Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:

"At any age it does us no harm to look over our past shortcomings and plan to improve our characters and actions in the coming year." 
- Eleanor Roosevelt

"Take up one idea. Make that one idea your life - think of it, dream of it, live on that idea. Let the brain, muscles, nerves, every part of your body, be full of that idea, and just leave every other idea alone. This is the way to success."
- Swami Vivekananda

'Insanity in individuals is something rare - but in groups, parties, nations and epochs, it is the rule."
- Friedrich Nietzsche


1. Russian Forces Halt Kyiv Advance as Kremlin Says Donbass Was Only Goal All Along
2. War in Ukraine: Change of emphasis or admission of failure by Moscow?
3. Russia Abandons March on Kyiv, Focuses Embattled Troops Instead on Donbas
4. In Ukraine, Russian Activity Now More Focused on Donbas Than Kyiv
5. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 25 (PUTIN'S WAR)
6. Vladimir Putin on the run? Russia says it will scale back its Ukraine invasion to focus on 'liberating' the eastern Donbas region 'and save face' after losing 20 BATTALIONS
7. Russian commander run over ‘deliberately’ by his own troops in Ukraine, officials say
8. UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATE 19
9. The new Russian cult of war
10. Russia Was Losing the Information War. Then Fox News Stepped In.
11. Op-Ed: Ukraine — Redefining the role of modern special forces in a ground war
12. Alert the Fifth Force: Counterinsurgency, Unconventional Warfare, and Psychological Operations of the United States Air Force in Special Air Warfare
13. Special Operations News Update - March 26, 2022 | SOF News
14. Supreme Court restores Pentagon's authority over deployment of unvaccinated SEALs
15. Russia’s failures in Ukraine imbue Pentagon with newfound confidence
16, How NATO ‘woke up’: The response to Putin’s war
17. Did Putin's Invasion of Ukraine Damage Russia's Ability to Sell Weapons?
18. Yes, US Green Berets Helped Ukraine Train for a War with Russia
19. That Time US Forces Tore Hundreds of Russian Wagner Group Mercenaries to Pieces in Syria
20. Ukraine, Taiwan, the Koreas: Is the world tilting toward major wars?
21. Constellis company Triple Canopy wins $1.3 billion State Department WPS III Baghdad contract
22. The Lost Reason Russia Is Losing in Ukraine: The Information Economy Problem


A 3 minute Public Service Announcement:
The Disinformation Threat to America
Simple. Common Sense. But why do we not follow this advice? 



1. Russian Forces Halt Kyiv Advance as Kremlin Says Donbass Was Only Goal All Along

Is this the beginning of the end? Has Putin found the off ramp to Putin's War? I do not want to jinx things but hopefully Putin understands his failure and is trying to find a way out (although he must end up with no Russian troops on any Ukrainian territory).

A strategic thought: if Ukraine successfully defends itself (and I believe it can, will, and must) without NATO/US direct military intervention it will be a decisive loss for Putin. It will be a great loss for Putin and a huge win for Ukraine. Ukraine will have nearly single handedly stood for democracy against authoritarianism. Not requiring direct NATO/US intervention in every conflict is a good thing.  

I have been critical of President Biden and his public statements saying we will not deploy US troops to Ukraine, we will not contribute to establishing a no-fly zone, we will not assist in the transfer of MiG-29's from Poland to Ukraine, our stated fear of escalation and nuclear war, all of which would appear to cede the initiative to Putin while conducting our own "self deterrence." However, if Ukraine is successful with only indirect support (material and training) from NATO and the US, President Biden should take credit for the largest and most successful "through, with and by" operation ever executed. 

Yes we made mistakes.We should have provided the right weapons systems sooner. But the contributions of Green Berets and other USSOF, the CIA, and the California National Guard, and other States were instrumental in providing training while many more senior personnel (both in uniform and as retired military personnel working as contractors) helped the Ukrianians to conduct a major military transformation from a Russian based military to one based on superior western/NATO military organizations and structures (to include an NCO corps) able to employ mission type orders, dispersed command and control and integrate combined arms maneuver operations with territorial defense forces and popular resistance with superb strategic communications and psychological warfare that we should all learn from.. Ukraine can truly say it has conducted a whole of society defense.

A most important lesson that we should all focus on transmitting to the world is that an authoritarian country where its troops fight for an authoritarian leader, to keep him in power, cannot defeat a people who have a deep love for freedom and democracy and who are defending their homeland.

When Ukraine wins it will validate the Resistance Operating Concept. published in 2020 by the Joint Special Operations University. These excerpts are worth considering.

The Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) originated as an initial effort under the guidance of Major General Michael Repass, Commander, Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). Mr. Byron Harper took that guidance and began the Resistance Seminar Series in 2014, supported by the next SOCEUR Commander, Major General Gregory Lengyel. They had the foresight to realize that it was necessary for the United States and our allies to have a common understanding of national resistance, and cooperate in planning for such an eventuality, based on Russian actions that continue today. Though developed with European partners, this concept has worldwide application.
 
 
This Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) explores actions that a sovereign state can take to broaden its national defense strategy and prepare to defend itself against a partial or full loss of national sovereignty. This document is a result of inputs to the Resistance Seminar Series, initiated in 2014, as a succession of seminars dedicated to studying resistance as a means of national defense.
 
The Resistance Seminar Series assembled a multinational academic and practitioner network to foster a broader intellectual perspective and build a common understanding among the disparate groups and individuals needed to support a resistance. Our partner participants were primarily from northern and north-central Europe, with common concerns. The seminars provided a structured forum for stakeholders to critically evaluate and develop “pre-crisis” activities, including preparation, deterrence, and other activities, while allowing for discussion and exchange of ideas on theoretical, historical, and practical elements of resistance. The seminars promoted critical thinking on resistance themes, creating a basis for collaboration and mutual understanding at strategic and operational levels.
 
As a culmination of these efforts, the ROC:
 
• Defines resilience as: The will and ability to withstand external pressures and influences and/or recover from the effects of those pressures or influences.
 
• Defines resistance as: A nation’s organized, whole-of-society effort, encompassing the full range of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally established government (potentially exiled/displaced or shadow) to reestablish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory that has been wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power.
 
• Provides a common understanding of terms defined within previous seminars and by reference to publicly available U.S. military doctrine. “Adversary” and “enemy” are used to describe an aggressor state. The term adversary is used to describe the aggressor state prior to conflict, while enemy is used after that adversary becomes the foreign occupier and national resistance becomes necessary to restore national sovereignty.
 

Help the oppressed free themselves. (De Oppresso Liber)
Russian Forces Halt Kyiv Advance as Kremlin Says Donbass Was Only Goal All Along
Pentagon official rebuts Moscow's claims about war aims, casualties; adds that Russian precision munitions are failing at high rates.
defenseone.com · by Tara Copp
A month into its invasion, Russia appears to be reducing its war aims from capturing all of Ukraine to merely holding the Donbass region–which a top Russian military officer said Friday was the goal from the start, but which Pentagon said may be a result of Russia’s intelligence failures.
“Our forces and equipment will focus on the most important thing, the complete liberation of Donbass,” Russian General Staff head of military operations Sergei Rudskoi said at a Friday briefing in Moscow, as reported by Interfax. Rudskoi said the month-long invasion had completed its first phase and achieved its purpose: keeping Ukraine from retaking the separatist-controlled Donbass territories.
Rudskoi claimed the attacks on Kyiv and outlying cities were done only to keep Ukraine from being able to send troops or defenses to Donbass.
He also said Russian military casualties were 1,351 dead and 3,825 wounded. Both figures are far below recent NATO estimates of 7,000 and 15,000 Russians dead and 40,000 wounded.
A senior U.S. defense official told reporters on Friday that Pentagon leaders have a different assessment of the situation: that intelligence, command and control, and logistics failures were taking their toll and potentially forcing Russia to reconsider its objectives.
“They overestimated their ability to take any population center and they clearly underestimated the Ukrainian resistance,” the official said. “So I think it's safe to assume that they face some intelligence failures of their own. Whether they're now changing their strategic goals or not, I think it's difficult to say.”
On the ground, the official said, the Russians were facing “significant command and control problems, both in terms of an individual leader’s ability to command troops in his field but also the ability of commanders to speak to one another.”
Unlike the United States, Russia does not have a non-commissioned officer corps, seasoned and senior enlisted leaders who provide decentralized command and control.
Russia’s stalled ground attack and columns of forces that have faced fuel, food and water shortages have forced it to rely heavily on long-range fires, which were also facing shortages and high failure rates.
Those long convoys of troops that had been headed to Kyiv have not made significant forward progress in weeks and were now digging in, the official said.
“The Russians are at least for the moment not pursuing a ground offensive towards Kyiv. They are digging in. They're establishing defensive positions. They don't show any signs of being willing to move on Kyiv from the ground,” the official said.
As of Friday, Russia was also continuing its escalated air war, launching more than 300 sorties a day, but its stocks of air-launched cruise missiles were dwindling, the official said.
All types of Russian precision munitions are seeing high failure rates, perhaps up to 60 percent, the official said.
“The ranges I've seen in the press from anywhere from 20% to 60%—I would not push back on that assessment,” the official said. “There are times when they have—when our assessment is that they have experienced a significant amount of failure in their missiles.”
Russia appears to be concentrating its forces on eastern Ukraine, the official said.
“At least for the moment, they don't appear to want to pursue Kyiv as aggressively, or frankly at all. They are focused on the Donbass,” the official said.
defenseone.com · by Tara Copp


2. War in Ukraine: Change of emphasis or admission of failure by Moscow?
Again, are we seeing the beginning of the end? Or is Putin conducting some kind of deception operation?

War in Ukraine: Change of emphasis or admission of failure by Moscow?
BBC · by Menu
By Paul Adams
BBC News
Published
1 hour ago

Kharkiv has been pounded for weeks - now that Russian firepower may be deployed further east
Is the Russian military having to change its plans? Perhaps even reduce the scale of Moscow's ambitions in Ukraine?
It's probably too early to tell, but there's definitely a shift in emphasis.
A top Russian general - Sergey Rudskoy - says the "first stage" of what President Vladimir Putin calls Russia's "special military operation" has been mostly accomplished and that Russian forces will now concentrate on "the complete liberation of the Donbas".
This is likely to mean a more concerted effort to push beyond the "line of contact" that separates Ukrainian government-held territory in the east of the country from the Russian-backed separatist "people's republics" of Donetsk and Luhansk.
The pace of Russia's advance in other areas of Ukraine remains glacial. Its forces have been pushed back from positions around the capital, Kyiv, and are said to have started digging defensive positions to avoid losing more or prepare for some kind of pause.
It's probably way too early to conclude that Russia has given up on capturing Kyiv, but Western officials say that Russia continues to experience setback after setback.
On Friday, they said Russia had lost another general - the seventh - and that morale was at rock bottom in some units.
They believe General Rudskoy's announcement implies that Moscow knows that its ambitious pre-war strategy has failed.
"Russia is recognising that it can't pursue its operations on multiple axes simultaneously," one official said.
As many as 10 new Russian battalion tactical groups are being generated, officials say, and are heading for the Donbas.
Even before the war began last month, they voiced the fear that Russia would make a concerted effort to encircle and envelop Ukraine's best fighting units which make up the Joint Forces Operation (JFO), stationed along the line of contact.
Retreat may not mean tame ambitions
A renewed push now could see Russian troops pushing out into so-far unconquered areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, possibly aiming to link up with forces moving south from Kharkiv and Izyum.
And if Russia can succeed in finally pacifying the port of Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov, then other forces could move north and complete the encirclement of the JFO.
Some of these objectives still seem out of reach. Mariupol's defenders are putting up a ferocious fight, preventing Russia from fully achieving another of its pre-war ambitions - a land bridge from the Crimean Peninsula to the Donbas.
But if Moscow has concluded that it makes more sense to concentrate, for the time being, on achieving one objective at a time, it's likely to concentrate its firepower, especially from the air.
The Ukrainian military, disciplined and motivated as it is, will need all the help it can get to withstand the pressure.
"I hope that's where the Western supply of arms will make a significant contribution to Ukrainian forces," one Western official said.
If the coming days do see a shift of focus to the Donbas, that doesn't yet mean that Moscow has abandoned its wider ambitions.
"We don't see a re-evaluation of the invasion as a whole," a senior US defence official said.
Russian advances in the east
War in Ukraine: More coverage
Media caption,
A survivor told the BBC: "We were sprayed with broken glass and concrete"
More on this story
Related Topics
BBC · by Menu


3. Russia Abandons March on Kyiv, Focuses Embattled Troops Instead on Donbas

Seems to be a lot of reporting on this.

Russia Abandons March on Kyiv, Focuses Embattled Troops Instead on Donbas
By U.S. News Staff U.S. News & World Report3 min

A Ukrainian serviceman stands at a checkpoint on Thursday, March 24, 2022, in Kyiv, Ukraine.(Vadim Ghirda/AP)
Russia appears to have abandoned its plan to seize and hold the Ukrainian capital city Kyiv, several officials said Friday, as Moscow faces mounting battlefield casualties and a surprising level of resistance from Ukraine’s armed forces.
A senior U.S. defense official told reporters Friday afternoon that the Russian army, bogged down along several axes across the former Soviet state it invaded last month, has reset its dwindling military resources on the Donbas instead. The region of eastern Ukraine composed of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, or administrative divisions, has been the site of an existing, protracted, Russia-backed conflict by supposed separatist forces since 2014. Russia appears to believe that greater control in what it has long considered breakaway regions persecuted by Kyiv will strengthen its position in future negotiations regarding Ukraine.
“They don’t show any signs of being able to move on Kyiv from the ground,” the official said, referring to Russia’s current “defensive crouch” around the capital aligned with assessments from U.S. officials earlier this week that Ukraine’s defenses had forced the Russian troops to transition from offensive operations to entrenching themselves.
“Clearly they overestimated their ability to take Kyiv, and frankly they overestimated their ability to take any population center,” the official said. “And they clearly underestimated the Ukrainian resistance.”
The official’s comments came shortly after Russian military leaders themselves confirmed a new focus on the Donbas region.
In an operational briefing that Russia’s Ministry of Defense organized Friday morning – in which officials said all current operations are going “according to plan,” state news reported – Russian Col. Gen. Sergei Rudskoy stated that his country’s main goal now is “the liberation” of the Donbas.
“In general, the main tasks of the first stage of the operation have been completed,” the first deputy chief of the Russian General Staff said.
Ukraine and its Western backers refute that assessment. Reports emerged Friday afternoon that Ukraine’s armed forces had successfully attacked and sunk a Russian naval vessel somewhere in the Sea of Azov. And the Pentagon stated Friday afternoon that the city of Kherson, a key point in the Black Sea region, is no longer clearly occupied by Russian invaders but is now considered “contested” due to Ukraine’s offensive.
Retaking that territory “would be a significant development in terms of the southern part of the war,” the senior defense official said.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has appealed internationally for volunteer forces to join Russia’s cause in Ukraine, specifically those from Syria where Moscow successfully propped up the regime of Bashar Assad.
The Defense Department revealed Friday that Russia is attempting to relocate its forces currently stationed from nearby Georgia to reinforce its other troops in Ukraine. It was not immediately clear where specifically Russia plans to deploy those forces, though they will likely converge on its new focus in the Donbas.


4. In Ukraine, Russian Activity Now More Focused on Donbas Than Kyiv

Even our own government is reporting this.

But before we get our hopes up or break out the champagne, we must remember that there is still tremendous death and destruction taking place in Ukraine and many people are suffering terribly. Let us not forget them.

In Ukraine, Russian Activity Now More Focused on Donbas Than Kyiv
defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez
In Ukraine, the Russians are still launching airstrikes on the capital city of Kyiv, but it appears the Russian military is less interested now in conducting ground operations there than they have been in the past and are instead now focused on an eastern area of the country known as the Donbas.
During a background briefing today, a senior defense official said an official from the Russian Ministry of Defense publicly announced the Russians are now prioritizing the Donbas.

Ukraine Map
A DOD official said in Ukraine, Russia is now focusing more on the Donbas Region in the eastern part of the country than it is on the capital city, Kyiv.
SHARE IMAGE:
Photo By: Peggy Frierson, DOD
VIRIN: 220325-D-D0439-001
"They are putting their priorities and their efforts in the east of Ukraine," the DOD official said. "That's where still there remains a lot of heavy fighting and we think they are trying to not only secure some sort of more substantial gains there as a potential negotiating tactic at the table, but also to cut off Ukrainian forces in the eastern part of the country."
When it comes to the capital, Kyiv, the senior defense official said air strikes continue, but the activities of ground forces have changed.
"It appears that the Russians are, at least for the moment, not pursuing ... a ground offensive towards Kyiv," the official said. "They are digging in. They are establishing defensive positions. They don't show any signs of being willing to move on Kyiv from the ground."
Nevertheless, the official said, there are still airstrikes on Kyiv, but nothing from the ground.
"It's interesting that the bulk of [Russian] air activity is really only Kyiv, Chernihiv — which remains a very bloody fight — and then the Donbas," the official said. "That's where we're seeing the air activity. So again, all of that sort of reinforces this idea that, at least for the moment, they don't appear to want to pursue Kyiv as aggressively or frankly at all. They are mostly focused on the Donbas."
The same official also confirmed reports that Ukrainian forces had destroyed a Russian navy vessel on the Sea of Azov at the port city of Berdyansk.


