Quotes of the Day:

“Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties.” 

- John Milton

"The most radical revolutionary will become a conservative the day after the revolution." 

- Hannah Arendt

"If asked for a brief explanation, I would say that the existential vacuum derives from the following conditions. Unlike an animal, man is not told by drives and instincts what he must do. And in contrast to man in former times, he is no longer told by traditions and values what he should do. Now, knowing neither what he must do nor what he should do, he sometimes does not even know what he basically wishes to do. Instead, he wishes to do what other people do - which is conformism - or he does what other people wish him to do - which is totalitarianism." 

- Dr. Viktor E. Frankl

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 10, 2023

2. Sweden Is Not Staying Neutral in Russia’s Information War

3. U.S. Reaches Deal With Iran to Free Americans for Jailed Iranians and Funds

4. To Battle New Threats, Spy Agencies to Share More Intelligence With Private Sector

5. 2023 National Intelligence Strategy

6. Biden Seeks Another $24 Billion for Ukraine in Test of Bipartisan Support

7. F-16 training for Ukrainian pilots faces delays and uncertainty

8. Alarm grows as Ukraine’s counteroffensive falters

9. SEAL Team Three Celebrates 40 Years | SOF News

10. Inside a Volunteer Unit Driving Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Forward

11. Land forces now control the sea — and that is vital in the Pacific

12. A Global Law Firm Separates From Its Chinese Partner, Citing Cybersecurity and Data Rules

13. China salutes WWII American general Joe Stilwell in personal push to improve US ties

14. Ukraine and Russia are fighting two different kinds of war

15. China says military company worker exposed as CIA spy

16. Why Ukraine's offensive has stalled

17. How much firepower does Russia have left?

18. What senior officers can learn from junior officers’ ‘fanatical care’

19. The Emerging “Cold Tech War” Between the U.S and China

20. Did Russia Play Everyone For Fools? Wagner Mutiny Was A Staged ‘Special Operation Coordinated With Putin’, Claims High Ranking Ukrainian Politician

21. Lukashenko boots Wagner out of Belarus

22. We need a solution now to unfreeze military confirmations

23. NATO Is on the Back Foot in the Indo-Pacific

24.  A Looming Threat: Weaponized Artificial Intelligence by John Fenzel

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 10, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2023

Key Takeaways:

• The Wagner Group continues to maintain a presence at facilities in Belarus and the status of its rumored withdrawal to Russia remains unclear.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has yet to comment on these speculations either directly or through intermediary sources as he has done previously, suggesting that Prigozhin may not be entirely at liberty to comment on the future of Wagner.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 10.
• A Russian milblogger accused Russian military personnel of fabricating or embellishing claims of Russian forces destroying Ukrainian vehicles in Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted another series of missile and drone strikes in Ukraine overnight on August 9-10.
• The Kremlin is likely attempting to crypto-nationalize Russian internet giant Yandex to strengthen control over the Russian information space in preparation for the 2024 Russian presidential election.
• The possible transfer of Yandex to affiliates of Russian First Deputy Presidential Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko suggests that Putin seeks to reward Kiriyenko for his personal loyalty, particularly following the June 24 Wagner Group rebellion.
• Affiliates of arrested former Federal Security Service (FSB) officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin continue to explicitly attack the Kremlin on August 10.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 10 and made some advances.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 10.
• Russian officials continue to highlight the claimed success of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
• A Ukrainian military official reported that Russian forces are co-opting civilian infrastructure for the repression of local populations in the occupied territories.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 10, 2023

Aug 10, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 10, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 10, 2023, 7:00pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Wagner Group continues to maintain a presence at facilities in Belarus and the status of its rumored withdrawal to Russia remains unclear. Satellite imagery collected on August 9 shows a significant number of vehicles at the Wagner camp in Tsel, Asipovichy, Belarus, and may even indicate that more vehicles have arrived at the base between August 1 and August 9.[1] Ukrainian sources continue to report about expanding Wagner activity in Brest Oblast, and a Wagner-affiliated source posted footage on August 10 showing that Wagner instructors continue to train Belarusian military personnel.[2] The Wagner-affiliated source amplified a denial from an alleged Wagner fighter wherein the fighter stated that the speculations are “fantasies,” although he acknowledged that many Wagner fighters themselves often do not learn about their deployments until the last moment.[3] ISW has not observed counter-indicators that would refute recent speculation from August 8 that Wagner bussed 500 to 600 personnel from Belarus to Krasnodar Krai and Voronezh and Rostov oblasts, however.[4] Russian sources speculated that Wagner forces plan to conduct the second stage of their alleged withdrawal from Belarus on August 13 but that a small group of Wagner instructors would remain in Belarus to train Belarusian forces.[5]

Source: Planet Labs

Source: Planet Labs

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has yet to comment on these speculations either directly or through intermediary sources as he has done previously, suggesting that Prigozhin may not be entirely at liberty to comment on the future of Wagner. Prigozhin was last publicly seen on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa Economic Humanitarian Forum in St. Petersburg on July 27 and most recently commented on Wagner‘s future in an audio recording published on July 30, during which he asserted that Wagner fighters who did not sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) would arrive in Belarus by August 5.[6] ISW previously assessed that the speculation about Wagner’s withdrawal from Belarus suggested that the Kremlin may be reneging on elements of the agreement brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko that brought Wagner’s June 24 rebellion to an end.[7] Kremlin-affiliated sources renewed attacks against Prigozhin in early August, and the speculation itself may be a part of an information operation aimed at degrading Prigozhin’s position with Wagner fighters or at some other objective.[8]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut, Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area), and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[9] Geolocated footage published on August 10 suggests that Ukrainian forces crossed the Mokri Yaly River and advanced eastward into the southwestern outskirts of Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial successes in the direction of Urozhaine and south and southeast of Staromayroske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[11]

A Russian milblogger accused Russian military personnel of fabricating or embellishing claims of Russian forces destroying Ukrainian vehicles in Ukraine. The milblogger claimed on August 7 that the ”Soviet system of military service” encourages Russian servicemen to report false successes on their missions to please their commanders and claimed that commanders and peers actively discourage Russian military personnel from writing honest, but “dull” and negative reports.[12] The milblogger suggested that Russian soldiers have filmed Russian helicopters and artillery firing on the same, previously damaged Western-provided armored fighting vehicle from different angles and on different days and reported them as separate kills at least three times.[13] The milblogger claimed that everyone in the Russian military knows that servicemen do this and that the Russian military leadership has no intention of stopping servicemen from making false or embellished reports.[14] Russian milbloggers have previously accused Russian attack helicopters of striking already destroyed Ukrainian military equipment and suggested that the Russian MoD may be using these repeated hits to inflate Ukrainian losses.[15] The Kremlin has previously used wildly inflated Ukrainian armored vehicle losses to portray Russian defensive operations as extremely effective.[16]

Russian forces conducted another series of missile and drone strikes in Ukraine overnight on August 9-10. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Zaporizhia Oblast officials reported that Russian forces conducted an Iskander missile strike against a residential area in Zaporizhzhia City, injuring 16 civilians.[17] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces targeted Ukraine with 10 Shahed 131 and 136 drones, seven of which Ukrainian forces shot down.[18] Rivne Oblast Regional Administration Head Vitaly Koval reported that a Russian drone struck an oil depot in Dubno Raion, Rivne Oblast.[19]

The Kremlin is likely attempting to crypto-nationalize Russian internet giant Yandex to strengthen control over the Russian information space in preparation for the 2024 Russian presidential election. Yandex has likely been trying to balance between the Kremlin and its foreign governing bodies but now appears to be losing the battle to the Kremlin. The Kremlin appears to be forcing Yandex to sell or distance itself from international subsidiaries, including rideshare service Yango Israel, in order to comply with strict Russian data disclosure laws requiring Yandex to supply all user data – not just data of users in Russia – to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).[20] The Russian government has previously fined Yandex for failing to comply with this law despite Yandex’s statements that it is unable to provide the requested data.[21] The Russian government also previously fined Yandex CEO Artem Savinovsky for Yandex’s failure to comply with Russian censorship laws, possibly trying to compel Yandex into complying with Russian censorship laws not just in Russia but globally to undermine its global operations and userbase.[22] Yandex officials have previously stated that Yandex aims to follow the laws within each country it operates and have rebuked Russian datamining efforts by claiming it only provides user data to governments of users in that specific country.[23] Some Russian insider sources speculated that Yandex corporate development advisor Alexey Kudrin attempted and failed to turn Yandex into a national private company that Putin’s reported personal banker Yuri Kovalchuk would control.[24] Yandex founder and former CEO Arkady Volozh publicly decried the invasion of Ukraine on August 10, and some Russian insider sources speculated that Volozh’s statement was a “white flag” showing that he had accepted that the Kremlin would likely go forward with its speculated formal nationalization effort.[25] Reuters reported that its sources within Yandex fear a “brain drain” if the Kremlin nationalizes Yandex, as many Yandex employees left Russia following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[26] The Kremlin is likely aware of this concern as investors affiliated with Kremlin officials rather than Russian government entities have recently made bids to purchase Yandex.[27]

The possible transfer of Yandex to affiliates of Russian First Deputy Presidential Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko suggests that Putin seeks to reward Kiriyenko for his personal loyalty, particularly following the June 24 Wagner Group rebellion. Russian opposition outlet Meduza previously suggested that Kovalchuk, Kudrin, and Kiriyenko collaborated to propose a deal for investors to purchase Yandex on behalf of Kovalchuk.[28] Kiriyenko and Kovalchuk previously backed Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin; while their current connection to Prigozhin is unclear, Kiriyenko has continued to publicly posture himself as a firm Putin loyalist following the June 24 rebellion.[29] Putin may be rewarding Kiriyenko to further secure Kiriyenko’s loyalty headed into the 2024 presidential elections, particularly as Kiriyenko has served as the Kremlin’s point person for affairs and elections in occupied Ukraine.[30]

Affiliates of arrested former Federal Security Service (FSB) officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin continue to explicitly attack the Kremlin on August 10. “Civic Solidarity” movement leader and Angry Patriots Club member Georgiy Fedorov, amplified by Girkin’s Angry Patriots’ Club, proposed a platform of radical social and economic policy reforms aimed at decreasing economic inequality and the power of the elite in Russia.[31] The proposed policy changes include reduced funding for the entire state apparatus “starting with the President,” the implementation of fair, competitive elections at all levels, and the formation of a “truly independent judiciary.”[32] Fedorov notably called for the resignation of the current Russian government and the formation of a new coalition government in its place.[33] Fedorov claimed that these reforms will lead to “democratic socialism” in Russia and will remove oligarchs and the “influence of money on politics.”[34]

Key Takeaways:

• The Wagner Group continues to maintain a presence at facilities in Belarus and the status of its rumored withdrawal to Russia remains unclear.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has yet to comment on these speculations either directly or through intermediary sources as he has done previously, suggesting that Prigozhin may not be entirely at liberty to comment on the future of Wagner.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 10.
• A Russian milblogger accused Russian military personnel of fabricating or embellishing claims of Russian forces destroying Ukrainian vehicles in Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted another series of missile and drone strikes in Ukraine overnight on August 9-10.
• The Kremlin is likely attempting to crypto-nationalize Russian internet giant Yandex to strengthen control over the Russian information space in preparation for the 2024 Russian presidential election.
• The possible transfer of Yandex to affiliates of Russian First Deputy Presidential Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko suggests that Putin seeks to reward Kiriyenko for his personal loyalty, particularly following the June 24 Wagner Group rebellion.
• Affiliates of arrested former Federal Security Service (FSB) officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin continue to explicitly attack the Kremlin on August 10.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 10 and made some advances.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 10.
• Russian officials continue to highlight the claimed success of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
• A Ukrainian military official reported that Russian forces are co-opting civilian infrastructure for the repression of local populations in the occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and reportedly advanced on August 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks north of Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and near Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[35] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces are trying to seize the initiative in the Kupyansk direction and that Ukrainian forces have significantly strengthened defenses in the area in recent days.[36] The Russian MoD claimed that assault detachments of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces improved their tactical situation along the front line during offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction.[37] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Sergey Zybinsky claimed that Russian elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) captured five Ukrainian strongholds near Vilshana (14km northeast of Kupyansk).[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the initiative in the Kupyansk direction and are conducting offensive operations near Synkivka, Vilshana, and Lyman Pershi (11km northeast of Kupyansk).[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to positions 7km away from Kupyansk in the Synkivka area and are also advancing in the direction of Kamianka (33km northeast of Kupyansk) and Dvorichna (16km northeast of Kupyansk).[40] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces withdrew from unspecified positions in the Synkivka area and that Russian forces are advancing after Ukrainian forces retreated towards Kupyansk.[41] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced towards Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk) between August 8 and 9 and that they hold positions within 4km of the R-79 (Kupyansk to Dvorichna) highway.[42] The milblogger speculated that Russian forces are attempting to capture positions along the Synkivka-Petropavlivka-Kucherivka line (up to 7km east of Kupyansk) and plan to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) along the R-79 highway to threaten Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk.[43] ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of Russian forces making these recent advances in the Kupyansk direction and currently assesses that the closest Russian positions to Kupyansk are roughly 10km northeast of the settlement.

Ukrainian officials announced mandatory evacuations for civilians in 53 settlements in Kupyansk Raion, Kharkiv Oblast on August 9 due to intensified Russian shelling and aviation strikes against settlements near the frontline.[44] Russian forces hold positions northeast of Kupyansk well within artillery range, and the intensification of Russian offensive operations in the area significantly increases the risk to civilians in Kupyansk and surrounding settlements. The evacuations in Kupyansk Raion do not necessarily indicate that Ukrainian forces expect Russian forces to make significant advances in the area, however.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks northeast of Kupyansk on August 10. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Synkivka and the Mankivka tract (around 15km east of Kupyansk).[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on August 10 and advanced south of Kreminna. Geolocated footage published on August 9 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Kreminna.[46] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces broke through Ukrainian first lines of defense near Kreminna, but did not specify the nature or location of the breakthrough.[47] A Russian milblogger amplified footage on August 8 purporting to show Russian forces breaking through Ukrainian defensive lines in the Serebryanske forest area south of Kreminna.[48] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 2km into Ukrainian defenses and captured an unspecified number of Ukrainian strongholds and tactically significant heights, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Nadiya (15km west of Svatove) and south of Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove).[50]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Novoselivkse, Luhansk Oblast, and Terny (16km northwest of Kreminna) and Bilohorivka (33km south of Kreminna) in Donetsk Oblast.[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and made no confirmed or claimed advances on August 10. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks south of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) and that the intensity of combat remains high in these areas.[52] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks near Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) on August 9.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and reportedly made marginal advances on August 10. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted counterattacks against Ukrainian forces near Klishchiivka and Andriivka and pushed Ukrainian forces from unspecified positions near Klishchiivka.[54] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions northeast of Druzhba (18km southwest of Bakhmut), on the outskirts of Klishchiivka, and near Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut.[55]

Russian forces continued attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on August 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Avdiivka, Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka), Pobieda (5km southwest of Donetsk City), Marinka (just southwest of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (10km south of Marinka).[56] Russian sources also reported Russian ground attacks in these areas.[57]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and did not advance on August 10. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Novomykhailivka.[58]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and advanced on August 10. Geolocated footage published on August 10 suggests that Ukrainian forces crossed the Mokri Yaly River and advanced eastward into the southwestern outskirts of Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[59] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Berdyansk direction and achieved partial success south and southeast of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and in the direction of Urozhaine.[60] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Urozhaine and tried to gain a foothold near the settlement on August 9.[61] The Russian “Vostok” Battalion, which is defending the area, claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced closer to Urozhaine on the evening of August 9.[62] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacking Russian forces on the outskirts of Urozhaine on the morning of August 10, and other Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Russian forces repelled the Ukrainian attacks.[63] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) on August 10.[64]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and did not advance on August 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain lost positions near Staromayorske.[65]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 10 and reportedly advanced. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the direction of Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast).[66] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces advanced into Russian defenses near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and Novopokrovka (16km southeast of Orikhiv).[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne on the night of August 9, and another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Robotyne on August 10.[68] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the direction of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) on August 10.[69] A Russian media aggregator claimed on August 9 that positional battle continued near Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv) and Robotyne, and a Russian milblogger claimed on August 10 that Ukrainian forces attempted to conduct limited ground attacks near Pyatykhatky and Zherebyanky (26km southwest of Orikhiv).[70]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not advance on August 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations south of Novodanylivka (6km south of Orikhiv).[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked east of Robotyne on August 9.[72] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that elements of the Chechen “Vostok-Akhmat” battalion are fighting near Robotyne.[73]

Russian sources continued to discuss the recent Ukrainian incursion near Kozachi Laheri in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian thermobaric artillery units struck near Kozachi Laheri on August 9 and speculated that this suggested that some Ukrainian forces are still on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[74] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces did not attempt to cross the Dnipro River on August 10.[75]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted unsuccessful drone strikes on occupied Crimea. Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Russian forces downed 11 to 12 Ukrainian drones near Sevastopol, Cape Tarkhankut (115km northwest of Sevastopol), Yevpatoria (67km north of Sevastopol), and Saky (59km north of Sevastopol).[76] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian drones targeted the Novofedorivka airfield near Saky.[77]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials continue to highlight the claimed success of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). First Deputy General Director of the Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec Vladimir Artyakov claimed on August 10 that Rostec’s production of armored vehicles has quadrupled since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and that Rostec’s shipments are often ahead of schedule.[78] Artyakov claimed that Rostec is producing 20 times the amount of artillery and MLRS ammunition in 2023 compared to 2021. Artyakov claimed that Rostec is constantly refining its armored vehicle designs based on how the vehicles perform in combat in Ukraine.[79]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

A Ukrainian military official reported that Russian forces are co-opting civilian infrastructure for the repression of local populations in occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on August 10 that Russian forces recently converted a Ukrainian food production facility into a prison in Pervomaivka, occupied Kherson Oblast.[80] Malyar reported that armed Russian military personnel confiscated non-residential buildings from local Ukrainian business owners to use as detention centers in Tokmak, occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Malyar also reported that Russian forces are using a student dormitory room to interrogate and torture local Ukrainian citizens in Vasylivka, occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[81]

Russian occupation officials highlighted the expansion of patronage networks tied to Henichesk Raion in occupied Kherson Oblast, likely to project stability following the Ukrainian missile strikes on the Chonhar and Henichesk bridges on August 6. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on August 10 that he met with Russian Energy Minister Nikolai Shulginov to discuss problems with Kherson Oblast’s energy facilities following the Ukrainian strikes on the Henichesk bridge and future energy-related infrastructure projects in occupied Kherson Oblast.[82] Saldo stated that the Russian federal government has assumed ownership of 260 energy facilities in Kherson Oblast and that large Russian energy companies have already begun work at these facilities.[83] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported that Kherson Oblast occupation minister of industry and trade Ivan Safronov met with representatives of the Russian trading network, who agreed to open two new stores in Henichesk.[84] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported on August 9 that officials from Krasnodar Krai are renovating a public facility in Henichesk.[85]

Russian and Ukrainian officials continue to report the forced movement of Ukrainian children to Russia and Russian-held territory. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration head Yevgeny Balitsky stated on August 10 that the Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration sent 15 Ukrainian children from a Melitopol school to Moscow for a children’s cultural forum.[86] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported that Ryazan Oblast sponsored and organized the movement of 39 Ukrainian children from Kherson Oblast to a 21-day long camp in Yevpatoria in occupied Crimea.[87]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

See topline text.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Sweden Is Not Staying Neutral in Russia’s Information War

Could we learn from Sweden?

As I have written many times, we must recognize the enemy strategy, understand it, EXPOSE it, and then attack it with a superior political warfare and information strategy.

Excerpts:

The Psychological Defense Agency could become a model for how democratic governments can fight back against similar disinformation.

...

It turned to the Psychological Defense Agency, a part of the Ministry of Defense that its government created last year. The agency has become the first line of defense for a country facing a sustained information attack from abroad.

The country’s leaders are borrowing from an old Cold War strategy to steel the country’s 10 million people for the possibility of “total war” with the Soviet Union. Today’s main threat — though not the only one — is the Soviet Union’s successor state, Russia. According to the agency’s officials, the Kremlin has targeted Sweden with a concerted online campaign on social media and elsewhere to discredit the country and undermine its bid to join the NATO alliance.

After working quietly behind the scenes, the agency has now explicitly accused Russia of exploiting recent protests by immigrants and others in Sweden that have included burning copies of the Quran, an act of desecration that is deeply offensive to Muslims. The outrage has already had an impact: delaying Sweden’s accession to NATO because of objections by another member, Turkey.

“They were on a level that we’d never seen before,” Mikael Tofvesson, the agency’s director of operations, said in an interview, referring specifically to Russian efforts to amplify global reaction online to a protest outside Stockholm’s largest mosque on June 28.

...

The Psychological Defense Agency also raised political concerns when it was proposed, but its leaders have emphasized that mandate allows it to address only foreign sources of disinformation, not content generated in Sweden.

Sweden Is Not Staying Neutral in Russia’s Information War

By Steven Lee Myers

Steven Lee Myers, who covers disinformation, reported from Stockholm.

Aug. 10, 2023

Updated 12:37 p.m. ET

The New York Times · by Steven Lee Myers · August 10, 2023

The country has empowered a government agency to openly combat online disinformation coming from foreign adversaries, and especially the Kremlin.

Sergels Torg public square in Stockholm. Russia has targeted Sweden with a concerted online campaign to discredit the country and undermine its bid to join NATO.Credit...Felix Odell for The New York Times

By

Steven Lee Myers, who covers disinformation, reported from Stockholm.

Aug. 10, 2023, 12:00 p.m. ET

Facing a tsunami of disinformation about the treatment of Muslims that has in recent months fueled protests from Stockholm to Baghdad, Sweden decided it needed to fight back.

It turned to the Psychological Defense Agency, a part of the Ministry of Defense that its government created last year. The agency has become the first line of defense for a country facing a sustained information attack from abroad.

