Quotes of the Day:

“The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write but those who cannot learn, unlearn and relearn.”

- Heidi and Alvin Toffler

“A wise man speaks because he has something to say; a fool because he has to say something.” 

- Plato

"The only thing that will redeem mankind is co-operation, and the first step towards co-operation lies in the hearts of individuals." 

- Bertrand Russell

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 20 (Putin's War)

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (20.10.22) CDS comments on key events

3. Russian threats revive old nuclear fears in central Europe

4. Putin’s War in Ukraine May Destroy Russia

5. The greatest risk to China's Xi Jinping? Himself

6. Iranian drone trainers in Crimea to help Russians, White House says

7. Army Focused on Countering ‘Kamikaze Drones'

8. China’s Military Is Catching Up to the U.S. Is It Ready for Battle?

9. China May Never Become a Superpower

10. Xi’s CCP congress speech indicates a major push towards military intelligentisation

11. China, 'factory of the world,' is losing more of its manufacturing and export dominance, latest data shows

12. Transfer of Green Berets, SEALs to Army base in Germany questioned in House funding bill

13. Poland buying Korean made MLRS, continuing Seoul spending spree

14. ‘It Was Horror’: Ukrainians Share Grim Tales of Russian Occupation

15. US busts network providing technology to Russian military

16. Watch Estonia's foreign minister — whose country just voted to declare Russia a terrorist state— bluntly say he wants to see Putin go 'to hell'

17. China's Nightmare: What If the U.S. Military Sent Troops to Taiwan?

18. The impending loss of Kherson: How will Putin spin it?

19. Russia appears to be signaling a retreat from key Ukrainian port city of Kherson

20. US general on rare visit to nuclear-armed sub in Arabian Sea

21. Biden Takes on Grand Strategy

22. ‘US thumbing its nose’ at Russia with missile drills on Hokkaido, security expert says

23. America and China Don’t Need to Knock Each Other Out to Win

24. FDD | U.S. Offer of Sanctions Relief Remains Active Despite Iran Protests

25. FDD | China, Russia Deepen Partnership on Satellite Navigation

26. Turkey’s Opposition Is Paving Erdogan’s Path to Victory

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 20 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20

Key Takeaways

• Russia is likely continuing to prepare for a false-flag attack on the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP).
• Russian forces are likely setting conditions to remove military and occupation elements from the west bank of the Dnipro River in anticipation of imminent Ukrainian advances.
• The White House confirmed on October 20 that Iranian military personnel are in Russian-occupied Crimea, Ukraine to assist Russian forces in conducting drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure.
• Iran is providing military support to Russian forces in Ukraine despite new international sanctions likely in part because Iranian leaders believe that they need Moscow’s help to upend the US-led global order.
• Iran is providing military support to Russian forces in Ukraine despite new international sanctions likely in part because Iranian leaders believe that they need Moscow’s help to upend the US-led global order.
• Russian sources continued to claim that Russian forces are consolidating limited regained positions in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast on October 20 despite Ukrainian reports that Ukraine has liberated all but 1.8% of Kharkiv Oblast.
• Russian sources indicated that Ukrainian troops have advanced in northern Kherson Oblast as Ukrainian forces continued their interdiction campaign.
• Russian forces continued to conduct ground assaults in Donetsk Oblast but Russian sources contradicted their own claims on control of Bakhmut. Russian forces are likely continuing to falsify claims of advances in the Bakhmut area to portray themselves as making gains in at least one sector amid continuing losses in northeast and southern Ukraine.
• Russian regional governments and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continue to blame each other for military administrative failures.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 20

Oct 20, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Karolina Hird, Katherine Lawlor, Riley Bailey, George Barros, Nicholas Carl, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 20, 7:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russia is likely continuing to prepare for a false flag attack on the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 20 that Russian forces mined the dam of the Kakhovka HPP and noted that the HPP holds over 18 million cubic meters of water, which would cause massive and rapid flooding of settlements along the Dnipro River, including Kherson City.[1] Zelensky emphasized that the flooding would impact hundreds of thousands of people.[2] Russian sources, however, continued to accuse Ukrainian forces of shelling the Kakhovka HPP and have widely circulated graphics depicting the flood path in the event of a dam breach.[3] As ISW reported on October 19, Russian sources are likely setting information conditions for Russian forces to blow the dam after they withdraw from western Kherson Oblast and accuse Ukrainian forces of flooding the Dnipro River and surrounding settlements, partially in an attempt to cover their retreat further into eastern Kherson Oblast.[4] Continued Russian preparation for a false-flag attack on the Kakhovka HPP is also likely meant to distract from reports of Russian losses in Kherson Oblast.

Russian forces are likely setting conditions to remove military and occupation elements from the west bank of the Dnipro River in anticipation of imminent Ukrainian advances. Kherson City Telegram accounts claimed on October 20 that Russian forces disbanded and looted a fire station in Kherson City and ferried fire trucks, stolen civilian cars, and other miscellaneous household items across the Dnipro River to Hola Prystan.[5] ISW cannot independently confirm those reports. The Ukrainian service of Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty also reported on October 20 that Russian forces are moving military equipment from the west bank to the east bank of the Dnipro River in the face of recent Ukrainian advances, and posted satellite imagery that shows a Russian cargo ferry traveling across the Dnipro River from Kozatske (west bank) to Nova Kakhovka (east bank).[6] Radio Liberty noted that the ferry is fully loaded when it arrives at Nova Kakhovka and empty when it returns to Kozatske and suggested that this movement has been ongoing since early October.[7] Taken in tandem, these reports indicate that Russian troops are likely deliberately removing large amounts of personnel and equipment from the west bank of the Dnipro River. Russian forces have likely learned, at least in part, from their failures during the panicked Russian retreat from Kharkiv Oblast in the face of a previous Ukrainian counteroffensive. The militarily sensible thing would be to remove men and equipment in good order to avoid another devastating rout. Such a rout in Kherson could trap Russian forces and equipment on the west bank of the Dnipro River.

The White House confirmed on October 20 that Iranian military personnel are in Russian-occupied Crimea, Ukraine, to assist Russian forces in conducting drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby told reporters that “a relatively small number” of Iranian personnel are in Crimea to train Russian personnel in the use of unfamiliar Iranian-made drones.[8] Kirby emphasized that “Tehran is now directly engaged on the ground and through the provision of weapons that are impacting civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, that are killing civilians and destroying civilian infrastructure in Ukraine” and warned that Russia and Iran will continue to lie about their partnership. Russian officials have continued to deny their purchase of Iranian drones, but the existence of the deal is increasingly common knowledge even within Russia. A member of the Russian Ministry of Defense Public Council, Ruslan Pukhov, believed he was not being recorded when he told a Russian television host live on air on October 20 that “we won’t rock the boat too much, so I ask you not to [focus] too much on those Iranian [drones], like that classic story: ‘you have an ass but no word for it.’ We all know that they’re Iranian, but the authorities are not admitting that.”[9] Iranian officials have also denied the sales despite the widespread Russian use of Iranian drones in Ukraine since mid-September, but Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei boasted on October 19 that ”a few years ago, when pictures of [Iran’s] advanced missiles & drones were published, they said they’re photoshopped pictures! Now they say Iranian drones are dangerous [and ask] why do you sell them to so & so?”[10]

Iran is providing military support to Russian forces in Ukraine despite new international sanctions likely in part because Iranian leaders believe that they need Moscow’s help to upend the US-led global order. The European Union imposed additional sanctions on Iranian officials and the manufacturer of the Shahed-136 drones that Iran has sold to Russia for use in Ukraine on October 20.[11] Senior Iranian officials and state media frequently argue that Tehran must expand strategic relations with Russia and China to cooperate toward countering US global influence.[12] Iranian leaders may worry that a Russian failure in Ukraine would seriously disrupt this vision and possibly threaten Vladimir Putin’s hold on power and, therefore, Iran’s security. Iran could further expand its military support to Russia in the coming months.

The risk of a Russian offensive from Belarus into northern Ukraine remains low despite a prominent Ukrainian official’s October 20 warning that the risk of a Russian offensive from Belarus is “growing.” The deputy chief of the Main Operational Department of the Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov, stated that the risk of a renewed offensive from Russian forces against northern Ukraine is growing.[13] Hromov stated that Russian forces may attack northwest Ukraine to disrupt Ukrainian supply lines from Western partner countries. Such a course of action remains unlikely in the coming months given that Russian forces lack the capability even to interdict Ukrainian supply lines from the west with a ground offensive. The nearest Ukrainian east-west rail line is 30 km from the Belarusian border, and the Pripet Marshes in northern Ukraine and Belarus make maneuver warfare across the international border in Volyn and Rivne oblasts exceptionally difficult. Ukraine’s road and rail network has sufficient nodes with Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary that a Russian incursion from Belarus could not seriously degrade Ukrainian logistical lines without projecting deeper into Ukraine than Russians did during the Battle of Kyiv, when Russian forces were at their strongest. Those forces are now significantly degraded. A Russian milblogger reiterated on October 20 that the Russian force group in Belarus is too small to threaten Kyiv.[14] White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby reiterated on October 20 that Belarus may concentrate manpower on the border to fix Ukrainian forces in northern Ukraine and prevent their deployment to the active area of operation in southern and eastern Ukraine, as ISW has assessed.[15]

Key Takeaways

• Russia is likely continuing to prepare for a false-flag attack on the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP).
• Russian forces are likely setting conditions to remove military and occupation elements from the west bank of the Dnipro River in anticipation of imminent Ukrainian advances.
• The White House confirmed on October 20 that Iranian military personnel are in Russian-occupied Crimea, Ukraine to assist Russian forces in conducting drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure.
• Iran is providing military support to Russian forces in Ukraine despite new international sanctions likely in part because Iranian leaders believe that they need Moscow’s help to upend the US-led global order.
• Iran is providing military support to Russian forces in Ukraine despite new international sanctions likely in part because Iranian leaders believe that they need Moscow’s help to upend the US-led global order.
• Russian sources continued to claim that Russian forces are consolidating limited regained positions in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast on October 20 despite Ukrainian reports that Ukraine has liberated all but 1.8% of Kharkiv Oblast.
• Russian sources indicated that Ukrainian troops have advanced in northern Kherson Oblast as Ukrainian forces continued their interdiction campaign.
• Russian forces continued to conduct ground assaults in Donetsk Oblast but Russian sources contradicted their own claims on control of Bakhmut. Russian forces are likely continuing to falsify claims of advances in the Bakhmut area to portray themselves as making gains in at least one sector amid continuing losses in northeast and southern Ukraine.
• Russian regional governments and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continue to blame each other for military administrative failures.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Oskil River-Kreminna Line)

Russian sources continued to claim that Russian forces are consolidating limited positions in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast on October 20 that Russian forces allegedly regained over the last few days. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian troops took control of a segment of the railway line in Horobivka, 16km northeast of Kupyansk.[16] However, Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov noted that Ukrainian troops have liberated all but 1.8 percent (32 unspecified villages) of an unspecified area of Kharkiv Oblast, which suggests that unsubstantiated Russian claims of regained territory in this area likely reflect extremely limited gains compared to the recent sweeping Ukrainian counteroffensive that retook almost the entire oblast.[17] ISW’s maps currently depict about 3-4 percent of Kharkiv Oblast under Russian control or advances. ISW will update its maps as soon as it has sufficient data to further clarify the control of terrain.

Russian and Ukrainian forces likely continued fighting along the Svatove-Kreminna line on October 20. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai reported heavy fighting along the frontline in the directions of Kreminna and Svatove.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled a Russian attack near Bilohorivka, about 10km south of Kreminna in the vicinity of Lysychansk.[19] Several Russian sources discussed continued Ukrainian attempts to cross the Zherebets River west of Kreminna around Nadiya, Stelmakhivka, Makiivka, and Yampolivka, each about 15km west of Kreminna.[20]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Ukrainian military officials offered limited insight into ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive actions in Kherson Oblast on October 20. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian units are active along the entire frontline and that Russian troops are taking defensive measures, regrouping, engineering fortifications, and mining areas of projected Ukrainian advance.[21] Deputy chief of the Main Operational Department of the Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov, noted that Russia has concentrated up to 45 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the Kherson ”direction” to defend against ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensives.[22] Hromov additionally reported that Ukrainian troops improved their tactical positions around Blahodatne, about 40km north of Kherson City, but did not offer additional details.[23]

Russian sources indicated that Ukrainian troops have advanced in northern Kherson Oblast. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) acknowledged on October 20 that Ukrainian forces penetrated Russian defenses around Sukhanove, about 30km north of Beryslav, and claimed Russian forces repelled the attack.[24] The Russian MoD also stated that Russian troops struck Piatykhatky, which lies 8km northwest of Sukhanove and 40km north of Beryslav, confirming that Ukrainian troops have taken control of the settlement.[25] Other Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops attempted to break through Russian defenses in that area toward Beryslav from the Nova Kamianka area.[26] ISW has not observed independent verification of these Russian claims.

Ukrainian forces additionally continued their ongoing interdiction campaign against Russian military assets and concentration areas in Kherson Oblast on October 20. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that Ukrainian strikes destroyed two Russian ammunition depots around Beryslav on October 19.[27] Social media footage and reports from residents of Nova Kakhovka showed explosions following Ukrainian strikes in the area on October 20.[28]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to conduct ground assaults in Donetsk Oblast on October 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut, northeast of Bakhmut near Bakhmutske (11km northeast of Bakhmut), southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Opytne (4km south of Bakhmut).[29] A Russian miblogger claimed on October 20 that Wagner units advanced near the southern outskirts of Bakhmut.[30] The Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces launched a counterattack near Ivanhrad (4km southeast of Bakhmut) to hold back advancing Wagner forces so that Ukrainian strike groups could reposition in the Bakhmut direction.[31] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have also made minimal gains over the past five days in Soledar (12km northeast of Bakhmut).[32] ISW cannot independently verify these Russian claims. Russian outlet RIA published a map on October 20 showing Ukrainian control over most of Bakhmut despite repeated claims made by numerous Russian sources that Russian forces are operating within Bakhmut itself, supporting ISW‘s assessment that Russian forces are likely falsifying claims of advances in the Bakhmut area to portray themselves as making gains in at least one sector amid continuing losses in northeast and southern Ukraine.[33] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks south of Avdiivka near Krasnohorivka (23km southwest of Avdiivka), Novomykhailivka (37km southwest of Avdiivka), Nevelske (16km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted assaults north of Avdiivka near Keramik (15km north of Avdiivka), Novobakhmutivka (15km northwest of Avdiivka), Niu-York (23km northeast of Avdiivka), and the Mayorsk Railway Station.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk Oblast.[36]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to conduct routine artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole, and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv oblasts on October 20.[37] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Marhanets, Chervonohryhorivka, Mykolaiv City, Ochakiv, and Bereznehuvate.[38] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces struck energy infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih Raion with S-300 missiles.[39] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces conducted drone attacks in Mykolaiv Oblast and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 14 Russian drones and reported Ukrainian forces intercepted most of the drones.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 20 that Ukrainian forces struck and damaged up to 150 Russian personnel and 15 vehicles in Zaporizhia Oblast in the past few days.[41]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian regional governments and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continue to blame each other for military administrative failures. Russian MoD officials mobilized a Russian physical education teacher in Pskov Oblast despite the Pskov Oblast governor’s previous statement that physical education teachers are exempt from mobilization.[42] A local Pskov Russian Telegram channel commented on the conflict between the Pskov Oblast governor and local MoD-run military commissariat, noting that local military registration and enlistment offices pay little attention to what Russian governors want or say.[43] Family members of Russian servicemembers from Kursk Oblast complained to the local government about the lack of information about their family members fighting in Ukraine’s Kharkiv Oblast.[44] Soldiers’ relatives contacted Kursk Oblast government officials and stated neither the governor nor the military commissariat knows where their relatives’ unit is currently deployed. Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit publicly deflected responsibility, stating that “all military commissariat and enlistment offices relate to the [MoD] and are not under the jurisdiction of the Kursk Oblast Administration.”[45]

Russian authorities continue mobilizing Russian men at least into November 2022 despite increasingly framing mobilization as complete. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Russian leadership will continue its “first stage” of mobilization until November 25.[46] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously stated on October 14 that mobilization would be over “within about two weeks” (around October 28).[47] Putin claimed that Russia had already mobilized 220,000 people as of October 14. Magadan Oblast Governor Sergei Nosov announced that Magadan Oblast completed its mobilization on October 20.[48] Malyar stated on October 20 that Russian forces have mobilized approximately 200,000 people, about two-thirds of the target of 300,000 as of October 20.[49]

The Russian military continues to face difficulties in procuring body armor for Russian forces. Russian Federation Council Senator Lyudmila Narusova complained of the almost 2,000-percent increase in Russian body armor prices, up to 135,000 rubles (almost $2,200), since January 2022 and called on Russian antimonopoly authorities to investigate.[50] A Russian milblogger reported that the situation with Russian mobilized men having bad equipment is improving in terms of public attention and prioritization but that Russian troops are still receiving bad equipment. The milblogger argued that Russian forces receiving body armor may not make a difference since Russian body armor issued to mobilized forces demonstrably does not protect against small arms.[51]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[6] https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid02u1kBYJyFw4RKt7nnjJVLG...(dot)radiosvoboda.org/a/skhemy-armiya-rf-khersonshchyna/32092006.html?fbclid=IwAR3mE-BPsb0H4aiZwe3JNqLMqQljb4bz6BPkjvP-sqw2ZOqZjIU1O2Hss20

[7] https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid02u1kBYJyFw4RKt7nnjJVLG...(dot)radiosvoboda.org/a/skhemy-armiya-rf-khersonshchyna/32092006.html?fbclid=IwAR3mE-BPsb0H4aiZwe3JNqLMqQljb4bz6BPkjvP-sqw2ZOqZjIU1O2Hss20

[12] www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/04/31/2746522; www.fourdo dot ir/fa/news/14791; www.irna dot ir/news/84279066

[17] https://t.me/stranaua/70895; https://strana dot news/news/412276-v-kharkovskoj-oblasti-sozdali-tri-linii-oborony-deokkupatsija-prodolzhaetsja.html

[38]

[42] https://gubernia dot media/news/gubernator-pskovskoy-oblasti-poprosil-voenkomaty-ne-vygrebat-vseh-kto-popad/; https://gubernia1.port0 dot org/news/mobilizovannyy-uchitel-fizkultury-iz-pskovskogo-rayona-ne-podlezhal-bronirovan/; https://t.me/guberniaband/4968; https://t.me/guberniaband/4957; https:... org/news/nesmotrya-na-slova-vedernikova-v-pskovskom-rayone-ne-otmenili-mobilizaciyu-edi/

[44] https://t.me/astrapress/14349; https://focus dot ua/voennye-novosti/533559-brosili-v-lesu-kak-sobak-70-mobilizovannyh-rossiyan-poteryalis-v-ukraine-bez-bk-edy-i-vody

[45] https://t.me/astrapress/14349; https://focus dot ua/voennye-novosti/533559-brosili-v-lesu-kak-sobak-70-mobilizovannyh-rossiyan-poteryalis-v-ukraine-bez-bk-edy-i-vody

[48] https://t.me/readovkanews/44857; https://kolymaplus dot ru/news/zadachi-po-chastichnoy-mobilizacii-magadanskaya-oblast-vypolnila-polnostyu/20649

[50] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2022/10/19/946306-sovfede-prizvali-razobratsya-rostom-tsen-na-voennoe-snaryazhenie

understandingwar.org

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (20.10.22) CDS comments on key events

CDS Daily brief (20.10.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

Since October 10, Russia has carried out about 300 strikes on Ukraine's energy system using missiles, artillery, and drones, Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko said.

As of October 20, the police found 1,365 bodies of civilians killed during the occupation.

Staring at 11:24 p.m. on October 19, planned power outages began in Kyiv to avoid accidents. Kyiv residents are urged to consume electricity sparingly - turn on energy-consuming devices one at a time, and reduce electricity consumption as much as possible from 5:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. Businesses are asked to limit the external lighting of offices, restaurants, and shopping centers. On October 20, buses will run on 21 out of 38 city electric bus routes to save electricity in the city. Scheduled blackouts are also introduced in Kharkiv, Poltava and Sumy Oblasts.

On the night of October 20, the Russian military struck an industrial enterprise, and an energy infrastructure facility in the Kryvy Rih district, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, head of the Oblast Military Administration Valentyn Reznichenko said. No one was injured, but there was serious damage. However, the night passed without emergencies in the rest of the Oblast's districts.

Deputy Head of the Office of the President Kyrylo Tymoshenko said that this morning, around 07:20, Russian terrorists launched a rocket attack on the territory of a specialized children's school in the village of Komyshuvakha, Donetsk Oblast. No victims were reported.

Russian troops shelled Mykolaiv from S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems on the morning of October 20, the head of Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration, Vitaly Kim, said. No victims and destruction. "They only spoil our lawns," Kim joked.

To date, 544 towns and villages have been de-occupied in Kharkiv Oblast. Thirty-two remain under temporary occupation, which is a little less than 2%, Oleg Sinegubov, head of the regional military administration, said.

In the de-occupied Lyman of Donetsk Oblast, law enforcement officers completed the exhumation at the site of the largest mass burial: they discovered the bodies of 111 civilians and 35 military personnel, the National Police reported.

22 places of torture have been identified in the liberated parts of Kharkiv Oblast, Volodymyr Tymoshko, head of the Main Directorate of the National Police in the Kharkiv Oblast, told a press briefing. They were identified based on the testimony of witnesses or victims. The torture chambers were found in Vovchansk (2), Kupyansk (4), Shevchenkove (2), Izyum (4), Kozachya Lopan (3), Liptsy, Velykiy Burluk, Pisky-Radkovsky, Borova etc. According to Tymoshko, it is

currently impossible to name the total number of people who went through these torture chambers, since some people are currently in the Russian Federation.

Occupied territories:

The probability that the Russian occupiers will fire on the civilian population of Kherson Oblast is high, Ukrainian General Staff warns. On the morning of October 19, the occupying forces sent messages around the occupied territories calling for the evacuation of the Nova Kakhovka residents, allegedly due to a planned shelling by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. A similar assessment was shared by the Institute for the Study of War. The Russian forces are setting information conditions for a false flag attack on the Kakhovka HPP to justify or cover up their retreat in Kherson Oblast. On the evening of October 20, President Zelenski said that the dam and equipment of Kakhovka HPP were mined and that Russia was preparing for a manmade disaster.

The Russian occupation forces are starting to flee from the city of Enerhodar, where Zaporizhzhya NPP is located, NAEC "Energoatom" said. Yesterday, October 19, and on the night of October 20, they started moving looted property from the places of their compact residences and the occupying "administration" of the city. Local residents recorded a mass robbery of the Skifsky hotel. The Russian invaders "took it out and packed everything they could into buses and trucks: TVs, refrigerators, furniture, kettles and other household items", the message from Energoatom reads.

According to the legally elected Mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov, schools in the city are "guarded" by armed military personnel, mostly Chechens. In the morning, after the classes start, they lock the schools, preventing parents from entering the building. Then, after an additional check, they let the students out at the end of the school day. Fedorov also said that the occupying forces come to people's houses, break down doors, and take people captive. Over the past two weeks, they have taken hundreds of people and released only a few. Fedorov believes that with martial law's introduction, terror will only increase.

