Quotes of the Day:
"The worst government is often the most moral. One composed of cynics is often very tolerant and humane. But when fanatics are on top there is no limit to oppression."
– H. L. Mencken
"I have learned over the years that when one's mind is made up, this diminishes fear; knowing what must be done does away with fear."
– Rosa Parks
"Learning is not attained by chance, it must be sought for with ardor and diligence."
– Abigail Adams
1. China’s Economy Continues to Slow, Rattled by Real Estate and Energy
2. Washington Hears Echoes of the ’50s and Worries: Is This a Cold War With China?
3. Chris Inglis and the Gathering Cyber Storm
4. Stronger deterrence will avoid war over Taiwan
5. America’s doughnut shaped Indo-Pacific strategy
6. Nato to expand focus to counter rising China
7. ‘Integrated deterrence’ taking shape against China
8. US rejoining UN Human Rights Council; what it should do first
9. FDD | Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen Stands Up to Xi Jinping
10. FDD | Does Big Tech Have an Anti-Semitism Problem?
11. Colin Powell dead at 84 from COVID-19 complications
12. The End of American Militarism?
13. The Lion and the Bard: How Churchill Used Shakespeare to Change the World
14. British defence strategy is undergoing a naval tilt
15. Road Rules: Colin Powell's 13 Rules of Leadership
16. Pentagon, State Department square off on Afghanistan accountability
17. 9 months after getting Pentagon approval, Alwyn Cashe still hasn't received the Medal of Honor
18. Anger over Afghanistan and the Imperfect Example of Stu Scheller
19. Assessing Airborne Status in U.S. Army Special Operations Forces
20. Fletcher becomes 6th Commander for NATO Special Operations Headquarters
21. Why Right-Wing Extremists Love the Unabomber
1. China’s Economy Continues to Slow, Rattled by Real Estate and Energy
What are the short and long term implications of this? What will be the effect on the Chinese instrument of economic power and then on the military instrument?
China’s Economy Continues to Slow, Rattled by Real Estate and Energy
Growth of 4.9 percent shows the country’s huge industrial sector has run into trouble. But exports and services are looking strong.
A China Evergrande housing complex in Zhumadian, a city in Henan Province, in September. Problems in real estate pose a major threat to the Chinese economy.
By
Oct. 17, 2021
BEIJING — Steel mills have faced power cuts. Computer chip shortages have slowed car production. Troubled property companies have purchased less construction material. Floods have disrupted business in north-central China.
It has all taken a toll on China’s economy, an essential engine for global growth.
The National Bureau of Statistics announced on Monday that China’s economy increased by 4.9 percent in the third quarter, compared to the same period last year; the period was markedly slower than the 7.9 percent increase the country notched in the previous quarter. Industrial output, the mainstay of China’s growth, faltered badly, especially in September, posting its worst performance since the early days of the pandemic.
Two bright spots prevented the economy from stalling. Exports remained strong. And families, particularly prosperous ones, resumed spending money on restaurant meals and other services in September, as China succeeded once again in quelling small outbreaks of the coronavirus. Retail sales were up 4.4 percent in September from a year ago.
Chinese officials are showing signs of concern, although they have refrained so far from unleashing a big economic stimulus.
“The current international environment uncertainties are mounting, and the domestic economic recovery is still unstable and uneven,” said Fu Linghui, the spokesman for the National Bureau of Statistics.
The government’s own efforts, though, are part of the current economic challenges.
In recent months, the government has unleashed a raft of measures to address income inequality and tame businesses, in part with the goal of protecting the health of the economy. But those efforts, including penalizing tech companies and discouraging real estate speculation, have also weighed on growth in the current quarter.
The government had also imposed limits on energy use as a part of a broader response to climate change concerns. Now, the power shortages are hurting industry, and the country is rushing to burn more coal.
“The economy is sluggish,” said Yang Qingjun, the owner of a corner grocery store in an aging industrial neighborhood of shoe factories in Dongguan, near Hong Kong. Power cuts have prompted nearby factories to reduce operations and eliminate overtime pay. Local workers are living more frugally.
“Money is hard to earn,” Mr. Yang said.
Trying to Solve the Real Estate Question
Urbanization was once a great engine of growth for China. The country built spacious apartments in modern high-rises for hundreds of millions of people, with China producing as much steel and cement as the rest of the world output combined, if not more.
Now, real estate — in particular, the debt that developers and home buyers amassed — is a major threat to growth. The country’s biggest developer, China Evergrande Group, faces a serious cash shortage that is already rippling through the economy.
Construction has ground to a halt at some of the company’s 800 projects as suppliers wait to be paid. Several smaller developers have had to scramble to meet bond payments.
This could create a vicious cycle for the housing market. The worry is that developers may dump large numbers of unsold apartments on the market, keeping home buyers away as they watch to see how far prices may fall.
“Some developers have encountered certain difficulties, which may further affect the mood and confidence of buyers, causing everyone to postpone buying a house,” said Ning Zhang, a senior economist at UBS.
The fate of Evergrande has broader import for the long-term health of the economy.
Officials want to send a message that bond buyers and other investors should be more wary about lending money to debt-laden companies like Evergrande and that they should not assume that the government will always be there to bail them out. But the authorities also need to make sure that suppliers, builders, home buyers and other groups are not badly burned financially.
These groups “will get made more whole than the bondholders, that’s for sure,” predicted David Yu, a finance professor at the Shanghai campus of New York University.
Addressing Difficulties in Heavy Industry
As electricity shortages have spread across eastern China in recent weeks, regulators have cut power to energy-intensive operations like chemical factories and steel mills to avoid leaving households in the dark. It has been a double whammy for industrial production, which has also been whacked by weakness in construction.
Industrial production in September was up only 3.1 percent from a year earlier, the lowest since March of last year, when the city of Wuhan was still under lockdown because of the pandemic.
“The power cuts are more concerning to some extent than the Evergrande crisis,” said Sara Hsu, a visiting fellow at Fudan University in Shanghai.
Power lines in Dongguan, China. The government has imposed limits on energy use, as a part of a broader response to climate change concerns. Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times
The Energy Bureau in Zhejiang Province, a heavily industrialized region of coastal China, reduced power this autumn for eight energy-intensive industries that process raw materials into industrial materials like steel, cement and chemicals. Together, they consume nearly half the province’s electricity but account for only an eighth of its economic output.
Turning down the power to these industries risks creating shortages in industrial materials, which could ripple through supply chains.
Understand China’s New Economy
Card 1 of 6
An economic reshaping. China is enacting new measures to change how business works and limit executives’ power. Driven by a desire for state control and self-reliance, these changes mark the end of a Gilded Age for private business that made the country into a manufacturing powerhouse and a nexus of innovation.
China’s leader, Xi Jinping, is recasting China’s business world in his own image. Above all else, that means control. Where executives once had a green light to grow at any cost, officials now want to dictate which industries boom, which ones go bust and how it happens.
Many measures have already been implemented. The Chinese government has tightened supervision of the country’s internet Goliaths, declared all financial transactions involving cryptocurrencies illegal and detained top executives from troubled companies. Meanwhile, China’s largest developer, Evergrande, is teetering with no word from officials about a bailout.
What China does next will be significant. If Chinese officials save Evergrande, they risk sending a message that some companies are still too big to fail. If they don’t, as many as 1.6 million home buyers waiting for unfinished apartments and hundreds of small businesses, creditors and banks may lose their money.
The long-term outlook is unclear. Some analysts say Mr. Xi’s measures and the push to curb excess borrowing have already made a big difference. But the world’s No. 2 economy is slowing, and the Chinese government may have to work harder to rekindle it.
Assembly plants in industries that use less electricity, like car manufacturing, have not faced the same demands for power cuts. But they face other challenges.
Ongoing coronavirus outbreaks in Southeast Asia have interrupted supplies of some auto parts. There is also a global shortfall of semiconductors, a critical component in cars.
Volkswagen, the market leader in China, said on Friday that its production had been falling as the company faced an ever-worsening chip shortage and other supply chain issues. The company doesn’t have enough cars to fill customers’ and dealerships’ orders, creating a backlog.
“Our priority is to work off our backlog,” said Stephan Wöllenstein, the chief executive of Volkswagen’s China division.
Finding Strength in Exports
For months, economists have made the same prediction: the fast growth of China’s exports cannot last.
The economists were wrong.
China’s exports kept surging through the third quarter and finished strong, up 28.1 percent in September compared with the same month last year. China posted its third-highest monthly trade surplus ever last month.
China has essentially maintained its strength in exports ever since its economy emerged from the pandemic in the spring of last year. As much of the world hunkered down at home, families splurged on consumer electronics, furniture, clothing and other goods that China manufactures in abundance.
The export boom, though, is creating another source of tension between the United States and China.
Katherine Tai, the United States trade representative, suggested in a speech two weeks ago that China’s export prowess was partly the result of subsidies and other unfair practices. “For too long, China’s lack of adherence to global trading norms has undercut the prosperity of Americans and others around the world,” she said.
But Chinese officials and experts contend that the country’s success is the result of a strong work ethic and consistent, large investments in manufacturing. They are quick to point out that by bringing the pandemic firmly under control within several weeks early last year, China was able to reopen its factories and offices quickly.
“We have very strong supply, but weak demand,” said Tu Xinquan, the executive dean of the China Institute for World Trade Organization Studies at the University of International Business and Technology in Beijing. “So companies have to export.”
Li You contributed research.
2. Washington Hears Echoes of the ’50s and Worries: Is This a Cold War With China?
More than a metaphor.
I am reminded of this wisdom:
"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking."
- Clausewitz
But for Americans it is about naming the war versus gaining a deep understanding of it.
Excerpts:
Yet the question of whether the United States is entering a new Cold War is about more than just finding the right metaphor for this odd turn in superpower politics. Governments that plunge into a Cold War mind-set can exaggerate every conflict, convinced that they are part of a larger struggle. They can miss opportunities for cooperation, as the United States and China did in battling Covid-19, and may yet on the climate.
And the issue of whether this is a Cold War, or something quite different, lurks just beneath the escalating tensions over economic strategy, technological competition and military maneuvers — undersea, in space and in cyberspace.
Washington Hears Echoes of the ’50s and Worries: Is This a Cold War With China?
News Analysis
Incursions into Taiwan’s air zone, a space launch and what looked like a prisoner swap raise a question that is about more than just semantics. It could signal a dangerous new mind-set.
Unlike the Cold War with the Soviet Union, one with China would most likely encompass technological and economic competition as well as the classic military rivalry.Credit...Roman Pilipey/EPA, via Shutterstock
By
Oct. 17, 2021
When Kevin Rudd, the former Australian prime minister and longtime China expert, told a German newsmagazine recently that a Cold War between Beijing and Washington was “probable and not just possible,” his remarks rocketed around the White House, where officials have gone to some lengths to squelch such comparisons.
It is true, they concede, that China is emerging as a far broader strategic adversary than the Soviet Union ever was — a technological threat, a military threat, an economic rival. And while President Biden insisted at the United Nations last month that “we are not seeking a new Cold War or a world divided into rigid blocs,” his repeated references this year to a generational struggle between “autocracy and democracy” conjured for some the ideological edge of the 1950s and ’60s.
Yet the question of whether the United States is entering a new Cold War is about more than just finding the right metaphor for this odd turn in superpower politics. Governments that plunge into a Cold War mind-set can exaggerate every conflict, convinced that they are part of a larger struggle. They can miss opportunities for cooperation, as the United States and China did in battling Covid-19, and may yet on the climate.
And the issue of whether this is a Cold War, or something quite different, lurks just beneath the escalating tensions over economic strategy, technological competition and military maneuvers — undersea, in space and in cyberspace.
President Biden has insisted that “we are not seeking a new Cold War or a world divided into rigid blocs,” but his references to a struggle between “autocracy and democracy” have evoked the 1950s.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
And just before the announcement of the Australia deal, satellite photographs revealed new Chinese nuclear missile fields, whose existence Beijing has not explained. American analysts are uncertain about the Chinese government’s intentions, but some inside American intelligence agencies and the Pentagon are wondering whether President Xi Jinping has decided to abandon six decades of a Chinese “minimum deterrent” strategy, even at the risk of setting off a new arms race.
The constant background din of cyberconflict and technology theft was one factor behind the Central Intelligence Agency’s announcement this month that it had created a new China mission center to position the United States, in the words of its director, William J. Burns, to confront “the most important geopolitical threat we face in the 21st century, an increasingly adversarial Chinese government.”
For all this, Mr. Biden’s top aides say that the old Cold War is the wrong way to frame what is happening — and that the use of the term can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Instead, they argue that it should be possible for the two superpowers to compartmentalize, cooperating on the climate and containing North Korea’s arsenal, even while competing on technology and trade, or jousting for advantage in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.
The White House is loath to put a label on this multilayered approach, which may explain why Mr. Biden has yet to give a speech laying it out in any detail. But his actions so far look increasingly like those in a world of competitive coexistence, a bit edgier than the “peaceful coexistence” that the Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev used to characterize the old Cold War. (Interestingly, after meeting this month in Switzerland with Jake Sullivan, the president’s national security adviser, China’s top diplomat said he objected to any description of the U.S.-China relationship as “competitive.”)
But if the administration is still struggling with the terminology, it says it knows what this isn’t.
“This is nothing like the Cold War, which was primarily a military competition,” one of Mr. Biden’s senior administration advisers said in an interview, speaking on the condition of anonymity because, in the Biden White House, there is no area where words are measured more carefully than in talking about relations with Beijing.
In July, Mr. Biden’s top Asia adviser, Kurt M. Campbell, told the Asia Society that the Cold War comparison “obscures more than it illuminates” and is “in no way helpful, fundamentally, to some of the challenges presented by China.”
The deep links between the two economies — the mutual dependencies on technology, trade and data that leaps the Pacific in milliseconds on American and Chinese-dominated networks — never existed in the more familiar Cold War. The Berlin Wall not only delineated a sharp line between spheres of influence, freedom and authoritarian control, it stopped most communications and trade. The year it fell, 1989, the United States exported $4.3 billion in goods to the Soviets and imported $709 million, an inconsequential blip for both economies. (In current dollars, those numbers would be a bit more than doubled.)
In this superpower standoff, all those lines are blurred, with Huawei and China Telecom equipment running data through NATO nations, the Chinese-owned TikTok app active on tens of millions of American phones, and Beijing worried that the West’s crackdown on selling advanced semiconductors to China could cripple some of its national champions, Huawei included. And yet, even through a pandemic and threats of “decoupling,” the United States exported $124 billion in goods to China last year and imported $434 billion. That made China the largest supplier of goods to the United States, and the third largest consumer of its exports, after Canada and Mexico.
“The size and complexity of the trade relationship is underappreciated,” Mr. Campbell said in July, as part of his argument of why this moment in time differs dramatically from the Cold War of 40 years ago.
Meng Wanzhou, a top Huawei executive held in Canada since 2018, after being freed last month in a deal that resembled a Cold War-era prisoner swap.Credit...Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters
But, another of Mr. Biden’s advisers noted the other day, psychology counts for as much in superpower politics as statistics. And whether or not the two countries want to call this a Cold War, they are often behaving, the official noted, as if “we are already immersed in one.”
That is the central argument of those who contend that a new Cold War — one very different from the last — is quickly coming to dominate Washington’s dealings with its central rival. “People think that the only definition of a Cold War is the U.S.-Soviet model,” said Paul Heer, a longtime C.I.A. analyst who spent years focused on Asia, “which it need not be.”
He agrees with the White House officials who say that the new dynamic is not defined largely by a nuclear standoff, or by an ideological struggle in which only one side can prevail. And, he notes in a recent article in The National Interest, the world will not “divide itself into American and Chinese camps.”
But the core element of the old Cold War — “a state of hostility short of armed conflict” in Mr. Heer’s telling — is already clear, as both countries seek power and influence, and to obstruct or contain each other. “There are good reasons that neither government wants to call it a Cold War,” Mr. Heer noted in an interview last week. “But they are both approaching it that way, and the politics on both sides are making it hard to imagine how we will keep it from evolving into that.”
In Washington, one of the few issues that overrides partisan divides in Congress is the specter of Chinese competition, in such crucial areas as semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum computing: That is how the “China bill” passed the Senate in a solidly bipartisan vote. (It has yet to come up in the House.)
Some American intelligence and military officials are wondering whether President Xi Jinping of China has decided to abandon six decades of a “minimum deterrent” strategy, even at the risk of setting off a new arms race.Credit...Andy Wong/Associated Press
While few on Capitol Hill want to utter the words, the bill amounts to industrial policy, a once contentious concept in Washington that is now barely debated, thanks to the specter of Chinese competition. For example, the Senate bill, as passed, offers $52 billion to expand domestic chip manufacturing, far beyond anything the United States considered when battling Japan’s technological dominance in the same industry more than 30 years ago. But today Japan’s share of the global chip sales has declined to about 10 percent, and it no longer looms large in American industrial fears.