The country’s leaders are borrowing from an old Cold War strategy to steel the country’s 10 million people for the possibility of “total war” with the Soviet Union. Today’s main threat — though not the only one — is the Soviet Union’s successor state, Russia. According to the agency’s officials, the Kremlin has targeted Sweden with a concerted online campaign on social media and elsewhere to discredit the country and undermine its bid to join the NATO alliance.

After working quietly behind the scenes, the agency has now explicitly accused Russia of exploiting recent protests by immigrants and others in Sweden that have included burning copies of the Quran, an act of desecration that is deeply offensive to Muslims. The outrage has already had an impact: delaying Sweden’s accession to NATO because of objections by another member, Turkey.

“They were on a level that we’d never seen before,” Mikael Tofvesson, the agency’s director of operations, said in an interview, referring specifically to Russian efforts to amplify global reaction online to a protest outside Stockholm’s largest mosque on June 28.

The Psychological Defense Agency could become a model for how democratic governments can fight back against similar disinformation campaigns.Credit...Felix Odell for The New York Times

The Psychological Defense Agency borrows from an old Cold War strategy to steel the country’s 10 million people for the possibility of “total war” with the Soviet Union.Credit...Felix Odell for The New York Times

Other countries have scrambled in recent years to counter foreign influence operations, including France, which has created a similar agency, but Sweden is now on the front lines of a fight over the country’s security, its social cohesion and even its democratic foundations. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — and Sweden’s subsequent decision to seek NATO membership — have put the country in the Russian cross hairs.

The work of the Psychological Defense Agency could become a model for how democratic governments can fight back — or a symbol of how ineffective they are against determined authoritarian adversaries.

Sweden’s prime minister, Ulf Kristersson, who has led a coalition government since elections last fall, said that “states and statelike actors” were “actively exploiting” the protests in Sweden. In a statement with Denmark’s leader late last month, he said that Sweden faced “the most serious security situation since the Second World War.”

Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson of Sweden. After the recent Quran burnings, the government is considering increasing internal security and border controls, without restricting freedom of expression.Credit...Caisa Rasmussen/EPA, via Shutterstock

In Sweden, as elsewhere, the question of what to do in the face of an information onslaught has become increasingly fraught, pitting traditions of tolerance for free speech against the dangers that malicious information online poses.

In the United States, the debate has become increasingly partisan, with Republicans accusing the federal government of stifling critics at home. Last year, an effort to create a disinformation advisory board at the Department of Homeland Security was scuttled amid fierce opposition.

The Psychological Defense Agency also raised political concerns when it was proposed, but its leaders have emphasized that mandate allows it to address only foreign sources of disinformation, not content generated in Sweden.

The challenge is one facing all democracies that, as a matter of principle, decline to enforce official ideologies, allowing divergent points of view of what is true or false.

“The government can’t control the truth if it’s going to be a democracy,” said Hanna Linderstål, the founder of Earhart Business Protection Agency, a cybersecurity firm in Stockholm, and an adviser to the International Telecommunication Union, part of the United Nations.

“The government can’t control the truth if it’s going to be a democracy,” said Hanna Linderstål, the senior cybersecurity adviser of Earhart Business Protection Agency.Credit...Felix Odell for The New York Times

The Psychological Defense Agency began operations in January 2022, but some of its functions previously fell to a civilian department in the Civil Contingencies Agency. Its roots extend further back, to 1953, when Sweden, though neutral, feared Soviet domination in the ideological struggle between the West and Communism.

The decision to revive the country’s capacity to combat information war came after Russia’s seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, beginning a military intervention that has been characterized by waves of disinformation. Officials in Sweden, as elsewhere, have expressed concern that the propaganda has succeeded in sowing confusion and doubt among European electorates, undermining government policies to counter Russia’s aggression.

“When it comes to information war,” said Pär Norén, a senior analyst who conducts training sessions for the agency, “it is the brain that is the battle space.”

From the agency’s inception, Sweden faced intensive disinformation campaigns. They began in late 2021 with posts on Twitter, YouTube and other social media platforms expressing anger over the plight of an Iraqi immigrant in Sweden whose children were removed from his custody by the country’s child protection services.

The accusations metastasized into false accusations that Sweden was kidnapping Muslim children and forcing them to eat pork or otherwise violate Islamic traditions, which spread online in Arabic-speaking countries, including Egypt, Morocco and Lebanon, as well as Turkey.

The immigrant was not, in fact, Muslim, but Mandaean Sabian, an adherent of an ancient monotheistic faith in southern Iraq that reveres John the Baptist, among other prophets.

Protesters burn Sweden’s flag during a demonstration in Karachi, Pakistan, in July, as they protest against the burning of the Quran outside a Stockholm mosque.

The accusations have persisted online, including on a YouTube channel with nearly one million subscribers that first circulated them. One of Russia’s state television networks followed this year with a similar report involving an ethnically Russian immigrant family from Latvia, saying Sweden would not allow the children to speak Russian, which is not true.

The controversies over social services gave prominence to a new political party, Nyans, or Nuance, that has built support among the country’s immigrant voters. The party’s leader, Mikail Yüksel, acknowledged that the accusations of state kidnappings were false but nevertheless criticized the government for its policies.

“Sweden is an anti-Islamist country,” Mr. Yüksel, who emigrated from Turkey, said. “This is not disinformation. This is the truth.”

The government was slow to respond to the accusations about social services, but the new government under Mr. Kristersson announced a series of measures this year in response, including bringing on more staff members at the Psychological Defense Agency, which now has 55 employees.

The agency’s headquarters is in Karlstad and it has an office in Solna, a suburb of Stockholm. There, it occupies an inconspicuous yellow building on the campus of the Karolinska University Hospital, which has opened its doors for refugees and casualties from the war in Ukraine.

“What we see now is a full-blown, full-scale war in Europe,” said the agency’s director general, Magnus Hjort, a former historian who wrote a report proposing the reconstitution of a department devoted to psychological defense. “And Sweden is not neutral.”

According to the agency, Russian state media and online accounts have also amplified a series of protests that have featured the burnings of the Quran over the past two years — in Russian and in Arabic across the Middle East. Some of the sources, it found, were the same ones circulating false reports about kidnapping Muslim children. Other researchers have suggested that Russians were involved in helping to instigate the protests.

One of the first protests involved Rasmus Paludan, a far-right politician in Denmark who also has Swedish citizenship, who burned a copy of the Quran in Jönköping in 2002. He did it again in January in front of the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm, prompting outrage in Turkey that has helped stall approval of Sweden’s application to join NATO.

The cost of the permit for Mr. Paludan’s protest in January — 320 krona, or about $30 — was paid for by a Swedish journalist who had previously worked for Russian media, Chang Johannes Frick. Mr. Paludan, however, denied any association with Russia, saying in an email that he opposed Russia’s invasion and that he had staged the protest to draw attention to Turkey’s position.

“I wanted to send a signal to Erdogan that he should not interfere with freedom of expression in Sweden,” he wrote, referring to Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Another protester, Salwan Momika, has held a series of small demonstrations desecrating the Quran, twice setting off demonstrations in Iraq that resulted in attacks on Sweden’s embassy in the capital, Baghdad. Mr. Momika, an Iraqi Christian who immigrated in 2017, initially agreed by email to answer questions about his motivations, but he did not respond when asked about his connections to Russia.

Mr. Hjort and other agency officials declined to detail the evidence of Russia’s involvement, and so far the agency has produced few public reports about foreign disinformation campaigns. Much of its work involves advising other government agencies behind the scenes to raise awareness of the threat of foreign interference. That included training sessions for municipal departments handling child welfare cases among immigrants. It did conduct a public service campaign — in Swedish, Arabic and English — ahead of last fall’s elections that used humorous posters to warn of the falsehoods lurking online.

Mr. Hjort said that the agency was regularly in touch with the social media platforms but that it did not ask for the removal of accounts. Only once has it publicly called out a source of disinformation — Shoun Islamiya, the YouTube channel in Egypt that brought international attention to the false accusation of kidnapping children — but it remains online.

“The best way to protect a society against disinformation, if you live in a democratic society, is to increase awareness about the threats and your own vulnerabilities among the population, so they make the right decision,” said Mr. Tofvesson, the director of operations. “And that is the Swedish way.”

Steven Lee Myers covers misinformation for The Times. He has worked in Washington, Moscow, Baghdad and Beijing, where he contributed to the articles that won the Pulitzer Prize for public service in 2021. He is also the author of “The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin.” More about Steven Lee Myers

The New York Times · by Steven Lee Myers · August 10, 2023

3.U.S. Reaches Deal With Iran to Free Americans for Jailed Iranians and Funds

In response to my excerpts below a friends provided these comments:

Dave:

Given that money is fungible, $6 billion that is released from frozen funds is $6 billion in resources now available to the Iranian regime.

It is also clearly money that the USG has had the ability to control said money, wherever it is located. (One of the benefits of having a truly global banking system.) Otherwise, why wouldn't the Iranians have had access to it before?

Notably, some of that money had been held up as US lawsuits have proceeded against the Iranian regime for such actions as taking American diplomats hostage and other actions against American citizens. The idea was that, until those trials and other legal mechanisms were resolved, we'd want to have money that any penalties and awards could be charged against held in a way that the Iranians couldn't just say, "Well, too bad. Come and get it from us." In some ways, it's sort of like escrow (with less trust).

So, there's a difference between handing over pallets of cash (which we've also done) and releasing frozen funds, but for a family that might get blown up or an Iranian woman being stoned or a company being hacked, I'm not sure how much of a difference there'd be?

Excerpts:

The United States will also unfreeze nearly $6 billion of Iran’s assets in South Korea, putting the funds into an account in the central bank of Qatar, according to the people familiar with the deal. The account will be controlled by the government of Qatar and regulated so Iran can gain access to the money only to pay vendors for humanitarian purchases such as medicine and food, they said.

...

A key part of the agreement has been the Biden administration’s willingness to unfreeze $6 billion of Iran’s oil revenue held in South Korea.

The release of the Iranian funds is likely to be contentious in the United States. Republicans have repeatedly condemned the idea of allowing Iran to have direct access to its frozen financial assets, which could end up in the hands of its elite military force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, and be used to fund and arm militants across the Middle East.

In 2016, President Barack Obama settled a dispute with Tehran over a $400 million arms deal as part of an agreement to release four American citizens detained in Iran. Republicans assailed the conclusion of negotiations to limit the country’s nuclear ambitions as well as the settlement, calling it a ransom payment — an accusation Mr. Obama denied.

U.S. Reaches Deal With Iran to Free Americans for Jailed Iranians and Funds

By Farnaz Fassihi and Michael D. Shear

Reporting from New York and Washington

Aug. 10, 2023

Updated 2:49 p.m. ET

The New York Times · by Michael D. Shear · August 10, 2023

Five American detainees will eventually be allowed to leave Iran in exchange for Tehran gaining access to $6 billion for humanitarian purposes and the United States freeing several jailed Iranians.

President Biden has made bringing home detained Americans a priority.Credit...Desiree Rios for The New York Times

By Farnaz Fassihi and

Reporting from New York and Washington

Aug. 10, 2023, 12:25 p.m. ET

The United States and Iran have reached an agreement to win the freedom of five imprisoned Americans in exchange for several jailed Iranians and the unfreezing of about $6 billion in Iranian oil revenue, according to several people familiar with the deal.

As a first step in the agreement, which comes after more than two years of quiet negotiations, Iran has released into house arrest five Iranian American dual citizens, according to the lawyer for one of the prisoners.

The prisoners are Siamak Namazi, Emad Sharghi and Morad Tahbaz, who had all been imprisoned on unsubstantiated charges of spying, as well as two others whose families withheld their names. One of the unnamed Americans is a scientist, and the other is a businessman, according to two people briefed on the arrangements of the release.

The three named prisoners and one other person were transferred on Thursday from Evin Prison, one of the most notorious detention centers in Iran, to a hotel in Tehran, the capital, where they will be held for several weeks until they are allowed to board an airplane, said Jared Genser, the lawyer for Mr. Namazi. One other prisoner, an American woman, had been released into house arrest earlier, according to several people familiar with the arrangements.

“I hope that this means that Siamak Namazi and the other prisoners’ nightmare will finally come to an end, but I won’t be celebrating until the plane takes off from Tehran,” Mr. Genser said. “All I can say is that I am more optimistic now than I’ve ever been.”

Biden administration officials declined to comment or to confirm details about what Iran will get in return. But the people familiar with the agreement said that when the Americans are allowed to return to the United States, the Biden administration will release a handful of Iranian nationals serving prison sentences for violating sanctions on Iran.

The United States will also unfreeze nearly $6 billion of Iran’s assets in South Korea, putting the funds into an account in the central bank of Qatar, according to the people familiar with the deal. The account will be controlled by the government of Qatar and regulated so Iran can gain access to the money only to pay vendors for humanitarian purchases such as medicine and food, they said.

The deal with Iran — a bitter adversary of the United States — is the latest in a series of high-profile prisoner swaps engineered in secret by the Biden administration in an effort to bring home Americans whom the State Department deems wrongfully detained in foreign countries.

Mr. Namazi, 51, was given a 10-year sentence and has been held in Evin Prison since 2015 on charges of “collaborating with a hostile state.” Mr. Sharghi, a businessman, was sentenced in 2020 to 10 years in prison on charges of spying. Mr. Tahbaz, a conservationist who was arrested in 2018, was sentenced to 10 years on charges of having “contacts with the U.S. government.”

All have denied the charges, and the United States has said the three were wrongfully detained.

The prisoner exchange deal was nearly completed in March but stalled when Iran detained one of the unnamed U.S. dual citizens, according to two Iranians close to the government who were familiar with the agreement. The United States demanded that the prisoner also be included, but Iran initially refused, the two Iranians said.

A fifth U.S. dual citizen was also released from custody, according to the people familiar with the negotiations, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the final deal.

John F. Kirby, a spokesman for the National Security Council, said in May that “there are wrongfully detained Americans elsewhere around the world, and we’re working on that very, very hard.”

People familiar with the negotiations between the United States and Iran, which were mediated by Oman, Qatar and Switzerland, said the final deal took shape in recent months and that all sides had been working on the logistics for weeks.

Evin Prison in Tehran. After the American detainees are transferred from Evin Prison to a remote hotel, they will remain under house arrest until they board a plane to Qatar.Credit...Wana News Agency, via Reuters

Unlike previous prison swap deals when detainees immediately boarded a plane out of Iran, this exchange will take place in a series of coordinated steps, according to Ali Vaez, the Iran director for the International Crisis Group, a conflict prevention organization, who is familiar with the terms of the deal.

The Americans will be allowed to leave Iran once the money arrives in the Qatari bank account, a process expected to take four to six weeks because of the complexity of licensing and sanctions exemptions paperwork required for moving a large sum belonging to Iran, Mr. Vaez said. The detainees are expected to be taken to Doha, the Qatari capital, on a government airplane provided by the country because of the central role it has played in brokering the deal, he said.

The Iranians detained in the United States can also leave for Doha for the exchange. But it is unclear whether they would want to because many live in the United States with their families and do not intend to return to Iran, Mr. Vaez said.

A key part of the agreement has been the Biden administration’s willingness to unfreeze $6 billion of Iran’s oil revenue held in South Korea.

The release of the Iranian funds is likely to be contentious in the United States. Republicans have repeatedly condemned the idea of allowing Iran to have direct access to its frozen financial assets, which could end up in the hands of its elite military force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, and be used to fund and arm militants across the Middle East.

In 2016, President Barack Obama settled a dispute with Tehran over a $400 million arms deal as part of an agreement to release four American citizens detained in Iran. Republicans assailed the conclusion of negotiations to limit the country’s nuclear ambitions as well as the settlement, calling it a ransom payment — an accusation Mr. Obama denied.

The people familiar with the new arrangement said the transfer of funds to allow Iran access for humanitarian purposes is not unprecedented.

Iran has opened similar accounts in more than a half-dozen other countries to accept payments for oil purchases from those governments despite U.S. sanctions that blocked the country from gaining access to the money for most purposes. Over the years, Iran has managed to spend funds held in India, Turkey and elsewhere as a result of exceptions to the sanctions for humanitarian needs.

Mr. Vaez said the Treasury Department had spent many months ensuring that the funds could be used only for humanitarian purposes.

“All Iran can do under this deal is submit orders to a bank in Doha for food and medicine and a limited number of medical equipment that do not have dual military use,” Mr. Vaez said. “The bank in Doha would pay for the goods, and Qatari companies would deliver them to Iran. Iran has no direct access to the funds at all.”

“The Biden administration has a strong argument,” Mr. Vaez added. “If you are against this deal, you are against Americans coming back home and you are against Iranian people having access to food and medicine.”

People familiar with the discussions said Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, and Brett H. McGurk, the coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa at the White House, met with officials in Oman in early May to discuss a prisoner swap with Iran.

The breakthrough comes as Washington and Tehran remain unable — despite extensive efforts — to reach an agreement to address tensions around Iran’s advancing nuclear program and heavy U.S. sanctions. More than a year of talks to restore the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which President Donald J. Trump unilaterally abandoned in 2018, collapsed last summer.

While in Oman, Mr. McGurk led indirect talks with Iranian officials, with a goal of reaching an informal agreement under which Iran would cap its enrichment of uranium material to a level below what was needed to fashion a nuclear weapon and to limit its military aid to Russia, among other objectives. In return, the United States would agree not to tighten sanctions or pursue certain other punitive measures against Iran in international forums.

U.S. officials have long insisted that their diplomacy to free imprisoned Americans is not directly connected to talks related to Iran’s nuclear program. Analysts say additional progress by Iran toward a nuclear weapon could prompt military action by Israel, the United States or both countries. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes and denies it is pursuing a bomb.

In late May, the sultan of Oman went to Iran to meet with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country’s supreme leader. They discussed a swap, according to people familiar with the discussions.

Mr. Biden has made bringing home detainees a priority during his first years in office. In March, the United States secured the release of Paul Rusesabagina, a human rights activist detained in Rwanda. In December, Russia agreed to release Brittney Griner, an American basketball star, in exchange for Viktor Bout, a convicted Russian arms dealer known as the Merchant of Death.

But others remain in detention. In March, Russia accused the Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich of espionage and detained him. Mr. Biden has said his administration is working on the release of Mr. Gershkovich.

The Biden administration’s recent Iran diplomacy has been complicated by the absence of its Iran envoy, Robert Malley, who was placed on unpaid leave in late June amid a review of his security clearance. The State Department has not explained the reason for the review.

Michael Crowley contributed reporting from Washington.

Farnaz Fassihi is a reporter for The New York Times based in New York. Previously she was a senior writer and war correspondent for the Wall Street Journal for 17 years based in the Middle East. More about Farnaz Fassihi

Michael D. Shear is a veteran White House correspondent and two-time Pulitzer Prize winner who was a member of the team that won the Public Service Medal for Covid coverage in 2020. He is the co-author of “Border Wars: Inside Trump's Assault on Immigration.” More about Michael D. Shear

The New York Times · by Michael D. Shear · August 10, 2023

4. To Battle New Threats, Spy Agencies to Share More Intelligence With Private Sector

Excerpts:

Haines said that the intelligence community has strengthened its focus on global health. Her office, she said, now has a senior official whose responsibilities include coordinating intelligence work on global health issues, has invested more resources and has strengthened outreach to organizations such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

But the government, she said, also needs to rely on outside experts. Haines’ office brought in scientists and other specialists outside the government to help investigate the origins of the Covid pandemic and the health incidents affecting U.S. personnel abroad known as Havana Syndrome.

Such exchanges can be tricky. Many academics don’t want to be associated publicly with the intelligence community, said Haines, who has resisted efforts by Republican lawmakers to disclose the names of those consulted on the Covid question.

The emphasis on greater intelligence sharing is part of a broader trend toward declassification that the Biden administration has pursued. The United States has released unprecedented levels of formerly secret intelligence to warn of Russia’s plans in Ukraine and its quest for weapons from China, Iran and North Korea. 

To Battle New Threats, Spy Agencies to Share More Intelligence With Private Sector

Pandemics, cyberattacks and supply-chain disruptions are pushing government to work more with outside groups

https://www.wsj.com/articles/to-battle-new-threats-spy-agencies-to-share-more-intelligence-with-private-sector-db25e36

By Warren P. Strobel

Follow

Aug. 10, 2023 9:00 am ET

WASHINGTON—U.S. spy agencies will share more intelligence with U.S. companies, nongovernmental organizations and academia under a new strategy released this week that acknowledges concerns over new threats, such as another pandemic and increasing cyberattacks.

The National Intelligence Strategy, which sets broad goals for the sprawling U.S. intelligence community, says that spy agencies must reach beyond the traditional walls of secrecy and partner with outside groups to detect and deter supply-chain disruptions, infectious diseases and other growing transnational threats.

The intelligence community “must rethink its approach to exchanging information and insights,” the strategy says.

The U.S. government in recent years has begun sharing vast amounts of cyber-threat intelligence with U.S. companies, utilities and others who are often the main targets of foreign hackers, as well as information on foreign-influence operations with social-media companies.

The last National Intelligence Strategy was released in 2019 under the Trump administration, before the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

“There’s so much that’s changed in the threat landscape, and in the world that we’re operating in today,” Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said in an interview. 

She sketched out a broader, more institutionalized information exchange on a wider array of topics with the private sector, ranging from academia to local governments.

Illustrating the changing threats, a senior U.S. official said that the daily intelligence briefing prepared for President Biden and his top advisers—once dominated by terrorism and the Middle East—now regularly covers topics as varied as China’s artificial-intelligence work, the geopolitical impacts of climate change, and semiconductor chips. 

The new strategy is meant to guide 18 U.S. intelligence agencies with an annual budget of about $90 billion whose work Haines coordinates. 

The 16-page document, which contains no budget or program details, also says spy agencies must support the U.S. in its competition with authoritarian governments such as China and Russia, particularly in technological arenas.

On transnational threats such as financial crises, narcotics trafficking, supply-chain disruption and infectious diseases, the document calls on intelligence agencies to strengthen their internal capabilities to warn U.S. policymakers of looming threats.

A report last year by the House Intelligence Committee, at the time led by Democratic Rep. Adam Schiff, concluded that three years after the Covid-19 pandemic began, U.S. intelligence agencies still hadn’t made the changes needed to provide better warnings of future global health crises.