Aerial View
An aerial view of the Pentagon, May 11, 2021.
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Photo By: Air Force Staff Sgt. Brittany A. Chase, DOD
VIRIN: 210512-D-BM568-1287R
"They did strike a Russian LST while it was pier-side in Berdyansk," the official said. "It appears from the imagery we've seen that they destroyed that ship."
The destroyed Russian ship, called the Saratov, was an Alligator-class amphibious landing ship that could carry up to 20 tanks. The term "LST" means "Landing Ship Tank."
The official said the DOD is unaware of how many Russians were on the ship when it was hit, or how many casualties there had been. Additionally, the official wouldn’t say what weapons system the Ukrainians had used to destroy the vessel to protect their operational security.
The official also said the department believes the ship was in port at Berdyansk as part of a mission to resupply Russian combat operations near Mariupol.
Also of significance, the official said, is that the Russian military now appears to be pulling troops it has in nearby Georgia to participate in operations in Ukraine.
"We've seen our first indications that they are trying to send in some reinforcements from Georgia," the official said. "We have seen the movements of some number of troops from Georgia."
The official couldn't say how many Russian troops would leave Georgia for Ukraine, or where those troops would be going when they arrived in Ukraine.
defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez


5. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 25 (PUTIN'S WAR)

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 25 (PUTIN'S WAR)
Mar 25, 2022 - Press ISW
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 25
Mason Clark, Fredrick W. Kagan, and George Barros
March 25, 5:00 pm ET
The Russian General Staff issued a fictitious report on the first month of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on March 25 claiming Russia’s primary objective is to capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Sergei Rudskoi, first deputy chief of the Russian General Staff, gave a briefing to Russian press summing up the first month of the Russian invasion on March 25.[1] Rudskoi inaccurately claimed Russian forces have completed “the main tasks of the first stage of the operation,” falsely asserting that Russia has heavily degraded the Ukrainian military, enabling Russia to focus on the “main goal” of capturing Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
Rudskoi’s comments were likely aimed mainly at a domestic Russian audience and do not accurately or completely capture current Russian war aims and planned operations. Russia’s justification for the invasion of Ukraine from the outset was the fictitious threat Moscow claimed Ukrainian forces posed to the people in Russian-occupied Donbas. The Kremlin has reiterated this justification for the war frequently as part of efforts to explain the invasion to its people and build or sustain public support for Putin and the war. Rudskoi’s framing of the capture of the rest of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as the “main goal” of the operation is in line with this ongoing information operation.
Rudskoi’s assertion that securing the unoccupied portions of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts was always the main objective of Russia’s invasion is false. The Kremlin’s initial campaign aimed to conduct airborne and mechanized operations to seize Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and other major Ukrainian cities to force a change of government in Ukraine.[2] Rudskoi’s comments could indicate that Russia has scaled back its aims and would now be satisfied with controlling the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, but that reading is likely inaccurate. Russian forces elsewhere in Ukraine have not stopped fighting and have not entirely stopped attempting to advance and seize more territory. They are also attacking and destroying Ukrainian towns and cities, conducting operations and committing war crimes that do not accord with the objectives Rudskoi claims Russia is pursuing.
Russia continues efforts to rebuild combat power and commit it to the fight to encircle and/or assault Kyiv and take Mariupol and other targets, despite repeated failures and setbacks and continuing Ukrainian counter-attacks. The Ukrainian General Staff reports that the Russian military is building “consolidated units,” likely comprised of individuals or small units drawn from a number of different battalions, brigades, and regiments, to replace combat losses and deploying them on the west bank of the Dnipro near the Chernobyl exclusion zone, among other locations. Russian forces continue their grinding and likely costly advance in Mariupol as well.
The absence of significant Russian offensive operations throughout most of Ukraine likely reflects the inability of the Russian military to generate sufficient combat power to attack rather than any decision in Moscow to change Russia’s war aims or concentrate on the east. Rudskoi’s comments are likely an attempt to gloss the Russian military’s failures for a domestic audience and focus attention on the only part of the theater in which Russian troops are making any progress at this point. The West should not over-read this obvious messaging embedded in a piece of propaganda that continued very few true statements.
Key Takeaways
  • The Russian General Staff is attempting to adjust the war’s narrative so make it appear that Russia is achieving its aims and choosing to restrict operations when in fact it is not achieving its objectives and is being forced to abandon large-scale offensive operations because of its own failures and losses as well as continuing skillful Ukrainian resistance.
  • Ukrainian forces claimed to kill the commander of Russia’s 49th Combined Arms Army, operating around Kherson.
  • Ukrainian counterattacks northwest of Kyiv made further minor progress in the past 24 hours.
  • Ukrainian forces additionally conducted a successful counterattack east of Kyiv in the past 24 hours, pushing Russian forces east from Brovary.
  • Russian attempts to encircle Chernihiv remain unsuccessful.
  • The military situation in northeastern Ukraine did not change in the past 24 hours.
  • Russian forces continue to take Mariupol street-by-street and have entered the city center.
  • Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations around Kherson in the past 24 hours.

The Russian General Staff continued to downplay Russian casualties and issued likely false claims of damage inflicted on the Ukrainian military. Rudskoi claimed 1,351 Russian servicemen have been killed and 3,825 wounded since February 24. NATO estimates 7,000-15,000 Russian servicemen have been killed, and Kremlin-affiliated outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda posted and quickly deleted an article on March 22 citing the Russian Defense Ministry that 9,861 Russian soldiers have been killed and 16,153 have been wounded.[3]
Rudskoi falsely claimed Ukraine’s air force and air defenses "are almost completely destroyed” and its navy “ceased to exist.” Russian forces have failed to secure air superiority, with the Ukrainian General Staff reporting on March 25 that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed one plane, one unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and four cruise missiles in the past 24 hours; the Ukrainian air force remains active.[4] Rudskoi additionally claimed that all Ukrainian units have suffered significant losses, including 65.7% of tanks and armored vehicles, 42.8% of field artillery guns and mortars, 30.5% of multiple launch rocket systems, and 82% of S-300 and Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as three-quarters of Ukrainian aircraft, half their helicopters, and 35 of Ukraine‘s 36 TB2 drones. These figures are likely falsified and inaccurate.
Rudskoi claimed that Western states are only supplying Ukraine with weapons to prolong the conflict with Russia, not to support Kyiv. Rudskoi additionally claimed the number of “foreign mercenaries” in Ukraine peaked at 6,600 but has fallen due to desertion. Rudskoi falsely and preposterously claimed Russian forces do not strike civilian infrastructure in Ukraine and blamed all destruction on Ukrainian “nationalists.” He also falsely claimed that Russia opens daily humanitarian corridors to evacuate civilians and falsely claimed Ukraine has not opened a single corridor.
Russia continues to rush forces to Ukraine to replace high combat losses, including the commander of the 49th Combined Arms Army. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at noon local time on March 25 that Ukrainian forces killed Lieutenant General Yakov Rezantsev, commander of the 49th Combined Arms Army (operating around Kherson), though ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff stated on March 25 that Russia is deploying “consolidated units”—likely referring to BTGs formed from larger units that suffered combat losses earlier in the war—from the 37th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), 5th Separate Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA EMD), and 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to Belarus.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported on March 24 that Russia is withdrawing unspecified units from Ukraine after sustaining personnel losses over 50 percent.[7]
We do not report in detail on the deliberate Russian targeting of civilian infrastructure and attacks on unarmed civilians, which are war crimes, because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
  • Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
  • Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
  • Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts;
  • Supporting effort 2—Mariupol; and
  • Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances northward and westward.
Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis are aimed at encircling the city from the northwest, west, and east.
Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro
Ukrainian counterattacks northwest of Kyiv made small gains in Irpin on March 25, confirmed by videos of Ukrainian troops operating in previously Russian-controlled areas of the town.[8] Local civil authorities reported heavy fighting ongoing in Irpin, Hostomel, and Makariv on March 25.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces northwest of Kyiv did not make any advances on March 25 and were limited to shelling Ukrainian positions.[10] The General Staff additionally reported on March 25 that unspecified Russian Eastern Military District forces established a field camp in the Chernobyl region.[11]

Subordinate supporting effort—Chernihiv and Sumy axis
Ukrainian forces conducted a successful counterattack east of Kyiv on March 24, recapturing Luk’yanivka (40km east of Brovary) and several other small towns.[12] Ukrainian forces claimed to have destroyed nine Russian APCs and two tanks and killed 40 troops.[13] Local social media users confirmed Ukrainian forces retook the town on March 24 and depicted several destroyed and abandoned Russian vehicles.[14] Ukrainian media reported the Ukrainian counterattack pushed Russian forces back 25km on March 24.[15] The Ukrainian Armed Forces and several Ukrainian media outlets reported Ukrainian forces continued the counterattack on March 25, but ISW cannot independently confirm any further Ukrainian gains on March 25.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces near Brovary went over to the defensive as of noon local time on March 25 in response to the Ukrainian counterattacks.[17]
Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on Chernihiv city as of noon local time on March 25.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported ongoing Russian efforts to encircle Chernihiv continue to be unsuccessful.[19] The General Staff additionally reported Russian forces are distributing propaganda leaflets around Chernihiv to “decrease resistance from the civil population,” but ISW cannot verify the content or location of these leaflets.[20]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:
The military situation in northeastern Ukraine did not change in the past 24 hours. Russian forces continued to shell Kharkiv but did not conduct any ground attacks in the past 24 hours and are unlikely to resume efforts to direct assault the city in the coming weeks.[21] Civilian authorities in Kharkiv stated Russian forces continued to shell humanitarian aid distribution points and civilian infrastructure on March 24-25.[22] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack toward Kamyanka (south of Izyum) as of noon local time on March 25.[23] Russian forces likely intend to encircle Izyum after failing to take the city through direct assault but are unable to successfully break through Ukrainian defenders. Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations around Sumy in the last 24 hours.[24]
Supporting Effort #1a—Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts:
Russian forces paused their ground operations in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in the past 24 hours and regrouped their forces.[25]
Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol:
Russian forces continue to take Mariupol street-by-street, with several social media users depicting Russian troops entering downtown Mariupol.[26] Chechen forces claimed to have captured the entire left (eastern) bank of Mariupol on March 24.[27] The Mariupol City Council additionally reported Russia’s ruling United Russia party opened an office in occupied Mariupol, framed as a ”humanitarian headquarters,” to distribute pro-Russian news.[28] Russian forces will likely fully reduce the Mariupol pocket and capture the city in the coming weeks.

Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and advances northward and westwards:
Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in the southern direction in the past 24 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces paused to restore combat capabilities and that up to five Russian BTGs “moved to the defense in the Zaporizhya direction,” but did not specify which bank of the Dnipro River these Russian forces are on.[29]
The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that Ukrainian forces sank the alligator-class landing ship Saratov and damaged the Caesar Kuniko and Novocherkassk landing ships in Berdyansk on March 24.[30] Initial reports incorrectly stated that Ukrainian forces sank the Orsk and damaged or sank one other Russian vessel.[31]
Immediate items to watch
  • Russian forces will likely capture Mariupol or force the city to capitulate within the coming weeks and have entered the city center;
  • Russia will expand its air, missile, and artillery bombardments of Ukrainian cities;
  • Ukrainian officials suggest that Ukrainian forces may launch a larger counterattack in western Kyiv Oblast in the coming days;
  • The continued involvement of the Black Sea Fleet in the Battle of Mariupol reduces the likelihood of an amphibious landing near Odesa, Russian naval shelling of Odesa in recent days notwithstanding.
[1] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/14188667.
[15] https://www.unian dot ua/war/viyna-v-ukrajini-zsu-zvilnili-vid-okupantiv-selo-luk-yanivka-na-kijivshchini-novini-vtorgnennya-rosiji-v-ukrajinu-11758156.html.
[16] https://twitter.com/ArmedForcesUkr/status/1507057353530789888; https://twitter.com/tweetsNV/status/1507063921773002756https://apostrophe dot ua/news/world/2022-03-24/vsu-mesyats-geroicheski-nesut-oboronu-nashey-stranyi-hronika-sobyitiy-voynyi-24-marta/263662.


6. Vladimir Putin on the run? Russia says it will scale back its Ukraine invasion to focus on 'liberating' the eastern Donbas region 'and save face' after losing 20 BATTALIONS

20 battalions lost. Think about that. There is no saving face or regaining honor when you throw away 20 battalions. The Russian people need to hold Putin accountable for starting and losing Putin's War.


Vladimir Putin on the run? Russia says it will scale back its Ukraine invasion to focus on 'liberating' the eastern Donbas region 'and save face' after losing 20 BATTALIONS... but Western intelligence warns it could all be part of a trap
  • Russia's defence ministry also updated its losses in Ukraine to 1,351 soldiers, adding 3,825 had been wounded
  • Russia's figure is far lower than Western estimates that say tens of thousands have been killed in the war
  • Moscow today attempted to put a positive spin on its disastrous invasion,saying it had achieved its targets 
  • In another embarrassing blow, it was revealed today that a Russian brigade commander had died after being run down with a tank by his own troops 
PUBLISHED: 15:27 EDT, 25 March 2022 | UPDATED: 23:44 EDT, 25 March 2022
Daily Mail · by Chris Jewers For Mailonline · March 25, 2022
The Russian military hinted that Moscow may scale back its invasion of Ukraine and instead focus on 'liberating' the eastern Donbas region in a potential face-saving climbdown amid Western claims that Putin's military has been devastated and 20 battalions have been wiped out.
Russia's defence ministry also updated its losses in Ukraine to 1,351 soldiers, adding that 3,825 soldiers had been wounded - figures that are far lower than Western intelligence estimates that put Moscow's losses in the tens of thousands.
In a military update today, Moscow attempted to put a positive spin on its disastrous invasion saying that the first phase of its military campaign in Ukraine was over.
In a potentially significant shift in Moscow's tactics, Sergei Rudskoi, chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of Russia's armed forces, said the first phase of its campaign was over and its troops would now focus on the 'liberation' of the Donbas region in Ukraine's east.
Rudskoi said the shift was possible because 'the combat potential of Ukraine's armed forces has been significantly reduced which allows (us) - I emphasise once again - to focus our main efforts on achieving the main goal - the liberation of Donbas.'
But the update - combined with the West's claim that Russia has lost 20 out of the 120 battalions originally massed on Ukraine's border - is the latest sign that Vladimir Putin has rolled back his ambitions, and is on the run.
But Western intelligence officials have cautioned that it could also be a ploy to encircle Ukrainian forces in the east of the country.
In another embarrassing blow to Putin, it was claimed by the West today that a Russian brigade commander had died after being run down with a tank by his own troops.
Western officials believe Colonel Yuri Medvedev was brutally taken out by mutinous soldiers after their 37th Motor Rifle Brigade suffered huge losses.
But despite the apparent change in tactics, smaller-scale strikes continued without pause as Russia, suffering heavy losses and meagre progress against key targets, pursues its relentless campaign of bombardment against Ukraine's cities.
In one attack on Friday, Ukraine said a Russian missile attack had hit a military command centre in the city of Vinnytsia in central Ukraine. Kyiv officials reported the attack on Friday, adding it was unknown if there were any casualties.
'Today at around 4.30 p.m, the Russian occupiers launched a missile strike on the territory of the Air Force Command in Vinnytsia,' the Ukrainian Air Force said on Telegram.
It posted an image of the alleged centre in rubble and said missiles had hit 'several buildings, causing significant damage to infrastructure'.

Ukraine has disabled 20 Russian battalions, Western officials said today, as a Kremlin army chief hinted that Moscow may scale back its all-out attack on its neighbour and instead focus on 'liberating' the eastern Donbas region. Pictured: (L-R) Sergei Rudskoi, a senior representative of the General Staff, Defence Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov and Mikhail Mizintsev, head of the Russian National Defence Control Centre, hold a briefing on Russian military action in Ukraine, in Moscow on March 25, 2022



Russia's defence ministry also updated its losses in Ukraine to 1,351 soldiers, adding that 3,825 soldiers had been wounded - figures that are far lower than Western intelligence estimates that put Moscow's losses in the tens of thousands



(L-R) Sergei Rudskoi, a senior representative of the General Staff, Defence Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov and Mikhail Mizintsev, head of the Russian National Defence Control Centre, hold a briefing on Russian military action in Ukraine, in Moscow on March 25, 2022

A Ukrainian soldier passes by a destroyed Russian artillery system 'Grad', in Kharkiv, Ukraine, Thursday, March 24, 2022. But the update - combined with the West's claim that Russia has lost 20 out of the 120 battalions originally massed on Ukraine's border - is the latest sign that Vladimir Putin has rolled back his ambitions, and is on the run

In one attack on Friday, Ukraine said a Russian missile attack had hit a military command centre in the city of Vinnytsia in central Ukraine. Kyiv officials reported the attack on Friday, adding it was unknown if there were any casualties. The Ukrainian air force posted an image (pictured) of the alleged centre in rubble and said missiles had hit 'several buildings, causing significant damage to infrastructure'
When Russia unleashed its multi-pronged invasion on February 24, a swift toppling of Ukraine and its democratically elected government seemed likely.
But as Wednesday marked four full weeks of fighting, Russia has been bogged down in a grinding military campaign with no sign of progress.
The slow Russian advance has seemingly taken the Kremlin by surprise, and Western officials have said that Moscow made a 'catastrophic miscalculation'.
Russia attempted to re-frame its war goals in a way that may make it easier for Putin to claim a face-saving victory despite a woeful campaign in which his army has suffered humiliating setbacks, military analysts say.
In a potentially significant shift in Moscow's tactics, Sergei Rudskoi, chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of Russia's armed forces, said the first phase of its campaign was over and its troops would now focus on the 'liberation' of the Donbas region in Ukraine's east.
Rudskoi said the shift was possible because 'the combat potential of Ukraine's armed forces has been significantly reduced which allows (us) - I emphasise once again - to focus our main efforts on achieving the main goal - the liberation of Donbas.'
The Donbas is the largely Russian-speaking eastern part of the country where Russian-backed separatists have been fighting Ukrainian forces since 2014 and where many residents have expressed support for Moscow.
In the eight years of fighting, at least 14,000 people have been killed in the region.
Rudskoi claimed Russian forces had 'practically' destroyed Ukraine's air force and anti-aircraft defences as well as the navy.
But Rudskoi's comments were contradicted by Ukraine and Britain's Ministry of Defence, which said Russian forces were being pushed back.
'Ukrainian counter-attacks, and Russian forces falling back on overextended supply lines, has allowed Ukraine to re-occupy towns and defensive positions up to 35 kilometres (22 miles) east of Kyiv,' Britain's defence ministry said in a daily update.
In the south, logistical problems and Ukrainian resistance are slowing the Russians as they look to drive west toward the port of Odesa, the ministry added.
Ukraine's Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba indicated no let-up in his country's refusal to accede to Russian demands after what he termed 'very difficult' talks with Moscow.
'We insist, first of all, on a ceasefire, security guarantees, and territorial integrity of Ukraine,' he said.
And while Mariupol and other places are now charred ruins, Western systems including shoulder-fired anti-tank missiles have helped Ukraine's armed forces hold their line - and increasingly to go on the offensive.
'Obviously they have completely failed in everything they've set out to do and so now they are redefining what the purpose is so they can declare victory,' Ben Hodges, a former commander of U.S. army forces in Europe who now works for the Center for European Policy Analysis, said of Russia's latest update.
'Clearly they do not have the ability to continue sustained large-scale offensive operations... Their logistics problems have been apparent to everybody, they've got serious manpower issues and the resistance has been way beyond anything they could have possibly imagined.'

A cyclist rides past by houses destroyed by shelling in Kharkiv, Ukraine on March 25, 2022



Volunteers and neighbours try to extinguish a fire at a house shelled by the Russian army in Horenychi, Ukraine, March 25

A Western official said Russia's failure to organise so far has been 'remarkable', pouring scorn on the claims that it had achieved the main military objectives.
They said that losses had been 'really high' in some areas. At the outset 115-120 battalion tactical groups were in the Russian force, but 20 battalions were now not thought to be 'combat effective' and had been withdrawn, either because repairs were needed to vehicles or because of massive losses.
In some instances three battalions had been merged together to redeploy.
A Russian battalion typically consists of approximately 600 to 800 officers and soldiers, 200 of which are infantrymen equipped with around 10 tanks and 40 infantry fighting vehicles - such as armoured troop carriers.
A NATO official estimated on Wednesday that 7,000 to 15,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in four weeks of war in Ukraine, and added that between 30,000 to 40,000 Russian soldiers are estimated to have been killed or wounded in total.
By comparison, Moscow lost about 15,000 soldiers in Afghanistan over 10 years.
Putin is said to be assembling at least 10 more battalions to shore up his army, with officials warning that shows he is going 'all in' behind his 'botched' invasion - and could be preparing to launch a chemical attack to turn the tide.
Rudskoi said the Russian army did not rule out further attacks on cities, claiming that originally such assaults had not been planned.
Russia has continued to deny it has been deliberately targeting civilian centres, despite swathes of evidence to suggest otherwise.

