Quotes of the Day:
"You do not have to burn books to destroy a culture. Just get people to stop reading them."
- Ray Bradbury
"There is no virtue in being old, it just takes a long time."
- Robert A Heinlein - Time Enough for Love
"It should be the aim of grand strategy to discover and pierce the Achilles' heel of the opposing government's power to make war. Strategy, in turn, should seek to penetrate a joint in the harness of the opposing forces. To apply one's strength where the opponent is strong weakens oneself disproportionately to the effect attained. To strike with strong effect, one must strike at weakness."
-Sir Basil H. Liddel-Hart (Strategy, 1954)
1. President Moon makes last-ditch effort to realize North Korea talks within tenure
2. Seoul bids for Hong Kong’s crown as Asia’s financial hub
3. Apology by Chun's widow not meant for Gwangju massacre victims
4. Can Korea and Japan survive issues of history?
5. Can Korea learn from ASEAN to navigate US-China tensions?
6. Coronavirus is surging in South Korea thanks to an eye-poking sect. That's bad news for Kim Jong Un
7. Chinese police capture North Korean convict on the run
8. Could North Korea Pull the U.S. and China Into a Nuclear War?
9. Intimate Perspectives on North Korea by Fabian Muir – in pictures
1. President Moon makes last-ditch effort to realize North Korea talks within tenure
From now through at least March (presidential election) and possibly through May (the presidential inauguration) we will likely see the moon administration take steps to cement President Moon's legacy as the peace president. This may or may not be helpful to the ROK/US alliance or to his successor. And it may or may not be helpful to security on the Korean peninsula.
President Moon makes last-ditch effort to realize North Korea talks within tenure
President Moon Jae-in delivers a speech during a ceremony to mark the 20th anniversary of the foundation of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea at Myeongdong Cathedral in downtown Seoul, Nov. 25.
Yonhap
By Nam Hyun-woo
Park Sun-won, first deputy head of the National Intelligence Service / Courtesy of Cheong Wa Dae
South Korean President Moon Jae-in is making a last-ditch effort to realize tangible progress in his proposal to declare a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War, which he believes will be a powerful enticement to bring North Korea back to denuclearization talks.
As part of his efforts, the President replaced three out of four deputy heads at the country's spy agency to refresh its behind-the-scenes communications with Pyongyang over the end-of-war declaration.
Cheong Wa Dae announced Friday that Moon named three new deputy heads of the National Intelligence Service (NIS). The NIS has four deputy heads who report directly to NIS Director Park Jie-won, with the first in charge of overseas/North Korea, the second in counter-espionage, the third scientific intelligence, and another for planning and coordination. The President replaced all but the third deputy head in charge of scientific intelligence.
New first deputy head Park Sun-won is known as a North Korea specialist. He had been deputy head of planning and coordination and served as presidential secretary for unification during the 2003-08 Roh Moo-hyun administration.
Park is credited with facilitating the 2007 inter-Korean summit between Roh and then-North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. Along with current presidential national security adviser Suh Hoon, Park is known to have played a pivotal role in working-level discussions between the two Koreas.
He also reportedly served as a messenger between the U.S. and North Korea during the 2019 summit between then-U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
"Along with the perspective as a security strategist, he also has a reformative mindset," presidential senior secretary for public communication Park Soo-hyun said in a statement. "We expect his contribution to lead to a breakthrough in the inter-Korean and the U.S.-North Korea stalemate."
Moon's spy agency reshuffle is interpreted as his last-ditch effort to see tangible progress in declaring a formal end to the war. As the conflict ended in an armistice and not a peace treaty, Moon has been championing this idea under the belief that a formal declaration of peace would be a powerful enticement to bring the North back to the stalled talks, even though it is a non-binding political statement and does not affect the current state of the Korean Peninsula.
Since Moon floated the proposal again in September, South Korea has been coordinating with the U.S. over the content of the declaration, and multiple South Korean officials said the discussion is now in its final stage.
"Regarding the progress of the end-of-war declaration and its timing, the coordination between South Korea and the U.S. is now in its final stage," a senior official at the Ministry of Unification said on Nov. 24. Unification Minister Lee In-young and First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi Jong-kun have also made similar remarks.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspects a construction site in Samjiyon, Ryanggang Province, in this photo carried by the regime's official Korean Central News Agency, Nov. 16. YonhapAgainst this backdrop, Moon's appointing of Park is interpreted as an order to engage North Korea with the draft version of the end-of-war declaration.
The draft version is expected to include clauses that the declaration will not affect the armistice status between the two Koreas, thus the United Nations Command in South Korea and the U.S. Forces Korea will stay as they are today.