Operational situation

(please note that this part of the report is mainly on the previous day's (October 20) developments)

It is the 240th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). The enemy tries to maintain control over the temporarily captured territories. It concentrates its efforts on disrupting the counteroffensive actions of the Ukrainian troops and at the same time, does not give up attempts to conduct the offensive in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions.

The Russian military shells the positions of the Ukrainian troops along the entire contact line, fortifies defensive positions and frontiers in certain directions, and conducts aerial

reconnaissance. In violation of the norms of international humanitarian law, the laws and customs of war, it strikes critical infrastructure and residential quarters.

Over the past day, the Russian forces have launched 3 missile and 20 air strikes and fired up to 10 MLRS rounds. Up to 20 towns and villages were hit by the Russian fire, particularly Terny, Bakhmut, Vuhledar and Komyshuvakha of Donetsk Oblast. Near the state border, the villages of Mykolaivka and Kostobrody of Chernihiv Oblast, Dvorichne, Krasne and Strilecha of Kharkiv Oblast were shelled with mortars and barrel artillery. Attack UAVs were used.

The Russian military has once again launched a massive attack on the civilian infrastructure of Ukraine using attack UAVs. The Ukrainian Defense Forces shot down 15 out of 20 UAVs.

The military and political leadership of the Russian Federation are officially ending the partial mobilization. At the same time, the forced delivery of subpoenas to certain categories of Russian citizens continues. In the Mosrentgen settlement of Moscow Oblast, the mobilized were placed in the deployment point of the 27th separate motorized rifle brigade for medical examination and subsequent transportation to the combat zone. Significant problems arise in the course of implemented mobilization measures.

The occupation authorities continued the forced mobilization of the male population in the temporarily occupied territories. At the same time, the evacuation of the civilian population began in separate directions.

The aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces made 6 strikes over the past day. Hits on 2 areas of enemy weapons and military equipment concentration, 2 strongholds, and 2 Russian anti-aircraft missile systems are confirmed. Ukrainian air defense units shot down 15 "Shahed-136" unmanned aerial vehicles.

Over the past day, Ukraine's missile forces and artillery hit 1 command post, 2 areas of manpower, weapons and equipment concentration, and 2 Russian ammunition depots.

The Republic of Belarus continues to support the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The threat of the Russian Armed Forces resuming the offensive on the northern front is growing. The western part of Ukraine may be chosen as the direction of attack to cut the main logistical arteries of the weapons and military equipment supply to Ukraine from partner countries. On the Republic of Belarus territory, aviation and other units of the Russian Armed Forces are being deployed at the relevant airfields and other military infrastructure facilities, particularly those transferred under the full control of the Russian army. As a part of the same effort, preparations for covert mobilization are being carried out on the territory of the Republic of Belarus. At the same time, this country continues to provide its territory for ballistic missile and UAV launches.

The Republic of Belarus has deployed Russian MiG-31 aircraft at its airfields, which can be armed with Kinzhal-type cruise missiles.

The defense forces are taking measures to ensure reliable protection of the Ukrainian state border and the city of Kyiv from the north.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low.

Kharkiv direction

• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.

The Russian forces fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces with mortars, barrel and rocket artillery in the areas of Zarichne, Bilohorivka, Torske, Terny and Yampolivka.

Kramatorsk direction

● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

●  252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.

There is no change in the operational situation.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;

●  Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military fired from tanks and rocket artillery in the areas of Bakhmut, Soledar, Zelenopillya and Yakovlivka.

Zaporizhzhia direction

●  Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

●  Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian forces did not conduct active offensive actions. They inflicted fire damage on the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces and civilian infrastructure in the areas of more than 35 towns and villages along the entire line of contact.

Tavriysk direction

-    Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 42, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7 km;

-   Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 37th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 10th, 16th, 346th separate SOF brigades, 239th air assault regiment of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331st parachute airborne regiments of the 98th airborne division, 108 air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault battalion of the 7th Air assault division, 11th and 83rd separate airborne assault brigade, 4th military base of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 7 military base 49 Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 126th separate coastal defence brigades, 127th separate ranger brigade, 1st and 3rd Army Corps, PMCs.

Areas of more than thirty towns and cities along the contact line suffered fire damage. To conduct aerial reconnaissance, the Russian military made up to 40 UAV sorties of various types.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.

In the open sea, the Russian naval group is comprised of 9 ships and boats located along the southwestern coast of Crimea. Among them are 2 cruise missile carriers (a corvette of project 21631 and a 636.3 submarine) carrying a total of 12 "Kalibr" missiles.

Russian aviation continues to fly from the Crimean airfields of Belbek and Hvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 14 Su-27, Su-30, and Su-24 aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved.

The Russian military continues targeting Ukrainian ports and coastal areas with missiles and drones. Ukrainian defenders shot down 14 Iranian Shahed-136 kamikaze drones within two hours on the night of October 20 over Mykolaiv Oblast. As the Air Force Command reported, nine drones were shot down by the forces and means of the "South" Air Command air defense. The soldiers of the Navy and the National Guard destroyed two drones each, and one more was destroyed by law enforcement officers of the National Police.

According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 63% of cruise missiles are shot down by Ukrainian air defense. Since October 10, the Russian military has launched 154 missiles over Ukraine, which is an increase of almost 7 times compared to the first ten days of the month (there were 21 missiles).

Oleksandr Sukhanov, the deputy head of the Transportation Ministry of the Russian Federation, will resign due to the explosion on the Kerch Strait Bridge. Oleksandr Sukhanov primarily took care of the transport industry security issues and oversaw operations of the Government Security Department (UVO) of the Transportation Ministry, including the Kerch Strait Bridge security.

"Grain initiative": 8 million tons of Ukrainian agricultural products have already been shipped. Today, October 20, within the "Grain Initiative" framework, 2 ships with 82 thousand tons of agricultural products left the port of Pivdenyi. In particular, the ATLANTIS ALMERIA tanker and the ARIS T bulker left the port. The food is headed for countries in Asia and Europe.

8 million tons of agricultural products have already been exported since the departure of the first vessel with Ukrainian grain. A total of 362 ships with food left Ukrainian ports for the countries of Asia, Europe and Africa.

Russia is threatening to "reconsider cooperation" with the UN Secretary-General if the UN sends experts to verify the origin of the drones used by the Russian military to damage Ukraine's civilian infrastructure and strike cities. Such statements were made after a closed session of the UN Security Council, convened at the initiative of the USA, France and Great Britain. Experts assume that the statement referred to the so-called "grain initiative", launched after personal efforts and agreements with the Kremlin reached by the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 20.10

Personnel - almost 66,650 people (+370);

Tanks 2,567 (+13);

Armored combat vehicles – 5,255 (+20);

Artillery systems – 1,646 (+9);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 372 (0); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 189 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 4,005 (+6); Aircraft - 269 (0);

Helicopters – 243 (+1);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,311 (+25); Intercepted cruise missiles - 329 (+6);

Boats / ships - 16 (0).

Ukraine, general news

In an interview with the Canadian TV channel CTV News, President Volodymyr Zelenskyi rejected Russia's accusation that Ukrainian special services organized the explosion on the Kerch Bridge on October 8. Instead, the president suggested that the explosion on the bridge could have been the result of infighting between the Russian special services and the military.

Head of the President's Office, Andriy Yermak, said that Ukraine has already destroyed almost 50% of the military potential of the Russian Federation which is NATO's main threat. "Ukraine's membership in NATO will definitely strengthen the Alliance," Yermak stressed.

According to the National Bank's forecast, inflation will accelerate to about 30% at the end of this year, but will decrease in the following years, subject to the expected decrease in security risks and a coordinated monetary and fiscal policy, the NBU Chairman Andrii Pyshnyi said at a briefing.

The President of Ukraine signed two decrees imposing sanctions against the Russian Federation, designating almost 4,000 individuals and companies. In particular, sanctions are imposed on the occupation administrations' representatives (Kyrylo Stremousov, Volodymyr Saldo, Volodymyr Rogov, Kostyantyn Ivashchenko, etc.). There are also military personnel and mercenaries (in particular, the financier of the "Wagner" group Yevhen Prigozhin), as well as mercenary recruiters (in particular, the commander of the "Palestine Liberation Army" Muhammad Al-Salti, the leader of the Syrian group Al-Ahdat al-Omaria Abu Ghani Shammut). Sanctions were also imposed against Russian propagandists Olga Skabeeva, Volodymyr Solovyov and members of his family, Tigran Keosayan. The restrictions are applied for 10 years.

42% of Ukrainians began to communicate in Ukrainian more, and 14% completely switched from Russian to the Ukrainian language, according to a survey conducted by Gradus Research ordered by "Suspilne" public TV. 54% of residents of small cities (with a population of 50 thousand and less) and 60% of residents of large cities began to communicate in Ukrainian more. Sociologists

explain this by the fact that residents of small towns often communicated in Ukrainian even before the war.

International diplomatic aspect

On the background of the increasing Russian missile and (Iranian-made) drone attacks on Ukraine's critical infrastructure, the Israeli government reiterated its policy of not supplying any weapons to Kyiv. A diplomatic note from the Ukrainian embassy in Israel was leaked, indicating the interest in obtaining air defense and anti-drone systems.

Though some experts interpreted the words of the Israeli Defence Minister that the Russian use of Iranian drones against Ukraine is a "change of paradigm" as a sign of readiness to provide anti- drone systems, it doesn't seem to be the case. And the rumors that the Minister postponed his telephone conversation with his Ukrainian counterpart five times in a row support that hypothesis.

Benjamin Netanyahu, a former Israeli Prime Minister that might return to the office again in the coming weeks, justified the refusal to send any weapons to Ukraine by the possibility of those arms falling into the wrong hands and firing back at Israel. He knows what he is talking about. After the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russians acknowledged their backwardness facing Israeli-made UAVs operated by the Georgian Armed Forces. So, they approached Israelis, asking to sell them various drones and set up their production. The Israeli government has been mulling over the proposal for quite some time, fearing letting out their technology and the possibility of weapons finding their way to their enemies. It was on Netanyahu's watch that the deal was cleared with the promise from Moscow not to send S-300 air defense systems instead, as well as clear skies over Syria. The bilateral production project was established. In 2016 the Israeli government halted the deal under US pressure; Russia supplied four S-300PMU2 batteries to Iran, and, perhaps, as gratitude, Israeli drone technology was used during an attack against Israel that same year. It was reported that in April 2022, Iran returned some S-300 systems back to Russia to be used against Ukraine, replacing them with the Iranian-made Bavar-373 system.

In a closed-door UN Security Council meeting, the US, UK, and France accused Iran of providing drones to Russia in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 of 2015, which banned the transfer of drones with a range beyond 300 km. Though the "expert briefing" laid out proof of Iranian drone supply to Russia, representatives of both countries denied their involvement. Moreover, the Russian diplomat threatened to revise Moscow's relations with the UN and not prolong the "grain agreement" if the UN sent an expert team to investigate the drone issue on the ground. There might be 450 drones that attacked Ukraine, given that the Ukrainian military claimed to shoot down 223 of them, while US officials estimate Ukraine's success rate at about 50%.

The UK introduced sanctions targeting "the individuals and businesses personally responsible for providing the drones used in these barbaric strikes." The violation of the UN Security Council Resolution might be a fatal blow to a new version of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (so- called Iran nuclear deal). The Biden Administration has been pushing for an agreement but found

resistance from the Iranian side and criticism from the Hill and the Israeli ally. If the GOP retakes the Senate in November, the draft of the JCPOA might be shelved for good. Meanwhile, the Biden administration announced several criminal charges and sanctions related to physical persons and entities engaged in a scheme of US military technologies procurement by Russia aimed at use in its war effort in Ukraine.

The UK Prime Minister Liz Truss steps down. Whoever of the Tories is at Dawning 10 after her, support for Ukraine won't be diminished. It's been speculated that Boris Johnson may try his fortune. Rishi Sunak, who lost the leadership race to Liz Truss six weeks ago, Penny Mordaunt, who came third in the summer leadership contest, and once again Ben Wallace, though he didn't make a bid last time, might be in the race. However, suppose there're general elections, just a bit less enthusiastic about supporting Ukraine. In that case, Labour might come to power (some 52% support Labour, while the popularity of the Conservative party is at 23%).

The UK Defence Minister informed the Commons about an incident with a Russian SU-27 fighter releasing a missile in the vicinity of the UK RAF RC-135 Rivet Joint, a spy plane, in the international airspace over the Black Sea. The Russians explained it was "a technical malfunction of the SU-27 fighter." It's unlikely so, given the track record of Russian jets and warships increasingly behaving recklessly and dangerously since the illegal annexation of Crimea. In June last year, the HMS Defender was reportedly shut at by the Russians while the UK warship was passing by in the vicinity of the Crimean Peninsula.

Russia, relevant news

Mobilization in Russia will exacerbate labor shortages and undermine consumer confidence, so the economy has resumed its decline, says the report compiled by the analytical department of the Central Bank of Russia. The mobilization in Russia has already hit consumer confidence and business activity and is likely to weigh on the economy in the coming months.

One trillion rubles will be allocated from the National Welfare Fund, created under the leadership of President Putin, to cover the deficit of the federal budget in 2022, according to the resolution signed by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. The amount of money in the National Welfare Fund of the Russian Federation as of October 1 was to 10.79 trillion rubles. It decreased by 1.08 trillion rubles in September.

Finnish company Orion Pharma has started the liquidation of its Russian office. It is planned to be closed by the end of 2022, the Russian newspaper Vedomosti reported citing its sources in the company.

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3. Russian threats revive old nuclear fears in central Europe

Excerpts:

The war has triggered fears across Europe, and these are especially felt in countries like Poland and Romania that border Ukraine and would be highly vulnerable in case of a radiological disaster.

After the Polish government order, firefighters visited the steel plant’s shelter last week and listed it in their registry. Warsaw’s leaders said the city’s subway and other underground shelters could hold all its 1.8 million residents and more in the case of an attack with conventional weapons.

Russian threats revive old nuclear fears in central Europe

AP · by VANESSA GERA · October 21, 2022

WARSAW, Poland (AP) — Two stories beneath a modern steel production plant on Warsaw’s northern edge lies an untouched Cold War relic: a shelter containing gas masks, stretchers, first aid kits and other items meant to help civil defense leaders survive and guide rescue operations in case of nuclear attack or other disasters.

A map of Europe on a wall still shows the Soviet Union — and no independent Ukraine. Old boots and jackets give off a musty odor. A military field switchboard warns: “Attention, your enemy is listening.”

Until now, nobody had seriously considered that the rooms built in the 1950s — and now maintained as a “historical curiosity” by the ArcelorMittal Warszawa plant, according to spokeswoman Ewa Karpinska — might one day be used as a shelter again. But as Russia pounds Ukraine, with shelling around a nuclear power plant and repeated Russian threats to use a nuclear weapon, the Polish government ordered an inventory this month of the 62,000 air raid shelters in the country.

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The war has triggered fears across Europe, and these are especially felt in countries like Poland and Romania that border Ukraine and would be highly vulnerable in case of a radiological disaster.

After the Polish government order, firefighters visited the steel plant’s shelter last week and listed it in their registry. Warsaw’s leaders said the city’s subway and other underground shelters could hold all its 1.8 million residents and more in the case of an attack with conventional weapons.

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The ArcelorMittal Warszawa plant’s Karpinska is suddenly receiving inquiries about the shelter. Following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s threats to carry out a tactical nuclear attack, “everyone is worried,” she said. “I believe that he will not (stage a nuclear attack), that it would be completely crazy, but nobody really believed he would start this war.”

Amid fighting around Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, Poland also drew up a plan to give potassium iodide tablets to local fire stations, which would distribute them to the population if needed. There has been a rush elsewhere in Europe on potassium iodide — which protects the thyroid gland in the neck in case of radiation exposure — including in Finland where the government urged the population to buy them.

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During the Cold War there were hundreds of thousands of shelters in Europe. Some dated from the buildup to World War II, while communist-era authorities also ordered that new residential and production facilities include underground shelters.

Finland, which borders Russia, along with Sweden and Denmark, have maintained their shelters in order. Finland, for instance, maintains shelters in cities and other densely populated areas capable of accommodating around two-thirds of the population. A few of them are designed to withstand detonation of a 100-kiloton nuclear bomb.

While some countries still maintain their Cold War underground shelters, after the collapse of the Soviet Union some were transformed into museums — relics of an earlier age of nuclear fears that would offer no real protection today.

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Bomb shelters were a key element in the former Yugoslavia’s preparedness doctrine against a nuclear attack.

The most famous of all, in a mountainous area 60 kilometers (35 miles) from Sarajevo in Bosnia, is a vast underground fortress built to protect military and political leaders. Known then only to the Yugoslav president, four generals and a handful of soldiers who guarded it, the Konjic site was turned in 2010 into a modern art gallery.

“From the military-political and geopolitical standpoint, the global environment right now is unfortunately very similar to what it was like (during the Cold War), burdened by a very heavy sense of a looming war,” said Selma Hadzihuseinovic, the representative of a government agency that manages the site.

She said the bunker could be returned to service in a new war, but with nuclear weapons having become far more powerful it would not be “as useful as it was meant to be when it was built.”

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In Romania, an enormous former salt mine, Salina Turda, now a tourist attraction, is on a government list of potential shelters.

Many urban dwellers also go past shelters every day without realizing it while riding subways in cities like Warsaw, Prague and Budapest.

“We measured how many people could fit in trains along the entire length of the metro, in metro stations and other underground spaces,” said Michal Domaradzki, director of the security and crisis management for the city of Warsaw. “There is enough space for the entire population.”

Attila Gulyas, president of the Hungarian capital’s Urban Transport Workers’ Union, has been involved in regular drills of the city’s metro lines. He was trained to shelter thousands of people as chief of the Astoria station at Budapest’s metro line 2.

“The system is still in place today, it works perfectly, it can be deployed in any emergency” Gulyas said. “Up to 220,000 people can be protected by the shelter system in the tunnels of metro lines 2 and 3.”

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But with Russia waging an energy war against Europe and power costs soaring, for many the chief worry is how to get through the winter.

Sorin Ionita, a commentator with the Expert Forum in Bucharest, Romania, said many consider a Russian nuclear strike improbable as it would not “bring a big military advantage to the Russians.”

Still, Putin’s threats add to a general sense of anxiety in a world in tumult.

Just days after the Russian invasion began, Czechs bought potassium iodide pills as a precaution of sorts against a nuclear attack. Experts say these might help in a nuclear plant disaster but not against a nuclear weapon.

Dana Drabova, the head of the State Office for Nuclear Safety said that in such a case, the anti-radiation pills would be “useless.”

___

Eldar Emric in Konjic, Bosnia; Karel Janicek in Prague; Bela Szandelszky in Budapest, Hungary; Jan M. Olsen in Copenhagen, Denmark; Jari Tanner in Helsinki, Finland; and Nicolae Dumitrache in Bucharest, Romania, contributed.

AP · by VANESSA GERA · October 21, 2022

4. Putin’s War in Ukraine May Destroy Russia

A friend who flagged this article for me noted this:" It’s a very good (to a layman) run-down of the ethnic perils Putin has created with the war in Ukraine. In short, the author posits Putin has sown the seeds of the Russian Federation’s demise by recruiting from the non White Russian states."

Excerpts:

Yet non-Russian regions are beginning to wake up to Moscow’s nefarious designs. In recent weeks protests have broken out in several Muslim regions of Dagestan and Bashkortostan, and in Siberia. After Chechnya recently claimed to have fulfilled its quota and refused to send more men, Yakutia, a large region of Siberia, did the same.

The significance of those protests hasn’t been lost on Ukrainian authorities. On Sept. 29, President Volodymyr Zelensky gave a speech in front of the memorial to Imam Shamil, the 19th-century North Caucasus leader, who commanded the Muslims’ war against Russia for nearly 30 years. Mr. Zelensky appealed to the peoples of the Caucasus and other non-Russians to prevent their sons from dying in the fields of Ukraine. Their cause, he added, was the same: to be free from Russian domination.

Mr. Putin should look to history. During World War I, Russian authorities tried to conscript Muslims from Central Asia. The result was a major uprising in summer 1916, which took months and tens of thousands of Russian troops to suppress. In the end, none of the Muslims were sent to battle—and, by withdrawing army units from the front to confront the internal uprising, Russia expedited its eventual defeat. Less than six months later, the czar and his government were forced to resign.

By sending poorly trained non-Russian men to Ukraine, Moscow may soon meet a similar fate. Centuries of pent-up bitterness and frustration over rule by Moscow may spill into a military confrontation and civil war. Given Russia’s current military defeats, this isn’t a distant prospect. If and when that happens, Russia will fall apart as the empire of the czars and Soviet Union did. It would be ironic if the man who wanted to revive the U.S.S.R. instead ushers in the twilight of Russia’s last empire.

Putin’s War in Ukraine May Destroy Russia

In his attempt to resurrect the Soviet Union, Mr. Putin may be presiding over his country’s final collapse.

By Michael Khodarkovsky

Oct. 20, 2022 1:09 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-twilight-of-the-last-russian-empire-putin-kremlin-russian-federation-republics-war-ukraine-russification-mobilization-collapse-11666270992

The Western media for decades has hailed Vladimir Putin as a great strategist. But if the past eight months have proved one thing, it’s that this strategic wizard often achieves the opposite of his intentions.

Mr. Putin has promised many things, including to make Russia an attractive place to live by 2020. Instead, millions of Russians have left and settled in the West. Russia’s economy remains largely dependent on oil and gas—and gross domestic product per capita income has fallen nearly 60% since 2013. Government efforts to slow demographic decline have failed, and the Kremlin’s military mobilization for its war in Ukraine has pushed more than 300,000 Russians to flee the country. Many of those unable to escape or bribe their way out of the draft are non-Russians from remote and impoverished regions in the east and south.

These factors paint a grim picture with clear implications: Rather than resurrecting his country’s greatness, Mr. Putin might be presiding over the collapse of the last Russian empire. Russia has always been a colonial power in denial. While conquering and ruling multitudes, it insisted that—in contrast with violent Western conquests—the indigenous peoples themselves sought Russian protection and that Russian rule was benign. This gap between rhetoric and reality is evident in the country’s current designation as a “Russian Federation.”

There are 21 republics within Russia, each with a titular non-Russian ethnic group. In Soviet times, Moscow drew the territorial boundaries and allowed each its own cultural autonomy. After the U.S.S.R. collapsed in 1991, these small republics demanded genuine administrative and political autonomy. A new democratic Russian government under Boris Yeltsin was prepared to concede as much and signed bilateral treaties with all but one: Chechnya. When the Chechen Republic refused to comply, demanding instead full autonomy, the Yeltsin government sent in troops in what became the First Chechen War (1994-96).

During those few years of democracy, once-forbidden topics came to light. New research revealed that Russia was an expansionist empire bent on subjugating indigenous peoples. Mr. Putin curbed freedom and open discussion after becoming president in 2000. He brutally suppressed Chechen independence aspirations and ordered the celebration of anniversaries that marked indigenous people’s choice to “voluntarily join Russia.” He resolved to undermine the autonomy of indigenous republics, to erase their ethno-territorial borders and to turn them into regular Russian administrative entities. To this end, the Kremlin ordered that instruction in indigenous languages be cut back, and it appointed Russian loyalists to local posts. In July 2017, the Kremlin terminated the last and longest surviving power-sharing treaty, with Tatarstan.

