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Quotes of the Day:
“The saddest aspect of life right now is that science gathers knowledge faster than society gathers wisdom.”
- Isaac Asimov
"It is not enough to fight. It is the spirit which we bring to the fight that decides the issue. It is morale that wins the victory." "The soldier's heart, the soldier's spirit, the soldier's soul, are everything."
- GOA George C. Marshall
“Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom...must undergo the fatigue of supporting it.”
- Thomas Paine
1. Joint Statement on the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group Meeting (ROK/US)
2. S. Korea, U.S. warn of 'overwhelming, decisive' response to any N. Korean nuclear attack
3. US vows continued deployment of strategic assets after North Korea nuclear law
4. Yoon orders scrapping of plan for new state guest house
5. Typhoon Nanmadol to grow stronger, come closest to Korea within 2 days: KMA
6. S. Korea, US to craft 'tailored' responses to potential nuclear crises: defense chief
7. China's top legislator stresses 'mutual respect' in 'sensitive matters' with South Korea
8. Defense fair helps establish Korea as solid weapons exporter
9. A North Korean refugee learns about Harvard
10. Experts: North Korea's New Law on Preemptive Use of Nuclear Weapons Puts Regime at Risk
11. Korea should capitalize on soaring dollar
12. We Must Plan to Defend Against North Korea's Nuclear Weapons
13. North Korea keeps its options open in selling weapons to Russia | Opinion
14. North Korea's Nuclear Fail-Safe
15. Maryland Gov. Hogan expects 'compromise' over controversial law on inflation after midterm elections
16. The John Batchelor Show #DPRK: The Soviet Kims.
1. Joint Statement on the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group Meeting (ROK/US)
The irony is that most of those in the delegation from both sides visiting the B-52 at Andrews Air Force Base are younger than the aircraft.
Joint Statement on the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group Meeting
defense.gov
Immediate Release
Sept. 16, 2022
The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea.
In line with the decision by President Joseph R. Biden and President Yoon Suk Yeol in May, the foreign affairs and defense agencies of the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) held an Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) meeting at the Under Secretary/Vice Minister level on September 16, 2022 in Washington D.C. ROK First Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Cho Hyundong and ROK Vice Minister of National Defense Shin Beomchul led the ROK delegation. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Bonnie Jenkins and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl led the U.S. delegation.
This is the third meeting of the high-level EDSCG, which provides a forum for comprehensive discussions on strategy and policy issues to strengthen Alliance deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The September 16 dialogue highlighted the commitment by both partners to use all available levers — including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools — to strengthen and reinforce the U.S. security commitment to the ROK and strengthen deterrence against DPRK aggression, and more broadly counter the DPRK threat.
The United States and the ROK expressed their serious concern over the DPRK’s escalatory and destabilizing messaging related to nuclear weapons use, including its adoption of the new nuclear policy law. The two sides committed to continue efforts to employ all elements of both countries’ national power to strengthen the Alliance deterrence posture. The United States reiterated its ironclad and unwavering commitment to draw on the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, missile defense, and other advanced non-nuclear capabilities, to provide extended deterrence for the ROK. The United States and the ROK made clear that any DPRK nuclear attack would be met with an overwhelming and decisive response. Both sides also confirmed their will to continue and strengthen close Alliance consultation regarding U.S. nuclear and missile defense policy.
The United States committed to strengthen coordination with the ROK to continue to deploy and exercise strategic assets in the region in a timely and effective manner to deter and respond to the DPRK and enhance regional security. They highlighted the combined training of fifth generation F-35A fighter jets in July and the upcoming deployment of the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group in the region as a clear demonstration of such U.S. commitment.
The two sides will continue to explore avenues to enhance Alliance strategic readiness through improved information sharing, training, and exercises, as they relate to nuclear and non-nuclear threats, including better use of table-top exercises. Both sides also pledged to improve coordination and strengthen the Alliance’s missile response capabilities and posture, and continuing cooperation in the space and cyber arenas, to include through expanded multi-domain exercises.
The United States reiterated its strong support for the aims of the ROK’s Audacious Initiative, and both sides committed to continue their coordinated efforts to achieve the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The two sides also agreed that they will enhance cooperation to address DPRK sanctions evasion and illicit cyber activities using diplomatic, economic, and military tools. Both countries emphasized that the DPRK’s continued pursuit and development of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction in defiance of multiple United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions undermines regional and global security and stability and the global non proliferation regime. Both sides agreed on the importance of upholding and fully implementing all relevant UNSC resolutions.
The United States and the ROK reaffirmed that a DPRK nuclear test would be met with a strong and resolute whole-of-government response. The two countries are closely coordinating in detail and stand ready for all possible scenarios.
In the face of the DPRK’s evolving nuclear and missile threats, and increased threats in the region, both sides pledged to continue collaborating to ensure that ROK and U.S. strategies and postures promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, including through bilateral exercises and training as well as trilateral and multilateral cooperation with partners throughout the region.
The two sides assessed that the third EDSCG, including a delegation tour of a B-52 strategic bomber, contributed substantively to strengthening Alliance deterrence, as well as enhanced shared understanding and effectiveness of U.S. extended deterrence. The two sides agreed to hold the high-level EDSCG annually. The next EDSCG engagement will be held during the first half of 2023 at the expert-level to advance efforts prior to the next EDSCG high-level meeting.
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2. S. Korea, U.S. warn of 'overwhelming, decisive' response to any N. Korean nuclear attack
Kim must be made to understand that all of his strategies, political warfare, blackmail diplomacy, and military attack, will and are failing.
(LEAD) S. Korea, U.S. warn of 'overwhelming, decisive' response to any N. Korean nuclear attack | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · September 17, 2022
(ATTN: UPDATES with more details in paras 13-15, 17-18)
By Song Sang-ho
SEOUL, Sept. 17 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States warned North Korea would face an "overwhelming and decisive" response in the event of a nuclear attack, as the allies had a high-level deterrence dialogue in Washington D.C. on Friday (local time).
The two sides agreed on a "strong and resolute whole-of-government" response in case Pyongyang presses ahead with another nuclear test and "all available levers" to address its evolving military threats, according to a joint statement on the results of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) meeting held after a nearly five-year hiatus. The session came amid a view that the North has already completed preparations for what would be its seventh nuclear test.
The EDSCG, a gathering of the allies' vice-ministerial diplomatic and defense officials, resumed just a week after the North codified a nuclear policy that leaves open the possibility of a preemptive strike in case of a regime security threat.
"The United States and the ROK made clear that any DPRK nuclear attack would be met with an overwhelming and decisive response," the statement reads, using the acronyms for the official names of South and North Korea, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
The U.S. reiterated its "ironclad and unwavering" commitment to draw on the full range of its military capabilities, including "nuclear, conventional, missile defense, and other advanced non-nuclear capabilities," to provide extended deterrence for the South.
Extended deterrence refers to America's stated commitment to mobilizing the whole of U.S. military capabilities to defend its ally. Topping the EDSCG talks was the joint endeavor to enhance its credibility.
"The September 16 dialogue highlighted the commitment by both partners to use all available levers, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools, to strengthen and reinforce the U.S. security commitment to the ROK, strengthen deterrence against DPRK aggression and more broadly counter the DPRK threat," the statement said.
Pointing out the North's assertive nuclear policy enshrined in a recently enacted law, the allies voiced "serious" concern and decried it as "escalatory and destabilizing messaging."
"The two sides committed to continue efforts to employ all elements of both countries' national power to strengthen the alliance deterrence posture," the statement said.
Touching on concerns about the possibility of the regime staging a nuclear test, Seoul and Washington highlighted their readiness against it.
"The United States and the ROK reaffirmed that a DPRK nuclear test would be met with a strong and resolute whole-of-government response," it said. "The two countries are closely coordinating in detail and stand ready for all possible scenarios."
As part of efforts to strengthen deterrence, the U.S. reiterated its commitment to reinforce coordination with the South to continue to deploy and exercise its strategic assets in the region in a "timely and effective" manner, according to the statement.
In addition, both sides agreed on the importance of fully implementing U.N. Security Council sanctions resolutions on North Korea, noting the North's continued development of ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction undermines global security.