Haines said that the intelligence community has strengthened its focus on global health. Her office, she said, now has a senior official whose responsibilities include coordinating intelligence work on global health issues, has invested more resources and has strengthened outreach to organizations such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

But the government, she said, also needs to rely on outside experts. Haines’ office brought in scientists and other specialists outside the government to help investigate the origins of the Covid pandemic and the health incidents affecting U.S. personnel abroad known as Havana Syndrome.

Such exchanges can be tricky. Many academics don’t want to be associated publicly with the intelligence community, said Haines, who has resisted efforts by Republican lawmakers to disclose the names of those consulted on the Covid question.

The emphasis on greater intelligence sharing is part of a broader trend toward declassification that the Biden administration has pursued. The United States has released unprecedented levels of formerly secret intelligence to warn of Russia’s plans in Ukraine and its quest for weapons from China, Iran and North Korea. 

Write to Warren P. Strobel at Warren.Strobel@wsj.com

5. 2023 National Intelligence Strategy

The 20 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/National_Intelligence_Strategy_2023.pdf

2023 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY

https://www.odni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2023/item/2402-2023-national-intelligence-strategy?utm

• Print

The 2023 National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) provides the Intelligence Community (IC) with strategic direction from the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) for the next four years. The NIS is a foundational document for the IC and reflects the input of leaders from each of the 18 intelligence elements, as it guides the operations, investments, and priorities of the collective.

It supports the national security priorities outlined in the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy as well as other national strategies.

View the 2023 National Intelligence Strategy here.

6. Biden Seeks Another $24 Billion for Ukraine in Test of Bipartisan Support

Biden Seeks Another $24 Billion for Ukraine in Test of Bipartisan Support

By Peter Baker and Luke Broadwater

Peter Baker, who covers the White House, and Luke Broadwater, who covers Congress, reported from Washington.

The New York Times · by Luke Broadwater · August 10, 2023

The aid request is the first by the president since Republicans took over the House in January, and some party leaders have expressed opposition to spending more to help Ukraine beat back Russian forces.

Ukrainian soldiers training in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region in July.Credit...Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times

Aug. 10, 2023, 3:04 p.m. ET

President Biden asked Congress on Thursday for another $24 billion to help Ukraine and other countries affected by Russia’s invasion, the first time lawmakers have been asked to increase financing for the war effort since Republicans took over the House in January.

The request will test whether the expansive American effort to bolster Ukraine retains the bipartisan support it has enjoyed in Washington since Russian forces crossed the border nearly 18 months ago. Leading Republicans, including former President Donald J. Trump, have grown increasingly vocal in expressing skepticism or opposition to more aid for Ukraine.

“The president has reaffirmed that we will stand with Ukraine as it defends its sovereignty for as long as it takes, a strategy that has successfully united our allies and partners and equipped Ukraine to defend itself against Russian aggression,” Shalanda D. Young, the director of the White House Office of Management and Budget, wrote in a letter to Speaker Kevin McCarthy, Republican of California.

Mr. McCarthy said in June that any supplemental appropriation request for Ukraine was “not going anywhere” and that additional aid would have to be worked out in the regular congressional spending process. Seventy House Republicans voted last month to cut off Ukraine altogether and while that suggests a bipartisan majority remains, it was unclear if Mr. McCarthy would defy such a large segment of his conference.

The president’s request includes $13.1 billion for military aid to Ukraine and replenishment of Pentagon weapons stocks used for the war effort. Another $8.5 billion would go for economic, humanitarian and other assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war, and $2.3 billion to leverage more aid from other donors through the World Bank.

The supplemental appropriation request also includes $12 billion for disaster relief, $4 billion for border security and $60 million for wildland firefighter pay. The combined $40 billion total of the request will challenge the spending limits that Mr. Biden negotiated with Mr. McCarthy in May.

Dan Caldwell, the vice president of the Center for Renewing America, a right-wing think tank influential among House Republicans and Freedom Caucus members, said his organization would work to try to kill Mr. Biden’s request.

“Congress should not spend billions more in support of continuing a war in which there are no vital American interests at stake and where there remains a real risk of nuclear escalation,” Mr. Caldwell said. “Speaker McCarthy made clear after the passage of the debt limit deal that he would not support supplemental spending packages like the one the Biden administration is requesting. Both he and the rest of the House G.O.P. need to keep their promise by not moving this aid package forward.”

Peter Baker is the chief White House correspondent and has covered the last five presidents for The Times and The Washington Post. He is the author of seven books, most recently “The Divider: Trump in the White House, 2017-2021,” with Susan Glasser. More about Peter Baker

Luke Broadwater covers Congress. He was the lead reporter on a series of investigative articles at The Baltimore Sun that won a Pulitzer Prize and a George Polk Award in 2020. More about Luke Broadwater

The New York Times · by Luke Broadwater · August 10, 2023

7. F-16 training for Ukrainian pilots faces delays and uncertainty

I keep hearing US government officials touting the "combined arms maneuver" training we are providing to the Ukrainian military. Yet US combined arms maneuver is dependent on air superiority that can allow strategic and deep attack as well as close air support. We are providing our form of combined arms maneuver training without providing them with all the tools and capabilities necessary to most effectively execute modern maneuver warfare.

F-16 training for Ukrainian pilots faces delays and uncertainty

Kyiv wants U.S.-made fighter jets as fast as possible, but the first pilots to undergo training probably won’t be ready to fly them until next summer

By Isabelle Khurshudyan, Emily Rauhala and Missy Ryan

August 11, 2023 at 1:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Isabelle Khurshudyan · August 11, 2023

KYIV, Ukraine — A first group of six Ukrainian pilots is not expected to complete training on the U.S.-made F-16 before next summer, senior Ukrainian government and military officials said, following a series of delays by Western partners in implementing an instruction program for the sophisticated fighter jet.

The timeline reflects the disconnect between Ukraine’s supporters, who envision F-16s as a key tool in the country’s long-term defense, and Kyiv, which has desperately requested that the jets reach the battle space as soon as possible, viewing them as critical for the current fight against occupying Russian forces.

President Biden, after denying Ukrainian appeals for the F-16 for more than a year, reversed course in May and said he backed the idea of training Ukrainian pilots on the jets, and supported the transfer of the planes by other countries. Denmark and the Netherlands volunteered to lead a training effort, prompting hopes among officials in Kyiv that the planes would be defending Ukrainian airspace by as early as September.

It was a familiar pattern for Ukraine and its chief military backer, the United States, which has repeatedly declined Ukrainian requests only to relent at a later date.

But after the start of training was pushed back several times, Ukraine will now probably have to endure another year without the fighters, which officials in Kyiv have predicted would provide a significant military edge amid a slow-going counteroffensive and help better protect civilians against Russia’s regular missile and drone strikes.

While the Biden administration has vowed ongoing support for the Europe-led initiative, officials described a training effort that is only gradually getting off the ground. In mid-July, national security adviser Jake Sullivan said the United States would provide its backing “as soon as the Europeans are prepared.”

Ukrainian officials’ anxiety underscores ongoing tensions between Kyiv and its supporters about the best way to position Ukraine for success against a far larger, better-armed Russian force. It also highlights divisions among those backers themselves, as a small number of European allies pushes to give Ukraine maximum capabilities for its defense and the Biden administration, by far the largest donor of military gear, cautiously weighs next steps.

Ukraine’s commander in chief, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, has criticized Western partners for expecting Ukrainian forces to conduct a large-scale counteroffensive without modern air power. Without fighter jets like the F-16, Ukrainian officials say, they can’t compete in the sky.

Ukrainian soldiers on the front lines have said that low-flying Russian helicopters have been successful in attacking their ground forces in part because Ukraine is unable to threaten them in kind.

Just six pilots, about half a squadron, will go through the first round of training, according to two Ukrainian officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to address a sensitive matter. Two other pilots have been identified as reserve candidates.

Though the pilots are already fluent in English, the officials said, they must first attend four months of English lessons in Britain to learn terminology associated with the jets. That instruction will occur along with ground staff who may be less proficient in English because, according to Ukrainian officials, Denmark requested to train entire crews together rather than just the pilots first. Denmark’s ministry of defense declined to comment.

That pushes back the start of combat training, which is expected to take six months, to January, the Ukrainian officials said. A second group of about the same size would be ready six months after that, or roughly the end of next year.

“This is called dragging it out,” one Ukrainian official said. Both Ukrainian officials said they were reluctant to be too critical of their U.S. and European benefactors for fear of appearing ungrateful.

Another 20 Ukrainian pilots are ready for English training, U.S. officials said, adding that most of Ukraine’s best pilots are expected to remain in Ukraine, where they are flying sorties in Soviet-developed planes and firing French SCALP and British Storm Shadow missiles.

Brig. Gen. Serhii Holubtsov, aviation chief for Ukraine’s air force, told The Washington Post that, in between their sorties, Ukrainian pilots have been taking English classes online for the past year.

“Additional specialized training will be provided to flight and ground personnel on the terminology required for the F-16 training,” Holubtsov said. “It was not possible to train pilots and other personnel in Ukraine in this terminology due to the lack of experience in working with such terminology.”

He said that because the selected pilots already have a high level of basic English, learning the additional terminology “will not take much time.”

Holubtsov said that F-16s come with a powerful radar, which would allow Ukraine to identify more targets and better counter enemy aircraft, missiles and drones than Ukraine’s current fleet of fighter jets, which includes Soviet-era MiG-29s and Su-27s. Ukraine would also be able to deploy United Kingdom-provided Harpoon anti-ship missiles from F-16s — a capability Kyiv does not have currently, Holubtsov said — to target Russia’s navy, which regularly launches missiles from the Black Sea.

High-speed, anti-radiation missiles, or HARMs, which the United States sent Ukraine last year, would also be launched from F-16s, Holubtsov said. “They are already adapted for use on MiG-29 fighters, but due to the lack of an aiming system, their effectiveness is significantly limited,” he said.

Ukraine’s existing Soviet jets also have semiactive homing warheads, meaning they must continue flying directly at their target until the missile hits. That makes the mission very dangerous for the pilot, he said.

Even as the Zelensky government clamors for immediate assistance in boosting Ukraine’s air power, officials in the United States have articulated a very different vision for the F-16. They describe the aircraft as a tool that, rather than altering the battlefield calculus in Ukraine’s current operation in the country’s east and south, will play a prominent role in Kyiv’s transformation into a well-armed regional power that can effectively deter Russia.

“F-16s are about our long-term commitment to Ukraine and are a capability that won’t be relevant to the current counteroffensive,” said Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder, the Pentagon’s press secretary. He cited ongoing U.S. security aid since Russia’s February 2022 invasion — which now exceeds $40 billion, including missiles, mine-clearing equipment and air defenses — and said the United States would support its allies in attempting to get the F-16 training underway as quickly as possible.

“We fully recognize the tough fight Ukraine is engaged in as they defend their country, which is why we continue to actively provide security assistance vital to the battlefield situation at hand,” Ryder said.

The single-engine F-16, which debuted in the 1970s and has been updated repeatedly, has been a prized fighter for American partners worldwide. Roughly 3,000 of the aircraft, which can fly as fast as 1,500 mph, are in operation globally, according to manufacturer Lockheed Martin.

Ukraine has asked allies for fighter jets since the early days of Russia’s invasion, but its push did not gain traction until this spring.

“We have always given them what they need just about in time,” said Michael Clarke, a visiting professor in the department of war studies at King’s College London. “Now we may be giving them what they need, just about too late.”

Biden’s change of heart in May — after months during which U.S. officials insisted the jets weren’t needed at this stage in the fight — came amid intensifying pressure from Ukrainian and European officials and U.S. lawmakers.

At a NATO leaders’ summit in July, Danish and Dutch officials announced that nine other countries — Britain, Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Sweden — were on board and that training would start in August.

Well into August, it is clear that plans are still shaping up. Denmark and the Netherlands are wary of getting into specifics on the scope, scale or timing of the effort.

The Danish Ministry of Defense declined to comment on how long the program would take, or respond to questions about potential delays. The Dutch government is working with Romania on setting up a training center in Romania, but U.S. officials said that will take time.

A spokesman for the Dutch Ministry of Defense, Lt. Col. Mark van de Beek, said details were still being fleshed out.

A key challenge, Van de Beek said, is the shortage of F-16 trainers in Europe. The Netherlands, for instance, is in the process of transitioning to the more advanced F-35 and has switched the focus of its training away from F-16s.

“To train a fighter pilot you also need fighter pilots,” Van de Beek said. “That is expensive and a capability that smaller countries don’t have much anymore.” He stressed that training someone to fly an F-16 in combat is a complex task that must proceed step by step. He compared it to learning to drive a car — “first you need to operate the lights and blinkers” he said, “then, you drive it in a parking lot.”

But driving a car in a parking lot — or getting an F-16 in the air for training — does not equip you for battle, he said. The final step will be combat training.

Ukrainian officials have questioned why the United States, with a far larger pool of trainers, doesn’t conduct the training at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona, where more than 400 American pilots are trained to fly the F-16 each year. That program lasts seven months.

Ukrainians were trained to operate the U.S.-made Patriot air defense system at an Army base in Oklahoma earlier this year. The small number of Ukrainian pilots being trained at one time is because there aren’t enough trainers available for a bigger group, a Ukrainian official said.

U.S. officials, meanwhile, say that Ukraine has put forward only eight pilots so far. A U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to provide a candid assessment of the training effort, said the Biden administration had recently received a list of pilot names.

“Ukraine only has a handful of pilots that are ready to begin training and roughly two dozen more that they’ve told us need some additional English language training before the pilots can move forward,” the official said.

Those small numbers have raised questions in Washington about how prepared Kyiv is to launch such an ambitious program in the midst of an existential fight.

While the administration has said it will move quickly to approve partner nations’ transfer of the jets to Ukraine once those deals are ready, as required under U.S. law, it has not signaled whether it would potentially conduct F-16 training on U.S. soil at a later date.

The U.S. official underscored that European nations — unlike in many of the other initiatives surrounding Western support for Ukraine — are taking the lead on the F-16 training. “We’ve made clear we’re willing to consider a range of options to support,” the official said.

The U.K., which does not fly F-16s, is planning to provide ground training and elementary flight training for Ukrainian pilots, laying the groundwork for the more specialized training spearheaded by the Dutch and Danish governments. A U.K. official said that the British government had offered to train Ukrainian pilots on the Typhoon, a twin-engine fighter flown by the Royal Air Force, but Kyiv opted to pursue the F-16.

Like the United States, the British government sees the F-16s as part of a longer-term effort to develop Ukraine’s military might.

Though the combat training for Ukraine’s most experienced pilots is expected to take six months, Western allies have proposed a separate track for novices that would require more than two years of training, including English lessons.

Rauhala reported from Brussels, and Ryan from Washington. Serhiy Morgunov in Stuttgart, Germany, contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Isabelle Khurshudyan · August 11, 2023

8. Alarm grows as Ukraine’s counteroffensive falters

Excerpts:

Part of the problem for Ukraine is the extensive network of defenses Russia had months to construct and continues to fortify.

Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar this week admitted Russia was “seriously strengthening its defensive lines.”

“And our troops are now faced not only with mining, but also with concrete engineering fortification of key commanding heights,” she said in a Telegram post.

But Ukraine is adjusting its tactics and still maintains the initiative, said Mick Ryan, a retired major general from the Australian Army and a military analyst. Ukrainian forces are now seizing small bits of territory, holding the land and moving forward under the cover of artillery.

“Ukraine is making some progress. Because none of us, except the Ukrainian military high command and government members, know the actual Ukrainian objectives for each phase of the war, we cannot say with any certainty whether this is behind or on schedule,” he wrote in a recent analysis. “However, Ukraine is recovering its territory.”

One of the most difficult challenges for Ukraine outside of the battlefield is countering expectations in the West for immediate results.

In recent speeches, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly called for “maximum focus” and unity behind Ukraine and its allies during the offensive.

Mykhailo Podolyak, adviser to the office of Zelensky, said Ukraine has already demonstrated that it can take on Russia and supporters should not get carried away by relentlessly commenting on the speed of the operation.

“Everyone needs to be patient and closely monitor the high-quality work of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” he said.

Alarm grows as Ukraine’s counteroffensive falters

BY BRAD DRESS - 08/10/23 5:55 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4148128-alarm-grows-as-ukraines-counteroffensive-falters/

There is growing alarm about the pace and prospects of Ukraine’s counteroffensive, with few signs of progress in recent weeks and Russian lines holding strong. 

Those concerns picked up steam in the past week after Ukraine launched a second push in the southern Zaporizhzhia region and has still come up mostly empty in the eyes of Western allies.

U.S. officials told CNN on Tuesday that significant progress was “highly unlikely,” especially with fall and winter fast approaching. And another U.S. official told NBC News, “There is a frustration that they have not used more of the combat power that they have.”

The Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft said in a “Time” magazine piece that Ukrainian forces are outmanned and outgunned and need a “Plan B,” which would include scaling back to focus on defense.

Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.), a former football coach, gave voice to the growing skepticism, comparing Ukraine to “a junior high team playing a college team” in an interview with Fox News this week, adding: “They can’t win.”

Despite the sobering assessments U.S. officials are making anonymously in the media, the Biden administration maintains that Ukraine will recapture Russian-occupied territory and ultimately triumph.

The narrative has frustrated Ukraine, which continues to urge patience as it chips away at Russian fortifications — including thousands of landmines — and searches for weak spots along the frontlines. 

Maksym Skrypchenko, the president of the Kyiv-based Transatlantic Dialogue Center, a nonprofit think tank that advises Ukraine’s government, said the current Western support is “enough to survive” but “not enough to effectively counterattack.”

“Without [the weapons] I think that nobody should expect some miracle like it was a year ago, because Russia is more prepared right now and already knows what to expect from the Ukrainian side,” he said.

Ahead of the offensive, which launched in early June, NATO members gave Ukraine hundreds of modern tanks, armored carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. The U.S. said Kyiv had everything it needed for the offensive. Some allies have also delivered Soviet-era jets and long-range missiles to supplement Ukraine’s needs.

But Skrypchenko noted the U.S. has held back on key weapon systems such as Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which fires long-range missiles, and F-16 fighter jets. He also said Ukraine does not have nearly enough artillery shells because defense production in Western nations has been unable to keep pace with the war. 

Skyrpchenko said Soviet-era jets are unable to cross into the front lines to execute certain maneuvers because they will be “shut down,” and the highly valued ATACMS would significantly boost the military’s ability to destroy key Russian-held bridges.

“Of course it’s not a silver bullet, but it would be dramatically easier for Ukraine to advance using better and more advanced weapons,” he argued.

The counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia has big ambitions: Ukrainian forces need to break through miles of territory to the Sea of Azov and sever a land bridge from mainland Russia to the Crimean Peninsula. 

Further north in eastern Ukraine, troops are trying to retake territory around the city of Bakhmut in a push to liberate the Donetsk region.

Both offensives face major obstacles of dug-in trenches, minefields, Russian air superiority and intense artillery defenses. And Russian troops are resisting Ukraine with its advances, with territory constantly being traded back and forth. 

Branislav Slantchev, a professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego, who studies the conduct of war, said Ukraine was moving slower than some supporters would expect because Kyiv wants to minimize casualties.

Slantchev predicted Ukraine is “very close to a breakthrough in Zaporizhzhia,” pointing out it took Ukraine months of work before big results were achieved in a successful offensive to retake Kherson last year.

“Nothing happens for several months and then suddenly the results come in. Because once they’ve degraded some sectors sufficiently to attempt a breakthrough, if the breakthrough works, you will see it very quickly afterwards,” he added.

Slantchev, however, said the delay behind key weapons and armor shipments has been an issue for Ukraine. He argued F-16s and ATACMS are not “wonder weapons” but more advanced weapons can be considered “game changers.” He also said Kyiv has only received some of the equipment promised earlier this year.

“A lot of the promises that we’ve made are longer term, that will take months,” he said. “It’s not that they’re lying. It’s just that the people who say we’ve given a lot make it sound like everything that’s been promised is actually delivered, or will be delivered shortly, which is just not true.”

Pentagon spokesperson Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder on Thursday characterized the current phase of the war as a “tough fight” but praised the Ukrainian army for its past victories and ability to overcome great odds.

“We’ve known from the beginning that regardless of when any counteroffensive started, it was going to be a tough fight,” Ryder told reporters. “Going forward, we’re going to continue to consult with them, we’re going to continue to provide them training so that they can take back sovereign territory.”

The White House doubled down on that commitment on Thursday, requesting another $13 billion in security aid for Ukraine from Congress. The Biden administration has also played down a CNN poll last week that found most Americans don’t want Congress to authorize additional aid to Ukraine. 

The counteroffensive so far has achieved the liberation of around 100 square miles of territory within two months, compared to the thousands of square miles retaken in the Kherson and Kharkiv offenses last year.

Part of the problem for Ukraine is the extensive network of defenses Russia had months to construct and continues to fortify.

Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar this week admitted Russia was “seriously strengthening its defensive lines.”

“And our troops are now faced not only with mining, but also with concrete engineering fortification of key commanding heights,” she said in a Telegram post.

But Ukraine is adjusting its tactics and still maintains the initiative, said Mick Ryan, a retired major general from the Australian Army and a military analyst. Ukrainian forces are now seizing small bits of territory, holding the land and moving forward under the cover of artillery.

“Ukraine is making some progress. Because none of us, except the Ukrainian military high command and government members, know the actual Ukrainian objectives for each phase of the war, we cannot say with any certainty whether this is behind or on schedule,” he wrote in a recent analysis. “However, Ukraine is recovering its territory.”

One of the most difficult challenges for Ukraine outside of the battlefield is countering expectations in the West for immediate results.

Ukraine funding request sets up battle when Congress returns

Christie on Tuberville’s choice to block military promotions: ‘I don’t think it’s the right one’ 

In recent speeches, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly called for “maximum focus” and unity behind Ukraine and its allies during the offensive.

Mykhailo Podolyak, adviser to the office of Zelensky, said Ukraine has already demonstrated that it can take on Russia and supporters should not get carried away by relentlessly commenting on the speed of the operation.