The pace of this so-called Russification wasn’t swift enough for Mr. Putin and his allies. The Kremlin understands that Russia’s demographic trends are disastrous. The ethnic Russian population has declined precipitously over three decades, while the non-Russian population grew rapidly. According to some estimates, Russia could become a majority-Muslim country by the 2050s.

Mr. Putin is obsessed by the Russian gene, which he labels “special” and “endangered.” He invaded Ukraine in part to increase the Slavic population of Russia by incorporating the Ukrainians, whom he considers “Little Russians.” This attitude, together with Mr. Putin’s aspirations for “Russian world” in which all Russian speakers are united under Moscow’s rule, bears strong resemblance to 1930s Germany. It’s why Moscow has been kidnapping and transferring people—particularly children—from occupied Ukrainian territories to Russia.

Moscow has long considered Russia’s multiethnic character a potential threat to its ideal of a unitary state. With his war in Ukraine, Mr. Putin seems to have found an answer to his Russification efforts: genocide of various non-Russian peoples. Since the early days of its February invasion, Moscow has been disproportionately recruiting and drafting non-Russians, including Tatars from the illegally annexed Crimea region of Ukraine.

Yet non-Russian regions are beginning to wake up to Moscow’s nefarious designs. In recent weeks protests have broken out in several Muslim regions of Dagestan and Bashkortostan, and in Siberia. After Chechnya recently claimed to have fulfilled its quota and refused to send more men, Yakutia, a large region of Siberia, did the same.

The significance of those protests hasn’t been lost on Ukrainian authorities. On Sept. 29, President Volodymyr Zelensky gave a speech in front of the memorial to Imam Shamil, the 19th-century North Caucasus leader, who commanded the Muslims’ war against Russia for nearly 30 years. Mr. Zelensky appealed to the peoples of the Caucasus and other non-Russians to prevent their sons from dying in the fields of Ukraine. Their cause, he added, was the same: to be free from Russian domination.

Mr. Putin should look to history. During World War I, Russian authorities tried to conscript Muslims from Central Asia. The result was a major uprising in summer 1916, which took months and tens of thousands of Russian troops to suppress. In the end, none of the Muslims were sent to battle—and, by withdrawing army units from the front to confront the internal uprising, Russia expedited its eventual defeat. Less than six months later, the czar and his government were forced to resign.

By sending poorly trained non-Russian men to Ukraine, Moscow may soon meet a similar fate. Centuries of pent-up bitterness and frustration over rule by Moscow may spill into a military confrontation and civil war. Given Russia’s current military defeats, this isn’t a distant prospect. If and when that happens, Russia will fall apart as the empire of the czars and Soviet Union did. It would be ironic if the man who wanted to revive the U.S.S.R. instead ushers in the twilight of Russia’s last empire.

Mr. Khodarkovsky is a history professor at Loyola University Chicago.

5. The greatest risk to China's Xi Jinping? Himself

Excerpts:

When Xi assumed power in 2012, China’s economy was booming as it integrated more closely with the rest of the world. Just four years before, China had stunned the world with the extravagant Beijing Summer Olympics. But to Xi, the party was in a state of crisis: overrun by corruption, infighting, and inefficiencies.

Xi’s solution was to return to dictatorial and personalistic rule. He purged political enemies in a sweeping anti-corruption campaign, silenced internal dissent, abolished presidential term limits and enshrined “Xi Jinping Thought” into the party’s constitution.

According to analysts, many dictatorships fall into a pattern of abuse of power and poor decision-making when a lack of critical advice reaches the leader. They point to Vladimir Putin’s increasingly costly war against Ukraine as a concern that Xi’s similarly unquestionable power to the Russian President could one day lead to equally disastrous consequences.

Putin and Xi “suffer from the same strongman-syndrome problem, which is that they turned their policy advice circles into echo chambers, so people are no longer able to speak their mind freely,” Tsang said. “We are seeing big mistakes being made because that internal policy debate has been reduced or indeed eliminated in terms of its scope.”

...

“So what this suggests, and this is a pretty disturbing idea, is that the Chinese Communist Party no longer brands itself as a developmental party, putting economic development as its primary objective. But instead, it’s Xi Jinping’s hold on power.”

The greatest risk to China's Xi Jinping? Himself | CNN

CNN · by Selina Wang · October 21, 2022

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Here's Xi Jinping's vision to make China great again

Hong Kong CNN —

China’s economy is faltering. Unemployment is skyrocketing. Endless Covid lockdowns are wreaking havoc on businesses and people’s lives. The property sector is in crisis. Ties between Beijing and major global powers are under strain.

The list of problems faced by the world’s second-largest economy goes on – and many of those long-term challenges have only worsened under a decade of Xi Jinping’s rule. Yet the Chinese leader’s grip on power is unwavering.

In the past decade, Xi has consolidated control to an extent unseen since the era of Communist China’s strongman founder, Mao Zedong. He’s the head of the Chinese Communist Party, the state, the armed forces, and so many committees that he’s been dubbed “chairman of everything.” And now, he is poised to step into a norm-breaking third term in power, with the potential to rule for life.

But absolute power can often mean absolute responsibility, and as problems mount, analysts warn Xi will have less room to avoid blame.

“I think the worst enemy of Xi Jinping’s longevity in ruling China is Xi Jinping himself,” said Steve Tsang, director of the SOAS China Institute in London. “It is when he makes a huge policy mistake that causes havoc in China that could potentially start the process of unraveling Xi Jinping’s hold to power.”

Inside an echo chamber?

Mao’s rule from 1949 until 1976 was marked by rash policy decisions that led to tens of millions of deaths and destroyed the economy. After those decades of turmoil, the Communist Party developed a system of collective leadership designed to prevent the rise of another dictator who could make arbitrary and dangerous decisions.

China’s next leader, Deng Xiaoping, set an unwritten rule and precedent that the Communist Party’s General Secretary – the role from which China’s leader derives true power – would step down after two terms.

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From Mao to Xi: A history of China's leadership

04:01 - Source: CNN

When Xi assumed power in 2012, China’s economy was booming as it integrated more closely with the rest of the world. Just four years before, China had stunned the world with the extravagant Beijing Summer Olympics. But to Xi, the party was in a state of crisis: overrun by corruption, infighting, and inefficiencies.

Xi’s solution was to return to dictatorial and personalistic rule. He purged political enemies in a sweeping anti-corruption campaign, silenced internal dissent, abolished presidential term limits and enshrined “Xi Jinping Thought” into the party’s constitution.

According to analysts, many dictatorships fall into a pattern of abuse of power and poor decision-making when a lack of critical advice reaches the leader. They point to Vladimir Putin’s increasingly costly war against Ukraine as a concern that Xi’s similarly unquestionable power to the Russian President could one day lead to equally disastrous consequences.

Putin and Xi “suffer from the same strongman-syndrome problem, which is that they turned their policy advice circles into echo chambers, so people are no longer able to speak their mind freely,” Tsang said. “We are seeing big mistakes being made because that internal policy debate has been reduced or indeed eliminated in terms of its scope.”

The zero-Covid trap

In recent history, no country has modernized as rapidly as China. The Communist Party claims its leadership helped lift hundreds of millions out of poverty, turning backwater villages into stunning megacities. But that growth miracle has slowed. And many longstanding challenges in China’s economy have only been exacerbated by Xi’s policies.

Xi has made it his mission to strengthen the party and its control over business and society. He unleashed a crackdown on the once-vibrant private sector that’s led to mass layoffs. Beijing claims the tougher regulations restrict overly powerful corporations and protect consumers, but the measures have suffocated private businesses, sending chills through the economy and sparking fears about future innovation.

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China's once vibrant private sector suffocating under Xi's crackdown

03:20 - Source: CNN

Beijing started clamping down on easy credit for property firms in 2020, which led to cash crunches and defaults for many developers, including giant conglomerate Evergrande. Housing projects have stalled and desperate homebuyers across the country are refusing to pay mortgages on unfinished homes. Disruptions in the property sector have an outsized impact on China’s broader economy, as it accounts for as much as 30% of the country’s GDP.

But during Xi’s leadership, nothing has rocked China’s economy and society as much as zero-Covid. In year three of the pandemic, China has clung to the harsh policy, which relies on mass testing, extensive quarantines and snap lockdowns to stamp out infections at all costs, even as the rest of the world has learned to live with the virus.

The country continues to lock down entire cities over a handful of infections, while sending all positive cases and close contacts to government quarantine facilities. Lining up for Covid tests and scanning a tracking health code to enter any public space have become normalized. Beijing argues the policy has prevented China from spiraling into a health care disaster like the rest of the world, but zero-Covid is wielded at enormous and growing costs.

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Artist wears 27 hazmat suits to protest China's policies

03:08 - Source: CNN

‘Self-inflicted’ pain

Constant lockdowns have dramatically shrunk the pace of growth in China’s economy. Record youth unemployment has reached nearly 20%. Pocketbooks are shrinking. Heavily indebted local governments are forced to spend on mass Covid testing. Experts say resources would be better spent on increasing vaccination rates rather than building costly testing sites and quarantine facilities. China has still not approved any foreign mRNA vaccines proven to be more effective against the highly contagious Omicron variant than the inactivated vaccines used in China.

At the start of the pandemic, Beijing censored – and in some cases punished – doctors, experts, and citizen journalists who tried to warn of a deadly in virus in Wuhan.

Nearly three years on, as most international experts advise China to find a way to live with the virus, Beijing has doubled down. Earlier this year, Shanghai – a metropolis with a population more than three times that of New York City – was locked down for two months. People struggled to get enough food and basic necessities. Desperate residents broke out of home confinement and clashed with enforcement workers in rare street protests. Many patients were denied life-saving health care.

When the World Health Organization criticized the zero-Covid policy as “not sustainable,” China censored the statement on social media.

Susan Shirk, director of the 21st Century China Center and author of “Overreach,” a book on Xi’s leadership, says China’s leaders “compete with one another to prove how loyal they are to him because Xi promotes loyalists, not the most competent people.” That leads to subordinates going over the top in executing policies to try to please Xi, she said.

Shirk said this has played out with zero-Covid, as Xi has directly tied his leadership to the strategy, so local officials have zealously followed it to show loyalty to the leader and protect their careers.

“A lot of the pain in China’s economy has been self-inflicted by China’s leader,” Shirk said.

“So what this suggests, and this is a pretty disturbing idea, is that the Chinese Communist Party no longer brands itself as a developmental party, putting economic development as its primary objective. But instead, it’s Xi Jinping’s hold on power.”

CNN · by Selina Wang · October 21, 2022

6. Iranian drone trainers in Crimea to help Russians, White House says

"Proxy wars" take many forms (with many definitions). Who would think the Russians could be a kind of proxy for Iran?(only with half tongue in cheek)

Iranian drone trainers in Crimea to help Russians, White House says

Defense News · by Joe Gould · October 20, 2022

WASHINGTON ― The White House on Thursday accused Iran of sending military personnel to Crimea to assist Russian pilots who bombarded Kyiv with Iranian kamikaze drones earlier this week.

In a call with reporters, U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby also warned that Russia, as it grapples with supply shortages, may seek advanced conventional weapons, including surface-to-surface missiles, after obtaining the Iranian-made Shahed drones.

Videos of delta-shaped Shahed drones conducting deadly strikes across Ukraine, including in Kyiv, have surfaced on social media in recent days. Refuting Russia and Iran’s denials, the White House said Iran has sent Russia dozens of such drones, as well as a small number of trainers and tech support personnel to assist Russian pilots in Crimea conducting the strikes.

“Iran and Russia can lie to the world, but they certainly can’t hide the facts, and the fact is that Tehran is now directly engaged on the ground,” Kirby said, adding that the U.S. would “pursue all means to expose, deter and confront Iran’s provision of these munitions against the Ukrainian people.”

Kirby said Iran brought in trainers after operator and system failures prevented the drones from striking their intended targets, adding that Russian operators are flying the drones.

Russia is believed to have sent waves of Shahed drones into Ukraine to strike power plants, residential buildings and other key infrastructure in Kyiv, the capital, as well as other cities. Ukraine’s Western-reinforced air defenses have made it difficult for Russian warplanes to operate, and killer drones are a cheap weapon to seek out and destroy targets while spreading fear among troops and civilians.

Pentagon Press Secretary Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder echoed the White House assessment and told reporters Iranian officials are “lying” when they deny they provided Russia with the drones.

“We do assess that Iranians have been on the ground in Ukraine to assist Russia with the drone operations there,” Ryder said.

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Ukraine to target Russia’s bases of Iran-supplied explosive drones

Ukrainian forces have used Soviet anti-aircraft weapons as well as German-supplied Gepards to counter so-called suicide drones, a Ukrainian official says.

Asked whether Ukraine can strike the location where the drones are originating, Ryder said, “the Ukrainians have been pretty effective in terms of shooting a lot of those drones down.” He added that the Pentagon’s focus continues to be providing Ukraine with military aid while the administration responds on economic and diplomatic tracks.

Ukraine on Tuesday accused Iran of violating a U.N. Security Council ban on the transfer of drones capable of flying 300 kilometers and invited U.N. experts to inspect what it said were Iranian-made drones being used by Russia against civilian targets.

The U.N.’s most powerful body in 2015 adopted Resolution 2231 to endorse the nuclear deal between Iran and six key nations — the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany, aimed at curbing Tehran’s nuclear activities and preventing the country from developing a nuclear weapon.

Kirby said the resolution would allow the U.S. to continue to sanction Iranian entities involved in developing and manufacturing drones. He also said the U.S. would “vigorously enforce U.S. sanctions on both the Russian and Iranian arms trade.”

“We’re going to make it harder for Iran to sell these weapons to Russia,” he said.

The comments come as the U.S. is working with allies to fulfill Ukraine’s requests for air defenses. When Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley were in Brussels earlier this month to coordinate military aid to Ukraine, they said they were organizing a patchwork of systems to provide Ukraine with layered defenses.

“I can’t tell you today what that’s going to look like [or when] we’re going to be able to move additional air defense capabilities to to Ukraine, but I can assure you that DoD is well aware of the threat and is working hard to see what they can do to to help the Ukrainians deal with the threat,” Kirby said.

So far, the Pentagon has equipped Ukraine with counter-drone systems, including the Vampire truck-mounted rocket launcher from L3Harris Technologies, and pledged to provide the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System, or NASAMS. Other countries too have provided air defenses; Slovakia sent Ukraine its S-300 and Ukraine recently deployed an IRIS-T system from Germany.

With reporting by The Associated Press

About Joe Gould

Joe Gould is the senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry. He served previously as Congress reporter.

7. Army Focused on Countering ‘Kamikaze Drones'

Excerpts:

Layering capabilities would give operators the tools to detect and neutralize threats in varying environments, said Leigh Madden, the CEO of Epirus, a California-based company that specializes in directed energy solutions for counter-UAS efforts.

“There are technologies like high-powered microwaves that are not affected by the weather. There are other high-power or directed energy technologies, like lasers, that definitely are impacted by weather and smoke and other things,” he said during the panel. “So, I truly believe that a layered approach is the right way to go at it.”

Considering the events during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — which has seen both sides employ loitering munitions with success — the JCO’s efforts are on track, Parker said.

“On initial blush, it looks like we are headed down the right direction with respect to what we are doing and the lessons that we are pulling out of Ukraine,” he said.

JUST IN: Army Focused on Countering ‘Kamikaze Drones'

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Mikayla Easley

10/20/2022

By

Army photo

With loitering munitions dominating the battlefield in Ukraine, the U.S. Army is looking for ways to combat small unmanned aerial vehicles designed for one-way and sometimes deadly missions.

The Army’s Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office, or the JCO, will be conducting another capability demonstration next May to look at how the services can defeat one-way small UAS, said Col. William Parker, the office’s military deputy director. He noted that the demonstration will focus on the threat of group 3 drones that have a maximum weight of 1,320 pounds.

Sometimes called kamikaze drones, loitering munitions are able to fly to targets and strike with an explosive or other kinetic effect, resulting in both the target and drone being destroyed. The tactic has been repeatedly used during recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which is giving the office ideas of how to defend against them, Parker said.

“Based on the capability that we have now, we have the technology to defend against those one-way attack drones and that’s what we need to continue our development [and] continue our investment,” he said Oct. 20 during a panel discussion hosted by the University of Oklahoma and the Oklahoma Aerospace & Defense Innovation Institute.

The Army’s JCO is currently leading a Pentagon-wide push to address how the U.S. military will combat small UAS on future battlefields. Part of these efforts include hosting demonstrations twice a year with the services and industry that focus on a range of counter-drone tactics — from low-collateral interceptors to high-powered microwave technology.

Because low-tech drones have become an inexpensive asset for militaries around the world, there is an imbalance when considering the cost curve of defensive systems, Parker noted.

“Do I want to use that $1-million-dollar-plus Patriot missile in order to be able to engage that group 3, one-way attack that is currently inbound?” he said. “If that is all I have, then yes I do.”

The office needs to collaborate closely with industry to provide less expensive counter-UAS technologies and stabilize that cost curve, he added.

Parker said there is no “silver bullet” when it comes to counter-drone systems. Instead, the JCO is pursuing a system-of-systems approach that layers both kinetic and non-kinetic effects and is integrated into a common command-and-control system.

“That allows both the ability to use the best effector against the threat, as well as the warfighter who's actually operating equipment to be able to fight effectively using a common operating picture,” Parker said.

Layering capabilities would give operators the tools to detect and neutralize threats in varying environments, said Leigh Madden, the CEO of Epirus, a California-based company that specializes in directed energy solutions for counter-UAS efforts.

“There are technologies like high-powered microwaves that are not affected by the weather. There are other high-power or directed energy technologies, like lasers, that definitely are impacted by weather and smoke and other things,” he said during the panel. “So, I truly believe that a layered approach is the right way to go at it.”

Considering the events during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — which has seen both sides employ loitering munitions with success — the JCO’s efforts are on track, Parker said.

“On initial blush, it looks like we are headed down the right direction with respect to what we are doing and the lessons that we are pulling out of Ukraine,” he said.

Topics: Army News, Unmanned Air Vehicles

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Mikayla Easley

8. China’s Military Is Catching Up to the U.S. Is It Ready for Battle?

I do not mean this as a negative comment toward our great SEALs, but everyone likes to use our SEALs as their standard of measure and comparison. (but it is good to see our great Air Commandos mentioned as well)

Photos at the lnk.

Excerpts:

Military analysts say the PLA does have some highly proficient service members, including units similar to U.S. Navy Seals and Air Force commandos.

Mr. Xi has intensified efforts to make military drills more realistic and complex. Before he took power, exercises were sometimes seen by outside analysts as little more than performances to make the military look good. Now they more often provide some of the closest simulations to real-world combat available, military analysts say.

Last year, the PLA’s air force and army took part in the first major joint exercises with Russia inside China, involving more than 10,000 personnel. The drills included airborne troop assaults, drone attacks and precision fighter jet strikes, according to official reports.

Dennis Blasko, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who was a military attaché in Beijing in the 1990s, says force-on-force training is usually held by the PLA for relatively short periods such as a day or few days, which wouldn’t prepare it for a prolonged war.

The true test of PLA personnel will be when they’re called on to fight. Some American military strategists and analysts say China might be a generation away from having the ability and training in its military that could effectively match those of the U.S.

“Our staffs have been doing extended combined operations for decades. Theirs haven’t,” Mr. Blasko said.

China’s Military Is Catching Up to the U.S. Is It Ready for Battle?

The People’s Liberation Army is emerging as a true competitor but Beijing worries about the ability of its troops

https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-military-us-taiwan-xi-11666268994?mc_cid=05ca08b245

By Alastair GaleFollow

Oct. 20, 2022 10:04 am ET

China’s military is emerging as a true competitor to the U.S. under Xi Jinping.

The People’s Liberation Army now has hypersonic missiles that evade most defenses, a technology the U.S. is still developing. Its attack drones can swarm to paralyze communications networks. China’s naval ships outnumber America’s, and it launched its third aircraft carrier this summer, the first to be designed and built in the country. Its defense budget is second only to the U.S.’s. China’s military has more serving members, at around 2 million, compared with just under 1.4 million in the U.S.

The question for Mr. Xi, which he has raised in public, is whether those forces are ready for battle.

China hasn’t fought a war since a brief border clash with Vietnam in 1979. Unlike American forces, who have fought for most of the past two decades in Iraq and Afghanistan, China’s service members have virtually no combat experience—which some Chinese leaders have referred to as a “peace disease.” Finding a solution short of actual war has been a priority for Mr. Xi, especially as he seeks to prepare the country for a potential showdown with the U.S.

CHINA UNDER XI JINPING

• Xi’s Endgame: A China Prepared for Conflict With the U.S.
• Xi’s Quest for Control Over China Targets Even Old Friends
• Xi’s Ideological Ambition Challenges China’s Economic Prospects
• China’s Surveillance State Pushes Deeper into Citizens’ Lives

See more...

“We must comprehensively strengthen military training and preparation, and improve the army’s ability to win,” Mr. Xi said on Sunday at the opening of the Communist Party’s twice-a-decade congress.

The issue has become more pressing for Beijing as tensions build with Taiwan, which China sees as part of its territory. On Sunday, Mr. Xi reiterated that Beijing wouldn’t renounce the use of force in China’s effort to take control of the island.

“The complete unification of the motherland must be realized, and it will be realized,” he said, drawing loud applause.

Taiwan reported few sorties by the Chinese air force close to the island before 2020. It says they have reached more than 1,200 so far this year. After Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei in August, angering Beijing, Chinese military aircraft began crossing the median line between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland on an almost daily basis.

Beijing’s state media reported an increase in more qualified recruits to the PLA after Mrs. Pelosi’s visit.

Yet PLA publications say some officers make flawed operational decisions, struggle to lead their troops and sometimes don’t understand their own orders. Rank-and-file troops are caught in a top-down system of command, potentially leaving them ill-equipped to improvise in battlefield situations—a situation that has hobbled Russia’s military in its invasion of Ukraine.

China’s political priorities mean that around 40% of new recruits’ training has involved studying about the Communist Party rather than learning how to be a service member. Leaders, some of whom see young Chinese as pampered products of the country’s one-child policy, question whether they are tough enough to fight.

People's Liberation Army band members watched a ceremony that included Xi Jinping at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People in 2020.

PHOTO: KEVIN FRAYER/GETTY IMAGES

An effort to make China’s different military branches work more closely together—so-called “jointness,” which is considered crucial to modern warfare—remains untested.

“At present, there are not many commanders in the PLA who are truly proficient in joint combat,” one serving officer at the Zhengzhou Joint Logistics Support Center wrote earlier this year in a commentary in the PLA Daily, the military’s newspaper. “If this situation does not change, once there is a war, it will be very dangerous.”

Outside analysts say the PLA appears to be making progress in bringing forces together for more complex joint exercises, helped by interaction with other militaries, especially Russia’s. Since Mr. Xi took power, China has increased drills with Russia to as many as 10 a year from one or two previously.

“We are observing an increasing complexity and sophistication in how they are performing in exercises,” said Oriana Skylar Mastro, who researches the Chinese military at Stanford University.