"The two sides also agreed that they will enhance cooperation to address DPRK sanctions evasion and illicit cyber activities using diplomatic, economic, and military tools," the statement said.
The U.S. renewed its support for the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's "audacious" plan designed to help the North improve its economy if it takes steps towards denuclearization.
Seoul's Vice Defense Minister Shin Beom-chul and Vice Foreign Minister Cho Hyun-dong attended the session, with the U.S. represented by Colin Kahl, undersecretary of defense for policy, and Bonnie Jenkins, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security.
The two sides agreed to hold the high-level EDSCG annually. In the first half of next year, they plan to have the next EDSCG engagement at the "expert level" prior to the high-level session.
The EDSCG session had been suspended for years since its second and last session in January 2018, when the then liberal Moon Jae-in administration pushed for an initiative to promote inter-Korean rapprochement.
The reactivation of the EDSCG followed a Seoul summit deal in May between South Korean President Yoon and his U.S. counterpart, Joe Biden.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · September 17, 2022
3. US vows continued deployment of strategic assets after North Korea nuclear law
US vows continued deployment of strategic assets after North Korea nuclear law
channelnewsasia.com
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File photo of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. (Photo: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP/STR)
17 Sep 2022 07:20AM (Updated: 17 Sep 2022 07:25AM)
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WASHINGTON: The United States and South Korea on Friday (Sep 16) denounced North Korea's first-use nuclear doctrine unveiled this month as "escalatory and destabilising" and Washington vowed to continue to deploy and exercise strategic assets to deter and respond to Pyongyang.
A joint statement after a vice ministerial-level meeting of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), the first convening of the body since 2018, reiterated the "ironclad" US commitment to defend South Korea and said any North Korean nuclear attack would be met with an "overwhelming and decisive response".
The statement said the countries "committed to continue efforts to employ all elements of both countries' national power to strengthen the Alliance deterrence posture".
"The United States committed to strengthen coordination with the ROK to continue to deploy and exercise strategic assets in the region in a timely and effective manner to deter and respond to the DPRK and enhance regional security," it said, referring to South Korea and North Korea by the initials of their official names.
The statement referred to combined training of F-35A fighter jets in July and an upcoming deployment of the USS Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group in the region "as a clear demonstration of such US commitment".
It noted that the EDSCG delegation had inspected a US B-52 strategic bomber and said the two countries would look to enhance strategic readiness through improved information sharing, training, and exercises.
They also pledged to strengthen the alliance's missile response capabilities and posture.
Last week, North Korea officially enshrined the right to use preemptive nuclear strikes to protect itself in a new law that leader Kim Jong Un said makes its nuclear status "irreversible" and bars denuclearisation talks.
Observers say Pyongyang appears to be preparing to resume nuclear testing for the first time since 2017, after historic summits with then-US president Donald Trump in 2018 failed to persuade Kim to abandon his weapons development.
In their statement, the United States and South Korea reaffirmed that a resumption of nuclear testing "would be met with a strong and resolute whole-of-government response" and the two countries to "stand ready for all possible scenarios".
4. Yoon orders scrapping of plan for new state guest house
A quick response to criticism. An issue that is not worth falling on the sword over and get it out of the media as rapidly as possible because a fight over something like this is not worth it.
(3rd LD) Yoon orders scrapping of plan for new state guest house | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 황장진 · September 16, 2022
(ATTN: RECASTS headline; lead; UPDATES with Yoon's remarks in paras 1-5)
SEOUL, Sept. 16 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk-yeol on Friday ordered the government to scrap a contentious plan to build a state guest house at the new presidential compound.
Earlier in the day, the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) slammed the government for requesting a massive budget for the project, saying the administration is squandering taxpayers' money on the unnecessary presidential office relocation.
"After returning Cheong Wa Dae to the people, we tried to prepare a facility for state events, befitting national dignity, as the nation's future asset, not the presidential office's property. It is disappointing that the government failed to fully explain this purpose," Yoon was quoted as saying by Kim Eun-hye, senior presidential secretary for public affairs.
Yoon ordered the cancellation of the project to make sure it does not cause concern to the people, she added.
The DP said the government had requested a more than 87.8 billion won (US$62 million) in funding for the construction, much more than the 49.6 billion won that the government had originally said would be necessary to move the presidential office out of Cheong Wa Dae.
DP floor leader Rep. Park Hong-geun said it is wrong to spend such a large amount of money at a time when ordinary people are struggling with economic hardships, and the party, which controls the National Assembly with 169 out of 299 seats, will cut all of the requested budget.
"The presidential office has once again deceived the people suffering from economic hardships," Park said.
Park also urged President Yoon issue a public apology for "lying" to the people about the relocation cost.
DP Chairman Lee Jae-myung also said he was surprised to learn of the budget.
"As we have a parliamentary majority, it is our obligation to make sure that a budget, which runs counter to people's beliefs, will not pass," he said, adding that the requested budget could be used to dole out 10 million won each to about 10,000 flood victims.
Rep. Park Chan-dae, one of the party's Supreme Council members, also said it would be better for the government to move back into Cheong Wa Dae.
The presidential office hit back, saying the construction of a new state guest house is "partly inevitable" considering the country's national interest and the need for an appropriate space to receive foreign and local dignitaries.
"If we build a state guest house, it won't belong to the Yoon Suk-yeol government," a presidential official told reporters. "It will remain as the state guest house of the government of the Republic of Korea for a long period of time."
The official called on the National Assembly to look at the matter with a long-term perspective, noting that hosting state events at museums, convention centers and hotels incurred additional security costs and caused inconveniences to the public.
The official also rejected accusations that the presidential office lied about the relocation cost, saying the cost of building a state guest house is separate from the cost of moving the presidential office.
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 황장진 · September 16, 2022
5. Typhoon Nanmadol to grow stronger, come closest to Korea within 2 days: KMA
Leaving for Korea tomorrow. Hope our flight is not delayed.
Typhoon Nanmadol to grow stronger, come closest to Korea within 2 days: KMA
The Korea Times · September 17, 2022
In this file photo, a big wave hits the seaside of Ulsan, about 310 kilometers southeast of Seoul, on Sept. 6, as Typhoon Hinnamnor makes landfall in Korea. Yonhap
Typhoon Nanmadol, currently passing the waters east of Japan's Okinawa, is expected to grow stronger Saturday before coming closer to South Korea in the next couple of days, the state weather agency said.
With a central atmospheric pressure of 920 hectopascals and a maximum wind speed of 53 meters per second, this year's 14th typhoon was passing waters 520 kilometers east of Okinawa at 9 a.m., according to the Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA).
Nanmadol, currently a "very strong" typhoon, was forecast to develop into a "super strong" one later in the day.
Typhoons are classified into four categories: medium, strong, very strong and super strong. Super strong refers to typhoons with a maximum wind speed of at least 54 meters per second.
According to the KMA, Nanmadol is expected to land in Japan's Kyushu Island on Sunday and come closest to South Korea the following day, between early morning and afternoon.
"A typhoon alert may be issued on Jeju Island and the southeastern coast between Sunday afternoon and Monday morning as the regions come under the influence of Nanmadol's heavy winds," the KMA said, warning the maximum wind speed could reach up to 35 meters per second in those areas.
Heavy rain will fall on Jeju and the Gyeongsang provinces in the next two days, with precipitation of up to 150 millimeters forecast in the southeastern coastal region, the KMA added. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · September 17, 2022
6. S. Korea, US to craft 'tailored' responses to potential nuclear crises: defense chief
My recommendations for a tailored response:
The ROK and U.S. should make sure the press, pundits, and public understand that this is a fundamental part of North Korean strategy and that it conducts provocations for specific objectives. It does not represent a policy failure; it represents a deliberate policy decision by Kim Jong-un to continue to execute his political warfare strategy. The following is a response framework for consideration:
First, do not overreact. But do not succumb to the criticism of those who recommend ending exercises. Always call out Kim Jong-un’s strategy As Sun Tzu would advise- “ …what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy; … next best is to disrupt his alliances.” Make sure the international community, the press, and the public in the ROK and the U.S. and the elite and the Korean people living in the north know what Kim is doing.
