray China as supporting Russia's war in Ukraine. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a document on February 24 titled "China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis" that called for Ukraine and Russia to respect each other's sovereignty, cease hostilities, resume peace talks, reduce strategic risks, and cease unilateral sanctions.[8] Advisor to the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) head Rodion Miroshnik falsely asserted that China's peace plan insinuated that Ukraine and the West are the aggressors, supporting Russia's framing of the war.[9] China's release of the vague peace plan is likely in support of an ongoing effort balance between supporting Russia and retaining access to European markets by portraying China as a disinterested third-party mediator. The Chinese peace plan is unlikely to be a serious blueprint for a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine.

US intelligence reportedly assesses that China is seriously considering sending weapons to Russia amidst continued pressure from Western sanctions regimes on Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). CNN reported on February 24 that sources familiar with the intelligence stated that Chinese officials have not made a final decision on the provision of lethal aid but are discussing the price and scope of the supply of attack drones and ammunition with Russian officials.[10] Senior US officials reportedly assess that recent intelligence suggests that China is leaning toward providing the equipment to Russia, although based on a bilateral arms sales agreement and not as security assistance.[11] German outlet Der Spiegel reported on February 23 that Russian officials are engaged in negotiations with Chinese drone manufacturer Xi'an Bingo Intelligent Aviation Technology for the mass production and delivery of 100 ZT-180 drones to Russian forces by April.[12] Der Spiegel reported that the ZT-180 drone can carry a 35-50kg warhead, suggesting that these drones may be a dual-use technology that Russian forces are seeking to acquire for reconnaissance purposes and not just as loitering munitions or high-precision weapons systems.[13] Russian and Chinese officials have reportedly developed plans for the shipment of the drones to Russia under falsified shipping documents labeling the equipment as replacement parts for civil aviation.[14]

Russian officials are likely seeking support from Chinese defense manufacturers due to restrictions that international sanctions regimes have placed on Russia's defense industry. The United Kingdom (UK) government and the US Department of Treasury both announced new sanctions and export ban measures on February 24 specifically targeting industries, entities, and individuals supporting Russian military capabilities.[15] The UK government stated that its new package of export bans aims to block the export of every item that Russia uses on the battlefield in Ukraine and that its new sanctions package would target senior executives of Russian state-owned nuclear power company Rosatom, executives of Russian defense firms, six entities involved in the repair of Russian military equipment, four Russian banks, and Russian elite figures.[16] The US Department of Treasury stated that Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on 22 individuals and 83 entities, 30 of which are reportedly third-country entities and individuals that help Russia evade existing sanctions measures.[17] Intensified Western sanctions regimes will likely continue to constrain Russia's ability to acquire the technology and materiel to maintain a defense industrial base necessary for supporting its war effort in Ukraine.

Western governments made a variety of statements on the provision of military aid to Ukraine on February 24. Polish President Andzej Duda reported that Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki delivered the first batch of Leopards to Ukraine as part of the international "tank coalition."[18] Conversely, US Army Minister Christine Wormuth stated that it could take the United States more than a year to deliver M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine due to the production and modernization timeline associated with such tank variants.[19] US National Security Advisory Jake Sullivan stated on February 24 that Russia has already lost its war in Ukraine, but that the provision of F-16 fighter jets, which the Ukrainian government has consistently asked the West for, "are not the key capability" that Ukraine currently needs.[20] Sullivan remarked that the provision of F-16s is not a question of the short-term and instead a question of long-term defensive capabilities.[21] As ISW has previously assessed, the West's material support for Ukraine, particularly the provision of main battle tanks and other critical systems, is essential to enable Ukraine to conduct successful mechanized counteroffensives to liberate Ukrainian people and territory. Continued Western support for Ukraine is crucial to enabling Ukraine to regain the initiative and reengage in successive counteroffensive operations in the near future.

The Kremlin escalated its information conditions-setting for a possible false-flag operation in Russian-occupied Transnistria, Moldova. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) made a second claim on February 23 that Ukrainian forces are intensifying preparations to invade Transnistria following its first such claim earlier in the day.[22] The MoD emphasized that the claimed Ukrainian plan poses a significant threat to the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Transnistria. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed on February 24 that Russia will consider any action that threatens Transnistrian security as an attack against Russia.[23] The Kremlin may instead aim to destabilize Moldova, however. Some Russian milbloggers amplified the Kremlin's rhetoric by claiming that the situation along the Ukrainian-Transnistrian border is becoming increasingly tense.[24] Moldovan officials continued to deny Russian claims on February 24, characterizing the claims as "aggressive disinformation" or "a psychological operation."[25]

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin did not comment on the first anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, likely because Russia has failed to achieve any of its stated objectives and has not made significant territorial gains since July 2022.
A Russian source capitalized on China's release of a 12-point peace plan to inaccurately portray China as supporting Russia's war in Ukraine.
US intelligence reportedly continues to assess that China is seriously considering sending lethal aid to Russia amid continued pressure from Western sanctions regimes on Russia's defense industrial base.
Western governments made a variety of statements on the provision of military aid to Ukraine on February 24.
The Kremlin escalated its information condition-setting for a possible false-flag operation in occupied Transnistria, Moldova.
Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks northwest of Svatove and near Kreminna.
Russian sources confirmed that Russian forces have split certain Airborne (VDV) force formations across at least two axes of advance.
Russian forces made marginal territorial gains around Bakhmut and continued to conduct ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast front line.
Ukrainian officials suggested that Russian forces may feel insecure in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
Russian authorities continue measures to expand the capacity of Russian peacekeepers.
Russian sources likely attempted to shift the blame for scandals associated with Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) commanders to the conventional Russian military.
Ukrainian partisans likely blew up a railway segment near Poshtove, Crimea.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1- Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks northwest of Svatove and near Kreminna on February 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove).[26] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack near Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove).[27] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna), and the Serebrianska forest area (11km south of Kreminna).[28] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Russian forces seized an unspecified Ukrainian fortified position near Bilohorivka.[29] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked Bilohorivka and attempted to advance toward Terny (17km northwest of Kreminna) and Makiivka (23km northwest of Kreminna).[30] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive actions along the Ploshchanka-Makiivka-Zhuravka Balka line (16-23km northwest of Kreminna).[31]

Russian sources confirmed that Russian forces have split certain Airborne (VDV) formations across at least two axes of advance. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on February 23 that unspecified elements of the Russian 76th Airborne Division are operating in unspecified positions on the Svatove-Kreminna line and that VDV units operate along the entire Svatove-Kreminna front.[32] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that unspecified elements of the 76th and 106th Airborne Divisions are operating in the Bakhmut area in Donetsk Oblast, confirming ISW's assessment that the 76th and likely the 106th are not deployed as full division-level formations in either area.[33] Such disaggregation of VDV formations in different sectors of the front contrasts with the deployment of Western Military District motorized rifle divisions as full doctrinal formations and suggests that the Russian military is using its elite forces to plug gaps and as spot reinforcements in key areas.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on February 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Bakhmut; within 30km north of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamianske, Fedorivka, Rozdolivka, Dubovo-Vasylivka, Zaliznianske, and Berkhivka; and within 26km southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske, Chasiv Yar, Dyliivka, and Vasylivka.[34] Geolocated footage published on February 23 indicates that Russian forces likely made marginal advances near the E40 highway west of Paraskoviivka (7km north of Bakhmut).[35] Geolocated footage published on February 24 indicates that Wagner Group fighters likely advanced into the northern outskirts of Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut).[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters have taken control of most of Yahidne, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation that they have done so.[37] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin also claimed that Wagner fighters completely captured Berkhivka (4km north of Bakhmut), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[38] Other Russian sources amplified Prigozhin's claim, although a prominent milblogger stated that claims about the capture of Berkhivka are premature.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces control elevated positions north of Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and attempted to advance towards Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group fighters also conducted an offensive toward Vesele (17km northeast of Bakhmut) from Bilohorivka (21km northeast of Bakhmut).[41] Geolocated footage published on February 24 indicates that Russian forces likely secured marginal gains on the northeastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that positional battles are ongoing in Bakhmut and that Wagner fighters advanced in the eastern part and the southwestern outskirts of the city.[43] The Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group fighters resumed offensives in the direction of the T0504 highway and near Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), where there is reportedly fighting on the outskirts of the settlement.[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on February 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions within 36km southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, Vodyane, Nevelske, Marinka, and Novomykhailivka.[45] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pobieda (32km southwest of Avdiivka) and pushed Ukrainian forces out of strongholds in the settlement.[46] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces lack the personnel needed to make advances around Pobieda.[47] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced into Pobieda, although ISW has not seen any visual confirmation of Russian forces in the settlement.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted an assault toward Avdiivka from Spartak (5km south of Avdiivka) and from Novobakhmutivka (13km northeast of Avdiivka) towards Keramik (15km north of Avdiivka).[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on February 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Prechystivka (35km southwest of Donetsk City).[50] Geolocated footage published on February 23 indicates that Russian forces likely secured marginal gains northeast of Mykilske (27km southwest of Donetsk City).[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults in the direction of Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City) from positions in the dacha area west of Mykilske.[52] Another Russian milblogger complained that Russian forces are inexplicably unable to destroy high-rise buildings in Vuhledar that reportedly offer Ukrainian forces effective observation positions for adjusting artillery fire around the settlement.[53]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian officials suggested that Russian forces may feel insecure about their ability to maintain control of the east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Adviser Serhiy Khlan stated on February 23 that Russian forces increased their presence in areas close to the Dnipro River and have defined security in the Henichesk area as "conditional."[54] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk reported that Russian forces have intensified shelling against areas in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast.[55] Khlan reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in Nova Kakhovka on February 24 after Russian forces moved equipment to the area on February 23.[56]

Russian forces continued to conduct routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on February 24.[57]

Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces both conduct reconnaissance-in-force and engage in positional battles without making significant advances in Zaporizhia Oblast.[58]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities continue measures to expand the capacity of the Russian peacekeeping force. The Russian government sent a bill to the State Duma on February 23 that expands the mechanisms by which Russian peacekeepers can deploy abroad.[59] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) previously proposed an amendment on February 7 that allows Russian forces to recruit peacekeepers from conscripts and mobilized personnel without contracts, as ISW has previously reported.[60] Russian forces may aim to set conditions to secure increased capabilities for their peacekeeping missions abroad or to legitimize the presence of Russian forces in conflict-heavy areas.

Ukrainian sources reported that Russian officials continue covert crypto-mobilization efforts in Russia and in occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 24 that Russian officials are continuing covert mobilization in Russia, particularly in regions of the Caucasus where Russian officials are reportedly forcibly mobilizing men of conscription age regardless of health or willingness to fight.[61] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian officials are mobilizing a large number of these personnel from penitentiaries with the promise of release if they fight in Ukraine.[62] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on February 24 that Russian officials are actively recruiting Russian occupation officials and police officers into the Russian military and telling them that if they conclude contracts voluntarily before an upcoming mobilization wave in occupied territories, they will be able to serve in safer areas of the front.[63] Russian officials may be more heavily conducting crypto-mobilization efforts in occupied territories and the Caucasus to shield the wider Russian public from these efforts and avoid potential associated domestic discontent.

Russian sources are likely attempting to shift the blame for scandals associated with Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) commanders to the conventional Russian military. Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) First Deputy Information Minister Danil Bezsonov argued on February 24 that DNR commanders are mistreating disobedient mobilized personnel because Russian military commanders did not solve these issues during the mobilized personnel's training in rear areas.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that many of these mobilized personnel do not want to fight and that Russian officials deceived them about the nature of their deployments to Ukraine.[65] These Russian sources likely issued these statements in response to recent scandals in which mobilized personnel reportedly subordinated under DNR formations publicly accused DNR commanders of mistreatment and poor command.[66] The Russian military's integration of DNR formations into the Russian Armed Forces has also generated widespread complaints from Russian milbloggers and DNR-linked figures that the Russian military is sidelining DNR commanders.[67] Elements of the ultranationalist pro-war community will likely continue to criticize the Russian MoD for the conduct of this integration effort while shielding the DNR military command from criticism.

Attacks on military recruitment offices in Russia reportedly continued as Russian officials punish previous perpetrators of such attacks. A Russian source claimed on February 23 that an unknown person threw a Molotov cocktail at an enlistment office in Murmansk City.[68] A Russian source stated on February 23 that a Volgograd City Court sentenced a Russian citizen to over four years in prison for an arson attack on a military recruitment office in Volgograd City in May 2022.[69]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian partisans likely blew up a railway segment in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on February 24 that Ukrainian partisans damaged a railway station in Bakhchisaray Raion, occupied Crimea.[70] The Resistance Center shared photographs of a cut segment of the railway. Russian sources claimed that unknown actors damaged part of a railroad near Poshtove in Bakhchisaray Raion, approximately 12km northwest of Sevastopol, delaying three civilian transport trains.[71]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian occupation authorities are attempting to limit the spread of information about Russian military movements in occupied Ukraine. The General Staff reported that mobile operators in Luhansk Oblast cut off all internet access in some areas to prevent residents from spreading information about Russian military actions.[72] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that occupation officials imposed a 24-hour curfew in Chaplynka, Kherson Oblast – a frequent target of Ukrainian strikes—from February 23 to 25 possibly to transfer Russian military equipment from Crimea to unspecified defensive lines.[73]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense reported on February 24 that it is relocating a Belarusian missile unit to an unspecified designated position as part of a combat readiness check.[74]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[2] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/274; https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2023/02/24/19822471.shtml

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[4] https://t.me/strelkovii/4050; https://t.me/strelkovii/4049

[5] https://t.me/strelkovii/4048

[6] https://t.me/sashakots/38646

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[8] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html

[9] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10609

[10] https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/24/politics/us-intelligence-china-drones-rus...