Mr. Xi’s ambition, according to China’s most recent defense white paper, is to complete a modernization of the military by 2035 and turn it into a “world-class force” by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

Strategists outside China say the PLA’s short-range missile, air and naval power is now so well developed that it would be nearly impossible for other countries’ militaries to operate near China’s shoreline in a conflict.

The Liaoning, a Chinese aircraft carrier, during a drill at sea in 2018.

PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

A screen in Beijing displayed a map of locations around Taiwan where China’s PLA conducted exercises in August.

PHOTO: FLORENCE LO/REUTERS

Beijing’s cyberwar capabilities are widely considered to be state-of-the-art. The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which advises the president on national security, said in a report this year that China is almost certainly capable of launching cyberattacks that would disrupt critical infrastructure in the U.S., including oil and gas pipelines and rail systems.

Hundreds of millions of dollars spent on ballistic missile technology mean that China can now put U.S. bases in Asia under threat. A growing nuclear arsenal is providing Beijing with the means to better deter rivals.

Reports of training missteps or incompetence occasionally surface in state media. Like other militaries, the PLA puts together exercises in which its own forces play the part of rivals. In China, these are known as Blue teams, a color representing NATO. The PLA teams are red, the color of China’s flag.

In one 2014 exercise in Inner Mongolia described in state media, the Blue team decided to trick the Red team by sending around 20 troops disguised as members of a friendly local government group, with offerings of cabbages, potatoes and drinks.

It worked. The Red team brought them to their headquarters, where the impostors pulled out weapons and captured the Red commander.

In another case reported in state media, an army battalion commander issued an incorrect order to fire shorter-range artillery when long-range fire was needed. The shots fell short, enabling a Blue armored helicopter to find and destroy the Red position.

AFP / Getty Images

A PLA Daily account from last year described how the leaders of a brigade were given night vision equipment ahead of an exercise. They didn’t know what it was, and failed to distribute it to their troops.

Such mistakes aren’t exclusive to China, but they have fueled insecurity among leaders, who have repeatedly used the phrase “five incapables” to describe PLA failings in speeches and commentaries in China’s military press.

The phrase refers to fears that PLA officers cannot judge situations, understand higher authorities’ intentions, make operational decisions, deploy troops, or deal with unexpected circumstances.

Another common phrase of self-criticism, the “two inabilities,” refers to a perceived inability of the PLA to fight a modern war and the inability of PLA officers to command.

Mr. Xi has been trying to rectify those problems since he came to power in 2012.

In 2015, he launched China’s most ambitious military reforms in decades. He overhauled the organizational structure of the PLA with the goal of allowing its armed services—army, navy, air force and rocket and support forces—to work more closely together. Such coordination would likely be needed for major operations such as an invasion of Taiwan.

Mr. Xi also expanded the PLA’s budget, created new special operations units and stepped up efforts to draw in more qualified service members.

Beijing extended free healthcare to troops and their families, improved military canteens and encouraged putting popular boy band members in military propaganda to drive recruitment.

U.S. vs. China: Military Bases Reveal Strategies to Extend Global Reach

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U.S. vs. China: Military Bases Reveal Strategies to Extend Global Reach

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The U.S. operates hundreds of foreign military bases. China has only one, but military experts say Beijing is also leveraging over 90 commercial ports. WSJ unpacks what’s on these bases and the countries’ differing strategies to expand their global footprint. Illustration: David Fanner

Central to the PLA’s issues, defense experts say, is a shortage of high-quality talent, including for officers.

In the U.S., competition to get into West Point or one of the other four military academies for officer training is intense. But in China, average scores on standardized admissions tests for those accepted into its military academies over the past few years fell well below those accepted into the most well-regarded universities.

The lowest successful scores at China’s prestigious Tsinghua University in 2021 were in many cases nearly 10% higher than at the National University of Defense Technology, often referred to in China as the military Tsinghua.

As a wing of the Communist Party, the PLA is subject to demands from political leaders. In 2021, the Ministry of Education said the role of the military was to provide jobs for young Chinese. Recruitment is skewed heavily toward poorer rural areas, which tend to have lower educational standards and higher unemployment.

Unlike the U.S., the PLA lacks a well-established system for bringing in and retaining talented noncommissioned officers, the backbone of most militaries. NCOs are usually high-school graduates who rise through the enlisted service to help execute orders and manage the lower ranks.

China has tried to make NCO roles more attractive. One program allows recruits to continue studies at a college or vocational school for 2½ years before entering the military, and covers some of the cost, to better qualify them for civilian jobs after military service.

Just over 20,000 students enrolled in the program in 2020, according to official data, a fraction of the overall NCO corps. This year, China said it would add better benefits.

A screen showed an image of PLA soldiers in Beijing in August.

PHOTO: TINGSHU WANG/REUTERS

Military analysts say the PLA does have some highly proficient service members, including units similar to U.S. Navy Seals and Air Force commandos.

Mr. Xi has intensified efforts to make military drills more realistic and complex. Before he took power, exercises were sometimes seen by outside analysts as little more than performances to make the military look good. Now they more often provide some of the closest simulations to real-world combat available, military analysts say.

Last year, the PLA’s air force and army took part in the first major joint exercises with Russia inside China, involving more than 10,000 personnel. The drills included airborne troop assaults, drone attacks and precision fighter jet strikes, according to official reports.

Dennis Blasko, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who was a military attaché in Beijing in the 1990s, says force-on-force training is usually held by the PLA for relatively short periods such as a day or few days, which wouldn’t prepare it for a prolonged war.

The true test of PLA personnel will be when they’re called on to fight. Some American military strategists and analysts say China might be a generation away from having the ability and training in its military that could effectively match those of the U.S.

“Our staffs have been doing extended combined operations for decades. Theirs haven’t,” Mr. Blasko said.

Corrections & Amplifications

Xi Jinping’s ambition is to turn the military into a “world-class force” by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. An earlier version of this article incorrectly said 2049 was the 100th anniversary of the founding of the ruling Communist Party.

Write to Alastair Gale at alastair.gale@wsj.com

Appeared in the October 21, 2022, print edition as 'China’s Military Catches Up'.

9. China May Never Become a Superpower

Excerpts:

In fact, spurts of popular dissent suggest that at least some Chinese believe the CCP is failing at its essential task of providing both prosperity and security.

Beijing-based writer Helen Gao recently observed: “The unusual eruptions of public rage are not just a result of the party’s failure to keep up its side of the bargain; it is also the fact that much of the recent difficulties are the product of erratic, reckless party policies.”

Although the regime’s brutally repressive security apparatus prevents organized resistance, there is little reason to believe that the PRC’s challenges will soon ease. Economic stagnation, imploding real estate values, and continued COVID crackdowns likely will further fuel widespread anger with unpredictable results.

Of course, Chinese weakness does not preclude danger to other peoples and nations. Some analysts contend that if the PRC has peaked—or, at least, come closest to reducing the distance to America—CCP paladins may be more likely to react aggressively and even militarily. This suggests something akin to what President Ronald Reagan called a “window of vulnerability” involving the Soviet Union.

Ironically, this perspective offers greater long-term assurance for the U.S. and other relatively free societies. That is, Beijing’s opportunity for advantage may be limited and the CCP mainly poses a short-term problem. In any case, America should proceed with confidence, not fear, in the coming years as it competes with China.

China May Never Become a Superpower

19fortyfive.com · by Doug Bandow · October 20, 2022

China’s President Xi Jinping opened the latest congress of the Chinese Communist Party with a strong defense of his record. Because of his program, an increasingly brutal crackdown on the slightest dissent, he said he had “ensured that the party will never change in quality, change its color, or change its flavor.”

In short, dictatorship now and forever.

And he even claimed better is yet to come. Xi concluded his formal report to the CCP representatives: “The Party has made spectacular achievements through its great endeavors over the past century, and our new endeavors will surely lead to more spectacular achievements.”

No doubt Xi, the most powerful Chinese leader next to Mao Zedong, believes the People’s Republic of China will prevail. However, his triumphant expectations are premature. The CCP overestimates its position vis-à-vis the West, which could bring China grief.

Certainly, the PRC has become a serious global power. However, it is important not to exaggerate its strength. Although Beijing is a far more comprehensive power than the Soviet Union, the foundation of which proved to be clay, China’s impressive national edifice is built on pot metal rather than iron. Beijing is a vulnerable, not-yet superpower.

That doesn’t mean its collapse is imminent. Challenges should not be ignored. Some analysts have spent years predicting the PRC’s imminent demise. Today the issue of China’s economic prognosis and that nation’s capability for future mischief divides scholars even at the same institution.

Nevertheless, panic is the wrong reaction to Beijing’s rise, especially since that response tends to encourage decidedly illiberal policies. For the PRC, slower growth appears inevitable, a recession is possible if not likely, and a jump to high-income status is not certain. A lengthy period of stagnation is seen as increasingly likely. Indeed, some analysts are less certain that the PRC is destined to generate a bigger economy than America.

Although China’s remarkable growth after the post-Mao reforms reflected the release of enormous resources, both capital, and labor, inefficient state enterprises survived, in part because they provided politically important employment. As would be expected, they have remained a major economic drag. Now further reform, once promised by Xi, is unlikely: his government views parastatals as an essential tool for reasserting party control over economic actors.

Commercial discrimination and abuse have turned many foreign investors against what was once seen as illimitable markets likely to yield inevitable profits. The Xi government’s continuing rigid COVID-lockdown policy, along with rising wages, Chinese government restrictions, and U.S. political pressure, also are encouraging businesses to rethink the PRC. Overall, U.S. investor confidence in China is at record lows. Although there so far has been no exodus of firms from the PRC, they are less likely to make ambitious plans for the future.

China is heavily indebted, a problem exacerbated by continuing COVID lockdowns. The latter also is exacerbating youth unemployment, the impact of which concerns families as well as young adults. An increasing number of disillusioned younger workers are adopting attitudes of “lying flat” and “let it rot,” downgrading ambitions and reducing efforts.

The New York Times interviewed a 25-year-old who was “among a small but growing group of Chinese who are looking to the exits as China’s pandemic controls drag into their third year. Many are middle-class or wealthy Shanghai residents who have been trapped for nearly two months by a citywide lockdown that has battered the economy and limited access to food and medicine. Some … have ties overseas and worry that China’s door to the world is closing. Others are disheartened by heightened government censorship and surveillance, which the pandemic has aggravated.”

The PRC’s property bubble is not new but is another significant economic weakness, one long promoted by Chinese government policy. Indeed, the country is notorious for its “ghost cities.” The ongoing crisis has greatly affected urban households, two-thirds of whose wealth is in property, and the middle class, as many property buyers pay mortgages on unfinished homes. Indeed, some buyers have joined mortgage strikes, further destabilizing the real estate market.

President Kagame and President Xi Jinping of China Joint Press Conference | Kigali, 23 July 2018

This decline is likely to intensify. Warned the Council on Foreign Relation’s Brad Setser: “China’s real estate crisis poses financial risks, but it is ultimately a crisis of economic growth. Since the development and construction of new property is estimated to drive over a quarter of the country’s current economic activity, it is not difficult to see how a temporary downturn in the property market could promote a prolonged economic slump.”

Analysts have even begun speculating on China’s resemblance to Japan in the 1990s when a real estate collapse contributed to the infamous “lost decade.” State banks, many already saddled with significant bad debts, are suffering as the real estate market slows. In fact, Chinese regulators have ordered banks to provide continued financing to troubled developers to complete ongoing projects, further undermining already overburdened financial institutions.

Even so, some in the Chinese government advocate additional interference with the financial sector to spur growth. Wang Yiming, an adviser with the People’s Bank of China, argued that “Greater financial support is needed to develop commercial sustainability.” He added: “The original financial model of supporting traditional industry … needs to be adjusted to improve the ability to respond to the risk.” Which ultimately would mean even greater losses.

The much-hyped Belt and Road Initiative adds an international financial drain, with nearly $400 billion in lending to mostly developing states, many with authoritarian governments and statist economic policies. Sri Lanka is only the most recent example of projects that look like a burden rather than benefit Beijing. Indeed, the PRC recently announced debt relief for 17 African countries.

The biggest problem is the PRC’s increasingly politicized economic policies. China’s increase in total factor productivity has been falling since the 1990s, reducing prospects for future growth. Yet the party has expanded and strengthened its controls within private firms. Officials are pressing to dramatically increase penalties for noncompliance by tech companies; one regulator declared that law enforcement needed to “grow very sharp teeth.” The basic objective is to impose the regime’s political objectives on the private sector. The CCP’s expanded reach was highlighted by the public humbling of Jack Ma, founder of Alibaba, and other entrepreneurial titans. Xi also is pressing for “common prosperity,” or wealth redistribution, to defuse popular dissatisfaction with income inequality that has become so evident in a nominally socialist economy, even one “with Chinese characteristics.”

Experience suggests that the greater the state interference, the more harm to the economy. Economist Pranab Barnhan pointed to the essential threat:

“The disadvantage for China follows from the lack of an open system that could encourage free spirit, critical thinking, challenging of incumbent organizations and methods, and diversity rather than conformity—these are necessary ingredients of many types of creative innovations. The current system of state promotion and guidance of globally successful large private technological enterprises (Alibaba, Tencent, etc.) is worth examining from this point of view. On the one hand, the state wants them to be ‘national champions’, on the other hand, it does not want them to be autonomously powerful enough to be outside the ambit of its control, supervision, and surveillance.”

China also is heading over a demographic cliff. The population has peaked, much earlier than once predicted. With a shrinking population, and a potential two-thirds reduction in working-age population by the end of the century, the PRC might not outstrip the U.S. economically. Still much poorer than America, China is rapidly growing older before it grows rich. That might become its permanent status. The PRC also is rapidly aging and suffers a dearth of women, as a result of the infamous “one-child policy,” which encouraged rural dwellers to abort or kill baby girls.

Chinese President Xi Jinping. Image Credit: CCP.

As economic growth slows, it will become increasingly difficult for single children to support their parents and grandparents, and for China to meet the expenses of an older society. The PRC’s compensatory policies, including an embarrassing call on CCP members to have three children, are unlikely to achieve much. Forbes columnist Milton Ezrati observed:

“By 2040, according to UN estimates, the country will have seen a 10% drop in the absolute numbers in its working population, while its population of dependent retirees will have increased by some 50%. The economy will have barely three workers for each dependent adult. Those three workers will have to produce enough for their own consumption, those of their other dependents, and one-third of a retiree’s needs. The economy’s flexibility will have all but disappeared, while limited human resources will constrain its ability to invest in the future.”

Chinese officials long have claimed that their system provides competent and flexible governance—at least after the end of Mao’s mad, disruptive, and deadly reign. China’s ambassador to America, Qin Gang, defended his nation’s political system: “On matters concerning people’s keen interests, there are broad-based and sufficient consultations and discussions before any decision is made. Policies and measures can only be introduced when there is a consensus that they are what the people want and will serve the people’s needs. It has been proved that the whole-process democracy works in China, and works very well.”

However, Xi’s leadership style contradicts these purported advantages. He has eliminated almost anyone inclined to question his judgment. He centralized power in the national government, restricted the information flow, and discouraged local and provincial initiatives.

Earlier this year several scholars negatively assessed the impact of Chinese policy in testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. For instance, Victor Chung Shih of the University of San Diego predicted that “information manipulation by officials around [Xi] may lead to policy missteps.”

Jessica Teets of Middlebury College warned that “centralization has also resulted in reduced local discretion for policy experimentation, rigid policy implementation without local adaptation, and decreased morale among local officials,” which has resulted in “the loss of long-term innovation and citizen engagement.”

This system falls short in the international realm as well. Xi overvalues confrontation as a foreign policy tool. This failing is evident in both “Wolf Warrior” and COVID-19 diplomacy, which so far internationally have been busts.

Chinese President Xi Jinping with the first lady during the Moscow Victory Day Parade on 9 May 2015.

Moreover, as noted earlier, the PRC lacks allies and genuine friends. After all, what other country believes in the principle of Han ethnic superiority? Trade/investment and BRI projects might gain temporary favor with some governments, but Beijing’s determination to seize any advantage accrued has proved costly. Even the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, sought to escape the PRC’s tight embrace when a decade ago it initiated its semi-democratic experiment, which terminated last year in a new coup.

Finally, though the PRC’s governing process remains opaque, the continuing centralization of power in Beijing and the exaltation of Xi pose political risks. There already is a hint of potential discord—or at least concern—over the economic consequences of tighter economic regulation and COVID restrictions. Internal discussions remain shrouded and Xi could be using others to deliver bad news. However, there is significant negative economic news, which could create political problems. Although claims of ongoing political challenges appear overblown, continued difficulties could undermine Xi’s authority. Given his ubiquitous role, he cannot avoid responsibility for failure and has many enemies who will seek to take advantage of any misstep.

In fact, spurts of popular dissent suggest that at least some Chinese believe the CCP is failing at its essential task of providing both prosperity and security.

Beijing-based writer Helen Gao recently observed: “The unusual eruptions of public rage are not just a result of the party’s failure to keep up its side of the bargain; it is also the fact that much of the recent difficulties are the product of erratic, reckless party policies.”

Although the regime’s brutally repressive security apparatus prevents organized resistance, there is little reason to believe that the PRC’s challenges will soon ease. Economic stagnation, imploding real estate values, and continued COVID crackdowns likely will further fuel widespread anger with unpredictable results.

Of course, Chinese weakness does not preclude danger to other peoples and nations. Some analysts contend that if the PRC has peaked—or, at least, come closest to reducing the distance to America—CCP paladins may be more likely to react aggressively and even militarily. This suggests something akin to what President Ronald Reagan called a “window of vulnerability” involving the Soviet Union.

Ironically, this perspective offers greater long-term assurance for the U.S. and other relatively free societies. That is, Beijing’s opportunity for advantage may be limited and the CCP mainly poses a short-term problem. In any case, America should proceed with confidence, not fear, in the coming years as it competes with China.

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire. He is a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.

19fortyfive.com · by Doug Bandow · October 20, 2022

10. Xi’s CCP congress speech indicates a major push towards military intelligentisation

Excerpts:

Xi didn’t mention military–civil fusion in his speech. However, that doesn’t mean it has been downgraded as a strategy. The CCP leadership has promoted military–civil fusion as a national strategy since 2015 but stopped mentioning it in official documents in 2019 because of the international backlash.

To understand what’s going on, it’s helpful to look back to the report of 19th congress, which referred to both military–civil fusion and an ‘integrated national strategic system and capacity’ (一体化国家战略体系和能力). These are actually similar concepts in that they both seek to remove barriers between the commercial and defence industrial sectors. Xi continues to mention the latter—as he did in this week’s report—and also continues to promote the sharing of resources and production between the military and civilian sectors, as well as to champion the transformation of science and technology into combat capabilities. This indicates that China is continuing with the development of the military–civil fusion strategy—just without using the name.

The 20th congress report suggests a major trend towards military intelligentisation as a pathway to developing the PLA into a world-class military. That pathway may also lead to new friction with China’s neighbours and other countries across the region.

Xi’s CCP congress speech indicates a major push towards military intelligentisation | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Masaaki Yatsuzuka · October 21, 2022

The party congress report is a highly official statement of the Chinese Communist Party, and General Secretary Xi Jinping delivered a lengthy version this week to the 20th national congress in Beijing.

There is value in looking at the key words in the party report, though interpretation is needed. One way to make sense of it is to reflect on the context in which the CCP has used this language in the past.

The overall tone of the 20th congress report clearly expressed the party leadership’s sense of crisis over the deteriorating international environment—for instance, the reference to ‘external attempts to suppress and contain China’ that ‘may escalate at any time’. While Xi didn’t name countries, he was clearly referring to the West, particularly the United States. He stressed strengthening ‘mechanisms for countering foreign sanctions, interference and long-arm jurisdiction’, seemingly with long-term strategic competition with the US in mind.

However, along with a sense of crisis, Xi also sees strategic opportunities in the area of technology—and made it clear in the report that he means for China to seize those opportunities by achieving dominance in key sectors. ‘At present, momentous changes of a like not seen in a century are accelerating across the world,’ he said. ‘A new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation is well underway, and a significant shift is taking place in the international balance of power, presenting China with new strategic opportunities in pursuing development.’

He named seven sectors as ‘emerging strategic industries’ that are central to this opportunity. Those are next-generation information technology; artificial intelligence; biotechnology; new energy; new materials; high-end equipment; and green industry.

On defence, the previous party congress report in 2017 laid out plans for reform and modernisation of the military by 2035. The military section of this week’s report, however, was more of a stocktake, providing a review of reform measures implemented over the past decade. The emphasis is on continuity rather than change.

That said, Xi pointedly articulated goals set to be reached by the centenary of the People’s Liberation Army in 2027. The report didn’t specify what those are, but a reasonable interpretation, which matches the reported conclusions of US intelligence agencies, is that Xi intends for the PLA to have the capability to take control of Taiwan by force by then.

Regarding military strategy, Xi this week called for implementation of a ‘military strategy for the new era’ (新时代军事战略方针). Military strategy for the new era is something China has been laying out since January 2019. It defines the overall war principles in the medium to long term. In the defence white paper released in 2019, the Chinese government demonstrated its recognition of the rapid evolution of warfare, saying that intelligentised warfare (智能化战争) is on the horizon. The report of the 20th congress was much more specific about particular key trends such as the development of unmanned intelligentised operational capabilities (无人智能作战力量). This aligns with the Chinese government’s significant efforts to train drone pilots, and may reflect the fact that the PLA’s leadership is determined to expand the use of drones in waging war. On the other hand, the report proposes studying the characteristics of informatised and intelligentised warfare and innovating ‘military strategic guidance’ (军事战略指导). This suggests that despite the enthusiasm for drones as platforms of the future, the military leadership has yet to set an operational doctrine for waging intelligentised warfare.

Indeed, another interesting point is that the reference to accelerating the development of military intelligentisation in the 19th congress has changed to a somewhat more moderate statement in the current report. This time it refers to the continued integrated development of military mechanisation, informatisation and intelligentisation (机械化信息化智能化融合发展). This is curious given that mechanisation was supposed to be completed by 2020. The new language suggests that some in the PLA are still cautious about intelligentisation and feel that it shouldn’t get ahead of the need to consolidate mechanisation and informatisation. Alternatively, this might simply be related to the politics of competing interests in the allocation of defence spending.

The report also suggests that China continue to expand the role of the PLA. It mentions not only defending national sovereignty and security, but also securing ‘development interests’ (发展利益) as among the PLA’s missions and tasks. As China’s economic power and weight have grown, its companies and their employees have expanded across the world. During the Libyan civil war in 2011 and the Yemeni civil war in 2015, the PLA conducted large-scale convoy operations to rescue Chinese expatriates. These conflicts were wake-up calls for China’s leadership to recognise the importance of the PLA’s overseas deployment to support Chinese workers abroad. As one of the lessons from these conflicts, the PLA has had personnel permanently stationed at its naval base in Djibouti since August 2017. This week’s report indicates that the PLA will continue to expand its global reach.

Another key passage is Xi’s remark that China will become ‘more adept at deploying our military forces on a regular basis and in diversified ways and our military will remain both steadfast and flexible as it carries out its operations’. This language was not used at the 19th congress, and Xi’s use of it this week might point to China’s growing awareness of the potency of hybrid warfare. The 2013 defence white paper, which detailed the diversified operation of the armed forces, emphasised the use of paramilitary forces such as armed police and militia. In light of this, the word ‘diversification’ (多样化) can be seen to indicate a policy of actively using paramilitary as military forces.