Second, never ever back down in the face of North Korean increased tension, threats, and provocations.
Third, coordinate an alliance response. There may be times when a good cop-bad cop approach is appropriate. Try to mitigate the internal domestic political criticisms that will inevitably occur in Seoul and DC. Do not let those criticisms negatively influence policy and actions.
Fourth, exploit weakness in North Korea – create internal pressure on Kim and the regime from his elite and military. Always work to drive a wedge among the party, elite, and military (which is a challenge since they are all intertwined and inextricably linked).
Fifth, demonstrate strength and resolve. Do not be afraid to show military strength. Never misunderstand the north’s propaganda – do not give in to demands to reduce exercises or take other measures based on North Korean demands that would in any way reduce the readiness of the combined military forces. The north does not want an end to the exercises because they are a threat, they want to weaken the alliance and force U.S. troops from the peninsula which will be the logical result if they are unable to effectively train.
Sixth, depending on the nature of the provocation, be prepared to initiate a decisive response using the most appropriate tools, e.g., diplomatic, military, economic, information and influence activities, cyber, etc., or a combination.
There is no silver bullet to the North Korea problem. Therefore, the focus must be on the long-term solution to the security and prosperity challenges on the Korean peninsula. This requires the execution of a superior ROK/U.S. alliance political warfare strategy. It must focus on resolving the Korean question, e.g., “the unnatural division of the peninsula” (per paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice Agreement). Solve that question and the nuclear issues and the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity will be ended. The question to ask is not what worked and what did not, but whether the ROK/U.S. alliance actions move the region closer to the acceptable, durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance U.S. and ROK/U.S. alliance interests.
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/north-koreas-ballistic-missile-test-a-6-step-strategy-to-respond/
S. Korea, US to craft 'tailored' responses to potential nuclear crises: defense chief
The Korea Times · September 15, 2022
Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup speaks during an interview with Yonhap News Agency at his office in Seoul, Sept. 14. Yonhap
South Korea and the United States will formulate concrete contingency plans for various nuclear crisis scenarios in their joint deterrence strategy to be revised in order to counter North Korea's evolving military threats, Seoul's defense chief said.
Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup unveiled the scheme in an exclusive interview with Yonhap News Agency following the North's recent codification of an assertive nuclear policy that leaves the door open for launching a preemptive strike in case of a regime security threat.
"In the tailored deterrence strategy set to be revised, the South and the U.S. will make the sharing of intelligence and contingency consultation procedures more systematic, and further flesh out responses to each nuclear crisis situation," Lee told Yonhap at his office in Seoul on Wednesday.
Among the crisis scenarios is the North's verbal threat of a nuclear attack, the minister said. He did not elaborate on other scenarios, but they could include a phase when signs emerge of an impending nuclear strike or the North's actual recourse to nuclear options.
Adopted in 2013, the allies' tailored deterrence strategy (TDS) is designed to cope with growing threats from the North's nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. It is the first such bilateral deterrence document that Washington has crafted with a single treaty ally.
The need for the revision has arisen, as Pyongyang has been doubling down on its nuclear program despite years of peace efforts under the former liberal Moon Jae-in administration. The regime is thought to have completed key preparations for what would be its seventh nuclear test.
"At present, the North's nuclear threats are far more advanced compared with what they were in 2013, while the capabilities of our military and the U.S. military have also developed considerably," Lee said. "In a comprehensive consideration of such changes, we are working on revising the TDS."
Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup speaks during an interview with Yonhap News Agency at his office in Seoul, Sept. 14. Yonhap
The revision work took on greater importance last week, as the North promulgated a law on its nuclear policy outlining five conditions for its nuclear use, which indicated its intention for first-strike nuclear options.
In a reassuring tone, the defense minister reiterated his ministry's stern message against the North's potential use of nuclear arms.
"Should the North attempt to use nuclear arms, it would face the overwhelming response from the South Korea-U.S. alliance and its regime would be put on a path of self-destruction," Lee emphasized.
His message is likely to be backed up by the session of the allies' vice-ministerial Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) slated to take place Friday in Washington, D.C., for the first time since 2018. Extended deterrence means the U.S.' stated commitment to mobilizing a full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear ones, to defend its ally.
Designed to reinforce the credibility of extended deterrence, the EDSCG will touch on a raft of issues, such as the sharing of intelligence, crisis-period communication, allied defense exercises and the deployment of U.S. strategic military assets, according to Lee.
"The credibility of extended deterrence refers to the U.S. delivering on its commitment to the defense of the Korean Peninsula despite risks of an attack on the U.S. mainland," the minister pointed out.
Touching on the possibility of the North pressing ahead with a nuclear test, Lee warned the test would be met with a "stronger-than-usual" response from the South Korea-U.S. alliance.
Despite his emphasis on deterrence, Lee also held out the prospect of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration taking reciprocal measures to reduce tensions and build trust with the North, which he said would be discussed should the North take substantive steps towards denuclearization. But he did not specify them.
"We will take such measures in a bolder manner," Lee said.
Commenting on the U.S. Forces Korea's efforts to upgrade its THAAD missile defense battery in the southern county of Seongju, Lee called them "not unusual."
The U.S. military has been working on the upgrade designed to streamline and integrate its THAAD and Patriot missile defense systems into a single program for enhanced, more flexible security operations.
"All weapons systems are bound to be upgraded continuously. It's not unusual," he said in broad generalities. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · September 15, 2022
7. China's top legislator stresses 'mutual respect' in 'sensitive matters' with South Korea
China's top legislator stresses 'mutual respect' in 'sensitive matters' with South Korea
The Korea Times · September 16, 2022
Li Zhanshu, chairman of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress, left, speaks during a joint press conference with South Korea's National Assembly Speaker Kim Jin-pyo after their meeting in Seoul, Friday. Joint Press Corps
China's sulk at THAAD battery disguised as cordial greeting
By Nam Hyun-woo
Li Zhanshu, China's third-most-powerful official and chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, stressed, Friday, the spirit of "mutual respect" in addressing "sensitive matters" with South Korea, in an apparent reference to Seoul's recent move to normalize deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on its soil.
During a press announcement after meeting Seoul's National Assembly Speaker Kim Jin-pyo, Li said he and Kim "shared their thoughts that the two sides should address sensitive problems based on the spirit of respecting each other's key major interests" for the sake of productive and healthy bilateral relations.
The sensitive problems Li mentioned seem to be Seoul's recent moves to normalize the THAAD base in Seongju, North Gyeongsang Province.
Ever since South Korea deployed the missile defense system in 2017, China has been expressing its opposition, more recently urging Seoul to uphold the so-called "Three Nos" policy, which refers to no additional THAAD deployments, no South Korean integration into a U.S.-led regional missile defense system and no trilateral alliance with the U.S. and Japan.
The mutual respect Li was referring to has been widely acknowledged as China's expression that the THAAD battery hurts Beijing's interests, thus Seoul should show respect on this.
"The terminology has widely been using in cordial remarks between the two countries' leaders and ranking diplomats, but the two countries have been using it for different purposes," said Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University. "While China wants to be respected on its claim, South Korea is using the term of mutual respect, asking China to accept that South Korea needs THAAD to counter North Korea's nuclear and missile threats."
During his meeting with Speaker Kim, Li also said that "President Xi Jinping has evaluated that China-South Korea relations were able to make their achievements because they have maintained the values of mutual respect, mutual trust and reciprocal magnanimity."
The concept of mutual respect has been the keyword in Seoul and Beijing's recent diplomatic overtures, as South Korea's Yoon Suk-yeol administration is putting greater emphasis on expanding its ties with the United States, triggering concerns that this may sour South Korea's relations with China, its largest trading partner.
As a tactic to address this dilemma, South Korea has been stressing the value of mutual trust. Foreign Minister Park Jin, during a meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi last month, stressed that the two sides can have healthy relations even though there may be differences in their values and socio-political systems.
During Li's meeting with speaker Kim, they recognized the progress in bilateral relations over the past three decades and discussed how they should develop them further in the future.