In this case, however, there is still a chance that the North will not agree with the declaration. Regarding Moon's proposal, Pyongyang has been demanding Seoul stop its joint military exercises with the U.S. and acknowledge its weapons development programs as preconditions.
Since these are not conditions that both Washington and Seoul can accept, attention is growing on what other favors will be offered to North Korea.
"We don't have to be too strict about interpreting North Korea's precondition," said Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies.
"If Seoul and Washington can show a certain level of sincerity, Pyongyang may engage in talks for the end-of-war declaration. For example, a high-level U.S. figure can officially say that the U.S. does not have a hostile policy toward North Korea. South Korea and the U.S. can also say they will not deploy additional ballistic missile defense systems or other strategic weapons on South Korean soil."
2. Seoul bids for Hong Kong’s crown as Asia’s financial hub
Can South Korea adapt to seize this potential opportunity?
This could be more important than the Moon administration's peace initiatives and is where the priority should be.
Seoul bids for Hong Kong’s crown as Asia’s financial hub
The South Korean capital faces obstacles to attracting overseas firms including unfavorable tax rates and regulations.
Seoul, South Korea – When Alex Short was offered rent-free office space to locate his fintech startup in Seoul’s financial district, he jumped at the opportunity.
For Short, whose startup PerformID helps online shoppers claim cashbacks and other benefits, South Korea felt like an ideal location for his business due to its highly skilled workforce and cutting-edge technology.
“I think that it makes sense to build a team there even if we do work with overseas banks,” Short told Al Jazeera from his home in Australia. “It meant the two employees based in Seoul had a place to work in. We plan on scaling that office significantly in the coming months.”
“I think that the Korean market, particularly digital, is so far ahead of what it is in Australia and in the US,” added Short, whose startup has operated out of a wood-lined workspace in Seoul’s Yeouido district run by Seoul Fintech Lab, an accelerator program funded by the Seoul Metropolitan Government, since July.
PerformID’s bet on Seoul comes as the South Korean capital makes a renewed push to rival Hong Kong and Singapore as Asia’s premier financial hub.
As part of the drive to become “Asia’s Financial City”, the city government earlier this month announced plans to spend 241.8 billion won ($204.4m) over the next five years on incentives such as employment subsidies and rental support to attract firms from overseas. Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon has pledged to transform the city into one of the world’s top five financial hubs by 2030, aiming to triple foreign direct investment to $30bn and lure at least 100 foreign financial institutions.
Seoul’s ambitions to become a major financial centre date back to the early 2000s, when former South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun promoted a vision of the capital as Northeast Asia’s business and finance hub.
“It was an idea before the global financial crisis in 2008,” Kim Hansoo, a research fellow at the think-tank Korea Capital Market Institute, told Al Jazeera. “The Korean government saw it as a future source of growth since the Korean manufacturing sector was challenged by other developing countries.”
Yeouido district is ground zero of Seoul’s efforts to attract foreign firms [File: Woohae Cho/ Reuters]
Seoul, however, faces a host of obstacles to realising its vision. When compared to Hong Kong or Singapore, South Korea suffers from a rigid labour market, cumbersome regulations, relatively high taxes and a lack of spoken English.
“Korea still has a foreign exchange control policy, no other major financial city or country controls their foreign exchange,” Kim said. “Tax levels in Hong Kong and Singapore are objectively better. Korea is on par with major cities like New York or Sydney.”
In the latest Global Financial Centres Index compiled by Z/Yen Group, Seoul ranked 13th, up three places from last year, but behind cities including Hong Kong, Singapore, London, New York, Paris, Shanghai and Beijing.
Yang Jiyoung, the head of support at Financial Hub Korea, a department of South Korea’s financial regulator tasked with promoting the city, told Al Jazeera Seoul hoped to capitalise on the uncertainty in traditional financial centres such as Hong Kong.
“Other hubs are going through turbulence at the moment, take Hong Kong and China,” Yang said. “Some companies are thinking of leaving.”
Yang said the city had “bright prospects” and counted its prowess in innovation among its greatest strengths, particularly in the marriage of traditional finance and technology, known as fintech.
“We’re in the middle of our fifth plan for nurturing the financial sector. We’re focusing on asset management and fintech, and we’ve put a lot of effort into fintech,” Yang said.
“Maybe roughly 25 percent of the plan is focused on fintech, it’s one of the major areas we would like to nurture. The concept of a financial hub will change.”
‘Best of both worlds’
Others are sceptical that Seoul has much chance of rivalling Hong Kong.
Andrew Collier, managing director of the research firm Orient Capital Research, told Al Jazeera Hong Kong offered the “best of both worlds” with its proximity to China and a British-inherited legal system.