There are reasons to worry that whatever this era is called, the chance for conflict is now higher than it has ever been. Joseph S. Nye, known best for his writings on the use of “soft power” in geopolitical competition, rejects the Cold War analogy, noting that while many in Washington “talk about a general ‘decoupling’” of the world’s two largest economies, “it is mistaken to think we can decouple our economy completely from China without enormous economic costs.”
But Mr. Nye, who once ran the National Intelligence Council, a group that provides long-term assessments of threats to the United States, warns against the risk of what he calls “sleepwalker syndrome,” which is how the world spiraled into conflict in 1914.
“The fact that the Cold War metaphor is counterproductive as a strategy does not rule out a new Cold War,” he said. “We may get there by accident.”
3. Chris Inglis and the Gathering Cyber Storm
Excerpts:
Everyone has heard the old saying that time is money, but in Inglis’ case, time is security so I asked him point blank whether he thought government was moving has quickly as it should on the cyber problem.
“Government is moving at speed; the question is if it is at the necessary speed. I don’t think anyone is moving at the necessary speed. Some are moving at light speed, but at the end of the day, we need an integrated, collaborative approach. While we won’t have unity of command, I think there needs to be a universally felt sense of urgency so that we will all get our heads in the game.”
Congress, are you listening? Oh, and by the way, that poster in Inglis’ office? It reads, ‘Hours Since the Last Surprise.”
“As a startup with maybe too few resources at the start and who often didn’t understand how all the wickets are run, we have our occasional surprise,” said Inglis. “When we encounter those surprises and go to someone with the deep and sharp expertise to help us navigate that, we get what we need. However, we are not a full functioning, full featured, fully capable organization yet. We’re trying to build somebody else’s airplane while we’re free falling from our own. We have a parachute, and we can land safely, but it is a bit of a challenge at times.”
Chris Inglis and the Gathering Cyber Storm
Chris Inglis’ new White House office has a startup feel to it. There are desks, a few chairs, a coffee maker and a poster hanging on the wall. But as the head of the newly established Office of the National Cyber Director, Inglis has to make due with what he has while still advising President Joe Biden on the smartest ways for the US to prevent and respond to cyberattacks.
Inglis has already had numerous conversations with the president, who has made clear that the government has a role to play in the defense of the private sector and in assisting the private sector in defending critical infrastructure. And the president knows, says Inglis, that means the government needs to get its own cyber house in order.
But like any real startup, Inglis’ resources are scarce. More than three months after being confirmed by the Senate, he still doesn’t have the full staff he needs to take on his timely and critical mission. That’s because the funding for his office – some $21 million, part of the $1 trillion infrastructure bill making its way through Congress – is still stuck in the political spin cycle. Why does it matter?
“The threat is greater than I can ever remember,” Inglis told me during last month’s AFCEA and INSA Intelligence & National Security Summit in National Harbor, Maryland. “The audacity, the brazenness, the thresholds that have been crossed at every turn; we’re in a difficult place.”
While he’s waiting for Congress to act, he says he’s spending about fifty percent of his time defining his role, being careful not to duplicate the work already being done by other agencies and departments, while spending another fifty percent building relationships that will be important later. Eventually, he’s expected to have a staff of some 75 people who will be expected to work hand in glove with CISA, the National Security Council’s cyber staff, the OMB and others. The remaining fifty percent of his time, Inglis jokes, is spent figuring out how to attract the country’s best talent.
“People are starting to flow into the organization. I’m confident that we’re coming up to a breakout moment, not for the National Cyber Director, but the contribution that we can and should make. I’m sobered by the nature of the challenge, I’m optimistic we can make a difference.”
Optimistic he is. And he’s not even complaining about being given a critical task for US national security and then having to wait for politics to play out before being able to act on it.
“It has been a semi-silver lining in that we would not have had time to think about how we want to apply the resources coming our way.”
While Inglis has been waiting, he and his small team have had time to think about the four things they’d like to focus on right away.
First, is streamlining the roles and responsibilities in government of who handles what when it comes to protecting the public and private sectors from cyberattacks. He also spoke during his confirmation hearing about the importance of allocation of resources and while the Office of the National Cyber Director doesn’t have the authority to move money, it does have what Inglis calls the responsibility to account for cyber money.
“One of the most critical gaps in cyber is that the physical digital infrastructure is not built to a common standard. The executive order related to this requires that within a certain amount of time we have to install basic procedures like multifactor authentication and encryption of stored material. That is a challenge and a potential vulnerability for us. We need to make sure that we make these investments necessary to buy down the lack of investment for years.
The second gap is in talent related to number of people required to occupy these jobs. It’s not simply the folks with IT or cyber in their name, but general cyber awareness. There is some expenditure of resources of time, attention, and money to get awareness right on the part of the truly accountable parties like agency and department heads. We have to make sure they don’t see cyber as a cost center, but an enabler on the part of all the users as they understand what their roles are and what the accountability is.
He admits there is still a level of education needed within government to get there.
“That is usually the case in both the government and the private sector,” he said. “We need to think this way about cyber and invest in cyber so that we can enable the mission, not hold it back. I think that education is the most important and effective way to handle this. Then, it is to make sure that the accountability is aligned and harmonized. We tend to take risk in one place and expect someone in another place to be the mitigator of a risk they don’t understand was taken in the first place. We need to operate in a collaborative fashion and get away from divisions of effort which are an agreement not to collaborate and allow adversaries to pick us off one at a time.”
Inglis says that unity of effort must start at home. “The executive order issued in May has begun to lay out common expectations about the hardware, software, and practices that we need to begin in those spaces,” he said. “Externally, if we have sector risk management agencies who engage the private sector for the purposes of supporting and engaging the critical components of that infrastructure, we need to make sure you don’t need a Ph.D. in government to know who to deal with and what you’re going to get from them.”
He is arguing for the government to also put ‘valuable material’ on the table. “That could be our convening power,” said Inglis. “We could perhaps address and reduce liability or give companies a clue as to what might be around the corner because the government has access to exquisite intelligence. If that setup is possible, we also need a venue where collaboration takes place. Information doesn’t collaborate, people do.”
Inglis likes to point to the example of CISA and the Joint Cyber Collaborative. “They put people from the private sector and the public sector side by side to co-discover threats that hold us at common risk. That project sets up the possibility of implicit collaboration in what we then do with that common operational picture. The government could take ideas that private sector companies turn into proprietary systems and enrich and classify them to deal with it in their system.”
Using what he calls “all the tools in the toolkit,” Inglis also notes the importance of international relationships, which fits nicely into the White House’s International Summit on Ransomware last week in Washington, which zeroed in on tighter cryptocurrency standards, among other things. “Beyond the Five Eyes, what do other like-minded nations think about what is expected behavior in this? What are governmental actions that are appropriate,” he asked.
Inglis has been an active participant in the president’s recent actions in cyber. He took part in a White House meeting with tech leaders in August that was hosted by President Biden, who Inglis says, spent the first hour sharing his vision about how the country should focus on collaborative integration. “The companies represented weren’t only companies like Microsoft and Apple, but people who operate in the critical infrastructure space,” said Inglis. “The people component, educators, were represented reflecting the president’s view that cyberspace is not just technology, it is also the people component. They are a major link in the chain, and we need to get the roles and responsibilities right.”
While he’s waiting for the funding he needs to get his office fully staffed, Inglis said he’s also putting thought into reconciling resources with aspirations. Managing expectations is going to be important. Frustration has been growing for years over what some see as a lack of government response to some of the largest hacks in history. The phrase ‘time and place of our choosing’ as a definition of response has grown old and some Americans are weary of a government that isn’t responding in a more public way to the beating it sees the US taking in cyberspace.
So, I asked Inglis whether there should be red lines in cyber.
“Red lines are both good and bad,” he answered. “They are clear and crisp, and everybody knows what they are. The downside is that because of that, an adversary knows exactly how far they can go. It means that you set up a somewhat permissive environment. Red lines also don’t have context; sometimes there is a reason that a defender would make the ransomware payment. As a matter of policy, the U.S. government does not pay ransomware, but I imagine there will be a situation at some point where a hospital is against the Russian state and actual life and safety is at risk. If there is no other way to get the material back, in order to get back in the business of saving lives, they would want to rethink if a red line is a red line in that particular situation. I think the right thing to do here is not to establish hard thresholds of things with scripted responses, but outline what we are prepared to defend and what principles we will exercise in defense of those things. We commit to defending the private sector when it is held at risk by a nation state in cyberspace as much as in the kinetic space and make that clear to adversaries. I think that would be more helpful in changing decision calculus and creating a useful ambiguity about when and where we will come in.”
Inglis said he’s also thinking a lot about present and future resilience. It’s a worthwhile focus, given that the White House estimates that nearly half a million public and private sector cybersecurity jobs are currently unfilled.
“That is a massive problem,” said Inglis. “However, the more insidious problem is that the 320 million people in the United States who use the internet who have no idea how to properly take their place on the front lines of this issue. There is an awareness issue that requires us not to make Python programmers out of them but to make sure they understand the nature of this space.”
Everyone has heard the old saying that time is money, but in Inglis’ case, time is security so I asked him point blank whether he thought government was moving has quickly as it should on the cyber problem.
“Government is moving at speed; the question is if it is at the necessary speed. I don’t think anyone is moving at the necessary speed. Some are moving at light speed, but at the end of the day, we need an integrated, collaborative approach. While we won’t have unity of command, I think there needs to be a universally felt sense of urgency so that we will all get our heads in the game.”
Congress, are you listening? Oh, and by the way, that poster in Inglis’ office? It reads, ‘Hours Since the Last Surprise.”
“As a startup with maybe too few resources at the start and who often didn’t understand how all the wickets are run, we have our occasional surprise,” said Inglis. “When we encounter those surprises and go to someone with the deep and sharp expertise to help us navigate that, we get what we need. However, we are not a full functioning, full featured, fully capable organization yet. We’re trying to build somebody else’s airplane while we’re free falling from our own. We have a parachute, and we can land safely, but it is a bit of a challenge at times.”
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4. Stronger deterrence will avoid war over Taiwan
Integrated deterrence. I define this as nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence and unconventional deterrence.
Stronger deterrence will avoid war over Taiwan | The Strategist
Xi Jinping is positioning the People’s Liberation Army to bring Taiwan under the control of the Chinese Communist Party. The Taiwanese assess perhaps a three-year time frame before an attack, while US Indo-Pacific Command in Honolulu considers a military assault in six years to be possible.
If conflict breaks out, it will be large-scale and bloody. It will throw the world into two hostile camps—in effect, the democracies versus the authoritarian regimes. War over Taiwan will inevitably involve Australia.
There will be no positive outcomes from a conflict. If China is defeated, Xi will fall from office and the CCP will face an existential crisis of legitimacy that could see it lose its hold on power amid large-scale political turmoil.
If Beijing wins, it will have to deal with a bloody occupation on an island of 25 million people who mostly reject the idea of communist control. The Taiwanese will put up tough resistance. Xi will face his own Iraq occupation moment, with nothing to offer Taiwan other than repression.
Beijing’s control of Taiwan would transform the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Japan would become vulnerable from the south and east, and face the reality that China could cut its trade and energy supplies.
It’s hard to see how the US’s Pacific alliances could survive a defeat like the communist takeover of Taiwan. Everything depends on how the situation plays out. Imagine a US administration that decides that war over Taiwan, contrary to all American statements, isn’t worth fighting.
If that happens, America’s allies in the region, Australia included, will know they are on their own when it comes to dealing with a militarily successful Beijing. In this world the choice for Japan, Australia and South Korea is to either appease Beijing or develop much stronger military capability at breakneck pace.
Imagine another scenario where America does indeed choose to come to the defence of Taiwan. Australia will get the president’s second phone call after he or she has rung Tokyo, asking what military support we will offer. Does anyone imagine Australia has a realistic option to sit out the fight? If we tried to opt out, we can say goodbye to ANZUS, intelligence cooperation, nuclear-propelled submarines, US foreign investment and all the other things that have made us wealthy and secure.
It’s claimed Pentagon desktop war games invariably see the US lose against the PLA over Taiwan. That doesn’t necessarily mean much. But to be clear, a US defeat and a resurgent China would be a disaster for the interests of countries that don’t want to bow to Beijing.
All this means war over Taiwan is an outcome that must be avoided. Xi has built up such a momentum towards war, and such aggressive and nationalistic expectations among the Chinese people, that I believe the only way to prevent a war is to change Xi’s calculation of the risk and costs of starting a conflict.
Internationally, Xi has been a successful risk-taker. He staged a takeover of the South China Sea and militarised reclaimed ‘island’ bases with no effective international response; he has prosecuted wholesale cyber intellectual property theft around the world with, until recently, most countries reluctant to even name China as the cause; he trashed Beijing’s agreement with the UK over Hong Kong and is rolling out repressive rule over its 7.5 million people. The world responded with empty hand-wringing.
China continues to prosecute a campaign of economic coercion against Australia where our fellow democracies have been happy to fill the export niches we once enjoyed. We are asked by China’s supporters in Australia to believe it’s our fault because we provocatively wanted to investigate the origins of Covid-19.
Through all of this, Xi has learned that being audacious and taking risks has worked. He has gotten away with international aggression, internal repression and the Covid-19 cover-up with hardly a scratch. Xi will apply a similar calculation of cost and risk to Taiwan. Large-scale military incursions into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone, the ramped-up propaganda about the inevitability of ‘reunification’ and the attempts to squeeze Taiwan out of any international engagement are all aimed at testing how far Xi can move without receiving pushback.
It is a certainty that PLA air incursions will continue, get larger and get closer to Taiwan’s landmass. In a major speech last week, Xi returned to the old formulation of calling for the ‘peaceful reunification’ of Taiwan, but there is no doubting his sense of urgency. Xi wants to be the leader that delivers this outcome and not leave it to his successors.
We can prevent this looming catastrophe by making it clear to Xi that the democracies will not tolerate China’s forced incorporation of Taiwan. An emergency meeting of the G20 should be held to make an unambiguous commitment to its security.
Australia should accept Taiwan’s offer to exchange intelligence and security assessments as it does with our Quad partners, Japan, India and the US. We should post a Defence liaison to our mission in Taipei and invite a counterpart to Canberra. Our hardline reading of the ‘one China’ policy meant that, as a senior Defence official, I couldn’t talk with Taiwanese counterparts. We run the risk that we could be asked to defend Taiwan without ever having discussed the task with the Taiwanese military.
Most importantly, the US, Japan and Australia need to make explicit our intention to work together to protect Taiwan and to afford Taipei more opportunities to have its voice heard in international forums. More Australian leaders should follow Malcolm Turnbull and Tony Abbott and engage with Taiwan, strengthening political and economic ties.
Beijing will not welcome this, but we know the price of Xi’s approval is compliance to his wishes. Xi needs to understand the world will not look the other way while the PLA attacks Taiwan.
It’s clear Beijing won’t give up its aspiration for unification with Taiwan, but if Xi realises the costs of such military folly will be too high, the hope is he will leave that to future generations. Deterrence secures the peace, whereas appeasement will surely lead to war.
5. America’s doughnut shaped Indo-Pacific strategy
Excerpts:
The frustrating fact here is that on key metrics, the United States is not as far behind China in Southeast Asia as many assume. In 2019, China was only a marginally bigger export market for ASEAN countries than the United States. In most years since 2015, US investment into ASEAN has far outstripped Chinese investment. Where the United States has fallen short is in its distinct lack of economic diplomacy. Here, it could take a leaf out of China’s book. Though progress has been slow since the G7’s announcement, the Build Back Better World (B3W) may be an attempt to do this.
Beijing is not resting on its laurels. China’s indefatigable foreign minister Wang Yi has hosted colleagues from ASEAN countries twice this year, and in September went on a regional tour. After joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), China has now applied to join the CPTPP in an attempt which appears to be more serious than many observers anticipated.
The United States’ competition with China is global in character. However, for elemental reasons of economics, geography and history, Southeast Asia is always going to be at the epicentre of this contest. The Quad, NATO, G7 and AUKUS all have much to contribute. But they are no substitute for actual regional engagement. If handled poorly, their initiatives can feel like external impositions. Blinken’s late September promise to ASEAN leaders to introduce a comprehensive regional strategy focusing on Southeast Asia is long overdue.
America’s doughnut shaped Indo-Pacific strategy
As Washington’s pivot to Asia begins to take shape, showing
up in person and walking the talk will be deal-breakers.
With the exception of India, the common thread linking the United States’ Indo-Pacific and broader China strategy so far has been the rallying of long-standing US allies.
Early summits with President Moon Jae-in and former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga are starting to bear results. South Korea is slowly starting to step up its regional engagement. Japan is getting increasingly serious about defending Taiwan.
China’s prognostication that the Quad arrangement between Australia, India, Japan and the United States would “dissipate like ocean foam” was wishful thinking. Even if the military aspect of the Quad is limited for now, it will considerably complicate the Chinese People’s Liberation Army defence planning. The Quad’s revitalised pledge to donate 1 billion Covid-19 vaccines to Southeast Asia is a welcome example of the United States stepping up to provide public goods. From further afield, this year’s G7 and NATO Summits were unprecedented in their focus on the Indo-Pacific.