On top of this, ‘regularisation’ (常态化) indicates a policy of applying pressure on other countries to progressively expand China’s claims—including territorial claims—without provoking a response that might lead to war. We can expect the PLA to continue to use military police and militia for operations in ‘grey zone’ situations on a regular basis.

Xi didn’t mention military–civil fusion in his speech. However, that doesn’t mean it has been downgraded as a strategy. The CCP leadership has promoted military–civil fusion as a national strategy since 2015 but stopped mentioning it in official documents in 2019 because of the international backlash.

To understand what’s going on, it’s helpful to look back to the report of 19th congress, which referred to both military–civil fusion and an ‘integrated national strategic system and capacity’ (一体化国家战略体系和能力). These are actually similar concepts in that they both seek to remove barriers between the commercial and defence industrial sectors. Xi continues to mention the latter—as he did in this week’s report—and also continues to promote the sharing of resources and production between the military and civilian sectors, as well as to champion the transformation of science and technology into combat capabilities. This indicates that China is continuing with the development of the military–civil fusion strategy—just without using the name.

The 20th congress report suggests a major trend towards military intelligentisation as a pathway to developing the PLA into a world-class military. That pathway may also lead to new friction with China’s neighbours and other countries across the region.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Masaaki Yatsuzuka · October 21, 2022

11. China, 'factory of the world,' is losing more of its manufacturing and export dominance, latest data shows

China, 'factory of the world,' is losing more of its manufacturing and export dominance, latest data shows

KEY POINTS

• The latest data in the CNBC Supply Chain Heat Map shows China is losing more manufacturing to Vietnam, Malaysia, Bangladesh, India, and Taiwan.
• Exports in furniture, apparel, footwear, travel goods and handbags, minerals, and science and technology are all declining.
• China’s ‘Zero Covid’ policy is a big factor, with Port of Ningbo, the world’s largest port, the latest to be impacted.

CNBC · by Lori Ann LaRocco · October 20, 2022

The container ship Emma Mærsk docked at the Dapukou container terminal of Ningbo-Zhoushan Port on August 21, 2022 in Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province.

Vcg | Visual China Group | Getty Images

China is losing more manufacturing and export market share in key sectors to Asian neighbors, with recent "Zero Covid" policies a significant factor leading to further erosion in its long-time dominance of global trade.

According to data shared with CNBC by transport economics firm MDS Transmodal, China has lost ground in key consumer categories, including clothing and accessories, footwear, furniture, and travel goods, while also seeing declines in its share of exports from minerals to office technology.

"China's Zero Covid approach is impacting production and manufacturers are seeking for alternatives to the current 'factory of the world'," said Antonella Teodoro, senior consultant at MDS Transmodal.

"Drilling down to the individual commodity groups exported from China, we observe that China has been continuing to lose market share, with Vietnam amongst the countries gaining importance on the international landscape," Teodoro said.

That view matches other recent market research on the gains being made by Vietnam in particular.

Teodoro said Vietnam's close proximity to China and cheap labor are reasons why Vietnam is considered a suitable alternative.

Ocean carrier MSC, along with the Vietnam Maritime Corporation, announced in July the creation of a new transshipment container terminal project near Ho Chi Minh City. Once completed, this terminal would become the largest in the nation. Both Maersk and CMA CGM are investing in their own facility expansions in that region.

"Shipping lines are looking for new markets and investing and expanding new markets," Teodoro said. "They perceive demand and are creating a market with these investments."

The competition had been intensifying in the years before Covid. Vietnam has taken the lion's share of the manufacturing trade away from China with an almost 360% increase in far-distance trade since 2014 — the year the country started to invest in its maritime and manufacturing sector.

Malaysia and Bangladesh have taken apparel manufacturing away from China, according to MDS Transmodal, while Taiwan has seen a marginal uptick in metal manufacturing.

Since U.S. trade tariffs in 2018, there has been a hunt for alternative sourcing locations to China, initially limited to fashion and footwear, according to Akhil Nair, senior vice president of products, Asia Pacific for SEKO Logistics. The compounding impact of Covid lockdowns in China (Shenzhen, Ningbo, etc.) and the disruptions in supply chains led to what Nair called "a quick ramp up in clients hedging their sourcing geographies, especially with countries like Vietnam."

Nair says SEKO has seen an increase in intra-Asia trade for raw material flows and subsequent finished goods exports rising from Vietnam and other southeast Asian countries.

"While recent China lockdowns don't impact vessel operations or the terminal itself, it is clear that there remains impact on other highly dependent parts of the supply chain like trucking, CFS warehousing, and container yards in some cases," Nair said.

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How dynamic Covid restrictions are impacting trade

State of Freight

Data from freight tracking firm Project44 shows that the total vessel TEU (container) capacity departing Chinese ports has been dropping since the onset of the pandemic lockdowns at the beginning of 2021.

A pre-2021 monthly vessel capacity of around 11.2 million TEU dropped to 8.6 million TEUs departing Chinese ports in September, representing a 23.2% decrease in vessel capacity leaving Chinese ports, according to Josh Brazil, vice president of supply chain insights for Project44.

There has been a continued decline in shippers placing orders for container transport by ocean carriers, according to ocean bookings tracked by FreightWaves SONAR.

Logistics managers tell CNBC orders for cargo arriving from China to the U.S. in November are expected to be down by 40% to 50%.

"The combination of excess inventory coupled with reduced demand continues to weigh on Pacific import volume," said Alan Baer, CEO of OL USA. "Vessel operators have increased the number of blank sailings and terminated several vessel strings pulling out approximately 30,000 TEU per week of USWC space."

Ningbo port hit by Covid policies

The Port of Ningbo, the world's largest port and the third-largest container port, is the latest Chinese trade hub to see an impact from the government's "Zero Covid" policies. A Covid outbreak was detected on Thursday of last week and spread to Beilun, which is the area that has the most terminals for the Port of Ningbo, leading to a decrease in productivity, according to global maritime analytics provider MarineTraffic.

On Monday, MarineTraffic tracked what supply chain in-transit visibility lead Alex Charvalias described as an "important decrease of containership arrivals at the Ningbo port," and which he attributed to the latest Covid outbreak in the area. "Even though it seems from MarineTraffic data that the number of vessels that arrived during the next day was higher than the previous days, we can still see that there is a growing TEU capacity waiting off port limits over the past few days," he said.

These delays are also showing up in the latest CNBC Supply Chain Heat Map.

"A large number of warehouses and container yards are located in Beilun, so since October 16th, the Beilun District temporarily closed management," said Joe Monaghan, CEO and president of Worldwide Logistics Group. "A large number of Ningbo warehouses cannot open to receive cargo and can't pick up empty containers from container yards, and truckers need to apply for a special pass for delivery to the Ningbo dock area. The situation in Ningbo may last for a week."

The CNBC Supply Chain Heat Map data providers are artificial intelligence and predictive analytics company Everstream Analytics; global freight booking platform Freightos, creator of the Freightos Baltic Dry Index; logistics provider OL USA; supply chain intelligence platform FreightWaves; supply chain platform Blume Global; third-party logistics provider Orient Star Group; global maritime analytics provider MarineTraffic; maritime visibility data company Project44; maritime transport data company MDS Transmodal UK; ocean and air freight rate benchmarking and market analytics platform Xeneta; leading provider of research and analysis Sea-Intelligence ApS; Crane Worldwide Logistics; DHL Global Forwarding; freight logistics provider Seko Logistics; and Planet, provider of global, daily satellite imagery and geospatial solutions.

CNBC · by Lori Ann LaRocco · October 20, 2022

12. Transfer of Green Berets, SEALs to Army base in Germany questioned in House funding bill

Why not take some forces from Green Berets and SEALS in CONUS to the "front lines" and put these forces in Baumholder as planned?  

We need more SOF permanently forward stationed in Europe and in all theaters around the world. If I were king for a day I would have more SOF permanently stationed overseas (especially in Asia) than in CONUS (but that is more than a bridge too far).

Excerpts:

But House lawmakers want to block funding for construction projects to support the move, saying that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin must first justify the effort.

Specifically, the House’s version of the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act calls for Austin to explain why U.S. special operators wouldn’t be better positioned in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania or Poland, all of which are on the front lines when it comes to deterring Russian aggression.

Transfer of Green Berets, SEALs to Army base in Germany questioned in House funding bill

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · October 20, 2022

Chris Hood of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and a contractor discuss the progress of renovations at Smith Barracks in Baumholder, Germany, in May 2022. U.S. Special Operations Command Europe forces are slated to move from Stuttgart to Baumholder. But House lawmakers want to block funding for the construction projects saying that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin must justify the choice. (Chris Gardner/U.S. Army)

STUTTGART, Germany — U.S. special operations units poised for a move to a rural part of western Germany could need a special Pentagon waiver that explains why those forces wouldn’t be more useful in countries nearer to Russia.

For years, U.S. Special Operations Command Europe has wanted to send SEALs and Green Berets to an Army base in Baumholder, Germany.

And those plans are coming to fruition, with various construction projects in the works and hundreds of troops expected to relocate from their current base of operations in Stuttgart.

But House lawmakers want to block funding for construction projects to support the move, saying that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin must first justify the effort.

Specifically, the House’s version of the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act calls for Austin to explain why U.S. special operators wouldn’t be better positioned in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania or Poland, all of which are on the front lines when it comes to deterring Russian aggression.

U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers prepare for a jump over Latvia in 2020. SOCEUR troops operate on a rotational basis out of local training bases in the Baltics and Poland. (Robert L Kunzig/U.S. Navy)

The waiver would need to detail how “hosting such forces in Germany would provide greater deterrence or greater operational utility” than the other nations, the NDAA states. It would also need to describe how taking up a position in Baumholder “is in the national security interests of the United States.”

The House version of the NDAA passed in July. It will eventually be reconciled with the Senate version of the act, which does not include the waiver provision and has not yet been put to a vote.

If the waiver provision makes it into the final bill, it’s unlikely that it will pose a major obstacle for the military and its planned move to Baumholder, assuming Austin doesn’t want to go in a new direction.

On the surface, Baumholder could appear to be an unlikely place to put special operations teams, given the range of security concerns along the eastern flank.

However, having sensitive infrastructure farther removed from potential hot spots in the Baltics could be one explanation for the Baumholder move.

The extensive training ranges in the area also would give operators space to coordinate larger drills with various allies.

Meanwhile, SOCEUR troops already do rotating deployments from local training bases to the Baltics and Poland, where they have had a persistent presence since 2014, when Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine paved the way for the Kremlin to annex Crimea.

The 2023 House NDAA calls for more than $200 million to be spent on various projects in Baumholder, with about $78 million directed toward buildings and facilities to support special operations teams.

The eventual move to Baumholder would shift hundreds of troops from Stuttgart, a congested metropolis, to a more rural area.

But Special Operations Command Europe headquarters is slated to remain in Stuttgart.

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · October 20, 2022

13. Poland buying Korean made MLRS, continuing Seoul spending spree

As South Korea becomes a partner in the arsenal of democracy, it seems that Poland is its best customer.

Poland buying Korean made MLRS, continuing Seoul spending spree - Breaking Defense

Since late July, Poland has inked agreements with South Korea to purchase 1,000 K2 tanks, 672 K9 self-propelled howitzers, and 48 FA-50 light combat aircraft, along with the MLRS announcement today.

breakingdefense.com · by Aaron Mehta · October 20, 2022

Poland’s MND Błaszczak at the singing ceremony for the K239 Chunmoo for the Polish Armed Forces. In the background is a visualization of the K239 on a Jelcz chassis. (Poland MND)

WARSAW — Poland on Wednesday accepted the first batch of its new South Korean-made tanks and howitzers at a ceremony in Seoul, while signing yet another weapons deal with local industry — after key Polish officials were blocked from attending due to what seems to be a power play by China.

The Polish government delegation, led by Mariusz Błaszczak, Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, planned to make the visit on Oct. 17, to participate in the delivery ceremony for the first K2 Black Panther tanks and K9A1 Thunder self-propelled howitzers, and sign a new K239 Chunmoo rocket artillery system supply contract. According to Poland’s official statement, the trip was cancelled because of technical malfunction of the aircraft.

But Polish website onet.pl, citing the Korean television station SBS News and the Yonhap agency, said the visit was canceled after the Chinese government refused to allow a Polish aircraft to pass through Chinese airspace.

“The round-trip times would be too long for Polish government planes,” an anonymous government official told SBS News. The broadcaster believes China’s blocking of the flight may be related to Poland’s favorable policy towards Taiwan, including a recent agreement between the countries to set up a working group on semiconductors.

While Błaszczak would not make it, two days later on Oct. 19 the ceremony did happen, attended by personnel from the Polish embassy in Seoul.

According to the spokesman of the Polish Armaments Agency, Lt. Col. Krzysztof Płatek, 10 K2s and 24 K9A1s will be delivered to Poland later this year, which will allow the start of staff training in Poland.

Black Panthers will be equipped with Korean engines and German gears, while the Thunders will be equipped with German engines and American gears as well as some Polish components, including the integrated Topaz combat management system.

The first K2 tanks will be delivered to Morąg, where the 20th Bartoszyce Mechanized Brigade is based. In turn, in Ostróda, an additional tank battalion will be created, subordinated to this brigade. Ultimately, the 16th Division is planned to consist of four brigades, as it is planned to transform into a part of the 11th Masurian Artillery Regiment, which will also receive the first batch of K9A1 howitzers. (Currently, the 16th Division consists of seven units: 9th Armored Cavalry Brigade, 15th Mechanized Brigade, 20th Mechanized Brigade, 11th Artillery Regiment, 15th Anti-Aircraft Regiment, 16th Logistics Regiment and 9th Command Battalion.)

Poland’s MND signed executive contracts for the supply of K2 Black Panther tanks and K9A1 Thunder self-propelled howitzers on August 26 this year. For 180 K2 tanks in the Korean configuration, together with the ammunition, training and logistics package, Poland will pay approximately PLN 16 billion ($3.26 billion), with deliveries to be completed by 2025. And the cost of purchasing 212 K9A1 howitzers together with the ammunition, training and logistics package will be approximately PLN 11.4 billion ($2.32 billion), with deliveries coming until 2026.

Agreement For K239 Chunmoo MLRS

The same day as the ceremony in Seoul, a framework agreement was inked between Poland and South Korea on delivery of 288 K239 Chunmoo K-MLRS (Korean Multiple Launch Rocket System) units, designed by South Korea’s Hanwha, to the Polish Land Forces.

Deputy Minister of Defense for Force and Resource Management of the Republic of Korea Dongjoon Yoo Lim and Deputy Minister of the Defense Purchase Planning Agency Il Sung were joined by Błaszczak to sign the agreement — with the Polish minister directly tying the decision to buy Korean to a lack of production availability from the US.

“In 2019, an agreement with the United States to acquire the HIMARS for the Polish Armed Forces was signed. The delivery of this equipment is scheduled for the next year. We submitted an inquiry for larger deliveries, but unfortunately due to limited industrial capabilities, it will not be possible for the equipment to be delivered in a satisfactory timeframe. Therefore, we started talks with South Korea, our reliable partner, which resulted in the signing of a framework contract for the delivery of K239 Chunmoo today,” Błaszczak stated during the ceremony.

“Chunmoo have very similar characteristics to the HIMARS. It is a very good weapon, it is very good equipment, and I think that our joint Polish-Korean success is that the first Chunmoo squadron will be delivered to Poland next year. Our next success is that this Chunmoo squadron will be built on Polish Jelcz trucks, that are being built by the Polish Armaments Group. It will also be equipped with Polish communications and the battlefield management system, which will ensure that it will be operational also next year,” he added.

According to Płatek, the armaments spokesman, the first squadron of 18 Chunmoo, on Jelcz truck chassis and equipped with Topaz system, will be delivered to Poland in 2023 and will be subordinated to the 18th Mechanized Division, to be equipped with Abrams tanks.

The delivery date of the remaining launchers was not disclosed. Along with the K239s, in the first stage of the program a supply of ammunition will also be purchased, which will cover a total of several thousand 239mm guided rockets (having a range of about 80 km) and 600mm KTSSM-II tactical ballistic missiles (having a range of approximately 290km). Ultimately, both types of ammunition are to be produced in Poland. The purchase of support vehicles, including command and ammunition vehicles, and technology transfer is also planned.

The agreement on the Chunmoo continues the sudden, and shockingly large, spending from Warsaw on South Korean produced weaponry. Since late July, Poland has inked agreements to purchase 1,000 K2 tanks, 672 K9 self-propelled howitzers, and 48 FA-50 light combat aircraft, along with the MLRS announcement today.

14. ‘It Was Horror’: Ukrainians Share Grim Tales of Russian Occupation

The brutal nature of the evil Putin regime.

Photos at the link.

‘It Was Horror’: Ukrainians Share Grim Tales of Russian Occupation

With Russian soldiers pushed out of parts of the Kharkiv region, Ukrainian investigators have been overwhelmed with accounts of detentions, torture and missing relatives, as well as collaboration and property theft.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/20/world/europe/ukraine-civilans-russia-occupation.html?utm_

By Carlotta GallPhotographs by Ivor Prickett

• Oct. 20, 2022

BALAKLIYA, Ukraine — Russian troops spent weeks searching for Mariya, the 65-year-old common-law wife of a serving Ukrainian Army officer.

Twice, she said, they ransacked her cottage in a village outside the town of Balakliya, and when they did eventually detain her months later, they tortured her repeatedly under interrogation, using electric shocks and threats of rape.

The recapturing by Ukrainian fighters of much of the Kharkiv region a month ago is now revealing what life was like for thousands of people living under Russian military occupation from the early days of the war. For many there were periods of calm, but almost no food or public services. For those like Mariya, accused of sympathizing with or helping the Ukrainians, it was pure hell.

“In a word, it was horror,” Mariya said. “I thought I would not come out alive.”

Image

Mariya at her ransacked cottage in Balakliya. She was held prisoner, beaten and tortured because her husband was in the Ukrainian army.

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Russian forces spray-painted a symbol of the Russian occupying force on a car belonging to Mariya’s husband.

Police officers who have returned to towns and villages to re-establish a Ukrainian administration have been overwhelmed by complaints of theft and property damage, but also accounts of detentions, torture and missing relatives.

The scale of abuse of the population in eastern Ukraine under Russian occupation is most likely greater than that seen in the spring in Bucha and other areas around the capital, Kyiv, given the breadth of the territory and the length of the occupation, police officials said.

So far, police officers have logged more than 1,000 cases of people being detained in police stations and temporary holding facilities across the region, said Serhii Bolvinov, the police chief of Kharkiv Province. The real figure is probably two or three times that, he said.

Torture was routine, according to witnesses. The signs of abuse were already apparent in some of the 534 bodies recovered across the region, the police chief said. “There are bodies that were tortured to death,” he said. “There are people with tied hands, shot, strangled, people with cut wounds, cut genitals.”

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Last week, in a small cemetery set amid open fields on the edge of the town of Borova, a father stood silent watch as Ukrainian investigators carried out the grisly task of exhuming and examining the body of his son, Serhii Avdeev. Mr. Avdeev’s wife had found his bullet riddled corpse in a pit at a camp vacated days earlier by Russian troops as they retreated.

Image

War crimes investigators conducted a preliminary examination after Serhii Avdeev’s body was exhumed last week.

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Mr. Avdeev’s mother, Svetlana Avdeeva, showed an old photograph of her son, at left.

The killing of Mr. Avdeev, 33, a welder who had earlier served in the Ukrainian army, is just the latest subject of interest to war crimes prosecutors. His was one of hundreds of corpses recovered in dozens of towns and villages recaptured by Ukrainian troops in northeastern Ukraine.

The State of the War

• Drone Attacks: Russia’s use of Iranian-made drones in recent strikes across Ukraine may be a sign that Moscow is running low on precision-guided weapons. It also shows how Tehran has become an increasingly close ally to the Kremlin.
• Occupied Regions: President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia declared martial law in four illegally annexed regions of Ukraine as pro-Kremlin authorities in the city of Kherson said they would evacuate tens of thousands of people in advance of a possible Ukrainian counterattack.
• A Looming Crisis: Russia’s stepped-up attacks on infrastructure and vital utility networks in Ukraine herald a new phase of the war — one that threatens millions of Ukrainians with the prospect of a desolate winter without electricity, water and heat.
• Russia’s Chaotic Draft: Newly mobilized Russian recruits are already at the front in Ukraine, reports say, fighting and dying after only days of training. The draft has provoked widespread criticism across Russia and prompted thousands of Russian men to flee the country.

On Saturday a joint team of French and Ukrainian forensic specialists carried out an autopsy on Mr. Avdeev’s body in a morgue in Kharkiv, discovering at least 15 bullet wounds and four bullets lodged in his corpse. One of his nails and part of his finger had been torn off.

Accounts of those detained reveal the same pattern of abuse, including beatings and electric shocks during interrogations, in almost every police station and improvised jail across the region. Some inmates were held in open-air cages in the city of Kupiansk, one witness said.

Image

French and Ukrainian forensic experts documenting the wounds on Serhii Avdeev’s body.

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A mass burial site in Izium, where over 400 bodies have been recovered since the Russians retreated.

Mariya was held for 40 days in a police detention facility, where she endured hours of interrogation, electric shocks and threats of rape and death. One time, she fell from her chair, unconscious, and came around as someone was kicking her in the head.

Going by their accents she concluded that most of her interrogators were Russians, she said, and demanded to know where her husband was. They also repeatedly accused her of being a spotter who was identifying bombing targets for the Ukrainian Army.

Live Updates: Russia-Ukraine War

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• A missile ‘released’ by a Russian fighter jet near a British plane was not ‘a deliberate escalation,’ the U.K. says.
• ‘I thought I would not come out alive:’ Liberated Ukrainians describe life under occupation.
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From her cell, she could hear men and women screaming in pain. “Men screaming so hard I cannot describe it enough,” she said, weeping. She said she understood from the screams that women were being sexually assaulted (though she says she herself was not). “If they stripped me to my underwear, you can imagine what they did to the girls.”

There was another element to her persecution that was petty and vengeful.

Mariya hid in an empty apartment near a school where she worked as a cleaner, but she thinks someone disclosed her location to the Russians. In July, Russians wearing masks banged on the door and called out her name.

The second time they searched her house, the Russians spray-painted the letter Z — a symbol of the Russian occupying force — on every wall and door, including the interior of the refrigerator, and attacked her husband’s car with an ax and gunfire.

Image

Russian forces used this basement in Balakliya to hold prisoners.

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Prisoners were kept in Soviet-era cells at the Balakliya police station.

Another resident of Balakliya, Serhii, 30, a lumberjack, was detained by Russian soldiers in the woods near his house while he was out walking the dogs with his brother and a friend. The three men were stripped, beaten and interrogated.

“They wanted to know where the Ukrainian positions were,” said Serhii, who gave only his first name for fear of retribution, should the Russians ever return. “They were asking questions that we did not have the answers to.”

Then at 3 a.m. they were taken into the forest, made to dig a trench and put through a mock execution. “I thought they were dead,” Serhii said of his companions, his face crumpling as he broke into a sob.