[11] https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/24/politics/us-intelligence-china-drones-rus...

[12] https://www.spiegel dot de/international/world/the-war-in-ukraine-china-is-reportedly-negotiating-with-russia-to-supply-kamikaze-drones-a-13909157-4740-4f84-830e-fb3c69bc1dff?sara_ecid=soci_upd_KsBF0AFjflf0DZCxpPYDCQgO1dEMph

[13] https://www.spiegel dot de/international/world/the-war-in-ukraine-china-is-reportedly-negotiating-with-russia-to-supply-kamikaze-drones-a-13909157-4740-4f84-830e-fb3c69bc1dff?sara_ecid=soci_upd_KsBF0AFjflf0DZCxpPYDCQgO1dEMph

[14] https://www.spiegel dot de/international/world/the-war-in-ukraine-china-is-reportedly-negotiating-with-russia-to-supply-kamikaze-drones-a-13909157-4740-4f84-830e-fb3c69bc1dff?sara_ecid=soci_upd_KsBF0AFjflf0DZCxpPYDCQgO1dEMph

[15] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-sanctions-ban-every-item-russia-i...

[16] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-sanctions-ban-every-item-russia-i...

[17] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1296

[18] https://twitter dot com/prezydentpl/status/1629074483419164672

[19] https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-2-23-23...

[20] https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-2-23-23...

[21] https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-2-23-23...

[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/24389

[23] https://www.mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1855478/

[24] https://t.me/wargonzo/11073; https://t.me/notes_veterans/8194 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/8194 ; https://t.me/Republic_Of_GaGauZia/29079

[25] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64746801

[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VUMyzdLujbAqhPLtzM...

[27] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/8877

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nCFx9k3Y1ynnSNkDeei... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VUMyzdLujbAqhPLtzM...

[29] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3385

[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/110741

[31] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/10857

[32] https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27470.5/4725429/; https://t.me/sashakots/38649; https://t.me/sashakots/38644; https://t.me/sashakots/38645

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nCFx9k3Y1ynnSNkDeei...

[35] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1628930875944579072; https://tw... https://twitter.com/EerikMatero/status/1628690678497648641

[36] https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1629142689307402242; https://twitter... https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1629161255800918016?s=20

[37] https://t.me/milchronicles/1594 ; https://t.me/rybar/43938

[38] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/501

[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/78951 ; https://t.me/vrogov/7847 ;https://t...

[40] https://t.me/rybar/43938 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/11074

[41] https://t.me/wargonzo/11074

[42] https://t.me/rybar/43938

[43] https://t.me/rybar/43938

[44] https://t.me/rybar/43938

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nCFx9k3Y1ynnSNkDeei...

[46] https://t.me/rybar/43924 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/11074

[47] https://t.me/rybar/43924

[48] https://t.me/readovkanews/53423

[49] https://t.me/wargonzo/11074

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VUMyzdLujbAqhPLtzM...

[51] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1628906717894393856; https://twitter.com/GloOouD/status/1628891054442262528

[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/11074

[53] https://t.me/notes_veterans/8198

[54] https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid02sFVA5Sy9RLtTfMqRBkooJ...

[55] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/02/24/vorog-vyshukuye-novu-taktyku-natalya-gumenyuk/

[56] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/02/24/vorog-vyshukuye-novu-taktyku-natalya-gumenyuk/

[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VUMyzdLujbAqhPLtzM... https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/4383

[58] https://t.me/vrogov/7849

[59] https://sozd.duma.gov dot ru/bill/301940-8 https://t.me/sotaproject/54249

[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VUMyzdLujbAqhPLtzM...

[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VUMyzdLujbAqhPLtzM...

[63] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/02/24/okupanty-namagayutsya-verbuvaty-vlasnykiv-rosijskyh-pasportiv-na-tot-do-lav-armiyi/

[64] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/22650

[65] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/19534

[66] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://isw.pub/UkrWar020823

[67] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021823

[68] https://t.me/astrapress/21617

[69] https://www.kavkaz-uzel dot eu/articles/386167/ ; https://t.me/sotaproject/54243

[70] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/02/24/nevidomi-geroyi-poshkodyly-zaliznyczyu-v-krymu/

[71] https://t.me/readovkanews/53409; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/45605; ht...

[72] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VUMyzdLujbAqhPLtzM...

[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nCFx9k3Y1ynnSNkDeei...

[74] https://t.me/readovkanews/53432; https://t.me/modmilby/23595

File Attachments:

Zaporizhia Battle Map Draft February 24,2023.png

Kherson-Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft February 24,2023.png

DraftUkraineCOTFebruary24,2023.png

Donetsk Battle Map Draft February 24,2023.png

Kharkiv Battle Map Draft February 24,2023.png

3. West Looks Askance at Beijing’s Apparent Desire To Play Peacemaker

My comments below.

West Looks Askance at Beijing’s Apparent Desire To Play Peacemaker

Considering Communist China’s latest refusal at the UN to condemn the Russian invasion, Washington could be expected to block the idea of Beijing moderating peace talks.

https://www.nysun.com/article/west-looks-askance-at-beijings-apparent-desire-to-play-peacemaker

President Putin greets the Chinese Communist Party's foreign policy chief, Wang Yi, during their meeting at the Kremlin February 22, 2023. Anton Novoderezhkin, Sputnik, Kremlin pPool via AP

DONALD KIRK

Friday, February 24, 202315:37:01 pm

Beijing is looking for a role as an honest broker in the Ukraine war as it plays America versus Russia in a conflict in which it professes neutrality.

The unlikely desire to be a peacemaker lies at the heart of Communist China’s 12-point proposal for a “political settlement” of the Ukraine crisis that has little chance of broad acceptance but may lay the groundwork for eventual talks between the NATO nations, led by Washington, and the Russians. China may even dream of winning President Zelensky’s endorsement of its ideas as long as the Chinese stop short of selling arms to the Russians.

“Not bad” was Mr. Zelensky’s surprisingly upbeat response to China’s proposal. That’s “something we can talk about,” he said, not ruling out the possibility that China may manage to make a difference in a final settlement. The question, as he noted, was “what follows the words … in what steps and where they will lead.”

Mr. Zelensky has come out with his own 10-point peace plan calling for complete withdrawal of Russian troops and “war crimes” trials of Russian leaders. Those demands won’t get anywhere, of course, but now he’s in effect saying, “Sure, I’ll talk to the Chinese, why not?”

Once you get past the opening boilerplate in the Chinese proposal about “respecting the neutrality of all nations,” “abandoning the Cold War mentality,” and “ceasing hostilities,” the verbiage comes down to what the Chinese really would like. What’s that exactly? The answer might well be the job of moderator — or, in President Xi’s wildest dreams, chairman — of a multi-sided peace conference.

China’s yearning for the title of moderator or broker, all coated by a veneer of impartiality, is obvious in the careful wording of the plea for talks. “Dialogue and negotiation are the only viable solution to the Ukraine crisis,” it says. “China will continue to play a constructive role in this regard.”

Considering Communist China’s latest refusal to condemn the Russian invasion by abstaining from a non-binding vote at the United Nations General Assembly calling for immediate withdrawal of Russian troops, Washington could be expected to block the idea of Beijing moderating peace talks. On the upside, though, China’s proposal does indicate Mr. Xi may hesitate to agree to sell arms to Russia if and when he goes to Moscow for a summit that President Putin, in what may be a mood of desperation, is urgently inviting him to attend.

The Americans seem convinced, based on unspecified intelligence sources, that the Chinese are talking to the Russians about arms sales. Washington has warned China of the disastrous consequences, to which China has suggested American fears are almost paranoid — or, in the words of a spokesman, “slander and smears.”

How, after all, could China agree to weaponizing the Russians for a prolonged war knowing the uproar that would ensue for “crossing the threshold” as an arms supplier? As the Chinese peace plan suggests, Beijing may be pro-Russian but it is still a disappointment to Mr. Putin in his quest for the weapons needed to keep his forces on the offensive.

Still, who can believe in China’s sincerity about offering its good offices in any quest for peace? “China’s mention of a peace plan was met skeptically by U.S. and European officials,” the U.S.-funded Radio Free Europe said. “China wants to be seen as very strong and as a leader of the global south and a peace promoter,” RFE quoted a senior European Union official as saying, but “Europe is not wooed.”

Others also had grave doubts about the Chinese proposal.

“We are already seeing reports that the proposal is dead on arrival in Ukraine, the U.S., and the West,” a retired American Army colonel now with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, David Maxwell, said.

For one thing, he said in an email, the Chinese proposal “could be an attempt” to counter the narrative about China “not being a responsible member of the international community and not abiding by the rules based international order.”

Mr. Maxwell believes the Chinese proposal “could also simultaneously be an attempt to divert attention from support to Russia and inoculate itself from criticism for support to Russia.” In the final analysis, he believes the proposal amounts to “political warfare with Chinese characteristics.”

Officially, the Americans share such skepticism. The national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, appearing on CNN, had a simple response: “This war could end tomorrow if Russia stopped attacking Ukraine and withdrew its forces” — a notion that China did not mention in its proposal.

DONALD KIRK

Mr. Kirk, based in Seoul and Washington, has been covering Asia for decades for newspapers and magazines and is the author of books on Korea, the Vietnam War and the Philippines.

4. BIDEN’S UKRAINE TRIP A CHANCE FOR SECRET SERVICE AND JSOC TO RENEW OLD TIES

An article from a new substack called The High SIde (for "In-depth national security reporting) by Jack Murphy and Sean Natkor. It is a subscription service.

reading, it'll appear here.

BIDEN’S UKRAINE TRIP A CHANCE FOR SECRET SERVICE AND JSOC TO RENEW OLD TIES

By Jack Murphy thehighside.substack.com2 min

Jack Murphy

and Sean D. Naylor

22 hr ago

View Original

A task force of the U.S. military’s most elite special operators deployed to Europe to support President Joe Biden’s 23-hour visit to Ukraine, according to two former military officials familiar with the visit.

The support from Joint Special Operations Command is a normal feature of presidential trips to combat zones and other high-risk locations, and just one of the ways in which such visits differ markedly from presidential trips to safer locales, according to former Secret Service and special operations personnel.

For Biden’s Feb. 20 Ukraine visit, JSOC (pronounced “Jay-Sock”), which includes special mission units such as the Army’s 1stSpecial Forces Operational Detachment – Delta (known popularly as “Delta Force”) and the Navy’s SEAL Team 6, deployed elements of one of those two units, according to the two former military officials familiar with the visit, who were reluctant to identify the specific unit. In addition, said one of the former officials, JSOC sent the so-called “Bullet Package” – a quick-alert grouping of helicopters and crew from the Army’s 160thSpecial Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) – forward.

The two former military officials did not say where the Bullet Package was positioned while Biden was in Ukraine, but a former senior Delta officer said it was likely deployed to an airfield in a NATO country bordering Ukraine. Biden flew on Air Force One into Rzeszów-Jasionka Airport in eastern Poland, about 40 miles from the Ukraine border, and then took a roughly ten-hour train journey to Kyiv and back, spending about five hours in the capital.

The elite forces’ involvement is in keeping with previous presidential visits to war zones, according to former Secret Service agent Bill Gage, who accompanied President Barack Obama on two visits to Afghanistan. “Each time, we had a Tier One unit, whether it was DevGru or CAG, assigned to us,” said Gage, using the abbreviations for Naval Special Warfare Development Group and Combat Applications Group, cover names for Team 6 and Delta respectively. “Tier One” units are those assigned to JSOC, reporting directly to the JSOC commander.

While the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan meant the risk of an armed attack on the president in Kabul or Baghdad was arguably higher than in downtown Kyiv, the United States also enjoyed a much greater level of control in war zones in which its troops were fighting. “The trips I went on to Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. controlled the entire country,” said Gage, who left the Secret Service in 2013.

Not to mention that the United States military controlled the airspace in those war zones, while in Ukraine the airspace is contested with regular incursions from Russian fighter jets, drones, and ballistic missiles.

The huge U.S. military presence in those places made it easier to use uniformed U.S. special operations forces to help protect the president. “When President Bush came to Iraq in November 2003, we had 95 percent of the operation” to protect him, said a former senior Delta officer.

That level of on-the-ground involvement by U.S. special operators would have been extremely difficult in Ukraine, according to Gage. “If it was done for this [Ukraine] visit it would have been very, very low-vis[ibility], extremely low-vis,” he said.

5. Eight Ways the Russia-Ukraine War Changed the World

Photos and video at the link.

War can cause great, significant, and catastrophic social change.