Finally, AUKUS – the strategic defence partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States – has been heralded as the belated realisation of Obama’s pivot to Asia. Assuming there is an effective stopgap solution to get extra submarines in the water for Australia before the late 2030s – admittedly a fairly huge if at the moment – AUKUS should lead to a significantly more favourable balance of power in the region.
Virtual talks though, can only go so far in a region that puts a premium on face time.
Nonetheless, so far, there is a gaping hole right at the centre of US President Joe Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy – the lack of anything beyond perfunctory efforts to engage with Southeast Asia.
According to a review of the White House’s Statements and Releases, almost nine months into his term, Biden has yet to speak to a single Southeast Asian leader. Secretary of State Antony Blinken took until July to officially engage with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations after technical glitches ruined his planned May summit. US ambassadorial posts to ASEAN, Brunei (ASEAN’s current chair), the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam remain vacant. As yet, there are no nominees for the ASEAN, Philippines or Singapore postings.
The United States has at least upped its game recently, with Blinken in August holding virtual talks with ASEAN counterparts over five consecutive days. Virtual talks though, can only go so far in a region that puts a premium on face time.
Whilst Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin and Vice President Kamala Harris’ visits to Singapore and Vietnam (and Austin’s visit to the Philippines) were no doubt welcome, they sent mixed messages. Bangkok and Jakarta both felt justifiably snubbed. At least – unlike Kuala Lumpur – both capitals were warranted a visit by Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman back in late May-early June.
China’s prognostication that the Quad would “dissipate like ocean foam” was wishful thinking. President Joe Biden, joined by Vice President Kamala Harris (l) and Secretary of State Antony Blinken (c), participates in the virtual Quad Summit with Australia, India, and Japan, 12 March 2021 (White House/Adam Schultz/Flickr)
Vietnam has been assiduous in resisting Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea, while Singapore and to a lesser extent the Philippines (even under President Rodrigo Duterte) have done much to facilitate the US regional military presence. In its clear prioritisation of these countries, the United States risks sending the message that it sees Southeast Asia primarily through the lens of security competition with China.
Even in the security realm though, Biden’s approach has thus far proved to be deficient. May budget documents flag just US$179 million in military financing for the entire Indo-Pacific. The Middle East gets US$5.46 billion. Despite mentioning Singapore and Vietnam, the administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance curiously omitted treaty allies, the Philippines and Thailand.
Beijing is not resting on its laurels. China’s indefatigable foreign minister Wang Yi has hosted colleagues from ASEAN countries twice this year.
Of course, none of this picture is helped by Washington’s inability to deepen trade links with the region. Reported disagreements between administration officials have slowed proposals for a US-led digital trade pact. Compared to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) – a clear third rail – a digital trade deal should be easy to achieve. If AUKUS is indeed the long-heralded arrival of the pivot, it’s missing an economic component.
The frustrating fact here is that on key metrics, the United States is not as far behind China in Southeast Asia as many assume. In 2019, China was only a marginally bigger export market for ASEAN countries than the United States. In most years since 2015, US investment into ASEAN has far outstripped Chinese investment. Where the United States has fallen short is in its distinct lack of economic diplomacy. Here, it could take a leaf out of China’s book. Though progress has been slow since the G7’s announcement, the Build Back Better World (B3W) may be an attempt to do this.
Beijing is not resting on its laurels. China’s indefatigable foreign minister Wang Yi has hosted colleagues from ASEAN countries twice this year, and in September went on a regional tour. After joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), China has now applied to join the CPTPP in an attempt which appears to be more serious than many observers anticipated.
The United States’ competition with China is global in character. However, for elemental reasons of economics, geography and history, Southeast Asia is always going to be at the epicentre of this contest. The Quad, NATO, G7 and AUKUS all have much to contribute. But they are no substitute for actual regional engagement. If handled poorly, their initiatives can feel like external impositions. Blinken’s late September promise to ASEAN leaders to introduce a comprehensive regional strategy focusing on Southeast Asia is long overdue.
6. Nato to expand focus to counter rising China
Excerpts:
Stoltenberg said Russia and China should not be seen as separate threats. “First of all China and Russia work closely together,” he said. “Second, when we invest more in technology . . . that’s about both of them.”
“This whole idea of distinguishing so much between China, Russia, either the Asia-Pacific or Europe: it is one big security environment and we have to address it all together. What we do on readiness, on technology, on cyber, on resilience matters for all these threats. You don’t put a label,” he added.
Stoltenberg said the hasty withdrawal of Nato forces from Afghanistan in August was “an obvious choice” after the US decision to leave the country. He said that while European militaries might have been able to remain without US support, political leaders could not justify a continued presence.
“It was partly a military aspect: capabilities. But I think fundamentally more important was the political aspect: we went into Afghanistan after an attack on the United States,” he said. “Militarily it would have been possible [to stay]. But politically, I regard it as absolutely unrealistic . . . that was the main reason.”
Nato to expand focus to counter rising China
Countering the security threat from the rise of China will be an important part of Nato’s future rationale, the alliance’s chief has said, marking a significant rethink of the western alliance’s objectives that reflects the US’s geostrategic pivot to Asia.
In an interview with the Financial Times, Nato secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg said China was already having an impact on European security through its cyber capabilities, new technologies and long-range missiles. How to defend Nato allies from those threats will be “thoroughly” addressed in the alliance’s new doctrine for the coming decade, he said.
The military alliance has spent decades focused on countering Russia and, since 2001, terrorism. The new focus on China comes amid a determined shift in the US’s geopolitical orientation away from Europe to a hegemonic conflict with Beijing.
“Nato is an alliance of North America and Europe. But this region faces global challenges: terrorism, cyber but also the rise of China. So when it comes to strengthening our collective defence, that’s also about how to address the rise of China,” Stoltenberg said. “What we can predict is that the rise of China will impact our security. It already has.”
Nato will adopt its new Strategic Concept at a summit next summer, which will outline the alliance’s purpose for the following 10 years. The current version, adopted in 2010, does not mention China.
Nato secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg: ‘China is coming closer to us’ © Virginia Mayo/Reuters
The Nato alliance is seeking a new direction following the end of its 20-year deployment in Afghanistan, while discussions over the future of the US military presence in Europe are ongoing.
Stoltenberg, the former Norwegian prime minister who is set to step down next year after almost eight years at the helm, said that Nato allies would seek to “scale down” activities outside of their borders and “scale up” their domestic defensive resilience to better resist external threats.
“China is coming closer to us . . . We see them in the Arctic. We see them in cyber space. We see them investing heavily in critical infrastructure in our countries.
“And of course they have more and more high-range weapons that can reach all Nato allied countries. They are building many, many silos for long-range intercontinental missiles,” he said.
China tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile in August, the FT reported over the weekend, demonstrating an advanced long-range weapons capability that surprised US intelligence and underscored the rapid military progress China has made on next-generation weapons.
But any suggestion of a shift away from deterring Russian aggression would meet protests from eastern European member states that view Moscow as an existential threat and the alliance as their sole security guarantor.
Stoltenberg said Russia and China should not be seen as separate threats. “First of all China and Russia work closely together,” he said. “Second, when we invest more in technology . . . that’s about both of them.”
“This whole idea of distinguishing so much between China, Russia, either the Asia-Pacific or Europe: it is one big security environment and we have to address it all together. What we do on readiness, on technology, on cyber, on resilience matters for all these threats. You don’t put a label,” he added.
Stoltenberg said the hasty withdrawal of Nato forces from Afghanistan in August was “an obvious choice” after the US decision to leave the country. He said that while European militaries might have been able to remain without US support, political leaders could not justify a continued presence.
“It was partly a military aspect: capabilities. But I think fundamentally more important was the political aspect: we went into Afghanistan after an attack on the United States,” he said. “Militarily it would have been possible [to stay]. But politically, I regard it as absolutely unrealistic . . . that was the main reason.”
7. ‘Integrated deterrence’ taking shape against China
All instruments of national power of the US and our allies for nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence, and unconventional deterrence.
‘Integrated deterrence’ taking shape against China
New defense doctrine recognizes US needs a network of allies to counter the threat of China's growing military capabilities
MANILA – The Biden administration’s “integrated deterrence” strategy against China has gained momentum in recent weeks amid more military cooperation and expanded naval drills with key regional allies and strategic partners.
This month alone saw two major drills between the US and like-minded powers in the Indo-Pacific. First came the joint naval exercises between two US carrier strike groups as well as the United Kingdom’s Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG21), along with a Japanese big-deck warship, in the waters off the coast of Japan’s Okinawa prefecture.
A week later, the US kicked off the second phase of the massive Malabar 2021 exercises with fellow Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) powers Australia, India and Japan in the Bay of Bengal.
Shortly after that, the Philippines, a US treaty ally, also announced the restoration of ‘full scale’ Balikatan joint exercises, with thousands of troops from both sides expected to take part in major war games amid rising maritime tensions in the region.
The decision came only months after the two allies restored the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). On the eve of the 70th anniversary of the Philippine-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it signaled deeper maritime security cooperation in light of growing Chinese naval assertiveness in adjacent waters.
The concept of “integrated deterrence” burst into mainstream strategic discourse after US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s high-profile speech in Singapore earlier this year. The US defense chief, however, had raised the concept much earlier during his visit to the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in Hawaii in April.
“Throughout American history, deterrence has meant fixing a basic truth within the minds of our potential foes: And that truth is that the costs and risks of aggression are out of line with any conceivable benefit,” Austin said, emphasizing the changing nature of warfare and strategic challenges in the 21st century.
“To make that clear today, we’ll use existing capabilities, and build new ones, and use all of them in networked ways – hand in hand with our allies and partners,” he added. Emphasizing that “deterrence still rests on the same logic – but it now spans multiple realms, all of which must be mastered to ensure our security in the 21st century.”
US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Photo: AFP / Mandel Ngan
In recent months, other top Pentagon officials have further elucidated on the new American defense doctrine in light of China’s rapidly expanding military capabilities.
As Melissa Dalton, the acting assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities, explained, “integrated deterrence” is based on the assumption that the US can no longer just “rely on [its own] military strength alone to prevent adversaries from attacking.”
“Adversaries are pressing for advantage in multiple domains, and our department requires a different approach – one that requires deeper integration with allies, partners and other instruments of national power,” she added during a September panel talk at the Air Force Association’s annual Air, Space and Cyber Conference.
For his part, Gregory M Kausner, the acting undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, emphasized that “integrated deterrence” relies on the right mix of technology, operational concepts and capabilities – all woven together and networked in a way that is credible, flexible and so formidable that it will give any adversary pause.
“We can expect adversaries to challenge our logistics dominance from the homeland to the outer reaches of the battlespace,” he added, underscoring the importance of proactive and cooperation projection of power in multiple theatres, which “is united with allies and partners, and is fortified by all instruments of national power.”
The controversial AUKUS (Australia, the UK and US) nuclear submarine deal is clearly just the tip of the iceberg, as the Biden administration doubles down on high-stakes defense cooperation with allies and other like-minded powers in the Indo-Pacific.
In early October, the US Navy joined the UK Royal Navy, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Royal New Zealand Navy and the Royal Netherlands Navy in large-scale multinational exercises off the coast of Japan.
“In addition to the two carrier strike groups of the US Navy, I feel very honored to be able to train with the Royal Navy’s most advanced carrier strike group, which is an extremely valuable experience,” said JMSDF Escort Flotilla 2 commander Rear Admiral Konno Yasushige in a statement.
“This training, which brings together three CSG, embodies the strong will of the participating countries to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific. The JMSDF will work closely with allied and friendly navies, which share the same objectives, to respond to global challenges and defend maritime order based on the rule of law,” he added in a thinly-veiled jab at China, which has been accused by the US and its allies of undermining regional stability and freedom of navigation.
“And we have continued to improve our ability to conduct prompt and sustained operations at sea with a more mobile, agile and flexible force,” US Rear Admiral Dan Martin said in a separate statement.
Meanwhile, UK CSG21 commander Commodore Steve Moorhouse hailed the British fleet, which “offers the largest 5th generation air wing afloat today and working with our close allies to develop operating procedures and capabilities while concurrently showcasing the agility of land and carrier-based aviation in the Indo-Pacific demonstrates our commitment to the region.”
Just over a week later, the US held Phase II of the Malabar exercises with other Quad powers in the Bay of Bengal, having concluded the first phase near Guam earlier this year.
The escort vessels Ise and Izumo of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force Self-Defense fleet conduct joint training with Britain’s Royal Navy carrier Queen Elizabeth strike group on September 9, 2021. The navies are learning how to work together. Photo: AFP / EyePress News
This month’s Quad exercises featured, among others, anti-submarine warfare training, surface gunnery exercises, cross-deck helicopter operations and a whole host of other exercises aimed at integrating maritime security operations among the four naval powers across the Indian Ocean.
The Pentagon deployed the US Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 1, consisting of the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Stockdale and 8A Poseidon maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft.
The Indian Navy, on its part, deployed Rajput-class guided-missile destroyer INS Ranvijay, the Shivalik-class multi-role stealth frigate INS Satpura and a P-8I maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. They were joined by the JMSDF’s Izumo-class multipurpose operation destroyer JS Kaga and Murasame-class destroyers JS Murasame as well as the Royal Australian Navy’s Anzac-class frigate HMAS Ballarat and HMAS Sirius.
“This visit to Carl Vinson during Malabar was an important opportunity to see first-hand the integration between our two navies at sea,” US Navy Admiral Michael Gilday said in a statement, emphasizing how “our navies [are] continuing to exercise together, as we are doing right now alongside Japanese and Australian naval forces, there is no doubt our partnership will only continue to grow.
“Cooperation, when applied with naval power, promotes freedom and peace, and prevents coercion, intimidation and aggression.”
“[The latest Malabar exercise] improves the compatibility of our forces in support of our mutual desire for unmatched maritime security in the global commons,” said Rear Admiral Dan Martin, the commander of Carrier Strike Group 1. “Unit integration during complex task group maneuvers further demonstrates our ability to effectively work with our Indo-Pacific allies and partners and win in any contested maritime environment,” he added.
As a direct claimant state in the South China Sea and a century-old US ally, the Philippines is also an important node in the US’ “integrated deterrence” strategy. Up until 2019, the two allies conducted as many as 280 bilateral defense activities, the most among all INDOPACOM partners.
But the following year saw Beijing-friendly Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte temporarily abrogating the VFA, which provides the legal framework for large-scale bilateral defense exercises, including the Balikatan.
Philippine marines take position next to US marines Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV) during an amphibious landing exercise at the beach of the Philippine navy training center facing the South China sea in San Antonio town, Zambales province, north of Manila on October 6, 2018. Photo: AFP / Ted Ajibe
In response to China’s strategic opportunism in the South China Sea in the past year, and with Duterte entering his twilight months in office, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has been eagerly restoring defense ties with the Pentagon.
“We have lined up a number of activities that will further strengthen the bilateral relationship between our two militaries and as mentioned, we will go full-scale Balikatan next year,” new AFP Chief of Staff General Jose Faustino Jr said on October 14.
The Philippine military chief announced that up to 300 joint defense activities were scheduled for next year. Back in 2019, Balikatan featured amphibious exercises, which saw as many as 4,000 Filipino soldiers joining 3,500 Americans and 50 Australian soldiers.
Next year will likely see similar large-scale drills, especially as the two allies agreed to fully implement key bilateral defense deals, including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), and pursue a new defense framework focused on maritime security against the backdrop of the South China Sea disputes.
If and when fully implemented, the EDCA would, inter alia, allow US forces to preposition weapons and rotate large number of troops across key Philippine bases, which are close to the disputed South China Sea land features.
“I am optimistic that our alliance will continue to be robust in view of new and emerging security challenges that confront our nations. After all, we share the same goal of keeping peace and stability in this region,” the Philippine military chief added.
8. US rejoining UN Human Rights Council; what it should do first
Excerpts:
This is Blinken’s chance.
The United States will be seated as a UNHRC member in January, but its work to dissolve the commission of inquiry should begin now. Blinken and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield should urge key UN leaders to block funding for the commission. The UN’s Fifth Committee controls the budget, which is traditionally passed close to Christmas. That gives the U.S. and its allies two months to try to defund the commission.
The Biden administration should also start building allied support for a resolution to dissolve the commission. There is precedent for the U.S. successfully leading such a reversal when it uses its diplomatic muscle: The 1991 General Assembly vote to repeal a 1975 resolution declaring Zionism to be racism, which is essentially what the UNHRC’s commission of inquiry was established to conclude.
Biden officials claim the UNHRC is not broken beyond repair — that engagement and diplomacy can achieve much-needed reforms, starting with ending the Council’s bias against Israel. Let them prove their critics wrong by dissolving the anti-Israel commission of inquiry.