“Everyone needs to be patient and closely monitor the high-quality work of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” he said.

9. SEAL Team Three Celebrates 40 Years | SOF News

SEAL Team Three Celebrates 40 Years | SOF News

sof.news · by DVIDS · August 11, 2023

By Chelsea Meiller.

It’s a bright, cloudless day. A gentle ocean breeze flows over the terrace as the crowd begins to take their seats. Officers, enlisted personnel, Gold Star family members and friends fill the seats on the Silver Strand Training Complex, the new home of West-Coast based Naval special warfare operators. Today, they gathered together to celebrate a very special occasion – the 40th anniversary of SEAL Team THREE.

SEAL Team THREE’s 20th commanding officer gave the opening remarks and gave the plankowners – the founding members of the team – his thanks.

“We are all here today because of your bold leadership and spirit of innovation. We stand on the shoulders of giants,” he said. “I am happy to report that the culture you established all those years ago is thriving in the troops behind you and the halls of Team THREE.”

Though SEAL Team THREE was formally established in 1983, the history of the SEAL teams predates Team THREE by more than 20 years. In his inaugural address in 1961, President John F. Kennedy quelled the fears of the nation facing a new-era of strife and conflict.

“Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty,” Kennedy said. “This much we pledge–and more.”

In January 1962, President Kennedy established the first SEAL Teams at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, California, and Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Virginia. The teams were comprised of warfighters from the Amphibious Scouts and Raiders (Joint) and Special Mission Naval Demolition Units, lending to the name “SEALs”, which stands for “sea, air and land.”

The establishment of the first SEAL teams paved the way for Team THREE’s commissioning in October 1983. Though a path had been laid before them, the Team’s impressive record speaks for itself.

Retired Adm. William McRaven, former commanding officer of SEAL Team THREE and the ninth commander of United States Special Operations Command, spoke to Team THREE’s immense legacy and commitment to the country’s safety and security in the post-9/11 landscape.

“Some of the first units into Afghanistan were SEAL Team THREE,” said McRaven. “Between 2002 and 2005, the teams deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the new hotspot – the Philippines. From the oil fields of the Al Faw peninsula to Fallujah, to Habbaniyah. From Zamboanga to the Horn of Africa, the operators of SEAL Team THREE were everywhere, contributing to ever single aspect of the war effort.”

The Team wasn’t just given those missions, though. From the onset, they had to work tirelessly to gather the resources and manpower needed to commission a team built for success. Retired Capt. Joe Quincannon, SEAL Team THREE’s first commanding officer, touched on the challenges he faced while putting together a combat-ready team.

“When the Navy gave me the opportunity to commission the command, my first priority was getting the right senior enlisted on board,” he said. “I was focused on people who had proven themselves fighting in Vietnam. A giant step forward in attaining this goal was when Master Chief Gallagher agreed to become the command master chief. His combat experience, reputation and common-sense approach to problem solving were instrumental in helping me attain the goal I had for the command – which was to fight and win if called upon by the country.”

Retired Capt. Joe Quincannon, SEAL Team THREE’s first commanding officer

People were not the only resource needed though. Funding allocated to outfit the command was imbalanced. The warfighters needed weapons, personal protective equipment, night vision gear and more.

“The main problem was the imbalance between the operations and procurement funds” Quincannon said. “Simply put, I couldn’t use the operations funds to buy the equipment we needed.”

Eventually, Quincannon was able to procure exactly what the command needed to be successful. And it paid off – he volunteered his new team for deployment based on their outstanding training record, and they got to go.

Though it’s been decades since that first deployment, the fabric of SEAL Team THREE remains the same. Woven into the command is an enduring legacy of selflessness, bravery and camaraderie.

“Our fallen brothers, those we will see on the other side, the never forgotten stewards will forever remind us – the duty bound – that we are the owners of our legacy,” said SEAL Team THREE’s current Command Master Chief. “It is our charge to honor them by passing down our lessons learned from conflict to conflict. To honor their sacrifice by our deeds and ensure that their names will forever echo.”

Whether it is routine training or large celebratory ceremonies, SEAL Team THREE’s permanent residents (fallen members) are woven into everything the team does. Each one has a command space dedicated to them, and each is spoken about and remembered. One of SEAL Team THREE’s current special warfare operators spoke about the sense of duty and honor that comes with being a part of a command so steeped in Frogman history.

“One of the first things we do as a ‘new guy’ on the team is give a presentation to our platoon about one of our fallen,” the operator said. “It really helps us all remember the immense legacy we are upholding. We’re just renters here. Our permanent residents – those are the owners. That brotherhood and sense of duty and connectedness is so deeply rooted here, and it’s a huge part of why we do what we do.”

As the current Frogmen of SEAL Team THREE go forward into a new era of ever-evolving uncertainty, one thing has remained unchanged for the past four decades – the heart and tenacity of the men who choose to become United States Naval Special Warfare Operators.

“A part of me hopes you never have to experience the harsh ugliness and realities of war, but a more familiar part of me understands, that if called, you will gladly welcome it. And if that call comes, be swift, violent and lethal to our enemies. But never lose your way. You are the 1% of the 1% not because you do the hard things no one else can, but because you do the hard things no one else can while holding yourself and your teammates to a higher standard of judgment and accountability than our enemies.”

Lt. Cmdr. Jonny Kim, a NASA astronaut and SEAL Team THREE alumni.

Since 1962, Naval Special Warfare has been the nation’s premier maritime special operations force – a highly reliable and lethal force –ready to conduct full-spectrum operations, unilaterally or with partners, in support of national objectives, and uniquely positioned to extend the Fleet’s reach, delivering all-domain options for naval and joint force commanders.

********************

This story by Petty Officer 1st Class Chelsea Meiller of Naval Special Warfare Group One was first published by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service on August 10, 2023. DVIDS content is in the public domain.

sof.news · by DVIDS · August 11, 2023

10. Inside a Volunteer Unit Driving Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Forward

Excerpts:

The Wall Street Journal has followed Skala’s men for a year, during which the group retook parts of Ukraine’s northeast, suffered casualties after triggering a land mine, and chewed up Russian paramilitary fighters from the Wagner Group in the eastern city of Bakhmut.

They are now fighting to take Robotyne, a small village on the route south toward a key goal of the counteroffensive: reaching the Sea of Azov to cut Russian occupation forces in two.

Inside a Volunteer Unit Driving Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Forward

On the southeastern front, platoons backed by artillery fight to dislodge Russians

By James MarsonFollow

 | Photographs by Emanuele Satolli for The Wall Street Journal

Aug. 10, 2023 7:52 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-uses-small-unit-tactics-to-retake-captured-territory-from-russia-d9ef32a3?mod=hp_lead_pos9&utm

NEAR ROBOTYNE, Ukraine—Under cover of darkness, 15 Ukrainian soldiers crept along tree lines to the edge of this Russian-occupied village in southeastern Ukraine and launched an assault just after dawn.

When the Ukrainians opened fire, Russian troops responded with a hail of machine-gun bullets. Ukrainian drones and artillery slammed into Russian positions. After a day of fierce fighting that killed two Ukrainian soldiers and injured others, the platoon managed to gain a foothold in Robotyne, a settlement of around 150 houses.

Ukraine’s two-month-old counteroffensive had advanced another mile.

Ukraine’s attempts in early June to smash through lines of entrenched Russian forces using large mechanized formations trained and equipped by the West stalled in the face of deep minefields and Russian air power. So Ukraine has fallen back on the kind of small-unit tactics that brought it success earlier in the 17-month war.

Ukraine southern front line

Ukrainian advances

Russian fortifications

Russian-held area

Pokrovske

Velyka Novosilka

Zaporizhzhia

Orikhiv

Robotyne

Nikopol

Tokmak

Mariupol

Melitopol

UKRAINE

Area of detail

Sea of Azov

20 miles

20 km

Note: As of August 6

Sources: Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project (areas of control); staff reports

Andrew Barnett/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

These kinds of operations are a specialty of Skala Special Unit, a group of around 170 men who are now on the leading edge of the Ukrainian campaign here. The soldiers, with varied civilian backgrounds and military experience, are led by Maj. Yuriy Harkaviy, whose hulking frame won him the nickname Skala, or Rock, after actor Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson.

From his headquarters near Orikhiv, Skala sends reconnaissance teams with aerial drones to spot Russian positions and equipment and call in artillery fire. He dispatches assault teams who walk for miles on foot along lines of trees before attacking.

The Wall Street Journal has followed Skala’s men for a year, during which the group retook parts of Ukraine’s northeast, suffered casualties after triggering a land mine, and chewed up Russian paramilitary fighters from the Wagner Group in the eastern city of Bakhmut.

They are now fighting to take Robotyne, a small village on the route south toward a key goal of the counteroffensive: reaching the Sea of Azov to cut Russian occupation forces in two.

Skala’s men coordinated the battle operation to take control of Robotyne village in Ukraine.

Skala’s men arrived in the area at the start of July. The Russians had spent months preparing defensive lines in the southeast, including miles of deep trenches and thousands of mines. And they had beaten back Ukraine’s initial attempts to advance in large columns with tanks and armored personnel carriers.

Ukrainian commanders decided that to move forward in a region of flat fields separated by thin tree lines, they would need better reconnaissance and infantry assault teams to help clear a path.

Skala moved into an abandoned house surrounded by mulberry trees to the north of Robotyne. Many of the men with him have fought since the first days of the war with little break. Most learned on the job. New volunteers had been picked up at training centers by Skala’s straight-talking chief of staff.

Before launching assaults in the area, Skala’s drone teams flew their craft day and night, getting a picture of Russian positions and directing artillery gunners to hit them. Assault teams walked long distances to avoid detection, sometimes taking Soviet-era or captured Russian rifles so they could pick up ammunition from the Russians they killed rather than lugging along extra rounds for Western-made guns.

Ukrainian reconnaissance teams use aerial drones to spot Russian forces and equipment and call in artillery fire.

Skala’s drone teams fly their craft day and night to get a picture of Russian positions and direct artillery gunners.

Seized Russian weapons adorn a wall in Skala’s operations room, where banks of screens display drone feeds and an air-conditioning unit struggles against the summer heat.

Last week, Skala’s men ejected Russian troops from a trench and destroyed a machine-gun nest in a concrete bunker west of Robotyne. Early Tuesday, the Ukrainians assaulted the village from four directions. The team that attacked from the north advanced furthest, to the village cemetery, after overcoming a machine-gunner in the first house who was killed with an explosives-laden drone.

The Russians counterattacked with armored vehicles, grenades and mortars. As evening fell, Skala’s men needed reinforcements.

Skala’s troops gather before going into combat in southeastern Ukraine.

The Wall Street Journal has followed Skala’s men for a year.

Skala called commanders in brigades nearby. They mustered volunteers: a handful from one brigade, a dozen from another and more than 20 from a third.

As Skala sketched out on a map how the teams should enter the village, one of his men spotted a Russian 120 mm mortar on its western edge. Skala gave the location to another commander by phone. Five minutes later, the officer called back: The mortar had been destroyed.

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After going out of production in 2012, StarStreak missiles are being revived to help Ukraine’s air defense. WSJ examines how the British missile stands out among its peers and why its unique features allow it to see past Russian countermeasures. Photo illustration: Annie Zhao

On the veranda, a dozen new recruits were preparing for battle. Among them was Anatoliy Shkryabniy, a 41-year-old nurse whose right arm has been weak since he was stabbed in the neck a decade ago. He volunteered for the army a month ago, and said the fingers on his right hand can pull a trigger. “Why should I wait for a missile to land in my apartment?” he said.

Beside him stood Ruslan Lutsenko, a 47-year-old farmhand with four children. “I have to defend them,” he said.

They piled into a green van and set out. Some would head to Robotyne, while others would be kept in reserve.

Meanwhile, Skala’s men were rushing to evacuate the injured.

A video of rescue efforts shot from a body camera shows a soldier leaping from the back of a U.S.-made Bradley fighting vehicle and running to a group, including two lying injured, who were taking cover behind another disabled armored vehicle.

“F—, guys, let’s drag them,” the soldier said.

The two injured men, exhausted and covered in dirt, resisted and remained on the ground. “Don’t shout,” one said as the others tried to invigorate him.

“Let’s get the f— out of here,” another soldier yelled. They dragged the groaning men into the back of the Bradley then closed the ramp.

Maj. Yuriy Harkaviy, known as Skala, the Rock, took his nom de guerre from his resemblance to the actor Dwayne ‘The Rock’ Johnson.

Skala’s troops specialize in small-unit tactics against Russian forces in Ukraine.

In the fading daylight, another Skala soldier set out on a motorbike over paths along the side of farm fields. He made repeated trips to evacuate three injured men who clung on behind him.

As night fell, a drone team set out for a field about 3 miles from Robotyne to check for any Russian movement in the northern part of the village.

They covered themselves with anti-mosquito spray—“Our main enemy here,” one of them joked—and took up positions in trenches seized from Russians.

The pilot was a 31-year-old welder known as Lyutsyk, short for Lucifer, a nickname given to him in jest by his wife. He sent his drone, a quadcopter with four rotors, soaring toward Robotyne. As the sky darkened, he flicked a switch to turn on the craft’s thermal-imaging camera. He pointed out craters from Russian bombs and disabled Ukrainian vehicles that litter the battlefront. All was quiet.

Back at headquarters, Skala was poring over his map in the operations room.

“We have turned the tide,” he said. “The most important thing is to get in there, and the Russians will scatter.”

The following morning, Skala reported a successful operation: Despite suffering losses, the reinforcements had taken up firmer positions in the north of Robotyne.

“They went in and dug in,” he said. “Motivation is everything.”

Write to James Marson at james.marson@wsj.com

Skala’s men during a drone mission to check Russian positions in Robotyne, Ukraine.

The special unit arrived in the area near Robotyne at the start of July.

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the August 11, 2023, print edition as 'Ukrainian Troops Fight Russians Inch by Inch'.

11. Land forces now control the sea — and that is vital in the Pacific

A view from Australia.

I am glad I took that class at CGSC on operational art in the Pacific theater tracing the operations of Nimitz and MacArthur in the Pacific.

Conclusion:

In the Second World War in the Pacific, US operations proceeded with a certain cadence. Air control enabled ships to put a land force ashore that enabled the construction of new airbases under whose cover the US fleet could move forward. Today, the challenge is not dissimilar, and will require similar coordination between the services. If sea control is to be achieved it will be achieved from the land. If it is denied, that too will be from the land.

Land forces now control the sea — and that is vital in the Pacific - Breaking Defense

"It is likely that we are only at the beginning of a leap in the capability of land based anti-ship missiles," warns Albert Palazzo of the University of New South Wales.

breakingdefense.com · by Albert Palazzo · August 10, 2023

Chinese DF-26 anti-ship missile (Xinhua)

The US may have the most advanced navy in the world — but as Pentagon officials have openly warned, China’s strategy to counter it has been to load up on land-based anti-ship missiles. Below, Albert Palazzo of the University of New South Wales in Canberra, Australia, warns that the threat will only continue to grow.

There is an old saying, attributed to British Admiral Horatio Nelson, that “a ship’s a fool to fight a fort.” In light of modern weaponry improvements Nelson’s saying is overdue for an update. Now it would be more accurate — if less alliterative — to say that “a ship is a fool to fight a missile defended coast.”

Sea control has always been an essential objective for many countries’ militaries. Without it, a fleet cannot achieve its goals. If an enemy force controls the sea, it can deny a weaker fleet the ability to maneuver and act. Sea control, therefore, is a prerequisite for the attainment of many nations’ war aims. For example, in 1982 Britain first had to establish its fleet in the waters around the Falkland Islands so it could put ashore the land force that retook the islands from Argentina.

For as long as humanity has sailed upon the world’s waters, the fight for sea control has depended on the outcome of battle between ships, or more recently, ships and maritime strike aircraft. This reality

endured from the age of the galley to that of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Now land forces, armed with long-range maritime strike missiles supported by sensing and targeting systems, will change how sea control is achieved or denied.

Contemporary anti-ship missiles that are already in service can reach out over the sea for thousands of kilometers and, since their cost is trivial compared to that of a ship, an adversary can afford to use them in large numbers and thus overwhelm a ship’s defenses. The Chinese, for example, guard their maritime approaches with a host of anti-ship missiles including the DF-21D, which is ominously known as the “carrier killer.” Nor are distant fleet bases safe. The Chinese DF-26 missile is nicknamed the “Guam Killer,” and has the range to hold the US military’s infrastructure on that island at risk.

To date, no major fleet has ventured into waters overwatched by a hostile land-based maritime strike missile system. Some may, therefore, point to a lack of real-world evidence to support this article’s thesis. Those advocating for the battleship over the aircraft carrier took a similar approach. Still we are not without harbingers of what is to come, including the sinking last year of the Russian flagship, the Moskva, by two Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missiles and the destruction of the HMS Sheffield by an Argentinean Exocet missile in the Falklands War.

It is likely that we are only at the beginning of a leap in the capability of land based anti-ship missiles. These weapons will almost certainly improve, and their range, speed and warhead size will all increase. The fielding of hypersonic missiles will only make warship survival even more of a challenge. While fleets may still be safe in the middle of an ocean, at least for now, at some point they will need to close with a coast that is overwatched by a missile fortress. Pearl Harbor decisively settled the battleship or aircraft carrier debate. It would be preferable to avoid a similar tragedy as warfare makes the transition to control of the sea by land forces.

Defense policy makers and naval strategists will need to adjust to a new reality since things usually end poorly for those who refuse to adapt in the face of technological progress. Where maritime affairs are headed is towards a naval no man’s land of enormous breadth across which naval power projection against a land-based missile defense will be prohibitively costly, if not impossible.

To succeed in this future will necessitate significant changes in how navies think and operate, as well as new recognition by land forces that the sea is theirs to dominate. Such changes in thinking would include:

• Thinking small and many: The trend towards bigger and exquisite needs to change, because large ships are easier to target and impossible to replace in any meaningful sense. Smaller ships are harder to find and their loss will not cripple an entire operation. Moreover small ships, with different capabilities, can be linked with modern communications to act jointly.
• Thinking economically: Modern warships rarely cost less than a billion dollars each. The price tag for the Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier was $13 billion. While its capabilities are awe inspiring, the missiles likely to sink or disable it will cost in the millions. Big ships cannot win the cost contest against missiles. A smaller ship is a less costly and inviting target.
• Thinking unmanned: Uncrewed platforms, in all domains, continue to gain capability. Where possible, tasks should be replaced by remotely-piloted vessels. Perhaps the only big ships in a future fleet will be the tenders for an uncrewed fleet.
• Thinking differently: To sail into an adversary’s anti-access/area denial zone is to play to the enemy’s strength. In their doomed attempts to cross No Man’s Land in the First World War, soldiers died in their tens of thousands. Navies need to re-examine how they intend to operate. For example, it may prove necessary to establish local dominance with land, air and cyber assets before ships sail
• into harm’s way.

In the Second World War in the Pacific, US operations proceeded with a certain cadence. Air control enabled ships to put a land force ashore that enabled the construction of new airbases under whose cover the US fleet could move forward. Today, the challenge is not dissimilar, and will require similar coordination between the services. If sea control is to be achieved it will be achieved from the land. If it is denied, that too will be from the land.

Albert Palazzo is an adjunct professor at the University of New South Wales in Canberra, Australia. He writes frequently on the changing character of war, with a special interest in the effect of long-range strike.

breakingdefense.com · by Albert Palazzo · August 10, 2023

12. A Global Law Firm Separates From Its Chinese Partner, Citing Cybersecurity and Data Rules

A Global Law Firm Separates From Its Chinese Partner, Citing Cybersecurity and Data Rules

U.S. News & World Report3 min

August 10, 2023

View Original

One of the world’s biggest law firms says it is separating from the Chinese firm that was part of its global network for eight years, citing changes in cybersecurity and other rules that have rattled foreign companies

Police officers patrol past visitors seeking information at a special exhibition of legal services during the China International Fair for Trade in Services (CIFTIS) at the Shougang venue in Beijing on Sept. 1, 2022. One of the world's biggest law firms said Thursday, Aug. 10, 2023 it is separating from the Chinese firm that was part of its global network for eight years, citing changes in cybersecurity and other rules that have rattled foreign companies. (AP Photo/Andy Wong)Andy Wong

BEIJING (AP) — One of the world’s biggest law firms said Thursday it is separating from the Chinese firm that was part of its global network for eight years, citing changes in cybersecurity and other rules that have rattled foreign companies.

The decision by Dentons follows warnings by business groups that global companies are postponing or shifting investment away from China due to concern about an expanded anti-espionage law, tighter controls on business, a data security crackdown and raids on foreign consulting firms.

Dentons said it was separating from Beijing Dacheng Law Offices due to changes in cybersecurity and data protection but gave no details. Dentons said in a statement Dacheng will be a “separate, standalone firm” that is its “preferred law firm” for clients with needs in China.

Dacheng joined the Dentons network in 2015. Dentons, which says it has more than 10,000 lawyers in some 80 countries, added the Chinese characters for Dacheng to its logo used worldwide.

The arrangement was unusual in China because it made Dacheng part of an integrated international network, unlike other foreign firms that have contractual relationships with Chinese affiliates that remain separate entities.

Such an arrangement might conflict with China’s data controls by giving foreign lawyers or firms abroad access to information, according to Lester Ross, the partner in charge of the Beijing office of Washington law firm WilmerHale.

“I suspect that this would have made it very difficult for such firms to continue to operate through such structure,” Ross said in an email.

The ruling Communist Party has tightened restrictions on the handling and protection of data about Chinese citizens and companies and what can be sent abroad.

The ruling party launched a data-security crackdown on Chinese tech companies in 2020. Consulting firm Bain & Co. said in April its staff in Shanghai were questioned by police. A corporate due diligence firm, Mintz Group, said its Beijing office was raided and five employees detained.

Unease about tighter controls has hampered efforts by Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s government to revive foreign investor interest following the lifting in December of anti-virus controls that blocked most travel into and out of China.

The British Chamber of Commerce in China appealed in May for “greater clarity” on data restrictions in the auto and other industries.