The eight ways:

It resurrected the Western alliance

Wars will be fought differently

The U.S. industrial base gets a boost

America revives its influence abroad

Russia and China are moving ever closer

How energy flows around the globe have shifted

Russia is severed financially from the world

Many things cost more

WORLD

Eight Ways the Russia-Ukraine War Changed the World

The conflict drove up food and energy prices, invigorated NATO, altered military doctrine and revived American influence abroad

By WSJ Staff

Feb. 24, 2023 12:01 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-ukraine-war-impact-on-the-world-4f318a37

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a year ago today, set off a cascade of global repercussions for energy, economics, geopolitics and the role of American leadership. More than 300,000 people are estimated to have been killed or wounded. Millions more have fled their homes. The war also united the West, recast global energy trade and exposed the limits of U.S. military manufacturing.

It resurrected the Western alliance

Sweden Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist, European Union Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and Finland Defense Minister Antti Kaikkonen in Brussels on Oct. 13.

PHOTO: YVES HERMAN/REUTERS

Around 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron declared the North Atlantic Treaty Organization brain dead and President Donald Trump threatened to quit. Most member nations had ignored their commitments to boost spending and rebuild militaries, even after Russia’s seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. The invasion of Ukraine last year brought the alliance to life. NATO members have pledged, and begun following through, with billions of dollars worth of military spending. NATO operations along its eastern edge have ballooned and its plans for action-ready forces have expanded 10-fold. Western Europe’s two biggest nonaligned countries, Finland and Sweden, have applied for membership, uniting most of Europe’s wealthiest countries in opposition to Moscow. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia look to join next.

—Daniel Michaels

Wars will be fought differently

A Ukrainian serviceman preparing to fly a drone near the front-line in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine on Feb. 13.

PHOTO: EVGENIY MALOLETKA/AP

Ukraine successfully appropriated tactics from commandos and guerrilla groups in ways that fundamentally alter conventional military doctrine. Kyiv knocked back Moscow’s ground forces and sank warships with small bands of hit-and-run troops and portable, advanced Western weapons. Ukrainian troops re-engineered off-the-shelf drones to drop grenades and spot distant targets for satellite-guided rockets donated by the West. The Ukrainian military improvised an intelligence network modeled on taxi-dispatcher software. In Ukraine, the software collects enemy locations from civilian tips and Russian social-media posts, and computer jockeys pass minute-by-minute information to nearby forces.

How Ukraine’s Growing Military Has Changed Over One Year of War

The U.S. industrial base gets a boost

A Ukrainian service member unpacking Javelin antitank missiles, part of a U.S. military support shipment, at an airport outside Kyiv on Feb. 10.

PHOTO: VALENTYN OGIRENKO/REUTERS

Ukraine has gone through munitions faster than expected, exposing U.S. military shortfalls in ammunition procurement, equipment stockpiles, workers and its supply chains. Doubling the number of Javelin antitank missiles or Himars rocket launchers produced would take two years and a lot more money. The Pentagon has awarded about $3.4 billion in new contracts to replenish domestic and allies’ stocks. The Army has asked Congress for $500 million a year to upgrade production plants. The White House, lawmakers, and the Pentagon are now focused on keeping the U.S. and its allies armed and supplied for future conflicts, including a potential showdown with China.

—WSJ Staff

America revives its influence abroad

President Joe Biden and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during Mr. Biden’s visit to Kyiv on Feb. 20.

PHOTO: EVAN VUCCI/AP

The U.S. embraced the role of global leader, easing doubts about its commitment to Western security. It played a central role rallying European allies to support sanctions, export controls, currency restrictions and energy-market interventions aimed at Russia’s economy. The U.S. has given Kyiv billions of dollars more for weaponry than the next largest donor, Germany. Some Republicans are skeptical about supplying Ukraine with arms. But European leaders look to Congress and President Biden to lead the West’s efforts in Ukraine’s defense.

—WSJ Staff

Russia and China are moving ever closer

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, speaking with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on Sept. 16.

PHOTO: SERGEI BOBYLEV/SPUTNIK/AP

The war in Ukraine has cemented the partnership of the West’s chief strategic rivals by deepening Moscow’s economic dependence on Beijing. China is now a significant buyer of discounted Russian gas and oil, as well as a conduit for goods no longer directly available to Russia because of Western sanctions. China doesn’t supply weapons to Russia, but it provides so-called dual-use goods with military applications. Their partnership has echoes of the Cold-War era. This time, however, Beijing is in the driver’s seat, an uncomfortable position for many in Moscow.

—Stephen Fidler and Austin Ramzy

How energy flows around the globe have shifted

A worker by the docks at the Cheniere Sabine Pass Liquefaction facility in Cameron, La., last year. Cheniere Energy Inc. is the largest exporter of liquefied natural gas in the U.S.

PHOTO: MARK FELIX/BLOOMBERG

Western countries no longer buy Russian oil, to the benefit of Persian Gulf and U.S. energy producers. The halt of natural gas flowing from Russia to Europe has created demand for U.S. supplies, making America the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas. Russia’s production is declining, and Moscow is increasingly dependent on sales to China and India, countries benefiting from significant discounts on Russian oil and gas. The race to secure new sources of oil accelerated a shift in U.S. policy toward Venezuela that included lifting some sanctions to increase crude production there. Israel and Lebanon agreed to a U.S.-brokered deal that opened the way for Israel gas exports to Europe.

—WSJ Staff

Russia is severed financially from the world

A woman stands in line at a currency exchange office in St. Petersburg, Russia, on Feb. 25 last year, the day after Russia invaded Ukraine.

PHOTO: ASSOCIATED PRESS

The West cut off Russia from major parts of the global financial infrastructure. The U.S., European Union and other allies froze around $300 billion worth of Russia’s foreign reserves. They booted major Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging system that underpins most international transactions. Moscow has been working to build its own payments systems and is embracing other currencies for trade, including the ruble and China’s yuan. Goldman Sachs and other major banks have plans to leave Russia, which also was kicked out of major investment indexes. Sanctions have frozen some Russians’ investments abroad and led to the country’s first default on overseas debt since 1918.

—Chelsey Dulaney

Many things cost more

Angelou Liberta Coletta, 75 years old, checks prices during a shopping trip at an H-E-B grocery store in Houston on Dec. 18

PHOTO: BRANDON BELL/GETTY IMAGES

The invasion of Ukraine aggravated global inflation by disrupting the flow of food, oil and natural-gas exports. Benchmark European gas prices shot up 275% in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, but have since fallen. Last year, consumer prices grew by 9.6% in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a group of 38 affluent countries, which was the fastest rate since 1988. Grain prices peaked soon after the invasion, which crimped Ukraine’s production of corn, wheat and sunflower oil. Those prices have fallen but still contribute to higher food prices worldwide. U.S. gasoline prices rose past $5 a gallon last summer. Containing inflation remains the biggest job of central banks and the biggest worry among investors bracing for more interest-rate increases.

—Alistair MacDonald and Matt Grossman

—The photographs in this article were converted to appear in black and white.

6. China Is Trying to Quickly Launch 13,000 Satellites to Defeat Starlink

China Is Trying to Quickly Launch 13,000 Satellites to Defeat Starlink

How will Elon Musk and SpaceX respond?

BY JACKIE APPEL PUBLISHED: FEB 24, 2023

Popular Mechanics · February 24, 2023

China is aiming to send thousands of satellites into low-Earth orbit to compete with SpaceX’s Starlink.
The satellites will be able to track those in the Starlink mega-constellation, and will secure China a place in the low orbit space.
As worries about the militarization of Starlink persist, China aims to be able to monitor the positions and behaviors of Starlink satellites, and disable them if they see the need.

China is preparing to send almost 13,000 satellites into low-Earth orbit in order to directly compete with—and monitor—SpaceX’s Starlink constellations.

Huge numbers of satellites like this are becoming less and less unexpected. They are not without their faults—a fact that any astronomer whose data has been ruined by the devices’ reflectivity will be quick to tell you—but they have the potential to increase internet coverage and communication efficiency around the world. So, it’s not surprising China wants in on the action.

The project, codenamed “GW,” is being run by a newly established group called China Satellite Network Group Co, whose hope is to quickly launch a total of 12,992 small satellites into orbit. This would dwarf Starlink’s current count of around 3,500 satellites, though SpaceX plans to have 12,000 satellites in orbit by 2027 and an eventual total count of 40,000 orbiting devices.

Don't Let Retired Generals Drag America Into the Ukraine War

19fortyfive.com · by Daniel Davis · February 25, 2023

I get it. We love military heroes, and since the days of “Black Jack” Pershing from World War I and George Patton from World War II, we’ve especially venerated the general. But today’s crop of flag officers are not the stuff of their storied predecessors, and if we listen much longer to what they’re saying in regards to the Russia-Ukraine war, we may discover how catastrophically bad their judgment truly is.

Ukraine and the Generals

While it’s no secret that since 2013 I’ve argued – many times (including last month in these pages) – we place too much trust on our generals and turn too blind of an eye when they are proven disastrously wrong. With statements and claims made by a number of retired general officers leading up to Friday’s one-year mark in Russia’s war with Ukraine, however, it is more urgent than ever that the American public take what they say with more than a little skepticism.

If our policymakers take the advice of these former high-ranking officers, America may find itself at war with Russia, shocked by a Ukrainian loss – or worst of all: sucked into a nuclear exchange with Russia.

Lest any think these are unsubstantiated claims, consider the following claims and statements made by America’s highest profile generals on television of late. If one only listened to these former officers and didn’t know what was actually happening on the ground, they would be forgiven for believing Russia is a spent force, that Ukraine is well on its way to victory, and that the only way Ukraine doesn’t win would be if Western politicians go weak and fail to provide necessary supplies and gear.

Former Central Command General David Petraeus said he believed Ukraine would “retake the territory Russia has seized since 24 February (2022),” and that it is “even conceivable now that they could retake Crimea and the Donbas.” Former general Mark Clark seconded Petraeus’ suggestion, adding that taking Crimea “is a concrete, understandable and achievable military objective.” Retired general Ben Hodges went further, claiming it was “quite possible” Zelensky’s troops “will liberate Crimea by the end of (this) summer.”

Though many have argued that Crimea was a major emotional issue for Russia – for which Putin has flat-out said he might use nuclear weapons to defend – Hodges casually dismissed that idea. The chances, Hodges categorically claimed, “that Russia will use nuclear weapons are almost non-existent.” The rock-solid rationale Hodges puts forward for such confidence?

He “believes” Putin accepts that Biden would retaliate with a nuclear response. That any former general officer would so casually dismiss the idea that a desperate Russian leader might resort to nuclear weapons is itself a major red flag.

Finally, expanding on this line of thinking that Russians can so easily be read – and dismissed – is former commander of 1st Armored Division, Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling. Earlier this week in a Washington Post op-ed, Hertling plainly stated Ukraine “will win the war.” The reason for his declarative optimism? Russia won’t make the changes necessary to win “simply because it can’t.”

The Russian military, the former general claimed, “reflects the character and values of the society” from which it was drawn, and Russians are incapable of learning lessons. The good general seems to have forgotten that Russia, when sufficiently threatened, destroyed France’s Napoleonic armies in 1812 and Germany’s vaunted Wehrmacht in 1945.

Without a doubt, Russia has underperformed in this war for a full year. But these generals fail to even consider a number of critical fundamentals of war that don’t support the idea of a Russian defeat and Ukrainian victory. To one degree or another, each of these generals have based their claims of an inevitable Ukrainian victory on the delivery of modern NATO equipment.

It’s almost as though they aren’t aware, however, that all this promised equipment will be arriving in dribs and drabs, spread literally out throughout the year, and in some cases – like with the U.S. Abrams tanks – possibly not until early 2024. Further, the latest U.S. package for Ukraine of $2 billion will not include weapons and ammunition from existing stocks that could be immediately delivered to Ukraine, but “could take a year or two to get to the battlefront,” as reported by the Associated Press today.

The Ukrainian forces suffer egregiously in the Bakhmut “meat grinder” on a daily basis, and lose tanks, artillery pieces, and armored personnel carriers in the process. How any U.S. general officer supposes that a force defending along a 1,000km front, under heavy pressure by its enemy, and which won’t see meaningful amounts of new gear until likely late in the summer, could switch to the offensive and even put at risk Crimea is strange to say the least.

There is no reasonable path through which the UAF could mount a credible attack in the foreseeable future. They will do well to prevent additional Russian advances along the current front. Aside, however, from failing to account for obvious factors on the battlefield that don’t support a successful offensive, the greater danger posed by flag officer advice is encouraging U.S. and NATO policymakers to support unnecessarily risky actions.

On Thursday of this week, seven former four-star generals, all of whom at one time served as the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, published an editorial in Defense One that argued the U.S. and NATO “must do everything” possible to enable “a Ukrainian victory.” One of their key claims is that the U.S. must support a Kyiv victory because of what they claim would come next from Russia should they defeat Ukrainian forces.

“It is highly likely,” the seven generals write, “that a successful Russian invasion would have emboldened China to act against Taiwan. History teaches, they continue, “that distant conflicts abroad can directly threaten us at home when we do not engage.” With all due respect: that is nonsense! China will or will not move on Taiwan based on their own calculations, regardless of whether Russia is or isn’t successful.

And speaking of what history teaches, a far more pertinent lesson is that those nations which fight wars that are neither required nor beneficial have often resulted in their own civilization being destroyed; see also the Greek empire, Roman Empire, British Empire, all bankrupted by imperial and military overreach.