The men were held in a basement and then after two weeks were released without explanation.

Investigators reopening police stations all over the recaptured territory have discovered hundreds of men and women with similar tales: beaten and tortured on accusations of serving in the Ukrainian Army, of having relatives in the army or of simply being pro-Ukrainian.

But even more were detained for a minor infraction, such as violating curfew, or on the catchall accusation of being a spy or a spotter.

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Police investigators at a basement in Kozacha Lopan where Russian forces held prisoners.

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Russian troops used a summer camp as a base.

Serhii Pletinka, 33, a builder who lives near the town of Shevchenkove, was detained twice, accused variously of being a Nazi, of illegally selling humanitarian aid and of plotting to kill a Russian-appointed police chief.

His accusers were all local men who had landed jobs with the new pro-Russian administration, and one of them had a longstanding dispute with him, Mr. Pletinka said.

Another man in his village, Oleh, 28, who was held for two weeks, said most of those making accusations were motivated by money or petty revenge. “Police officers were making false accusations to get rewards,” he said. “They did it for the money.”

Residents looked on as some of their neighbors began enjoying their newfound power and driving new cars, though things did not work out for all of them, Mr. Pletinka said. Among his cellmates, he said, was the first Russian-appointed mayor, who was later accused of misappropriation of funds and arrested.

Many of those who collaborated, including the imprisoned mayor, fled the country as Ukrainian troops recaptured the region and are thought to be in Russia, he said. But Mariya said her neighbors, some of whom, she recounted, stole her belongings and farm tools while she was in detention, have remained hostile, with one claiming he bought property from the Russians.

Image

Serhii Pletinka was detained and beaten by Russian forces near the town of Shevchenkove.

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Mobile phones confiscated by Russian forces were nailed to tree in the center of Kozacha Lopan.

In the police station of Kozacha Lopan, the site of a major Russian base near the border, investigators found a military field telephone used to administer electric shocks, along with documents identifying the Russian-appointed police chief who had been in charge at the station.

The Russians and their proxies often demonstrated an obsessive suspicion of spotters and others who might be helping the Ukrainian Army. They confiscated cellphones to prevent people from communicating with the other side, and even nailed cellphones to a tree on the main square of Kozacha Lopan to scare the public, Ukrainian police officers said.

“They were trying to establish a new rule,” said an investigator in Balakliya, who gave only his first name, Kyrylo, for security reasons. “And they were ruling through violence.”

The detentions continued right up until the end, even as Russian forces were retreating.

Mr. Avdeev, who had served in the military, had at first been questioned and beaten by Russian troops, but not held. Then on Sept. 9, when Russia’s hold on the region was unraveling, Russian-backed separatists from the region of Luhansk took him away.

His family found his body a week later in the abandoned Russian camp.

Image

The bodies of a man and a woman were found in a pit at a summer camp used as a base by Russian troops.

Oleksandr Chubko and Denys Tsiba contributed reporting from the Kharkiv region.

In Reclaimed Towns, Ukrainians Recount a Frantic Russian Retreat

Sept. 13, 2022

As Russia Retreats, a Question Lingers: Who Counts as a Collaborator?

Sept. 22, 2022

Carlotta Gall is a senior correspondent currently covering the war in Ukraine. She previously was Istanbul bureau chief, covered the aftershocks of the Arab Spring from Tunisia, and reported from the Balkans during the war in Kosovo and Serbia, and from Afghanistan and Pakistan after 2001. She was on a team that won a 2009 Pulitzer Prize for reporting from Afghanistan and Pakistan. @carlottagall • Facebook

A version of this article appears in print on Oct. 21, 2022, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Ukrainians Tell of Torture in Russian Occupation. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

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Better Understand the Russia-Ukraine War

• History: Here’s what to know about Russia and Ukraine’s relationship and the causes behind the conflict.
• On the Ground: Russian and Ukrainian forces are using a bevy of weapons as a deadly war of attrition grinds on in eastern Ukraine.
• Outside Pressures: Governments, sports organizations and businesses are taking steps to punish Russia. Here is a list of companies that have pulled out of the country.
• Updates: To receive the latest updates in your inbox, sign up here. The Times has also launched a Telegram channel to make its journalism more accessible around the world.

How We Verify Our Reporting

• Our team of visual journalists analyzes satellite images, photographs, videos and radio transmissions to independently confirm troop movements and other details.
• We monitor and authenticate reports on social media, corroborating these with eyewitness accounts and interviews. Read more about our reporting efforts.

15. US busts network providing technology to Russian military

US busts network providing technology to Russian military

AP · by ERIC TUCKER and FATIMA HUSSEIN · October 19, 2022

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Biden administration on Wednesday announced a round of criminal charges and sanctions related to a complicated scheme to procure military technologies from U.S. manufacturers and illegally supply them to Russia for its war in Ukraine.

Some of the equipment was recovered on battlefields in Ukraine, the Justice Department said, and other nuclear proliferation technology was intercepted in Latvia before it could be shipped to Russia.

The Justice Department charged nearly a dozen people in separate cases in New York and Connecticut, including Russian nationals accused of purchasing sensitive military technologies from U.S. companies and laundering tens of millions of dollars for wealthy Russian businessmen; Latvians accused of conspiring to smuggle equipment to Russian and oil brokers for Venezuela accused of working on illicit deals for a Venezuelan state-owned oil company.

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“As I have said, our investigators and prosecutors will be relentless in their efforts to identify, locate, and bring to justice those whose illegal acts undermine the rule of law and enable the Russian regime to continue its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine,” Attorney General Merrick Garland said in a statement.

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Five of the defendants charged in New York are Russian nationals, and two have been arrested. Two others are oil brokers for Venezuela.

All four defendants in the Connecticut case — three Latvians and one Ukrainian — were taken into custody months ago at the request of U.S. authorities.

They are accused of conspiring to smuggle a jig grinder, a high-precision grinding machine, that was manufactured in Connecticut to Russia. The equipment requires a license for export or reexport to Russia.

The criminal charges complement the latest round of Biden administration sanctions targeting Russia.

The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control announced sanctions Wednesday against one of the men charged by the Justice Department, designating Yury Orekhov and two of his firms, Nord-Deutsche Industrieanlagenbau GmbH and Opus Energy Trading LLC, for procuring advanced semiconductors and microprocessors used in fighter aircraft and ballistic and hypersonic missile systems among other military uses.

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Orekhov and the firms ultimately sent the materials to Russian end-users, including companies designated by various federal agencies, in violation of U.S. export controls. Prosecutors say Orekhov was arrested in Germany. It was not immediately clear if he had a lawyer who could speak on his behalf.

The Justice Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control worked in coordination to identify the Russian network.

Along with sanctions on members of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inner-circle, the U.S. has frozen Russian Central Bank funds and imposed aggressive export controls.

The latest effort is dedicated to preventing Russia from procuring military technologies.

Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo said in a statement Wednesday that Russia has increasingly struggled to get the technologies it needs to sustain the war “thanks to the unprecedented sanctions and export controls imposed by our broad coalition of partners and allies.”

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“We know these efforts are having a direct effect on the battlefield,” he said, “as Russia’s desperation has led them to turn to inferior suppliers and outdated equipment.”

Information from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, presented Friday at the Treasury Department, said Russia has lost more than 6,000 pieces of equipment since the beginning of the war in late February and is turning to Iran and North Korea for supplies.

Russia is reliant on foreign production machinery and ongoing banking sanctions have undercut the Kremlin’s ability to obtain financing for importing military equipment, the ODNI said.

—-

This version of the story corrects that 11 people, not nine, have been charged since total includes oil brokers.

AP · by ERIC TUCKER and FATIMA HUSSEIN · October 19, 2022

16. Watch Estonia's foreign minister — whose country just voted to declare Russia a terrorist state— bluntly say he wants to see Putin go 'to hell'

Twitter video here: https://twitter.com/i/status/1582654058719981568

Watch Estonia's foreign minister — whose country just voted to declare Russia a terrorist state— bluntly say he wants to see Putin go 'to hell'

Business Insider · by Lloyd Lee

Estonia's Foreign Minister Urmas Reinsalu has called for stronger punishments against Russia.

Sergei Grits/AP

• Estonian Foreign Affairs Minister Urmas Reinsalu was asked Tuesday about Vladimir Putin.
• Reinsalu has criticized western countries for not throwing more support to Ukraine.
• Estonia, which was occupied by the Soviet Union until 1991, announced more sanctions for Russia.

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Estonia's minister of foreign affairs Urmas Reinsalu had a few choice words for Vladimir Putin during a Tuesday interview in Berlin.

When political reporter Nina Haase-Trobridge of DW News asked Reinsalu, "Would you like to see Vladimir Putin go to jail," the foreign minister had another place in mind.

"To hell," he said bluntly, after briefly mulling it over.

—DW Politics (@dw_politics) October 19, 2022

Reinsalu's forward answer may not come as a surprise given his outspoken support for Ukraine and denunciation of Putin's war. The foreign minister previously defended his country's decision to ban Russian tourists and stop issuing new visas to Russians.

In the same interview with DW News, Reinsalu said that the West has not done enough to support Ukraine and that the "price is paid by the blood of Ukrainians."

At the outset of Russia's invasion, Estonia donated one-third of its military budget to Ukraine, according to the foreign minister. By August, the Baltic state had donated €220 million, or roughly $215 million, in support — about 0.8% of the country's GDP, according to Politico. In addition, the country has imposed several packages of sanctions against Russia.

On Tuesday, Estonian parliament members also almost unanimously voted to declare Russia a "terrorist regime," with only three lawmakers abstaining to vote, according to Radio Free Europe.

Estonia shares a 183-mile border with Russia. The country, along with the Baltic states of Latvia and Lithuania, was under Soviet occupation for five decades until 1991.

Business Insider · by Lloyd Lee

17. China's Nightmare: What If the U.S. Military Sent Troops to Taiwan?

Re-establish the Taiwan Resident Detachment (1957-1973) formed from SAFASIA (1st Special Forces Group in Okinawa)

China's Nightmare: What If the U.S. Military Sent Troops to Taiwan?

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Farley · October 20, 2022

Concerns over a cross-strait conflict have only grown over the past five years. President Joe Biden has chipped away at the policy of ambiguity that has long governed U.S. diplomatic relations towards Taiwan, meaning that the specifics of deterrence have come into the debate.

Deterrence is a difficult and complex thing; often we don’t know if a competitor has been deterred, or simply did not intend to do the thing that we don’t like. Sometimes a word of caution is sufficient to deter. Sometimes a promise of support is enough; sometimes a brigade and a squadron of interceptors is necessary. We have seen this dynamic play out in NATO, as the United States has steadily increased its commitments to the Baltic states as concerns over Russian aggression have grown.

The shifting stance of the Biden administration on Taiwan almost inevitably spurs the question of whether the United States eventually needs to pre-position equipment and personnel on Taiwan in order to deter a Chinese attack?

U.S. Troops to Taiwan? It Has Happened Before

The United States military has deployed troops in Taiwan in the past, albeit in far different strategic and political circumstances.

As the Chinese Communist Party and its armies rolled up mainland China in 1949, U.S. naval forces interposed themselves between Formosa and the mainland in order to prevent an invasion of the sort that captured Hainan Island. The first substantial U.S. forces deployed to the island in the mid-1950s, during a period of severe tension between the PRC and the RoC. The US military commitment on Taiwan itself maxed out at about 2,0000 in 1958 but remained in the thousands until the 1970s.

In addition to troops, the US deployed the nuclear-armed Matador cruise missile, which had a range of nearly 1000km and could reach many Chinese population centers. With the normalization of relations between Beijing and Washington in the late 1970s, the U.S. removed its remaining troops from Taiwan and trusted in a combination of naval power and diplomacy to maintain the security of the island.

The situation has changed for a variety of reasons. The expansion of Chinese naval and aerospace power has shifted the conventional military balance in Beijing’s direction, making a contested invasion at least somewhat plausible. Technological developments have tended to favor long-range precision fires, increasing China’s capacity to control access to Taiwan.

Finally, the diplomatic relationship between Beijing and Washington has deteriorated badly. In combination, these factors could make the pre-positioning of US military equipment and personnel an attractive option for the first time in over forty years.

Does China Get a Vote?

China’s reaction to the peacetime deployment of U.S. forces to Taiwan could get extreme. Past U.S. deployments came during a period in which the United States enjoyed presumptive conventional and nuclear superiority over the PRC. These deployments ended when the U.S. and the PRC entered their extended period of detente and friendship from the 1970s into the 2000s. Putting consequential military forces back in Taiwan could do irrevocable damage to the relationship.

The likelihood of a negative reaction makes the pacing and sequencing of a deployment particularly important. The news of a U.S. deployment would be self-defeating if it incurred an immediate Chinese attack on Formosa. Much will depend on context, but the establishment of a tripwire might not be a sufficient deterrent against a Beijing deeply irritated by Washington’s intervention in its relationship with Taipei. If the Biden administration or a future administration decided to do this, it would need to rapidly transition consequential military forces into Taiwan in order to forestall a Chinese attack. It would not be at all surprising in China responded with force, even if at a level of escalation lower than a full-scale invasion.

Image Credit: Creative Commons.

The secret transfer of forces and capabilities might seem ideal, but keeping the deployment of, say, nuclear cruise missiles to Taiwan secret from Beijing would be exceedingly difficult and virtually guaranteed to enrage China when it became public. We do, after all, have historical experience with an effort to secretly transfer nuclear missiles to an island next to continental nuclear power. Any kind of secret deployment would require extraordinary care to pull off successfully.

A U.S.-China Relationship Transformed

The deployment of US forces to Taiwan would mark a transformation in the US-China relationship. If the U.S. decided to escalate in this fashion, it should be while Washington’s attention is firmly focused on China; ideally, the Ukraine War would have ended, for example. On the upside, the pre-positioning of U.S. forces would eliminate any doubt in Beijing’s mind that invading Taiwan would start a major war. On the downside, it would risk starting a major war, as well as disrupting one of the world’s most important economic relationships.

We can only hope that a future US administration will contemplate such a move with the greatest of care.

Now a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Farley · October 20, 2022

18. The impending loss of Kherson: How will Putin spin it?

The impending loss of Kherson: How will Putin spin it?

slantchev.wordpress.com · by Branislav Slantchev · October 20, 2022

October 20, 2022

Two days ago, the Ukrainian military asked all bloggers, YouTubers, and social media personalities to observe radio silence when it comes to events and operations in Kherson Region. The last time they imposed such a media blackout was when the Kharkiv Offensive began. There is, essentially, total compliance with this request, and so all information about what’s going on in Kherson, especially on the right bank of the Dnipro River, now comes from Russian sources.

Here is what we know for a fact:

1. The occupation authorities of Kherson (the “governor” Sal’do and his deputy Stremousov”) posted video messages where they urged the residents of the right bank to evacuate as quickly as possible. They promised that the Russian government will pay for their transportation, and that anyone who loses their home as a result of this relocation will be given a certificate that would help them find a new dwelling somewhere in the Russian Federation. Both claimed that this is done in order to enable the Russian military to defend Kherson more effectively so they would not have to worry about civilians, and that the evacuations are voluntary.
2. The occupation authorities announced that all government institutions, banks, and related personnel will relocate to safety on the left bank of the Dnipro. Videos show that the Russians are also looting museums, taking valuables with them.
3. Putin declared martial law in the illegally annexed territories (and state of heightened alert in all border regions of Russia). This allows the authorities to compel the relocations (among other things). Videos from Kherson show long lines of people waiting to be transported across the river. Russian sources claim that between 50,000 and 60,000 people will be relocated, which should take about a week. The reason now is a supposed impending Ukrainian attack on the dam at Novaya Kakhovka.
4. The newly appointed commander of the Russian forces in Ukraine, General Surovikin, gave a video interview, where he read from a teleprompter all carefully prepared answers (he did not even once look at the camera — he clearly needs more practice with this). He acknowledged that the situation in Kherson is very difficult, and that — depending on how it develops — difficult decisions would have to be made. He also said that Russia has intelligence that the Ukrainians are planning to destroy the dam at Novaya Kakhovka.

From this point on, we have to do some interpretation of these facts, which will necessarily involve educated guesses.

It is almost certain that the Russian leaks about a Ukrainian attack on the dam are meant to prepare the audiences for a destruction of the dam. The Ukrainians have no incentive to do this, but the Russians do. Everybody understands that except people in Russia, so the intended audience must be domestic. I believe that this is how Putin has decided to deal with the impending loss of Kherson: by satisfying the Russian public’s bloodlust and urge to avenge the defeat.

Let’s unpack this a bit.

The Ukrainians have no incentive to destroy the dam whatsoever. The video below shows what Russian sources estimate the expected inundation to look like. The height of the water will reach 4.8m, it will spread across 5km, and take 2 hours for the water to reach the city of Kherson. The inundation would last for 3 days. I have no reason to doubt the essential veracity of these estimates (I have heard other sources that claim the water level would not exceed 2m). The residents that Sal’do specifically told to evacuate are all from towns that would be in the path of the flood.

I have written previously both about the importance of the Novaya Kakhovka for strategic purposes (when ZSU first crossed the Inhulets River below Davydiv Bryd months ago) and the possible Russian attack on the Ukrainian hydroelectric cascades on the Dnipro River. To refresh our memories, recall that the Dnipro River has 3 bridges in the region — the Antonovskyi Bridge in the city of Kherson itself, the railway bridge slightly upstream, and the one at Novaya Kakhovka. The Ukrainians have managed to take the first two out of commission, and they destroyed the third as part of their effort to isolate the Russian units on the right bank. Unfortunately, the bridge at the dam is just a short connector — most of the crossing is over the dam itself. The Russians were able to fix it with simple earthworks which are very difficult to destroy, and would require a bombardment that would endanger the dam itself. As a result, ZSU have had to target transportation columns directly, which has been far less effective.

The Russians badly need this crossing to continue to supply their forces on the right bank and to evacuate them if ZSU threatens them with encirclement. The Russian units there, estimated to be about 25,000 strong, are supposed to be among the better ones, and so worth preserving.

The Ukrainian offensive in the South started about a week ago, and met with unexpected (by me, at least) success as they tore through the Russian defenses in the north, but especially north-east of Kherson. They made good progress but then slowed down again as the Russians rushed reinforcements. From all available information, it appears that the Russians do not expect to be able to hold the right bank against superior ZSU forces, not without significant reinforcements, which they do not have. Most, if not all, Russian reinforcements are sent to the units trying to take the key transport hub Bakhmut in Donetsk region so they can push toward Kramatorsk-Slovyansk (where they have been making extremely slow advances for several months) and in a counter-attack toward Lyman from the area of Kremennaya in Luhansk Oblast (apparently, on Putin’s orders to retake the initiative in the north), plus hardening of the defenses of Luhansk, where ZSU is still continuing the Kharkiv Offensive (which should probably be renamed to the Kharkiv-Luhansk Offensive by now). If the Russians succeed in both directions, they could encircle the ZSU units that are north of Bakhmut and west of Kramatorks, in a sort of a payback for the defeat at Izyum.

We have some contradictory information about what the Russians are doing in Kherson: some units are leaving but others are going in. The best I can tell is that the Russians are evacuating their valuable forces and equipment from Kherson while sending in newly mobilized troops to hold the front line and provide the rest with the time necessary to complete the withdrawal. These reinforcements are basically sent to act as a speed bump against the advancing ZSU. It is also likely that the Russians are using the evacuation of civilians, in part, to mix them with military traffic and so deter ZSU from attempting to bomb the olumns.

This brings me to a very interesting fact: ZSU seems not just to have stopped its advance but it has refrained from trying to impede the traffic at Novaya Kakhovka. It could be that the Russian tactic is working, but the Ukrainians seems to have left alone that crossing even before the evacuations began. Given how adamant they had been about destroying the access routes across the Dnipro River before, the question is why — why are they leaving the third crossing unchallenged?

To answer this, let’s consider the military situation. The Ukrainians had mined all three crossings before the war began and were supposed to blow them up the moment it started. I don’t know whether the order was given, but even if it was, it was never executed. The Russians crossed the Dnipro unchallenged, and took Kherson without firing a shot. Treason is the most likely explanation. The Ukrainians have more or less successfully interdicted large movements of troops and supplies by degrading and destroying the crossings over the past several months, which has made the Russian position in Kherson untenable. Still, the Russians did use the time to dig in, construct more defenses, and so any frontal attack on those would result in a lot of casualties for the Ukrainians, casualties ZSU can ill afford since these would be valuable veterans with months of training, difficult to replace, and very much unlike the partially mobilized human mass that the Russians are throwing at them.

Since ZSU is in no hurry to advance, it must be that they either are unwilling to do it or cannot do it with available forces. (There are conspiracy theories floating on Russian sites that there’s an “agreement” of some sort between the field commanders in Kherson whereby the Ukrainians are pretending to attack and the Russians are pretending to defend, all the while the Ukrainians are letting the Russians escape unmolested. This is inconsistent with the ferocity of the fighting reported from many parts of the front there, extraordinarily difficult to implement without becoming public, and nonsensical from Ukrainian perspective — all forces that the Russians save now will be used against ZSU at a later point, and probably not under circumstances as advantageous to the Ukrainians as right now.)

Since the Russians are evacuating, apparently they think the Ukrainians do have sufficient forces to take Kherson, and so the inference has to be that ZSU does not want to press too hard right now. I think that the Ukrainians are, in fact, giving some Russian units the opportunity to escape, and that’s because they wish to weaken the forces they have to overcome in their sweep of the right bank. Casualty-avoidance is likely among the reasons, but also it could be that the Ukrainians do not have sufficient forces to encircle and fight a 25,000-strong Russian grouping. If that’s the case, it would be simply necessary to let the enemy whittle down its own numbers. At any rate, destroying the dam would absolutely not play to ZSU’s advantage.

But neither it would to the advantage of the Russians here if they wish to continue the evacuation. This is why I think the destruction of the dam is not going to happen until they have withdrawn all or most of what they intend to withdraw. Because after that, cutting off ZSU and stranding the Ukrainian forces on the right bank would be very, very attractive to the Russians. They would be able to shell Kherson from the left bank unperturbed (which they will certainly do), and they will force the Ukrainians to attack from the direction of Zaporizhzhia on the right bank further east instead of this direction. This would allow the Russians to build up more forces there and thin out the lines here. Since the Russians cannot just destroy the bridge for the same reason the Ukrainians could not, they would have to blow up the dam, something the Ukrainians were unwilling to do but the Russians would be.

The problem with blowing up the dam is political — the military necessity can justify it in Putin’s eyes and in the eyes of the Russian military, but it would play badly worldwide and probably even in Russia. So out comes the cockamamie story about a Ukrainian terrorist act. The Russians are preparing everyone for something they are planning to do. When the dam is destroyed, they would say, “see, we told you so!” and “we warned everyone, including the residents of Kherson,” and “look how much effort we put into trying to save their lives,” and so on and so forth. So the evacuation of civilians also has a propaganda purpose to illustrate the humanitarian efforts of the Russian forces, and contrast them with the evil bestiality of the Nazi terrorists. Plus, since there still will be Russian forces on the right bank (remember, they are surrendering, they are fighting to the last man, as the propagandist like to say), there will be casualties among them as well. Plus the added benefit of forcing the rest to either fight or surrender, the first being portrayed as an act of self-sacrifice and heroism, and the latter — as prudence in the face of the Ukrainian overwhelming superiority acquired through the atrocity. Both would have to be avenged.