US rejoining UN Human Rights Council; what it should do first
The Hill · by Richard Goldberg and Orde Kittrie, opinion contributors · October 16, 2021
The United States on Thursday won a seat on the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) beginning in January 2022, with the Biden administration vowing to prove it can reform the council from within. Biden’s first test: dissolving the council’s one-sided commission of inquiry on Israel.
In a statement issued moments after the UNHRC election results were announced, Secretary of State Antony Blinken put anti-Israel bias at the top of the Biden administration’s reform agenda. The council, he said, “suffers from serious flaws, including disproportionate attention on Israel and the membership of several states with egregious human rights records.”
Indeed, the council’s obsession with castigating Israel has long been atop the list of criticisms leveled against it. Since the council’s creation, it has adopted more resolutions condemning Israel than every other country in the world combined. In contrast, the council has adopted zero resolutions on the gross human rights abuses in China, Cuba, and Russia.
In addition, Israel is the only country to which the council dedicates a standing agenda item. As if Israel — a democracy rated by the respected Freedom House as a free country, which boasts Arabs on its Supreme Court, in its parliament and in its coalition government — were the world’s leading abuser of human rights.
The council currently is preparing its most insidious assault on Israel to date.
In May, the Hamas terrorist organization rained thousands of rockets down on Israeli civilians while using Palestinians as human shields — both clear violations of the law of armed conflict. Rather than condemning Hamas, the UNHRC voted to establish a new commission of inquiry designed to produce a report falsely accusing Israel of committing apartheid.
The mandate for this new commission includes not only investigating Israel for violations of the law of armed conflict but also investigating “systematic discrimination and repression based on national, ethnic, racial or religious identity” and establishing facts of “crimes perpetrated.” This phrasing mirrors the language of a report issued in April by Human Rights Watch, which invented a new, broader definition of the decades-old crime of apartheid and falsely accused Israel of violating it.
The commission’s objectives are clear: falsely label Israel as committing apartheid; leverage the commission’s reporting to support the global boycott, divestment, sanctions movement, and pressure the International Criminal Court to expand its illegitimate investigation of Israel.
Importantly, this commission, unlike its predecessors, came with no expiration date — rather than producing a one-time report on a particular outbreak of violence, it is to issue annual reports in perpetuity. The commission will be staffed by full-time researchers who will create a steady stream of official UN documents containing one-sided allegations that Israel is guilty of war crimes, apartheid, and other human rights violations. For those who recall the controversial Goldstone report of 2009 — a product of a similar fact-finding mission ordered by the UNHRC following an Israeli conflict with Hamas — the new commission looks like Goldstone on steroids.
The UNHRC’s fatal flaws stretch beyond its bias against Israel, of course. The council’s membership is dominated by countries that violate human rights, including China, Cuba, Eritrea, Libya, Russia, and Venezuela. The UNHRC’s disproportionate focus on Israel seems designed to distract attention from the gross and systemic abuses committed by the council’s own member states, which are rarely if ever condemned by the council.
When Blinken first declared the U.S. would return to the council, he said that the U.S. “withdrawal in June 2018 did nothing to encourage meaningful change, but instead created a vacuum of U.S. leadership, which countries with authoritarian agendas have used to their advantage.” Blinken committed that the U.S. would be at the council “table using the full weight of our diplomatic leadership” and that he strongly believed “that when the United States engages constructively with the council, in concert with our allies and friends, positive change is within reach.”
This is Blinken’s chance.
The United States will be seated as a UNHRC member in January, but its work to dissolve the commission of inquiry should begin now. Blinken and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield should urge key UN leaders to block funding for the commission. The UN’s Fifth Committee controls the budget, which is traditionally passed close to Christmas. That gives the U.S. and its allies two months to try to defund the commission.
The Biden administration should also start building allied support for a resolution to dissolve the commission. There is precedent for the U.S. successfully leading such a reversal when it uses its diplomatic muscle: The 1991 General Assembly vote to repeal a 1975 resolution declaring Zionism to be racism, which is essentially what the UNHRC’s commission of inquiry was established to conclude.
Biden officials claim the UNHRC is not broken beyond repair — that engagement and diplomacy can achieve much-needed reforms, starting with ending the Council’s bias against Israel. Let them prove their critics wrong by dissolving the anti-Israel commission of inquiry.
Richard Goldberg is a senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (@FDD), a Washington-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. Goldberg previously served as Director for Countering Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction for the National Security Council. Follow him on Twitter @rich_goldberg
The Hill · by Richard Goldberg and Orde Kittrie, opinion contributors · October 16, 2021
9. FDD | Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen Stands Up to Xi Jinping
FDD | Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen Stands Up to Xi Jinping
A tale of two speeches.
fdd.org · by Thomas Joscelyn Senior Fellow and Senior Editor of FDD's Long War Journal · October 15, 2021
This week, I want to take a close look at two China-related stories that caught my eye. First, Taiwan’s President, Tsai Ing-wen, stood up to the mainland’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in a remarkable speech. Tsai was responding to the latest provocations from Xi Jinping, the Chinese ruler who has his eyes set on her tiny island nation.
Second, the Islamic State conducted a suicide bombing at a Shiite mosque in Afghanistan’s Kunduz province. Although this sort of attack is commonplace, it was intended to send a message not only to the Taliban, but also China. Let’s examine both stories.
Xi claims history is on his side.
On October 9, Xi delivered an ominous speech regarding the “Taiwan question.” Xi’s remarks were intended to commemorate the 110th anniversary of the Revolution of 1911 (or Xinhai Revolution), which overthrew the imperial Qing dynasty. While Xi reiterated his alleged desire for a “peaceful reunification,” a seemingly benign outcome, his address was clearly dark and menacing.
Xi began by placing the “Taiwan question” in historical context, claiming it “arose out of the weakness and chaos of our nation and it will be resolved as national rejuvenation becomes a reality.” This is a reference to China’s fractured past. The CCP regularly uses historical grievances—both real and imagined—to justify its hold on power. Xi and other Chinese officials argue that the Chinese people, including citizens of Taiwan, can avoid the chaos of the previous, disunified era more than 100 years ago only by submitting to the party’s iron grip on power today.
After re-asserting China’s historical grievances, Xi argued that the “the general trend of Chinese history,” as well as the “common will of all Chinese people,” will necessarily lead to reunification. He then cited Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the 1911 revolution, as saying: “The tide of history is mighty. Those who follow it will prosper, while those who go against it will perish.”
In Xi’s view, the “tide of history” is on the CCP’s side, while the government of Taiwan is going “against it.” It does not require much effort to understand which party must “perish.”
After delivering this admonition, Xi then spoke of “[n]ational rejuvenation by peaceful means,” saying it was in the best “interests of the Chinese nation as a whole, including our compatriots in Taiwan.” But the Chinese ruler wasn’t finished threatening Tsai’s government in Taipei. Xi said that his compatriots “on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should stand on the right side of history and join hands to achieve China’s complete reunification and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
Xi claimed that the “Chinese nation has an honorable tradition of opposing division and safeguarding unity.” And “Taiwan independence” is the “greatest obstacle to national reunification,” as well as “a grave danger to national rejuvenation.”
Then, Xi issued a clear threat: “Those who forget their heritage, betray their motherland, and seek to split the country will come to no good end, they will be disdained by the people and condemned by history.” The audience erupted in applause as Xi spoke those words.
Xi said the “Taiwan question is purely an internal matter for China, one which brooks no outside interference,” and that no one “should underestimate the resolve, the will, and the ability of the Chinese people to defend our national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” More applause followed.
“The complete reunification of our country will be and can be realized,” Xi vowed.
Tsai Ing-wen echoes President Biden, while standing up to Xi Jinping.
Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, responded in a defiant speech of her own the next day, October 10. That date is significant. It is known as Double Tenth Day, which marks the anniversary of the uprising against the Qing dynasty—the same event Xi commemorated in his speech. That revolution also led to the founding of the Republic of China, Taiwan’s official name.
Tsai said her nation would not “bow to pressure” from mainland China and the two “should not be subordinate to each other”—a clear rebuke of Beijing’s intention to subsume the tiny island nation.
Tsai repeated a theme that has become the cornerstone of President Joe Biden’s foreign policy: The world is embroiled in a contest between autocracies and democracies.
“At this moment, the global political landscape is undergoing drastic change,” Tsai said. “Free and democratic countries around the world have been alerted to the expansion of authoritarianism, with Taiwan standing on democracy’s first line of defense.”
She praised other democracies for supporting Taiwan throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically thanking Japan, the United States, Lithuania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Poland. All of these countries, with the exception of Lithuania, now have a diplomatic presence inside Taiwan. And Lithuania “will soon establish a representative office” inside the country. Tsai explained that this is “an embodiment” of “this year’s theme”: “Broadening Democratic Alliances and Making International Friendships.”
“In Washington, Tokyo, Canberra, and Brussels, Taiwan is no longer on the margins, with more and more democratic friends willing to stand up for us,” Tsai said. As a result, her country “is no longer seen as the orphan of Asia, but as an Island of Resilience that can face challenges with courage.”
But President Tsai knows full well that the CCP seeks to end Taiwan’s success story. The “more we achieve, the greater the pressure we face from China,” Tsai warned. “So I want to remind all my fellow citizens that we do not have the privilege of letting down our guard.”
Tsai reminded her audience that the CCP’s goons have taken “complete control of Hong Kong,” while “suppressing … democracy activists” there. She also mentioned that the CCP was challenging the “regional order” in the “South and East China Seas.”
Earlier this month, Beijing launched its largest incursion into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) to-date, sending approximately 150 military aircraft into the area off the island nation’s coast. This activity “has seriously affected both our national security and aviation safety,” Tsai said.
In “contrast” to these unprovoked provocations, “democratic countries are working to strengthen our broad-based, mutual cooperation in order to respond to regional and global developments.” She pointed to alliances and partnerships such as the “G7, NATO, EU, and QUAD,” all of which “highlighted the importance of peace and security in the Taiwan Strait, while expressing concern over whether China may unilaterally undermine the status quo of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.”
It’s clear that Tsai is hoping that these same actors will rise to Taiwan’s defense, should Xi decide that “peaceful reunification” is no longer an option.
Tsai reiterated her own nation’s commitment “to the peaceful development of the region” and called “for maintaining the status quo.”
Only time will tell how long this “status quo” will last, or how far the U.S. and its allies are willing to go in defense of Taiwan. It may be the case that historians will look back on the speeches delivered by Xi and Tsai this month as key landmarks in this story.
A suicide bombing in Kunduz.
On October 8, a suicide bomber blew himself up at a Shiite mosque frequented by members of the Hazara community in Afghanistan’s northern Kunduz province. The Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) quickly claimed responsibility for the heinous attack, which killed or wounded approximately 100 civilians.
The Islamic State is well known for such bombings. The Sunni jihadist group has a fetish for spilling Shiite blood and regularly dispatches its “martyrs” to locales frequented by the Muslim minority. Indeed, in one of its messages after the bombing, the Islamic State reiterated its intent to continue exporting its hatred for Shiites from Baghdad to the Khorasan (meaning Afghanistan and Pakistan).
But ISIS-K had another purpose for the bombing. The Islamic State’s Amaq News Agency identified the terrorist responsible as a Uyghur Muslim, claiming that the Taliban “had pledged to expel” Uyghur Muslims from Afghanistan “in response to China’s demands and policies against Muslims” in the Xinjiang region.
I covered much of the backstory in a previous edition of Vital Interests. The short version is that the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), an al-Qaeda-affiliated group, waged jihad on behalf of the Taliban to resurrect its Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The TIP is predominantly composed of Uyghur Muslims, many of whom are from Xinjiang. The Islamic State has its own contingent of Uyghur jihadists, and has tried to poach from the TIP since 2014, when the would-be caliphate began to openly challenge the Taliban’s authority inside Afghanistan. To date, the TIP has remained loyal to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but some Uyghur jihadists have signed up for the former caliphate’s cause.
Therefore, the Islamic State’s suicide bombing in Kunduz was intended to send a message not only to Shiites, but also to China, the Taliban, and Uyghur jihadists.
The Islamic State’s message to China is straightforward: We have Uyghur suicide bombers willing to kill on our command.
The Islamic State’s message to the Taliban: If you think you can cut a deal with China, trading security guarantees for economic incentives, then think again. The Islamic State will find ways to disrupt any such arrangements and embarrass the Taliban.
And the Islamic State’s message to Uyghur jihadists: If you feel betrayed by the Taliban, then join us, we aren’t going to rein you in.
China has demonstrated a willingness to do business with the Taliban. And the Islamic State has every incentive to disrupt their dealings.
Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for FDD’s Long War Journal. Follow Tom on Twitter @thomasjoscelyn. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Thomas Joscelyn Senior Fellow and Senior Editor of FDD's Long War Journal · October 15, 2021
10. FDD | Does Big Tech Have an Anti-Semitism Problem?
FDD | Does Big Tech Have an Anti-Semitism Problem?
fdd.org · by Richard Goldberg Senior Advisor and David May Senior Research Analyst· October 15, 2021
Employees at Google and Amazon launched a petition drive this week to persuade both companies to end their contracts with the world’s only Jewish state. Google and Amazon can send a powerful message in response by rejecting this anti-Semitic pressure campaign and incorporating the international working definition of anti-Semitism into its employee code of conduct instead.
This year’s explosion of anti-Semitism on corporate listservs and within diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) departments has sent a clear message to Jewish employees of America’s Big Tech firms: Safe spaces exist for everyone except Jews, and hate is condemned against all groups unless the hate is directed at Jewish supporters of the world’s only Jewish state. Hostility toward Jews and Israel isn’t restricted to activists chatting at the water cooler; it is institutionalized by key DEI officials.
In June, Google reassigned a high-ranking member of its diversity team following revelations he published a 2007 blog post entitled “If I Were a Jew,” in which he accused Jews of having an “insatiable appetite for vengeful violence.” A month later, Google stood by another DEI official who accused Israel of “settler-colonial apartheid” and referred a Jewish employee to books on the “boycott, divestment and sanctions” (BDS) campaign when a complaint was registered.
In May, more than 500 Amazon employees signed a letter to CEO Jeff Bezos calling on him to “sever business contracts and corporate donations with companies, organizations and/or governments that are active or complicit in human rights violations, such as the Israel Defense Forces.” That same month, 250 Google employees sent a letter to executive leadership requesting “the termination of contracts with institutions that support Israeli violations of Palestinian rights, such as the Israel Defense Forces.” This week’s “anonymous” petition drive is just the latest recycling of the same baseless hate.
The actions of these so-called activists signal a measure of hypocrisy when it comes to human rights. They aren’t bothered that Hamas is a terrorist organization that uses human shields to maximize civilian casualties during conflicts. They don’t care that Hamas intentionally fires rockets at civilian targets. And they seem oblivious that Hamas oppresses women and LGBTQ residents of Gaza. This raises doubts about their real concern for the welfare of the Palestinian people. Instead, it appears some may be out for blood—Jewish blood.
Natan Sharansky, the respected former Soviet dissident, wrote that the way to tell whether someone is anti-Semitic when criticizing Israel is to apply what he called the “3-D test”—demonization, double standards and delegitimization. On all three counts, the anti-Israel organizers prove themselves to be Jew-haters—not human rights activists. Adopting the IHRA definition will give human resource executives a clear path to stop employees from isolating, harassing and persecuting their fellow Jewish employees whose identities are deeply connected to the Jewish state.
If, however, the moral obligation to defend Jewish employees is not enough to swat down activist calls to boycott Israel, there is another compelling reason for C-Suites and board rooms to stay above the fray. State laws around the country, which were established to defend against this bigotry, could inflict significant financial, legal and reputational harm on companies that inflict politically motivated economic harm on Israel or Israeli companies. More than 30 U.S. states have legislation or executive orders placing restrictions on companies engaging in anti-Israel boycotts. More than 20 states prohibit state contracts with companies engaged in boycotts of Israel, while a dozen don’t allow their pension funds to invest in such companies.
Google has contracts with Illinois, Arizona and other states, while Amazon provides services for California, Maryland and Rhode Island, among others. Additionally, many states with investment prohibitions on companies boycotting Israel own shares of these technology firms. Together, these states hold more than $3.3 billion in Amazon and $2.1 billion in Google.
If Big Tech companies want to take a stand against hate and prove they’ll defend all their employees—even Jews—their first move should be to adopt the IHRA working definition of anti-Semitism. Next: Take a hard look at DEI staff and consultants to eliminate the insidious anti-Semitism creeping into their ranks. Finally, don’t give into calls to boycott Israel—doing so is not only morally corrupt, but will trigger significant financial, legal and reputational costs.
Richard Goldberg is as a senior adviser at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies where David May is a senior research analyst. Follow Goldberg via @rich_goldberg and May via @DavidSamuelMay. Follow FDD on Twitter: @FDD. FDD is a Washington, D.C.-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Richard Goldberg Senior Advisor · October 15, 2021
11. Colin Powell dead at 84 from COVID-19 complications
A sad day for our nation. What a legacy he has left us.
