Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:

“Never fight unless you have to. Never fight alone. Never fight for long”
- Fox Conner

“Men have their choice in this world. They can be angels, or they may be demons. In the apocalyptic vision, John describes a war in heaven. You have only to strip that vision of its gorgeous Oriental drapery, divest it of its shining and celestial ornaments, clothe it in the simple and familiar language of common sense, and you will have before you the eternal conflict between right and wrong, good and evil, liberty and slavery, truth and falsehood, the glorious light of love, and the appalling darkness of human selfishness and sin. The human heart is a seat of constant war… What takes place in individual human hearts often takes place between nations, and between individuals of the same nation.”
- Frederick Douglass

"So this is the rationality paradox. Here is how it works: rationality is the opposite of certainty. Certainty is the opposite of wisdom. Why? Because wisdom is not the sum total of what you know, wisdom is the sum total of what you don't know. In other words, the capacity to reflect critically on your own assumptions. This is also why politicians want to sell you certainty and want to avoid rationality. Certainty is comforting, rationality is discomforting. Which means that to be rational is to question the basis of peoples' certainties."
- Julian De Medeiros

Note: Yesterday's unattributed quote is from the brilliant Korea specialist, Scott Snyder:  "Specialists argue that North Korea’s propensity to revert to provocations is so deeply embedded that it is part of the country’s DNA."  




1. Seoul to push for summit between President-elect Yoon and Biden at early date: delegation
2. Complete, verifiable denuclearization of N. Korea difficult but must achieve goal: Goldberg
3. Kim Yo-jong statement a choreographed move to create tension: U.S. intelligence official
4. North Korea’s March 24 ICBM Launch: What if It Was the Hwasong-17?
5. Could the world's next nuclear power be U.S. ally South Korea?
6. South Korea Must Pick a Side
7. Tensions With North Rise as South Korea’s President-Elect Takes Tougher Line
8. Defense ministry begins relocation for presidential office
9. UNC deputy chief urges 'common sense,' dialogue amid concerns about potential N.K. provocations
10. Restoration work ongoing at N.Korea's nuclear test site: report
11. HarperNorth lands 'harrowing' story of woman who escaped North Korea twice
12. North demolishing hotel that was symbol of Korean engagement
13. What Russia's invasion means for Korean Peninsula
14. Experts voice concerns over Yoon's US-centered foreign policy









1. Seoul to push for summit between President-elect Yoon and Biden at early date: delegation

This is quite a change in views from the previous US and the outgoing ROK administrations:

Excerpts:
Park said the delegates have raised the issue of reactivating a high-level dialogue between Seoul and Washington on extended deterrence, known as the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group, to discuss possible deployment of U.S. strategic assets to South Korea against North Korean provocations.
He did not provide any specific U.S. responses to the request for talks on U.S. strategic assets.
Still, Park said the sides agreed on the importance of their joint military exercises.
"I believe both South Korea and the U.S. understand very well the importance of joint military drills to maintain their deterrence and defense posture against North Korea," he said in the press briefing.



Seoul to push for summit between President-elect Yoon and Biden at early date: delegation | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · April 8, 2022
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, April 7 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's incoming President Yoon Suk-yeol will seek to hold summit talks with U.S. President Joe Biden at an early date, the head of Yoon's delegation said Thursday, adding the Biden administration also understands the need for an early meeting between them.
Rep. Park Jin of the People Power Party said the exact date and other details of a Yoon-Biden summit will be discussed through diplomatic channels. Yoon is set to take office May 10.
"Every person we have met in the U.S. has highlighted the importance of the South Korea-U.S. alliance to the U.S.," Park said in a press briefing.
Park and six other members of the U.S.-South Korea Policy Consultation Delegation arrived in Washington on Sunday for meetings with various U.S. administration officials, including Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, as well as U.S. lawmakers and experts from think tanks.

Park said the U.S. "fully supports President-elect Yoon's vision and determination to further upgrade (the countries' relationship) into a comprehensive and strategic alliance."
"We could actually see how many expectations the U.S. has for the incoming administration of Yoon Suk-yeol," he added.
The chief delegate said after meeting with Sherman on Monday that the sides have formed a "consensus" on the need to form a comprehensive and strategic alliance.
The delegates also discussed with U.S. officials the need to strengthen their countries' cooperation to deal with ongoing provocations by North Korea, according to Park.
"The U.S. officials seemed to believe the North will likely continue to make additional provocations," he said. "We talked about the need for watertight coordination against North Korea's continued nuclear and missile provocations."
North Korea conducted 12 rounds of missile launches this year, also firing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on March 24, marking its first ICBM launch since November 2017.
Many believe Pyongyang may also be preparing to resume its nuclear testing, with earlier reports pointing to ongoing construction work at the North's Punggye-ri nuclear test site that was purportedly demolished in 2018.
Park said the delegates have raised the issue of reactivating a high-level dialogue between Seoul and Washington on extended deterrence, known as the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group, to discuss possible deployment of U.S. strategic assets to South Korea against North Korean provocations.
He did not provide any specific U.S. responses to the request for talks on U.S. strategic assets.
Still, Park said the sides agreed on the importance of their joint military exercises.
"I believe both South Korea and the U.S. understand very well the importance of joint military drills to maintain their deterrence and defense posture against North Korea," he said in the press briefing.
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · April 8, 2022




2. Complete, verifiable denuclearization of N. Korea difficult but must achieve goal: Goldberg

Key points:

"Comprehensive, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization -- those are difficult goals, but they fit very well with our non-proliferation goals," he said in his confirmation hearing before the Senate foreign services committee.
"They fit with our policy of deterrence, building, broadening, deepening our alliances with the Republic of Korea, and doing all possible to defend against a rogue regime in North Korea that is violating at every opportunity UN resolutions, their own commitments, international agreements," he added, referring to South Korea by its official name.

(LEAD) Complete, verifiable denuclearization of N. Korea difficult but must achieve goal: Goldberg | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · April 8, 2022
(ATTN: UPDATES with additional remarks from Goldberg in paras 13-15; ADDS more photo)
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, April 7 (Yonhap) -- The United States and its allies must resolutely pursue a complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) of North Korea, the nominee for U.S. ambassador to South Korea said Thursday.
Philip Goldberg also said North Korea may stage additional provocations amid suspicions that Pyongyang may be preparing to conduct a nuclear test.
"Comprehensive, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization -- those are difficult goals, but they fit very well with our non-proliferation goals," he said in his confirmation hearing before the Senate foreign services committee.
"They fit with our policy of deterrence, building, broadening, deepening our alliances with the Republic of Korea, and doing all possible to defend against a rogue regime in North Korea that is violating at every opportunity UN resolutions, their own commitments, international agreements," he added, referring to South Korea by its official name.

The remarks come after North Korea staged 12 rounds of missile launches this year, including the test firing of an apparent intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on March 24 that ended its self-imposed moratorium on long-range missile testing that had been in place since November 2017.
Officials here and in Seoul have also noted North Korea appeared to be repairing underground tunnels at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, the site of all six nuclear tests so far that the North had purportedly demolished in 2018 to show its willingness to denuclearize.
The Joe Biden administration is believed to have refrained from using the term CVID, at least publicly, vowing to seek a practical and calibrated approach to completely denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, as opposed to North Korea.
Goldberg, who served as coordinator for implementation of U.N. Security Council sanctions on North Korea in 2009-2010, insisted the U.S. must be "resolute" about its CVID goals.
"So it is a very difficult problem. If we don't admit it, I'm admitting it here. But it's one that we need to continue to work on and be quite resolute about," he said.
Goldberg, who is a career ambassador, the highest diplomatic rank in U.S. foreign service, also underscored the need to deal resolutely against North Korean provocations, noting the recalcitrant country may engage in additional activities that he said were "outrageous" and "deeply troubling."
"I think our Special Representative for North Korea Sung Kim said just yesterday that we expect more (provocations), especially with some of the celebrations upcoming in North Korea," he said, referring to the 110th anniversary of the birthday of the North's late founding leader Kim Il-sung next Friday.
"We have to react with enhanced deterrence, with a solid alliance between the United States and South Korea, Japan, and working together to thwart these threats from North Korea when sanctions are available and enforceable, to also continue with very strong implementation," he added.

Goldberg noted sanctions alone may not convince North Korea to denuclearize, but said they must be maintained and implemented, insisting that Pyongyang wants them eased or removed for a reason.
"North Korea wants those sanctions lifted, which is a reason to keep pressing because they want them lifted for a reason," he said when asked about the efficacy of the existing sanctions on North Korea.
He added, "They are an important element but they're not an element that will necessarily do the trick by themselves."
Goldberg also highlighted the importance of trilateral cooperation between South Korea, Japan and the U.S.
"There are reasons that two democratic, technologically advanced, scientifically advanced countries should be working together more not just on the North Korea issue, which has been an issue where they have come together, but also on other issues regionally and around the world," he said.
Goldberg was nominated to be the new U.S. ambassador to Seoul on Feb. 11. If confirmed, he will replace Harry Harris, who stepped down early last year when Biden took office.
(END)
Related Articles
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · April 8, 2022



3. Kim Yo-jong statement a choreographed move to create tension: U.S. intelligence official


Choreographed is a good choice of words. 

Yonhap has done a good job of reporting on the key points from our National Intelligence Officer for Korea. This is a very useful tutorial about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime, especially for those who do not follow Korean security issues closely.


Kim Yo-jong statement a choreographed move to create tension: U.S. intelligence official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · April 8, 2022
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, April 7 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's recent missile provocations and statement from leader Kim Jong-un's sister about the possible use of nuclear weapons are highly "choreographed" tactics to escalate regional tensions in time for a change of government in Seoul, a U.S. intelligence official said Thursday.
Sydney Seiler, national intelligence officer for North Korea at the National Intelligence Council, also said the North uses U.S.-South Korea joint military drills as a pretext for its provocations while it continues to conduct much larger and less transparent field exercises of its own.
"North Korea will want to create an environment of tension and exploit our concerns about escalation," Seiler said in a webinar hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank based in Washington.
"This is why the Kim Yo-jong statement is a great example of this," he added, referring to the statement issued by the North Korean leader's sister Tuesday (Seoul time).