The greatest benefit to the United States is for the war between Russia and Ukraine to come to an end, not see it extended possibly for years to come – especially when doing so could spawn the worst possible outcome for us: nuclear escalation. Yet the advice from such men who have so many stars on their chest is having a troubling impact on the opinions of even America’s allied leaders.

Two weeks ago Petraeus argued that whenever the conflict ended, the West should provide “ironclad security guarantees” to Ukraine. One week later, Polish president Andrzej Duda called for NATO to provide security guarantees to Kyiv. On Friday, the leaders of France, Germany, and the U.K. said that because Russia’s wars sometimes “unfreeze”, Ukraine “will need more guarantees from us.”

Whether they had in mind some tri-country promise or they intended to seek a NATO guarantee is unclear. But what should be plainly clear is that it would be folly of the highest order to provide any security guarantee to a party who is currently at war with Russia, as any future flair of hostilities might immediately engulf the West.

It is the undisputed national interest of the United States to make good on our obligation to NATO’s Article 5 treaty and defend every inch of NATO territory – it is not in our interest to essentially expand that protection to a volatile partner with a nearly decade-long history of conflict with nuclear armed Russia.

Too many of today’s retired general officers seem to still believe they are dealing with a foreign head of state like Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi, or Bashar al-Assad, none of whom had or have the power to do any meaningful harm to the U.S. or NATO. Vladimir Putin, regardless of how much many in the West may detest him and blame him for the war in Ukraine, is not in that category by virtue of his nuclear arsenal.

Moreover, as has been graphically demonstrated over the past year of war in which Russia has struggled to possess even a fifth of one bordering nation, Moscow does not represent any credible conventional threat to the NATO alliance. Even with a major mobilization, Putin will be hard-pressed to capture all the Donbas; there is presently no chance for him even to capture all of Ukraine. It is concerning that our generals don’t seem to grasp this clear military reality.

It is beyond time, therefore, that the American public and leaders – along with our NATO allies – start to apply significantly more scrutiny to claims by retired U.S. generals. If their advice continues to influence today’s policymakers, the United States may one day find itself sucked into a war that should never have been fought.

Author Expertise and Experience

A 1945 Contributing Editor, Daniel L. Davis is a Senior Fellow for Defense Priorities and a former Lt. Col. in the U.S. Army who deployed into combat zones four times. He is the author of “The Eleventh Hour in 2020 America.” Follow him @DanielLDavis.

19fortyfive.com · by Daniel Davis · February 25, 2023

8. A global divide on the Ukraine war is deepening

A global divide on the Ukraine war is deepening

Russia capitalizes on disillusionment with the United States to win sympathy in the Global South.

By Liz Sly

Updated February 23, 2023 at 4:12 p.m. EST|Published February 22, 2023 at 5:14 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Liz Sly · February 22, 2023

JOHANNESBURG — Clement Manyathela, who hosts a popular and influential talk show on South Africa’s Radio 702, remembers the outrage he felt when Russian troops first surged into Ukraine. He had believed Russia’s insistence that it wasn’t planning to attack and felt cheated when war broke out.

“We were lied to,” he said.

But as the fighting continued, he, and many of those who call in to his show, began to ask questions: Why had President Vladimir Putin deemed it necessary to invade? Was NATO fueling the fire by sending so many weapons to Ukraine? How could the United States expect others around the world to support its policies when it had also invaded countries?

“When America went into Iraq, when America went into Libya, they had their own justifications that we didn’t believe, and now they’re trying to turn the world against Russia. This is unacceptable, too,” Manyathela said. “I still don’t see any justification for invading a country, but we cannot be dictated to about the Russian moves on Ukraine. I honestly feel the U.S. was trying to bully us.”

In the year since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a reinvigorated Western alliance has rallied against Russia, forging what President Biden has trumpeted as a “global coalition.” Yet a closer look beyond the West suggests the world is far from united on the issues raised by the Ukraine war.

The conflict has exposed a deep global divide, and the limits of U.S. influence over a rapidly shifting world order. Evidence abounds that the effort to isolate Putin has failed, and not just among Russian allies that could be expected to back Moscow, such as China and Iran.

India announced last week that its trade with Russia has grown by 400 percent since the invasion. In just the past six weeks, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has been welcomed in nine countries in Africa and the Middle East — including South Africa, whose foreign minister, Naledi Pandor, hailed their meeting as “wonderful” and called South Africa and Russia “friends.”

On Friday, a year after the invasion began, the South African navy will be engaged in military exercises with Russia and China in the Indian Ocean, sending a powerful signal of solidarity at a moment the United States had hoped would provide an opportunity for reinvigorated worldwide condemnations of Russia.

Conversations with people in South Africa, Kenya and India suggest a deeply ambivalent view of the conflict, informed less by the question of whether Russia was wrong to invade than by current and historical grievances against the West — over colonialism, perceptions of arrogance, and the West’s failure to devote as many resources to solving conflicts and human rights abuses in other parts of the world, such as the Palestinian territories, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The Western countries “are hypocritical,” said Bhaskar Dutta, a clerk in Kolkata, India. “These people colonized the entire world. What Russia has done cannot be condoned, but at the same time, you cannot blame them wholly.”

U.S. officials point out that 141 of 193 countries voted at the United Nations to condemn Russia after the invasion; the same number approved a nearly identical resolution on the eve of the anniversary Thursday. But only 33 countries have imposed sanctions on Russia, and a similar number are sending lethal aid to Ukraine. An Economist Intelligence Unit survey last year estimated that two-thirds of the world’s population lives in countries that have refrained from condemning Russia.

This is not a battle between freedom and dictatorship, as Biden often suggests, said William Gumede, who founded and heads the Johannesburg-based Democracy Works Foundation, which promotes democracy in Africa. He pointed to the refusal of South Africa, India and Brazil to join Biden’s global coalition.

That reluctance, he said, is the outgrowth of more than a decade of building resentment against the United States and its allies, which have increasingly lost interest in addressing the problems of the Global South, he said. The coronavirus pandemic, when Western countries locked down and locked out other countries, and President Donald Trump’s explicit disdain for Africa, further fueled the resentment.

As the West pulled back, both Russia and China stepped into the vacuum, aggressively courting developing nations and capitalizing on the disillusionment with the United States and Europe by presenting an alternative to perceived Western hegemony. The Middle East and Africa are key battlegrounds in this struggle for hearts and minds, as are Asia and, to a lesser extent, Latin America, whose fortunes are more closely bound by geography to the United States.

The Middle East is one region where Russia has succeeded in winning friends and influence, said Faysal, a retired Egyptian consultant on organized crime who asked that his full name not be used because of the sensitivity of discussing political issues in Egypt.

“Of course I support Putin,” he said in an interview in Cairo. “A long time ago, we lost faith in the West. All the Arabs on this side of the world support Putin, and we are happy to hear he is gaining lands in Ukraine.”

“There’s been a failure of the West in the past 15 years to see the anger building up around the world, and Russia has absolutely exploited this,” Gumede said. “Russia has been able to portray Ukraine as a war with NATO. It’s the West versus the rest.”

Despite Western efforts to attribute global inflation and a food crisis to the Russian invasion, most countries around the world blame the West for the imposition of sanctions, said Kanwal Sibal, a former Indian foreign secretary.

They do not subscribe to the narrative that countering Russia is a moral imperative if the principles of democracy and territorial integrity and the rules-based world order are to be upheld, Sibal said.

“That’s not an argument that serious people buy,” he said, citing the NATO bombing of Serbia, U.S. support for dictatorships during the Cold War, and the Iraq War as examples of what he sees as the United States violating those same principles.

“The rest of the world genuinely sees this as a European war. They do not see a global conflict or the way it is presented by the West,” he said. “Yes, it has international repercussions such as inflation. But those repercussions are because of the sanctions.”

In refusing to risk its relationship with Russia, India is taking a hardheaded view of its own interests, he said, including its dependence on Russia for military supplies and the opportunity to hold inflation at bay by buying discounted Russian oil. There are tens of thousands of Chinese troops massed on India’s border with China, its geopolitical rival, and India can’t afford to alienate Russia or risk any interruption of its weapons supplies, he said.

The United States needs India to counterbalance China and, after initial attempts to pressure New Delhi to fall into line with its policies, now appears to have accepted India’s position, Sibal said. The United States decided not to impose sanctions on India for a missile deal it concluded with Russia last year and instead has been pursuing expanded ties, including its own defense deals.

South Africa’s decision to join military exercises with Russia and China has been met with less understanding. U.S. and Western diplomats have expressed alarm at both the timing and the nature of the drills, saying they suggest that South Africa is veering beyond its professed neutrality toward siding with Russia.

South African officials have noted that the country also participated in exercises with the U.S. military last year. But those drills were focused on humanitarian and disaster responses, said a U.S. official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive issue. The Russia-China exercises, which began Friday, involve offensive naval capabilities and could conceivably enhance Russia’s naval combat capacity. The Russian force includes one of Moscow’s premier warships, the Admiral Gorshkov, which Russia has said is equipped with its newly developed hypersonic Zircon missile.

The exercises are giving Russia an important public relations boost as the West’s attention is focused on the anniversary of the war, said Kobus Marais, spokesman for South Africa’s Democratic Alliance opposition party. He said South Africa had become “Russia’s useful idiot” and could become complicit in war crimes if the Admiral Gorshkov is later deployed to fire missiles into Ukraine.

The exercise follows the mysterious docking at a South African port in December of a Russian ship, the Lady R, which is under U.S. sanctions because it is known to have engaged in weapons deliveries. The cargo ship was denied permission to dock at Cape Town, its original destination, and instead sailed a few miles away to a smaller port at Simon’s Town, where it was observed unloading and then reloading containers that had apparently originated at a South African special forces ammunition-storage site, according to Marais.

The U.S. government sent a formal warning to the South African government that any entity that interacted with the vessel would risk secondary sanctions, but received no reply, the U.S. official said. The South African Defense Ministry has said it is investigating the matter.

“Their ostensible position of neutrality is, to put it charitably, harder and harder to believe,” the U.S. official said. The United States has invested heavily in post-apartheid South Africa and is South Africa’s biggest foreign investor and biggest export market, and it makes little sense for it to jeopardize its relationship with Washington, the official said.

But South Africa has its own reasons for remaining loyal to Russia despite the risks, South Africans say. The ruling African National Congress party was backed by the Soviet Union throughout the decades it spent in exile during the apartheid era, and many of its most senior figures received training in the Soviet Union, including the powerful defense minister, Thandi Modise.

On the streets of Soweto, the vast urban settlement on the edge of Johannesburg that was a center of resistance to the apartheid regime, people say they still see Russia as an ally. “Russia was with us when we were in chains,” said Elijah Ndlovu, 51, who is unemployed. “We don’t say Russia is good by destroying Ukraine, but if you ask us where we stand in that fight, we have to be honest. We can never turn our back on Russia.”

Shakes Matlhong, 33, said that his understanding of the conflict was hazy but that he has long regarded the United States as an “imperialist” power. “And now Russia is fighting back,” he said.

“Africa’s attitude to the war is that Russia is defending itself against NATO,” he said. “Russia never participated in any colonialism. It might be that Russia is wrong, but people’s attitude is determined by history.”

That Russia did not participate in the colonization of Africa and that the Soviet Union backed many of the continent’s liberation movements are points that have been exploited by Putin in his messaging, said Liubov Abravitova, Ukraine’s ambassador to South Africa. She acknowledges an uphill struggle in trying to win the sympathies of Africans for the Ukrainian cause. Russia’s “only card is that they never colonized Africa,” she said. “But this is also true of Ukraine.”

Karishma Mehrotra in New Delhi contributed to this report

The Washington Post · by Liz Sly · February 22, 2023

9. IntelBrief: China Aids and Abets Russian Disinformation Efforts in the Ukraine Conflict

IntelBrief: China Aids and Abets Russian Disinformation Efforts in the Ukraine Conflict - The Soufan Center

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · February 23, 2023

February 23, 2023

Russian Foreign Ministry Press Service via AP

Bottom Line Up Front

Throughout nine years of conflict in Ukraine, Russia has leaned heavily on disinformation as part of the war effort.
Russian-backed/aligned disinformation campaigns and narratives have primarily sought to undermine support for Ukraine and amplify anti-US and anti-NATO sentiments on a global scale.
With Chinese support for Russia showing increased strength of late – rather than abating – it seems likely that Beijing will also increase its support for Moscow through disinformation and influence campaigns.
Western efforts to counter Russian and Chinese disinformation narratives related to Ukraine in regions outside of the United States and Europe, including in South America and Africa, have been met with limited success.

Since the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russia has leaned heavily on disinformation as part of the war effort. False or misleading narratives have been peddled online primarily to justify armed aggression, deflect and re-direct blame for atrocities committed by Russia, and undermine support for Ukraine globally, including by undermining NATO and Western influence. Other state actors, like the People’s Republic of China (PRC), have also sought to spread falsities about the ongoing war in Ukraine for their own political goals. The United States and the European Union (EU) have devised strategies and tactics to deal with the onslaught of false information percolating online, including efforts such as “pre-bunking” measures and instituting new analytic techniques.