Very few have earned the subtle Soldier-Statesman.
Colin Powell dead at 84 from COVID-19 complications
The Hill · by Mychael Schnell · October 18, 2021
Former Secretary of State Colin Powell, the first African American to serve in the post, died on Monday at the age of 84 due to complications from COVID-19, his family announced in a statement.
The family said the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been fully vaccinated and was receiving treatment at Walter Reed National Medical Center.
“General Colin L. Powell, former U.S. Secretary of State and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, passed away this morning due to complications from Covid 19. He was fully vaccinated. We want to thank the medical staff at Walter Reed National Medical Center for their caring treatment,” the Powell family said in a statement posted to Facebook.
“We have lost a remarkable and loving husband, father, grandfather and a great American,” the family added.
This developing report will be updated.
The Hill · by Mychael Schnell · October 18, 2021
12. The End of American Militarism?
Be careful what you ask for (and how you define the problem). We have to deal with the world as it really is and not as we would wish it to be. The military instrument will always play important role. Do not let the pendulum swing as far as Bavecivh and like-minded people desire.
Excerpts:
The best testing ground for Biden to put his words into action is China. If force is truly the option of last resort, Biden will exert himself to prevent the increasingly adversarial U.S. relationship with China from becoming an all-out military competition. Allowing the U.S.-Chinese relationship to center on an arms race, comparable to the one that drove U.S.-Soviet antagonism in the 1950s, would be the height of rashness. Yet as the recently announced Australia-United Kingdom-United States agreement to sell nuclear-powered submarines to Australia suggests, Biden appears to be leaning in that very direction. In his speech at the UN, Biden said that the United States is not “seeking a new Cold War or a world divided into rigid blocs.” But actions speak louder than words, and so far, Biden seems to be either accepting a new Cold War as all but inevitable or welcoming such a prospect. In either case, with the submarine deal, the credibility of Biden’s assertion that the United States now intends to lead by example begins to look rather thin. Perhaps Biden is banking on enhancing the military power of second-tier U.S. allies to make China more accommodating. If so, he is placing a very large and risky bet.
In respectable circles, “America first” rates as tantamount to blasphemy. It harkens back to the irresponsibility of the 1930s and the cluelessness of Biden’s predecessor. In fact, however, keeping America first—maintaining a position of global primacy—has long ranked as the paramount objective of the foreign policy establishment of which Biden is a card-carrying member. Members of that establishment accept it as given that the United States should enjoy privileges and prerogatives not allowed to any other country. The American people agree, classifying such privileges and prerogatives as their due. Perhaps the United States should consider the present moment as an invitation to reassess that proposition. At the very least, policymakers might consider the possibility that further misuse of military power will only serve to squander what remains of the United States’ privileged status.
The End of American Militarism?
Biden Must Confront Washington’s Addiction to Force
Foreign Affairs · by Andrew J. Bacevich and Annelle Sheline · October 15, 2021
President Joe Biden would like the world to believe that the United States is changing, and in big ways. The American infatuation with war has ended, he told the UN General Assembly last month. Going forward, the United States will no longer treat military power as “an answer to every problem we see around the world,” he said. Central to the president’s message was an acknowledgment that in recent decades, the United States has not classified force as a “tool of last resort.” On the contrary, the promiscuous use of force has become a hallmark of American statecraft, so much so that phrases such as “endless war” and “forever wars” have become staples of everyday political discourse. In this new era, U.S. global leadership remains important, Biden said, but the United States will lead “not just with the example of our power” but “with the power of our example.”
Assume that the president means what he said. Assume further that the Pentagon, the U.S. intelligence agencies, and the military-industrial complex (along with their allies in Congress and the media) concur with the commander in chief. How might his views translate into reality? What difference might they make? In that regard, Biden’s reference to force as a “tool of last resort” answers certain questions but avoids others. It provides broad but not particularly helpful guidance as to when to use force—not too soon, but presumably just in time—and none whatsoever regarding what might justify the use of force. And it dodges altogether the most crucial question: In the present age, what is armed force good for?
If Biden wants to turn this provisional doctrine into something concrete, he needs to build his administration’s policies and spending choices—and not just his speeches—around it. For example, the United States should play by the same rules governing the use of force as it expects other countries to play by. It should reduce its military footprint around the world and reconsider the $1 trillion it plans to spend on its nuclear arsenal over the next several years. These are some of the steps Biden could take if he genuinely wishes to signal that the United States has truly come “back” from the Trump era of “America first.” Yet simply reverting to the status quo that preceded (and helped pave the way for) Donald Trump won’t suffice.
The Rules Do Apply
If the president is serious about leading by example, he should bring the United States into compliance with preexisting norms from which it has routinely exempted itself, especially in the years since the 9/11 attacks. This means that Washington should fully abandon the idea of preventive war. In his West Point address of May 2002, President George W. Bush declared that the 9/11 attacks had rendered the Cold War–era principles of deterrence and containment defunct. “If we wait for threats to fully materialize,” Bush warned, “we will have waited too long.”
Less than a year later, he put this so-called Bush Doctrine into practice by invading Iraq, with disastrous consequences. On a major public occasion such as his next State of the Union Address, Biden should explicitly revoke the Bush Doctrine, unambiguously reinstating deterrence as the cornerstone of U.S. military policy. For too long, successive administrations have conceived of American military might as an expedient means to solve problems—toppling regimes deemed objectionable or bumping off alleged terrorists and other individuals Washington perceived as threatening. Biden should renounce this fantasy. That the United States today has no shortage of foreign adversaries stems at least in part—by no means entirely—from its past misuse of military power. Whatever its present difficulties with Tehran and Pyongyang, armed conflict is unlikely to provide a cost-effective solution.
By extension, Biden should renew the U.S. commitment to the UN Charter, ratified by a 98–2 vote in the U.S. Senate on July 28, 1945. Article 2 of the charter requires all members to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force” in any “manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Whenever it suited them to do so, successive U.S. administrations have ignored this proviso. Biden should affirm that Article 2 applies to the United States as much as to any other UN member state. And he shouldn’t stop there. Article 51 of the charter offers a caveat to Article 2. It recognizes “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs.” Biden should enshrine self-defense—not regime change, nation building, or the crossing off of putative evildoers on a “kill list”—as the overarching rationale for the use of U.S. military force.
Biden’s statements regarding “the power of our example” ring hollow when the United States continues to refuse to sign onto or respect key aspects of international law.
There are many other opportunities to demonstrate good faith by signaling a willingness to abide by norms to which most members of the international community have committed themselves. This includes honoring the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention, ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1949, which defines collective punishment as a war crime. By that standard, U.S. economic sanctions targeting Cuba and Venezuela are illegal and immoral. They have also proven to be ineffective and should be lifted. As with force itself, coercion by other means should become a last resort.
Biden should affirm the renewed U.S. compliance with the Convention Against Torture, ratified by the Senate in 1994 but largely ignored in the years after 9/11. And he should endorse Section 2340A of Title 18 of the United States Code, which makes it a federal crime for public officials to engage in torture outside the United States. Closing the detention facility in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, once and for all offers one way to signal that the United States is moving beyond torture. Biden should also press the Senate to ratify several key treaties and international agreements, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1996), the Mine Ban Treaty, or Ottawa Treaty (1997), and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998). That a badly divided U.S. Senate led by partisans such as Mitch McConnell and Chuck Schumer is unlikely to take up these matters is no doubt the case. Yet if Biden is serious about aligning the United States with existing international norms, he will at least call upon the Senate to act. A gesture is better than silent acquiescence.
Biden’s statements regarding “the power of our example” ring hollow when the United States continues to refuse to sign onto or respect key aspects of international law. The existing pattern of U.S. behavior is not difficult to decode: Washington tends to oppose or ignore any international agreement that inhibits its freedom to coerce. If Biden means what he said to the UN General Assembly, that will have to change.
More Than Just Lip Service
If leading by example signifies something more than a throwaway bit of oratory, the president should detail what it will mean in practice. He can begin with the U.S. Department of Defense. Notwithstanding its official name, the Defense Department’s taken-for-granted purpose is not defense: it is power projection. The armed forces of the United States stand ready to deal with potential threats in distant places, such as the Persian Gulf, East Asia, and Europe. As the past two years have starkly revealed, threats that endanger the immediate safety and well-being of Americans where they live are, more often than not, an afterthought. For the Pentagon, this means that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea takes precedence over wildfires, hurricanes, floods, pandemics, and porous borders here at home, not to mention quelling the occasional insurrection. These become the responsibility of agencies whose budgets and resources pale in comparison to what the armed services routinely enjoy.
At issue here is the meaning of “national security.” Since the end of World War II, the term has implied addressing military threats by relying on overt or covert military action. As a result, the Pentagon is accustomed to getting the lion’s share of resources earmarked for national security. Within the foreign policy establishment, this allocation of resources—the Pentagon being the big winner while others survive on relative scraps—is not even remotely controversial. Biden should insist on redressing this imbalance, allocating more money to agencies such as the Coast Guard, the National Institutes of Health, the U.S. Forest Service, and the U.S. Border Patrol, with the army, navy, and air force obliged to get by with a bit less.
Deeply invested in the status quo, the military-industrial complex will oppose any move away from the standard conception of national security. So if Biden is committed to change, he has his work cut out for him. Whether he is willing to spend the necessary political capital to take on the forces committed to existing arrangements remains to be seen. If, for example, Biden objects to the recent vote in the House of Representatives approving $768 billion in new military spending for 2022—the largest-ever military budget in total dollars—he has yet to say so publicly.
Where to begin trimming the U.S. overseas military profile? Europe.
Cutting the Pentagon’s budget would necessarily have major implications for the configuration and stationing of U.S. armed forces. Here, too, is an opportunity for Biden to demonstrate that he is serious about classifying force as a last resort and emphasizing noncoercive approaches to leadership. Closing one or more of the six U.S. regional combatant commands, which oversee U.S. military operations across vast geographic expanses, offers a good place to start. In that regard, United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which asserts “responsibility” over the entirety of South America and the Caribbean, should be the first to go.
The United States’ neighbors to the south face a variety of challenges. Chief among them are economic underdevelopment; fragile political institutions; domestic troubles related to corruption, crime, and the drug trade; and not least of all, climate change. That the United States should exert itself to alleviate these problems is no doubt the case. But none of them avail themselves to military solutions. Apart from offering employment to a four-star general or admiral, SOUTHCOM is about as relevant to present-day national security concerns as the crumbling coastal artillery emplacements still found flanking major U.S. ports.
More broadly, the Biden administration should also reduce the number of U.S. overseas bases abroad. There are currently some 750 in over 80 countries. Where to begin trimming the U.S. overseas military profile? Europe. Nearly eight decades after World War II and some three decades after the Cold War, it is no longer necessary for U.S. forces to garrison prosperous democracies such as Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, which are fully capable of defending themselves. In addition to reducing the U.S. military’s footprint, the Biden administration should also curb the export of American manufactured weaponry, which in fiscal year 2020 amounted to a world-leading $175 billion. Curtailing the sale of advanced arms to Saudi Arabia—currently exceeding $3 billion annually—offers a place to start.
The ongoing modernization of the U.S. nuclear strike force also offers a place to begin a shift away from militarism and a chance to redirect defense spending to more urgent priorities. Nuclear war (or a nuclear mishap) remains one of the most immediate threats to humanity. With minimal public debate, the United States is currently engaged in replacing its entire existing “strategic triad,” consisting of long-range bombers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and land-based, intercontinental ballistic missiles. This project will likely continue until midway through the next decade and will cost at least $1 trillion. And yet, as a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States has vowed to “pursue negotiations in good faith” leading to “nuclear disarmament.” If Biden wants to demonstrate that he is serious about leading by example, he might consider treating U.S. obligations under the NPT with something other than lip service. Refurbishing rather than replacing the U.S. nuclear arsenal would do just that.
So, too, would foregoing the option of a nuclear first strike, meaning a preemptive attack to take out an adversary’s arsenal. A “no-first-use” pledge would not prevent the United States from retaliating in the event of being targeted by a nuclear attack. It would, however, signal that the United States is serious about removing the sword of Damocles that the nuclear powers have suspended over humankind since the early days of the Cold War.
A New Cold War?
The best testing ground for Biden to put his words into action is China. If force is truly the option of last resort, Biden will exert himself to prevent the increasingly adversarial U.S. relationship with China from becoming an all-out military competition. Allowing the U.S.-Chinese relationship to center on an arms race, comparable to the one that drove U.S.-Soviet antagonism in the 1950s, would be the height of rashness. Yet as the recently announced Australia-United Kingdom-United States agreement to sell nuclear-powered submarines to Australia suggests, Biden appears to be leaning in that very direction. In his speech at the UN, Biden said that the United States is not “seeking a new Cold War or a world divided into rigid blocs.” But actions speak louder than words, and so far, Biden seems to be either accepting a new Cold War as all but inevitable or welcoming such a prospect. In either case, with the submarine deal, the credibility of Biden’s assertion that the United States now intends to lead by example begins to look rather thin. Perhaps Biden is banking on enhancing the military power of second-tier U.S. allies to make China more accommodating. If so, he is placing a very large and risky bet.
In respectable circles, “America first” rates as tantamount to blasphemy. It harkens back to the irresponsibility of the 1930s and the cluelessness of Biden’s predecessor. In fact, however, keeping America first—maintaining a position of global primacy—has long ranked as the paramount objective of the foreign policy establishment of which Biden is a card-carrying member. Members of that establishment accept it as given that the United States should enjoy privileges and prerogatives not allowed to any other country. The American people agree, classifying such privileges and prerogatives as their due. Perhaps the United States should consider the present moment as an invitation to reassess that proposition. At the very least, policymakers might consider the possibility that further misuse of military power will only serve to squander what remains of the United States’ privileged status.
Foreign Affairs · by Andrew J. Bacevich and Annelle Sheline · October 15, 2021
13. The Lion and the Bard: How Churchill Used Shakespeare to Change the World
As Charles Hill argues in his book Grand Strategy, literature has contributed to strategy in important ways throughout history. And "reading is fundamental" to being able to "do good strategy."
Excerpts:
To be sure, Winston Churchill was the product of his time, his upbringing, and his circumstances. But he was surely a product of all that he read and embedded in his soul. By reading, Churchill understood the stories. By memorizing, Churchill lived the stories. By loving, Churchill gave the stories back to each one of us with a scowl and a cigar clamped firmly between his teeth.
Today, over a half century later, it is up to us to read what the critic Matthew Arnold dubbed “the best which has been thought and said,” so that we, too, will be wise, will be formed, and will be prepared — should the circumstance arise — to answer history’s call to give the roar.
The Lion and the Bard: How Churchill Used Shakespeare to Change the World
Winston Churchill (Library of Congress)
More than any other author, the poet of Stratford informed the writing of the towering British statesman, political leader, and Nobel laureate.
The most important tribute any human being can pay to a poem or a piece of prose he or she really loves is to learn it by heart. Not by brain, by heart. . . .What you know by heart, the bastards cannot touch.
—George Steiner
Use your memory! It is those bitter seeds alone which might sprout and grow someday.
—Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
Be prepared.
—Motto, Boy Scouts of America
Then out spake brave Horatius,
The Captain of the Gate:
“To every man upon this earth
Death cometh soon or late.
And how can man die better
Than facing fearful odds,
For the ashes of his fathers,
And the temples of his gods.”
Though the words from Thomas Babington Macaulay’s The Lays of Ancient Rome conjured images of a misty, robed-and-pillared past, it was young Winston Churchill’s elocution that was electrifying. Standing before the Harrow School committee, Churchill flawlessly poured out line upon line telling the story of Horatius — the noble captain who would bodily defend the city against the onslaught of the mighty Etruscan army. At the conclusion of his proud, if not defiant, presentation, a transfixed room roared in applause as Churchill was awarded the declamation prize.
From a young age, Churchill was enamored with the written and spoken word. Though Latin was a sure form of torture for the young Briton, English was indispensable. The language of his British father and his American mother, of his beloved Shakespeare, and of the never-ceasing Empire was cause for great felicity and solemnity. Churchill reflected:
Naturally, I am biased in favor of boys learning English. I would make them all learn English: and then I would let the clever ones learn Latin as an honour, and Greek as a treat. But the only thing I would whip them for is not knowing English. I would whip them hard for that.
During his military service in India, Churchill found himself enduring hours of agonizing monotony. Unwilling to waste precious time playing cards or napping during the interminable and sweltering Indian days, he entreated his mother to send him boxes of books, which he immediately devoured. Macaulay’s twelve volumes of English Histories and Gibbon’s eight-volume The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire were meticulously apportioned to his open hours, and soon he was reading Adam Smith, Charles Darwin, Plato, and Henry Hallam’s The Constitutional History of England. Eager to follow in his Tory father’s parliamentary footsteps, Churchill even asked for 27 volumes of The Annual Register (dating back to Disraeli’s government) from which he could read bills from the House of Commons, summarize their proposals, and craft eloquent written arguments (and votes) for or against. This period of intense self-education Churchill dubbed “the University of One.” It would solidify his lifelong love for reading. “If you cannot read” all your books, Churchill purred,
at any rate handle them and, as it were, fondle them. Peer into them. Let them fall open where they will. Read from the first sentence that arrests the eye. Then turn to another. Make a voyage of discovery, taking soundings of uncharted seas. Set them back on your shelves with your own hands. Arrange them on your own plan, so that if you do not know what is in them, you at least know where they are. If they cannot be your friends, let them at any rate be your acquaintances.