During the press announcement, Kim said he proposed a trilateral meeting between the parliamentary heads of South Korea, China and Japan, as a way to strengthen exchanges between high-ranking officials of the countries.
"Chairman Li and I have shared the recognition that the two countries' legislative bodies should make contributions to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia amid the flexible geopolitical circumstances," Kim said. "Li responded that he will seriously consider the proposal, and I will soon communicate this with Japan in an appropriate manner."
Li also said in the press announcement that the two sides recognized that the peace and safety of the Korean Peninsula should be protected through conversations and negotiations, and "the establishment of a peace scheme on the peninsula serves each country's common interests."
President Yoon Suk-yeol shakes hands with Li Zhanshu, chairman of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress, during the latter's visit to the presidential office in Yongsan District, Seoul, Friday. Joint Press Corps
After meeting Kim, Li met President Yoon and exchanged cordial words recognizing the past 30 years of bilateral relations.
"This year marks the 30th anniversary of the two countries diplomatic ties," Yoon said during the meeting at the presidential office in Yongsan District, Seoul. "I expect Chairman Li's contribution and interest for the progress in the bilateral relations, and I also hope the two countries expand their common interests and build friendship and trust between their people."
Li responded that the two countries' relations have achieved "omnidirectional developments" under the two countries' leaders in the past 30 years.
Li's visit to Seoul came upon Speaker Kim's invitation. Along with 66 delegates including some minister- and vice minister-level officials, Li arrived in Seoul on Thursday for a three-day visit.
Also on Friday, Li paid a visit to LG Science Park in southwestern Seoul's Gangseo District, which accommodates the R&D departments of LG Group's eight major affiliates including LG Energy Solution, the world's No. 2 EV battery maker in terms of sales.
The Korea Times · September 16, 2022
8. Defense fair helps establish Korea as solid weapons exporter
The global pivotal state will contribute to the arsenal of democracy.
Defense fair helps establish Korea as solid weapons exporter
The Korea Times · September 17, 2022
Kwon Oh-sung, the president of the organizing committee for the Defense Expo Korea, poses at the headquarters of the Association of the Republic of Korea Army in Seoul. Courtesy of Association of the Republic of Korea Army
DX Korea to take place at KINTEX Wednesday through Sunday
By Kang Seung-woo
Korea has been expanding its presence in the global defense industry on the back of its recent massive arms deal with Poland, worth an estimated 20 trillion won ($14.3 billion), an achievement bringing more attention to Korean-made military hardware.
The agreement even encouraged President Yoon Suk-yeol last month to unveil a plan to make Korea one of the world's top four weapons suppliers.
Amid the winning vibes, Kwon Oh-sung, the president of the organizing committee for the Defense Expo Korea (DX Korea), believes that the biennial defense fair can play a role in helping the country to establish itself as a solid international powerhouse in the sector.
DX Korea, hosted by the Association of the Republic of Korea Army and co-organized by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), is the nation's lone exhibition for equipment of ground forces and marketing defense products to not only international buyers but also to defense purchasing decision makers from all around the world. Since its first iteration in 2014, DX Korea has solidified its position as the platform for international cooperation in constructing cutting-edge national defense power.
This year's edition is scheduled to take place Wednesday through Sunday at KINTEX in Goyang, Gyeonggi Province, with 210 international and local exhibitors participating.
"The defense industry is a difficult sector to access and hold exhibitions for, so the DX Korea has served as a place helping people with mutual interests to meet each other," Kwon said in an interview with The Korea Times.
"As top military brass, government officials and representatives from defense companies flock to DX Korea, arms deals can be made, while each country's military requirements can be confirmed as well."
Kwon, a former Army chief of staff, said the upcoming DX Korea will be different from its predecessors in a few ways.
"Amid increasing interest in defense exports, we have extended 'customized' invitations strategically," he said.
According to him, the defense ministry, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, the Army and defense firms each invited players, based on respective needs.
Kwon also said this year's edition will come up with a new program helping small and mid-sized defense companies promote their products.
"In general, exhibitions proceed centered on major firms, so we have devised the 'Pitch Program' that will introduce smaller exhibitors' new products and technologies," he said, adding that 12 companies have applied for the program.
Unlike other international military fairs, DX Korea stages a massive live fire and maneuver demonstration, with the 2022 edition to feature 19 types of military vehicles and equipment at the Republic of Korea Army's training Center in Yangpyeong, Gyeonggi Province.
"It is a large-scale firing demonstration that is not usually feasible in other military expos," Kwon said.
Foreign soldiers visit a booth at DX Korea 2020. Courtesy of the organizing committee for the DX KoreaHowever, the organizing committee chief said the demonstration will not end up being just a "show of force."
"Through the firing event, Korean-made military hardware could appeal to potential buyers," he added.
In July, Poland signed deals with Korea to acquire 48 FA-50 jets, 980 K2 battle tanks and 648 K9 howitzers ― one of the country's most important and largest defense orders in recent years.
Against this backdrop, President Yoon wants Korea to join the world's top four defense exporters.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Korea ranked eighth in the world in arms exports from 2017 to 2021, with its volume accounting for 2.8 percent. The United States, Russia and France rounded out the top three, representing a combined 69 percent, but China, which came in fourth, logged 4.6 percent.
Kwon said DX Korea could give a further boost to the "ambitious" goal.
"If each company were to just develop defense technologies and make products, they would have to put in more efforts for themselves," Kwon said.
"However, we provide a place at DX Korea, which will become a venue to promote their defense products and exchange essential information for the future defense development.
"In short, DX Korea helps the president's words turn into action."
The Korea Times · September 17, 2022
9. A North Korean refugee learns about Harvard
Her example should be used as part of themes and messages to inspire Koreans still living in the north.
A North Korean refugee learns about Harvard
The Korea Times · September 17, 2022
North Korean refugee Han Song-mi, center, poses with Casey Lartigue of Freedom Speakers International, left, and Park Jin, second from left, foreign minister, at the Harvard Club of Korea's annual alumni dinner on Dec. 1, 2019. To Han's left are Park Jae-Joon of Yonsei University College of Medicine, and Park Young-sun of Hackers English Institute. Courtesy of Casey Lartigue.
By Han Song-mi
I attended elementary school for only one year when I was growing up in North Korea. My life was unstable in North Korea as I moved from home to home, my mom and I were homeless for a while, and I was usually starving and in poverty.
My mom escaped to South Korea then later rescued me from North Korea. I struggled with adjusting to life in South Korea. I even contemplated suicide at one point. As I was going through that dark time, I was trying to find something to save myself.
I tried several things, including re-starting learning English. In late 2019, a friend told me about an organization named Freedom Speakers International. I was so amazed as I watched the videos and read articles about the organization. It seemed to be a dream come true for a North Korean refugee like me who can't afford private tutoring.
I learned that the co-founder was an American named Casey Lartigue Jr. I contacted him to ask about applying to the organization as a student. He directed me to the online application process. A few weeks later, I met with him and FSI co-founder Lee Eun-koo. Was there really an organization that focused on helping North Korean refugees learn English? I told them a little about my struggles, that I was trying to find something meaningful.
After my second visit, Casey and Lee Eun-koo had talked about me. Casey invited me to the most wonderful event. The Harvard Club of Korea held its annual alumni dinner at the Westin Chosun Hotel in Seoul. I felt like I was dreaming the whole night.
I wanted to understand everything being said, but my English was so poor. Even when I understood, I was too nervous and shy to speak. My eyes shone with happiness as I smiled the whole night, unable to hide my feelings. It was an elegant night. We had a fancy dinner. Educated and professional people were drinking nice wine and talking about many things, much of which I couldn't understand.
I met Park Jin, a member of South Korea's National Assembly who greeted me. He was so nice. Later, I saw in the news that he had become South Korea's Minister of Foreign Affairs. I can't believe that such a high-ranking person in the South Korean government knows who I am.
The most exciting moment of the night was when they had a quiz about Harvard University's history. When the announcer asked a few of the questions, Casey pointed at me, trying to get the announcer's attention. Then, it happened! The announcer pointed at me. I stood up, excited as a person brought the microphone over to me. Casey whispered to me, "Just say 'eight.'" I had been shy all night, but not at that moment. Very loudly and proudly, I said, "Eight!"