In the statement carried by Pyongyang's state media, Kim Yo-jung claimed the North would not fire a single bullet toward South Korea, but use nuclear weapons should there be an armed conflict initiated by Seoul.
Seiler said the harsh rhetoric was part of what he called a "short-term choreography" or propaganda that Pyongyang has historically employed while seeking to convince others that the escalation of tension is simply a result and not the desired outcome of its actions.
Kim's statement came about a month before South Korea's President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol is set to take office on May 10.
On a similar note, the U.S. intelligence official noted that North Korea has consistently used U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises to justify its provocative actions, sometimes successfully, while putting the blame on the ROK-U.S. alliance.
"They will use our exercises as a pretext ... and a lot of people will be convinced by that, again forgetting that one million-men KPA military's out there training at about the same time with no transparency, and no desire to reduce tension like we do when we do our own exercises," he said, referring to North Korea's army by its official name, the Korean People's Army.
"I think that's another thing we should be careful about. Otherwise we become so kind of satisfied when the noise stops that we think we have seen a change in behavior, and indeed there's no change," he added.
The top U.S. intelligence official on North Korea also noted the North's return to dialogue in the past may have been choreographed or premeditated, insisting the North may have no intention of actually giving up its nuclear and other weapons programs.
"These capabilities that we saw outlined in the Eighth Party Congress (of North Korea), again, you could have interesting robust debates about the actual progress on a hypersonic glide vehicle, the performance or type of an ICBM launch, but it's clear that these are areas, first of all, that Kim is committed to developing, and two, that he is willing to pay a considerable diplomatic and economic price to pursue," he said.
Seiler also noted the North has broken and breached numerous denuclearization deals and agreements in the past.
"Admittedly, each breakout that we have seen, agreed framework, breakout, six-party talks, breakout, leap day agreement, breakout, Singapore-Hanoi breakout, each time the (North Korean weapons) program advances a little more, making it harder to imagine denuclearization as a viable topic for discussion," he said.
Still, he highlighted the importance of engaging with North Korea.
"In the past, North Korea has pivoted, admittedly, to what amounted to a little more than tactical charm offenses ... after which it went back to so behavior, but each opportunity allows us to continue to probe, to continue to explore, continue to convince Kim that there is an alternative path," he said.
North Korea currently remains unresponsive to U.S. overtures, which Seiler said is frustrating to the U.S.
Seiler expressed hope the North would return to dialogue in the future.
"I would say I would not want my analytic assessment of the current lack of interest in dialogue with Pyongyang to be somehow definitive or deterministic to a degree that all hope would otherwise appear lost," he said.
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · April 8, 2022


4. North Korea’s March 24 ICBM Launch: What if It Was the Hwasong-17?



Bottomline:

If it was the Hwasong-17 that was launched on March 24, no significant new insights were provided. Instead, it only confirmed outside analysts’ prior assessments of the missile’s capabilities. The Hwasong-17 will only make a significant military and technological addition to North Korea’s existing ICBMs if it is equipped with a MIRV payload.[13] This is because, for a few years now, the North has apparently already operationally deployed ICBMs with nuclear warheads that are capable of striking anywhere in the US, and those missiles use the same type of rocket engine as the Hwasong-17, albeit in different configurations.
It remains to be seen if, when and how extensively North Korea will deploy MIRVs on the Hwasong-17 and, therefore, whether the new missile will make a real difference.
North Korea’s March 24 ICBM Launch: What if It Was the Hwasong-17?



On March 24, 2022, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The next day, it announced it was the Hwasong-17—the new system first seen in a parade in October 2020. However, since the launch, it has become unclear whether the missile was actually the Hwasong-17, the smaller Hwasong-15 ICBM, which was previously flight tested in 2017, or a modified version thereof.[1] This article assesses the implications if the launch was, indeed, that of the Hwasong-17. A future article will address the implications if the launch was instead of a Hwasong-15 or a modified version, including the significance of North Korea claiming that a Hwasong-15 launch was of a Hwasong-17.
This would be the first launch of the Hwasong-17 missile that successfully demonstrated the boost power of an ICBM. The launches that occurred on February 27 and March 5 of this year and that were revealed by the US to “involve” the Hwasong-17 only demonstrated medium range, while the March 16 launch of what was probably the new system failed early in flight. If the March 24 test was the Hwasong-17, it would have a number of key implications, including:
  • Demonstrating the ability to reach anywhere in the US with a large payload, just as analysts had assessed based on the missile’s dimensions (performance challenging to extract from the Hwasong-15);
  • Demonstrating the ICBM is also capable of putting satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO) and that it can be used to launch warheads against the US from the south (flying from North Korea over Antarctica) rather than directly from the west; and
  • Suggesting that further Hwasong-17 launches are likely.
It should be noted as well that the March 24 test apparently did not test multiple warheads or associated technology. Despite many analysts’ association of the Hwasong-17 with multiple warheads, they remain only a potential payload for the system.
Regardless of what ICBM was involved, the launch was accompanied by extensive political messaging about North Korea’s military and technological capabilities, and commitment to retaining a nuclear deterrent, unlike most launches in 2022.
However, the reality is that the Hwasong-17 will only make a significant military and technological addition to the North’s existing ICBMs if it is equipped with a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload. It remains to be seen if, when and how extensively North Korea will deploy MIRVs on the Hwasong-17 and, therefore, whether this new missile will make a real difference.
What the Test Did and Did Not Show
On Range and Payload
When the Hwasong-17 was first unveiled during a DPRK military parade in October 2020, it was widely assessed, based on the missile’s length and diameter, that it would be capable of delivering a larger payload (1,700 kg, compared to 1,000 kg for the Hwasong-15) to anywhere in the US than the North’s previous, smaller Hwasong-14 and -15 ICBMs. This capability was successfully demonstrated in the March 24 test. By flying to an altitude of some 6,200 km over a distance of approximately 1,100 km, the missile exhibited sufficient flight time and boost energy to achieve a range of over 15,000 km if flown on a traditional ballistic missile trajectory—compared to upwards of 13,000 km for the Hwasong-15.
Furthermore, the Hwasong-17 had been previously assessed to use two twin-chamber rocket engines that were based on the Soviet RD-250 engine in the first stage. This was confirmed in images released by the North after the test.[2] However, the second-stage propulsion system remains unknown.
On Multiple Warheads
Despite some media reports claiming that the Hwasong-17 “is thought to carry multiple warheads,” the only thing that is known for certain at this point is that it would be a good candidate to carry them due to its larger diameter and greater payload capability than previous North Korean ICBMs.[3]
North Korea’s press statement about the March 24 launch was silent on the payload carried, and there has been no information to date from other sources on this matter.[4] In addition, there was no mention of multiple warhead-related testing in the United States’ March 10 statement, which revealed that the February 27 and March 5 launches that North Korea claimed were related to reconnaissance satellite testing actually “involved” the Hwasong-17 and were likely intended to test unspecified “elements” of that system. The possibility that the “attitude control devices” North Korea claimed to test on these launches were for, or could contribute to, a post-boost vehicle (PBV) to dispense MIRVs remains unconfirmed.[5]
MIRVs are not the only appropriate use of the Hwasong-17’s larger diameter and payload-carrying capability, even if they would make a lot of sense militarily if Pyongyang has the technical capability to develop them. The large ICBM would also be good for carrying the following:
  • A multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) payload, where the warheads are dispensed shotgun-style without being independently targeted by a PBV;
  • A very high-yield single warhead, as China and Russia still deploy;
  • Highly realistic, and therefore heavy, decoy reentry vehicles to help one or more standard warheads penetrate missile defenses; or
  • More missile defense penetration aids of other types in conjunction with any other type of payload. (See below for another possible payload option that is unrelated to multiple warheads.)
It should also be noted that the only public indication of North Korea having any interest in developing multiple warheads was when Kim Jong Un reported in January 2021 that the country was researching “the guidance technology for [a] multi-warhead rocket.” [6] To the extent that what a Hwasong-17 launch “really represents is North Korea’s steady progress toward the ability to put multiple nuclear warheads on targets in the United States in the event of a war,” is because of the successful test of a suitable booster as opposed to having anything to do with multiple warheads themselves.
On Space Launch Capability
The boost energy demonstrated in the March 24 flight also confirms that the Hwasong-17 would be capable of putting a satellite into LEO. As previously noted, the new ICBM has more capable rocket motors and more energetic liquid propellants than the Taepodong-2/Unha-3 booster used in previous North Korean satellite launches. Therefore, it may also be able to launch a satellite about twice as heavy as the Unha is able to carry. Furthermore, the Hwasong-17 could do this from a road-mobile launcher, which would allow for a satellite launch to be conducted more quickly, with less warning and less vulnerability to an attack than the large, fixed-launcher Unha.
Another potential use for the level of boost capability demonstrated by the Hwasong-17 would be with a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) payload. This was an option that was assessed for the new missile soon after its original unveiling but is not known to have been discussed by the North Koreans. Instead of flying directly to its target on a typical ballistic missile trajectory, the FOBS warhead is put into a low orbit and is then de-orbited over the target using retro-rockets prior to completing a full revolution of the earth. This option would be of potential value to the DPRK in making it possible to launch a strike against the US from the south (flying from North Korea over Antarctica) as opposed to from the west like a traditional ICBM, thereby avoiding US missile defenses in Alaska.[7]
On Political Messaging
The March 24 launch stands out for the direct and extensive North Korean political messaging that accompanied it, which was starkly different from the succinct, overwhelmingly technical and operational focus of Pyongyang’s messaging around all the missile launches in January 2022.[8] The political dimension of the launch, especially for the North Korean domestic audience, is particularly evident in the overproduced promotional video of the launch shown on state television and Kim Jong Un’s participation in it.[9]
According to the statement accompanying the launch, it was intended to convey:
  • North Korean power and self-reliance;
  • Reliable nuclear deterrence;
  • Industrial might;
  • Technological prowess; and
  • The priority of building up the North’s military capability.
Most importantly, in light of common Western characterizations of the launch (and most other DPRK missile activities) as a North Korean effort to provoke a favorable negotiating outcome with the US, the North proclaimed that “steadfast is the strategic choice and determination of our Party and government to keep bolstering the powerful nuclear war deterrence qualitatively and quantitatively” (i.e., it does not intend to trade its nuclear deterrent away).[10]
This was underscored in a March 28 North Korean report on Kim’s meeting with persons involved in the development of the Hwasong-17. The report referred to: “the absolute force of self-defense that can not be bartered nor be bought with anything,” and Kim’s declaration that “we would continue to attain the defence up-building goal and develop much more powerful strike means to equip our army.”[11]
Pyongyang also clearly was prepared to weather whatever increased international political and sanctions blowback resulted from acknowledging the new launch to be an ICBM rather than trying to blunt the impact by claiming a satellite-related purpose.
On Further Launches
North Korea did not characterize the Hwasong-17 as nearing series production or operational deployment, as it did with several other types of missiles it launched in January. Instead, by stating that the missile will “be [future tense] operated by the strategic forces of the DPRK” and “will creditably perform its mission and duty,” it implied that these milestones have yet to be reached and that further flight testing will occur.[12] The failure that occurred early in the boost phase of the probable Hwasong-17 that was launched on March 16 also seems to provide a good reason for further flight testing, although North Korea has previously deployed missile systems after only one successful test, apparently including the Hwasong-15 ICBM. Further testing would almost certainly be required if the North intends to deploy the Hwasong-17 with multiple warheads since, as previously mentioned above, this type of payload has apparently not yet been demonstrated.
Important Unknowns Remain
Finally, in evaluating the significance of the March 24 test and the Hwasong-17 missile system, it is important to remember that the following is currently unknown:
  • Why the March 16 launch failed, how successful the March 24 launch was—much less which missile was actually flown–and what development work remains to be done on the Hwasong-17, including how many more developmental flight tests will be conducted;
  • Whether North Korea will actually bring the Hwasong-17 into serial production and operational deployment;
  • How many Hwasong-17 launchers and missiles may be deployed; and
  • What type(s) of payload(s) may be deployed, and in particular, how many warheads any MIRV version would carry, and how long MIRV development would take.
The Bottom Line
If it was the Hwasong-17 that was launched on March 24, no significant new insights were provided. Instead, it only confirmed outside analysts’ prior assessments of the missile’s capabilities. The Hwasong-17 will only make a significant military and technological addition to North Korea’s existing ICBMs if it is equipped with a MIRV payload.[13] This is because, for a few years now, the North has apparently already operationally deployed ICBMs with nuclear warheads that are capable of striking anywhere in the US, and those missiles use the same type of rocket engine as the Hwasong-17, albeit in different configurations.
It remains to be seen if, when and how extensively North Korea will deploy MIRVs on the Hwasong-17 and, therefore, whether the new missile will make a real difference.
  1. [1]
See Colin Zwirko, “Imagery casts doubt over North Korea’s Hwasong-17 ICBM claims,” NK Pro, March 25, 2022, https://www.nknews.org/pro/imagery-casts-doubt-over-north-koreas-hwasong-17-icbm-claims; “Allies view N. Korea’s ICBM launch as involving Hwasong-15, not new missile: sources,” Yonhap News Agency, March 27, 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220327002200325; Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “North Korea’s latest missile test may not have been what it claimed,” The Washington Post, March 28, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/28/north-korea-missile-hwasong; and Timothy W. Martin, Dasl Yoon, and Nancy A. Youssef, “North Korea’s ICBM Intrigue: Is Latest Missile New or Old Technology?,” The Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-koreas-icbm-intrigue-is-latest-missile-new-or-old-technology-11648819821.
  1. [2]
“Striking Demonstration of Great Military Muscle of Juche Korea: Successful Test-Launch of New-Type ICBM Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Test Launch of ICBM Hwasongpho-17,” Rodong Sinmun, March 25, 2022.
  1. [3]
For example, see “N. Korea fires apparent ICBM toward East Sea.” Yonhap News Agency, March 24, 2022. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220324007452325; and Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea still faces technological hurdles to clear in its ICBM quest,” The New York Times, March 24, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/03/24/world/north-korea-icbm-launch.
  1. [4]
“Striking Demonstration of Great Military Muscle of Juche Korea: Successful Test-Launch of New-Type ICBM Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Test Launch of ICBM Hwasongpho-17,” Rodong Sinmun.
  1. [5]
“NADA and Academy of Defence Science Conduct Important Test for Developing Reconnaissance Satellite,” Rodong Sinmun, February 28, 2022.
  1. [6]
“Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-style Socialist Construction to Fresh Victory: On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at Eighth Congress of WPK,” DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 9, 2021.
  1. [7]
However, such an attack would not be able to arrive undetected. It would be detected upon launch by US infrared intelligence satellites as a Hwasong-17 flying to the south in an orbital trajectory, and the warhead would be seen coming over the southern horizon flying toward the US by ballistic missile early warning radars.
  1. [8]
Those launches were almost certainly intended to convey implicit political messages, just as the latest ICBM launch probably was.
  1. [9]
Supersuhui, “주체조선의 절대적힘, 군사적강세 힘있게 과시-신형대륙간탄도미싸일시험발사 단행경애하는 김정은동지께서 대륙간탄도미싸일 《화성포-17》형시험발사를 지도하시였다,” YouTube, march 25, 2022, video, 15:14, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0mA3Gik3paM. Also see Alistair Coleman, “North Korea Hwasong-17 launch gets Hollywood-style effects,” BBC News, March 25, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60877578.