Foreign law firms can operate representative offices in China, but legal representation must be done by Chinese firms, which are tightly controlled by the ruling party. Since 2012, lawyers have been required to give an oath of loyalty to the Communist Party. Every firm must have a party committee.

“The presence of the party makes it hard to integrate the cultures and governance of foreign and Chinese firms,” said James Zimmerman, a partner in the Beijing office of Perkins Coie and a former chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China, in an email.

“In my view, this is the key reason it's incompatible to have a true merger between a foreign and Chinese law firm,” Zimmerman said.

13. China salutes WWII American general Joe Stilwell in personal push to improve US ties

Tyring that soft power approach again?

China salutes WWII American general Joe Stilwell in personal push to improve US ties

• Politburo member Yuan Jiajun appears at commemorations in Chongqing with general’s descendants
• Beijing is turning to people-to-people exchanges as official relations languish

Orange Wang

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Published: 9:00pm, 10 Aug, 2023

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3230674/china-salutes-wwii-american-general-joe-stilwell-personal-push-improve-us-ties

Chongqing Communist Party chief Yuan Jiajun greets a member of the Stilwell family in Chongqing on Wednesday. Photo: Weibo

China has rolled out the red carpet for the descendants of a second world war American general, commemorating the late officer as Beijing turns to informal personal contacts to improve ties between the two countries.

Yuan Jiajun, the Communist Party chief of Chongqing, met members of the family of Joseph Stilwell in the southwestern city on Wednesday.

The group included Susan Cole and Nancy Millward, the great-granddaughters of the general who was based in the city during the war and worked closely with Chinese leaders against Japanese forces.

“[We] hope to take this visit as an opportunity … to better promote people-to-people exchanges between China and the United States and contribute to the development of China-US relations,” Chongqing Daily quoted Yuan as saying.

Members of the family have visited China before but previous commemorations have not attracted such attention.

Yuan is one of the 24 members of the Politburo, the party’s inner circle, and his presence this time for the 140th anniversary of Stilwell’s birth highlights Beijing’s focus on informal contact with the United States.

‘China will not challenge or replace the US’, Xi tells Blinken at crucial meeting

Despite some resumption of senior-level official communication, relations with Washington remain in the doldrums and Beijing has opted to host a series of prominent American public figures to try to promote ties.

In June, Chinese President Xi Jinping told his “American friend” billionaire Bill Gates that people were the foundation of relations.

“We count on the American people, and hope for lasting friendship between the two peoples,” Xi told the Microsoft co-founder and philanthropist, just days before meeting US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

In July, Xi met former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, telling the centenarian that “we never forget our old friends”.

Xi said he hoped that Kissinger and “other people of foresight” in the US could continue to play a constructive role in restoring relations between the two countries.

That theme continued on Wednesday when Yuan referred to Stilwell as “an old and good friend of the Chinese people”.

“We will always remember his name,” he said.

Stilwell’s efforts were a key chapter in the history of US-China collaboration and he is the only high-ranking US military figure who has a museum dedicated to his memory in China.

02:18

Xi Jinping tells his ‘old friend’ Bill Gates he hopes US-China friendship will continue

Xi Jinping tells his ‘old friend’ Bill Gates he hopes US-China friendship will continue

As part of this week’s events commemorating his 140th birthday, Cole and Millward planted a friendship tree at the museum in Chongqing on Tuesday together with Liu Ning and Liu Yinna, the great-grandson and great-granddaughter of Zhu De, the founder of the Chinese Red Army, which later became the People’s Liberation Army.

When Stilwell died in 1946, Zhu said that not only had the US lost a great general but the Chinese people had lost a great friend.

The commemorative events also included a seminar on Tuesday, attended by more than 150 people, including representatives from the Chinese foreign ministry and the US embassy in Beijing.

02:34

China treats ‘old friend’ Kissinger to a lavish lunch

China treats ‘old friend’ Kissinger to a lavish lunch

China has previously saluted the legacy of the Chinese-American wartime friendship to foster relations.

In April last year, Qin Gang, then China’s envoy to Washington, attended the 80th anniversary of the Flying Tigers, a group of American pilots who fought for China against Japanese forces during the second world war.

Qin addressed the event while wearing a Flying Tigers jacket sent by two US veterans.

During a trip to Chongqing in May, US ambassador to China Nicholas Burns visited the Stilwell museum and one dedicated to the Flying Tigers.

CONVERSATIONS (27)

Orange Wang

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Orange Wang covers the Chinese macroeconomy, and has many years of experience with China's monetary and fiscal policy moves. He also covered global market and financial news for a long time, with a particular focus on new technologies and their influences on economic growth and society. Before joining the South China Morning Post, Orange worked as a Shanghai Correspondent for ET Net, a Hong Kong financial news agency.

​14. Ukraine and Russia are fighting two different kinds of war

Excerpts:

For Russia, this has always been a public relations war. Other than complaints about Ukraine possibly joining NATO many years in the future, and false propaganda that its Jewish president is a “Nazi,” Russia had no substantive grievances with Ukraine that it was seeking to redress. Instead, Putin launched the war to reassert Russian racial superiority over a people he regarded as inferior, and to stoke patriotic spirit in order to distract the Russian people from the hardships that rampant corruption in Russia have created.

...

For the Ukrainians, on the other hand, this has always been a war of national survival. Because Russia has repeatedly broken commitments not to attack Ukraine, the Ukrainians understand that security can only come from defeating Russia. If Russia is allowed to keep any of the territory that it recognized as Ukraine’s in 1994, Putin will claim success and invade again after he has patched up his military. Ukrainians therefore are focused on how to reclaim all their territory, not any particular town. 

One key part of the Ukrainian strategy has been to inflict disproportionate losses on Russia. After recognizing Putin’s obsession with Bakhmut, the Ukrainians began a slow fighting retreat, giving ground to save their own lives while inflicting huge casualties on Russia. They have now begun to encircle Bakhmut, knowing that Putin’s pride will force him to devote far more forces to its defense than its strategic value actually merits.

Ukraine and Russia are fighting two different kinds of war

BY DAVID A. SUPER, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 08/10/23 12:30 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4145799-ukraine-and-russia-are-fighting-two-different-kinds-of-war/

In this photo provided by the Ukrainian Presidential Press Office, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy attends an event for marking Statehood Day in Mykhailivska Square in Kyiv, Friday, July 28, 2023. (Ukrainian Presidential Press Office via AP)

Some commentators have recently suggested that Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is stalling out, because its territorial gains remain smaller than those of Ukraine’s prior efforts around Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson. Some even are questioning whether the Ukrainians will be able to reclaim a significant additional amount of lost territory.

These writers fail to appreciate that, since the beginning of this conflict, Russia and Ukraine have been fighting two fundamentally different kinds of war. The Ukrainians have never sought to emulate Russia’s boastful definition of success. To the contrary, they have been more than happy leveraging Russia’s obsession with headlines to inflict heavy losses and hasten their own victory.

For Russia, this has always been a public relations war. Other than complaints about Ukraine possibly joining NATO many years in the future, and false propaganda that its Jewish president is a “Nazi,” Russia had no substantive grievances with Ukraine that it was seeking to redress. Instead, Putin launched the war to reassert Russian racial superiority over a people he regarded as inferior, and to stoke patriotic spirit in order to distract the Russian people from the hardships that rampant corruption in Russia have created.

Accordingly, Russia has continually pursued bragging rights regardless of the cost. Once Putin became fixated on the small, strategically insignificant city of Bakhmut, his commanders were ordered to seize it at all costs. It took them seven months of bloody urban warfare to do it, with Russia losing five times as many troops as Ukraine. Along the way, Russia threw away the lives of thousands of conscripts in human wave assaults.

Russian losses are ballooning again as commanders are reportedly being ordered to hold this or that insignificant hamlet “at all costs.”

For the Ukrainians, on the other hand, this has always been a war of national survival. Because Russia has repeatedly broken commitments not to attack Ukraine, the Ukrainians understand that security can only come from defeating Russia. If Russia is allowed to keep any of the territory that it recognized as Ukraine’s in 1994, Putin will claim success and invade again after he has patched up his military. Ukrainians therefore are focused on how to reclaim all their territory, not any particular town. 

One key part of the Ukrainian strategy has been to inflict disproportionate losses on Russia. After recognizing Putin’s obsession with Bakhmut, the Ukrainians began a slow fighting retreat, giving ground to save their own lives while inflicting huge casualties on Russia. They have now begun to encircle Bakhmut, knowing that Putin’s pride will force him to devote far more forces to its defense than its strategic value actually merits.

Another key for Ukraine has been strangling Russia’s already inept logistics. After blunting Russia’s initial drives on Kyiv and Kharkiv, the Ukrainians did not forcibly evict the invaders; they just cut off the Russians’ access to food and ammunition, to the point that Russia eventually had to withdraw. They removed Russia from Kherson in a similar way.

Rather than launch costly all-out frontal assaults on entrenched Russian positions, Ukraine’s counter-offensive is again focusing on inflicting disproportionate losses and on destroying Russian logistics. In order to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991, the U.S. spent over a month heavily bombing Iraqi soldiers, ammunition depots, and supply routes before the first soldier crossed the frontier.

Ukrainians cannot do that, because the West has refused to give them advanced military aircraft. Ukraine also has limited supplies of long-range missiles.

Accordingly, the Ukrainians need to lure Russian units, equipment and ammunition storage close enough to the front to be within range of the missiles the Ukrainians do have. They thus have been advancing just enough in the south to force the Russians to move up resources in response — then destroying those resources. And by keeping up pressure across the front, the Ukrainians force Russia to commit all of its reserves. If Russia undertakes another large-scale mobilization, the loss of many of its training officers when they were rushed into battle to meet one of Putin’s artificial deadlines means that these fresh troops will be effective at little more than human wave attacks.

The Ukrainians actually do not seem to care whether they or the Russians go on the offensive. In the north, Russia assembled over 100,000 soldiers for a major offensive. The Ukrainians allowed them to advance a few kilometers, then crushed the salient and inflicted heavy losses when Russia moved up resources to try to preserve its gains.

The Ukrainians are increasingly choking off supplies to Russian-occupied Crimea. The only ways onto the peninsula are a handful of bridges and ships, all of which the Ukrainians have struck recently. They also have cut the only overland railroad into the southwestern occupied territories. Russian soldiers have begun complaining bitterly that they no longer have effective artillery support when the Ukrainians attack.

It’s hard times for those seeking global denuclearization

AI’s real problem is that it’s boring

Putin has kept Russian elites behind him by disproportionately sending ethnic minorities and Muslims to die in Ukraine. That started to change with the Wagner Group’s abortive coup in June, a rebellion triggered by complaints about inadequate logistics. Putin had to replace many of his top generals for complicity with the coup or for publicly complaining about inadequate logistics. Repeated drone strikes on the Russian Ministry of Defense have punctured what remained of his myth of invincibility.

Putin’s only real hope is that the West will tire of the war and cut off aid to Ukraine. If we show patience, and do not ask the Ukrainians to wage a Russian-style public relations war, we can expect to see collapses of Russian logistics, Russian frontline defenses, and the Russian regime, in no particular order. Defeating Putin’s ugly aggression once and for all will be well worth it.

David A. Super is a professor of law at Georgetown Law. He also served for several years as the general counsel for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Follow him on @DavidASuper1.

15. China says military company worker exposed as CIA spy

China says military company worker exposed as CIA spy | CNN

By Nectar Gan and Martha Zhou, CNN

Published 1:27 AM EDT, Fri August 11, 2023

CNN · by Nectar Gan,Martha Zhou · August 11, 2023

CNN —

China’s civilian spy agency has exposed a Chinese national for allegedly providing sensitive military information to the CIA, the latest in a string of highly public espionage accusations between Washington and Beijing.

In a statement Friday, China’s Ministry of State Security said the suspect, identified by his surname Zeng, worked for an unidentified Chinese military industrial group in a role which gave him access to important classified information.

The ministry said Zeng, 52, was sent by his employer to advance his studies in Italy. While there he was allegedly approached by a US embassy official, and they gradually developed a “close relationship” through activities such as dinner parties, outings and watching operas, according to the statement.

The ministry claimed that as their engagement deepened, the US official revealed himself to be a CIA officer. Zeng was allegedly offered “a huge amount” of money and immigration to the US for his family, in exchange for sensitive information about the Chinese military, the statement said.

It said Zeng signed an espionage agreement with the US and received assessment as well as training.

Upon completing his studies, Zeng returned to China and allegedly met with CIA personnel multiple times to provide “a large amount of core intelligence,” according to the statement.

The ministry said it had taken “compulsory measures” against Zeng after obtaining evidence of his espionage activities in an investigation. The case has been handed to the prosecutors for review and indictment, it added.

China’s announcement about the alleged CIA spy came a week after two US Navy sailors in California were arrested for allegedly providing sensitive US military information to Chinese intelligence officers.

China’s Ministry of State Security is a civilian agency that oversees intelligence and counterintelligence both within China and overseas. Its remit has encouraged analogies to a combined CIA and FBI, but is far more secretive about its work – without even a public website describing its activities.

But recently, the ministry has taken a higher profile. On August 1, it launched a public account on Wechat, China’s super app, calling on “all members of society” to join its fight against espionage and offering rewards and protection for those who provide information.

Friday’s statement about Zeng’s case was also released on the ministry’s Wechat account.

China’s military also has its own intelligence agency.

The United States and China have long spied on each other but the recent deterioration in ties between the world’s two largest economies has supercharged this rivalry.

China’s Communist Party rulers have long pushed the narrative that “foreign forces” are trying to undermine the country’s rise while Xi Jinping, China’s most assertive and authoritarian leader in a generation, has made state security his top priority.

Last month, China introduced a revised version of its already sweeping counter-espionage law, which further expanded the definition of espionage.

CIA operations in China suffered a staggering setback starting in 2010, according to The New York Times, when the Chinese government killed or imprisoned more than a dozen sources over two years.

In 2021, CNN reported that the agency was overhauling how it trains and manages its network of spies as part of a broad transition to focus more closely on adversaries like China and Russia.

CNN · by Nectar Gan,Martha Zhou · August 11, 2023

​16. Why Ukraine's offensive has stalled

Conclusion:

There is, then, only one route forward: to fight the war in earnest, as befits a struggle of national liberation. Ukraine’s population has declined but still exceeds 30 million, so that the total number in uniform could be as much as 3 million (Israel’s 10% ratio in 1948) or at least 2 million (Finland’s reservists as a percentage of the population). With those troops, Ukraine could win its battles and liberate its territory in the same way as most of Europe’s wars of independence — by gruelling, attritional warfare.

Why Ukraine's offensive has stalled

There is only one route forward

Professor Edward Luttwak is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.

unherd.com · by Edward Luttwak · August 9, 2023

Whenever Russian missiles strike a Ukrainian city, or Kyiv’s drones target a building in Moscow, the attacks are inevitably followed by the sort of media coverage worthy of a Blitz raid. Yet generating headlines is just about their only achievement: precision missiles cannot deliver much explosive, and drones even less. As for their great accuracy, it is only effective when valuable targets can be identified — something which is hard to do except against tanks on the battlefield and warships floating on open water.

Against buildings, small missile warheads and puny drone charges can certainly inflict damage, but not of any real consequence. And this is a key aspect of the entire war, especially when compared to the last great conflict on the European continent.

From March 1942, the RAF’s Bomber Command was flying Lancaster bombers with a typical individual bombload of 6,400kg, so that the first Lancaster raid to feature 400 bombers dropped 2,560 metric tons — more than the total tonnage dropped on Ukraine by Russian cruise missiles since the war started. True, British night bombing was notoriously inaccurate and much criticised in the aftermath. But by 1945, cities such as Hamburg and Cologne were burnt out, while others including Berlin were devastated. Nothing equivalent has happened to Kyiv, nor could it, because Russia only has a small strategic bomber force while Ukraine has none. All the military drones now operational across the globe cannot deliver as much explosive as the Bomber Command could drop in a couple of nights.

Thus the first serious war of the third millennium must be fought on the ground — quite a comedown from the “post-kinetic” cyber and information warfare that had been confidently predicted by both Western and Russian generals. This is a war that must be fought by sheer, grinding, attrition, just like the First World War on the Western Front, with almost none of the “manoeuvre warfare” exploits that made celebrities of Guderian, Rommel, Patton and Rokossovsky in the Second World War, and Arik Sharon in 1967 and 1973.

All those masters of war won disproportionate victories with surprise offensives. Arriving in fast-moving columns, their forces greatly outnumbered and overwhelmed a specific sector, while the bulk of the enemy, distributed across an entire front, could not intervene in time.

In other words, “manoeuvre warfare” depends entirely on surprise. Even in the Second World War, there was reliable aerial photography, so that pre-battle concentrations of tanks, trucks and artillery tractors could not escape detection as they gathered over a period of weeks. But once the offensive columns moved, it was hard to keep them under observation, let alone predict their destination. Photography was impeded by night, clouds and enemy fighters, leaving more than enough uncertainty to deceive enemies with decoys, simulated radio traffic, and the false tales of double agents.

This is how it came to be that on D-Day, 6 June 1944, the strongest German Panzer columns ended up being massed behind Calais to face Patton’s fictional First United States Army Group, while the Allies were landing in Normandy 230 miles away. Douglas MacArthur’s Inchon landings in September 1950, which nullified a string of North Korean victories in the preceding months, likewise achieved total surprise by very elaborately simulating a landing at Kunsan, 100 miles to the south.

None of this could happen now. The Americans, Russians and other military powers have observation satellites equipped with synthetic-aperture radars, capable of revealing single tanks, let alone any large grouping of forces, regardless of visibility, while their returns are refreshed often enough to detect troop movements in hours if not in minutes. Any other information drawn from intercepts, aerial reconnaissance or ground observation merely supplements this reliable intelligence. It is enough to make the battlefield transparent and operational surprise impossible, killing off the manoeuvre warfare that can win battles quickly and without mounds of casualties.

In early summer, when the Ukrainians deployed the precious “operational reserve” they had built up, there was no great mystery as to what they would do with it: attack somewhere south of Zaporizhzhia and fight their way down to the Black Sea. This would cut off all the east-west roads and rail lines that supply the Russian forces strung out to the west below the Dnipro river. It would set the stage for a great victory, with Putin forced to choose between continuing the war or negotiating a cease-fire to rescue his stranded troops.

There were three possible vectors for the offensive. First, Kyiv could launch a straight assault on Melitopol, which would involve an ambitious penetration offensive over 90-miles deep. Alternatively, it could aim for Berdyans’k with a 125-mile offensive that would cut off more Russians and take more territory. Or, even more daringly, it could march the full 150 miles to Mariupol, a movement that would have to be Napoleonic in speed and concentration to reach the Black Sea shore before the Russians could counter.

None of those options has proved to be workable. While the Ukrainians were training and deploying, the Russians south of the Dnipro were digging trench lines shielded by minefields that stretch roughly 625 miles — 185 miles longer than the Western Front at its greatest extent. Napoleon called this style of linear defence a “cordon”, a thick rope made of infantry to hold the enemy along a long front. And, in his own time, he rightly explained why cordons were the stupidest way of defending a front: the enemy would arrive in columns and easily cut through the few troops holding the particular sector they attacked.

But once again the transparent battlefield has changed everything. Watching the Ukrainians advance in real time, the Russians could send their forces to intercept them in equal if not greater numbers. And even if the numbers were equal, the combat would be unequal because the Russians would be shielded by their minefields and by their trenches.

It was also unfortunate that the Ukrainians had greatly overestimated the combat value of the huge 66-ton Leopard tanks they had asked for, begged for, and finally practically demanded from the Germans. The Leopard is comparable to the US M1 and Israeli Merkava IV (all three have some 60 tons of layered armour and high-velocity 120mm guns). But it lacks one thing that the M1 and Merkava both rely on when facing the Russian-equipped forces: Trophy, an Israeli active defence with radar to detect incoming anti-tank missiles, and miniature guns to smash their warheads.

The Germans are acquiring the device but insisted on testing it themselves, delaying its shipment to Ukraine. Without Trophy’s protection, the Leopards fell prey to Russian tank-hunters armed with Kornet anti-tank missiles. While much simpler, less versatile and much cheaper than the US Javelin, the Kornet is all too effective with its double warhead that defeats reactive armour. When Ukraine’s long-awaited offensive started, it demonstrated this most unfortunately, with the destruction of some of the precious Leopards that were supposed to lead the way.

One might have hoped for a better outcome from the geo-economic confrontation between the heavily-sanctioned Russian economy and the much richer Western coalition that supports Ukraine — especially because things started so well. Early fears that Germany and Italy would not tolerate the loss of their Russian markets and Russian natural gas supplies proved unfounded. Instead of defections, the coalition that economically supports Ukraine has expanded across Europe and now includes Japan and even South Korea, which sent a token $150 million this year.

But initial hopes that Russia could be seriously pressured, perhaps all the way to the negotiating table, by stalling both their oil exports and their imports of Western goods soon faded. Unlike China, Russia is self-sufficient in both food and fuel, and can manufacture all it needs, except for micro-processors and other high-tech items that are easily smuggled.

Turkey, while ostensibly a close American ally, is still the transit point for many high-technology exports to Russia, and Turkey’s traders and traffickers have plenty of competition in other countries. As for the Russian economy, the news is gloomy but not gloomy enough. A meagre 1.5% growth will be achieved this year, but that still exceeds the German growth rate (which is expected to be zero). Russia’s inflation rate of 3.3% is also around half the Euro average. The war will not end because of Russia’s economic capitulation.

There is, then, only one route forward: to fight the war in earnest, as befits a struggle of national liberation. Ukraine’s population has declined but still exceeds 30 million, so that the total number in uniform could be as much as 3 million (Israel’s 10% ratio in 1948) or at least 2 million (Finland’s reservists as a percentage of the population). With those troops, Ukraine could win its battles and liberate its territory in the same way as most of Europe’s wars of independence — by gruelling, attritional warfare.

unherd.com · by Edward Luttwak · August 9, 2023

17. How much firepower does Russia have left?

Excerpts:

Pavel Luzin, a Russian political analyst and visiting scholar at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, told Newsweek that the on-paper expansion of Russia's army does not equate to a more robust fighting force.