A local resident points at an apartment building destroyed in the course of Ukraine-Russia conflict in the besieged southern port city of Mariupol, Ukraine March 25, 2022

Volunteers are seen preparing and distributing food for locals and territorial defense in Kyiv, Ukraine on March 25, 2022

Pictured: A man is seen being handed bottles of water as volunteers work to hand out supplies to residents of Kyiv

Volunteers are seen preparing and distributing food for locals and territorial defense in Kyiv, Ukraine on March 25, 2022
'Initially, we did not plan to storm them in order to prevent destruction and minimise losses among personnel and civilians,' he told reporters.
'Although we do not rule out such a possibility, however, as individual groupings complete their assigned tasks... our forces and means will concentrate on the main thing - the complete liberation of Donbas,' he said, referring to eastern Ukraine.
Senior military officials addressed journalists in Moscow on the 30th day of the Kremlin's military campaign in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, a Western official revealed a Russian brigade commander had died after being run down with a tank by his own mutinous troops, in the latest sign that there is a growing dissatisfaction among Putin's forces i the country.
The official said of Colonel Medvedev: 'He was killed by his own troops we believe as a consequence of the scale of losses that had been taken by his brigade. [...] That gives an insight into some of the morale challenges the Russian forces are having.'
The official added that the colonel appeared to have been run down using a tank. 'We believe he was killed by his own troops deliberately,' they said.
The comments came after footage allegedly showed Colonel Medvedev being stretchered into a hospital after suffering severe injuries to his legs was released earlier this week.
The episode has echoes of 'Fragging' during the Vietnam War - when soldiers would take out hated officers by throwing grenades into their tents.
It was also reported today that soldiers in the Russian National Guard refused to fight in Ukraine, prompting Moscow to fire them on the spot. The 12 soldiers refused to carry out Putin's orders to travel to Ukraine at the start of the invasion after they argued their military contracts only applied to Russian territory.
As Russia continued to count its losses, the civilian cost of its medieval invasion rose significantly on Friday as Ukrainian authorities said 300 people were killed in the Russian airstrike last week on a Mariupol theater that was being used as a shelter.
The bloodshed at the theatre fueled allegations Moscow is committing war crimes by killing civilians, whether deliberately or by indiscriminate fire.

This satellite image provided by Maxar Technologies on Saturday, March 19, 2022 shows the aftermath of the airstrike on the Mariupol Drama theatre, Ukraine, and the area around it
For days, the government in the besieged and ruined port city was unable to give a casualty count for the March 16 bombardment of the grand, columned Mariupol Drama Theater, where hundreds of people were said to be taking cover, the word 'CHILDREN' printed in Russian in huge white letters on the ground outside to ward off aerial attack.
In announcing the death toll on its Telegram channel Friday, the city government cited eyewitnesses. But it was not immediately clear how witnesses arrived at the figure or whether emergency workers had finished excavating the ruins.
U.S. President Joe Biden's national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, said Friday the theater bombing was an 'absolute shock, particularly given the fact that it was so clearly a civilian target.' He said it showed 'a brazen disregard for the lives of innocent people.'
The scale of devastation in Mariupol, where bodies have been left unburied amid bomb craters and hollowed-out buildings, has made information difficult to obtain.
But soon after the attack, the Ukrainian Parliament's human rights commissioner said more than 1,300 people had taken shelter in the theater, many of them because their homes had been destroyed. The building had a basement bomb shelter, and some survivors did emerge from the rubble after the attack.
'This is a barbaric war, and according to international conventions, deliberate attacks on civilians are war crimes,' said Mircea Geoana, NATO's deputy-secretary general.
He said Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to break Ukraine's will to resist are having the opposite effect: 'What he's getting in response is an even more determined Ukrainian army and an ever more united West in supporting Ukraine.'
While the Russians continue to pound the capital from the air, they appear to have gone into a 'defensive crouch' outside Kyiv and are focused more on the Donbas, a senior U.S. defense official said.
'They don't show any signs of being willing to move on Kyiv from the ground,' the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity to describe an internal U.S. military assessment of the war.
The official also said the U.S. has seen indications that Russia is beginning to draw on Russian soldiers in Georgia for deployment to Ukraine. The official offered no numbers and no timeline for the move.

Flames and smoke rise from a fire following a Russian attack in Kharkiv, Ukraine, Friday, March 25, 2022

Firefighters battle a blaze following a Russian attack in Kharkiv, Ukraine, Friday, March 25, 2022

A man recovers items from a burning shop following a Russian attack in Kharkiv, Ukraine, Friday, March 25
After summits of NATO, the European Union and G7 in Brussels, Biden warned that the NATO alliance would 'respond' if Russian President Vladimir Putin resorts next to chemical weapons.
En route to Poland, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said Russia would pay a 'severe price' - but stressed 'the United States has no intention of using chemical weapons, period, under any circumstance'.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov accused Biden of seeking to 'divert attention', and also denied Ukrainian claims that Russia had broken international law by dropping incendiary phosphorus bombs on civilians.
Biden and EU commission chief Ursula von der Leyen announced a joint energy task force in Brussels, before he headed to the eastern Polish town of Rzeszow, a mere 80 kilometres (50 miles) from Ukraine.
Taken together, Western sanctions are 'draining Putin's resources to finance this atrocious war', von der Leyen told reporters alongside Biden.
Germany, Moscow's biggest customer in Europe, said it would halve Russian oil imports by June and end all coal deliveries by the autumn.
'The first important milestones have been reached to free us from the grip of Russian imports,' Economy Minister Robert Habeck said.
In Poland, Biden met members of the US 82nd Airborne Division, part of NATO's increasingly muscular deployment to its eastern flank.
He was also being briefed on the dire humanitarian situation in Ukraine, which more than 3.7 million people have fled, mostly to Poland.
The UN believes that more than half of Ukraine's children have already been driven from their homes - 'a grim milestone that could have lasting consequences for generations to come', according to Unicef chief Catherine Russell.

Children sit in a refugee center in Nadarzyn, near Warsaw, Poland, on Friday, March 25, 2022. Millions of refugees have fled Ukraine into neighbouring countries to escape the invasion

Refugees and volunteers have lunch together at the Kust volunteer center of Dnipro in the restaurant in Dnipro, Ukraine on March 25, 2022

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy addresses the Ukrainian people, as Russia's attack on Ukraine continues, in Kyiv, Ukraine March 25, 2022
For his part, Putin accused the West of discriminating against Russian culture, likening it to the ceremonial burning of books by Nazi supporters in the 1930s.
'Today they are trying to cancel a thousand-year-old country - I am talking about the progressive discrimination against everything connected with Russia,' he said in televised remarks.
After the Kremlin imposed an information blackout on its 'special military operation', most Russians are unaware of the true picture of fighting in Ukraine.
But an exhibition of 24 shocking images opened on Friday at a train station in Lithuania used by Russians transiting from the exclave of Kaliningrad.
On some of the pictures, exhibited at the height of the carriage windows, an inscription read: 'Today, Putin is killing the peaceful population of Ukraine. Do you approve of this?'

Putin's Navy underwater: Wreckage of Russian warship the Orsk is spotted by satellite in port of Berdyansk after it was blown up by Ukrainian missile
The wreckage of a sinking Russian warship was left smouldering in a Ukrainian port on Friday after the country's navy scored a direct hit on the vessel the day before, incredible satellite images showed.
The Ukrainian navy said Thursday that it had struck the Orsk, a 370ft Russian Alligator-class tank carrier, as it was sitting at anchor in the captured port of Berdyansk, in the south of Ukraine.
Satellite images taken today from above the port showed a huge plume of thick smoke rising into the air from the blackened wreckage of the destroyed ship that appeared to be sinking into the ocean.
Multiple photos and videos on Thursday showed smoke rising from the port as one ship sat at the harbour in flames, while another two sailed away - one of which also appeared to be damaged.
Ukraine also claimed two more ships were damaged and a 3,000-ton fuel tank was destroyed when the Orsk was sunk, causing a fire that spread to nearby ammunition supplies.
Just three days before the strike, Russian state media had filmed the Orsk at the port unloading armoured vehicles which it said would reinforce troops in nearby Mariupol - prompting speculation that Ukraine could use the video to target the vessel.


The wreckage of a sinking Russian warship - the Orsk - was left smouldering in a Ukrainian port today after the country's navy scored a direct hit on the vessel on Thursday, incredible satellite images showed (pictured)


The Ukrainian navy said early Thursday that it had struck the Orsk, a 370ft Russian Alligator-class tank carrier, as it was sitting at anchor in the captured port of Berdyansk, in the south of Ukraine. Satellite images taken today from above the port showed a huge plume of thick smoke rising into the air from the blackened wreckage of the destroyed ship



The Ukrainian navy has destroyed an Alligator-class Russian landing ship and damaged two others which were unloading reinforcements and supplies at the captured port of Berdyansk, in the south of Ukraine



One vessel was shown consumed by fire (left) as two other boats fled (centre), at least one of which also appeared to be on fire though was able to escape the port



Flames and smoke are seen rising from what appears to be a Russian Alligator-class landing ship docked at the port of Berdyansk, in southern Ukraine, after Kyiv's navy claimed to have destroyed a vessel called Orsk
A Ukrainian ballistic missile struck the 112-metre Alligator-class Orsk vessel on Thursday, causing huge explosions in the port of Berdyansk. As flames broke out on board the veseel, two other Russian ships also damaged in the strike – one apparently ablaze – hastily put to sea.
The attack, a major morale boost for the Ukrainians, was caught on film and beamed around the world.
Berdyansk – that lies 50 miles south-west of the besieged city of Mariupol – has been under Russian control since February 27. Earlier this week, a Moscow TV channel broadcast images of supplies and armoured vehicles being unloaded from the Orsk.
But the propaganda was spotted by Ukrainian forces and at 7am on Thursday, an OTR-21 Tochka missile struck the Orsk, which has a displacement of 4,000 tons when fully loaded.
The ship, which is capable of carrying 20 tanks and 400 troops, partially sank after the fire burned out of control and ignited ammunition on board.
Blazes were extinguished on board a pair of Ropucha-class landing ships docked alongside as they escaped eastwards, but they appeared to be seriously damaged.
UK intelligence reports questioned why Russia left such an important vessel in place for several days with ineffective cover – particularly after heralding its arrival.
According to these reports, the blast damaged facilities at the port – which can only hold up to five vessels – hampering Russian hopes of unloading more landing craft.
One report said: ‘Not only has Russia’s ability to bring in support been curtailed, likely slowing offensive operations in the south, but three of its 11 landing ships in the Black Sea have been lost or damaged.
‘The incident suggests poor damage control or ammunition handling and is further indication of sub-par Russian performance.’
Berdyansk is of strategic significance to the Kremlin as part of its plan to cut off Ukraine from the sea.
Its capture helps the Russians build a bridge between Crimea in the south and the Donbas region in the east, areas already under Russian control when the invasion was launched a month ago.any of those fleeing Mariupol have sought refuge in the city, which has seen many protests against the invasion despite being occupied by the Russians.



Smoke and flames rise over the port of Berdyansk, located in the south of Ukraine and occupied by Russian forces, as Kyiv's navy claimed to have hit the Orsk - a huge Russian tank-carrier



Images show an explosion at the port with a Russian Alligator-class transport ship visible at the dock. It was not immediately clear from the images whether the port or the ship had been struck



A fireball rises into the air over the port of Berdyansk, a Ukrainian port on the Sea of Azov which has been captured by Russian forces and was being used to ferry reinforcements to shore before it was struck
Daily Mail · by Chris Jewers For Mailonline · March 25, 2022

7. Russian commander run over ‘deliberately’ by his own troops in Ukraine, officials say
"Colonel" Neidermeyer? (perhaps I should not invoke such sarcasm). On a serious note this is certainly an indicator of the breakdown of the chain of command.

And the report of the 7th Russian general officer KIA.

Excerpts:
Colonel Medvedev was allegedly run down after Russian soldiers’ morale plummeted to an all time low, with one official noting Moscow’s forces had unexpectedly “found themselves in a hornets’ nest and are suffering really badly” due to ongoing logistical and military issues.
The same official said that a lieutenant general commanding the 49th Combined Arms Army also recently died in the fighting. It makes him the seventh Russian general to be killed in combat since Russia’s war on Ukraine began – more than a third of those deployed at the start of the operation.


Russian commander run over ‘deliberately’ by his own troops in Ukraine, officials say
Independent · by UK EditionUS EditionAsia EditionEdición en Español · March 25, 2022
A Russian brigade commander fighting in Ukraine has been run down by his own troops, according to Western officials.
Yuri Medvedev, commanding the 37th Motor Rifle Brigade, is believed to have been deliberately targeted due to anger at the number of casualties his unit experienced.
An initial report by officials said Colonel Medvedev had been “killed”, but this was later restated amid suggestions he had suffered leg injuries and been evacuated to Belarus.
One official said the attack “gives an insight into some of the challenges that Russian forces are having”.
Colonel Medvedev was allegedly run down after Russian soldiers’ morale plummeted to an all time low, with one official noting Moscow’s forces had unexpectedly “found themselves in a hornets’ nest and are suffering really badly” due to ongoing logistical and military issues.
The same official said that a lieutenant general commanding the 49th Combined Arms Army also recently died in the fighting. It makes him the seventh Russian general to be killed in combat since Russia’s war on Ukraine began – more than a third of those deployed at the start of the operation.
Nato has estimated that in four weeks of fighting, between 7,000 and 15,000 Russia troops have been killed. Though Russia’s latest death toll had the number of its soldiers killed at 1,351, according to Sergei Rudskoi, head of the Russian General Staff’s Main Operational Directorate, and 3,825 injured.
One Western official said that of the 115 to 120 battalion tactical groups the Russians had at the start of the war, 20 were no longer “combat effective”.
“After a month of operations to have somewhere in the region of a sixth, maybe even a fifth, of the forces being no longer effective, that is a pretty remarkable set of statistics,” they added.
This map shows the extent of the Russian invasion of Ukraine
(Press Association Images)
The news came as Russian president Vladimir Putin decided to “pause” his multiple attempts to take Kyiv in order to concentrate his forces on the Donbas region in the east of Ukraine.
While the advance faltered, though, men are said to have become angry at the number of deaths being recorded in a war that has so far “not been successful,” according to officials.
“It’s clear Russia is recognising that it can’t pursue its options on multiple axis simultaneously,” one official noted.
However, they warned the West should not be “getting ahead of ourselves” in believing Russia will not come back harder.
“What we’re not seeing is a turning of the tide,” the official said.
The Independent has a proud history of campaigning for the rights of the most vulnerable, and we first ran our Refugees Welcome campaign during the war in Syria in 2015. Now, as we renew our campaign and launch this petition in the wake of the unfolding Ukrainian crisis, we are calling on the government to go further and faster to ensure help is delivered. To find out more about our Refugees Welcome campaign, click here. To sign the petition click here. If you would like to donate then please click here for our GoFundMe page.
Independent · by UK EditionUS EditionAsia EditionEdición en Español · March 25, 2022

8. UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATE 19


UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATE 19
Mar 25, 2022 - Press ISW
Institute for the Study of War, Russia Team
with the Critical Threats Project, AEI
March 25
The ISW Russia team's Ukraine Conflict Update is a semi-weekly synthetic product covering key political and rhetorical events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. This update covers events from March 22-24. All of Russia’s team’s coverage of the war in Ukraine—including daily military assessments and maps, past Conflict Updates, and several supplemental assessments—are available on our Ukraine Crisis Coverage landing page.
Key Takeaways March 22-24
  • Kyiv remains firm that Russia must return Crimea and Donbas to Ukraine, despite Kremlin claims that Zelensky is willing to discuss recognizing Russian control over these temporarily occupied territories.
  • The Kremlin increased its rhetoric accusing the West of posing an existential threat to Russia and refusing to rule out the use of nuclear weapons in the event of threats to Russia to deter the West from further supporting Ukraine.
  • Western leaders continued to sound alarms about potential Russian chemical or biological attacks in Ukraine.
  • The Kremlin continues to undercount Russian deaths in Ukraine, which have likely passed 10,000 dead since February 24.
  • Western sanctions are successfully disrupting Russia’s military industry and energy exports.
  • Russian forces are likely forcibly relocating Ukrainian citizens to Russia to establish control over occupied areas and gain political leverage.
  • The EU and NATO announced both short- and long-term plans to increase military defense spending, troop deployments to Eastern Europe, and military assistance for Ukraine.
Key Events March 22-24
Negotiations:
Ukrainian officials remain firm that Russia must return Crimea and Donbas; the Kremlin increasingly claims Kyiv is stalling negotiations. Russia is unlikely to reduce its maximalist demands despite the failure of its initial military campaign. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Foreign Minister Dmyto Kuleba stated on March 22 and 24 respectively that Ukraine must regain control of Crimea and Donbas, refuting Russian media claims that Zelensky would discuss recognizing Russia’s illegally occupied territories.[1] Kuleba also said that Ukraine is negotiating security guarantees with the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Turkey.[2] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on March 23 that Russia does not oppose Western mediation in Russia-Ukraine negotiations but repeated that Russia has “red lines” on Ukrainian integration into Western structures.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on March 22 that peace talks with Ukraine were moving slower than expected.[4] Lavrov and Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that Ukraine is constantly changing its position under manipulation from the United States.[5] The Kremlin likely incorrectly anticipated a quick Ukrainian capitulation, but is unlikely to reduce its maximalist demands in the near term and the war will likely protract.
Russian Domestic Opposition and Censorship:
The Kremlin began implementing new laws against spreading “fakes” about its war in Ukraine and increasingly seeks to convince Russian citizens that any opposition to the war is treason. Moscow’s Presnensky Court detained a Russian citizen in the first criminal case for spreading “fakes” about Russian military activities in Ukraine on March 22.[6] The pro-Kremlin political party “A Just Russia” encouraged civilians to persecute anti-Kremlin dissent by launching a website on March 21 to report authorities’ “intentional shortcomings” and turn in “traitors.”[7]
The Kremlin continued measures to control the domestic information space by regulating YouTube and Google News. YouTube unblocked the Russian State Television and Radio Fund channels in Russia on March 24, complying with a Roskomandzor demand made on March 19.[8] Roskomnadzor also blocked Google News on March 23 and claimed that the platform provided “fake information” about the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[9] The Kremlin will likely attempt to coerce other Western companies to retain or restart operations in Russia in exchange for complying with Russian government censorship
Isolated signs of dissent are appearing among Russian government officials. Russian Special Representative for Relations with International Organizations Anatoly Chubais resigned on March 23 and has likely left Russia. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced the “dismissal” of Chubais later in the day and maintained Chubais did not resign over Ukraine on March 24.[10] Chubais was the chief of staff for former Russian President Boris Yeltsin and is the highest-ranking official to publicly break ties with the Kremlin after the invasion of Ukraine.[11] Bloomberg also reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Russian Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina’s resignation sometime shortly after the invasion of Ukraine.[12]
Kremlin Narratives:
The Kremlin labeled Western actions surrounding Ukraine as potential “existential threats,” seeking to intimidate the West and possibly set conditions to use nuclear weapons. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov refused to rule out Russian use of nuclear weapons if it faces an “existential threat” during an interview with CNN on March 22.[13] Other Kremlin mouthpieces warned about Western efforts to subjugate and destroy Russia in the following days. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev claimed on March 23 that the United States aims to “humiliate, limit, and destroy” Russia before targeting China, claiming this will result in a “nuclear explosion.”[14] Kremlin Spokesperson Maria Zakharova echoed these claims on March 23.[15] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed on March 23 that the West seeks to establish a unipolar world order and that Ukraine was “chosen as a tool” to suppress Russia’s independence.[16] Russian presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky accused the West of putting “the very existence of Russia at stake” on March 24.[17] The Kremlin likely seeks to intimidate Western states into limiting their activity in Ukraine by portraying a low threshold for “existential threats” that would prompt Russian use of nuclear weapons.
The Kremlin continued to promote disinformation about US-funded biolaboratories in Ukraine and US chemical weapons in Europe to set conditions for a potential false-flag chemical or biological attack. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov claimed on March 22 that the United States had not destroyed its alleged chemical weapon arsenal in Europe and that Russia cannot tolerate US-funded biolaboratories that could develop biological weapons in Ukraine.[18] The Russian State Duma opened an investigation into the alleged US-funded biolaboratories in Ukraine on March 22, and Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin demanded that President Biden explain his son’s involvement in Ukrainian biolaboratories on March 24.[19] The Kremlin also began fabricating baseless evidence to support their claims. The Russian Embassy in South Africa tweeted a map of alleged Pentagon biolaboratories in Ukraine on March 22.[20] Russian Defense Ministry Representative Igor Konashenkov claimed on March 24 that Russia had obtained documents from Ukrainian biolaboratory employees that indicate direct US involvement.[21] The Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation claimed on March 24 that the Kremlin is flooding the Russian information space with these “false reports” and stressing the need for Russia to strike Ukraine pre-emptively.[22]
Western leaders are escalating their warnings that Putin is considering staging a false-flag chemical or biological attack in Ukraine. US President Joe Biden and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz separately warned on March 23 that Russian claims of Ukrainian and US biological weapons indicate a “real threat” that Putin is considering deploying such weapons himself.[23] NATO approved an aid package to Ukraine with equipment to detect, protect, and respond to a chemical weapons attack on March 24.[24] ISW previously assessed on March 9 that the Kremlin is setting informational conditions to possibly blame Ukraine for a Russian chemical or radiological false-flag attack against civilians as a pretext for further Russian escalation.[25]
The Russian military continues to suppress Russian casualty numbers, which have likely surpassed 10,000 dead. Pro-Kremlin tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda reported and quickly deleted an article on March 22 citing the Russian Defense Ministry that 9,861 Russian soldiers have been killed and 16,153 have been wounded in Ukraine.[26] Komsomolskaya Pravda claimed that hackers posted the “fake news,” and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov declined to comment on the initial report.[27] The Kremlin released new casualty figures on March 25 stating 1,351 soldiers had been killed and 3,825 wounded, likely a severe undercount.[28] By comparison, NATO estimated on March 23 that 7,000-15,000 Russian troops have been killed in the current invasion.[29]
Russian Reactions to Sanctions:
Western sanctions are successfully degrading Russia’s military industry and energy exports despite Russian efforts to mitigate their impact. The Kyiv Independent reported on March 22 that Russia’s largest tank manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod, suspended operations due to supply shortages stemming from Western sanctions.[30] On the same day, the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC) established an “operational headquarters” to mitigate the impact of sanctions on the Russian military-industrial complex.[31] Russian President Vladimir Putin tried to allay fears about sanctions on March 23, claiming food rushes in Russia had fallen.[32] The Moscow Exchange Index reported a rise of 4.5% on its first open trading day on March 24 after a one-month closure.[33] Putin also announced that Russia will only send energy exports to designated “unfriendly” states if they pay in rubles, a move likely intended to both punish Western states and mitigate sanctions.[34] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba urged European states not to make gas payments in rubles; German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said Germany would not pay for gas in rubles.[35]
The United States, United Kingdom, EU, and G-7 countries announced more sanctions against Russian officials and entities on March 24, including State Duma members and the Wagner Group.[36] Western countries also continued freezing and seizing Russian state and businessmen’s assets as more private companies ended operations in Russia.[37]
Russian Occupation:
Russian forces are likely forcibly relocating citizens from Ukraine to establish control over occupied areas and gain political leverage. The Mariupol City Council claimed on March 24 that Russian soldiers have forcibly deported 15,000 Ukrainian civilians to Russia.[38] The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry claimed on March 24 that Russian forces transported at least 6,000 civilian hostages to camps and plan to relocate thousands more to gain political leverage over Ukraine.[39] Russian forces may additionally use forcibly relocated Ukrainian civilians as hostages in negotiations with Kyiv.
Drivers of Russian Threat Perceptions:
The European Union (EU) and NATO agreed on plans to increase short- and long-term military defense spending and troop deployments to Eastern Europe.
  • NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg announced that NATO members agreed to double their Defense Investment Pledge to support deployments of four battlegroups to Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria during a NATO summit on March 24. NATO battlegroups consist of approximately 1,000 soldiers.[40] The new deployment will double the number of battlegroups on NATO’s eastern flank.[41]
  • The European Council (EC) passed the Strategic Compass legislation on March 22 to increase defense spending and enhance military and technological capabilities by 2030. The legislation will improve deployment capacity and agility as well as advance the EU’s counterintelligence and cybersecurity programs.[42]
  • The EU doubled its military assistance for Ukraine from 500 million euros (about $550 million), last budgeted in February 2020, to 1 billion euros (about $1.01 billion) on March 23.[43]
  • Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom announced further defensive military aid shipments to Ukraine, including thousands of anti-tank missiles, on March 23 and 24.[44]
  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called for unlimited military aid “without restrictions” to help Ukraine protect itself from Russia during an address to NATO members on March 24.[45]
Foreign Involvement:
Turkish and Israeli efforts to mediate a ceasefire in Ukraine are unlikely to succeed in the near term.
  • Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on March 22 that Turkey is holding frequent discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to reach a ceasefire agreement.[46] Turkish Foreign Minister Melvut Cavusolgu also encouraged fellow NATO members to focus on bringing about a ceasefire agreement instead of only applying sanctions at the March 24 NATO summit.[47]
  • Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett offered to mediate peace talks between Ukraine and Russia in Kyiv, Ukraine, in an official statement on March 22.[48]
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennet discussed Ukraine on March 23, their sixth call since February 24.[49]
China continued to protect Russia in international organizations while Western countries condemned Chinese political support for Russia and warned Beijing against supplying material support to Russia.
  • The Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said that no G-20 member has the right to expel another, amid reports Western countries are considering removing Russia from the economic bloc on March 23.[50]
  • Senior aide to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky Andriy Yermak called on March 22 for China to play a more active role in pushing Russia to end the war.[51]
  • NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg accused China of politically supporting Russia and said on March 23 that NATO is “concerned” China could begin supplying material support soon.[52] However, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said on March 22 that the United States still had no evidence that China was sending military equipment to Russia.[53]

[1] https://vesti dot ua/politika/ultimatumy-rossii-ni-k-chemu-ne-privedut-intervyu-zelenskogo; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/volodimir-zelenskij-ya-gotovij-piti-na-vse-yaksho-moya-hoda-73721; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/14140203; https://lenta dot ru/news/2022/03/22/krym_donbass/
[2] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/ukrayina-vede-peregovori-shodo-garantij-bezpeki-z-5-krayinami-zokrema-zi-ssha-kuleba
[5] https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/20223231147-yL5z7.html; https://tass dot com/politics/1426299
[6] https://reform dot by/304325-v-moskve-vzjat-pod-strazhu-figurant-pervogo-ugolovnogo-dela-o-fejkah-pro-rossijskuju-armiju; https://iz dot ru/1308931/2022-03-22/v-moskve-sud-vpervye-otpravil-rossiianina-v-sizo-za-diskreditatciiu-vs-rf
[7] https://vnnews dot ru/expressnews/spravedlivaya-rossiya-za-pravdu-zap/; https://kapital-rus dot ru/news/386001-eto_ne_pro_chistki_spravedlivaya_rossiya_predlojila_cherez_sait_soob/; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/14132889; https://russian.rt dot com/russia/news/978907-sait-bastrykin-vopros; https://ria dot ru/20220321/vrediteli-1779260789.html; https://secretmag dot ru/news/spravedlivaya-rossiya-oprovergla-prichastnost-k-saitu-dlya-donosov-22-03-2022.html
[8] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/03/24/youtube-razblokiroval-kanaly-gosteleradiofonda-ranee-etogo-treboval-roskomnadzor
[9] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/03/23/roskomnadzor-zablokiroval-google-news
[11] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/03/23/bloomberg-anatoliy-chubays-pokinul-post-spetspredstavitelya-prezidenta-i-uehal-iz-rossii; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-23/putin-adviser-chubais...
[13] https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/22/europe/amanpour-peskov-interview-ukraine-... org/a/ukraine-russia-nuclear-weapons-mariupol/31766212.html
[15] https://riafan dot ru/22174405-zaharova_schitaet_chto_vsled_za_rossiei_ssha_popitayutsya_razorvat_v_kloch_ya_kitai
[16] https://tass dot com/politics/1426275; https://iz dot ru/1309335/2022-03-23/lavrov-nazval-poslednie-sobytiia-v-mire-popytkoi-ustanovki-novogo-poriadka; https://tass dot ru/politika/14153791.
[18] https://russian.rt dot com/world/news/979382-ryabkov-ssha-himicheskoe-oruzhie?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=RSS; https://tass dot ru/politika/14141763
[19] https://russian.rt dot com/russia/news/979512-rassledovanie-biolaboratorii-ukraina?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=RSS; https://tass dot com/politics/1427005.
https://tass dot com/defense/1426693[21]
[22] https://www.kyivpost dot com/ukraine-politics/ukraine-government-moscow-is-preparing-to-strike-with-chemical-weapons.html
[27] https://tass dot ru/politika/14144933
[31] https://iz dot ru/1308794/2022-03-22/v-fsvts-rossii-sozdali-operativnyi-shtab-po-borbe-s-sanktciiami
[32] https://tass dot u/ekonomika/14158343
[33] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/5272016
[34] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/14158033
[49] https://tass dot com/politics/1426499

9. The new Russian cult of war

Excerpts:
Mr Putin’s long subsequent periods of isolation seem to have firmed up the transformation. He is said to have lost much of his interest in current affairs and become preoccupied instead with history, paying particular heed to figures like Konstantin Leontyev, an ultra-reactionary 19th-century visionary who admired hierarchy and monarchy, cringed at democratic uniformity and believed in the freezing of time. One of the few people he appears to have spent time with is Yuri Kovalchuk, a close friend who controls a vast media group. According to Russian journalists they discussed Mr Putin’s mission to restore unity between Russia and Ukraine.
Hence a war against Ukraine which is also a war against Russia’s future—or at least the future as it has been conceived of by Russia’s sometimes small but frequently dominant Westernising faction for the past 350 years. As in Ukraine, the war is intended to wipe out the possibility of any future that looks towards Europe and some form of liberating modernity. In Ukraine there would be no coherent future left in its place. In Russia the modernisers would leave as their already diminished world was replaced by something fiercely reactionary and inward looking.
The Russian-backed “republics” in Donetsk and Luhansk may be a model. There, crooks and thugs were elevated to unaccustomed status, armed with new weapons and fitted with allegedly glorious purpose: to fight against Ukraine’s European dream. In Russia they would be tasked with keeping any such dream from returning, whether from abroad, or from a cell. 
Reactionary, obscurantist and having a day in the sun
The new Russian cult of war
It has been growing unnoticed for some time
Mar 26th 2022
ON MARCH 22ND, in a penal colony 1,000km north-east of the front lines around Kyiv, Alexei Navalny, the jailed leader of Russia’s opposition, was sentenced to another nine years imprisonment. To serve them he will probably be moved from Vladimir, where he has been kept for more than a year, to a yet harsher maximum-security jail elsewhere.
The crime for which he was sentenced is fraud. His true crime is one of common enterprise with that for which the people of Ukraine are now suffering collective punishment. The Ukrainians want to embrace many, if not all, the values held dear by other European nations. Mr Navalny wants the same for Russia. Vladimir Putin cannot countenance either desire. As Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s foreign minister, told The Economist, “If Russia wins, there will be no Ukraine; if Ukraine wins, there will be a new Russia.” That new Russia is as much a target of Mr Putin’s war as Ukraine is. Its potential must be crushed as surely as Mr Navalny’s.
This crusade against a liberal European future is being fought in the name of Russkiy mir—“the Russian world”, a previously obscure historical term for a Slavic civilisation based on shared ethnicity, religion and heritage. The Putin regime has revived, promulgated and debased this idea into an obscurantist anti-Western mixture of Orthodox dogma, nationalism, conspiracy theory and security-state Stalinism.
The war is the latest and most striking manifestation of this revanchist ideological movement. And it has brought to the fore a dark and mystical component within it, one a bit in love with death. As Andrei Kurilkin, a publisher, puts it, “The substance of the myth is less important than its sacred nature…The legitimacy of the state is now grounded not in its public good, but in a quasi-religious cult.”
The cult was on proud display at Mr Putin’s first public appearance since the invasion—a rally at the Luzhniki stadium packed with 95,000 flag-waving people, mostly young, some bused in, many, presumably, there of their own volition. An open octagonal structure set up in the middle of the stadium served as an altar. Standing at it Mr Putin praised Russia’s army with words from St John’s gospel: “Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.”
His oration, delivered in a $14,000 Loro Piana coat, made much of Fyodor Ushakov, a deeply religious admiral who, in the 18th century, helped win Crimea back from the Ottomans. In 2001 he was canonised by the Orthodox church; he later became the patron saint of nuclear-armed long-distance bombers. “He once said that the storms of war would glorify Russia,” Mr Putin told the crowd. “That is how it was in his time; that is how it is today and will always be!”
A cathedral dome 19.45 metres across
In both his broad appeals to religion and his specific focus on the saintly Ushakov Mr Putin was cleaving to Stalin’s example. After the Soviet Union was attacked by Germany in 1941, the sometime seminarian turned communist dictator rehabilitated and co-opted the previously persecuted Orthodox church as a way of rallying the people. He also created a medal for outstanding service by naval officers called the order of Ushakov and arranged for his remains to be reburied.
This was not a mere echo or emulation; there is a strand of history which leads quite directly from then to now. Links between the church and the security forces, first fostered under Stalin, grew stronger after the fall of Communism. Whereas various western European churches repented and reflected after providing support for Hitler, the Moscow Patriarchate has never repented for its collusion with Stalin in such matters as the repression of Ukrainian Catholics after 1945.
The allegiance of its leaders, if not of all its clergy, has now been transferred to Mr Putin. Kirill, the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox church, has called his presidency “a miracle of God”; he and others have become willing supporters of the cult of war. An early indication of this possibility was seen in 2005, when the orange and black ribbons of the Order of St George, a military saint venerated by the Orthodox church, were given a new pre-eminence in commemorations of the 1941-45 struggle against Germany, known in Russia as the “great patriotic war”. Its garish culmination can be seen in the Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces in Kubinka, 70km west of Moscow, which was inaugurated on June 22nd (the day Hitler launched his invasion) in 2020 (the 75th anniversary of the war’s end) with Mr Putin and Kirill in attendance.
The cathedral is a Byzantine monstrosity in khaki, its floor made from melted-down German tanks. But it is not devoted solely to the wars of the previous century. A mosaic commemorates the invasion of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the country’s role in Syria’s civil war: angels smile down on the soldiers going about their holy work.
In keeping with this attitude Kirill has declared the current war a Godly affair and praised the role it will play in keeping Russia safe from the horrors of gay-pride marches. More zealous churchmen have gone further. Elizbar Orlov, a priest in Rostov, a city close to the border with Ukraine, said the Russian army “was cleaning the world of a diabolic infection”.
As the cathedral shows, the Russian people’s sacrifice and victories in the great patriotic war, which saw both the loss of 20m Soviet citizens and the creation of an empire greater in extent than any of the Tsars’, are central to Mr Putin’s new ideology of the Russian world. Today, though, the foes and allies of the 1940s have been shuffled around, allowing the war to be reframed as part of an assault on Russia’s civilisation in which the West has been engaged for centuries. The main culprits in this aggression are Britain and America—no longer remembered as allies in the fight against Nazis, but cast instead as backers of the imaginary Nazis from which Ukraine must be saved.
Project Russia
More important to the cult even than the priests are the siloviki of the security services, from whose ranks Mr Putin himself emerged. Officers of the FSB, one of the successors to the KGB, have been at the heart of Russian politics for 20 years. Like many inhabitants of closed, tightly knit and powerful organisations, they have a tendency to see themselves as members of a secret order with access to revealed truths denied to lesser folk. Anti-Westernism and a siege mentality are central to their beliefs. Mr Putin relies on the briefs with which they supply him, always contained in distinctive red folders, for his information about the world
In this realm, too, a turn towards the ideology now being promulgated was first seen in 2005, when a faction within the FSB produced an anonymous book called “Project Russia”. It was delivered by courier services to various ministries dealing with security and Russia’s relationship with the world, warning them that democracy was a threat and the West an enemy.
Few paid much heed. Though Mr Putin’s ascension to the presidency in 2000 was helped by his willingness to wage war in Chechnya, his mandate was to stabilise an economy still reeling from the debt crisis of 1998 and to consolidate the gains, mostly pocketed by oligarchs, of the first post-Soviet decade. His contract with the Russian people was based not on religion or ideology, but on improving incomes. Only dedicated Kremlin watchers, astute artists such as Vladimir Sorokin and a few political activists paid much attention to the new ideology of isolationism appearing in some of the darker corners of the power structure. At a time of postmodernist irony, glamour and hedonism it seemed marginal at best.
Two years later the new way of thinking became much more obvious to the outside world. In his Munich speech in 2007 Mr Putin formally rejected the idea of Russia’s integration into the West. In the same year he told a press conference in Moscow that nuclear weapons and Orthodox Christianity were the two pillars of Russian society, the one guaranteeing the country’s external security, the other its moral health.
After tens of thousands of middle-class city dwellers marched through Moscow and St Petersburg in 2011-12 demanding “Russia without Putin” the securocrats and clerics started to expand their dogma into daily life. A regime which sustained, and was sustained by, networks of corruption, rent extraction and extortion required religion and an ideology of national greatness to restore the legitimacy lost during the looting. As Mr Navalny remarked in a video which revealed Mr Putin’s palace in Sochi, covering up things of such size requires a lot of ideology.
Broken destinies
At that point it was still possible to see the ideology as a smokescreen rather than a product of real belief. Perhaps that was a mistake; perhaps the underlying reality changed. Either way, the onset of the covid-19 pandemic two years ago brought a raising of the ideological stakes. At the time, the most discussed aspect of the constitutional changes that Mr Putin finagled in July 2020 was that they effectively removed all limits on his term in office. But they also installed new ideological norms: gay marriage was banned, Russian enshrined as the “language of the state-forming people” and God given an official place in the nation’s heritage.
Mr Putin’s long subsequent periods of isolation seem to have firmed up the transformation. He is said to have lost much of his interest in current affairs and become preoccupied instead with history, paying particular heed to figures like Konstantin Leontyev, an ultra-reactionary 19th-century visionary who admired hierarchy and monarchy, cringed at democratic uniformity and believed in the freezing of time. One of the few people he appears to have spent time with is Yuri Kovalchuk, a close friend who controls a vast media group. According to Russian journalists they discussed Mr Putin’s mission to restore unity between Russia and Ukraine.
Hence a war against Ukraine which is also a war against Russia’s future—or at least the future as it has been conceived of by Russia’s sometimes small but frequently dominant Westernising faction for the past 350 years. As in Ukraine, the war is intended to wipe out the possibility of any future that looks towards Europe and some form of liberating modernity. In Ukraine there would be no coherent future left in its place. In Russia the modernisers would leave as their already diminished world was replaced by something fiercely reactionary and inward looking.
The Russian-backed “republics” in Donetsk and Luhansk may be a model. There, crooks and thugs were elevated to unaccustomed status, armed with new weapons and fitted with allegedly glorious purpose: to fight against Ukraine’s European dream. In Russia they would be tasked with keeping any such dream from returning, whether from abroad, or from a cell. ■
Read more of our recent coverage of the Ukraine crisis
This article appeared in the Briefing section of the print edition under the headline "The cult of war"

10. Russia Was Losing the Information War. Then Fox News Stepped In.

Truly sad.