  1. [10]
“Striking Demonstration of Great Military Muscle of Juche Korea: Successful Test-Launch of New-Type ICBM Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Test Launch of ICBM Hwasongpho-17.”
  1. [11]
“Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Has Photo Session with Those Who Contributed to Successful Test-Fire of Hwasongpho-17 Type,” Rodong Sinmun, March 28, 2022.
  1. [12]
“Striking Demonstration of Great Military Muscle of Juche Korea: Successful Test-Launch of New-Type ICBM Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Test Launch of ICBM Hwasongpho-17.”
  1. [13]
An MRV or FOBS payload could only engage single targets, just like existing ICBMs, although it would complicate missile defense more than existing systems.

5. Could the world's next nuclear power be U.S. ally South Korea?

Some very interesting analysis and of course very pithy commentary from the whip-smart Professor Sung-Yoon Lee.

Excerpts:

Sung-Yoon Lee, who serves as the Kim Koo-Korea Foundation Professor of Korean Studies and Assistant Professor at The Fletcher School at Tufts University, told Newsweek that the reality of recent international events meant we are living in "a very different world" than the one that previously restrained such nuclear steps.
"Today, we are past the prelude in this portentous five-act drama," he argued, one in which "it increasingly appears that there are few reasonable options for Seoul other than arming itself with nukes."
"While wiser folks may reverse this trajectory, I think we are nearing the end of Act 1," Lee said. "Act 5 will close the day with the opening of Japan's own nuclearization play, and the NPT by then will ring hollow. Can South Korea and Japan become 'responsible' nuclear powers, say, like the UK and France? Perhaps."
"But, while one has a fairly good idea of how Rambo 5 or Pyongyang's next post-provocation peace ploy may end," he added, "this, the South Korean nuclear drama, is a novel story whose ending is unknown."
Could the world's next nuclear power be U.S. ally South Korea?
Newsweek · by Tom O'Connor · April 7, 2022
The United States has long sought to oppose efforts to expand the exclusive club of nuclear-armed nations, a small clique most recently joined 16 years year ago by North Korea. But as current members expand hone new capabilities and unrest plagues the international community, one or even two of Washington's own allies may seek to build a bomb of their own.
For decades, South Korea and Japan have lived under the umbrella of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, the second largest in the world after that of Cold War-era rival Russia, once again a top-priority foe after last month's incursion into Ukraine. Now, however, Seoul is revisiting its nuclear strategy in what would mark a massive shift in the security situation in Asia and the non-proliferation regime that has attempted to rein in such weapons of mass destruction across the globe.
Lami Kim, assistant professor at the U.S. Army War College's Department of National Security and Strategy, told Newsweek that "there are important differences between Ukraine and South Korea," as "Ukraine is not a U.S. ally, while South Korea has significant strategic importance for the U.S."
"That said, there has been a constant fear of abandonment by the U.S. among South Koreans, and what's happening in Ukraine has heightened this fear," added Kim, who also serves as a U.S.-Korea NextGen Scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and an adjunct fellow at the Pacific Forum. "I believe that's strengthening their ambition for nuclear armament."
That ambition has roots that precede the Ukraine war. It was reflected in a poll published by the Chicago Council on February 21, three days before Putin's invasion, which showed up to 71% of South Koreans would support developing nuclear capabilities. Only just over half, around 56%, would seek U.S. nuclear weapons on their country's soil, and, if forced to choose, just 9% would accept U.S. nuclear weapons as opposed to 67% who backed an independent arsenal.
Kim helped author the survey, but she issued a caution about interpreting the results of the study, saying "we need to distinguish between popular sentiment and what the government will likely decide to do."
But if Seoul, emboldened by the election of new conservative leader Yoon Seok-yeol, did decide to embark on the path of developing nuclear arms, she said the consequences would be seismic.
"If the U.S. fails to prevent South Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, that would ring a death knell to the international nonproliferation efforts," Kim said. "It is possible that Japan would follow suit and develop its own nuclear weapons."
Tokyo has been far more reluctant to embrace a nuclear future, particularly because it is the only country in the world that has ever been targeted by such weapons, and not just once, but twice — Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.
But even in Japan, there is a growing push to review the three non-nuclear principles adopted half a century ago, as former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo called on lawmakers last month to consider hosting U.S. nuclear weapons.
"And if the U.S. accepts, or even promotes its allies' nuclear armament," Kim said, "its argument that other countries like Iran and North Korea shouldn't have nuclear weapons wouldn't carry any weight."