"Russia is trying to create an illusion of its readiness for the long-term war," he said. "Actually, it is making efforts to get a ceasefire for several years (before the next round of war) and to keep captured territories.

"At the same time, the Russian leadership fears defeat. It is not only a matter of political calculations but also a matter of ideology. In this way, the Kremlin is ready to sacrifice a lot of things and a lot of Russians to avoid the defeat."

Comparing Putin's regime to ISIS forces fighting in the Middle East, Luzin added: "They were not able to win, they were weakening every day. But they were irrationally ready to fight until the very end because of their ideology and fears. The Kremlin is the same."

"However, the Russian army is continuing its organizational and technical degradation; it is an inevitable process," Luzin added. "I don't know whether or not the collapse will happen, but the further degradation of Russia's army is inevitable.

"ISIS wasn't a regular army but resisted till the end. So, Russia may continue to fight even if its army will become irregular. Nevertheless, the longer Russia continues the war, the less opportunities for a sustainable political and economic future it has."

How much firepower does Russia have left?

BY DAVID BRENNAN ON 8/10/23 AT 3:00 AM EDT

Newsweek · by David Brennan · August 10, 2023

Some 200,000 people are thought to have been killed in fighting between Russia and Ukraine since February 24, 2022, when President Vladimir Putin opened the latest—and perhaps final—chapter of Moscow's 30-year effort to hinder Kyiv's westward drift and regenerate a neo-imperial sphere of influence.

Putin's military gambit has not gone to plan. The stunning failure of Russia's thunder run on Kyiv in the early days and weeks of the invasion proved a harbinger of Moscow's battlefield struggles. The demands of large-scale, mechanized, 21st century warfare pulled back the veil on Russia's supposedly modernized force, illuminating the kind of corruption and incompetence that have hamstrung Moscow's militaries for years.

Against the odds, Ukraine has survived. Kyiv has been able to liberate around 50 percent of the territory seized by Kremlin forces since February 2022, and has its eyes set on Crimea and the areas of the Donbas region occupied since 2014.

But for all the pain Ukraine's resolute defenders have inflicted on the Russian invaders, Moscow's war goes on. The slow and costly nature of Kyiv's ongoing counteroffensive speaks to the resolve of the Russian military, even after suffering staggering losses. Putin, meanwhile, shows no sign of backing down. Europe's largest conflict since World War II has become a war of attrition.

Equipment with Russian military markings on is seen in Dnipro, Ukraine, on July 23, 2023. Russia is believed to have suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties in it's war on Ukraine. Denys Poliakov/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images

Soldiers

Russia's initial invasion force numbered around 190,000 troops. Many of those have now been killed, captured, or wounded so badly they can never return to the battlefield. Pentagon documents leaked earlier this year estimated 189,500 to 223,000 Russian casualties as of February, including as many as 43,000 killed.

That number will be higher after another six months of fighting, and Kyiv claims to have "liquidated" 251,620 Russian personnel since February 2022. Newsweek has contacted the Russian Defense Ministry by email to request comment.

The losses have forced the Kremlin to expand its draft. In August 2022, Putin ordered a 13 percent increase in the number of active soldiers—around 137,000 troops—aiming to raise the total to 1.15 million.

A month later, the Kremlin ordered its "partial mobilization," calling up 300,000 reserves. Despite persistent rumors of a second wave, Putin has so far only overseen a gradual expansion and tightening of the draft process as Russian casualties mount. If Moscow was to embark on a second wave of mobilization, Ukraine has estimated it might call up another 500,000 troops.

Russia's armed forces now have around 1.3 million troops, with a goal to expand this to 1.5 million by 2026. The active portion of Russia's Ground Forces is believed to comprise around 550,000 troops, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The strain of the war on the army is clear. British Defense Minister Ben Wallace said in February that 97 percent of the force was already deployed inside Ukraine, though remained unable to achieve a sizeable battlefield breakthrough.

Numbers alone do not tell the whole story. Russia's regular armed forces have been augmented with auxiliaries of varying quality.

At one end of the spectrum, Wagner Group mercenaries—of which there were around 50,000 at the group's peak before its ill-fated June mutiny—proved the most effective of Russia's forces, though suffered severe casualties among the jailed Russians it recruited in the early stages of the invasion. At the other end, volunteers and forcibly mobilized soldiers from the Russian-occupied provinces in Ukraine have reportedly been given little training and suffered high casualty rates.

Military cadets take part in a rehearsal for the Victory Day parade in St. Petersburg, Russia, on April 25, 2023. Russia's ground forces have sustained severe casualties in their invasion of Ukraine. OLGA MALTSEVA/AFP via Getty Images

Russia's elite forces have been badly mauled. Those who replace them will be less experienced and less motivated, though those who survived the initial stages of the conflict have emerged hardened and likely more effective.

Pavel Luzin, a Russian political analyst and visiting scholar at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, told Newsweek that the on-paper expansion of Russia's army does not equate to a more robust fighting force.

"Russia is trying to create an illusion of its readiness for the long-term war," he said. "Actually, it is making efforts to get a ceasefire for several years (before the next round of war) and to keep captured territories.

"At the same time, the Russian leadership fears defeat. It is not only a matter of political calculations but also a matter of ideology. In this way, the Kremlin is ready to sacrifice a lot of things and a lot of Russians to avoid the defeat."

Comparing Putin's regime to ISIS forces fighting in the Middle East, Luzin added: "They were not able to win, they were weakening every day. But they were irrationally ready to fight until the very end because of their ideology and fears. The Kremlin is the same."

"However, the Russian army is continuing its organizational and technical degradation; it is an inevitable process," Luzin added. "I don't know whether or not the collapse will happen, but the further degradation of Russia's army is inevitable.

"ISIS wasn't a regular army but resisted till the end. So, Russia may continue to fight even if its army will become irregular. Nevertheless, the longer Russia continues the war, the less opportunities for a sustainable political and economic future it has."

Tanks

Russia's tank fleet has suffered badly in Ukraine. More than 2,000 are thought to have been destroyed or captured, representing around two-thirds of those in active service before the war.

Among these are dozens of T-90 main battle tanks; Russia's most advanced combat-proven platform. The most modern system—the much-hyped but rarely seen T-14 Armata—has been introduced in small numbers but has not played a central role.

The situation appears bleak for Russia's armored divisions, but the central role of the tank in Soviet and Russian military doctrine means Moscow has an enormous stock of mothballed weapons. The Military Balance 2021 database estimated that there were some 10,200 tanks in storage, including relatively modern platforms like the T-72, T-80, and T-90.

The Russian tanks in storage alone represent more than six times the number of fielded Ukrainian tanks. However, given deep-reaching corruption within Russia's armed forces, it is not possible to say how many of these tanks are serviceable.

Moscow has certainly been dipping into its mothballed stock. Many videos and images have emerged during the course of the full-scale invasion showing outdated tanks being sent to the frontlines.

People look at a destroyed Russian military vehicle on display in the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv on June 17, 2023. Russia has lost thousands of armored vehicles since February 2022. Roman Pilipey/Getty Images

One of Russia's largest armor storage facilities—the Vagzhanovo depot in Russia's Siberian republic of Buryatia—has seen some 40 percent of mothballed vehicles removed since the start of the full-scale invasion. According to The Moscow Times, the armed forces had around 3,840 armored vehicles stored there in September 2021. By May 2023, only 2,270 remained.

But despite foreign derision at the Kremlin's "museum pieces," even old tanks heading to the front pose dangers for Ukrainian troops. Some have been used as static gun emplacements, while others have been used to deliver vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) to Ukrainian positions.

Such efforts might appear desperate to Western publics, but Oleg Ignatov—Crisis Group's senior analyst for Russia—told Newsweek they mean little to most Russians.

"I would say that people don't pay attention to such information," he said.

"People usually don't know about this information," Ignatov added, noting the hold of state media over the vast majority of the national information space.

"Even people in Moscow sometimes don't know that Moscow was attacked," he said, referring to recent drone strikes on the capital.

Artillery

The failure of Russia's three-day war plan meant its traditionally formidable artillery—known as Russia's "god of war"—would be at the fore of the subsequent fighting. Much of the full-scale invasion has been shaped by frontline artillery duels, in which the Ukrainians have often been outnumbered and outgunned.

Kyiv's troops have slowly been closing the gap, increasingly armed with NATO-produced tube and rocket artillery. In Ukraine's ongoing counteroffensive, Russian batteries—and the munitions depots from which they are fed—have been priority targets.

Kyiv claims to have destroyed more than 5,000 Russian guns since February 2022, along with more than 710 multiple-launch rocket systems.

The Ukrainian figures are significantly higher than open-source estimates. The Oryx tracking website has reported the damage or destruction of 107 artillery support vehicles and equipment; 483 units of self-propelled artillery; and 253 MLRS platforms.

The IISS' Military Balance 2023 inventory reported that Russia still possesses 4,458 artillery weapons of various types.

Shell hunger has been a constant for both sides through the full-scale invasion, whether because of logistics issues or purely a lack of available munitions. Russia's pre-war artillery shell stock dwarfed that of Ukraine and its Western partners. Indeed, a central element of Western support for Kyiv has been a historic munition production effort.

The BBC has reported that Russia may have had as many as 16 million shells in storage before the war, though how many are in a suitable state for use is unknown. According to Admiral Sir Tony Radakin—the chief of the British defense staff—Moscow's forces were already facing a "critical shortage" of shells by the end of 2022.

Air Power

Russia's air assets have fared better than its ground assets, but have still sustained significant losses. Moscow's continued inability to establish air superiority over a much smaller Ukrainian air force stands as one of its biggest failures of the full-scale invasion to date. Nearly 18 months into the fighting, Ukrainian airspace remains contested.

Ukraine claims to have downed 315 Russian planes and 312 Russian helicopters. Oryx has identified 76 destroyed and eight damaged aircraft, including 21 Su-34s, 11 Su-30s, and four Su-35s. Oryx has also confirmed the loss or damage of 101 Russian helicopters, among them 40 Ka-52 "Alligator" attack helicopters.

Russia is believed to have around 900 fighter jets and 120 bombers, meaning its losses in Ukraine are a small but significant portion of its total aerial strength. Moscow's failure to ensure air superiority means Russian aircraft are largely operating far from the front, launching long-range munitions against Ukrainian military, infrastructure and civilian targets.

The tail of Russian helicopter that was shot down in Kherson Oblast is exhibited in the Dnipro History Museum in Dnipro, Ukraine, on June 2, 2023. Russia is thought to have lost scores of helicopters in 18 months of fighting. Informator.ua/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images

The British Ministry of Defence wrote this week: "Over the summer, Russian tactical combat aircraft have typically carried out over 100 sorties a day, but these are almost always restricted to operating over Russian-controlled territory due to the threat from Ukrainian air defenses."

President Volodymyr Zelensky this week lauded the development of Ukraine's anti-air network, which he said has destroyed more than 5,500 objects since the start of the full-scale offensive.

But Moscow's aircraft pose a potent threat to Ukraine, which is still trying to secure access to NATO-made fighter jets.

Long-range Missiles

Russia's arsenal of long-range ballistic missiles is arguably a more pressing threat than Moscow's aircraft. Missile attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure have become commonplace, including strikes on civilian targets like shopping malls and high-rise apartment buildings.

Many of Russia's more modern missiles reportedly rely on foreign technology. The broad Western sanctions campaign on Moscow in response to the February 2022 full-scale invasion was predicted to choke its advanced weapon production capacity, but missiles have continued raining down on Ukrainian targets regardless.

In January, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said that Russia had around 19 percent of its pre-war strategic missile arsenal still available for use. Among those were 144 of the 900 pre-war Iskanders, 59 of the 500 pre-war Kalibrs, 118 of the 444 pre-war Kh-101/555s, and 162 of the 370 pre-war Kh-22/32s. Reznikov said Russian production meant it had 53 available Kinzhal missiles compared with 43 pre-war.

A man examines the circuit board of a Russian missile that struck a grain storage facility in the village of Pavlivka, in Ukraine's Odesa region, on July 24, 2023. Russian missile attacks on Ukrainian cities have become routine. Scott Peterson/Getty Images

Russia had a larger remaining proportion of tactical missiles, Reznikov said. This included 326 of 470 pre-war Onyx, 6,672 of 8,000 pre-war S-300s, and 312 of 500 pre-war Kh-29/31/35/58/59s.

Russia has continued its long-range strikes in subsequent months, meaning these figures will have been somewhat whittled down. But Moscow has been able to continue production even while Western sanctions bite.

Russia has reportedly been using conduit third countries to import dual-use electronic goods it can cannibalize for required military components. Vladyslav Vlasiuk, an adviser to Zelensky on sanctions policy, told Reuters in April that Kyiv is now finding more Chinese components inside Russian missiles.

Naval Forces

Despite some high-profile losses, Russia's navy is largely unscathed. Only the Black Sea Fleet has been heavily involved in the full-scale invasion, losing its Moskva flagship in the process.

The Slava-class missile cruiser is among eight vessels confirmed destroyed by Oryx, along with five Raptor-class patrol boats, one high-speed assault boat, the Tapir-class landing ship Saratov, one Serna-class landing craft, and rescue tug the Vasily Bekh.

Two Ropucha-class landing ships have been damaged, as has a Natya-class minesweeper. The Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate Admiral Makarov was also claimed damaged by Ukraine in a naval drone attack last year.

Russia still has the third-largest navy in the world behind the U.S. and China, according to the World Directory of Modern Military Warships' 2023 database. Among its assets are one aircraft carrier, 58 submarines, four cruisers and 12 destroyers.

Newsweek · by David Brennan · August 10, 2023

18. What senior officers can learn from junior officers’ ‘fanatical care’

I had no idea about "fanatical care." Of course for us old timers this seems to contradict the "mission first" concept we have long been taught or is some attempt at revising the mission first people always that some services adopt.

But this concept is interesting and may actually be a better description of leadership and the yin yang relationship between mission/people and how you must pursue the proper balance between the two in the given circumstances.

I think I have worked for many good leaders who acted this way intuitively and did not have a label for the leadership style.

Excerpts:

Fanatical care has two tenets: (1) develop and care for people even at the expense of the mission; and (2) collectively pursue and care about the mission even at the expense of people. While potentially conflicting, these two tenets are critically related: the first is the main line of effort to achieving the second.

In the first case, the ‘fanatical’ aspect comes from the singular focus of care — that is, care without compromise, even if in the short term the mission may suffer. It is zealous, focused, and characterized by a ferocious pursuit of sailor welfare.

In the second tenet, the fanatical aspect refers to the intensity of effort applied to the mission — without compromise, even when in the short term the mission causes adversity to sailors. Fanatical care for the mission is crucial to organizational success, but it cannot be forced. It can only be won. That is, junior officers can demonstrate their own fanatical care of the mission, but to ensure collective, zealous, pursuit of mission success as a team, junior officers must take action to inspire it in those they lead.

...

The fanatical care practiced by junior officers is fundamentally about understanding and being able to apply exceptions. Total adherence to the mission-first mentality does not solve the problems of a division filled with people who did not choose to be there or with each other.

Effective junior officers know when to make an exception, when to apply a specific solution, and do so. Senior officers would benefit from harnessing this model more often. While a major commander cannot be personally involved in the work and life of the hundreds of sailors under his or her command, he or she can apply fanatical care to the skippers who work for her and support their efforts to do the same for their people.

What senior officers can learn from junior officers’ ‘fanatical care’

militarytimes.com · by Lt. Cmdr. Josh Portzer · August 11, 2023

The one phrase everyone in the Navy has heard at least once, and probably more times than they can count, is “we’re a family here.” Being part of a division, department, or command is in fact like being surrounded by relatives, because the other old aphorism is true: you can’t pick your family. In the private sector an executive, manager, or leader can hire his or her team. If an employee’s performance isn’t up to standards, the person in charge can fire them and pick someone new. Often, not so for the Navy.

While joining the Navy is obviously a choice, much of what happens after that point is not. Once an enlisted sailor gets there, he or she is assigned to a division to work with the people who already happened to be there. When a junior officer arrives at a command, he or she is similarly assigned to lead a division/department of people who also already happened to be there. With the exception of a few highly specialized commands and billets, members of the Navy pick neither their team, their teammates, nor their bosses. The mission must be executed, regardless of the qualities, abilities, or personalities of the people charged with doing so.

Speaking broadly, in the corporate world, the ability of a team to meet its goals can often be determined by controlling the composition of the team. If someone is failing to meet the standard or simply isn’t meshing well, they can be let go — and a better fit brought in as a replacement. Junior officers, on the other hand, are almost never able to either hire or fire people. Yet they must (and do) accomplish the mission anyway. Junior officers effectively lead in the military despite their lack of managerial control by practicing “fanatical care.”

Fanatical care has two tenets: (1) develop and care for people even at the expense of the mission; and (2) collectively pursue and care about the mission even at the expense of people. While potentially conflicting, these two tenets are critically related: the first is the main line of effort to achieving the second.

In the first case, the ‘fanatical’ aspect comes from the singular focus of care — that is, care without compromise, even if in the short term the mission may suffer. It is zealous, focused, and characterized by a ferocious pursuit of sailor welfare.

In the second tenet, the fanatical aspect refers to the intensity of effort applied to the mission — without compromise, even when in the short term the mission causes adversity to sailors. Fanatical care for the mission is crucial to organizational success, but it cannot be forced. It can only be won. That is, junior officers can demonstrate their own fanatical care of the mission, but to ensure collective, zealous, pursuit of mission success as a team, junior officers must take action to inspire it in those they lead.

Utilizing individual-focused care, junior officers overcome their almost total inability to change the composition of their team.

A lieutenant commander makes the department better at its job by aggressively pursuing individual development. A lieutenant practices empathy to figure out how to convince two ensigns to work together. A lieutenant junior grade fosters a culture of trust to ensure he or she is equipped to react when an airman is accused of misconduct. In each case, junior officers craft individual solutions: extra bridge simulator time, a sit-down airing of grievances, or a thorough investigation (as examples). This type of care-based problem solving is how junior officers do their job —and they do it extremely well.

In the face of a lack of traditional carrots and sticks (e.g. promotions or firings), junior officers are able to successfully lead and transform organizations by forming individual, caring relationships. Senior officers, on the other hand, have a few more carrot/stick tools at their disposal, although they too are limited by the nature of the Navy personnel system.

The fanatical care practiced by junior officers is fundamentally about understanding and being able to apply exceptions. Total adherence to the mission-first mentality does not solve the problems of a division filled with people who did not choose to be there or with each other.

Effective junior officers know when to make an exception, when to apply a specific solution, and do so. Senior officers would benefit from harnessing this model more often. While a major commander cannot be personally involved in the work and life of the hundreds of sailors under his or her command, he or she can apply fanatical care to the skippers who work for her and support their efforts to do the same for their people.

Similarly, senior Navy leadership should keep the model of fanatical care in mind when drafting policies — allowing leaders both the trade and decision space to craft individual-focused solutions. The result will be organizational transformation and mission accomplishment.

Lt. Cmdr. Josh “Minkus” Portzer is an active duty naval flight officer. He commissioned as an ensign in 2010 through the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps at the University of Virginia. Lt. Cmdr. Joelle C. Portzer is the assistant senior defense counsel for Defense Service Office North. She commissioned as an ensign in 2010 through the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps at the University of Virginia.

These opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense.

19. The Emerging “Cold Tech War” Between the U.S and China

Excerpts:

The U.S. and China are now engaged in a full-fledged tit-for-tat cable competition, launching new projects of their own and disrupting projects started by the other. For instance, the United States, Japan, and Australia signed an agreement with Micronesia in June of this year to construct an undersea cable for their island chain. These islands are situated in the western Pacific—an area where Washington and Beijing are both vying for influence. The U.S. successfully convinced the Micronesians to reject a similar offer from the Chinese in 2021, warning that the CCP would likely use a Chinese-laid cable to collect intelligence.

Capitol Hill is also taking steps to counter China’s ability to build undersea cables. In early 2023, House Republicans led by Representative Brian Mast (FL-21) drafted a bill that “would require the Biden Administration to develop a strategy to limit foreign adversaries like China from accessing goods and technologies capable of supporting undersea cables.” The legislation, titled the Undersea Cable Control Act, unanimously passed the House in March, and is expected to pass in the Senate.

Submarine cable competition between the United States and China has serious implications for today’s information war. If China and the U.S. continue to bid against each other, countries will be forced to choose between their cable networks, forming a “digital Iron Curtain” that splits the internet ecosystem in two. Just like Cold War-era Germany, a boundary line will separate two ideological worlds. This time though, the Berlin Wall will be invisible, and the divide will not be one of peoples, but of information itself.

The Emerging “Cold Tech War” Between the U.S and China

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/08/11/the_emerging_cold_tech_war_between_the_us_and_china_972273.html?mc_cid=83e65fe01b&mc_eid=70bf478f36

By Nicole Robinson & Grace Phillips

August 11, 2023

The Sino-U.S. “cold tech war” is reaching new heights—or rather depths—as tensions are building under the sea. First it was semiconductors. Now it’s submarine cables.

Undersea cables, unseen and often ignored, are essential to daily life and critical to U.S. national security. Over 97 percent of global data traffic travels through a network of cables that sit atop the seabed of the world’s oceans. Those same cables transmit upwards of $10 trillion in financial transactions every day and are a central component of the American military’s network-centric warfare operations.

In the current geopolitical climate, submarine cable financing and construction is about far more than turning profits. Control of cable networks means control of information—a center of gravity in modern conflict. Now, national governments are inserting themselves in bidding wars between private firms to gain a strategic edge over their adversaries in the information sphere. Nowhere is such competition more apparent than between the United States and China.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) openly monitors and regulates the flow of information between its citizens, and increasingly, the same is true worldwide. In fact, the CCP mandates that Chinese-based fiber-optic companies conduct surveillance on its behalf both at home and abroad. The U.S. government has since limited the use of equipment from these businesses on American shores, stating that its authorization poses “an unacceptable risk to national security.”