Even with the introduction of the controversial national security law last year, Collier said banks and financial institutions would stick with the city as long as contracts continued to be upheld.
“You don’t even need the rule of law in Hong Kong, you just need contract law,” Collier said. “I don’t think Seoul has much of a chance of competing to get a piece of that action.”
For Short, Seoul’s future looks promising — not least because of its position at the forefront of technologies including smartphones and 5G.
The oval-shaped glass building that houses PerformID recently added two extra floors of office space to allow Seoul Fintech Lab to house more startups.
From just 14 startups at its launch in 2018, the incubator, which assists firms with finding the right lawyers, fundraising and providing office space, now supports nearly 100 firms hailing from 10 countries. The startups span a range of traditional and emerging fields ranging from asset management and financial investment, to crowdfunding, insurtech and blockchain.
“When you look at what’s happening globally and with the convergence between tech and finance, I think it just makes logical sense that they’re positioned as a hub in Asia for that,” Short said.
3. Apology by Chun's widow not meant for Gwangju massacre victims
This wound may never heal for Korea.
Apology by Chun's widow not meant for Gwangju massacre victims
Lee Soon-ja, center, the widow of Chun Doo-hwan, and other bereaved family members enter the Seoul Memorial Park to attend Chun's cremation ceremony, Saturday.
Yonhap
By Lee Hae-rin
The apology by the widow of Chun Doo-hwan for past wrongdoings inflicted by the former dictator has only refueled the anger of victims of the bloody suppression of the 1980 Gwangju pro-democracy movement, as Chun's side made it clear that the massacre was not subject to the apology.
Former first lady Lee Soon-ja made the apology during Chun's funeral in Seoul, Saturday, four days after he died of a type of blood cancer. The former Army general, who seized power through a military coup in 1979 and served as president from September 1980 to February 1988, was responsible for the brutal suppression of Gwangju citizens but went to his grave without ever making an admission of guilt or an apology.
In a speech as a family representative, Lee said, "On behalf of my husband, I would like to deeply apologize, especially to those who suffered pains and scars during his time in office."
Lee's apology was initially assumed to be for the victims killed in the May 1980 uprising. But civic groups related to the movement, including those of bereaved families, criticized it for being vague and incomplete, saying they couldn't accept the apology.
Then Chun's former secretary Min Jeong-ki told local reporters that Lee was not talking about Gwangju.
"Lee clearly said 'during his time in office,'" Min told reporters hours after Lee's remark, at Seoul Memorial Park where the cremation took place. He explained that the Gwangju incident took place before his presidency, which officially began on Sept. 1, 1980.
When asked to specify "those who suffered pains and scars," Min replied, "There are students who participated in (other) pro-democracy protests and died during torture by police (during Chun's term) … He was not directly responsible but he was the president anyway."
In light of this, the civic groups said Lee's apology was even more meaningless and only worsened their pain.
"It seems Lee made the apology reluctantly and unwillingly because of the growing public criticism," Choi Hyung-ho, the head of Seoul branch of The May 18 Memorial Foundation, told The Korea Times, Sunday. "A truthful apology would require Chun's family coming to and kneeling at the victims' graveyard."
Choi said what matters the most is the uncovering the whole truth about the movement, such as whether Chun ordered the shooting from military helicopters on citizens ― which Chun kept denying despite witnesses coming forward and forensic evidence of bullet holes high up in buildings and patients admitted to hospitals with injuries consistent with being shot from above. "Also a relevant law should be revised to recover assets accumulated illegally by Chun's aides during his term," he said.
4. Can Korea and Japan survive issues of history?
I always pay attention to Ambassador Ahn's analysis and commentary. I hope Korean and Japanese leaders will.
Excerpts:
I am often reminded of all the efforts we used to make together between Korea and Japan at multilateral fora. Korea's accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the 1990s owed a lot to the advice and cooperation we used to get from our Japanese colleagues, including Makoto Taniguchi, who was the OECD's deputy secretary-general at the time.
During the Great Recession of 2008, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) emerged as a key institution for the global financial system, and was dubbed "the fourth pillar" of the architecture of global economic governance. In the process of joining the FSB, Korea again enjoyed the support and cooperation of Japanese officials, including Ambassador Yoichi Otabe, who used to be the G20 sherpa for the Japanese prime minister at the time.
Were there no issues of history at the time of Korea's accession to the OECD or the FSB? There were. However, officials of Korea and Japan at the time were mindful of the advantage of adhering to the aforementioned firewall.
Can Korea and Japan survive issues of history?
By Ahn Ho-young
Korea's Supreme Court rendered its final ruling on the case brought by victims of forced labor during the Japanese occupation of Korea against Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Corp. in October, 2018. Since then, relations between Seoul and Tokyo have been in a deep freeze.