South Korean submarine ROKS Dosan Ahn Changho conducts the country's first submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test on September 15, 2021, a major step for a country that has long relied on U.S. security as rival North Korea hones its own nuclear-capable missile prowess. Republic of Korea Defense Ministry
How the conflict raging in Europe influences these nuclear debates in South Korea and Japan "depends on the outcome of the war in Ukraine," according to Steve Fetter, an associate provost and dean at the University of Maryland's Graduate School, who is also a former member of the Director of National Intelligence's Science Board and Energy Department's Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee.
"If Russia does not achieve its objectives and is deterred from further armed conflict, and if the NATO alliance is strengthened, that should increase the confidence of Japan and South Korea in U.S. security guarantees and in our collective ability to resist coercion, deter armed conflict and decrease support for an independent nuclear capability," Fetter told Newsweek.
Both Japan and South Korea "have highly advanced scientific and technological capabilities, including extensive civilian nuclear industries," he said, and "either country could obtain nuclear weapons, if it chose to do so."
"Fortunately, both countries have demonstrated a strong commitment to nonproliferation and to remaining non-nuclear-weapon states," Fetter added. "U.S. security guarantees are an important foundation for this commitment."
But if NATO's success in backing Ukraine against Russia may assuage fears that help fuel a desire for an independent nuclear option, then the alliance's failure to do so may only exacerbate the concerns that are driving these trends. Moreover, developments even closer to home appear to be having a potentially even more potent effect, especially in South Korea.
"I believe that the war in Ukraine, along with North Korea's recent ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] testing, has had an indirect influence in reinforcing South Korea's belief that it needs to improve its strategic deterrence, namely through nuclear means," William Kim, a researcher at the Stimson Center's 38 North program with previous experience at the House Armed Services Committee, told Newsweek.
He said the popular support for a nuclear option in South Korea has "been reinforced" by "the heightened calls for South Korea's nuclear armament in response to the invasion," as well as last month's election of conservative leader Yoon, "who has advocated for the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea."
Russia Says Ukraine Crisis Must Not Reach Arctic, NATO Says It Already Has
Read more
Yoon's razor-thin victory, with a margin of less than 1%, has raised concerns of even more serious tensions returning to the Korean Peninsula. It could mark the end of an era of President Moon Jae-in's urgent attempts to make peace between two rival neighbors still technically at war since 1950.
But even under Moon's administration South Korea has expanded its military capabilities, forging a new deal with President Joe Biden last May that would lift long-standing limits on Seoul's ballistic missile development. In September, South Korea tested its first submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), becoming the first non-nuclear power to do so.
The test came just hours after North Korea (officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - DPRK) fired two short-range ballistic missiles believed to have been launch from a railway-based platform, part of a series of tests showcasing various capabilities, including last month's ICBM test, the first of its kind since 2017.
In response to this most recent DPRK test, South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea -ROK) immediately ordered missile drills including land, air and sea platforms, suggesting a more assertive tone from Seoul even before Yoon entered the Blue House.
However, South Korea's hardline tactics are likely to be met in kind by North Korea. Just days after South Korean Defense Minister Suh Wook discussed the possibility of carrying out preemptive strikes against its foe, the DPRK's ruling Korean Workers' Party Central Committee Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong, sister of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, issued two statements in which she warned Seoul should "discipline itself if it wants to stave off disaster," and threatened "a miserable fate little short of total destruction and ruin" if the situation escalated.
And in a rare move, she explicitly pointed out the "obvious contrast" between the countries, with North Korea, unlike South Korea, being "a nuclear weapons state," even though she insisted her words were rooted in "the fact that the north and the south of Korea are of the same nation who should not fight against each other."
Yoon's spokesperson, Kim Eun-hye, answered by defending Suh's comments, telling a press briefing Tuesday that "we will respond without the slightest error to North Korea's provocations and security threats."
With the new leader set to be sworn in next month, William Kim told Newsweek that "only time will tell whether President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol's comments in favor of nuclear armament of South Korea were an idea with real policy intent or just lip service to secure conservative voters in favor of nuclear options."
"However," he added, "it is more likely than not that the current security context of the world will reinforce his belief in strengthening the ROK's defense capabilities, either through conventional or nuclear means."
Should Seoul choose to do so, though, he said he was confident that it would not risk triggering the international isolation that has befallen Pyongyang.
"South Korea is too intertwined and embedded into the global economy — as a leader in critical industries like semiconductors and EV [electric vehicle] batteries — that even if it does pursue nuclear armament of any kind," William Kim argued, "it will try to do so within acceptable boundaries that do not invite sanctions or other aggressive responses from the rest of the world."
Jeong-Ho Roh, director of Columbia University's Center for Korean Studies, agreed with that assessment.
"One of the most important things we have to understand is nuclear weapons or nuclear programs, it's a legal issue, it's a matter of law," he said. "It's not a question of politics or others."

South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol (C) signs a guest book, as he is accompanied by General Paul J. LaCamera (L), who serves as head of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea, and Combined Forces Command Deputy chief Kim Seung-kyum (R) at Camp Humphreys on April 7 in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. Yoon vowed to strengthen deterrence against North Korea's nuclear and missile threats during a visit to a U.S. military base, according to his spokesperson. Staff Sergeant Kris Bonet/U.S. Army/Getty Images
Three decades ago, the two Koreas agreed on the denuclearization of their shared peninsula in a joint declaration as the U.S. withdrew the nuclear weapons it had deployed on its ally's territory since the late 1950s. At that time, Pyongyang and Seoul were both parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a 1968 agreement that sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but the DPRK withdrew from the treaty in 2003, three years before it conducted its first nuclear test.
Roh argued that North Korea's decision to pursue nuclear weapons has made their 1992 joint declaration "no longer valid legally." And even with the NPT in place, the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on nuclear weapons published in 1996 ruled that there is no source of law, customary or treaty, that explicitly prohibits the possession or even use of nuclear weapons.
While the status quo has prevailed for some time given U.S. security commitments, a solidifying Chinese and Russian acceptance of North Korea's nuclear-capable moves, indicated by their lack of condemnation of the recent ICBM test, as well as growing uncertainties regarding the U.S. commitment to taking on nuclear powers directly, as evidenced by the war in Ukraine, has fostered what Roh identified as "the necessity for [South] Korea to be more self-sufficient."
"What happened this year is a direct reflection of this polarizing world," Roh said. "The legal institutions that were formed post-1945 and the U.N. that created our legal order has essentially been weakened."
Russia Wants Cyber Treaty 'Before It's Too Late,' US Hopes World Rejects It
Read more
Still, Roh felt that South Korea pursuing its own nuclear option was far less likely than reintroducing U.S. nuclear weapons to the country as part of a sharing agreement. The U.S. has similar agreements with non-nuclear NATO allies such as Belgium, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey — yet another legal nuclear gray zone.
Such a move, he argued, would also be more tolerable or even beneficial to Japan, which would otherwise find a "nuclear South Korea" to be "not acceptable," even if Seoul took the semi-internationally endorsed "responsible" route like India as opposed to North Korea's "rogue" path.
Though both U.S. allies, Japan and South Korea have a difficult history with deep-seated conflicting narratives rooted in the former's occupation of the Korean Peninsula in the first half of the 20th century. Their inability to reconcile this past has led to high-profile diplomatic and political disputes, some ongoing to this day.
As such, Roh notes that "one of the other problems, of course, is: can Korea and Japan really cooperate with each other based on our unfortunate history?"
Another important aspect of the situation in the Asia-Pacific is what Roh calls "three hotspots" in the region, including the Korean Peninsula, the self-ruling island of Taiwan sought by an increasingly assertive China, and the lesser publicized territorial dispute between Japan and Russia over an island chain largely controlled by the latter but claimed in full by the former.
This feud has also left Moscow and Tokyo without a peace treaty since World War II, when fears of a Soviet invasion deeper into Japan played into the U.S. calculus to expedite victory through atomic warfare in the first place, thus avoiding the kind of division that took place in the Korean Peninsula, or even Germany.
Even as Russia deploys new weapons to these islands and Japan broadens its own conventional arsenal, however, Nakano Koichi, a professor at Sophia University in Tokyo, said that Japan's place in the "Far East" still made the conflict in Ukraine feel distant for most in the country.
"There certainly are plenty of conservative political, security, business, and media elites here that want to utilize the war in Ukraine to bury Japanese postwar pacifism once and for all," Nakano told Newsweek. "But the popular opinion remains divided at best, and in my view, still predominantly strongly antiwar."

U.S. ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel (L), accompanied by Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, lays a wreath at the Cenotaph for atomic bomb victims at the Peace Memorial Park in Hiroshima on March 26. The U.S. atomic bombings of August 6 and 9, 1945 killed estimates of more than 200,000 people, most of them civilians. Jiji Press/AFP/Getty Images
Among the U.N's 193 member states, only nine are known to have nuclear weapons. These include Russia and the U.S., which hold up to 90% of the world's arsenal, NATO members France and the United Kingdom, a rapidly developing China, neighboring rivals India and Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, which neither confirms nor denies its possession of such weapons.
Others to have explored nuclear capabilities include apartheid-era South Africa, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, who was toppled by the U.S. over ultimately false claims that he was in possession of weapons of mass destruction, and Libya under Muammar el-Qaddafi, who was overthrown in a NATO-backed rebellion years after securing a deal to shutter his program for better ties with the West.
Another country at the center of the nuclear debate is Iran, which has an advanced nuclear program that officials have repeatedly denied was intended to produce a weapon. Still, the Islamic Republic's efforts have resulted in intensive negotiations, as the Biden administration attempted to reenter a 2015 deal abandoned by then-President Donald Trump in 2018.
Now, as the war in Ukraine continues, even Russian ally Belarus has amended its law to potentially host Russian nuclear weapons as Minsk draws Western condemnation for its role in the conflict.
Ukraine also once possessed a massive nuclear stockpile during its time as part of the Soviet Union. When the USSR collapsed, the weapons were returned to Russia in exchange for economic and security assurances as part of a 1996 agreement. Though Kyiv never controlled the weapons, many today cite this as yet another example of how giving up nuclear weapons resulted in little benefit.
Sung-Yoon Lee, who serves as the Kim Koo-Korea Foundation Professor of Korean Studies and Assistant Professor at The Fletcher School at Tufts University, told Newsweek that the reality of recent international events meant we are living in "a very different world" than the one that previously restrained such nuclear steps.
"Today, we are past the prelude in this portentous five-act drama," he argued, one in which "it increasingly appears that there are few reasonable options for Seoul other than arming itself with nukes."
"While wiser folks may reverse this trajectory, I think we are nearing the end of Act 1," Lee said. "Act 5 will close the day with the opening of Japan's own nuclearization play, and the NPT by then will ring hollow. Can South Korea and Japan become 'responsible' nuclear powers, say, like the UK and France? Perhaps."
"But, while one has a fairly good idea of how Rambo 5 or Pyongyang's next post-provocation peace ploy may end," he added, "this, the South Korean nuclear drama, is a novel story whose ending is unknown."
Newsweek · by Tom O'Connor · April 7, 2022

6. South Korea Must Pick a Side

No more tightrope walking.