A recent report by the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) Stratcom (Strategic Communications) division noted that among a sample of observed Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) activity between October and December 2022, an astonishing 60 percent of the FIMI activity was assessed as motivated by supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The report also noted the use of key tactics, including the use of multiple languages, videos, and images, as well as impersonating legitimate news sources, to mislead online audiences, known as media spoofing. In September 2022, Meta announced that it disrupted an extensive Russia-backed network on Facebook, which was impersonating European news outlets to spread pro-Kremlin narratives about the war in Ukraine. Some of the most concerning types of disinformation narratives observed over the past year are those that allege Ukraine is planning “false flag operations,” including using dirty bombs or chemical weapons against Russian forces. Such false narratives could be utilized by Kremlin-backed/aligned actors to justify Russian atrocities. In addition, documented efforts by the Kremlin and Kremlin-backed/aligned users to utilize propaganda, disinformation, and conspiracy theories to dehumanize the Ukrainian people and dispute the nationhood and sovereignty of Ukraine are cause for particular concern, as this tactic has been used historically to preempt or justify genocide.

Russian-backed/aligned actors have also seized on the war in Ukraine to deploy disinformation campaigns and narratives to a global audience to undermine support for Ukraine and amplify anti-US and anti-NATO sentiments. Aggressive influence campaigns throughout the Global South, including in sub-Saharan Africa, have been seemingly effective based on support for Moscow in several African capitals. These efforts frequently involve diplomats amplifying false or misleading narratives through official channels and social media accounts, framing sanctions on Russia as damaging the global economy, deflecting blame for the global food crisis, and portraying the United States and NATO as the aggressors of the war. While Putin and the Kremlin have used the false justification of “De-nazifying” Ukraine as a pretext for war, anti-Semitic conspiracy theories and disinformation narratives have been amplified to Western audiences online. False claims about the “Global Cabal” utilizing Ukraine as a human trafficking hub and Putin serving as the “savior” of human trafficking victims in Ukraine plays into existing anti-Semitic conspiracy theories common on far-right extremist online forums. Not only do such false narratives distort the very real tragedies of human trafficking in a conflict zone and complicate the work of aid organizations seeking to combat it, they also nefariously deflect from reports of Russia abducting Ukrainian children from occupied territories in Ukraine.

One disturbing trend that has been further crystalized in 2022 is efforts by PRC-backed/aligned actors to peddle disinformation, including Kremlin-seeded disinformation, for their own political gain. Soon after Russia’s February 2022 invasion, the Chinese Communist Party deployed its powerful censorship apparatus to suppress anti-war voices while amplifying pro-Russian conversations online. The Chinese Communist Party and allies have also peddled anti-US conspiracy theories, including the Kremlin-seeded stories about “US secret biolabs” being operated in Ukraine. English-language state-backed media outlets in China, like The Global Times, have spread anti-US propaganda seeking to portray NATO as a war-mongering organization and the EU as a puppet of the United States. With Chinese support for Russia showing no signs of abating, it seems likely that Beijing will also increase its support for Moscow through disinformation and influence campaigns.

These disinformation efforts by the CCP should be considered within the broader context of the strategic competition between the PRC and the United States, and Chinese efforts to position itself as an attractive alternative to the US-led world order. Such sentiments were on full display during PRC top diplomat Wang Yi’s speech at the Munich Security Conference last week, where he announced that President Xi will soon unveil his peace proposal for Ukraine, something he urged European leaders to consider while insinuating that “some actors” (largely interpreted as the US) do not want peace due to possible “strategic goals larger than Ukraine itself.” Wang then continued onwards to Moscow, where he met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on February 22, amidst US intelligence warnings that the CCP could seek to supply Russia with “lethal support” for the war in Ukraine (the CCP has disputed this). Still, while in Moscow, China’s top diplomat described Sino-Russian ties as “rock solid.”

Russia’s war in Ukraine has illustrated that disinformation, conspiracy theories, and misleading information are integral to the Kremlin’s war efforts. Other states, especially China, are supporting Russia while also focusing on protecting their respective national interests and existing spheres of influence. The United States and the EU have devised strategies and tactics to deal with the onslaught of false information percolating online. US and European allies have moved fast to declassify intelligence in attempts to pre-bunk Russian disinformation and defang falsities before they gain traction online. The Global Engagement Center at the US Department of State published reports, fact sheets, and disinformation dispatches in 2022, highlighting the Kremlin’s disinformation efforts and disputing false narratives about Ukraine.

In early February, the EU announced it will launch a new monitoring and analysis platform, the Information Sharing and Analysis Center, to counter disinformation campaigns by Russia and China. Still, reports and government officials have highlighted that efforts to counter Russian and Chinese disinformation narratives related to the Ukraine war in countries outside the US and Europe, including in South America and Africa, have had limited success. With Putin showing no indication of ceasing hostilities, it will be crucial for the West to continue refining its approach to countering disinformation about the war in Ukraine.

This IntelBrief is part of a series reflecting on the 1-year anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine.

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · February 23, 2023

10. ABC News: Biden says Ukraine does not need F-16 fighter jets

ABC News: Biden says Ukraine does not need F-16 fighter jets

news.yahoo.com · by The Kyiv Independent news deskFebruary 24, 2023, 4:56 PM·1 min read

In an interview with ABC News, U.S. President Joe Biden said he has ruled out giving Ukraine advanced fighter jets “for now.”

When asked whether President Volodymyr Zelensky needs F-16 fighter jets, Biden responded by saying, “he doesn’t need F-16s now.”

He added that there is “no basis upon which there is a rationale, according to our military now, to provide F-16s.”

However, Biden noted that there is no way to know what Ukraine would need in the future.

“Look, we’re sending him what our seasoned military thinks he needs now,” Biden said. “He needs tanks, he needs artillery, he needs air defense, including another HIMAR(s).”

Biden added that the U.S. is sending Kyiv what is necessary for Ukraine “to be able to make gains this spring and this summer going into the fall.”

Zelensky has repeatedly asked his Western allies to supply Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets.

On Jan. 30, Biden dismissed Zelensky’s request, saying that the U.S. will not be providin Kyiv with the jets.

On the one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Biden reaffirmed his vow that “Ukraine will never be a victory for Russia,” adding that “brutality will never grind down the will of the free.”

On Feb. 24, the U.S. also imposed additional sanctions on Russia, and announced $10 billion and $2 billion aid packages for Ukraine.

news.yahoo.com · by The Kyiv Independent news deskFebruary 24, 2023, 4:56 PM·1 min read

11. Blinken heads to Asia, with China, Russia tensions soaring

Blinken heads to Asia, with China, Russia tensions soaring

AP · by MATTHEW LEE · February 24, 2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — Fresh from a meeting with China’s top diplomat and a U.N. Security Council session on Ukraine, Secretary of State Antony Blinken will travel to Central and South Asia next week for international talks that will put him in the same room as his Chinese and Russian counterparts.

The State Department said Blinken would travel to the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan before going to India for a meeting of the Group of 20 foreign ministers from the world’s largest industrialized and developing countries, including China and Russia.

The trip comes as tensions have soared between the U.S. and Russia and between the U.S. and China over Russia’s war in Ukraine and Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. All three countries are competing fiercely to outdo each other in global influence.

Underscoring the challenges the U.S. faces, the three countries Blinken will visit were all among the 32 nations that abstained in Thursday’s U.N. General Assembly vote that condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by a vote of 141-7.

“It’s clear to us that the countries of Central Asia and India have had long, complex relations with Russia,” said Donald Lu, the top U.S. diplomat for the region, on Friday. “I don’t think they’re going to end those relations anytime soon, but we are talking to them about the role they can play in this conflict.”

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Lu added: “We may not share the same approach every day on Ukraine, but I think we do share the goal that this conflict ends and it ends based on principles in the U.N. charter.”

U.S. officials have been tight-lipped about the prospects for Blinken sitting down with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang or Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in New Delhi. But all three will be present in the Indian capital for the G-20 meeting.

“A major multilateral summit like the G-20, of course, lends itself to the potential for bilateral engagements on the margins, but we don’t have any specific scheduling updates to offer,” deputy State Department spokesman Vedant Patel said. He added, though, that “the United States believes it’s important to keep the lines of communication open.”

The last time the G-20 foreign ministers met — in Bali, Indonesia, in 2022 — Blinken held extensive talks with China’s then-foreign minister, Wang Yi, that led to a summit between President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Xinping in November.

And Wang, who has since been promoted, met with Blinken last weekend on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference in Germany, the first high-level talks since the U.S. shot down a suspected Chinese surveillance balloon and Blinken postponed a much-anticipated trip to Beijing.

A meeting between Blinken and Qin, who was formerly China’s ambassador to the U.S., would be their first in Qin’s current capacity.

The broader G-20 meeting is expected to focus on food and energy security, especially for developing countries, which have been hit by fallout from the Ukraine conflict. In Bali, a number of nations that have not outright condemned Russia for the war expressed deep concern about its impact on the prices and supply of food and fuel.

Before traveling to Delhi, Blinken will visit the Kazakh capital of Astana for talks with leaders there as well as a meeting of the so-called C5+1 group, made up of the U.S. and the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

At that meeting, he will stress the U.S. “commitment to the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Central Asian countries,” the State Department said in a statement that mirrors the wording it has been using to support Ukraine against Russia.

Blinken will then go to Tashkent for talks with Uzbek officials.

AP · by MATTHEW LEE · February 24, 2023

12. 20 Ways to Win the Future of War, and Not One Is a Balloon

Damn, I just invested all my money in the balloon, the newest shiny thing! (note sarcasm).

From Peter Singer's recent congressional testimony: https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings/citi-hearing-future-war-pentagon-prepared-deter-and-defeat-america-s-adversaries

20 Ways to Win the Future of War, and Not One Is a Balloon

military.com · by 24 Feb 2023 Military.com | By Peter W. Singer · February 24, 2023

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com.

Peter W. Singer is a strategist at New America and founder and managing partner at Useful Fiction LLC.

Balloons aren't going to decide whether we win or lose a war with China.

Given the heated discussion of Chinese balloons everywhere from the pages of this publication to the halls of Congress, I know it is hard to believe. Indeed, we've been told by multiple leaders and media outlets that this is a "new Sputnik moment" for America.

So why would I think that? The reason is that at literally the same moment last week that hundreds of members of Congress gathered to learn the latest intelligence on China's wayward balloons and hector the Biden team for failing to foil the fabric threat, I was at a sparsely attended House Armed Services Committee hearing a few hallways down that explored the actual question that matters for our security.

The hearing, entitled "The Future of War: Is the Pentagon Prepared to Deter and Defeat America's Adversaries?" was chaired by Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., who is also chairman of the new Select Committee on China. As one of the expert witnesses asked to testify, I found notable not just the collegial manner in which Gallagher and his Democrat counterpart, Ranking Member Ro Khanna of California, treated each other (Gallagher even gave Khanna a birthday present to pass on to his wife), but the welcome substance of the discussion. And, illustratively, at no point in the hours of debate on whether our military would be ready to fend off America's foes did its lack of either balloon-building or balloon-popping technology come up.

Instead, the discussion focused on what actual elements and reforms would enable us to win future wars. Even more specifically, it focused on how we could solve the central problem for U.S. defense planning: deterring China from even starting a war. (To be clear, it is not by it launching balloons, but by attacking Taiwan.)

Given China's tremendous growth in power, it is as tough a problem as they come. Yet, fortunately, the testimony identified 20 areas of action:

Enact regular open-ended wargames, designed to test and learn about key changes in warfare.
Avoid letting political and bureaucratic inertia and the mentality of "sunk costs" drive our next weapons acquisitions; what we've bought in the past shouldn't determine what we buy next.
Foster a dynamic defense marketplace, where the military can more easily purchase from both big and small firms.
Scale the successful innovation hubs and experimental task forces present in a few units, such that every command has rapid means of learning and implementation.
Acquire a new generation of unmanned systems, but avoid drones that simply replicate the expensive manned systems they are replacing.
Develop new doctrines to take advantage of robotics' unique attributes, allowing swarming and cheap, high-risk uses.
Prepare for our adversary's certain use of drone swarms, in turn, by acquiring new counter-drone systems.
Invest in artificial intelligenceI to match its growing civilian importance.
Reform U.S. military networks to copy the civilian world's best practice of a federated model of meshed data, to better take advantage of AI's possibilities.
Ensure the U.S. military is able to retain its professionalism, while still evolving to reflect the new American society it both draws upon and protects.
Build upon new designs being tested in the Army and Marine Corps for a new generation of military units that can operate across domains and rapidly deploy out into networks of small teams, each able to fight independently yet generate disproportionate effects.
Transform special operations forces into blended teams of technical experts and elite soldiers, able to provide a "full continuum" of uses against not just terrorists and insurgents, but great power militaries.
Create redundancies and scale in our space networks through fleets of small satellites that are cheap so you can have hundreds or even thousands instead of a handful of big ones systems.
Bake cybersecurity into the emerging Internet of Things through greater design requirements and market regulation, to limit physical damage from digital threats.
Utilize both cyber and diplomatic means to out covert campaigns meant to undermine democracies and create digital literacy programs, modeled after successful allied efforts, to better equip American youth and our forces for new online threats.
Engage in persistent competition on the information, economic, political and cyber fronts, to create greater friction along China's "Belt and Road" and foster its own imperial overstretch challenges.
Provide Taiwan with distributed anti-air weapons and unmanned systems and, most especially, cheap, rapidly deployable smart sea mines to block essential seaways.
Aid efforts to create a Taiwanese society prepared for resistance, especially in urban settings, and mirror its digital governance systems outside the country.
Bolster multilateral ties between states that have worsening bilateral ties with China.
Secure Russia's defeat in Ukraine, both to weaken it and its allies, as well as to provide a model of success for other democracies under threat.