Excerpts:

“The Pentagon has placed biolabs all along the Russian border,” Sergei Lavrov said in an interview earlier this week. “Ukraine is their biggest project. It's a clear threat to international peace and security.”
Experts also worry that the Kremlin could be boosting this narrative as a pretext to use chemical weapons inside Ukraine.
Last week the Russian Defense Ministry released documents that claimed to prove that the U.S. was training migratory birds to carry bioweapons from Ukraine into Russia.
And now it’s claiming that Hunter Biden is involved, knowing full well that use of his name will result in another cycle of credulous reporting from America’s hugely influential right-wing media machine.
On Thursday night, the conspiracy came full circle when the person who shared the original Twitter thread that caused the biolabs conspiracy to explode told his 51,000 Telegram followers that Carlson covering the story was helping spread the conspiracy among the ”normies.”
“Say what you want, but the most-watched news show in America is talking about Hunter Biden’s connection to biolab funding in Ukraine via Rosemont Seneca,” he wrote on his Telegram channel. “The normies are being herded on a collision course with the truth. They are on the cusp of piecing it all together. Make no mistake, this is culminating into a mass realization the likes of which the world has never seen.”

Russia Was Losing the Information War. Then Fox News Stepped In.

A conspiracy theory about U.S.-supported biolabs in Ukraine originated here, but it’s helping Russia turn the tide.

Unraveling viral disinformation and explaining where it came from, the harm it's causing, and what we should do about it.
On Thursday afternoon, the head of the radiation, chemical, and biological defense department of the Russian Armed Forces dropped some bombshell news: Hunter Biden had funded the Pentagon’s “military-biological program” in Ukraine.
Igor Kirillov backed up his explosive claim with a color-coded spider diagram featuring pictures of Biden alongside a smiling George Soros and links to the Democrat Party and multiple U.S. government departments. What he didn’t back it up with was any actual evidence.
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But just like the wider “U.S.-funded biolabs in Ukraine” conspiracy, Kirillov and the Kremlin don’t need facts, because they know that simply mentioning Hunter Biden’s name in the same sentence as “biolabs” would get them exactly what they wanted.
And just hours later, Fox News’ top-rated host Tucker Carlson gave it to them:
In the days following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a consensus emerged outside of Russia: The Kremlin had lost the information war.
This thesis took hold because Russia’s initial attempts to convince the world it had a valid reason for invading a sovereign country failed spectacularly, as open-source researchers and journalists on the front line quickly and easily debunked fake videos and the obvious false flag operations the Kremlin was using as pretexts for war.
Add the sophisticated and slick use of social media by Ukrainian President Vlodomyr Zelenskyy and other Ukrainian officials, plus viral stories of Ukrainians facing down Russian forces, and it’s easy to see why people might have believed the information war had been won.
But Russia has been in this game for longer than most, and there were indications that measures the Kremlin had put in place years ago were beginning to reap rewards. For example, this viral map produced by a German media outlet secretly backed by the Kremlin was shared widely among progressives and served to distract those viewing it from the horrors unfolding in Ukraine by flagging other conflicts happening around the globe.
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What the Kremlin was waiting for was a narrative that would take hold not inside its own country, but globally, and in the biolabs conspiracy, it found the perfect one.
The conspiracy broadly claims that the U.S. is helping fund biolabs inside Ukraine (which is true) and that those laboratories are developing biological or chemical weapons that will be used against Russia (which is not true). Variations of the theory claim Ukraine was behind COVID-19, and that perennial right-wing bogey figures like Hillary Clinton and Anthony Fauci are involved.
As the biolabs conspiracy took hold earlier this month, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki blamed Moscow and Beijing for spreading the false narrative—but in reality, the conspiracy was homegrown.
Claims that the U.S. has been funding biolabs to develop chemical or biological weapons around the world have been circulating for years, but the Ukraine conspiracy theory was born on Feb. 14 on the far-right Christian social network Gab, when a user posted a map of Ukraine, claiming to show the locations of U.S.-funded biolabs.
The map, first reported by NBC, attracted just three comments, but on the day the invasion began, the same image was shared by an anonymous Twitter account called @WarClandestine, which had previously shared QAnon conspiracy theories.
A thread by that account claiming to have uncovered the “real” reason why Russian President Vladimir Putin was invading Ukraine garnered huge attention, and though Twitter subsequently removed the account, the damage was done.
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A month later, right wing communities still view @WarClandestine’s thread as verifiable proof that the conspiracy is real, and it has pervaded conspiracy theory communities like QAnon, as well as the wider pro-Trump MAGA world typified by Carlson’s credulous section on Thursday night’s show.
Today, the biolabs story is everywhere. Along with Carlson’s unending willingness to give airtime to conspiracy theories and Kremlin propaganda, new research by Brookings this week showed that it is being boosted by hugely popular right-wing U.S. podcasts host including Steve Bannon, Dan Bongino, and Charlie Kirk.
These popular figures are also boosting this conspiracy on their social media channels and those platforms are struggling to control it.
New research from the Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH) showed that on Facebook, up to 80% of the posts sharing the bioweapons conspiracy have not been labeled to inform readers that the posts are missing context or contain partly or entirely false information.
The bioweapons conspiracy has become canon among many right-wing communities, who are using it as a way to justify their defense of Putin, who has committed war crimes against the Ukrainian people.
The conspiracy has also taken hold in many communities outside of the U.S., as exemplified by Matthew from Derby, who spoke to TalkRadio in the U.K. this week:
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The conspiracy may not have originated in the Kremlin’s disinformation department, but they have done everything in their power to keep it in the news.
As well as pushing out this narrative via its army of cyber trolls, the government’s highest-profile figures continue to push the conspiracy at every opportunity to help convince their own citizens that the war is justified.
“The Pentagon has placed biolabs all along the Russian border,” Sergei Lavrov said in an interview earlier this week. “Ukraine is their biggest project. It's a clear threat to international peace and security.”
Experts also worry that the Kremlin could be boosting this narrative as a pretext to use chemical weapons inside Ukraine.
Last week the Russian Defense Ministry released documents that claimed to prove that the U.S. was training migratory birds to carry bioweapons from Ukraine into Russia.
And now it’s claiming that Hunter Biden is involved, knowing full well that use of his name will result in another cycle of credulous reporting from America’s hugely influential right-wing media machine.
On Thursday night, the conspiracy came full circle when the person who shared the original Twitter thread that caused the biolabs conspiracy to explode told his 51,000 Telegram followers that Carlson covering the story was helping spread the conspiracy among the ”normies.”
“Say what you want, but the most-watched news show in America is talking about Hunter Biden’s connection to biolab funding in Ukraine via Rosemont Seneca,” he wrote on his Telegram channel. “The normies are being herded on a collision course with the truth. They are on the cusp of piecing it all together. Make no mistake, this is culminating into a mass realization the likes of which the world has never seen.”
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11. Op-Ed: Ukraine — Redefining the role of modern special forces in a ground war

I am reminded of Richard Simpkin's book Race to the Swift in the early 1980s. 

There is nothing new under the sun.

I do love this assessment and the use of these words "tactical pedantry and dogmatic operational style."

  • Russian tactical pedantry and dogmatic operational styles aren’t adapting at all to the new combat reality.


Op-Ed: Ukraine — Redefining the role of modern special forces in a ground war - Digital Journal
digitaljournal.com · by ByPaul Wallis · March 24, 2022
Experts said Ukraine's effort to drag Russia to the world court over the invasion could have symbolic value - Copyright AFP LLUIS GENE
Ukraine’s special forces (SOF) have been clocking up many recent successes in an ever-increasing number of strikes against Russian forces. They’ve done a remarkable job for a force that was only founded in 2015.
This is a pretty solid organization, with about 2,000 members as of March 2022. It’s actually quite a large force, in comparison with other countries. They’ve been deployed behind Russian lines, in free-flowing combat, and in the front lines around Kyiv.
That’s a heavy workload in the middle of a shooting war at point-blank range of their capital and other cities. They seem to be hitting anything and everything in a particularly well-structured series of operations. Their success rate is extraordinary.
In contrast, Russian special forces seem to have achieved very little in the same war and the same military contexts. Even the Russian propaganda machine has nothing good to say about their activities on any level. Russian special ops seem to have been badly beaten up in southern Ukraine by one of their counterparts, the Azov Regiment.
Some of the old with a lot of the new
Ukraine’s special ops are echoing some elements of the past. The original SAS and Long Range Desert Group started in North Africa in World War 2. Their missions were to penetrate behind the lines and cause havoc.
Ukraine’s SOF has been doing continuous operations of this type for some time now. They’ve made a mockery of Russian lateral security in the process. They even captured a FARA mobile system, which is specifically designed to monitor, locate, and target enemy forces.
This level of operations is pretty much bread and butter to special ops forces, but it’s being done around the clock by the Ukrainian SOF. That’s very new. Even allowing for comparatively short distances, the scope of the SOF operations is telling a new story for modern warfare.
Hit hard, hit fast, and keep hitting
Russia’s clunky methods of operation are hopelessly outclassed in this war. It’s clear they have no answers to the rampaging Ukrainian SOF. The SOF’s 4-week encyclopedia of successes have been achieved against an active combat army in the field.
That’s very new territory for special forces. Despite the criminally inexcusable inferior combat quality of some Russian units:
  • There are still supposedly effective combat and Russian special forces units that have failed miserably against Ukraine’s SOF for weeks on end.
  • The sheer number of successful operations of the SOF indicate no effective application of any countermeasures at any level.
  • Russian tactical pedantry and dogmatic operational styles aren’t adapting at all to the new combat reality.
  • No area of Russian operations has been safe from attack by SOF.
The new way of war? It just might be.
The SOF operations are contributing directly to other Ukrainian operations in more ways than just attacking the Russians:
  • Economy of force: SOF is a comparatively small force, less than 1% of Ukrainian military forces, achieving extremely high value results.
  • Integrations of SOF with ground operations: Flexible operations are meshing well with Ukrainian countermoves.
  • Expert current intelligence on the ground: Special forces are mobile intelligence by definition. This is obviously working out well for the Ukrainians. They have local and other combat intelligence in almost real time from reliable sources.
  • Constant security threat: The Russians have an expensive choice which is almost impossible to make in this environment – Commit a lot of forces to much higher lateral security, or simply hope their local forces can outfight SOF. They’re running out of ground forces, and they haven’t yet outfought them.
  • Mobile forces are hard targets: You can have as much firepower as you like; mobile forces can dodge it. Hypersonic missiles, TOS and similar systems can hit static targets, but not much else. Mobility can nullify firepower and do it well.
This is where the future kicks in. It should be a very hard kick in the appropriate place for military dogmatists. In the increasingly automated military space, effective people are the new benchmark. Ukraine’s SOF is proving how effective tech-savvy mobile assault forces can be on a fundamental level.
Complex warfare doesn’t somehow get less complex. It evolves and develops nuances. It requires top quality skill sets in more areas. It needs ideas as much or more than it needs expensive hardware.
Command of smaller units is famously more combat-efficient than ponderous command army-level structures in combat. Self-contained units can be given a task and manage most of it themselves.
Mobility and agility are key factors. Ukraine’s extremely agile SOF operates at roughly company strength or less. Larger units simply cannot do logistical gymnastics of this kind in these roles.
These highly adaptive combat units can manage fluid situations well. The usual story is that when things get moving, command is trying to keep up with information. These units can clearly dictate combat, retain the initiative, and manage situations ASAP.
Special forces can be mini-battlegroups. That’s not particularly new, but the Ukrainian methods are showing how that methodology can work in a ground combat context. Conventional military forces could do this too, with a bit of training and some upgrades.
Why commit a battalion or brigade when you can do the same job with less risk and more tactical agility this way? Mobile infantry and armored commanders in particular will be well aware of the issues.
Managing your own strength in combat is a pretty grim, thankless task. It’s the amount of punch required, not the number of troops. This option delivers the punch without straining the muscles.
This war is turning into a major military classic in tactics. Western militaries around the world should be inviting the Ukrainians for some lectures. They’ll be well worth the time.
A bit of black humor for military readers – A few days ago, Russian forces attacked a village with an armored column. The villagers beat them back and made a mess of the column. The net Russian achievement was to damage some buildings and destroy an old lady’s outhouse.
Might just be that the old way of ground warfare needs something a bit classier, would you say?
_________________________________________
Disclaimer
The opinions expressed in this Op-Ed are those of the author. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Digital Journal or its members.
digitaljournal.com · by ByPaul Wallis · March 24, 2022

12. Alert the Fifth Force: Counterinsurgency, Unconventional Warfare, and Psychological Operations of the United States Air Force in Special Air Warfare

Again, there is nothing new under the sun. This is a review of a book published in 1969.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, MacCloskey’s Alert the Fifth Force finds most of its value in being the personal thoughts of an extremely unique practitioner of the past. Modern-day information operations, psychological operations, and special operations forces (SOF) officers would do well to parse through this book and others like it for relevant lessons from the past to serve as inspiration for the future. Although this book will not be revolutionary nor will it substitute an academic history of the war, it provides useful insight from a military perspective. As the role of SOF in strategic competition is revisited, understanding their applications through the lens of a significant member of history has value in and of itself.



Alert the Fifth Force: Counterinsurgency, Unconventional Warfare, and Psychological Operations of the United States Air Force in Special Air Warfare
airuniversity.af.edu · March 21, 2022
  • Published
Alert the Fifth Force: Counterinsurgency, Unconventional Warfare, and Psychological Operations of the United States Air Force in Special Air Warfare by Monro MacCloskey. Richards Rosen Press, 1969, 190 pp.
If the Air Force’s first and only leader of its short-lived psychological warfare command saw the world as it stood today, what do you think he would say? Although this tome sometimes feels confused as to its overall purpose, it provides insightful, experienced, and highly relevant observations for modern-day unconventional warfare, information operations, and strategic competition practitioners.
A product of its time, Alert the Fifth Force zigs and zags from a political analysis of the communist modus operandi to the role of nuclear deterrence in a grand strategy to the storied history of US Air Force (USAF) special air warfare in World War II and the Vietnam War. Despite the seemingly scattered strategy, each chapter succinctly captures an element deemed crucial by author Brigadier General Monro MacCloskey, USAF, retired, to understanding how American airpower could be brought to bear as a solution to the ever-growing communist threat—at that time, presumed to be threatening rapid expansion around the world.
MacCloskey writes with several backgrounds that gave significant credibility to the book. At the time of writing, the author was serving as the executive director of the Air Force Historical Foundation. Before that, however, he performed numerous combat missions in World War II as an Army Air Corps aviator supporting unconventional warfare, psychological operations, and other special activities, culminating in him taking command of the Air Force’s first and only attempt to establish a command dedicated to psychological warfare—the innocuously named Air Resupply and Communications Service (ARCS).
The ARCS would go on as a foundational piece of today’s Air Force Special Operations Command. It should be no surprise, then, that the thoughts of MacCloskey as communicated in this book could be summed up thusly: given the inability of nuclear supremacy or conventional arms to put an end to guerilla warfare, the capabilities provided by special operations such as counterinsurgency operations, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations will be the key to victory in Vietnam and the war against communism.
The book opens by focusing on the foundational problems posed by communism and insurgency. MacCloskey draws an intense focus on the inner workings of communism operations, including their methods of expansion, growth, and sustainment before instigating revolution. After breaking down how the adversary operates, the author then surveys the then-required topic to touch upon—the role of nuclear deterrence. MacCloskey concludes that while the American nuclear force’s primary focus should only ever be that of unqualified nuclear deterrence, conventional assets such as Strategic Air Command’s B-52 fleet can still support unconventional warfare operations through the significant psychological impact their operations can have.
The second portion of the book delves into a survey of unconventional warfare historical case studies, the inner workings of the Viet Cong, and wrestles with what it means to achieve strategic superiority in guerilla warfare. Conventional events retold through the lens of unconventional warfare include the American Revolution, the French Revolution, and the “Russian Revolution of March.” Further case studies examined are the communist uprisings in Greece following World War II; former Philippines President Ramon Magsaysay’s strategies and policies to combat the rise of communist forces within his country, the Philippines; and the British lessons learned in combating the communists in Malaya.
Finally, the book pivots to applying these lessons to a deeper history of the Viet Cong within Vietnam, including their origins under French colonial rule. It is around halfway through the book when MacCloskey first begins to introduce such topics as the Navy SEALs, Army Special Forces, Air Force special air operations, and indigenously trained counterguerrilla forces and their various roles in combating a guerilla uprising.
Finally, MacCloskey rounds out the book by exploring the history of special air operations from World War II, the postwar period, and Vietnam and applying their lessons learned to the future of the current conflict. This section includes a significant emphasis on understanding the insurgency problem as a whole-of-society problem as opposed to a strictly military one. For this reason, MacCloskey argues, that special air power brings significant but often overlooked capabilities to bear, such as the impact of civil-military operations, the ability to engage and win in psychological warfare, and, perhaps its most well-known military application, the ability to perform low-level strikes and maneuvering.
Despite its strong conclusion, there is a significant limitation of this work in that it becomes immediately clear that this is the work of a practitioner and not that of a political scientist. In that regard, a reader may find this piece to be wanting for more foundation in political economy or sociology regarding the origins and operations of communism as a whole of societal issue. Further, the book has a conspicuous lack of citations and references, a curious omission for a professional historian. This weakness further cements that this book is more the thoughts of a practitioner on a matter relevant to his personal expertise and not a rigorous scientific study.
In conclusion, MacCloskey’s Alert the Fifth Force finds most of its value in being the personal thoughts of an extremely unique practitioner of the past. Modern-day information operations, psychological operations, and special operations forces (SOF) officers would do well to parse through this book and others like it for relevant lessons from the past to serve as inspiration for the future. Although this book will not be revolutionary nor will it substitute an academic history of the war, it provides useful insight from a military perspective. As the role of SOF in strategic competition is revisited, understanding their applications through the lens of a significant member of history has value in and of itself.
Captain Robert Stelmack, USAF
SSQ
airuniversity.af.edu · March 21, 2022