Excerpts:
Today, South Korea generally balances its relations with major regional actors so as not to inflame its greatest security challenge: a nuclear-armed North Korea. For the last seven decades, Seoul has bolstered its bilateral ties and security alliances with Washington. At the same time, it has also sought to build amicable relations with Beijing and Moscow based on trade and investment due to their influence over Pyongyang as well as their geographical proximity and economic growth potential.
The golden years of globalization in the 1990s and early 2000s helped Seoul use free trade and economic cooperation to strengthen its diplomatic prowess. Key here was avoiding political sensitivities: Seoul kept mum on human rights and territorial disputes in the South China Sea and Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.
...
With conservative President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol set to take office in two months’ time, it’s quite possible Seoul will respond positively to that plea.
Reacting to the Russian invasion, the incoming president said that South Koreans, including himself, will support the Ukrainian people in their fight against Russia.
“It is very natural for many free countries, including South Korea, to condemn and participate in sanctions against Russia’s invasion, which is clearly a violation of international law,” Yoon said on Feb. 24.
Yoon has affirmed that Seoul-Washington ties will be the “central axis” of his foreign policy, which is what nearly 90 percent of South Koreans want, according to an April 4 report published by the Federation of Korean Industries.
With its GDP now among the world’s 10 largest, and its military power in the top six, South Korea’s place in the world is no longer shrimp-sized. Seoul’s actions should reflect this. It’s no longer a question of choice of whose side to take—it’s a matter of facing up to responsibility.

South Korea Must Pick a Side
Russia’s war in Ukraine has shown the “shrimp among whales” that hedging is no longer a viable foreign policy.
By Sooyoung Oh, a South Korean journalist based in Seoul.
Foreign Policy · by Sooyoung Oh · April 6, 2022
When foreign media and the international community criticized the South Korean government’s response to Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine, the Moon Jae-in administration seemed baffled.
For weeks leading up to the war, Seoul had distanced itself from the U.S.-led sanctions campaign on Russia. This was because it deemed punitive measures detrimental to its relations with the country, which holds some sway over North Korea and is a critical export market for South Korean household electronics.
This reaction was “[q]uite something from a key US partner in Asia that relies for its existence on the security guarantees of others,” Christian Davies, the Financial Times’ Seoul correspondent, tweeted shortly after the invasion.
When foreign media and the international community criticized the South Korean government’s response to Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine, the Moon Jae-in administration seemed baffled.
For weeks leading up to the war, Seoul had distanced itself from the U.S.-led sanctions campaign on Russia. This was because it deemed punitive measures detrimental to its relations with the country, which holds some sway over North Korea and is a critical export market for South Korean household electronics.
This reaction was “[q]uite something from a key US partner in Asia that relies for its existence on the security guarantees of others,” Christian Davies, the Financial Times’ Seoul correspondent, tweeted shortly after the invasion.
The Moon administration “could not comprehend” the bad press, according to presidential communications secretary Park Soo-hyun. “There are Korean companies and nationals in Russia. Our trade volume has been growing, and we can’t just disregard those things,” Park told the South Korean broadcaster TBS a day after the war began. “Do they honestly expect us to impose independent sanctions?”
The answer was yes. Sanctions were exactly what the global community expected from a key U.S. ally that has declared itself a “full-fledged democracy” and flaunted its new “advanced nation” status, brushing shoulders with the major powers at the G-7 summit last year. But instead of showing diplomatic initiative, Seoul’s reluctance to align itself with the global tide against Moscow knocked it off its own pedestal.
“South Korea was out of step,” said Evans Revere, a former U.S. principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. “Not only out of step with the United States, but out of step with the international community, undermining the perception of international solidarity among democratic and allied countries.”
On the eve of Russia’s invasion, while other governments were coordinating efforts on sanctions and engaging in shuttle diplomacy to prevent war in Europe, Moon ordered “urgent measures” and emergency meetings to protect South Korean exporters. When the invasion occurred, the South Korean president did not condemn it, nor did he make a public address. In brief comments relayed by Park, Moon expressed “regret” over the situation.
Moon ultimately caved to U.S. pressure on sanctions, saying South Korea would partake in global efforts to de-escalate the conflict but offering no details on how or when they would be implemented. This was a classic example of the country’s approach to foreign policy, which is characterized by hedging: an avoidance of sensitive issues aimed at buttressing trade relations.
South Koreans have long identified their country as a “shrimp among whales,” a reference to its precarious position between bigger regional powers. Wedged between China, Mongolia, and Japan—which have each vied for regional dominance over the centuriesactive hedging and strategic ambiguity have been vital to South Korea’s sovereignty and security.
Today, South Korea generally balances its relations with major regional actors so as not to inflame its greatest security challenge: a nuclear-armed North Korea. For the last seven decades, Seoul has bolstered its bilateral ties and security alliances with Washington. At the same time, it has also sought to build amicable relations with Beijing and Moscow based on trade and investment due to their influence over Pyongyang as well as their geographical proximity and economic growth potential.
The golden years of globalization in the 1990s and early 2000s helped Seoul use free trade and economic cooperation to strengthen its diplomatic prowess. Key here was avoiding political sensitivities: Seoul kept mum on human rights and territorial disputes in the South China Sea and Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.
In 2003, China became South Korea’s largest trading partner and most popular investment destination, and China-bound shipments now account for more than 27 percent of South Korea’s total exports. Around 2007 and 2008, Russia became a key export market as well, with Samsung and LG dominating sales of household electronics and opening regional production hubs. Hyundai, meanwhile, built its sixth overseas factory in St. Petersburg. Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the opening ceremony in 2010, test-driving a sedan.
Heightening tension between the United States and China during the 2007- 2008 global financial crisis made it increasingly difficult for South Korea to put business before geopolitics. To their credit, the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations attempted to play a bridging role between Washington and Beijing, pursuing non-security initiatives to promote regional peace and cooperation. However, these attempts at being a middle power failed.
With a growing nuclear threat from North Korea—and Beijing ignoring phone calls from Seoul—Park Geun-hye decided to side with the United States. Her administration in 2016 agreed to install the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system in South Korea, to the fury of China, which saw it as a form of U.S. deterrence against Beijing. Over the course of 18 months, the Chinese government made sure Seoul paid for its insolence, retaliating with heavy economic and travel boycotts that wiped out more than $15 billion from the South Korean economy in the tourism sector alone by the end of 2017.
This should have been a wake-up call that hedging was not a viable policy, said Bruce W. Bennett, a defense researcher at the Rand Corp. “The South Korean government should have realized a free economic system is important, but economics is tied to politics and China uses economics as a powerful weapon,” he said.
Yet, the Moon administration took a step backward, attempting a “double allegiance” to Washington and Beijing in hopes of advancing on inter-Korean diplomacy. Moon expressed support for U.S. Indo-Pacific initiatives and increased South Korea’s contributions to shared defense costs. At the same time, he refused to drop Chinese 5G networks, diplomatically boycott the Beijing Olympics, raise the issue of human rights in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, or mention China’s aggression toward Taiwan in a joint declaration with U.S. President Joe Biden last May.
Seoul’s reluctance to align itself with the global tide against Moscow knocked it off its own pedestal.
Moon’s tenure has featured no tangible results or progress on inter-Korean peace or denuclearization. Hedging had only caused friction in South Korea’s alliance with the United States, and its ambiguity on geopolitical issues has ruptured its credibility with other countries, too. A 2020 survey of countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, for example, showed a critically low level of trust in South Korea when it came to “maintaining the rules-based order and upholding international law.” It then came as no surprise when Moon’s New Southern Policy, which aimed to expand cooperation with ASEAN, largely failed to take off.
“South Korea appears to have internalized Beijing’s economic leverage in its foreign-policy calculation and refrained from criticizing China’s human rights violations,” said Son Daekwon, a professor of international relations at Sogang University’s Graduate School of International Studies.
Come Feb. 24, the Moon government still had not learned its lesson. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, South Korea was “hedging again to almost an embarrassing degree,” said Revere, the former U.S. official. He pointed out that Germany—which has much closer ties to Russia than does South Korea—halted the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and even Switzerland decided this was no time for neutrality, adopting wide-ranging sanctions and freezing Russian assets.
“This crisis is a test of whether South Korea is going to stand by the United States and the international community during a moment of need. And very few people in the leadership in Seoul got that,” Revere said.
Moon’s officials were horrified to discover that Seoul was not included in the list of 32 trusted countries exempt from the U.S. Commerce Department’s Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR), which requires foreign firms using U.S. technology to seek approval from Washington before exporting their products to Russia. This could severely compromise Samsung’s and LG’s leading market share in household appliances and mobiles in the country.
Four days after the FDPR list was released, the Moon government decided that it would impose independent sanctions on Russia after all, as a “responsible member of the international community.” It was clear among leadership in Seoul that there was no more room for strategic ambiguity and that further missteps could lead to damaging and entirely self-inflicted consequences for South Korea’s export-dependent economy.
Most Seoul-based analysts have already ruled out the possibility of South Korea being accepted as a member of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a major Japan-led trade deal, given the country’s ongoing dispute with Tokyo over historical issues. But if it continues to remain ambiguous on counterbalancing China, Seoul also faces the risk of missing out on the Biden administration’s new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) initiative, a trade policy announced last October that aims to strengthen trade, investment, and economic ties between the United States and its partner countries in the region.
“It is critically important for South Korea to be included in the IPEF,” said Oh Joon-seok, a professor of business at Sookmyung Women’s University and president of the Korea Tax Research Forum. It would be damaging for the South Korean economy if it were to be excluded from the IPEF because of its heavy reliance on the export of semiconductors and communications technology.
A Feb. 24 U.S. congressional paper said the IPEF “could potentially include South Korea,” which equally implies it may not. “In the end, the degree to which the South Korean companies and government support the free part of the world will be really telling in terms of what the world is prepared to do for South Korea,” said Bennett, the Rand researcher.
Whether Seoul will look beyond its own interests and live up to its new role in global governance is its decision alone. A change in foreign policy is desired not only by international observers but also by the South Korean people.
Read More
A man looks at posters ahead of South Korea's presidential election.
With elections close, a rising country considers its place in the world.
In the past, the South Korean public’s polarized views on relations with Washington and Beijing had led to “oscillating between two extremes in foreign policy,” according to Son, the international relations professor. Conservatives have pursued stronger security ties with the United States and alignment with Western values, while progressive South Koreans have been skeptical about the U.S. presence in East Asia, showing greater preference for relations with China. However, with China’s growing aggression, negative sentiment toward Beijing has grown from 37 percent in 2015 to 77 percent in 2021, according to a Pew Research Center survey. By contrast, 77 percent of South Koreans see the U.S. in a positive light.
“As the [South Korea]-U.S. alliance expands from a security to value-based alliance, South Koreans have started to see Washington not only as a ‘peninsula defender’ but a ‘regional stabilizer,’ and are likely to become more expressive about their common values such as human rights and democracy,” Son said.
The war in Ukraine has underscored this changing dynamic. While the Moon government dithered, members of the public have actively voiced their support for the Ukrainian resistance, protesting outside the Russian Embassy in Seoul, donating over $3 million to support humanitarian assistance for the people of Ukraine, and calling on their own government to do more.
With conservative President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol set to take office in two months’ time, it’s quite possible Seoul will respond positively to that plea.
Reacting to the Russian invasion, the incoming president said that South Koreans, including himself, will support the Ukrainian people in their fight against Russia.
“It is very natural for many free countries, including South Korea, to condemn and participate in sanctions against Russia’s invasion, which is clearly a violation of international law,” Yoon said on Feb. 24.
Yoon has affirmed that Seoul-Washington ties will be the “central axis” of his foreign policy, which is what nearly 90 percent of South Koreans want, according to an April 4 report published by the Federation of Korean Industries.
With its GDP now among the world’s 10 largest, and its military power in the top six, South Korea’s place in the world is no longer shrimp-sized. Seoul’s actions should reflect this. It’s no longer a question of choice of whose side to take—it’s a matter of facing up to responsibility.
Foreign Policy · by Sooyoung Oh · April 6, 2022