Japan insists that Korea is not complying with international law, in particular the Claims Agreement concluded between the two countries in 1965. The Korean government counters that it has to respect the ruling of the independent court here.
It was against such a backdrop that the Japanese government imposed an embargo ― that impacted Korean companies ― on the export of essential parts for manufacturing semiconductors, a key export item for Korea, in July, 2019. Several months later, the South Korean government responded by declaring that it would suspend the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) agreement between the two countries as a countermeasure against the Japanese embargo on semiconductor parts.
Several Japanese officials and politicians sought my views on the suspension of the GSOMIA agreement at the time. I said I was deeply concerned and disappointed by Korean government's action. I swiftly added that I had been equally concerned and disappointed by the action taken by the Japanese government earlier in July.
This was because the Japanese action violated a delicate firewall existing between the issues of history and the issues of cooperation in other areas. The observance of the firewall had enabled Korea and Japan to develop bilateral relations to mutual benefit for several decades irrespective of issues of history flaring up between the two countries from time to time.
I was recently reminded of these exchanges with Japanese colleagues two years ago, as I read an interview with Yoshimasa Hayashi, the new foreign minister of Japan. Hayashi gave a press conference on Nov. 11, the day he was inaugurated.
His answer to the question on Korea-Japan relations appeared to me to be along the following lines; "Korea-Japan relations are very important and must get sufficient attention. But, it will have to wait until issues of history are first be resolved, for which Korea must provide an answer."
The first part was encouraging to me. With respect to the second part, I wonder if Hayashi could have gone a step further, as a leading member of "Kochikai," one of the most moderate factions within the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, which has typically supported a dovish foreign policy, including diplomatic engagement with Korea.
For example, he could have said: "I urge the Korean government to provide an answer to the forced labor issues. In the meantime, I will not be bogged down by these issues, because there are so many other urgent issues Korea and Japan must address together. I will go ahead and engage the Korean government to jointly address them." In fact, such an approach is what we need, given the current geopolitical and economic situation in Northeast Asia and beyond.
At the same time, such an approach would have worked as a stronger and far more effective incentive for the Korean government to diligently seek solutions for issues on history as well. In fact, there are a large number of issues which the two countries can engage in for mutual benefit, starting from some multilateral ones.
One such issue is Korea joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). As a number of countries, including the United Kingdom, China and Chinese Taipei, apply for accession to the CPTPP, there is an increasing call for Korea to join it as well. One of the challenges facing Korea is Japan's presumed sabotage of its accession, as Tokyo tries to link this to the issues of history. Hayashi, for example, could declare that such a presumption is misplaced.
Another possible multilateral forum where Korea and Japan could further strengthen cooperation is the Quad. I have long argued through this page as to why Korea must seriously consider participating in Quad activities. Sato Masahisa, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense in Japan's House of Councillors was recently asked by a Korean newspaper about his views on Korea joining the Quad, comprising the United States, Japan, India and Australia. He answered "Japan will welcome Korea joining the free world camp, even if we will continue to have questions about Korea's credibility."
I am often reminded of all the efforts we used to make together between Korea and Japan at multilateral fora. Korea's accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the 1990s owed a lot to the advice and cooperation we used to get from our Japanese colleagues, including Makoto Taniguchi, who was the OECD's deputy secretary-general at the time.
During the Great Recession of 2008, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) emerged as a key institution for the global financial system, and was dubbed "the fourth pillar" of the architecture of global economic governance. In the process of joining the FSB, Korea again enjoyed the support and cooperation of Japanese officials, including Ambassador Yoichi Otabe, who used to be the G20 sherpa for the Japanese prime minister at the time.
Were there no issues of history at the time of Korea's accession to the OECD or the FSB? There were. However, officials of Korea and Japan at the time were mindful of the advantage of adhering to the aforementioned firewall.
Ahn Ho-young (hyahn78@mofa.or.kr) is president of the University of North Korean Studies. He served as Korean ambassador to the United States and first vice foreign minister.
5. Can Korea learn from ASEAN to navigate US-China tensions?
I think the author has identified the fundamental challenge. Can countries and international organizations avoid taking sides? At what point will they have to choose?
Excerpts:
While the idea then was to avoid taking sides between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the realities of the present day order have to be acknowledged as the concept has new relevance in a U.S.-China context. The global trade situation today is a very much more complex and inter-connected one compared with that of the Cold war era which ended over 30 years ago now.
Further afield, since Britain has taken sides by joining AUKUS, it would be advisable for the EU to remain neutral so that ASEAN and other developing countries in Africa and South America have an economic ally to rely on to promote the idea of neutrality.