13. Special Operations News Update - March 26, 2022 | SOF News



Special Operations News Update - March 26, 2022 | SOF News
sof.news · by SOF News · March 26, 2022
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world. Our next Ukraine War Update will be on Monday, March 27, 2022.
Photo: An AC-130 Gunship shoots off flares. Courtesy of Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), January 1, 2020.
Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).
Ukraine War News
We will be back on Monday with our usual coverage of the Ukraine War. For now, here are some highlights from the past 24 hours. The Russians have ‘completed the current phase’ of their ‘special military operation’. They will now concentrate their activities in eastern Ukraine in the regions along the Russian border. Russian forces are on the defensive in the Kyiv region. The Ukrainians have counterattacked in southern Ukraine; with some reports saying that they may be able to take back Kherson. President Biden was in Poland on Friday visiting Polish officials, NATO leaders, and U.S. troops.
The Ukraine War and SOF
Ukraine’s SOF. The achievements of the Ukrainian special operations forces may never be fully disclosed. However, what is known so far is that they have been a significant factor in the defense of the country. Their behind the lines operations, reminiscent of the British Special Air Service and Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) of World War II, have been wrecking havoc on the Russians. SOF adherents and students will be studying the exploits of the Ukraine SOF for years to come. “Ukraine – Redefining the role of modern special forces in a ground war”, Digital Journal, March 24, 2022.
Where Are Russian’s Little Green Men? The 2014 invasion by Russia of Crimea and eastern portions of Ukraine was a quick success. In part, this was because of its use of cyber, information operations, airborne units, and Spetsnaz (the so-called Little Green Men). The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is remarkedly different and the presence of Spetsnaz and other elite units do not seem to have the same effect as it had several years ago. In fact, Russian SOF has been taking a beating in the war thus far. Dan Goure explores this in detail in “What Happened to Putin’s Little Green Men?”, Real Clear Defense, March 22, 2022.
Putin’s Spetnaz. Russian SOF have been deployed to Ukraine to conduct a number of different operations. According to some sources one of their primary missions was the capture and / or execution of Ukrainian President Zelensky. Learn more about this unit in an article by The Sun, March 23, 2022. (Warning: heavy use of glossy pics and sensationalized wording!).
Chechen SF Heading Home? Military units of Chechen soldiers have suffered huge losses in a major blow to Vladimir Putin’s war. According to the Security Service of Ukraine ‘several hundred’ of the Chechen soldiers were killed. “Putin humiliated as hardmen Chechen special forces go home after losing hundreds of men”, Express, March 21, 2022.
Israeli Ex-SOF Helping Ukraine. Veterans of Israeli special forces units are helping Ukrainians train up for the fight against the Russian army. The team is working at a location in western Ukraine and includes former members of the elite Sayeret Matkal commando unit. “Israeli Intelligence, Ex-Special Forces Helping Ukraine”, Israel Radar, March 25, 2022.
US SOF and Training Ukraine SOF. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 the United States and other nations stepped up to provide military equipment and training to the Ukrainian military. A good chunk of this training was geared towards the Ukrainian special operations forces. The U.S. Army Special Forces and other SOF units have spent considerable time working with their Ukrainian counterparts over the past several years. Read more in “The US Army’s Green Berets quietly helped tilt the battlefield a little bit more toward Ukraine”, Fox News, March 24, 2022.

US SOF News
USASOC Sniper Competition. Twenty-one teams from across the military, US law enforcement, and allied armies competed in the US Army Special Operations Command International Sniper Competition. The four-day event concluded on Friday, March 25. The competitors took part in 23 shooting events with long-range rifles, carbines, and pistols. The first place team was from the Army Special Operations Command, second place team was from the French Marines, and the third place went to a team from the Army National Guard’s 20th Special Forces Group. Read more in “Fort Bragg Team Wins Army Special Operations Sniper Contest, French Marines Second”, Coffee or Die Magazine, March 25, 2022.
That Time the Wagner Group Got Waxed in Syria. One of Russia’s mercenary groups fighting in Ukraine is getting a lot of press. But the tactical expertise of this group of ‘private fighters’ could be overrated. In 2018 US SOF and the Wagner Group faced off against each other in what came to be known as the Battle of Khasham. A large force of over 500 Russians and Syrians attacked a small US outpost in eastern Syria. A four hour fight took place between US special operations forces (with a lot of airpower) and a combined force of over 500 Russians and Syrians. The battle resulted in one Syrian fighter wounded on the US side and over 300 dead for the opposition. Read more in “That time US forces tore hundreds of Russian Wagner Group mercenaries to pieces in Syria”, Coffee or Die Magazine, March 25, 2022.
Mint 400. Green Berets once again took their tactical trucks to an annual race held in the foothills of Las Vegas. Competing against other off-road vehicles is fun for the SF team but also exposes them to different ways of navigating over harsh terrain. See “Army Special Forces took part in the legendary Mint 400 off-road race”, We Are the Mighty, March 21, 2022. Read more about the SF group’s participation in the 2020 Mint 400.
SEALs and COVID Vaccinations. The Supreme Court granted an emergency request from the Defense Department to restore its authority over the deployment of unvaccinated Navy SEALs and other special warfare service members. The is a pending legal challenge to the military’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate. “Supreme Court restores Pentagon’s authority over deployment of unvaccinated SEALs”, The Hill, March 25, 2022.

SOF History
Medal of Honor – Charles Hoskings. A U.S. Army Special Forces soldier was on his third deployment to Vietnam when he was killed in action while saving his fellow Green Berets. Hoskings started his career with the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II. His first tour with SF in Vietnam was in 1961 as a military advisor. During his third tour in Vietnam, this time with the 5th Special Forces Group in 1967, he was an advisor for a Civilian Irregular Defense Group Reaction Battalions. Read more about MSgt. Hoskings in a news report by DoD News, March 21, 2022.
Building Named after General William Darby. A new building, the rapid deployment facility at Fort Drum – home of the 10th Mountain Division, has been named after a legendary WWII general. William Darby was the officer who led the first Army Rangers during World War II and later was the 10th Mountain Division’s assistant commander during the campaign in Italy. The 1st , 3rd, and 4th Ranger Battalions of World War II were known as “Darby’s Rangers”. “Fort Drum deployment facility named for famed World War II officer”, Informnny.com, March 23, 2022.

Information Operations
New IO Unit for USAF. The U.S. Air Force has established a new hybrid wing-level organization known as ‘Detachment 1’. It will operate out of the 67th Cyberspace Wing at Joint Base San Antonio in Texas. The Information Warfare Training and Research Initiative Detachment will connect with airman worldwide working in the information warfare field. See “US Air Force establishes new information warfare detachment”, Defense News, March 25, 2022.
Bombs to Bits. There is a lot of discussion on how America can achieve superiority in the cyber, information, and space realms. Today’s armed forces should take an approach used by the air-to-ground operations community in doctrine, organization, and training. “From Bombs to Bits: Air-to-Ground Operations as a Model for the Tactical Information Environment”, War on the Rocks, March 25, 2022.

Books, Podcasts, and Videos
Book Review – Alert the Force. The role of special operations forces in this new era of ‘strategic competition’ is being revisited. A book published in 1969 provides some historical insight and observations for modern-day unconventional warfare, information operations, and strategic competition practitioners. Read more in a review of Alert the Force: Counterinsurgency, Unconventional Warfare, and Psychological Operations of the United States Air Force in Special Air Warfare, Air & Space Power Journal, March 21, 2022.
CA Papers. The latest volume of “Civil Affairs Issue Papers” is now available. This is a joint effort between the Civil Affairs Association and the Association of the U.S. Army. The series is a report from the 2021 Civil Affairs Symposium and has five authored papers on topics such as great power competition, innovation, and civil-military operations and relations. See “Papers Highlight Civil Affairs Global Role”, Association of the United States Army, March 23, 2022.
Podcast – COIN and Cultural Intelligence? Andrew Milburn and Kyle Atwell explore the topic of cultural intelligence in counterinsurgency. They pose some questions and provide some answers along with their guests – Sir Simon Mayall and Dr. Christian Tripodi. “COIN and Culture: How Important is Cultural Intelligence in Counterinsurgency?”, Irregular Warfare Podcast, Modern War Institute at West Point, March 25, 2022, 48 minutes.
Video – SORB Mountain Team Video. Members of a mountain team of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) conduct training in austere, high-elevation environments. Mountain movement is one of many capabilities in which members of Special Forces operational detachments specialize. DVIDS, March, 25, 2022, one minute.
Video – Special Operations Winter Mountain Course 22. The 10th Special Forces Group hosted a field training exercise as the final event for the Special Operations Winter Mountain Operator Course (SOWMOC) in Gunnison, Colorado during March 2022. DVIDS, March 24, 2022, one minute.
**********
sof.news · by SOF News · March 26, 2022


14. Supreme Court restores Pentagon's authority over deployment of unvaccinated SEALs

So... Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch would deny the authority of the Commander in Chief to command the military. So much for "conservative" support for the military (or at least some conservatives). But Kavanaugh "gets it."

Supreme Court restores Pentagon's authority over deployment of unvaccinated SEALs
The Hill · by Jordan Williams · March 25, 2022

The Supreme Court on Friday granted an emergency request from the Defense Department to restore its authority over the deployment of unvaccinated Navy SEALs and other special warfare service members amid a pending legal challenge to the military’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate.
The court’s move temporarily blocked a January ruling by a federal judge in Texas. That judge halted the department from considering vaccination status in deployment decisions affecting Navy special forces operators who have refused to comply with the military’s mandate on religious grounds.
Justice Clarence Thomas indicated that he would have denied the Pentagon’s request, and fellow conservatives Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch wrote in dissent.
“In this case, the District Court, while no doubt well-intentioned, in effect inserted itself into the Navy’s chain of command, overriding military commanders’ professional military judgments,” conservative Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote, concurring with the majority.
A spokesperson for the Justice Department said the agency will “rely on our prior filings in this matter for any comment.”
The Hill has reached out to the Pentagon for comment.
The ruling marks the latest twist as the Pentagon fights to be able to enforce its mandate against the plaintiffs in the case, who argued that the mandate violated their religious rights.
In early January, U.S. District Judge Reed O’Connor blocked the Navy from taking “any adverse action” against 35 special warfare sailors — including Navy SEALs, divers and special warfare combat crew. He argued that the religious accommodation process was “by all accounts, it is theater,” adding the branch “merely rubber stamps each denial.”
The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals later turned down a request from the Pentagon to partially stay that ruling, saying the agency hadn’t proven “paramount interests” that justify vaccinating the plaintiffs.
Active-duty sailors had until Nov. 28 to be fully vaccinated, and reservists had until Dec. 28 to comply. As of March 23, the Navy has only granted nine accommodations for members in the Individual Ready Reserve, but those service members will have to be vaccinated before returning to active service.
The high court was largely left to determine whether the district court’s ruling negatively impacted the military’s decision making.
Kavanaugh said he saw “no basis” for employing judicial power in a way that “military commanders believe would impair the military of the United States as it defends the American people.”
But Alito, writing for the dissent, criticized the Navy for not truly considering the service members’ requests. However, he indicated that he was “wary” of the district court’s “judicial interference with sensitive military decision making.”
“I agree that the Navy has a compelling interest in preventing COVID–19 infection from impairing its ability to carry out its vital responsibilities, as well as a compelling interest in minimizing any serious health risk to Navy personnel,” Alito said. “But the Navy’s summary rejection of respondents’ requests for religious exemptions was by no means the least restrictive means of furthering those interests.”
Updated at 6:18 p.m.
The Hill · by Jordan Williams · March 25, 2022


15. Russia’s failures in Ukraine imbue Pentagon with newfound confidence

As I have written, if Ukraine successful defends itself (and I believe it will), it will be the largest and most successful "through, with and by" operation the US has ever conducted.(Note the "through, with, and by" concept was "coined" by COL Mark Boyatt in a War College paper he wrote and then again in Special Warfare Magazine after he commanded 3d Special Forces Group in Haiti. It is the essence of Special Forces operations but is applicable to the entire military and even the government.

From Mark Boyatt's 1993 War College paper and his 2016 book, Special Forces:A Unique National Asset "Through, With, and By"

What does “through, with and by” mean? This phrase describes the manner in which Special Forces, working “through, with and by” other people such as indigenous populations, rebels and revolutionaries, the oppressed and persecuted, displaced persons and refugees, accomplish the military and political objectives of the United States. However, most often Special Forces does the “through, with and by” with the militaries and civilian authorities of our friends and allies. Special Forces accomplishes this unique work by living with, training, fighting alongside and even, at times, leading these groups. Usually this is accomplished openly, but, at times, behind the scenes.
 
“With” is simple. It means working, eating, sleeping and living, side by side 24 hours per day, seven days a week, with those we are helping for as long as it takes -- years or generations -- to accomplish the objectives of both the people we are supporting and the USA; however, their objectives and conduct must, or certainly should, align morally and ethically with the United States. This “with” usually takes place overseas in the location of the people, but it can occur in surrounding areas or even in training locations within the United States. Regardless, it does mean that Special Forces go to war side-by-side with these people.
 
But what is the difference between “through and by?” “Through” is as simple as the special forces not working directly with the people but working through surrogates (trusted third parties acting as intermediaries). This may happen when we wish to conceal US support or when Special Forces are not permitted direct contact with the people we wish to help.
 
The “by” is when the indigenous people conduct the actual operations by themselves, but are supported and assisted by Special Forces who may work with them in remote, safe locations to train and prepare them, secure their equipment and supplies, but not accompany them when they return to their home location to conduct operations.
 
“Through, with and by” can be conducted in peace or conflict and, to be clear, some other organizations do “through, with and by” to some degree. But only Army Special Forces are specifically selected, assessed, trained and organized for “through with and by” for long duration (years, generations) in foreign lands with foreign cultures in war and other conflicts, specifically in unconventional warfare.



Russia’s failures in Ukraine imbue Pentagon with newfound confidence
The Washington Post · by Greg Jaffe and Dan Lamothe Today at 2:00 a.m. EDT · March 26, 2022
For more than a decade, the Pentagon, pinned down in Afghanistan, followed China’s rise as a global power and Russia’s ambitious military modernization program with growing alarm. The consensus in Beijing, Moscow and among some in Washington was that an era of U.S. global dominance was rapidly coming to an end.
But one month into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, senior Pentagon officials are brimming with newfound confidence in American power, spurred by the surprising effectiveness of U.S.-backed Ukrainian forces, Russia’s heavy battlefield losses and the cautionary lessons they believe China is taking from the war.
“Let me put it this way,” said one senior Pentagon official of America’s standing in the world. “Who would you switch places with? Seriously, who would you switch places with?”
It’s a stunning shift in tone for a department that in August ended a 20-year war in Afghanistan with a chaotic withdrawal as an ascendant Taliban returned to power. Even though the U.S. military has not played the primary role in the American response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, senior Pentagon officials are quick to tout the still-unfolding war as proof of America’s economic, diplomatic and military strength.
The senior Pentagon official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal strategy, said that the last few weeks have shown that the United States can marshal its “primacy in the global financial system” and its network of allies “in ways that can absolutely pummel aggressors.”
The success of U.S. and NATO-trained Ukrainian forces has also bolstered the Pentagon’s confidence following the embarrassing collapse of U.S.-trained militaries in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade. The Ukrainian military’s will to fight and ability to inflict heavy losses on larger and more technologically advanced Russian force has taken many at the Pentagon by surprise.
“I think Ukraine has been able to tie the Russians in knots in large part because of what we’ve been able to do to help them since 2014,” the senior defense official said, adding that the failures of Afghan forces “might” have caused U.S. officials to underestimate Ukrainian troops.
Such optimism isn’t universally shared. Critics note that the Russian invasion is only one month old and that the Russians already are using their overwhelming firepower advantage to level Ukrainian cities in an attempt to secure a brutal and bloody victory. Even a partial triumph would allow Russian President Vladimir Putin to say that he had stood up to the world and the flood of arms from the West.
The United States also has relied heavily on European allies, who have often taken the lead in leveling crippling sanctions on the Russian economy at considerable costs to themselves. It’s not yet clear whether the current unity will fracture if the war drags on for months.
“We need to demonstrate our [collective] power every day, and we can only demonstrate it if we keep everybody together,” said Ivo Daalder, president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and a former U.S. ambassador to NATO. “This is not something the U.S. has traditionally done well.”
Some Republicans have charged that Putin’s perception of the United States and its allies as militarily weak or unwilling to fight gave him the confidence to invade Ukraine. Rep. Michael McCaul (Tex.), the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, this month compared Biden to Neville Chamberlain, the former British prime minister who sought to appease Hitler before World War II.
“Weakness invites aggression. It’s a historic axiom. And it’s true,” McCaul said in a news conference on Capitol Hill.
Pentagon officials contend that there was little they could do to deter Putin, who expected a quick and easy victory in Ukraine, and argue that their broader strategy of “integrated deterrence” — which leverages economic, diplomatic and military power to dissuade potential aggressors — has so far worked to stop Putin from expanding the war into NATO territory. The Biden administration has made integrated deterrence the cornerstone of its soon-to-be released National Defense Strategy, which was delayed as the threat of an invasion grew.
“I don’t think there’s any doubt that the model of integrated deterrence comes out smelling pretty good from this,” the senior defense official said.
Others pointed to Putin’s Ukraine invasion as proof of the concept’s failure. Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) said in an interview that he “completely and strongly” disagrees with anyone who cites Ukraine as an example of the success of integrated deterrence. “I cannot fathom how they can make that argument with a straight face,” he said. “Their whole deterrence strategy rested on the idea that the threat of limited sanctions could deter Putin.”
Gallagher added that the Ukraine conflict “could still escalate in ways that we don’t foresee right now.”
The biggest critique from Republicans has been that Biden and the Pentagon have been too quick to foreclose military options and too worried that aggressive U.S. efforts to arm the Ukrainians might spur Putin to widen the war.
More robust U.S. involvement “would be an assurance that Russia would lose the war,” said Kori Schake, the director of foreign and defense policy at the conservative American Enterprise Institute. “If the Ukrainian military can fight the Russian military to a standstill, imagine what it would look like if the United States and its allies joined?"
Biden’s worries about triggering a wider war against a nuclear power, however, haven’t constrained U.S. ambitions regarding Ukraine. A few weeks ago there was grave doubt among senior U.S. military officials about whether the Ukrainians could hold onto their country if Putin was determined to launch an all-out invasion. Now Pentagon officials talk of the need to make certain Putin suffers a “strategic failure.”
Such an outcome, these officials said, would have far reaching consequences in Moscow but also in Beijing, where China’s Xi Jinping is almost certainly drawing lessons from Putin’s struggles.
“Amphibious landings are the single hardest large-scale military operations that there is,” the senior Pentagon official said. Since the start of the Ukraine invasion, Russia has kept its amphibious ships parked off the coast of Ukrainian cities, apparently afraid to come ashore. At least one of those ships, thought to be carrying armored personnel carriers and tanks, was struck by Ukrainian forces Thursday in the Black Sea port of Berdyansk, resulting in a huge fireball.
Compared with Ukraine, Taiwan is a “hellscape” for an invading force that combines open beaches, mountainous terrain and dense cities, the senior defense official said.
Former defense secretary Robert M. Gates offered a similar assessment Wednesday in an online conversation with Michael Vickers, his former undersecretary of defense for intelligence. Xi and Putin have both described the United States as “in decline,” politically paralyzed and eager to pull back from the rest of the world.
“Xi’s got to wonder about his own army at this point,” Gates said in the conversation, organized by the OSS Society. “The resistance of the Ukrainians has got to make him wonder, ‘Maybe I’ve underestimated the consequences of a military attack on Taiwan?’”
Gallagher took the opposite lesson, arguing that even though China recognizes Russia’s struggles, Putin’s gamble should spur a greater sense of urgency regarding Taiwan. “All of the evidence suggests that we are already in the window of maximum danger,” he said.
A longer-term challenge for the Pentagon, which is prone to its own fits of military hubris, will be to recognize the limits of its power and the crucial role U.S. allies will play in containing Russian and Chinese global ambitions, according to analysts and even some senior Pentagon officials. In the 1990s and early 2000s when the United States was at the height of its power, U.S. leaders often treated allies as an afterthought. Former President Bush launched the invasion of Iraq in 2003 over the objections of allies such as Germany and France.
“We had this sense where we could do it all and the allies were a problem,” said Daalder, the former NATO ambassador.
More recently, Biden decided on a rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan with little input from America’s NATO allies who had fought alongside U.S. troops for two decades. Now Daalder said the challenge for the Biden administration and possibly successive presidents will be to hold together the global coalition of democracies that came together to confront Putin “not just for a month or a year, but for a decade plus” as the United States and its allies work to disentangle their economies from Russia and eventually from a resurgent and increasingly authoritarian and aggressive China.
Such an approach would require a new kind of humility, and new deference to the allies on both military and economic matters.
“If strong economic, political and military competition with Russia and China is the priority,” Daalder said, “we can’t do it by ourselves.”
The Washington Post · by Greg Jaffe and Dan Lamothe Today at 2:00 a.m. EDT · March 26, 2022