7. Tensions With North Rise as South Korea’s President-Elect Takes Tougher Line
We need a holistic deterrence strategy - or integrated deterrence: nuclear and missile deterrence but also conventional warfighting deterrence. 
Tensions With North Rise as South Korea’s President-Elect Takes Tougher Line
Yoon Suk-yeol promises to strengthen deterrence against Pyongyang’s nuclear, missile threats

South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol supports a pre-emptive strike against North Korea if necessary.
PHOTO: YONHAP NEWS/ZUMA PRESS
By Dasl YoonFollow
Apr. 7, 2022 8:09 am ET
SEOUL—South Korea’s incoming president, who has promised to take a tougher stance on North Korea, hasn’t taken office yet. The tone between Seoul and Pyongyang is already getting more adversarial.
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, who takes office next month, promised Thursday to strengthen deterrence against the Kim Jong Un regime’s nuclear and missile threat. The moves could include bringing in more U.S. military firepower, according to delegates representing Mr. Yoon.
Mr. Yoon’s comments followed a pair of missives issued by Kim Yo Jong, the sister of the North Korean leader, who mocked Seoul’s claims of having a pre-emptive strike ability to undercut an imminent North Korean attack. North Korea is a nuclear-weapons state, Ms. Kim said, and doesn’t regard South Korea as its military equal.
Should Seoul adopt a confrontational military stance against Pyongyang, South Korea could face a “shower of fire” and a “miserable fate little short of total destruction and ruin,” Ms. Kim said on Wednesday.
North Korea has started this year with a historic spree of weapons tests, including on March 24 its first full-range intercontinental ballistic missile launch in more than four years.
More weapons provocations could be coming soon, as Pyongyang celebrates a marquee holiday next week—the 110th anniversary marking the birth of country founder, Kim Il Sung, on April 15.
A potential nuclear or missile test couldn’t be ruled out, said Sung Kim, the U.S. special envoy for North Korea, in a Wednesday briefing with reporters. The U.S., along with its allies and partners, stand prepared for any scenario, he added.
Inter-Korean relations are at a tenuous spot. Mr. Yoon promises a pivot from the outgoing South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who sought to warm ties with Pyongyang after his 2017 election.
Mr. Yoon supports a pre-emptive strike against North Korea if necessary—a stance that was reiterated by his spokeswoman this week even after Ms. Kim’s remarks. In a Thursday visit to an American military base located about 45 miles south of Seoul, Mr. Yoon backed tighter solidarity with the U.S.

A TV at the Seoul railway station showed an image of a North Korean missile launch conducted on March 24.
PHOTO: CHUNG SUNG-JUN/GETTY IMAGES
“I cannot emphasize enough the need for strong deterrence through the U.S.-South Korea military alliance and joint defense posture amid the stern international situation including North Korea’s ICBM,” said Mr. Yoon, a 61-year-old former prosecutor.
North Korea’s threats signal a shift to tense inter-Korean relations, but it is unlikely that Pyongyang would quickly return to military confrontation against Seoul, security analysts say.
Before launching an ICBM last month, North Korea warned weeks in advance that it could soon break its self-imposed moratorium on major tests. But the Kim regime hasn’t raised the prospect of nullifying inter-Korean military agreements made in 2018 between Messrs. Kim and Moon, which includes toning down military hostilities, said Hong Min, a North Korea analyst at the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul.
Even as Ms. Kim lambasted Seoul, the two countries have continued to hold regular calls via a cross-border phone line established to keep direct communication open. North Korea has previously sought to punish South Korea by severing such communications.
“North Korea is testing the waters with the incoming administration, warning them that inter-Korean relations could turn sour,” Mr. Hong said.
North Korea’s Expanding Missile Arsenal Unpacked
North Korea’s Expanding Missile Arsenal Unpacked
Play video: North Korea’s Expanding Missile Arsenal Unpacked
From a more powerful intercontinental ballistic missile to hypersonic ones, North Korea has been displaying new weapons alongside its nuclear bombs and submarines. WSJ takes a look at the regime’s growing arsenal to see what message it sends to the world. Composite: Diana Chan
In response to the Kim regime’s most-recent ICBM test, South Korea conducted rare military drills of its own, such as displaying American F-35 stealth jet fighters. The country’s defense minister said Seoul has the capability to respond and punish Pyongyang if necessary—remarks that drew the response from Kim Yo Jong.
‘North Korea is testing the waters with the incoming administration, warning them that inter-Korean relations could turn sour’
— Hong Min, a Seoul-based North Korea analyst
The U.S. has also cited North Korea’s missile tests as it conducted aircraft carrier drills in the Yellow Sea and intensified artillery drills at an air base. Annual joint U.S. and South Korean military exercises are expected to start this month.
Seoul and Pyongyang are using threats as a deterrent against military conflict, said Kim Jina, a professor at South Korea’s Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. “But North Korea will use the upcoming military drills as justification for more aggressive action,” Ms. Kim said.
South Korean delegates representing Mr. Yoon, on a trip to Washington this week, discussed with Jake Sullivan, the U.S. national security adviser, the deployment of American strategic assets—military hardware such as a nuclear-powered submarine or long-range bombers—to deter North Korean provocations.
The two sides also held consultations on strengthening the “extended deterrence,” or the use of U.S. nuclear forces across the region to defend its allies. The U.S. maintains around 28,500 military personnel in South Korea.
Seoul is left with few options other than strengthening its defense capabilities with Washington as Pyongyang is likely to further test new missile capabilities in the coming weeks, security analysts say.
“The U.S. continues to be crucial in providing the ultimate security to South Korea with U.S. troops and its nuclear weapons,” said Ramon Pacheco Pardo, KF-VUB Korea chair at the Institute for European Studies in Brussels.
Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com
Appeared in the April 8, 2022, print edition as 'Tough Stance, Missile Tests Fan Inter-Korean Tensions'.

8. Defense ministry begins relocation for presidential office


Defense ministry begins relocation for presidential office | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 강윤승 · April 8, 2022
SEOUL, April 8 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's defense ministry set in motion phased relocation work Friday to empty its main building in the central Seoul district of Yongsan for use as the country's new presidential office starting in May.
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol has decided to move the presidential office to the compound from Cheong Wa Dae in the northern part of the capital.
"The relocation work for the fifth story (of the building) and higher got underway in earnest this morning," a ministry official said.
Yoon is expected to use a room on the fifth story as his provisional office with his inauguration on May 10 until the relocation of the ministry, mostly to the nearby Joint Chiefs of Staff building, finishes four days later.
As moving trucks showed up at the compound, officials were busy carrying packages and preparing to get confidential papers shredded.