No doubt, an ideal situation would be when each country is able to maintain its own sovereignty and international relations based on mutual benefit without fear or favor.
However, the current situation calls for ASEAN to act as one entity and refrain from taking sides ― a strategy other countries across the region, including Korea, may wish to consider to maintain a balance in a vital area for the world's economy.
[Contribution] Can Korea learn from ASEAN to navigate US-China tensions?
Bala RamasamyBy Bala Ramasamy
The increasingly difficult U.S.-China relationship has left many East Asian countries caught in the cross-fire. Recent geopolitical developments have brought a clash of interests as far as trade and traditional security partnerships are concerned, and highlight the tightrope that many countries have to walk.
One of the most pertinent questions today for many East Asian states is: How to maintain good relations with both the U.S. and China without jeopardizing economic links with either?
Perhaps Korea can take a look at Southeast Asia's recent history and current challenges, in particular how individual neighboring countries can place emphasis on cooperating with each other, to try to plot a way ahead for itself.
An important factor that has contributed to the economic success of countries in Southeast Asia has to be the peace and stability in the region, mainly brought about by their membership in ASEAN.
For a region that is so diverse in terms of political systems, religion, economic development and culture, this achievement is unparalleled. But it should not be taken for granted.
Political upheavals in member countries, including the recent military coup in Myanmar, as well as regional disputes in the South China Sea, can destabilize regional peace. Nothing will hurt ASEAN more than allowing an external power to tear apart this deep-rooted unity by forcing member countries to take sides. Politically, this is foolish. Economically, it is trouble.
Recent developments pose a challenge to ASEAN - the sudden elevation of the Quad ― the U.S., Japan, India and Australia ― from a security dialogue to one that forces countries to divide along ideological lines i.e. Cold War 2.0. Similarly, AUKUS, a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, brings added tension to the region.
Meanwhile, if the creation of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP and its modification, CPTPP) to rival the emergence of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was not enough, the aims of the Quad and AUKUS are to balance the influence of China in the Indo-Pacific.
However this risks damaging the decades-long peace and stability in the region. In addition, vaccine diplomacy initiated by both parties in Southeast Asia as reported in the media recently is taking the pandemic into an international relations dimension.
From an economic perspective, China and the Quad (particularly the U.S. and Japan) are important for the Southeast Asian countries. Quad countries are particularly important export markets while China is an important import source.
Damaging the relationship with one at the expense of the other will negatively affect the economic prospects of all countries in the region. As a whole, 27 percent of ASEAN's total exports head to the Quad while China takes about 14 percent.
But on the import side, China accounts for 22 percent compared to 20 percent from the Quad. The picture is even more obvious at a country level. Indonesia exports 29 percent of its goods to the Quad but imports 26% from China. Thus both the Quad and China are equally important trading partners, showing how much ASEAN countries have to lose by siding with one power or the other.
Perhaps remaining neutral to both parties and taking a stand that ASEAN will be non-aligned to any superpower would protect the unity of ASEAN.
This would not be new as such ― all 10 ASEAN countries are members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that was established by former leader of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito in 1961.
While the idea then was to avoid taking sides between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the realities of the present day order have to be acknowledged as the concept has new relevance in a U.S.-China context. The global trade situation today is a very much more complex and inter-connected one compared with that of the Cold war era which ended over 30 years ago now.
Further afield, since Britain has taken sides by joining AUKUS, it would be advisable for the EU to remain neutral so that ASEAN and other developing countries in Africa and South America have an economic ally to rely on to promote the idea of neutrality.
No doubt, an ideal situation would be when each country is able to maintain its own sovereignty and international relations based on mutual benefit without fear or favor.
However, the current situation calls for ASEAN to act as one entity and refrain from taking sides ― a strategy other countries across the region, including Korea, may wish to consider to maintain a balance in a vital area for the world's economy.
The writer is the Director of GEMBA Programme at China Europe International Business School
6. Coronavirus is surging in South Korea thanks to an eye-poking sect. That's bad news for Kim Jong Un
There is the COVID paradox for the Kim family regime- it is an opportunity and a threat and as it takes advantage of the opportunity (to impose great control over the people) it risks instability within the military and security services and population writ large thus increasing the potential threat to the regime. And paradoxically if there is a large scale COVID outbreak it will also have a devastating effect on internal stability.
Coronavirus is surging in South Korea thanks to an eye-poking sect. That's bad news for Kim Jong Un
The tension on the Korean peninsula has always been most palpable at the strip of land where these two nations meet: The heavily guarded Demilitarised Zone (DMZ).