The announcer said I was right, and I won co?ee from a Harvard alumni! I was in a room with Harvard professors and alumni, and I was the person with the right answer! The right answer was "eight." Eight what, I didn't know. Casey later told me that "eight" was the number of Harvard graduates who had become president of the United States. Casey could have won the co?ee, but instead he told me the answer so I could win. It was an amazing night.
Later that night, I sent the photos to my mom. "Mom, I went to this event. It is really special."
She asked, "Why is it special?"
"I met Harvard professors."
She also got excited as she heard more details. Her daughter who didn't study or read a book for years when she was in North Korea was in the same room with Harvard alumni as a special guest. Mom said to me, "I think you are a lucky girl to have met Harvard professors. I am so grateful Casey took you there." Mom is always worried about me. After we reconciled in South Korea, our relationship got even stronger than before. It was a wonderful moment. I was a daughter telling her mom about a special night.
I didn't know anything about Harvard University when I was in North Korea. Before I went to the dinner, I searched online to learn more about it. I was so excited as I told mom about Harvard University as if she also had never heard of it.
Mom asked, "Are you crazy? You didn't know about Harvard?"
"Mom," I said. "I had never heard about Harvard when I was in North Korea. I had to work to survive. I feel so lucky."
I sent the photos to a long-time friend who is like an aunt to me. She also posted the photos on her social media. She was so proud that I had gone to a Harvard University event.
I was still going to have a lot of trouble over the next few months and year, and had struggled so much for several years, but that night was a bright spot. When I was on the subway going home, I couldn't stop smiling.
I later told Casey more about the problems I had been going through. He was disappointed that I had not told him earlier. He said that I should have told him sooner, and that he would help me organize my life.
At the end of 2019, I was looking for something to save myself. I am now in a different place in my life, as an author, speaker, people from around the world have contacted me, and I have numerous organizations inviting me to participate in their activities.
I will never forget going to that Harvard Alumni Dinner as a special guest. I will soon have a Part 2 to my Harvard story.
Next week I will be visiting the U.S to give speeches in Nashville (TN), New York City (NY) and Cambridge (MA) for the U.S. release of my memoir, Greenlight to Freedom. My trip to the U.S. will end with a visit to Harvard University. Casey will be giving a speech at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. I will be joining him, and I will have a chance to speak at Harvard University.
Oct. 3 is a special day in my life. On Oct. 3, 2011, I was released from South Korea's re-education center for North Korean refugees and became a citizen of South Korea. I will be celebrating my freedom day this year speaking at a famous university I never heard of when I was in North Korea.
Han Song-mi is co-author with Casey Lartigue of the book Greenlight to Freedom: A North Korean Daughter's Search for Her Mother and Herself. She is a Keynote Speaker with Freedom Speakers International and was the winner of the organization's 16th English Speech Contest on Aug. 27.
The Korea Times · September 17, 2022
10. Experts: North Korea's New Law on Preemptive Use of Nuclear Weapons Puts Regime at Risk
There are no experts on north Korea. We are simply students of the problem trying to understand the hard target that is the regime in Pyongyang.
Experts: North Korea's New Law on Preemptive Use of Nuclear Weapons Puts Regime at Risk
September 15, 2022 10:28 PM
voanews.com
WASHINGTON —
North Korea has put itself in a dangerous situation by ruling out denuclearization and legalizing the use of its nuclear weapons preemptively to strike against adversaries that threaten its leadership, according to experts.
Pyongyang prioritizes regime survival, and North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly, the country's rubber-stamp parliament, legitimized on September 8 the preemptive use of its nuclear weapons "automatically" if its leadership or command and control centers are threatened.
The same day, leader Kim Jong Un outlined in a speech that the law stipulating the justifiable use of nuclear weapons made North Korea's position as a nuclear state "irreversible" unless the world, as well as political and military situations on the Korean Peninsula, changed, according to the state media KCNA.
Kim said he will "never give up" his nuclear weapons and ruled out negotiations for denuclearization. His assertion came weeks after his powerful sister Kim Yo Jong rejected a proposal by Seoul to provide aid in return for denuclearization, saying "No one barters its destiny for corn cake."
Experts said Pyongyang's official declaration of its preemptive intent made the regime more vulnerable as its nuclear strike would be met by a counterstrike by the U.S.
"The United States has actually been perfectly clear about what would happen to North Korea if it ever used a nuclear weapon," said Bruce Bennett, a defense analyst at the RAND Corporation.
"The 2018 nuclear posture review says that if North Korea uses a nuclear weapon, the regime will not survive. Since survival is the regime's number one objective, this is an effective deterrent objective if the U.S. is serious about implementing it," continued Bennett.
The U.S. assessed that Pyongyang's "expansive nuclear and missile programs suggest the potential of nuclear first use in support of conventional operations," according to the report issued four years ago.
The posture review continued, "Our deterrent strategy for North Korea makes clear that any North Korean nuclear attack against the United States or its allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime."
David Maxwell, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracy, said Washington and Seoul "must make sure the regime knows the use of weapons of mass destruction will result in its destruction." He continued, "The recent message from the South Korean spokesman demonstrates strategic reassurance and strategic resolve."
Moon Hong Sik, South Korea's Defense Ministry spokesperson, said Tuesday, North Korea's use of nuclear weapons would put the regime on the "path of self-destruction" facing "overwhelming response" by Washington and Seoul.
VOA Korean contacted the Permanent Mission of North Korea to the United Nations in New York for a response to the experts' assessment of the new law but did not receive a response.
Pretext for preemption
Ken Gause, director of the Adversary Analytics Program at CNA, said North Korea might have made its intent to use nuclear weapons official to bolster its stance against Seoul's "decapitation strategy" aimed at Pyongyang leadership.
In July, the South Korean Defense Ministry announced it would create a Strategic Command by 2024 to oversee its "kill chain" strategy and the military assets to implement it.
The kill chain is Seoul's preemptive strategy to strike North Korea's leadership and key military centers if it detects Pyongyang is about to launch an attack against South Korea.
Joseph DeTrani, who served as the special envoy for the six-party denuclearization talks with North Korea, said Seoul's new stance on enhanced deterrence could also have "motivated" Pyongyang to include preemptive nuclear response.
During the summit between South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden in May, the two agreed to reactivate the bilateral Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG).
The EDSCG was launched in 2016 to discuss and implement military options to deter aggression by North Korea, including the use of U.S. nuclear weapons to defend South Korea.
On Friday, Washington and Seoul will hold the first EDSCG meeting since 2018.
On Aug. 17, U.S. and South Korean defense officials concluded the two-day Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) and issued a joint statement announcing an option to deploy U.S. strategic assets around the Korean Peninsula if North Korea conducted a nuclear test.
Strategic assets include aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines and strategic bombers.
Washington and Seoul have been assessing whether North Korea is preparing for what would be its seventh nuclear test after detecting preparatory activities at its main Punggye-ri nuclear test site.
Evans Revere, a former State Department official with extensive experience negotiating with North Korea, said, "With the ROK's recent reference to its 'kill chain' strategy and the ongoing U.S.-ROK discussion of 'strategic assets,' we can also view the new DPRK law and Kim Jong Un's speech as a response to those developments."
South Korea's official name is the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the DPRK refers to North Korea's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Revere continued, "But it is important to remember that North Korea's nuclear weapons strategy has been evolving in this direction for many years. The ROK and U.S. actions merely provided a convenient pretext for this move by Pyongyang."
Denuclearization dead but ultimate goal
Experts said North Korea's new nuclear law and Kim's continuing refusal to relinquish his nuclear arsenal have made pursuing diplomacy for denuclearization more difficult. Talks have remained stalled since 2019, and Pyongyang countered any moves to resume them with 19 weapons tests this year.
Revere said, "Denuclearization is almost certainly a dead issue, and the North Koreans have just bluntly reminded us of that."
Revere added, "Policy makers would be wise now to focus on ways to make the cost to North Korea of its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons truly unbearable."