In works considering the influence of literature on Churchill (Churchill’s Literary Allusions, The Literary Churchill) as well as according to the findings of eminent Churchill historians Martin Gilbert, William Manchester, Andrew Roberts, and Richard Langworth, Churchill had a deep and abiding love for Shakespeare. Shakespeare, in fact, is the leading English author — bar none — that Churchill references in his essays, books, and speeches. Among his favorites include Hamlet, Richard III, and King John.
In 1944, when the fortunes of the Second World War had begun to turn for the Allies, Churchill was exuberant on learning that Laurence Olivier and Filippo Del Giudice were teaming up to produce a full-length color film of Shakespeare’s Henry V. The prime minister insisted that Henry V was “a gleam of splendour in the dark, troubled story of medieval England,” adding that “Henry led the nation away from internal discord to foreign conquest. He had the dream and perhaps the prospect of leading all Western Europe into the high championship of a crusade.” On the eve of the top-secret D-Day invasion, what better story than Shakespeare’s Henry V to tell the world of an underdog British nation, beset by troubles and uncertainty, facing the roaring might of a haughty, well-fed, well-funded French army in a historically crucial battle . . . and winning? Shakespeare, from Churchill’s perspective, had already foretold the outcome.
Even after the war and into Churchill’s twilight years, the great man treasured Shakespeare. Richard Burton tells the well-known story of his 1953 encounter with the 79-year-old rumbustious prime minister and war hero while Burton was playing Hamlet at the Old Vic in London. “There he was,” Burton remembered,
sitting in the front row, literally within arm’s length. I heard this sort of dull, thunderous kind of rumbling in the stalls and I wondered what it might be. And it was Churchill who spoke every line with me. This was fairly disconcerting so I tried to shake him off. I went fast; I went slow; I went backwards; I went edgeways, but the old man caught up with me all the time. And, of course, Hamlet is so long that they cut three-quarters of an hour out of it. Whenever there was a cut there was a tremendous explosion in the stall [from Churchill] — you would have thought I was Hitler!
“He knew every play absolutely backwards.” Burton would later say. “He knows perhaps a dozen of Shakespeare’s plays intimately.”
While Churchill could thrill or weep (and Churchill was a cryer) at the swirl of Shakespearean drama, his intimate knowledge of the Bard wasn’t simply recreational. It was formative. The wit and the nerve, the agony and the ecstasy of the human experience told in pristine English was woven into the fabric of Churchill himself. To be sure, without the sweeping histories written by Macaulay and Gibbon, Churchill would not have offered the same epic style. But without Shakespeare, Churchill would likely never have galvanized the masses with phrases such as “I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears, and sweat,” or “Never in the field of human conflict has so much been owed by so many to so few,” or “Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, ‘This was their finest hour.’” In the wake of the war and pressed by colleagues about how history would treat him, Churchill quipped with a twinkle in his eye, “History will be kind to me, for I intend to write it.” Shortly thereafter, Churchill did just that, penning a magisterial six-volume series on the Second World War.
In 1953, Winston Churchill was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature “for his mastery of historical and biographical description as well as for brilliant oratory in defending exalted human values.” At the presentation speech, Swedish writer Sigfrid Siwertz of the Nobel committee offered that “Churchill’s political and literary achievements are of such magnitude that one is tempted to resort to portray him as a Caesar who also has the gift of Cicero’s pen. Never before has one of history’s leading figures been so close to us by virtue of such an outstanding combination.”
One year later, in a Westminster Hall packed to celebrate Churchill’s achievements and his 80th birthday, he uncharacteristically deflected the outpouring of praise, remarking that the nation’s
will was resolute and remorseless, and as it proved, unconquerable. It fell to me to express it, and if I found the right words you must remember that I have always earned my living by my pen and by my tongue. It was a nation and race dwelling all round the globe that had the lion heart. I had the luck to be called upon to give the roar.
To be sure, Winston Churchill was the product of his time, his upbringing, and his circumstances. But he was surely a product of all that he read and embedded in his soul. By reading, Churchill understood the stories. By memorizing, Churchill lived the stories. By loving, Churchill gave the stories back to each one of us with a scowl and a cigar clamped firmly between his teeth.
Today, over a half century later, it is up to us to read what the critic Matthew Arnold dubbed “the best which has been thought and said,” so that we, too, will be wise, will be formed, and will be prepared — should the circumstance arise — to answer history’s call to give the roar.
Evangelization & Culture
14. British defence strategy is undergoing a naval tilt
Excerpts:
Despite its active role during the pandemic last year and its response to the fuel crisis this month, as well as its successful airlift from Kabul, the army is smarting from brutal cuts in the defence review. But it has also botched key projects. Ajax, an armoured reconnaissance vehicle that was supposed to serve as the digital hub for Britain’s future armoured division, is suffering from potentially crippling problems with vibration and may have to be scrapped. Francis Tusa, a defence analyst, says that some in the army are worried that it will not be able to deliver a high-readiness brigade (roughly 5,000 troops) to NATO by 2024, as promised, because of equipment shortages.
The army, caught between peacetime missions that require light infantry, and preparation for high-end warfare with heavier forces, “is in danger of no longer having a clear role—or being able to perform one”, warns Anthony King of Warwick University, who advises the army. Preserving inter-service harmony may require Admiral Radakin to pay close heed to the Royal Marines’ motto: per mare, per terram—by sea, by land.
British defence strategy is undergoing a naval tilt
The promotion of an admiral to run the armed forces accentuates the turn to the seas
Oct 14th 2021
IN A COUNTRY of grand titles, no official holds a loftier one than Britain’s first sea lord, the head of the Royal Navy, whose office predates that of the prime minister. Now Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the incumbent, has been handed dominion over not just the oceans, but also land, air and space. On October 7th the government announced that he would become the next chief of defence staff, the country’s most senior military officer, to replace General Sir Nick Carter on November 30th.
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Admiral Radakin, a trained barrister born in Oldham, in the north of England, will be the first naval officer to hold the top job in almost two decades. That is no coincidence. After 20 years of grinding land warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan—the latter concluding in disastrous fashion in August, with the fall of Kabul—British defence strategy is once more acquiring a pronounced naval flavour.
In March the government published a review of foreign policy that emphasised Britain’s role as a “maritime trading nation”. It promised to deepen the country’s connections to Asia, Africa and the Gulf and set out a “tilt” to the Indo-Pacific. A subsequent defence review said that the armed forces would be designed for “permanent and persistent global engagement”, not just preparing for big wars.
One manifestation of this maritime tilt is that while the army is being shrunk, the navy’s fleet is planned to grow to 24 frigates and destroyers by the 2030s, though with a lean period over the coming decade. In a speech in May Admiral Radakin hailed a “renaissance of British shipbuilding”.
Today’s ships are being worked hard. Last year the Royal Navy sent ships to the Barents Sea, the heart of Russian naval power, for the first time since the cold war. In August a British destroyer skirted Crimean waters, drawing fire from Russia’s coastguard. The crown jewel of the fleet, a carrier strike group built around HMS Queen Elizabeth, one of two new aircraft-carriers, is voyaging through Asia. On September 27th one of its destroyers passed through the Taiwan Strait, becoming the first British warship to do so in 13 years.
Some sailors will stay far from home. The Royal Navy plans to deploy two small vessels to Asia permanently. Though it will stretch the navy thin, a pair of “littoral response groups”, in essence a handful of commando-packed amphibious ships, will deploy in the North Atlantic this year, and to Oman, in the Indian Ocean, in 2023.
These strategic shifts—a maritime turn, greater attention to Asia and an emphasis on using the navy to make friends—came together in the AUKUS pact of September 15th, in which America and Britain agreed to help Australia build nuclear submarines to deter China. It cannot have hurt Admiral Radakin’s candidacy that he helped negotiate the agreement.
Meanwhile on land, the mood is glummer. Having provided six of the past ten defence chiefs, the British Army saw Admiral Radakin chosen ahead of two of its own: General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith, chief of the general staff (the head of the army) and General Sir Patrick Sanders, who leads Strategic Command, which controls special forces and cyber capabilities.
Despite its active role during the pandemic last year and its response to the fuel crisis this month, as well as its successful airlift from Kabul, the army is smarting from brutal cuts in the defence review. But it has also botched key projects. Ajax, an armoured reconnaissance vehicle that was supposed to serve as the digital hub for Britain’s future armoured division, is suffering from potentially crippling problems with vibration and may have to be scrapped. Francis Tusa, a defence analyst, says that some in the army are worried that it will not be able to deliver a high-readiness brigade (roughly 5,000 troops) to NATO by 2024, as promised, because of equipment shortages.
The army, caught between peacetime missions that require light infantry, and preparation for high-end warfare with heavier forces, “is in danger of no longer having a clear role—or being able to perform one”, warns Anthony King of Warwick University, who advises the army. Preserving inter-service harmony may require Admiral Radakin to pay close heed to the Royal Marines’ motto: per mare, per terram—by sea, by land. ■
This article appeared in the Britain section of the print edition under the headline "Master and commander"
15. Road Rules: Colin Powell's 13 Rules of Leadership
As we mourn the loss of General Powell, some wisdom from him to keep in mind. These rules would serve well now and in the future.
Road Rules: Colin Powell's 13 Rules of Leadership
“The challenge of leadership is to be strong, but not rude; be kind, but not weak; be bold, but not a bully; be thoughtful, but not lazy; be humble, but not timid; be proud, but not arrogant; have humor, but without folly.” – Jim Rohn
Most leadership philosophies are built around a list that captures the essence of how a specific leader actually leads. My own philosophy was built around ten rules that probably soundly like something from a David Letterman episode. General Paul Funk, the commanding general of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, uses a list of around 40 rules captured in “Funk’s Fundamentals.” “Stormin’” Norman Schwarzkopf, who led the coalition that liberated Kuwait during the Gulf War, had his own list of 14 rules on leadership. If nothing else, lists are a simple way to convey not just how you lead, but what matters most to you.
Colin Powell was no different. In his 2012 memoir, It Worked For Me: In Life and Leadership, Powell drew on personal collections of lessons and anecdotes to share the wisdom of a lifetime in service to the nation. The book itself is a terrific read, something you can consume in a few short hours. But the true value of the book comes in the first few pages, in the list he uses to open the book – his 13 Rules.
Colin Powell’s Leadership List
Like most of our leadership lists, Powell’s rules are actually lessons themselves, gleaned from his decades in uniform. The genius is in their simplicity; the power is in their brevity. He doesn’t waste a lot of words; he doesn’t spend a lot of time explaining them. Instead, he shares them with the same directness that came to define him as a leader.
1. It ain’t as bad as you think. It will look better in the morning.
There’s a silver lining in every cloud, you just have to find it. That’s not always as easy as it sounds. Things might look bad today, but if you’ve put in the effort, tomorrow will be a brighter day. It’s a state of mind; believe it and you will make it happen.
2. Get mad, then get over it.
There’s always going to be days when events—or people—push you to the edge. When you do lose your temper, don’t lose control at the same time. People always remember the leader with a bad temper, and never in a good way.
3. Avoid having your ego so close to your position that when your position falls, your ego goes with it.
People who think that their way is the only way tend to experience a lot of disappointment. Things aren’t always going to go your way, that’s just a fact of life. Be humble enough to accept that fact.
4. It can be done!
Just about anything can be accomplished if you set your mind to it, have the necessary resources, and the time to get it done. Don’t succumb to the skeptics; listen to what they have to say and consider their perspective but stay focused and positive.
5. Be careful what you choose.
Don’t rush into a bad decision. Take the time to consider your options, weigh the relevant facts, and make reasoned assumptions. Once you pull the trigger, there are no do-overs. So make it count.
6. Don’t let adverse facts stand in the way of a good decision.
Powell was fond of connecting good leadership to good instincts. Be a leader who hones judgement and instinct. Take the time to shape your mental models. Learn how to read a situation for yourself. Become the decision-maker your people need you to be.
7. You can’t make someone else’s choices.
Never allow someone else to make your decisions for you. Ultimately, you’re responsible for your own decisions. Don’t duck that responsibility and don’t succumb to external pressures. Make your own decisions and live with them.
8. Check small things.
Success is built on a lot of seemingly minor details. Having a feel for those “little things” is essential. In a 2012 interview, David Lee Roth shared the story of how Van Halen used brown M&Ms as an indicator of whether large concert venues paid attention to the minor details critical to a major performance. Leaders must have ways to check the little things without getting lost in them.
9. Share credit.
Success relies on the effort of the entire team, not just the leader. Recognition motivates people in ways that are immeasurable. Don’t be a glory hog. Share credit where credit is due and allow your people to stand in the spotlight. It ain’t about you. It’s about them.
10. Remain calm. Be kind.
Keep calm and carry on. Kill ‘em with kindness. When chaos reigns, a calm head and a kind word go a long way. When everyone is under incredible stress, be the leader people want to follow, not the leader people want to avoid.
11. Have a vision. Be demanding.
Followers need to things from leaders—a purpose and a firm set of standards. When you see leaders fail, it is almost always for one of those two things. They either lead their followers in a flailing pursuit of nothing, or they don’t set and enforce an example for their people.
12. Don’t take counsel of your fears or naysayers.
Fear can be a powerful motivator, but it can also paralyze a leader at the worst possible time. Learn to understand your fears and channel them in ways that you control rather than allowing them to control you. Think clearly, think rationally, and make decisions that aren’t rooted in emotion.
13. Perpetual optimism is a force multiplier.
Optimism is infectious. Maintaining a positive attitude and an air of confidence is as important for you as it is for those around you. People will feed off your optimism. Believe in your purpose, believe in yourself, and believe in your people. And they’ll believe in you.
16. Pentagon, State Department square off on Afghanistan accountability
We need an objective study of mistakes to determine lessons learned. We do not need finger pointing between State and DOD.
Pentagon, State Department square off on Afghanistan accountability
The Hill · by Rebecca Beitsch · October 17, 2021
Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle say constant finger-pointing between the Pentagon and State Department is making it difficult to get a full accounting of the messy withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Recent hearings on Afghanistan have left members of Congress frustrated as top officials from the State Department and Department of Defense (DOD) lay blame on the other at congressional hearings on Afghanistan.
“When the State Department is here and we asked them a question they say, ‘Well, you have to ask the Defense Department that,” Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) said at a recent hearing. “And now today, again, Defense Department people are before us. And the question was asked and the answer ... was, 'Well, you'll have to ask the State Department that.”
"I object to the continuation of that.”
It’s been two months since President Biden said “the buck stops with me” on Afghanistan, but the State Department has yet to announce a formal review of its work in Afghanistan, and the Pentagon has stopped short of laying out its own timeline.
“There is a lot of finger pointing taking place right now, and I think we’ve got to learn what worked and what didn’t,” Rep. Ami Bera (D-Calif.), whose district is home to one of the largest Afghan populations in the U.S., told The Hill.
“I would try to take the politics out of it,” he said. “How did we get Afghanistan so wrong after 20 years and hundreds of billions of dollars of investment?”
In the wake of the chaotic August withdrawal, Biden administration officials have grown irritated with the focus on the military’s final two weeks in the country instead of overall U.S. involvement over two decades.
Though there have been several efforts to require reviews of various aspects of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, many are Republican-led.
Sens. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) and Rick Scott (R-Fla.) introduced legislation to create a joint select committee with lawmakers from both chambers, with Hawley saying they need to examine how the Biden administration “purposefully obscured the facts around their botched Afghanistan withdrawal.”
Another measure, backed by 30 Senate Republicans, is more forward-looking, requiring the State Department to establish a task force to determine how to evacuate the many Afghan allies the U.S. left behind.
Eliot Cohen, a counselor at the State Department on topics including Afghanistan during the George W. Bush administration who previously led a review of the first Gulf War, said efforts to evaluate U.S. actions in Afghanistan are “only helpful if you create a self-appetite within government for self-examination.”
He said he has doubts that Congress can act as an effective review board.
“I think neither Republicans nor Democrats are going to be particularly inclined to a really close examination of the presidencies that dealt with this,” said Cohen, who now works at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
“You’ve got both Republican and Democrat presidents here — two of each — and a really serious accounting of all of this is going to be hard on all of them," he said. "It would require a certain amount of, dare I say, statesmanship for both Republicans and Democrats to go into this knowing that their guys are going to get pummeled because that is virtually certain to happen.”