Nobody in the West (or the world, except North Korea) would believe this nonsense. But the Russian public will. They have been told stories about Ukrainians destroying their own cities for years. And they will be told that the Russians were totally going to hold Kherson (heck, even take Odesa soon) but the khokhols murdered thousands of Russian citizens (remember, in the fantasy world of the Kremlin this is now Russian territory) and flooded the area, which forced the brave Russian military to evacuate its soldiers and start rescue operations instead of fighting. Kherson was not lost, really, it was drowned by the criminal Kyiv regime, and we have to avenge that! Surely, we’ll take it again soon, as soon as the waters recede. And the Russian public will call for Ukrainian blood instead of wondering why it is that its wondrous military keeps losing territories in Ukraine.

For all of this to work, Putin does need to show that his military is victorious (so the loss of Kherson can be readily attributed to the terrorist act by the Ukrainians rather than incompetence by the Russians). And so the Russians are furiously attacking in Donbas. Bakhmut they absolutely need to take if they are going to conquer Donetsk to its administrative borders. And pushing ZSU away from Severodonetsk would help holding Luhansk in the north. Putin may also want to open yet another front in the north, from Belarus, to force ZSU to split its forces and render it incapable of sustaining local superiority in the south that allows it to advance there.

If the situation continues as it is right now, I fear that an attack on the Novaya Kakhovka dam is inevitable.

Of course, things might not continue as they are now. There is some info that the Russians might have been able to organize a pontoon bridge along the Antonovskyi, which would permit them to supply their forces in Kherson. If this is the case, they might try to organize a defense of the city akin to what the Ukrainians did with Mariupol except they will not be totally cut off (until, that is, ZSU destroys that bridge as well). Putin’s first choice would obviously be to hold Kherson — and maybe he thinks the new units plus supplies could do it. Then, the exchange of units that’s happening right now would be a compromise between the pessimists that believe Kherson cannot be held (so the good units must be saved while there still is time) and the optimists that believe that Kherson can be defended (so new units, albeit of lower quality, must be rushed in). If the optimists are correct, there would be no need to blow up the dam (the Ukrainian terrorist attack would magically disappear).

The next few days should bring more clarity to this situation as we see whether ZSU resumes its offensive in the area.

There is a silver lining to this: if the move works, Putin would not have to use tactical nukes to stem the Ukrainian advance. (These would be much harder to sell and would come with additional international costs.)

Let’s also take a quick look at other developments.

Iran is supplying Russia with kamikaze drones that have wreaked havoc on the Ukrainian energy system (Zelenskyy said that 30% of it has been affected). As we have noted repeatedly, the Kremlin strategy of attrition has been focusing on civilian infrastructure because of lack of success against the ZSU. The Iranians deny any involvement but now we have credible intel that they will supply Russia with even more drones and, more troublingly, ballistic missiles. The recent UNSC meeting about this fell apart –unavoidably since Russia is there — with both the Russians and the Iranians denying the origin of these drones. The Russian UN guy, Polyanskiy, gave a bizarre presser where he insisted that the drones were Russian-made because anyone could see that Russian name on the debris, complained that people are underestimating the Russian drone industry, and threatened to withhold cooperation from the UNSC if they sent anyone to take a closer look at the debris. Totally credible denials, as you can see.

The Iranians denials have a very Jesuit quality to them because they seem very carefully worded. As in, “we are not supplying drones” or “we are not supplying any arms that violate UN Resolution 2231”, leaving me with the impression that they might be supplying the parts for the drones that the Russians can then assemble either in Syria or Tajikistan (where there are reported drone-producing facilities) or maybe even in Russia itself.

At any rate, the drones are likely to be soon taken care of. Right now, the Ukrainians are already shooting down more than two-thirds of them, but they are using very valuable missiles in doing so. The US is rushing electronic counter-measure equipment that would confuse the drones, and, soon, automated active defenses that would shoot them down. Even with the additional supplies it is unlikely that the Russians would be able to create more than a nuisance with the drones. Frankly, the Ukrainians should have started working out drone countermeasures as soon as the US leaked that Iran has agreed to supply them. I have no idea why they wasted two months and now have to play catch-up.

The bigger problem are the Iranian ballistic missiles. These have sufficient range to cover all of Ukraine from launch sites in Crimea, Belgorod, or Belarus. They are also very difficult to intercept. The Ukrainians would need something like our Patriot systems, but these require a lot of training to operate, and we are unlikely to supply them with American contractors to do so. This means that effort should go into either getting Iran to give up on that (unlikely) or interdicting them along the way (extremely hard). I think that we will probably see them in Ukraine. They are going to be devastating against civilian targets but I do not see how it could improve the military situation for the Russians.

The Russian hope that the Ukrainian people will crack is misplaced. I am not aware of a single anti-civilian campaign that significantly undermined the war effort of their government. It did not work against the British in the Blitz (80,000 casualties, half of them dead, over 7 months of incessant bombing by the Germans), it did not work against the Germans during World War II (over a million casualties, a third of them dead, over two years of bombing by the British and the Americans), it did not work against the Vietnamese during the Vietnam War (up to 40,000 dead over 3 years of bombing by the Americans).

Moreover, the Ukrainians seem especially determined. The most recent GALLUP poll (taken in the first half of September) shows that 70% of Ukrainians want to fight to victory, and only 26% want to start negotiations. Remarkably, the support for fight-to-victory is higher among the highly educated (80%) than among those with secondary education or less (68%). And how do Ukrainians define victory? Those who said Ukraine should fight to victory defined it as the recovery of all territory lost since 2014, including Crimea (91%). It’s unlikely that these people would be cowed by having to light their rooms with candles or huddle under blankets for a while. The Russian terror campaign will fail.

The other aspect of Putin’s strategy is targeted at Ukrainian support in the West. There are some encouraging (for him) signs there: recession in Europe seems inevitable, unrest in France over high energy prices is widespread, right-wingers in Italy and Sweden have come to power, Hungary and Austria keep interfering with common measures in the EU designed to make the union independent of Russian energy, Saudi Arabia cutting oil production and declaring its desire to join BRICS, and head of Republicans in the US House McCarthy stating that should the GOP win the House, they will cut US aid to Ukraine. Useful idiots in the West have again taken to penning articles about the need for negotiations to avoid nuclear war (yes, I am looking at wealthiest useful idiot among them, Musk, too), basically conceding Putin the credibility of that threat that he desperately needs, that he tried to desperately manufacture with the sham annexations, but that remains elusive as far as any level-headed person should be concerned.

But before Putin breaks out the champagne for having outlasted the Ukrainians, let’s take a closer look at what’s happening. The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO has now been ratified by all but two of the members, and is coming soon. The new Italian PM might be an anti-immigration hardline conservative, but she has had a consistent record of supporting Ukraine, and insisting that Italy do more to help. The EU Commissioner von der Leyen recently said that when they initially estimated how long it would take Europe to wean itself from Russian gas, they thought it would be years, but now — barely six months in — they have replaced 2/3 of Russian gas already. The European storage facilities are full, and the energy prices have come down. Nobody will be freezing in Europe this winter.

Chancellor Scholz blasted Putin just yesterday for his “scorched earth” tactics, and affirmed that the Europeans will not back down. He also declared that Germany had freed itself from dependence on Russian gas. His party’s co-leader gave a presser where he admitted that party (and the German leadership) had made serious mistakes in their dealings with Russia, having failed to see the transformation of the country under Putin. This breaks with Merkel’s “I have no regrets” refrain that she had been singing ever since the war began, and signals the completion of the transformation of German politics, where elites finally came to recognize that their “change through trade” does not really work.

I actually welcome a revision of our relations with Saudi Arabia, and am happy that they are forcing our hand in this — I do not think there would have been political will to do so regardless of who sits in the White House.

Speaking of our leaders, I am not too troubled by McCarthy’s blabbing over funding for Ukraine. First, the Republicans in the Senate are quite staunchly anti-Russian. Second, even with a crazy MAGA-wing in the House, it’s unlikely the GOP would cut the aid. The reason is simple: greed. Our military aid is estimated to be worth billions of dollars, and — sure — some of it involves us making purchases of weapons on Ukrainians’ behalf. But a lot of what we send is from our own armories. We are basically using up stored equipment that had been gathering dust for years. This has already been paid for, and even though we include these payments in the cost announcements, the money is not coming out of the current budget. That’s one reason Biden has not have had to use Lend/Lease: the administration has been able to pay for the aid (financial and purchases) from the ongoing authorizations.

Of course, as we deplete our stocks, they would have to be replenished. This is where the real spending will come. But now, the government would be paying American companies to produce weapons for ourselves. I can’t imagine a GOP politician (heck, a Democrat either) who would hurt our military-industrial complex. This sort of thing just does not happen. And so the money will flow, the companies will crank out the replacements, people will keep being employed, and the GDP will increase. Economic bliss is sure to follow. (I realize how all of this sounds to people who hate this system but, in this case, just think about the Ukrainians.)

The US is also positioning itself to profit handsomely from this war. In addition to replacing Russia as the main gas supplier to Europe, we are becoming an attractive host to European companies, several of which have decided to move their manufacturing facilities here (e.g., BMW), and can retain American companies which could have moved them overseas (e.g., Tesla). In the current climate of global instability, energy price volatility, and authoritarian resurgence with its violation of property rights, investments will flow into the areas where governments can offer a safe business climate. No one beats the US in that. So the situation is grim, yes. But it’s grim for Russia and its hangers on, not for us.

This post is already very long, and I have not even mentioned China.

That’s because I don’t know what to say. President Xi is about to become the new Emperor in everything but name. The 2-hour speech he delivered — 60 single-spaced pages in translation — is essentially either undecipherable or, more likely, devoid of any content. It’s all a bunch of self-congratulatory nonsense served with a heavy dose of ideological verbiage but if one is looking for any hints what Beijing will do next, then one might as well read tea leaves.

As with supposed conspiracies to dethrone Putin, all speculation about what goes on at the highest levels in Beijing is just made up garbage. We just don’t know. All I will say is that it’s very unlikely that Xi would welcome an outright defeat for Russia (this would leave China as a lonely competitor to the US, and it’s always useful to have some crazy guy with nukes on your side) even if this would allow China to plunder Siberia at will. By the same token, I very much doubt that he would be willing to accept a Russian “victory” of sorts if it comes with the use of nuclear weapons. Whether he has enough leverage to restrain Putin — should Xi finds it necessary to do so — is not clear to me. Putin’s megalomania and belief in his own historical importance would make him a very unlikely target of hand-twisting. He looked distinctly unhappy when, during their last face-to-face meeting in Astana — the Tajik president read him publicly the riot act about mistreating his neighbors. You can bet that Putin was calculating just when he would be able to go after the insolent underling.

All of this — plus the economy’s enmeshing with the West — makes China’s moves difficult to predict. The US, for its part, has tried to signal that it prefers a non-confrontational approach. In our new security strategy document, we defined China as a competitor with the potential to alter the world system (music to Xi’s ears and ego) while we defined Russia as an imminent threat. So there’s plenty of room for coexistence and compromise there. It’s probably inevitable that we would have to learn to live with a China that we do not particularly like, but so what — lots of people don’t like us either, and seem to be able to live with that as well. We will learn too (and probably outcompete them anyway).

• international relations
• Russo-Ukrainian War 2022

slantchev.wordpress.com · by Branislav Slantchev · October 20, 2022

19. Russia appears to be signaling a retreat from key Ukrainian port city of Kherson

Russia appears to be signaling a retreat from key Ukrainian port city of Kherson

The Week · by Peter Weber

Russian state media on Wednesday showed video of people lining up for ferryboats to take them across Ukraine's Dnipro River from the strategic Black Sea port city of Kherson, away from Ukrainian forces who are closing in to try and retake the city.

The Russian-appointed regional leader of Kherson, Vladimir Saldo, said Tuesday that officials would be evacuating civilians, including Russian occupation ministries and departments, in an "organized, gradual displacement." Civilians in the city received "Evacuate immediately!" text messages Wednesday, and occupation officials distributed pamphlets warning that Ukrainian forces were approaching and claiming they will shell the city. Ukraine's military is maintaining operational silence in Kherson.

Saldo and other occupation officials insisted Russian forces are not retreating from Kherson. But Gen. Sergei Surovikin, the new top Russian commander in Ukraine, acknowledged Tuesday that his army faces "hard decisions" in Kherson, and suggested retreat is an option. "Our future plans and actions regarding the city of Kherson will depend on the unfolding military-tactical situation," he said on television. "I repeat — today it is already quite difficult."

"Surovikin's announcement highlighting negative news about the 'special military operation' is highly unusual," Britain's Ministry of Defense said early Thursday. "It likely indicates that the Russian authorities are seriously considering a major withdrawal of their forces from the area west of the Dnipro River."

"Russian authorities are likely setting information conditions to justify planned Russian retreats and significant territorial losses in Kherson Oblast," the Institute for the Study of War research group concurred, and "attempting to mitigate the informational and operational consequences of failing to defend against another successful Ukrainian advance."

Civilians inside Kherson told BBC News and The Wall Street Journal they aren't being forced to leave and have no plans to do so. "People are not panicking, nobody wants to be evacuated," one woman told the BBC. Serhiy Khlan, an aide to the ousted Ukrainian leader of Kherson, called the televised ferry crossings "deportation theater" possibly meant to cover "the withdrawal of troops." Russia is already starting to establish a new regional capital at Henichesk, he added.

Recapturing Kherson would be a huge "prize" for Ukraine and "a humiliation" for Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Journal explains. "If Russia's military is forced to abandon the city — the only Ukrainian provincial capital captured since its February invasion of the country — it would be a significant blow to the Kremlin and could mark a potential turning point in the monthslong conflict."

The Week · by Peter Weber

20. US general on rare visit to nuclear-armed sub in Arabian Sea

US general on rare visit to nuclear-armed sub in Arabian Sea

AP · by LOLITA C. BALDOR · October 20, 2022

WASHINGTON (AP) — The top U.S. military commander for the Middle East boarded a U.S. ballistic missile submarine in the Arabian Sea on Wednesday, a rare move that highlighted U.S. nuclear undersea capabilities during tense times with Iran and Russia.

Gen. Erik Kurilla was shuttled out to the USS West Virginia and went aboard for about eight hours as the submarine rose to the surface in an undisclosed location in international waters in the sea.

The West Virginia is one of the Navy’s Ohio Class, long-range submarines, known as boomers. They are stealthy and, as one leg of America’s nuclear triad, can launch nuclear missile strikes and are considered a key strategic deterrent. The U.S. seldom advertises the location of its nuclear-powered submarines, and doesn’t often have them patrolling in the Middle East.

In a statement Wednesday, U.S. Central Command said Kurilla met with Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, the commander of the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet, on the submarine. It said Kurilla also got a “hands-on demonstration of the capabilities of the vessel.”

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“These submarines are the crown jewel of the nuclear triad, and the West Virginia demonstrates the flexibility, survivability, readiness, and capability” of the U.S. forces at sea, Kurilla said in the statement.

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The unusual submarine visit by a Central Command leader comes as Russian President Vladimir Putin has threatened to use nuclear weapons with his forces losing ground in the war in Ukraine. And Iran — which is in the Central Command region — has become more involved in the war, supplying waves of drones that Russia has been using to strike targets in Ukraine, including power plants, residential buildings and other key infrastructure.

Central Command leaders have often visited U.S. Navy ships in the waters around the Middle East, including massive aircraft carriers that were routinely sent to the region as a deterrent to Iran. Since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have ended, the Navy has not had a frequent carrier presence in the region.

Kurilla’s submarine tour also came as NATO began its long-planned annual nuclear exercises in northwestern Europe. Fourteen of NATO’s 30 member countries were scheduled to take part in the exercises, which are conducted around the same time every year and run for about one week.

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The drills involve fighter jets capable of carrying nuclear warheads, but do not involve any live bombs. U.S. long-range B-52 bombers are taking part in the maneuvers.

Russia usually holds similar nuclear force exercises this month, and those are expected to begin soon.

The Ohio Class submarines are equipped with Trident II D-5 missiles. The U.S. submarine fleet, split between bases at Bangor, Washington, and King’s Bay, Georgia, represents one leg of the U.S. nuclear “triad,” along with the Air Force’s long-range B-2 and B-52 bombers and land-based Minuteman 3 missiles.

AP · by LOLITA C. BALDOR · October 20, 2022

21. Biden Takes on Grand Strategy

Excerpts:

Ultimately, the president is the decider—but the reality of the so-called rule of ten and fifty means that Joe Biden—or any other chief executive—can only concentrate on a handful of issues at any one time. Senior figures around him can tackle a larger number, and depending on their personal access and whether they hold the president’s confidence, they might be able to act as his alter ego. More often than not, competing imperatives in the strategy will lead to satisficing compromises at lower levels of the interagency, or will lead to certain aspects of the strategy being pushed “down the calendar.” Already we’ve seen in the last year, since COP26 in Glasgow in 2021, how many of the longer-term climate promises have been suspended or abrogated in favor of shorter-term economic needs, including a resumption in the use of coal-fired plants to generate electricity.

To the extent there is a clear prioritizing principle, it might be “climate geopolitics”: reducing dependence on authoritarian states for natural resources for fueling Western economies, which can spur domestic technological innovation and also spur movement towards a green energy revolution while giving new purpose to Cold War alliances that move beyond military cooperation towards closer technological and economic relationships that will benefit their middle classes. Yet even that perspective still requires further operationalization. In sending this signal, the next step will be to see how the various “lower level” strategies of the US government decide to further define and clarify these questions.

Biden Takes on Grand Strategy - Foreign Policy Research Institute

fpri.org · by Nikolas K. Gvosdev

Editor’s Note

This is the first article in a series on the Biden administration’s new National Security Strategy.

Executive Summary

• The National Security Strategy aims to break down the separation between “domestic” and “foreign” policy—but does not provide a mechanism for reconciling competing imperatives
• The strategy calls for confrontation with authoritarian, revisionist powers but also posits a series of transnational challenges that require international cooperation—but lacks a clear calculus as to which priority takes precedence
• “Climate geopolitics” appears to be the emerging organizing principle—but will require further elucidation and operationalization

In March 2022, as we awaited the release of the first National Security Strategy (NSS) of the Biden-Harris administration, I assembled some observations about the role and function of such documents. I noted that a “national security strategy … is supposed to provide strategic guidance for the entire federal government” and that it is “released in the President’s name and is supposed to encapsulate his thinking, perspective, and worldview.” At the same time, the final document can often represent “an exercise in satisficing between different bureaucratic and policy interests of the various departments of government and the political factions that make up his administration.”

On October 12, 2022, the White House released its National Security Strategy. It is quite comprehensive in its scope and ambitions. It envisions containing the world’s leading revisionist powers (among them China and Russia) while forging new broad international coalitions to tackle a broad away of transnational threats, starting with climate change. The document lays out aspirations to regenerate the American domestic industrial base along Fourth Industrial Revolution lines while forging new economic partnerships with like-minded members of the democratic community of nations. Finally, it calls for the United States to play a leading role in creating and sustaining regional security architectures in every part of the world.

And yet, since the NSS is designed “to serve as the foundation for the strategic documents and policies” of every department of the US government, this latest iteration, while serving as a “first draft of what the administration sees as its strategic priorities,” still leaves some unanswered questions, which must be addressed in the coming weeks and months if this document takes the next step from presenting “broad, aspirational language” towards more operational guidance.

At several points in the NSS, the point is stressed that the bright dividing line between “foreign” and “domestic” policy has broken down, what Politico‘s Nahal Toosi has described as “omnipolicy“: collapsing the bureaucratic silos around such issues as “energy” or “climate.” And yet an omnipolicy approach requires a much higher degree of coordination and harmonization among the different parts of the US government where responsibilities for discrete portions of a particular policy initiative reside. This moves beyond the challenges of reconciling differences within the national security establishment between geographic and functional portfolios to also bring into the conversation a whole host of domestic regulatory questions and priorities.

In his message of transmission, the president indicates that foreign challenges have often been the spur to domestic reform and innovation. Yet who will be in the driver’s seat—and where will inevitable disputes be brought to resolution? As we have seen in just the last month, “domestic” decisions on how to allocate tax credits for electric vehicles or the release of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve—meant to bolster and address domestic concerns and interest groups—have also led to friction in US relationships with key partners like South Korea and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, cabinet departments—such as the Department of Commerce under Secretary Gina Raimondo—have played a much more leading and upfront role in some of America’s major foreign policy initiatives—in this case, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity.

The appointment of Ambassador Susan Rice to head the Domestic Policy Council seemed to suggest that the Biden administration understood that an omnipolicy approach might benefit from having a seasoned member of the foreign policy community to head the principal White House interagency process for domestic issues, while the designation of Jake Sullivan, who had done so much work on economic statecraft (and helped to formulate the “foreign policy for the middle class” tag line) as national security advisor, heralded the creation of a National Security Council process that would not just consider the international environment, but domestic considerations, in the formulation of US strategic options. If this NSS is to assist in developing implementable options, however, it suggests that a much closer fusion of the Domestic Policy Council and National Security Council staffs and interagency working groups will be required.

The NSS also lays out that the United States must be able to navigate among two broad sets of challenges—containing revisionist powers while promoting cooperation—and to do so in ways that balance US interests and obligations in different regions of the world as well as address domestic concerns and constituencies. While the president invokes an optimistic, can-do spirit (“There is nothing beyond our capacity”) the reality is that there are always competing clusters of interests and values. In keeping with President Bill Clinton’s dictum that “we don’t have to choose,” US strategic documents are usually loath to spell out the criteria for trade-offs, and this NSS is no exception. Nevertheless, the strategy contains within it distinct and separate imperatives that could contradict each other. Climate change is an existential issue, but the NSS stresses the importance of “out-competing” China; rejuvenating American domestic industry and manufacturing is a sine qua non for the maintenance of American power, but so is deepening trade and economic integration across the Pacific and Atlantic Ocean basins. The strategy envisions an entire plethora of overlapping coalition partners but many of these partners also have important and critical differences with each other.

Just to note a few of the challenges the United States is grappling with in real time. Washington wants India as a linchpin for its strategy for a free and open Pacific, but also want New Delhi to dramatically reduce its energy imports from Russia in order to deprive Moscow of revenue that helps support its malign activities, including the invasion of Ukraine. But deepening America’s relationship with European allies is also a priority, and part of that is helping to ensure their energy security as they decouple from Russia, which means helping to facilitate alternate sources of supply—which pivots cargoes away from India. North America could supply more energy in theory, but both production and constructing the export infrastructure create environmental issues amidst concerns that increasing short-term supplies of hydrocarbons retards the necessary shift to greener forms of energy down the line. Green energy is part of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, an area where the United States wishes to retain advantages vis-à-vis its competitors, especially China, but does that include areas such as energy that have climate impacts? Finally, of course, any international policy that significantly raises domestic energy prices will run into considerable political resistance. All of a sudden, one precipitating event—India’s decision over the last seven months to increase its energy purchases from Russia—has no one response that successfully meets all the goals of the strategy.