Before the pandemic, North and South Korean forces would stand face-to-face here, armed adversaries refusing to give an inch.
But coronavirus has seen soldiers from one side of the conflict take a few steps back into their territory.
"The [North Korean] soldiers still work there, but they don't come out of their buildings," said Vice Admiral Stuart Mayer, an Australian who is second in charge of the United Nation's Command which controls the area.
"If they do on the rare occasions that they must, they work in chemical protective suits and they wear gas masks."
The Joint Security Area is the only section of the Korean Demilitarised Zone where soldiers from the North and South can come into contact. (ABC News: Mitch Denman Woolnough )
The North Korean side of the border is unkempt, as the maintenance crews won't risk coming into close contact with the south.
What is really happening beyond the border is always a mystery.
"North Korea constantly surprises. It's called the hermit kingdom for very good reason," said Vice Admiral Mayer.
But it's clear to everyone that North Korea cannot risk an outbreak of COVID-19.
"North Korea's COVID measures are extremely strict, beyond anything that we experience in democracies," he said.
While the North has claimed to be COVID-free for the duration of the pandemic, the past 18 months has taught us that this virus will always find a way.
And recent events south of the border could have major implications for North Korea and its enigmatic ruler.
South Korea is suddenly in dire straits
South Korea has recently started easing its restrictions, pivoting to a new policy of learning to live with the virus.
But since then, the situation has rapidly deteriorated.
This time, a cluster of infections spread from a little-known religious settlement led by a pastor who pokes his followers in the eyes to heal them.
The latest surge of COVID-19 in South Korea is breaking daily infection records. (ABC News: Mitch Denman Woolnough )
South Korea is now averaging about 4,000 cases a day. More worrying is the acute spike in serious cases.
Despite nearly 80 per cent of South Koreans being fully vaccinated, almost two-thirds of ICU beds across the nation are full.
If the virus creeps over the border into North Korea, the country is unlikely to cope.
With a decrepit medical system, it slammed its borders shut to the world in early 2020.
While experts are sceptical of the regime's claim that they have since been virus-free, Rachel Minyoung Lee from the Stimson Centre said there are clues the situation is under control — for now.
"They continue to have large-scale gatherings, which tells me that the regime feels comfortable and confident about managing the situation," the North Korea watcher said.
But by keeping out the virus, they have also kept out vital supplies of fuel, which is necessary for food production.
"Definitely, the food situation is difficult. Kim Jong Un mentioned that directly," she said.
A reported exodus of the remaining foreign diplomats still in North Korea suggests the nation is continuing with its elimination strategy.
North Korea watcher Rachel Minyoung Lee says coronavirus is an opportunity and a threat for Kim Jong Un. (ABC News: Mitch Denman Woolnough )
Ms Lee said that suggests the "COVID lockdown will be in place for a while longer".
"That's why they're leaving. They don't know when the situation is going to end," she said.
North Korea has so far knocked back potential shipments of vaccine from the UN-backed COVAX facility and there are no signs it has struck a deal with its two most important partners, China and Russia.
"They maybe have trust issues with the Chinese vaccine and perhaps even the Russia vaccine," Ms Lee said.
"I think the other issue too, is whether it can get enough doses for the entire population."
While no-one knows for sure, intelligence suggests even Kim Jong Un himself may still be unvaccinated.
The potential dangers for Kim Jong Un
Coronavirus has presented opportunities and potential threats to Kim Jong Un's power.
Experts say the North Korean ruler has long believed his country is too reliant on its neighbour China.
With their shared border closed, he has been able to push a campaign of self-reliance.
North Korean soldiers have retreated away from the DMZ, likely to avoid the spread of COVID-19.(ABC News: Mitch Denman Woolnough )
"He's a smart man and he realises that it's not a sustainable model to be overly reliant on one country," Ms Lee said.
But Ms Less suspects he is trying to consolidate his power and stave off concerns about his longevity.
"I think that was due to some strict diet regimen," said Ms Lee.
“He's now on the same footing as [his grandfather] Kim Il Sung and [father] Kim Jong Il."
But other analysts aren't so certain Kim Jong Un is doing enough to maintain his grip on power.
"There have been rumours Kim Jong Un's leadership could be re-evaluated in the next two years," said national security analyst Yun Ji-won from Sangmyung University.
Some analysts are interested to see what Kim Jong Un's sister Kim Yo Jong does in the next two years. (AP: Jorge Silva)
She said there are even whispers of a potential coup by his little sister, Kim Yo Jong.
"It's far-fetched," Ms Yun said.
"But the fact the rumours even exist might indicate he could potentially face a problem."