The bad news may be that none of these steps to winning the future is as exciting as a balloon. But the good news is none of them needs an imagined "Sputnik moment" to come true. Doing better at deterring and defeating America's adversaries just requires us to focus instead on the important stuff.

military.com · by 24 Feb 2023 Military.com | By Peter W. Singer · February 24, 2023

13. Red flags: China, North Korea flex military capabilities as fears over new conflicts continue to rise in Asia

Red flags: China, North Korea flex military capabilities as fears over new conflicts continue to rise in Asia

foxnews.com · by Peter Aitken | Fox News

Video

Timing of Taiwan troop announcement 'sends a signal' to China: James Carafano

The Heritage Foundation VP of foreign and defense policy studies James Carafano reacts to the U.S. expanding its troop presence in Taiwan on 'America Reports.'

The Philippines and Taiwan sounded alarm bells after detecting dozens of suspected Chinese vessels and aircraft across the South China Sea on Friday.

"To undermine the Taiwanese public’s faith in the ability of the armed forces to protect the island’s sovereignty, China’s near-daily aerial and naval incursions will probably increase in number and intensity over the course of the coming year," Craig Singleton, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told Fox News Digital.

The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense issued a statement saying that it had detected 37 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft and six PLA Navy vessels around Taiwan at around 6 a.m.

An update noted that 12 of the aircraft had crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone.

US SENDING UP TO 200 MORE TROOPS TO TAIWAN AS CHINA TENSIONS GROW

The island responded by dispatching aircraft and naval vessels to monitor the Chinese crafts.

Around the same time, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) issued a statement claiming that a patrol aircraft had spotted at least 26 suspected Chinese "maritime militia vessels" during a flyover of the South China Sea.

A Chinese navy fleet departs for an upcoming China-Russia joint naval exercise from a military port in Zhoushan, east China's Zhejiang Province, Dec. 20, 2022. Chinese and Russian navies will hold the joint naval exercise "Joint Sea 2022" in waters east of the sea area from Zhoushan to Taizhou, east China's Zhejiang Province, starting from Dec. 21, according to the Chinese navy. (LiLi Yun/Xinhua via Getty Images Yun/Xinhua via Getty Images)

The vessels were spotted within the Philippine exclusive economic zone, which the Philippines has exclusive rights to the sea resources, Radio Free Asia reported.

The plane "received inaudible radio challenges, both in English and Chinese from CCG-5304 [a Chinese vessel] currently continuing to maintain presence in the area," the PCG said in a statement.

PENTAGON SAYS MAJORITY OF DOWNED CHINESE SPY CRAFT FOUND

Reporters aboard the flight said they heard warnings that the plane was "entering the vicinity of Chinese territory" and was requested the leave the area.

"These latest exercises are broadly consistent with the 'new normal' China established in the region after former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's travel to Taiwan last August, in which China now regularly conducts military maneuvers much closer to Taiwan’s shores," Singleton explained.

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Gilday speaks during an interview with the media at a private hangar in Manila, Philippines, on Feb. 22, 2023. The United States is "committed" to conducting joint maritime patrols with the Philippines in the disputed South China Sea, said Gilday as the countries seek to deter Chinese aggression. (Ted Aljibe/AFP via Getty Images)

"All told, China doubled its annual incursions into Taiwan’s air defense zone from 538 in 2021 to 1,241 in 2022," he continued. "Likewise, China intensified its cyber-attacks against Taiwanese governmental and financial institutions, as well as launched disinformation campaigns aimed at subverting Taiwan’s political process."

"Xi’s problem in all this—which he may not yet realize—is that China’s aggressive attempts at sub-crisis maneuvering could have the unintended effect of catalyzing the very superpower crisis he seeks to avoid," Singleton concluded. "Gaming out gray zone escalation suggests such provocations could lead the United States and its allies to embrace more forceful counter-responses in the future."

11-YEAR-OLD CAMBODIAN GIRL DIES FROM BIRD FLU IN COUNTRY'S FIRST KNOWN HUMAN INFECTION SINCE 2014

China’s military activity in the region follows reports that North Korea test-fired long-range cruise missiles off its eastern coast on Thursday. Pyongyang’s official Korean Central News Agency said the four missiles flew for nearly three hours after being launched from the northeastern coast, drew oval and figure-eight patterns above the sea, and showed they can hit targets 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles) away.

The launches, initially reported by Pyongyang and later confirmed by South Korea’s military, were intended to verify the reliability of the missiles and the rapid response capabilities of the weapons. South Korea’s joint chiefs of staffs said the details described by North Korea "had discrepancies," but did not elaborate.

A Chinese Air Force H-6K bomber flies to the West Pacific, via the Bashi Strait, for a routine combat simulation drill, Sept. 12, 2016. The Chinese Air Force on Monday sent multiple aircraft models, including H-6K bombers, Su-30 fighters, and air tankers, for the drill. The fleet conducted reconnaissance and early warning, sea surface cruising, inflight refueling, and achieved all the drill's targets. (Xinhua/Guo Wei via Getty Images)

The launches came as the U.S. and South Korean defense officials held a Deterrence Strategy Committee Table-Top Exercise (DSC TTX) at the Pentagon. A day before that, North Korea launched a Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile, with Kim Jong Un's sister saying that they were "using the Pacific" as their "firing range."

"Given the DPRK’s recent aggressive nuclear policy and advancements in nuclear capabilities, the TTX scenario focused on the possibility of the DPRK’s use of nuclear weapons," the Pentagon said Thursday.

Tensions in the region have increased after the U.S. held joint training exercises with Britain and Australia to strengthen air defenses against Chinese aircraft.

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The joint exercise, dubbed Red Flag, lasted for three weeks, giving pilots the chance to practice combat against peer and near-peer technology. The exercises included F-22s, F-35s, B-52s, F-16s and C-130s based out of Nellis Air Force Base.

"[China is] just the pacing challenge that we train to so that we're ready ... We think that if we're ready for China, we're ready for anybody," U.S. Air Force Colonel Jared Hutchinson told Reuters.

Anders Hagstrom and The Associated Press contributed to this report.

Peter Aitken is a Fox News Digital reporter with a focus on national and global news.

foxnews.com · by Peter Aitken | Fox News

14. After a Green Beret’s Suicide, His Wife Hopes Revised Army Program Will Reach Others

Too many spouses are suffering like this.

After a Green Beret’s Suicide, His Wife Hopes Revised Army Program Will Reach Others

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February 24, 2023Joshua Skovlund

Warrant Officer 1 John Michael Wirka Jr. with his wife, Erica. Wirka died in January 2021. Erica is hoping that a new program in Special Operations Command will help other Special Forces soldiers seek help if they are in crisis. Inset image courtesy of Erica Wirka, US Army photo by K. Kassens.

Erica Wirka didn’t think her husband’s short trip to El Salvador would be anything out of the ordinary. When Warrant Officer 1 John Michael Wirka Jr. left that January morning, their goodbye didn’t seem unusual or peculiar. The couple had been through several short trips like this one, a pre-deployment site survey.

“On Jan. 10, 2021, I said goodbye to my husband that morning — for the last time,” Wirka said.

Four days later, Wirka was greeted just past 7 p.m. by an officer and chaplain at her front door. Her husband, who went by “Johnny,” had killed himself via a gunshot.

When Johnny finally returned home, it was in a flag-draped casket.

Special Forces Warrant Officer 1 John Wirka and Erica Wirka. Photo courtesy of Erica Wirka.

Addiction and the Road to Recovery

In the wake of her husband’s death, Wirka found her way to a program within the Army’s special operations world that is revamping how soldiers in the Army’s most elite units — and their families — deal with mental health and ideations of suicide within the ranks. It differs in its approach to both prevention and reaching those affected, like Wirka.

In September 2022, the Army Special Operations Command’s Suicide Prevention Program adopted a new policy incorporating the tenets of the “interpersonal theory of suicide,” based on the research of Florida psychologist and suicide expert Dr. Thomas Joiner.

Joiner’s work has found that suicide risk grows when individuals feel a lack of belongingness and perceived burdensomeness and also develop acquired capability, according to program manager Georgia Harrison.

After abusing alcohol to the point of being hospitalized, Lt. Col. Eric Kreitz, a Green Beret, tells soldiers there is hope after crisis. “It was that vulnerability that I really lacked. And, it’s my hope now that this vulnerability — this honesty with myself — can provide hope to other people,” Kreitz said. “There is life after crisis. There’s a chance to continue on with your career.” Photo courtesy of Eric Kreitz.

To attack each of those causes, Harrison said, the new approach enables “tribes” within the Army’s special operations world to tailor their approach. What works for soldiers in the 75th Ranger Regiment, for example, may not be the best approach for Green Berets in 3rd Special Forces Group, Harrison said.

“[The theory] gives a level of flexibility to the commands so that we can have a theory-based research fact structure, that they have that flexibility to be able to take local resources and their different cultures into account to truly get at what matters to them,” Harrison said.

But it’s not an easy task. Though unit-level suicide rates are hard to come by, according to Defense One, 18 soldiers assigned to USASOC committed suicide in 2022. That’s higher than the previous two years and the third year of a troubling rise, over 12 in 2018 and six in 2017.

Army Rangers wearing night vision devices. USASOC’s suicide prevention program, which is part of the Human Performance and Wellness program, extends to Special Forces units, the 75th Ranger Regiment, and other units within the command. Department of Defense photo.

When suicides happen, units are required to conduct psychological autopsies as part of an Army-wide requirement. The forensic investigation explores what happened during a soldier’s suicide, what elements played into it, the method of suicide, and several other factors.

“I think one thing that is proven to be by looking at these things over the years is that each one of these events is very, very individualized,” says Jeff Wright, deputy director of USASOC’s Human Performance and Wellness program. “There are things that are going on in those people’s lives that are distinctly different from others.”

According to Maj. Gen. Patrick Roberson, USASOC deputy commander, mental health and risk for suicide in the military is at the top of leadership’s priorities across all of the Army’s special operations forces.

“It’s not something that we can change overnight because these are cultures that you’re trying to change,” Roberson said. “[We have] a lot of great folks, very hard-charging folks. A lot of them have volunteered three, four times to do what they’re doing out there. So we take special care, and taking care of our people is the first SOF truth: People are more important than hardware.”

Master Sgt. Trevor Beaman was a high-performing Special Forces soldier, earning a master’s degree and serving as an instructor at the Special Forces dive school in Key West, Florida. But childhood trauma and job stress led him to addiction and suicide attempts. “Being vulnerable didn’t take away anything about me being an operator or a warrior. It did the opposite,” he said. “It really enhanced me to be a better thinker and a better provider in the unit that I was in.” Photos courtesy of Trevor Beaman.

A Short Deployment Turned Tragic

As a teacher, Erica Wirka was busy with her class throughout the morning of Jan. 14, 2021, but managed to check her email over lunch. Wirka read a message from her husband in pure disbelief.

Johnny said in the email that he would kill himself and did not want to be remembered. She reached his chain of command within 20 minutes of receiving the email but could not get in touch with Johnny.

He committed suicide before anyone could intervene.

“Because he was in El Salvador, I felt I was completely helpless,” Wirka said. “I couldn’t just get in my car and drive to try to find him. I texted and called hundreds of times, to no avail, to reach him.”

Within hours, the senior soldiers were knocking on her door.

“That was just, that was the most soul-crushing moment of my life,” Wirka said. “Johnny was really one you would never see this happening. It was just — it was so surreal.”

John and Erica Wirka. Photo courtesy of Erica Wirka.

Wirka recently began sharing her story about her husband’s suicide to spread the word of USASOC’s new focus on suicide in the ranks.

“It’s hard to be vulnerable and to admit you need help,” Wirka said. “But within that vulnerability, there’s strength. This narrative that being vulnerable is a weakness — I really try to encourage people that it’s not a weakness, it is strength.”

Sharing their stories along with Wirka were one active-duty Green Beret and a lieutenant colonel assigned to USASOC. Both have taken up roles as spokesmen to reach their fellow special operators. Lt. Col. Eric Kreitz and Master Sgt. Trevor Beaman both have experience with trauma, addiction, suicidal thoughts, and suicide attempts.

Kreitz said he held himself to such a high standard that he failed to realize how bad his mental health was. But after nearly taking his own life after drinking to the point of blackout, he was hospitalized. That forced him to be vulnerable for the first time in his life.

“It was that vulnerability that I really lacked. And, it’s my hope now that this vulnerability — this honesty with myself — can provide hope to other people,” Kreitz said. “There is life after crisis. There’s a chance to continue on with your career.”

Special Forces operators leap from the rear of a helicopter for maritime infiltration training. DOD photo.

Beaman is currently assigned to the 7th Special Forces Group and, on the surface, is the ideal example of what a soldier can accomplish.

Initially assigned to 3rd Special Forces Group, he saw combat on deployments to Afghanistan and Africa. At home, Beaman earned his master’s in strategic studies in 2015 and became an instructor at the famed Special Forces Dive School in Key West, Florida.