Ultimately, the president is the decider—but the reality of the so-called rule of ten and fifty means that Joe Biden—or any other chief executive—can only concentrate on a handful of issues at any one time. Senior figures around him can tackle a larger number, and depending on their personal access and whether they hold the president’s confidence, they might be able to act as his alter ego. More often than not, competing imperatives in the strategy will lead to satisficing compromises at lower levels of the interagency, or will lead to certain aspects of the strategy being pushed “down the calendar.” Already we’ve seen in the last year, since COP26 in Glasgow in 2021, how many of the longer-term climate promises have been suspended or abrogated in favor of shorter-term economic needs, including a resumption in the use of coal-fired plants to generate electricity.

To the extent there is a clear prioritizing principle, it might be “climate geopolitics”: reducing dependence on authoritarian states for natural resources for fueling Western economies, which can spur domestic technological innovation and also spur movement towards a green energy revolution while giving new purpose to Cold War alliances that move beyond military cooperation towards closer technological and economic relationships that will benefit their middle classes. Yet even that perspective still requires further operationalization. In sending this signal, the next step will be to see how the various “lower level” strategies of the US government decide to further define and clarify these questions.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev

Nikolas Gvosdev is the Editor of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs and a Senior Fellow in FPRI's Eurasia Program.

fpri.org · by Nikolas K. Gvosdev

22. ‘US thumbing its nose’ at Russia with missile drills on Hokkaido, security expert says

‘US thumbing its nose’ at Russia with missile drills on Hokkaido, security expert says

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · October 20, 2022

Members of 3rd Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division test-fire rockets from a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, in Hokkaido, Japan, Oct. 14, 2022. (Diana Jimenez/U.S. Marine Corps)

The U.S. Marine Corps last week test-fired missiles on Hokkaido of the same type that have plagued Russian forces at war in Ukraine.

The Marines fired their High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, and Javelin anti-tank guided missile, systems supplied by the U.S. to Ukrainian forces that have been credited with turning the tide against invading Russians.

Test-firing missiles that are “the scourge of Russia's invading forces in Ukraine … so close to Russia's eastern borders looks like the US thumbing its nose at the Russians,” James Brown, an international affairs expert at Temple University’s Japan campus, said in an Oct. 14 email.

Kunashiri, an island 15 miles north of Hokkaido, is the closest of four islands claimed by Japan but occupied by Russia since the end of World War II.

The Russian military has been expanding its presence in the islands, even as it fights a costly war in Ukraine, the Center for Strategic and International Studies reported Sept. 27.

Russian forces north of Hokkaido defend the Kuril chain and deny access to the Sea of Okhotsk, an important sanctuary for Russian submarines, Brown said.

“There has been a buildup of Russian capabilities on the islands, including the addition of anti-ship missiles and better anti-aircraft weapons,” he said. “However, these capabilities are consistent with defensive goals. Additionally, most Russian drills on the islands simulate defending the territory against amphibious landings, not attacking.”

Russia has no intention of invading Japan and Japan has no intention of retaking the disputed islands by force, Brown added.

“Things would have to get a whole lot worse than they currently are for this situation to change,” he said.

A force of 1,600 Marines, led by the Okinawa-based 12th Marine Regiment, an artillery unit, trained on Hokkaido Oct. 1-14, alongside 1,400 troops from Japan’s Northern Army during the Resolute Dragon exercise.

“We are aware of the Russians. You can’t not be because they are very close,” 12th Marines commander Col. Jonathan Sims, who led U.S. forces training on Hokkaido, told Stars and Stripes by phone from Okinawa on Thursday.

Last month, Russia scrapped an agreement with Japan to allow Japanese former residents to visit the disputed islands off Hokkaido without visas, sparking a protest by Tokyo. Japan and the U.S. have imposed sanctions on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine.

The Russians filed a diplomatic protest about the Resolute Dragon drills, Sims said.

A Russian destroyer, submarine and submarine rescue ship were sighted 25 miles northeast of Cape Soya, Hokkaido, on Oct. 6, Japan’s Defense Ministry reported the next day.

“We are all aware of what is going on in Ukraine,” Sims said, noting that the Marines are applying lessons learned from the conflict to their training.

Guidance from Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. David Berger calls for distributed operations, Sims said.

“Watching the way Ukraine is operating and winning has validated it,” he said. “A lot of things we have been practicing out here, they have put into practice there.”

On Hokkaido, the Marines spread out their launchers and fire direction centers to not provide large targets, Sims said.

“We have to be distributed as if we are under a persistent watch by an adversary,” he said.

The Marines practiced setting up bilateral command and control with their Japanese counterparts. Those skills will be honed next month during the Keen Sword exercise and at the Yama Sakura drills in December. Both exercises will happen on Okinawa and Kyushu, Sims said.

Stars and Stripes reporter Hana Kusumoto contributed to this report.

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · October 20, 2022

23. America and China Don’t Need to Knock Each Other Out to Win

America and China Don’t Need to Knock Each Other Out to Win

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/19/opinion/international-world/united-states-china-taiwan-xi-jinping.html?utm_source=pocket_mylist

Oct. 19, 2022

The Chinese military conducted live-fire military exercises to intimidate Taiwan after a high-profile visit by Nancy Pelosi, the House speaker, to Taipei in August.Credit...Lai Qiaoquan/Xinhua, via Associated Press

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By Jessica Chen Weiss

Dr. Weiss is a professor of China and Asia-Pacific studies at Cornell University.

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Competition and conflict between the United States and China have continued to intensify. On Aug. 2, the House speaker, Nancy Pelosi, visited Taiwan to showcase congressional support for the self-governing island, defying Chinese protests that her visit was inconsistent with the “one China” policy of the United States. China responded by ringing the island with live-fire military exercises, missile tests and other operations in the Taiwan Strait.

On Oct. 7, the Biden administration ordered sweeping export controls to prevent China from acquiring the most advanced semiconductors and the equipment required to manufacture them, and forbidding any American or foreign company to sell to China any such equipment that uses American technology.

These developments have perhaps not surprisingly taken place against the backdrop of growing cooperation between China and Russia over their shared belief that neither can be secure in a U.S.-led international order. China’s rhetorical and diplomatic support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine has solidified the sense that the United States must outcompete its autocratic rivals to shape the future of the international order.

U.S.-China competition risks becoming an end unto itself, pressing leaders in Beijing and Washington to embrace maximalist positions meant to thwart each other and crowding out efforts to tackle global challenges like climate change and pandemics.

In a nearly two-hour address to the Chinese Communist Party’s continuing 20th congress on Sunday, Xi Jinping — who is expected to win a third term as China’s top leader — stated confidently and to lengthy applause that “the wheels of history are rolling on toward China’s reunification and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Mr. Xi has often proclaimed that time is on China’s side, and that Beijing can afford to be patient.

In his speech, the Chinese leader lauded the party’s accomplishments but also steeled his audience for “dangerous storms” and potential perils ahead. His report to the party congress affirmed that amid “global changes of a magnitude not seen in a century,” China’s development has entered an era where “strategic opportunities, risks and challenges are concurrent.”

Under Mr. Xi’s leadership, the Communist Party has used more aggressive tactics to defend its legitimacy and interests, seeking regional pre-eminence and acceptance as a strong and respected peer by the United States.

But the Chinese leader is unlikely to seek military conflict, either to divert attention from domestic challenges or to act before China’s power peaks. The political scientists Taylor Fravel and Andrew Chubb have shown that Chinese foreign policy tends to be more cautious when its leaders are preoccupied with domestic challenges. Mr. Xi’s speech underlined the many “deep-seated problems” and “formidable tasks” that China faces, from unemployment to inequality to acute environmental challenges.

China’s long-term ambitions and capabilities are a work in progress, especially as its economic growth slows. The Communist Party recognizes that China is still weaker than the United States, and its modernization drive remains dependent on international technology and capital. Despite efforts to become more self-sufficient, Mr. Xi acknowledged that “China’s capacity for scientific and technological innovation is not yet strong enough.”

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Beneath Mr. Xi’s efforts to project confidence lie undercurrents of domestic dissatisfaction with how doggedly he has stuck with “zero Covid” policies, mismanaged the economy and alienated the West. Yet so long as Mr. Xi can point to perceived U.S.-led efforts to contain China’s development, his appeals to Chinese nationalism will continue to win these domestic debates and sideline dissent as unpatriotic. Many Chinese who are unhappy with how Mr. Xi has ruled still share his view that U.S. pressure and sanctions are intended to undermine China’s development and preserve U.S. primacy.

Given the deep distrust on both sides, coordinated, unilateral steps back from the brink — voluntary bounds on behavior rather than limits on new capabilities — could give both the United States and China breathing room to get through acute domestic challenges and navigate a particularly perilous period.

The long-term risk is that uncontrolled competition will fuel overextension abroad, where the impulse to counter every potential threat or challenge by the other makes it difficult to focus resources and attention on achieving positive priorities and outcomes. In the United States, escalated competition could exacerbate domestic divisions and undermine democracy. Already, increased xenophobia and anti-Asian violence in America, along with ramped-up efforts to protect research security, have led more than 60 percent of Chinese-born scientists working in the United States — including naturalized citizens and permanent residents — to consider leaving the country.

The United States once judged that the world would be safer with China inside rather than outside the international system. That bet largely paid off and is still better than the alternative. Leaders in the United States and China should utilize bilateral and multilateral forums, like the Group of 20, to discuss steps each side could take to move away from the brink.

A good place to start would be military operations around Taiwan, including the reduction of Chinese maneuvers across the “median line,” an unofficial buffer line, of the Taiwan Strait. Beijing’s actions have undermined the credibility of its assurances that it prefers to resolve differences across the Taiwan Strait peacefully. In his speech on Sunday, Mr. Xi broke little new ground on Taiwan, affirming that China would “continue to strive for peaceful reunification” and warning against “interference by outside forces.”

Concrete evidence of Mr. Xi’s claimed “patience” and willingness to engage constructively would reduce the urgency of growing calls in the United States for a new policy framework that would assert a clearer American commitment to defending Taiwan.

Though well intentioned, calls for change in U.S. policy are more likely to increase the risk of a Chinese attack on Taiwan that they aim to deter. The United States should be prepared to demonstrate its own willingness to limit steps that do more to symbolize U.S. support than to strengthen Taiwan’s welfare and capacity to resist coercion. This would include public statements and official visits that would treat Taiwan as a separate country or appear to restore an alliance-like relationship with the island. And the Biden administration should continue to help Taiwan toughen its defenses and press forward with trade and investment agreements that will strengthen economic ties.

The United States and its allies can still shape plausible terms of coexistence with Beijing by making punishments and rewards conditional on Chinese behavior. This requires making clear that if China’s leaders refrain from the proscribed behavior, they can expect to be rewarded rather than exploited.

Mr. Xi and President Biden should focus their efforts on the future they seek, rather than the one they fear. Instead of reflexively countering every new initiative or idea the other puts forward, China and the United States should invest more attention and resources in metrics of success not defined by undermining or gaining advantage over the other.

It is critical to resist fatalism and maintain a healthy dose of skepticism against dire assessments that could become self-fulfilling. If a peaceful — if competitive — coexistence is the ultimate objective, Washington and Beijing do not need to knock each other out to win.

24. FDD | U.S. Offer of Sanctions Relief Remains Active Despite Iran Protests

FDD | U.S. Offer of Sanctions Relief Remains Active Despite Iran Protests

fdd.org · October 20, 2022

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Human rights groups report that the Islamic Republic of Iran has killed at least 233 Iranians, including at least 32 minors, while detaining thousands more during mass protests over the past five weeks. Though the State Department said last week that nuclear talks with Iran are “not our focus right now,” the Biden administration has yet to withdraw offers of sanctions relief already made to the regime in Tehran — leaving the door open for lifting sanctions on entities and sectors of Iran’s economy that finance the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has played a role in suppressing protests.

Expert Analysis

“It’s one thing to pose for pictures with Iranian dissidents in Washington. It’s another thing to send a clear message throughout Iran that U.S. sanctions relief for the Islamic Republic is off the table, full stop. Nothing could be more demoralizing to the Iranians putting their lives on the line than hearing that the United States is keeping the door open to pumping cash into the regime they are protesting.” – Richard Goldberg, FDD Senior Advisor

Biden Offer to Lift Sanctions Still on the Table

In 2018, the U.S. Treasury Department revealed that entities connected to the Basij militia, a branch of the IRGC that has played a role in suppressing protests, were “deeply entrenched in major Iranian industries, such as automotive, mines and metals, tractor manufacturing, and banking.” Yet the Biden administration has already offered to rescind executive orders and lift sanctions on all of those sectors on day one of a phased nuclear deal.

Additionally, the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) continues to finance the ministries and agencies — including the IRGC — currently involved in the crackdown on the Iranian people, making it a potential target for a human rights sanctions designation. Yet the administration has offered to lift sanctions on the CBI as part of a revived nuclear agreement.

Support for Protesters Requires Ending Nuclear Talks, Enforcing Sanctions

Even as it assesses that prospects for a renewed nuclear deal are low, the Biden administration continues to insist that the “door for diplomacy will always remain open,” as White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre put it on Monday. But so long as Washington keeps the nuclear deal on the table, Tehran will feel emboldened to continue its repression, confident that international pressure will ultimately fade. As such, nuclear talks exacerbate the human rights abuses that the Iranian people are currently protesting.

Related Analysis

“How Biden Can Stand With the Iranian People,” by Behnam Ben Taleblu and Saeed Ghasseminejad

fdd.org · October 20, 2022

25. FDD | China, Russia Deepen Partnership on Satellite Navigation

​Excerpts:

Looking ahead, Moscow hopes China can help Russia defy Western sanctions by sourcing microelectronics to meet its space and broader military and economic needs. Russian illicit procurement networks often rely on obscure firms and cut-outs, but the Treasury Department should also keep an eye out for formal or informal involvement by state-affiliated Russian defense companies. For example, a company owned by JSC Shvabe, a U.S.-sanctioned holding company controlled by Russia’s state-owned Rostec defense conglomerate, maintains a subsidiary in Shenzhen for the express purpose of procuring microelectronics and other products, according to the company’s website.

The Biden administration should continue to remind Beijing of the risks of violating U.S. sanctions against Russia, including in the space industry. Any Chinese firms that refuse to listen should be swiftly punished.

​

FDD | China, Russia Deepen Partnership on Satellite Navigation

fdd.org · by John Hardie Russia Program Deputy Director · October 20, 2022

China and Russia signed contracts late last month to host ground stations for their respective global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs), BeiDou and GLONASS, which are alternatives to the U.S.-run Global Positioning System (GPS). These stations will improve the performance of their systems, which provide precision, navigation, and timing (PNT) services for both military and civilian purposes.

The two sides inked the contracts during the September 27 annual meeting of their Project Committee on Important Strategic Cooperation in Satellite Navigation, launched in 2015. He Yubin, head of the China Satellite Navigation System Committee, and Yuri Borisov, head of Russia’s state corporation Roscosmos, co-chaired the meeting.

Under the contracts, Beijing will place three ground monitoring stations at various locations throughout Russia, while Moscow will do the same in China. Both countries have sought to expand their respective networks of ground stations in recent years, aiming to bolster the performance of their systems. Sino-Russian talks on mutual hosting of ground stations have been ongoing since at least 2014.

Beijing and Moscow sides also said the China Satellite Navigation Office’s Testing and Evaluation Research Center and the Information and Analysis Center for Positioning, Navigation and Timing at Roscosmos’ Central Research Institute of Machine-Building signed a statement “on the joint provision of information support services” to BeiDou and GLONASS customers, without offering additional details.

Improving the PNT services offered by BeiDou and GLONASS would benefit Chinese and Russian military as well as civilian users. Both militaries are working to integrate PNT and other space services into their weapons and command-and-control systems, as the U.S. intelligence community warned last year. Some industry observers also fear Sino-Russian cooperation could help erode GPS’ international market share. Indeed, China’s People’s Daily has boasted that the GLONASS-BeiDou partnership could “break the U.S. ‘hegemony’ in satellite navigation” while mitigating the risk of reliance on GPS.

Beijing and Moscow also hope their GNSS cooperation will support advances in applications such as precision farming and unmanned vehicles, facilitate cross-border transportation, and help promote their systems internationally. BeiDou is central to Beijing’s quest to achieve dominance in space, and expanding BeiDou use abroad is a key element of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. To the extent Sino-Russian cooperation can promote civilian GLONASS use, as Roscosmos hopes, it could help cover operating costs and support the system’s repeatedly delayed modernization.

Last month’s agreements are only the latest development in Sino-Russian GNSS cooperation, part of their broader partnership in outer space. Their GNSS cooperation began in earnest after Western backlash against Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, which led Moscow to accelerate its turn toward Beijing despite historical wariness about aiding China’s rapidly advancing space program. Most recently, at Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 2022 summit, the two sides signed an agreement on “ensuring complementarity” between BeiDou’s and GLONASS’ respective time-keeping systems. This is a key first step toward broader interoperability, which can improve the accuracy and reliability of both systems.

Looking ahead, Moscow hopes China can help Russia defy Western sanctions by sourcing microelectronics to meet its space and broader military and economic needs. Russian illicit procurement networks often rely on obscure firms and cut-outs, but the Treasury Department should also keep an eye out for formal or informal involvement by state-affiliated Russian defense companies. For example, a company owned by JSC Shvabe, a U.S.-sanctioned holding company controlled by Russia’s state-owned Rostec defense conglomerate, maintains a subsidiary in Shenzhen for the express purpose of procuring microelectronics and other products, according to the company’s website.

The Biden administration should continue to remind Beijing of the risks of violating U.S. sanctions against Russia, including in the space industry. Any Chinese firms that refuse to listen should be swiftly punished.

John Hardie is deputy director of the Russian Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he also contributes to FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP) and Center on Economic and Financial Power. For more analysis from John, the Russian Program, CMPP, and CEFP, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CMPP and @FDD_CEFP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

fdd.org · by John Hardie Russia Program Deputy Director · October 20, 2022

26. Turkey’s Opposition Is Paving Erdogan’s Path to Victory

Turkey’s Opposition Is Paving Erdogan’s Path to Victory

Turkey’s political opposition has a public responsibility to challenge Erdogan and provide voters with an alternate vision, but it has refused to do so.

The National Interest · by Sinan Ciddi · October 20, 2022

Turkey is rapidly declining as a functioning state, and few in the country’s political elite seem to care. It has gone from being an imperfect democracy to an autocratic wasteland, and although President Recep Tayyip Erdogan can largely be blamed, he is not the sole facilitator of this tragic decline. Turkey’s opposition, the so-called “Nation Alliance”—a coalition of six political parties—is greasing the rails for Erdogan, ensuring that Turkey’s autocratic turn is likely to become institutionalized.

Sometime before June 2023, Turkey is required to hold presidential and parliamentary elections. Erdogan is running for a third (unconstitutional!) term as the country’s chief executive. To that end, he has begun to mobilize all resources available to him to ensure a seamless victory. On October 16, he ratified a parliamentary bill which critics have decried as a “censorship law,” or in the government’s parlance: “disinformation law.” Under its provisions, the state is now empowered to remove any content on media platforms, if the judicial authorities deem it to be against the public interest. The law’s provisions are so widely applicable and ambiguous, that any prosecutor can require social media, as well as conventional media platforms, to remove content or risk being fined. Critics fear that the law will be widely used to imprison scores of dissidents who openly defy the government. Moreover, the all-powerful “Directorate of Communications”—Turkey’s version of a state ministry of propaganda, that is directly attached to Erdogan—maintains a vast secretariat. Run by the maniacal Fahrettin Altun, the government agency will likely deploy an army of digital content observers to target dissidents across Turkey and perhaps beyond. In the short term, the law is likely to frighten individual citizens into self-censorship and prevent them from posting and/or re-posting any content that is critical or offensive to Erdogan. I know this because friends have already reached out to other colleagues and me stating “please keep speaking up about what’s going on inside Turkey, but we may not be able to re-post it, as we are more afraid than ever.”

It is clear why Erdogan wanted this law passed: to instill fear and control information flows. What is unclear is why Turkey’s political opposition is sitting around and twiddling its thumbs. During parliamentary deliberations, the main opposition Republican People’s Party did virtually nothing to prevent the law from being passed. Yes, in the end, they could not have prevented its passage as they lack a parliamentary majority. However, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the CHP, was not even in parliament. Instead, he was in Washington meeting with students and intellectuals and seemingly touring the mid-Atlantic corridor. For Turkey’s beleaguered opposition leader, there could not have been a worse time to schedule a visit to the United States and just bumble around. The incompetence, cowardice, and lackluster strategy (if you can call it that) of the Nation Alliance is bewildering. At the very least, the CHP and other opposition parties could have brought attention to the implications and provisions of the draconian law, generally making life for the governing Justice and Development Party uncomfortable. Alas, this did not happen.

This is only one recent development, however. The opposition alliance that was conceived to defeat Erdogan is basically playing a game of thrones. Past polling data over the last twelve months infused a false sense of confidence into the six parties: owing to high levels of inflation (83 percent at present), historical declines in household incomes, and visible levels of government corruption, all the opposition would have to do was wait for the elections, and Turks would vote Erdogan out of power. Since the inception of this mirage, the alliance members have not only failed to declare a presidential candidate but also failed to enunciate a political and economic platform. We have no idea what they intend to do should they attain the office. Insider information suggests that each of the political leaders is interested in two things: which party gets to lead which agency and who will land the presidency. Absent from these calculations is the glaringly obvious: given that polls are shifting back in Erdogan’s favor, why should voters choose the opposition? For now, and as things continue, undecided voters will be tempted to vote for Erdogan, holding their noses for one simple reality: Erdogan is the devil they know.

Moreover, the alliance appears to be fixated on nominating the person who is least likely to defeat Erdogan: Kilicdaroglu. Leader of the CHP since 2010, Kilicdaroglu has no victories against Erdogan. He is personable and kind, but that’s it. He is seventy-three years old, uncharismatic, and has little accolades that will convince voters that he can deliver an attractive, alternative future for Turkey. On the other hand, Ekrem Imamoglu, the young and energetic mayor of Istanbul is just about the most logical choice for president. Erdogan is scared of him, and for good reason. Imamoglu won the race for Istanbul not once, but twice (Erdogan annulled his victory at the 2019 municipal elections and forced a re-run, which he won by a larger margin). Furthermore, Imamoglu taunted Erdogan by conducting what appeared to be a campaign tour in the president’s own turf—Turkey’s Black Sea region—and was received enthusiastically by thousands. He has decent polling numbers and is an excellent campaigner. Will the opposition nominate Imamoglu? Likely not. Why? Because Imamoglu is feared by alliance members. They worry that in the event that Imamoglu becomes president, he will overshadow them and make them politically irrelevant.

An Erdogan victory in 2023 will solidify his hold on Turkey and will further institutionalize Turkey’s illiberal trajectory. It will result in the country becoming further cut off from democratic norms and its Western partners and aspirations. Erdogan knows and wants this; he has done very little to hide it. Turkey’s political opposition has a public responsibility to challenge Erdogan and provide voters with an alternate vision, but it has refused to do so. The opposition’s failure does not appear likely to change going forward. I am not holding my breath for 2023.

Sinan Ciddi is a non-resident senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’s Turkey Program and Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP). He is also an Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Command and Staff College-Marine Corps University and Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He tweets @sinanciddi​.

Image: Reuters.

The National Interest · by Sinan Ciddi · October 20, 2022

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com