What you need to know about coronavirus:
7. Chinese police capture North Korean convict on the run
Is he a convict or a victim who escaped? Again, and I cannot say this enough, China is complicit in north Korea's human rights atrocities.
Chinese police capture North Korean convict on the run
Beijing – Chinese police have captured a North Korean convict who staged a daring escape from prison in October and had been on the run for more than forty days, authorities said Sunday.
Officials in northeast China were offering a $23,000 bounty for the recapture of the escapee, in a manhunt that has sparked massive interest on social media.
The 39-year-old prisoner, identified by the Chinese name Zhu Xianjian, was jailed in China after fleeing reclusive North Korea.
He escaped the facility in the city of Jilin by scaling a shed and vaulting the outer wall on Oct. 18, and managed to stay at large before being captured Sunday.
A one-line statement from Jilin police said he had been captured at about 10 a.m. Sunday morning, without giving more details.
Videos shared by state-run Beijing News showed an emaciated-looking man being carried by several officers, with a photograph of him then lying on the ground with his hands behind his back.
Zhu was convicted of illegal entry into China, larceny and robbery, and was due for release and deportation back to the North in 2023, prompting online speculation that he broke out to avoid being sent back.
He illegally crossed a river separating North Korea from China in 2013. He then raided several houses in a nearby village, stealing money, mobile phones and clothes, court records show.
He also stabbed an elderly woman who discovered him and tried to flee in a taxi before being arrested by police.
Human Rights Watch said in a July report that at least 1,100 North Koreans are detained in China, Pyongyang’s main ally and economic benefactor.
Many face deportation back to their home country upon release, where they may suffer torture and other rights violations, according to the NGO.
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8. Could North Korea Pull the U.S. and China Into a Nuclear War?
Some traditional analyst from Professor Farley.
I think we need to consider north Korea as a spoiler in strategic competition.
Of the four revisionist and rogue powers we tend to isolate north Korea as a separate and often lesser included case within the larger national security challenges and also because of its perceived geographic confines to Northeast Asia.
However, I would argue the Kim family regime is actually a global problem and one that could be a spoiler in strategic competition. What is a spoiler? – The extreme type is the total spoiler which is defined as groups or individuals that will never compromise or negotiate. Although the international relations theorists say this is actually extremely rare, I would argue that it applies to north Korea and that has important implications for the US and all the powers competing in strategic competition. North Korea has the potential through words and deeds to upend cooperation and competition and this could lead to conflict. And what makes north Korea a spoiler most of all? It’s absolute unwillingness to negotiate the denuclearization of north Korea. It is its nuclear weapons that provide it with the ability to operate around the world to achieve its objectives and this can put a wrench in strategic competition.
Could North Korea Pull the U.S. and China Into a Nuclear War?
It's a very scary thought.
Here's What You Need to Remember: But if China and the United States did become engaged in active combat operations against one another in Korea, it is unlikely that the fight would stay confined.
War on the Korean Peninsula is almost too horrible to contemplate.
Nuclear-armed adversaries, fighting in densely populated urban terrain, could cause humanitarian disaster on a scale that the world has never seen. But the scenario might grow even worse. The last time that the United States fought North Korea, the People’s Republic of China intervened with destructive effect. The war lasted for three years, with heavy casualties on both sides. While both China and the United States have worked hard to prevent a recurrence of this catastrophe, the two great powers remain at odds over the fate of North Korea, a disagreement that might yet lead to war.
How it Happened Before:
The United States and China were not supposed to go to war in 1950. The war resulted primarily from U.S. miscalculation of Chinese intentions and capabilities; U.S. forces failed to detect the movement of significant People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces into Korea, failed to pay sufficient attention to Chinese signals, and lacked a good understanding of Communist China’s nascent diplomatic efforts. Chinese intervention was an operational surprise that should not have been, successful in throwing U.S. forces out of North Korea and restoring something close to the antebellum status quo. The first Korean War did not work out well for either country, although both the United States and China successfully maintained the independence of their respective proxies.
How it Could Happen Again:
War in Korea could resume for any number of reasons; even a collapse of the North Korean regime could start a race for Pyongyang that produced great power conflict. Over the past year, however, tensions have grown over the extent and progress of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The United States sees these (and North Korean bombasticity) as a threat, and the North Koreans see U.S. threat-mongering as the potential prelude to war. This leaves both sides with ample incentive to launch a preemptive war against the other. Thus, war between the U.S. and the DPRK could plausibly begin with either a North Korean attack on South Korea or Japan, or a U.S. attack on North Korea.