The relocation of the ministry's key offices, including those for the minister, vice minister, and policy chief, is scheduled to begin following the April 28 end of the springtime military exercise of South Korea and the United States.


colin@yna.co.kr
(END)
Related Articles
en.yna.co.kr · by 강윤승 · April 8, 2022
9. UNC deputy chief urges 'common sense,' dialogue amid concerns about potential N.K. provocations

In point of fact the ROK government could ask for the UN Command to leave Korea at any time (or they demand its departure). It is not something that is solely decided by the UN Security Council. And of course the UN Security Council could vote to disband it as well. But not only does the ROK have a vote, it has the vote (though not in the UNSC). It may exercise its vote by asking for the withdrawal of the UNC. I do not think that is likely with the incoming ROK administration but we need to understand that ROK sovereignty takes precedence and the UN Security Council cannot force the ROK to allow the presence of the UN Command. We need to be careful about making statements that appear to not respect ROK sovereignty. There are some inthe ROK who are susicpiece of the UNC and the US intent in regard to the UNC. Some accept the conspiracy theory that when OPCON transition occurs the US wants the UNC to return to the "high headquarters" and exercise control over the ROK/US Combined Forces COmmand. I am 100% there is no intention to do that and I do not believe we would. But as I said there are those who believe this.

Excerpt:

Harrison said that the future of the UNC is a "responsibility for the U.N. Security Council" that crafted resolutions on the launch of the command tasked with restoring peace in Korea.



(Yonhap Interview) UNC deputy chief urges 'common sense,' dialogue amid concerns about potential N.K. provocations | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · April 8, 2022
By Song Sang-ho
SEOUL, April 8 (Yonhap) -- British Lt. Gen. Andrew Harrison, the deputy commander of the United Nations Command (UNC), called Friday for "everyone to seek common sense" and pursue stability on the Korean Peninsula amid growing concerns about the possibility of additional provocations by North Korea.
Harrison made the call during an interview with Yonhap News Agency, describing the current security situation in the region as "very tense" and stressing his key takeaway from his experiences in conflict zones: Communication is "always the solution."
Speculation has lingered that Pyongyang could test-fire a submarine-launched ballistic missile or another intercontinental ballistic missile in time for key political events later this month. Satellite imagery suggests it may be even gearing up for a nuclear test.
"I think it's very tense. My assessment would be that the challenges appear to be growing greater every month," Harrison said. "I hope everyone can seek common sense and we can get back into a position where security is much more stable."

Having assumed duty here in December, Harrison sees opportunities here to apply lessons from his 35-year military service marked by tricky peace operations in conflict zones, including in Iraq, Afghanistan and Sierra Leone.
The deputy commander himself has learned lessons the hard way through his own share of ordeals, including 12 days of captivity by rebels in Sierra Leone in 2000 when he was serving as a U.N. observer.
"I think the first and most important is that violence doesn't work and the threat of violence only seems to make tensions greater," Harrison said. "Communication is always the solution ... and transparency and explaining what you're doing and why you're doing it."
Asked about how the UNC will cooperate with the incoming Seoul government of President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, Harrison expressed his command's hope for "very cordial" relations.
"I think we're all looking forward to very cordial relationships with the new government when it comes in," he said, mentioning Yoon's visit earlier this week to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, south of Seoul, where the UNC and U.S. Forces Korea are headquartered.
Touching on the issue of a potential peace treaty that would replace the current armistice that halted the 1950-53 Korean War, Harrison said it is "what we all hope for" but challenges have remained for decades.
"So clearly, this is not a simple problem and it's a problem that I hope one day can be resolved," he said. "But it is a real challenge."
The outgoing Moon Jae-in administration had pushed for the declaration of a formal end to the Korean War as part of efforts toward the ultimate goal of a peace treaty. But the endeavors have raised a fundamental question on the future of the UNC, as a peace treaty could end the command's key role as an enforcer of the armistice.
Harrison said that the future of the UNC is a "responsibility for the U.N. Security Council" that crafted resolutions on the launch of the command tasked with restoring peace in Korea.
The British general also stressed the need to remember the "price of war" so as to constantly realize the importance of peace and communication.
"Those who haven't seen war risk glamorizing it," he said. "Korea went through a horrific conflict 70 years ago and those memories will fade. But with that fading memory comes the risk that we won't remember how awful it was."
Harrison, who has ample experience in European operations, expressed sadness over the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
"Clearly, it is not the business that I am about here ... But as a soldier, as a father, as a human being, it is tragic to see that you are again in conflict," he said.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · April 8, 2022



10. Restoration work ongoing at N.Korea's nuclear test site: report

Again, the regime may be trying to create the conditions through increased tensions, threats, and provocations to extort sanctions relief from the US.


Restoration work ongoing at N.Korea's nuclear test site: report | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · April 8, 2022
SEOUL, April 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea appears to be continuing restoration work at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, including the construction of a tunnel entrance, a new report said, amid concerns that the secretive state may be pushing for another nuclear experiment.
Commercial satellite imagery taken between March 24 and April 6 indicates continued activity at the site's Tunnel 3, such as new spoil piles and a newly uncovered entrance, according to the report released by the Vienna-based Open Nuclear Network.
"The DPRK likely established a preliminary entrance to Tunnel 3 and started excavation of the tunnel structure," read the report by Katsuhisa Furukawa, a former member of the U.N. Panel of Experts on North Korean sanctions. DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
There are four known tunnels in the Punggye-ri zone, which was formally shut down in 2018, with demolition work carried out in front of a small group of invited foreign journalists.
Speculation has been widespread that the North may soon conduct its first nuclear test since September 2017 in time for key political events, including the 110th birth anniversary of Kim Il-sung, the late national founder and grandfather of current leader Kim Jong-un, on April 15.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · April 8, 2022

11. HarperNorth lands 'harrowing' story of woman who escaped North Korea twice
I look forward to reading this book though I am sure this will be a very difficult one to read as it will contain stories of heart-wrenching suffering. Jihyun Park should be an inspiration to all of us.

HarperNorth lands 'harrowing' story of woman who escaped North Korea twice
HarperNorth has landed a “harrowing” story of a woman who escaped famine and terror in North Korea twice.
Jonathan de Peyer, senior commissioning editor, acquired world English-language rights to The Hard Road Out: Escaping North Korea by Jihyun Park and Seh-Lynn Chai from Caroline Michel at PFD for HarperNorth. The book will publish in May 2022.
The Hard Road Out follows Park’s story. The first time she escaped North Korea, she was forced to abandon her father on his deathbed, crossing the border under a hail of bullets. In China she was sold to a farmer, with whom she had a son, before being denounced and forcibly returned to North Korea.
Earlier this year she became the first defector to seek political office outside of the Korean peninsula, when she stood as a councillor in Bury, Greater Manchester. She was granted political asylum in Britain with the aid of the UN in 2008 but has only now felt able to tell her story with the aid of her South Korean co-writer Seh-Lynn Chai, who lives in London.
The authors said: “This is a book for anyone who wants to believe in hope and reconciliation.”
De Peyer said: “I was gripped from the first line of this astonishing story of survival and humbled by Jihyun’s indomitable spirit. Hers is a story for the ages, bearing witness to the unspeakable but often overlooked human-rights abuses perpetrated by one of the world’s most tyrannical regimes. And crucially, that story is relayed in her own words, on her own terms. I think anyone who has read Philippe Sands, Barbara Demick and Yeonmi Park will find much to admire here.”

12. North demolishing hotel that was symbol of Korean engagement

Strong statement to follow?

North demolishing hotel that was symbol of Korean engagement
AP · by KIM TONG-HYUNG · April 8, 2022
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea is demolishing a South Korean-owned hotel at a North Korean resort that was one of the last symbols of inter-Korean engagement, according to Seoul officials who called for the North to stop the “unilateral” destruction.
South Korea built dozens of facilities at North Korea’s Diamond Mountain resort to accommodate tourism by its citizens during a high period of engagement between the rivals in the 1990s. But North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in 2019 called the South Korean facilities there “shabby” and ordered them destroyed after months of frustration over Seoul’s unwillingness to defy U.S.-led sanctions that kept the tours from resuming.
The North postponed the demolition work in 2020 as part of stringent measures to prevent COVID-19.
South Korea’s Unification Ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs, said Friday that North Korea was proceeding with the demolition of the Haegumgang Hotel. The floating hotel, docked at a coastal area of the resort, was a major property among dozens of facilities South Korea established to accommodate Diamond Mountain tours, which began in 1998.
ADVERTISEMENT
Unification Ministry spokesperson Cha Deok-cheol said it wasn’t clear whether the North also was destroying other facilities at the site. He said Seoul “strongly regrets North Korea’s unilateral dismantlement” of the hotel and urged the North to engage in talks to resolve disagreements over the South Korean properties at the site.
Commercial satellite images indicate the demolition work has been underway for weeks. Cha said Seoul used inter-Korean communication channels to demand an explanation and talks on the issue, but the North has ignored the request.
The demolition comes amid heighted tensions over recent missile launches. North Korea conducted its first intercontinental ballistic missile test since 2017 on March 24, as Kim revives brinkmanship aimed at forcing the United States and other rivals to accept the North as a nuclear power and remove crippling sanctions.
South Korean tours to Diamond Mountain were a major symbol of cooperation between the Koreas and a valuable cash source for the North’s broken economy before the South suspended them in 2008 after a North Korean guard fatally shot a South Korean tourist.
South Korea can’t restart mass tours to Diamond Mountain or any other major inter-Korean economic activity without defying sanctions, which have been strengthened since 2016, when the North began accelerating its nuclear and missile tests. While U.N. sanctions don’t directly ban tourism, they prohibit bulk cash transfers that can result from such business activities.
During their brief diplomacy in 2018, South Korean President Moon Jae-in met Kim three times and vowed to restart Diamond Mountain tours, voicing optimism that sanctions could end. But North Korea suspended cooperation with the South after diplomacy with the U.S. collapsed in 2019 and Seoul wasn’t able to wrest concessions from Washington on its behalf.
AP · by KIM TONG-HYUNG · April 8, 2022

13. What Russia's invasion means for Korean Peninsula


Many lessons. But keep in mind the ROK is a treaty ally and the US is committed to the defense of the ROK.

The author also notes the vulnerability of nuclear power plants. This is something we need to be concerned with if the north attacks .
What Russia's invasion means for Korean Peninsula
The Korea Times · April 7, 2022
By Kim Sang-woo
It is clear now that Russian President Vladimir Putin will be unable to achieve the political objectives he intended, namely, to march into Kyiv and replace Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's government with one friendly to the Kremlin. Putin's war may have destroyed much of Ukraine physically, but the unprecedented sanctions and economic isolation are destroying Russia economically.