What Cohen would like to see is something modeled after the 9/11 Commission that could draw together a panel of experts to review the war in its entirety. Such an endeavor, he said, would need to be led by people “whose bipartisanship or nonpartisanship is beyond reproach and who have a mantle to call it as they see it. And a lot of people will find that dangerous, frankly.”
The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has put out numerous reports over the years, including 11 that focus on “lessons learned.”
But lawmakers still see some gaps that need to be closed.
Bera is among the Democrats pushing for a broader review, asking several departments’ inspectors general to do an audit of special immigrant visa processing — the route for allies to come to the U.S.
“That’s something I’d be critical of. I think the Biden administration was slow to appreciate how big the backlog was,” he said, pointing to several efforts in Congress to speed the processing.
However he’s also concerned about the way the U.S. mission was portrayed to lawmakers, noting they were “constantly given a much rosier picture.”
“Clearly mistakes were made for the analysis of how stable the Afghan government was. How stable the Afghan security forces were when we pulled out was clearly misassessed. Certainly in briefings we received, the worst case scenario was six-months post August; obviously we saw complete collapse in a week,” Bera said.
“Were we not given the whole picture as Congress?” he asked. “That's super important information. Was information withheld from Congress? What information did the administration have? Or was it just bad analysis ... in which case that’s a different question. Like how did we miss this?”
Among House Republicans, some calls for investigations have met resistance from Democrats.
House Oversight GOP members have made numerous requests for a hearing on the Afghanistan withdrawal but have been thwarted by committee Democrats.
Republicans on the Foreign Affairs Committee hired their own investigator to delve into the U.S. withdrawal, but they say their efforts have been stymied by the majority, who have not approved the resolution of inquiry forwarded by Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), the panel’s ranking member.
“It is unacceptable that the State Department and White House are refusing to accept any responsibility for the debacle that was their withdrawal from Afghanistan. It’s time for this administration to stop pointing fingers and take responsibility for the disaster they caused that resulted in Americans, [permanent residents], and countless Afghan partners being left behind enemy lines,” McCaul said in a statement to The Hill.
“Mistakes were made across the government – including DOD – but at the end of the day, the horrific catastrophe we saw unfold happened because of policy failures at the White House and State Department. We certainly question some of the choices DOD made in implementing those policy decisions, and will push for oversight and accountability of those issues as well," he continued. "But as the president has said, the buck stops with him.”
A State Department spokesperson told The Hill that the agency is committed to learning lessons from the two-week period of the evacuation, but stressed that it would be a tremendous disservice to not also review the war in its 20-year entirety.
That sentiment was underscored by Secretary of State Antony Blinken in an interview with KDKA in Pittsburgh.
“I think for anyone to say that any of these decisions were made by any one agency, that’s not how we work. We do these – we do all of this together. The president brings everyone together, everyone is heard, everyone is listened to, and we make these decisions collectively. That’s what happened in Afghanistan,” Blinken said.
The Pentagon did not respond to a request for comment from The Hill.
Cohen said that any effort to get the full picture on Afghanistan is likely to come with significant hurdles.
“This was an extremely long, complicated conflict with lots and lots of different people involved. And having seen some of this from the inside myself, you have a lot of people that all think they're trying to do the right thing. That doesn't necessarily mean they’re doing it very well,” he said.
“If you have a serious endeavor, it's not going to give simple answers that would make people in the Bush administration or the Obama administration or the Trump administration or the Biden administration happy," he said. "And it won't make journalists happy either because it won't have clear cut villains or heroes or clear cut lessons or explanations because the reality is, it’s complex.”
The Hill · by Rebecca Beitsch · October 17, 2021
17. 9 months after getting Pentagon approval, Alwyn Cashe still hasn't received the Medal of Honor
When will this American hero's family receive the Medal of Honor for his sacrifice?
9 months after getting Pentagon approval, Alwyn Cashe still hasn't received the Medal of Honor
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Editor’s note: This article was originally published on Sept. 9, 2021.
On Oct. 17, 2005, during an ambush in Daliaya, Iraq, Army Sgt. 1st Class Alwyn Cashe made a decision that ensured the survival of his men, at the cost of his own life. Drenched in gasoline, he walked into the still-burning wreckage of a Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and began pulling them out one by one. Three times he walked through fire to rescue his soldiers.
Even so, the delays have continued.
A spokesman for the National Security Council said on Sept. 8 that there were no updates to share regarding Cashe’s posthumous Medal of Honor.
Sgt. 1st Class Alwyn Cashe, in an undated photo. (Courtesy photo)
Although Cashe’s award package was sent to the White House from the Pentagon at the beginning of this year and the White House planned to move forward with it before the Jan. 20 inauguration, it was delayed after the attack on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6.
Kasinal Cashe White, Alwyn Cashe’s sister, said in March that she understood President Joe Biden was focusing on the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) as he got settled in office. As a registered nurse, she “thought it was more important to get these vaccinations out.”
She told Task & Purpose in early September that she’s been waiting to hear a date for the announcement from the White House, and has attributed the delay to the crisis that unfolded in August and September in Afghanistan. She doesn’t want to take attention away from the loss of 13 service members in Afghanistan, she said, but she’s ready for the journey to get her brother the recognition he deserves to come to a successful end.
And who can blame her? It’s been almost 16 years since Cashe lost his life after walking through fire to save his soldiers.
The 35-year-old combat veteran was on his second deployment to Iraq in October 2005, and was conducting route clearance with his platoon on the evening of the 17th. Cashe was a gunner in the lead Bradley Fighting Vehicle, which “struck a victim detonated pressure-switched [improvised explosive device]” his Silver Star citation says.
A US soldier walks near a Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) during a patrol near the Rumaylan (Rmeilan) oil wells in Syria’s northeastern Hasakeh province on June 22, 2021. (Photo by Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images)
The explosion ignited the fuel cell in the vehicle, causing it to erupt into flames with the soldiers still inside of it. Cashe was only slightly injured in the explosion, but became drenched in fuel. But without a second thought, he immediately began working to get his soldiers out: There were six in the back along with the unit’s translator, as well as the driver, who had been burned.
“Flames had engulfed the entire vehicle from the bottom and were coming out of every portal,” the citation says.
Cashe went to the rear of the vehicle and began pulling soldiers out through the flames. As he worked, fire spread on his fuel-soaked uniform and then all over his body, but he kept going anyway. One by one he pulled the soldiers out, brought them to safety, and then returned for the others. Each time he went back, the fire spread further, burning Cashe.
By the time the company first sergeant arrived at the scene, Cashe was the most wounded soldier on the ground, suffering from second and third degree burns over 72% of his body. Still, he “refused to be loaded onto a medical evacuation helicopter until all the other wounded men had been flown,” the Los Angeles Times reported in 2014.
To the Air Force doctor who treated Cashe and his soldiers in Iraq, Maj. Mark Rasnake, Cashe was a hero.
“I did not realize it at the time, but he is the closest thing to a hero that I likely will ever meet. This is a place where the word ‘hero’ is tossed around day in and day out, so much so that you sometimes lose sight of its true meaning,” Rasnake wrote in a letter home, later published by the Air Force. “His story reminded me of it.”
Kasinal Cashe prays Thursday Dec. 15, 2005 for her brother, U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Alwyn Cashe of Oviedo, Fla., while holding the eastern redbud tree planted in his name at Warriors’ Walk in Fort Stewart, Ga. Cashe died in Iraq from wounds he suffered while rescuing other soldiers trapped inside a Bradley Fighting Vehicle that was destroyed by a roadside bomb. The tree dedication ceremony was the second largest for those killed in action while serving with the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division. (AP Photo/Stephen Morton)
The military doctors in Iraq worked “for hours” on Cashe’s wounds, Rasnake said, but the damage to his lungs was severe. Ultimately he was flown to Germany — the air evac team delivering “every breath to him during that flight by squeezing a small bag by hand,” according to Rasnake’s letter — and then to Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas.
His sister, Kasinal Cashe White, told the Los Angeles Times that when her brother was finally able to speak, his first words were: “How are my boys?” He died just weeks after the incident, on Nov. 8, 2005. He was ultimately responsible for saving the lives of six soldiers.
“Sgt. Cashe saved my life,” one of those soldiers, retired Sgt. Gary Mills, told the Los Angeles Times. “With all the ammo inside that vehicle, and all those flames, we’d have all been dead in another minute or two.”
“My little brother lived by the code that you never leave your soldiers behind,” Cashe’s sister, Kasinal, recalled to the Times. “That wasn’t just something from a movie. He lived it.”
Rasnake told Military.com just last year that Cashe’s actions were awe-inspiring among he and his colleagues, who believed if “his actions don’t deserve the Medal of Honor, we had trouble imagining anything … that would.”
More great stories on Task & Purpose
Haley Britzky is the Army reporter for Task & Purpose, covering the daily happenings in the Army and how they impact soldiers and their families, as well as broader national security issues. Originally from Texas, Haley previously worked at Axios before joining Task & Purpose in January 2019. Contact the author here.
18. Anger over Afghanistan and the Imperfect Example of Stu Scheller
Anger over Afghanistan and the Imperfect Example of Stu Scheller
Lt. Col. Stu Scheller, who has become a symbol in some military and political circles of a need for military accountability and reform, spent much of his time during his court-martial this week repeatedly admitting that the statements he made through social media posts were intentionally disrespectful and unwarranted.
Scheller catapulted into the burgeoning swamp of public discontent and blame after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan came to an abrupt conclusion in August with a final 13 service members dead and as images of desperate Afghans clinging to the sides of a plane stoked anger over a 20-year war that hadn't ended in triumphant victory.
In a string of videos, he berated senior military leaders for the results of the war and called out a culture that, in his eyes, was incapable of holding itself to account. It was a view that, according to Scheller's remarks in court, resonated with "many Gold Star families, junior Marines, and Congresspeople" who reached out to him "in support."
However, throughout his explanations after he pleaded guilty to six charges, Scheller's words painted dueling pictures of a man who was willing to be held accountable but remained unrepentant.
"I am standing here today pleading guilty; this is me accepting accountability," Scheller said in his own defense Thursday. "But it deeply pains me that my senior leaders are incapable of being as courageous."
Scheller's videos went largely unchallenged by the Marine Corps, which said little beyond issuing a handful of statements and confirming basic facts as they accumulated views.
But the court-martial provided long-awaited insight into what drove the Marine officer to make a series of career-altering posts, as well as what the branch's leaders found most objectionable about Scheller's public remarks, leading to a gag order, a mental health check, and finally pretrial confinement ahead of this week's hearings. It also showed how Marine Corps officers repeatedly tried to divert him away from his escalating rhetoric, only to see Scheller post again and again as his business and marriage faltered and his life "was spiraling."
In the space created by the public silence from the service, some painted Scheller as a hero, demanding a reckoning over the collapse of Afghanistan. Others saw a troubled Marine wounded by the unsuccessful end of a war in which he'd personally fought. Still others saw a man carving out a path for a political run.
All contained a level of truth, something that began to take shape when the facts behind Scheller's sudden rise to public consciousness were laid out in court. On Friday, he was sentenced to forfeit $5,000 from one month's pay and to receive a letter of reprimand. He also is set to be discharged from the Marine Corps, although the specifics of his separation have yet to be decided by Navy Secretary Carlos del Toro.
The Charges
Scheller faced six different charges -- tied to four videos and other posts he'd uploaded to social media sites -- that ranged from disrespecting public officials to conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. As part of his guilty plea, the Marine officer had to go through every charge and convince the court of the sincerity of his plea.
"The court will only accept your guilty plea if you are guilty and believe you are guilty," Col. Glen Hines, the judge in the case, explained Thursday.
The result was a detailed recounting of what brought Scheller before the court-martial, which was held in a small, utilitarian structure amid the barracks buildings and fast food restaurants of Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. Media were not allowed inside the courtroom and instead watched a video feed from a trailer set up nearby.
Two Marines walk past the sign outside the building where Lt. Col. Stu Scheller’s court-martial was being held on Thursday, Oct. 15, 2021. (Konstantin Toropin)
Scheller's first video, posted Aug. 26, prompted the charge of disrespecting a public official -- Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.
"I believed the secretary of defense made decisions that led to the failed withdrawal of Afghanistan," Scheller explained in court, admitting that he highlighted "his [Austin's alleged] incompetence publicly" in his first video.
The trial revealed that, while that first video prompted a publicly acknowledged relief from his command by the Marine Corps, Scheller's bosses also issued a nonpunitive letter of caution after his second video. Such letters are private between the writer and recipient and, according to a Navy JAG newsletter, are intended "to serve as a leadership tool for teaching and training, instead of punishment."
Scheller, who spoke unsworn before the judge, took particular exception to a statement that the Corps released shortly after his second video in August. It was one of the few times the service commented publicly on Scheller's posts, saying it was "taking appropriate action to ensure the safety and well-being of LtCol Scheller and his family."
"This seemed like an obvious attempt from the Marine Corps to paint me as suicidal," Scheller said in his statement Thursday.
He went on to argue that he took the development to mean that "the system didn't really care about me, but only wanted to protect itself."
At several points in the testimony, Scheller alluded to the stress and hardship that he was undergoing in his life amid these posts. "My life was spiraling," the Marine said in court.
Scheller said that, by the time he had posted two videos, his wife had left him, his small business was in trouble, and the specter of legal proceedings with the Marine Corps began to loom.
However, both Scheller and his lawyers were careful to note that, while the Marine was under extreme pressure, he was not mentally ill.
"There is no question that there is an emotional and a mental health aspect to this case," Timothy Parlatore, one of Scheller's four lawyers, said in his closing remarks.
Scheller, in his unsworn statement, said, "Just because you're mad, doesn't mean you're bipolar or have a mental illness."
Meanwhile, Parlatore noted that no one was citing diagnostics manuals or calling experts for testimony.
Instead, he argued that Scheller "went through a mental process of pain, anger and despair that countless veterans have gone through ... very publicly." Scheller's public calls for accountability stemmed from that emotional anguish, spurred on by the chaotic and deadly withdrawal from Afghanistan, Parlatore contended.
"The Marine Corps only cared about my mental health once I publicly challenged the leadership," Scheller charged in his testimony.
The message was that Scheller's mental state was a context, not an excuse.
The Marine noted that his mandatory mental health evaluation determined that he "wasn't mentally unstable, just very angry at what I perceived to be consistent betrayal."
After four videos and even more posts to social media, Scheller was ordered to stop posting on the sites by his boss, Col. David Emmel, on Sept. 17. It was an order that Scheller admitted he disobeyed -- though through court discussion and body language, it was clear that he didn't fully agree the order was legal.
"I believe that's what Col. Emmel believed," Scheller told Hines. Violating the order led to the third charge for Scheller and, after three posts, brig time.
A video Scheller posted Sept. 16, in uniform, asking for donations led to one of his two charges for dereliction of duty.
Two other charges -- another dereliction of duty charge, as well as a charge of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman -- stemmed from the total sum of the Marine's activity between Aug. 26 and Sept. 26, the date of his last Facebook post. Prosecutors charged that Scheller discredited himself as an officer or disrespected other officers and officials 27 times through posts and remarks public and private.
The Corps Speaks
Until this trial, the Marine Corps had said almost nothing about the Scheller case.
In his closing remarks, prosecutor Lt. Col. Troy Campbell argued that the timeline of behavior in this case was the result of a man who "insisted on escalating this process" and who "quit on the command" that was trying to help him.
Campbell said that even the special court-martial -- a process with very limited ability to issue punishment, in contrast to a general court-martial -- is a sign of the Corps' efforts to aid Scheller.
"Time after time, his command said, 'Come here, let's talk about this,'" Campbell said.
Scheller himself admitted that his boss was "very patient" after the first video went up and noted that he "didn't jump straight to [a gag] order."
When the trial resumed Friday, Hines described Scheller as someone whose service record painted the picture of "a career that appeared to be on the upward slope" while his posts showed "someone to be in pain, perhaps confused, and significantly frustrated."
The judge also had sharp criticism for the manner in which the Corps handled aspects of the case.
Hines noted that the nine days of pretrial confinement, as well as a leak of documents related to Scheller to a media outlet, raised the "specter of unlawful command influence."
The defense noted both events as something they found troubling and would have litigated further if not for the plea deal that was reached.
The trial also, at times, highlighted another aspect of Scheller's saga: the unacknowledged partisanship of some of his closest backers and supporters.
Since the first video, many of the replies related to the Marine's posts have argued that his calls for accountability were a critique of Democratic policies and leadership.
"I have stated many times that this is about Americans and not about divisions, to include Republican and Democrat," Scheller said in court. "This is about accountability of my senior leaders, not about politics."
Despite that, congressional support for Scheller came only from Republicans, and many were members of the far-right Freedom Caucus.
Supporting testimony during the trial came from Reps. Louie Gohmert, R-Texas, and Marjorie Taylor Greene, R-Ga. The latter's testimony drew repeated objections from the prosecutor for being irrelevant as it meandered from a retelling of her personal experience of Sept. 11, 2001, to calls for President Joe Biden's resignation.