But as his career evolved, he began using alcohol and prescription drugs to bury the pain he was feeling from the physical toll of the job and mental trauma from his childhood. As a child, Beaman said, he was sexually assaulted for six years, beginning when he was 8.

Even as he grew into a high performer and special operator in the military, he was self-destructing, attempting suicide several times.

It was only when his wife and fellow soldiers reached out to him that he found his way to the Army resources and — vitally — realized that seeking help would not harm his career.

Maj. Gen. Patrick Roberson, USASOC deputy commander, says mental health and risk for suicide in the military are at the top of leadership’s priorities. “[We have] a lot of great folks, very hard-charging folks. A lot of them have volunteered three, four times to do what they’re doing out there,” Roberson said. “So we take special care, and taking care of our people is the first SOF truth: People are more important than hardware.” DOD photo.

He likened the treatment for mental health to the way physical injuries are treated and said his teammates never treated him differently. Beaman said seeking treatment for mental health ailments didn’t make him weak.

“Being vulnerable didn’t take away anything about me being an operator or a warrior. It did the opposite,” Beaman said. “It really enhanced me to be a better thinker and a better provider in the unit that I was in.”

Roberson, the USASOC commander, said breaking through the stigma of seeking help is a primary issue. SOF soldiers, he said, will avoid the doctor for physical injuries because they don’t want to “get benched,” an attitude that is even harder to break for mental interventions.

In fact, reaching out for help is now part of the high standards of SOF soldiers. Roberson said each unit’s schoolhouse has psychologists available to the students and encourages them to seek out those resources.

A special operations soldier leaps into a HALO jump over an Arctic-like landscape. DOD photo.

Human Performance and Wellness Program

Wright, the program’s deputy director, said while each branch of SOF runs its own program, early detection is a major part of suicide prevention.

It could be something as basic as noticing a soldier with low energy or performance during a morning workout.

“There’s a pretty good chance that that performance coach is going to stop me at an appropriate time, try to inquire about that decrement of focus or that decrement of energy applied to that workout,” Wright said.

Based on how the inquiry is answered, the coach will recommend that a soldier speak with one of the on-staff cognitive performance coaches, physical therapists, or whoever is a good fit for the problem causing the soldier’s falloff in performance.

Symptoms of a service member struggling with mental health could be as simple as an overtraining injury or as complex as excessive alcohol use.

“Having a top-down approach wouldn’t really get to the heart of the matter,” said Harrison, the command’s program manager. “But being able to have that grassroots approach, hearing from the commands, hearing from the members, that’s really what’s going to drive the basis of the programs.”

An Army Ranger. DOD photo.

Capability and Firearms

A key factor addressed in Joiner’s interpersonal theory is acquired capability, including an individual’s desensitization to pain and to the fear of death. And a related element is firearms control — Roberson said a large percentage of suicides were a result of access to a firearm.

He encourages safe storage of firearms when they aren’t being used and said the 75th Ranger Regiment was quick to enact rules that keep guns out of barracks.

With those rules, soldiers don’t have guns readily accessible when they may fall into a bout of depression or face other mental or behavioral health issues. For soldiers not living in the barracks, it comes down to a personal choice. Beaman does not keep firearms in his home to proactively prevent himself from pulling the trigger on himself.

Collecting and measuring data is also essential to the success of this new approach. Gathering data has been difficult due to the clandestine nature of USASOC and its different mission sets, and the data that was collected wasn’t reaching the right people.

SOCOM uses a program called Smartabase that helps track data while maintaining privacy. Officials also emphasize using “wearables,” a technology like Fitbit, Whoop bracelets, or even an Apple Watch.

“I think one of our biggest impediments to progress has been kind of a stovepiping of a lot of this information, and we’ve done a better job,” Roberson said.

15. Ukraine Is the West’s War Now

A long essay with a lot of photos and info boxes. Please go to the web site to read this in the proper format. https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-is-the-wests-war-now-5d468bdb?mod=hp_lead_pos8

Ukraine Is the West’s War Now

The initial reluctance of the U.S. and its allies to help Kyiv fight Russia has turned into a massive program of military assistance, which carries risks of its own

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-is-the-wests-war-now-5d468bdb?mod=hp_lead_pos8

By Yaroslav TrofimovFollow

Feb. 25, 2023 12:01 am ET

Two days before the Russian invasion of his country, on Feb. 22, 2022, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba was welcomed to the White House. As he greeted President Biden and senior administration officials, Mr. Kuleba later recalled, he felt like a patient surrounded by doctors presenting him with a diagnosis of stage-four cancer.

The consensus among the U.S. and its European allies was that there was nothing they could do to prevent the inevitable. Their intelligence services predicted a Russian takeover of Kyiv and a collapse of the Ukrainian state within days. The U.S. by then had already closed down its embassy and evacuated all American personnel.

U.S. Weapons Pledge to Ukraine Exposes Cracks in Defense Supply Chain

Beijing's Global Media Offensive: Book Review and Author Interview

thekootneeti.in · by The Kootneeti Team · February 21, 2023

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China has been investing heavily in building its global media presence, particularly through state-backed media outlets such as Xinhua, China Daily, and China Global Television Network, or CGTN. These media outlets are no longer just promoting Chinese government policies and events but have expanded to cover a wide range of topics and issues, from technology and culture to global news and opinion pieces. They have also developed digital capabilities, creating multimedia platforms and mobile apps to reach a wider audience.

Moreover, China has been using various means to influence local media and politics in other countries. One tactic is through having pro-China business people in countries invest in local Chinese language media outlets or by having state newswire Xinhua signing content-sharing deals with local language outlets, giving China a voice in local news coverage. Another tactic is through expanding China’s social media giants WeChat into other regions, and these can be used to disseminate Chinese propaganda and censor critical voices. China has also been investing in wired and wireless technology that underpins information flows, such as 5G networks and undersea cables.

Despite these efforts, China has faced significant challenges in winning hearts and minds around the world. Its assertive and sometimes aggressive diplomacy has often backfired, leading to a backlash against China’s policies and harming its image in many states. Additionally, many people in other countries are skeptical of China’s media and distrustful of its intentions, particularly given China’s domestic human rights record and its history of suppressing dissent at home.

Nonetheless, China’s media and political influence campaigns are likely to continue and adapt to changing circumstances in other countries. This could have negative consequences for press freedoms, human rights, and democracy in other countries as China seeks to export its authoritarian political model and protect the ruling Communist Party’s grip on power at home.

In his book, “Beijing’s Global Media Offensive: China’s Uneven Campaign to Influence Asia and the World,” Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Joshua Kurlantzick examines how China is attempting to build a media and information superpower. He also highlights China’s media and information failures and the negative consequences of China’s aggressive and often alienating diplomacy. Despite these setbacks, China’s media and political influence campaignslikely will continue to expand and potentially damage press freedoms, human rights, and democracy abroad.

The Kootneeti interviewed Kurlantzick, author of the book “Beijing’s Global Media Offensive: China’s Uneven Campaign to Influence Asia and the World,” discussing a wide range of topics related to China’s media power and influence campaigns around the world. Kurlantzick discussed the motivation behind his book and the challenges he encountered while writing about China’s efforts to exert influence in other countries through state media outlets, social media platforms, funding of foreign politicians, and covert operations in education and ethnic Chinese communities. He also spoke about the United Front Work Department (UFWD), a Chinese intelligence organization that, in part of its work, targets discourse on university campuses and ethnic Chinese student groups, and how it has evolved into a global operation for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Kurlantzick elaborated on China’s soft power toolkit and its impact on spreading propaganda, including the role of social media platforms like WeChat. He also discussed how liberal democratic societies could counter China’s influence and the future of China’s media offensive in an era of AI and advanced technologies like ChatGPT. Here are the excerpts:

Question: What motivated you to write a book on China’s global media offensive and what were the top challenges he encountered while writing about China’s efforts to exert influence in other countries through its state media outlets, social media platforms, funding of foreign politicians, and covert operations in education and ethnic Chinese communities?

Answer: I wrote a book that came out in 2007 called Charm Offensive. That book chronicled China’s soft power efforts in Asia and other parts of the world, and at that time Beijing was fairly successful in some of its soft power efforts, including via media, cultural diplomacy, and many other types of soft power. At that time, too, China was nowhere near as powerful strategically as it is now, and nowhere near as aggressive militarily (and economically) as it is now. I wanted to revisit China’s efforts to wield influence inside other countries again, but this time with China as the world’s second most powerful state – and thus a situation that makes it much harder for Beijing to wield soft power in some ways. In fact, that is why Beijing has increasingly turned to sharper, more concealed types of power. Some of the major challenges I encountered were getting people from Chinese state media outlets to talk to me, though I did find some who were willing, getting a real read on the extent of Chinese influence over politicians and education in other countries, since some analyses overstate China’s efforts and I find them often to be not as effective as they seem at first, and finding that, after doing my research, I actually concluded China was having only mixed success in its influence campaigns – and actually turning much of the world against it.

Question: In your book, you mentioned the United Front Work Department, an organization that historically dealt with the Chinese diaspora but has evolved into a much larger intelligence operation. It often targets discourse on university campuses and ethnic Chinese student groups. Before asking about the UFWD, I wanted to ask, how important are Chinese intelligence operations within China’s own diaspora. Why it is so important to keep an eye on ethnic Chinese in other countries?

Answer: The diaspora is absolutely critical to China’s foreign influence efforts. Beijing has always (wrongly) assumed that ethnic Chinese in any country, regardless of their citizenship or views, are somehow destined to be loyal to Beijing – even though many Chinese living abroad are actually the opposite, they may have fled China, and may be strong opponents of the CCP. But targeting the diaspora has always been a key part of Chinese influence efforts and Xi Jinping has made the UFWD more powerful during his tenure, and Beijing has expanded its diaspora efforts, as China itself becomes more powerful, to include extensively trying to sway the diaspora on university campuses, among business groups, and among Chinese associations in places like Southeast Asia, the U.S, Australia, and other places. The goal in part is to encourage self-censorship in diaspora groups about China’s problems, and to encourage pro-Beijing sentiment. In some places, too, wooing diaspora groups allows Beijing to play a bigger role potentially in politics in those countries and in the countries’ education systems.

Image source: Getty

Question: Those who are unaware of Beijing’s ways of operating may not know about the United Front Work Department UFWD’s way of operating. What is the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and how has it evolved into a global intelligence operation for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)? Can you provide a few examples of its role in influencing ethnic Chinese communities and foreign governments, as well as its impact on education and electoral politics in different countries?

Answer: It has expanded in size significantly under Xi Jinping, although it has been around for a long time – he has given it broader powers and functions beyond its more limited efforts with diaspora communities in the past. The UFWD is widely believed to play a role in assisting/funding Chinese student associations on university campuses in many countries, for instance, and in this way, it helps influence discourse about China on campuses among ethnic Chinese students – and potentially scare people who are critical of China into not criticizing China. There has been pushback though against this – and in countries like the U.S. and India there is now great scrutiny of the UFWD, as well as of the CCP’s interference in university education. That is why many liberal democracies have closed or are closing Confucius Institutes, which were supposed to be language and cultural centers set up at universities but have sometimes played a role in fostering self-censorship on campuses about China. The UFWD also allegedly has played a role in targeting Australian and New Zealand and Taiwanese politics, among other places, although again there has been a backlash – tough foreign interference laws in Australia for instance, laws that may be copied by many other liberal democracies. So in some ways many of China’s influence efforts are backfiring against it.

Question: In your book, you write at one point about a soft power toolkit, and at another point, you write about China’s state media attempting to copy the styles of Russian outlets Sputnik and RT. Can you elaborate on this? Is there any particular kind of Chinese state media evolving? And do you think Chinese state media may take another form in the world after the Ukraine war or in the future in the case of a possible conflict in the Taiwan strait?

Answer: Actually, what I think I said was that Beijing wanted ideally to make its state media more like Al Jazeera, rather than Sputnik or RT – outlets based in authoritarian countries but (in the case of Al Jazeera) relatively respected for their coverage of most issues, albeit not independent in coverage of Qatar or issues related to Qatar, where Al Jazeera is based. I don’t think Chinese state media could be like Sputnik and RT, which, before the Ukraine war, when they operated relatively freely in most countries, were actually given a decent degree of latitude in what they published and ran on TV, albeit much of it designed to create conspiracies and to demonize democracy. I don’t think Beijing could ever allow its state media that level of freedom and freewheelingness that Sputnik and RT had, so I think that wasn’t really a viable option. And it turned out that Al Jazeera couldn’t be a viable model either, even though for a time China hired a lot of quality local journalists in many countries. But most of those people have quit as China has become more authoritarian under Xi Jinping, and the idea to be like Al Jazeera failed since Chinese state media outlets just couldn’t produce independent reporting about almost anything and have little audience anywhere, other than Xinhua, which is indeed building an audience. I don’t think Chinese state media other than Xinhua has the capacity to evolve, and the Ukraine war is only making it harder for Chinese state media.

Question: There have been various claims and reports suggesting that China could be using TikTok for intelligence-gathering purposes. What is the role of social media in spreading Chinese propaganda and how effective is the spread of Chinese soft and sharp power through platforms like TikTok in terms of impact?