However, he continued, "The U.S. and the ROK should continue to pursue the ultimate goal of denuclearization, since giving up that goal would play into the hand of a North Korea which seeks 'acceptance' of its nuclear status."
DeTraini said, "Policy toward North Korea should not change, and indeed, it would be a mistake to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state."
voanews.com
11. Korea should capitalize on soaring dollar
Korea should capitalize on soaring dollar
The Korea Times · September 15, 2022
By Robert D. Atkinson
The U.S. dollar has reached near-record highs, including against the Korean won which is down 16 percent over the last 20 months. This makes U.S. imports to Korea more expensive and Korean exports to the U.S. less expensive. Great for American consumers but bad for American workers. And vice versa for Korea.
The skyrocketing dollar will further increase the U.S. trade deficit and the hollowing-out of America's manufacturing base. In fact, 2022 is projected to set all-time records for the U.S. trade deficit ($1.2 trillion) and its deficit in high-tech goods ($236 billion). Indeed, America's expected trade deficit will equal 70 percent of Korea's GDP.
For more than three decades, conventional U.S. economists have waved away any concerns about the massive U.S. trade deficit, arguing wrongly that it stems principally from the lack of U.S. savings, strong U.S. economic growth or even superior U.S. innovation.
The reality is much simpler: America has run trade deficits every year since the 1970s because of a less than fully competitive U.S. economy (in part because other nations support their export industries with a range of fair, and sometimes unfair, policies) that has been cyclically weakened by an overvalued currency dragging down U.S. exporters.
With the rapid rise of the value of the dollar in the last several years, the inflation-adjusted trade-weighted value of the U.S. dollar is now higher than its past peak in 2003 (which preceded a massive decline in U.S. manufacturing jobs), and just 12 percent lower than the 1983 peak (which also was associated with significant decline in U.S. manufacturing).
An overvalued currency exacerbates the trade deficit. As one study by the U.S. Department of Commerce argued in the mid-1980s "a decline in the exchange value of the dollar would significantly improve the trade deficit." It was true then and it's even truer now.
Another study found that the effect of a rising dollar "is small in the short run but can become quite large as the dollar's strength persists." After three years of dollar strengthening America we are likely to see even larger effects.
Another study found that manufacturing investment declines with dollar appreciation, because a strong dollar reduces corporate profits, which in turn leads companies to cut capital investment in order to maintain price competition with imports. Not a recipe for long-term U.S. manufacturing competitiveness.
So what difference does it make if America runs big and growing trade deficits? There are three reasons. First, trade deficits create trade debt. In the first seven months of this year, Korean companies provided Americans with $25 billion more exports of Hyundai cars, Samsung phones and dishwashers and LG televisions than American exports to Korea.
As an American I say "thank you." But all Korea gets is an IOU for $25 billion. Those IOUs add up and at some point Korea and other countries will want to get paid in real goods and services, not more Treasury bills.
Over time, there are only two ways for America to deal with its massive trade debt. The first is to run trade surpluses every year, likely brought on by a massive decline in the value of dollar. The second and perhaps more likely, especially if other nations do not boost their currencies, is to default on the debt that foreign governments and other investors own from recycling their export earnings into U.S. T-bills.
The second reason the trade deficit matters is that it hollows out strategic export sectors. If the United States were running a trade deficit principally in industries like food and minerals there would be little concern.
Given U.S. natural resources these sectors could be revived with a weaker dollar. But the strong dollar has reduced U.S. companies' global market share in advanced industries, such as machinery, transportation equipment, computers and semiconductors.
Unlike for commodity industries, these losses usually inflict permanent damage, putting some companies out of business and reducing economies of scale and continual reinvestment of earnings in R&D for the others.
Given that the U.S. manufacturing base has already been shrunk because of past dollar booms, it's not clear it can survive many more of these dollar appreciation-manufacturing decline cycles without its manufacturing economy looking more like that of the U.K. and Australia.
Third, the high value of the dollar reduces the attractiveness of investing in the United States, something the Biden administration and Congress are expecting after the passage of the CHIPS and Science Act (which provides grants and tax credits to invest in semiconductor facilities) and the Inflation Reduction Act (which provides tax incentives for domestic clean energy production).
The strong dollar will reduce ― and possibly completely offset ― the value of these incentives, limiting foreign investment, something that is already near record lows. The high value of the dollar will, however, enable Korean companies in a wide range of industries to gain greater market share in the United States through increased exports.
To address this challenge, the Biden administration needs to immediately convene a modern-day "Plaza Accord" bringing together the world's major central bankers to agree to increase the value of their currencies. If not enough countries agree, the Treasury or the Federal Reserve should sell dollars to buy foreign currencies, pushing those currencies up against the dollar.
Unfortunately, the chances of the Biden administration doing this are slim. In preparation for the 2022 election, the administration hyperfocused on inflation, and a strong dollar reduces inflation.
Moreover, the United States keeps creating manufacturing jobs because for the first time, manufacturing productivity is growing more slowly than non-manufacturing productivity, meaning even if manufacturing output declines a share of GDP jobs can still grow. So even though U.S. manufacturing competitiveness will be eroding, the administration can point to stable or even growing manufacturing jobs as proof that its policies are working.
Of course this can't go on forever either, because eventually U.S. firms will lose so much global competitiveness that they go out of business or contract in scale, or move operations offshore.
But that probably won't be noticeable until after the 2024 presidential election, so the proverbial can will continue to be kicked down the road, with the only solution likely to be a financial crisis that finally brings America's trade into something resembling balance, and with it, finally, a realization that the U.S. economy is nowhere near as strong globally as the elites thought it was.
Robert D. Atkinson (@RobAtkinsonITIF) is the president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), an independent, nonpartisan research and educational institute focusing on the intersection of technological innovation and public policy.
The Korea Times · September 15, 2022
12. We Must Plan to Defend Against North Korea's Nuclear Weapons
The regime will employ nuclear weapons if Kim decides to attack the South.
We Must Plan to Defend Against North Korea's Nuclear Weapons
19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · September 16, 2022
This week North Korea once again attracted world attention to its nuclear weapons program by passing a law rejecting denuclearization and negotiation about its weapons program. This legislation emerged from North Korea’s legislature, the Supreme People’s Assembly, and was pronounced by the country’s supreme leader, Kim Jong Un. The law also included a frightening provision for North Korea to use its nukes preemptively.
South Korea responded by insisting that it still seeks denuclearization and that North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons would bring about the regime’s destruction. The U.S. has insisted that it has ‘no hostile intent’ toward North Korea and that this new North Korean language is an unnecessary escalation.
Law does Not Mean Much in North Korea
There has been much anxiety and global attention to these new statements, but they almost certainly do not actually change North Korean nuclear policy that much.
The most obvious reason is that North Korea is not a rule-of-law state. Its elites do not feel bound to formal policy statements emanating from the North Korean state. De facto policy does not come from the national legislature because North Korea is run more like a mafia clan than a modern state. The people who run the country are the cronies, friends, and family of Kim himself.
As such, formal statements like this new law have no binding power on elites or constrain or channel their behavior in any meaningful way. By way of illustration, legislation emerging from the U.S. Congress regarding policy or procurement for the US military, such as the National Defense Authorization Act, does constrain both the American president and US commanders. Law is meaningful in the US, and the content of the annual NDAA is a contentious annual budgetary issue which tells us important information about US military choices.
Kim faces nothing like this. He could change North Korean policy at whim.
The Law’s Real Value is Rhetorical
North Korea produces an enormous amount of political language like this week’s statements: aggressive, belligerent, frightening, paranoid, and so on. But it rarely acts on its regular threats and abuse. So its statements are of questionable utility as policy indicators, much less as binding ‘law.’ Far more likely is that they signal stylized commitments to North Korea’s external opponents and its internal population.
In this case, the North is telling the world once again, in rhetorical ‘legal’ language, that it is committed to its nuclear weapons track, will not denuclearize, and is leaning ever harder into its nuclear weapons for security and prestige. And to its people, it is signaling, again, strength and determination in the face of hostile external pressure – a nationalist message of resistance to explain why North Korea must remain poor and backward. Most national resources must go into defense, because the country’s neighbors are plotting to pull it down.