16. How NATO ‘woke up’: The response to Putin’s war


How NATO ‘woke up’: The response to Putin’s war
One month into the war in Ukraine, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO looks at the alliance’s response, fears of an escalation and the legacy of Madeleine Albright.

Global Security Reporter
March 24, 2022
grid.news · by Joshua Keating
As the war in Ukraine enters its second month, President Joe Biden is in Brussels for a NATO summit to discuss the allies’ coordinated response to the Russian invasion. An alliance founded 73 years ago at the dawn of the Cold War, and until recently dismissed by many as outdated and adrift, now appears more central to global affairs than it has in decades.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his allies blame NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe for provoking the conflict, but if the invasion of Ukraine was meant to push the alliance back, it’s accomplished just the opposite. NATO’s response to the war has been united, and more military might is now flowing to the countries on the alliance’s eastern edge to protect them from possible future Russian aggression.
At the same time, NATO leaders are struggling to balance an imperative to back Ukraine and punish Russia, against fears of sparking a direct Russia-NATO conflict, which could have apocalyptic consequences.
At the one-month mark of the war, Grid spoke with Ivo Daalder, who served as U.S. ambassador to NATO during Barack Obama’s administration, to discuss the state of the alliance and its collective response to Putin’s war. Daalder is now president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Grid: One month in, how do you think the NATO alliance has been transformed by the war in Ukraine?
Ivo Daalder: I think you see an alliance that sort of woke up out of a slumber and decided that the mission for which it was created is back. It wasn’t completely asleep. Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 stopped the decline in defense spending, and for the first time [NATO] sent serious military capabilities forward into Eastern Europe. But this is qualitatively different. There’s now a real sense that the collective defense of NATO territory and promoting security and stability throughout Europe is, again, the core of the NATO mission.
G: So it’s no longer “brain-dead,” as President Emmanuel Macron would say?
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ID: It never really was brain-dead. And it certainly isn’t “obsolete,” as a certain U.S. president said. But it’s found a clear purpose. There’s always been some degree of discord about the extent to which NATO should think outside its area of responsibilities, in terms of, say, its mission in Afghanistan or counterpiracy in the Gulf of Aden. When I was U.S. ambassador, we had six operations on three different continents. You may still see some capabilities in different parts of the world going forward, but the focus is very clear now: It’s on defending NATO territory and promoting security and stability in Europe.
G: The question that a lot of governments in the alliance seem to be grappling with is how much support they can provide for Ukraine without risking escalation or even a Russia-NATO war. Where do you draw that line? How far can we go without provoking something much larger and more catastrophic?
ID: That line is not set in stone. It is moving. It has always moved, and it has already moved. At the outset of the war, we were not providing drones. Now we are providing drones. We weren’t providing high-altitude air defense systems. Now we’re providing high-altitude air defense systems. And we weren’t providing actionable intelligence. Now, apparently, we are providing actionable intelligence.
As the strategic context of this war changes, so will this line, specifically, if Putin escalates in a significant way. Of course, if he directly attacks NATO territory — cyber, missile or whatever — the context changes. But also if he doesn’t do that, but starts using chemical weapons or bombs chemical industrial facilities that lead to large-scale casualties, or God forbid, if he uses a nuclear weapon, that line will change. And I wouldn’t exclude the possibility that at that point, the conclusion becomes that the best way to defend Ukraine is to become directly involved and make sure that Russia doesn’t win.
G: The question of whether Ukraine would eventually become a member of NATO is obviously a big part of the context for this conflict. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said that actual membership is no longer a goal, but he is looking for credible security guarantees from Western powers. What might that kind of guarantee look like, something that satisfies the Ukrainians but isn’t NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense clause?
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ID: Yeah, people are running around saying we’re very close to an agreement, just because they have agreed on the issue of neutrality. When you read the bottom line exactly, what [the Ukrainians] said is that they’re fine on neutrality as long as they have real security guarantees, and not the same kind they had in 1994. Under the Budapest Memorandum in 1994, we gave them security assurances, but not guarantees, because we didn’t want to have to automatically defend Ukraine in case of need.
[Budapest purposefully] wasn’t a sort of “Article 5-light.” Now, I don’t see how Ukraine is going to be satisfied with anything less than that. And whether the United States and others are willing to provide that is an open question. My sense is that the issue of NATO has changed. Whenever this war is over, or whenever Ukraine has taken control over all or most of its territory, the willingness of NATO countries to bring Ukraine into NATO will have increased.
G: Do you think that the U.S. and Western countries should be more actively involved in these negotiations and seeking a negotiated settlement for this war?
ID: I think a negotiated settlement needs to be done between the Ukrainians and the Russians. It is up to Ukraine to decide what it is willing to accept. We will become involved if there’s going to be outside guarantees. And I’m sure that if there is an agreement on neutrality, Ukraine’s willingness to sign on the dotted line will depend on our willingness to provide those guarantees. So, we will be involved in that case, but I don’t see any real reason for direct involvement in negotiations by us when the Israelis are doing it, the Turks are doing, and the Chinese ought to be doing it.
G: How do you assess the performance of the Biden administration in its handling of this crisis thus far?
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ID: The administration’s done a remarkable job. This Western coalition that has come together is remarkable. In part, it’s because of the shock that the invasion itself inflicted on Western opinion, but in a very real way, it’s also because of the way the Biden administration has handled the diplomacy up to and through the invasion. It gained a significant amount of credibility by presenting detailed evidence of what was to come, which was dismissed by many but was then proven to be right. It also worked very hard to prepare the kind of sanctions that we saw implemented immediately after the war.
Most importantly, [Biden] has been leading in a very different way than I think we have generally seen American presidents lead, which is, “Here’s what we’re going to do. And now you do the same.” In fact, he has worked with the Europeans and often pushed them to move early, to move before the United States. It happened with SWIFT, it happened on the imposing of sanctions on Putin himself.
In a variety of ways, what we saw was the U.S. deliberately helping the Europeans to move and move quickly, and for us to then come in behind. So, they could say, “We’re doing this because it’s important,” as opposed to “We’re doing it because the United States asked us to.”
G: You wrote recently in Foreign Affairs about the return of the strategy of “containment” that defined U.S. policy for much of the Cold War. Obviously, many people are drawing parallels to the Cold War right now, but what do you think are the biggest differences in today’s global environment that might inform the way efforts to contain Russia would be carried out?
ID: There are a number of differences. It is even more important in the current era that we create a united front with our allies, not only Europe, but also in Asia, that we have a very strong and, I would argue, institutionalized form of cooperation. If there’s ever been a time to get into [the Trans-Pacific Partnership], this is it. If there’s ever been a time for the European Union to join TPP, this is it. And if there’s ever been a time for the United States to negotiate a trade and investment pact with the European Union, this is it.
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We need to be aware that economic globalization has now become weaponized. We have weaponized it against the Russians, but the Chinese weaponized it against Norway and South Korea and Australia, and Lithuania, and that’s likely to continue in the competition between us and the Chinese.
The second big change from the Cold War is that Russia and China are far more linked economically into the global economy than the Soviet Union ever was. And part our policy over the next five years will be to delink in some form or another, or to reduce the vulnerability that linkage creates.
G: If you go back to the first year of Biden’s foreign policy, the emphasis of the rhetoric was, as it is now, on competition with authoritarian powers. But generally it was China that was emphasized rather than Russia. Does this war change the approach to China that the U.S. and its allies should take?
ID: I think the big change is that for the last 30 years, we have believed that globalization was an unalloyed good, that economics drove politics and that interdependence will lead to greater peace and prosperity. This conflict shows that that’s actually not true. Geopolitics is going to drive geoeconomics.
The Europeans were generally skeptical about this. They started to move already last year, in part because of the pressure of the United States on issues like Huawei. But I think this shock has made the Europeans realize that their preferred strategy — economic entanglement leading to peace — no longer works. So, we have to adjust.
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G: Last summer, after the fall of Kabul, you saw a lot of commentary about what this meant for U.S. leadership, whether the U.S. could still be a leader on important security issues. Do you think the war in Ukraine should change those appraisals, to the extent they were accurate to begin with?
ID: I don’t think they were really accurate. The U.S. had plenty of capability to lead. I think it’s domestic divisions that undermine its capacity to lead effectively. But it needs to lead differently than it did in the past. In the past, we stressed that we were indispensable. During the second Bush administration, we were perfectly happy to be on our own or just have a small “coalition of the willing,” because we thought allies were constraining. This administration understands the way you get allies to buy in is to actually make them part of the decision-making process. They’re less likely to walk away when they’re more tied into the policy.
G: Finally, I was going to ask if you had any reflections on the passing of Madeleine Albright and if there’s any lessons from her long career we might apply to this crisis.
ID: I think Madeleine Albright reminded all of us that at every point we need to remain true to our core values — a belief in democracy, a belief in human rights, a belief in freedom. Those who shared our values were the ones you kept close. And those who didn’t share your values were the ones you kept far away or at arm’s length. This conflict is, at its core, a values conflict. That’s what Madeleine Albright fought her entire life and career for.
grid.news · by Joshua Keating

17. Did Putin's Invasion of Ukraine Damage Russia's Ability to Sell Weapons?

As I told Voice of America (HERE), north Korea is equipped with Russian based weapons and the Russians have not been doing so well with that equipment (and the Russian equipment is even more modern than the Russian based equipment the north employs)

Did Putin's Invasion of Ukraine Damage Russia's Ability to Sell Weapons?
19fortyfive.com · by ByRobert Farley · March 25, 2022
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may transform the global arms export market, leaving Moscow isolated and making Beijing a key player in the arms trade.
The reality of the international arms market is that not many countries have much of a choice between Russia and China on the one hand and the West on the other. A few countries consistently import from both Russia/China and the West, but most choose either one or the other. These groups can be divided neatly on the metric of intellectual property law; for reasons mostly unrelated to arms exports, the US and the European Union tend to sell weapons to countries that have strong intellectual property protection. This is more or less a proxy for “follower of the rules-based liberal international order,” but is nonetheless a useful indicator of how weapons end up in one place rather than another.
Thus, even as they have grown closer politically, Moscow and Beijing have developed a zero-sum relationship with respect to arms exports. The truth is that China has been chipping into the Russian export market for some time, making Russia’s position as an exporter precarious. Most Russian equipment dates at least in part to the Cold War, and although this is also true of US and European suppliers the West has substantially upgraded most of its equipment. The Russians can still compete on cost with the Americans and Europeans, but again there aren’t many customers who buy on price alone. For those who do, China is an increasingly attractive option.
Russia sells a large plurality of its arms exports to China and India. Russia’s arms relationship with China has been fraught since trade resumed in the 1990s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia immediately began to export huge amounts of military equipment to China of all kinds of configurations. Over time, the Russians grew concerned that China was violating licensing and intellectual property rights by reverse engineering or otherwise modifying exported equipment, and the trade fell off significantly, especially in the most advanced technologies. Several years ago Russia reversed this decision, apparently out of a conviction that China was so close to catching or surpassing Russian standards that it no longer made sense to withhold technologies. Thus, the Chinese defense industry has largely caught up with (and in some ways surpassed) its Russian counterpart.
Potential buyers of Russian equipment have to ask themselves some very difficult questions. Russia will undoubtedly devote much of the capacity of its defense industrial base (DIB) to recapitalizing its forces, given the losses in Ukraine. When Russian needs to compete with those of the export market, who will win? Countries that buy Russian weapons will also face sanctions that could prevent them from accessing Western arms markets, and could even have a serious negative effect on their ability to use the US dollar. Russian technicians and engineers, necessary to upgrading and maintaining much-exported equipment, may face sanctions of their own including travel restrictions.
Chinese firms will face few or none of these problems. Indeed, Chinese defense companies may well find themselves exporting arms to Russia in order to assist with the recapitalization of its armed forces. There are a few countries that can’t buy Chinese, and thus that is necessarily tied to the Russian DIB. As China’s rival in South Asia, India simply cannot rely on the potential for arms purchases from across the Himalayas. Similarly, Hanoi cannot count on Beijing as an arms exporter as most of the arms Vietnam buys are intended to fight China. It is perhaps not surprising that neither Vietnam nor India have been eager to join in the international condemnation of Russia.
All of this leaves Russia in a tough spot. Russia exports essentially two things; energy and weapons. Sanctions have cut deeply into both of those, but in the final analysis, will probably have more of an impact on arms than on energy (Germany doesn’t need to pretend to not want Russian weapons). Many arms importers will, given the choice, make the determination that a military relationship with China is safer and more reliable than one with Russia.
To be sure, China may run into its own issues; the performance of Turkish UAVs in Ukraine may assure Ankara’s dominance in a market that Beijing has tried to capture. Still, this could leave Russia as the exporter of choice to only the very few countries that China won’t sell to, including India and Vietnam. This would have very negative long-run effects on the Russian economy and DIB by making it harder to earn hard currency, and by making it impossible for Russia to rely on foreign sales to offset the development costs of new weapons. Indeed, the Russian DIB may find itself simply an annex to the Chinese, producing equipment largely for the Russian and Chinese armed forces, and becoming part of the supply chain for the People’s Liberation Army.
In this as in so many other ways, President Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine has put Russia’s status as a great power into dire jeopardy.
Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Dr. Robert Farley is a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School at the University of Kentucky. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020).
19fortyfive.com · by ByRobert Farley · March 25, 2022



18.  Yes, US Green Berets Helped Ukraine Train for a War with Russia

Reporting on Green Berets/Special Forces is popular in the media.

Yes, US Green Berets Helped Ukraine Train for a War with Russia
19fortyfive.com · by ByPeter Suciu · March 25, 2022
Did American Green Berets Help Prepare Ukraine for Russian Invasion? – During Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimea, images circulated online that showed armed men who carried the same weapons as the Russian Army, used Russian military equipment, and spoke with Russian accents. They even were seen with Russian-made trucks with Russian number plates – yet according to Moscow, those individuals were part of a “self-defense group,” organized by locals who bought all their uniforms and equipment at military surplus stores.
Soon, media in both Russia and Ukraine began to refer to those soldiers as “Little Green Men,” a reference to the color of their uniforms and their unconfirmed origin. It likely was also meant to compare them to the largely nondescript toy soldiers (i.e. “Little Green Men”) that children play with around the world.
Now it seems another type of green men may have aided Ukraine prior to Russia’s unprovoked invasion last month. Following the 2014 annexation, the U.S. military stepped up to help train the Ukrainian military, and among the units deployed were the U.S. Army’s Special Forces – better known as Green Berets.
“Ukraine was taken very seriously by Special Forces,” retired Green Beret Sgt. Maj. Martin Moore told Fox News Digital earlier this week.
“They immediately set upon a great effort to protect Ukraine, to provide training,” Moore added. “There’s nobody better at training than Green Berets. These are people that can teach.”
Green Berets and other U.S. military personnel from the U.S. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) had been advising and training Ukrainian forces at the Yavoriv Combat Training Center in Western Ukrainian since 2014. While U.S. forces had already pulled out of the facility, its significance may have been noted by Moscow – as it came under a Russian rocket attack on March 13, in which 35 Ukrainians there were killed.
The Significance of Training
The U.S. Army’s Special Forces have conducted such training with U.S. allies and partners around the world, and have been a “force multiplier” that can help improve the combat capability of the international forces they train with. However, this isn’t about teaching the Ukrainians and others to conduct raids and ambushes, or how to conduct other covert operations.
Rather it is about best taking advantage of the location from where the force is operating. In this case, the training may have prepared the Ukrainians to counter Russia’s tanks, but also to cripple the enemy by taking out its command structure. To date Russia has seen hundreds of tanks destroyed, and it has lost at least a half a dozen general officers, while an even greater number of colonels have been killed.
Roughly 7,000 to 15,000 Russian troops have been killed in four weeks of fighting in Ukraine, a senior NATO military official said Wednesday.
Guerilla Warfare
Even if Russia were to be successful in overrunning the country, the Ukrainians have been trained to set up militia units that could wage guerilla warfare.
During the Cold War, NATO had created a network of clandestine, stay-behind units in many European countries. These consisted of troops tasked with conducting intelligence and reconnaissance operations, as well as guerrilla attacks, in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion. Ukraine could have already instituted a similar plan, which could allow small units to further disrupt Russia’s troop movements.
While an insurgency plan could be rendered moot if Russia’s aim is to dismantle Ukraine’s military rather than occupy territory, so far, Moscow has seemed unable to do either. Possibly thanks to the training the Ukrainians have already received from the Green Berets and other special operators.
Now a Senior Editor for 1945, Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military hardware, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes.
19fortyfive.com · by ByPeter Suciu · March 25, 2022
19. That Time US Forces Tore Hundreds of Russian Wagner Group Mercenaries to Pieces in Syria

The Russian military and Russian mercenaries are not 10 feet tall.