Answer: There are some reports of this; the bigger concern is that TikTok data flows through servers in China, which is a reason why India has banned TikTok and there are calls in the U.S. and other countries to ban it too. I think ultimately some solution will be worked out in which TikTok users’ data is kept on servers within the countries where they are located. TikTok is not yet a major factor in spreading propaganda but given its popularity it obviously could be highly worrisome. More often propaganda is spread via disinformation on other social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and others, and these outlets have not been great about their content moderation – particularly not Twitter in recent months. China is becoming more skilled at using these platforms for disinformation and propaganda.

Image for representation

Question: How do you see liberal democracies countering this Chinese information impact? Also, in this era of AI and tools like ChatGPT where does the Chinese media offensive fit into the spread of AI and chatbots?

Answer: I’m not sure how AI and ChatGPT play in – they could play a role, but they would have to be used by China – China’s own AI or version of ChatGPT – to spread propaganda and one of the aspects of something like ChatGPT is it is a tool that continually learns and amasses information and tries to provide “accurate” answers so I’m not sure how such a tool could necessarily be programmed to spread propaganda – though, granted, I am far from an expert on ChatGPT, and China’s AI now is lagging that of the United States and other countries, because China’ authoritarianism is driving away its most talented innovators. Democracies, including India, can combat China’s influence efforts. That can be done by strengthening democracy, by applying stricter scrutiny to foreign interference efforts in politics and media, by learning more about how China uses social media platforms, by strengthening content moderation on social media platforms while also dealing with the issue of TikTok and where users’ data is stored, by pushing back against Chinese economic coercion and other types of coercion, by funding and supporting independent media in Chinese in particular, and by using many other tools.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Kootneeti Team

thekootneeti.in · by The Kootneeti Team · February 21, 2023

17. Year One of the Ukraine War: The Big Lessons and Questions

Excerpts:

The world’s liberal democracies seem to have finally gotten over their reluctance to supply Ukraine with weapons that will enable it to mount a full-scale offensive. Right now, Russia’s ability to push back against such an offensive looks shaky at best, and Ukraine’s ability to accomplish its goal of liberating all of its territory and restoring its pre-2014 borders looks increasingly realistic.

What this will mean for Russia itself—and whether the rebirth of a free, sovereign, peaceful Ukraine can be followed by the birth of a free Russia—is a question for another day. But there should be no question that in this conflict, Ukraine’s cause is a righteous one, and Putin’s tired excuses are as empty as ever. The 2014 “Revolution of Dignity” was not a Western coup. The people of Donbas were not victims of Kyiv but, first and foremost, of the “insurgent” gangster statelets formed by Russian proxies in Eastern Ukraine. Putin’s claim that he is trying to save the Russian-speaking population of Eastern and Southern Ukraine, supposedly denied the right to speak Russian, is easily rebutted by several simple facts: (1) No one was slaughtering or persecuting Russian-speaking communities in those parts of the region that were not under the control of the “insurgents,” such as Mariupol, Odessa, or Kherson. (2) It was Russia and its proxies that repeatedly thwarted attempts by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to monitor the conflict areas. (3) According to the OSCE, the overwhelming majority of ceasefire violations in the Donbas in 2021 were initiated by the Russian proxies. (4) Despite these violations, the death toll from the conflict had dropped dramatically between 2014 and 2021, from thousands to dozens of casualties. It was the Russian invasion that brought back death and destruction on a massive scale.

Putin’s appearance before the federal assembly was accompanied by another mostly overlooked but remarkable bit of symbolism. On the same day, he issued a decree that awarded the honorary title of “Guards,” for “mass heroism and valor, endurance, and courage,” to the anti-aircraft missile brigade that supplied the Buk missile system that shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-17. It is fitting way to mark the first anniversary of a war marked by a succession of war crimes.

Year One of the Ukraine War: The Big Lessons and Questions

Plus: With no victories to report, Putin fulminates about Western perfidy, supposed Ukrainian Nazis, and a gender-neutral God

by CATHY YOUNG FEBRUARY 22, 2023 5:30 AM

thebulwark.com · by Cathy Young · February 22, 2023

A year after the start of Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine, it is often difficult to remember what the early days were like. It wasn’t just the Kremlin thug and his propagandists at home and cheerleaders in the West who expected Ukraine to fold in a matter of days. Even among those horrified by the invasion, a common, perhaps dominant mood was encapsulated in the instantly mythologized encounter between a Russian warship and Ukrainian Navy sailors on Snake Island off the Ukrainian coast: the audio in which a dispatcher from the warship told the guards to surrender and one of the guards replied, “Russian warship, go fuck yourself.” The initial story was that all thirteen Ukrainian soldiers at the post were killed by the warship’s guns—a story, in other words, of heroic and tragically doomed resistance.

As it turned out, the Snake Island episode was emblematic of the war’s course in an entirely different way. The Ukrainian soldiers lived, and while they were captured they were freed in a prisoner exchange on March 24, exactly a month after the invasion. What’s more, less than a month after that, one of the two Russian warships that had attacked Snake Island, the guided missile cruiser Moskva, sank after being hit by two Ukrainian missiles. Whether or not it was the same vessel that had transmitted the message to the sailors and received the defiant response, the symbolism was striking. Russia initially tried to deny the sinking and then claimed that damage to the vessel was caused by the detonation of munitions due to a fire of unspecified cause, even as some Russian propagandists simultaneously raged about an “act of war” and called for retaliation. In a postscript that was perhaps equally emblematic, in November a missing sailor who had presumably died in Moskva’s sinking received a draft notice threatening him with prosecution if he did not report for mobilization.

When Ukraine surprised much of the world by successfully fighting back, thanks in part to the remarkable leadership of its president Volodymyr Zelensky—whose “I need ammunition, not a taxi” in response to a U.S. offer of emergency exfiltration became just as much of an instant legend as the Snake Island standoff—the sane majority of Americans responded with elation. Yet doubts about Ukraine’s ability to turn its victories into long-term and durable success lingered—reasonably so, given that the country was ostensibly outmanned and outgunned by the enemy. The concern trolling at places like the American Conservative, where regular warnings that Ukraine isn’t really winning and Russia can’t really lose more or less artfully mask the belief that a defeat for the Kremlin in its conflict with the “neoliberal” West would be a bad thing, coexists with genuine concerns by people sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause that time is working against Ukraine.

Of course complacency would be misguided. But a cautious optimism, at this point, seems like a good bet.

The nervously anticipated Russian winter offensive in Donbas, for instance, is not going all that well. On February 6, a Russian attempt to capture Vuhledar—a town which the Russian Ministry of Defense first claimed to have under control back in November—ended in disaster for the invading forces, with not only major losses of hardware but, apparently, the virtual destruction of an elite Russian naval infantry brigade.

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The nightmarish Battle of Bakhmut, practically a World War I reenactment with live ammunition and real corpses, is also not going the way Russia had hoped. The town, which many had expected to fall after the Russian capture of nearby Soledar, still remains in Ukrainian hands, with heavy fighting still continuing; the same goes for nearby Avdiivka. There had been speculation that the Russian military was under heavy pressure to take Bakhmut, Vuhledar, and/or Avdiivka before Putin’s February 21 annual report to the Federal Assembly (the Russian replica of the U.S. State of the Union address), to give Putin something that could be touted as major headway toward “liberating” the formally annexed Donetsk and Luhansk regions. But when Putin made his speech, there was, as Russian writer and opposition activist Kira Yarmysh put it on the Popular Politics YouTube channel, “not a word about victories on the frontlines, because they simply don’t exist.”

The Donbas offensive has also been exposing conflicts within the Russian forces. One of the more surreal aspects of the war in Ukraine has been the newfound visibility in Russia of the Wagner Private Military Company, a mercenary group informally affiliated with Russian state security structures, and of its odious chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, the ex-convict millionaire restaurateur nicknamed “Putin’s chef.”

At one point, Prigozhin, whose recruitment of convicts directly from penal colonies with a promise of pardon gave the Russian side a large unskilled-but-expendable fighting force, looked like a new big-time player in the grotesque political landscape that is Putin’s gangster state. Now, it looks more and more like the Russian military is deliberately setting up the “Wagnerites” for slaughter near Bakhmut and Avdiivka—or at least, so claims Prigozhin himself, who has been vocally complaining that Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, respectively Russia’s defense minister and chief of the general staff, are denying his men ammunition, help with air transport, and even shovels for trench-digging. In a video posted a few days ago, two Wagner men made the same point much more indecorously by using photos of Shoigu and Gerasimov for target practice while blasting the two officials with obscene epithets. Whether all of this means that Wagner—which is no longer recruiting convicts—is done as an important element in the Russian war effort remains to be seen. But it is noteworthy that Putin did not even obliquely mention the group while expressing appreciation to a wide range of military and affiliated personnel in his speech to the federal assembly. Perhaps a shady semi-private army that rebrands murderers as war heroes and celebrates its sledgehammer executions of alleged traitors poses image problems even for Putin’s Russia.

Then again, Putin’s Tuesday address was one big image problem. None of the expected horribles materialized: no announcement of a new round of mobilization, no formal declaration of war—let alone a call to a holy “people’s war” in which the entire population must make major sacrifice for victory—and no belligerent rhetoric with transparent allusions to a nuclear strike, as in Putin’s speech when announcing the “special operation” a year ago. (At the time, he warned that any country that dared to get in Russia’s way would see “such consequences as you have never before experienced in your history.”) Instead, there was tedium and copium: familiar talk about how the West had started the war and Russia was really trying to end it, about the evils of the supposed neo-Nazi regime in Ukraine, about the Kyiv Nazis’ atrocities against Russian-speaking people in Donbas, about the eternal anti-Russian perfidy of the West which had apparently plotted “to deprive Russia of these historical territories that are now called Ukraine” since the nineteenth century and the days of the Austro-Hungarian empire. There were also, as expected, references to Western decadence, only this time, instead of “parent number one and parent number two,” it was an alleged attempt to normalize pedophilia and promote the idea of a gender-neutral God.

On another Popular Politics program, expatriate Russian journalist Michael Naki argued that the most notable thing about Putin’s speech, at least its opening portion that dealt with the war, was how “whiny” and full of excuses it was: “He’s standing there like a schoolboy saying, ‘I’m not the bad guy, they’re the bad guys.’” This, Naki pointed out, is not the language of a leader who is winning. The only “wins” Putin was able to report were that the Russian economy had not contracted as much as experts had predicted despite the sanctions, and that the four Ukrainian regions annexed by Russia—the “People’s Republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk and the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions—had “made their choice” in last fall’s fake referenda and were with Russia to stay. Oh, and also: the Sea of Azov was once again Russia’s internal sea. (Hurray?)

Of course, to listen to Putin, one would never know that the city of Kherson had been retaken by Ukraine a little over a month after its “forever union” with Russia; or that, even as Putin spoke, Russian forces were shelling the city, killing six people and wounding many more—people who, according to Russia, are citizens of the Russian Federation.

There is a certain symbolism, too, in the fact that Putin’s speech was bookended by Joe Biden’s trip to Kyiv (which left the Russian propaganda machine seething in helpless fury) and by Biden’s speech in Warsaw which affirmed “unwavering” U.S. and NATO support for a free Ukraine. It also came right on the heels of England’s King Charles meeting with Ukrainian soldiers who are in the United Kingdom undergoing intensive combat training by the British Army.

The world’s liberal democracies seem to have finally gotten over their reluctance to supply Ukraine with weapons that will enable it to mount a full-scale offensive. Right now, Russia’s ability to push back against such an offensive looks shaky at best, and Ukraine’s ability to accomplish its goal of liberating all of its territory and restoring its pre-2014 borders looks increasingly realistic.

What this will mean for Russia itself—and whether the rebirth of a free, sovereign, peaceful Ukraine can be followed by the birth of a free Russia—is a question for another day. But there should be no question that in this conflict, Ukraine’s cause is a righteous one, and Putin’s tired excuses are as empty as ever. The 2014 “Revolution of Dignity” was not a Western coup. The people of Donbas were not victims of Kyiv but, first and foremost, of the “insurgent” gangster statelets formed by Russian proxies in Eastern Ukraine. Putin’s claim that he is trying to save the Russian-speaking population of Eastern and Southern Ukraine, supposedly denied the right to speak Russian, is easily rebutted by several simple facts: (1) No one was slaughtering or persecuting Russian-speaking communities in those parts of the region that were not under the control of the “insurgents,” such as Mariupol, Odessa, or Kherson. (2) It was Russia and its proxies that repeatedly thwarted attempts by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to monitor the conflict areas. (3) According to the OSCE, the overwhelming majority of ceasefire violations in the Donbas in 2021 were initiated by the Russian proxies. (4) Despite these violations, the death toll from the conflict had dropped dramatically between 2014 and 2021, from thousands to dozens of casualties. It was the Russian invasion that brought back death and destruction on a massive scale.

Putin’s appearance before the federal assembly was accompanied by another mostly overlooked but remarkable bit of symbolism. On the same day, he issued a decree that awarded the honorary title of “Guards,” for “mass heroism and valor, endurance, and courage,” to the anti-aircraft missile brigade that supplied the Buk missile system that shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-17. It is fitting way to mark the first anniversary of a war marked by a succession of war crimes.

thebulwark.com · by Cathy Young · February 22, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

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FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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