Parlatore defended the choice to call her as a witness by telling reporters that he "would have loved to have both parties."
"I'm not going to tell any elected official who wants to come in and speak on behalf of their constituency about the impact of this [that] we don't want to hear from him."
Congressman Ralph Norman, R-S.C., compared the case to that of Eddie Gallagher, the now-retired Navy SEAL who was found not guilty after his former colleagues accused him of war crimes during a tumultuous deployment to Iraq in 2017.
Gallagher's story and judicial saga is closely tied with Trump, who broke tradition to overrule Navy leaders' attempts to hold the chief accountable after a court-martial found him guilty of only one minor charge. Since that trial, Gallagher has remained unrepentant and very publicly lashed out at his critics.
Now, Gallagher and his Pipe Hitter Foundation are championing Scheller's case. The former SEAL has made more than 20 social media posts on the topic and helped raise over $2.5 million for him.
Scheller, who smiled as he walked past reporters into court Friday morning, said that he felt "good" heading into his sentencing, the only time he talked to a small group of reporters gathered to cover the trial.
-- Konstantin Toropin can be reached at konstantin.toropin@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @ktoropin.
19. Assessing Airborne Status in U.S. Army Special Operations Forces
Assessing Airborne Status in U.S. Army Special Operations Forces
Title: Assessing Airborne Status in U.S. Army Special Operations Forces
Date Originally Written: August 26, 2021.
Date Originally Published: October 18, 2021.
Author and / or Article Point of View: The author has spent the majority of his career in U.S. Army special operations and on airborne status. The author contends that although there are a significant and legitimate number of reasons airborne status should be removed from special operations units, maintaining this status is essential to the posterity of elite Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF).
Summary: Airborne operations date back to World War 2. During this time, airborne operations delivered large numbers of paratroopers and special operations personnel (Office of Strategic Services) into denied territories[1]. Today, despite improved technology and the rise of great power competition, there is still a place for this capability in the ARSOF as it still fosters “eliteness,” and camaraderie, and is an effective assessment and selection tool.
Text: Since its humble beginnings, airborne operations have played a critical role in U.S. military operations throughout the world. From World War 2 to Vietnam to Grenada to Iraq, paratroopers answered the nation’s call. However, as the face of battle has changed over the last century, so too has the need for delivering large numbers of paratroopers behind enemy lines. As this metamorphosis has taken place, many senior military and civilian decision makers have begun to question the practice of maintaining large standing formations of airborne qualified troops. This practice is called further into question when applied to ARSOF, as their employment is even less probable.
There are many compelling arguments against keeping special operations soldiers on airborne status such as: money, training time, injuries and lack of practical application. The first, and arguably most discussed is cost – a paratrooper on status is currently paid 150.00 dollars per month for hazardous duty pay. This equates to 1,800.00 dollars per year per soldier. Multiplying that number over a battalion sized element of 800 soldiers equates to 1.44 million dollars per year. If applied to an airborne brigade of 4,500 paratroopers this number swells to 8.1 million dollars. This is just airborne pay to the soldiers – this number does not account for the maintenance and employment of the airframes and equipment utilized to conduct airborne operations.
Another argument often made pertains to training time required to maintain currency. On average it takes, conservatively, anywhere between four and twelve hours to conduct an airborne operation depending on the number of personnel, type of aircraft and weather conditions. In order to maintain currency, by regulation, a paratrooper must jump four times per calendar year. This is time that could arguably be used for other training that promotes soldier and unit readiness.
Finally, jumping out of airplanes is a hazardous endeavor, which often leads to a litany of injuries – back, knees, hip, ankle, and head, just to name a few. Injuries of this nature directly impact readiness either temporarily (soldier gets injured, recovers and returns to duty) or permanently (soldier gets injured, cannot make a full recovery and is in turn discharged from the Army altogether).
So why should ARSOF maintain airborne status?
Although all of the above are legitimate and justifiable arguments as to why airborne forces should become a thing of the past, there are a multitude of reasons to maintain airborne status in both conventional and ARSOF units such as: elitism, camaraderie, and assessment and selection. One of the most important is elitism. Although in many circumstances elitism is construed in a negative light, when applied to elite military units, this is not the case. According to the Cambridge Dictionary, elitism is defined as “the belief that some things are only for a few people who have special qualities or abilities [2].” By definition, being a paratrooper is being one of the elite in the Army. Elitism promotes esprit de corps, and esprit de corps promotes the good order, confidence and discipline required in military units to fight and win in battle.
Another intangible that is invaluable in military formations is camaraderie. As counterintuitive as it may sound, engaging in activities that are life threatening forges a bond between soldiers that simply cannot be replicated anywhere else – jumping out of airplanes is one such activity. Soldiers put their lives in one another’s hands on a daily basis. As such, it is imperative that they trust one another implicitly – that they have a tight bond. Airborne units forge and promote that bond as it pays tremendous dividends in stressful situations such as combat.
Finally, in order to become a paratrooper, a soldier must volunteer for airborne school. For ARSOF, airborne school serves as a form of early assessment and selection. It is not uncommon for ARSOF soldiers to face danger and be uncomfortable. In fact, this facing of danger is more often than not a common occurrence. As all ARSOF units are airborne units, if a solider is unable or unwilling to jump out of airplanes, they are probably not the right fit for special operations.
Throughout United States history, airborne forces have played a key role in the nation’s defense. However, for various reasons, over the past two decades, airborne units were scaled back, hence decreasing the number of paratroopers on airborne status. Although understandable in an age of shrinking military budgets and increasing technologies, there is still a place for the airborne as it is an elite force providing both the tangibles and the intangibles necessary to fight and win the nation’s wars. Airborne!
Endnotes:
[1] The Office of Strategic Services or OSS was a wartime intelligence agency of the United States during WWII. It was the predecessor of both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Army Special Forces (Green Berets). The organization was disbanded at the conclusion of WWII.
20. Fletcher becomes 6th Commander for NATO Special Operations Headquarters
Fletcher becomes 6th Commander for NATO Special Operations Headquarters
Oct 17 2021
MONS, Belgium – Antonio M. Fletcher assumed command of NATO Special Operations Headquarters following his promotion to lieutenant general at NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) on Friday, October 15, 2021.
Presiding over the promotion and assumption of command ceremonies Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Tod D. Wolters stated, "The Fletcher brand has been incredibly successful for 32 years. You've done it your way and I think you've done it the correct way. So I would contend that from now, until the time that you give up command of this great organization that you do it the Fletcher way because it's given us great success up to this point, and we're all convinced it will continue to do so in the future."
This command recognises and fully embraces the reality that we are all bound together by a common goal of a peaceful future.
Fletcher becomes the sixth commander of NSHQ and will be responsible for providing strategic special operations forces advice to NATO and coordinating the development of special operations forces capability and interoperability for Allies and Partners within the Alliance.
MONS, Belgium – US Army Lieutenant General Antonio M. Fletcher assumes command of NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) in a ceremony held on October 15, 2021. Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Tod D. Wolters presided over the ceremony where Fletcher became the sixth commander of NSHQ replacing U.K. Brigadier Rob Stephenson who served as the acting commander since the retirement of Lieutenant General Eric Wendt in January 2021. (NATO photo by Staff Sgt Ross Fernie)
Fletcher graduated from the United States Military Academy (West Point, New York) in 1989. He is a career U.S. Army Special Forces officer and has led special operators at all levels. Most recently from August 2020 through September 2021 he served as the Defense Threat Reduction Deputy Director and from June 2018 through July 2020 as the Commander U.S. Special Operations Command South.
He pledged to work with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and Allied and Partner Special Operations Commands to ensure special operations continued integration and interoperability across the Alliance.
"For my NATO SOF Headquarters teammates, I've always been extremely impressed with the work you do every day to earn the trust and confidence of our Allies and partners. This command recognises and fully embraces the reality that we are all bound together by a common goal of a peaceful future," said Fletcher.
U.K. Brig. Rob Stephenson, Deputy Commander for NSHQ, served as the Acting Commander upon the retirement of U.S. Lt Gen. Eric Wendt in January 2021. Both Wolters and Fletcher thanked Stephenson for his dedication to NSHQ and ensuring the command met and exceeded all its goals during his time as Acting Commander.
Established in 2009, the mission of NATO Special Operations Headquarters provides strategic special operations forces advice to NATO and coordinates the development of special operations forces capability and interoperability for Allies and Partners. Within the comprehensive framework, NSHQ balances strategic and operational planning to employ relevant, ready, integrated special operations for NATO. NSHQ is located next to SHAPE near Mons, Belgium.
Story by NSHQ Public Affairs Office
21. Why Right-Wing Extremists Love the Unabomber
Excerpts:
The incorporation of this environmentalist dimension into white supremacism is an ideological innovation, but so far there is no evidence of related tactical shifts. There do not appear to be operational differences between violent right-wing actors who express support for environmental goals and those who do not. Despite drawing on Kaczynski for inspiration and employing rhetoric emphasizing the destruction of the environment as a central threat facing humanity as a whole and white people in particular, these far-right extremists have not targeted sites explicitly associated with industrial society. Rather than attacking oil pipelines or hydroelectric dams, self-professed “ecofascists” like Tarrant attack the same kinds of people and places as non-environmentalist right-wing terrorists such as Dylann Roof or Robert Bowers.
This may change if climate change and environmental crises around the world motivate more right-wing extremists to embrace Kaczynski and the ecofascist ideology. These actors claim that creating and maintaining spaces exclusively for white people will require both violent action against modern society and its technological elements and against non-white individuals. Though environmentalist concerns are often associated with left-wing politics, this new hybrid ideology demonstrates that concern for the environment is not confined to any one part of the political spectrum. The internet and social media have facilitated the cross-pollination of ideas that may initially appear to be incongruous but that extremists have found ways to integrate into their worldviews. Anticipating and responding effectively to extremist threats requires a nuanced understanding of how actors justify their beliefs and their violent mobilization, and the far-right’s appropriation of Kaczynski’s work is a telling variation in the story some extremists tell themselves.
Why Right-Wing Extremists Love the Unabomber
Editor’s Note: Ted Kacyznski, the Unabomber, is having a revival. Although Kacyznski was known for his opposition to modern technology, Georgetown’s Kiernan Christ finds that the far right is claiming him as one of their own and that his reemergence shows how labels like “right wing” and “left wing” are often misleading and ignore how different extremes intermingle.
Daniel Byman
***
“The Industrial Revolution and its consequences have been a disaster for the human race.” So begins Theodore J. Kaczynski’s 1995 manifesto, Industrial Society and Its Future—a 35,000-word call to arms for a revolt against technology. Kaczynski, better known as the Unabomber, was an American domestic terrorist whose 17-year bombing campaign killed three people and injured 23 others. Seeking to protect wilderness and destroy technology, he targeted scientists and businessmen. However, Kaczynski’s contemporary influence isn’t strongest among environmental activists. Rather, his manifesto and ideology have found a home on far-right websites, where Kaczynski is cited as a key radicalizing influence and thought leader in spaces generally extremely hostile to modern environmentalism.
Kacyznski’s critique of industrial society as harmful to human freedom has been co-opted and incorporated into a broader yet still explicitly ethnonationalist critique of modernity. On imageboards, Twitter and TikTok, young right-wing extremists create memes and engage in discussion about Kaczynski, referring to him fondly as “Uncle Ted.” Reverence for Kaczynski is one manifestation of a broader trend: right-wing extremists using environmentalist language and perspectives on topics like pollution and wilderness preservation to support violent mobilization. This phenomenon can be understood as an attempt to strengthen the allure of far-right ideology by appealing to popular concerns regarding the destruction of the environment to justify fascist beliefs.
Kaczynski, who is currently serving multiple life sentences at a maximum security prison in Colorado, is a strange inspiration for modern right-wing extremists. Although he has dismissed leftists for being driven by “feelings of inferiority” and for their attachment to “the conventional attitudes of our society while pretending to be in rebellion against it,” he has denounced both conservatives and fascists as well. In Industrial Society and Its Future, he describes conservatives as “fools,” and in his 2010 book Technological Slavery, he describes Nazism as a “kook ideology.” He rejects any sort of politics whose focus is not the “revolution against the technoindustrial system.”
For right-wing extremists, the appeal of Kaczynski’s works originates in their identification of Kaczynski’s narrative about the development of industrial civilization and the destruction of wilderness with their own narrative about what they perceive to be the replacement and disempowerment of white people. Kaczynski’s description of the alienation of people from one another caused by technology aligns with white supremacists’ calls for solidarity among white people to resist what they regard as the threat of oppression and “white genocide.” Kaczynski’s writing reinforces their romanticizing of rural life and traditional values, juxtaposing their ideal society against the “technological society,” which Kaczynski writes “HAS TO weaken family ties and local communities if it is to function effectively.” Kaczynski’s lack of overt racism does not dissuade white supremacists from agreeing with him: In a typical thread about Kaczynski on a far-right discussion board, one poster argues that “if goals of say Kaczynski … would bear fruit, Jewry would be finished one way or another.” By reading a racial dimension into his words, white supremacists have co-opted Kaczynski’s ideology.
The far-right’s valorization of Kaczynski is evidenced by the degree to which his words and ideas have spread both on the broader internet and in right-wing spaces in recent years. While some anarchist admirers of Kaczynski have attempted to live out his ideology by learning survival skills and adopting a primitive lifestyle, Kaczynski as a figure has been profoundly meme-ified by right-wing fans. For instance, their invocation of the phrase “the industrial revolution and its consequences have been a disaster for the human race” as a response to perceived failings of modern society has spread beyond far-right corners of the internet and begun to permeate mainstream spaces, including YouTube and TikTok. Adopting both joking and sincere tones, documents describing Kaczynski’s ideology to a right-wing audience circulate on spaces like 4chan’s “Politically Incorrect” board. In a thread titled “Ted Kaczynski General,” a document that explains Kaczynski’s appeal responds to concerns that the real problem is “International Jewry/Zionism, blacks, diversity and Multiculturalism” by arguing that “nobody is denying” those things are a “net negative” but that those “grave problems are dwarfed when compared to industrial society and its consequences.” The thread also links to a document full of instructions for “prepping” for the inevitable fall of industrial society, including tips on self-improvement, nutrition, medicine and combat. These are just a handful of examples of a broader trend. A search for “Kaczynski” in archives of 4chan’s politics section turns up 17,214 results.
The increasing popularity of Kaczynski in right-wing spaces is one part of a growing strain of thought within right-wing extremism that incorporates environmental concerns as part of a racist and fascist worldview. A reading list shared on right-wing imageboards titled “Deep Ecology: An Introduction for Nationalists” includes Kaczynski’s works alongside thinkers from both left- and right-wing backgrounds. This hybrid ideology has found its way into real-world violent mobilization. Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian terrorist who killed 77 people in attacks in Oslo and Utoya in 2011, directly copied parts of his manifesto from Kaczynski’s, substituting words like “multiculturalism” for “leftism.” Environmentalist issues have also inspired right-wing terrorists who did not explicitly cite Kaczynski. Brenton Tarrant, who killed 51 Muslims in a mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2019, explicitly cited environmentalism as one of his primary motivations. In his manifesto, Tarrant wrote that he desires “ethnic autonomy for all peoples with a focus on the preservation of nature” and stated that “green nationalism is the only true nationalism.” Patrick Crusius, who targeted Latinos in a 2019 attack in a Walmart in El Paso, Texas, described his anger at corporations that employ immigrants in low-wage jobs and connected this to corporations’ pollution of the environment, arguing that the necessary response is to “decrease the number of people in America using resources.” These arguments dovetail with those of Kaczynski admirers on the right-wing internet that join concerns about the preservation of the environment to concerns about the preservation of the white race.
The incorporation of this environmentalist dimension into white supremacism is an ideological innovation, but so far there is no evidence of related tactical shifts. There do not appear to be operational differences between violent right-wing actors who express support for environmental goals and those who do not. Despite drawing on Kaczynski for inspiration and employing rhetoric emphasizing the destruction of the environment as a central threat facing humanity as a whole and white people in particular, these far-right extremists have not targeted sites explicitly associated with industrial society. Rather than attacking oil pipelines or hydroelectric dams, self-professed “ecofascists” like Tarrant attack the same kinds of people and places as non-environmentalist right-wing terrorists such as Dylann Roof or Robert Bowers.
This may change if climate change and environmental crises around the world motivate more right-wing extremists to embrace Kaczynski and the ecofascist ideology. These actors claim that creating and maintaining spaces exclusively for white people will require both violent action against modern society and its technological elements and against non-white individuals. Though environmentalist concerns are often associated with left-wing politics, this new hybrid ideology demonstrates that concern for the environment is not confined to any one part of the political spectrum. The internet and social media have facilitated the cross-pollination of ideas that may initially appear to be incongruous but that extremists have found ways to integrate into their worldviews. Anticipating and responding effectively to extremist threats requires a nuanced understanding of how actors justify their beliefs and their violent mobilization, and the far-right’s appropriation of Kaczynski’s work is a telling variation in the story some extremists tell themselves.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