That Time US Forces Tore Hundreds of Russian Wagner Group Mercenaries to Pieces in Syria
coffeeordie.com · by Mac Caltrider · March 25, 2022
It’s been one month since Russia invaded Ukraine. What Vladimir Putin and much of the world originally expected to be a quick and easy victory over their smaller neighbor has rapidly devolved into a military disaster for Russia. The Pentagon estimated more than 7,000 Russian soldiers had been killed since the invasion started, while NATO believes the number could be as high as 15,000. Russian generals continue to die, and reports are describing mass desertions and fratricide on the front lines. As much of the world celebrates the modern David versus Goliath story, cracks in the veneer of Russia’s supposed military might have shone through long before the invasion of Ukraine, and a four-hour battle that unfolded in Syria in 2018 is one of the most striking examples.
When the US launched Operation Inherent Resolve in June 2014, its goal was to destroy the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS. US forces and their allies sought to degrade and destroy the notorious terrorist organization, but the conflict eventually evolved into a proxy war between two superpowers as Russia committed its military forces to defending the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The US was allied with Kurdish fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces against the common enemy of ISIS, but the regional conflict involved an intricate web of disparate factions and objectives.
A US Marine fires an M777A2 Howitzer in Syria June 1, 2017. US Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Matthew Callahan.
Against that backdrop, Russia and the US opened up a communications hotline to avoid direct conflict with each other while supporting their proxies on opposite sides. In February 2018, after three years of gingerly avoiding a direct confrontation, the two world powers went toe to toe for the first time since the end of World War I in what came to be known as the Battle of Khasham — a roughly four-hour battle in which the mighty Russian bear (with its Syrian allies) was reduced to a whimpering pup by a much smaller force of American commandos.
As the afternoon sun began to sink over the cradle of civilization on Feb. 7, 2018, a group of US Marines and Army Special Forces soldiers watched surveillance drone feeds in disbelief as a large enemy force amassed 20 miles away near the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. The combined group of Syrian forces and Russian mercenaries from the infamous Kremlin-linked Wagner Group swelled to an estimated 500 troops by early evening. With them were 27 vehicles — including Russian T-72 tanks and armored personnel carriers.
Marines with Weapons Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, attached to Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, Crisis Response, Central Command, fire 81 mm mortars in support of Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve operations Sept. 18, 2018. US Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Gabino Perez.
American brass monitoring the situation at the air operations center at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and the Pentagon were baffled as they watched a massive enemy force positioning itself to attack a nearby outpost where about 30 US Army Rangers and Delta Force commandos from the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) were working alongside Kurdish and Arab forces. American commanders readied aircraft and ground crews, and the members of the JSOC detachment prepared to defend themselves.
The Marines and Green Berets at the mission support site 20 miles away from the JSOC outpost in Deir al-Zour in northwestern Syria prepared a quick-reaction force of about 16 troops, loading four mine-resistant vehicles with anti-tank missiles, thermal optics, food, and water.
At 8:30 p.m., as three Russian tanks moved in closer, it became clear an attack was imminent, and the quick-reaction force prepared to launch.
A US Army Special Forces Multi-Purpose Canine team provides security for a mortar firing position from an abandoned rooftop in the Middle Euphrates River Valley’s Deir Ezzor province, Syria, Oct. 11, 2018. US Army photo by Sgt. Matthew Crane.
At approximately 10:30 p.m., the approaching column of Russian and Syrian vehicles opened fire on the tiny outpost. Tank, artillery, and mortar fire bombarded the Americans as they ran for their defensive positions and returned fire with machine guns and anti-tank missiles.
During the opening minutes of the battle, then-Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis contacted his Russian counterpart.
“The Russian high command in Syria assured us it was not their people,” Mattis testified to Congress later. The secretary of defense then directed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr. “for the force … to be annihilated.”
“And it was,” the former Marine general, whose troops nicknamed him “Chaos,” added.
Lance Cpl. James Gordon, a machine-gunner with 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, attached to Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, Crisis Response, Central Command, fires at his target with an M240B machine gun during a live-fire demonstration near At-Tanf Garrison, Syria, Sept. 7, 2018. US Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Roderick Jacquote.
With the expert direction of Air Force combat controllers and others calling in air and indirect-fire support, waves of F-22 fighters, F-15E strike fighters, AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, AC-130 gunships, B-52 bombers, MQ-9 Reaper drones, and heavy Marine artillery relentlessly punished the enemy force.
The quick-reaction force sped toward the battle but was slowed by myriad obstacles, damaged roads, and the fact it was driving blacked out and relying on night-vision equipment. As the convoy of four vehicles made slow progress, American airpower and Marine artillery cut through the Syrian and Russian attackers like a scythe through hay.
F-22 Raptors supported the fight against Syrian forces and mercenaries from Russia’s Wagner Group in the Battle of Khasham. US Air National Guard photo by Tech. Sgt. Steven Tucker.
“We should never have been there; our leadership messed up. The Americans knew exactly where we were,” former Russian mercenary and survivor of Khasham Marat Gabidullin told The Guardian in February 2022.
Around 1 a.m. — with the enemy artillery and tanks finally silenced — the QRF reached the outpost and joined the turkey shoot.
Fighting from their vehicles, the Green Berets and Marines engaged the rapidly diminishing enemy force. Several Marines ran much-needed ammo to the commandos’ defensive positions while combat controllers guided a second wave of lethal strikes from American aircraft. An hour after the QRF’s arrival, the remnants of the attacking force fled the field. In their wake lay between 200 and 300 dead fighters. Inside the JSOC outpost, one allied Syrian fighter was wounded, and no Americans were harmed.
AH-64 Apache attack helicopters played a key role in the Battle of Khasham, helping to annihilate a combined force of hundreds of Syrian soldiers and mercenaries from Russia’s Wagner Group. US Army photo by Maj. Robert Fellingham.
In the aftermath of the slaughter, Russian state media downplayed the battle. Maria Zakharova, press secretary for the Foreign Ministry of Russia, said only five Russian contractors were killed. Reports of audio recordings purportedly featuring Russians describing the battle tell a much different story.
“To make it short, we’ve had our fucking asses kicked,” one Wagner Group veteran reportedly says in a recording. “Yeah so, one squadron fucking lost 200 people immediately … Another one lost 10 people, and I don’t know about the third squadron, but it got torn up pretty badly too … They tore us to pieces.”
Marine artillery support was vital to the fight against Syrian forces and mercenaries from Russia’s Wagner Group in the Battle of Khasham. US Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Matthew Callahan.
The lopsided American victory worked as a deterrent a month later when another group of Syrian fighters and Russian mercenaries began a similar buildup near American forces along the Euphrates. This time, when Mattis called his Russian counterpart, the enemy force dispersed, successfully avoiding a second curb-stomping.
The Wagner Group is trained at Russian Defense Ministry bases, and the group’s leaders have received awards in the Kremlin, but Russia downplayed its involvement in the engagement that’s come to be known as the Battle of Khasham. Russia claimed the clash was a result of American aggression.
Similar Russian misinformation is rampant in the war in Ukraine, and like in the Battle of Khasham, Russia’s numerical superiority isn’t translating to tactical success. In hindsight, perhaps Russia’s humiliating defeat in Syria was a sign of what was to come in Ukraine, where many analysts predicted Russia would “steamroll” that nation’s military and defense forces.
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coffeeordie.com · by Mac Caltrider · March 25, 2022
20. Ukraine, Taiwan, the Koreas: Is the world tilting toward major wars?

It is prudent to be wary of course. My optimistic side says that the ass whooping Putin is taking in Putin's war may give others pause, especially when assessing what it is like to attack a free people.

And on a serious note, along those lines will this be one inflection point in the 21st Century? (Putin's war is being assessed as an inflection point in a number areas from the international order and globalization to economics, influence, finance, and security)


Ukraine, Taiwan, the Koreas: Is the world tilting toward major wars?
The Hill · by Donald Kirk, opinion contributor · March 25, 2022

Images of the Russian army strangling the cruelly crushed Ukrainian city of Mariupol pull at heartstrings around the world, evoking indignant cries of “Stop it!” and “Do something!” to rescue survivors, drive out the invaders and save what’s left of a shattered community of more than 400,000 souls.
You cannot help but admire the bravery of ordinary people holding out in Mariupol even as Russian tanks rumble through empty streets littered with the wreckage of buildings and lives lost in a desperate struggle against overwhelming odds. You wonder, though, what the rest of the world is doing besides wringing hands, offering help that will never be enough and cringing at pleas for the kind of aid that might stop the Russians dead in their tracks.
In a battle between David and Goliath, David is supposed to win, but in the real world the biblical story may be a fantasy for Mariupol and much of the rest of the country. Yes, aid is pouring into Ukraine, and foreign volunteers are rushing to join the Ukrainian forces staving off the Russians as they advance from all sides on the capital of Kyiv and other beleaguered cities, but no one really advocates what President Volodymyr Zelensky says is absolutely necessary: the creation of a “no-fly zone” enforced by foreign air forces against Russian planes responsible for much of the death and destruction.
You can appreciate the urgency of Zelensky’s plea — and the reluctance of the NATO countries, led by President Biden, to escalate to the point of actually waging war, however limited, against Russia. No way would Russian President Vladimir Putin order his planes to stay out of the way just because the U.S and some of its NATO allies were telling them to do so. Nor would the Russians suddenly decide that now’s the time to agree to a conference at which they might have to make concessions — even, perhaps, a ceasefire.
You have to ask, though, would there be any other way to stop Russia from taking over Ukraine, other than to challenge it in the air and maybe strike Russian air bases on the other side of the border, or perhaps deep in Russia? Would the world then plunge into World War III, in which China, on the other side of the Eurasian landmass, would not only side with Russia but swing its weight ever more dangerously around Asia?
It’s not difficult to imagine China’s president, Xi Jinping — a leader disturbingly similar to Putin in his grasp on power in his own country and his vision of expanding borders — deciding the time was ripe finally to recover the lost province of Taiwan, which was last under Beijing’s thumb in 1895. That was when the Japanese took over the island, about 100 miles from the Chinese mainland, after defeating the forces of China’s last dynasty in the Sino-Japanese War. Should the U.S. and its Northeast Asia allies, South Korea and Japan, all go to war for Taiwan?
The question of when and how to exert retaliatory force is relevant in the case of North Korea, too. It’s plain to everyone that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is not going to give up his nukes. In fact, Kim gives every impression of wanting to improve his nuclear capabilities, fabricating ever more warheads while developing intercontinental ballistic missiles for carrying them to targets anywhere.
In response, there’s talk of South Korea developing its own nuclear capability, along with more and better missiles. Also, some are asking, how about the U.S. and the Republic of Korea jointly attacking North Korea’s nuclear complexes and missile launch sites?
These notions are madness. Just as enforcement of a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine could escalate into a full-scale war, NATO versus Russia, so could an assault on North Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities risk more than just another Korean War. It’s easy to imagine both China and Russia jumping in to defend their old Korean War ally. Korean War II could spread over Asia as easily as World War III could flare in Europe.
Such cold, rational reasoning, though, does nothing to relieve the suffering of those in Mariupol or the rest of Ukraine, any more than it helps the thousands of North Koreans suffering in the North’s gulag system. We’re left to watch in anguish as the people of Ukraine, those who haven’t fled or died, face a ruthless foe that’s hellbent on conquering a democratic neighbor.
Donald Kirk has been a journalist for more than 60 years, focusing much of his career on conflict in Asia and the Middle East, including as a correspondent for the Washington Star and Chicago Tribune. He currently is a freelance correspondent covering North and South Korea. He is the author of several books about Asian affairs.
The Hill · by Donald Kirk, opinion contributor · March 25, 2022
21. Constellis company Triple Canopy wins $1.3 billion State Department WPS III Baghdad contract


Constellis company Triple Canopy wins $1.3 billion State Department WPS III Baghdad contract
25 March 2022
The U.S. Department of State awarded Constellis company Triple Canopy the Worldwide Protective Services III (WPS III) Baghdad protective services contract.
Herndon, VA. — Constellis, a leading provider of essential risk management and mission support services to government and commercial clients worldwide, announced today that the Department of State (DOS) awarded the company’s Triple Canopy subsidiary a 10-year protective services contract in Baghdad, Iraq, under the WPS III Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract, with a $1.3 billion contract value.
Under this contract, Triple Canopy will continue providing protective services, specialized security services, and logistical support services at the U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq.
“Triple Canopy has been supporting the Department of State in high-threat locations for more than 15 years,” said Jim Noe, President of Global Support Operations at Constellis. “We owe this award to the outstanding performance of our team in Baghdad. Their professionalism and tireless dedication to the mission define Triple Canopy as a premier global provider of high-end security solutions. We are honored to continue protecting U.S. Chief of Mission personnel and facilities in Baghdad, Iraq.”
“We are proud that the Department of State has chosen Triple Canopy to continue supporting this mission for the next decade,” said Terry Ryan, CEO of Constellis. “Our team is committed to ensuring our customers have the requisite security solutions to ensure mission success.”
About Constellis
In an ever-changing and complex world, security concerns are paramount. Enhanced security requires education, training and specialized skills. Constellis provides end-to-end risk management and comprehensive security solutions to safeguard people and infrastructure globally. Our team of strategic problem solvers has a steadfast moral compass and unwavering dedication to creating a safer world. Constellis is committed to the success of our customers and partners.
Headquartered in the Washington, DC, area, Constellis has operated in over 50 countries and across five continents.
Learn more about us at Constellis.com, and follow us on LinkedInFacebook and Twitter.
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+1 866 996 3599

22. The Lost Reason Russia Is Losing in Ukraine: The Information Economy Problem
Conclusion:

Ukraine and its friends appear to be winning the intelligence war, or at least Russia appears to be losing it badly. There’s still time for Russia to repair its information economy, but the dreadful losses that Russian forces in the field are suffering indicate that Russia needs to clean up its game fast.
The Lost Reason Russia Is Losing in Ukraine: The Information Economy Problem
19fortyfive.com · by ByRobert Farley · March 26, 2022
Russian and Ukrainian forces are operating on entirely different economies of information. Russia’s apparent inability to compete with Ukraine in this sphere may make its failures even more catastrophic.
By “information economy,” we refer not simply to the techniques and technologies for the collection of intelligence, but also to how information moves vertically and horizontally through a military organization. How does command transfer information to subordinates? How do tactical units feed intelligence back to command? Finally, how do units at the same level of the hierarchy transfer information to one another?
Over history, there is wide variation in all of these aspects of information exchange. In some armies the vertical exchange of information is so bad that junior officers will not communicate bad news to their superiors out of fear of reprisal; this makes it impossible for an army to react in an agile fashion to developing opportunities and risks.
In some armies, the horizontal exchange of information is excellent and allows units and officers at the same level to exchange information and ideas about what tactics and procedures might work best, as well as to supply actionable intelligence in a timely manner.
In other armies, different units are either too afraid of one another to communicate or are actively hostile to their comrades in arms. Indeed, efforts to “coup proof” national leadership sometimes makes it difficult or impossible for senior officers to exchange information, necessarily to the detriment of military effectiveness.
But that’s just how information moves. Obviously, it’s also important how information is collected. US and NATO intel collection systems are, to put it bluntly, considerably more advanced than their Russian counterparts. It is hardly unthinkable that NATO could be developing a clearer vision of the war than the Russian military, especially given conflicting reports about Russian morale and what we might call the information economy of the Russian forces. The United States can intercept, collate, and then release entire conversations between tactical Russian units under attack, very possibly giving readers of the New York Times website a better sense of the tactical realities in Ukraine than the senior commanders of the Russian army.
Reports conflict over the extent to which the US is supporting Ukrainian forces with direct intelligence. One report from earlier in the conflict suggested that the US was offering strategic level intelligence but refraining from transferring tactical data. This appears on the one hand to represent a kind of “red line” that the US believes would be escalatory to cross, and on the other hand to be a responsible policy given the danger to sources and the bottlenecks in Ukraine’s own information economy.
This also means that the United States has something in its back pocket in case Russia escalates, or in case a prime opportunity develops to help the Ukrainians. Real-time data could provide Ukrainian forces the key to opening an offensive against poorly prepared Russian defensive positions, for example, or could give long-range artillery some particularly juicy targets. The flow of data would become more effective as Ukrainian forces accommodate themselves to the information flow, ensuring that receivers pass data along to shooters in a rapid and tactically relevant way.
We do not yet have a firm grip on the Russian information economy, but there are worrying signs. Historically Russian armies have not been terrible in the vertical transfer of information, despite the presence of cranky authoritarian leaders and political officers. But in Ukraine, the technologies of communication (radios, walkie-talkies, encrypted phones) seem to be scarce and do not work well with one another. This makes both vertical and horizontal communication difficult. When Russian phones do work, they are easily accessible by the Ukrainians, giving Ukraine a clear window into Russian military decision-making.
The ridiculous number of Russian generals to die in combat thus far also suggests that there are serious vertical communications problems, with senior officers either struggling to get orders down the chain or receive information up the chain.
Finally, it does seem that information is not flowing well at senior levels. Putin appears to be dependent on a small and shrinking circle of loyalists, making it possible that he does not possess a firm grasp of the realities on the battlefield. In some regimes, this would not be a problem (no one seems to think that President Zelenskyy has significant input into tactical or operational decision-making) but in a regime increasingly characterized by the centralization of decision-making, a weak information economy can pose a real problem.
Ukraine and its friends appear to be winning the intelligence war, or at least Russia appears to be losing it badly. There’s still time for Russia to repair its information economy, but the dreadful losses that Russian forces in the field are suffering indicate that Russia needs to clean up its game fast.
Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Dr. Robert Farley is a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School at the University of Kentucky. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020).
19fortyfive.com · by ByRobert Farley · March 26, 2022





V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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