In 2018, a consortium including state-backed China Mobile applied to build the “Bay to Bay Express” cable, connecting Hong Kong to California. However, a Trump-era working group assessed that Hong Kong-based cables “would expose U.S. communications traffic to collection” by the Chinese Communist Party. Approvals for cable landings linking U.S. soil to Hong Kong were therefore blocked, forcing China to abandon the project.

Following the collapse of several similar deals in the Pacific, China’s undersea cable industry turned toward Africa and Eurasia—markets that receive low levels of American investment and are therefore open to Chinese capital. Already part of the “Belt and Road Initiative,” President Xi Jinping’s colossal investment strategy to enhance the CCP’s political influence in the developing world, some of these countries were more receptive to becoming part of China’s cable network.

In 2021, China Mobile, Facebook, and others constructed a submarine cable surrounding the African continent. The cable advances China’s “Digital Silk Road,” the technological component of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative that will expand its global infrastructure network. Additionally, notorious tech giant Huawei’s cleverly rebranded subsidiary HMN Tech laid a cable in December 2022 known as “PEACE,” linking Kenya and Pakistan to France. The PEACE cable extends through the Suez Canal—a vital waterway connecting the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea along China’s “Maritime Silk Road” route.

The U.S. is combating CCP fiber-optic influence at its source—the bidding process. In February 2023, a U.S. government push successfully removed HMN Tech, China Telecom, and China Mobile from the South East Asia-Middle East-West Europe 6 (Sea-Me-We 6) project, a proposed 12,000-mile cable that will connect southeast Asia to western Europe.

Unfortunately, that success was short-lived. Two months later, China Telecom and China Unicom announced plans to finance a $500 million undersea cable, calling it Europe-Middle East-Asia, or EMA. This undersea cable will rival the Sea-Me-We 6, stretching along a remarkably similar route and landing at many of the same locations.

The U.S. and China are now engaged in a full-fledged tit-for-tat cable competition, launching new projects of their own and disrupting projects started by the other. For instance, the United States, Japan, and Australia signed an agreement with Micronesia in June of this year to construct an undersea cable for their island chain. These islands are situated in the western Pacific—an area where Washington and Beijing are both vying for influence. The U.S. successfully convinced the Micronesians to reject a similar offer from the Chinese in 2021, warning that the CCP would likely use a Chinese-laid cable to collect intelligence.

Capitol Hill is also taking steps to counter China’s ability to build undersea cables. In early 2023, House Republicans led by Representative Brian Mast (FL-21) drafted a bill that “would require the Biden Administration to develop a strategy to limit foreign adversaries like China from accessing goods and technologies capable of supporting undersea cables.” The legislation, titled the Undersea Cable Control Act, unanimously passed the House in March, and is expected to pass in the Senate.

Submarine cable competition between the United States and China has serious implications for today’s information war. If China and the U.S. continue to bid against each other, countries will be forced to choose between their cable networks, forming a “digital Iron Curtain” that splits the internet ecosystem in two. Just like Cold War-era Germany, a boundary line will separate two ideological worlds. This time though, the Berlin Wall will be invisible, and the divide will not be one of peoples, but of information itself.

Nicole Robinson is a Senior Research Associate in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy at The Heritage Foundation.

Grace Phillips is an intern with The Heritage Foundation.

20. Did Russia Play Everyone For Fools? Wagner Mutiny Was A Staged ‘Special Operation Coordinated With Putin’, Claims High Ranking Ukrainian Politician

Take with a huge boulder of salt.

Did Russia Play Everyone For Fools? Wagner Mutiny Was A Staged ‘Special Operation Coordinated With Putin’, Claims High Ranking Ukrainian Politician

BY DAVE MALYON

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24 HOURS AGO

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knewz.com · by Dave Malyon · August 10, 2023

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While Wagner’s aborted mutiny in Russia followed reports of the PMC boss being visibly unhappy with Moscow’s inner circle and rampant speculation of Vladimir Putin’s imminent demise, it could be that that the incident was not what it appeared to be.

A recent allegation stemming from higher-ups in Volodymyr Zelensky’s administration asserts that the Wagner putsch was merely staged.

Wagner Boss Yevgeny Prigozhin during one of his videos. Twitter/Kyiv Post

According to News.com, Ukrainian Defense Secretary, Oleksiy Danilov, released a televised statement saying: “Today we can already say that it was a special operation coordinated with Putin to expose those generals who were not entirely loyal to Putin and his entourage.”

Experts also claim that the reason for the march on Moscow last month was twofold. The first reason was to see which of the Russian President’s underlings were truly loyal to him, and the second, to fool the West into a false-found sense of complacency.

Perhaps supporting these allegations were the reports that followed of an ‘exiled’ Yevgeny Prighozhin making numerous trips to Russia after his expulsion and even attending a secret meeting with Putin where the mercenary boss’s top brass “pledged their “loyalty to Putin”.

While Western media believed that the failed coup was the start of Putin's downfall, Ukraine says it was just a farce. By: MEGA

Prigozhin was even photographed at a recent meeting with African leaders in St. Petersburg where Putin canvassed support by handing out gifts to his guests.

Ukraine is not the the only entity to doubt the authenticity of the events of June, 23.

In an interview with Newsweek, Alexei Pavlenko who is a professor of Russian at Colorado College said: “The entire Prigozhin affair, even before the mutiny, struck me as a kind of a burlesque, staged by Putin and his close advisers for Western consumption.”

Prigozhin shakes the hand of one of the African leaders at the St. Petersburg summit. By: Twitter

“The purpose of this farce was to confuse the Western analysts and military experts and then gloat over their predictable predictions of Putin’s impending demise.”

“The objective of this setup was both to keep the official army generals on their toes and to plant confusion into the adversaries’ intelligence.”

Rebekkah Koffler, a former Defence Intelligence Agency staffer went as far as writing an article about the failed coup and criticized the West, claiming that they had fallen for the farce.

Koffler wrote:

“None seemed to realize the obvious truth: The coup was staged, and completely faked false flag operation. Think about it: An army invades Russia, races right up to Moscow, and no one gets hurt? With just a few thousand men, it achieved what Hitler with almost a million men wasn't able to? And Putin holds his military back? And then, with Moscow supposedly within his grasp, Prigozhin decides, "Oh well, never mind" and heads to Belarus?”

Newsweek

Yevgeny Prigozhin during the Rostov-on-Don takeover. By: Twitter

Prighozhin’s main base is now reported to be in Belarus and according to a recent article by Knewz.com, his men are training with the Belarussian army near the border of Poland.

For Prighozin it seems business as normal and he (per New York Post) was recently reported offering his services to the Junta government of Niger after a coup.

Dave Malyon Dave is a writer and reporter for Knewz.com, covering breaking news.

knewz.com · by Dave Malyon · August 10, 2023

21. Lukashenko boots Wagner out of Belarus

Lukashenko boots Wagner out of Belarus

Story by IntelliNews •6h

By Ben Aris in Berlin

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/lukashenko-boots-wagner-out-of-belarus/ar-AA1f7TXM?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=U531&cvid=51dd9f56c2984be9934cd8d6700794a1&ei=41

Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko has reportedly kicked the Wagner PMC out of Belarus, after refusing to finance the Russian mercenaries.

Wagner forces left Russia for Belarus as part of a settlement deal brokered by Lukashenko following the armed mutiny on June 24 that saw Wagner’s leader Yevgeny Prigozhin turn on his boss, Russian President Vladimir Putin.

But reports have now emerged suggesting Lukashenko has refused to finance their stay in the country and the mercenaries are being 'bussed' back to Russia for a “vacation.” According to the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel, operations to remove all Wagner Group men began earlier in the month, with a second phase to remove the rest going into effect this weekend.

Wagner’s services don’t come cheap. Putin recently admitted that the Kremlin has spent around $1bn on the private military company last year, using state budget funds. Previously the Kremlin denied all knowledge of Wagner.

VChK-OGPU said the men headed for Russia are mercenaries that rejected re-assignment to Libya, where the Group has been operating for years.

'A source of the Cheka-OGPU said that after the meeting of PMC Wagner, everyone who did not sign up for a business trip to Libya was urgently sent on vacation to Russia,” VChK-OGPU posted on its channel. “Right now, mercenaries in Belarus are packing their bags and going back to Russia on vacation. At the same time, everyone was asked to stay in touch with PMCs, since at any moment a certain command from above could follow.' Earlier Lukashenko said that the Wagner forces would be used to train the Belarusian army.

The presence of Wagner in Belarus has seriously worried Poland and the Baltic states, as following a successful eight-month long campaign to take the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, Wagner fighters have won a reputation for military ferocity and effectiveness.

Tensions along the Belarus-Poland border have ratcheted up steadily over the last year and reached a fresh high when Belarusian military helicopters flying along the border briefly violated Polish airspace last week.

Warsaw and Vilnius see potential threats posed by Belarusian military exercises and the presence of the Wagner Group in Belarus. Poland is planning to move up to 10,000 additional troops to the border with Belarus to support the Border Guard.

Ukraine has also heavily fortified its border with Belarus over the last eight months to prevent a second invasion from the north by Russian troops based in Belarus.

Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki met with Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda in Suwalki, Poland on August 3 and discussed the challenges posed by the Suwalki Corridor, an area separating Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast from Belarus and considered to be a military weakness.

Morawiecki emphasised the need for increased vigilance among Nato allies due to the high potential for provocations by Belarus following the helicopter incident.

Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Pawel Jablonski announced that all necessary measures, including isolating Belarus and closing the border, are being considered to protect Polish territory and citizens.

Lithuania has also decided to shut down two border checkpoints with Belarus due to the presence of Wagner Group mercenaries on Belarusian territory.

In the midst of escalating tensions between Belarus, Poland and Lithuania, Belarus initiated military exercises on its borders with Poland and Lithuania, near the Suwalki Gap.

The Belarusian Defence Ministry stated that these drills were inspired by Russia's conflict with Ukraine and would involve the use of drones and co-ordinated efforts between various military units.

Nato spokesperson Oana Longescu commented on Wagner's presence in Belarus, mentioning that Nato has not observed an immediate military threat. However, the alliance is closely monitoring the activities of the Wagner Group in the region.

​22. We need a solution now to unfreeze military confirmations

We need a solution now to unfreeze military confirmations

Defense News · by Gen. Robert Brown (ret.) · August 10, 2023

An unprecedented Senate freeze in confirming more than 300 senior military officers for critical jobs across the joint force demands immediate action to avoid the national security disaster that could arise from not having a full stable of senior leadership.

Leaving key vacancies in critical Pentagon leadership posts — including the Army chief of staff and Marine Corps commandant — is never wise. The Marine Corps hasn’t had a vacancy in its top leadership post since 1910-1911, according to the Pentagon, and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has said there was never before a time when both the top Army and Marine Corps leadership posts were vacant simultaneously.

This is an especially bad situation in today’s global environment. It puts the U.S. and our allies and partners at unnecessary risk, and it tarnishes America’s reputation as an unshakeable, always-ready global leader.

This monthslong blockade has steadily grown while the U.S. and the world face deepening crises and threats, from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and North Korea’s increased tests of nuclear-capable missiles to China’s threatening modernization and the unsettling recent display of Russian and Chinese warships operating together off the Alaskan coast. Times of transition, particularly among top leaders, are already dangerous. It is not hard to fathom how one or several of these threats could explode.

The only ones benefiting from this reckless and unnecessary delay in filling vital leadership positions are America’s adversaries, who are always looking for weaknesses in America’s resolve. The U.S. has long been revered for its stability and the professionalism of its leaders; derailing this traditional, nonpartisan process tarnishes that shine.

A team of experienced military leaders could help deter conflict while also preparing for what happens if deterrence escalates into major warfare. It is not so easy when key command positions are vacant or temporarily filled by someone who’s not able to fully exercise the power of the office.

Sen. Tommy Tuberville talks about why he’s holding up promotions following a Pentagon policy about abortion access, and hears from the secretary of defense.

Temporary leaders — like Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George, who is performing the duties of the chief of staff and pending confirmation by the Senate — face limits on their authority while awaiting confirmation because they are prevented from taking any actions that assume they will be confirmed.

This crisis of our own making is entirely avoidable if the Senate can find a solution other than crippling Department of Defense leadership by benching the first team.

A freeze at the top has implications throughout the ranks as well. Army Secretary Christine Wormuth described a service “now in limbo” because of the hold on confirmations.

“We need these leaders in place to ensure the readiness of our force. And we need to end all of this uncertainty for our military families,” she said at the Aug. 4 ceremony where Gen. James McConville relinquished responsibility as the 40th Army chief of staff.

Delayed promotions of senior military leaders have a direct impact on lieutenant colonels and above because their climb up the ranks and permanent change-of-station moves to relocate their families are all impacted. For other soldiers, they may be left wondering who’s in charge and about the strength of the government’s commitment to military members and their families.

Military life is never easy for families. I say this as someone who moved 26 times in my Army career. Being in limbo is terrible for families — not knowing when they need to pack, where they’ll be attending school, when a spouse will land a job and even if their children will be able to play on a sports team at their new location. The incredible uncertainty caused by the confirmation delays impacts the entire family and could lead to the loss of talented leaders who may decide to leave the service early. This is not the people-first philosophy we aspire to have in the Army.

We need a fair confirmation process that encourages high-quality people to serve in higher ranks. This freeze is completely unnecessary. There is a solution: having the Senate change its rules on the confirmation of general officers, eliminating the ability of any one senator to freeze a nomination.

General and flag officer nominations should be reviewed and confirmed in a timely manner and be blocked only for conduct, character or competence concerns.

When the Senate returns in September, bipartisan leaders should approve the waiting backlog of defense nominations and revise the rules so that routine promotions do not become entangled in other matters. That is the right thing to do.

Retired U.S. Army Gen. Robert Brown is president and CEO of the Association of the United States Army. He previously led U.S. Army Pacific.

23. NATO Is on the Back Foot in the Indo-Pacific

Excerpts:

More fundamentally, NATO should avoid vague complaints against “China’s stated ambitions,” a China threat, or the danger that authoritarian regimes pose to democracies. It should confine itself to clearly identifying behavior that flouts international law in the region, such as China’s attempts to claim economic rights within the nine-dash line encapsulating much of the South China Sea, so that common cause may be found.

NATO should also have a positive agenda and work with the EU and the United States to support peace and prosperity in the region through political means, namely, through consultation and cooperation on “defence and security-related issues to solve problems, build trust and prevent conflict.” Focus should be placed on low-intensity and collaborative activities, which could include capacity-building (such as helping to boost maritime domain awareness) and dialogue on nuclear security and nonproliferation, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism.

If the NATO liaison office in Tokyo goes through—and private conversations at the Vilnius summit and the forum that took place alongside it, in which this author participated, suggest it might—it may be used to increase understanding in the region about the alliance and its political dimensions. Thus far, news about the liaison office has allowed China to reinforce its claims of NATO expansionism and militarization. When asked about the proposed office in Tokyo, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “NATO’s attempt to make eastward inroads into the Asia-Pacific will inevitably undermine regional peace and stability.”

What is known about NATO in the region is very much a reflection of the mirror China holds up to it. China’s complaints about NATO hold sway in Asia. Understanding, addressing, and ideally, preempting these concerns will allow the alliance to more effectively engage an important region to achieve its core objective of safeguarding the freedom and security of its members.

NATO Is on the Back Foot in the Indo-Pacific​

By exploiting an information vacuum about its intentions, China is setting the region against the Western alliance.

By Lynn Kuok, the Shangri-La Dialogue senior fellow for Asia-Pacific security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the co-editor of the IISS Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment.

Foreign Policy · by Lynn Kuok · August 10, 2023

The recent NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, was watched closely for the outcome of Sweden’s bid for membership—Turkey agreed on the eve of the summit to ask its parliament to approve Sweden’s membership—and the alliance’s response to Ukraine’s formal application to join—NATO maintained that Ukraine would become a member “when allies agree and conditions are met” without setting out a time frame for the country’s entry after the war. In Asia, another aspect of the meeting was scrutinized: how NATO positioned itself on China.

There were three developments ahead of and in Vilnius on this front. First, as with the NATO summit held in Madrid in 2022, NATO extended invitations to four Indo-Pacific countries: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. These are countries with which the alliance now has agreements to deepen cooperation. Their invitations were aimed at underscoring the strategic linkages between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific. Second, the leaders’ communiqué included strong language expressing concern about China. And third, NATO laid down plans to open a liaison office in Tokyo. This proposal was blocked by objections from the French and, reportedly, at the last minute, the Germans, though NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg insists that plans to open a liaison office in Tokyo are “still on the table.”

Beyond the four partner countries, there are others in the Indo-Pacific, including in Southeast Asia, who are at best agnostic and at worst hostile toward NATO. More must be done to reassure these countries that NATO will not be a destabilizing force in their backyards. The alliance is not well understood in the region, with most commentary focusing on its military dimensions.

Because of this, China has been allowed to shape NATO’s image in the Indo-Pacific. Reports of the planned liaison office in Tokyo, for instance, made news without NATO first stressing its political goals or setting out how the liaison office fits in with these. The failure allowed China to step into the informational void and craft the narrative. While the communiqué that emerged from the summit accused China of being “opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up,” NATO itself could also be faulted for, if not opacity, then a lack of strategic clarity—as demonstrated by the French objections to the Tokyo liaison office on the basis that it would create misunderstanding about NATO’s commitment in the Indo-Pacific, which is not its geographical area of competence.

It would be wrong to suggest that NATO has no business beyond the Euro-Atlantic. NATO’s stated purpose is to “safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means,” and ensuring this sometimes involves “engaging outside of NATO,” as “the outbreak of crises and conflicts beyond Allied borders can jeopardise this core objective.” In addition, NATO can play an important role in defending and promoting the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific. But NATO’s presence being defensible in terms of the alliance’s stated mission is not the same as it being wise. Whether engagement in the region is prudent will depend on how effective such engagement is. Beyond its posturing on China, NATO can and should do more to address disquiet around its aims and intentions in the Indo-Pacific.

Chinese objections to the summit emerged in the lead-up to it. About a week prior, China’s state media criticized “NATO’s hidden agenda.” Beijing argued this had been exposed in advance by Lithuania, the host nation, announcing its own Indo-Pacific strategy—the wording of which had been “directly taken” from U.S. rhetoric toward China. The Global Times poured scorn on “a Baltic country with a population of less than 3 million, located in the direct radiation zone of the Russia-Ukraine conflict” releasing an Indo-Pacific strategy. The commentary also decried the attendance of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea at the summit for a second consecutive year, which gave, it argued, a “strong signal of NATO’s expansion into the Asia-Pacific.”

Meanwhile, the leaders’ communiqué, which came out of the summit and reflected almost word-for-word the language in the NATO strategic concept issued in March 2022, accused “the People’s Republic of China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies [of] challeng[ing] our interests, security and values.”

The leaders’ communiqué went further than the 2022 strategic concept to expand on the “deepening strategic partnership” between China and Russia. A NATO wish list in relation to China was added: namely, for it “to play a constructive role as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to condemn Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, to abstain from supporting Russia’s war effort in any way, to cease amplifying Russia’s false narrative blaming Ukraine and NATO for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and to adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.” NATO called, in particular, for China “to act responsibly and refrain from providing any lethal aid to Russia.”

NATO clearly wanted to send a signal of concern over China’s behavior. This was important, though parts of the communiqué lacked specificity—which of China’s “stated ambitions,” for example, were objectionable? China, unsurprisingly, took umbrage at the communiqué, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded that NATO “stop making groundless accusations and provocative rhetoric targeting China, quit the outdated Cold War mentality, ditch the wrongdoing of seeking absolute security.” It is fair to ask what NATO has achieved thus far in the broader Indo-Pacific beyond signaling. Neither the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nor its member states have an official position on NATO, but suspicion of the alliance in Southeast Asia is exemplified in commentaries highlighting a sense of distrust.

Kishore Mahbubani, a prominent Singaporean former diplomat and academic, wrote in 2021 in the Straits Times, a national broadsheet newspaper, that “the Pacific has no need of the destructive militaristic culture of the Atlantic alliance,” and that “NATO is not a geopolitically wise organization.” The Jakarta Post, an Indonesian newspaper, carried an op-ed in May this year labeling NATO’s outreach to Asia as “a very perilous step” and “very disturbing news for regional peace and stability.” A commentary in the National Defence Journal of Vietnam, linked to the Vietnamese Central Military Commission and Ministry of National Defence, alleges that the “expansion of NATO’s influence into the Indo-Pacific has been arousing concern for countries in this region, as it increases the risk of instability when the competition between China and the West becomes increasingly fierce.”

Worries around NATO in the Indo-Pacific can be teased out into two main concerns. First, that NATO is expanding militarily in the region—a claim for which there is no basis. Many in the region regard NATO as solely a military alliance, forgetting its political dimensions, and its expansion into the Indo-Pacific conjures up images of NATO troops and equipment. NATO member states are clear that there are no plans to expand militarily in the region; the alliance should seek to reinforce this message.

The second concern is more nuanced, namely, that even short of military operations, an expansion of the U.S.-led NATO in the Indo-Pacific will complicate an already fraught geostrategic landscape. Compounding this worry is a perception, even in countries in the Indo-Pacific that have taken a strong stance against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, that NATO is geopolitically clumsy and bears at least some responsibility for the invasion. Among Southeast Asian countries, Singapore took the strongest stance against what it described as Russia’s “clear and gross violation” of international law and the U.N. Charter. Nonetheless, Singapore’s minister of home affairs gave a speech in March 2023 that posited that “the West and NATO … were not uninvolved bystanders who had no role to play in the current situation.”

And while China’s actions in the South China Sea—where its expansive maritime claims are a clear breach of the international law—are egregious, not all countries in the region regard China as a threat. Even Southeast Asian claimants to land also claimed by China (and Taiwan) in the South China Sea are wary of alienating the neighborhood superpower. They see their dispute with China as only part of a broader bilateral relationship, which reaps actual and potential benefits. According to a 2023 Yusof Ishak Institute poll of Southeast Asians, China continues to be seen as the most influential economic power in the region, with almost 60 percent of respondents selecting China over the United States (10.5 percent). (China is also regarded as the most influential political and strategic power, with 41.5 percent of respondents choosing China and 31.9 percent choosing the United States.)