China is unlikely to view U.S. response to a North Korean attack as legitimate cause for war, unless that response crosses certain red lines. These red lines could be similar to those that the PRC laid down in 1950, although both Chinese fear of the United States and Chinese affection for North Korea have declined over time. Similarly, the United States probably will not see any upside in pre-empting Beijing’s response by directly attacking China. Still, Beijing has little interest in seeing U.S. forces along the Yalu River. If China believes that the United States foolishly blundered into a war, or pushed North Korea into a pre-emptive war through brinksmanship, then Beijing’s attitude could become more belligerent. Moreover, China might view a U.S. attack on North Korea as an indicator of incorrigible aggression, evidence that the United States truly is a “rogue nation” as likely as not to attack China at some point in the future.
As a prelude to intervention, China would begin to signal its disfavor by elaborately visible military preparations, as well as diplomatic condemnations. The Trump administration undoubtedly runs some of the same risks of misinterpreting Chinese statements as the Truman administration did in 1950. The US could properly read these signals as indications of China’s willingness to commit, or it could misread them as bluster. At the same time, if Beijing was serious, it would begin quietly redeploying long-range assets away from Korea, into relatively safe locations in China’s interior. The PLA faces the dilemma of needing to reduce the chance of war, while at the same time maximizing its chance of victory.
How it Could Play Out:
If war starts with a Chinese response to a perceived U.S. provocation, the PRC will initially confine its activities to the Korean Peninsula. Beijing will want to send a message of seriousness to Washington without opening up a wider war, in the hopes that the Trump administration will restrain itself from further aggression. Chinese ballistic missiles and cruise missiles (launched from air and land platforms located as deep as possible within China, in order to avoid offering easy targets to the US) will strike US and South Korean military installations, including airbases, communications centers, and logistics facilities. If U.S. and ROK forces have advanced into North Korea, China will likely focus on forward deployed assets, although the PLA will not want to waste valuable munitions on conventional forces along the front.
This strategy essentially worked in 1950; the United States refrained from attacks against the Chinese mainland, did not mobilize Japan militarily, did not “Unleash Chiang” from his Formosan stronghold, and did not use nuclear weapons. Instead, the combatants waged war in conventional means up and down the peninsula, a matchup which did not equalize the playing field but did give the PLA its best hope of victory.
But if China and the United States did become engaged in active combat operations against one another in Korea, it is unlikely that the fight would stay confined. The U.S. military would face an enormous temptation to directly airbases, missile installations, and staging areas in China, while attacks US bases across the region would undoubtedly tempt China. Changes in military technology have altered the nature of distance in warfare; Chinese and American missile sites can hit targets in Korea from vast distances, and commanders would be tempted to attack enemy staging and launch areas in depth. Moreover, the huge Chinese reconnaissance-strike complex, laid out over a vast expanse of space, air, sea, and land, would immediately become the subject of US attentions. In particular, the U.S. might see fit to convey its own seriousness by launching attacks against major Chinese naval vessels, including aircraft carriers, destroyers, and nuclear submarines.
Parting Thoughts:
War between the United States and China in Korea is unthinkable, but not impossible. Therefore, we have to think about it. While the first Korean War represented a failure of diplomacy and strategic planning, Washington and Beijing nevertheless managed to confine the conflict, and limit the extent of escalation. Whether they would be able to do so in 2017, after dramatic changes in the geopolitical situation, is a different question entirely.
In case war breaks out (either at the instigation of Pyongyang or Washington), American and Chinese diplomats need to go into overdrive in order to ensure good communication between the two capitals. The vast commercial interests that depend on the health of U.S.-China trade need to make their voices heard in both China and the United States. And if war does happen, policymakers on both sides need to work hard to limit the extent of destruction, whatever cold comfort this may provide to the victims of the war on the Korean Peninsula.
Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as a senior lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky.
9. Intimate Perspectives on North Korea by Fabian Muir – in pictures
They show some of the Socialist Worker's Paradise.
Intimate Perspectives on North Korea by Fabian Muir – in pictures
The Guardian · by Photograph: Fabian Muir/Courtesy of the Head On Photo festival · November 26, 2021
Fabian Muir’s composition of images from inside North Korea give a delicate insight into the shuttered nation. Documented over two years the images reveal a complexity and nuance residing in their society.
Fabian’s exhibition is showing for the first time at the Head On photo festival in Sydney
Main image: A girl gives a performance accompanied by a teacher (or two) in a junior school in the northeastern port town of Chongjin. Many assume such performances are put on only for the benefit of foreigners. However, Chongjin sees almost no travellers and such shows are, in fact, a feature at schools throughout the country, where musical talent is identified and pushed from an early age. Photograph: Fabian Muir/Courtesy of the Head On Photo festival
The Guardian · by Photograph: Fabian Muir/Courtesy of the Head On Photo festival · November 26, 2021
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