For Ukraine, the resilience of its leadership, society and armed forces is a marvel. National identity is more robust than ever; Ukraine's staunch resistance inspired the world.

However, it has come at a great cost. An estimated 10 million Ukrainians are internally displaced or refugees. The economy has been wrecked.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is more united and stronger as a result of Russia's aggression. It also benefits from the poor performance of the Russian armed forces, which appeared to be no match for the Western alliance.

U.S. President Joe Biden made a speech in Warsaw on March 26. Biden described the Russian invasion of Ukraine not only as a threat to European security but as "a battle between democracy and autocracy, between liberty and repression, between a rules-based order and one governed by brute force."

Nevertheless, no one should underestimate Putin's willingness to keep this brutal war going until he controls enough Ukraine territory to demand concessions that could be dressed up for the Russian public to look like a victory.

At this juncture, two very different futures are possible. If Putin is successful in undermining Ukrainian independence and democracy, the world will return to an era of aggressive and intolerant nationalism reminiscent of the early 20th century.
On the other hand, if Putin leads Russia into a debacle of military and economic failure, the chance remains to relearn the liberal lesson that power unconstrained by laws leads to national disaster.

The one thing that might ease Putin's desperation would be Chinese support. It is not clear yet if Washington's threat of sanctions has deterred China ― or encouraged it to side with Putin.

Yet by associating so closely with Putin, Xi Jinping has exposed himself to criticism for flawed judgment that damages China's reputation and raises the risk of being targeted with secondary sanctions.

While China has long sought to divide the West, its alignment with Russia has done the opposite, alienating Western Europe, where it had been making significant economic inroads. It will also lead to a much tougher U.S. policy toward China and highlight the costs the country should face if it were ever to move militarily against Taiwan.

If Washington now faces both Chinese and Russian challenges, it must necessarily empower its allies and modernize burden-sharing arrangements in Asia and Europe. Fortunately, the Biden administration's grand strategy has space to do both.

Its special emphasis on building what U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan calls a "latticework of flexible partnerships; institutions, alliances, [and] groups of countries" has already gained considerable traction in Asia.

As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it recently, the United States has developed a "five-four-three-two" formation in Asia ― "from strengthening the Five Eyes to peddling the Quad, from piecing together AUKUS to tightening bilateral military alliances."

Thanks to Putin's war in Ukraine, Europe's prolonged sabbatical from geopolitics has come to an end. It is finally ready to do more for its own defense, including a historic German decision to rearm.

Neither Asia nor Europe can balance China and Russia on their own for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, by doing more for their own security, they help boost U.S. domestic political support for sustained military commitment to the two regions.

By promoting a larger role for its allies, Washington can build durable regional balances of power in Asia and Europe ― backed by U.S. military strength.

The immediate impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on the Korean Peninsula is that it has left the door wide open for North Korea to pursue an even more robust missile testing regime without fear of consequences from the U.N. Security Council.

Chinese and Russian proposals to weaken Security Council imposed sanctions on North Korea since December 2020 had already eroded U.N.-led sanctions for North Korean ballistic missile testing and with the Ukrainian conflict, has now been shattered.

The Moon Jae-in administration has aligned South Korea with the United States and Europe in imposing sanctions on Russia and cooperating with its sanctions measures.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken has expressed satisfaction with South Korea's efforts to hold the line on Russian sanctions.

On March 8, Biden sent a letter of gratitude to President Moon Jae-in for South Korea's leadership and actions supporting Ukraine's sovereignty.

The conflict in Ukraine will put more pressure on South Korea's new president, who assumes office on May 10, in his efforts to deter North Korean missile tests, with little diplomatic means.

The Biden administration should be pleased that the incoming president places alignment with the United States at the center of South Korea's foreign policy priorities and intends to take more of a leadership role as a "global pivotal state."
The more active international role of South Korea's new government will be welcomed, especially at a time when nations are finding it more difficult to contribute to global agendas.

The Russian threats in Ukraine regarding the risks of nuclear escalation and their implication for the Korean Peninsula should be closely watched.

Moreover, Russian efforts to secure control over Ukrainian nuclear power plants and the challenge of how to ensure their safety and security during a military conflict will be important lessons to be learned for South Korea.

After the revelation of the shocking performance of Russia's military forces in Ukraine, I hope that Kim Jong-un will think hard about the real capability of his military forces before doing anything foolish.

Kim Sang-woo (swkim54@hotmail.com), a former lawmaker, is chairman of the East Asia Cultural Project. He is also a member of the board of directors at the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation.


The Korea Times · April 7, 2022


14. Experts voice concerns over Yoon's US-centered foreign policy

Korea conferences in the coming years are going to be interesting as Korean experts who hold these views express their opinions.

And of course we can expect the north Korean Propaganda and Agitation department to weigh on this in a most negative light.

Actually the President-elect's policy should not be described as US centered. He is actually putting the security of the ROK first and working to ensure there is no war on the Korean peninsula. It just so happens that it is best to do that with a ROK/US alliance.


Experts voice concerns over Yoon's US-centered foreign policy
The Korea Times · April 8, 2022
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol enters his office in Tongui-dong, Jongno District, Seoul, Friday. Joint Press Corps

President-elect has yet to decide whether to send delegations to China, Japan
By Nam Hyun-woo

President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol has pursued a foreign policy stance of strengthening South Korea's relations with the United States, sending his delegation only to the U.S. so far, while Yoon himself visited U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys in Pyeongtaek city.

However, such a move is triggering concerns, as China is already expressing its displeasure over the strengthening of Seoul-Washington ties as the basis for South Korea's diplomatic strategy.

According to Yoon's aides, he has yet to decide whether to send delegations to China, Japan, the European Union (EU), or Russia. His predecessors, in contrast, sent diplomatic delegations to key diplomatic partners soon after being elected.

"The delegation for policy coordination to the U.S. will return home this weekend and there is no fixed schedule on sending delegations to other countries such as China, Japan, or the EU," an aide said.

"It is true that the alliance between South Korea and the U.S. has become looser during the Moon Jae-in administration, and President-elect Yoon has been stressing the importance of the alliance throughout his campaign. That is why the delegation was sent to the U.S. first, and the rest will be determined depending on national interests."

President Moon Jae-in, who was inaugurated without a transition period, sent his special envoys to the U.S., China, Japan, Russia and the EU months after he took the office. Moon's predecessor Park Geun-hye sent her delegations to the U.S. and China when she was president-elect, and Park's predecessor Lee Myung-bak also sent his delegations to the U.S., China, Japan and Russia.

Rep. Park Jin, the head of President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol's delegation to the U.S., left, poses with U.S. Rep. Gregory Meeks, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, during their meeting in Washington, Wednesday (local time). Courtesy of presidential transition committeeOn Thursday, President-elect Yoon visited U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys in Pyeongtaek city, Gyeonggi Province, and met with U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Commander Gen. Paul LaCamera.

The event was unprecedented because the president-elect visited the USFK command center before visiting any other South Korean military base. Before Yoon, former President Kim Dae-jung was the only South Korean commander-in-chief who visited a USFK base as a president-elect, but he visited the base after inspecting a South Korean military base in Gyeonggi Province first.

Yoon's spokesperson, Rep. Bae Hyun-jin, said Friday, "The visit was to ensure the strong alliance between the two countries." She added, "You should not find any special meaning about the order of visiting military bases."

But the visit is widely interpreted as Yoon's intention to put the South Korea-U.S. alliance at the forefront of his diplomatic approach.

President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol gestures during his meeting with U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Paul LaCamera at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, Thursday. Courtesy of office of president-elect's spokesperson

However, experts said the move may have been "too conspicuous," given South Korea's diplomatic environment of being intertwined in the U.S.-China rivalry and North Korea's escalating nuclear and missile threats.

"It is obvious fact that the South Korea-U.S. alliance is the main pillar of Seoul's diplomacy, national security and economic policies," said Prof. Kim Heung-kyu, director of the U.S-China Policy Institute at Ajou University. "However, it is uncertain whether the Yoon administration is pursuing policies leaning toward the U.S. after considering the costs of such policies."

The costs Kim is referring to are the possible strains in Seoul-Beijing relations, such as China's economic retaliation or tacit acceptance of North Korea's missile and nuclear capabilities. Seoul has suffered large-scale economic damage after it decided to deploy a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery on South Korean soil. But Yoon has pledged to deploy additional THAAD batteries as a deterrent against Pyongyang.

Regarding Yoon's promise, the Chinese Ambassador to Korea Xing Haiming said Thursday that the THAAD system "should be a taboo" in Seoul-Beijing relations, which was widely interpreted as a disapproval of Yoon's diplomatic approach of siding with the U.S. more visibly.

"It seems that Yoon is engaging with the U.S. without contingency plans for North Korea's nuclear and missile threats and the side effects of joining the U.S. bandwagon," Kim said. "Regarding the Korean delegation to the U.S., Yoon has revealed his hand too quickly and even if he decides to send delegations to China, he needs to be more prudent about the consequences."

Park Won-gon, a North Korea studies professor at Ewha Womans University, also said Yoon's recent moves are too conspicuous and urged the president-elect to find the right balance.

"It seems that Yoon is carrying out what he said during the presidential campaign ― rebuilding the South Korea-U.S. alliance," Park said. "There is no doubt that we should have the alliance as the basis of our diplomacy, but it is also true that we cannot rule out China given the intertwined relationship with North Korea and other neighboring countries."

Park said the Moon administration has faced diplomatic difficulties because it prioritized North Korea relations over all other issues and the incoming Yoon administration may find itself losing other diplomatic advantages as it is focused on improving relations with the U.S.

"The current situation forces South Korea to choose a side between the U.S. and China, but we also have to think about risks associated with uncertainty surrounding the U.S. side," Park said.


The Korea Times · April 8, 2022










V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
Company Name | Website
basicImage