In most, if not all, of Southeast Asia, an acceptance of the importance of the rule of law is not matched by an appetite to risk conflict or economic development in its defense. Concerns are most pronounced around deteriorating U.S.-China ties and its destabilizing impact, and, for many, a United States that is perceived as unduly confrontational. Given this, NATO needs to adopt a different tack if it is to effectively mobilize the Indo-Pacific to support a rules-based international order.

To be effective, outreach in the Indo-Pacific must go beyond Japan and the other NATO Indo-Pacific partners. The four countries in attendance in Vilnius are important but by no means the entirety of the region—a fact that received scant acknowledgement at the summit. Southeast Asia, for one, is at the geographic heart of the Indo-Pacific, and China is cultivating ASEAN and its member states. China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner for 14 years, its foreign direct investments in Southeast Asia are on an upward trajectory, and its Belt and Road Initiative is generally welcomed.

More fundamentally, NATO should avoid vague complaints against “China’s stated ambitions,” a China threat, or the danger that authoritarian regimes pose to democracies. It should confine itself to clearly identifying behavior that flouts international law in the region, such as China’s attempts to claim economic rights within the nine-dash line encapsulating much of the South China Sea, so that common cause may be found.

NATO should also have a positive agenda and work with the EU and the United States to support peace and prosperity in the region through political means, namely, through consultation and cooperation on “defence and security-related issues to solve problems, build trust and prevent conflict.” Focus should be placed on low-intensity and collaborative activities, which could include capacity-building (such as helping to boost maritime domain awareness) and dialogue on nuclear security and nonproliferation, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism.

If the NATO liaison office in Tokyo goes through—and private conversations at the Vilnius summit and the forum that took place alongside it, in which this author participated, suggest it might—it may be used to increase understanding in the region about the alliance and its political dimensions. Thus far, news about the liaison office has allowed China to reinforce its claims of NATO expansionism and militarization. When asked about the proposed office in Tokyo, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “NATO’s attempt to make eastward inroads into the Asia-Pacific will inevitably undermine regional peace and stability.”

What is known about NATO in the region is very much a reflection of the mirror China holds up to it. China’s complaints about NATO hold sway in Asia. Understanding, addressing, and ideally, preempting these concerns will allow the alliance to more effectively engage an important region to achieve its core objective of safeguarding the freedom and security of its members.

Foreign Policy · by Lynn Kuok · August 10, 2023

24. A Looming Threat: Weaponized Artificial Intelligence by John Fenzel

A Looming Threat: Weaponized Artificial Intelligence

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/looming-threat-weaponized-artificial-intelligence-john-fenzel/

John Fenzel

Keynote Speaker : Leading by Example : Overcoming Adversity : Teamwork : Storyteller : Green Beret

120 articles Following

August 9, 2023

Imagine waking up one day to complete darkness, the still silence interrupted only by distant sirens. Your town, and all of the world's major cities are paralyzed—not by a natural disaster or a traditional act of war, but by a coordinated, invisible assault: lines of code manipulated by a state-sponsored AI weapon. Air traffic control systems falter, causing panic in the skies. Financial markets crash as AI-driven trades spiral out of control, wiping out lifetimes of savings in mere hours. Military drones, once under national control, drift ominously across borders...

As an author of four novels, crafting scenarios that captivate readers at a time where reality often outpaces fiction is always a unique challenge. Yet, the narrative of weaponized artificial intelligence isn't just a page from dystopian fiction; it's a haunting echo of our contemporary vulnerabilities. This silent warfare, driven by AI's stealth and precision, looms as a very real threat in our contemporary landscape.

Still skeptical? Okay. Well, hear me out...

The Rise of AI Technology

From making movie recommendations to diagnosing medical conditions, AI technologies have witnessed an astonishing evolution in the last two decades. The once theoretical concept of machines 'thinking' and 'learning' has now permeated every sector, be it healthcare, finance, entertainment, or defense. With processing power skyrocketing and algorithms growing ever more sophisticated, our dependence on AI has become all-encompassing, changing the landscape of how we live, work, and protect our nations.

The Dual-Use Nature of Technology: Benefits and Threats

But, like every powerful tool, AI comes with an inherent duality. The same algorithms that help doctors predict patient illnesses can also be programmed for malicious intent. The same systems that streamline global supply chains can be rerouted to cause chaos. The possibilities are endless and varied, making the threat particularly hard to pin down and combat. As our reliance on AI deepens, so does our vulnerability to its potential weaponization. As we stand at this technological crossroad, it is crucial to balance the immense benefits of AI with the looming threats that can reshape geopolitics and redefine warfare.

Historical Perspective

Nuclear Technology. Much like AI, nuclear technology was once at the forefront of scientific marvels. First envisioned as an almost limitless source of energy, the discovery of nuclear fission in the 1930s promised to revolutionize our world. However, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 painted a grim picture of its potential for mass destruction. This duality of purpose—a beacon of hope and a harbinger of doom—is a recurring theme in our technological narratives. And so, too, is the requirement for collective responsibility.

Invention of the Internet. Similarly, the invention of the internet was seen as a revolutionary medium to connect the world, fostering communication and collaboration. Yet, it didn't take long for the darker aspects to emerge, from cybercrimes and espionage to cyber warfare.

Flight. The past is replete with examples of technological marvels turned into instruments of war. The benign flight of the Wright brothers' first airplane in 1903 was a testament to human innovation. But by the time World War I rolled around, airplanes were equipped with guns and bombs, marking the birth of aerial warfare.

Chemistry. Chemistry, a science that has cured diseases and improved our quality of life, also gave us chemical weapons. The horrors of mustard gas attacks during WWI remain a haunting reminder of how scientific advancements can be twisted for malevolent purposes.

Space. Even space, the final frontier, wasn't free from militarization. The Cold War saw an arms race not just on Earth but also in orbit, with both the USA and the USSR developing anti-satellite weapons and reconnaissance satellites.

These examples of history's dualism underscore a vital point: every technological leap, no matter how promising, carries with it the shadow of potential misuse. As AI continues its meteoric rise, we must remain vigilant, ensuring that its vast potential benefits aren't overshadowed by the specter of weaponization. The stakes have never been higher, and our collective future hinges on the choices we make today.

Understanding Weaponized AI

Weaponized AI is not merely the stuff of science fiction; it's a burgeoning reality we all need to come to terms with now. At its core, weaponized AI refers to the use of artificial intelligence technologies in military or conflict-related applications, designed either to cause harm or influence outcomes in favor of a particular entity. This fusion of cutting-edge computation with warfare opens up a Pandora's box of possibilities, some of which are already being realized, while others lurk ominously on the horizon. They come in a whole variety of forms, to include:

Drones. Once simple remote-controlled aircraft, drones have evolved dramatically with AI integration. They can now autonomously navigate, identify, and even eliminate targets without human intervention, ushering in a new era of warfare where decision-making happens at machine speed.

Cyber Warfare Tools. AI-driven cyber-attacks present a novel and evolving threat. Automated hacking tools can exploit vulnerabilities, spread malware, or steal sensitive information at scales and speeds unimaginable to human hackers. Imagine a cyber-attack that doesn't just target one institution but simultaneously assaults multiple critical infrastructures across a nation.

Propaganda Bots. In the age of information, influence is power. AI-driven bots can spread propaganda, fake news, or manipulate online discussions to sow discord, influence public opinion, or interfere in democratic processes. These bots can tailor their messages, adapting in real-time to the reactions of their audience, making them incredibly effective at their insidious tasks.

Potential Scale and Speed of AI-driven Conflicts

The true terror of AI-driven conflicts lies in their potential scale and speed. Traditional warfare, with its human limitations, at least offered the buffer of time—time to strategize, to negotiate, to prevent escalation. But AI eliminates such buffers:

Unprecedented Scale. AI systems can coordinate and execute operations on a global scale simultaneously. A single AI-driven cyber-attack could, in theory, cripple interconnected infrastructures worldwide, from power grids to financial systems.

Blistering Speed. Conflicts driven by AI can escalate in the blink of an eye. Decisions that once took humans hours, days, or even weeks can be made in microseconds. This speed leaves little to no room for human intervention, oversight, or de-escalation. An accidental trigger could lead to rapid, uncontrollable spirals of conflict.

Persistent Threat. AI-driven tools can be relentless, operating 24/7 without fatigue. They can adapt, learn from their environment, and continually refine their tactics, making them formidable and persistent adversaries.

As the world grapples with the implications of weaponized AI, understanding its forms and potential impacts is crucial. The promise and peril of AI have never been more intertwined, and the choices we make today will determine the nature of future battlefields. Will they be domains of uncontrolled machines, or can we harness AI's power responsibly, ensuring a safer world for all? Only time—and our actions—will tell. But one thing all of us can do now is to begin thinking about the issue in a deliberate, thoughtful way.

Real-World Scenarios and Case Studies

1. Drones in Military Operations

Modern warfare has seen a significant shift with the introduction of drones, or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). These machines are more than just surveillance tools; with AI integration, they've transformed into precision instruments of warfare.

Case Study: The Battle of Mosul (2016-2017)

During the operation to retake Mosul from ISIS, drones played a pivotal role. Not only did they provide crucial reconnaissance for coalition forces, but ISIS also deployed consumer-grade drones rigged with explosives. The ability of drones to hover silently before dropping a deadly payload was a tactic never seen on such a scale before. The accessibility and affordability of drone technology, combined with AI's precision, makes it a significant factor in modern conflict.

2. Automated Cyber-Attacks and Defense Mechanisms

The virtual world has become a battleground as significant as any physical terrain. With AI, the capability to launch, defend against, and adapt to cyber threats has grown exponentially.

Case Study: The 2017 WannaCry Ransomware Attack

In May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware attack spread across the globe, affecting over 200,000 computers in 150 countries. While the direct AI involvement is debated, the attack's speed and scale highlight the potential risks of automated cyber warfare. Future AI-driven cyber-attacks could analyze systems in real-time, exploit vulnerabilities faster than human response times, and adapt to defensive measures on-the-fly.

3. Deepfakes in Misinformation Campaigns

Deepfakes, or AI-generated fake videos or audio recordings that appear real, have emerged as potent tools in misinformation arsenals. They have the potential to cause political turmoil, incite violence, or damage reputations.

Case Study: Gabon's Political Instability (2019)

In 2019, a video of Gabon's President Ali Bongo surfaced, addressing the nation. However, his opponents declared the video a deepfake, citing his unusual appearance and behavior. Although it remains unclear whether the video was manipulated, the mere suspicion of a deepfake stirred political instability, leading to an attempted coup. This scenario underlines the potential dangers of deepfakes in a politically charged environment, where the line between reality and fabrication can become perilously thin.

The evolution of AI in warfare, cybersecurity, and information dissemination presents an intricate tapestry of opportunities and challenges. While they offer unparalleled advantages, the misuse or unchecked proliferation of these technologies can lead to unforeseen consequences. As we further delve into the age of AI, striking a balance between innovation and regulation becomes paramount.

Ethical Implications

As AI continues its meteoric rise in the military and cybersecurity sectors, so too do the moral and ethical dilemmas surrounding its use. 

The Machine Morality Conundrum: Entrusting machines with life-and-death decisions introduces a new ethical frontier. Can algorithms ever truly replicate the complex moral reasoning of a human being? When mistakes occur, as they inevitably will, who bears the responsibility? 

International Warfare Norms: The unchecked weaponization of AI threatens to destabilize existing international conventions and treaties on warfare. The Geneva Convention and other accords were designed for a pre-digital age. How can they be updated or reinterpreted to address the unique challenges AI presents?

Societal Stakes: Beyond the battlefield, the weaponization of AI has broader societal implications. Advanced surveillance tools that leverage AI could lead to privacy erosion and human rights violations. Moreover, unchecked AI could empower authoritarian regimes, leading to a global landscape where individual freedoms are curtailed.

Key Considerations: As nations race to harness the power of AI, it's essential for citizens and decision-makers alike to step back and evaluate the broader ramifications. The potential benefits of AI in defense are vast, but without careful oversight, the risks may far outweigh the rewards.

Technical Challenges

In the quest to leverage artificial intelligence for defense and security purposes, several technical obstacles must be addressed to ensure its safe and efficient application.

Reliability and Predictability: As with any complex system, achieving consistent and predictable behavior from weaponized AI is challenging. Training these systems requires massive datasets and meticulous calibration. Yet, even with vast amounts of data and rigorous testing, there remains the possibility of AI systems behaving unexpectedly, especially in unfamiliar or unanticipated scenarios.

Vulnerability to External Threats: Weaponized AI, like all digital systems, is susceptible to hacking. Adversaries might attempt to compromise these systems, either by directly hacking into them or by feeding them misleading information – a strategy known as "data poisoning." The consequences of such breaches can be catastrophic, especially if a compromised AI system has the authority to make autonomous decisions.

System Malfunctions: Beyond external threats, there's also the inherent risk of system malfunctions. As AI models grow in complexity, so do their potential points of failure. A minor glitch or a misinterpreted command could lead to unintended actions with grave consequences.

The race to integrate AI into defense mechanisms amplifies the need for rigorous technical oversight. While the potential benefits are undeniable, the technical challenges serve as a reminder that the path to weaponized AI must be treaded carefully and deliberately.

Global Response and Defense Mechanisms

As the prospect of weaponized AI becomes increasingly real, nations worldwide recognize the need for collective action and preventive measures to safeguard global security.

Establishing International Norms and Treaties: Analogous to nuclear disarmament treaties, there's a burgeoning movement towards crafting international accords on AI weaponization. Nations are coming together to set standards and limits on the deployment and development of lethal autonomous weapons. These treaties aim to prevent an unchecked arms race and ensure that AI's weaponization is governed by ethical and humanitarian principles.

Development of AI Countermeasures: Recognizing the potential threats posed by weaponized AI, research into AI countermeasures has gained momentum. These countermeasures include techniques to detect and neutralize adversarial AI systems, whether they be drones, cyber tools, or misinformation bots. Such defensive technologies aim to identify vulnerabilities in AI systems and exploit them, effectively "outsmarting" the AI.

Defensive Technologies: Beyond countermeasures tailored explicitly for AI threats, there's a broader push to develop defensive technologies to safeguard critical infrastructures and data. This includes advanced encryption methods, secure communication channels, and intrusion detection systems that use AI to identify and respond to threats.

The global community appears to be waking up to the challenges posed by weaponized AI. Through collaborative efforts, both in diplomacy and technology, the world is gearing up to face this new frontier, striving to strike a balance between leveraging AI's potential and ensuring global safety.

Economic and Political Stakes

The rise of weaponized AI isn't merely a technical or ethical dilemma; it intersects profoundly with the global political and economic landscape, shaping and being shaped by the aspirations and maneuvers of nations and industries.

The AI Arms Race Among Nations: Much like the nuclear arms race of the 20th century, nations today are deeply entrenched in a competition to achieve supremacy in AI capabilities. As the boundaries of AI expand, countries are investing heavily in research and development, seeking an edge in both defensive and offensive AI technologies. This race is not just about military might but also about economic leverage and geopolitical influence.

Economic Implications: The militarization of AI could bring about significant economic shifts. As AI systems take on roles traditionally held by humans in defense sectors, there's potential for job displacement. Moreover, nations that achieve a technological edge in AI could wield considerable power in international trade and negotiations, altering global economic dynamics. On the other hand, countries lagging behind might face economic vulnerabilities, being more susceptible to cyber threats or misinformation campaigns.

Lobbying and Commercial Interests: The defense industry, with its deep pockets and significant political influence, plays a pivotal role in the weaponization of AI. Many defense contractors are investing in AI research, sensing the potential for lucrative contracts in the future. This influx of money is accompanied by intense lobbying efforts, as companies vie to shape policies and secure government deals. The intertwining of commercial interests with national security priorities can sometimes blur the lines, making it challenging to discern purely defensive intentions from profit-driven motives.

The evolution of weaponized AI is not occurring in a vacuum. It's deeply entangled with global politics and economics, raising questions about power, influence, and the very nature of warfare in the modern age. The stakes are high, and the decisions made today will shape the geopolitical landscape for decades to come. All of us should be paying close attention.

Public Perception and Media Influence

In our interconnected digital age, media and popular culture exert a formidable influence on how emerging technologies, including weaponized AI, are perceived by the general public. This perception, in turn, can shape policy decisions, funding allocations, and even the pace of technological advancement.

Portrayal in Popular Culture: Over the decades, movies, books, and television have often portrayed AI and robots as existential threats to humanity. From the relentless terminators of the "Terminator" series to the rogue AI of "Ex Machina" and "Mission Impossible," audiences are frequently introduced to dystopian futures where AI turns against its creators. These fictional portrayals, while entertaining, can instill a sense of unease and caution about real-world AI developments, even if the reality is less sensational.

The Media's Role: Beyond fiction, mainstream media plays a crucial role in framing the narrative around weaponized AI. News outlets, through their choice of language, imagery, and emphasis, can either allay fears or exacerbate concerns. For instance, an emphasis on AI's potential in precision and reducing collateral damage in warfare might paint a positive picture. In contrast, highlighting incidents of AI malfunctions or ethical dilemmas can stir public apprehension.

Shaping Public Opinion and Policy: As public perception sways, so do the decisions of policymakers. Leaders and legislators, keenly aware of their constituencies' sentiments, might advocate for stricter regulations, increased transparency, or even moratoriums on certain AI applications. Moreover, public campaigns or grassroots movements influenced by media narratives can further pressure governments to adopt specific stances on AI weaponization.

The portrayal of weaponized AI in popular culture and media is not just a reflection of societal sentiments but also an influencer. As we navigate the complexities of AI's role in modern warfare, it's crucial to differentiate between fiction and reality and ensure that decisions are based on informed discussions rather than sensationalist narratives.

Future Prospects

The realm of weaponized AI stands at an intriguing crossroads, with advancements promising to reshape global defense dynamics in unprecedented ways. As we look towards the future, it's crucial to anticipate both the opportunities and threats that may emerge, while also acknowledging that the evolving technological landscape can influence the trajectory of AI's militaristic applications.

Predictions for Weaponized AI:

Opportunities: Enhanced precision in targeting could lead to reduced civilian casualties and collateral damage. Automated defense systems might deter adversaries and enhance security without direct human involvement, reducing the risk to soldiers' lives. Furthermore, AI's ability to rapidly analyze vast amounts of data could aid in intelligence operations, ensuring timely interventions.

Threats: Over-reliance on AI in military operations might result in unintended escalations if systems malfunction. Autonomous weapons systems could be misused by rogue states or non-state actors, leading to destabilized global security. Lastly, a swift AI arms race could divert resources from pressing global issues, such as climate change or public health.

Emerging Technologies Influencing the AI Landscape:

Quantum Computing: This could amplify the risks and rewards of AI. Quantum computers, capable of processing vast amounts of information rapidly, can potentially make AI systems more powerful and efficient. However, they could also be exploited to break encryption codes, posing risks to secure AI-operated defense systems.

Neural Interfaces: Direct connections between machines and the human brain might allow for more nuanced control of AI systems, reducing the chances of miscommunication or errors. But they also open up new avenues for cyber threats directly targeting individuals.

Advanced Cybersecurity Protocols: As AI systems become more integrated into defense, the parallel development of robust cybersecurity measures becomes paramount. Future technologies might provide AI systems with self-healing capabilities, where they can detect breaches and repair themselves autonomously, thereby mitigating risks of hacking or malfunction.

The future of weaponized AI teems with possibilities that could redefine warfare and global security. While the opportunities are vast, so are the challenges. Proactive engagement with emerging technologies, balanced by ethical considerations and robust security measures, will be crucial in navigating the uncharted waters ahead.

A Few Concluding Thoughts...

The march of progress, with AI now at its forefront, presents a captivating dance of innovation and, and opportunity for some introspection. While technological advancements like weaponized AI offer prospects that can change the very fabric of warfare and international politics, they also simultaneously unmask ethical quandaries that challenge our understanding of morality, agency, and responsibility.

For policymakers, the advent of weaponized AI is a clarion call to rise above partisan politics and craft robust, forward-looking regulations that safeguard humanity while embracing innovation. Tech developers have an inherent responsibility to embed ethics and core values in all of their work, recognizing that with great power, so too comes great responsibility. None of us should be passive observers to the rapidly evolving landscape. All of us hold the power of collective voice and action. By staying informed and demanding transparency and accountability, we can play a significant role in steering the direction of AI's future.

So, our shared tomorrow hinges on the choices we make today. The juxtaposition of technological prowess and all the ethical imperatives embedded into the decisions to be made along the way requires a united response. Together, we must tread thoughtfully, ensuring that the tools we build serve our common humanity do not inadvertently, subdue or endanger it.

References:

1. Weapons of Math Destruction, by Cathy O'Neil

2. Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, by Max Tegmark

3. Artificial Intelligence and the End of the Human Era: Our Final Invention, by James Barrat

4. Future of Life Institute (Website: https://futureoflife.org/project/lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems)

5. Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, S. Matthew Liao (ed.)

6. Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Nature of Future W, by Paul Scharre

7. The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation, - Report by Brundage, et al.

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John Fenzel

Keynote Speaker : Leading by Example : Overcoming Adversity : Teamwork : Storyteller : Green Beret

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Over the past few months, I've been thinking about the concept of "Revolutions in Military Affairs" (RMA), and whether we're in the midst of one right now? Historically, breakthroughs such as gunpowder, the combustion engine, and nuclear technology have fundamentally reshaped the landscape of warfare. Today, I believe, we're standing on the precipice of another seismic shift: the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into the military domain. My strong belief is that this not only represents a new revolution in military affairs, but also challenges our conventional understanding of strategy, ethics, and the very essence of warfare as we now know it. So, this article is a reflection of that thinking. It takes a look at some of the implications of weaponized AI, and this rapidly evolving RMA--that "deep end" we're now swimming in, whether we realize it or not.  I welcome your feedback and insights. #AI #artificialintelligence #RMA #Revolution #Warfare #cyberdefense #Strategy #Ethics #Values #Military #War #Defense #Predictions #Future #Technology #Weapon #History #Drones #Conflict #Crisis #technology #trends

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David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com