What Do We Do? Defense
This week’s statements are yet another reminder that North Korea sees its nukes as non-negotiable, or would demand such a high price for denuclearization that the US and South Korea will not pay it. During the presidencies of Donald Trump and South Korea’s Moon Jae-In, the two made a major effort to pull North Korea into nuclear negotiations. North Korea offered little seriousness at those meetings. Kim never seemed to take the negotiations seriously, and never put forward an offer in exchange for his weapons.
It seems very likely that North Korean nuclear weapons are here to stay and that we must adapt to their existence and integration into North Korea’s warfighting doctrine. We must now consider defense against these weapons, as Kim will likely never give them up. I see three options:
Missile Defense
The US pushed South Korea for two decades to beef up its missile defense, either through indigenous development or by buying more systems from the US. This is now the most obvious option, as South Korean cities are effectively naked against North Korean missile strikes.
South Korean Nuclear Weapons
Elsewhere I have argued that South Korea’s own direct nuclear deterrence against North Korean nukes is an increasingly likely option given that missile defense does not work well enough to block most inbound missiles.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un near Hwasong ICBM. Image Credit: North Korean State Media.
Preemption
South Korea’s president floated this option earlier this year, but its risks are enormous. It could ignite the very war it seeks to prevent. I think this is unlikely.
Whatever the South Koreans decide, the debate on Northern nukes is increasingly moving away from negotiation – as this week’s rhetoric makes clear again – and toward defense and military options.
Expert Biography: Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; RoberEdwinKelly.com) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University and 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.
19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · September 16, 2022
13. North Korea keeps its options open in selling weapons to Russia | Opinion
North Korea keeps its options open in selling weapons to Russia | Opinion
Newsweek · by Daniel R. DePetris · September 16, 2022
Russian President Vladimir Putin doesn't have many friends these days. His decision to invade, pummel, and occupy Ukrainian territory has transitioned Russia into a pariah state in the West. Trade between Russia and the European Union, worth 247.8 billion euros per year before the war, is now a shell of its former self. U.S.-Russia ties are practically severed, Europe no longer views Russia as a reliable energy supplier, and Russian citizens who wish to travel to the EU are forced to pay more for their visas.
But there is one country that has stood by Russia's side for the duration of the war—and it's not China. Despite Xi Jinping's proclamations of having a "no limits" friendship with Moscow, the Chinese leader remains concerned about breaking U.S. export rules to help Russia acquire sensitive military technology.
But North Korea, the small, poor, isolated nuclear-armed state in Northeast Asia, has offered Putin a degree of political support that makes Beijing's look pale in comparison. And unlike China, which must ensure its bridges with the West remain intact (Beijing's total trade with the U.S. and the EU in 2021 amounted to more than $1.3 trillion), Pyongyang's open endorsement of Russia's policy in Ukraine won't cost the North Koreans much at all in terms of damage to its reputation or economy. For North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, a stronger relationship with Moscow is a no-brainer.
In this photo taken on Sept. 9, 2022, in Pyongyang, performers take part in a celebration that marks the 74th anniversary of North Korea's founding. KIM WON JIN/AFP via Getty Images
While Russia and North Korea have always maintained formal diplomatic relations and have a long, deep history between them (Kim Jong-un can thank the late Soviet leader Joseph Stalin for turning his family into a political dynasty), Pyongyang's words of encouragement and its effusive praise of Moscow have been over-the-top ever since the war in Ukraine began on Feb. 24.
Four days after the invasion, the Kim dynasty recycled the Kremlin's talking points by blaming the U.S. and its NATO allies for instigating the conflict. North Korea was only one of five countries that opposed a U.N. General Assembly Resolution calling on Russia to "immediately, completely and unconditionally" withdraw its troops from Ukraine. In mid-July, the North became only the third country to formally recognize the Russia-proclaimed Luhansk People's Republic and Donetsk People's Republic as independent states. According to Russian officials, North Korean construction companies have offered to rebuild parts of Russian-occupied territory in the Donbas region and are hinting that North Korean laborers could be sent to perform the work.
Meanwhile, the U.S. intelligence community has recently assessed that Moscow is turning to North Korea for millions of artillery shells and rockets, a sign that Russia's defense industrial complex is struggling to sustain armaments production at a time when long-range Ukrainian strikes are destroying Russian ammunition depots well beyond the frontlines.
All of this activity would suggest that Kim Jong-un, who is dealing with a stringent U.S. sanctions regime of his own, is hell-bent on providing Putin with seemingly unlimited assistance during the most consequential period of the Russian leader's 22-year tenure. But it would be wrong to assume Kim is doing all of this out of the kindness of his heart. In reality, running to Russia's corner is a shrewd tactical move.
Consider North Korea's geopolitical situation. Notwithstanding its small inventory of nuclear warheads and an increasingly impressive missile program, the North is a highly vulnerable state in a tough neighborhood. Pyongyang is surrounded by countries much wealthier, diplomatically relevant, and militarily powerful than it could dream of being. Two of those states, Japan and South Korea, have the luxury of being U.S. treaty allies. The North's hyper-vigilant efforts to contain the coronavirus shaved off a large portion of its already dismal economy, with overall trade decreasing by over 78 percent in 2020.
If it wasn't for China, the Kim dynasty would be in even more desperate straits. Despite endorsing multiple U.N. Security Council Resolutions against the North since 2006, China often breaks those very same resolutions by looking the other way as illicit commerce proceeds along the border. Beijing has been more vocal in its opposition to additional U.N. sanctions measures, even vetoing (in coordination with Russia) Washington's attempt in May to strengthen the economic restrictions in retaliation for Pyongyang's missile tests.
Yet as rosy as China-North Korea relations appear at the moment, it would be dangerous for Kim to assume the bonhomie will last indefinitely. Indeed, ties between the two have had repeated ups and downs, with the North sometimes viewing China as duplicitous and Chinese leaders, Xi Jinping included, often viewing the Kim dynasty as a troublemaker ungrateful for Beijing's support. Xi only sought to repair the relationship with Pyongyang after it became clear that Kim was attempting a rapprochement with the U.S. The two may tolerate each other, but they most certainly don't trust one another.
Therefore, Pyongyang's aid binge to Russia isn't about sending gifts to Putin as much as a concerted campaign by Kim himself to diversify North Korea's foreign relationships and lessen its dependence on China. Kim is, in effect, mimicking the strategy his grandfather, Kim Il-Sung, used throughout the Cold War, when he played Beijing and Moscow off of each other in order to enhance the North's freedom of movement. Put simply, the North hopes to use closer ties with Russia to get out from underneath China's foot.
One of the golden rules of geopolitics is to avoid relying too much on a single country. Russia's war in Ukraine has given the North Koreans an opportunity to correct course, and Kim Jong-un intends to take full advantage.
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune and Newsweek.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
Newsweek · by Daniel R. DePetris · September 16, 2022
14. North Korea's Nuclear Fail-Safe
Excerpts:
The law offers little new for longtime North Korea watchers, but it does offer insight into how Pyongyang seeks to ensure deterrence if its supreme leader were to be killed by an adversary’s attack. “In case the command and control system over the state nuclear forces is placed in danger owing to an attack by hostile forces,” the new policy reads, “a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately to destroy the hostile forces including the starting point of provocation and the command according to the operation plan decided in advance.”
...
That makes it a fundamentally different threat from when the South first designed these plans under the Park Geun-hye administration. In 2022, the codification of North Korea’s new nuclear posture marks an important step forward in its evolution as a nuclear state. Pyongyang is no longer rattling scabbards, but sabers.
North Korea's Nuclear Fail-Safe
Foreign Policy · by Megan DuBois · September 16, 2022
With a new law, Kim Jong Un takes a page from the Soviet nuclear playbook to ensure payback.
By Megan DuBois, an editorial fellow at Foreign Policy.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is shown on a television screen at a train station in Seoul on Sept. 9.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is shown on a television screen at a train station in Seoul on Sept. 9. ANTHONY WALLACE/AFP via Getty Images
Last week, North Korea announced its most significant update to its nuclear weapons law in almost a decade, clarifying the nuclear chain of command in the event that Kim Jong Un kicks the bucket before he can press the button.
The law offers little new for longtime North Korea watchers, but it does offer insight into how Pyongyang seeks to ensure deterrence if its supreme leader were to be killed by an adversary’s attack. “In case the command and control system over the state nuclear forces is placed in danger owing to an attack by hostile forces,” the new policy reads, “a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately to destroy the hostile forces including the starting point of provocation and the command according to the operation plan decided in advance.”
This text is carefully worded in such a way that it doesn’t identify a successor to Kim or imply that anyone other than Kim has the authority to issue a nuclear order even upon his death. Rather, it suggests that orders will be executed “according to the operation plan decided in advance,” meaning someone else may press the proverbial nuclear button, but only as an extension of Kim’s living will. As such, the plan promises nuclear retaliation through what’s known as a “dead hand”—exemplified by the eponymous Soviet-Russian system meant to launch a nuclear strike if Western missiles take out Moscow’s military leadership.
The timing here is no coincidence. South Korea’s newly elected Yoon Suk-yeol administration favors a hard-line approach for its North Korea policy, and it has recently doubled down on previous administrations’ plans that allow for retaliatory strikes against North Korean leadership targets. For North Korea, a state whose primary strategic aim is to preserve its family business and defend against attempts at forced regime change, this is an existential threat.
A decapitation strike makes sense, in adversaries’ eyes, because Kim is the one man in North Korea with his finger on the button. The new law is explicit in this sense, making it crystal clear that Kim has “monolithic command” of the state’s nuclear forces. Seoul and other potential adversaries surmised that without Kim, North Korea could be left scrambling without a clear way to designate nuclear authority, and thus incapable of carrying out a retaliatory response.
North Korea, like all nuclear states, needs a plan B so adversaries know any incapacitation of leadership won’t necessarily compromise its nuclear deterrent. A new study lays out what those options could look like. Countries like the United States have a line of succession for nuclear authority, from the vice president to the speaker of the House, and so forth. Others delegate, granting discretion over when and how to employ nuclear weapons after making the decision that nuclear use is required. Or, leaders can delegate authority prior to conflict in anticipation that they may lose contact or become incapacitated in the course of war; British prime ministers famously dispatch “letters of last resort” to the commanders of nuclear submarines. Using an automatic approach, leaders make a pre-authorized order, which will be automatically executed should they become incapacitated—essentially, making the decision, but handing off the “nuclear button” to someone else, not unlike Russia’s “dead hand” fail-safe.
By putting things on autopilot, Kim avoids having to pick an heir, said Shane Smith, director of the U.S. Air Force Academy Institute for National Security Studies. No potential heir means no real-time rivals. Another question is whether North Korea can actually communicate launch orders if Kim is out of the picture.
Still, putting another hand on the button makes sense from a deterrence standpoint, given North Korea’s limited strategic depth and acute sense of vulnerability, said Ankit Panda, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nuclear Policy Program. “They took the right lessons away from Dr. Strangelove. If you’re going to have a doomsday device, don’t keep it a secret,” he said.
Pyongyang hopes the new plans will make Washington and Seoul think twice about striking leadership. But this strategy is not without risk; it could exacerbate the already worrisome potential for escalation or misperception in times of crisis. This risk is particularly concerning to the United States, which has long worried about being dragged into a conflict by an adventurous South Korea.
To smooth things over, the United States and its South Korean allies could publicly swear off decapitation strikes. But Kim’s been twice-burned by the spectacular diplomatic failures of former U.S. President Donald Trump. Jenny Town, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center and the director of its 38 North program, said Kim suffered domestically for returning home empty-handed from the summits in Singapore in 2018 and Hanoi in 2019. “We see the price of not getting what they wanted when they were willing to negotiate,” she said. “If we go back to negotiations now, we’re not starting from Hanoi. With a newly powerful North Korea, the price will be higher.”
In the 2013 edition of the new law, North Korea, a threshold nuclear state with a minimally credible deterrent, went to great lengths to justify the existence of its nuclear weapons program. Almost a decade later, North Korea is a rapidly maturing nuclear power that has made qualitative and quantitative advancements. Beyond its accumulation of nuclear warheads, Pyongyang has built better, more precise missiles, some of which are capable of evading missile defenses, and some of which may be capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to targets in Northeast Asia and potentially in the United States and Europe.
That makes it a fundamentally different threat from when the South first designed these plans under the Park Geun-hye administration. In 2022, the codification of North Korea’s new nuclear posture marks an important step forward in its evolution as a nuclear state. Pyongyang is no longer rattling scabbards, but sabers.
Megan DuBois is an editorial fellow at Foreign Policy. Twitter: @meganmdubois
15. Maryland Gov. Hogan expects 'compromise' over controversial law on inflation after midterm elections
I will try ask him about this when I meet him in Seoul at a conference we are both attending.
Maryland Gov. Hogan expects 'compromise' over controversial law on inflation after midterm elections
koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · September 17, 2022
By Yonhap
Published : Sept 17, 2022 - 13:41 Updated : Sept 17, 2022 - 16:12
Maryland Gov. Larry Hogan speaks during a press conference in Seoul on Sept. 17, 2022. (Yonhap)
Maryland Gov. Larry Hogan voiced cautious hope Saturday for a "compromise" over a new U.S. law aimed at reducing inflation that has unnerved South Korea by excluding electric vehicles made outside North America from tax benefits.
He raised the possibility of a breakthrough on the controversial matter after the November midterm elections, speaking at a press conference in Seoul.
The governor highlighted his commitment to efforts to insulate Seoul-Washington relations from the negative impact of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). But he pointed out the realistic difficulty of "totally reversing" the legislation before the elections.
In August, U.S. President Joe Biden signed the IRA in a legislative feat, which observers said could help his Democratic Party ahead of the high-stakes midterm elections seen as a referendum on his presidential performance.
"It's not easy to totally reverse the bill ... certainly not before the election," Hogan said, describing the law as "rushed through Congress without some understanding of negative implications."
He added, "But I think as we go about developing the final details of the bill and after the election, I believe some accommodations and maybe some compromise can be worked out that will be more acceptable to all the parties involved.
The Republican governor, who is expected to run for the 2024 presidential poll, and his Korean American wife, Yumi Hogan, arrived here Tuesday for a nine-day visit, leading a delegation tasked with boosting economic and trade relations with South Korea.
The IRA has been a front-burner issue that dominated a series of talks with top Seoul officials, including a meeting with President Yoon Suk-yeol on Friday and another with Foreign Minister Park Jin a day earlier.
Hogan's message was simple and clear: The United States doesn't want to do anything to harm the long-standing relationship with Korea.
"We just talked with all of the leaders and said that we were going to take a serious look at how we might be able to work together to find some type of compromise to put this back on track," he said.
Calling himself a "hanguk sawi," which means a son-in-law of South Korea in Korean, the governor expressed his strong affection toward the alliance between the South and the U.S.
"I think that the alliance is critically important ... and I support everything that we can do to work together and to achieve mutually beneficial results for both countries," he said.
As part of his trade mission here, Hogan made an aggressive pitch in the hopes of stronger economic ties with South Korea.
"We were very aggressively trying to seek out more business beyond our borders. But there's no question that the state of Maryland has a most special relationship with Korea," he said "It's very important for us to improve the relationship so that we can help the economies of both nations."
The governor and his wife attended the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity held on the southern resort island earlier this week. They are scheduled to leave for Japan on Wednesday. (Yonhap)
16. The John Batchelor Show #DPRK: The Soviet Kims.
The John Batchelor Show #DPRK: The Soviet Kims. David Maxwell, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill
https://audioboom.com/posts/8157950-dprk-the-soviet-kims-david-maxwell-senior-fellow-at-the-foundation-for-defense-of-democracies
Photo: No known restrictions on publication.
@Batchelorshow
#DPRK: The Soviet Kims. David Maxwell, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/05/us/politics/russia-north-korea-artillery.html
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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